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                     _The_ ENGLISH _of_ MILITARY
                            COMMUNICATIONS

                                 _By_
                           WILLIAM A. GANOE
               _Major of Infantry, United States Army_

                    Assistant Professor of English
                    United States Military Academy

                      [Illustration: (colophon)]

                         The Collegiate Press
                   GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING COMPANY
                          MENASHA, WISCONSIN




                           _Copyright, 1918
                                  by
                   George Banta Publishing Company_


                                              PRINTED AND BOUND BY
                                           GEORGE BANTA PUBLISHING CO.
                                            MANUFACTURING PUBLISHERS
                                               MENASHA, WISCONSIN




                               CONTENTS

                                                                  PAGE
  FOREWORD                                                           V

  PREFACE                                                          VII

  CHAPTER I—Our Approach to a Critical Matter                        1

  CHAPTER II—Military Communications                                20

  CHAPTER III—Problems in the Composition of the Field Message      33

  CHAPTER IV—More Problems on the Composition of the Field Message  41

  CHAPTER V—Verbal Field Message                                    49

  CHAPTER VI—The Field Order, The Estimate, The Decision,
       The Expression                                               58

  CHAPTER VII—Problems in the Field Order                           73

  CHAPTER VIII—More Problems of the Composition of the Field Order  93

  CHAPTER IX—The Verbal Field Order                                110

  CHAPTER X—The Operation Order, Orders, Letters of Instruction    124

  CHAPTER XI—The War Diary—The Report—Routine Orders               147

  CHAPTER XII—Official Correspondence—Explanations—Lectures        165

  APPENDICES                                                       187




FOREWORD


It is important in military matters that a writer shall express
definitely the ideas he intends to convey and in such phraseology
that there can be no misunderstanding of the language used.
Carelessly or improperly phrased instructions have caused many
miscarriages of military plans. The attainment of perfection in the
use of language is a matter of painstaking study and the gradual
refinement of practice. Merely dreaming of what one will do when
responsibility is thrust upon him is not the way to prepare for
successful achievement. It is the duty of every self respecting
officer to be ready to do not only his best but to do what is right.

When one has qualified himself to write or dictate orders and
instructions properly he has already learned to interpret those he
may receive from others. Accuracy of language demands discipline
of mind. Under our system of raising war armies much has had to be
entrusted to men without either discipline of mind or of character.
This makes it necessary for officers not only to be qualified
themselves to prepare and to interpret orders, but to teach the art
to others.

Carelessly written instructions are like contoured maps with the base
data omitted, leaving one in doubt as to whether he is observing a
hill or a depression. A recent instance of such carelessness, coming
under my observation, may serve to illustrate this: orders were
received at my headquarters to call out certain reservists for actual
service and direct them to report at Fort Wayne, Indiana. In the
execution of the order individual telegrams were dispatched during
the night. As orders had been received previously to turn over for
the training of such reservists several permanent posts, including
Fort Wayne, near Detroit, Michigan, telegraphic inquiry was made
to find out if a mistake had been made. The reply established that
the Post of Fort Wayne, Michigan, and not the City of Fort Wayne,
Indiana, was intended.

Modern warfare of nations-in-arms is vastly different from the
campaigns and open field fighting of the smaller armies of past
wars. Nations no longer entrust the preparation and solution of
their military problems to old type of practical soldiers. Military
Academies, War Colleges, and General Staff Colleges have become
necessary to insure that only trained men shall be entrusted with the
preparation of instructions for the employment of the forces.

To combine the study of tactical problems, the preparation of orders
and the correct use of language, as contemplated by Major Ganoe, will
afford a great advantage to the student of today, and should make the
diaries, journals, and war histories of the future finished writings
without necessity for editing. These are the true sources of military
history, a knowledge of which is essential to the ambitious officer
desirous of perfecting himself in his profession.

                              (signed)     WILLIAM HARDING CARTER,
                                  _Major General, United States Army_.




PREFACE


This course of lessons has for its sole object a demonstration to
the military man that rhetoric is a big part of his profession. If
he sees this advantage early it is hoped that he will not slight
his rich language as so many of us have done to our later regret.
Vocational training in English! That is practically what this book
is. It is recognizing rhetoric for the first time as a separate study
in the field service regulations. Just as we take up topography,
engineering, sanitation, and supply as sciences by themselves in
order to fit our efficiency into the team work of battle later, so
here we apply ourselves to that part of field work which helps us
state our ideas in a proper military manner.

The course is in no way tactics, but it forms an excellent primer
to tactics. It leads up to and aids in the solution of tactical
problems by passing over military ground. Because it is a combination
of analysis and synthesis, rhetoric, as we know, is, unlike the
exact sciences, purely a secondary subject. Its material, whether
of poetry, essay, or fiction, is indiscriminate in its selection
of matter so long as the matter is good. The idea in this book is
to make both the material and the treatment count—to place the
emphasis upon the manner of expressing oneself and to let the
student see incidentally the interesting military features as he is
passing along. He will be learning what he has never before had the
opportunity of taking up separately, and what will lead him more
easily into intricate tactical paths afterwards.

Some will criticise the book in that the author is not conforming to
the principles which he is enunciating. They will say, “He tells us
to boil our communications to the clearest minimum while he himself
deals in reiteration and illumination.” Although this objection
appears just, it is nevertheless cursory. A closer view will reveal
the fact that the _purpose_ and _readers_ of communications are quite
different from the _purpose_ and _readers_ of a text book. One of
the first principles we learn in rhetoric is to suit our treatment
and diction to our _purpose_ and _readers_. Commanders await with
interest and expectancy the words of a field message or order.
Students await with skepticism or inertia the chapters of their
lessons. Although we rightly can prescribe the severest clearness
for something which is bound to be absorbed, we cannot be satisfied
with one precise, colorless statement of that which is likely to be
ignored. The student must be cudgeled and enticed. As a proof of
the correctness of this position, this course has been tried with
unexpected success upon the Cadets of the United States Military
Academy. The very items which have been repeated and highly colored
have proven themselves to the instructors to be the very ones which
have more easily driven the points home.

Grateful acknowledgment is made by the author to Lieut. Colonel L. H.
Holt, Professor of English and History, who made the book possible;
to Captain G. Hoisington, Infantry, for drawing a plate; to Captains
J. R. N. Weaver, Infantry, R. H. Lee, Coast Artillery Corps, L. E.
Moreton, Coast Artillery Corps, C. C. Benson, Cavalry, and J. H.
Grant, 24th Infantry, for their valuable criticism; and to Major A.
W. Chilton, Infantry, for the revision of the book in order to make
it conform to the practical work passed over—by his disinterested
correction the whole becomes more valuable as a text.

                                                          W. A. G.




CHAPTER I

OUR APPROACH TO A CRITICAL MATTER


All military language should be of the utmost brevity and clarity.
Death and disaster are the direct results of ambiguity. Throughout
all history mistaken directions and information have been the ruin
of whole campaigns. Careless wording, like careless shooting, is not
only ineffective but often suicidal.

The object of these few lessons is to give practice in putting the
language of military communication into form. It is hoped that by
means of certain technical and rhetorical principles the student may
gain proficiency in expressing his thoughts as he intends them and as
military efficiency demands them.

Our Field Service Regulations state that “clear and decisive orders
are the logical result of definite and sure decisions.” But this
statement does _not_ imply that if a person arrives at a definite
and sure decision, he gains clear and decisive phraseology without
effort on his part. General Wagner, a pioneer among American military
authorities, divides into completely separate operations the act
of deciding upon a definite plan of action and that of drafting or
framing orders which will carry that decision into effect. One is
purely military and has to do with dispositions of forces; the other
is mainly rhetorical and has to do with manipulations of language.
Many a military man has decided certainly in his own mind what he
is going to do in order to carry out his mission, only to be faced
immediately with a harder task. He must set that definite idea in
the mind of some one else. “How,” he sighs, “shall I put this so as
to let my Captains, Smith and Jones, know exactly what I want?” He
seats himself on a warm rock under the blazing sun and chews his
pencil. What he at first writes down, he finds, is full of loop-holes
and is not expressive of what he means. He tries again, crosses out
words here and there, adds others, and changes his sentences until
the whole is undecipherable. In disgust he tears up the paper and
tries again. After fifteen minutes of such effort he holds in his
hand a few paragraphs of which he is not proud, but which will have
to do. There has been no want, perhaps, of clear tactical reasoning
on his part, but rather a distinct lack of ability to drive common
English home. His case, we find, is not exceptional. One has only to
listen to the discussions of military beginners (or of some, alas,
who are not military beginners) to hear this statement confirmed. How
often after having given careful or even brilliant estimates of a
situation will a man burst out with, “I know what I mean right here,
but don’t quite know how to say it!” All the way along there has been
a decided blank space between decision in the mind and embodiment in
language.

Whether slang, profanity, or colloquialisms have cut into our
ordinary speech to such an extent as to keep us at a loss for the
apt word, or whether we have grown careless or slovenly in our
habits of expression, is a matter with which we are not concerned
here. We do know that we are continually hampered by our inability
to state absolutely our meaning. This lack of skill in composition
which besets us, we must overcome in our profession, for the sake
of the lives dependent upon our words. Napoleon sitting at his desk
scribbling off orders and messages as fast as his nimble fingers can
travel, his secretaries standing about him grasping each finished
piece from under his pen and sending it off immediately by courier
without revision or correction, is a dazzling picture for the
military leader to contemplate. In his writing, a commander capable
of carrying out single-handed all the phases and minor items of the
mightiest of campaigns could, no doubt, be precise and accurate
habitually. He _was_ a genius. Yet Napoleon had had long years of
practice in putting his will into words; for, we are told, he began
to compose orders and to think tactically and strategically at a
time of life when most of us have not even chosen our careers.
If, then, we can try our hand at transcribing our ideas in as
formative a period as possible in our military careers, we, too,
may attain a proficiency that will become a second nature with us.
At least, we may put behind us a great part of this uninteresting
but indispensable work of learning to control our language, before
we confront the more serious task of straightening out tactical and
strategical difficulties in the presence of the enemy.

Incidentally, while we are on our way in our progress in expression,
we may pick up much valuable military information. In our practice
with tactical language we must make use of certain facts which have
been found by experience appropriate to certain happenings connected
with officers’ and soldiers’ duties. We shall be in constant touch
with the workings of patrols, advance guards, outposts, and forces
in battle. Like so many reporters we shall be present at maneuvers
putting our notes into graphic and specific form.

Now, however, we are going to rivet our attention to the main
issue—the mastery of clear and brief military communication. It has
been mentioned that such ready skill often prevents loss of battles
and human life. It prevents another loss which we have not taken up
separately—the loss of time. The officer who sat chewing his pencil
on the warm rock threw away from ten to twelve minutes which might
have been used profitably upon the accomplishment of his mission—an
amount of time which might have given the very advantage needed to
gain a complete victory over the enemy. If he had had a skilful
working knowledge of his own Mother Tongue, the delay would not have
occurred. His effectiveness was lost for want of power of expression.
To illustrate further, consider for a moment an army post going about
its routine duties of drill, guard, and police. Into the Adjutant’s
office walks an individual who announces himself to be Major Smart
of the Inspector General’s Department. On being introduced to the
Colonel, he identifies himself, and gives immediate orders that the
Colonel shall have his regiment on the parade ground ready for field
service in fifteen minutes. When the troops are formed, the Inspector
rides up to the Colonel, hands him a typewritten tactical problem,
and asks for a solution of it as soon as possible. The Inspector then
takes out his watch and observes. If the Colonel consumes more than
a reasonable number of minutes in writing his orders, or if he shows
a hesitancy in so doing, or if he must seek aid from his Adjutant,
it is surprising to note how soon after Major Smart’s departure from
the post, the Colonel receives a letter from Washington apprising him
of his shortcomings, and recommending, for his own good, a speedy
remedy. Because of the inroads upon efficiency, the War Department,
like any good business firm, cannot brook vacillation or unwarranted
loss of time.

We must, then, adopt some method or procedure by which we will
effectually beat down the causes of this loss of time, battles, and
life. After analysing past proficiencies and deficiencies in military
communication, we spy out from all the roads to the goal open to us,
two which appear to be shorter than the rest. If we guide ourselves
along these we shall come upon our object in the quickest way. Since
the first leads into the second, they are given here in order. We
should strive: (1) To learn to find quickly expressions which will
cover information and decisions that are trying to struggle into
language; and (2) To plant that information and decision into the
recipient’s understanding exactly as it was rooted in our minds.

_The first process is that of defining thoughts exactly and briefly._

_The second process is that of making those thoughts so unmistakable
that the most stupid cannot misunderstand and the most captious
cannot misinterpret._

After we have done the first, we should look over our work and be
certain that we have done the second.

The first has to do with the kind of situation that faced the man
who knew what he “wanted to say but couldn’t express himself.” Some
authorities argue that there is no difference between clear thinking
and clear expression. They give no place to the “mute inglorious
Milton.” They would not concede that the man groping for language
had formed a definite plan in his mind, because that plan was not
definite enough to be expressed. “If he has not thought in language,”
they say, “he has not really thought.” Their opponents claim that a
man thinks in pictures, and that he conceives his ideas as a painter
imagines objects. In his mind are the outlines and colors of what
he considers. There is truth in both views of the matter. But it is
likely from what we know of the training of the military man that his
mind works more by visualizing the troops and by conjuring up the
scene than by gaining his conceptions through words. His forces are
moving along roads, occupying trenches, or surging into conflict.
His map is not a plane surface with names upon it, but a vision of
highways, waving corps, and rolling hills. He is looking at these
things without mentally describing them. For the purpose of this
course, we shall take the view that there are occasions where we
deduce certain results, but are unable, because of unfamiliarity
with framing good sentences or because of a small vocabulary, to
communicate those results or deductions in accordance with common
usage.

The second road can be illustrated by comparison with the first.
There is a wide difference, although at first there does not
appear to be, between merely stating a thing clearly and making
it unmistakable. The first is but a negative approach to complete
certainty of expression, but the second must be a positive one. The
distinction is one more or less of attitude of mind, and although
heretofore it has been overlooked as an entity in English text
books and military regulations, it assuredly illustrates itself in
two types of men who actually exist. The man who is content with
merely making himself clear takes the attitude of, “O, well, they
will get what I meant because any other interpretation is absurd
or incorrect.” The man who is not content unless he makes himself
unmistakable says, “I won’t let any of them have the slightest
excuse for any other interpretation; when I get through there will
be but _one_ interpretation and that will be _mine_.” The first one
in sending a message to his commanding officer locates himself by
putting in his heading, “Irrigation ditch 500 yards east of southeast
corner of Catholic Church.” He notices another irrigation ditch fifty
yards further to the east, but says to himself, “If my commanding
officer measures the distance on the map he will know which one I
mean.” The second man, upon looking about him and discovering the
other ditch, does not accept the chance of letting his commanding
officer confuse the two ditches by a possible difference of maps
or measuring instruments. He investigates further. By moving a few
yards to the top of a hillock he notices that the farther ditch
is entirely a dirt construction whereas the one he occupies is a
concrete one. He confirms this intelligence by looking at his map
which shows the ditches to be as he has made them out. He, therefore,
heads his message, “Concrete irrigation ditch 500 yards east of
southeast corner of Catholic Church.” This is a case where an added
word has made the meaning more proof against error. There are similar
cases where a word taken away, or the change of a phrase, clause, or
sentence, will make the recipient of the communication more sure of
the true state of affairs.

To sum up as far as we have gone, we see that our object is to put
military communication into proper form; that the failure to make
our expression of the utmost brevity and clarity causes loss of
efficiency, battles, and life; that a condition of inability to
express ourselves exists widely; that by starting as early as we can
to practice clear and brief form within the bounds of rhetorical
and military rules (which, after all, are nothing more than those
of common sense), we shall overcome this deficiency; and that for
ourselves we are going to direct our course along two highways, viz.:

(1) To learn to find quickly expressions which will cover information
and decisions that are trying to struggle into language; and

(2) To plant that information or decision in the recipient’s
understanding exactly as it was rooted in our minds.

We have, so far, rehearsed the general attitude we must adopt toward
conquering indefinite and lengthy expression. Because this weakness
is so natural to us, we cannot afford to trifle with it if we wish
to become a factor in battle. Positive decisions and information
must be given in a positive way. Since no other kind of decision or
information is countenanced in the military service, we must search
for specific means of having our language stand sturdily by itself.

