A BRITISH ARMY,

  AS IT WAS,--IS,--AND OUGHT TO BE:

  ILLUSTRATED BY

  EXAMPLES DURING THE PENINSULAR WAR:

  WITH OBSERVATIONS

  UPON

  INDIA--THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA--CANADA--THE
  BOUNDARY LINE--THE NAVY--STEAM WARFARE, &c.

  BY LIEUT.-COLONEL JAMES CAMPBELL,
  LATE BRIGADE-MAJOR 3RD DIVISION,
  AND FORMERLY OF THE 45TH AND 50TH REGIMENTS.

  LONDON:
  T. & W. BOONE, 29, NEW BOND STREET.
  1840.




TO

GENERAL SIR THOMAS M. BRISBANE,

BART., G.C.B., &c. &c. &c.


  Sir,

As a soldier who has seen much service in all parts of the world, and
commanded large bodies of troops in the field, you can decide if my
views are correct or not. As a General of the 3rd division, you must
know whether I have erred (certainly unintentionally) in my statements;
and I also trust you will be able to bear me out when I say, that the
honour and renown of my companions in arms, and the good of the army in
general, are my sole objects in appearing before the public.

I wish to dedicate the fruits of my experience to you, as a trifling
tribute of the gratitude I feel for the friendship and kindness you
have shown me on many occasions.

I can with truth say, my motives in the following work are pure and
disinterested; but my views are not those of the generality of writers
of the day. I know, as well as they do, that British soldiers will
always follow their gallant officers in any attempt, if even requiring
the most supernatural efforts; but I am not, as they almost all seem
to be, blind to the great imperfections of too many of those allowed
to enter our regiments. I can gladly leave them the reputation of
possessing the most undaunted courage of any soldiers in the world, and
the nation the honour and glory their deeds in battle have acquired.
Let both pride themselves, as they have a right to do, upon these; but
for the time to come, we want, and ought to have, the good and true
men of the British Empire brought into the ranks of our armies; and of
whom many--very many--can be found, if called upon, as they should be,
to serve their Sovereign and their country as they might hereafter be
served by a British army, formed, as it ought to be, to suit the times.

  I have the honour to be,

  Sir,

  Your truly devoted humble servant,

  THE AUTHOR.

 _Ravensdale, June 10, 1840._




CONTENTS


   CHAP. I.

                                                                       Page

   What a British Army was, is still, and the commencement of certain
   introductory matter, intended to show in part what it ought to be      1


   CHAP. II.

   Continuation of the subject, and pointing out what is required to
   render the army more suitable to the times                            31


   CHAP. III.

   Continuation of the subject, and showing how essential it is that
   corps for East India service, and for our colonies, should be formed,
   with a view to rendering the regular army perfectly efficient.--Various
   changes recommended and reasons assigned for them
   being necessary.--Some observations                                   60


   CHAP. IV.

   Continuation of the subject, with observations upon various matters
   connected with the efficiency and discipline of the army.--Veterans
   unfit for service in North America.--Remarks upon
   proposed changes in our militia.--Attention called to various
   subjects.--Improvements in system, &c. suggested.--Numbers of
   men taken away upon service from corps as bat-men, &c., its evil
   effects, and a remedy proposed.--Baggage and followers of an
   army in the field, &c.                                                88


   CHAP. V.

   Introductory observations upon the staff of an army.--Remarks upon
   the état-major of the French army.--The staff wanted for a
   British army.--Remarks upon the battle of Talavera.--Staff of an
   army continued.--An efficient and highly respectable police for
   an army in the field recommended.--Some of its duties alluded
   to.--Important remarks upon military police and courts-martial.--Staff
   duties continued.--Medical department and its establishments
   in the field.--The commissariat department in the
   field.--Observations                                                 126


   CHAP. VI.

   Farther observations.--Insufficiency of allowance of practice ammunition
   for corps.--Hints for the maintenance of discipline in
   quarters and in the field.--Attention to the religious and general
   education of regiments strongly urged.--A plan for this purpose
   proposed.--Various necessary observations, &c.--Lord
   Wellington's letter to generals commanding divisions and brigades, with
   remarks.--Useful observations upon the storming of Ciudad
   Rodrigo.--Remarks and general order relating to the 3rd division
   in the retreat from Elbodon to Guinaldo.--Storming of the
   castle of Badajoz.--Conduct of our troops there given to show
   the composition and conduct of a British army in the field           171


   CHAP. VII.

   The escalade of the castle of Badajoz held up as an example to
   future commanders of such enterprises.--The part performed by
   the 3rd division under Sir Edward Pakenham at Salamanca, with
   remarks, &c.--The French generals and état-major before the
   lines of Torres Vedras, &c.--Marshal Soult and his état-major
   before the battle of Toulouse, &c.--The 3rd division at Toulouse,
   &c.--Part performed by the 3rd division at Vittoria, with remarks.--Some
   occurrences at the Nivelle, with useful observations.--A
   few necessary remarks upon the battle of the Pyrenees.
   The 3rd division at Orthes, and shewing its style of fighting
   there, and upon other occasions.--This farther illustrated
   at the Vic Bigore, with other matters                                219


   CHAP. VIII.

   Observations upon the United States of America.--Their present
   position as regards Great Britain, the Canadas, &c.--Attention
   particularly called to that country, with observations upon naval
   and military matters.--Expedition to Plattsburg, with other matters
   of importance; such as the question of the Boundary line,
   &c. and some official documents respecting our North American
   territories.--Instructions of a military nature, respecting Lower
   Canada in 1814, with useful hints and matters of consequence to
   be attended to by Great Britain.--Future combined naval and
   military enterprises, with necessary and useful
  observations.--Concluding general remarks                             264




ON

THE BRITISH ARMY,

_&c. &c._




CHAP. I.


I have imposed upon myself a task which may probably expose me to much
annoyance, or perhaps severe criticism; so much so, that I am almost
deterred from entering upon it, in consequence of feeling that although
I may fancy I understand the subjects I intend to write upon, yet at
the same time I greatly fear I am unequal to do them that justice
which they require; but something I shall neither attempt to describe,
nor analyze, urges me on in what I consider, as an officer of some
experience, I ought to undertake; and let the consequences be what they
may, I have the consolation to think, that my motives, at all events,
are pure and disinterested.

Many well-meaning men, and many mischievous men, have for years past
been exerting themselves, with unwearied assiduity, to have the
corporal punishment of flogging done away with in our army; but no
experienced officer, or person acquainted with the subject, when
he considers its former and present composition, can for an instant
entertain such an idea, unless some other mode of punishment can be
thought of, as a substitute, equally prompt, and which, from its
consequences, would keep the transgressor as short a time from the
performance of his duties as flagellation does.

I do not presume to say, that the conduct of all corps of cavalry,
infantry and artillery, were alike; but such officers as have been much
employed with a British army in the field, must be aware of what he had
to contend with, to prevent irregularities, and above all drunkenness,
and the crimes arising out of its demoralizing effects, into which our
soldiers invariably fell; so much so, that the greater part of them
could never be trusted out of the sight of those who had the charge of
them; and the annoyances and sufferings of the unlucky officers who had
too often to bear the blame for their disorderly conduct, especially
in going to and returning from the several hospital stations, and upon
escort, and other duties, which took them away from their corps in
Portugal, Spain, and other countries, cannot have forgotten what they
had to encounter, and they must fully bear me out when I say, that
it was perfect misery to have any thing to do with them; and nothing
but the certainty of being flogged, if caught by the Provost absent
from their corps, kept many of them in the line of march, or in their
camps afterwards; and as for their conduct at sieges, and upon other
occasions, when they had the power of breaking loose, or from under the
watchful eyes of their officers, the less that is here said by me upon
the subject the better.

This is really a melancholy picture to draw of most of our soldiers;
but I lament to say it is a true one, and I am also reluctantly obliged
to admit, that the almost only redeeming quality which they possessed,
was undaunted courage in battle. But to show that I do not make these
assertions on slight grounds (and I would never have been induced to do
so without an important object in view), I must beg that the words of
his Grace the Duke of Wellington, upon several occasions, may be duly
considered.

In the month of May, 1809, he thus, in general orders, addresses his
army--"The Commander of the Forces is much concerned to be obliged
again to complain of the conduct of the troops; not only have outrages
been committed by whole corps, but there is no description of property
of which the unfortunate inhabitants of Portugal have not been
plundered by the British soldiers, whom they have received into their
houses, or by stragglers from the different regiments of the army. The
Commander of the Forces apprehends that the interior discipline of the
regiments is materially relaxed, &c. &c."

After establishing certain regulations for the maintenance of
discipline, his Grace further observes that, "the object of these
visitings is to see that the soldiers conduct themselves regularly
in their quarters, to ascertain if there are any complaints by their
landlords, and of whom, and that the men are in their quarters,
instead of marauding in search of plunder." And after calling upon
officers of all ranks to perform the duties required of them, he thus
concludes--"The people of Portugal deserve well of the army; they have
in every instance treated the soldiers well; and there never was an
army so well supplied, or which had so little excuse for plunder, if
any excuse can in any case exist. But if the Commander of the Forces
should not by these and other measures be enabled to get the better of
these practices, he is determined to report to His Majesty, and send
into garrison those corps who shall continue them, as he prefers a
small but disciplined and well-conducted body of troops to a rabble,
however numerous; and he is resolved not to be the instrument of
inflicting upon the people of this country the miseries which result
from the operations of such a body. The regulations of these orders are
to be understood as applicable to the dragoons and the artillery as
well as the infantry."

Again, in the month of June, 1812, we read--"The soldiers must not be
allowed to quit their corps to plunder, and Assistant-Provosts attached
to divisions must see that the orders of the army on this subject are
not disobeyed. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to observe, that
the outrages so frequently committed by the soldiers when absent from
their regiments, and the disgraceful scenes which occurred upon the
storming of Badajoz, have had the effect of rendering the people of the
country the enemies, instead of being the friends of the army. It is
the duty of all officers to prevent the soldiers from plundering, and
the Commander of the Forces calls upon them to perform it. He declares
his determination to punish any person who may be found plundering
on any occasion, and to make the soldiers give up any money or other
valuable articles that they may have plundered.

"As these acts of outrage are generally committed by parties of men,
the parties shall be put under stoppages to make good the damage which
they shall do upon any occasion," And His Grace concludes this order by
calling upon the officers, and non-commissioned officers, to assist in
putting a stop to such disgraceful crimes and irregularities.

We again read in the General Orders of the 31st of July, 1812:--

"The Commander of the Forces requests to have returns of the several
men missing from their regiments in the march of the 10th instant.
It is reported to the Commander of the Forces that the enemy have in
their power above a hundred men, British soldiers, taken on that day,
straggling in the rear, and in the flanks of the army. As the army did
not march more than ten or twelve miles on that day, and the country
was perfectly open, the straggling of the soldiers, and their being
prisoners, must be attached to the neglect of the officers of their
regiments. It is quite obvious that if the soldiers cannot be made to
march in their ranks at all times, the army cannot effect a march in
face of an enemy, and it is so far unfit for service, &c. &c."

I do not at present wish to give many extracts from the Duke of
Wellington's orders; but another dated Paris, the 9th of August, 1815,
will be sufficient to prove that the character of British soldiers had
not changed from 1812 up to that period.

No. 4. "The Field Marshal receives constant complaints of the robberies
committed on the road from Neuilly to Paris, and he therefore now
desires that guards may be mounted by the divisions encamped at
Neuilly, and in the Bois de Bologne, so as to have sentries in
communication with each other from Neuilly to the barrier de L'Etoile."

I consider it also necessary to give here two division orders nearly to
the same effect:

  "D.O.      _Madrid, 28th August, 1812._

 "1. The officer commanding the escort of prisoners furnished by the
 3rd division, which rejoined this morning, has reported that the men
 composing that detachment, were extremely irregular while absent, and
 some individuals were disobedient to a great degree.

 "2. The disobedient non-commissioned officers and soldiers are to be
 tried by a Division Court Martial, and the soldiers composing the
 remainder of the detachment are to stand under arms from six o'clock
 every evening till nine at night, for seven successive days, when they
 are to be marched into their quarters, to which they are also to be
 confined for the same period.

 "3. No soldier of this detachment is to be suffered to take his duty
 for seven days, but must make it up afterwards.

 "4. Any man of this detachment who shall fall sick before the
 expiration of punishment, must stand under arms after recovery.

 "5. The British Brigade will ultimately furnish three sergeants to
 superintend this disgrace under the orders of the Provost-martial,
 who will correct, on the spot, any soldier who may commit further
 irregularity.

 "Severity and shame are required to bring soldiers to a sense of duty,
 who forget every principle when detached, and require force to command
 them."

  "D.O.      _Moimenta de Beira, 24th Dec. 1812._

 "1. The detachment of recovered men that left Celorico on the 15th
 instant, were irregular and disobedient.

 "2. So much has been said on the subject of soldiers forgetting their
 duty when detached, that Major-General Pakenham, for the present,
 gives up the idea of bringing the troops to a sense of discipline by
 reason.

 "3. When punishment has made the unprincipled sensible of their
 crimes, and the good soldiers know they will be supported if they will
 take the lead, then reason shall again be referred to.

 "4. The soldiers composing the detachment of Lieutenant Walsh, 5th
 regiment, are to be assembled at the head-quarters of their respective
 brigades, for the purpose of being kept under arms, for ten days, from
 daylight till nightfall.

 "5. The said soldiers are afterwards to be drilled for one month with
 the young soldiers, and they are not to have either spirits or wine
 for the whole period.

 "6. The Provost-martial and assistant will frequently visit this
 punishment and notice any impropriety.

 "7. Officers commanding brigades will report the manner in which the
 detachment joined the several battalions on the 22d instant."

Many more of Lord Wellington's observations upon the conduct of
soldiers might be adduced, but what I have given, and the orders of
Sir Edward Pakenham, are deemed sufficient for the object now in view.
But his Grace throughout the whole of his campaigns threw most of the
blame for such outrages occurring upon the officers, whom he constantly
accused of neglect of duty, or such crimes could not have been
perpetrated. I beg leave, however, to observe, and I am alone induced
to do so in some measure to justify officers in general, that many of
them were both active and zealous in the performance of their duties,
but the men they had to deal with were very incorrigible; and those who
were then subalterns must well remember that the chief responsibility
rested most heavily upon them; for the soldiers were almost never
allowed to leave their camps but under their charge; for it was too
well known, and I regret to say it, that many of the non-commissioned
officers could not be much more trusted than the privates.

As a regimental officer of long experience, not only at home and
abroad, but also in the field; as a staff officer during the greater
part of the Peninsular war; and with the army of occupation in France,
and in other parts of the world, I unhesitatingly declare, that
corporal punishment as now inflicted in the army, cannot be dispensed
with, but at the risk of the total subversion of all discipline: indeed
the hampering commanding officers in this respect, as has been the
fashion of late years; and its being fancied, or pretended, that he
is the best commander of a regiment, who returns the smallest number
of soldiers punished, is, to say the least, very impolitic, and most
injurious to the interests of the army; for crimes which should have
called for punishment, must in consequence have been passed over,
or so inadequately visited upon the offenders, that other men could
not have been deterred from being guilty of similar conduct, and the
effects of this, I fear, must in the end be dangerous; for what we
frequently hear of and read respecting military punishments, in some
of the newspapers, can scarcely, when coupled with an unavoidably
relaxed state of discipline, be expected to have any other tendency.
Solitary confinement, to be at all efficacious in preventing or
punishing crimes in the army, keeps the soldier too long away from his
necessary exercises and duties, and if it takes place in our common
jails, whatever he may have gone into them, he certainly must come out
matured in crime, from being the associate of criminals of the worst
description; for what jail can contain sufficient cells to separate
all who may be sent there. Offenders' lists, common and marching order
drills, confinement to barracks, &c. &c., are all well enough, in
these quiet times, for trifling offences or irregularities at home
or abroad, so long as the soldier knows that he can be brought to
the halberts for any act of insubordination on such occasions; but
in case of war, and should it be necessary for our army to take the
field, this system would never answer. I must beg, however, that it
may not be supposed, that I am by any means an advocate for continuing
corporal punishments, or that I have any intention of extenuating or
justifying what was sometimes practised by officers, under generally, I
feel convinced, a mistaken idea, that they were only doing what their
duty required of them; but my surprise often was, how officers who
composed courts-martial, could by their sentences, always so readily
lend themselves to the views, or perhaps badly regulated feelings of
their commanders: indeed the trials I have witnessed were sometimes
little else than mere matter of form, and they could not well be
otherwise, for I have seen a soldier receive two or three hundred,
or even more lashes, inflicted with great severity, under a sentence
awarded by a drum-head court-martial, after an investigation of a few
minutes duration of the charges brought against him. Such arbitrary
proceedings as these, were generally abuses of power, with which many
men are unfit to be entrusted; and from habit we really thought little
of such matters, and the soldiers themselves were only thereby rendered
the more callous. I declare, however, that I am at a loss to say, which
is preferable--the prompt manner of acting in our navy, where a captain
when he orders the punishment of a man, does so on his own serious
responsibility, or that of a commanding officer of a regiment, who can
generally act as he pleases, whilst all he does is sanctioned by a
court martial.

I could easily bring forward many occurrences which would show in the
strongest light, how much a serious consideration of both our old and
present system in the army, as regards punishments, is required; but so
heartily do I detest flogging, that my thoughts have been long directed
to devise means of getting rid of it; but I always tremble at the
obvious alternative--_capital punishments_--which must be resorted to,
and I should fear, very frequently, as in the French armies, especially
upon service, as a substitute for flogging for the maintenance of
discipline; for an army without it, is, as the Duke of Wellington
observed in one of the orders I have given, a rabble, and must be far
more dangerous to the country to which it belongs, than formidable to
its enemies.

For years past, I have given this subject most serious consideration.
I have weighed all its difficulties, and I can see no way of doing
away with flogging in a British army, so long as it is composed of
the present description of men. But I am inclined to hope, and I must
now beg that all I have to say may be heard with patience--that this
most desirable object may be attained by a completely new organisation
of our regiments, and bringing into their ranks a totally different
description of men, from those who generally offer themselves as
recruits--men with other ideas, and altogether other feelings.

But as I wish to bring the subjects I intend to discuss, candidly
and fairly before the reader, I must beg leave to transcribe what
Sir George Murray lately said at a great public meeting in London,
as taken from "the Times." "The British Army did not consist of the
constrained conscripts of arbitrary power, but of citizens voluntarily
in arms to defend their country, to obey and respect her laws at home,
and to resist and repel, with their utmost energy, every effort of
her foreign foes, &c. &c." Sir George Murray, as the world knows,
and as the British Army in particular knows, is a most able and
accomplished Quarter Master General; but as such he could not have had
much to say to the maintenance of discipline, for that comes under the
Adjutant-General; yet still he will no doubt be looked upon as good
authority in such matters, so much so, that I have been induced thus to
give what may be considered as his opinion, and which the sequel will
still more show to be contrary to mine: indeed, if I were not borne out
by the evidence I have even already adduced, my attempting to do any
thing towards improvement in our army would seem to be unnecessary and
uncalled for.

An intelligent writer observes, that the French campaigns of 1792,
93 and 94 astonished military Europe. At first the French armies
had neither discipline, nor order, and but little instruction. The
regiments were without organization. National intelligence put in
motion by exalted feeling, for the moment did every thing. The
conscription had brought more knowledge into a single French regiment,
than there was to be found in a whole enemy's division. This was
certainly the case, but I am very far from wishing to establish a
conscription in Great Britain like what exists in France; but the
times, we may depend upon it, will compel us, and that too before long,
to think of getting, with greater facility, another description of men
into our armies; if it were only to enable us to meet our enemies in
the field on fair terms; and I would, therefore, at once beg to propose
to overturn entirely the present system of enlistment for regiments
of Dragoons, Artillery, the Line, and the Marines; and in its stead,
a plan could be introduced for calling forth those warlike energies
of the people of Great Britain and Ireland, which they so eminently
possess; but for safety to our liberties, which we ought ever carefully
to cherish, I would still keep the powerful means I have in view, under
the control of Parliament both as to men and money.

Suppose a law were enacted, extending and improving our militia system,
and permanently establishing amongst our millions of people, two
descriptions of soldiers; in place of our present inefficient mode of
calling out that force for service in Great Britain and Ireland only;
and exempting clergymen, all seamen serving, or who may have served
in our navy, or such as have been duly apprenticed to our merchant
service; and certain individuals employed in the Civil departments of
the state, every man, no matter how high or low his rank in life may
be, should be made liable to be called upon to serve his country as a
soldier, but by Act of Parliament only; and for this purpose, all those
at a certain time of life should be required to have, under a heavy
penalty, and according to their means, or at the risk of imprisonment,
or treatment as vagrants, known places of abode, or belong to a parish
or district where they could be found or heard of; for my object is,
that the wealthy, who for their own gratifications might think fit to
reside abroad, may not be able to evade the law.

From the effective part of our male population, between the ages of
seventeen and thirty-five, I would propose to call out once each
year, (or oftener when necessary) by lot or ballot, and according to
registers to be publicly and fairly kept, so that every individual
coming under the act, could be aware that he might expect to be drawn
for, a certain number of healthy men, about a fixed height--say 5 feet
5-1/2 inches--to constitute or keep up the first, or regular army of
Great Britain and Ireland, liable to serve in any part of the world,
for _ten years only_, when, having so served, they must be discharged,
whether at home or abroad, unless their characters are so good, as to
render it desireable that they should be kept longer in the service,
and should it be also their own wish to remain in it. If they are kept,
it ought to be for five years more. At the end of that second period,
they must, if they desire it, be discharged; but they should then, if
their conduct has continued good, be entitled to receive a pension for
life of nine-pence a day, and also to a medal of _superior merit_, and
they ought now to get both, whether they are to be again kept in the
service or not. If it is still desirable that they should remain in
it, and that they are also willing to do so, it must be for another
or third period of five years; at the end of which--that is to say 20
years--if they have maintained the respectability of their characters,
they should receive, on now retiring from the service, an additional
three-pence per diem, making in all the full pension of one shilling a
day for life, together with what should be termed the _grand medal_.
If non-commissioned officers, they of course should get a superior
description of medals and higher rates of pensions, whether corporals,
serjeants, or staff-serjeants. But all discharges--and I consider this
of vast importance--ought to set forth distinctly their characters as
soldiers, whether good, indifferent, or bad, and should invariably be
delivered to them publicly, in presence of, at least, one magistrate
and a clergyman of the city, town, or parish to which they formerly
belonged, when they could not again be called upon to serve as soldiers.

If the character of the men who have served for ten years only, show
that they have been brave, honest and regular during that period, they
should also receive _publicly_ a _medal_ of _merit_, and thus become
entitled, along with those who have served longer, and have received
pensions, to the privileges of _freemen_ in the cities, towns, and
parishes, to which they originally belonged. They should also, together
with other advantages, have a right to vote at all elections of Members
to serve in Parliament, and likewise at the appointment of persons
to the corporate bodies, and should be themselves eligible to fill
situations in or under such bodies, in the cities, towns, or parishes,
to which they belonged. If their conduct as soldiers had been bad
or disreputable, all these advantages should be withheld from them.
Some of them, according to character, ought to be sent off without
remark upon their conduct, but others, if they deserved it, should
have the words "Disgraced Soldier," stamped in large letters, by their
commanding officer's orders, upon their discharges; and thus soldiers
would be deterred from disgracing, not only their regiments, but also
their families, to whom they would know, that when they were to be
discharged, they would always, and under all circumstances, be sent
back.

It being most desirable towards attaining the object I have in view,
that no soldier should be permitted to remain in the army, whose habits
would bring disgrace upon the corps to which he might be attached;
when it was therefore found, that a soldier had committed a serious
crime, or that his conduct had become bad or disgraceful, he should
either be handed over to the civil power, or brought to trial before
a Court-martial, which should have the power, besides transporting
him as a felon, or making him serve as a soldier for life in any part
of the world, to sentence him to be turned out of the regiment, with
every mark of infamy, and to be sent back, under escort, to the place
from whence he came, to be there discharged, in the manner already
pointed out, and also imprisoned, if thought necessary for the sake of
example, in the common jail, for any period not exceeding two years.
If this system is ever established, merit will be distinguished and
rewarded, and bad conduct publicly stigmatized or punished.

As the regular army should at all times be complete in numbers, and
efficient in every respect; when vacancies occurred in corps, they
should be supplied yearly, from the city, town, or rather district,
from which the several regiments would be kept up. Great Britain
and Ireland would, therefore, if this plan is carried into effect,
have to be divided into districts; but for this purpose, counties
and cities would nearly answer, and each district being required to
furnish men for a particular regiment of cavalry (and this should be
an agricultural one), or of artillery, infantry of the line, or of
marines; the cavalry or infantry regiments should take the name of that
district, as well as retain its own particular number, together with
such designations, badges, or honorary distinctions, to which it may be
at present entitled.

The second army, to be officered as our present militia, and to be
embodied upon the same system, and managed and disciplined as the
first, and styled either Militia, or the Army of Reserve, could be
called out to serve in Great Britain or Ireland only, when the country,
either from being at war, or in case of commotions, might require its
services; or should it be deemed necessary, that this force be embodied
for a fixed time.

The men for the Reserve might be taken at a lower height, and from
the age of sixteen to forty-five; but serving in the Reserve should
not exempt individuals from taking their turn if drawn in the mean
time for the First or Regular Army. When the Reserve, or a part of it
is embodied, a few officers and non-commissioned officers (receiving
additional pay when so employed), should be taken for a short time
from the Regular Regiments, to assist in the formation and drilling of
the corps; but any permanent staff for this purpose must be found not
only useless, but expensive. A Quarter-master alone could be required
to take charge of stores of any kind belonging to the battalion when
embodied.

Any man, who by ballot, becomes liable to serve in the First or Regular
Army, must do so, or find within a given time, and at his own expense,
a proper substitute of good character, or else pay down the sum of, say
fifty pounds, for exemption: and finding a substitute or paying the
stipulated sum, ought to exempt the person for the future from serving;
but any individual who may have joined the corps for which he has been
drawn, ought not afterwards to be discharged, but by the authority of
the Commander-in-Chief.

Finding a proper substitute of good character, or paying down
say--twenty pounds, under the same rules as those established for the
regular army, should entitle individuals to exemption from serving in
the army of reserve. And it might fully be expected, that the reserve
regiments, under officers so patriotic and zealous as those of our
militia always were, would soon become like battalions of the line,
and so highly disciplined as quite to equal them, as was the case
with many of our militia corps last war. I am, therefore, decidedly
of opinion, that it would never again be necessary to add second
battalions to regiments of the regular army, nor to raise at great
expense fencible corps. The plan of second battalions was in general
found to be even as objectionable as our present inefficient depot
system, for it too often afforded only very inferior supplies to first
battalions, of half disciplined soldiers.

To commence this system of the ballot for the regular army (which,
by allowing the finding of substitutes, or the paying a sum of money
for exemption from serving, completely removes the idea of arbitrary
conscription,) I beg further to suggest, that commanding officers,
under the superintendence of generals selected for the purpose, should
have the power of rejecting, and recommending to be discharged from
their corps, all men whom, from character, health, or other causes,
they may consider objectionable; and the remainder should be allowed to
come under the new regulations, as to the period of ten years service,
dating from the time of their enlistment; and this being carefully and
judiciously arranged, upon the responsibility of commanding officers
and regimental surgeons, the numbers required for corps of cavalry,
infantry, artillery, or marines, to complete them to their respective
establishments, should be called out at once by ballot, and thus the
immense expense of bounties might be saved, and a sum for a complete
equipment for each soldier of the regular army would only hereafter be
required from the country.

This new and more constitutional mode of recruiting the army, would
bring into its ranks, and in a manner so little objectionable, such
a different description of men, and would so vastly increase the
respectability of the service, and give such a high tone of national,
and also local interest and feeling to our regiments (for they ought
ever after to be kept up by men from the same districts), that the idea
of subjecting such soldiers, who could no longer be considered as mere
mercenaries, to the corporal punishment of flogging, should, I trust,
be abandoned. It may, however, be said, that corporal punishment was
found to be necessary to keep up discipline formerly in our militia;
and it might be asked, were not the men then called out, and as I now
propose, of much the same description as those who composed the militia
regiments? I answer--that men who could conduct themselves so as to
deserve flogging--which was too much the fashion in those days, ought
to have been turned out of the regiments, or got rid of as I have
already pointed out.

It may be supposed, that some of the soldiers after having conducted
themselves well for ten years, might not think fit to take advantage
of the opportunity which would be offered them, of remaining in the
service, so as to obtain pensions at future periods; but having
accepted of their discharges, had returned to their homes, where,
finding out that military habits had become more powerful with them
than they supposed, they might again wish to return to the service.
Now, although these men would have got beyond the age at which
substitutes might be taken, yet they should be allowed to become such,
provided they offered themselves within one year from the date of their
discharges, and having served reputably for ten years more, I would
propose so far to give them credit for their former ten years service,
as to allow them, on being discharged, pensions of nine-pence a day,
but no more, for not having availed themselves of the opportunity of
remaining in the army, when they might have done so, other men had to
be called out and equipped at the expense of the country, to replace
them in their regiments; and it would also be presumed, that they had
been paid for becoming substitutes. It might be expected that such
men, after ten years service only, would make excellent policemen, or
non-commissioned officers for the Reserve when called out.

If it were necessary to advocate in the strongest possible manner, the
advantages of corps possessing national, or rather local feelings, I
would have nothing to do but to instance some of the Scotch regiments,
which were raised and kept up from particular parts of that country,
whose conduct in all situations, and under all circumstances, was so
praise-worthy. These corps, whilst they were proverbial for their
gallantry in the field, were known to have been for long periods
without a single instance of corporal punishment.

An army composed, as that I have in view, ought not to be officered
by men who can get forward, as at present, by purchasing over the
heads, too often, of much better soldiers than themselves, in point
of gallantry, military science, and experience. And how strangely
also, and inconsistently, are honours conferred upon officers in our
army--not for alone distinguishing themselves in action, but because
they happened to hold a rank sufficiently high to entitle them to a
certain command, or to be the head of a department, and to which the
greater part of them had attained, perhaps, by money, well backed by
interest; for an officer may have been in every action of importance,
from the beginning of the present century up to Waterloo; may have
frequently distinguished himself, and may have been even promoted to
the rank of Major, and Lieutenant-Colonel, for services in the field,
and yet not be entitled to either a clasp or medal, because he did not
happen to hold that which would bring him within a fixed regulation
on this head. I do not, however, pretend to say, that many of those
who commanded corps or detached bodies, and who had arrived at that
honour by means of money, were not excellent and gallant officers,
but others, over whose heads they, perhaps, had got, could have been
pointed out, whom, from not possessing that mainspring, money, or from
want of opportunity of applying it, had been obliged to submit to
the, perhaps, annoying questions of a genteel, though not rich, and
consequently uninfluential family--such as--pray, Colonel, how comes
it, that you have neither a clasp nor a medal, nor any thing else to
show, although we know that you were present in so many battles, and
at so many sieges; when there was at the Mayor's feast the other day
(and yet we never heard much of him) General Sir Richard Sam, the son
of old Dickey Sam, who, years ago, did his best to bring in ---- for
----, who was quite covered with clasps, medals, and ribbons, and he
is also a Knight Commander of the Bath into the bargain. Well might it
have puzzled the Emperor Napoleon to conceive how a British army could
have been kept efficient, and in the state it was, in which high minded
gentlemen were subjected to so galling and absurd a system of obtaining
rank and honours; especially when it was also seen, that through the
effects of our strange brevet system, a Captain of a Company, from
being, perhaps, a senior Lieut.-Colonel in the Army, could in garrison,
or when acting with a mixed body of troops in the field, take the
command of the whole, and likewise of the Lieut.-Colonel of his own
regiment,--and I have known instances of this kind--but probably
the very next day, when the corps came to act separately, or when a
senior officer took the command of the troops, the Lieut.-Colonel of
the corps, or its major, or any of its captains, who happened to have
seniority in the regiment to the Brevet Lieut.-Colonel, could drill
him in the ranks to their heart's content, and thus teach the teacher
of the previous day respect for his--very likely--superior in wealth.
All this is, however, very ridiculous, and shews our brevet system to
be bad, and that it should, as well as the present mode of purchasing
promotion, be abandoned.

The matter could be easily settled, and the mischief obviated for the
future, by the country refunding to those who purchased promotion, if
they think fit to retire from the army, the regulated sums they are
supposed to have paid; and, under other heads, I hope to be able to
show, should any avail themselves of this offer, how savings can be
effected to meet this or any other outlay I may venture to propose;
for it is too well known to be denied, that many an officer, who
bought promotion in former times in this undeniably injurious manner
to the service, pledged his word of honour, that he would not give
more than the regulated price, whereas he had, perhaps, at the moment
agreed privately to pay double for the step; and what must be thought
of a system, when even those in power had not probably the necessary
information to enable them to check such evasion, and almost open
defiance of orders.

The Sovereign alone, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief,
should have the power of rewarding and honouring conspicuous gallantry,
and high merit, by marks of distinction, or by promotion out of the
regular routine of seniority; but this prerogative, I think it will
be allowed, ought, especially as regards promotion, to be very rarely
exercised; and putting an end to such a disheartening and disgusting
a practice, as that of officers being able to get forward by money or
interest alone, would wonderfully improve our regiments of the line,
and infinitely more those of our cavalry.

I have just had my attention called to some of the points which appear
to have been brought under the consideration of the Naval and Military
Commission, from whom so much was looked for. I confess that I am
greatly disappointed; for they seem to me to have only tried how they
could best repair an old defective system, in place of proposing, as
might have been expected from so many experienced officers, something
new, and more suitable to the times, and the wants of the country;
but this, I conclude, has been occasioned by the manner in which the
several points were submitted for their consideration; and I am not,
therefore, deterred from proceeding in the task I have assigned myself,
and must remark, in continuing my subject, that if what I propose
is adopted, we might probably hear of promotion being expected to
be too slow; but what I have still to beg attention to, may greatly
obviate any such objections; yet, when officers saw that justice was
done impartially, it would make them patient and contented, even if
promotion were slow; but let me ask, where were such officers to be met
with in any army, as our highly educated and enlightened officers of
Engineers and Artillery, though for many years situated with respect to
promotion, as I wish all our officers nearly to be in future.

Granting the brevet rank of field officer to regimental captains is
of little advantage to them individually, and has often been found
injurious to the service; and would be still more so under the proposed
system; and it ought in consequence, to be (as I have before suggested)
abandoned, or at all events as seldom conferred as possible. In order
that regimental field rank may be sooner attained, I would venture to
recommend, that no lieut.-colonel should be obliged to remain in the
almost always unpleasant and most responsible command of a regiment,
longer than a fixed number of years; when having so served, he should,
as a matter of course, become a major-general on the _effective
list_--that is, he ought to receive a fixed pay, though not employed.
Or perhaps it might be preferable, when a lieut.-colonel had commanded
for the required number of years, if he thought proper to retire
altogether from active service, with the rank however of major-general,
to allow him a superior retirement from the country to what may be
the pay of major-generals on the effective list; and this being added
to what he would receive from a military fund, which I intend yet to
propose, would induce many to avail themselves of the opportunity,
especially if they had little hope of being actively employed, or no
chance of getting a regiment. This would remove any apprehension from
being entertained of our generals on the effective list becoming too
numerous.

I am aware it may be said, that this plan is defective; for there
is no arrangement made, so as to remove one of the great objections
to our present mode of promotion, with regard to officers of
engineers, artillery, and marines; but I take a very simple view of
this matter; for I would merely look to a list of officers of the
regular army of all ranks, and to the dates of their commissions;
and when a cornet or ensign of any regiment became by the regular
routine of promotion a lieutenant, I would, as a matter of course,
make any officer of engineers, artillery, or marines of the same
standing, a lieutenant also, yet without giving him the additional
pay till a vacancy occurred in his own corps; and I would do the
same through the different gradations of ranks, until the officers
of engineers or artillery had become lieut.-colonels. I would then
style them, and cause them to act as chiefs of engineers or artillery,
and which rank they should hold for the same number of years as
lieut.-colonels commanding regiments, when, like them, they should
become major-generals; and enabling them also to take advantage of the
retirement from the country, and of the system to be proposed for the
military fund, these accomplished officers, if they thought fit to
remain upon the effective list, could become available for staff or any
other appointments the same as other generals, and at the same period
of life. Out of the effective list of major-generals, lieut.-generals,
or generals, the Commander-in-chief, as at present, could select those
whom it might be deemed advisable to employ upon the staff of the
army, or for any particular object, and as it is to be presumed that
their services might be constantly required, especially in our foreign
possessions, few of them would be found an unnecessary burden upon the
country.

Many objections might be started as to our present plan of unattached
promotion; and if what I propose is adopted, these would be greatly
increased. Staff officers alone should be allowed to hold unattached
rank, and their promotion should progress in the same manner as I have
suggested for the engineers and artillery. But if unattached promotion
is to continue, it should be very rarely resorted to, and never but
as a reward for very distinguished services; and if such officers
must be brought into regiments, their being so would be infinitely
less objectionable and annoying, than if they had got over the heads
of their brother officers by money alone. My alarm on this head is on
account of the interest or patronage which might be exerted. But I do
not see how unattached officers can, with any degree of justice, be
brought into regiments, unless it were done when vacancies occurred by
deaths, or when officers were dismissed the service by the sentences of
courts martial; and in the former case not allowing such steps to go in
the corps, in which they took place, would be considered very unfair
dealing. It might probably be said, let the unattached officers who
have to be brought in, pay to retiring officers the whole sums usually
given on such occasions--as will be pointed out when the plan for the
military fund comes to be considered--but I must object to this, as it
would be restoring the system of purchase, even in a worse and more
objectionable form than it assumes at present.

A very essential duty should be performed by major-generals, for
whose travelling and other expenses on such occasions a suitable
allowance ought to be made; viz. that of superintending the ballot
of the men for the regiments in the several districts. Assisted by
at least two magistrates or civil authorities of the district, who
could be supposed most able to afford information respecting the
people, these major-generals ought to see the process of balloting
carried on in their presence, and thus all bribery, or any kind of
unfairness could be guarded against. They should also be required
to see and approve of such men as were produced as substitutes. One
major-general could superintend the ballot in a number of districts,
but he should not be sent for two years following to the same places;
so that the people might be satisfied that any kind of collusion was
impossible; especially as our medical staff (also never going for two
successive years to the same district) stand too high in rank and
public estimation, to admit of its being for a moment supposed, that
they could be induced by any means to pronounce a man fit or unfit
for service, unless he really were so; and as for a man's height or
appearance, the general could not be easily deceived in these respects.

The present expensive recruiting establishments throughout the United
Kingdom might be greatly reduced, as in future they could only be
required for certain colonial corps, which I shall have to speak of
hereafter.

The cruelty of this system of ballot, although rendered almost as
mild as that at present in force for the militia, would no doubt be
much talked of by pretenders to philanthropy; and the people might be
made to suppose, that it was intended to introduce as many horrors
into it, as attend a Russian conscription; but the cases would be
widely different. In Russia public opinion is of no weight, and is
openly set at defiance. In Great Britain it is all powerful, and
must be respected. I will not even talk of a French conscription, in
which the youth of France gloried in the days of Napoleon. It may
probably be asked, would you take away a father, and leave a large and
perhaps helpless family to starve or become a burden upon the parish;
or would you take away the only son of a widow, or her only one fit
for agricultural purposes? I answer--that I intend to do no such
thing--but let these philanthropists, and the parish or district, and
especially the wealthy part of it, make timely arrangements to find
substitutes for such fathers or sons, if they have not the means to
do so themselves; and thus such contingencies could be easily met, by
what would only be a charitable duty, which one man owes to another, if
he presumes to say that his heart is influenced by correct christian
feeling.




CHAP. II


Young gentlemen not under the age of sixteen, and not above nineteen,
who may have prepared themselves for the army, by studying at any
military college, academy, or other institution, should be selected for
appointments to engineers, &c., but they ought always to be subjected
to a previous examination, in order that it may be ascertained that
they have been properly educated. Non-commissioned officers, who may
bear high characters in their regiments, ought also to be occasionally
appointed to ensigncies, provided they have been so well educated as
to pass an examination, but not otherwise, however meritorious their
conduct may have been. But I am decidedly of opinion, and many will
agree with me, that no captain should ever be promoted to the rank of
Field Officer, who could not pass a much stricter examination before
a board which should be established for this purpose, and also for
examining candidates for first appointments to cavalry, infantry,
engineers, and artillery; and this would obviate the necessity of
having expensive institutions for public military education.

One of the best educated officers I ever met with, had never been at
any military school. He had been taught enough of his own language,
in which so many are deficient, and Latin; but the study of the
latter had not been allowed to occupy too much of that period of life,
when boys can be best instructed in what is much more useful. At a
respectable school, he had made considerable progress in the higher
branches of arithmetic, also in Algebra, Geometry, History, Drawing,
&c., and had acquired a perfect knowledge of what is so essential to
an officer, viz. Geography, in all its various bearings; such as the
dimensions, boundaries, aspect, climate, soil, mineral, and other
productions, resources, commerce, &c. of countries; together with the
genius, or bent of mind of their inhabitants; their education, habits,
government, the reputations of their armies and navies, productive
industry, internal communications, such as canals and roads, &c.;
information upon all which points being what ought to be looked upon
as constituting a considerable part of a military education. Under
the able head of the school alluded to, who was aware of his wish
to become an accomplished soldier, he went through fortification,
chiefly according to Vauban's system; and he even acquired a slight
knowledge, but sufficient for an infantry officer, of the theory of
gunnery. Whilst thus occupied, and which was not uncommon in those
days, he became an Ensign, and then a Lieutenant in a regiment of the
line by purchase. He was also at this time able to avail himself of
the advantages to be derived from the assistance of a scientific and
practical French officer, who, on account of his loyalty, had been
obliged to emigrate, after having served in the army of the Prince of
Condé. By him he was advanced in the knowledge of the French language,
and likewise made to understand, and how to apply usefully, what he
had been previously taught. The military features of a country were
pointed out to him; and wherein the strength or weakness of positions
consisted; and other matters such as the effects of concentration and
extension of force, &c.; and which should be understood by officers who
have any pretensions to being considered scientific.

I hope the reader will excuse me for having been so minute in giving
the history, trifling as it may appear, of this officer's instruction;
but it has been done solely with the view of showing, in some measure,
what I mean by a military education, and also what those should have
undergone, who aspire to become field officers in the British army.
In young gentlemen desirous of entering the army, I would in their
previous examination expect to find, at least, the germs of such
accomplishments; but the officer I allude to had mastered, without ever
entering a military school, nearly the whole I have mentioned before
the age of seventeen; and he had thus acquired habits of study, which
were not only agreeable, but useful to him afterwards through life.

I beg here to remark, that it has always greatly surprised me, why
it should be deemed indispensable, that a young gentleman must have
a first rate education, in order to his being admitted into the
artillery; whilst any one is allowed into our cavalry and infantry,
without it being ascertained whether he can either read or write.
Surely the latter may be supposed to want even a better education than
the former, if it is expected that he should be able to manœuvre, or
direct the movements of troops correctly, either upon a confined or
large scale; or to act properly, or as a scientific officer in the
field, as he may often have to construct field works, and perform other
military operations, when well educated engineers are not at hand.

The examinations of captains might be allowed to take place at any
period after they have attained that rank, but should they fail to pass
after two attempts, they ought not to be allowed to present themselves
again before the board, for this purpose. This last examination I
consider as most important, for from amongst these officers must be
taken our future commanders of regiments, who may reasonably look
forward to become our generals, to be afterwards intrusted with
important commands, and even with the civil government of portions
of our foreign possessions; for which their high tone of honourable
military feeling, and strict habits of discipline, as well as respect
for civil authority, must render them so superiorly calculated, as to
leave no comparison between them and civilians in general for such
appointments; but if most of the allowances, and emoluments formerly
attached to these governments, are not restored, and which were in
general not more than sufficient to enable those who held them, to
support with becoming dignity their stations as representatives of
majesty, it would be perhaps as wise to yield to the fancies of a few
turbulent and disloyal men, whose understandings seem to be obscured by
wild speculations upon colonial affairs; and to allow them to rule in
their own way, or as advised or instigated by that indefatigable organ
of economy, our distant but valuable possessions--doubly valuable to
Great Britain, for in the ships employed in our colonial trade, many
of our seamen receive those early lessons which afterwards fit them,
according to the present system, for our navy.

I would have been better pleased were it in my power now to proceed
to other subjects, rather than have to touch upon what is really
unpleasant to me; for I know that I am about to tread on very ticklish
ground, and to offend the aristocratical notions of many; and I am also
aware, it is very likely, that I shall in consequence be set down as a
mere plebeian, or even accused of being wanting in that loyalty, which,
as a British soldier, I should possess; but still I feel that I ought
to go on steadily, in order, if possible, to accomplish what I have in
view, that is to say--in endeavouring to do all I can so as to have our
army the finest in the world, for which we possess ample materials,
and as an essential step towards this, I must venture to propose to
make certain changes in our regiments of guards; and I do not see how
I can avoid recommending that they should, in a great measure, be
converted into battalions of regular cavalry and infantry, so as to
be supplied, in future, with recruits from (selected) districts, the
same as other corps; for without this, they could only be composed of
an inferior description of men: yet in point of rank they should,
of course, be placed at the head of the list of British regiments,
for their gallantry, on all occasions, well entitles them to this
distinction; but the privileges and the advantages of their officers,
in, I must say, improperly obtaining rank, can no longer, it appears to
me, be tolerated by those noblemen and gentlemen, who, I trust, would,
under the proposed system, officer our regular army. It can be of no
consequence to the country, that a few of our young nobility, and the
sons of wealthy men, who wish to go into exclusive corps, for a short
time only, were prevented from getting too rapidly forward in rank,
through the means of money and interest, to the discouragement of real
soldiers. I must, however, in fairness, bring before the reader what a
good soldier, Lieut.-General Sir Charles Dalbiac, says upon the subject.


"TO MAJOR-GENERAL THE RIGHT HON. SIR HENRY HARDINGE, K.C.B.

"My dear Sir Henry,--The army estimates for the ensuing year being
now under the consideration of the House of Commons, I am induced to
trouble you with a few remarks upon a point to which I have always
attached considerable importance.

"It has been much the practice in previous years, when in committee
of supply upon army estimates, for certain Hon. members of the House
of Commons to raise objections against the establishment of our
household troops; and in the session of 1836 the hon. baronet the
member for East Cornwall moved as an amendment to the vote proposed
by the Secretary at War (for a sum of money to be granted to His
Majesty to defray the expenses of His Majesty's land forces), "that
the Foot Guards be placed on the same footing as the infantry of the
line." I feel quite assured that Hon. members could never entertain a
proposition of this nature were they thoroughly acquainted with the
difficulties and the consequences that would attend the conversion of
the household regiments into regiments of the line; and an anxiety to
aid your endeavours to disabuse Hon. members in this matter, should
fresh occasion need, and thereby set the question at rest, must be the
apology for my present letter.

"I may premise, not indeed, for your information, but for that of
others, that the brigade of household cavalry consists of the two
regiments of Life Guards and the royal regiment of Horse Guards (Blue).
The brigade of household infantry consists of three battalions of the
Grenadier Guards, two battalions of the Coldstream, and two battalions
of the Scots Fusileer Guards, in all seven battalions.

"The grounds of objection taken against these corps have been,--

"1. That the maintenance of household troops creates an additional and
unnecessary charge against the public.

"2. That the household troops are exempted from the ordinary tour of
colonial service.

"3. That the officers of the household troops enjoy privileges in
respect to rank which are not enjoyed by the officers in regiments of
the line; and that such exemption from the ordinary tour of colonial
service, and such enjoyment of privileges in respect to rank, engender
invidious feelings between the officers of the different services.

"First, as to the plea that the maintenance of the household corps
entail an additional and an unnecessary charge upon the public.

"It will be found by reference to the army estimates for the military
year now expiring, that the charge for the three regiments of household
cavalry is stated at the sum of 85,757_l._, and a little calculation
will show that the charge for corresponding numbers of cavalry of
the line amounts to about 62,757_l._ the difference being 23,000_l._
It will also be found that the charge for the brigade of Foot Guards
amounts to 192,104_l._, and a little calculation will show that the
charge for corresponding numbers of infantry of the line amounts to
about 159,854_l._, the difference being 33,250_l._ It would thus
appear, upon a first superficial glance of the army estimates for the
current military year, that by converting (or changing) the household
regiments into regiments of the line, a saving would accrue to the
public of about 56,250_l._ per annum.

"It becomes very essential, however, to inquire by what process such
proposed conversion could be carried into effect: and here I would
again advert to the amendment moved by the Hon. baronet the member for
East Cornwall in 1836, "That the Foot Guards be placed on the same
footing as the infantry of the line," the particular wording of which
amendment implies a supposition that the House of Commons or the
Sovereign possessed the power of converting the household troops, as
at present constituted, into troops of the line. But I humbly presume
that any such conceived power would be subject to question; because it
is quite unnatural to imagine that either the Sovereign or the House
of Commons could ever commit a breach of faith with any portion of Her
Majesty's forces.