It must not choke our idea or our will, however little. Our
decisiveness must reach our farthest superior or subordinate; and
_words_, _phrases_, _clauses_, _sentences_, and _paragraphs_ are
going to be our only representatives. They alone will stand for us.
Every pencil mark on that paper will be a part of the photograph of
our intelligence. Our phraseology will be ourselves. We shall be
judged by it, and rightly so, at a time when we shall have no chance
to offer an amendment, an excuse, or an _I-didn’t-mean-quite-that_.

Guide-posts must mark our highways, if we are in earnest about our
destination of brevity and clarity. In the specific hints which
follow as to what to do and what not to do, there will be no attempt
to point the way to literary effects which have entertainment for
their sole object. Our effort must be to find a practical and speedy
outlet for military information and decision through the most
unmistakable channels. But since we must be terse and clear even to
entertain, most of the rules of English will apply here. So we must
not betray surprise or anguish when we are beset on our way by some
old enemies with whom we have wrestled in rhetorics. In meeting them
again we shall become the stronger because of the exercise on new
and professional ground. The effort to put facts into forceful and
compact form now, will create for us such a habit of brevity and
clarity that later on we shall have room in our natural language for
only such _ideas_ and _decisions_ as are brief and clear.


WHAT WE MUST NOT DO

AS TO WORDS.

1. Never use a term which depends upon the point of view of the
observer, such as _right_, _left_, _in front of_, _behind_, _on this
side_, _beyond_, and the like. Any of these directions may be turned
askew in nine cases out of ten for the hearer or reader. Use instead
_north_, _east_, etc.—the points of the compass—designations which do
not change. To give an exact position of a place, state the _number
of yards_ it lies _south_, _west_, etc., of a certain point on the
map or of a well-known object called _a reference point_.

Exceptions.—_Right_ and _left_ may be used in regard to individuals,
banks of a stream, and flanks of troops, because their _rights_ and
_lefts_ do not change. The right of a man is the side on which his
right arm is no matter which way he faces; the right bank of a stream
is the right as the observer faces down stream; the right flank of
a body of troops is the right as the troops face the enemy. (Troops
in retreat are supposed to be facing the enemy. The rear guard in
reality is doing so.)

2. Do not use qualifying words such as, _sort of_, _kind of_, _very_,
_almost_, _quite_, _exceedingly_, _tremendously_, _somewhat_,
_rather_, _nearly_, and the like;

For,

(a). They lessen force, because they render uncertain ideas which
should be definite; and

(b). They mean different things to different people. Smith’s _almost_
may achieve; Jones’ _almost_ may scarcely start.

3. Do not use slang. There is usually a word which will express the
meaning more truthfully. “Putting it over” may mean complete victory
or a sniper’s accurate shot. The phrase is not truthful.

4. Use no abbreviations except A. M., and P. M., and those given in
Appendix 9 of our Field Service Regulations.[1] Noon and midnight
should be written out fully.

5. Never use _he_, _it_, _this_, _him_, _her_, _their_, _them_,
_that_, _those_, _which_, _whose_, or the like, without looking at
them from every angle to make sure that they refer to a _single
word_. If they refer to a whole statement or to two or more possible
words, they are used wrongly. The addition of a noun will usually fix
the meaning. Suppose you were to receive a message with this sentence
in it:

  The platoon leader assigned to one squad the wrong objective, and
  it delayed the firing.

Grammatically, the objective delayed the firing. Logically, either
the act of the platoon leader or the squad delayed the firing. You
make out by re-reading the whole message that it must have been the
mistake of the platoon leader which delayed the firing. But in the
meantime you have lost three minutes, and the government has lost
that much efficiency.

_And this_ or _which_ in place of “_and it_” in the message would
have made the sense no clearer. But _and this error_, or _which
error_, makes the meaning unmistakable.

6. Never use a participle without inspecting it to see that it does
not dangle—that it refers to the subject of the sentence rightly.
Example:

  “Looking over the crater, the periscope of the enemy was seen to
  turn.”

What this sentence really says is that the periscope was looking
over the crater—a very possible happening. But all circumstances
connected with the idea, after a series of mental deductions on the
part of the reader, reveal that the writer had been looking over the
crater at the periscope. The commander who received this information
might have been led to believe that the periscope was situated in the
crater. At least he was delayed, if not misled.

7. Do not use _and_ except where necessary. Usually, when we connect
clauses with it, we do not mean _and_, but some more expressive word
such as _because_, _whereas_, _when_, etc.

8. Do not use any word which might not mean the same thing to any
probable recipients, or might not commonly be understood. For
instance, to a southerner _evening_ means something different from
its significance to a northerner, and to an Englishman _clever_ has
not the American meaning. Watch the words which have local standards.


AS TO PHRASES AND CLAUSES.

1. Do not allow a phrase or a clause to string out your expression
when one word might answer. Boil your communication to the clearest
minimum.

  (a). We went back to headquarters with all possible speed. We
  hurried to headquarters.

Here the specific verb _hurried_ does away with your phrase _with all
possible speed_.

  (b). When we were present in the cantonment, the soldiers looked as
  though they were quite hungry.

  Our inspection of the cantonment revealed the soldiers to be hungry.

Here _our inspection_ does away with the clause _when we were
present_; and _to be hungry_ does away with _as though they were
quite hungry_.

This error of spreading words is common to ordinary writers and is
most tiring and time-wasting to readers.

2. Do not omit words from your phrases and clauses where there is a
chance for misunderstanding. Examples:

  The detachment commander will be with the main body until 7 a. m.
  and thereafter the advance guard.

What is really stated is that the advance guard will be with the main
body after 7 a. m.—an unintended statement. Make your grammar accord
absolutely with your meaning. Add the _with_ which belongs before
_the advance_, and notice how the sense is brought out. Again,

  They order us to go to Brownsville and do impossible things.

In this sentence do they order us to do impossible things, or do they
themselves do impossible things?

Add the sign of the infinitive where it belongs before _do_. _And to
do impossible things_ reads unmistakably.

3. Do not use a participial phrase without first inspecting it to see
that it holds but one idea.

  Having changed our position, the enemy was confused.

What this sentence really says is that the enemy, when he had changed
our position, was confused. This meaning is evidently not intended
from the very nature of the statement.

It is clearer and more accurate to use a finite form of the verb
instead of the participle; as,—

  Because we changed our position we confused the enemy.

Or if you can condense with accuracy,

  The change in our position confused the enemy.


AS TO SENTENCES.

1. Avoid long involved sentences. Even if they are grammatically
well constructed, they are liable to rhetorical error. The following
sentence because of its length violates unity:

  “The organization of the German army is today well known to
  American Army officers, and experience has shown that German
  problems and solutions of a complex character changed in
  translation to conform to American units are often more troublesome
  for the student to understand than the original would be, as, on
  account of the difference in the size of the units, it is often
  necessary in reading such a translation to go back to the German
  organization in order to explain a distribution of troops, which,
  though simple for a German division, would be an awkward one for a
  division organized after our own Field Service Regulations.”

The first thought given to the reader is that “the organization of
the German army is today well known to American Army officers.”
The last thought of the sentence is that the “explanation of a
distribution of troops would be an awkward one for a division
organized after our own Field Service Regulations.” The path from the
first thought to the second is long and winding. In fact the two do
not belong in the same sentence as the sense stands.

With a simple change we can make the whole easier to read:

  The organization of the German army is today well known to American
  Army officers. Their experience has shown that German problems and
  solutions of a complex character changed in translation to conform
  to American units are often more troublesome for the student to
  understand than the original would be. On account of the difference
  in the size of the units, it is often necessary in reading such
  a translation to go back to the German organization in order to
  explain a distribution of troops, which, though simple for a German
  division, would be an awkward one for a division organized after
  our own Field Service Regulations.

The reader has been allowed to take in a thought at a time instead of
three thoughts at once.

In spite of the injunction in our Field Service Regulations that
“short sentences are easily understood,” such long and involved
expressions as the above have abounded among military writers.
In war, this continuous motion in a single sentence has marred
undertakings; in peace, it has robbed efficiency. It has been an
incubus upon general orders, and even communications in the field.

CAUTION.—By short sentences we do not mean choppy sentences—sentences
unnecessarily short as,—

  The battalion halted for the night. It ate supper. Then the
  battalion relieved the outpost.

Here the reader has been stopped when he should have been kept going,
for there is in reality but one thought in the three separate
sentences. They should be combined into some such form as this,—

  After the battalion had halted for the night and had eaten supper,
  it relieved the outpost.

The proper relation of ideas is here expressed for the reader. He
knows that the relief of the outpost is the main consideration,
depending in point of time upon the halt and supper. And the whole
thought is not too big for him to take in as he reads.

The first error, illustrated by the sentence concerning German
organization, is a fault common to older writers. They have allowed
themselves to grow into the habit of adding qualifying phrases and
clauses to sentences already completed until their additions come to
swamp the originals. The second error, illustrated by the sentence
concerning the battalion relieving the outpost, is a fault common
to young writers. They have not yet formed the habit of relating in
their own minds the separate ideas of a complete thought.

The happy mean between these two indefinite extremes is the one we
wish to find—the sentence that gives speedy and accurate intelligence.

2. Do not use compound sentences containing _and_, save where they
cannot be avoided. Here is a common piece of slovenliness found in
such a construction.—

  The wagon trains pulled out and the troops ate breakfast.

Any one of the following is more definite.

  After the wagon trains pulled out the troops ate breakfast.

  The wagon trains pulled out before the troops ate breakfast.

  As the wagon trains pulled out the troops ate breakfast.

The writer in the first instance was too lazy or stupid to think out
the specific meaning of _and_ for the reader.

Remember, also, that the use of _and_ to connect clauses leads us
into the treacherous “run-on sentences”—the sentence that flits from
subject to subject like an old gossip.

  “They fell into the trap and so the commanding officer’s orders
  were lost and they remained there twenty days and were finally
  removed to a prison camp and there winter soon came on and finally
  they were released and went home in the spring.”

The sentence, in addition to having too many ideas in it, has them
unrelated.


WHAT WE MUST DO

AS TO WORDS.

1. Every geographical name must be printed in capitals, thus,—

WEST POINT, MARNE RIVER, PARIS.

This rule does not mean that the names must be printed, merely, but
that every letter must be capitalized legibly.

If the place be not pronounced as it is spelled, it should appear
thus,—XENIA (Zē′-nĭ-ä), POUGHKEEPSIE (Pṓ-kĭp′-sĭ), CHIHUAHUA
(Chḗ-wä′-wä).

A road must be designated by enough points to make it unmistakable
along the entire course considered; thus:—

BIGLERVILLE—582—CENTER MILLS. (See map, A-8 and 7.) The 582 inserted
in this case keeps the course from being confused with the turn-off
toward GUERNSEY. If the course were intended to lie through GUERNSEY,
the road would appear thus,—

BIGLERVILLE—GUERNSEY—CENTER MILLS.

2. Use the words of one syllable preferably. You will find that the
longer words come to you more readily but are usually more hazy in
meaning. You will gain vigor and clearness by the cultivation of
Anglo-Saxon.

3. Do not connect two sentences by a comma; for example:—

  The phrase does not imply motion, thus it would mean nothing to say
  that the battery is advancing on the line Twins-Concrete Ford.

The error here is not so much one of punctuation as of sentence
idea. Somehow, the thought does not run smoothly. We find that two
separate thoughts without much relationship have been compressed into
a single sentence—into something which should be a complete whole,
and go from capital to period without break. Oftentimes, by showing
this relationship, we may bring the idea within bounds of a single
sentence; for example:—

  Since the phrase does not imply motion, it would mean nothing to
  say that the battery is advancing on the line, etc.

4. Watch the position of your adverbs. When you mean,—

  We captured almost all the ammunition,

Do not say,—

  We almost captured all the ammunition.

The first means that we captured at least a part of the ammunition;
the second means that we were close to success, but failed to capture
ammunition.

5. Use the words _head_ and _tail_ when speaking of a column of
troops. The head is the leading element and the tail is the other
end, no matter in which direction the column happens to be facing.

6. In the newspaper or book that you are reading, every time you meet
a new word make it yours. Look up the meaning in the dictionary until
you are sure that you know how to use the word.

At the first opportunity, employ it in your conversation or writing.
Sooner or later “dope” and the eternal “damn” will have ceased to
fill in endless crevices in your talk and their places will have
been taken by incisive words. You will awake to find that you are
expressing yourself more easily and plainly. On the other hand, every
word you pass over or for which you merely consult the dictionary,
is a tool cast aside in your building of an officer. Every bit of
slang or profanity which now crowds out the appropriate word will
later rise up and clog your thought at a time when you are making
your utmost endeavor to put into clear, forceful English your plan of
action or your order.


AS TO PHRASES AND CLAUSES.

Remember to place phrases and clauses nearest the words they modify.

  Captain George will divide the tools equally among the battalions
  _which are fit for felling timber_.

The change of the italicized clause to its proper position next the
word _tools_, gives the intended meaning.


AS TO SENTENCES.

1. Use the short complex sentence; such as:—

  An attack is expected tomorrow from strong hostile forces whose
  advanced troops are near FORT MONTGOMERY.

  The enemy’s infantry disappeared to the south as soon as our
  advance cavalry came over the hill.

The use of _when_, _since_, _because_, _where_, _whenever_,
_although_, _after_, _till_, _until_, _as_, _so long as_, _now
that_, _whence_, _whither_, _inasmuch as_, _that_, _in order that_,
_so that_, and _lest_, with the finite form of the verb is a good
construction to practice.

Notice how compact and explicit is the following:—

  Lest the enemy should turn your flank, keep veering to the east.

Try to put this same thought into twelve words by means of a
different construction.

2. When you start with one kind of construction, keep it up unless
there be some good reason to change it. If you begin with the past
tense and third person, have the past tense and third person continue
throughout the sentence or sentences.

  It is reported that extensive preparations are being made in the
  vicinity of CAMBRAI and the enemy has stored railroad material
  there.

  It is reported that the enemy has made extensive preparations at
  CAMBRAI and has stored railroad material there.

Which sentence reads along with less break?

Again,

  It is advisable to advance part of the ammunition columns and that
  the division should follow at 200 yards.

Better,

  It is advisable to advance part of the ammunition columns and to
  have the division follow at 200 yards.

Now that specific guides have been posted near the grammatical turns
of the road, let us look at two general rules covering everything we
do.

1. _Write legibly._—Rain, wear in the pocket, dim and fading lights,
and crumpled paper are going to make havoc of your orders and
messages in war time. Your commanding officer must be able to make
out your script as well as your meaning. Now is the moment to make
your handwriting a size or two larger and noticeably plainer.

2. _Inspect the form._ After you have written your ideas legibly,
_look at them searchingly to see that they mean only what you intend_.

You cannot be too cold-blooded about this act for two reasons.

In the first place, there is a habit which is strong upon us. We
have all been too prone to state a thing haphazardly, and then to
exclaim, “You know what I mean!” The person addressed, of course, is
not going to acknowledge that he has not the brains to understand; so
the jumble is never smoothed out. Thus in nine-tenths of our off-hand
moments we have been accustomed to say what we do _not_ mean. The
habit is so strong that when we find ourselves dealing with matters
of life and death, we are still liable to whisper to ourselves,
“O, well, he’ll get it.” The result is that the part of the order,
message, or report, which struck us as having our usual clearness,
is a puzzle to the recipient.

In the second place, the impression has grown up in the minds of many
that substance, no matter how it is mixed, is all that is necessary.
There has come about a certain proud disregard of the _manner_ in
which a thing is expressed. Too many technical books have failed of
their purpose because the writer, although he was an expert in his
line, did not know how to present his subject in an attractive form.
In the same way explanations have failed upon the drill ground, and
lectures have made excellent tacticians appear like school-boys. The
very manner of communication has not only spoiled the taste for the
subject matter but has hindered its absorption. His audience has not
understood his explanation.

In inspecting your work, take the attitude that the recipient is
skeptical of everything you have said.

       *       *       *       *       *

It is assumed that you wish to fasten in your mind everything in this
chapter. The following method is suggested as the best short-cut:

1. Make an outline of the whole chapter, expressing the main idea of
each paragraph and sub-paragraph in two or three words.

2. Close your books.

3. With the aid of your outline see whether you can call to your mind
everything the paragraph or sub-paragraph means.




CHAPTER II

MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS


The following are the various types of military communication:

FIELD MESSAGES convey verbal or written information by messenger or
wire.

REPORTS are written accounts of some enterprise, undertaking, or
event, such as a reconnaissance, march, or battle.

WAR DIARIES are daily records of events kept during campaign by each
battalion and higher organization. From the entries in these diaries
the facts of our military history are obtained.

LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION, issued by higher commanders, regulate in a
general way movements covering much time and space. Army and Corps
commanders may, by visits and conferences, often communicate verbally
the substance of letters of instruction.

FIELD ORDERS, issued verbally or in writing by commanders of tactical
units, regulate the tactical actions of troops, and such strategical
actions as are not covered by letters of instruction.

GENERAL ORDERS are written directions having to do with the general
administration of a command. They contain the necessary details
for carrying out injunctions from higher authority, for keeping up
standing instructions, and for publishing results of special and
general courts-martial.

ORDERS (when not used as a general term) refer to the instructions
communicated to troops by commanders of divisions and of separate
brigades in regard to combat, field, ammunition, supply, sanitary,
and engineer trains.

SPECIAL ORDERS cover such matters in regard to individuals as are not
necessary to be communicated to the entire command.

OPERATION ORDERS, as we now use the term in reference to trench
warfare, are the orders governing a certain enterprise along a given
sector of the front. Although they are even more precise than field
orders, they contain more details on account of the wide difference
between trench and open warfare.

CIRCULARS are printed from time to time by various bureaus and
departments of the War Department, and by purchasing officers, for
the publication of data pertaining to the business of a bureau or
department.

BULLETINS publish, usually in pamphlet form, information for the
military service.

Both _circulars_ and _bulletins_ have the force of orders.

MEMORANDA are published from time to time by commanding officers to
embody directions not vital or sweeping enough for general or special
orders. _Memoranda_ have the force of orders.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE consists of official letters, returns, rolls,
estimates, requisitions, and certain routine reports.

These types of communication have been defined in order to give a
general survey of the many kinds of written and oral expression of
which military men should become masters. Although the task appears
huge, proficiency can be gained by attention to the hints suggested
in Chapter I.

In order to apply those suggestions in a practical way, we must
now sort out from all of the above types those which should press
themselves most upon our attention. Certainly all these types cannot
be equally necessary for our immediate study. Possibly if we classify
them from the point of view of the occasion for their use, we may see
more clearly how to treat them.


CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO STRESS

  MESSAGE           }  Communicated usually in the presence
  FIELD ORDERS      }    of the enemy under stress.
  OPERATION ORDERS  }

  ORDERS—Written often in the presence of the enemy under stress.

  LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION—Written under stress, but with more or less
  leisure.

  WAR DIARIES—Written under stress, but at any time, during
  twenty-four hours.

  REPORTS—Written during campaign or peace at comparative leisure.

  GENERAL ORDERS    }
  SPECIAL ORDERS    }
  CIRCULARS         }  Written during campaign or peace
  BULLETINS         }    concerning subjects of a routine
  MEMORANDA         }    nature.
  CORRESPONDENCE    }
  EXPLANATIONS      }
  LECTURES          }

It is evident that we are going to have to write messages, field
orders, and operation orders when the enemy is upon us, and when
every second is vital. If we must stop in that crisis and putter
over the forms and methods of drafting our thoughts, how useless we
shall be! When that time comes, one thing alone should occupy our
conscious thought—our military idea. That will be sufficient to keep
busy the most brilliant intellect.

In order that we shall have, then, perfect freedom to grapple with
tactical, strategical, or logistical difficulties on the field of
battle, let us learn the forms and methods of messages, field orders,
and operation orders as soon as possible.

In so doing we shall discover two things,—

(1) That messages, field orders, and operation orders have a bearing
upon each other in the sequence given, and

(2) That the work of framing them will give us the greatest possible
practice in writing all other types of communication.

THE MESSAGE.—The general term _message_ may refer to (1) any informal
or short communication, (2) any directions or orders too abbreviated
to be known as field orders, or (3) any piece of information
transmitted in the presence of the enemy.

Number 1 is too broad for treatment here. Moreover, the ready skill
in composing anything of its nature should follow easily from what we
are about to practice.

Number 2 is to be considered in connection with field orders.

Number 3, then, is the important one for us to take up now. From its
definition it is already familiar to us as


THE FIELD MESSAGE

Since it deals entirely with the communication of information, it
might be well to inquire from what sources this information is to
be derived, in order that we may know something about the kind of
material with which we are going to deal. Just as a stenographer
acquaints herself with some of the workings of her employer’s
business in order to attain the greatest amount of usefulness, so we
should now look over the vast amount of territory which the contents
of field messages cover in order to gain the maximum efficiency in
composing these communications. Accordingly, we find that higher
commanders, adjoining troops, inhabitants of the country, newspapers,
letters, telegraph files, prisoners, deserters, spies, maps, and
reconnaissances, are all sources of valuable military information. It
is from these that we shall obtain our data.

Most of all, however, will the fighting man obtain his from
reconnaissance—the work of gathering information in the field.
From the moment of entering the theatre of operations to that of
abandoning it, there is necessary a constant quest of knowledge
of the enemy’s composition, morale, material, disposition, and
activities. No leader can act intelligently without this information,
and, since he cannot hope to get it in person, he must depend for its
acquisition upon certain reconnaissance units, chief of which is the
patrol.

Our concern with these reconnaissance units lies in the fact that
the information which they gather must be sent to the commander
by messages. If no one in the patrol is capable of sending back
accurate and timely written information, the reconnaissance has
failed, and the patrol might as well have remained in camp. The good
field message is the strong link between the reconnoitering party
and the main body. The poor field message is a gap which no amount
of courageous effort in ferreting out facts from a wary enemy will
bridge. The ideal reconnaissance, then, is one which keeps a constant
stream of accurate and reliable messages flowing back to the proper
recipient.

The main factors which go to make up accuracy and reliability of
field messages are keen observation and faithful expression. Both of
these faculties can be cultivated, and indeed are so closely allied
that they ought to be considered together. It is quite difficult
at times to tell where one leaves off and the other begins. If a
man puts in his message, “The enemy was seen over the hill,” and
another, witnessing the same occurrence, states that “seven hostile
infantrymen lay down on the military crest of hill 307 at 4-17
p. m.,” which one has keenly observed? Which one has faithfully
expressed himself? Is it possible that the first man did not see any
of the details of the second message? Or did he fail to put them down
faithfully? In whatever way we answer these questions, we are brought
to the realization that the second man applied both faculties to an
equal extent. And, therefore, we are led to the conclusion that from
the standpoint of complete expression we must take things quickly,
precisely, and accurately, and put them out certainly, specifically,
concretely, unmistakably, and faithfully.

The field message is not used by the reconnaissance unit exclusively.
An exchange of communications might be necessary between commanders
to tell of changing conditions. The enemy has developed an unexpected
attack, reinforcements are urgently needed, etc. This message will
differ slightly in form from the ordinary field message which will be
analysed below, but it will be of the same essential type, and will
make the same demands upon brevity and clearness.


FORMS FOR FIELD MESSAGES

The Infantry Drill Regulations state that “the authorized message
book should be used and the form therein adhered to.” This book,
issued by the Signal Corps, contains fifty message blanks with fifty
duplicating sheets, so that fifty messages may be sent and a copy of
each retained. The front of the blank appears as on next page.

The back of the blank is divided into squares. By means of a ratio
between the size of these squares and certain scales for maps, a
fairly accurate sketch is possible.


_Caution._

Remember that a message may not always go direct from sender
to receiver, but may be relayed by several methods of
communications—buzzer, helio, or flag. Think how errors may creep
in at each change of method, and guard against them by making your
message one of telegraphic brevity and unmistakable clearness.

  +------------------------+----+--------+-----+---------+-----+-------+
  |                        | No.| Sent by| Time| Rec’d by| Time| Check |
  |    =U. S. ARMY FIELD   |    |        |     |         |     |       |
  |         MESSAGE.=      |    |        |     |         |     |       |
  |                        | (These spaces for Signal Operators only.) |
  +------------------------+-------------------------------------------+
  |      Communicated by   |        (Name of sending detachment.)      |
  | Buzzer, Phone,         |                                           |
  | Telegraph, Wireless,   |                                           |
  | Lantern, Helio, Flag,  | _From_................................... |
  | Cyclist, Foot          |       (Location of sending detachment)    |
  | Messenger, Mounted     |                                           |
  | Messenger, Motor Car,  | _At_..................................... |
  | Flying Machine.        |                                           |
  |                        |                                           |
  | Underscore means used. | _Date_........... _Hour_........ _No_.... |
  +------------------------+                                           |
  | _To_.............................................................. |
  | .................................................................. |
  | .................................................................. |
  | .................................................................. |
  | .................................................................. |
  | .................................................................. |
  | _Received_........................................................ |
  +--------------------------------------------------------------------+

By means of this sketch, the message may often be shortened, for the
sender can refer by letter or number to various points on the sketch,
whereas he would otherwise be compelled to describe positions or to
go into detail at length. When he does draw a sketch, he should refer
to it somewhere on the bottom of the face of the message thus: (See
sketch over) or (See sketch reverse side).

The sketch is not usually duplicated.

The reverse side of the message blank appears thus:

[Illustration: (grid of 25x35 squares)

  _Scale of Sketch_ ... _ins. = 1 mile._

  _When scale is 6 ins. = 1 mile, each small square is 50 yards._

  _When 3 ins. = 1 mile, each one is 100 yards._

  _When 6 ins. = 1 mile, V.I. = 10 ft. When 3 ins. = 1 mile, V.I. =
  20 ft._]

The form of address of the regulation envelope for this message
appears below. It is probably best explained by an extract from
paragraph 36, Field Service Regulations, which reads as follows:
“Messages carried by a messenger are usually enclosed in envelopes
properly addressed. The envelope when not marked ‘confidential’
is left unsealed, so that commanders along the line of march may
read the contents. Upon the envelope is written the name of the
messenger, his time of departure, and rate of speed. The last is
indicated as follows: Ordinary, rapid, or urgent. Ordinary means five
miles an hour for a mounted man; rapid, about 7 or 8 miles an hour;
and urgent, the highest speed consistent with certainty of arrival
at destination. The recipient notes the time of receipt upon the
envelope and returns the latter to bearer.”


UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD MESSAGE

  _To_..................................... _No_...........
                          (For signal operator only.)

  -----------------------------------------------------------
  _When sent_.............................. _No_...........

  _Rate of speed_..........................................

  _Name of Messenger_......................................

  _When and by whom rec’d_.................................

       =This Envelope Will Be Returned to Bearer=

We should certainly be armed with a Field Message Book when the
crucial moment for writing a message arrives. But it so happens,
especially in open warfare, that that article of equipment may have
been left in the saddlebags, or have been borrowed by a friend. At
any rate it is not present for duty when we want it. However, we
are always able to produce a piece of paper or clothing—something
upon which to write—from someone of the party present. It behooves
us, then, to learn to compose a message without the aid of a blank.
Indeed, this idea is contained in the latter part of the quotation
from the Infantry Drill Regulations—“and the form therein adhered
to.”

We are not compelled to memorize the form of the Field Message Blank.
We can, however, analyse it so that it will fix itself in our memory
and will be a part of what we must know in regard to the field order.
And we can gain a knowledge of this form rather by adhering to the
field message blank than by departing from it. Yet we need not know
its entire form but simply what contents are necessary and what order
they must have.

In the first place the field message may be divided into three parts:

  THE HEADING,
  THE BODY,
  THE ENDING.

THE HEADING should contain:

  THE NAME OF SENDING DETACHMENT,
  THE LOCATION OF SENDING DETACHMENT (PLACE),
  THE DATE,
  THE HOUR OF ISSUE,
  THE NUMBER OF THE MESSAGE.

For example, the whole heading would appear something like this:

                    Combat Patrol, 318th Infantry,

  Cross Roads 500 yds. south of CLINTON SCHOOL HOUSE.

  No. 3.          9 Jan. 18.          9-45 p. m.

Location of sending detachment means the _exact spot_ upon which
sender is located at time of writing.

The date should be given always as above in the sequence, day, month,
year. This combination prevents the numerals from being confused. In
naming a night both days should be mentioned thus: Night 4/5 Feb. 18.

The time should always have the dash between the hour and minutes.

Messages sent on the same day from the same sending detachment are
numbered consecutively. Each day or each mission starts a new series.

If a map referred to is not the one on the reverse side of the
message, the sender should designate the name or number of the map
used, immediately below the number of the message.

THE BODY of the message contains the following:

  TO WHOM SENT,
  THE BODY PROPER.

THE BODY PROPER has the following sequence for its information:

  1. ENEMY.
  2. YOUR OWN TROOPS.
  3. TERRAIN.
  4. YOUR PLAN.

The body then would appear something like this:

  “To Commanding Officer, Advance Guard, 71st Brigade:

  Squadron of enemy’s cavalry encamped in meadow 600 yards southeast
  of here. Our officer’s patrol, which we met at ZION CHURCH at
  8-10 a. m., reported two regiments enemy’s infantry intrenched at
  railroad one mile south of here. Tail of our second battalion at
  PARKSBURG steel bridge 7-20 a. m. Battalion was marching south.
  MARTIN’S CREEK unfordable at any point between SMITH’S CORNERS and
  GREENSBURG. Will move southeast from here along creek bed in order
  to complete mission.”

On account of lack of space, paragraphing is impossible: but if this
sequence is followed the thought is easily gained. If some one of our
own troops tells us concerning the enemy, this information should
come between 1 and 2, and should be definitely shown to be hearsay
and not our own observation.

Of course, all of the parts, 1, 2, 3, and 4, do not always occur. The
order is nevertheless followed.

THE ENDING consists of

  THE SIGNATURE

which, in turn, consists of the sender’s surname and his rank, thus,

                                                        FLETCHER,
                                                                  SGT.

The outline of the whole message construction, then, would be as
follows:—

               { 1. Name of sending detachment.
               { 2. Location of sending detachment (place).
  THE HEADING  { 3. The Date.
               { 4. The Hour of Issue.
               { 5. The Number of the Message.

                                     { 1. Enemy.
               { 1. To whom sent.    { 2. Your own troops.
  THE BODY     { 2. The body proper. { 3. Terrain.
                                     { 4. Your plan.

  THE ENDING—THE SIGNATURE           { 1. Surname.
                                     { 2. Rank.

The message we have composed, when assembled, would appear as follows:

                    Combat Patrol, 318th Infantry,

  Cross Roads 500 yds. south of CLINTON SCHOOL HOUSE.

  No. 3.          9 Jan. 18.         9-45 a. m.

  To Commanding Officer Advance Guard, 71st Brigade:

  Squadron of enemy’s Cavalry encamped in meadow 600 yards southeast
  of here. Our officer’s patrol, which we met at ZION CHURCH at 8-10
  a. m., reported two regiments enemy’s infantry intrenched at
  railroad one mile south of here. Tail of our second battalion at
  PARKSBURG steel bridge 7-20 a. m. Battalion was marching south.
  MARTIN’S CREEK unfordable at any point between SMITH’S CORNERS and
  GREENSBURG. Will move southeast from here along creek bed in order
  to complete mission.

                                                         FLETCHER,
                                                                  SGT.

  (See sketch reverse side.)

Caution.—Remember that “your own troops” means friendly supporting
troops and not the troops of which you are in immediate command.




CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD MESSAGE


“An intrinsically good tactical exercise,” says Griepenkerl,[2]
“loses by _faulty composition_ and careless or illegible
handwriting.... A rambling mode of expression, a long-winded,
elaborate style, is unmilitary. Therefore, test your order to see
whether you cannot cross out some superfluous word, or whether you
cannot think of some shorter and more suitable mode of expression;
_grudge every word_.”

But he goes on to say in another place that clearness takes
precedence over brevity; “therefore, rather use a long expression
where a shorter one might be misunderstood. _Brevity must never lead
to superficiality._”

Griepenkerl was speaking of orders. Yet our Field Service Regulations
state that “most of the rules adopted to secure clearness in orders
apply equally to messages.”