"It is well known that the commissioned officers, the non-commissioned
officers, and soldiers of the household troops have, one and all,
engaged or enlisted to serve Her Majesty in those particular corps,
and in those particular corps only. And in consideration of the very
privileges which are peculiar to the household corps have the officers
thereof been induced to submit to extraordinary sacrifices in the
purchase of their respective commissions, the regulated price of a
lieutenant-colonelcy in the Foot Guards being double, the price of
every minor commission more than double the price of corresponding
commissions in battalions of the line. The supposition therefore that
the existing establishments of the household troops can ever "be placed
on the same footing as the troops of the line" is entirely out of
the question; when they are no longer to be maintained as at present
constituted, they must be disbanded altogether.

"Let us, then, commence with the commissioned officers. The contract
under which the officers of the household corps engaged to serve
Her Majesty having been annulled, the officers will be entitled, in
common fairness, to be placed in the same pecuniary situation in
which they stood prior to their having entered Her Majesty's service.
They will accordingly require to receive back the regulated value of
their respective commissions. Now, according to the scale of prices
fixed by His Majesty's regulations of the 8th of April, 1824, the
value of the commissions of the officers in the household brigade of
cavalry, taken collectively (exclusive of the three colonels, who are
general officers), amounts to the sum of 201,285_l._, and the value
of the commissions of the officers in the brigade of Foot Guards,
taken collectively, amounts to the sum of 610,600_l._, which two
sums, being added together, form a total of 811,885_l._ But, as an
appropriation in aid of the said sum to be provided, there will be the
value of the commissions in the new levy of regiments of the line,
which will be raised to replace the household corps. The regulated
value of the commissions in three regiments of cavalry of the line
amounts to 126,840_l._, and the regulated value of the commissions
in six regiments of infantry of the line (which number of regiments
will exceed the establishment of the brigade of Foot Guards) amounts
to 242,400_l._; and these two sums being added together form a total
of 369,240_l._, which total being deducted from the previous total of
811,885_l._, leaves a balance against the public of 442,645_l._ as the
difference between the value of commissions to be paid for and the
value of commissions to be sold.

"There will then require to be raised a new levy of 6,279 men to
replace the non-commissioned officers and men of the household corps
who are to be discharged; the bounty money for which new levy, with
expenses prior to joining (officially stated at 5_l._ 2_s._ 6_d._
per man), will amount to 31,475_l._; and this sum being added to the
previous balance of 442,645_l._ will swell the amount to be provided by
the public to 474,120_l._ for raising regiments of the line to serve as
substitutes for our present household troops.

"Next with respect to contingencies. The charge on account of army
contingencies is stated in the estimates at 101,148_l._, of which sum
the proportion of 65,000_l._ appears applicable to the troops stationed
in the United Kingdom, their amount being about 37,500 effectives. But
the said contingencies are not applicable to the household troops when
employed on the London duties, except to a fractional amount; and the
ordinary average of the household troops so employed may be taken at
5,000 men. This brings the expenditure on account of contingencies to
about 2,000_l._ per annum for every 1,000 men. If, then, the military
duties of the metropolis are to be performed by regiments of the line
in lieu of the household troops, there will be an increase of charge on
account of contingencies to the amount of 10,000_l._ per annum.

"One item of extra charge for the household troops comes under the head
of clothing (and accoutrements), which exceeds the charge under the
same head for corresponding numbers of the line by nearly 11,000_l._
But it may be asked whether the clothing or the equipment of the
household troops surpasses in respectability or in splendour what
is due to the seat of Royalty and the seat of Government, or what is
consistent with the pageantry which should belong to the Sovereign
of these kingdoms, or what the nation would desire to behold upon
occasions of state or of Royal parade? If not, the same allowances
with respect to clothing must be granted to the troops of the line
when employed on the London duties as are now granted to the household
regiments.

"Another item of extra charge for the household troops is on account of
pay. The pay of the privates in the battalions of Foot Guards is 1d.
a-day more than in battalions of the line, and there is a considerable
increase of pay in the household cavalry above the pay of the cavalry
of the line; but a great portion of that increase is in consideration
of the additional cost and the additional wear and tear of those
articles of cavalry equipment which the non-commissioned officers and
men of the household cavalry are required to provide out of their own
pockets. And here again, if the troops of the line are to be brought
up for the duties of the metropolis, where every article of life is
dearer than in the provinces, and if the non-commissioned officers
and men are to be subject to greater disbursements on account of the
additional wear and tear of more costly appointments, it will not be
accounted unreasonable if, when they shall be expected to maintain the
same appearances as those which are now maintained by the household
troops, they should also expect to receive the same consideration with
respect to pay which had been enjoyed by their predecessors.--Under
the circumstances above stated, especially the circumstance of an
original outlay of nearly half a million sterling, together with the
interest to be paid thereupon, it may reasonably be questioned whether
any advantage could accrue to the public, even on the score of expense,
by substituting troops of the line for the performance of the London
duties in lieu of the household regiments. In every other respect but
that of expense, the transmutation would be productive of incalculable
detriment to the public service.

"I proceed to the second objection raised against the maintenance of
the household troops--namely, 'that the household troops are exempted
from the ordinary tour of colonial service.' It will presently be shown
that exemption from a portion of colonial service must, of necessity,
take place in favour of any body of troops (whether household or of
the line) which shall be appointed to the London duties, provided
the said duties shall continue to be carried on, as heretofore, with
perfect efficiency and with perfect safety to the public service. Upon
all other occasions (save in a portion of the colonies) the battalions
of the Foot Guards have taken their full share of foreign service
with the regiments of the line. The proud memorials which are borne
upon the colours of those distinguished battalions afford abundant
testimony of their achievements in the field throughout the late war,
from the memorable plains of Lincelles, under their late revered
Colonel-in-Chief, the Duke of York, to the post of Hougumont, where,
to use the words of the Duke of Wellington, the battalions of Guards
'set an example which was followed by the whole British army,' in that
eventful struggle when it belonged to a comparative handful of English,
Scotch, and Irish soldiers to restore the balance of trembling Europe!
Nor have the Guards been spared since the peace upon occasions where
prospects were held out for service in the field. In the year 1826,
when an expedition was suddenly despatched for Portugal, a brigade of
Guards was placed on ship board in less than 48 hours. In 1838, when
it became expedient to augment our forces in North America, the first
troops that embarked were a brigade of Guards.--Nor was it amongst
the least of the advantages to be drawn from the establishment of our
household troops, as at present maintained, that the battalions of
the Foot Guards are held at all times in a state of the most perfect
efficiency, and available at any moment for service in the field,
whilst it will often occur that scarcely a single battalion can be
drawn from amongst the regiments of the line, serving at home, in a
state perfectly efficient for field service abroad. Nor can this be
wondered at when it is considered that the battalions of the line which
are stationed in the United Kingdom consist only of those which have
recently returned home from the East or West Indies, or other of our
colonies, in order to recruit, to refit, and reorganize, and at the
end of four years to be despatched again to some foreign station. But
if the household troops are exempt from taking their turn of duty in
certain of the colonies, there are other duties which press far more
severely upon the brigade of Foot Guards than upon any other portion
of the British army. Let a course of 25 years' service be taken, and
let a comparison be made between the number of night duties performed,
the number of nights when the soldier has been kept out of bed, in a
battalion of Foot Guards, and the number of similar duties performed in
any battalion of the line, and the balance will be as three or four to
one against the Guards.--Hence is it that the casualties produced by
consumption and other pulmonary diseases are exceedingly more numerous
amongst the battalions of the Foot Guards than amongst any other
battalions in her Majesty's service.

"I come now to the third objection that has been raised against the
household troops--namely, 'that the officers of the household corps
(especially of the Foot Guards) enjoy privileges with respect to rank
which are not enjoyed by the officers of regiments of the line.'
No doubt the privileges with respect to rank which are enjoyed by
officers of the household corps are high privileges. But the question
is, whether the Sovereign of these kingdoms shall be despoiled of the
prerogative which has been so long exercised by the Sovereign, of
maintaining near the Royal person a select body of household troops,
and of conferring upon the officers of such select body some especial
mark of Royal favour? I deny that the privileges accorded to the
officers of the Guards, with respect to rank, have engendered invidious
feelings amongst the officers of the army at large. Individuals, no
doubt, will be found in every service to complain of wrongs and of
grievances. But the said privileges have not been of _ex post facto_
creation. They have been productive of no breach of contract or of
faith with the officers of other corps. Every officer now serving in
the line accepted his commission subject to the disadvantages which
might arise from the privileges accorded to the officers of the
household troops with respect to brevet rank and brevet promotion.

"The most important question of all remains to be considered--a
question which, I am persuaded, can never have presented itself to
those Hon. members of the House of Commons who would advocate the
disbandment of our household corps. By what description of troops, and
by what course of service, are the military duties of this metropolis
to be regulated and carried on when the household corps shall have
ceased to exist?

"It has already been explained that the battalions of the line,
which are stationed from time to time in the United Kingdom, are,
generally speaking, amongst the least effective of any of Her Majesty's
service. The evil is unavoidable, owing to the inefficient state in
which regiments usually return home from colonial or other service
abroad. Such, then, would be the description of troops to which the
London duties would be assigned in the event of the household corps
being disbanded. Moreover, it is the general rule of the service,
that regiments shall change their quarters every year; but suppose an
exception were made in favour of the regiments performing the London
duties, and that such regiments were retained in London two years,
instead of one, still what would be the consequence?--That just as
they were beginning to be inured to the duties of the metropolis,
they would be marched off, and be succeeded by other regiments, whose
apprenticeship would then have to commence. Woe to this vast and
opulent metropolis upon the day of riot or of actual disturbance, when
the public peace and the protection of property shall be committed to
raw and inexperienced troops; and all troops must be accounted raw and
inexperienced (however high their qualifications in other respects)
which shall have been nowise initiated in the peculiar duties which
they are called upon to perform. Had the celebrated light division of
the lamented Moore--had the famous fighting division of the gallant
Picton, landed at Portsmouth at the termination of the late war, fresh
from the fields of all their glory, flushed with the pride of all their
victories, and thence been ordered to take the London duties--had
they been accompanied with the cavalry brigade which La Marchant led
in the onset at Salamanca, or by the cavalry brigade which Ponsonby
headed in their charge against the column of 12,000 at Waterloo, I
would have accounted the whole of those distinguished corps, from the
moment they had crossed Westminster-bridge, as raw and inexperienced
troops in respect to the duties upon which they were about to enter,
so utterly different are the military duties required by the garrison
of London from the military duties performed by the British army
in any other part of the world. You are aware that no portion of
my military service has been passed in the household regiments. I
entertain no favour or affection towards those corps above that which
I bear towards the whole army. I set no higher value, as soldiers,
upon a battalion of Guards than upon a battalion of the line. It
is solely on account of the apprenticeship they have served--it is
because, in addition to their general duties as soldiers, they have
been trained from their enlistment to the peculiar duties which belong
to a London garrison--because they have been instructed in the delicate
and the critical position in which they are often placed whilst on
duty--because they have been taught to bear and forbear--because they
are conversant with all the arts, and intrigues, and temptations of
a London populace--because they are familiar with all the public
departments, the public offices, and the public authorities, as well
as with all the localities within the bills of mortality,--it is on
these grounds that I pronounce the household corps to be by far better
fitted for the London duties than can ever be the case with any other
portion of her Majesty's troops. To the foregoing advantages, I would
add the perfect understanding which has been established and cemented
between the household corps and the metropolitan police. The beautiful
manner in which their reciprocal duties are blended on every occasion
of being brought together amounts to a piece of mechanism, which no
exertions could ever preserve under a continued introduction of fresh
and inexperienced troops.

"The household corps of the British army represent a body of troops
which, for appearance, for discipline, for intelligence, and for
respectability, are unequalled by the troops of any other nation upon
earth. They reflect credit upon the Sovereign, upon the Government,
upon the service, and upon the nation at large. They serve to impress
every foreigner who visits this country with a high opinion of our
military character, and of our military power. Yet have propositions
been entertained for disbanding these household corps. The result that
would follow upon their disbandment is manifest. That, whereas the
military duties of London are now, and have been hitherto, conducted
in a manner the most perfect and the most efficient, they would be
committed henceforth to different portions of Her Majesty's troops,
which, by reason of their frequent relief, and their consequent want
of experience, could at no time be expected to carry on the military
duties of London with equal efficiency for the maintenance of the
public peace, and the protection of public property; and in the event
of any serious disturbance arising (which God avert!) the disbandment
of our household corps, and the dissolution of that unity of service
which is at present so happily established between the military and the
civil forces of the metropolis, might be productive of consequences
fatal to the security of the metropolis itself, and to the interests of
the empire at large.--I remain, my dear Sir Henry, with the greatest
respect, yours most faithfully,

  "J.C. Dalbiac, Lieutenant-General.

"_13, Albany, March 9, 1840._"

Sir Charles Dalbiac's letter is certainly a strong appeal to the
army and country; and as one of the staff of Picton's division, I
particularly feel it. What Sir Charles says, as to the soldiers of
that division taking the duties of London, I readily admit to be quite
correct. My objection is not to the Guards, but to the unnecessary and
injurious privileges possessed by their officers. Perhaps, however, the
desirable object I have in view, may not be considered attainable; and
should this prove the case, it might not be unreasonable to expect,
that these corps should be kept perfectly distinct from the regular
regiments; and that no exchange shall ever be allowed between officers
of the Guards and those of the regular army. If they must continue a
privileged body, to the injury of the service, their privileges ought
not to be allowed to hurt even the feelings of the latter.

All regular regiments of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should,
as before observed, be liable to serve in any part of the world, in
case of war or commotion; but they should from many parts of it be
invariably and immediately re-called, as soon as the causes for which
they were sent out had been removed; but these regiments might be
stationed wherever it should be deemed expedient, and for any period;
for instance, in such countries as North America, the Cape of Good
Hope, the islands in the Mediterranean, &c.

Service in the regular army being limited to ten years only, there
could be no necessity in future for burdening the country with
any other pensions than those already proposed for well behaved
non-commissioned officers and soldiers, except in cases of severe
wounds, or loss of health in the service; but both these should be
placed under very strict regulations; and my object for so limiting
the period is, that when the time for discharging a soldier arrives,
he would not be too old to return to and resume his former occupation
or trade; for, I am sorry to say, that old soldiers, in general, are
rather addicted to drunkenness, and consequently have become unfit for
the quiet walks of life; and practice in war also teaches us, that
experienced officers, and young but well-disciplined soldiers, always
achieve the most brilliant and enterprising feats of heroism in battle
or at sieges; and even in skirmishing I have never found that veterans
were to be preferred. There were exceptions occasionally met with, but
those who have seen much of modern warfare, will, I think, coincide
with me in these opinions.

To effect some of the objects I have in view, it should be permanently
settled, how many corps of cavalry, infantry, engineers, artillery,
and marines, are to constitute the regular army of Great Britain
and Ireland; and their respective establishments in officers should
likewise be permanently fixed upon; for I am most anxious, and I
consider it to be practicable, to do away with half-pay to officers;
and although the peace and war establishments of corps, as to
non-commissioned officers and privates, may vary, I do not see, if
officers are not unnecessarily and improperly taken away from their
regiments, why their numbers should ever be increased or decreased;
for the whole being efficient, and well instructed, they could, in a
very short time, with the aid of intelligent non-commissioned officers,
train such recruits as it might be found requisite to call out to
augment the establishments of corps; and thus a considerable saving to
the country may be effected.

Situated as Great Britain now is with regard to other nations; and
considering the number of troops likely to be at all times required in
some of our foreign possessions, together with the state of Ireland,
and also how very few corps are now available for home service; and
even bearing in mind our fine army of reserve, but which ought not
unnecessarily to be called out, and likewise what I have yet to propose
in regard to the East Indies and some of our foreign possessions, I
cannot suppose, that our regiments of cavalry ought to consist of less
than 1 colonel, 1 lieut.-colonel, 2 majors, 8 captains, 8 lieutenants,
8 cornets, 24 sergeants, 32 corporals, 16 trumpeters, 560 privates.
And to insure our having really effective corps of infantry, they
ought to have 1 colonel, 1 lieut.-colonel, 2 majors, 10 captains,
10 lieutenants, 10 ensigns, 30 sergeants, 40 corporals, 20 buglers,
760 privates. Both cavalry and infantry should, of course, have the
usual number of regimental staff officers and sergeants, including a
school-master, sergeant, and a trumpet and bugle major.

The establishments of corps of engineers, artillery, and of marines,
should also be finally decided upon; as likewise that of a permanent
staff, which I intend to propose for the army.

I am aware that objections have been made to the plan of a military
fund, yet I have never heard a good reason assigned by those who
made them against it. To such as ask if it would not render officers
too independent, I would not even deign to give an answer. I see,
therefore, no cause why I should not venture strongly to urge that
a military fund be established under the sanction and approval of
Government; and to promote so desirable an object, the country, as it
would thus soon be freed from the great expense of half-pay to the
officers of the army, ought, in common justice, to contribute a certain
sum annually, and especially at first, towards it; for it should be
borne in mind, that, comparatively speaking, very few pensions would
be hereafter required for soldiers, and, I may say, none whatever for
officers.

All officers, according to their rank, should be obliged to contribute
a certain small sum monthly towards the fund, which could be regulated
in proportion to the assistance afforded by Parliament, and likewise
by what might be expected to arise from such officers as were desirous
of retiring from the army being required to pay a fixed but moderate
sum, according to the rank they may hold at the time, into the fund;
but I expect that the whole amount in any manner contributed, or which
will accumulate at interest in the public fund, would produce annually
sufficient to enable those who may be intrusted with its management,
to allow retired officers, after a certain number of years service,
considerably more than is at present granted in the shape of half-pay.

At present, officers sometimes receive fixed sums, according to their
rank, for going upon half-pay; but I propose to reverse this as to
retirements; and my reason for so doing is to quicken promotion; for
I wish to make it the interest of every officer under the individual
desirous of retiring (who ought to be allowed to retain his rank) to
make up the sum amongst them, which he would have to pay into the fund,
in order that he might be entitled to a retirement, and something
besides to go into his own pocket, and which he should be permitted to
take openly; for a step would, by this means, be gained by all those
under him in the corps; and this would greatly remove the apprehension
of promotion becoming too slow, and officers would no longer be
exposed to the present galling and disheartening system of purchase. A
considerable sum might thus be produced annually for the fund, out of
which, as I calculate, even general officers should receive retirements
at the same rate as lieut.-colonels.

Something of this kind is, I find, adopted by officers in the service
of the East India Company, who contribute so much monthly towards a
purse given to retiring officers, by which their promotion is found to
be quickened.

If wounds, or ill health, acquired in the service, should compel an
officer to retire from his regiment, or should he have served for
fourteen years, he ought, without any payment to the fund, to be
allowed the full retirement to which he would be entitled according
to his rank, whether those below him were willing to contribute for
him to the fund or not; but should these officers have done so, in
order to induce him to retire, and an attempt be made to conceal the
transaction, the retired officer, if it was afterwards found out that
deceptions had been practised, ought, by an unalterable regulation, to
be deprived of his retirement.

The senior Cornet or Ensign, Lieutenant, Captain or Major, as the case
might be, would find it their interest to subscribe a much larger sum
than the other officers, for him who was to retire, as he would thus
acquire a higher rank in the corps and also an increase of pay.

With respect to pay-masters and surgeons, as a plan has already
been adopted by Government for their retirements, after a certain
number of years service, it would be unwise to interfere with such an
arrangement, but they should, nevertheless, be permitted to subscribe
to the military fund, although they could not, like the other officers,
be expected to pay towards it on retiring; and unless their monthly
payments to the fund were increased, which would not probably be
desirable, they must be satisfied with smaller retirements from it;
but all such points should come under the consideration of a board
of management, as well as the amount of retirements for regimental
quarter-masters and assistant-surgeons, but officers ought not to be
allowed any retirements whatever until after seven years service;
and till they have completed their fourteen years, (or twenty years
when there should be another increase) it ought to be only on a very
moderate scale. It might also be a point requiring consideration-but
it strikes me, that for obvious reasons, a general Court Martial by
its sentence ought to have the power of depriving an officer of any
retirement he might have become entitled to.

Some of our best commanders of regiments had objections to married
officers remaining in the corps, and often did their best, but without
injuring them, to have them removed; for they always found, that at
the very time when their thoughts ought to have been entirely given
to their profession, they were quite distracted from it, by the
care of the world, and anxiety about their families; now the fund I
propose to establish, would enable those who had become so situated,
or such captains as might be apprehensive that they could not pass
the examinations required before they could get the rank of major, to
retire, without being obliged to do so, to the quiet of domestic life.
I must beg also to observe, that it has long been a common saying as
to young men, that the most talented of a genteel family ought to go
to the bar, the next into the church, and that any dunce would answer
well enough for the army or navy; but if the examinations I have
suggested are strictly inforced, this reproach will be removed, and
taking into account what I am so anxious to establish for the benefit
of officers, not only as regards a military fund, but also with respect
to promotion, the army would be rendered a much more desirable and
suitable profession for young men of talent than it is at present, and
would make it well worth their while to exert themselves to get into
it.

There ought not to be any difficulties started as to the appointment of
a board of management of the military fund, and as it is to be presumed
that no member of Her Majesty's Government could have a wish to
interfere, or to have any control over the board; I have now to propose
(and I think this will satisfy all parties) that the Commander-in-Chief
should have the nomination of the president and board, which should
consist of at least two, if not of four efficient members, removable
only by the authority which had appointed them to it, and which should
also have the power of choosing as secretary, a gentleman of habits
of business, who would require the assistance of a certain number of
clerks. An annual report of the state of the military fund should
be made out and submitted for the information of Government, the
Commander-in-Chief, and that of every corps in the army.

The officers of the board and secretary for performing what cannot be
otherwise than troublesome duties, all the details of which they would
have to regulate, and as they must have considerable responsibility
attached to them, probably requiring security to be given, I conclude
they would be allowed respectable fixed salaries. The clerks will
also be of course well paid. I may be sanguine, but I confess I feel
very confident, that the plan would be found, under the management
of an able board, to work well. I have been more minute than I could
have wished, but my object in being so, was to obviate many of the
objections which are likely to be started. I regret much, however,
that I cannot now see how to include the officers of the navy in it;
for, unless it were so arranged, that they could contribute towards the
fund, as retiring officers of the army are made to do, I fear that so
desirable an object cannot, as they are now situated, be effected for
them.

By establishing this military fund, Government would not only be able
to do away with half-pay, but also to discontinue the practice of
granting pensions, excepting in particular cases to officers of the
army, their widows and children, as I conclude that they would all in
future be provided for under the regulations to be made by the board
of management; and what a relief to the minds of officers, and what a
proud and proper feeling it would be for them to indulge in, that they
could at such a trifling sacrifice, and on such easy terms, provide
for themselves; and for those about whom they must naturally be so
anxious, without becoming a burden to the country; and would not this
plan give them a stake in it, which must perpetuate (though it cannot
for a moment be supposed, that in such feelings and principles they
can be wanting,) that attachment to their Sovereign, and to our free
and admirable constitution, which they have ever so strongly evinced;
and thus an additional and powerful barrier would be formed against
the dangerous designs of men, who apparently wish to see our excellent
institutions destroyed, and the country thrown, to suit their own
selfish purposes, into such confusion, as could only end in a despotism
of some kind or other.

I am not blind to the circumstance, that if what I am endeavouring to
establish for the good of the service is accomplished, a severe blow
must be given to the patronage of the army, but I trust that this
will not be allowed to become a stumbling-block in the way of so much
general benefit. I, however, willingly leave the cause of our gallant
army, with which I am now, I may say, almost unconnected, to public
opinion, which fortunately in this country is so powerful, as not to
be easily or long withstood; and we may, I will venture to say, be
certain, that if what I have presumed to propose, is practicable and
desirable, the Commander-in-Chief will readily meet the wishes of the
country and the army, with all that good will and zeal which he has on
so many occasions evinced for the welfare of both.




CHAP. III.


What I have next to propose, will I think be allowed to be of
importance; for I wish to free our army from much inconvenience, and at
the same time to insure its efficiency. I have therefore to recommend,
that the East India Company should have the power of raising, as usual
by bounty, in the United Kingdom, such a number of regiments as they
may require for their service; to be commanded by their own officers,
in the same manner as has hitherto been the custom in their European
corps; so as to enable them to maintain their ascendancy in the East,
without the aid of Her Majesty's troops, except in cases of great
emergency; for I am most anxious that any of our regular regiments sent
there, as I have before observed, should be immediately ordered home,
as soon as the cause for which they may have been sent out had been
removed.

I am convinced that the Honourable Company's native armies would be
greatly improved, and rendered fully competent to contend with any
troops in the world, if several corps of Malays were formed for their
service, and officered in the manner now practised in Ceylon, and when
in the field made to act along with the Sepoys; and for very unhealthy
parts of India, where the heat is almost unbearable, some corps of
those always effective, and light-hearted beings--Caffres, would be
found most admirably calculated for service, either in garrison or in
the field. I am however aware that prejudices exist against both Malays
and Caffres, but they should be got over.

From what I have seen of Malays, I believe them to be the bravest
people of the East. The only resistance, worth talking of, which our
troops met with in taking Ceylon from the Dutch, was from a battalion
of Malays in their service; and I am convinced, that Sir Stamford
Raffles did not speak too highly in their praise. It was however, a
sad mistake, our having relinquished so much of their country, and I
fear too without their consent, to the tender mercies of the Dutch;
for they were always greatly attached to us, and it is well known that
they make excellent faithful soldiers. They are also very healthy in
almost any situation, and this alone should induce us to prefer them to
every other description of troops, which could be employed in Indian
warfare. Ought we not to look forward, and that too before long, to
the Company's wars increasing in number and importance; for does not
history and experience show us, that conquerors cannot easily stop in
their conquests, and say, this river, or that range of mountains shall
be our future boundary, and we shall go no farther; do we not almost
invariably find, that before they had long endeavoured to halt, and
when they had just began to expect, in rest and peace, to enjoy the
fruits of their victories, that they were either again obliged to go
forward, or else to retrace their steps. These historical facts are
particularly applicable, even at the present moment, and ought to be
considered as timely notice to beware of rendering our already vast
Eastern Empire too extensive, unless we are prepared to support our
high pretensions, by powerful and well organized fleets and armies;
and that our chief object is to disseminate the blessings of pure and
reformed Christianity throughout the East, for the long neglect of
which we have, as a nation, so much to answer for.

I well remember looking upon it as a hopeless business to expect that
the Portuguese could ever be brought to stand before French troops;
and in making this remark, I more particularly allude to the period
when Marshal Soult occupied Oporto. I could then have got, most
advantageously, as many did, into the Portuguese army; but having, by
chance, witnessed what took place on that occasion, and on some others,
nothing could induce me to have any thing to do with them. I certainly
came to a wrong conclusion, and I did not calculate, as I ought to have
done, that British officers can make almost any men in the world fight;
at all events, when they have an opportunity of seeing how British
troops set about their work.

I should greatly fear, that it cannot now be safe to employ--at least
in some of our West India Islands--corps composed of Blacks; I must
therefore beg leave to recommend, that regiments should be raised by
bounty in the United Kingdom, for service in that part of the world,
and in some of our other foreign possessions; and none of our regular
regiments should be required to serve there, but in cases of emergency;
and they ought always to be immediately re-called from such countries,
when the cause for which they were sent out had been removed. Such an
arrangement would obviate many objections to the plan of the ballot,
and would be found the means (so desirable an object in these times)
of keeping our regiments in a very high state of discipline and
efficiency; for they would be then very superior in these respects to
any troops we can now, or even could avail ourselves of; and if what I
suggest be adopted, a vast saving of expense to the country would be
the consequence, which is incurred in constantly relieving the number
of regiments we are obliged to have always stationed abroad.

In order to shew in the strongest manner, how serious a drawback such
prolonged service in tropical climates is to the British army, I shall
here take the liberty of stating, that in the year 1820, the regiment
to which I then belonged arrived in the East, complete in officers and
men. It lately returned to England, without having lost, I believe,
any individual in action; but the climate alone had produced great
changes in its ranks; and although volunteers from other corps were
added to it, and many recruits had been sent out during the period of
its absence from home, to keep up its strength, yet when it returned
it could scarcely be called a regiment. Some of the officers had
certainly exchanged into other corps at home, or had sold out; but
only one or two reached England of all those who had embarked with
it. This is most injurious to the discipline and efficiency of our
army; for, according to present arrangements, and from unavoidable
circumstances, a corps can only be at home for so short a period,
that there is not sufficient time allowed to bring it into that
state in which it ought to be for service; and when regiments arrive
in foreign stations, they are too often so much detached in small
bodies, that notwithstanding all the zeal and exertions of officers,
a certain degree of relaxation in discipline necessarily takes place,
and generally increases the longer a regiment, always hoping to be
re-called--is kept abroad. This feeling, or anxiety about home, at
least to any considerable extent, could not be supposed to exist in
Colonial corps; for those who voluntarily entered them, would have, in
a great measure, made up their minds to consider such foreign stations
as their homes, at all events, for a certain number of years, which
both officers and men can, in most instances, contrive to pass both
profitably and agreeably.

The officers of Colonial corps should be kept distinct from those of
the regular army, and there ought to be no exchanges permitted from
the one to the other; and it might perhaps be thought advisable, that
Colonial officers should receive a higher rate of pay or allowances,
and they ought to be allowed--as the same system of promotion is
supposed to exist in such corps as in the regulars--to join the latter
in making a provision for their retirement from the service, upon
the plan I have endeavoured to establish. But fixed rates of pensions
for service in the Colonial corps should be established for the
non-commissioned officers and privates, which ought invariably to be in
proportion to good conduct, and to the period spent in those generally
unhealthy climates. In these stations, and in the East particularly,
I have observed that soldiers of regiments of the line, were very
liable to be cast down, in consequence of the expectations they had
formed of the pleasures they were led to look for, not being by any
means realized; and being exposed to temptations which they could not
resist, especially that of drinking, they were more likely to become
slaves to it, and reckless, than in other parts of the world; it would
therefore be a point requiring serious consideration, how far it might
be prudent, when the composition of these Colonial corps is borne in
mind; to dispense entirely with corporal punishment; it ought not,
however, to be permitted to take place, but when called for by the
strongest possible causes, and a special report of the circumstance,
should invariably and immediately be made, by the officer commanding
the corps, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief.

The establishments of Colonial corps ought to be fixed according to the
service likely to be locally required of them; and where their officers
obtained the rank of generals, they could, of course, be employed in
any manner, or upon any service for which the Commander-in-chief might
think fit to select them; but their knowledge of these countries would
eminently qualify them for colonial commands, and thus this branch of
the service would not only be rendered highly honourable, but it would
also hold out many advantages to those who entered it. They ought,
therefore, to be obliged to undergo before appointment, and afterwards
before they get the rank of major, the examinations to which the
officers of the regular army must submit.

I must now request attention to what I shall next bring before the
reader--that is to say--as no one would hereafter, according to the
plan proposed, be permitted to enter our regular army, who was not of
a certain height, and of a sound constitution, I must strongly urge,
that the old fashioned fancy of having grenadier and light infantry
companies to regiments should be discontinued; for it takes away the
best, or the picked men from the others, to gratify the vanity of
two of the captains, at the expense of the feelings of the rest, and
which also most seriously affects the general efficiency, and ruins
the appearance of regiments: and how galling and discouraging it is
to a corps, but especially to its commanding officer, to have these
companies placed under the orders of probably a stranger; who may
have sufficient influence or interest with a general commanding an
expedition, so as to be able to induce him to form grenadier, or light
infantry battalions, for a particular service, and which any regiment,
or part of it, ought to be as well able to perform.

A battalion, or any body of troops, which is not perfect in the
exercises and duties of light infantry as well as in the less rapid
movements of the line, should be looked upon as unfit for modern
warfare. All regiments of infantry ought therefore to be like the
old 43d and 52d; and I must, at whatever risk, presume to say, that
officers unable to make their corps, if not altogether, at least almost
as efficient as these were when they came from the hands of Sir John
Moore, ought to be considered incapable of commanding them. I have also
no hesitation in adding, that during the late wars, these corps and the
Rifles, far surpassed all others in many respects.

We all know that the celebrated Marshal Saxe, who was looked upon as a
high military authority in olden times, is reported to have said, that
the whole art of war was in the legs. This, to a certain extent, is
true; but he then, of course, only spoke of the trade and not of the
science. I have no doubt but that some of our ancients may be inclined
to think they got on well enough without exerting much activity in
their day; yet I must say, that officers unfit for rapid movements
_on foot_ should be recommended to retire from the service, as their
unfitness in this respect might render it indispensable that they
should not be allowed to remain a burden upon it. And I would likewise
take the liberty of suggesting, that all regimental officers, according
to their rank, should be dressed and appointed alike; and all the
soldiers of the ten companies alike.

If all our regular regiments were made light infantry, which they
ought to be, it might no longer be considered advisable to encumber
them with the large colours now in use. Once upon a time, a commanding
officer of a light corps (not belonging to the famous light division),
expecting next day to be engaged, actually came to the strange
determination of burning those of his regiment; but when acting in
line, I would propose (though some one else might think of something
very superior), that there should be substituted as rallying points,
and to which should be attached the same importance as to colours, two
golden-lions, which might be ornamented by a scroll, upon which could
be emblazoned, or inscribed, the actions in which the corps may have
distinguished itself--these should be screwed on to light staffs; those
for English regiments, being near their heads, adorned with Roses;
those for Scotch, with Thistles; and those for Irish, with Shamrocks:
these standards in the field should be consigned to the care of the
two youngest lieutenants, and they should be made strictly responsible
for them; for I once knew an ensign, who, in action, actually threw
down one of the colours of a renowned regiment, and made off to the
rear, without thinking more of it, from having been hit rather sharply
by a spent ball. These are likely, I fear, to be thought too trifling
matters for a work of this kind; but I hope the reader will excuse me
for having introduced them; and also for adding, that in order to keep
pace with improvements made by other nations in modern warfare, ought
it not to be well considered whether our slowest movements, in what
is termed ordinary time, would not be improved, if the soldier was
required to take a greater number of steps, say 87, of only 30 inches
in length in the minute; and if what is called quick time was made 126
paces of only 30 inches each per minute, which would make him pass
over the same extent of ground in the same space of time as he does by
the present plan. At least, I have no doubt, and I speak, as an old
adjutant, and as an officer long practised in the movements of both
small and large bodies of troops, that all manœuvres would be performed
at these paces with much less chance of confusion, and with more ease
to the soldier, especially in action, than according to the present
mode.

It would lead me far beyond my present intentions if I were to enter
extensively upon the subject of military evolutions; but I beg leave to
say, that to simplify and render their execution easy, ought to become
the primary object of all modern tacticians.

In manœuvring, especially large bodies of troops, rapid movements in
columns at quarter distances ought to be much more attended to than
they are.--Masses of such columns, or close columns, as practised
by the Duke of Wellington at Paris or elsewhere, can be quickly and
scientifically placed or prepared for advancing or retiring in any
direction, or for deployment, by simply, when put in motion, marking
time and bringing up the shoulder; and by this means gradually
producing a change of position or of formation of the whole mass.
Deployments can be made from such columns in quick or double-quick
time, and with the greatest accuracy, by merely moving in threes or
fours to the right or left. What an advantage an army thus instructed
would have over one proceeding in the old heavy manner, in seizing
hold of a position, or of a point, presenting evident advantages,
and that too with perfect safety; for, in case of a sodden attack of
cavalry, a quarter-distance column is in security in square in an
instant. This column also possesses many advantages over the close
column, not only in the superiority and rapidity of its movements, but
likewise in its being much less liable to get into disorder in broken
ground, or to suffer from cannon, which very soon, if well served,
destroy a perfectly solid mass, especially if steady battalions of
infantry are also firing into it, as was the case at Talavera, when
our Guards in the afternoon made a gallant but injudiciously-directed
charge; and when the 48th regiment, on the one hand, and the 45th on
the other, taught the French, that breaking through an enemy's line
in dense columns would not answer with a British army.--Echelons of
these quarter-distance columns would, in many instances, be very
superior to lines of battalions or brigades, as they could be moved
with rapidity to the points of formation in a new line or position,
and without any risk of getting into confusion; commanding officers
of corps, their majors and adjutants having only carefully to attend
to, judge, and preserve their respective distances; and even in common
drill or manœuvres of a single battalion, this ought always to form
an important part of the practice and instruction of these officers,
who in regimental tactics are, in general, not sufficiently occupied,
and consequently are too often found ignorant of their business when
obliged to act in brigade, and with this object in view every movement
should be performed as if in reference to a corps supposed to be upon
either or both flanks, with which they ought to work in unison. Now I
must beg the unmilitary reader to imagine a large body of troops thus
manœuvring in columns at quarter-distances, or in open columns, or
lines formed from them, covered by clouds of sharpshooters, supported
by these columns or lines, cannon and cavalry, and he will have at
once before him a chief feature in modern warfare, in which science
and experience on the part of generals and staff officers must be so
essential and indispensable.

In thus endeavouring to bring certain matters under consideration, and
in doing so I fear I may exhaust the patience of the reader, I hope I
may not give offence to some of those interested in their remaining as
they are at present; but I must proceed in the task I have assigned
myself, and observe, that I look upon it to be a point of importance
that the present mode of furnishing clothing and accoutrements for
regiments should be altered, and that upon a general being appointed
colonel of a regiment, he should receive a fixed income as such; but
all clothing and accoutrements of every description, ought, under
proper regulations, to be supplied through the regimental agents, upon
the responsibility of the colonels, but it should be so arranged that
neither could have any interest in the articles being procured at a
cheap rate. The granting, however, a fixed income to colonels need be
no additional expense to the country; for what are the off-reckonings
which go to colonels of regiments but an over-payment on the part of
Government for clothing, &c. &c. Some colonels are very liberal to
their corps, but many more cannot afford to be so; an alteration,
whatever it may be, ought therefore to come under the notice of some
board or other, so as to be kept, if possible, out of the hands of Mr.
Joseph Hume and his liberal associates.

To all who saw much service during the late wars, it must have been
obvious under what disadvantages, owing to the colours of their dress,
our soldiers had often to contend with the French, but especially with
the United States troops in skirmishing. The latter were certainly,
from having much practice, good marksmen; and thickly wooded America
was very favourable to their irregulars; for our brilliant scarlet
coats, white belts, and bright belt and cap-plates, enabled the enemy
to discover, whether in a wood, at the back of a hedge, or wherever
they were posted, our unlucky soldiers, who were too apt to expose
themselves, and many of them were in consequence laid low; whereas
the French, or wary Yankees, almost entirely escaped; and that much
owing to their being dressed in dark colours, which enabled them
easily to conceal themselves. But officers who served in our Rifle
brigade, and in that also experienced corps, of which I saw so much
on many occasions, the 5th battalion of the 60th, could give the best
information, and a correct opinion upon this head; and I feel certain
that they would join with me in recommending that a change should be
made in the dress of our army, so as to make it more suitable for
modern warfare, in which light troops are so much employed. I must
beg, at the same time, to say, that I often regretted that these fine
regiments were not armed with superior muskets in place of rifles, for
they are seldom to be preferred to muskets, and never but when loaded
with great care, and this, in action, takes up too much time.

We every day hear of experiments and improvements in the construction
of fire-arms; and the country can surely afford to supply our army with
a superior musket, with a proper elevation, and a percussion lock. The
present old fashioned firelock, with which nearly all our troops are
still supplied, is very imperfect, and heavier than it ought to be. But
would it not be well to consider, whether the new musket should not be
considerably longer in the barrel and smaller in the bore; and that
the bayonet should be much reduced in size; and I would also arm the
soldiers, I have in view, with a sword, of the shape and size used by
the ancient Romans; for we may depend upon it, that our brave, powerful
men, would follow their officers, sword in hand, into the midst of
their enemies. The musket could be then carried either in the left hand
or slung upon the soldier's shoulder, and the bayonet could be fixed to
it if preferred. It might be necessary to weigh well the consequences
before we so armed our impetuous soldiers, for it would be certain to
lead to a new era in war; and would expose troops so fighting, which
must be in a degree of loose order, to be charged by cavalry; yet the
Romans fought in that manner, and with great success, though equally
liable to be so attacked. Every thing would, however, depend upon so
high a state of discipline being established amongst the troops, as
would enable officers to keep them in hand, and at all times obedient
when commanded to resume their places; and our dragoons ought always to
be at hand, ready to support infantry so acting. Such views as these
are, I suppose, entertained by those officers who seem to be so anxious
to have broad sword and bayonet exercises, introduced. I do not wish
to enter farther into this discussion; yet I beg leave to say, that,
though I am certain our soldiers would have closed with their enemies,
yet, in all my practice, which was tolerably extensive, I never saw
two bodies of troops fairly charge each other with the bayonet; for
one side or other (and generally it was that attacked) gave way. I
have certainly seen a few instances of individuals, French and British
soldiers, actually attacking each other with the bayonet; and at the
battle of Roliça, I remember seeing a soldier of the 29th regiment, and
a fine-looking Frenchman, lying on the ground close together, who had,
judging from the positions in which they lay, evidently killed each
other with their bayonets; but such occurrences were, I believe, very
rare.

The introduction of the percussion lock into the army will necessarily
cause a change to be made in part of the musket exercise; but it will
simplify the motions and expedite the firing. I, however, hope, that
before any thing of this kind is decided upon, the following remarks
may be allowed to have due consideration.

The pouch might be differently constructed, and advantageously
converted into a magazine, to carry securely a certain quantity of
powder in bulk, in an air tight tin canister, with a screw stopper, to
insure its being, at all times, and in all situations, kept perfectly
dry; and this is a very essential point, as many cartridges are
destroyed or rendered unserviceable in the men's present pouches by
rain, a damp atmosphere, and even continued friction; and this is too
often only found out at the moment when they are required for service,
and when there is, perhaps, no opportunity of exchanging them; and
as this magazine ought at all times on service to be kept full of
powder, the officer when inspecting his company or detachment, could
easily ascertain if any of it had been made away with: indeed, the
stopper might be safely sealed over, or otherwise secured; and thus
the soldier could be made, without inconvenience, to carry such a
supply of ammunition as to render it unnecessary that recourse should
be so constantly had to that carried in reserve for the army. The
pouch should also be made to contain, besides the powder, a sufficient
supply of percussion caps, and a proportionate number of balls, to
the quantity of powder in the canister; and every ball should be
separately, thinly, yet sufficiently covered with a kind of stuff
similar to soft leather, so as to make it fit tightly when rammed down
into the barrel of the musket, and it would thus become a good wadding
over the powder. For what is called blank cartridge firing, waddings of
the common kind, and of the proper size, could be used.

The pouch thus contracted, would hold the soldier's reserve ammunition,
which would amount to a much greater number of rounds than it contains
according to the present plan. But to effect what I have in view, every
soldier should be supplied with a good powder flask, with a proper
measure to suit the musket, according to the most improved method, and
similar to that which Mr. John Manton usually supplied along with his
guns; having the measure forming an angle to one side, so as, in case
of explosion, if such a thing could happen in loading, the right hand
would not be much, if at all, hurt. This flask could be made to contain
a sufficient quantity of powder, say for twenty rounds, at all times
on service ready for use, and which, for the reason I have already
assigned, ought, when the soldier is required to have ammunition in
his possession, to be likewise kept full; and should it at any time be
suspected that the powder in it had become damp, it could be easily
aired by simply dipping the flask in boiling water.

I regret that I am obliged to be particular in my descriptions of such
trifles; but this flask should, I conclude, be carried for convenience
on the left side or breast, and secured from falling when the soldier
is in movement, by a slight chain attached to the belt, to which the
flask might also be steadily fixed by some simple contrivance; and
to render this the more easily done, it ought to be rather flat in
shape, and not larger than to contain the quantity of powder I have
mentioned; and twenty rounds are quite as many as can be wanted at
reviews or field days. In action, if these twenty rounds are expended,
I need scarcely observe, that if no other reserve powder be at hand,
the flask could be replenished instantly from the magazine; but under
an apprehension that ammunition might be made away with, the quantity
in bulk should be touched as seldom as possible, and if any of it be
used, it ought to be immediately replaced. A small pocket might be
made in the right side of the soldier's coat, which should be only
sufficiently large to contain a number of covered balls in proportion
to the quantity of powder in the flask; and a flap should button over
this pocket to prevent the balls from falling out. Each soldier would
likewise require to be equipped with one of those brass cases for
holding percussion caps, which, by a spring inside, forces each cap out
in succession as it is wanted. Those I use contain thirty caps. This
case should also be attached to the belt, but upon the right side.

The buck shot, I before mentioned, can easily be made up so as to serve
for wadding, in place of the covered ball; and a sentry upon his post,
especially at night, in many situations, would have more confidence
with his piece so loaded, than if he had only a single ball in it. A
better method than that which I have ventured to propose, may very
likely be pointed out; but whatever it may be, the admitting of the
knapsack being carried somewhat lower and easier to the soldier, ought
to be kept in view; and he should not be obliged, as at present, to
take cartridges with so much inconvenience out of his pouch every time
he loads his musket; and the new exercise introduced on account of the
percussion lock, must of course be made to suit the alterations.

Should the soldier be supplied with a well-constructed musket with
a percussion lock--and if he be required to use a muzzle stopper, a
charge though a day or two in the barrel, will go off almost as well
as if just loaded, and this too in any kind of weather. Our commanding
officers when going into action, or rather on supposing that they were
about to do so, in general made the soldiers prime and load too soon,
for this, I may say, is the business of a moment; and how often after
the regiments had loaded, have they never had an opportunity of firing
a shot the whole day. At night probably the soldiers bivouacked, and
it rained heavily, so that in the morning not a firelock, if it had
been attempted, would have gone off. Darkness had prevented it from
being done the night before, and when the charge had next morning
to be drawn, it was found to be a very difficult job, when the ball
was held tight by wet paper. And then the barrel required to be well
washed out, which took more time than could be allowed for the purpose,
and consequently it was badly done. I need, therefore, now scarcely
observe, that the percussion lock, in a great measure, obviates, by a
very little attention, such serious inconveniences and defects.

It may very likely be deemed great presumption for me to propose so
many changes; yet, having spoken of an alteration in the uniform of the
regiments, I shall now venture to mention what has been suggested to me
as likely to be a great improvement; but I do not by any means pretend
to say that nothing superior could be thought of or invented. But if
people take the liberty of finding fault with fashions or systems,
whether old or new, it is but fair that they should be required to
point out remedies or improvements.

Suppose that the uniform of the regular infantry was nearly assimilated
to that of our Rifle Brigade (with Her Majesty's Guards I don't venture
to interfere). It is generally allowed, that the dress of both officers
and men of these corps is soldier-like, handsome, and far better
adapted for service than that now worn by the rest of our army. But I
am most anxious that the soldier's coat should be made for comfort as
well as for appearance; and I should, therefore, greatly prefer that
it was made in the shape of what is usually termed a frock, but to
have a stand up collar, and to come down nearly to the knee. Both coat
and trousers could, at a very trifling additional expense, be made
water-proof. But soldiers ought never again to be overloaded on service
with blankets, and let the reader only imagine their being obliged,
as was often the case, to carry them when wet. But to make up for the
blanket, they should be furnished with a large sized water-proof cloth
great coat; in these they could sleep sufficiently warm and secure from
any damp that might rise from the ground, and which in campaigning is
of such importance towards preservation of health. The country would
also be saved expense if this plan were adopted, by not being obliged
to provide and convey bulky blankets to the points where they were
to be delivered out to the troops; and these water-proof great coats
being of a very durable material, would last much longer than the old
fashioned ones.

Many of the absurdities which once existed in the dress of our infantry
officers and soldiers; such as the powdered heads and long pigtails,
and white pipe-clayed tight buckskin breeches, and large jack-boots of
the former; and the soaped hair with finely feathered sidelocks, as
they were termed, and long highly polished leather queues, tight white
cloth breeches, and long tight gaiters of the latter, have long been
done away with; and why not go a step farther, and in the way hinted
at, in order to secure to our infantry great and decided advantages.
Many may remember the strange figures, which most of our soldiers cut
in Paris after the battle of Waterloo, in their dirty red coats, and
ugly shaped caps; the former much stained, and the latter become brown
and disfigured by exposure to rain and weather; the consequence was,
that our army made, I do not hesitate to say, the worst appearance of
all those assembled in and around that capital.

I do not intend in this work to make many remarks upon our cavalry, but
I must say, that I hope yet to see some of our lights made heavier,
and mounted on powerful yet sufficiently active horses. I confess I am
not one of those who admire what are called hussars, &c., because I
know how to value our heavy cavalry, and am therefore induced to draw
a comparison between the two; and I boldly assert, that no cavalry
in the world can stand before our splendid heavy dragoons and their
noble steeds. One regiment--and I am enabled to judge from what I saw
of them upon several occasions--would with ease cut their way through
all the Cossacks of the Don, or any such _Lights_, which are seldom
of any other use but to follow up a beaten enemy; and, I must say,
that it has often surprised me, how we could think of copying the
inefficient cavalry of any nation. Sir Thomas Picton, but he was an
infantry officer, was also no great admirer of our light cavalry, and
some of them may, perhaps, remember an opinion he publicly expressed
of their efficiency at Roncesvalles, when he, in his emphatic way,
and, I must admit, not very politely, drew a comparison between them
and the dragoons of the German Legion, who were not only excellent and
experienced, but always effective. We were all greatly attached to the
German dragoons, and for nothing more, than for their literally making
companions, or playfellows, of their fine English horses, which they
always thought of, with respect to care and food, before they did of
themselves.