In the following problems which are designed for practice in framing
field messages, we should adhere not only to Griepenkerl’s advice,
but also to the hints, forms, and cautions of Chapters I and II.
Remember that each time a faulty form or expression is used, some
commanding officer is halted or hindered, retarded or confused. The
highest premium should be placed upon correct form and expression.

With the selection of material from the purposely misleading
and sometimes ill-stated problems below, you may, however, have
difficulty. Certainly all of the long narrative, often in soldier
jargon, cannot be placed in the message. Some facts must be
eliminated as unessential. What you should let your commanding
officer know can be determined sometimes only by technical
experience. However, Major General Morrison’s[3] caution along this
line should be repeated here for your help: “We all recognize the
fact that, as a rule, the sooner information reaches headquarters,
the more valuable it is. But this applies only to information
which really has value. If you are in doubt as to whether or not
information would be valuable, give headquarters the benefit of the
doubt and send it in.” So you see that if you are not quite decided
about stating a detail, it is better to give the information than to
withhold it. Therefore, exclude only those items which would on the
ground of common sense be pointless.

In extracting and writing your messages from the problems given, it
will be assumed that you do not know whether or not the recipient is
provided with a map similar to your own. It may be taken for granted,
however, that he is acquainted with the names which appear on your
map.

It may also be assumed that you have drawn a sketch on the reverse
side of your message sheet.

In reading your map the signs and abbreviations, explained in
Appendix 4, Field Service Regulations, will aid you.

A scale of yards is at the bottom (the south) of your map. By the use
of a slip of paper, distances in yards may be measured off from place
to place.

Wherever it is stated in these problems that a person writes a
message, the student should construct that same message. In so doing:

(1) Assemble your information in proper sequence,

(2) Give it proper and unmistakable expression, and

(3) Inspect it thoroughly in order to be positive that you have given
it proper sequence, and proper and unmistakable expression.

_Hold yourself strictly accountable for every expression which could
be put into better form._

Caution.—The hour in the heading of message is the _time_ of
_signature_.


PROBLEMS

1. On January 27, 1926, you are Corporal Peck in charge of a
reconnoitering patrol from the advance guard of the third battalion
of the 177th regiment of Infantry. You are proceeding along the
road east to Hunterstown from 549 (D, 5 and 6). You arrive at the
east edge of J. Bell’s orchard when you see several men at the zero
in 602. With the aid of your field glasses you make out four field
pieces and limbers to be turning to the north off the road just
opposite to, and south of, the men. The vehicles soon disappear
behind the knoll of 602. You can see that the men are wearing the
enemy’s uniform. After five minutes of observation, the men go out
of sight on the far side of the hill, and nothing further happens.
After you have written your message at half past four o’clock in the
afternoon, you travel under cover of the creek and fields in the
general direction of Henderson Meeting House, in the hope of finding
out more about the force in the vicinity of 602.

2. On August 27, 1920, you are Sergeant Fenton of a left flank
patrol sent out from the second battalion (27th Infantry) which is
marching north, as an advance guard to its regiment, toward 546 from
Hunterstown. As you come out into the open to the west of the J. Bell
farm house, you receive a volley from about twenty rifles from the
woods at the north. Two of your men are killed. With the remainder
of your men you retire hastily under cover of the Bell orchard to
the stream bed which you follow to the north until half way between
the Bell house and the “R” in Beaverdam. There you go through the
fields to the west until you get a glimpse of the high ground in the
vicinity of 574. You can make out through the corn-rows infantrymen
deployed and lying down facing you. They extend along the fence for
fifty yards on each side of the dirt road. You can see a field piece
half way between the ends of the fence and at the edge of the woods.
You go back to where you left the stream and write your message. You
hand it to one of your men at 20 minutes past two in the afternoon
for delivery. You then crawl forward leaving your men under cover in
the stream, and remain in observation in the corn-field.

3. You are 1st Sergeant James in charge of a combat patrol from
the 38th Infantry which is on outpost duty for the 8th Division at
Granite Hill (5, bottom). In passing the house at 5-E the farmer
tells you that yesterday at noon he saw about one hundred and fifty
saddle-horses in a lot near the cross-roads in Hunterstown. On
questioning him further he tells you that there were quite a lot of
soldiers about, having a good time, and wearing the enemy’s uniform.
You keep on your course. When you arrive at the orchard near 603 it
is after nightfall. You hear voices and laughing at the northern edge
of the orchard just south of the “6” in 603. You sneak up until you
can make out four of the enemy’s infantrymen sitting about a little
fire. You charge with bayonets fixed, kill three and capture one. He
is half drunk on apple-jack and talks freely. He says his brigade
is in bad shape, has marched four days and nights without stopping,
has a big outpost at Woodside School House, and that he himself is
with a bunch of the advance cavalry in the town. At a quarter of
ten at night you hand your message to a member of your patrol for
delivery. You then proceed along the road toward 549, looking for
more information. You arrive there, having seen nothing of value, the
next day at 7 a. m., July 18, 1940.

4. On June 21, 1920, you are a first lieutenant in charge of an
officer’s patrol from the 80th Cavalry which is operating as
Independent Cavalry for the 190th Division. It is six o’clock in
the evening when as you are riding along the road from Texas to
Biglerville, three of the enemy jump out upon you. In the struggle
which ensues the three are overpowered and sabred by your superior
force. You search the dead men, but find nothing upon them but
ornaments indicating they belong to the 27th Cavalry. You dismount,
tie your horses in the orchard near the word Stiner, and proceed with
two of your men along the railroad track toward Biglerville. Near 626
you look toward the town to find the space between you and it well
dotted with tents. Placing your men well under cover in the woods,
you lie down in the culvert at 626. Before taps is blown in the
enemy’s camp, from conversations which have gone on in your vicinity,
you have learned that a regiment of cavalry has been encamped there
for two days, that no other force is about, and that the regiment
will move out at five the next morning, marching toward Goldenville.
You write your message at 9:15 p. m. After it is sent, you take up
your position again in the culvert.

5. On the 19th of February, 1940, a visiting patrol in charge of
Corporal Eaton sent out from 2d Battalion, which is acting as outpost
for the 81st Infantry, is on its way to a picket of friendly troops.
Its route lies from Boyd School House, E-8 toward McElheny. As it
approaches the bridge near the 4 in the 480 contour, it hears
footsteps of men hurrying into the timber to the east. The suspicions
of the patrol being aroused, it looks about and discovers loose earth
scattered over the snow at the abutments of the bridge; upon further
investigation it finds fuses leading from the center of the pile of
fresh earth. The message is finished on the spot at exactly midnight.
After the messenger has departed the corporal and one man remain on
guard over the mines whose fuses were cut before the messenger left.

6. You are Corporal Peters sent out with a visiting patrol from
Company A, 2d Battalion of your regiment. Your company is Support
number 2 of the outpost at the “K” in Oak Ridge, E-8. As you approach
Boyd School House, you are not challenged as you expect. You hurry
on to where the sentry of the picket should be posted at the
cross-roads, only to find him dead of a bayonet thrust. You go to the
south side of the school house and there find the remainder of the
picket in their blankets in the same condition. You put your hand
on one of the men and find that his body is still warm. At fifteen
minutes to three, September 30, 1932, you complete your message at
the spot where you found most of the picket dead. You then take your
remaining man with you and together perform double sentry duty at the
cross-roads.

7. On July 4, 1925, you are Sergeant Black in charge of an harassing
patrol sent out from the 68th regiment of Infantry which is acting as
outpost for the 12th Division. At a quarter to twelve at night, you
have just fired two volleys from Boyd School House in the direction
of Oak Ridge, and are proceeding toward C. Topper’s to do the same
there, when, as you cross the railroad one hundred yards south of the
“r” in Topper, you stumble upon a wagon wheel imbedded in the earth.
Cautious inspection reveals four howitzers camouflaged. With the aid
of known measurements upon your hand you find that the calibre of
each is 6 inches. You finish a message at a quarter to one and then
proceed as you intended.

8. On the 21st of August, 1919, you are Sergeant Stuart sent out in
charge of a contact patrol from the 99th Infantry acting as outpost
of the 32d Brigade. After hard work during which you are nearly
captured at the cemetery near Henderson Meeting House, you arrive
with your patrol, at ten minutes to nine in the evening, at 601 just
west of Hunterstown. A regiment of the enemy’s infantry has been
defeated by your troops during the day and it is your duty to find
out what you can about the enemy’s whereabouts and intentions. As
you look across to the west you see lights in the fields between R.
Smith’s farm house and J. Bell’s. You make your way carefully down
the hill to the farm house at D-6. As you lie in the edge of the
woods nearest the house you count fifteen rows of tents by the glow
from the fires. You see no animals or picket lines. The fires die
down shortly and the talking ceases. You take turns on watch with
the senior man of your patrol. At a quarter to one while you are on
watch, fires begin to spring up at the ends of the company streets.
Shortly afterwards a young soldier comes to the nearby farm house
to get water. He grumbles loudly that he must get up in the middle
of the night and complains that the first sergeant has ordered the
company to be in ranks at one fifty. You get your message off at five
minutes after one and remain in observation of the camp.

9. (Two messages.) On May 31, 1940, you are Corporal Decker in charge
of a reconnoitering patrol from the 71st Regiment of Cavalry acting
as Advance Cavalry to the 18th Division. You are proceeding toward
Heidlersburg from Friends’ Grove School House, and you arrive at
5-A. When, proceeding to the east, you are half way through the
woods, you hear hoof-beats on the road to the north. Having proceeded
due east, you now arrive at the edge of the woods. There you see
several mounted men of the enemy halted near the road fork 545,
but the trees in the ravine make it difficult for you to see them
clearly. Near the main cross-roads of the town you see a hundred or
more dismounted men holding their horses. After watching them for a
few moments you realize that the horses are being watered. At five
minutes to five you start to write your message where you are. After
sending it off you remain to see what is going to happen further.

At ten minutes past five, the mounted men ride west with an advance
guard of about a troop. Your patrol was well concealed so that it
was able to time the main body as it trotted past the road fork
578 in column of twos. It took two minutes and a half to pass. The
group near 545 that appeared to be a patrol has disappeared. While
the larger body was passing road fork 578 you heard firing about a
mile to the south by less than a dozen rifles. You begin to send a
message at a quarter after five and start to return to your command.
(100 cavalrymen in column of twos will trot past a given point in one
minute.)




CHAPTER IV

MORE PROBLEMS ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD MESSAGE


1. (Three messages.) On July 18, 1930, you are Corporal Flint in
charge of a reconnoitering patrol sent out from the 61st Infantry
which is acting as Rear Guard to the 19th Brigade, and which is
withdrawing from Goldenville through Table Rock. As you proceed south
along the stream which flows past Herman, 500 yds. south of C-7, you
stumble upon one of your own regiment seriously wounded and lying at
the “V” in Varney, in the open field. He tells you that a regiment of
Cavalry of the enemy passed by the nearest farm house going northeast
on the dirt road when the sun was overhead. You ask the people of
the farm house, who are manifestly in sympathy with the enemy, what
they know about the occurrence, but they refuse to answer. On the
road are many fresh hoof-marks. You begin to write your message at
the Varney farm house at half past three in the afternoon. When you
have finished you proceed southwest along the same road and along
the creek bed toward the race-track. At the bottom part of the “S”
in Stock Farm, you leave your men in the field under cover and go
south along the edge of the main road toward Boyd School House. You
see several patrols of the enemy but you press on. You have not gone
far, however, before you spy a low heavy cloud of dust ahead which
seems to be moving toward you. At the Boyd School House Cross Roads
it turns west at twenty-five minutes to six. It takes the column,
which you now make out to be infantry in column of squads, three
minutes and forty seconds to pass the cross-roads (175 Infantry in
column of squads can pass a given point in one minute). Since the
patrols of the enemy are becoming rather thick, you decide to make
your way back to the “K” in Stock Farm. There you finish writing
another message at a quarter after seven. You have scarcely sent it
off when there is a noise among the corn-stalks near you. You lie
low and have your men, whom you have now collected about you, do the
same. A friendly uniform appears through one of the corn-rows; it is
just light enough for you to make it out. You give a low whistle and
signal at which the wearer of the uniform approaches. He turns out to
be Sergeant Black of your regiment who is leading a combat patrol. He
tells you that he counted twenty passenger coaches hitched together
on the railroad to the southwest. The engine was pointed toward the
north and opposite the “r” in C. Topper at four o’clock. The enemy’s
soldiers were crowding around trying to hurry into the coaches.
After the Sergeant leaves you, you try to make your way back to your
company. At a quarter to twelve you have arrived under cover of the
fields and woods near the road-fork 646 just south of Hamilton when
you hear the rumble of wheels close behind you to the south. One of
your men counted twelve pieces of light artillery which turned off
the road and unlimbered just south of 664. You begin to write another
message at the “n” in Hamilton at 5 minutes after twelve.

2. On September 1, 1927, you are a first lieutenant of Infantry in
charge of an expeditionary patrol from the 26th Infantry, which is
acting as outpost to the 18th Division. The outpost is covering the
general sector from Stiner, 1,000 yards north of Texas, to Bender’s
Church, B-7. The Division is encamped between Biglerville and
Guernsey. Your patrol leaves the outermost picket near Table Rock at
three o’clock in the afternoon. Its mission is to capture a strong
officer’s patrol of the enemy which is supposed to be proceeding
north along the railroad from Hamilton. You conceal yourself and your
patrol in the shrubbery near the railroad bridge south of Table Rock
Station. At five minutes after four you hear footsteps and subdued
talking to the south. You allow the first two men to pass you, and
when the main body of the patrol is near the bridge you spring out
upon them with bayonets. The mêlée lasts for about three minutes.
Four men finally survive—the leader of their patrol, two of your men,
and yourself. Because of the wound of the foreign officer, whom you
make out by his insignia to be a staff officer of their 132d Regiment
of Engineers and a Captain, you decide that you will be unable to
risk bringing in your prisoner at once. You question him as to what
he has been doing and he tells you that he has been all day on the
road and that his regiment has marched for three days from the south
without stopping to pitch camp. He will answer no other questions.
You bind and gag him, after you have taken him into the field to the
bottom of the “S” in Table Rock Station. There you start to write
your message twelve minutes after the end of the fight. After you
have sent off the communication you and the one remaining man keep
guard over your prisoner.

3. (Six messages.) On October 29, 1945, you are Sergeant Murray
sent out in charge of a strong reconnoitering patrol from the 82d
Infantry which is acting as Advance Guard to the 34th Brigade. You
send a message from Mt. Olivet School House (7-top) that the country
is clear of the enemy from there back to Center Mills from which you
have come. You finish your message at half past one in the afternoon.
At ten minutes after two, from the main cross-roads of Guernsey,
you start another message in which you let your Commanding Officer
know that you have seen nothing of the enemy, and that the roads
have been patrolled to a distance of eight hundred yards on each
side. You keep on going south along the railroad. As the first two
men of your patrol enter the railroad cut five hundred yards south
of the main cross-roads of Guernsey, they receive a volley from the
top and west side of the embankment. They back out while you with
the remainder of your patrol skirt the top of the cut to the west.
Three men run to the west into the fields and woods. Your fire does
not reach them. You continue to scour the country as far as the
stream. At five minutes to three you begin to write a message from
the farm house near the southern exit of the cut. You then proceed
south along the railroad as before. As you approach Biglerville you
try to see through your field glasses any signs of the enemy’s men
or wagons which might be in the town. Seeing none, you go carefully
and completely around the village back to your starting point.
Two of your men then enter the main street from the east. After
investigating the first eight or ten houses, they signal you to
approach. You then with your patrol go along every street of the
town, go into the main stores and houses, but you can find no trace
of the enemy. At 20 minutes to five you finish your message at the
cross-roads five hundred yards southwest of the “B” in Biglerville.
You then take the main Carlisle road and proceed south on it. As you
go you inspect all bridges, railroad tracks, streams, and ground in
general for eight hundred yards on either side of the road, but find
no enemy. At twenty-five minutes to six you begin your message at
the Stiner House. Before you now go south, you investigate for eight
hundred yards the roads leading to the east and west from the main
cross-roads south of Stiner. After your men return you proceed along
the side of the road south toward the stream. As you come up to the
bridge, although it is getting dusk you see a sentinel on the bridge,
and you collect your men in some bushes near the north abutment. You
tell them that when you give the word they are to charge with you
across the bridge at a run with bayonets fixed. There is no sentry
at the north end of the bridge, and the one at the south end seems
to be lazily looking into the field. You give the signal and your
patrol leaps out, but in the middle of the bridge your whole party is
caught by fire from machine guns located near the wooden fence half
way between the word Texas and the bridge. All but two of your men
fall. You are hit in the leg, but are dragged back off the bridge to
a copse at the edge of the stream. Waiting for further developments,
but hearing nothing more of the enemy except laughter at the other
end of the bridge, you have your men carry you further eastward along
the stream to a place of comparative safety in the woods. You start
writing your message twenty yards south of the railroad crossing
east of Stiner at seven o’clock. You find that you will be unable
to travel for some time. After sending the message, you remain with
one man where you are, both of you concealing yourselves as well as
possible.