At the opening of one of the campaigns, a body of these German
dragoons, so much and deservedly admired by Picton, which had been
attached to the third division during most of the previous one,
returned to us from their cantonments, when we were again close
up to the enemy, and hourly expecting to be engaged; officers,
non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, turned out in a body to
welcome their old friends, who passed through the camp to where
they were to be stationed for the night, amidst the cheering and
congratulations of the fighting division--and Picton's division knew
well who were good soldiers. In making these remarks, I by no means
presume to say any thing against our light cavalry, but I must protest
against a system of mounting brave men upon horses unable to carry
them through their work on the day of trial, and in this respect
foolishly aping foreigners, who would give the world for such horses
as we possess; and who are doing all they can to improve their breeds
in order to be able to meet us at a future period. The plan, however,
which I have suggested for promotion in the army, would wonderfully
change matters in our cavalry regiments, into which many officers
would no longer go merely for the day, and for amusement, but into a
profession to which they were to belong for life. But mentioning these
German dragoons, reminds me of a welcome Sir Thomas Picton himself met
with on his return to the 3d division in the South of France, after
an absence occasioned by severe illness, and to which the following
letters allude.

  "_Valley of Bastau, August 27, 1813._

  "Dear Sir,

 "It has long been the wish of the officers of the three brigades,
 which we have had the honour to command under you in the 3d division,
 as also of the divisional staff, to have an opportunity of offering
 you an ostensible mark of their high respect, gratitude, and esteem,
 which we so sincerely feel in our hearts.

 "Every objection seems now removed, in point of time and otherwise,
 when on the recurrence of severe illness, which has in four successive
 seasons assailed you; you at present only await a sufficient degree of
 convalescence, to admit of your trying change of climate, with but too
 little prospect, we lament to think, of your returning to your command
 in this country.

 "Services such as yours, cannot but have been acknowledged before
 this, by the offering of one or more swords from your attached
 military brethren, or a grateful country. We therefore, for ourselves,
 and those who have desired us to represent them, request you will do
 us the honour to accept of a piece of plate with a short inscription,
 commemorative of the circumstance, and of the corps which composed the
 3d division under your command in the Peninsula.

 "With most sincere wishes for your early convalescence, followed by
 your confirmed good heath, on leaving a climate that has proved so
 unfriendly to you, we have the honour to subscribe ourselves,

  "Dear Sir,

  "Your ever faithful Servants,
  (Signed,) "C. Colville,
             Thomas Brisbane,
             M. Power.

  "_For the Staff of }
   the Division_,    } F. Stovin, A.A. G^r.

  "_Lt.-Gen. Sir Tho. Picton, K.B.
  &c. &c. &c._"

  "_London, 18th Sept. 1813._

  "My Dear General,

 "In the extreme weak state to which I was reduced previous to my
 leaving the Peninsula, my feelings were too powerful for my spirits,
 and it was not possible for me adequately to answer the kind letter of
 the general officers commanding brigades in the 3d division, which you
 did me the honour of forwarding to me from the Valley of Bastau, on
 the 29th of August last.

 "I cannot but highly value the testimony of gentlemen, to whose
 talents, zealous co-operation, and gallantry on every occasion, I feel
 myself indebted for the honours that have been conferred upon me, and
 for the degree of reputation to which I have risen in the service;
 and I shall receive any memento of their esteem and regard with
 corresponding sentiments and feelings of the heart.

 "The period of my life to which I shall always recur with the greatest
 satisfaction, is that which was passed at the head of the 3d division,
 when I always experienced such a spirit of unanimity and heroism,
 as never once failed of success in any of the difficult enterprises
 we were employed upon. Though I may never again have the honour
 of commanding so distinguished a corps, I shall ever feel myself
 identified with the 3d division in all its operations, and shall take
 as strong an interest in its success as I ever did, whilst I had the
 honour of presiding at its head.

 "Accept my many acknowledgments for your kind attention, and of my
 sincere and constant wishes for your success and prosperity on all
 occasions.

  "Your devoted and faithful,
  "Humble Servant,

  (Signed,) "Thomas Picton, Lt.-Gen.

  "_To the Hon. Major-General Colville,
                  Major-General Brisbane,
                  Major-General Power,
                  Lt.-Colonel Stovin, &c._"

The day upon which Sir Thomas Picton unexpectedly rejoined his
division, the 45th regiment was lying down at the head of Sir Thomas
Brisbane's brigade, which was concealed behind a height, ready for an
intended attack. The enemy were posted at a bridge on the right bank
of a brook, and occupying, advantageously, a few houses close to it.
Our sentinels and theirs were within ten yards of each other, when to
this corps delight, which had so long served under him, up rode their
favourite chief: in an instant, and under strong and general impulse
of feeling, which could not be suppressed, they to a man stood up, and
gave him three hearty cheers, which were immediately responded to by
the 74th and 88th regiments; thus discovering where they were to the
French. "Well 45th, you have let the enemy hear you, you may now, if
you please, let them feel you," was Picton's smiling reply; and at
the same instant he ordered the attack, which I need scarcely say was
completely successful.

I hope I may be excused for giving here another trifling anecdote. I
remember well Colonel Guard, whose adjutant I was at the time, being
most anxious that the 45th regiment, which he for some years commanded,
should be made Light Infantry, and also to have had them styled, "The
Sherwood Foresters." He, however, for what reason I know not, failed in
the objects he had in view. Not long after, the 45th was brigaded in
England for exercise with the 87th and 88th regiments. Colonel Guard
had constantly, and much to his annoyance, and more particularly on
account of his recent failure, heard these corps called to attention
by their appropriate local designations, in place of their numbers;
but one day he could stand it no longer, and when Colonels Butler and
Duff loudly and proudly exclaimed, "Prince's Irish," and "Connaught
Rangers,"--he in a very shrill voice, called out at the same instant,
"Nottingham Hosiers," attention. His brother chiefs, who seemingly had
not heard, or understood what he had said, looked all astonishment,
when the whole brigade burst into an irrepressible, and unmilitary
fit of laughter. I fear that in this instance, like old soldiers in
general, I have been led away by the love of telling my story, and
must therefore apologize for the liberty I have taken with the reader;
yet, if I am not mistaken, I think I have shown, that a particular
designation, however acquired, is considered by many, as of more
importance to a corps, than a mere number; I therefore look forward to
the day, if my views are adopted, when a district will have just cause
to be proud of its regiment; and to a regiment never hearing it named
but with a feeling of revived affection, and a determination, that
their home shall never be disgraced by any act of theirs.




CHAP. IV.


Other causes besides those arising from the description of men
generally enlisted into our army, tended greatly to keep soldiers what
they were--that is to say, difficult to manage, and always ready to
avail themselves of any opportunity of getting away from under the
eyes of their officers, with the view of indulging in irregularities
whenever it was possible to do so; as, I trust, I shall be able
hereafter to point out. I cannot, however, undertake to say, what may
be the custom in the present day; but a soldier, in former times,
could not commit a greater offence than to presume to think or act
for himself; and I remain still in doubt, when, or at what rank, an
officer was supposed to be capable or had a right to think. And as for
education, too many entertained the strange notion, that beyond reading
and writing, which were allowed to be useful to non-commissioned
officers, the less soldiers knew of such matters the better. After this
need it have surprised any one, that intelligence of any kind was but
rarely to be met with in the ranks of a British army; and that it was
constantly found in those of the French, into which the conscription
necessarily introduced it; and when evinced, it was sure to meet a due
reward.

I remember, years ago, being visited by a brother-adjutant. As he
entered my barrack-room, a young soldier placed a book upon the table
and retired; which my visitor, a few minutes after, took up, and being
surprised at what it indicated as its contents, he asked me, in seeming
astonishment, what a private soldier could have to say to such a work?
I replied carelessly, that the soldier who had just left the room,
was a young man of considerable ability and great promise; and that I
wished him to read useful books; so as to be fit, at a future period,
for any station he might attain. He looked at me again, and seemed by
no means satisfied by what I had said, nor with the book, and thus
in a very friendly way addressed me:--"You are a very young man, the
youngest I ever saw made an adjutant--I have myself risen from the
ranks, and have consequently had much experience amongst soldiers;
and know them well. You may therefore take my word for it, that books
containing such information, only tend to make soldiers question the
wisdom of their officers; and to fit them for being ringleaders in
any discontent, or even mutinous conduct in their companies: and it
also causes them to be disliked by the non-commissioned officers who
have to teach them their duties, and especially the drill-serjeants,
who are always jealous of those who are likely to become rivals."
This certainly surprised me as coming from my visitor, but he had
been for many years an adjutant, and it has often been remarked, that
no officers are so severe, or have so little consideration for the
feelings of soldiers as those who have risen from the ranks. With
this as a kind of text, and also requesting that the reader will bear
in mind what was shown at the commencement of this work, by excellent
authorities, to be the character of our soldiers in general, I shall
now proceed with my remarks, some of which may probably be thought
trifling.

The French plan of carrying the knapsack, though not so smart looking,
is in the opinion of many, superior to that adopted in our army; as it
has much more the ease and comfort of the soldier upon a march in view.
Our present mode, which binds the soldier so tightly within the slings
and straps of the knapsack, as almost to prevent the free circulation
of the blood, is certainly far from judicious, but we have been long
accustomed to it, and like it on account of appearance. But in olden
times, we had many ways of trying the tempers and dispositions of our
soldiers; such as making them, though kept at drill, or at exercise
in the field the greater part of the day, to burnish the barrels of
their firelocks, to their serious injury, till they were made to shine
like silver, and to polish their pouches, and oddly shaped caps, so
as to render looking-glasses quite unnecessary. How often have I,
when a zealous and enthusiastic adjutant, cracked a pouch with the
head of my cane, when it was not bright enough to please my practised
eye, with the kind intention of affording the owner a pleasant week's
occupation to get it again into order. And how often have I, on my
well-practised horse, placed camp colours as points of movement, till
the whole "Eighteen Manœuvres" were gone through; many of them,
if the commanding officer was dissatisfied, with the regiment's
day's performance, two or three times over; having previously had
the delight of marching past repeatedly, in quick and slow time, to
please the spectators, or because the soldiers did not make the ground
sufficiently resound by the firmness of their steps; thus altogether
agreeably occupying from five to six hours of the officers and soldiers
time, with the prospect before them of a long evening parade, or
inspection, because they had not been so steady under arms as they
ought to have been during the morning's occupations.

I sincerely hope we shall never again hear of such things being
practised in a British army; and no commanding officer should be
allowed to keep his regiment longer than an hour and a half, or two
hours at a time under arms, which will be found quite sufficient, if
well occupied, for every useful purpose of instruction; especially
as at almost every parade, a battalion ought to be made to perform a
movement or two before it is dismissed. I however look upon it to be of
the first importance, that a soldier should be accustomed to consider
his knapsack and accoutrements, I may say, as parts of himself, and
that he should be so habituated to them, that whether marching or not,
he could perceive little or no difference; and to effect this, he
should never appear under arms without his knapsack; but I hope, if
this plan be enforced, as it ought to be, to hear of an improvement
being made in the mode of carrying them.

Our soldiers were greatly overloaded, especially on service, when they
had to carry, besides their arms, accoutrements and ammunition, their
canteens, haversacks, and well-filled knapsacks, their great coats,
and often wet and consequently very heavy blankets, and sometimes in
addition two or three days bread, and generally ten extra rounds of
ball cartridges. Overloading soldiers in this manner was down right
madness, especially if we had considered the description of men we too
often had to deal with; and this will never answer in the more rapid
modes of carrying on war, to which we must hereafter look forward.

I saw it not along ago announced in a daily paper, that the recruiting
of the army had been very successful, 13,000 men having been raised for
the line, and had joined their corps in the course of 1838. Of that
number, more than 4000 were passed in the London district, and this was
exclusive of men raised for the East India Company's service. By this
it would appear, that London alone furnishes about a third of the men
raised to fill up casualties in Her Majesty's regiments.

It is very likely that the editor of the paper, who seemed so pleased
at being able to afford us this intelligence, is a zealous advocate for
doing away with flogging in the army; but if such be the description of
men of which it is chiefly composed, any person of common sense must
see that it is impossible to do so, for what are these men in general
but the vitiated and debilitated part of our population.

I have no doubt but it is very desirable that the country should get
rid of such subjects, who are mostly unfit for any military purpose
whatever; but why, at a great expense, burden the army with them?
Would it not be much better to allow the worthy Yankees to have many
of them at once, as emigrants or soldiers; and if sufficient authority
were given to our Police Magistrates, they could very soon, by only
threatening such fellows, with what a certain Colonel once upon a time
practised in Ireland with so much success, make volunteers in plenty,
and thus save our sympathizing friends the trouble and expence of
enticing them to desert from their corps in the Canadas. I am well
acquainted with their proceedings in this way, and can therefore speak
from experience, having been for some time employed upon the staff
of the army stationed in that part of the world. I certainly had at
that time no trifling task assigned me to make arrangements, so as
to have a good look-out kept all along the extensive frontier of the
lower Province, to prevent desertions, to which our soldiers were much
addicted, and encouraged by promises of both money and land, but which
were seldom intended to be fulfilled; indeed, most of those who got
off had nothing else left for it, in order to keep themselves from
starving, but to become once more soldiers, and to fight against their
old comrades.

It was supposed by some officers, that shooting a number of them (I
saw six shot in one day at Chambly), who were caught in attempting
to cross the boundary line, would have put a stop to this disgrace
to our army, but it had no effect whatever; indeed nothing we could
devise produced any change in this respect, until it was made the duty
of commanding officers to give me immediate information whenever a man
was missed from his corps. Small detachments of dragoons were posted at
certain points to convey to me at St. Johns the necessary intelligence.
Upon receiving it, the out-posts were instantly informed of the
circumstance. At the same time parties of Indian warriors were sent out
in all directions in search of him, and a reward was held out to them
for bringing him in. These arrangements being made known to the several
corps, and the deceptions of our kind neighbours being pointed out to
them, a complete stop was thus put for the time to desertions. But are
men who would so readily desert, those Great Britain should have in
her armies? I ought here however to mention, to the honour of my old
friends, the 88th, or Connaught Rangers, that they were exempted, by
Sir Thomas Brisbane, from witnessing executions for this crime, as not
a man of that corps had deserted to the United States.

In order to show what little effect executing men for desertion had
upon others, I shall take the liberty of mentioning what took place
upon one occasion at St. Johns. My General being absent at Montreal,
as Brigade-Major attached to the troops, most of the melancholy duty
of superintending such executions fell to my share. A private of De
Meuron's regiment was at this time to be shot. The troops were formed
in three sides of a square, at the other side towards the forest the
grave was dug, and the coffin for the criminal to kneel upon, was
placed, as usual upon such occasions, beside it. The Provost, with the
firing party escorting the prisoner, and with the band of the regiment
at their head playing the Dead march, entered the square--when, to my
surprise, there proudly marched the prisoner--coolly smoking a cigar.
Seeing at once the bad effects likely to result from such evident
contempt of death, painful as it was to me, I called the Provost, and
ordered him to take away the cigar from him. On approaching the grave,
the prisoner walked quietly, but steadily forward, looked into it, and
turning round to me, said, in French, "it will do." But still more
to my surprise, yet with equal calmness, he walked up to his coffin,
and before I was aware of what he was about, with his middle finger
and thumb he measured its length, and turning round again to me, he
said, in French, which his corps generally spoke, "it will do also."
This was so far beyond any thing I had ever before witnessed, that I
found it necessary to direct the Provost to proceed with the execution
as quickly as possible; he therefore went up to the prisoner with a
handkerchief, and, as is customary, offered to bind up his eyes. He
however, pushed the Provost aside, exclaiming, in French, "I am a brave
soldier, and have often looked death in the face, and shall not shrink
from it now." The Provost then desired him, or rather made signs to
him, to kneel upon his coffin, but he replied, "I prefer standing, and
shall do so firmly." "Vive L'Empereur, vive Napoleon," were his last
words. The party fired, and in an instant he ceased to exist.

He was a Frenchman, and had been a prisoner of war for a considerable
time in England, but had been very improperly allowed to enlist into De
Meuron's regiment; which he had, no doubt, entered with the intention
of deserting the first opportunity which should present itself.

I have yet to mention our North American possessions; but it would
appear, that it is now in contemplation, to employ corps of veterans
upon the Canadian and our other North American frontiers. It is,
however, evident that whoever can have suggested such a scheme, must
have altogether overlooked, or be ignorant of the rigorous nature of
a Canadian winter, and must likewise have forgotten, that almost all
our veterans have spent a great portion of their lives in tropical
climates, which cannot be supposed to have prepared their constitutions
to bear up against such cold as is quite unknown in any part of Great
Britain, as indicated by registers of the thermometer kept during
a residence there; where it ranges from zero to 10, 20 and even 35
degrees below it; and should a strong wind prevail along with such
cold, any one exposed to it is very likely to be frost-bitten. It
may also be supposed, that the proposers of such a plan, are not
aware of its being often necessary during winter in Canada, to have
sentries relieved, or at least visited every half hour; for if
they be unfortunately overcome by the severity of the cold, and in
consequence fall asleep, it is certain death. Are worn-out men, many
of them already martyrs to rheumatism, or must soon become so, fit
for service in such a country, and to which they may be sent from
their homes, probably reckoned upon as permanent, contrary perhaps to
their wishes, and very likely only to suit the economical notions of
penny-wise theorist and grumblers, who grudge old soldiers and sailors,
even the pittance their services entitle them to, whilst they would
handsomely reward the author of a mischievous pamphlet? But are these
poor veterans, I again ask, fit to guard such an extensive frontier,
constantly menaced by hardy and restless men, inured to a North
American climate?

I have no doubt but that prejudiced men, and such as are always ready
to cavil at any change proposed, be it good or bad, will at first be
inclined to look upon what I have suggested for keeping up our army,
as not only a wild and visionary, but also as an impracticable scheme;
yet all I request is a full and fair consideration of what I have said
and brought forward; and it ought now, I think, to be obvious, that our
regiments must be composed of a superior description of men, if the
country is to be served as it ought to be in our future wars, as will,
I trust, more fully appear as I proceed.

I shall now beg to remind officers, in general, of the numbers of
soldiers who arrived in Portugal and Spain, who went into hospitals
before we had many weeks carried on military operations in those
countries, many of whom, as might have been expected from their early
debilitating habits, never rejoined their regiments; and throughout
the war when fresh battalions arrived from England, nearly the same
thing invariably occurred, and with detachments of recruits for corps
already in the field, it was still worse, so much so, that we could
never calculate upon one-third of the new comers remaining fit for duty
with their regiments, even for a short time after their first arrival;
some of them, however, as they became more habituated to campaigning,
turned out to be good soldiers. Now many of these were men who had been
probably raised, according to our present system of recruiting, in
London, or in our manufacturing districts, and thus the country was put
to an enormous but useless expense.

The soldiers we could chiefly depend upon, were those who originally
belonged to the corps, or had come to us from many of the militia
regiments, and particularly those who had been brought up to early
habits of labour in our agricultural districts. I am aware that many of
the men we got as volunteers from the militia, had been called out from
our manufacturing population, but their habits and health had been much
improved by being obliged to relinquish debilitating practices, by good
feeding, and regular military exercises for a length of time before
we got them. A long peace has probably brought into our corps a more
robust description of men, than we had often to make the best we could
of during the late wars, and many of whom were frequently most wretched
creatures, so much so, that it was unfair to expect that British
officers, however zealous they might be, could always be successful in
battle against the finest men of France, which the conscription brought
into the French ranks; but if an immediate increase of the army, to any
considerable extent, should become requisite, and if the present system
of recruiting is to be still pursued, the same generally unprofitable
and expensive materials must be resorted to, for augmenting or
completing the respective establishments of our old, and also of any
new corps which it might be necessary to form, and many of whom must be
again found to sink under the fatigues and hardships of war, and the
weight of their knapsacks. I must, however, declare that none of the
inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland are deficient in courage. But
let us reflect upon the state into which Sir John Moore's army (which
almost set him distracted) had got in the retreat to Corunna. Almost
all the corps had become completely disorganized in every respect, and
had nearly lost the appearance of regular troops. An opportunity of
fighting presented itself, and in a moment steady and well disciplined
British battalions appeared in the field. Such were the strange beings
British officers had to manage as well as they could.

It would appear that a new plan is about to be adopted for
re-organizing and training the militia, and that the men are in future
to be raised at a small bounty to serve for a period of five years;
and that the whole are to be formed into battalions, of one thousand
strong each. The training to take place annually, in portions of two
companies at a time, for 28 days, under the adjutant, or permanent
staff; which in future is to consist of an adjutant, a serjeant-major,
eleven serjeants, one drum-major, and five drummers: one Serjeant to do
the duty of quarter-master-serjeant; and it is intended to allow a part
of the men to volunteer annually for the line.

This appears to me an exceedingly bad plan. In the first place,
the corps of militia must hereafter be composed of a very inferior
description of men to what they were of old; and flogging must, as
a matter of course, be persevered in; but why in these times are
the militia to be embodied and badly trained at a considerable and
unnecessary expense to the country; for it is quite time enough to
think of calling out this force when the country may be threatened by
an enemy with invasion; for with the fine regular army I have in view,
the tranquillity of the United Kingdom can be completely secured;
and such militia corps, as those that seem to be in contemplation,
must be the very worst description of troops which could possibly be
employed in case of commotions. I must sincerely hope that the old
and constitutional mode of calling out the good and true men of the
nation to serve in the militia regiments will never be abandoned, and
I yet trust to seeing it extended, as I have proposed, to the Guards
and regular army. Surely I have shewn plainly enough the evils of
our present recruiting system to dissipate the notion of extending
it to the militia. I have long entertained a dislike to the plan of
enlistment, unless every possible inquiry were made into the characters
of the men who offered themselves as recruits; and I endeavoured to act
in this manner some years ago, when commanding a depot at Glasgow. I
had an old friend in that city, who had been one of its magistrates,
and could look back to the period when only herring boats could come
up to the Broomilaw, and who knew every body. I never took a recruit
without the approbation of my friend the Bailie; but he rejected so
many, who were instantly taken by other depots, of which there were
several at the time in Scotland, that I was at last called upon to
say why I did not get on quicker with the enlistment of men for the
regiment. I gave as my reason, that I was anxious to take only men who
could prove that they were respectable in character; but this was not
deemed satisfactory, and I had no longer any thing for it but to take
such as presented themselves; and then I certainly got on fast enough
with recruiting.

Not very long after this, the Bailie came to see me, and I happened at
the time to be superintending the drill of several strong squads of my
newly enlisted recruits. The Bailie looked closely at them all, and I
could not help fancying that I read alarm in the countenances of many
of my prizes. "Well, Colonel," said the Bailie, "the city of Glasgow
is infinitely indebted to you, for you have freed it of many deserving
characters;" but observing that I became rather chop-fallen, he added,
"Never mind, man--they'll fight--they'll fight like devils. Was there
ever a better fighting regiment in the world than the ----, and they
were nearly all raised in Glasgow, which was, to my certain knowledge,
very peaceable for many a day after they were gone from it."

I am at this moment reminded, by what occurred upon the retreat to
Corunna, of the state into which many of our men were brought upon
that and other occasions from want of shoes. I may venture to say,
that we had seldom taken the field a fortnight--and our armies had
even more than once to halt on this account--when the greater part of
the soldier's shoes had gone to pieces, and others could not always be
got to replace them. This destruction of shoes was in a great measure
occasioned by the previous injudicious practice of highly polishing
them with injurious kinds of blacking, which I suppose must continue
to be the fashion in these quiet times; and I hope I may be allowed
to say, that whenever a corps of infantry is ordered upon service,
this practice should be positively forbidden. Two good pairs of
boots--not such clumsy concerns as some of the Russian soldiers wore
in France--should be properly prepared for every man--that is, well
saturated with the water-proof stuff, now so much used by sports-men,
and they should never after have anything else put upon them but some
of this composition, which not only softens, but also tends to preserve
them for a considerable time. Such boots will certainly not look so
well as those now in general use; yet for grand occasions, the soldier
might be made to carry another finer polished pair; but with the boots
I want, and good stockings, every soldier should be furnished, or
he cannot march as he ought to do, and is, therefore, so far unfit
for service. Some people may consider this trifling, but experienced
soldiers will think otherwise.

The plan I have suggested of calling out the regular army, of course,
overturns the present defective depot system, which seems to me to be
only calculated to give officers habits of idleness and restlessness;
and their frequent removals from the companies abroad to those forming
the depots, requiring others to be sent out to replace them, afford
opportunities of indulging in such pernicious habits. Depots are but
very inferior schools for the instruction of officers, non-commissioned
officers, or privates. The ten companies assembled form a fine
battalion, well adapted for all kinds of military movement and
instruction: a depot is quite the reverse of this.

There are now before me notes upon certain points, which I wish to
bring under consideration; but if they should appear to some readers
tiresome, or uncalled for, I can only regret that they should seem
so, and I must request that they will arm themselves with patience
sufficient to enable them to accompany me to the end of the chapter.

Regimental bands are looked upon as very pretty and necessary
appendages to corps; but as it is most essential that as few soldiers
as possible should be taken out of the ranks, it might be advisable to
consider whether it would not be wise to place them upon a different
footing. The present plan takes away from their companies perhaps
twenty soldiers to make second-rate musicians; as more men are almost
always occupied in this way, (at least it was so formerly) than
regulations would admit of; and supposing that all our regiments were
made light infantry, there would, I conclude, be neither drummers
nor fifers; but, in place of them, one sergeant as bugle-major, and
two buglers per company, and two extra buglers to accompany (when
necessary) detachments, the whole to be clothed almost the same as the
other soldiers; and I would also arm them with light muskets--indeed,
those which belonged to light companies generally contrived, when in
the field, to arm themselves. These muskets might be slung over their
shoulders when they were required to cheer the regiment on a march, or
to attract the fair to the windows as corps passed through towns; and
most delightful strains, at least, to a military ear, can be produced
by key bugles, French horns, trumpets, &c. There should, however, be
one good sized drum, on the new principle, allowed to mark the time;
and surely twenty-three men per regiment are quite sufficient for such
purposes, especially if some of them were also taught to perform upon a
few other instruments.

The corporal and ten pioneers per regiment, who are generally nothing
else but so many attendants upon the quarter-master and his sergeant,
should be done away with; that is, I would keep the men hitherto
employed in this way where they ought to be--in the ranks. If men are
wanted for fatigue, as it is termed, the soldiers should be employed
on it as a duty, and their time can never be better occupied than
in all kinds of labour or works, especially those which may tend to
instruct them in what is likely to be required of them at sieges, or
during campaigns; and above all, they should have a knowledge of the
best and quickest methods of making roads, temporary bridges, &c., and
even of preparing food, and lighting fires; if they were also taught to
be boatmen and good swimmers so much the better. It certainly would be
very desirable that soldiers had more practice in this way than is the
fashion in our army. But having mentioned preparing food, I think it
important to say a few words upon the subject.

The comfort in which the men of the 5th battalion 60th regiment (who
were chiefly Germans,) lived upon service was very striking, when
compared with the wretched diet of the generality of British soldiers.
I must, however, preface my remarks upon this subject by the following
division order which was issued by Major-general Colville, at Moimenta
de Beira, in Portugal, on the 29th March, 1813, respecting this corps:

"No. 9. A detachment of the 5th battalion 60th, has arrived at
head-quarters under the command of Captain Kelly, and which having left
Lisbon consisting of fifty men, has brought up all but one man who was
left sick at Coimbra, and no prisoners.

"This is so unlike the report of any detachment of the British part of
the division that has arrived at quarters since the Major-General's
taking the command of it, that he cannot help mentioning the
mortifying distinction, in the hopes that there may be yet left among
the good men of the division regard enough for their own honours to
keep a check upon the conduct of those of an opposite character."

It seemed to be settled amongst themselves, that every man of the
mess of the 5th battalion 60th, had to carry something, that is
say--highly-spiced meats, such as sausages, cheese, onions, garlic,
lard, pepper, salt, vinegar, mustard, sugar, coffee, &c.; in short,
whatever could add to or make their meals more palatable, nourishing,
or conducive to health. As soon as the daily allowance of beef was
issued, they set to work and soon produced a first-rate dinner or
supper, which were often improved by certain wild herbs which they knew
where to look for, whereas, in attempting this, I have known instances
of our men poisoning themselves; and what a contrast to this were the
ways of our too often thoughtless beings who rarely had any of the
above articles--day after day they boiled their beef, just killed,
in the lump, in water, which they seldom contrived to make deserving
the name of soup or broth. This and their bread or biscuit was what
they usually lived upon. But I lament to be obliged to add, that their
thoughts, of course unconnected with military matters, were too often
directed to ardent spirits and to the means of procuring enough of
it; for though a certain allowance, usually of rum, was issued daily,
this was not sufficient to satisfy their longings for more. And it was
always known when the rum was about to be given out when we heard a
shout in the camp, and from many voices a cry of "turn out for rum!"

Our mode of messing in barracks is extremely regular, and much in the
style so carefully exhibited in Russia to visitors of importance, and
is well calculated to produce effect. In general (at least in former
times,) cooks were hired, and the soldiers' wives were sometimes
engaged for this purpose, so that most of the men were kept almost in
ignorance of learning the simple art of boiling beef and potatoes: they
only knew, that at fixed hours daily, they were sure of a breakfast and
dinner; and although this was to be admired in quiet times, it sadly
unfitted soldiers for what they were afterwards to turn their minds
and hands to in the field; and it also sometimes left them more money
than they could spend with propriety. But if their thoughts could now
be more directed to the German and French style of living it would be
attended with the best results, and we should hear less of drunkenness
and the crimes arising from out of it in our regiments. These hints
might, perhaps, be thought useful to those interested in the welfare
of our population in general, whose early habits are too often very
pernicious and demoralizing.

The observations of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, on the 1st and
3rd of October, 1812, at the siege of Burgos, will shew the necessity
of our soldiers' being accustomed to labour and the consequences of
their not being habituated to it:--"The Commander of the Forces is
concerned to state, that the working parties in the trenches do not
perform their duty, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to
relieve them every six hours, &c.;" and his Grace adds--"The officers
and soldiers of the army should know that to work during a siege is as
much a part of their duty as it is to engage the enemy in the field;
and they may depend upon it, that unless they perform the work allotted
to them, with due diligence, they cannot acquire the honour which their
comrades have acquired in former sieges." The Guards were exempted from
the censure contained in this order; indeed their conduct was most
exemplary on all occasions. And we can again read in a general order,
dated Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811:--

"No. 2. As during the two years which the brigade of Guards have been
under the command of the Commander of the Forces, not only no soldier
has been brought to trial before a general court-martial, but none has
been confined in a public guard; the Commander of the Forces desires
that the attendance of the brigade, at the execution to-morrow, may be
dispensed with."

This ought surely to convince the country, that though the changes I
have proposed, as to the officers of the Guards, may be necessary for
the general good of the army; yet the idea of disbanding such troops
can only be entertained by an ignorant and absurdly prejudiced mind.

I have often wondered it has never been deemed indispensable, that an
uniform system of regimental economy was adopted for the whole army.
This most desirable object is by no means attained by the book of
general regulations and orders; for although there is to be found in
it much that is useful, still a vast deal more is required to come up
to what is necessary for the guidance of a regiment in the various
situations in which it may be placed; and the want of such a well
digested plan is the reason we see such a difference in the state of
corps; some being in every respect in the highest possible order,
whilst others are the very reverse. The former is entirely owing to
their being commanded by talented and judicious officers; the latter
is evidently occasioned by their being under men who are themselves
ignorant, inexperienced, and yet very likely self-sufficient. Many
regiments have good standing orders if they were steadily acted up
to; but much depending upon the will of the commanding officer, he
most probably adopts something of his own, which is often injudicious,
or even injurious; or as much only of the old standing orders as he
thinks fit; or perhaps he allows the whole to become a dead letter.
A matter of such importance as this should not be left to whim or
caprice; but a simple, uniform, and sufficiently comprehensive system
should be established for the whole army, for the guidance of regiments
in barracks and quarters at home and abroad; upon a march, or when
on board ship, or in any situation, but especially when employed in
the field. If this were done, and positive orders given, that there
should not be the slightest deviation from the system laid down, on the
part of commanding officers, we should hear less of corps being more
annoyed and teazed by one commander than another; and we should not be
able to observe that remarkable difference to be met with amongst them,
both in appearance and discipline.

There could not be much difficulty in effecting this most important
object. The standing orders of some corps, though in general too
diffuse and complicated, and requiring too many returns or reports from
companies, &c., would afford ample ground-work for all useful purposes,
except in what is essential for the field; in which respect, all those
I have seen were totally defective; but uniformity in every point is as
necessary in this as it is in military movements; and if judiciously
adopted, would be found as strikingly beneficial, as the changes
were from the fancies of every commanding officer to the well known
"eighteen manœuvres."

Having proposed to do away with regimental pioneers, to make up
efficiently for them, two men of good character should be enlisted--but
that only for service in the field, to take charge of and lead a
bat-horse each, to carry on well fitted pack-saddles a few of such
useful tools as might be required for ordinary military purposes.
The surgeon, at such times, also requires a man and a horse of this
kind for his instruments and medicines; and so do the pay-master and
adjutant, for the conveyance of money, books, and various indispensable
papers and returns. These ought always to march in the rear of the
corps to which they belong. Thus, by doing away both with generally
indifferent musicians and misappropriated pioneers, I would save to
each regiment about thirty soldiers, or about half the effectives of a
company of the present day.

It will surprise those who know nothing of war, and even many
military men, when I mention how many soldiers are lost, I may say,
to the service, taken out of the ranks of corps to be employed as
non-combatant clerks, servants or bat-men, horse-keepers or grooms,
&c. The head-quarters and staff sweep off numbers in this way beyond
belief. The general officers and staff of divisions and brigades,
including engineer officers, staff surgeons, commissariat, &c. if
allowed, quite as bad. Then come field officers and regimental staff,
and perhaps forty captains and subalterns per regiment, all of whom
must be supplied; a few with two, for taking care of their chargers
and pack-horses or mules, and all with at least one each to look
after pack-horses for the conveyance of baggage; most of it probably
indispensable, if it is expected that these gentlemen are to be kept
efficient. But there is another demand of a man per company for the
care of pack-horses for the carriage of tents, &c. as wheel carriages
for such purposes ought never to be allowed upon the line of march.

For these various occupations, I have no hesitation in saying, many
hundreds of soldiers are taken away from where they should be, and
corps are thus deprived of their best men, and greatly weakened before
they come into contact with an enemy.

This must appear almost incredible to many good people, who will
naturally be surprised what Mr. Hume, that mirror of economists,
could have been about; but who, they may depend upon it, invariably
contrives to have, at last, the candle burnt at both ends. But how
indignant they must now be to hear, probably for the first time, that
they were obliged to pay for such a number of soldiers, who only made
a figure upon paper to the disadvantage of the general's reputation
who commanded the army in the field, who was supposed to have had,
perhaps, 30,000 men to act with, whereas in reality he could not bring
into action 25,000; and when a battle took place, there were a few more
drains from the ranks besides the killed and wounded; for the latter
and sick required attendants at the several hospital stations, and also
on the road to them; and how often have I, as a Brigade-major of the
3d division, had to encounter the cross looks of commanding officers
of regiments, when I could not avoid calling upon them for officers,
non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, for such purposes, when the
enemy had, perhaps, sufficiently thinned their ranks.

I would suggest that money should be allowed, and, if possible, no
soldiers whatever for any of these purposes at home or abroad, and
certainly not upon service; and even at home it would be advisable
to make officers a proper allowance for private, or non-combatant
servants, so that an end might at once be put to the custom of taking
away soldiers from their duties to be employed as such. All servants
should however, be regularly enlisted as soldiers are at present, but
for a limited period only; and they should be bound to accompany
their masters abroad, or upon any kind of service; and commanding
officers of regiments should have the power of discharging, at their
master's request, these servants if found guilty of bad or improper
conduct, and of enlisting others to replace them, of course, such
servants come under martial law; but what I have proposed, in this
respect, is nothing new, for does not history tell us, of non-combatant
servants being of old attached to armies; and allow me to ask, with
what intention is it, that officers receive at the commencement of a
campaign, and at fixed periods afterwards, bat and forage money? If
the sums granted are insufficient--which they undoubtedly are--for
providing servants, field equipments, pack-horses, &c. more should be
given, as it must be admitted, that they are all indispensable. It
could never, however, have been intended, that the number of muskets
and bayonets in the ranks, were to be so much reduced, as I have shown
is the case, to supply men for the purposes enumerated, when by a
trifling comparative increase of the expenses of a war, our armies
could be kept efficient, and in such a complete state, as to enable a
General to carry it on with that vigour, which is always so essential
towards its successful and speedy termination.

But the necessity of what I have just recommended being adopted,
appeared in so strong a light, to one of our best officers, that we
read in a general order, dated Tholen, 20th of December, 1813, as
follows:--

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces being desirous to render the army
for the field as effective as possible, directs that all soldiers
acting as servants to officers, shall always appear in uniform, and
carry their arms and accoutrements on the march. The servants of
regimental officers to be in the ranks on the march, and the Commander
of the Forces calls upon the General and other officers in command
strictly to inforce this order."

"No. 2. With a view to diminish, as much as possible, requisitions
on regiments for soldiers as servants, General Sir Thomas Graham
authorizes any officer who is entitled by the usage of the service
to appear mounted and keep a horse, to hire a servant as bat-man in
lieu of a soldier, for which he will be allowed at the rate of 4_s._
6_d._ (quite insufficient) per week and a ration; but it is distinctly
understood, that the allowance is not to be extended to any persons
attached to this army, who, by the custom of the service, are not
entitled to soldiers to wait upon them, and whenever it is drawn, an
effective soldier is to be thereby restored to the army."

"No. 6. The Commander of the Forces strongly recommends to all general
officers of the army to return immediately any bat-men they may have to
their corps, and to direct their staff to do the same, at all events
no officer of any rank is to employ more than one soldier of this army
to attend upon him, whether he acts as his own personal servant or
bat-man."

"No. 7. Field officers of regiments are entitled each to a servant and
bat-man, and of course to draw the allowance for each, when men from
the ranks are not employed."

"No. 9 Announces that such servants come under martial law."

I believe that I could not any where, more conveniently or properly,
introduce some observations, I consider it necessary to make upon the
baggage of an army in the field, and upon some other matters connected
with it, than at the close of this chapter, and I feel convinced
that experienced officers will allow, that is a difficult subject to
enter upon. It must, however, have been obvious to many, how much the
quantity of baggage gradually increases as a campaign advances. Various
articles are accumulated in all sorts of ways, but chiefly by servants
upon the line of march, in the towns they pass through, in the field of
battle, and above all at sieges.

We unluckily have many wants, almost unknown to the people of other
countries, arising out of our early habits of indulging in many
comforts; indeed, so many and so productive are they of enjoyment, that
in spite of what some philosophers may say to the contrary, we cannot
easily divest ourselves of the remembrance of them, for with most of
us they too frequently become indispensables, or in other words, they
are apt to make us rather selfish. But a General who may wish to keep
such wants within reasonable bounds, or who is determined not to be
overwhelmed with baggage, followers, and animals of burden, must be
wholely uninfluenced by any other feeling than that of the good of the
public service, and must cut off, at once, with an unsparing hand, all
superfluities of every description; and he must endeavour to keep the
whole under due restrictions. All the odium of this ought not, however,
to be thrown upon the Commander of any army about to take the field, as
it must, to a certainty, render him unpopular with many; but it would
be much wiser that a British army should have, at all times for its
guidance, established regulations, which no one could, on any account,
be allowed to deviate from.

Selfish feelings never, I believe, show themselves more strongly
than amongst landsmen on board ship, and amongst too many men in the
field. Some, I have no doubt, have seen individuals retire to a snug
corner, to enjoy unobserved something good which they had in their
haversacks, lest they should be obliged to offer part of it to hungry
comrades. Others have been known to sleep sound, warm, and dry in
their tents, having probably offered shares of them, but in such a
way to the officers of their own companies, that even they could not
accept of their liberality, and preferred reposing at the roots of
trees, or behind hedges, exposed to the pitiless storm. My only object
in alluding to such trifling matters is, in the first instance, to
show that these things do sometimes occur, and, moreover, to try to
inculcate, if I can, into such badly brought up men, at least a little
feeling for the wants of others. Yet I would not leave it in their
power thus to enjoy their comforts--at all events in such situations,
for I would make the officers of a company live and sleep in the same
tent or hut, and be partakers of the same fare whatever it might be.

A regimental mess at home or abroad, is admirably calculated to keep
up respectability, by insuring a proper degree of genteel economy; but
of this the officers of corps cannot avail themselves in the field,
and then it becomes requisite to act upon established regulations. The
officers of a company should be made to have in common, a tent of a
particular size and shape, and they should all three contribute towards
its purchase, as well as towards the procuring of two horses or mules,
which they should be obliged to keep. I would also fix upon a trunk or
rather a portmanteau for each, of a certain size and shape. One of the
horses should carry, on a well-fitted pack-saddle, the two subaltern's
portmanteau, and the tent between them. The other horse should carry
the captain's portmanteau, which might be a very little larger than
those allowed to subalterns, but care should be taken that its size was
also fixed upon; and this should be balanced upon the horse's back by a
canteen (bought also amongst them) for the use of the mess, and between
them a bag of a certain size, made of some water-proof stuff, could be
placed, in which might be conveyed some useful articles for general
comfort, especially such as might be considered necessary, when the
country, the seat of war, could afford but few supplies.

It appears to me that the officers of a company could not possibly
contrive to get on, for any length of time, with less than those
two animals; but in the portmanteau should be carried, besides their
clothes and a blanket each, their mattresses made air tight, so as
to be inflated when necessary, and which can be rolled up into very
small compass, when not wanted for use; and such mattresses not only
make excellent beds, but also secure those who use them completely
from damp from the ground. This is all that could or ought to be
allowed to company officers in the field; and positive orders should
prevent any other article whatever from being put upon the horses, as
all good purposes are at once defeated if they are permitted to be
overloaded; and even the private servants or bat-men should be made to
carry their own knapsacks, in place of fastening them, as they will
always try to do, upon the loads. I at the same time conclude, that
the baggage of a company, regiment, brigade and division, marches in
proper order, and if one overloaded or sore backed animal knocks up,
the whole is most annoyingly and injuriously detained in consequence
upon the road. In any arrangement, however, of this kind, I should
expect that the baggage and animals allowed to field officers and
regimental staff, and to commissariat and medical officers, &c. were
likewise strictly brought under regulations, and the name of the owner,
or the number of the troop, company, and corps, being conspicuously
painted on a water-deck or cover, to go over the load of each animal,
any irregularity, and the individual who might occasion it, could be at
once ascertained.

It is quite impossible to make arrangements for company officers who
may be taken ill, and obliged to go to the hospital stations in the
rear. A company in the field is what must be kept in view in any
plan of this kind. The medical department, with the means I have
yet to propose to place at its disposal, would have to look to such
casualties. I must, however, here observe, that in Portugal especially,
we had often far too many officers at such stations--for instance at
Lisbon, or rather Belem, Coimbra, &c. where it was well known many of
them staid so long, that Lord Wellington had often to give them very
broad hints, that it was high time they should remember that their
regiments were in presence of the enemy. Some of these gentlemen, when
absent from their corps, had well supplied their wants, and returned at
last to their divisions, nicely mounted on a horse, probably purchased
in Lisbon, attended by a soldier, and perhaps a Portuguese boy, leading
a mule or two heavily loaded with the good things of this world. Thus
the baggage and animals with the army were always increasing. The
mule or horse had very likely soon to be sold, from want of food and
people to look after them, so that the good things brought up being
consumed, the temporary campaigner again fell so sick, that it became
indispensable for him to revisit an hospital station, to recruit his
health and replenish his supplies. This is by no means an over-drawn
picture; and when it was sometimes asked by those with the army, what
had become of so and so, the common answer was, that he had taken up a
strong position near Lisbon, his right upon the Tagus, and his left
at Belem; or that he was teaching the good people of Lisbon to cross
the river in cork boats,--for these gentlemen were not without their
amusements. It however strikes me at this moment, that as many of
these frequenters of hospital stations were really seriously ill, it
would be desirable, that when young gentlemen presented themselves to
be examined for commissions, it should not only be ascertained that
they had been educated, but also that they were fit for service. But I
must proceed with other matters. The large bell tents now in general
use for soldiers in the field, accommodate certainly a great many of
them at night, when well packed with their feet to the poles; but they
are much too heavy to be carried on the backs of animals when wet, or
when they must be struck before sunrise, saturated with heavy dew. The
baggage mules were often knocked up by them in this state. It is a bad
plan that of carrying the large iron camp kettles upon animals for the
use of companies; the light tin ones carried in turn by the soldiers
themselves, in a bag made for the purpose, are greatly to be preferred,
as they are always at hand.

It must altogether depend upon circumstances, but it would at all
times require serious consideration, whether company officers should
be allowed to keep riding horses or not. When they are allowed to ride
on the line of march, they are certainly enabled to go unfatigued into
action, and to look more closely after their men at the end of a day's
work; but I beg to ask (servants being along with the baggage) who
are to take the charge of their horses, when they must dismount when
near the enemy, on going into action; and no soldier should be taken
out of the ranks for such a purpose; how can any country be supposed
capable of furnishing the enormous quantity of forage required for such
increased numbers of animals, after regiments of Cavalry, Infantry,
(I mean those that must be kept by them) Artillery, and the other
departments have been supplied? Here therefore an almost insurmountable
difficulty presents itself, and it becomes wise to curtail as much as
possible in time, for every animal allowed to be kept, must be fed in
some way or other.

The fewer women permitted to accompany an army the better, for they are
generally useless, and tend immensely to increase the number of animals
and quantity of baggage. I once knew a general, who, in an order he
issued, was so ungallant, as to style these ladies, "his advanced guard
of infamy;" and I must admit that he had too often just cause to style
them so.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington was often greatly annoyed at the
enormous consumption of forage by his army, and found it necessary to
issue many orders upon the subject, of which I shall now give a few.

  "G.O.  _San Pedro, 19th May, 1809._

 "No. 10. As the Commander of the Forces has reason to believe many
 horses and mules are kept by even the soldiers of the army, and
 maintained by means entirely inconsistent with discipline and good
 order, he desires officers commanding regiments and brigades, to
 inquire into the number of horses and mules which are attached to the
 regiments under their command, and to enforce the immediate sale of
 those not allowed to be kept by the regulations of the army."

  "G.O.  _Zarza Mayor, 4th July, 1809._

 "No. 17. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of general
 officers commanding divisions and brigades, to the general orders
 of the 4th and 5th of March, by the late Commander of the Forces,
 relative to the use of mules allowed for conveying camp kettles, in
 any service, except for the carriage of camp kettles.

 "No. 18. The consequence of loading them with other baggage is, that
 they are unequal to carry the kettles which they are given to convey,
 and the loads are so ill put on, that they fall from the mules, and
 the camp kettles do not arrive from the march till after the hour, at
 which they ought to be used by the troops."

  "G.O.  _Merida, 25th August, 1809._

 "No. 3. The army must not forage for themselves, but must get it from
 the Commissary according to the usual mode, by sending in returns of
 the number of animals for whom forage is required, and receiving from
 him the regular rations; or if forage cannot be provided in that mode,
 and it is necessary it should be taken from the fields, it must be
 taken according to the general orders of the 17th of June, 1839."

  "G.O.  _Villa Formosa, 13th April, 1811._

 "No. 1. The Commander of the Forces requests, that, if possible, the
 green corn may not be cut for the horses, &c. belonging to the army;
 and that they may, if possible, be turned into the grass fields in
 preference to the green corn. It must be understood, however, that the
 horses, &c. attached to the army, must be fed, and must have the green
 corn, if they cannot get grass."

  "G.O.  _Nave de Rey, 16th July, 1812._

 "No. 1. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the
 attention of the commissariat attached to divisions and brigades of
 Infantry, and to regiments of Cavalry, and of the general officers of
 the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to the orders which
 have been issued regarding the cutting of forage.

 "No. 2. He desires, that whenever it is possible, grass may be given
 to the horses and other animals, instead of straw with the corn in the
 ear.

 "No. 3. The Assistant Provosts must be employed to prevent the plunder
 of the corn-fields, and their destruction by turning cattle into them."

  "G.O.  _Frenada, 25th November, 1812._

 "No. 4. The Commander of the Forces has taken the precaution of having
 the grass mowed, and saved as hay, in many parts of the country in
 which the troops are now, or may be cantoned, which resource is ample
 for the food of all the animals of the army during the winter, if duly
 taken care of, and distributed under the regulations of the service.

 "No. 5. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn, however, that
 much of what was thus provided in this part of the country, has been
 already wasted, or trampled upon and destroyed, and in particular
 35,000 rations of hay, which were at Espeja, and of which Lieutenant
 Holborne took possession, has been destroyed.

 "No. 6. He entreats the attention of general officers, and commanding
 officers of regiments, to these orders, as they relate not only to the
 hay provided by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, but to the
 forage, and other resources of the country."

Much more might be given and said upon this most important subject;
but being apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience
of many readers, I shall only farther observe, that in the French
armies they act in a very summary manner with respect to carriages and
animals kept contrary to the rules of the service. All such carriages
and animals, and the persons along with them, are laid hold of by the
police, and taken to head-quarters, to be delivered up to the provost,
who reports the circumstances to the major-general, and who commonly
orders the transgressors to be punished by the provost-corporals, and
the carriages and animals to be sold for the benefit of the captors.

It now becomes necessary to consider other subjects connected with the
higher branches of the military profession, and which require to be so
well weighed, that I may, if possible, give offence to no one; at least
it shall be my study to endeavour to avoid doing so.




CHAP. V.


There are many schools in which officers should study in order to gain
a perfect knowledge of the military profession, but certainly none
can be selected superior to that of experience, in which previously
acquired science or theory can be usefully exemplified. But the best
of all teachers is decidedly Cæsar, who still speaks to soldiers in a
language which they can understand; and of this Napoleon was so well
aware, that he always expected his officers to have carefully studied
that great general's Commentaries, and which are so well translated
into French by General Toulongeon. As an instance--selected out of
many to be found in that finely written narrative--what can possibly
be a more admirable piece of military policy, than when Cæsar, as
he tells us, having found that his army had become alarmed at the
accounts received of the warlike appearance, and desperate valour of
the Germans under Ariovistus, he decides at once, to allow all who had
no stomach for fighting to depart, if they thought fit to do so; and
which instantly produced the effects he so wisely anticipated. And let
me ask, if a British army were again to get into a scrape, like that in
which the 3rd division, and part of our troops, found themselves on the
Garonne, just before the battle of Toulouse, and had at least four to
one pitted against them; and if our General announced, that those who
did not like the appearance of matters might go home; how many would go?

Cæsar perfectly understood the feelings of a Roman army, and knew how
to act upon them; but let us see what were those of even a commander of
a British regiment.

Colonel Forbes was left by order of Sir Thomas Picton, after the 3rd
division moved up the Garonne towards Toulouse, with the 45th regiment,
to guard the pontoon bridge across it, where a considerable part of
the army had passed. He had reason to think that a battle was about to
be fought; and the idea of his remaining in the rear in command, even
of such a regiment as the 45th, and though employed upon an important
duty, was intolerable. Almost every hour I received a letter from him,
urging me to represent to Sir Thomas Brisbane how unhappy he and his
regiment felt, at being left in such a situation; and entreating that
he might be allowed to give up his post to some troops more in the
rear, or to detachments coming up to join the army. His impatience was
for some time laughed at; but at last I had the pleasure of sending him
orders to abandon his post, and to replace himself and his regiment at
the head of the right brigade of the 3rd division. He came up just in
time for the battle of Toulouse; and in it he fell, gallantly leading
on his regiment in the unfortunate attempt made to force the passage of
the canal.

To be able to take advantage of the proper moment for acting upon
national feeling or character, is a strong proof of an officer being
qualified to command. But a Commander-in-Chief cannot give the world a
stronger proof of his fitness or unfitness for his high station than in
the men by whom he surrounds himself or employs--if the choice is left
to him--upon the staff of the army placed under his orders.

It is the opinion of many of our best soldiers, that no officer should
ever be taken from his regiment to be employed upon the staff, unless
his place in it be immediately and permanently supplied by another; for
no corps ought thus to be deprived of those allowed for carrying on its
duties; and such appointments have often been found to injure, in some
degree, the individuals themselves ever after as regimental officers.
What a corps might suffer in being thus deprived of its officers,
seemed to be always overlooked; and interest or patronage alone too
often guided those who had the power of recommending or selecting
officers for such important appointments; their fitness to perform the
duties attached to them was quite another matter, with which they did
not appear to trouble themselves; and I have no doubt but I would be
set down as a mere simpleton in the ways of the world, if I were to
imagine that they would ever act otherwise.

It must be acknowledged, that our selections of officers for staff
appointments were too often injudicious; but I do not allow that they
were ever carried to the extent, shewn by an able French writer, that
they were brought in France at the commencement of the year 1792,
when the Etat Major of their armies were in so wretched a state, that
it was found necessary to re-establish, quietly, but imperfectly,
what had been destroyed by a decree of the 5th of October, 1790. The
difficulties of the service augmented incessantly, from their ignorance
even of the old forms gone through, and which some fancied they could
remedy, by multiplying the numbers employed. The power of attaching
assistants to the Etat Major consequently grew into a complete abuse;
and at last, in the month of April, 1792, rose to such a pitch, that
what with the numbers employed, and through the choice made, the
Minister of War saw himself forced to try to put things to rights, by
a circular letter addressed to Generals commanding military divisions,
and which led to the dismissal from their employments of the whole of
these assistants. It, however, soon after became necessary to employ
the same, or others equally useless; and this letter did not by any
means put a stop to the increasing evils of interest and patronage,
for there were still appointed to the Etat Major the most improper
and ignorant men, and even girls, who had mounted uniforms, and
substituted the sword for the distaff. We are told that there is still
to be seen a letter from General Dumourier to Pache, the Minister of
War, reproaching him for having sent to his army an opera dancer as
an adjutant-general. Men of abilities were, as may be well supposed,
disgusted, whilst they were overwhelmed with business, to make up for
the ignorance of others; and they were necessitated to use every
expedient in order to get through, in any way, the tasks assigned them;
and thus the service only presented one mass of confusion, the Minister
of War not receiving connected reports or returns; and, as a matter of
course, he could not give satisfactory information, when called upon
to do so, to those really interested in knowing the state of the army.
Another circular was, in consequence, issued by the Minister of War,
dated Paris, the 20th of April, 1793; but it had no effect whatever,
because it was not only unreasonable, but ridiculous, to require from
men what they neither could do, nor knew how to do. The Committee of
Public Safety, struck with this state of things, set about putting
matters to rights; but two or three of its members, interested that the
disorders should continue, found means to overturn all, and the state
of the Etat Major was allowed to remain as hopeless as ever. It was
not therefore until about the 4th year of the Republic, that they were
able in some measure to put things into order, by turning out ignorant
and incapable men, and the Etat Major then became composed of some good
officers, who established plans to keep its machinery in movement; but
France had then had time to see the danger, which there always is, in
even slightly disorganizing useful establishments, under the pretence
of reforming them. These remarks do not apply directly to us, farther
than in the occasional appointment, through interest, of inefficient
officers, for the returns of a British army, at least its regiments,
were and are still well and regularly kept. Yet, I must say, that for
the guidance of our staff in the field, we can scarcely show that we
have a system, or what ought to be considered as such.

The staff of an army ought to be a distinct and permanent branch of
the service, and no officers should be employed upon it but those who
had received such an education, as is usually given to our engineers,
the usefulness of which is so ably demonstrated by experiments and
practice under Colonel Pasley, whose establishment for instruction (if
we except what the artillery are taught at Woolwich,) is the only one
worth keeping up; but it is a great drawback to our military service,
that the officers of engineers are not more frequently placed in high
responsible situations, and intrusted with high important commands and
missions; at all events, officers employed even as Aides-de-Camp, but
certainly as Brigade-Majors, or in the departments of the Adjutant
and Quarter-Master-General, should have had a first-rate military
education; but I repeat, that I would not ask where it had been
acquired, whether in France, Germany, or wherever it can be had upon
the most reasonable terms, for in England it is far too expensive.

Staff officers ought to be men of talents and of great enterprise and
perseverance, and should possess even a certain knowledge of what
is considered business, both in a civil and military point of view,
which would render them capable of ascertaining and calling forth the
various resources of a country. They should also be well acquainted
with military police duties, or the best modes of exercising military
law, in all its bearings, and to enable them to do this with advantage
to the army, and to the country, they should have attached to them
an intelligent _mounted police corps_. From the want of such an
establishment, which it is the work of years to form, how often, and
how severely have our armies suffered, and must continue to suffer till
a change takes place.

Inexperienced officers, if even well educated, taken suddenly from
their regiments, and, according to the fancy of general officers, or
in compliance with the wishes of injudicious and interested friends,
are unfit for, and must be ignorant of the complicated duties of the
staff; and our generals, at least of old, were themselves too often
unequal to instruct them. The consequences therefore invariably were,
that on first taking the field, nothing could be worse managed than the
departments over which our misnamed staff had to preside. The system,
if it deserved to be so called, being undefined or ill-digested, the
movements or manœuvres of the army, were, as a matter of course, often
badly arranged, and nearly as badly executed; its combinations, as
far as the staff were concerned in them, were frequently defective.
The General-in-Chief had little or no assistance from the generality
of them in the time of need, and it was really ridiculous to see how
even our common out-posts were sometimes thrown out, leaving the most
essential points unwatched, or wholly disregarded.

These are sweeping charges, and I ought to be able to shew that I am
justified in making them: for example then--some may remember that
on the 27th of July, 1809, the first day, I may say, of the battle of
Talavera, the enemy's light troops broke unexpectedly in upon us at
the Alberche river, when our troops were quite unprepared for such an
event; some young corps were surprised and consequently did not behave
well. Lord Wellington, himself, if I mistake not, and some of his staff
were placed in a very perilous situation in an old unroofed house, into
which they had gone in order to ascertain from its highest windows what
was going forward; and his Lordship had, immediately after, to take
upon himself, in a great measure, the direction of the hastily-formed
rear guard of infantry, consisting of the 45th regiment and 5th
battalion 60th; which corps, assisted by our cavalry, covered the
retreat of the advanced division till it reached the position in which
the battle of that night, and the following day were fought. But who,
that witnessed it, can ever forget the scene of confusion which took
place on the night of the 27th, amongst the Spaniards! They literally
swept away with them, in their panic, occasioned by the fire of a few
French sharpshooters who had followed up to their position, the part
of the rear-guard to which I belonged. These untoward events, were, in
a great measure, the consequence of the advanced division not being
managed by instructed or experienced staff officers; but I can scarcely
undertake to say, that even for some time afterwards this branch of our
service had become respectable, though it certainly had improved by
practice. In short, in point of movement and intelligence on the part
of regimental officers, the British corps of cavalry and infantry were,
in general, excellent; but we had not, with a few exceptions, many
officers of rank employed, either as generals or upon the staff, who
were capable of directing or making use of such troops scientifically,
or to advantage. It may be said, that in thus speaking of British
soldiers I now contradict my former assertions, but I by no means do
so; I here only allude to their discipline and courage in the field,
under good regimental officers, and not to what occurred too often upon
other occasions.

The French fairly worked us into practical knowledge of war at last;
not that the officers of that gallant nation were themselves so greatly
enlightened, as was generally supposed, or that they or their troops
gained the battles fought--although I often, and especially at first,
wondered they did not--but we had almost always to pay most dearly for
victory, that is to say, for getting possession of the field of battle,
which was sometimes all we had to boast of.

I may not, perhaps, appear to be borne out in the opinions I have
ventured to give, by Lord Wellington's general orders after the battle
of Talavera; I must, nevertheless, bring it before the reader to enable
him to come to a right conclusion:--

  "G.O.      _Talavera de la Reyna, 29th July, 1809._

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the officers
and troops for their gallant conduct in the two trying days of
yesterday and the day before, in which they have been engaged with,
and beaten off the repeated attacks of an army infinitely superior in
number.

"He has particularly to request that Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke will
accept his thanks for the assistance he has received from him, as well
as from the manner in which he led on the infantry under his command to
the charge of the bayonet. Major-General Hill, and Brigadier-General
Alexander Campbell, are likewise entitled, in a particular manner, to
the acknowledgments of the Commander of the Forces, for their gallantry
and ability with which they maintained their posts against the attacks
made upon them by the enemy.

"The Commander of the Forces has likewise to acknowledge the ability
with which the late Major-General M'Kenzie (whose subsequent loss the
Commander of the Forces laments,) withdrew the division under his
command from the out-posts, in front of the enemy's army, on the 27th
instant, as well as to Colonel Donkin for his conduct on that occasion.

"The Commander of the Forces, likewise, considers Lieutenant-General
Payne and the cavalry, particularly Brigadier-General Anson and his
brigade, who was principally engaged with the enemy, to be entitled
to his acknowledgments; as well as Brigadier-General Howarth and
his artillery; Major-General Tilson, Brigadier-General R. Stewart,
Brigadier-General Cameron, and the brigades under their commands,
respectively.

"He had opportunities of noticing the gallantry and discipline of the
5th battalion 60th and the 45th, on the 27th; and of the 29th and 1st
battalion 48th, on that night; and on the 28th, of the 7th and 53rd:
and he requests their commanding officers, Major Davey, Colonel Guard,
Colonel White, Colonel Donallan, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Myers,
and Lieutenant-Colonel Bingham to accept his particular thanks.

"The charge made by the brigade of Guards, under the command of
Brigadier-General H. Campbell, on the enemy's attacking column, was a
most gallant one, and the mode in which it was afterwards covered by
the 1st battalion of the 48th, was most highly creditable to that most
excellent corps, and to their commanding officer, Major Middlemore.

"The Commander of the Forces requests Colonel Fletcher, the Chief
Engineer, Brigadier-General the Hon. Charles Stewart, Adjutant-General,
Colonel Murray, Quarter-Master-General, and the officers of those
departments, respectively, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bathurst and those
of his personal staff, will accept his thanks for the assistance he
received from them throughout these trying days."

Before the great French revolution, or about the year 1790, some
able French officers had given their attention to the formation of
an état-major, or staff, for their armies, which would have greatly
conduced to improvement in carrying on business in the various branches
of their service; and this was proposed to be chiefly accomplished by
establishing an uniform, comprehensive, and connected system; embracing
objects, to a certain degree, both civil and military; the details of
which would develop themselves, as the several heads of service came
to be examined.

These objects, owing to the confusion that arose out of the sudden
elevation to power of daring and able, but generally inexperienced
men, and the displacing of the old accomplished officers of the
royal army were frustrated, or at least lost sight of for some time:
but, although the French marched on from victory to victory over the
neighbouring panic struck and astonished nations, the want of such an
organized department, was seriously felt by the Commanders-in-chief
of their armies, so much so, that upon an able work being published
at Paris, by General Grimoard in 1809, styled "Traité sur le service
de l'Etat-major-general des Armées," it was received with great
approbation, and I may say, continued from that period to be a guide
to the French Marshals and Generals, in the formation of the staff of
the armies put under their charge; and it seemed also to be the system
adopted, or approved of, by the Emperor.

Not long before this General Thiebault had also published a very useful
work upon the same subject; but not by any means so comprehensive as
that of General Grimoard; which I am inclined to think, would afford
many useful hints to us in establishing a system for carrying on the
duties of this essential branch of our service; but taken as a whole,
it would, I am persuaded, be found too diffuse and complicated to
be advantageously adopted by any army. I may however observe, that
strictly speaking, we have no established system of this kind; for
the experience of a few officers, acquired on service, most of whom
are now high in rank, cannot be considered as such; and what a deal
an officer who wants information, would have to wade through, if he
endeavoured to find it in the several volumes of general orders of His
Grace the Duke of Wellington, who must have felt, and evidently did
feel, throughout his protracted operations in the field, how hard and
wearing it was, not only to command a British army, but also to have
so much of the weight and annoyance of attending to minute details of
military police, the commissariat, and of almost every thing else,
thrown upon him, and requiring his constant superintendence and
watchfulness. I am aware, that after they had acquired experience in
the field, he received assistance, to a considerable extent, from some
of the head-quarter staff, and from the generals and staff of divisions
and brigades; but I do not believe, and his orders fully bear me out
in saying so--that any of our other generals could have been equal to
the task he found it necessary to impose upon himself; for at first
he was evidently not much better off, than a commander of a regiment,
who happens to have an indifferent adjutant, and who is in the habit
of hopelessly attempting to carry on the whole of its duties, and
managing all its details, between himself and that functionary, without
considering for what purpose he has been furnished with two majors, ten
captains, twenty or thirty subalterns, and a number of non-commissioned
officers. But it is really wonderful what His Grace had at first to
get through, from the want of a properly organized staff for his
army, who could have acted upon fixed principles, or established
regulations. From not being able to avail himself of such assistance
(and no Commander-in-chief of a British army can ever under present
circumstances do so), he was obliged to come too much into contact
with divisions, brigades, and regiments, and their minute details; and
had even to decide, after having had all the trouble of inquiry into
intricate matters, either personally or through the means of a general
court-martial, as to the punishment the misconduct of many of our
soldiers merited, and even to order it to be carried into effect.

These and many other considerations should convince us, that there
ought never to be, what is usually termed a second in command, without
a division to take charge of, for he is too often only in the way; but
there should be a head, or chief of the staff of an army, in constant
and immediate communication with the commander of it; and he ought to
possess, in virtue of his office, considerable authority. He should
have under him, for carrying into effect the orders or views of the
Commander of the Forces, an adjutant, and a quarter-master-general,
with a sufficient number of assistants attached to them; and one of
each department, according to our present plan, should be appointed to
each division of the army; and a brigade-major ought also to have the
superintendance of the staff duties of each brigade.

The respective duties of the adjutant and quarter-master-general's
departments ought to be clearly defined in every point, and carefully
kept distinct; and the strictest system of responsibility, should at
all times, and in all situations, be enforced throughout the whole;
and it should never again be necessary for a Commander of the Forces
to issue such an order as that which follows, and which shows at once,
what must have been at first the composition of the staff of a British
army.

  "G.O.      _Zarza Mayor, 4th July, 1809._

"No. 1. The assistant-adjutant-generals, and brigade-majors of those
divisions and brigades stationed in the neighbourhood of head-quarters,
must attend at the adjutant-general's office for orders at 10 o'clock
precisely.

"No. 2. The brigade-majors will attend at the
assistant-adjutant-generals of divisions to receive the division orders
at half-past 11 o'clock, and at one, the brigade-majors must give out
the orders to the adjutants of regiments, which must be given out to
the troops and companies, and read to the soldiers at evening parades.

"No. 3. In case circumstances should prevent the brigade-majors from
issuing the general orders to the adjutants of regiments before 3
o'clock on any halting day, they are to receive and issue on that
day only the orders requiring immediate execution, of which the
general-officers commanding brigades are to make the selection, and on
the following day the other orders of general regulation.

"No. 4. All orders received by the adjutants of regiments must, at the
first parade, or earlier, if necessary, be read to the troops.

"No. 5. On marching days the assistant adjutant-generals and
brigade majors, stationed near head-quarters, will attend at the
adjutant-general's office for orders as soon as the troops reach their
ground.

"No. 6. All orders requiring immediate execution issued on marching
days, must be given to the adjutants, and read to the troops as soon as
possible.

"No. 7. The general orders will be sent from head-quarters to divisions
at a distance by the first opportunity, those requiring immediate
execution must be issued and read to the troops as soon as received;
the others, if not received by the general officer of the division
before 2 P.M., are not to be issued till the following day.

"No. 8. The assistant adjutant-generals, or the brigade major, of the
division or brigade at a distance to which the general orders will have
been sent, must send to the adjutant-general by the first opportunity,
a receipt for the orders received, specifying the number for each day.

"No. 9. When pass orders will be sent, directions will be written
on the back of them, stating whether they are to be circulated by
the person who will have carried them from head-quarters, or to the
officers respectively to whom they have been addressed.

"No. 10. Every officer, to whom they are addressed, must sign his name
on the paper on receiving them, and insert the hour of the day at which
they reached him.

"No. 11. As pass orders invariably must require immediate execution,
they must be issued and read to the troops without loss of time.

"No. 12. The numberless mistakes which have occurred, and the many
instances of neglect and disobedience of orders issued referring to
the health, subsistence, or the convenience of the troops, renders it
necessary not only to observe the early circulation of orders, but, if
possible, obedience to them and their early and prompt execution.

"No. 13. The obedience to orders of general regulations must depend
upon the attention of general officers commanding brigades, and
commanding officers of regiments, and their determination to enforce
regularity and discipline, but obedience to them requiring execution
can be secured by other means.

"No. 14. Accordingly the Commander of the Forces desires that officers
commanding regiments shall report to the general officer commanding the
brigade, that the general orders requiring the performance of any duty,
or the execution of any arrangement, have been obeyed."

All this proves that the knowledge and experience of the staff of a
British army were, at that period, at a very low ebb; but matters were
afterwards greatly improved, and the valuable time of the staff saved,
which was thrown away in attending for orders, by Lord Wellington
ordering the distribution of printed copies of general orders for
departments, divisions, brigades, and regiments; but, still, too
much of the time of the non-commissioned officers, who might have
been much better employed in assisting their officers in looking
after the soldiers, was always taken up in the field, in writing out
orders for their respective companies. This ought to be dispensed
with altogether. The corps should be quickly assembled in square, or
close column, and the orders or regulations, which should be few in
number, as almost every thing could be arranged before hand at the
Horse Guards, ought to be read distinctly to them by the commanding
officer, a field officer, or the adjutant; and when thus assembled, any
explanations, or farther directions, which might be necessary, could be
given, and the orders themselves more forcibly impressed upon the minds
of the soldiers, which is rarely properly done, if left to company
officers, or non-commissioned officers.

This plan would not only save much time, but also prevent many mistakes
from happening.

It is not my intention here, nor in any other part of this work, to
be unnecessarily minute in bringing matters before the readers; or
at present to enter fully into the various details of the duties of
staff officers; and I may, therefore, only now observe, and I shall
not hesitate in doing so to take advantage of the suggestions, or
hints, of any military writer, when it may suit my purpose, that the
duties or functions of the staff, which have hitherto, with us, been
only determined by what was considered custom, or by some obsolete
modes of practice, which, after much trouble, may, perhaps, be found
scattered through numerous orders and regulations, which from time to
time, have been issued by various commanders, or in books which have no
claim whatever to be considered official; and so completely is this the
case, that the practice of modern warfare makes it desirable, and even
indispensable, that where any authority may be attached to them, they
ought to be annulled or suppressed, and a new system, constructed on
a wise, and, if it can be done, on a limited scale, soon promulgated,
as the established regulations of the army, which would render it
scarcely possible, that mistakes, as to staff duties, could hereafter
happen when brought into practice; for, in the field, the slightest
misunderstanding, or disputing about points, perhaps in themselves
trivial, might destroy that unity and rapidity of acting, which is so
essential towards ensuring success in war.

The officer employed as chief of the staff should possess first-rate
talents, much military information or experience; great activity, and
perseverance. There are very few officers capable of filling this
important and responsible appointment; for it demands a complete
knowledge of the profession of a soldier. He should be well acquainted
with the country about to become the seat of war; with its history,
and with the wars which may have been there carried on, either in
ancient or modern times; so that the general in command of the army
could consult and arrange with him, if he thought proper, as to the
best mode of directing his operations, and his suggestions might in
many respects be of the most essential service. He should be looked up
to by both the generals and the army, as not only intrusted with the
plans or views of the Commander-in-Chief, but as also of being fully
aware how they were to be executed; so that all the details of service
would properly come from him; and thus freed from much care and
trouble, the General-in-chief would more particularly be able to devote
his attention to the grand objects of the enterprise in view. But the
duties of chief of the staff and those of the several departments under
him, being, as far as practicable, clearly defined by regulations;
with what little difficulty or danger from the effects of ignorance or
inexperience an army handled by officers so taught, and always kept
in readiness when called for, could be brought into the field in an
efficient state for service; whereas by the way in which we now try
to get through matters, a Commander-in-Chief in any future war would
have to wade through all the difficulties encountered, and by so much
perseverance overcome by his Grace the Duke of Wellington.

I must now observe, and in as few words as possible, that issuing of
orders and regulations, and upon all occasions seeing that they were
obeyed; keeping an historical journal of the events of a campaign;
making out returns for head-quarters, and calling for all those usually
required from divisions, brigades, and regiments, and the ordinary
correspondence appertaining to such subjects; arrangements for the
maintenance of the discipline of the army; furnishing of officers and
troops for guards and out-posts; issuing necessary instructions for a
well-regulated and mounted police force, whose commander, captains, and
subalterns, being well-taught their duties, and competent to perform
them, should be entrusted with even more power than was allowed to
provost-marshals;--these, with some other points of service, ought to
come under the Adjutant-General and his assistants. But all this, it
may be said, is already the common routine of business, and should be
known to staff-officers; yet every one of them, I am certain, who has
had experience in the field, must have felt the want of an efficient
police, and of a better system for their guidance.

No division of the army should ever be without a strong detachment of
police, either temporarily or permanently attached to it; and thus
crimes would either be prevented through their vigilance, or those
guilty of them immediately punished; the resources of a country would
then neither be lawlessly seized and frittered away by marauders,
nor would the inhabitants fail to bring supplies to the regularly
established markets of the army, where they would be sure to find
protection from the police. But all sutlers and persons permitted
permanently to supply articles in camp or cantonments ought to have
licenses from the head of the police, without which they should not be
allowed to do so.

As more irregularities are generally committed by soldiers when absent
from their corps, either upon duty or otherwise, than at other times;
patroles of the police ought therefore to be constantly moving upon the
roads in all directions, and should particularly have their eyes upon
all guards, and people allowed for the service of the commissariat,
either when foraging in collecting supplies of any kind, or in bringing
them from the depots in the rear; and this useful corps should also
extend their observations, even as far to the rear as the hospital
stations more immediately belonging to the army in the field. These
various, important, and indispensable duties if properly performed, and
their due performance being shown by simple returns or reports, would
require a considerable police force; but as I would expect them to be
armed and equipped in all respects as dragoons, they could, upon any
emergency, be called upon to act as such, and they must, therefore, in
no way be looked upon as taken away from the fighting part of the army;
by the regulations they would enforce, and by their preventing all
straggling of soldiers or followers of the camp in search of plunder or
liquor, the army would be rendered considerably more efficient through
their exertions. Therefore, to the establishing of such a corps,
which ought to be composed of well-conducted and well-paid men, I beg
particularly to request attention.

There is a point too much overlooked, or, at least, but little
understood in our army, viz. that of employing spies in order to obtain
intelligence; and, as I should expect, that the head of the police is
a man of ability and penetration, I would recommend that he should be
entrusted with the management of this necessary point of service. If
it is properly conducted, most useful information may be procured;
especially if sufficient means for this purpose are placed at the
disposal of a commander of the forces. There are various classes of
spies, but I am anxious to be as brief as possible in alluding to them.

1st. Men considered of importance and in high situations, who, through
avarice or meanness, yield to corruption. It belongs, however, to the
Government of a country to employ such spies, and it is believed that
Russia especially has, at this moment, many of them engaged in various
countries, and in various ways.

2nd. Men supposed to be respectable in character, priests and
intriguing women (I here adopt the words of a French writer), to be
almost always found in countries in which war may be carried on; who,
through a good use of part of the money, which it may be contrived to
remit to them, can procure sometimes valuable information; but the best
of such spies are usually found amongst those mentioned, and who are
the least liable to raise suspicion.

3rd. Individuals admitted in various ways into the enemy's army--such
as servants to general and other officers, sellers of spirits,
provisions, and many trifling articles required by soldiers; and some
men may through them be induced to desert at particular moments,
especially when any important movements are about to take place. Such
people can repeat the conversations they may have listened to; they can
say pretty correctly where the enemy is in force; what direction he
is moving in, as well as what places are occupied by his detachments;
but this is generally all that can be looked for from them, their
communications being frequently too confused and uncertain to be much
relied upon. But some men, for money, as I know from experience, can
be found (indeed they offer themselves) who would perform acts that
would scarcely be believed, were I to state them.

4th. Intelligent peasants of the country, of whom there are always
plenty to be found; but a good many of them should be sent out at one
time, under the pretence of selling various articles in the enemy's
camp, or cantonments; also to the detachments on his flanks, and lines
of communication and operation. Such men should not, however, be
employed at any great distance from their homes, as they soon become
ignorant of the country and roads.

5th. Good information can often be obtained from prisoners of war of
all ranks, if prudently and judiciously questioned by an officer, such
as I suppose the head of the police would be; and correct intelligence
was even sometimes, to my knowledge, pumped out of our single-minded
officers at the out-posts, by the French, during the Peninsular war.

6th. The best and most useful of all spies, are those, who, though
known as such, are employed and paid by both parties, according to
the value of the information they are able to obtain. It is at the
same time prudent, that they should be closely watched by the police,
without their being aware of it, whilst they remain with our army; and
it is not difficult to deceive them, and thereby make them convey false
intelligence to the enemy. It would, however, be very imprudent at any
time, to place too much reliance upon the reports of even the best
spies. It is, however, an established principle, that every possible
information should be extracted from spies, without unguardedly opening
the mind to them, which too much zeal or anxiety might sometimes lead
us into; and it is always wise to employ for the same object, men
unknown to each other, so that they cannot concert between them to
deceive. Only one spy should be spoken to at a time, and that in the
most secret manner. Little should be said to them; but they ought by
every means to be induced to talk much. They should also be led astray
by seeming to attach much importance to objects which are little cared
about; at the same time it requires much attention, to find out whether
one is dealing with double spies or not, for without this knowledge,
we must be taking unnecessary trouble, and often acting in the dark.
Now, no commander of the forces, nor chief of the staff, could possibly
be supposed to enter personally into such transactions, nor could
they possibly find time to devote to such minute investigations; but
the head of the police, whose duty it would be to make them, in the
prudent manner I have suggested, could communicate the result of his
perseverance in these respects to either, as he might be directed.

Spies should be well paid, especially when it is ascertained that
they have acted faithfully; and Frederick the Great of Prussia, who
has always been considered good authority, says in his military
instructions to his generals, (a work which should be carefully read
by all officers,) "a man, who, in your service, runs the risk of a
halter, deserves to be well rewarded."

I beg to apologise for here intruding what may be looked upon as a
digression; but mentioning information to be obtained from deserters,
has brought to my recollection the extraordinary circumstance--at
least I consider it as such--that it should have fallen to my lot, to
have had the lieutenant of my company desert to the enemy; the only
instance of the kind I ever heard of in the British army. It occurred
just before our advancing in pursuit of the French, from what were
considered the lines of Torres Vedras. I do not know in what part of
Ireland Mr. B---- first saw the light, but he had been sent in early
life to Salamanca, to be brought up for the Roman Catholic priesthood.
It was, however, I suppose, found that he was unfit for that calling;
at least, I understood that he had never been ordained; and having
married, some person had most unwarrantably taken it upon himself to
recommend him for an ensigncy in the army, for which he was still
more unfit than to be a priest, for he was both vulgar in looks and
manners; but as he spoke Spanish, and some Portuguese, and announcing
himself wherever he went as a good Catholic, he got on, though very
ignorant and illiterate, famously, both with the priests and people of
Portugal. But he had, on one occasion, very nearly, in that country,
come to an untimely end; for having been sent off, in order to get him
away from the regiment, with part of the 3rd division's "advanced guard
of infamy"--that is to say--the soldiers' wives, whom it was found
necessary to send to the rear, in consequence of the depredations they
daily committed; these Amazons, headed by a well known character, rose
upon him with the most diabolical intentions, as some may remember,
for the circumstance was much laughed at at the time, and he only
escaped from their clutches, by jumping out of a window, at the risk of
breaking his neck.

As soon as he disappeared, and that it was conjectured he had gone
over to the enemy, as captain of his company, I was called upon to
report upon the circumstances which could have led to so extraordinary
an event; and I was at the same time given to understand, that Lord
Wellington was uneasy lest he might have conveyed to the French some
useful intelligence; but I conclude that an explanatory letter which I
addressed to the officers commanding the regiment, set his Lordship's
mind at ease; for I unhesitatingly declared him to be totally unfit
to make any observations of consequence, as to the positions or state
of the army, or upon the country in rear of the lines; and in this
opinion, as we were afterwards able to ascertain, I proved to be quite
correct, for Marshal Massena finding him useless, he was altogether
neglected, and having been left by the French, in their retreat, asleep
in a hut, he fell into the hands of some of our light troops. It was
intended that he was to have been tried for deserting to the enemy, and
I was in consequence ordered to appear as the principal witness against
him; but upon his being brought before the General Court-Martial by
the Provost Marshal, it was at once ascertained, that he had become
deranged during his confinement. Upon this circumstance being made
known to Lord Wellington, he, I understood, ordered him to be sent
home, and I heard some time afterwards, that the unfortunate man died
in a lunatic asylum in Ireland. This was a melancholy instance of the
consequences of improper recommendations of persons for commissions in
the army, which I regret to say, was but too common in those days; and
my chief object in giving the story at all, is, that it may cause some
gentlemen in future, to consider what they are about, before they take
upon themselves the responsibility of introducing such men as Mr. B.
into her Majesty's army.

In the French armies, according to the system they pursue, an officer
possessing in many respects power not inferior to what I am so desirous
that our officers of military police should be intrusted, takes up
his station generally with or near the head-quarters of the army, or
close to what is to be the line of march of the following day, and, if
possible, within a reasonable distance of where he intends the markets
to be held, should the army be stationary even for a few days only, and
this enables him either personally to superintend what is going on,
or else to send his subordinates to do so. He or some of his people
patrole the neighbourhood of the camps, in order to protect all who
are coming to the markets with supplies, and, on the spot, he punishes
any one guilty of infringing the orders of the army.--Upon the line
of march he distributes his police in such a manner as to insure good
order amongst the soldiers, bat-men, carters, those attached to the
commissariat, sutlers, and even amongst the people bringing supplies to
the markets.

As he acts under the orders of the principal officer of the
"état-major," or the commander-in-chief, he and his subordinates have
the power of inflicting summary punishment, according to the rules of
the service; and they are, therefore, even accompanied by executioners,
the very sight of whom is conducive to good behaviour on the part
of the troops and followers of the army of every description. It is
something of this kind, but superior in arrangement, and in the rank
of those employed, that the British army so much wants, and what I
am anxious to have established upon a most respectable footing; but
in all arrangements for this purpose it should be kept in view how
beneficial it would be to the public service that a proper provision
should be made for the necessities of divisions of the army when acting
separately or independently. The French plan seems more particularly
adapted to the wants of the head-quarters only, and is therefore so far
defective.

In my anxiety to have an intelligent and efficient police established
in connexion with the adjutant-general's department, I have been
obliged to say more upon the subject than I at first intended, and
as everything relating to the discipline of an army comes under that
branch of the staff, I must also take the liberty to observe (and in
doing so I know that I am coincided with in the opinion I am about to
express by many officers,) that our courts-martial which are, even in
these quiet times, almost constantly sitting, have brought matters, as
the natural consequence of such a plan, into an unprofitable state, and
which cannot possibly from want of time, and for other obvious reasons,
exist, on service in the field. The strange system now pursued seems as
if intended to weaken the power and influence of commanding and other
officers in the corps, and which they must possess, if discipline is
to be maintained as it ought to be; and this state of things looks as
if brought about to suit the notions of men who are always dragging
military matters before the public, whilst they show the world that
they are quite ignorant of them. All this can, however, scarcely have
any other tendency than to prevent officers from duly performing their
duties lest they should be hauled over the coals for so doing, and I
greatly fear that this must before long seriously injure the discipline
of the army, so much so that if even what I have ventured to propose
for its good should not be thought worthy of consideration, events
alone may compel the legislature to look to the consequences likely to
be produced if the present system is adhered to, and the result may
most likely be that our military chiefs will have to be intrusted with
greater power than they ever before possessed, especially on service;
when far too much of the time of officers was always occupied upon
courts-martial of all kinds, which might have been employed in looking
after their men, and have prevented the crimes from being committed
which became the subject for investigation, and as a proof of this the
books of general orders issued upon service, are almost filled with
parts of their proceedings and the observations of Commanders of the
Forces upon them.

It is by no means with the view of inducing any one to follow
their example I now mention that, in the French armies, before the
Revolution, courts-martial were only assembled for the trial of those
guilty of very serious crimes; and in the field, even these were often
summarily judged and punished, occasionally upon a simple verbal order.
The National Constituent Assembly, however, without knowing what they
were about, and from a sheer love of novelty, under the pretext of
doing away with arbitrary military proceedings, rendered them, as
now with us, most vexatiously frequent and complicated, by requiring
courts-martial to be assembled for the investigation of even the most
trivial offences, in order to award the most trifling punishments; and
which commanding officers, as in our navy, could before have ordered
upon their own authority and responsibility. The new laws which they
made for this wise purpose had soon to undergo many and endless
changes, all tending to occupy the time of officers and to make the
proceedings of military tribunals more tedious and annoying; and they
are now, after all that has been done, no better than our own, and they
have attached to them a court of revision in which the matter, in case
of appeal, is re-considered. But to make up for being thus hampered,
the French état-major often found it necessary, under the delegated
authority of their commander-in-chief, to act in a very arbitrary and
summary manner in the field.

Other branches of the service, such as the Post-office, &c., come under
the Adjutant-General and his department, but I have already been too
minute upon this head; yet I do not see how I can be less so if I am at
all to enter upon the Quarter-Master-General's department, and in doing
so I must touch upon what is well known to many officers.

All military plans, sketches, &c. especially such as afford information
like the following:--

Plan pointing out where are situated, the stone bridges, &c. &c., which
exist upon the Ebro, from Reynosa to Tudela.

  +---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+
  |  Stone  | Wooden Bridges |         |         |         |             |
  | Bridges.|fit for Infantry| Ferries.| Fords in| Fords in|Observations.|
  |         | only, when the |         |  Summer.|  Winter.|             |
  |         |  river is low. |         |         |         |             |
  +---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+
  |Mirando, |   Pollentes,   |  Baca,  | Porlata,| Vadillo,|             |
  |  Haro,  |   Rampalais,   | &c. &c. | &c. &c. |  &c. &c.|             |
  |  &c. &c.|    &c. &c.     |         |         |         |             |
  +---------+----------------+---------+---------+---------+-------------+

Also the arrangements for the movements or marches of an army; its
encampments, bivouacs, quarters, in the field fixing upon the general
line for out-posts, supplies of almost every description, and the
arrangements connected with them, and various other matters come under
the Quarter-Master-general and his department; and it is the duty of
these officers to furnish the chief of the staff, for the information
of the Commander of the Forces, and also generals of divisions, when
necessary, with comprehensive returns, according to established forms,
which would show at one view the various resources of a country in
which war might be carrying on. These returns, of course, according to
circumstances, should embrace the cities, towns, villages, hamlets,
and the number of inhabitants in each. The number of carts, waggons,
or other carriages; the number of horses or mules for draught, burden
or saddle; the number of bullocks, cows or sheep; the agricultural
productions, such as the usual quantity of wheat, barley, oats, &c.;
also of hay, straw or green forage; the returns should likewise show
the quantity of each absolutely required for the use of the country,
and the supplies, if any, also the number of pairs of boots or shoes
fit for soldiers, or shoes for horses, which could be provided in a
given time, or any other manufactured articles, which it might be
supposed were likely to be required by an army.

Such information as this would enable the Commander of the Forces, or
the generals acting under his instructions, to employ the commissariat
advantageously, and also to order from the cities, towns or country,
whatever number of men, animals, &c. might be required for various
military purposes; and they would be enabled to decide what part of
the resources of the country could be made available for supplying
many of the wants of an army, so that considerable quantities of food,
forage, &c. might thus be obtained upon the spot, in place of its being
necessary to bring supplies from perhaps distant countries, and even
by ships, at an enormous expense, as was often the case during the
Peninsular war.

I do not pretend to be able, nor have I any wish to write a regular
military treatise; but I beg to observe, that acting thus upon system,
and every thing being, if possible, punctually paid for, or good
arrangements entered into, in cases of forced contributions, almost
any country could be made to contribute considerably towards the wants
of an army; but without such arrangements its resources are either
plundered or wasted. But nothing of this kind can possibly be effected,
unless an army has attached to it, a well organized mounted police, to
enforce regularity and punctuality.

The officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department, cannot
possibly perform the many duties required of them, without the
occasional aid of such a police force as I have in view, and which in
the end would be found to be a vast saving of expense, incurred in many
ways, by the country; nor without the assistance of a corps of mounted
men, usually termed guides; and which ought, if practicable, to be
raised in the country, the seat of war; and they should be so well paid
and treated as to insure their fidelity.

I must now, however, conclude this part of my undertaking, by
remarking, that into whatever parts or branches the duties, services,
or the business of an army may be divided, the whole should, as far as
possible, be brought under the Adjutant or Quarter-Master-General's
departments, and their correct and punctual performance should be shown
by the most simple, yet sufficiently comprehensive, returns or reports,
of which the forms should always be given; and they should be similar,
in many respects, to that which enabled the Duke of Wellington to
know, every day, the exact state or distribution of his army; returns
or reports of this kind cannot possibly be dispensed with from the
commissariat or ordnance, as the Commander of the Forces, and generals
of divisions and brigades ought to know, at all times, how the army,
and the parts of it under their charge respectively, are to be supplied
with provisions, ammunition, &c. &c.

It may probably, by those who wish to remain independent at the head
of departments, be deemed desirable, that the medical, commissariat,
and ordnance branches of the army should remain distinct, and that
they should continue to communicate direct with the Commander of
the Forces; but in this I cannot coincide, and it strikes me that
it would be desirable, to place the medical department and its
establishments under the Adjutant-General, and the commissariat
under the Quarter-Master-General. My reason, in the first place, for
the former is, that no where is it so essential, that the strictest
discipline should be maintained, as at the several hospital stations,
and in every thing connected with the medical department of an army;
and in our future wars this must be particularly necessary, from the
rapidity with which they must be carried on, as I intend more fully to
show hereafter, when the instant removal of sick and wounded to places
of safety will appear to be indispensable.

The Duke of Wellington, a most excellent teacher, says, in a General
Order, dated Pero Negro, 23d Oct. 1810--

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces has observed, with great concern,
the large number of men returned by the several regiments, as sick
in hospitals, compared with the returns received from the medical
officers, of the number of men actually on their books in the hospitals.

"No. 2. The former at present is more than double the latter, and it
must be owing to some existing abuse.

"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces has besides been informed by many
officers, commanding regiments and brigades in the army, that there are
many non-commissioned officers and soldiers walking about the streets
in Belem and Lisbon, quite recovered, while others are doing the duties
of these men before the enemy in the field.

"No. 4. In order to put a stop to these abuses, the Commander of the
Forces desires that the following regulations be attended to."

It is unnecessary here to give these regulations, but his Grace
repeats the orders which had been so frequently issued, that no
officer of the medical department should have any soldier from the
ranks as his servant and bat-man, or to attend upon him in any
manner; and he declares his determination to bring to trial before a
general-court-martial, any of the medical department, who should make
use of a non-commissioned officer or soldier in any menial capacity
whatever.

We had formerly attached to the medical department large cumbersome
waggons, which could scarcely have answered any wise purpose, even upon
our English roads, but which were next to useless in such countries as
Portugal; and the tortures and sufferings of the wounded and sick, when
sent off to the rear upon commissariat mules going for provisions, or
in country carts, drawn by bullocks, were beyond belief, especially
when aggravated by the effects of a burning sun, or the severity of the
wet and cold seasons of the Peninsula.

It is absolutely necessary that this department should be better
organized hereafter, as soldiers are induced to go forward and into
battle with much more confidence, when they know that it is enabled,
through good management, to remove them with care and kindness, if sick
or wounded, to places where they can be properly attended to.

The head of this department ought to be a man of great energy and
ability, capable of arranging and carrying into effect whatever plans
may have been adopted for the removal and care of the sick and wounded,
and above all he should possess, like the celebrated Dr. Larrey, of
the French army, not only extraordinary perseverance, but also that
kind-hearted benevolence, which insured for him, on all occasions, the
respect and affections of both officers and soldiers.

Under such a head, there should be placed, to be disposed of as he
might deem best, but in communication with the Adjutant-General, or
his assistants attached to divisions, who could, through the means of
the police at their disposal, afford him great help in carrying their
united views into effect, a complete establishment of conveyances, or
cars upon springs, calculated to contain, at most, four men each, of
a light but strong construction, with covers to them sufficient to
afford the sick and wounded protection from the sun and rain. They
should only be of such a size and weight that two horses of ordinary
powers could draw them and the four patients with the greatest ease,
even when required to move with some degree of rapidity, and the
generally low condition of horses on service in the field, should
not in the calculations be overlooked. The corps, as I may call it,
to which these conveyances should belong, ought to consist of steady
drivers, one for each car and pair of horses, (but he ought not upon
any account to be allowed to ride) some non-commissioned officers and
officers having certain military rank and authority. This useful body
of men should be formed by enlistment in the United Kingdoms, and the
horses either procured there, or in the country to become the seat of
war; but the corps and its cars and equipments should accompany any
military force whenever it was ordered to embark for service. It should
however always remain at the disposal of the medical officer at the
head of the department, who could appropriate parts of it, as might be
arranged between him and the Adjutant-General, and as circumstances
required, for the removal of sick and wounded from the divisions or
brigades to the hospital stations, and they could from thence assist
recovered men to rejoin their corps with less fatigue than they might
otherwise be too soon exposed to, and the officers and non-commissioned
officers of this establishment, occasionally assisted by the police,
could take the entire charge of such men, together with the usual lists
furnished by officers commanding companies or troops, of the articles
of necessaries, &c. sent with them, so that it would no longer be
necessary to detach numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers
from their regiments, where their presence is always required, to
perform this important duty.

The great utility of what I have just pointed out, must be obvious
to all experienced officers, who will, I think, coincide with me in
opinion, that such an establishment is indispensable in the field,
indeed both humanity and prudence most strongly call for it, as it
would tend to render an army much more efficient than it could possibly
be, if defective in this respect, or if such matters are left merely
to chance, or to the generally miserable resources of this kind to be
found in most countries.

It appears to me that the commissariat cannot properly or prudently
be separated from the Quarter-master-general's department, for all
its arrangements must depend upon the intended movements, stations,
positions, and views of the Commander of the Forces, to be carried into
effect by the Quarter-master-general, and his assistants, attached
to the division. But the commissariat ought to be under the immediate
superintendance of an officer of considerable abilities; possessing
a mind capable of comprehending, and performing with accuracy his
extensive part in all military combinations, for almost every thing in
war depends upon the troops being regularly supplied with food.

The officers of this branch of the service, cannot be formed in a day;
for they require not only the knowledge and habits of business, but
also experience in the modes of ascertaining and calling forth the
various resources of countries. Providing transport for supplies of
provisions is alone an extensive and difficult part of the duty of
the commissariat. There are few countries in which such means would
present themselves so efficiently and opportunely, as the brigades of
mules did in the Peninsula. It will not answer, entirely to depend
upon the resources of countries which may become the seat of war,
for such transport; but how far this may be prudent, can sometimes
be ascertained beforehand. But I beg here to ask, if it would not
be important to arrange how far rice might occasionally be made a
substitute for some of the articles usually issued to our troops in
the field by the commissariat? A little of it becomes a considerable
quantity of nourishing food when cooked, but its great advantage is,
that the means of transport required for it is trifling when compared
with what it takes to bring bread or biscuit from perhaps a distant
point, to an army acting in the field. Soldiers may not like rice at
first, but it should be remembered, that it constitutes in India, the
principal part of their food.

It is at all times very hazardous to allow the roads in the vicinity
of an army, especially when near the enemy, to become blocked up, but
especially in bad weather, by heavy waggons or carts of any kind; so
that pack-horses or mules, (the breeds in Great Britain and Ireland
of the former have mostly become too large for this purpose) with
well fitted saddles, and perhaps panniers, are the only conveyances
for provisions or stores, which should be allowed to come up to an
army in the field. But all such subjects require much consideration,
and also able arrangements, which should, as far as possible, be
completed before troops are allowed to quit our shores. The expense
is always great to provide even what is indispensable in this respect
for an army, but it would cost, in all probability, twice as much,
to form such an establishment in a country in which war had already
commenced. This naturally leads the mind to form plans so as to meet
the difficulties which will certainly present themselves, and to
calculate as to the manner in which a well-organized department, with
means at its command, can be produced; and though its vast extent
may be apt to discourage, yet it ought to be wisely looked into by a
Commander of the Forces, his quarter-master and commissary generals.
But if the commissariat consists of able, responsible and experienced
officers, much apprehension on this head may be removed. The selection
therefore of gentlemen qualified for this branch of the service, ought
always to be of primary importance, and their advancement in rank, and
consequent higher payment, should depend upon the ability and habits
of business they evinced in the discharge of their duties; and to the
exclusion, if such a thing can be, of interest or patronage.

I hope I shall be excused for here introducing what I may call a
commissariat anecdote; which those who knew Sir Thomas Picton will at
once recognize as characteristic of him.

During the splendid movement which Lord Wellington made from the
frontiers of Portugal, and which ultimately compelled the French to
concentrate their army and fight the disastrous battle of Vittoria; the
Assistant-commissary-general attached to one of the divisions, had,
through mistake, come into a part of the country, the supplies to be
got from which were allotted to the 3rd; and he was waiting patiently,
in a neat Spanish village, for the baking of a large quantity of bread,
to be finished; which he intended for his own division. Whilst this
was going forward, he had taken care, as commissaries usually did, to
establish himself in one of the best houses. Sir Thomas Picton very
soon learnt what he was about; and ordered that he should be brought
before him. "How dare you, Sir, to plunder that village?" "I am no
plunderer, Sir, and am only procuring bread for my division," "Neither
you nor your division, have a right to any thing in that village; and
if you don't instantly be off, Sir, I will order the provost-marshal
to hang you up on that tree." The zealous commissary (indeed he was
one of the most efficient in the army, and well known to be so by
Sir Thomas, who during the scene could scarcely conceal how much
he was amused), set off in great alarm, and without further reply,
at speed, to head-quarters; which happened to be not very distant,
where, we were told, he requested to see Lord Wellington: "What is
the matter?" demanded his Lordship, upon observing the commissary's
great perturbation. He told his story; concluding by declaring, "and
he was actually going to hang me!" His Lordship, now scarcely able,
as the story was told--to keep his gravity, asked with much apparent
earnestness, "Did he really say, that he would hang you?" "Yes, he
really did." "Then," said his lordship, "take my advice, and keep out
of his way, or he will certainly do so." The worthy commissary now
began, for the first time, to suspect that he had been made to cut a
ridiculous figure.