MESSAGES FROM COMMANDERS

4. On July 22, 1932, you are Colonel Algernon M. Potts, commanding
the 48th Infantry which is acting as Advance Guard for the 20th
Division. You have at a quarter to one just pushed two battalions
of the enemy’s infantry toward Woodside School House. Your adjutant
counts on the ground over which they have fled forty-eight of their
dead and wounded. When you have taken up and reorganized your line
from Plainview through the cross-roads at 666 to, and including,
the farm house one mile and a quarter directly east of A. Logan,
Lieutenant Shelley, adjutant of the first battalion, reports to you
that Major Jones’ command has captured twenty-two prisoners. While
you are talking, suddenly a heavy fire of artillery comes from
somewhere in the vicinity of 603 west of Hunterstown. At the same
time a message reaches you from Sergeant Stearns, who has been out
with a combat patrol to the south, that a regiment of the enemy’s
cavalry was between Table Rock and Herman at half past two, and that
a civilian had telephoned that an infantry regiment of the enemy was
seen marching west through Hunterstown at twenty minutes to twelve
that morning. You have no reenforcements at hand, but send your
reserve of one battalion to prolong the right of your line to the
bridge at Fidler, B-7. Your artillery seems to be superior to the
enemy’s and is holding down his fire which is growing heavier. The
adjutants of the 2d and 3d battalions report that their commands
have lost 12 dead, 17 wounded, and 24 missing during the previous
engagement. You feel that you will scarcely be able to hold out more
than an hour under the present circumstances, but decide to make
strenuous efforts to do more. You start to write your message to the
Division Commander at four o’clock in the afternoon.

5. You are Major Mark Montclair in command of the battalion which
constituted the reserves in the preceding problem. When you arrive
in your designated position at a quarter to five you are immediately
charged by two troops of cavalry which you drive off to the south by
superior fire. You send in pursuit one company and a machine gun.
By the number of loose horses you see galloping about and by the
haste with which the troopers took to their heels, you infer that
the casualties must have been large. Your adjutant arrives at this
time reporting that sixteen prisoners in sound condition have been
taken, that twelve dead and twenty-two wounded of the enemy have
been counted, and that your own losses are 3 missing, 4 dead, and 8
wounded. Just before you start to write your message at a quarter
to six, word reaches you from A Company which is still pursuing the
enemy, that they have captured 18 prisoners and have killed and
wounded twelve. You finish your message at five minutes to six, and
then go over your lines in order to make them stronger for defense.

6. On June 12, 1925, you are Captain James A. Marion in command of
Company I, 203d Infantry. Your company, which constitutes a detached
post from your regiment acting as outpost at Granite Hill, is at 601,
five hundred yards west of Hunterstown Cross-roads. At twenty-five
minutes to five in the morning you are charged by a squadron of
cavalry from the J. Bell farm. They strike you from the front, and
you are holding them by your fire when a troop hits your right flank
riding at a full gallop out of the woods from the direction of the
Henderson Meeting House. You are in a very awkward position and are
prepared to do or die, when, without warning of any kind, a squadron
of your own 29th Cavalry which has been on a raiding expedition in
the direction of New Oxford, deploys at a gallop from Hunterstown.
The enemy, who is now in turn struck in flank, is in serious straits.
He breaks and runs in the direction of Table Rock, the friendly
squadron pursuing. You count 45 dead and 62 wounded of the enemy.
Of your own troops 12 infantrymen are missing, 3 cavalrymen and
9 infantrymen dead, and 5 cavalrymen and 18 infantrymen wounded.
You start to write your message at twenty minutes to six. You
straighten out your former position and send strong connecting and
reconnoitering patrols to north and west.

7. On May 13, 1922, you are Major Gerald Pendelton of the 1st
Battalion, 43d Infantry. You have been ordered by your regimental
commander to establish by a line of your own troops a defensive
position facing east from the 4 (exclusive) in 664 east of Hamilton,
D-8, to the southeast corner of the orchard (inclusive), five hundred
yards northwest of Stock Farm. At five minutes to ten at night you
have formed your line as ordered and are beginning to entrench. You
are proceeding with your work when a messenger from B Company on the
left flank tells you that G Company of the 2d Battalion has arrived
at the 4 in 664, and that at ten minutes to ten the right flank
of that company was beginning to dig. Seven minutes later another
messenger from A Company arrives with similar information concerning
Company E, 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry; he states that the left flank
of that company at thirteen minutes to ten started to dig twenty
yards south of the corner of the orchard. You go over your lines
correcting positions here and there and start to send a message at
twenty-five minutes to eleven. The order of your interior companies
is, left to right, C, D.




CHAPTER V

VERBAL FIELD MESSAGE


OBSERVATION—ATTENTION—EXPOSITION

There are occasions when it becomes proper not to write the field
message, but to speak it. If the enemy is strong and active, so that
a bearer of information runs grave risk of capture, the message is
safer as a verbal one. In the case of the written one, both message
and messenger are lost; in the case of the verbal one, only the
messenger. Therefore, it is best to entrust the information to the
care of the messenger’s mind. The facts deposited there should remain
in readiness for the first opportunity of delivery.

There are times, too, when no chance is offered to write a message on
account of the pressure of the enemy. The attention of a leader may
be so occupied with warding off, or moving away from, strong hostile
bodies, that work with pencil and paper becomes an impossibility.

The form of the written field message must be abbreviated. The
gist of the _Heading_ and _Ending_ must be stated by the messenger
upon his arrival at his destination; and the _Body_ must be
contracted into one or two sentences depending upon the accuracy
and intelligence of the messenger. Where officers are messengers
the message may be lengthened. For our purpose and practice we must
attempt the shorter form.

The usual procedure in sending off a verbal message may be
represented by the following dialogue:

Patrol Leader (or Commander): “Swinton, go back at once to the
Commanding Officer of our Outpost and say,—

Twelve enemy’s cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton
11:45 a. m. Repeat.”

Swinton: “I am going back to the Commanding Officer of our Outpost
and say,—

Twelve of enemy marching north on Carlisle Road at 11:45 a. m.”

P. L.: “No, Swinton, twelve enemy’s _cavalry_ marching north on
Carlisle Road _at Hamilton_ 11:45 a. m. Repeat again.”

Swinton: “I am to go back right away and say to Commanding Officer,—

Twelve enemy’s cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton
11:45 a. m. Repeat.”

P. L.: “Not quite; you are to go back to Commanding Officer of
Outpost. Repeat again.”

Swinton: “I am to go back and say to Commanding Officer of the
Outpost,—

Twelve enemy’s cavalry marching north on Carlisle Road at Hamilton at
11:45 a. m.”

P. L.: “That’s right. It is now 12 o’clock. Notice where we are
located. I am going to continue on my mission toward the southwest.
Do you understand?”

Swinton: “Yes, sir.”

When Swinton arrives at headquarters he ought thus to be able to give
to his commanding officer not only the accurate _Body_ of the verbal
message, but the contents of the _Heading_ and _Ending_ of a similar
written one.

The above conversation is not exaggerated. It is not only what _does_
happen, but what _should_ happen. It does happen because the average
American has rarely developed his powers of attention to things
outside of his interest. It should happen because every word in every
good message is a vital word. Any omission or substitution is a loss.


PROBLEMS

In each of the following problems try to condense the essential
facts, without loss of substance or truth, if possible, into one
sentence. The _Body_ only will be attempted. In other words, that
part of the dialogue which preceded the last speech of the Patrol
Leader will be imitated. It is presumed that we are now conversant
with the material of the _Heading_ and _Ending_. We shall, therefore,
dispense with these parts of the message in the verbal exercise.

_CAUTION.—Under no circumstances should there be any writing done in
connection with the solution of the problems. A violation of this
prohibition will destroy the value of the exercise._

1. You are alone in your aeroplane scouting north from your Division
which is at Granite Hill. While you are flying low in the vicinity of
B-A, you notice a moving cloud of dust which produces a dark spot on
the road leading south from Guernsey. The haze extends from the lower
edge of the “G” in Guernsey indistinctly through the town. You turn
off and fly over Center Mills. When you return the head of the dust
cloud has reached the first road-fork south of Guernsey and the tail
of it is at the lower edge of the “G.” You land in twelve minutes at
Granite Hill. It is one o’clock in the afternoon. You are so cold
that you walk with difficulty. You call a Corporal of the Signal
Corps to you and give him a verbal message.

2. You are sitting on the knoll at 624 immediately south of the
“Sta.” in Granite Hill Station, 5-E. You see about fifteen horsemen
cross the railroad tracks and ride up to the cross-roads to the east
of you. It is half past ten in the morning when you see them split
up into three parties, one riding southwest, one northeast, and one
southeast on the three different roads in your vicinity. As the party
on the road running southeast comes opposite you, they dismount. You
can make them out to be cavalrymen of the enemy. As they start in
your rear to cross the stream and to come toward you, you decide to
send a verbal message.

3. You are proceeding from the cross-roads southwest of Plainview
(B-5) toward Hershey Mill (B-6). When you approach the mill race you
notice a quantity of smoke rising; when you come nearer you see the
smouldering ruins of the mill. You go on to the Miller’s house and
there perceive that the bridge has buckled in the middle and is lying
on its side in the water. The Miller tells you that an aeroplane of
the enemy went up and down the Conewago at six o’clock the evening
before, until it finally landed a bomb upon the bridge. As it was
circling to leave, it let another bomb drop upon the mill. You go to
the Miller’s telephone and send a message.

4. You are lying on the long knoll 566, five hundred yards south
of C-6. You are watching at half past two in the afternoon two
infantrymen of the enemy who are walking along the edge of the stream
to the west. You have been interested in their movements ever since
they crossed the first road to the southwest several moments ago.
While you are watching them, you are fired upon by what you estimate
to be sixteen rifles from the woods to the south. You hasten north
and give to one of your men a verbal message on the way.

5. You are proceeding south along the stream at 7⅓-E. At twenty
minutes after eight in the morning you approach the more densely
wooded section of country near the bridge. You look toward the
cross-roads to the west and spy in the field some of the enemy
loafing and talking at the letter “8” in 488. You see four stacks of
arms and are making further observations, when you hear a rustle of
undergrowth in the woods. Eight men rush out upon you. Three of your
men are killed. You escape with one man. As soon as you are able, you
give him a verbal message, and both of you take different routes back
to headquarters.

6. You are reconnoitering south along the railroad track from
Biglerville. When you reach the siding at 626, you notice that part
of the track exactly opposite “B,” both on the siding and main line,
is completely blown away. You count ten ties burning at the side of
the road. While you are making an inventory of the situation, you
are fired upon by a machine gun mounted on a flat car near the next
bridge to the south. The car apparently filled with men seems to be
approaching. Your patrol scatters to the fields. You give one man a
verbal message.

7. You have been sent with two men to find out whether the Conewago
is fordable at any point between Table Rock and Fidler, B-7. After
some search you find a crossing directly south of the zero in the
number 540 which marks the contour of that height. Some time ago you
sent a written message to the effect that there was a picket located
at the Logan farm house. You have finished searching thoroughly
that part of the stream assigned to you, when a strong party of the
enemy is seen approaching your position from A. Logan. You give your
remaining man a verbal message. Each takes a separate route.

8. You are in charge of a small reconnoitering patrol going south
from Boyd School House. As you approach the marsh (7-4¼5, bottom) at
the west of the road, you see three pieces of artillery stuck in the
mud up to their hubs. You find that the guns are 3 in. field pieces.
While you are investigating their mechanism in order to confirm your
opinion that they belong to hostile troops, about forty men of the
enemy with ropes and tackle appear about 400 yards to the south.
You hurry away under cover, and find a telephone. You send a verbal
message over the wire at twenty minutes to five in the evening.

9. You are delivering a message by motor cycle from Center Mills
to Granite Hill Station. You are riding at about thirty miles an
hour on a road supposedly clear of the enemy, when you are met by a
fusillade from the woods in the vicinity of Henderson Meeting House.
As you pass the road-fork, shots follow you and you feel a sharp pain
in the calf of your leg. You speed up to pass the cross-roads at
Hunterstown, and in two minutes reach Granite Hill Station. At twenty
minutes after nine in the morning you dismount from your motor cycle
and direct an infantryman standing near you to take a verbal message
to headquarters in addition to the written one you hand him.

10. You are Captain Williams in command of Company B, 1st Battalion,
24th Infantry. You are acting as a support during the Outpost duty
of your battalion. You are at 592, northwest of the Good Intent
School House, D-7, and are engaged in driving back a company of
infantrymen which is attacking you from the stream to the west. At
twenty-five minutes to ten in the morning you are suddenly attacked
also by a platoon of infantry from the direction of Herman. The
nearest friendly troops are those at battalion headquarters. You are
in a serious predicament. You at once send a verbal message by an
intelligent sergeant.

       *       *       *       *       *

We have doubtless demonstrated to our own satisfaction by means of
the problems above how difficult it is to frame a message briefly
and unmistakably. It might be well to inquire why we have had this
trouble. An analysis may not only reveal, but also remedy, the cause
of our inability to achieve the desired result.

We find upon investigation that we have permitted certain practical
talents to lie unused in our minds. We have not acquired the habit
of observing anything outside of our desire, of listening to anything
outside of our interest, and of explaining anything outside of
simplicity. Strict observation, attention, and exposition are the
ordinary tools of a military man. Let him develop them to the highest
degree and he has done no more than is expected of him.

Here, between the study of the field message, which informs
commanders, and the field order, which directs troops, it is
especially fitting for us to reckon with mental improvement. For it
is in this interval between the information’s coming to, and the
decision’s going from, a leader that the fateful question arises,
“What is my plan?” His thoughts, before they arrive at a decision,
must take in and classify in a certain definite order all obtainable
and pertinent facts. He must assemble all his data before he can take
the slightest risk as to how his troops are to act. Lives are at
stake in the passing minutes; victory is awaiting the decision. In
all this stress and excitement the commander must observe and listen
as if he were stalking a deer in a thicket. And when his mind is made
up he must formulate his decision as if he were sitting before his
own peaceful hearth writing a letter. But he must do both in one per
cent of the time allowed for stalking deer or writing letters.

To acquire this ability, he must have regarded beforehand the
development of these three talents as a necessity. If he has caused
himself to be a faithful observer, so that he is capable of taking
in many details at once, if he has compelled himself to be a keen
listener so that he can absorb every word instantly, if he has made
himself into a skilful instructor so that he can express rapidly his
exact wishes and knowledge, he will be able, when the crisis comes,
to give his entire attention to his plan. Otherwise he will be
hampered. If he has not observed, if he has not listened, he will be
able neither to decide nor to state his will forcibly.

The following hints may show us our deficiencies:

1. In regard to the scope and habit of observation,—

(a) Look out of the window, count off to yourself five seconds, turn
about and see how much of the view or of its salient features you can
describe.

(b) After you have taken your next long walk through the woods or
open country, go over in your mind your journey. Pick out points
along the course and see whether you know in regard to each: (1) the
appearance and number of trees within your view, (2) the rise and
fall of the ground within your view, (3) or the direction you next
took.

(c) What is the exact color of the hair or eyes, or the shape of the
hands of your closest associates?

(d) Have someone place five articles on a plane surface while your
back is turned. Look at the objects for ten seconds; then look away
and describe fully their appearance and position.

2. In regard to the power and habit of listening,—

(a) Have someone read aloud to you three sentences capable of being
understood by a person of ordinary intellect. Try to repeat in your
own words every idea given in the reading.