Sir Thomas Picton, though stern in aspect, possessed a most warm,
benevolent, and feeling heart. As an instance of this I cannot help
relating what occurred on one occasion in Spain. An officer, commanding
one of the regiments of his division, was killed in action. He, like
too many soldiers who fell in battle, left his widow and a child in
very narrow circumstances. This by some means or other came to Sir
Thomas Picton's knowledge, when he sent for a field-officer of the
regiment, to find out from him the widow's address; and his feeling
remark on the occasion was, "that both grief and poverty were hard
to be borne at one time." Having got the information he wanted, he
took care that a large sum of money (being apprehensive of making a
mistake, I shall not venture to say how much) was paid to her.

Towards the close of the war in the South of France, the Duke of
Wellington had brought his army--not only improved in its staff, but in
many other respects--into a complete state for service; indeed he had
made it as much so, as a British force, composed as it was and still
is, can be; and his plan of giving good commissariat establishments
to divisions and brigades, which enabled them to act at all times
efficiently and independently, was most admirable, and should, as
far as possible, be always imitated whenever our troops, in any
considerable numbers, may be hereafter required to take the field; but
those, who from experience, could properly form such establishments,
may most probably have then passed away, and the advantages which might
have been looked for from their practical knowledge of commissariat
duties, cannot be available, and I do not know where I could recommend
any one to look for correct information upon such subjects. But does
not this most clearly point out, the want of established system in this
as well as in other essential branches of our service, and for which I
do perseveringly contend.

It may appear to some, that to accomplish the various objects I have
alluded to, would be attended with vast expense to the country,
yet this will not be found, upon a calm consideration, or rather
investigation, to be so great as might be imagined; but no one
acquainted with military matters will pretend to say, that they can
be dispensed with, if the country is to be served by its armies as it
ought to be; and, I trust, that I have already shown in what manner
savings can be effected, more than sufficient to meet any increase of
expenditure I may venture to propose. I must now, however, leave the
subject of the staff of an army for the present, and proceed to other
matters which must still be brought before the reader.




CHAP. VI.


As I find that I have not yet touched upon some of the subjects which
I am anxious to bring under consideration. I must again beg here to
remind the reader, that having shown, in several instances, in what
manner considerable savings can be effected, I will now go on to point
out a very injudicious piece of economy, the consequences of which
have been always felt in our regiments, viz. that of never allowing
one quarter enough of ammunition for practice; and the result was,
that our soldiers, in general, I will venture to say, were probably
as bad marksmen as any in the world. Our game laws are in a certain
degree the cause that the lower orders of the people are all so
ignorant of the use of fire-arms; but this is a subject with which I
do not intend to meddle, and shall only say, that when English archers
were so formidable, the people were encouraged and even compelled
to assemble at various times of the year to practise this to them
amusing craft; and the result of this wise policy on the part of their
rulers was fully evinced in battle. I must, however, observe, that our
old-fashioned heavy muskets recoil, or kick so violently, after firing
even a few rounds, that if they then go off at all, they cause a man
to think twice, and probably to raise his eye from the object aimed
at, before he ventures to pull the trigger; but since I made a note of
this, with the intention of bringing the subject under consideration,
I find that an improvement in fire-arms, for the army in general, is
actually in contemplation.

I by no means wish to increase the quantity of blank cartridges usually
allowed to amuse grown children at mock-fights, &c. but of ball and
buckshot ammunition; for it is most desirable that the soldier should
know and be able to calculate, at what distances he ought to use both
with proper effect.

A general officer, now long in his tomb, entertained certain very odd
notions, in which I sometimes fancy that I participate; in one of his
usually laconic addresses, or exhortations, in which he was fond of
indulging even when going into action, upon one occasion, and rather
to the astonishment of the soldiers he led, though accustomed to his
ways, and after cautioning them, that he would not give the word _fire_
until he could see the white of the enemy's eyes; and he was very
near-sighted--he thus addressed them--"Now, lads, there is the enemy,
if you don't kill them, they will certainly kill you; and it is better
to break their shanks than to fire o'er the crown of their heads."
There was much to be admired in this pithy address, which could be
perfectly understood by soldiers. But I must say, that I have often
regretted seeing a useless, distant fire kept up, which had no effect
whatever upon the enemy, and certainly did not improve the taste of
our soldiers for the bayonet, in whose hands it may be always made
a very useful instrument for deciding the fate of battles. I must,
however, apologize for taking up the reader's time with these remarks,
and also for having so unceremoniously introduced the general, my
worthy ancestor, to him; yet I must beg to add, that a very brave and
esteemed friend of mine, Major Smith, 45th regiment, who fell fighting
gloriously, but too rashly, for he really went up to the French
bayonets at Busaco, had also sometimes a very odd way of expressing
himself. I remember hearing him on one occasion emphatically observe,
"I don't like your prudent officers, Sir, who deal in long shots,
and who talk so much of sparing the effusion of human blood--their
prudence, Sir, always increases it in the end, Sir." But those who
knew him will readily recognize this to be genuine; and it may be well
supposed, that he must have come up to Sir Thomas Picton's ideas of
what a good soldier should be; at all events, he considered that the
3rd division and the country, sustained an irreparable loss when Major
Smith fell. But to proceed--I beg to recommend, that there be erected,
as near as may be deemed consistent with the safety of the passers
by, and even against the high walls of barracks, sufficient mounds of
earth against which to fire with ball; and this should not only be made
the means of useful instruction, but also, like the bayonet and sword
exercises, conducive to the soldier's amusement; and whilst I would
greatly increase the allowance of ammunition for practice, I would
also suggest that a sum of money be annually granted to regiments
to be laid out at the discretion of commanding officers, in rewards
to the best shots and the best swordsmen. This is very essential, as
light troops are so much employed in modern warfare, that their being
good marksmen cannot be dispensed with; therefore, with a superior
description of musket, having a good percussion lock, serviceable in
wet as well as in dry weather, and fire never being uselessly thrown
away in action in a volley like a single report, which in former times
was considered so fine, our soldiers would be more than a match for the
Yankee Back-woodsmen, or any other troops in the world.

I have now arrived at a part of my undertaking in which I am very much
interested, and to which I am desirous of attracting attention; for
I am sure it will be readily allowed, that amongst any body of men,
there will always exist irregularities and misconduct; it is therefore
indispensable, that there should be at hand the means of making those
guilty of offences promptly feel the consequences of committing them.
With this in view, I conclude it will be thought necessary, that there
should be several small, dark, dry, and well ventilated cells in all
prisons attached to barracks at home and abroad, in which offenders
can be separately confined, either upon bread and water, low diet, or
otherwise for fixed periods, according to the present system, and to
the sentences of courts-martial, for I am obliged to write so as to
suit the times, and whilst undergoing this kind of punishment, the
inmates should be subjected to the most perfect silence; which, if duly
attended to, will soon be found to constitute the severest part of the
punishment, and to produce the most desirable results; every necessary
precaution should, therefore, be taken on this head; but it should
never be overlooked, that such kinds of punishment for the maintenance
of discipline, can never be resorted to when regiments are in the field.

In no regiment that I have ever had any thing to do with, have I yet
found the link of responsibility perfectly kept up. For instance, the
majors were not made answerable for the state of their respective
wings. The captains were almost never interfered with by the majors,
who were really little else than sinecurists: indeed, commanding
officers in general, did not like their doing so; as they too
frequently looked upon it as meddling with what did not concern them;
and they too often rendered the captains also mere nonentities with
their companies; managing all promotions, &c. (so powerful is the
love of patronage) between themselves and their adjutants. It was the
same as to granting leave of absence from the regiments, or even from
common parades; and thus captains were entirely stripped of influence.
It was also much the same with regard to men guilty of crimes or
irregularities: their names were found in guard reports; the adjutants
were made to inquire into the reasons of their confinement, and they
were sometimes sentenced by courts-martial, and even punished, without
any reference whatever being made to their captains; and I have heard
commanding officers say, that there was no use in consulting them, as
they knew nothing about their companies; but whose fault was that, and
why were they not encouraged and made to do their duty, and to look
after their men's conduct?

In former days (and I may go back even to the days of Marlborough)
captains were men of some importance, and were allowed to exercise much
more authority over their companies, than has for many years past been
the fashion. They could keep them at drill, or confined to barracks,
or camp, if their conduct was irregular, till the offenders were found
out, and punished by the soldiers themselves. These offenders were
tried by what were then called Company Courts-Martial, which consisted
of a non-commissioned officer and four privates. The sentence (nothing
else being written) having been approved of by the captain, or officer
commanding the company, it was in presence of the non-commissioned
officers, and sometimes of a subaltern, privately carried into
execution, either by the drummers of the company giving the culprit a
certain number of blows, or else all the soldiers had to do so with
the slings of their firelocks. This having been properly, and often
severely done by _themselves_, the company was considered as purified,
and were then dismissed from drill, or released from confinement
to barracks or camp. If a plan of this kind in spirit was properly
followed up, how admirably it would be found calculated for service in
the field even in our days. When the importance of company officers is
raised, so is proportionally that of the non-commissioned officers;
and does not the superiority of our companies of guards consist in the
respectability of their non-commissioned officers?

Not very long ago, what, I believe, was called Picketting, was
practised as a punishment in our regiments of cavalry for minor
offences, and I have heard from old officers, that the soldiers had
a great dread of it; they assured me it did not in the least injure
their health, or unfit them for immediate duty; and it almost entirely
obviated the necessity for flogging. Would it not therefore be well,
if the reviving of this kind of punishment in every corps, when an
army took the field, were to have due consideration. I am aware of the
outcry which most likely would be raised by injudicious men against
such a plan, and nothing would have induced me to venture to mention
it, but my abhorrence of flogging, and my fear that capital punishments
might become frequent and unavoidable, if there were no other mode,
of maintaining discipline amongst our troops. I therefore must not
shrink from suggesting it, as I feel convinced, that in the field, our
military police, might be safely trusted with the power of using it
as a punishment; and it would, I have no doubt, deter soldiers from
straggling from their corps in search of liquor or plunder.

We are constantly hearing of the horrors of flogging in our regiments,
and scarcely an instance occurs, but that some of the newspapers
endeavour to hold it up in the most exaggerated language, and strongest
colouring, to the detestation of the nation; but after all, what
is such punishment, as now inflicted, to what takes place all over
Germany, and in the armies of the Czar? We are told--and it should be
known in Great Britain--that the kind of bastinado, by which the flesh
is most cruelly torn off by the point of the stick, is so severe in
the German and other armies, that few men can stand many blows of the
corporals who inflict it; and as for the Russian knout, half a dozen
strokes, or even less, can be made fatal by a skilful hand.

Unluckily, by our mode of proceeding, punishment is, in some measure,
converted, by its slowness, into a kind of torture; and if flagellation
is to be unfortunately allowed to continue in a British army, it most
probably would be better if fewer lashes were awarded by the sentences
of courts-martial, but to be inflicted more after the manner practised
in our navy. At all events, what may be termed the teasing system,
which now prevails in regiments, and to which commanding officers,
in compliance with existing circumstances, must adhere, cannot be
productive of good, and must from necessity, and want of time and
means, be nearly abandoned when our army is actually in the field. In
what way then, I beg to ask, are officers to maintain discipline, if
their power and influence in their companies are not increased?

It has always been the practice in our army to direct attention--and in
this commanding officers of regiments had no choice--more particularly
to what was necessary for home service, or garrison duty abroad, or
their attention was called (as in the Russian service) to what would
produce effect, through a splendid display of neatness, uniformity, and
regularity in dress, messing, barrack and other arrangements; which
in themselves are much to be lauded and admired; but with regard to
what were really essential and indispensable in the field, for which
most of this instruction or knowledge, but little prepared them, such
matters seemed generally to be left to chance, or to be acquired by
both officers and men when once there; and this was one of the reasons
why so few regiments did not fall off in every respect, the very first
campaign in which they were employed.

One of the chief objects which I have in view being, however, to
do away with corporal punishment, and still to insure our having a
well-conducted and highly disciplined army, I consider as essential
towards securing this, that the utmost attention should be paid to what
was formerly so lamentably neglected--that is to say--the religious
instruction, and general education of corps. Without this all our
efforts must be useless and unavailing.

To expect that such objects can be attained by merely paying the
clergymen of towns, where troops are usually quartered, a certain
sum annually for performing clerical duties, is altogether out of
the question. Every regiment ought to have its own chaplain, and the
changes which have of late years taken place in the religious, as well
as in the moral feelings of the country, (for we ought not to attend
to the wild ideas and effusions of men, who in the present day are
leading the unwary astray,) have rendered their appointment to corps
no longer objectionable. The regimental chaplains should be required,
before appointment, to produce to the chaplain general, certificates
from bishops of the church of England, or from, at least, two ministers
of the church of Scotland, setting forth the respectability of their
characters, their fitness to discharge the religious duties, and to
direct and superintend the instruction of the regiment, to which they
might be attached, and in which a higher description of education was
hereafter to be looked for.

I must here declare, and I do so after long and serious consideration
of the subject, that the consequences of a mixture in corps of men
professing Protestant and Roman Catholic creeds have always been, that
religion, of any kind, became altogether a forbidden subject, and I
firmly believe, that much of the depravity and irregularities committed
by our soldiers, may be attributed to this cause; for what could be
expected from men, who, I may say, never gave religion even a thought.
The officers were almost all Protestants, whilst a considerable
proportion of the soldiers, in many regiments, from having been raised
in Ireland, were Papists; and it, unfortunately, yet clearly, became
the duty of those under whose command they were placed, to show no
respect of persons, or to hurt the feelings of either party on account
of religious opinions or differences; and thus what is commonly looked
upon as sacred amongst men, could not even be named, and much less
brought to the assistance of officers in the management of their men,
so that fear of punishment was all they had to depend upon (and even
corporal punishment when too frequently resorted to, lost its effects,)
for the maintenance of discipline, it was, therefore, to the system
pursued, and not to the officers that blame ought to have been attached
for much of the misconduct which the commanders of our armies, and Lord
Wellington in particular, had to lament and contend with. Much more
might be said upon this subject, but I do not wish to pursue it farther.

But let us for a moment look at the effects of unanimity in religious
views in a Russian army, in which, however, is to be clearly seen far
too much of the old Prussian severity of discipline to be productive
of good; and I am also aware, that in consequence of the power that
the upper class--themselves exempted from the conscription--possess
over their serfs, many bad characters are forced into their ranks; yet
their Emperor, generals, officers and soldiers are, I may say, of one
mind and of one religion. See the whole joining in its--to them--sacred
offices, and imposing ceremonies; and who then can deny, but that their
chiefs thus establish a firm hold upon the minds and affections of
their soldiers, who may, by this means, be led to respect morality,
and to imitate praise-worthy conduct, whilst they are at the same time
rendered more formidable as enemies.

Regimental chaplains ought to be married, and should be allowed
sufficient means to provide themselves with suitable lodgings, and
when it could be done, outside the barrack walls; and to insure their
respectability and fitness for the performance of their important
duties, they ought to receive the same pay and allowances as
pay-masters.

Very few churches in provincial towns, or villages, can afford proper
accommodation for the troops quartered in them, and they ought not
to be dependant upon this; and as regiments would thus have their
own clergymen, there should be attached to every barrack, at home or
abroad, a large comfortable school-house, in which divine service might
be performed twice a day on Sundays; so that one wing of a regiment
could be accommodated in the morning, and the other in the afternoon.

Every corps ought to have a well paid, and highly respectable
school-master, with whom no one should have a right to interfere,
but the commanding officer and chaplain; and part of the duty of the
latter should be to superintend the school and to direct the system of
education to be pursued in it. Every school-house ought to be furnished
with a carefully selected collection of books, which should be handed
over, in good order, from one chaplain to another, and according to an
inventory kept for the purpose. Of course the regiment relieved would
have to pay for any books lost or damaged. There ought to be also a
sufficient allowance of fuel and candles granted for the school-house;
and it would be most desirable that the soldiers should, as much as
possible, be induced to spend their evenings there; and in order to
increase this inducement, the books should not only be instructive,
but also amusing; and as far as practicable, different at every
station. A place of public resort of this kind, where a certain number
of non-commissioned officers should be required to be present, would
be particularly desirable everywhere, but especially in our North
American possessions, where in winter it is so difficult to find means
of amusement, for soldiers, and thereby to keep them out of mischief.
But all kinds of out-door amusements ought also to be encouraged in
every part of the world, and even money should be allowed to commanding
officers to provide what is required for them; and every thing possible
done, so as to make soldiers feel that their regiments are their homes,
and their officers their best friends. With this most desirable object
in view, officers must see what vast responsibility devolves upon them,
and how much they are called upon to teach by example.

It is well known, that in the United Kingdom, society is very
differently circumstanced to what it is in any other part of the world.
No nation can boast of such a high-minded and enlightened middle class
as we possess; and education and manners place most of them upon a
level with the highest. Almost all the officers of our army and navy
are taken from this middle class; but I regret to say, that too many
of them, as well as the first class, know as little of the habits
or feelings of the lower orders, as the latter know of theirs. Thus
the very formation of society is against that community of feeling
and interest, which ought to exist between officers and soldiers, or
sailors; and to the want of this sympathy among us, may be attributed
much of that powerful influence which dangerous men are able to
exercise over the lower orders of the people of the present day; for
they are generally destitute of the virtues or principles to be found
among men in a similar state; and the dependence in which they are
held by the more wealthy part of the community, engenders feelings of
jealousy and even dislike towards them, which may be expected at any
time, when opportunity offers, to burst forth in those acts of open
violence, which occasionally disturb the tranquillity of the empire.

The fancies and absurdities of some of our commanders in former times,
were most truly surprising; but to us who were their victims they
were any thing but amusing or laughable. Some of them ought to be
held up as beacons to warn others to avoid them; but doing so, and
showing their effects upon those under them, would occupy much more
time and space than I can devote to the purpose. But how rapidly an
army whose spirit has been already subdued by a too severe system of
discipline is vanquished, was clearly proved, by what occurred in the
year 1806. On the 7th of October in that year, the Emperor Napoleon
announced to the Senate, that he had quitted his capital to repair to
his army in Germany. Already had the Prussian army, completed to its
war establishment, passed their frontier, in all the confidence of
discipline, and had invaded Saxony; and their advanced posts had even
made their appearance not far from the cantonments of the Imperial army.

The French were instantly put in motion to cross the Rhine, and by
forced marches, the several corps occupied the points assigned them,
and every thing was arranged for advancing against the Prussians. By
the evening of the 8th, the French, after several brilliant affairs,
in which the Prussians were invariably beaten, had passed the Saale.
Events succeeded each other with great rapidity, and according to
the Emperor's account of what occurred, Marshal Davoust arrived at
Naumbourg on the night of the 12th of October. The Prussian army being
thus caught, "en flagrant délit," their left being turned, and many of
their depots of provisions taken. The king of Prussia intended to have
commenced hostilities on the 9th of October, by moving his right upon
Frankfort, his centre upon Wurtzbourg, and his left upon Bamberg; but
the Emperor seems to have anticipated this arrangement by marching upon
Saalbourg, Lobenstein, Schleitz, Gera, and Naumbourg, when the 9th,
10th, 11th, and 12th, were necessarily occupied by the Prussians in
changing their positions, and in recalling their detachments; so that
upon the 13th they were, by concentrating their troops, in number about
150,000, enabled to offer battle to the French between Capelsdorf and
Amerstadt.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, the Emperor arrived at
Jena; and from a height occupied by his advanced guard, he reconnoitred
the Prussian position, and made his dispositions for the morrow.

The Prussian army on the morning of the 14th displayed a splendid front
of infantry, cavalry, and seven or eight hundred pieces of cannon.
All their manœuvres were executed with that precision and rapidity
which might be expected from troops who spent their lives at constant
drill, and in military evolutions; in all of which the French were
very inferior; yet they had been sufficiently taught their business as
soldiers, without that severity of discipline having been resorted to,
which too frequently dispirits men, and renders them indifferent to
events.

The results of this campaign, of seven days duration, and the famous
battle of Jena, were 30,000 prisoners, and amongst them twenty
generals; upwards of twenty colours, three hundred pieces of cannon,
and great quantities of provisions taken by the French. The Prussian
loss was estimated at 20,000 in killed and wounded; and the wreck of
their army fell back in consternation and disorder, whilst the French
admitted only the loss of a few generals, and about 1,500 men killed
and wounded.

We are not to suppose that the Emperor Napoleon could have gained such
advantages over a Prussian army, manœuvred by such able officers as
those who led it, by superiority of tactics, though he evidently wished
the world to think so; and we must attribute the results of the battle
to the gallantry and superior intelligence of the French officers and
soldiers over troops in whom such a spirit no longer existed; for had
it not, in a great measure been banished, for the time, from amongst
them, by the severity of Prussian discipline, which is most certainly
calculated to eradicate courage out of any army in the world but that
composed of English, Scotch, and Irishmen, upon whom its effects were
but too long tried; and though it did not exhaust their innate national
bravery, and love of war, yet it rendered them at all times ready and
anxious to free themselves from the restraint under which they were so
tightly kept; and when once they could contrive to get out of the sight
of their officers, and to _think_ for themselves,--to do which they
perhaps had very few opportunities in the course of their lives--they
bade farewell to subordination, and took good care, in every kind
of excess, to make up for what they had suffered, under the kind of
discipline we had in a great measure copied from the Prussians; and to
this I venture to ascribe many of our soldiers' irregularities, and
even their crimes.

Let us see the effects of such absurd discipline upon a Russian army.
In the month of June, 1807, the Russians occupied Heilsburg, where they
had collected vast quantities of provisions, and all that was necessary
for an army. Their position was excellent, and during a period of
four months every thing possible had been done to render it, by field
works, more formidable. The Russians even attempted to be the first
to commence hostilities, but they were attacked by the French, and
completely beaten with the loss of 30,000 killed and wounded, and 4,000
prisoners; while the French lost (and the results go to prove their
statements to be correct) only 700 killed, and about 2,000 wounded;
and I do not hesitate to attribute the loss of the battle of Eylau to
the same cause as I do that of Jena; that is to say, the injurious,
depressing effects of Prussian discipline; and which system seems to be
even to this day followed up in the Russian armies.

In further proof of this, I must beg the reader's attention to what I
am going to mention, and which actually occurred in a regiment that
shall be nameless.

The day was fixed upon which it was to be reviewed. Its commanding
officer was suddenly taken ill, and he was confined to his bed. So far
had preparations been carried for this great event, that even the large
cards, as was the practice in those days, containing the manœuvres
to be performed, had been made out for the inspecting General. This
illness of the Lieutenant-Colonel was an event quite unforeseen, and
the senior Major, a good-natured old gentleman, whose military career
had been in the West Indies, and who was more agreeably occupied at
the time than in studying Dundas, was completely thunderstruck when he
found that at the shortest notice he had to make up his mind to assume
the command on this truly alarming occasion; for the General was well
known to be a first-rate tiger. It was, therefore, a very hopeless case
with the gallant Major, as he really could not at any time manœuvre
a battalion, and much less under such trying circumstances; and what
made matters worse, his Lieutenant-Colonel would rarely allow him to
try whether he could do so or not, for he was one of those commanders
who carried on every thing himself, aided by his adjutant, and a well
trained set of drummers, whom he kept in constant practice.

His Adjutant was a well-meaning man, and in kindly feelings, and good
will towards the Major, and in his great zeal for the reputation of his
corps, he went with the beautifully written out card of the manœuvres
(the produce of many an anxious hour of the Lieutenant-Colonel's
valuable time) to the Major, to explain it fully to him, and also
comfort him with the hope, that as the regiment had most diligently
practised every march, counter-march, and wheel of it, things must
go off well, if he would only not be alarmed. Accordingly, that very
evening, well prompted by the Adjutant, he actually got the regiment
through it handsomely enough. At night the Adjutant went to see and
condole with his most yellow, billious-looking commander. "How will
ever the poor Major get through with the review to-morrow?" "O, there
is no fear whatever of him, for he put the regiment through _it_
tolerably this evening." "Through what, Sir--have you presumed to show
him my manœuvres?" "Yes, Sir, but I thought there could be no harm in
doing so, as----" "You thought, Sir--no harm, Sir. Go immediately, Sir,
and bring back my manœuvres, and let Major ---- make out a review for
himself--he shall certainly not have mine."

The cards were consequently delivered up to their unselfish owner. But
the Adjutant, who flattered himself, that he was also something of a
manœuvrer, though, at the risk of irritating the Lieutenant-Colonel,
thought it would be well, before he should terrify the Major out of his
senses with this awful intelligence, to sit down and concoct a very
pretty review--one, at all events, which would show that the battalion
knew how to act against an enemy in its front and rear, and probably
upon both its flanks at the same moment. In short, he went that very
night with a splendid plan, which he proudly and confidently displayed
before the astounded Major; who, at last, after a good deal of trouble,
made so far to comprehend it, that he was able next morning, at five
o'clock, to put the regiment through it very tolerably. But this was
rather sharp work upon all concerned; for the grand review was to take
place at 11, A.M.--the Major was quite hoarse--and a new card
had to be finely written out for the General.

The review came off admirably--the Major (his voice cleared by the
yolks of eggs) was not often wrong; at least this was not observed, and
it did not signify, as both officers and men had fully determined to do
well, not only on the Major's account, but on their own.

At the long wished-for conclusion, the General came solemnly forward,
and in front of the regiment, really covered the blushing, but
exhausted, Major with praises and honourable acknowledgments, and
approbation of his own and the corps' most admirable performances.

On the return of the Adjutant from the field, he, as in duty bound,
waited upon his Commanding officer. "I suppose, poor ---- made a very
pretty business of it to-day?" "A most admirable review; and I have,
upon no occasion, ever seen the regiment do better; so much, so, that
the General expressed in the strongest terms his admiration of our
day's performance!"

This was quite enough, but the symptoms of the Lieutenant-Colonel's
attack of bilious fever, were not alleviated by the account of the
Major's unlooked-for success. Such were the men to whom the command of
our regiments was too often confided, and who generally contrived to
render soldiers indifferent to events, and reckless in their conduct.

I had the luck to be stationed in the West of Ireland under a General,
who considered that nothing tended so effectually to make first-rate
soldiers, as to accustom them to prolonged exposure, under arms, to
deluges of rain, and to all kinds of weather; and certainly in that
part of Ireland, there was no want of his favourite specific--rain. I
must, however, at the same time acknowledge, that of this he himself
took ample doses. Two other regiments, and the one to which I belonged,
and a body of cavalry and artillery, formed his brigade; and the
more gloomy and threatening the weather, the more certain were we of
a repetition of the General's admired refrigerant system, for his
practice in this line was extensive and unwearied; we had frequently,
on such occasions, to take up favourite positions, and to make long
and fatiguing excursions, over high sand-hills, which were some miles
distant from our cantonments. But, notwithstanding this excellent
treatment, our soldiers did not become a whit the more water-proof; and
many of them most provokingly went into hospitals with violent pains
in their backs, bones, &c. and which, to the General's surprise, often
terminated in fever.

How differently were Sir Thomas Brisbane's kindly feelings evinced for
those placed under his care (indeed Sir Thomas Picton always wished his
commanding officers to act in the same manner). No officer commanding
a corps was allowed, under any pretence, to keep his men unnecessarily
under arms, especially after a march. As soon as the soldiers reached
their cantonments, or ground of encampment, they were ordered to be
instantly dismissed, and allowed to go into their quarters or tents
to take off their accoutrements, knapsacks, &c. so that they might as
soon as possible recover from the fatigues of the march; for keeping
men standing, after being heated, till they became chilled, was always
found to be injurious to their health.

After the troops came down the river Plata from Buenos Ayres, we were
kept in what our Generals chose to denominate, barracks afloat--that
is to say--in transports off Monte Video. One of these great officers
came unexpectedly on board our head-quarter ship, which was certainly
kept in fine order. The moment he set his foot on deck he called for
the officer of the day, who happened to be also the senior officer on
board, and ordered him to show him all over the ship. I believe he
must have been surprised at the man-of-war style adopted, and at the
extreme cleanliness and regularity of every thing (for even in spite of
the remonstrances of the masters of the transports, as to their decks
being ruined, the soldiers were kept constantly rubbing away with the
holy stones), at all events, he found no fault, but unfortunately in
passing the ship's coppers, he thought fit to demand what was in them,
and being told rice for the soldiers' dinners, he, with great dignity
and gravity, inquired of the alarmed officer the quantity of rice
in them? The unlucky wight, not knowing well what to say, and being
fully aware, that to betray ignorance upon such important points, was
an unpardonable crime, answered at once, about 1000 pounds--terrible
mistake, at least the threatened consequences were terrible--for this
worthy coadjutor of General Whitelock, in an instant, set upon the
unlucky miscalculator of boiled and unboiled rice, and declared that
he had never met with such a downright ignorant blockhead in all his
life; for the hold of the ship (and she was 700 tons burden) could not
contain that quantity when boiled; "and now, Sir," continued this great
commander, "I shall take care to make you suffer for such ignorance
and inattention to your duty, and shall report your conduct upon this
occasion to the Horse Guards, in order to have your promotion stopped."
Whether he kept his word or not I cannot tell; but I am rather inclined
to believe, that he had other matters to occupy his attention, on his
return to England, which came more home to himself.

I could bring many more examples of this kind forward, but I must no
longer occupy the reader's attention with such frivolous matters.

But it is impossible to show in a more satisfactory manner, what was
the state of a British army in the field than by giving, as I intend
to do after a few observations, a letter from his Grace the Duke of
Wellington to the Generals commanding divisions and brigades; yet,
I trust it will not be deemed presumptuous if I venture to say that
the real causes of irregularities and bad conduct on the part of
soldiers, are not always perceived or ascribed even by men of the
greatest talents and experience to the proper sources; but having, in
the retreat from Madrid and Burgos, which is that alluded to by his
Grace, had much to do with the part of the rear-guard under Sir Edward
Pakenham, who then commanded the 3rd division of infantry, during the
absence of Sir Thomas Picton, and having also seen a good deal on many
other occasions, I hope I may be considered authorized to remark, that
owing to the admirable management and unwearied exertions of Sir Edward
Pakenham, the conduct of the division on that retreat was, I may say,
tolerably good, except upon the night after we left Madrid; when many
a pig was slain in the woods, and the lives of the staff and other
officers of the division and brigades seriously endangered in their
endeavours, under a sharp fire of musketry, kept up at these animals,
to put a stop to such disorderly conduct on the part of the soldiers,
as actually left the division, from the hunt having become almost
general, at the mercy of the French, had they known what we were
about; for they were close at hand, and must have wondered what could
have occasioned the uproar and firing in our camp. But what occurred,
day after day, during the retreat amongst the numerous disorderly
stragglers from the several divisions, some of whom, in spite of all
that could be done, occasionally fell into the hands of the enemy,
most clearly evinced very bad conduct on the part of the troops, and
also a want of management somewhere; but the irregularities, his Grace
laments, were comparatively nothing to what occurred in the retreat to
Corunna. In this instance, also, the weather, as usual in Spain, in
the month of November, was very severe, so much so, that some men who
had been barely able to reach the resting, or rather halting place for
the night, which was, perhaps, an open ploughed field, become quite a
swamp from the rain, were in the morning found dead, from the effects
of cold, wet, and want of sufficient food, much of which, from those
having charge of it, not knowing in what direction to move, had gone
astray; and in one instance, we, as rear-guard, obtained a supply
of biscuit, by taking a quantity of it off the hands of a conductor
of a brigade of mules, who, in a few minutes more, had he not been
prevented, would have led them in amongst the enemy.

After the troops from Madrid and Burgos met, the army, when there
were roads running nearly parallel to each other, marched generally
in two columns; but I must say matters were not always well managed,
and we had no properly organized police, who could have promptly,
when necessary, enforced discipline, for what were a few provosts
with their infantry guards, generally accompanying the baggage? The
columns sometimes unfortunately and probably unavoidably, came into
contact with each other on the same road, occasioning a certain degree
of confusion, which afforded opportunities for some of the soldiers
to escape from under the eyes of their officers, however watchful
they might be, and to become as usual irregular; and at other times
the columns (probably also unavoidably), considering the state of the
weather, the nature of the country, and the then bad roads, were at
times too far asunder, and the communication not having been kept up as
it should have been by either our cavalry or infantry, the army became
liable to sudden and unlooked for events; and in one instance of this
kind, I believe it was, that one of our generals was taken by a French
patrole, that through mistake, occasioned by the rain, and a hazy state
of the atmosphere, and a want of proper precaution on our part, had
actually contrived to get in between our columns, certainly not very
much to our military credit.

When his Grace's letter reached us after the retreat, the feeling of
the officers commanding brigades and corps was, that, in this instance,
if nothing were said about the pig hunt, the 3rd division, although a
few of its soldiers had fallen into the hands of the enemy, did not
deserve the censure pronounced against the army in general; and it was
thought right that Sir Edward Pakenham should be waited upon, in order
to induce him to point out this to Lord Wellington, for they were
besides hurt at the implied superiority of the French in even making
fires and in quick cooking. Sir Edward, however, soon settled the
matter, by declaring in his usually laconic manner, that "he would do
no such thing," and adding, "let whoever the cap fits wear it."

They all knew well in what this supposed superiority of the French
lay, for the truth was, they never hesitated to turn a town or village
inside out, if it suited their purposes, or to pull down a house, or
half a dozen of them, if necessary, so as to get dry wood for their
fires, whereas our people had to be marched regularly under officers
for beef, bread, water, and wood, and they had seldom any thing else
for it, but to cut down, bring in, and use the green branches of trees
as fuel to cook with. This accounts for the observable difference
between the two armies, for when our soldiers occasionally, and when
not a tree was to be seen, got a house or two to burn, which were
always paid for, they could then cook as quickly as their practised
foes.

  "Sir, _Frenada, Nov. 28th, 1812._

"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that
circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which
the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are
already in progress by different lines of communication to the several
divisions and brigades.

"But besides these objects I must draw your attention in a very
particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The
discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in
some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of
the general and other officers to bring it back to that state in which
it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that
the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late
campaign to a greater degree _than_ any army with which I have ever
served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no
disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention
on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which
there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has
it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity
of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when
they were most severe.

"It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the
troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the
one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command
over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were
committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought
never to have occurred.

"Yet the necessity for retreating existing, none was ever made in which
the troops made such short marches; none in which they made such long
and repeated halts, and none in which the retreating armies were so
little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look therefore for
the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the
army to some cause, besides those resulting from the operations in
which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual
inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as
prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the
orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and
spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that if
their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant
attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders
which have been issued for the performance of this duty, and that the
strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to
serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give
their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced
many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is
one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period
during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control
of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition,
accoutrements, necessaries, and his field equipments, and his horse
and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his
provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the
forage of his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers
of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, and a British
army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a
state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.

"These are points then to which I most earnestly intreat you to turn
your attention, and the attention of the officers of the regiments
under your command, Portuguese as well as British, during the period in
which it may be in my power to leave the troops in their cantonments.
The commanding officers of regiments must enforce the orders of the
army, regarding the constant inspection and superintendance of the
officers over the conduct of the men of their companies in their
cantonments, and they must endeavour to inspire the non-commissioned
officers with a sense of their situation and authority, and the
non-commissioned officers must be forced to do their duty, by being
constantly under the view and superintendance of the officers. By these
means the frequent and discreditable recourse to the authority of the
Provost, and the punishments by the sentence of courts-martial will
be prevented, and the soldiers will not dare to commit the offences
and outrages, of which there are too many complaints, when they know
that the officers and non-commissioned officers have their eyes and
attention turned towards them.

"The commanding officers of regiments must likewise enforce the orders
of the army, regarding the constant _real_ inspection of the soldiers'
arms, ammunition, accoutrements, and necessaries, in order to prevent
at all times the shameful waste of ammunition, and the sale of that
article, and of the soldiers' necessaries. With this view, both should
be inspected daily.

"In regard to the food of the soldier, I have frequently observed and
lamented in the late campaign, the facility and celerity with which the
French soldiers cooked, in comparison with those of our army.

"The cause of this disadvantage is the same with that of every other
description, the want of attention of the officers to the orders of
the army, and to the conduct of their men, and the consequent want of
authority over their conduct. Certain men of each company should be
appointed to cut and bring in wood, others to fetch water, and others
to get the meat, &c., to be cooked; and it would soon be found, if this
practice were daily enforced, and a particular hour for seeing the
dinners, and for the men dining named, as it ought to be, equally as
for the parade, that cooking would no longer require the inconvenient
length of time which it has lately been found to take, and that the
soldiers would not be exposed to the privation of their food at the
moment at which the army may be engaged in operations with the enemy.

"You will, of course, give your attention to the field exercise and
discipline of the troops. It is very desireable, that the soldiers
should not lose the habit of marching; and the divisions should march
ten or twelve miles twice in each week, if the weather should permit,
and the roads in the neighbourhood of the cantonments of the division
should be dry. But I repeat, that the great object of the attention
of the general and field officers must be, to get the captains and
subalterns of regiments to understand and perform the duties required
of them, as the only mode by which the discipline and efficiency of the
army can be restored and maintained during the next campaign.

"I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

  (Signed)  "Wellington.

  "_To the Officer commanding  -- Division._"

The Duke of Wellington in this letter again accuses the officers of
being, in a great measure, the cause of irregularities, by their
neglect of duty; nevertheless, I still venture to attribute the bad
conduct of the soldiers more particularly to what I am convinced was
the chief cause, viz. the description of men they had to deal with.
As a proof of this, we find what follows in a general order, dated
Vizar, 28th February, 1810. "No. 6. The Commander of the Forces draws
the attention of the soldiers of the army to the consequences of the
crimes committed by the soldiers thus ordered for execution, under
the sentence of a General Court-Martial. Cornelius McGuire, of the
27th regiment, and George Chambers, of the 88th regiment, committed a
crime, which the Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe is too
common in this army; they robbed and ill-treated an inhabitant of this
country, whom they met on the road; a crime which the Commander of the
Forces is determined in no instance to forgive.

"The soldiers of the army have been invariably well treated by the
inhabitants of Portugal, and the frequent instances which have
occurred of their being robbed and ill treated, and of murder being
committed, by soldiers who straggle from their detachments on a march,
are a disgrace to the character of this army, and of the British nation.

"The Commander of the Forces is therefore determined, in every instance
of the kind, that may occur, to have proof adduced of the crime
committed, and the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever
they may be, shall be carried into execution.

"The Commander of the Forces is concerned to observe, that the crime
committed by John McDonough, private in the 58th regiment, is no less
common in this army, than robbery and murder, and in respect to this
crime, (repeated desertion) he is equally determined to carry into
execution, the sentences of the General Courts-Martial, whatever they
may be."

We again find in a general order, dated Coimbra, 30th September,
1810, that four soldiers of the 45th regiment were found guilty, and
sentenced to be executed, for stopping on the highway, assaulting,
and robbing some Portuguese inhabitants, at, or near the bridge of
St. Euphemia; and which sentence was confirmed by his Excellency the
Commander of the Forces, but who was, as will be seen by what follows,
pleased to pardon them. "No. 3. Although the Commander of the Forces
has long determined that he will not pardon men guilty of crimes of
which the prisoners have been convicted, he is induced to pardon these
men in consequence of the gallantry displayed by the 45th regiment
on the 27th instant. (Battle of Busaco.) He trusts that this pardon
will make a due impression upon the prisoners, and that by their
future regular and good conduct, they will endeavour to emulate their
comrades, who have, by their bravery, saved them from a disgraceful
end."

I have already stated, that our soldiers certainly possess one
redeeming quality, which is undaunted courage in battle; but how
lamentable it was constantly to find that this was so much marred by
irregularities and crimes, which invariably and instantly followed the
most brilliant displays of it. As an instance of this, I beg to say,
that upon the night of the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, I was in the
trenches with the 45th regiment, which was destined to lead the assault
of the main breach. Whilst waiting for the hour fixed upon for this
purpose, an order arrived from Sir Thomas Picton, to form a forlorn
hope. The officers commanding companies were therefore called together,
and desired to bring to the head of the column, six men from each for
the purpose. They soon returned, but to my surprise, unaccompanied
by a single soldier, all of them declaring, that every man present
volunteered for the pre-eminence, and they wished to know how they were
to act, for that the oldest soldiers claimed it as their right. Well
might officers be proud of such men, who could evince such a spirit
with the breach, I may say, yawning for their destruction. The moment
for the assault had however arrived--no time could be spared--the
officer commanding knew not well what to do, when the Captain of
Grenadiers, (now Major Martin) who was there dreadfully wounded, put an
end to all difficulties, by requesting permission to lead as he stood
with his company at the head of the column. This was very reluctantly
acquiesced in, but there was no time to make any other arrangements,
and thus the regiment advanced rapidly, but compactly and in perfect
order, towards the breach.

The outer edge of the ditch was soon reached. The 45th, stoutly
supported by the 88th and 74th, the other fine corps composing the
leading brigade, jumped in upon bags of hay thrown there by the
sappers. At that instant a very loud and prolonged explosion took
place, seemingly at the foot of the breach, which, providentially,
the regiment had not then reached. This did not, even for a moment,
stop their progress, and the rugged breach was ascended under a most
destructive fire from all points. Many brave men had already fallen.
The enemy's fire continued to be most ruinous, and to our horror we
saw that the breach was completely cut off, and that there was no
possibility of advancing or descending into the city. The left was
first tried, but in vain; and although the loss of officers and men of
the brigade, but especially of the leading regiment was very great, yet
no one supposed that retracing our steps could even be thought of. I
had just made my way back, but with great difficulty, from the left of
the breach, when I met General McKinnon, who commanded the brigade,
and who had, by some means or other, contrived to get through the
dense crowd below; and though I tried, amidst the uproar, to make him
understand how we were situated, and that we could not gain ground to
the left, yet he seemingly did not understand me, and went on in that
direction. Whilst thus situated, another and a most dreadful explosion
took place, which shook the ramparts like a powerful earthquake, and
destroyed General McKinnon and most of those who had followed him.
A short but fearful pause insued, when Brigade-Major Wylde suddenly
appeared, coming greatly animated from the right, and pointing in that
direction; all followed him with loud cheers, and I will venture to
say, that he was the first man, who that night entered Ciudad Rodrigo.
In their hurry in falling back from the breach, the French had not had
time to remove a few planks laid across the cut to our right, and more
were found on the other side; and thus by unflinching and persevering
gallantry on the part of the leading brigade of the 3rd division, under
a most appalling fire, the city was carried.

I make no remarks upon the gallantry of those employed at the smaller
breach, but undaunted courage was unquestionably displayed upon this
occasion by the soldiers; but all the corps engaged immediately broke
away in search of plunder and liquor, or with the intention of enjoying
themselves in every kind of irregularity and excess, and that too in
spite of the utmost exertions of their officers, who could not for a
moment be supposed capable of countenancing their atrocities.

I found myself again with the 45th regiment, which had in so noble a
manner volunteered the forlorn hope, and had led so gallantly into
the breach. A great part of the regiment had been got together, by
the officers' exertions, in a large building in which they posted
themselves immediately after the city was gained. The officers had
begun to flatter themselves, and even to say to each other, that the
corps would surely in this instance gain great credit for its proper
behaviour; but while some watched one door, and all thought they had
the soldiers secure for once, and out of harm's way, they almost all
contrived to escape by another, and the officers, however zealous, had
nothing for it, but to arm themselves with patience and resignation.
Nevertheless several of them were ordered out into the streets to
endeavour to bring back the stragglers, but the horrors witnessed,
and which could not by any means be prevented, were beyond belief or
description. I well remember, looking on in dismay, at a party of these
madmen, belonging to all the corps engaged, sitting round a table,
in a large house, carousing, singing, cheering, and firing off their
muskets. The windows were all open, so that we could see every thing
that was going forward, for the house was in a blaze about them. I
called aloud, and did every thing possible to induce them to come out,
but all in vain; they neither listened to me, nor to several other
officers who were equally exerting themselves to save them, and we even
ran great risks of being shot by these idiots, who continued drinking,
singing, firing and cheering, and in which delightful occupations, I
saw that they were most cordially joined by some of the French garrison.

This noise, however, and the reports of their muskets suddenly ceased;
the roof of the building had fallen in, and they were all swallowed up
amidst the ruins!

These wretched men were, I conclude, returned by their regiments as
killed in the assault of the fortress.

Lord Wellington, I have reason to believe, ordered the 45th regiment,
(then under the command of the present Major-General Sir Leonard
Greenwell,) such was his opinion of their firmness, at the battle of
Fuentes d'Onor, to receive in line, and without forming square, the
enemy's cavalry then advancing in force towards them, if they should
venture to charge. The experiment was not, however, made, for the
French, I conclude, observing such a steady determined front presented
to them, thought it wiser to retire, especially as they were at the
time suffering severely from our cannon; but I have no doubt, as to
what would have been the result, had they ventured to charge; yet
this, if even successful, could not have been compared to the splendid
achievement of the 5th regiment, in the famous retreat of the 3rd
division from Elbodon to Guinaldo, in which I saw that corps receive
the charge of the French cavalry steadily and firmly; to my delight and
astonishment, however, they in turn charged them, and drove them down
the hill with considerable loss. The 5th and 45th were, perhaps, as
steady under arms, and as well conducted regiments as any in the army;
yet I have seen both led away at sieges, and upon other occasions, when
opportunities presented themselves, like the rest. I feel, however,
that I ought here to give Lord Wellington's orders issued immediately
after the retreat alluded to.

  "G.O.  _Richosa, 2d October, 1811._

"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces is desirous of drawing the
attention of the army to the conduct of the 2d battalion, 5th and 77th
regiments, and the 21st Portuguese regiment, and Major Arentschild's
Portuguese artillery, under the command of the Hon. Major-General
Colville, and of the 11th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars, under
Major-General Alten, in the affair with the enemy on the 26th ult.
These troops were attacked by between thirty and forty squadrons of
cavalry, with six pieces of cannon, supported by a division consisting
of fourteen battalions of infantry, with cannon.

"No. 4. The Portuguese artillerymen were cut down at their guns before
they quitted them; but the 2nd battalion, 5th regiment, attacked the
cavalry which had taken the guns, and retook them. At the same time the
77th regiment were attacked in front by another body of cavalry, upon
which they advanced and repulsed them.

"No. 5. While these actions were performed, Major-General Alten's
brigade, of which there were only three squadrons on the ground, were
engaged on the left, with numbers infinitely superior to themselves.
These squadrons charged repeatedly, supporting each other, and took
above twenty prisoners; and notwithstanding the immense superiority of
the enemy, the post would have been maintained, if the Commander of the
Forces had not ordered the troops to withdraw from it, seeing that the
action would become still more unequal, as the enemy's infantry were
likely to be engaged in it, before the reinforcement ordered to the
support of the post could arrive.

"No. 6. The troops then retired with the same determined spirit, and
in the same good order with which they had maintained their post--the
2nd battalion, 5th regiment, and 77th, in one square, and the 21st
Portuguese regiment in another, supported by Major-General Alten's
cavalry and the Portuguese artillery. The enemy's cavalry charged
three faces of the square of the British infantry, but were beaten
off; and finding from their repeated fruitless efforts, that the brave
troops were not to be broken, they were contented to follow them at
a distance, and with firing upon them with their artillery, till the
troops joined the remainder of the 3rd division, and were afterwards
supported by a brigade of the 4th division.

"Although the 21st Portuguese regiment were not actually charged by the
cavalry, their steadiness and determination were conspicuous, and the
Commander of the Forces observed with pleasure the order and regularity
with which they made all their movements, and the confidence they
showed in their officers.

"No. 7. The Commander of the Forces has been particular in stating the
details of this action in the general orders, as, in his opinion, it
affords a memorable example of what can be effected by steadiness,
discipline and confidence. It is impossible that any troops can, at
any time, be exposed to the attack of numbers relatively greater than
those which attacked the troops under Major-General Colville, and
Major-General Alten, on the 25th of September; and the Commander of
the Forces recommends the conduct of those troops to the particular
attention of the officers and soldiers of the army, as an example to be
followed on all such circumstances.

"No. 8. The Commander of the Forces considers Major-General Alten and
Major-General Colville, and the commanding officers of the regiments
under their command, respectively, viz. Lieutenant-Colonel Cummings,
Lieutenant-Colonel Arentschild, Lieutenant-Colonel Broomhead, Major
Ridge, and Colonel Bacellar of the 21st Portuguese regiment, and
the officers and soldiers under their command to be entitled to his
particular thanks, and he assures them that he has not failed to report
his sense of their conduct in the action of the 25th September to those
by whom he trusts it will be duly appreciated and recollected."