This is not a memory exercise.

(b) The next time you find yourself interrupting someone, check
yourself at once, and try to repeat in your own mind the substance of
what the speaker has last uttered.

(c) The next time you find yourself a part of an audience to which a
sermon or lecture is being delivered, say to yourself, “I am going
to get at least for practice’s sake every idea this speaker has to
offer.” Then note how short a time it is before you miss a phrase.

3. In regard to the power of exposition,—

(a) With your hands behind your back, try to describe in a sentence
each one of the following articles:

A barrel, a scabbard, a tea kettle, a potato, a billiard cue, a
chrysanthemum, a dumb-bell, your shoes, a fox terrier, a grand piano.

(b) Give the shortest complete description you can of the parts and
working of a rifle.




CHAPTER VI

THE FIELD ORDER, THE ESTIMATE, THE DECISION, THE EXPRESSION


“Upon the information of the enemy and of the terrain obtained
by reconnaissance, and, as far as time will permit, upon the
study of the terrain made by the leader in the field of probable
operations, the plan of action is based.” So state our Field Service
Regulations.[4] Decision, then, is built upon the amount of material
that the observation and attention of a commander can collect. And
it is only _his_ observation and attention which count. It is only
what he himself has fixed in his own mind which is going to do the
troops harm or good. He may receive dozens of excellent messages,
or may view the battle-field for twenty miles; yet it is only what
he himself appropriates to his own straight thinking, which can
influence the outcome. The reports or the visions of others cannot
enter into the decision, unless he has transferred those reports or
visions to his own calculations. How can he weigh what he has not
handled—consider what he has not absorbed? _The decision of a leader
issues from the door of his own observation and attention._ The most
pertinent facts may be laid at that threshold only to be shut out
because he has not increased his capacity to take them in. And no
one else can enter there in order to do the work for him unless the
intruder becomes virtually, if not actually, the leader.


THE ESTIMATE

Let us suppose that the observation and attention have taken in all
that they should. These various items lying in a more or less jumbled
mass must now be sorted. Information of one class must not be found
mixed with that of another class. Each organized body of information
must approach the leader’s judgment by itself so that: (1) nothing
will be overlooked; so that (2) each item will be with its proper
set. After they have all passed through his thought, certain ones,
of course, may be discarded; but they all must none the less be
first reviewed consciously by the leader. This process is called the
_estimate of the situation_. In order, therefore, to comply with
the full conditions of such an estimate, a fixed classification of
all the essentials which should go through the hopper of a leader’s
judgment has been made. After his information has been obtained and
before his decision has been formed, the leader must say to himself:—

1. What is my mission?

2. What are the forces—the enemy’s and my own?

3. What conditions are favorable and what unfavorable?

4. What is the enemy doing and what will he probably do?

5. What effect has the terrain upon my mission?

6. What different courses are open to me in order to carry out my
mission, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of each?

The method just described is no more than that of collecting,
classifying, and weighing data. It is the very process we must
follow before we can write a decent theme, article, report, or
anything fit to read. An estimate of a situation is nothing more
than an outline of observations made in order to arrive at a proper
conclusion. The leader has no time to write down the points. But he
nevertheless assembles in his own mind everything which bears on his
subject—unity; he classifies all this into groups with a certain
orderly arrangement—coherence; and he considers the effect of each
item upon his mission and situation—clear thinking.


THE DECISION

As soon as he has finished with this estimate of the situation, there
should stand forth as a result of this clear thinking his decision.
If he has been in the habit of making his ideas unmistakable in
conversation or writing—if he has been accustomed to dealing in good
exposition, his plan ought to be clear and simple. For no man can
make clear statements without first thinking clear thoughts. If then
he has habitually insisted upon his own use of only the clearest
phraseology, he ought certainly to arrive at a clear plan whatever
may be its tactical value.


THE EXPRESSION

To give this plan expression is the purpose of the field order.
Certainly if the decision is clear and simple, the translation
into language ought to be easy. Infantry Drill Regulations state:
“Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or inability
to formulate orders.” Since vacillation is a matter of character,
the discussion of such a trait is outside of this course; but the
inability to formulate orders is not. In fact it belongs only in
the course of Rhetoric or English. The following terms are found in
our Regulations and Text Books: “Clear and concise instructions are
given as to the action to be taken in combat”;[5] “an order must
be definite and the expression of a fixed decision”;[5] “field
orders are brief”;[6] “field orders must be brief and definite”;[6]
“clear and decisive orders are the logical result of definite and
sure decisions and are the means of transforming the decision into
action”;[6] “Make your order short and make it definite”;[7] “above
all do not give vague orders”;[7] “be positive and definite”;[7]
“a plan, promising success, may fail if it does not find correct
expression in an order.”[8] And so our manuals keep on telling us
to use correct English, but failing to tell us how. Putting the
clarified decision into the form of an order is the business of
Rhetoric. And the process requires the application of every rule for
correct English we have learned or are going to learn.

“_Often a faulty expression, a word too much or too little, or an
omission, may become the source of serious consequences_,” declares
Buddecke. Even in the orders of the greatest commanders, a twist of
phrase or a wrong word has given an unintentional meaning, so that
troops have from the very construction of the order acted contrary to
the will of the chief. Napoleon, in a despatch to Davout before the
battles of Auerstadt and Jena, stated: “If the Prince of Portecorvo
(Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor
hopes that he will be already in the position assigned him at
Dornberg.” Bernadotte, as it happened, had not gone to Dornberg. He
was with Davout. He determined, from the last clause of the order and
from the word “may,” that Napoleon desired him to be at Dornberg. To
Dornberg he marched, and there he calmly waited within sound of the
guns, while the battles of Auerstadt and Jena were fought. He was
useless both to Napoleon and to Davout. Indeed, he was seriously
needed by Davout who, with 27,000 was opposed to 51,000 Prussians.
Yet the error is attributable not to Bernadotte but to Napoleon, who
meant to say, “You should march together; but the Emperor hopes that
he has arrived,” etc. Napoleon for once did not say what he meant. It
is likely we may be found more wanting in this regard.

There is no error in the expressiveness of a field order which the
analytical and synthetical study of English will not overcome. We
must first learn by analysis to recognize mistakes when we see them.
We must then try to manipulate our language so that those mistakes
will not occur. Indeed, we must go further than the mere negative
avoidance of mistakes. We must not be satisfied until we have made
our expressions exert a positive force. The ways and means of so
doing are found in the simple rules of rhetoric.

It is, perhaps, not too much to say that the American works against
heavier odds than the European. The syntax of the inflected
languages of Europe demands that the speaker pay a proper attention
to the changes of number, gender, and case, if he would not appear
ridiculous, whereas the English language, being almost without
inflections, permits its speaker to toss his words about with an
ease unknown to Continental speech, and still be intelligible. The
result is that the European is trained to more care, and, therefore,
greater exactness, than is demanded of the American. Moreover, the
average American’s commercial education does not include a careful,
analytical study of an inflected language. His geographical aloofness
from the rest of the world insures him also a linguistic isolation.
The European, on the other hand, has an added advantage in that by
traversing a territory no larger than three or four of our big
states, he will encounter a half-dozen languages, of all of which he
must have some knowledge if he is to be a financial success.

The American, then, in writing orders is competing against a
handicap. Von Kiessing, a foreigner, states that “the best of plans,
the most skilful combinations, may fail, if the commander or his
staff officers cannot express them properly”; and Buddecke, also a
foreigner, insists that “a plan, promising success, may fail if it
does not find correct expression in an order.” If these men, schooled
in language as well as in tactics, find admonition so emphatically
necessary, how must we look upon the matter?

The form and composition of the order, if practiced now, ought to
give us a certain amount of independence when we come to practical
and strategical considerations later. For certainly, we shall be far
ahead of our fellows who must try at once, and for the first time,
both tactics and composition.


THE FORM OF THE FIELD ORDER

“To enable the will of the commander to be quickly understood, to
secure prompt cooperation among his subordinates, and for ready
reference, field orders are required to follow a general form. This
form divides an order into sections or parts and assigns to each a
particular class of information.

The parts of the field order are:

  THE HEADING.
  THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS (in certain orders).
  THE BODY.
  THE ENDING.”[9]

The only difference between the divisions of the field message and
the field order, then, is that the latter contains in certain orders
_The Distribution of Troops_.

THE HEADING.—The heading contains:

  THE TITLE OR NAME OF ISSUING OFFICER’S COMMAND.
  THE PLACE.
  THE DATE.
  THE HOUR OF ISSUE.
  THE NUMBER OF THE ORDER.
  THE REFERENCE TO MAP USED.

The _Title_ or _Name_ corresponds to the _Name_ of Sending Detachment
in the field message. But a title is the name applied to the
temporary duty of a command, such as, “Advance Guard, Det. 21st
Div.,” whereas the name itself might be “162d Inf., Det. 21st Div.”
_The Place_ does not need to be given so specifically as in the field
message, because the command issuing a field order takes up much more
space than a reconnaissance party. The _Date_ and _Hour of Issue_
are written as in the field message. Field Orders are numbered in
sequence usually annually. The _Reference_ to _Map Used_ is placed
immediately below the number. The Heading of a field order would
appear thus:

  Field Orders:              Det. 21st Div., 12th Corps,
    No. 22                          Leavenworth, Kansas,
  (Geological Survey Sheet)           9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.—“The distribution of troops shows the
tactical components into which a command is divided (advance guard,
main body, etc.) and the troops assigned to each. It is generally
used in march orders and in the first field order applying to a
command newly created or organized. In other cases it is usually more
convenient to name the troops in the body of the order, where their
duties are prescribed.

When a ‘distribution’ is used, it is headed ‘Troops,’ and in written
or printed orders is placed on the left of _The Body_, occupying
about one-third of the page. The tactical components are marked
with lettered subheads (a), (b), etc., the troops listed under each
performing the task prescribed in the similarly marked paragraph of
the body of the order.

When orders are dictated or sent by wire or signals, the distribution
of troops (if used) is given immediately after paragraph 2, without
number.”[10] In orders for a regiment and smaller bodies the
_Distribution_ of _Troops_ is usually omitted.

The Distribution of Troops in a field order would appear thus:

  _Troops._

  (a) Independent Cavalry:
      Col. Adams.
     1st & 2d Sqs. 1st Cav.
       (less one troop)
  (b) Advance Guard:
      Col. Byron.
     1st Inf., 1st Cav.,
     Btry. B, 5th F. A.
  Det. Co. A, Engrs.
  Det. Amb. Co. No. 1.
  (c) Main Body, in order of march:
     1st Bn, 2d Inf.
     1st Bn, 5th F. A.
       (less 1 btry).
     1st Brig. (less 1st Inf. and
       1st Bn. 2d Inf.).
     4th Inf.
     Co. A, Engrs. (less det.).
     Amb. Co. No. 1 (less det.).
     1st F. Hosp.
  (d) Signal Troops:
      Lieut. Dash.
     1 plat., Co. A.

THE BODY.—The Body, of course, is the main part of the order. It
contains the information and instructions for the command. It is to
this part that Buddecke refers when he says: “_The order, which is to
transform decision into action, is of the utmost importance._”


The Sentence and the Paragraph, then, should be perfectly
constructed. Each one of those elements should be tested to see
that it is unified, coherent, and emphatic. _The examples herein
given, or any set phrasing, should never be imitated._ Every leader
must compose his own words, his own decision. He must give to his
subordinates the language that best suits the particular occasion.
Otherwise there will be no unity of structure and little likelihood
of unity of action. Every military situation is a a law unto itself,
and the language of the field order should fit that law.

Nevertheless there are certain aids, as we shall see, in composing
_the Body_. The topic of each paragraph is to be found in our
Regulations. We must see that nothing enters the paragraph or
sub-paragraph but that which belongs in the topic assigned. We must
see, also, that all of the matter belonging in a paragraph is
placed there, and that every sentence in the paragraph is free from
violations of Unity, Coherence, and Emphasis.

“Paragraph 1 contains such information of the enemy and of our
supporting troops as it is desirable that subordinates should know.”

“Paragraph 2 contains the general plan of the commander, or so much
thereof as will insure cooperation of all parts of the command.”

“Paragraph 3 contains the detailed tactical dispositions adopted
by the commander to carry out the plan outlined in paragraph 2,
including the tasks assigned to each of the several combatant
fractions of the command. These tasks are given under lettered
subheads (a), (b), etc., the leading fraction, or the one having the
most important duty to perform, being generally considered first.
For instance: In an attack order it is customary to consider the
artillery first; in a march order troops are considered according to
their position in column.”

“Instructions applicable to all of these fractions may be embodied in
a sub-paragraph, letter (X), at the end of paragraph 3.”

“Paragraph 4 contains instructions for the trains, and may designate
the position of ammunition distributing stations, dressing stations,
and stations for slightly wounded.”

“The last paragraph, usually paragraph 5, shows where the commander
can be found or messages may be sent. In orders of subordinate
commanders, this paragraph also gives the location of lines of
information, if any have been established.”

“If additional paragraphs are necessary, they are incorporated,
properly numbered, after paragraph 4. Sometimes it is unnecessary
to include instructions for the trains; but whatever the number of
paragraphs the last always shows where the commander can be found,
etc.”[11]

Briefly, then, the paragraphs may be epitomized as follows:

  1. Enemy (sub-paragraph neither numbered nor lettered).

     Your own troops (sub-paragraph neither numbered
       nor lettered).

  2. Plan (single paragraph).

  3. (a) Task of the leading, or the most important,
         fraction of command.

     (b) Task of next, or next important, fraction of
         command. (X) Anything which applies to all
         fractions of command.

  4. Trains.

  5. Location of commander or place to which messages
     are to be sent (sub-paragraph neither numbered
     nor lettered).

     Location of lines of information (sub-paragraph
     neither numbered nor lettered).

The Body of a field order would appear thus:

                      1. The enemy’s cavalry patrols
                           have been seen north of
                           KICKAPOO. His infantry
                           and artillery are reported
                           at ATCHISON.
                         Our division is 8 miles south
                           of LEAVENWORTH.

                      2. This detachment will march
                           tomorrow to KICKAPOO.

                      3. (a) The independent cavalry
                            will start at 5-30 a. m.,
                            covering the movement.

                         (b) The advance guard will
                            clear the northern exit of
                            LEAVENWORTH at 6
                            a. m., marching by the
                            ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN
                            road.

                         (c) The main body will follow
                            the advance guard at
                            1,200 yards.

                         (d) The signal troops will
                            establish a line of information
                            along the line of
                            march between the independent
                            cavalry and
                            LEAVENWORTH, one
                            of the stations being at
                            FRENCHMAN.

                      4. The field train, escorted by
                           one company 4th Inf., will
                           follow the main body as far
                           as FRENCHMAN.

                      5. The detachment commander
                           will be with the main body
                           until 7 a. m., and thereafter
                           with the advance
                           guard.

THE ENDING.—“The ending contains the authentication of the order
and a statement of how it is communicated to the command. This
statement is an important feature of a field order and is made by the
officer signing the order, he being responsible that it is properly
distributed.”[12]

The ending then would appear thus:

  By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:

                                         J. G. HAMILTON,
                                               Lt. Col. 1st Inf.,
                                               _Act. Chief of Staff_.

  Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery and
  engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.

The various parts of the field order, when assembled, appear as
follows:

                                   Det. 21st Div. 12th Corps,
  Field Orders:                              Leavenworth, Kansas,
    No. 22.                                     9 Dec. 28, 8-15 p. m.
    (Geological Survey Sheet.)

        _Troops._

  (a) Independent             1. The enemy’s cavalry patrols
       Cavalry:                    have been seen north of
       Col. Adams.                 KICKAPOO. His infantry
      1st & 2d Sqs. 1st            and artillery are reported
       Cav.                        at ATCHISON.
       (less 1 troop).           Our division is 8 miles south
                                   of LEAVENWORTH.

                              2. This detachment will march
                                   tomorrow to KICKAPOO.
  (b) Advance Guard:
       Col. Byron.            3. (a) The Independent Cavalry
      1st Inf.                      will start at 5-30 a. m.,
      1 Troop, 1st Cav.             covering the movement.
      Btry. B, 5th F. A.
      Det. Amb. Co.              (b) The advance guard will
       No. 1.                       clear the northern exit of
                                    LEAVENWORTH at 6
                                    a. m., marching by the
                                    ATCHISON CROSS-FRENCHMAN
                                    road.

  (c) Main Body, in              (c) The main body will follow
       order of march:              the advance guard at
      1st Bn. 2d Inf.               1,200 yards.
      1st Bn. 5th F. A.
       (less 1 btry).            (d) The Signal troops will
      1st Brig. (less 1st           establish a line of information
       Inf. and 1st Bn.             along the line of
       2d Inf.).                    march between the independent
      4th Inf.                      cavalry and
      Co. A, Engrs.                 LEAVENWORTH, one
       (less det.).                 of the stations being at
      Amb. Co. No. 1                FRENCHMAN.
       (less det.).
      1st F. Hosp.            4. The field train, escorted by
                                  one company 4th Infantry,
                                  will follow the main body
                                  as far as FRENCHMAN.

                              5. The detachment commander
                                  will be with the
                                  main body until 7 a. m.,
  (d) Signal Troops:              and thereafter with the advance
       Lieut. Dash.               guard.
      1 plat. Co. A.
                                By order of Brig.-Gen. Forse:
                                         J. G. HAMILTON,
                                           Lt. Col., 1st Inf.,
                                          _Acting Chief of Staff_.

  Copies to Colonels Adams and Byron, commanders of artillery
  and engineers, and to staff; to division commander by wire.


There are certain

  SPECIAL CAUTIONS

in regard to the writing of the field order.

1.—What is required in paragraph 3 of the _Body_ is that the order be
logical—coherent.[13]

2.—An order tells a subordinate _what_ to do but not _how_ to do it.

3.—Conjectures, expectations, reasons for measures adopted, and
detailed instructions for a variety of possible events, do not
inspire confidence, and should be avoided.

4.—As a rule, an affirmative form of expression is used. Such an
order as: “The supply train will not accompany the division,” is
defective, because the gist of the order depends upon the single word
“not.” It is far better to say, “The supply train will remain at
so-and-so until further orders.”

5.—Do not use such expressions as “attempt to capture,” “try to
hold,” “as far as possible,” “as well as you can.” Besides being
indefinite, they divide responsibility. You, for example, receive
an order “to try to capture” a certain position. Immediately there
pops into your mind the suspicion that the commanding officer did
not believe that the place could be taken, or was not anxious about
having it captured. The commanding officer by the very wording of
his order has taken on himself a part of the responsibility in the
event of a repulse. At least he has not placed all the burden of
the undertaking upon you. In the latter case he has been guilty of
improper subordination.




CHAPTER VII

PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD ORDER


After the plan of Trench of the English Service, we are going to
take up the problems in the construction of the field order along
the lines on which tactical situations naturally develop themselves
during hostilities. We shall discover that the sequence will not only
conform to actual conditions, but will lead from the more simple to
the more complex. We shall, then, proceed with,—

  (1) The March Order.
  (2) The Attack Order.
  (3) The Order for Position in Readiness.
  (4) The Defense Order.
  (5) The Retreat Order.
  (6) The Pursuit Order.
  (7) The Halt Order.
  (8) The Outpost Order.

Emphasis will be laid upon the march and attack orders, because they
are the most usual and the most critical.

In these problems all necessary data will be given. No attempt will
be made to mislead in regard to fact. But every attempt will be made
to mislead in regard to the expression of the fact. Crude violations
and mixtures of rhetoric will therefore be found throughout.

In arranging his material the student should use his own style and
should not attempt to copy phraseology from any military forms. _That
which is most brief and most unmistakable is best, no matter who
writes the order._

_Note._—The topographical data will not be found upon the map. The
units for which a field order must be written require an area larger
than that which our limited sheet provides. The student, by reading
over the problem two or three times ought, with the aid of his
imagination, to perceive the will of the commander.


(1) MARCH ORDERS

1.—On June 12, 1925, you are Major General Abercrombie in command of
the 16th Division of the 12th Army Corps. You wish your division,
which is in the vicinity of Bruceville, to march over to Littlestown
the next day. You want it to cover the base and line of supply for
your troops. You want it to do all this because one of your flying
corps lieutenants saw from a captive balloon about a division of
the enemy pass through Chambersburg early in the morning. The enemy
was marching east and according to the lieutenant was composed of
infantry, cavalry, field artillery—in fact, all branches of the
service. You finish with this your twenty-second order since January
1st at a quarter after ten at night. But just before you finish with
your order a Colonel of Cavalry on your staff tells you that he
personally saw cavalry in Gettysburg during the evening. You want
your advance guard, which consists of the 1st Brigade, 1st Battalion
of the 1st Field Artillery, Company A, First Battalion of Engineers,
one section of a Signal Company, and the first ambulance company, to
get past the bridge over Pipe Creek at precisely six o’clock and to
go along the main road to Littlestown in its route. The advance guard
is to be commanded by Brigadier General Black. Now the main body,
you figure, will go along in column from front to rear,—one section
of the Signal Company, the fourth regiment of Infantry, the Field
Artillery Brigade without its combat train, the 2d Brigade without
the 4th Infantry, the third Brigade, the Signal Company (Company A)
without its detachments, the first Battalion of Engineers without
Company A, the Field Artillery Combat Train, and then the second,
third, and fourth Ambulance companies.

You want this main body to start across the Pipe Creek bridge at
half past six and you want it to go along keeping a distance of a
mile behind the tail of the advance guard. You want to tell your
troops, too, that you will be with the tail of the reserve of the
advance guard. You intend to sign your order yourself and you want
copies sent to Lieutenants Kingsley and Lawrence, and to Brigade
Generals Black, Dare, Evans, Colonel File, Major Glad, Captain Hume
and your staff. You want your trains to follow your main body in
order from front to rear: field trains, ammunition columns, supply
columns, field hospitals, medical reserve, and pack train. You feel
that the man in command of your signal corps should arrange to have
radio connection between your independent cavalry and the advance
guard. That idea brings up another matter. Your independent cavalry,
which will be commanded by Colonel File and which will consist of
the 1st Cavalry and one section of the Signal Company, will have to
reconnoiter all the roads which lead out of Gettysburg and which are
between the York Pike and the Emmitsburg road. You want the cavalry
to reconnoiter the York Pike and the Emmitsburg road, too. You want
this cavalry to maneuver so that they will come in contact with the
enemy as soon as practicable. Now you want the independent cavalry to
do all this because you want it to cover the whole movement of your
troops and you think it ought to start out promptly at five o’clock
in the morning in order to accomplish its purpose best.

2.—On the tenth of August, 1928, you are Colonel Bruce commanding
the 129th regiment of Infantry which is acting as advance guard to
the 5th Division. On the tenth of August at half past five in the
morning at the Penitentiary of Leavenworth, Kansas, you sign your
27th field order. You have in reality dictated it to your officers,
but you sign it as soon as you have finished. You have told them in
substance that all but one squad of Troop A, under command of Captain
Briggs, 21st Cavalry, would comprise the Advance Cavalry; that the
first battalion of the 1st Infantry, one squad of Troop A, 21st
Cavalry, and a detachment of Company A of the Engineers under Major
Chittombly, would constitute the support; and that the Reserve would
be Headquarters and 2d Battalion of the 129th Infantry, Battery B of
the 5th Field Artillery, the third Battalion of the 129th Infantry,
and a Detachment of Ambulance Company, Number 1. You assembled all
the officers of your command when you dictated your order and you
told them that the troops of the command would march in order as
stated above. You told them that you would stay with the reserve and
would march near its head. You stated that the field train would
assemble at the first cross-roads to the south and there wait under
command of Captain Phillips, the Quartermaster of the 1st Infantry,
for the field train of the main body and would join that field train
as it passed. The main body was to come along so that the head of
it would be just a half mile behind the tail of the Reserve of the
Advance Guard. The whole of the Advance Guard you want to march on
Kickapoo, because the enemy which someone had reported to have camped
near Atchison the night before, and is composed of all branches of
the service, has cavalry patrols out which were seen in the vicinity
of Kickapoo yesterday. You wish the point of the support to begin the
march at a quarter to six in the morning. It is to go by the general
route which marks the turning points Atchison Cross, Frenchman,
Kickapoo, along a continuous stretch of road. So that the Advance
Cavalry will have time to get ahead, you want it to leave camp at
once and march by way of Atchison Cross to Kickapoo. This proceeding
is necessary because you want all the country west of the line of
march to the extent of three miles very carefully observed. You want
Sheridan’s Drive to be observed carefully also. You want the reserve
to follow the support so that there will be 800 yards distance
between it and the tail of the support. You send a copy of the order
to your Division Commander.

3.—On the thirty-first of May, 1931, you are Major General Perkins
in command of the 16th Division, 22d Corps. War has just broken out
and not any of your army has crossed the frontier as yet. However,
it is going to do so on the next day, and the 22d Corps is going to
march on Thurmont and Frederick. Your division has been ordered to
cover the left of the whole army. Your independent cavalry in command
of Colonel Frank and composed of the 11th Cavalry and the first
radio section of the Signal Corps, is to be followed by the Advance
Guard under command of Brigadier General Blood. The advance guard is
composed of the first Brigade, the first battalion of the first field
artillery, a company of the first Battalion of Engineers, the first
Ambulance Company, and one radio section of the Signal Company. You
sign your order at eight in the evening and send copies to Brigadier
Generals Blood, Cook, Dean, Enfield, Colonel Frank, Major Good,
Captain Harry, by officers. You also furnish copies to your staff.
You decide to have your division march on Gettysburg in order to
carry out your mission. Your main body is going to start at seven
in the morning and will march in the following order: one section
of the Signal Company, the first battalion of the 4th Infantry, all
but one battalion of the first brigade of Field Artillery, all of
the second Brigade but the first battalion of the 4th Infantry, the
entire third Brigade, all but one company of the first battalion of
engineers, Signal Company A without certain detachments mentioned
before, the field artillery combat trains, and three ambulance
companies. You want the advance guard to be up and out of camp at
half past six in the morning. It is to march by the Chambersburg Pike
on Gettysburg and to be followed by the main body with a mile between
the two units. The independent cavalry is to be up and out of camp
by six o’clock in the morning. You want your trains to follow your
main body five miles behind it and you want them to follow in this
order: field trains, first section of the supply trains, ammunition
column, the remainder of the supply trains, field hospitals, medical
reserve, pack train. You want your independent cavalry to advance
on Gettysburg. You want your independent cavalry to reconnoiter all
the roads which run out of Gettysburg to the south and east and you
want them to get in touch with the cavalry of the corps as soon as
possible. You are going to march at the forward end of the reserve of
the advance guard. When you have signed your order at Chambersburg
where your troops are located, you have it telegraphed to Corps
headquarters.

4.—On May the eleventh, 1940, you are in command of the 8th Division
of the 19th Corps. You are at Frederick, Maryland, and you want
your division to advance toward Gettysburg and to be a protection
to your main army which is going to come through the passes of the
mountains in that vicinity. You are going to remain in Frederick
until half past eight the next morning, and then you are going to go
and be with the advance guard at its head. You want your main body
to begin to move out when the head is at the first railroad crossing
north of the town, and at ten minutes to seven to follow a mile
behind the advance guard which you are going to have march along the
Emmitsburg Turnpike. The end of the column ought to be across the
first railroad crossing north of the town at half past six in the
morning. The enemy’s main army is near Baltimore and Washington. You
have heard from pretty good sources that a part of his army is in
such a condition that any immediate movement is rendered out of the
question, though you have reliable word that one of his divisions
and possibly more are in fit condition to move toward the frontier.
Indeed they may have done so, for already your frontier is being
observed by all sorts and kinds of small detachments of the enemy.
You want your field trains to come along and get together north of
the town as soon as all of the troops have got out. You want them
to be divided into two sections and you want the first section to
be about two miles in rear of the troops and the second section to
come along after the first section with a two mile distance. Your
main body in order of march will be, one section of the signal
company, the first battalion of the fourth regiment of infantry, the
first brigade of Field Artillery without its first battalion, all
but the first battalion of the second brigade, all but one company
of the first battalion of Engineers, Signal Company A without its
detachment, the field artillery combat train, and three ambulance
companies. You want the river crossings of the Monocacy and the
roads, railroads, and in fact all approaches to them from the east
to be especially observed by the Advance Guard. That body will
consist of the first brigade, the first battalion of the first field
artillery, Company A of the Engineers, the first Ambulance Company
and the first section of the Signal Company, all under command
of Brigadier General Bates. The first section of the field train
will have the following order: field trains; one section of the
supply column; one wagon company of artillery ammunition; and one
wagon company of small arms ammunition. The second section: field
hospitals, all but two wagon companies of the ammunition column;
all but one section of the supply column; medical reserve; and pack
trains. You are going to begin this whole march on the next day. Your
independent cavalry, commanded by Colonel Fine, and consisting of the
first regiment of Cavalry and one section of the Signal Company is
to start out at half past five in the morning and cover your whole
movement. You want this cavalry to scout around Taneytown and see
what it can find on the roads which go off from the southeast from
there. The whole army of which you are a part aims to take up an
advance movement and it plans to get to Gettysburg on the eighteenth
of May. This is the second field order you have issued in this
campaign. You send copies of it by your aide Lieut. Kill to Generals
Bates, Cutts, Dent, and Eaton; by Lieut. Link to Colonel Fine, Major
Good, Captain Hall, and to the commander of the trains. You read the
order to your staff, send a copy by mail to Corps Headquarters and
telegraph a synopsis to the same place. You sign your order at a
quarter after nine.

5.—On June 10, 1925, you are Brigadier General Stewart in command
of a Detachment from the ninth division. You are lost. You can find
out nothing about the enemy. Indeed you can get no wind of where
your own troops are. You assemble all your officers and read at ten
minutes after five in the morning an order which you have written at
Bonnyville where you are located. You want your whole command to go
by way of Whitehall and move toward Levere. You want your field train
and ammunition wagon companies, on account of your ignorance of the
enemy to park near the western end of the town where the road runs
out. They are to make this maneuver after half past six and are to be
in readiness to move to the west or to the east. The advance guard
under command of Colonel Dent, and composed of all of the second
infantry but the third battalion, is to march on the road past St.
Luke’s Church and then on the same road toward Whitehall. It is to
get past the road fork where the main road goes out of the town at
the southeastern edge at twenty minutes to six. You are going to be
with the advance guard. You will be up front with the reserve. Your
independent cavalry is to march at half past four. It consists of the
first squadron of the fifth cavalry under command of Major Curt. It
is going to try to get in touch with the enemy. The main body is to
come along after the advance guard so that it will be eight hundred
yards from the tail of it. Your main body will march in the following
order: third battalion of the second infantry, first battalion
without the reserve, the third regiment of infantry, the first
regiment of infantry, the artillery reserve, the first ambulance
company and Signal Company A. Part of your main body is doing outpost
duty, and you have told your officer when you issued your order that
when the support of the advance guard reached St. Luke’s Church the
next morning the outpost would stand relieved, and that it would take
its place in column after it had closed in to the road, when the
troops came along.


(2) ATTACK ORDERS

6.—You are Brigadier General Greene commanding a Detachment of the
18th Division, and on June 11, 1965, you are at the headquarters of
your division at St. Luke’s Church. You receive reliable messages
to the effect that the enemy is in your front about two and a half
miles away. You determine to attack the left of the enemy and to
envelop that flank. You want the cavalry to cover your own left
flank, and you want the cavalry also to send out patrols to keep a
lookout on the right. First of all, though, you want the battalion of
artillery to go south via the Newman farm and take a position north
of the farm. You want the artillery to begin firing as soon as it
arrives in the position designated. You have heard from other patrols
coming in that the enemy is taking up a position on a hill in your
front about the distance away you had previously estimated. You want
the first infantry to form the reserve and you want it to follow in
rear of the left flank of the third infantry. The third infantry
will take up and follow over the same route as the artillery. After
crossing Plum Creek the whole regiment will move to attack the enemy.
The regiment will keep its left near the road which runs past Piper
and Whitehall. The battalion of artillery when it is moving to its
new position should move off the road whenever it is necessary to
screen itself from hostile view. The second infantry will attack
along the road it is now on. It should not, however, advance beyond
the Whitehall School House until the artillery opens fire. It ought
then to help along the attack in support of the third infantry. You
sign your message at half past six in the morning. You want your
first ambulance company to follow the reserve. When the company gets
to Plum Creek, however, it should stop there and wait until further
orders. You hear that your cavalry out in front has defeated the
enemy’s cavalry and that the enemy’s cavalry is fleeing eastward. You
wish to incorporate this fact in your order. You will have some one
always ready to receive messages at the cross-roads at the Newman
farm if you are not there yourself. You send a copy of this your
sixth field order of the campaign by Lieutenant Cost to Major Call.
You read the order at half past six to your commanders of infantry
regiments, artillery battalion, signal company, and staff officers.
You desire the Signal Company to establish a line which will connect
you with Bonnyville, and you should have a line to your support
commander, who is the commanding officer of the second infantry.