His Grace the Duke of Wellington very rarely bestowed such public
praise upon any part of his army; yet how strange it was that soldiers
who could, in the presence of their officers, behave so bravely
and merit such encomiums should, when out of their sight, act so
recklessly. I do not hesitate in saying that the officers of the army
deserved more credit for whatever was found deserving of commendation
in their men than was usually allowed them. It was of old a common
saying that, "with French officers and English soldiers the world might
easily be conquered." Whatever slur this may have been intended to
convey against British officers, it certainly no longer exists, and it
could be easily proved that they are now second to none; and all they
want is a superior description of men to act with, which the United
Kingdom can easily furnish, and a better system for their guidance--a
system which would allow them to treat those placed under them as
beings endowed with reason, and not as mere pieces of machinery.

The castle of Badajoz, after three unsuccessful attempts, was at last
carried chiefly through the wonderful exertions, persevering zeal
and gallantry of the officers of the 3rd division, several of whom
had waited, according to orders, just before the assault, upon Sir
James Kempt, then one of its generals of brigade, when a plan of the
castle was shown to them, and much pains taken to point out what was
to be overcome in order to capture it; and it must have been obvious
to those officers, that retreating, when once under the walls of the
castle, was quite impossible, and this clearly shows that the idea of
a false attack could never have been entertained; indeed it was talked
of and considered by many of us as an enterprise fit only for the
knight-errants of old.

To these explanations, and to the extraordinary perseverance and
gallantry of the officers, I have always chiefly attributed the
taking of the Castle of Badajoz by the 3rd division. But in giving
what follows, I cannot avoid again calling the reader's attention to
the praises so justly due to the officers, and also to the soldiers
for undaunted courage in following them; and I regret to say, to the
censure, the next moment, so well deserved by the latter. It may be
asked, why I persevere in making such severe remarks upon the conduct
of our soldiers? I readily answer, that my only motive is to induce the
country, if possible, to employ hereafter such men, as can be called
out in the way I have proposed in our armies, and not the inferior and
most difficult to be restrained part of our fine and warlike population.

  "G.O.  _Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812._

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces returns his thanks to the general
officers, officers and soldiers of the 3rd, 4th, and light divisions,
to the Royal engineers and artillery, and to the Portuguese artillery,
for their persevering patience and laborious industry, and the
gallantry which they have uniformly manifested throughout the late
siege of Badajoz.

"In thanking them for the uncommon gallantry displayed last night in
the assault of the place, under the most trying circumstances, the
Commander of the Forces must include among those the general officers,
officers and soldiers of the 5th division."

  "G.O.  _Fuente Guinaldo, 16th May, 1812._

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces has great satisfaction in
communicating to the army the following extract of a letter from the
Earl of Liverpool, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of
State, dated Downing-street, 28th April, 1812:--

'His Royal Highness has commanded me to express to your Lordship the
sense he entertains of the great services rendered to this country, and
to her allies, by the reduction of Badajoz.

'The Prince Regent has perused with most sincere regret the long
list of brave men who have suffered in this memorable siege, and
particularly in the assault of Badajoz, on the night of the 6th
instant. Never, perhaps, was immoveable intrepidity more imperiously
required, and never was it more conspicuously and more gloriously
displayed.

'The great proportion of officers of high rank who have bled in this
tremendous conflict, affords an affecting proof of the zeal with which
they pointed out the path of victory to their willing followers.

'The Prince Regent desires that your Lordship will receive his Royal
thanks for your conduct throughout these important and arduous
operations; and likewise that you would convey his thanks, in the
most public manner to the general officers, the officers of engineers
and artillery, and to all the officers, non-commissioned officers and
soldiers, (both British and Portuguese) employed under your command,
at the siege of Badajoz, for their distinguished services on this
occasion, in which their superiority has been so unequivocally and
nobly manifested.'"

But we must now, I am sorry to say, turn to the other side of the
picture:--

  "G.O. _Camp before Badajoz, 7th April, 1812._

"No. 4. The regiments of the 5th division are to return to their
bivouac by regiments, as soon as Lieutenant-General Leith will think
proper, excepting the Royal Scots and 9th regiment, which are to remain
in Badajoz as late this day, 'till the soldiers will have been turned
out of the town and order will be restored."

  "After General Order.  _7th April 1812._

"No. 1. It is now full time that the plunder of Badajoz should cease,
and the Commander of the Forces requests that an officer and six steady
non-commissioned officers may be sent from each regiment, British and
Portuguese, of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and light divisions into the town
to-morrow morning at five o'clock, in order to bring away any men that
may be straggling there.

"No. 2. The Commander of the Forces has ordered the Provost-marshal
into the town, and he has orders to execute men he may find in the act
of plunder after he shall arrive there."

  "G.O. _Camp before Badajoz, 8th April, 1812,
  at 11 o'clock, p.m._

"No. 1. The rolls must be called in camp every hour, and all persons
must attend till further orders.

"No. 2. Brigadier-General Power is ordered and held responsible that no
British or Portuguese soldiers, except those belonging to the place,
or having a passport from a field-officer, shall go into Badajoz till
further orders.

"No. 3. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to hear that the brigade
in Badajoz, instead of being a protection to the people, plunder them
more than those who stormed the town.

"No. 6. The Commander of the Forces calls upon the staff officers of
the army and the commanding and other officers of regiments, to assist
him in putting an end to the disgraceful scenes of drunkenness and
plunder which are going on at Badajoz.

"No. 7. The Provost-marshal of the army, and the Assistant Provosts of
the several divisions, are to attend there to-morrow at daylight and
throughout the day.

"No. 8. Brigadier-General Power is requested to place 50 men, with
officers in proportion, on guard at the gate of Elvas, and another of
the same number at the breaches; and to prevent soldiers from entering
the town, or from quitting it with bundles of any description.

"No. 9. British and Portuguese soldiers are forbid to go into Badajoz,
and the Provosts are to punish those they may find there as being
guilty of disobedience of orders, unless they have a pass signed by a
field officer, or the commanding officer of the regiment."

This must surely open the eyes of the most incredulous as to the
behaviour of our army; but even long before the Peninsular war the
conduct of the British soldiers, wherever they had an opportunity of
breaking loose, was much to be deplored, indeed nothing can show this
more strongly than the following extracts from a modern publication,
and for the correctness of which I think I could answer, from what I
myself saw in South America.

"We took the cannon and turned them on the fugitives, after which
we pursued them into Maldonado, and sweeping from house to house,
were in five minutes masters of the town. Then followed a scene of
barricading and plunder, such as I have no words to describe. While
some ran to fill up the ends of the streets with barrels, cars, and
household furniture, others broke into wine and spirit stores, or
ranged through the dwellings of the inhabitants, carrying destruction
and terror into all their quarters. For our commandant gave his people
three hours license, and never surely did men make better use of the
opportunities afforded them. It was in vain that the officers flew
from cellar to cellar, knocking in the heads of casks, and pouring out
the contents into the streets. The soldiers if they could not get at
liquor elsewhere, dropped their canteens into the kennel and were soon
in a state which set all subordination and discipline at defiance. It
was well for us that the Spaniards did not think of returning to the
attack. If they had done so, we should have been cut to pieces almost
without resistance." We again read in the same publication, "Meanwhile
the few among our people who were fit for duty, took the out-posts,
and the rest slept where they had fallen down: some in houses, some in
the streets, but all in a state of helpless intoxication. Under such
circumstances, the night was, to those in command, an anxious one."

I think it must now be allowed, that the object I have in view has been
effected; and that I have brought forward sufficient to sanction my
entertaining a hope, that the plans I have proposed for calling out
men for our regular army may be deemed worthy of notice; and I also
trust that after what I have shown to be the conduct of our soldiers,
in spite of the utmost exertions of their officers, the idea of
enlisting men at low bounties for the militia will be well considered
before it is adopted.




CHAP. VII.


The escalade of the castle of Badajoz, ought to be held up as an
example to future commanders of such enterprises. Good maps, and
plans of fortifications can almost always be purchased, or procured
by some means or other, of any country about to become the scene of
warfare. If they cannot be purchased in Great Britain, it ought to
be the business of some department of the state to endeavour, if
possible, to procure them; and the generals and staff of the army
about to leave our shores should be furnished with correct copies of
such maps; and when necessary, they should be referred to as official
documents. All those therefore intended to be used, whether by the
General commanding-in-chief, or by any general or staff officer,
should be strictly alike; and how easy it would then be to direct the
movements of bodies of troops, though even stationed at a distance,
upon particular points by certain lines of march, and thereby to insure
punctuality and correct performance of all the parts of a combined
operation. And what a quantity of writing and explanation would thus
be rendered unnecessary. I however repeat, that to the plan of the
castle of Badajoz--which had been much strengthened during the time
the French held it--and which was, I believe, obtained through the
means of a deserter, I attribute our success in that very difficult
enterprise; for by it the officers were shown where to go, what they
might expect to encounter, how they were to overcome the obstacles
which would present themselves; and they were even encouraged to ask
questions, and for explanations upon points which they might not
clearly understand. How different was this to the display of consummate
wisdom, by some of our chiefs at the attack upon Buenos Ayres in South
America; who seemed, I must say, generally to have been selected
because they possessed, to say the least of it, most overbearing
manners, and truly Prussian ideas of discipline. A field-officer
who was to command one of the wings of a regiment in that very
injudiciously arranged undertaking, ventured to ask, how he was to act
after reaching a certain point, which was a conspicuous building shown
him--a general present on the occasion deigned to reply yet in any
thing but an encouraging manner, and at the same time turning from the
unlucky querist, to the Commander of the Forces--"General Whitelock,
the city of Buenos Ayres will never be taken, if our time is to be
occupied in answering silly questions." Now all the wings of regiments
accomplished what was required of them, and it was entirely owing to
such silly questions not having been answered, and to those bodies of
gallant troops becoming isolated, and no communications being kept up,
or orders sent for their farther proceedings, that the total failure
of that ill-fated, and badly managed enterprise was chiefly to be
attributed.

I hope I shall be forgiven if I presume to observe, that if the manner
of carrying on war since the time of Julius Cæsar has been necessarily
changed, the spirit which a soldier should possess, and the attainments
requisite for rendering an officer fit to command-in-chief, or even to
be an able subordinate, are still the same.

The art of commanding, and of inspiring that confidence, which Cæsar
possessed so transcendently, and which can make men fight, who are not
much inclined to do so, are also still the same.

A General should not only have studied attentively the sciences which
qualify him for his profession, but he ought also to be an experienced
soldier. He should know, with due discrimination, how to appreciate
men, and to employ them, so as to reap the greatest advantages from
their various talents and acquirements, especially those which fit them
for staff appointments. He should know how to act, so as to make the
most of both the fear and love of those he leads. He should, like the
Duke of Wellington, command the respect of mankind by the uprightness
of his public dealings with them; even to the exclusion of his own
family or intimates, from appointments, which he could have, even
with apparent justice, bestowed upon them. He should possess that
rapid _coup d'œil_, which would enable him in war to take advantage
of any error in tactics, which his adversary might commit, and to
avail himself of events to the utmost; and whilst he inspired all with
confidence in his military skill, in his actions, and in the example he
set others, he should not only teach, but also create in them ambition
to resemble him.

The great Emperor Napoleon, possessed, as a soldier, many of these
essential qualities; and carried along with him, not only the hearts
and feelings of Frenchmen, but also those of the people of many other
countries, even in his most ambitious aspirations; and, perhaps, no
period of the world produced two men of greater or more opposite
characters, views, and abilities, not only for the welfare of mankind,
but also for their bane, than Wellington and Napoleon. In short, I look
for talents, acquirements, and many perfections in a soldier, who aims
at the distinction of commanding-in-chief, or even of holding a high
staff appointment; and amongst others, that confidence in himself, not
the fruits of presumption, but of matured experience, which a perfect
knowledge of the art of war naturally produces.

How often in his intercourse with his troops did we find the Emperor
Napoleon imitating Cæsar. At the battle of Jena, the infantry of the
Imperial Guard could not, as he tells us, conceal their annoyance,
when they saw all around them engaged, and they themselves kept only
as spectators of the battle. He at last heard from many voices the
words, "en avant." "What is that I hear?" said the Emperor, "Ce ne peut
étre qu'un jeune homme qui n'a pas de barbe, qui peut vouloir préjuger
ce que je dois faire; qu'il attende qu'il ait commandé dans treute
batailles rangées avant de prétendre me donner des avis!"

As it may serve as a lesson to many a gallant soldier, and show him how
to act, if ever it should be his fortune to be similarly situated, I
must now relate, and in as few words as I can, what I saw Sir Edward
Pakenham achieve at the battle of Salamanca, in which, during the
absence of Sir Thomas Picton, he commanded the 3rd division; and I am
anxious also to give the reader some idea of its style of fighting.
I shall not indulge myself in giving a description of the splendid
movements of the two armies, useful as they might be to the young
soldier, which took place previous to that battle--this has already
been done by able military writers; and I shall only say, that the
3rd division crossed the Tormes in the forenoon of the 22nd July, and
took up a position in the rear, and towards the right of our army.
Here the troops commenced cooking, but from what I saw going forward
in both armies, I did not expect that the soldiers would be allowed
to eat their dinners in tranquillity. The ground we occupied was well
selected, and offered many advantages to the part of the army intended
to form a rear-guard; in case, as appeared very likely, that we were to
fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo; and the manner in which Marshal Marmont
manœuvred at the moment, evidently showed that his object was to force
us to do so, under certain disadvantages. I, therefore, looking upon
the 3rd division as intended for that rear-guard, fully expected hot
work before long.

Thus situated, we were able to enjoy a delightful view of what was
going on in both armies. We were not, however, destined to remain long
mere idle spectators; but, on the contrary, to take a most active and
conspicuous part in the approaching action.

It might have been near two o'clock, when Lord Wellington, followed by
some of his staff, galloped up to where the 3rd division was posted;
and calling for Sir Edward Pakenham, he gave him certain orders in
a very few impressive words, and Sir Edward's reply was quite in
character.

Our camp kettles were in an instant overturned, and packed on the
mules, which started for the rear; many looking blank enough at having
lost their dinners; and venting their ire upon the stubble they had
been obliged to use as fuel, and which had made the business of cooking
so tedious.

The division was soon under arms, and moved off rapidly in open column,
right in front, the 45th regiment leading. To me, as Brigade-Major of
the right brigade, Sir Edward Pakenham, in his quick decided manner,
pointed out the direction we were to take, and desired me to tell
Colonel Wallace, 88th regiment, the officer in the temporary command of
the brigade, to move on with as much rapidity as possible, but without
blowing the men too much. We soon descended into a kind of valley, or
rather hollow, and having brought up our left shoulders a little, we
pushed on at a quick pace, but in excellent order, to the right; the
side of the hollow towards the enemy concealing our movements from
their sight.

The whole scene was now highly animating. The left brigade, headed
by the 5th regiment, was, I saw, marching parallel to the right, so
as to be ready to form a second line. The Portuguese brigade followed
the right, and the whole of the left flank of the columns was covered
by a cloud of sharpshooters, composed of light infantry companies, and
riflemen of the 5th battalion, 60th regiment.

Having moved a considerable distance in this order, (field officers and
adjutants prolonging the line of march,) the head of the column, by
bringing up the right shoulder, began gradually to ascend the hill, on
the top of which we expected to find the enemy still extending to their
left. At length, having fairly outflanked the French left, the whole
formed line, and with Sir Edward Pakenham in front, hat in hand, the
brigades advanced in beautiful style, covered by our sharpshooters, the
right of the first line admirably supported by the left brigade.

The enemy's skirmishers and ours now set to work, yet we did not wait
for their indecisive long shots; but advancing still rapidly and
steadily, our right soon came into contact with their left, which had
opened a very heavy and destructive fire upon us, and which would have
lasted long enough had the brigade been halted to return it, but it was
instantly charged and overthrown. It was now evident to us all that
Sir Edward Pakenham knew how to handle Picton's division. But at this
critical moment some of the enemy's cavalry charged in turn, and most
gallantly, the right flank of the 45th regiment, but a well directed
fire from the 5th, which had been brought up, so as to be close at
hand, removed all apprehensions in that point, and the enemy's infantry
were quickly pursued, chiefly by Colonel Wallace, at the head of the
88th, whose impetuosity was found most difficult to restrain.

The division continued to advance; and though in motion, and still
exposed to a heavy fire, order was soon restored in the ranks of the
corps which had been so warmly engaged, and with Sir Edward Pakenham
still in front, we were again ready for another dash at the enemy,
who were trying to reform on a gentle height, a short distance in
front of us. But how truly inspiring the scene had now become, and how
"beautifully the practice" of Major Douglas's artillery was telling
among the French! Another charge was intended; the French would not,
however, stand, and retired in tolerable order, but most severely
galled by our sharpshooters, who were close at their heels. They then
took up another position, in which they were reinforced by a large body
of their troops, and many guns, which opened on us.

We were not at the time aware that Marmont had been wounded; but
I must say, that I was much surprised to see such a want of skill
and combination in all their movements and arrangements; nor can I
imagine what had become of their cavalry, for they ought before this
to have endeavoured to check us, or it must have been obvious to them
that their ruin was inevitable. But our dragoons, with General Le
Merchant and Sir John Elley at their head, having come up to us, the
regiments were cautioned, that on no account were they to follow up the
enemy when they should next force them to retire; but as soon as the
height was carried, they were to halt, so as to admit of our dragoons
charging with proper effect. It was now most animating to behold Sir
Edward Pakenham. He had again taken off his hat, as he had done at the
commencement of the battle; bare-headed, he rode in front, endeavouring
by his gestures to restrain the too eager advance of the troops. We
soon approached the enemy, who began to waver, being terribly shook by
our admirable artillery, and the unceasing fire of our light troops.
We at once saw that they would not stand our charge, but as they were
going off we sent a rattling fire after them.

Under a heavy fire from their numerous and well-served artillery, and
from a very large body of skirmishers, with which the French bravely
endeavoured to cover their retreat, our noble dragoons now dashed at
them, and such a scene instantly presented itself as has seldom been
witnessed.

The 3rd division again advanced steadily. We saw before us our foes
completely overthrown. Thousands of them were taken prisoners by the
dragoons, numbers were cut down, and the remainder, in total deroute,
were running as fast as their legs could carry them towards another
height, where a considerable number of their troops were posted, and
from whence they kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions engaged upon
our left. They soon after, however, began to retire, under a ruinous
fire from our artillery and sharpshooters, who, intermixed with some
of our dragoons, gave them not a moment's respite. Our loss, however,
had been considerable, for the French, before they gave way, generally
contrived to open a very heavy irregular fire upon us, which the
battalions advancing in line, and with our light infantry in front,
could not return, had it even been desirable that they should have
done so. The 3rd division, thus aided and supported by our splendid
dragoons, were, however, completely victorious. The enemy's left was
entirely discomfited, carrying alarm and confusion amongst their centre
and right; and just before darkness hid them from our sight, their
right alone seemed to me to maintain any thing like order, though the
whole still kept up a heavy fire upon the divisions of our army with
which they were engaged. We had, however, committed one mistake, in
following up the enemy, for we had inclined too much to our left, and
had thereby thrown away the advantage we would have had in still acting
even after dark, upon the French left and rear. Had the 3rd division
been kept more to the right, instead of coming at dusk almost in
rear of the troops engaged with the enemy upon our left; and had it,
supported by our cavalry, continued to act even in the dark, I cannot
imagine how the enemy could have been able to re-cross the Tormes.

The celebrated Lord Stair being asked by Voltaire, at the Hague, what
he thought of the battle of Dettingen, in which he commanded the
British under George the Second, he replied, that the French had
committed one great fault, and the allies two. That of the French was,
that they did not know how to wait; and the allies, after having placed
the French on the brink of ruin, did not profit by the victory they had
gained. At Salamanca, French impatience and eagerness to force us to
retreat, when we most likely would have done so had they let us alone,
hurried them to their ruin; and it being probably unavoidable, that we
should have halted on the field of battle for the night, afforded the
French, after being completely defeated, time to escape.

I do not even attempt to describe the whole of the battle of Salamanca;
and I know but little of the achievements of the other divisions of the
army. No officer, actively occupied as I was, could possibly do so; and
I have mentioned only what came more particularly under my own eye;
and my great object in doing so, is to show the style of fighting the
3rd division was accustomed to, and which, I trust, will be imitated
by our troops in future wars. I at the same time hope, that I have
said enough to enable any one to understand and appreciate the part so
nobly performed in that action by Sir Edward Pakenham. It may be also
observed, that I have avoided saying more of particular corps, where
all distinguished themselves, than I found to be necessary to make
myself understood by the reader, but as the country cannot possibly
remember what regiments then composed the 3rd or Picton's division, I
shall here beg leave to record them.

           { 45th   Regiment    British    } Under Major-General Sir
  Right    { 74th      do.        do.      }   Thomas Brisbane, during
  Brigade  { 88th      do.        do.      }   a considerable part of the
           { 5th Bat. 60th do.  Germans    }   war.

           {  5th   Regiment    British    } Under Major-General the
  Left     { 83rd      do.        do.      }   Hon. Sir Charles Colville,
  Brigade  { 87th      do.        do.      }   during a considerable part
           { 94th      do.        do.      }   of the war.

  Centre   {  9th   Regiment   Portuguese  } Under Maj-Gen. Sir Manley
  Brigade  { 21st      do.          do.    }   Power, during the greater
           { A batt. of Caçadores,  do.    }   part of the war.

  Artillery  Brigade of 9 pounders, British  Major Douglas, do. do.

Sir Edward Pakenham, upon the retreat from Madrid, and subsequent to
the battle of Salamanca, and whilst still in the command of the 3rd
division, issued the following orders, which those who had the honour
and pleasure of his acquaintance, will at once know as characteristic
of him. These orders also confirm, if farther confirmation is wanted,
the opinions I have expressed of the conduct of the men who composed
our armies.

  "D.O.  _Guinaldo, 26th November, 1812._

"No. 2. This approval and divisional order of punishment is to give
publicity to the example, and to convince the soldiers that no delay
from the circumstances of service, shall prevent punishment falling
on the individual, who shall basely absent himself from his post or
company, when in movement before the enemy.

"No. 3. The 3rd division of infantry has often been led against the
enemy's troops, and as often has defeated them. The manly spirit which
the officers and soldiers have shown on these occasions has been worthy
of record. And it is the more unaccountable, how men of those corps
could, by want of perseverance, allow themselves to fall into the power
of that enemy, on a limited retreat, who was unable to take them in the
field.

"No. 4. The[1] absentee list is large, and in proportion is
discreditable to every corps to which it relates, and which future
discipline and efforts on this point of service, is the only means now
left to remove."

  "D.O. _Moimenta de Beira, Jan. 20, 1813._

"No. 1. Major-General the Honourable Charles Colville proposes to
assume the command of the 3rd division on the 23rd instant. All reports
from that date are to be addressed accordingly.

"No. 2. When superseded, Major-General Pakenham is to join the 6th
division.

"Although he cannot allow himself the liberty to regret leaving the 3rd
division from a due obedience to orders; the Major-General wishes to be
understood, that he will know how to value the corps that compose it,
and to remember the personal notice he has acquired from the splendid
conduct of those corps in the field, a notice to which, under other
circumstances, he could have had no pretensions.

"No. 3. As good conduct commonly commands good fortune, General
Pakenham expects to hear of the 3rd division's fair fame, each
opportunity bringing new acknowledgments in additional thanks from
England; and the increased dread of her inveterate enemy."

I believe that I should have, earlier in this work, protested against
its being supposed, when I stated, that I considered our army to be
deficient in good system in many points, that I have presumed to say,
that there were not employed upon the staff of Lord Wellington's
army, scientific and able officers; for it was well known, that many
of them, as well as our generals, had become excellent; but it was
in the school of experience, that most of them had received those
lessons which made them so; and what they chiefly wanted was greater
assistance, especially from a police force, in performing their duties,
and a sufficiently comprehensive and well considered system for their
guidance. I will also venture to say, that we were quite equal, and,
in some points, even superior to the French in this branch of military
service; and the extraordinary mistakes which they often committed,
fully justify me in saying so.

Probably the severe check which Massena's army had received at Busaco,
had rendered him and his état-major more cautious than Napoleon's
officers were reported to be; but could any thing have possibly been
more surprising, than after they had found out the strength of the
lines of Torres Vedras to be so great as to deter them from venturing
an attack, that they should have remained a single day, much less
a whole winter in front of them, exposing their fine army to the
ruinous Fabian system adopted by Lord Wellington, who by the steady
and composed front he displayed, whilst the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo
was going forward, and by the lesson he gave them at Busaco, must have
told them plainly enough what they were to expect. Surely Massena,
his generals, and état-major should have come to the conclusion,
either to attack, at all hazards, these lines, or that they ought
instantly to have made arrangements for falling back into Spain upon
their resources, which they very likely might have been able to do
undisturbed by us, from the melancholy state in which Portugal then was.

Had the two armies changed positions, and I think I am fully borne
out in what I am going to assert by the line of proceeding adopted by
Lord Wellington at the Nivelle and at Toulouse, I have no doubt but he
would have attacked Massena, and carried the lines of Torres Vedras,
strong as they were represented to be. Some points in such intrenched,
or fortified positions, may always be carried by concentrated attacks
of brave and ably directed troops, like the British and French, when
generally the whole of the defences, constructed probably at great
expense and labour, must be abandoned, and at all events an attack, if
even unsuccessful, could not have been so disastrous to the French as
the effects of want of cover, a short allowance of unwholesome food,
naturally producing diseases and causing many deaths amongst them, all
of which they experienced during the winter, miserably and uselessly
spent by them before the lines of Torres Vedras, and in their ultimate
retreat from Portugal, when the whole of the country, north of the
Tagus, was completely, imprudently, but unavoidably laid waste; thereby
proclaiming to the world, that the idea of attacking the Duke of
Wellington there, at any future period, had been abandoned.

In the next place, and in farther illustration of the inefficiency
of the French état-major, I beg to ask, was not the extension of the
French left till it became weakened, and of which Lord Wellington so
ably availed himself, a great error on the part of Marmont, or rather
of his staff, at the battle of Salamanca? Could Marshal Soult and his
état-major not have been aware of our situation before the battle
Toulouse, when our pontoon bridge was unavoidably removed, or it would
have been carried away by the floods in the Garonne, and by the masses
of timber, &c. sent down, I conclude, by the Marshal's orders; and when
part of our troops, having previously crossed, were left apparently at
his mercy--and that of his whole army: and why was not advantage taken
of such a favourable opportunity to attack us? For I cannot imagine,
that Soult's prudence in reserving his army for the defence of the
field works about Toulouse, ought to be looked upon as an excuse for
his not having done so, and for what I am more inclined to attribute
to his, or his staff's want of intelligence. Picton, his generals, and
his division had certainly made up their minds to fight lustily on that
occasion; and, having only a short time before, single handed, disposed
handsomely of two French divisions at Vic Bigore, even when fighting
in their own favourite manner--skirmishing on a large scale--certainly
did not diminish their confidence in themselves, and in their chiefs,
who I firmly believe, would have liked nothing better, had the light
division been only within a reasonable distance of them, than to have
contended with Soult and his whole army. Every precaution was, however,
taken, and preparation made for the expected attack; for we were well
aware of the situation in which circumstances, that could not have been
foreseen, had placed us, and that we could only look for assistance
from our splendid artillery, supporting effectually our right by firing
across the Garonne. Soult, his generals, and état-major, however,
allowed the opportunity to escape, but in a few days after, this very
confidence in himself, and in his division, was the cause of Sir Thomas
Picton receiving at Toulouse a severe check--the only one instance, as
well as I remember, in which the 3rd division was ever repulsed, or
rather obliged to be brought back from an assault during the whole war.

I had every reason to suppose Sir Thomas Picton was aware that the
passage of the canal could not be forced, and that the very point he
was induced to attack, was covered by a tête du pont, and another field
work which the enemy had recently constructed. I believe he was told
that the passage could be easily forced; but this, as the result, and a
careful examination afterwards proved was impossible. But it was most
mortifying, indeed, to the 3rd division, that its last feat in arms,
and after so long and brilliant a career, should have terminated in a
failure, and in the loss of many gallant officers and men killed and
wounded, and amongst the latter Sir Thomas Brisbane, who had so often
before led on his brigade to victory.

But I must give another conspicuous instance, out of many which might
be adduced, in support of what I assert respecting French generals
and staff; but I beg in the first place, to ask what could be more
extraordinary than their evident want of knowledge of the country, and
even of preparation for the battle of Vittoria? For I cannot suppose
that the French Commander-in-Chief and his état-major could have been
ignorant of our vicinity, or of the positions we occupied the evening
before the action; or, in the second place, could they have calculated
upon Lord Wellington not venturing to attack their fine army, when
concentrated under so many renowned chiefs.

The Duke of Wellington had adopted an excellent plan, which ought to be
followed by all commanders of armies, of never issuing his orders or
instructions, for any movement or object of importance, until within a
very few hours of the time at which they were to be executed, so that
the enemy could not possibly know, either through spies, or by any
other means, what he intended to do the following day; it was therefore
towards the middle of the night of the 20th of June, 1813, that I
received from an orderly dragoon, as senior staff officer in camp, for
the 3rd division, the following concise and excellent instructions, or
order of battle for the morrow.

"_Arrangements for the movements of the Army, the 21st of June._

  "_Subejana de Murillos, June 20th, 1813._

"Extract.

"The 3rd division, followed by the 7th division, will move (marching by
the left of divisions), at day break, and will proceed near the village
of Anda, and thence (turning to the right) towards the village of Los
Questos, on the road from Anda to Vittoria.

"On approaching Los Questos, this column will throw out detachments
to the right towards Mancharez, to put itself in communication with
detachments, which will be thrown out from the left of the column which
moves upon the village.

"Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie will have the immediate command
of the column composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions.

"The baggage of these divisions will remain sufficiently in the rear
of the troops, not to become an embarrassment to the column under any
circumstances.

"The left column of the army (divisions moving by the left) must move
from Murquia towards Vittoria. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham will
put himself in communication as soon as possible with the column of
the 3rd and 7th divisions, at Los Questos, and these divisions will
therefore throw out parties when near Los Questos, towards Murquia, to
facilitate this communication.

"The movements of the two columns on the left, viz. the Earl of
Dalhousie's and Sir Thomas Graham's, are to be regulated from the
right; and although these columns are to make such movements in advance
as may be evidently necessary to follow the progress of the two columns
on their right (that moving on Mancharez and Sir Rowland Hill's), they
are not however to descend into the low grounds towards Vittoria on the
great road, nor give up the advantage of turning the enemy's position,
and the town of Vittoria by a movement to their left. This part of the
instructions more particularly applies to the column under the orders
of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham.

"All communications intended for the Commander of the Forces, are to be
sent to the column composed of the light division and the troops which
follow it, which is the column which moves on Mancharez.

  (Signed) "G. Murray, Q.M. General."

About the dawn of day on the 21st of June, 1813, the 3rd division
moved off under its chief, Sir Thomas Picton, to perform perhaps more
than the part assigned it in the splendid scenes with which we were
about to treat our spectacle-loving foes. I went on with the advance,
consisting of our Light Infantry companies, and the 5th battalion
60th German riflemen, all experienced troops, and well acquainted
with and accustomed to their work. To my surprise, and I believe that
of Sir Thomas Brisbane, and many others, we met with no opposition
in passing the Zadorra, on the banks of which, as is well known, the
Black Prince, in olden times, astonished his foes, not only by his own
valour and knightly bearing, but also by the deeds of such soldiers
as I wish to bring into the ranks of our regiments, and of whom there
are still abundance in Great Britain and Ireland. I must however here
take the liberty to remark, that I have often since wondered, why Lord
Wellington did not allude, just before the troops went into battle, to
what history tells us was by that gallant prince achieved on the ground
which then lay before us. Napoleon, and I think Nelson also, would have
done so; but Lord Wellington, perhaps less enthusiastic, very likely
considered that his army required no such incitement to perform what he
looked upon as merely their duty. I believe I am not wrong, but I have
always fancied this seeming want of enthusiasm, to be a kind of defect
in the Duke of Wellington, for it certainly has had at all times, and
in all situations, when judiciously worked upon, a most surprising
influence upon the minds and hearts of mankind in general.

Whilst the troops were passing this, in a military point of view,
formidable object, over some very narrow bridges, I again went on
some distance, and even in front of our light troops, to ascertain,
if possible, what might be before us, for by this time Lord Hill was
sharply engaged considerably to our right, and we began strongly to
suspect, that the French still intended to be for once patient, and
to deceive us; so much so, that I every instant expected to see their
masses and cannon crown the rising ground just before us, prepared to
attack us, whilst still embarrassed in the passage of the deep, high
banked, but narrow river.

I very soon observed on the more distant heights a few videttes, whose
attention seemed entirely attracted to their left, in which direction
the firing had greatly increased.

Sir Thomas Picton and his generals were also soon aware of the mistake
the French had evidently committed in neglecting or overlooking
this essential position; Sir Thomas therefore (for I know not what
had become of Lord Dalhousie and the 7th division) with his usual
impetuosity, pushed his light troops, cannon and columns, rapidly for
the unoccupied heights, of which he got possession without firing a
shot, and before the enemy seemed to be aware of their importance; or
else they had erroneously calculated, that the natural difficulties we
should encounter at the Zadorra would either greatly delay, or perhaps
deter us altogether from advancing in the direction we had taken. As
soon, however, as they saw what we had achieved, and which threatened
them with such ruinous consequences, they quickly brought forward a
large body of troops of all arms, to recover what they ought never to
have lost. A desperate struggle ensued, especially in a village just
behind the heights, and which ought to have been guarded with the
utmost care by the French, being an important point in their position;
but Sir Thomas Brisbane, with his brigade, after a severe contest, and
by turning their left with his right regiment, had got full possession
of it, and the fate of the battle was thus, I may say, in a moment
decided, for their centre being forced, the wings, especially the left,
had also to give way, and to my delight, I beheld at this critical
moment, our old and often tried friends, the light division, coming on
in our own style, upon our right, carrying all before them.

When we had repulsed the enemy, who had fought very gallantly, from the
village, and were again advancing upon them in the usual manner of the
3rd division, Lord Wellington rode up to us, followed by his staff;
and he knew well how to profit from what had been, at least to us, so
unexpectedly accomplished.

There was much hard fighting after this, and many brilliant feats were
performed by the three brigades, in following up the French, who were
so hard pressed, that even before they reached Vittoria, they were
unable to offer any effectual resistance to our continued and impetuous
attacks.

I apprehend, as will appear by referring to the instructions from
Sir George Murray, that this was not the manner in which it had been
intended that the action was to have been fought; and I even fear that
I am not borne out in my statements by the Gazette account of it; but I
feel convinced they can be corroborated by many, and I think I owe this
detail of the part it performed to the 3rd division and its chiefs. I
have, however, no intention of farther detailing what occurred between
us and the French during the remainder of that eventful day; yet I
must observe, that the loss of the 3rd division, in consequence of
Sir Thomas Picton's perhaps too rapid advance, was great in officers
and men; for undoubtedly he had thus drawn upon it the brunt of the
battle; but my chief object, in at all alluding to it, was to shew that
the French Marshal, who commanded under Joseph, and his état-major,
committed great errors, especially in neglecting, or not understanding
their position, and which in the end became irretrievable and ruinous
to their brave army.

Towards the close of this battle, and when I thought the 3rd division
had got well through its day's work, in the usual manner, and when the
part of the French infantry before us were going off in hopeless and
irretrievable confusion, intermixed with their baggage, their cavalry
suddenly appeared before us, presenting a firm and most imposing front.
Our cavalry--I think they were all light--had now got in front of us,
in considerable force; it was therefore evident, that an important
moment in the battle approached; and as Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious
to see how our cavalry would accomplish a charge, which we concluded
must be made, I most willingly went on with him some distance before
his brigade, still advancing in column. Our cavalry went on bravely
to the attack, but the French did not wait to receive it: on the
contrary, they advanced boldly, rapidly, and in fine order, to meet our
people. The shock was severe. But I soon saw, and I believe so did my
general, that it was high time for us to be off to the infantry, for
I must confess that the battle of Marengo flashed across my mind at
the instant. We soon rejoined the brigade, when commanding officers
of corps were requested to keep them well in hand, and ready, if
necessary, to form squares. But the French seemed to have accomplished
what they had in view; that is to say, to cover the retreat of their
discomfitted infantry.

Having, in the course of this work, occasionally touched upon military
tactics and arrangements, I must, in corroboration of what I ventured
to say with regard to the Duke of Wellington and Massena at the lines
of Torres Vedras, and in farther proof that the French were not
superior to us as tacticians, here allude briefly to what occurred
upon the Nivelle. Let the reader cast his eyes over a good map of the
country, or rather a plan of the action, which bears that name, and
which may be seen in Colonel Jones's account of the Peninsular war; and
let him consider and calculate upon the apparent consequences of an
attack upon a position of such strength, taken up after due examination
by Soult, and covered by his directions, with strong and well planned
redoubts, mutually supporting each other; and I think he will admit
that the French lines upon the Nivelle, and those held by our army at
Torres Vedras were not very dissimilar. It could not also have been
unknown to Massena, that a very great part of the troops under Lord
Wellington were untried Portuguese, destitute of military reputation;
and which had only been recently placed under British officers.

It is not to be supposed, that the commander of a French army was
without information, or that he was not allowed to incur the expense
of employing spies, or otherwise obtaining intelligence; I cannot,
therefore, imagine he was entirely ignorant of the preparations making
by his adversary for his reception at Torres Vedras; and he might
also have learnt that the redoubts and lines of connection in that
position could not be finished by the time he might arrive before it.
If, therefore, he were to advance at all into Portugal, he undoubtedly
should have made his arrangements for attacking the lines of Torres
Vedras the moment he could reach them; but whether what I have stated
was known or not to Massena, he had probably been spoiled by too much
good fortune, until it was his fate to meet Lord Wellington in the
field.

But how did the Duke of Wellington act when nearly similarly situated
to what Massena was before the lines of Torres Vedras?

His army was encamped in the month of November in the Pyrenees, exposed
in crowded tents, to severe sufferings, from cold, rain, and snow,
enough to make any men, and especially British soldiers, anxious to
fight three times their numbers, or to storm all the redoubts or
intrenched camps in the world in order to get out of such a situation,
and some even fancied that his Lordship kept them there with that
intention.

I partook along with the brigade to which I was attached, and with
the rest of the 3rd division, of the comforts of that encampment in
the Pyrenees. On the 9th of November I was sent for by Sir Thomas
Brisbane, and I think he will remember the awful kind of cavern,
with the torrent rushing through it at Zugarramurdi, in which he
gave me directions for bringing down the division to where it was
to remain, until the hour should arrive for its advance, under Sir
Charles Colville, against the lines of the Nivelle. I scrambled back
to the camp, leading my horse the greater part of the way, which was
an excellent climber; but I had to look well about me, for by this
very path, if it deserved the name, I was to bring down, as soon as
it became dark, the fighting division; every individual of which then
in camp being perfectly ignorant, that the moment was at hand, when
they were to resign the comforts which they had there enjoyed. At the
hour fixed upon, the bugle sounded for the troops to get under arms,
and in twenty-five minutes more, the usual time allowed, the right
brigade, followed by the other two, commenced the descent, the whole
being cautioned to look carefully, if they could in the dark, to where
they placed their feet. The baggage was to remain upon the ground, and
to follow by another circuitous road, when ordered, in the morning,
after some hours of pretty hard work, we at last found ourselves at
Zugarramurdi, through which the division passed, and the brigades, in
contiguous columns, were allowed to repose upon the ground for the
remainder of the night, under the canopy of heaven, and until the hour
for assaulting the redoubts and entrenchments arrived. Of course the
same difficult operation had been performed unknown to the enemy, by
the other divisions of the army, for the third had not advanced far
when the cannon on our left belonging to Sir Lowry Cole's division,
announced that others as well as ourselves were awake; and when day
dawned, our army, to the right and left of us, was seen moving in most
perfect order to make combined attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments.

I have been so far minute to show in how able a manner Lord
Wellington's arrangements were invariably made for combined movements;
but I have no intention of entering into a detail account of the
action; and shall only say, that at night, the 3rd division, having
carried the redoubts and entrenchments before them, and having
accomplished, as usual, the work assigned them, found themselves beyond
St. Pé; and we were able to congratulate ourselves that Lord Wellington
had at last thought fit to allow us to find a way into a part of the
country blessed with a more genial climate than the Pyrenees. Had
Massena acted thus at Torres Vedras, there is no saying what might have
been the result, for the Portuguese, as I before observed, were then
young and inexperienced as soldiers, and but little to be depended
upon, had the parts of the position occupied by them been assailed by
the French.

It was an extraordinary occurrence in the action upon the Nivelle that
a redoubt carried by our 88th regiment should have been defended by the
greater part of the French 88th, the latter thus becoming prisoners to
the former. And it was likewise the fate of the French 45th at Talavera
to have been nearly destroyed by the fire of ours, as was ascertained
by the numbers of killed and wounded left upon the ground, and also
by the late Major-General Guard (who then commanded our 45th), who was
left amongst the wounded at Talavera when our army retreated after the
action.

I believe it is an axiom in war, at least it ought to be, that no
extended position--fortify it as you please--can be held for any length
of time against a properly combined movement of good troops. Had not
we to fall back through the Pyrenees before Soult, and did we not
find ourselves unable to make any effectual stand before him till we
reached the ground in front of Pampeluna? Sir Thomas Picton certainly,
the previous evening, checked the French for a short time; but after a
night's march we found ourselves in the excellent position selected by
him, and in which, when our army was more concentrated, we were able to
frustrate all Soult's efforts, great as they were.

I must not here omit remarking, that it was insinuated, and even
believed by many, that if Lord Wellington had not arrived in time,
followed by a part of the army at this position, Sir Thomas Picton
intended to have abandoned it, and to have retired behind Pampeluna,
and thereby would have removed our blockading force, and thrown it open
to Soult.

I can positively say that he had no such intention, and I feel I
ought to make this assertion, if it were only in justice to Sir
Thomas Picton's military reputation, and I know I can be borne out
in it. I had been particularly employed with the 3rd division in
originally forming the blockade of Pampeluna; that is to say, in
taking up with the troops the positions to be occupied around it,
and Sir Thomas Picton was aware that, in consequence, I was likely to
be well acquainted with the various roads in the neighbourhood; he
therefore sent for me on the night previous to the day upon which it
was insinuated that he intended to have abandoned the position. He
told me he expected to be attacked by Marshal Soult in the morning,
that he was determined to stand his ground; but wished to know, if,
before Lord Wellington could come to his assistance, and if such a
misfortune should happen as that of his being obliged, by very superior
numbers, and the unforeseen events of a battle, to fall back, if I was
sufficiently acquainted with the roads around the city to enable me to
undertake, under such circumstances, to conduct the troops, so as to
keep them out of the range of the cannon upon the ramparts of the city.
I replied, that I knew the roads sufficiently for the purpose, and was
about to retire, when he repeated his determination to maintain his
position, and even betrayed a kind of feeling of delight at the idea
of giving Soult and his army battle, with only the few troops he could
oppose to him, until the arrival of Lord Wellington.

Almost at this moment, as I learnt afterwards, an engineer officer
(I don't remember his name) arrived to report himself, who had been
looking for the 3rd division amongst the mountains; I think he said he
had been sent to supply the place of Colonel Burgoyne, who had been
taken ill, and was obliged to go to the rear. Sir Thomas, who at such a
time, would have wished not to be plagued by a stranger, desired him,
partly, it was fancied, with the intention of getting rid of him, to
go and find out the different roads leading to the rear of Pampeluna;
and I have often since wondered if in this could have originated the
silly story of Sir Thomas Picton's intention of abandoning the position
in which the battle was fought, and in which the 3rd division performed
its usual brilliant part.

I think it but fair next to mention, that the dispositions made by the
French at Orthes, were not only superior to what we usually met with,
but they also fought that battle with seemingly more confidence in
themselves, and in their chief, than they had latterly done. For some
time after the action commenced, neither the 3rd nor 4th divisions,
whose movements came more particularly under my observation, were
able to gain any ground to their front, or to set properly to work;
indeed, it was next to impossible for the former to advance, the
position before them being judiciously and most formidably occupied by
a considerable part of Soult's army; and we were aware that the moment
we should attempt to go forward, we would have been taken in flank
by a large body of troops, of whom part held very strong ground, and
part possessed a wooded ravine, which separated the 3rd from the 4th
divisions. We were thus most provokingly brought to a complete stand,
exposed to a heavy cannonade, and also to the fire of the infantry in
our front; and the French troops will fire away in that manner, and
usually with considerable effect, as long as their opponents please.

Sir Thomas Brisbane saw plainly how his brigade, the most advanced of
the three, was situated; and though most anxious to push forward to
assail the enemy, so well posted in his front, and to fight as the 3rd
division always did, yet in this state of things, it would have been
decidedly wrong to have done so. I was carefully observing what the
French before us, as well as those hitherto successfully opposed to
the 4th division, were about; and seeing a body of cavalry assembling
behind the infantry, with which we were more particularly engaged, I
pointed them out to Sir Thomas Brisbane, who took such steps as he
thought necessary in case of their venturing to charge us. Impolitic as
it was, with such a large force to contend with, it was evident that
there was nothing for it, but to detach some companies into the ravine,
to drive out the French skirmishers, who invariably took in flank the
4th division, in the several gallant attempts successively made on the
narrow tongue of land, by the regiments composing it, to get forward. I
conclude Lord Wellington saw how the two divisions were situated, and
sent a considerable part of the light division to our support, and to
clear the ravine; and to my delight, I saw Sir Andrew Bernard coming on
at their head for that purpose.

He soon completely scoured out the ravine, in the style the light
division were accustomed to do every thing they undertook; and it was
then no longer difficult for the 3rd and 4th divisions to advance,
and in a few minutes, the advantageous ground, upon which the French
had made so brave a stand, was in possession of the leading brigade.
A chase then commenced, during which it was found very difficult to
restrain the ardour of the troops, and had it been deemed advisable for
our cavalry to have charged sooner than they did, the loss of the enemy
must have been much greater than it was reported to be.

I have been again rather minute in detailing the part performed in this
battle by the 3rd division, as I wish to attract attention to the mode
of fighting invariably practised, and with so much success, by Sir
Thomas Picton, who would have thought but little of any commander of a
brigade or regiment who did not instantly, but in compact order, push
forward upon the enemy; a mode of fighting which he knew to be most
suitable to British soldiers and the least relished by their foes, who
would always have preferred firing away, either skirmishing or even in
line.

It was not in the power of the British armies either at Talavera or
Waterloo (the actions which most resembled each other in fighting under
a heavy fire,) to go forward in the manner I have mentioned against the
French; and our losses were, consequently, in both these actions, very
great from the enemy's fire.--Since the battle of Fontenoy, in which
a long-continued steady advance of British troops, in compact order,
effected such wonders, and which would have been completely successful
if supported by the Dutch and the rest of the Duke of Cumberland's
army, down to the present day, I cannot find that the style of
fighting practised in the 3rd division was ever unsuccessful; but,
on the contrary, was always attended with the best results, and even
with much less loss than would have been sustained in any other mode of
acting: I therefore trust I may be pardoned for having endeavoured to
illustrate the correctness of the opinion I entertain in this respect,
not only by what I have related of the battle of Orthes, but also by
the rather minute description I ventured to give of the achievements of
the 3rd division at Salamanca.

But even in acting as skirmishers on a large scale, when Sir Thomas
Picton's division had, at Vic Bigore, to contend with two French
divisions, each at least equal in number to the 3rd, the same
system of fighting was, as far as practicable, observed. Besides
the 5th battalion 60th, a battalion of Portuguese caçadores and our
light infantry companies, whole regiments, (and here we felt the
want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps,) only
retaining some companies in reserve and for support, were engaged as
sharpshooters. They were, however, constantly pushed forward upon the
French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but
rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them; and if a
halt was any where perceived in any part of the advancing skirmishers a
staff officer was invariably sent to the point to ascertain the cause.
The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused
retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another,
to the fire of our troops. After driving them for a considerable
distance before us in this style, the coming of night stopped our
career, but had we stood and fired, as usual upon such occasions, this
brilliant feat of the 3rd division would never have been heard of. At
dark, Lord Wellington came up to Sir Thomas Brisbane's brigade, which
was still warmly engaged.--He wished to know how the French, we had so
long followed up, were situated; but so thickly wooded, enclosed, and
covered with vineyards was the neighbourhood of Vic Bigore, near to
which this splendid affair terminated, that it was impossible to give
him any information about them.

A soldier of the 88th, hearing what had been said, volunteered to get
up into a tree, and thereby to make himself an object to be shot at.
This he accomplished with some difficulty, and being asked what he
could see; replied, "Och, nothing but them wearisome vineyards, and bad
luck to them, and a power of their scrimigers." Night closed the scene,
the firing had ceased. The French sentinels and ours being posted
not twenty yards from each other, they, as usual, thought no more of
strife; but in the course of the night, the enemy silently and quietly
moved off towards Tarbes. The day following we crossed the Adour at
that town. Picton was again advancing against the enemy, whose right
having been turned by the divisions on our left, they were marching,
or rather running in great confusion along the road, which passes
through a wooded height above Tarbes to Tournay. Sir Thomas Brisbane's
dispositions were even made to have had a dash at them; when an
order, which greatly surprised us, came for the troops to halt, when
without almost meeting with any resistance, we must have cut off and
taken vast numbers of the fugitives, who were thus allowed to "live to
fight another day." Upon receiving this order to halt from Sir Thomas
Picton's aide de camp, (who was questioned in order to ascertain if he
was sure he was correct in the message he delivered) I went back to
find out what could possibly have occasioned it. I soon met Sir Thomas,
and venturing cautiously to express my regret at such an opportunity
having been allowed to escape, of intercepting so considerable a number
of the enemy's troops, he replied, "That is no fault of mine; but go
now, Sir, and desire your general to move on." But before I could
return to the brigade, which were greatly amazed at being kept back,
the last of the French were just disappearing behind a hill about half
a mile off.

Colonel Napier says, in speaking of French and British soldiers, "place
an attainable object of war before the French soldier, and he will make
supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing, he becomes proportionally
discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied
to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with
unbounded energy; the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt
any thing."

This is a well-drawn picture of the French, yet I hope he will excuse
me for saying, that I think an officer of great experience, like
Colonel Napier, must often have seen supernatural efforts made by
French officers, both to bring on their men and to make them stand
their ground, but all in vain, when they saw British troops about to
close with them. Again Colonel Napier speaks of the unrelenting vigour
of British infantry, and of their deafening shout, rolling over a
field of battle, more full and terrible than that of any other nation,
and followed by the strong and unwavering charge. All this must be
fully acquiesced in, and the British soldier well merits this praise;
for I do not think that Colonel Napier ever had any difficulty in
getting his men to stand or follow him, either to the charge or to the
assault of the most rugged and impracticable breach; on the contrary,
I should suppose he must have found more difficulty in restraining
them in their headlong course, with their officers, still more daring
than themselves, at their head. In the comparison, therefore, drawn
between French and British soldiers, I consider that Colonel Napier
scarcely does the undaunted brilliant courage of the latter justice,
when he only speaks of the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry.
I conclude, when Colonel Napier composed this passage, he had the
fields of Talavera and Waterloo before his eyes, where, certainly,
great endurance of fire was necessary on the part of British troops,
and where the French had full scope for displaying their best qualities
as soldiers; but in the 3rd division, when it fought in Picton's
style, and was led as he expected his officers to lead, he would, on
all occasions, have witnessed the fine qualities attributed to French
soldiers most amply displayed, and even surpassed. Much, however, as
I admire the undaunted courage of British soldiers in following the
bravest and most noble-minded officers in the world, I cannot be blind
to their imperfections, and especially to their conduct after victory,
and upon other occasions, which often threatened us with the most
serious consequences; and it is this makes me so anxious to have more
of the good and true men of the British empire brought into our ranks,
and of whom there are enough to be found to form a well conducted
invincible army.

But let us imagine such troops as these, in a high state of discipline,
and properly supported by our splendid heavy dragoons and artillery,
charging an enemy sword in hand, in the manner I have before alluded
to, and it may be readily allowed that the fate of a campaign, or even
that of a kingdom, would be decided in a single battle; for the enemy's
troops, thus closed with, could not well escape from the field; and
we should no longer be incredulous when we read of the consequences
resulting from a charge of Roman legions. It has pleased Divine
Providence to form the men of the British empire for such a kind of
warfare; having bestowed upon them daring hearts, and powerful arms to
execute whatever may be required of them.

If ever the plan of calling out men by ballot is adopted, I would beg
leave to suggest, that a certain number of battalions of the regular
army, from adjoining districts, should be permanently considered a
division; and when a force was wanted in any part of the world, either
the division, or a brigade of it, should compose the whole or a part
of that force; and would not thus an esprit du corps be established in
such a division, like what was found so admirably calculated for mutual
support amongst the battalions and brigades of the light, 3rd, 4th, &c.
divisions under the Duke of Wellington; and which induced them readily
to make any effort, or any sacrifice, to aid each other in battle. And
how often have I witnessed this feeling prevail, to a great extent,
among the officers and soldiers of the 45th, 74th, 88th regiments,
and 5th battalion, 60th, which composed the brigade to which I was
so long attached as brigade-major. I can never forget one instance
of this kind in particular, which occurred at the battle of Fuentes
d'Onor. After a long and dreadful struggle in that village, between
the British and a large body of the French Imperial Guard and other
troops which supported them, the right brigade of the 3rd division was
at last brought up to take the place of the fatigued regiments so long
engaged, under a heavy fire, without any decided advantage being gained
by either party, the French holding the lower and our troops the upper
part of the village. The 88th, supported by the 45th, was ordered to
charge into it and drive out the enemy. They soon did so in the usual
style of the 3rd division. But I shall ever think with pleasure, of the
extraordinary eagerness evinced by the 45th to advance to the help of
their old friends the Rangers, who on that occasion wanted none. This
feeling, however, between these two corps in particular, was always
most strongly marked throughout the whole war; and I have no doubt
would be revived, if they ever met again in presence of an enemy.

It may, perhaps, be considered out of place, but, before closing this
chapter, I must beg leave to observe that I read--as I think every
one else must have done--with great interest what the Marquis of
Londonderry has told us in the account he has given of his visit to
Russia, of the enormous establishments of the Czar for the instruction
of those intended for the staff and other branches of his military
and naval services. The country ought always to feel indebted to
officers who can, like his Lordship, give useful information upon such
subjects; for we certainly, by some means or other, should be made
acquainted with what is going on in the military and naval world. And
although the grand reviews, or showing off of troops and establishments
were evidently got up in order to produce strong impressions, I feel
confident it must, hereafter, be found that the expense of keeping up
the latter will be much greater than the advantages to be derived from
them. But our army does not require such an extended and overgrown
system, which is neither suited to the feelings, ideas, or the genius
of the free people of the British Empire.--An absolute government,
which may one day have cause to tremble at the effects of what it has
produced, could alone be supposed capable of creating and carrying
out a plan of such magnitude, and which must, I should fear, prove
hazardous to the safety of the country in which it is adopted, and
also to its institutions.--I certainly would require that all gentlemen
intended for commissions in our service should have had a certain
military or naval education, but I would not ask where it had been
acquired, provided they could pass the examinations I have already
alluded to.

From our staff, at their own cost, well and probably expensively
educated, we might naturally expect that officers would be selected,
to be employed as consuls or otherwise, in ascertaining what might be
going forward in countries likely to be, or which have already become
the scenes of warfare, and about which, or the parties engaged, Great
Britain might be deeply interested, yet not altogether justified in
taking an active part in the contest, such as Circassia, Persia, South
America, and perhaps Spain; and, above all, we might constantly have
an eye upon our North American democratic neighbours, who can only be
properly dealt with by a military governor-general of the whole of
our North American territories, and who should be entrusted with much
authority, both civil and military, so that he could act at all times
with decision and promptitude.

Accomplished staff officers, such as I have in view, could give
such information as might be relied upon, and would enable those,
who direct the affairs of this great empire, to act judiciously and
advantageously; and when these officers wished to do so, they ought to
be allowed to go wherever war of any kind was carrying on, if it were
only with the view of acquiring greater knowledge of their profession;
for no matter what might be the nature of the warfare, some things
may always be learnt. But these officers should, at the same time,
be strictly prohibited from meddling with, or in any way aiding, or
advising either party, without permission to do so from our Government.
Civilians, in general, ought to be looked upon as not calculated for
employment such as that I speak of, and we had once a lesson given us
in this respect, if we will only profit by it, when Sir John Moore's
army was so nearly lost through the foolish presumption of our agent or
minister, sent out to the Spanish government of that day.

Many think that France could not be better governed than it is at
present by Louis Philip, who is universally allowed to be an able
sovereign; but I have often heard the question asked, how it was, that
Paris, and all France in its train, fell so easily and unaccountably
into the hands of the men of July, 1830. Although I know Paris
tolerably well, and a good deal of France and Frenchmen, yet the only
answer, I believe, that can be given is, that it did not suit the
views, prejudices, or feelings of the military, that the existing
order of things should be maintained; many of them, very probably,
at the time belonging to the political coteries, with which Paris in
particular always abounds, and in which are broached and discussed the
strangest possible doctrines and dogmas. British officers can never
belong to such dangerous associations, if they even did exist in the
United Kingdom.

Any tumultuous assemblage of men, if even partially armed, can at
first, as was the case the other day at Newport, be easily dispersed
or put down, by rightly disposed and well officered regular troops.
As for the barricades, of which we heard so much, they could only
have led, had the troops done their duty, to the greater destruction
of the city and the rioters; but as they were put up, why did an able
and enlightened officer like Marshal Marmont, who commanded, send
his soldiers in the manner he did into the streets of Paris, for
this was quite as useless as our going headlong into those of Buenos
Ayres, where some streets, and almost every house, were strongly
barricaded, and yet I believe we forced them all; but probably, if
he had ever heard of our exploits there, he had forgotten them. It
appears strange to many, that Mont-Martre and other commanding points
in and about Paris were not occupied by the Marshal in force with
cannon and mortars, his communications with the country secured by his
cavalry, and that he did not, without delay, bring up to the capital
a sufficient number of troops to restore order. But even before their
arrival, it is likely, that the peaceable and well-disposed part of
the inhabitants, and especially the householders, would have found
it to be their interest to declare openly against a lawless mob and
their political leaders; and to have taken part with the troops
opposed to them; but should this not have been the case, and it then
clearly appearing, that all were leagued to resist the established
government, which it is the duty of armies in all countries to uphold,
the Marshal, however painful it might have been to his feelings, could
have had no alternative but to announce to the riotous people, that
if tranquillity and obedience to the laws, and to the constituted
civil authorities, were not instantly restored, Paris, with the view
of punishing its lawless inhabitants, would be laid in ruins. It will
no doubt be asked, if such reasoners would have consented to destroy
that large, beautiful, and populous city, the seat of the arts, and
where every thing magnificent is to be found? Blucher would have done
this for them sometime before, for he had a great fancy to treat Paris
as General Steinbock did Altona years ago, had it not been for Lord
Wellington; and for this, I fear, the French people were not afterwards
even grateful to him. But this question is very like one I had put to
me some time ago, when I ventured to hint, that a certain determined
mode of acting, would, in the end, but in another country, prove to be
the most humane, viz. "Would you shoot the people--the poor misguided
people of Ireland?" I answered, that as an officer, I should be obliged
to do so, however reluctant I might be to adopt such a measure; but I
would begin with their selfish agitators, if they would not discontinue
their wicked practices, and cease holding out expectations to the
people of a dismemberment of the empire, and allow the laws, whatever
they may be, to be obeyed. If the laws are bad, or fancied to be bad,
and if they do not please all men, without regard to difference of
religion, and in other respects, upon an equality, let the Government,
whose business it is, endeavour to have them altered; but as long as
they stand the laws of the realm, it is the duty of officers and
soldiers to uphold them, and the civil authorities in the execution of
them, and they have nothing more to say to the matter. Had the French
acted thus, and upon such principles--for I cannot suppose that their
officers had lost all influence and command over their men--and as I
am convinced, British officers, if necessary, would act, we should
not now have before our eyes the awful example, of an established
government overturned, as was the case in 1830, and which, with what
has occurred in that country for many years past, ought to be held up
for ever as a lesson to the United Kingdom. I hope, however, that Great
Britain will never become so humbled, as to require salvation from
naval and military patriotism; but I boldly assert, and without fear of
contradiction, that no where on earth, amongst men, is this virtue to
be found so pure as in the hearts of the officers of our navy and army.


FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: N.B. Many of the absentees did not, as was supposed, fall
into the hands of the enemy, but had gone off in search of liquor or
plunder.]




CHAP. VIII.


There is no country with which Great Britain is likely so soon to come
into hostile contact as the United States of America, and for such a
war we must certainly want an army such as I have in view.

It has long been the fashion, and I believe it is the object of many
interested and designing men, to endeavour to have the United States
of America considered as much more powerful and dangerous to Great
Britain then they really are. No nation, nor body of men, be they
who they may, composed of such heterogeneous materials, scattered
over so vast an extent of territory, in which the laws, enacted by
an often unruly legislature, are so powerless, and in many places so
weakly administered, as not to be able to prevent aggressions upon
an unoffending neighbour, or to afford sufficient protection to the
peaceably inclined against the hand of violence, can possibly be
considered powerful. I am aware that parts of the United States ought,
to a certain extent, to be looked upon as exceptions, but, generally
speaking, this is by no means an over-drawn picture of what is the
state of society in that part of the world.

If Great Britain was only prepared to convince the world of her
strength in steam ships, and to send forth even a portion of them
from the St. Lawrence, and from other points in our valuable North
American possessions, she must in a very short time destroy, or shut
up in their ports, in hopeless inactivity, all the so much boasted of
Navy or traders of the United States. And it might be asked--would any
other power, when they saw we were really in earnest, dare to aid them
in their difficulties; and what would then become of their immense
commerce, from which alone they derive their present importance? Are
not the feelings and interests of the Northern, Southern and inland
States directly opposed to each other; and would not the continuance
of the last war, for even a short time longer, have had the effect of
causing discontents and divisions amongst the several States, already
independent of each other, which could never again, in all human
probability, have been brought in consequence to act in unison.

But to convince even the most incredulous of this, and of the kind of
spirit which was found to exist amongst the people of the States, and
to point out clearly with what zeal and patriotism we were opposed in
the last war in the march of our troops upon Plattsburg, I have only
to lay before them some Brigade orders which were issued by Sir Thomas
Brisbane at the time.

"No. 5. None of the inhabitants of the country are to be prevented from
passing the advanced posts either to the front or rear, from one hour
after sunrise till sunset; and they are to be permitted to drive in
cattle, or any thing else they may think fit; but officers commanding
picquets are to be very careful in examining those who pass; and must
take up, and send to the head-quarters of the Brigade (Dowy's house)
such as may appear suspicious.

"No. 7. Major-General Brisbane having received instructions to advance
with the troops under his command into the territory of the United
States, avails himself of the opportunity, to request that commanding
officers will use every exertion to maintain the strictest discipline
in their corps; and he holds them responsible, that in every instance
when a complaint is made to them of any injury sustained by the
inhabitants, that it is inquired into, and if necessary redressed; and
whatever damage is done, that it is instantly paid for and charged
against those concerned, and where this cannot be ascertained to the
corps in general, so that unoffending people may not be sufferers.

"In taking the necessary precautions against individuals, who may so
far forget what is due to themselves and their country, as to commit
acts of plunder or violence, the Major-General is at the same time
fully convinced, that the troops in general are determined, that their
conduct shall not bring disgrace upon the British name; he therefore
calls upon them to discover those who may be guilty of acts of plunder
or oppression, that they may be brought to the punishment they merit;
and the soldiers must soon find that such a line of conduct will add
much to their comforts; for the inhabitants of the country finding
that they are properly treated and protected, will bring every article
requisite into the camp; for those who remain quiet in their homes
are not in the smallest degree to be molested, nor is their property
to be taken from them without their full consent and its being paid
for; as it is not against such persons that Great Britain makes war,
but against the Government whose folly and ambition have brought the
miseries of war into their country, and the army and individuals in
arms for its support.

"The Major-General commanding has requested the magistrates of the
country, to explain to the people his object and determination, on
entering the American territory; and he trusts that the conduct of the
soldiers will be such as to reflect no shade of dishonour on their
country."

The apparent state of indifference of the people was so great, and the
effects of these orders, which were widely circulated, so evident, that
we found all the houses occupied, and every thing might have led us to
suppose we were still marching through Canada; and I do not remember
that a shot was fired at us until we fell in with some of the United
States troops as we approached Plattsburg.

Owing to a want of arrangement, and of sufficient preparation on our
part, we were last war unsuccessful upon Lake Champlain, and upon its
shores; and I had the mortification of seeing our fleet discomfited
in Plattsburg Bay. In consequence of this, and of the advanced state
of the season, and as no calculations of any kind seemed to have been
made for contingencies, our fine, but feebly commanded, army had to
fall back upon Canada; and the extensive and important conquests,
which were supposed to have been the objects of those who ordered us to
advance into the States, had to be abandoned.

The Americans pretended, that, in our retreat, they hotly pursued,
and occasioned us great losses; but there was no foundation whatever
for what they in this respect asserted, or for what was said on this
subject in their newspapers; for our only loss, I may say, consisted
in some heavy shot and an old gun, taken from the Americans, and which
had been left many years before in the States when General Burgoyne's
expedition failed, and which the state of the roads obliged us to
throw into the swamps, and in some worthless men who deserted from
their corps; for, whatever might have been said to the contrary,
nothing could be more unhurried or undisturbed than we were in all
our movements during the retreat. I do, however, recollect, that in
crossing the bridge at Champlain with the rear-guard, on our return,
that a Yankee had the impudence to say, when spoken to with civility:
"I guess as how you are not playing Yankee doodle now." Some of the
soldiers were inclined to have thrown him into the river, but of course
this was not allowed.

I was attached as Brigade-Major to the strong brigade (about 5,000 men)
of the army, which, under Sir Thomas Brisbane, formed its rear-guard,
and I can safely say, that although various stratagems were practised,
and every thing done by him so as to induce the American commander to
approach us, he never was able to succeed. I only mention this to show
what grounds they had for boasting. But is it not also too bad and
vexatious that works written by American authors are patronized and
lauded even in the United Kingdom, not so much perhaps on account of
their style of composition, or literary merits, as for the subjects
they contain; which are intended to extol, chiefly at the expense of
our navy, fierce and lawless men, many of whom were actually British
subjects? Yet who can for a moment suppose, that sending British seamen
or landsmen to the other side of the Atlantic, can deprive them of
their natural courage. There is, however, a degree of moral depravity
existing throughout the Union, which must always prevent these
extraordinary Republicans, should they even become more powerful than
they are at present, from being able to cope with us in war. And in
speaking of the degree of liberty enjoyed in the United States and in
Great Britain, what comparison can be drawn in this respect between the
two countries?--for who would prefer the tyrannical rule of a usually
tumultuous Democracy to the mixed Government under which all men enjoy
protection and sufficient liberty in the United Kingdoms, and all over
our vast empire, without its being allowed to become licentiousness?

As for the unfinished works at Plattsburg, had not Sir George Prevost
halted the troops, led by experienced and often before distinguished
generals, rapidly advancing against them, they must, with their
commander and all his troops, have been, I have no hesitation in
saying, in twenty minutes more in our possession; but as for the idea
which was foolishly entertained by some at the time, of our being
able, if successful in the assault of the works, to re-capture our lost
ship and vessels, it was too absurd to merit a moment's consideration.

The following official document will, I expect, be read with
interest, as it certainly removes much of the blame from Sir George
Prevost for the attack having been made upon the American fleet by
ours in an unprepared state; at least our Commodore (whether he was
injudiciously urged to go forward or not I cannot tell) acted with
a perfect knowledge of what he was about to attempt, and it would
have been produced had the former been brought to a court-martial as
intended. But the question should have been, why was the fine army,
confided to Sir George Prevost, pushed forward at all into the United
States, especially in the month of September, before our superiority
on Lake Champlain had been established? Extract from a communication
to Major-General De Rottenburg, dated Friday evening, 10 o'clock,
P.M.:--

"I have this moment received from Captain Downie intelligence of his
intention to weigh and proceed with the squadron, from its anchorage
off Chazy, about midnight, with the expectation of rounding into
the Bay of Plattsburg about the dawn of day, and with the intention
of commencing an immediate attack on the enemy's ship, vessels, and
gun-boats, if the anchorage they are in affords any chance of success;
in consequence you are to hold the left division in readiness to
execute the contemplated service at six o'clock to-morrow morning.

"The batteries directed to be completed and armed in the course of the
night, are to open on the enemy's position the instant the naval action
has commenced. You will cause the necessary preparations to be made for
the rocket service of each battery.

  (Signed),  "G. Prevost,
  "_Commander of the Forces_."

I shall pass this over without any remark, leaving it to the reader to
judge for himself; but we had far too many commanders, for they were
actually in each other's way. Here was Sir George Prevost himself,
Baron De Rottenburg and his staff, a brilliant head-quarter staff,
consisting of Adjutant and Quarter-master-general, assistants to both;
Military Secretary, Aides-de-Camp, Chiefs of Engineers, Artillery,
&c. &c., in short, enough to have caused confusion in an army three
times our numbers, and much more so amongst the three brigades, whose
experienced generals and staff wanted no help.

The moment the naval action commenced, the batteries, which had been
constructed entirely under Sir Thomas Brisbane's directions, opened
such a well-directed fire, that they apparently demolished all before
them, and in a very short time nearly silenced that of the enemy's guns
in their works. Under the protection of our artillery, the bridge over
the Seranac, (the planks only of which the Americans in their retreat
had been able to destroy or take up,) was repaired in a few minutes
by materials we had ready for the purpose; part of the troops, under
Sir Thomas Brisbane were moving down to pass by it to the assault,
and the greater part were marching rapidly under General Sir Manley
Power, and Sir Frederick Robinson, with the intention of effectually
cutting off the enemy's retreat, when the order from Sir George Prevost
to halt arrived, in consequence of our fleet having been discomfited
upon the Lake. It is, however, to be regretted that the works were not
allowed to be carried, for it would have prevented much boasting, and
would have served in some manner to counterbalance the loss of our
vessels. But what I witnessed during the whole of this unfortunate
and miscalculated business, convinced me that the enterprise which
embraced, as we understood, many extensive and important objects,
no doubt suggested from England, had been begun without almost any
fixed plan, carried on in considerable ignorance of the country, and
ultimately abandoned, because of an event, the probability of which
occurring, from the state of the two fleets, might, in a great measure,
have been calculated upon.

Any one of the three strong brigades into which our force was divided
was sufficient alone for all we had hitherto undertaken, and also
for the reduction of Plattsburg, if properly handled by an able and
experienced officer: but the ideas of military matters entertained
by the Generals and Staff we found in possession of power were very
different from ours; and I merely mention this to shew, that until our
Staff had acquired experience under the Duke of Wellington, they were
in general very deficient, and, as a further proof of this, I must
observe, that nothing could betray greater weakness and indecision than
the manner in which it was proposed to move upon Plattsburg.

It was at first intended that we were to have had a large body of
Indian warriors along with us in our invasion of the States; and Sir
Thomas Brisbane, attended by his Staff and several other officers, had
to go through all the customary ceremonies of war councils, speeches,
dances, presents, feastings, drinkings, &c., but after all we only took
them with us as far as the village of Champlain, and from thence, to my
great delight, at the request of Sir Thomas Brisbane, they were sent
back into Canada.

It was also intended that the whole army were to have moved in one
column, by the road leading to Plattsburg, which crosses the Dead
Creek, near to its mouth, where there is a bridge, and a ford a little
lower down, where it enters the Lake, and there we knew the enemy had
for some time been preparing to receive us. Sir Thomas Brisbane, who
led the advance, not looking upon this plan as judicious, and being
also fully aware of the difficulties which this Creek even naturally
presented, sent me from Champlain, accompanied by some flank companies
and Indian warriors, which altogether formed a strong reconnoitring
party, to ascertain if a road fit for the march of troops and cannon,
(of which we had lately heard), could not be found to our right, and
by which the formidable position of the Dead Creek might be turned. I
marched by what is called the Batemantown road, and very soon found
that it had been made, even as far as Plattsburg, fit for any military
purposes, at least, at that time of the year.

Sir Thomas Brisbane, at such an evident proof of want of necessary
and proper information on the part of our Staff, (for we were still
strangers in the country), had almost made up his mind to allow them to
take their own way and to march as they intended; but those feelings he
has so often evinced for the welfare of those placed under his command,
and for the good of the service; together with being convinced, that
his brigade must have suffered severely in forcing the Creek, induced
him to communicate in time with head-quarters on the subject, and the
consequence was, that the whole arrangements were altered; his own
column only marching towards the mouth of the Creek, and the other two
taking the road, which, it had been ascertained, turned the enemy's
position. The result was, that the Americans had to retreat upon
Plattsburg without being able to offer almost any resistance; and the
only loss, I may say, we did sustain was from the fire from the enemy's
gun-boats stationed at the mouth of the creek, where we were obliged to
ford it, as the bridge had been nearly destroyed. Sir Thomas Brisbane
was anxious to have turned our field artillery against the gun-boats.
But a senior general, who happened to be present, would not allow this
to be done; as he said it would only the more attract the enemy's fire
towards a point upon which it was already directed with right good
will. He, however, at last went off, as my general had previously
done with the advance towards Plattsburg, when our rocket-brigade was
brought forward, and a rocket well laid by the officer commanding it,
having, I believe the very first discharge, struck one gun-boat, and as
we heard afterwards wounded the officer commanding on board, and as it
in its continued flight went close over most of the others, the whole
took to their oars in an instant, and we were no more molested by them.

Up to this period the war had been carried on in a very irritating
manner, and in some instances in a way which could produce no advantage
to either party; for even sentinels on their posts were cautiously
approached and fired at.

Sir Thomas Brisbane proposed to the American generals Izard and
M'Combe, to put an end to such barbarities, and in future to carry on
military operations in the manner adopted by European nations. This
being readily agreed to by them, I did not hear of another instance of
the kind occurring upon either side as long as the war lasted; indeed,
this kind of polite intercourse between the generals was attended with
the best results, not only amongst those under them, but also produced
feelings of respect and offers of attention, if opportunity offered,
after the war was over.

Neither during our expedition to Plattsburg, nor for some time
afterwards were our affairs in the Lower Province well managed. Just
before the closing in of the ice on the lake, and when a part of
the United States fleet were still at Plattsburg, but, as we well
knew, from good authority, completely off their guard, and full
of that dangerous confidence often arising out of a victory too
easily achieved, it was arranged to surprise and capture them by our
gun-boats, and a number of batteaux manned by volunteers, of which
there were hundreds from the regiments. The attempt was intended to
have been made in the night; the soldiers in the batteaux being armed
with cutlasses, pistols, and with boarding pikes, of which there were
plenty at Isle aux Noix; and the following letter was addressed, by
order of Sir Thomas Brisbane, by me to the lieutenant of the Navy in
command of the gun-boats there; who, as it may be well supposed, being
delighted at an opportunity of retaliating upon the Americans, most
readily agreed to the proposal contained in it.

  "_St. Johns, November 12, 1814._

  "Sir,

 "Major-General Brisbane has desired me to communicate the following
 circumstances to you, with a view to induce you to co-operate in an
 attack upon such of the enemy's fleet as still remain in the Bay of
 Plattsburg, upon which, with your assistance, it is proposed by Sir
 George Prevost to make the attempt.

 "The enemy's force there, by the latest information, consists of only
 two sloops, and seven gun-boats, indifferently manned, and little
 or no attention is paid to the common measures of precaution. It is
 therefore natural to suppose, a sudden attack, or even surprise, might
 be attempted with every prospect of success.

 "On our part we can only employ batteaux for this enterprise, manned
 by volunteers from the regiments, in such numbers as you would think
 necessary to act along with your gun boats; and the strength of your
 crews could be increased if you require it. Of course, the whole will
 be under your direction, and success must depend upon secrecy, rapid
 preparation and action.

 "Major-General Brisbane, therefore, begs you will ascertain if the
 report of the strength and number of vessels in Plattsburg Bay be
 correct, and at all events, he requests that you will lose no time
 in coming here to arrange matters, or should you not think such an
 undertaking practicable, you will be so good as to point out in what
 the difficulties consist. It is, however, obvious, that when affairs
 of this nature are once proposed, the sooner they are carried into
 execution the better, or else entirely laid aside."

This well arranged attack, which, if successful, would have greatly
improved our situation upon the Lake the following spring, had the
war lasted, was, however, put a stop to only a few hours before the
departure of the expedition, by an express from the General commanding
the forces, who had become apprehensive that the attempt was too
hazardous.

I am induced to continue this subject for various reasons, but
principally because much that occurred during the last war in
North America, is at this moment becoming interesting; and useful
conclusions, in both a naval and military point of view, may be drawn
from what has already taken place there.

After the disappointment to our hopes of retaliating upon it, the whole
of the enemy's fleet were laid up for the winter at Whitehall, at the
head of Lake Champlain. It was again proposed by Sir Thomas Brisbane,
and agreed to by Sir George Prevost, to destroy them by an expedition
of five thousand men, which were to have started suddenly under the
orders of the former, to be conveyed to the point of attack, with their
supplies of provisions, and combustibles for destroying the ships,
&c. over the ice and snow in sledges. This also, from the excellent
information we had been able to procure, held out every prospect of
complete success; but the same timid councils again prevailed, and this
second, but much more important expedition, when about to start, was
almost similarly countermanded; and the disappointment was particularly
felt by us, for several of the regiments which were to have been
employed in this enterprise, formed part of the force which was not
long after assembled under Sir Thomas Brisbane at Paris, and when the
Duke of Wellington inspected it, he was pleased to say, that had these
fine regiments (and they amounted to nearly nine thousand men) been in
time for Waterloo, the Prussians would not have been wanted upon that
occasion. I must also add, that most of these corps had been formed
and accustomed to war under his Grace in Portugal, Spain, and the
south of France; and having been found at the end of the war to be the
most efficient of the army, they had been at once ordered off to North
America, where, from the way in which things were managed, they had not
the power of farther distinguishing themselves.

But I could, if necessary, show that at last we would have completely
effected our object in destroying the American fleet at Whitehall;
but in a very different manner, and which, from the share I had in
the transaction, and from the secrecy I thus feel imposed upon
me, I do not consider myself at liberty to disclose, and which the
notification of peace with the United States alone prevented. At that
moment it was quite evident that the effects of the war had begun to
be most seriously felt; and it was also an expensive, and as the Duke
of Wellington would pronounce it to be, _a useless little war_ for
Great Britain to be so long engaged in. If we are again provoked to
hostilities, which is very probable, the people of the United States
should be made to feel what are the effects of a war carried on in
earnest in their own country, by such a powerful empire as Great
Britain; but for this our navy and army must be properly prepared.

I have for several years past given the subject of our Boundaries with
the United States much consideration, and I have endeavoured to obtain,
by all the means I could bring to my aid, a correct view of it; but
what has been published in the "Times," of the 27th of April, and 26th
of May, 1840, as communications from Mr. Waddilove to the Editor, puts
the whole of that long misunderstood question, in so much clearer a
light than what I had prepared for this work (though I had come nearly
to the same conclusion) that I hope I shall be excused for giving them
in this place.


THE TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

[TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.]

_Extract from the definitive treaty of peace and friendship between his
Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, signed at Paris,
September, 3, 1783._

The first article recognizes the several States.

The second proceeds as follows:--

"And that all disputes which might arise in future on the subject
of the boundaries of the said United States may be prevented, it is
hereby agreed and declared that the following are and shall be their
boundaries viz.,--from the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that
angle which is formed by a line drawn due north from the source of the
St. Croix to the highlands, along the said highlands which divide those
rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which
fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-western-most head of the
Connecticut River, thence down along the middle of that river to the
45th degree of north latitude."

"If it can be shown, as it easily may, that there existed a then known
tract of country called "the Highlands," which had been in use in
former official documents, and which did separate the river flowing
south into the Atlantic Ocean from others flowing into the St. Lawrence
and into the St. John, which emptied itself into the Bay of Fundy,
not into the Atlantic Ocean,--if also the documents of the period
show that it was a leading object with Great Britain to preserve to
their dependencies the exclusive navigation of the river St. John,
and that the river St. Croix, and the line drawn north from it to the
said highlands, were fixed as boundaries to the land conceded to the
States, for the purpose of securing this exclusive possession,--if it
can be shown that a tract of country so circumstanced was one of the
concessions specially objected by Mr. Fox, Mr. Burke, Lord North, and
Mr. Sheridan, in the debates upon the peace (wherein upon a division,
the numbers were, against the Ministry 224, in favour 208), under
the name Penobscot, the principal river of the tract, which, with
its tributary streams did rise on the south side of these highlands,
and did fall into the Atlantic Ocean--if, too, as appears from all
these circumstances, the district now called Maine, was no other
than the district ceded to Massachusetts, under the name Penobscot,
the very objections made by these leading oppositionists afford the
strongest possible proof that the claims of an additional extent now
made by Maine and Massachusetts were unjust and unreasonable, and
more palpably absurd and untenable, when it is considered, that with
a view to obtaining a right to the navigation of the St. John, the
negociators did actually endeavour to obtain the portion of country
lying between the St. Croix--the St. Croix line and the St John, then
first attached to the government of Nova Scotia--and that the secret
articles of Congress prove it to have been a subject of debate, whether
the war should be continued on account of such additional territory,
(a question which was decided in the negative). The very contest
about the navigation of the St. John, also is in itself a proof of
the unsoundness of the claim, for it would be of little value to
shut out the mouth of the St. John, and the extent of its course cut
off by the St. Croix, and the northern line, if, by allowing America
possessions beyond the then known highlands, you had conceded a
territory connecting them with the St. John; and such would be the case
by allowing the extension of their settlements beyond the highlands to
the Aristook. I take it this fact of itself is sufficient to prove the
injustice of the claim.

"Moreover, the district so conceded, under the name Penobscot, and
which is no other than the present Maine, does actually fulfil the
special conditions laid down in the second article. It includes all
the rivers which flow from the highlands, and fall into the Atlantic,
and includes no other, and after crossing these said highlands, not
one river, except the St. John, does flow south towards the Atlantic,
except as a tributary stream of the St. John, through the Bay of Fundy.

"Neither can it be said that these tracts were then as little known
at the conclusion of a war, in which every part had been traversed,
as they have been to later Colonial Ministers, for the Government of
that day met the objections made to the cession of Penobscot in this
way:--One objector had stated that it ought not to have been ceded
by a maritime state, on account of the wonderful supply of excellent
timber for masts which it was known to afford. In opposition to which,
the Minister stated, "that it was proved by the certificate of Captain
Twiss, one of the ablest surveyors in the service, that there was not a
tree in the tract capable of making a mast."

"And one leading member of the Opposition, condemning the neglect
of Government in not making terms for the deserted loyalists, who
had forfeited their property by adhering to Great Britain, put his
question in these terms--"Could not all the surrenders we were to
make--the surrender of New York, the surrender of Charleston, of Long
Island, Staten Island, Penobscot, and Savanna, purchase security for
these meritorious persons?" Now, how much stronger would have been the
argument, if the cession of Penobscot had not been limited, as the
British boundary line limits it, by the highlands, but had extended
further, so as to entitle the States to the waters of the St. John,
and enable them to cut off the communication between Canada and Nova
Scotia? He adds also, that the inhabitants of these very places were
armed with us in the defence of their estates, and therefore we can
only attribute the rise of Maine as a State to the circumstance
of Massachusetts becoming possessed of the confiscated estates of
Penobscot, the boundaries of the state of Massachusetts having
previously been in a direct line from the Connecticut River to the Bay
of Passamaquoddy.

"That the description given in the treaty of 1783, Art. 2,--'A line
drawn due north from the heads of the St. Croix to the highlands, along
the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into
the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,' was a
description known and acknowledged in 1783 both to American and British
commanders and negotiators, is proved by the fact of that description
being used not only in the act of 1774, but in the Royal proclamation
of 1763. And this point is confirmed by another fact--viz. the
movement of a detachment of the American army under Colonel Arnold for
the invasion of Canada from the side of New England, while General
Montgomerie invaded it by the upper side and the lakes, in September,
1775, in not more than seven years before the preliminaries of peace;
and it is also to be observed that no part of Arnold's route came near
the northern ridge of highland to which the Americans lay claim, and
which in fact does not divide the rivers falling into the St. Lawrence
from those falling into the Atlantic Ocean, but only divides those
falling into the St. Lawrence from those falling into the St. John;
whereas the ridge claimed by Britain, referred to in the 14th George
III., 1774, and in the Royal proclamation of 1763, does actually
separate all the rivers flowing southward into the Atlantic from all
the rivers which flow north and north-east, whether they fall into the
St. Lawrence or into the St. John; and further, upon the north side of
the ridge claimed by Britain as the bound there does not rise a single
river which falls into the Atlantic, while all the rivers rising on the
south of the British boundary do fall into the Atlantic. It is a long
passage to copy, but the whole may give your readers a better notion
of the country traversed than were I merely to transcribe the passage
which proves my point. Under that passage I shall therefore place a
score:--

"'On the 22d of September, 1775, Arnold embarked upon the Kennebec (one
of the rivers rising on the south of the British ridge, and flowing
towards the Atlantic), in 200 batteaux, and proceeded with great
difficulty up that river, having a rapid stream, with a rocky bottom
and shores, continually interrupted by falls and carrying places, with
numberless other impediments to encounter. In this passage the batteaux
were frequently filled with water, or overset, in consequence of which
arms, ammunition, and stores were lost to a great extent. At the
numerous carrying places, besides the labour of loading and reloading,
they were obliged to convey the boats on their shoulders. The great
carrying place was above 12 miles across. That part of the detachment
which was not employed in the batteaux marched along the banks of the
river, and the boats and men being disposed in three divisions, each
division encamped together every night. Nor was the march by land more
eligible than the passage by water. They had thick woods, deep swamps,
difficult mountains, and precipices, alternately to encounter, and were
at times obliged to cut their way for miles through the thickets. The
constant fatigue and labour caused many to fall sick, which added to
their difficulties, and provisions became at length so scarce, that
some of the men ate their dogs, and whatever else of any kind which
could be converted into food.

"'Arriving at the head of the Kennebec, they sent back their sick,
and one of their colonels took that opportunity of returning with his
division, without the knowledge or consent of the Commander-in-Chief.
By this desertion Arnold's detachment was reduced about one-third:
they, however, proceeded with their usual constancy: _and having
crossed the Heights of Land, as a ridge that extends quite through
that continent is called, and from whence the waters on either side
take courses directly contrary to those on the other_, they at length
arrived at the head of the Chaudiere, which, running through Canada,
_falls into the River St. Lawrence near Quebec_. Their difficulties
were now growing to an end, and they soon approached the inhabited
parts of Canada; on the 3d of November a party, which they had pushed
forward, returned with provisions, and they soon after came to a house,
being the first they had beheld for 31 days, having spent the whole
time in traversing a hideous wilderness, without meeting anything
human.'

"Now, here you have, in the report of a campaign made by an American
general eight years before the peace, viz. in 1775, and printed in an
English _Annual Register_ five years before the peace, viz. 1799, as
direct a reference to the same marked distinction of rivers flowing
different ways, in consequence of the peculiar nature of the country,
as it is possible to desire; and you have an acknowledgment, _totidem
verbis_, that the then known designation of such tract was no other
than that used in the article of the subsequent treaty, as it had been
also used in the 14th of George III. by the British Legislature and in
the Royal proclamation of 1763, and upon examining any map, that of
the Useful Knowledge Society or any other, it will be seen that all
the rivers rising on the south side of the British boundary do fulfil
the terms of the above treaty, and that all on the other, or north
side, do, as the above account of Arnold's march expresses it, 'take
courses directly contrary.' The rivers on the south side flow towards
the Atlantic Ocean, not one on the other side does flow towards it--in
itself the most indisputable proof that the American claim cannot stand
with those words of the article which assign to them only that tract of
territory wherein the rivers flow towards and 'fall into the Atlantic
Ocean.'

"I may here remark, that as the proclamation of 1763 is the earliest
reference I know to these highlands so dividing the rivers, and as that
proclamation proceeds from west to east, and as General Arnold found
at the west end the peculiar marks required, the only really amicable,
and perhaps the only certain, mode of ascertaining the bound, would be
not to start on a loose cruise for highlands at the line of St. Croix,
which can itself only be determined by its abutment with the specified
highlands (in fact, I believe this loose and hand-over-head mode of
proceeding has produced all the difficulty), but to start the search
where General Arnold crossed, and run the line eastward according to
the direction of the rivers, giving all the territory wherein 'the
rivers fall into the Atlantic,' as by the treaty, to America, that
wherein 'the rivers flow the contrary way' to Britain; for with this
report of General Arnold's march seven years before under our view, it
is impossible to believe that General Washington would have sanctioned
a reference to so marked a distinction as these so-called 'highlands'
in one sense, while he meant, in future times, the reference to
be interpreted in another. Viewing the matter according to these
lights, which is the only just mode of viewing it, as a case between
Christians, Penobscot, the cession of which was reprobated in the
British Parliament at the time (and when many officers who had been
employed in Canada and in the States were present in both Houses), does
fulfil the terms required by the treaty--namely, it embraces all the
rivers which, rising on the south of Arnold's ridge, flow towards and
'fall into the Atlantic Ocean;' whereas, neither the boundary claimed
by America nor the line set out by the King of Holland as a fair
compromise, acceded to by the sufferer, Britain, and refused by the
gainer, America, can in any wise be said to meet.

"I know not, Sir, whether you will think these remarks, and this
information, upon a question likely to terminate in a war, or a
disgraceful concession of the just rights of the British nation, may
be useful or acceptable to you; but, such as they are, you are welcome
to them, and may use them as you please; and allow me at the same
time to add, there are other parts of the history of the same period
which would cast considerable light upon the present extraordinary
proceedings of the British Government in regard to Canada.

  "I have the honour to remain, Sir,

  "Your obedient servant,

  "W.J.D. Waddilove."


TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.

"My intention is now to show you, from a document already quoted,
the Royal proclamation of 1763, a further confirmation that the
division expressed, 'Rivers falling one way, and rivers falling
directly contrary into the Atlantic,' was a distinction perfectly
well understood, and that this peculiar expression being applicable
to "Penobscot," was the probable reason why that district was ceded
in 1783, and many tribes of Indians driven from a hunting ground
previously enjoyed, under the protection of the British Crown. If I
recollect right, some influential member of the opponents of Lord
Shelburne's peace stated in debate, that above 20 tribes, whom we
were bound by previous treaties and wampum belts to protect, were
driven from their homes by this unnecessary cession, for it may be
here remarked that one uniform condition of all treaties with that
ill-used race of men, by whomsoever made (Sir W. Johnson or others),
was this--for the sole purpose of guarding themselves against the
wanton aggression of the settlers, provided the tracts ceded be always
appropriated to His Majesty's sole use, and that the lines be run in
the presence of the British authority, and some of their own chiefs, to
prevent disputes hereafter.

"The 11th clause of the proclamation, evidently with a view to this
feeling on the part of the Indians, runs thus. After setting out the
limits and grants, &c. in the previous part of the instrument (binding
upon America, as well as upon ourselves, except where they may be
specifically relieved from its effect by the express words of the
treaty of 1783, since they were at the time British subjects) we read--

"'Whereas, it is just and reasonable, and essential to our interest and
_the security of our_ colonies (the States then included), that the
several nations or tribes of Indians, with whom we are connected, and
who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in
the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories as, not
having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, are reserved to them, or any
of them, as their hunting grounds; we do therefore, with the advice of
our Privy Council, declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that
no governor or commander-in-chief, in any of our colonies, Quebec, &c.
do presume, upon any pretence whatever, to grant warrants of survey,
or pass any patents for lands beyond the bounds of their respective
governments, as described in their commissions.' Now mark: 'As also
that no governor or commander-in-chief of our colonies or plantations
in America _do presume_ for the present, and until our further pleasure
be known, to grant warrants of survey, or pass patents, _for any lands
beyond the heads or sources of any of the rivers which fall into
the Atlantic Ocean_ from the west or north-west, or upon any lands
whatever, which not having been ceded to, or purchased by, us, as
aforesaid, _are reserved to the said Indians or any of them_.' Now,
will any man of common reflection say, that under such circumstances,
known to all our governors and commanders-in-chief, of course also
to all engaged in the internal legislation of the plantations, there
could be any obscurity to admit of dispute in the reference made to
this precise mark of distinction--'beyond the heads or sources of
any of the rivers falling into the Atlantic?' the same mark being
again referred to in the Imperial Act 14th George III., 1774, in
nearly the same words, only adding 'the highlands,' &c., dividing,
&c., again expressly described in the account of General Arnold's
march over the very country; and lastly, briefly referred to in the
treaty of 1783, the very brevity and looseness of the expression being
the strongest possible proof of the notoriety of such division and
landmark. I confess, Sir, I cannot divine any mode of escape from
the dilemma in which the sticklers for this unreasonable claim are
placed--either to recede from what is palpably an unjust pretence, or
to stamp Washington, Dr. Franklin, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Jay as the most
consummate knaves, adopting a loose phraseology to escape at a future
time from the effects of their own treaty. To the latter alternative
no Englishman acquainted with the history of Washington's glorious,
and--except in one point, too stern an adherence to what he conceived
to be justice-unblemished career, will ever be disposed to accede.

"The next point on which I engaged to remark was the probable reason
which induced Lord Shelburne to cede a country which the Indians had
possessed, and thereby drive so many tribes from their homes, and the
tombs of their ancestors, to them a heavier blow than any other That
the Indians did possess it, is proved not only by the statement in the
Imperial Parliament, but also by the fact of sundry raids occasionally
made by them from this tract upon the settlers of Nova Scotia, known to
be at that time altogether confined to the region about Pasamaquoddy
Bay, which now forms the southern part of New Brunswick.

"Now the clause which I have quoted above I conceive to afford that
probable reason. The governors, &c. are restricted not to grant
warrants of survey on any pretence 'beyond the heads and sources
of the rivers which fall into the Atlantic.' Though I believe it
admits a question whether any patents were passed extending the
British settlements beyond the 45th degree of north latitude,
for the old geographers carry the line along that degree to the
Bay of Pasamaquoddy, and bound Massachusetts on the west by New
Hampshire--though the description of General Arnold's march is a
traverse of a wild wilderness, wherein 'human face divine' seems
never to have been seen, yet this clause most decidedly leaves a
discretion in the Governor of Massachusetts, when population required
it, to extend his surveys and his patents as far north as the heads
of those rivers which fall into the Atlantic. The district now called
Maine, then Penobscot, is exactly a tract so situated, and, whatever
might have been the original intentions of the Crown as regarded the
Indians within this tract, the discretion so given formed a just and
proper reason, when peace was to be established, why the territory
so described should be ceded to the United States, and that very
cession of a country so circumstanced affords the strongest possible
confirmation that 'the heads and sources of the rivers falling into the
Atlantic' literally were the limits referred to in 1783, and that no
just claim can be made out in the face of this evidence to a territory
in which, by the confession of General Arnold's march, the rivers fall
'the contrary way.' I shall not trouble you further. A war founded on
unjust aggression can never expect God's blessing upon it. A calm
produced by concession to unjust aggression can never end in lasting
peace.

"'If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of
judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter, for he
that is higher than the highest regardeth." Eccles. v. 8.

  I remain, Sir, your obedient servant.

  W.J.D. Waddilove.

  "_Beacon Grange, April 28._"

       *       *       *       *       *

After Great Britain had acknowledged the independence of the several
States, if the true spirit of this treaty were not to be strictly
adhered to, it must have been obvious at the time, that it would be
impossible for her to defend her remaining North American possessions;
much less be able at any future period to make them sufficiently
powerful to cope with the United States. But surely with the Treaty,
and the various documents alluded to by Mr. Waddilove, in their hands,
a commission, composed of able military men, sent out to that part of
the world, could so well define the boundary between the two countries,
as to leave no further doubts upon the minds of our Government, as
to the line of conduct to be with justice pursued towards the United
States and also towards our North American possessions; and they
would then be enabled also to act with that firmness and decision
with which these republicans should be met in all our dealings with
them. The idea of umpires ought not for a moment be tolerated--the
treaty and the features of the country render them quite unnecessary.
Without having any ambitious views, Great Britain evidently wants
this disputed territory, if it were only for the security of her North
American Provinces; and it might reasonably be expected that this point
could be amicably arranged, if there is a sincere wish for peace, and
any thing like good will towards us to be found in the United States.
If therefore we are provoked to war, by simply working on both flanks
of any body of troops hazarded by the States into the country alluded
to, their fate may be pretty easily guessed or calculated upon; for
we could have no difficulty in acting at once from Quebec, Halifax,
&c.; and if hereafter emigration from the United Kingdom were duly
and liberally encouraged, as it should be, into a country rightfully
belonging to the British Empire, abounding in small lakes and fine
rivers, we might soon begin to talk not only of our valuable but also
of our powerful American colonies; especially if convicts, in place
of being all sent to New Holland, were employed to make good roads to
connect the countries lying between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence.
These convicts should never upon any account be allowed to become
settlers.

Having so far entered upon the subject, I think I ought to proceed
in what I hope may be useful; and whilst I speak from observations
made upon the spot, I must take the liberty of reminding the reader
that during the period occupied by "improvements" in the States; the
Canadas, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, &c., though somewhat retarded by
late events, have not been standing still.

The country behind the line running from Lake St. Francis, to Lake
Memphremagog, ought as soon as possible to be secured from sudden
incursions, by a few respectable forts, or strong redoubts; capable
of affording good cover for a certain number of cavalry and infantry;
situations for which, upon or close to the present frontier, can be
found, so that that entrance into Lower Canada may be covered. The line
mentioned being taken as a base, and Isle aux Noix, Ash Island, and the
part of the frontier extending along from the La Colle river towards
Lake St. Francis being judiciously protected, the Lower Province
would thus be secured from the inroads of brigands from the adjoining
States; and if they, or if even an army should venture forward in that
direction, it would not be quite easy for them to return; especially
if the redoubts I speak of, are by the labour of soldiers made strong
enough to require a week's regular siege for their capture, and which
might be scientifically thrown up at no great expense. They should,
however, be connected with each other by military roads; the making
of which, as well as constructing the redoubts, would be excellent
practice for the regular troops I am so anxious to have called out; who
could never be better employed, (for habits of labour are essential to
them,) than in works of this kind; and I hope I have already shown,
that veterans are quite unfit for the duties of our North American
frontiers.

The thick, in some places, almost impassable woods and swamps,
extending often for a considerable distance along the frontier line
of the Lower Province, render it difficult to make arrangements to
oppose inroads from the States; for it is impossible to calculate upon
the direction in which an enemy's force may make its appearance, and
in order to watch all the roads or approaches, especially in winter,
our troops must necessarily be too much scattered over the country; for
owing to want of cover, they cannot be kept in sufficient bodies, but
so far to the rear as to expose the advanced posts to be overpowered
and cut off.

The following documents, which appear to be official, will show
clearly, that I have not without good reason made the foregoing
observations respecting the state of our affairs with the United
States, and which call for energetic measures on our part.


"MILITARY AND NAVAL PREPARATIONS ON OUR NORTHERN FRONTIERS.

"The Chair submitted the following message from the President of the
United States:--


"TO THE SENATE.

"I communicate to the Senate, in compliance with their resolution
of the 12th instant, a report from the Secretary of War, containing
information on the subject of that resolution.

  "M. Van Buren.

  "_Washington, March 28._"

       *       *       *       *       *

  "_War Department, March 27._

"Sir,--The resolution of the Senate of the 12th inst. 'That
the President of the United States be requested to communicate to the
Senate, if in his judgment compatible with the public interest, any
information which may be in the possession of the Government, or which
can be conveniently obtained, of the military and naval preparations
of the British authorities on the northern frontiers of the United
States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic Ocean, designating the
permanent from the temporary and field works, and particularly noting
those which are within the claimed limits of the United States,' having
been referred by you to this department, it was immediately referred
to Major-General Scott, and other officers who have been stationed on
the frontier referred to, for such information on the subject as they
possessed, and could readily procure; and an examination is now in
progress for such as may be contained in the files of the department.
General Scott is the only officer yet heard from, and a copy of his
report is herewith submitted, together with a copy of that to which he
refers, made upon the resolution of the House of Representatives of the
9th instant. As soon as the other officers who have been called upon
are heard from, and the examination of the files of the department is
completed, any further information which may be thus acquired will be
immediately laid before you.

  "Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

  "J.R. Poinsett.

"_To the President of the United States._"

       *       *       *       *       *

"_Head Quarters, Eastern Division, Elizabethtown, New Jersey, March 23,
1840._

"Sir,--I have received from your office, copies of two
resolutions, passed respectively, the 12th and 9th instant, one by
the Senate, and the other by the House of Representatives; and I am
asked for 'any information on the subject of both, or either of the
resolutions, that may be in [my] possession.'

"In respect to the naval force recently maintained upon the American
lakes by Great Britain, I have just had the honour to report to
the Secretary of War, by whom the resolution of the House of
Representatives (of the 9th instant) was directly referred to me.

"I now confine myself to the Senate's resolution, respecting 'military
(I omit naval) preparations of the British authorities on the northern
frontiers of the United States, from Lake Superior to the Atlantic
Ocean, distinguishing the permanent from the temporary and field works,
and particularly noting those which are within the claimed limits of
the United States.'

"I will here remark, that however well my duties have made me
acquainted with the greater part of the line in question, I have
paid but slight attention to the forts and barracks erected by the
British authorities near the borders of Maine, above Fredericton, in
New Brunswick, or in Upper Canada, above Cornwall, being of the fixed
opinion which need not here be developed, that all such structures
would be of little or no military value to either of the parties in the
event of a new war between the United States and Great Britain.

"I was last summer at the foot of Lake Superior, and neither saw nor
heard of any British fort or barrack on the St. Mary's River, the
outlet of that lake.

"Between Lakes Huron and Erie the British have three sets of
barracks--one at Windsor, opposite to Detroit; one at Sandwich, a
little lower down; and the third at Malden, 18 miles from the first;
all built of sawed logs, strengthened by block-houses, loopholes, &c.
Malden has been a military post, with slight defences. These have been
recently strengthened. The works at Sandwich and Windsor have also, I
think, been erected within the last six or eight months.

"Near the mouth of the Niagara the British have two small forts--George
and Messisanga. Both existed during the last war. The latter may be
termed a permanent work. Slight barracks have been erected within the
last two years on the same side, near the Falls, and at Chippawa, with
breast works at the latter place; but nothing, I believe, above the
works first named, on the Niagara, which can be termed a fort.

"Since the commencement of the recent troubles in the Canadas, and
(consequent thereupon) within our limits, Fort William Henry, at
Kingston, and Fort Wellington (opposite Ogdensburg old works,) have
both been strengthened within themselves, besides the addition of
dependencies. These forts may be called permanent.

"On the St. Lawrence, below Prescott, and confronting our territory,
I know of no other military post; 12 miles above, at Brockville,
there may be temporary barracks and breastworks. I know that of late
Brockville has been a military station.

"In the system of defences on the approaches to Montreal, the Isle Aux
Noix, a few miles below our line, and in the outlet of Lake Champlain,
stands at the head. This island contains within itself a system of
permanent works of great strength. On them the British Government has,
from time to time, since the peace of 1815, expended much skill and
labour.

"Odletown, near our line, on the western side of Lake Champlain, has
been a station for a body of Canadian militia for two years, to guard
the neighbourhood from refugee incendiarism from our side. I think that
barracks have been erected there for the accommodation of those troops,
and also at a station, with the like object, near Alburgh, in Vermont.

"It is believed that there are no important British forts or extensive
British barracks, on our borders, from Vermont to Maine.

"In respect to such structures on the disputed territory, Governor
Fairfield's published letters contain fuller information than has
reached me through any other channel. I have heard of no new military
preparations by the British authorities on the St Croix or Pasamaquoddy
Bay.

"Among such preparations, perhaps I ought not to omit the fact that
Great Britain, besides numerous corps of well-organized and well
instructed militia, has at this time within her North American
provinces more than 20,000 of her best regular troops. The whole of
those forces might be brought to the verge of our territory in a few
days. Two-thirds of that regular force has arrived out since the spring
of 1838.

  "I remain, Sir, with great respect,

  "Your most obedient servant,

  "Winfield Scott.

  "_Brigadier General R. Jones, Adjutant-General
  United States Army._"


BRITISH ARMED VESSELS ON THE LAKES.

"The papers on this subject submitted to Congress by the President,
in compliance with a resolution of the House, show that at the close
of navigation last fall, two steamers (owned or hired by the British
authorities), one schooner, and a number of barges, were employed on
Lake Ontario, and the river St. Lawrence, as a security against an
apprehended renewal of the troubles of the preceding year; and from
the annexed communication of Mr. Forsyth, there is reason to expect
that even this small force, or at least a part of it, will be soon
withdrawn."

       *       *       *       *       *

  "_Department of State, Washington, March 13._

"The Secretary of State, to whom has been referred a resolution of
the House of Representatives of the 9th instant, requesting the
President to communicate to that body, 'if compatible with the public
service, whether the Government of Great Britain have expressed to the
Government of the United States a desire to annul the arrangements
entered into between the two Governments in the month of April, 1817,
respecting the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes;
and that, if said arrangements be not annulled, whether there has been
any violation of the same by the authorities of Great Britain,' has the
honour to report to the President a copy of the only communication on
file in this department on the subject to which the resolution refers.
Prior to the date of that communication, the Secretary of State, in an
interview invited for that purpose, called Mr. Fox's attention to the
disregard by Her Majesty's colonial authorities of the conventional
arrangement between the two countries, as to the extent of naval
armaments upon the lakes.

"In the autumn of the past year the Secretary of State made known
verbally to Mr. Fox, that the cause assigned in his note no longer
existing, the President expected that the British armament upon the
lakes would be placed upon the footing prescribed by the convention.
Mr. Fox engaged to communicate without delay to his Government the
substance of the conversation between them: and expressed his own
conviction, that if the winter then ensuing passed without renewed
attempts to disturb the tranquillity of the Canadas, there could be no
sufficient motive for either Government maintaining a force beyond that
authorized by the convention of 1817.

  "All of which is respectfully submitted.

  "JOHN FORSYTH.

"_To the President of the United States._"

The instructions which were deemed expedient to be given to Colonel
Sir William Williams of the 13th Regiment, commanding Isle aux Noix
and its dependencies in 1814, after we lost the superiority on Lake
Champlain, will clearly show that what I have proposed should be
seriously considered; and also support my opinion of the necessity of
establishing the fortresses I have mentioned, in which troops could at
all times be comfortably quartered; indeed, with such neighbours as the
Americans, our possessions can never be safe from insult without them.

  "_St John's, November 9, 1814._

  "SIR,

"I am commanded by Major-General Brisbane to transmit, for your
guidance, the following instructions, which are to be acted upon as
far as circumstances will permit, in case of an attack upon any of the
advanced posts; not that the Major-General has reason to conclude the
enemy have such an object in view; but the confusion always arising
out of unexpected occurrences in time of war, must as far as possible
be avoided or guarded against; and you ought also to be aware of his
intentions in case of such events happening.

"1st. The enemy appearing in force in the direction of Caldwell's
Manor, coming from Missisquoi Bay.

"It is not probable that the enemy would appear in that direction with
any other intention, but for a demonstration, unless he came with
the determination of attacking Isle aux Noix, in which case it is to
be expected he will bring with him, if before the frost sets in, the
means of water conveyance on the south river, or if afterwards, means
of transport for heavy guns on the ice. His intentions, therefore, in
these respects can be easily ascertained. If the former should be his
object, a force must be detached into the Manor, or the concessions,
(say five companies under a field-officer) to keep him in check, and
to prevent the country from being over-run and plundered; this may in
a great measure be effected by the choice of favourable situations or
positions, but no general affair must be permitted without the consent
of the Major-General.

"Whilst the enemy might be thus manœuvring, a real attack would likely
take place on the line of the La Colle and Ash Island. Such an attack
is not improbable, although the enemy could have no other object in
view but to beat up our cantonments, and cause the troops, in some
measure, to take the field exposed to the inclemency of the season, and
might be effected with only a small part of his force. The whole of the
posts upon that line must be ordered to hold out till reinforcements
can arrive from this place; for until then it would not be safe to
detach but small parties from the garrison of Isle aux Noix. A force
from L'Acadie could only be brought up in support of the bridge. La
Colle Mill and its dependencies must look to Isle aux Noix alone for
assistance.

"2ndly, If the enemy should come with the intention of attacking Isle
aux Noix with heavy guns, a certain time is requisite for him to make
his arrangements; and measures could be taken on our part to frustrate
his views.

"For some time longer, it is in the enemy's power to make an attack by
means of his fleet, upon Ash Island and La Colle, in conjunction with a
force acting in Caldwell's Manor; the necessity therefore, of keeping
the guns in battery there, as long as possible, even till the frost
sets in, must be obvious.

"It is not probable that the enemy might venture to pass Isle aux Noix
entirely, and move down the Richlieu at once upon this place; which
might perhaps be the case, if collecting a sufficient force, he should
meditate the invasion of the Lower Province. Under such circumstances,
the posts on the La Colle might be greatly exposed. It would then
be for you to act powerfully on his line of operations; and as most
likely, in such a case, your communications with the advanced posts
might be attempted to be cut off, it would therefore be advisable,
after destroying the road from the Mill to La Colle bridge, to withdraw
the troops from the former and Ash Island (after destroying the works)
to Isle aux Noix, which would place at your disposal sufficient means
to annoy an invading army. Of course the Burtonville road from the
bridge would be disputed to the utmost.

"3rd. The enemy appearing in force in Odletown.

"This is not likely to happen until the frost sets in; and could only
have in view the occupation of the posts of the La Colle and Ash
Island; objects of the first importance to us to prevent; and an attack
on that side in force must distract us much more than in the direction
of Caldwell's Manor, and in this case it would be reasonable to expect
a diversion on the right bank of the river, or even if the enemy has
sufficient force, a dash down the South river upon the Isle aux Noix,
which would make it hazardous to detach much from it for the support
of the advance before the troops from this can arrive; yet a force
could be easily, at this season, brought up to support the bridge of
La Colle, which is in itself no position to be held against cannon;
but the entrance of the Burtonville road is very favourable for light
troops and if they are judiciously posted there, it would be next to
impossible for the enemy to force a passage in that direction, and it
is not very likely such an attempt would be made; the danger rests in
La Colle Mill being taken, by which means we might be forced to retire
back on the road to L'Acadie, whereby the troops intrusted with the
defence of that entrance would be totally deprived of cover.

"Lastly. Any advance of the enemy upon us could deviate but little from
what has been stated in numbers one, two, and three, with any chance of
success; it must, therefore, be evident throughout the whole, that the
arrival of reinforcements from the rear is the primary object; it, upon
this account, becomes essential, that the Major-General should receive
the earliest possible intelligence of the appearance of the enemy in
any direction, and he, therefore, desires me to request, that in any
instructions you may give to the officers in command of the advanced
posts, _sending immediate information_ of suspicious movements in their
front may be held up to them as of the first importance.

"I am also to acquaint you, that we do not, at present, possess, at St.
John's, more means than would enable us to move one regiment at a time
up the river Richlieu to your assistance."

No doubt, since 1814, the number of roads from the States into the
Canadas have been considerably increased, which must render it still
more difficult, without the redoubts I speak of, to make arrangements
for the protection of the country; I hope, however, that what has been
said, and what are shown to be the difficulties to be met with and
overcome, together with the anxiety evinced on the part of the American
Government, as to any preparations we may have made in case of a war,
to which they evidently look forward, will receive timely and serious
consideration, but in any future contest with the United States, the
command of Lake Champlain ought instantly to be acquired; and our
superiority in war steamers upon all the Lakes cannot possibly be
dispensed with, if these fine and valuable provinces of the empire are
to be protected from inroads, and consequent devastation; and such is
my opinion of the loyalty of the people in general of the Canadas, and
even of the Canadians of the French extraction in the Lower Province,
if not allowed to be misled by designing men, that, I am convinced,
they would readily contribute towards their own defence, rather than be
brought under the democratical rule of the United States.

If the whole of our North American territories had arrived at a certain
point, when an increased, educated, and intelligent population, and
improved resources, had made it safe for them as one nation, to be
allowed entirely to manage their own affairs without any interference
on the part of the mother country, and that they really desired to
do so, Great Britain ought readily to comply with their wishes, yet
still remaining their friend and protector, and receiving, in return,
every commercial advantage; but to abandon them in their present weak
and distracted state, as some men have ignorantly talked of, and
even recommended, would only be throwing them into the power of our
_friendly_ neighbours, who, thus strengthened, and we proportionally
weakened, might, to a certain degree, become more formidable.

I beg, however, to ask, why is Great Britain become, as it were, timid,
or reluctant to declare, that no act nor pretensions on the part of the
United States can give them a right to incorporate British subjects
into their Union without the consent of our Government; and why is it
not made known, by proclamation, or otherwise, all over the world,
that British-born subjects have no right to renounce, and that they
can never be looked upon as having renounced, in whatever part of the
world they may think fit to reside, their allegiance to their Queen;
and that if any of them are taken in arms on land, or upon the seas,
fighting against their countrymen, they shall be tried and condemned as
traitors, and become liable to be punished as such. It may probably be
said, that in case of a war, this would render desperate many thousands
of our seamen now navigating the United States' ships at high rates
of wages, and would cause those in their ships of war to fight with
a halter about their necks. This might, perhaps, be the case at first
with a few of the worthless; but let our seamen be offered the same,
or even higher wages than they can receive in the ships of war of the
States, or in those of any other country, and I cannot, for a moment
believe, that brave men, the descendants of many of those who fought
with Nelson, and our other renowned naval chiefs, will abandon their
country, though it may have shown itself, perhaps, ungrateful to them
or their fathers for former services.

But surely it ought to be high time for us to consider the effects
produced by our now rather too long tried _reciprocal system of
trade_ with other nations, in which I have never heard, that we had
been fairly met, nor do I believe we ever will be met by any of them.
Let us, therefore, lay aside for the moment, the wild, and to the
generality of men, incomprehensible theories, clothed in the mystical
jargon of political economists; and permit me to ask any man of common
sense, where reciprocity is to be found in the commercial intercourse
between Great Britain and the United States? I suppose reciprocity to
mean, in this instance, mutual benefits conferred and received.

A few years ago--and I am not aware of any important change having
since taken place--Great Britain professed her principles as regarded
reciprocity to be,--"To abolish all discriminating duties affecting the
like productions of foreign countries, and in lieu thereof to establish
one uniform Tariff for the whole.

"To reduce that Tariff to the lowest degree, consistent, in
each particular country, with the two legitimate objects of all
duties--either the collection of the revenue, or the protection
absolutely requisite for the maintenance of our own internal industry.

"To abolish all discriminating duties upon the navigation of other
countries, so that the products and merchandize of these nations, when
imported in their own ships, shall be subject to the same rates only as
when imported in British ships."

Such principles are certainly most liberal; but in what did the wisdom
of those who professed them consist? certainly not in that of this
world; if the lofty position of Great Britain was considered at the
period when such regulations were framed, and when the then state
of our commerce with other nations were taken into account. But let
us see how this system has worked. Suppose we speak of cotton, (but
we might take, with almost equal advantage, other articles imported
into the United Kingdom), as being the chief export from the United
States. It is mostly brought to us in American ships, navigated, in
a great measure, by British seamen, some of whom they pretend to
have naturalized; but at present we shall say no more of this. Our
merchants will not of course, employ, to any extent, British ships to
bring cotton from the United States, because the Americans can afford,
from various causes, not counteracted by us, to convey it cheaper to
them. Where then can we find reciprocity in the shipping and seamen
employed in this great branch of trade? To balance this fairly, we
should surely, if it were only in self-defence, lay a tax upon cotton
imported in American, or any other vessels, in order to compel British
merchants to employ British ships and British seamen to bring it in its
raw state from America, or from our East India possessions, or from
any other country where we might think fit to encourage the growth of
this article. It may be said that cotton, thus raised in price, would
become too expensive for our manufacturers to be able to contend with
foreigners in the continental and other markets; but this could not be
long the case, for the American carrying trade being thus diminished,
they could not afford to convey it at low prices to any country, or to
pay their or rather our seamen such high wages; and are we not wisely
improving the models of all new ships which are built; and consequently
their rates of sailing, so that we shall soon be able to cope in this
respect, with the United States ships also.

I may, however, be told that the United States can meet us in this way
by laying taxes upon articles manufactured in the British dominions and
imported into their Union; or, perhaps, upon the cotton itself, before
it is exported to this country. Let them do so if they please, but they
will not adhere very long to that plan. We can find cotton elsewhere
or substitutes for most of it in flax and wool, to the great benefit
of our own colonies, and the Americans would soon create for our
advantage, by taxing our wares, a "pretty considerable" body of fair
traders out of the present sympathizers all along their most extensive
frontier. The last war did this, to my certain knowledge, to a great
extent, and I even had a person connected in some manner with a high
civil authority of the State of New York caught and brought to me when
engaged in this kind of traffic. We had, at the time I allude to,
excellent information of what was going forward in the adjoining States
to Canada. I was told that a military man of rank was in the habit of
crossing the boundary line, generally at night, and it was supposed,
judging from some of those who met him, that he came as a spy. I had
him therefore taken and marched into St. John's one morning.--I was
surprised however to find that he was a very gentleman-like man, both
in appearance and manners. He at once acquainted me with his object
in venturing so imprudently into Canada: indeed the very unpleasant
situation in which he stood as a spy made this quite necessary. He was
soon able to convince me by mentioning mercantile houses with which
he was connected in Montreal, &c. that though in a kind of military
situation, about the high authority I have alluded to, he had no
intention whatever of acting the part of a spy, but had only some
commercial business of importance on his hands. I had, of course, to
report the circumstance of his capture, through Sir Thomas Brisbane,
who was then at Montreal upon duty, for the information of Government,
and in the meantime I took this gentleman-like person into my own
house, he having pledged his word of honour that he would not attempt
to escape.

The answer I received to my letter respecting him rather alarmed me on
his account, for what I had mentioned as the reasons for his coming
into the Province were not deemed sufficiently satisfactory; and I
saw they were more inclined to look upon him as a spy than in any
other light. I therefore had to examine him again more minutely, and
according to instructions sent me; when he gave references to so many
respectable mercantile gentlemen as being well aware why he had come
into Canada, that I at last received orders to permit him to go back
to the States. But during the time I had the pleasure of his company I
had also an opportunity of becoming acquainted with a highly-informed
agreeable gentleman. But this, I conceive, will show clearly that the
fair trade during the war, had fallen into very respectable hands;
and from all I knew it was progressing in such a way as to hold out
expectations of great improvement had it lasted. I have been induced to
be thus minute in order to show how our manufactures are at any time,
and under any circumstances, certain of finding their way into the
States.

I shall most likely be told by the admirers of reciprocity, that the
American ships carry back our wares in return for their raw cotton.
This is not the case to any very great extent, and is chiefly done
where British mercantile houses have establishments in both countries;
for Jonathan will make what he can at home; and he would do much more
in this way, if he did not find that he can purchase most articles
cheaper ready made, than he can (owing to the great expense of labour,
and of living in the States) manufacture them himself, or else he
will send for what he wants to the cheapest markets, such as Hamburg,
Holland, Belgium, &c. where, we are informed, things are sold at
lower prices than what we can afford, even with the aid of science
and improved machinery, to make them for; and thus I am again at a
loss to understand where reciprocity in trade, carried on with all the
advantages on one side, is to be found.

I shall not enter into other branches of commerce, for such matters
would not suit this work, nor allude to what is practised by other
countries; but the same principles would apply equally to them as to
the United States. But it may not, perhaps, be improper here to ask,
if it has ever entered into the calculations of our "Squires of the
lofty Towers," which we see looking proudly down upon so many parts
of the country, in what manner the multitudes they have congregated,
like our chiefs of old, around their Baronial castles, are to be fed in
case of even a temporary stagnation of trade? But it is beneath them to
think of such matters, and they wisely leave subjects of this kind to
be discussed hereafter by improvident landlords, who, in consideration
of temporary advantages, have granted certain leases of parts of their
estates to these _squires_, to enable them to create cities, towns,
and villages, the enormous population of which, if it is to be kept in
tranquillity, must constantly require the presence of such troops as I
have in view.

I am afraid it may be found out before long, that we are rather too
closely connected with the United States; and are sacrificing far too
much, in a national point of view, and to our serious injury, in order
to maintain this imprudent connexion. Has it not already thrown the
greater part of the carrying trade into the hands of the Americans;
and has it not been the means of seducing from Great Britain her best
seamen? Let it, therefore, be made the interests of our merchants
to employ our sailors at such rates of wages as they can receive
in American or in any other ships. Let us meet countries fairly in
commercial affairs, who will really meet us fairly, and let us look
less to theories, and more to the essential object of practically
promoting our maritime prosperity.

Naval and military men must hereafter be much more closely connected,
than they have hitherto been, or I should not, in this work, presume to
speak of them as acting together; but must not every contemplative mind
foresee, that wonderful changes must soon be wrought by the power of
steam, not only upon naval, but also upon military affairs.

We must, therefore, turn our thoughts to it, with the deepest interest,
so as to ascertain, in time, what may be the best modes of bringing
the vast resources of Great Britain, in this respect, into action; and
also to the manner in which powerful armaments are to be conducted with
skill and rapidity to points selected for sudden invasion, for that
such must be the most prominent feature in all our future wars, will
most assuredly be developed, and that too before many years have passed
away.

Amongst the great and important changes to be brought about in war
by steam, we must look forward to its facilitating, by the certainty
and rapidity of the movements of those destined to accomplish the
objects in view, the protection, or destruction of much property, both
public and private; also to its occasioning, for the same reasons,
vast suffering to the inhabitants of the countries fixed upon, for
whatever cause, to become the theatres of these awful and devastating
operations. I cannot exactly compare them, and their consequences,
to the unlooked for descents of the sea-kings of old, yet they must
greatly, I fear, resemble them in their destructive and other effects,
and they must be felt ere long all over the world. We were, as a
nation, allowed by Providence, no doubt for wise purposes, to live
so long in, I fear, not duly valued tranquillity and security, under
the protection of our splendid navy of former days, that those who
remained at home really knew nothing of war, and its attendant trials
and privations, but the name. Long may this be the case, and this
happy state, when compared with that of other countries, may, in all
human probability, be rendered more lasting, if we will only be wise
enough to take timely lessons from the past. History tells us of the
rapid fall of many once powerful nations--how they fell it is not for
me to relate; but Spain, her former greatness, and the causes of her
present debasement, should be constantly before our eyes. We are still
a great and warlike people, but I trust that we may be enabled to act
with judgment, and to take, at all events, such steps as will prevent
any other nation from anticipating us in the use of steam for warlike
purposes.

Those who have already deeply considered the subject, have come to
the conclusion, that a comparatively small, but well constructed, and
powerfully propelled steamer, alike overcoming wind and tide; capable
of taking up and retaining a position within a certain distance of the
largest sailing vessel, may be supposed able to destroy or capture
her, however brave or excellent her officers and crew may be, and it
is concluded, that this could probably be accomplished with but very
little loss or damage, being sustained by the steamer, if judiciously
manœuvred, and her commander would besides possess the great advantage,
of going into action or not, as he might think most advisable. The old
naval tactics, such as that of ships gaining what is termed the weather
gage of each other, or any thing of that kind, in going into action,
must be wholely abandoned whenever a steamer heaves in sight; for the
sailing vessel is at once supposed to be, in a great measure, at her
mercy.

But such reasoners also calculate upon what would happen in an
engagement between two fleets, in which steam-ships of a large
class would be more numerous on one side than the other; for they
could at once act together, regardless of wind or weather, and thus
concentrating their force, they could cut off or destroy a certain part
of their opponent's fleet, before sailing vessels could possibly come
to their assistance. They also calculate upon this manœuvre being
repeated upon the remainder of the enemy's ships, which cannot escape
from these powerful steamers.

These are points, however, for seamen to decide; yet suppose a steamer,
calculated to carry only a few traversing guns of the longest range
for shot or shells, with what are usually termed percussion locks,
to insure good practice even when the vessel is in motion, to be
well managed or manœuvred by a skilful naval officer; and should he
occasionally use shot heated in the furnaces for the boilers, what a
formidable opponent she must prove, especially in a calm, or even in a
storm, to any sailing vessel. Many officers may remember what treatment
our ships of war frequently met with in parts of the Mediterranean,
from even a single Spanish gun-boat, carrying perhaps but one long
gun; and when the facility and rapidity of movement of a steamer are
considered, there can be no comparison whatever drawn between her and
a common gun-boat, even when propelled by sweeps or oars, but which
become useless in a rough sea. Such matters as these can, however,
be brought by calculation to something very near to certainty as to
results.

I am aware that the great difficulty which presents itself at present
is how to protect from shot the chimneys, paddles, and machinery of
war-steamers; but if, in these times, when science is daily performing
such wonders amongst us, sufficient rewards were offered for the best
plans for this purpose, I have no doubt but we should soon see much
accomplished; but even until this may be effected, the position
which can be taken up by the steamer will, it is thought, insure her
being no great sufferer from the shot fired from a sailing vessel.
But these, and many other points connected with steam, will be fully
elucidated the very first war in which we may be seriously engaged;
but in the mean time much can be immediately done, by merely making
some useful experiments, whereby we may, to a considerable extent, be
taught whether it be advisable or not for us to continue, at a great
expense, building and equipping, at all events for what may be termed
home service, the present description of sailing vessels, or whether
it would not be prudent to direct more attention to war steamers, or
to those ships which are propelled by both sails and steam; though I
should fear that this combination of the two propelling powers must be
found objectionable, as both would most likely be imperfect.

For foreign service, or for those parts of the world where the
necessary supplies of fuel for steamers cannot easily be procured, the
combining the two principles in a ship may be useful; but wherever
perfect steamers can be available, they should decidedly have the
preference. But for some time to come, causing both steamers and
sailing vessels to act together for mutual assistance and support in
action, especially in distant parts of the world, must obviously be
desirable.

It appears to be demonstrated that a steamer, from fifteen hundred to
two thousand tons burden, and upwards, possesses great proportional
advantages over one of only four or five hundred, in carrying troops,
cargo, or fuel; and her increased power of steam, gives her also
proportional superiority in forcing her way through the water, and
storms or heavy seas have much less effect upon her than upon smaller
vessels. A steamship of war of two thousand tons burden, well manned
and armed--and she need not carry many, but they ought to be guns of
long range--must possess such powers of movement, and of destruction,
as cannot be easily calculated or understood; and conceive that ship
to carry, independent of her crew, (which need not be anything like
so numerous as that of even a large frigate,) a regiment of cavalry,
or two of infantry; then suppose thirty such steam ships conveying an
army of perhaps 30,000 men, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, such
as I am so anxious to have called out in the manner I have proposed,
and which could be carried by these irresistible steamers into almost
any port having sufficient depth of water, or to any selected point,
and there landed, ready to act against an unprepared, or perhaps
distracted people; and how easy it would be with such ships to supply
an army afterwards with every requisite; and the object in view being
accomplished, or even if frustrated, with what little difficulty
could the troops, and their materiel, be again received on board, and
conveyed to any other point of attack, or back to our own shores.

I had written the above observations, when I saw, by accident, the
following description of the Cyclops steam frigate, and from what
is said of her, it may be seen what I had in view. A few of the
96-pounders will soon decide the fate of a battle.

"The Cyclops, Steam Frigate.--This magnificent vessel, the largest
steam man-of-war in the world, was launched from Pembroke Dock-yard
a few days ago. Her dimensions are as follow:--Length 225 feet, beam
between paddles 38 feet, depth of hold 21 feet. Her tonnage is about
1,300, being 200 tons larger than the Gorgon, launched from the same
slip about eighteen months since. Her equipment, as a man-of-war,
will be the same in all respects as a frigate, having a complete gun,
or main-deck, as well as an upper or quarter-deck. On the main-deck
she will carry eighteen long 36-pounders, and on the upper deck four
48-pounders, and two 96-pounders on swivels, carrying a ball of ten
inches diameter, and sweeping round the horizon 240 degrees. The
Cyclops, like the vessel already referred to, will be commanded by
a post-captain, these two being the only steamers taking frigate's
rank. Her crew will consist of 210 men, 20 engineers and stokers, and
a lieutenant's party of marines, who will have charge of the guns,
all of which move upon slides and fixed pivots, thereby taking a
much wider range than the ordinary carriages can give. She will be
schooner-rigged, but her foremast will be of the same scantling and
height as that of a 36-gun frigate. Her draught of water, with all
on board, including six months' provisions, completely armed, and
with twenty days' fuel, will be fifteen feet. This quantity of fuel
(400 tons) will be carried in the engine-room, but there is a space
in the fore and after holds for ten days more coal, making, in all,
sufficient fuel for a thirty days' run. She has an orlop deck below
the gun-deck, of dimensions so magnificent that there is room to stow
with comfort eight hundred troops and their officers; so that, taking
her all in all, the Cyclops may be considered the most powerful vessel
in her Majesty's service. The Cyclops has been built in six months,
under the immediate inspection of Mr. W. Eyde, master-builder, of
Pembroke-yard, from drawings and plans prepared by his brother, Mr.
John Eyde, the able assistant of Sir W. Symonds, the inspector of the
navy, upon whose principle--namely, the combining of the sailing and
steaming properties--this vessel has been constructed. The Cyclops
will be docked in Sheerness Dock-yard on the 30th instant, and, after
remaining there for a few days, will proceed to the manufactory of
Messrs. Seaward, at Millwall, Poplar, to receive her engines, which
will be of 320 horsepower, on the principle which, in the case of the
Gorgon, has proved so successful that the Lords of the Admiralty have
given orders for five more pairs of engines upon the same plan, for
as many frigates. Half-a-dozen such steamers would do three times as
much work as the same number of line-of-battle ships. Twelve years ago
Lord Cochrane maintained, that a few well-appointed steamers would
suffice to keep in check opposing fleets in the Mediterranean; and if
we may judge from appearances, a short time only will elapse before the
experiment is tried."

Suppose also that each of these powerful steamers had assigned to her
to take in tow, when necessary, a sailing vessel, conveying either
additional troops, horses, coals, provisions, forage, &c. &c., how
much more formidable such an armament would become.

In combined naval and military operations, I should conclude that the
usual mode of proceeding would be to secure the point of debarkation,
or any other considered more suitable, so as to admit of the army
being again received on board the ships with as little difficulty and
loss as possible; for we may well suppose that the exasperated and
suffering inhabitants would do every thing in their power to destroy
and annoy the invaders. Field entrenchments, but on as confined a scale
as possible, must be thrown up with skill and rapidity, in situations
to favour the re-embarking of the army, with all that belongs to it;
and how essential it must then be, that soldiers should be as much
accustomed to the use of the pickaxe and shovel as to their arms; in
short, it will become indispensable that they should have habits of
working, like the Roman soldiers of old.

Let us consider the consequences of such a descent. The country to a
considerable extent must be instantly over-run by an army perfect in
all respects, and amply supplied independent of the invaded country.
Should the destruction of the power of an adversary in steam be alone
the object, gunpowder and other means we can readily command, would
speedily accomplish this. Dock-yards, building-yards, coal pits,
mines, machinery, railways, constructed at enormous expense, and all
public and private works of vast value--in a few days, and before any
force sufficient for their protection could be assembled, might be
laid in ruins, or so destroyed, as to render the amount of mischief
done incalculable. But these are matters which demand instant and due
consideration; and the country should be prepared to meet the expense
which must be incurred, if it is only to ensure our exemption from such
mortifications and misfortunes. Fortifications can afford a country
but little protection against such calamities; for to a superiority in
steam ships we can alone look for this, and to that Omnipotent Being
who can influence the judgments and views of those who, by Him, are
permitted to direct the affairs of this mighty empire.

It is obvious, that in our future wars, we must require not only an
efficient steam navy and a fine army, but also that the latter should
be in the highest state of discipline, and be led by able officers.
Such conduct as that of which our troops were guilty at Badajoz,
Ciudad Rodrigo, and on many other occasions, if attempted in these
enterprises, to which we must look forward as of frequent occurrence,
would most certainly lead to total ruin: sobriety, good conduct, and
the strictest obedience to orders cannot then be dispensed with; and
the country I hope will be convinced by what has been adduced, that
we could not possibly expect to find these necessary qualities in a
British army unless raised, organized, and officered in the manner I
have ventured to propose. In short, we want an army, similar in point
of discipline, though differently enforced, to that which Charles the
12th of Sweden led to constant victory, until the fatal battle of
Pultowa. And to our army of reserve I would hold up, as an example,
the brave and patriotic behaviour of the Swedish militia, which under
General Steinbock, during the absence of Charles at Bender, defeated at
Helsingborg, though almost entirely composed of raw recruits, unclothed
and badly armed, a regular Danish army that dared to invade their
country, and of which, as its rash and extraordinary king was absent,
they expected to have made an easy conquest.

But what a contrast to our troops, or indeed to those of any other
country, must a victorious Swedish army have been; as we find in the
account given of them by the famous Comte de Saxe, who tells us,
that the Swedes always kept their ranks and that after the battle of
Gadebesck was gained, the first line of these brave troops, with the
enemy dead at their feet, did not even dare to stoop down to strip
them--such was the discipline established in their regiments--until
prayers had been offered up on the field of battle.

It has, as a matter of course, been proposed that men regularly
brought up to the sea, should be exempted from serving in our armies;
but this can answer no wise purpose, so long as it is in their power
to enter the service even of our enemies, or rather of those who may
soon become so. A captain of the navy, in one of his works, has lately
given us a very melancholy account of the desertion of their country by
British seamen; and has also, I believe, assigned the true causes of
such defection; but it would be giving up as hopeless and unavailing,
every good feeling implanted in the heart of man towards his country,
if no exertions are made to recall to their allegiance these brave,
thoughtless, but warm-hearted wanderers.

This may not now be easily accomplished, but something ought
notwithstanding to be attempted, or else our navy should be rendered
independent of the merchant service for supplies of sailors; and the
changes which steam is producing in seamanship, must make this the less
difficult to be effected, as seamen for steamers can be much sooner
formed than those intended for sailing vessels; and allow me to ask,
why might not bodies of seamen be raised, so as to become crews for
ships of war, for a certain number of years service; and ought there
not to be held out to them even superior advantages, as to pension, &c.
to what has been spoken of for soldiers; for a navy is of much more
importance to Great Britain than an army; and why might not seamen and
their officers of all ranks be transferred bodily from ship to ship,
as might be found desirable or necessary, without obstinately adhering
to the old injurious plan of paying all off, when the ships in which
they have served are put, for whatever cause, out of commission; and
why might not such a plan render it seldom necessary to have recourse
to impressment, which ought never, however, to be altogether abandoned.
There might surely be for the navy, as well as for the army, a fixed
peace establishment, on a proper and enlarged scale; and in case of a
war, if additional crews are wanted for ships of a larger class about
to be commissioned, those which until then had been serving in the
smaller rates, could be augmented to the required establishments in
both officers and men, and new crews for the smaller rates, if still
to be employed, could be easily raised by impressment or bounty; but
seamen taken by the former, ought invariably to be discharged as soon
as their places can be supplied by volunteers; but most of them, if
the advantages I have just mentioned are held out to them, will have
no wish to leave their ships and comrades, or the officers they have
served under; and having had a good foundation of seamen (if I may use
the expression) to build upon, excellent crews, increased in numbers,
would in a very short time be available for ships of even the largest
class.

Although a soldier, I have been much at sea, and I have frequently
heard and remarked, that the very best sailors were those trained,
especially from boyhood, in our ships of war.

At first, seamen might be taken wherever they could be found, to man
our ships; but if a system of this kind were adopted--and of course
many points connected with it would require to be well weighed--there
could not be a doubt but our ships would soon be very superiorly manned
by perfectly trained seamen, who could use cannon, mortars, &c. with
proper effect; and if they were only treated with kindness, which I
have no doubt they would be, and paid fairly and liberally, the navy
would have a most decided advantage over our merchant service, and men
would gladly enter the former in preference to the latter.

A considerable proportion of the crews for the several classes of
ships, should even at the commencement of the system be boys; and it
might naturally be expected, that they would not only grow up in a
complete knowledge of their duties as sailors, but also become, like
soldiers, strongly attached to their officers, in whom they could have
confidence, and from whom they were not, under any circumstances,
to be separated. Of course, such permanent seamen would require
occasionally, and especially after long voyages, to be allowed to
visit their families and friends; leave of absence from their ships,
ought, whenever it was possible, to be liberally granted to them; and
such men, when on shore, would know how to conduct themselves with
propriety; for on board, I should conclude that due attention was paid
to their religious and common education.

But I must not forget that there is one serious objection to this plan
being adopted, however advantageous it might be to the navy, not on
account of its being suggested by a soldier, but it would do away with
much _patronage_, which those in power do not like to relinquish.

Much has been said of the hardships experienced by mates, and the class
of petty officers of the navy in general; but this is a subject into
which I cannot, and ought not, to enter. But let us look a little into
other matters, and try to comprehend what interest it takes, even to
have one's son made a midshipman--then to get a captain to take him
with him for the three years he may be afloat--then another captain
must be found to take him for three years more under his wing, or
else we must have excellent interest indeed, if we can contrive to
get him forward without nursing captains; and all this time we have
been obliged to allow him sufficient for his messing, and to enable
him to appear dressed like an officer and a gentleman. In some ships
this cannot be done under sixty pounds a year. Then he probably comes
home to us a stout light-hearted fellow, who has already passed his
examinations for a lieutenancy, and would give the world to be made
one; but to effect this (for any services he may have performed
are of no importance) takes a vast deal of interest. This at last
accomplished; again patronage is required to get him afloat for some
years longer. But although now an experienced officer, what interest it
must take to have him made a commander. And then how much more to get
him appointed to a ship. In short, nothing but patronage or interest
from beginning to end will answer, or ever did answer in our navy;
and the reader need not therefore be surprised at my feeling next to
hopeless, that all this will ever be overturned, to suit what will no
doubt, be held up to the world as the effusions of a madman. Be this,
however, as it may, (and I leave it to the good sense of the country to
settle the matter with patrons,) a captain now commanding one of our
frigates, in a conversation I had with him on subjects of this kind,
mentioned, that he calculated it would cost him about £1,200., over and
above his pay, &c. to keep his table, and to meet other unavoidable
expenses, and that too, with strict attention to economy, for the
three years he calculated upon being actively employed; and I am aware
that it took a good deal of interest on his part, to get the ship he
now commands.

Our navy, I believe, has but little, if any, fixed system for its
guidance. Every captain of a ship carrying on its duties or discipline,
and managing almost everything according to his own views, or as taught
by experience. Ought this to be permitted, and should not certain
regulations be established to prevent his running into extremes, even
in zeal for the credit of his ship, in appearance, discipline, or even
in points which in themselves may be good, if not carried so far as
to become from their frivolity vexatious to those under his command,
and which I have seen occasion much punishment, which might have
been better avoided. In short, ought a captain not to be restrained
by established system, almost in a similar manner to that by which
I propose to prevent the injurious effects of whim or caprice in
commanding officers of regiments.

I am aware that I must look forward to every possible objection being
thrown in the way of what I have presumed to suggest for the benefit of
both our navy and army; and I fully expect some will say that all this
is very well, but what do you intend to do with the numbers of retired
officers, now on the lists of both services? In the first place, to
expect me to answer every objection is not a little unreasonable; and
in the next, I am convinced it cannot be anticipated, that one-tenth
of such _ancients_ can ever again be called into active service, I
therefore suppose the country must continue, under any circumstances,
to furnish the pittance now doled out to them, as long as most of
them shall live; but even to balance this continued charge upon the
country, and which cannot be avoided, have I not, amongst other items,
shown that we can call out our army, and keep it up hereafter in a
much more efficient state than it ever was, without any expense in
the shape of bounty? Now the bounty for at least 100,000 men, taking
the army in all its branches, at a low establishment, amounts to
something; yet we shall not take this into account, but let us say
(whilst I have no intention of recapitulating all the modes I have
mentioned, by which savings can be effected), that we want annually
20,000 recruits, according to our present system, to keep it up to
its peace establishment, in which calculation I consider that I am
borne out by the returns of the number of men raised for Her Majesty's
service in Great Britain and Ireland. Then suppose that each of these
recruits stands the country in only five pounds (but in time of war
it could not be done for much more) a-head for bounty, &c. we should
thus save something considerable; let this sum be therefore allowed
to go annually towards providing for retired officers, who it may be
apprehended will continue a burden upon the country for a few years
longer. But alas! climate, wounds, &c. under the effects of which many
of these poor but gallant fellows are suffering, will not admit of our
having very long an opportunity of evincing our gratitude to them for
past services.

Colonel Pasley, one of our ablest and most scientific officers, I
believe, about the year 1807, wrote a most useful work, calling the
attention of the country to a plan he proposed for carrying the war,
which had even then been of unusually long duration, into the north
of Europe, where landing an army, it was, as he suggested, to have
proceeded gradually, as joined by the troops which could be assembled
in the countries that lay between the point selected and France,
till Napoleon could be at last assailed upon his own ground. His
work produced a considerable sensation at the time, but Spain and
Portugal, very opportunely, presented themselves to us, and in which
the very game recommended by Colonel Pasley was successfully played.
I hope, therefore, I may be allowed to observe, that it is much to be
regretted, it has not struck Colonel Pasley, that a work coming from
him, elucidating some of the subjects I have reluctantly ventured to
touch upon, especially those connected with Russia, and a new boundary
line for our North American territories, would be well received by
statesmen, military men, and the country in general; all of whom must
allow that an efficient and highly disciplined army and navy are now
wanted by Great Britain, and that no time should be lost in acquiring
them. If these essential objects were once attained, would it not be
wiser for us to look more to our own interests, and with a view to
securing our internal tranquillity and national industry, than to what
we have so little to say to; and would it not be better, if we did not
allow ourselves to be led away and entangled in intricate Russian,
Austrian, and Turkish policy? This ought certainly to be carefully
watched by us; but it should never be permitted so to embarrass us,
as to prevent our being able at all times to direct our attention and
powerful means to objects of much more importance to us as a great
maritime empire, possessing the finest and most valuable colonies in
the world. It is also to be hoped that the brave people of France
and Great Britain have at length seen the madness of having wasted
centuries in unceasing rivalry and jealousy, and likewise the folly
of tearing each other to pieces, to the delight of countries which
would glory in seeing both so humbled as to suit their own boundless
ambitious views. What is Constantinople, and even all Turkey, Egypt,
and such countries, to us, farther than our commercial relations
with them are concerned, in comparison to Great Britain retaining
her superiority upon the ocean, and which pre-eminence was acquired,
in former wars, at the cost of so much blood and treasure, and which
enabled her to extend her enlightening influence, religious and
commercial blessings all over the world. Let Austria and other states,
which must immediately feel the effects of Russian acquisitions of
territory from the Turkish dominions, take measures to guard against
the consequences to arise out of such acquirements, especially as the
aspect of the times most clearly indicates that the very storms, we are
taught to look for, are now gathering in that quarter, and the awful
effects attendant upon their bursting upon the world cannot probably
by any human means be prevented from ever reaching us. Ought not we,
therefore, if possible, to be prepared? Should not Great Britain at
all times look with a jealous eye from her vast Eastern Empire towards
Russia, so as to be ready for such events as may happen? Should not the
question be asked--what has Russia, not a maritime nation, in view, in
forming and keeping up such fleets as we are told she now possesses in
the Baltic and in the Black Sea? For with the numerous and well-trained
armies at her command, she can have nothing to apprehend from her
neighbours, nor from us. Encroachments upon other nations can therefore
be her only object. If Russia will not regard our remonstrances as to
her unnecessary, and to other nations dangerous naval preparations
for war, the safety and honour of Great Britain require, that
such diversions should be made, as must compel her to look to her
own already enormous acquisitions from her weaker neighbours. For
instance, a little assistance from us would soon enable Circassia,
and other countries to the south of Russia, to give ample employment
to her overgrown armies. Poland, if fully assured of aid, from France
especially (for France is as much interested in Russia being kept in
check as we are), could be easily roused at the same time to assert
her freedom, and to revenge her wrongs. It could not be very difficult
to form, under the powerful protection of Great Britain, a coalition
of the Northern States, whose frontiers are now bounded by Russia,
and which only exist as kingdoms through Russian sufferance, with the
view of insuring their independence. Wars thus created, through her
ambition, by exhausting her resources, would effectually put an end to
her power of subjugating other nations; and if the standard of a war
arising out of opinions, which such measures would most likely produce,
was once unfurled in that extensive empire, in which the lofty ideas of
a proud, turbulent and wealthy nobility would to a certainty come into
contact with the hitherto suppressed feelings of millions of enslaved
serfs, there is no possibility of calculating in what such a war might
terminate, for there is no middle class in Russia which could act as a
check to both.

A few of the steam expeditions, which were before alluded to, would
quickly settle such questions, and curtail the deliberations of
diplomatists, and convince the world--that it is both dangerous and
impolitic to rouse Great Britain, or to give her cause of alarm about
the superiority of her navy upon the ocean. "Ships, colonies and
commerce," ought to be inscribed upon the banner of Britain, and our
chief efforts and views, should at all times be directed to these,
to us as a nation, important objects, whilst at the same time every
possible encouragement should be given to our own agriculture; for we
must never depend upon the continent of Europe, or upon any other part
of the world, for _bread_--if we are ever obliged to do so, we must no
more talk or even think of war.

I do not, like some men, look upon history to be as worthless as an old
almanack, for by it we are taught many useful lessons; and whatever
their opinions may be of history, popery, or even of prophecy, I avow
myself to be one of those who attach some importance to what is handed
down to us, especially in Scripture. Yet, without almost touching upon
such subjects, we may find, that a great maritime power will seemingly
soon be required, to act a most prominent part in the world, when
events will undoubtedly occur to command the attention and excite
the fears of mankind in general. As to what power may be intended to
perform this conspicuous part, it would be most presumptuous and even
impious to conjecture; and such is the rapid fall and rise of nations,
that all calculations in this respect must be as vain as unprofitable.

The grand object which ought never for a moment to be lost sight of, is
to have Great Britain ready for coming events. Let her vast resources
be, as far as necessary, called forth in time. Let the attention of
Government be wisely directed to providing such a number of steamers
of all classes, as to render competition on the part of other
countries hopeless; and why might not engagements be entered into with
wealthy companies and individuals, so as to induce them to employ, in
mercantile and other pursuits, steam vessels of such a construction,
that they could, in cases of emergency, be instantly fitted up and
armed with guns of long range for war; for very few, of those now in
use, can be made efficient in this respect. To accomplish this could
not be attended with any great expense to the country, especially if
advantages, as to exemption of vessels so constructed from various
charges, to which all are now liable, are held out to the owners;
and this would make it unnecessary at once to provide such a number
of war-steamers as might otherwise be requisite; and thus Government
could, at any moment, know where to find ships of all classes fit
for immediate service, on board of which, crews, such as I have
ventured to speak of, could be employed with every advantage to the
country. Lastly, let our army be also perfectly organized, and in all
respects prepared for a new and more rapid mode of warfare; and, under
Providence, we may not only be still the most powerful of maritime
nations, but also the means of promoting the tranquillity and happiness
of the world in general.


THE END.


G. NORMAN, PRINTER, MAIDEN LANE, COVENT GARDEN.