7.—You, on September 1, 1922, are at Kolpatrick School House. You are
in command of the 28th Brigade 3d Division, and you issue to your
assembled officers by word of mouth the twenty-ninth field order of
this campaign at ten minutes after nine in the morning. You send a
copy to the Chief of Staff of your Division by an aide. You have just
decided to attack a hostile detachment which has just been reported
by an officer to be near you and to be about half your strength.
In fact this detachment has taken a position on a ridge of long
mountains about two and one-half miles straight to the south of you.
You wish to communicate to your troops, also, that the entire army of
which your brigade is a part is engaged in a fight with the enemy;
and that the right of the line of the army is near Two Taverns. You
do not want the field train to move out and to accompany you in your
movement. The third infantry you have decided to make your reserve.
It ought to take up some kind of position to the right of the second
infantry and in rear of it. The first infantry should move out and
should follow the road leading south, and before any of the others
of the troops it ought to attack the enemy in front. You want the
first infantry to begin their movement right off and then later on to
support the enveloping attack. The enveloping attack you have trusted
to the second and third infantry regiments. The second followed
by the third is to move out with the artillery on their left. The
whole body is to march along Brush Run under cover of a ridge of
mountains on which you are located until it comes opposite to the
Brush Run School House. The artillery, as you plan it, is then to go
into position west of Brush Run School House, and to open fire on the
enemy. The second infantry is then to deploy, and it is to deploy so
that its right will be about five hundred yards to the left of the
artillery’s position. The second infantry is then to go right off
into an attack on the enemy’s right flank. While this body of troops
is on the march (the second, and third infantries and the artillery),
the commanding officer of the second infantry should see that the
necessary precautions are taken against surprise or attack by the
enemy. You have decided to be during the attack at the head of the
column on the extreme left until it deploys. After that you are going
to be with the reserve. The first squadron of the fourth cavalry
under your command is going to cover your left in this movement. It
should send out strong patrols to the right besides sending them
to the left and get in touch with the right of the main army. The
ambulance will go along with the third infantry. But when the third
Infantry gets to Cedar Ridge, the ambulance company will not proceed
any further.

8.—On the 6th of January, 1930, you are Brigadier General Hitt
in command of the first Brigade, first Division. You are at Ode,
Missouri. You defeated the enemy the day before. You have since
heard that he is occupying the line which extends from Baldwin to
the hill south of Eppley’s Farm. You have an advance guard for your
Brigade and you decide to take up an attack formation which will
not necessitate the use of an advance guard any longer. The trains
you feel should not be moved from where they are located, but the
ambulance company ought to move toward, and take a suitable position
near, Ode. You decide to attack immediately, and you are going to do
so in a way which will cause the enemy’s left to be enveloped. You
issue the 61st field order of the campaign at half past nine in the
morning.

You understand from reliable sources, in fact from officers’
patrols, that there is a large convoy of the enemy parked somewhere
in Farley. You decide that the first infantry ought to take up the
main advance against the enemy, and you think it ought to go in a
general direction along the road which runs past Square Corners and
Eppley. After the 1st Infantry has launched its attack it ought to
support the attack of the 2d Infantry. The 3d Infantry is going to
send the 2d Infantry a machine gun company, which you think you will
have attached to the 2d Infantry. The 2d Infantry, you have figured
out, ought to advance, keeping the ravine near Meas between itself
and the enemy. After it strikes the ravine, it ought to go along it
until the first part of the column approaches and comes up to a point
where the ravine starts to bend south. When it has exactly reached
that point where the ravine does bend south, it ought to start out
on the enemy’s left in an attack. The 2d Infantry ought to push
this attack with all its might. The 3d Infantry will be known as a
reserve, and it will be under your orders; until further orders it
ought to take up a position in some sheltered place to the west of
Square Corners. Before it starts out, however, it ought to send its
machine gun company, without further delay, so that the company may
report to the commander of the 1st Infantry as soon as practicable.
You give all this order to your regimental commanders after they have
been assembled—in fact, you read it off to them. With the regimental
commanders have been assembled also Major Black of the 7th Field
Artillery, and the officers in charge of the ambulance company, and
the officers of your staff. You are going to send a copy of this
order by the aide to your Division Commander. You are going to have a
station at the reserve where you will be in touch with any messages
that might come in—in fact, all the messages ought to be sent there.
You want the cavalry to cover your left flank, and you want a strong
patrol sent in the general direction of the west and also of the
south. Before you finished writing this order you found out that the
bridges over the Platte River were all destroyed. The Platte River
runs along the rear of the enemy. All those bridges which are between
Platte City and Farley you know are destroyed; you hear also that
the enemy is at work repairing them. From all the messages and all
sources of information which you can assemble, you estimate that
it will require two or three hours to make these bridges safe for
troops. You want the 1st Battalion of the 7th Field Artillery to
move out straight to the south and to take up a position 500 yards
south of where you are writing your message. When the artillery gets
there, you want it to open fire just as soon as it can on the enemy’s
position wherever that might be. You want your artillery to make the
enemy’s artillery a target, and to develop that target as soon as
possible.

9.—On the 17th of May, 1919, you are in command of the 1st Division
of the 18th Corps. Your division is encamped near Mt. St. Mary’s.
You want your division to attack the enemy right away and you want
him to go around so he will develop the left of the enemy. Your
first ambulance company ought to follow the Field Artillery to where
Hampton Valley starts, and it ought to stay there until further
orders. Your second ambulance company you want to go along with and
follow the 3d Brigade. This ambulance company ought to go as far as
the crossing of Beaver Branch, and then it should stay there and
not go away until further orders. The third and fourth ambulance
companies should not move out at all, but ought to park somewhere
near the road near the place called Rodey. The field hospitals will
not move out at all, but ought to stay until you send them orders
to the contrary. In the place called Thurmont, there ought to be a
collecting station for the slightly wounded. Your first artillery
ought to move out at once down Hampton Valley and take a position
somewhere near the road which runs through Emmitsburg and along past
St. Joseph’s Academy. The 2d Field Artillery should find a position
and take it up somewhere near Motters. The 3d Brigade, which we found
the second ambulance company was to follow, should move out and then
go along by Motters and launch an attack on the enemy; the 3d Brigade
ought to envelop the enemy’s left. The left of the 3d Brigade ought
to rest on the line which runs through the place called Motters, and
also runs through Tom’s Creek Church. The Brigade Commander of the
3d Brigade will have the general line of the Monocacy Creek under
observation of mounted men. This line ought to be kept in under
observation pretty well south—in fact, to the mouth of Hunting Creek.
The main attack will be launched, as you figured, all along the
front, which is determined by a line running through St. Joseph’s
Academy and also running through Long’s.

The brigade commander of this brigade ought to detail a battalion
of infantry; the special duty of this battalion will be to form an
escort for the 1st Field Artillery which it will accompany. One
wagon company of artillery ammunition will go down to the mouth of
Hampton Valley. You have heard that there is a great party of the
enemy, which has been estimated at say two-thirds of a division, and
that this big force is assembling and concentrating in rear of the
outlying timber. This fringe of timber extends from Tom’s Creek
Church all the way north to near Parkersburg. This hostile force
averages about 50 yards south of this timber. The first cavalry you
feel ought to cover your left. You feel that the reconnaissance that
it ought to take up must be strong, dashing, and vigorous, and that
it should reconnoiter east of the Monocacy. You write your order,
which is the third one during the year, at 9 o’clock in the morning.

Your Signal Company will lay a line from the 1st Field Artillery to
the road-fork, 500 yards west of Round Corners. A second line will
be laid from the 2d Brigade to the same road-fork. Your leading
wagon company of small arms ammunition should be placed just north
of Riley. You want to state to the remainder of your trains that
they are not to move out from there until they get orders from
you. You send copies of this order to Majors Black, Cord, Darwin,
Enfield, Colonel Forse, Major Good, and Captain Harrow. You report by
telegraph to your Division Headquarters what you have said in your
order. The 2d Brigade is going to be your general reserve; it should
take up a position outside near the cross-roads. This cross-roads
that you mean is 1,500 yards west of Motters. Any messages and
reports which are going to come to you, you want to have reach you at
the road-fork, which is about 2,000 yards west of the place called
Motters.

10.—You are Brigadier General Aaron in charge of a detachment of the
1st Division. You are about to get out your fourth field order of the
campaign, which you issued and signed at ten minutes to seven on the
morning of October 6, 1918. Your Chief of Staff is Lieutenant Bean.
The main body, of which you are a part, is engaged with the enemy
at the present time. The two bodies opposed to each other, fighting
strenuously, extend from near the Belmont School House toward the
north. You want the 1st Infantry to advance via the 530-618 road,
and you want it to deploy whenever it is necessary for it to do so.
You want it to deploy with its left flank touching the 548-618 road.
After it has done this you want it to attack at the same time that
the 2d Infantry does. Your artillery you want to move out by way of
the road which runs through 542 and 550, and you want it to go so it
will get a position somewhere near the Hill 608; it will be escorted
by the 1st Battalion of the 2d Infantry. You want this artillery
to support the attack in the best way it can. The 1st Battalion
of the 2d Infantry should take up such formation and movement as
will best provide protection for the left of your whole line. The
whole of the 2d Infantry, of course, excepting the first battalion,
will advance by 452. It will then take a cut across country and
then by the road which goes by 546 and 548. The 2d Infantry will
attack the enemy’s right flank. The cavalry should cover the left
of your own troops and make strong reconnaissance of the country to
the north and also to the west. A troop of this Cavalry should be
sent over to the right flank of our troops. The work of this troop
should be to get into communication and keep communication with your
main army by telegraph. You want the Signal Detachment to give you
wire communications, or in fact, any kind of communications which
will best keep you in touch with the 1st Infantry. You are at the
cross-roads near Mt. Vernon School House when you write your order.
You have learned that there is a body of the enemy, a rather large
body in fact, which is going into some position selected near Granite
Hill. You gain from reliable patrols all the above information, and
also the fact that this detachment of the enemy is about one-half
your own strength. You decide that you are going to attack at once
this detachment which is just spoken of, which is going into a
position near Granite Hill. If it is going into position, and if it
is now only one-half your strength, you can see that there are two
reasons why you must launch your attack with the utmost vigor and
celerity, because the enemy might gain reinforcements, or a good
position in the meantime. You state in your order that you are going
to be with the reserve all the time, and you send copies to all your
officers, especially to Major Good who is commanding the cavalry, and
you report what you have done by telegraph to the Chief of Staff. You
decide to have the 3d Infantry be the reserve. If the 3d Infantry is
the reserve and you are with it, it ought to be under your orders.
The 3d Infantry will follow along behind the 2d Infantry until the
latter regiment deploys.

11.—You are Major General Plunkitt. On the 3d of September, 1923, you
are near the town of Guldens. You are in command of the 4th Division
of the 12th Corps. You issue a written order by your Chief of Staff,
who is Lt. Col. Miley, at a quarter of eight in the morning of this
day. You propose that your division shall make a vigorous attack
upon the enemy, and that you will break through his outpost line.
Your intention is to go on through with all speed to Gettysburg. You
are going to be near the Plank Farm when this is happening. The two
troops of cavalry who are now with your advance guard, or really have
just been with your advance guard, are going to continue covering
your left flank as they have been doing. The 3d Brigade will march
from near the I. P. Plank Farm, and it will proceed north on the
road which runs north from that farm. Now, it will keep going on
that road until it gets to the woods and then it will advance to the
northwest of the railroad, and go against the enemy. The 2d Brigade
and Engineer Battalion are going to make up the reserve. They are
going to be under your orders directly, and they, in order to make
this attack successful will take a position somewhere under cover
northwest of Granite Hill. Colonel Field of your cavalry will cover
your right flank with those of his regiment who are not covering the
left. He ought to assemble his main body right now somewhere on the
Harrisburg road. You are writing this 7th field order since the first
of the year at a quarter to eight in the morning when information
from officers’ patrols comes in that there is only one division of
the enemy in Gettysburg, and that he has lost heavily by casualties
in the fight you have had with it the day before. You learn also at
the same time that there is an outpost line of the enemy, which is
extending from Body School House to McAllister Hill. This outpost
line crosses the road you are on and your troops are on, at Hill 618;
you find out also that Wolff Hill is full of the enemy. The artillery
of your command you figure ought to take up some position to the west
of Granite Hill, and that it should open fire on the enemy as soon as
the enemy has been discovered. The Signal Company should connect you
and your headquarters with all of the commanders of the first, third,
and artillery Brigades. You send copies of all these orders by Lieut.
Knight to your four brigade commanders, and also to the officers in
charge of the first section of your train; you read it off to your
staff, and you send a copy by an orderly to the second section of
your train. Your ambulance companies are going to park near the right
fork of 617, and you are going to camp east of this fork, which is
northeast of Granite Hill. You want the first sections of your trains
to go and park at Guldens, and you want the second section not to
budge from where it is now stationed. Your first brigade should
continue its advance along the road you are on, and when it becomes
necessary finally to deploy, they should deploy across this road.
After they have deployed they ought to take up the attack at once
and go forward with Hill 618 as their objective. There are about a
thousand of your troops, you learn, who are wounded in Gettysburg;
then, too, there are many wounded who are now held as prisoners of
war in Gettysburg where a division of the enemy is stationed, and
where it has lost heavily.




CHAPTER VIII

MORE PROBLEMS OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE FIELD ORDER


(3) ORDER FOR POSITION IN READINESS

1.—You are Major General Tuttill in command of the 10th Division of
the 3d Corps, which is at Taneytown. On June 3, 1952, your division
has been designated to keep a certain force of the enemy out of
a battle which is going to take place with your whole army. This
hostile force is directly in your front. You determine therefore to
take up a position in readiness on the south side of Pipe Creek.
You have been encamped with the outpost. You want this outpost and
the cavalry which is attached to your command, to watch out for the
retirement of your whole division to this position in readiness.
After that, this whole outpost is to withdraw to Keymar. They are
to get to Keymar by going over the road through Bruceville. The
commander of the outpost will be notified when he will begin this
withdrawal. The enemy, you have learned, is directly in your front
and has gone into camp along Piney Creek near the village of Piney
Creek toward the north. The third brigade is to start at 4 o’clock
in the morning and is to march directly to Keymar, and the artillery
brigade, all but one battalion, will start out at the same hour and
will go around by Otterdale mill and will go to Montunion Church. The
first brigade should march the very same hour with its destination
to be near the vicinity of a small amount of woods, which are about
1,000 yards in a southerly direction from Trevanion. Your army on
this very day crossed the Monocacy. During the expedition, they
don’t meet with very much opposition, so that they intend on the
next day to attack the main body of the enemy which is somewhere in
the vicinity of Mt. Ary. Your signal company should leave the third
brigade. When the signal company gets to Keymar, it should connect
up that place with the station of the first brigade; it should put
in on this line a station for the artillery brigade. In addition,
the signal company ought to keep up a line of communication with
the outpost until the outpost is withdrawn. You, as the commanding
general of this division want to notify all your troops about a
certain fact which applies to every one—namely, that the staff
officers should go along with the infantry brigade before mentioned,
and should pick out and mark points which are to be entrenched. Your
engineer battalion will start to march at the same hour as the other
troops mentioned above. They are to strike then across to Middleburg
and then they are to go to places which are to be picked out by the
chief of staff, and when they get to those places they are to assist
in the entrenching. You decide that you are going to go to Taneytown
and stay there until the outpost is withdrawn. You want the field
trains to start out at three o’clock in the morning, and these should
go along and follow in the course which has been already designated
for the respective units to which the field trains belong. These
field trains are to cross the Pipe Creek and are to assemble at
Woodsburg. All the other columns of the trains will start out at the
same hour as the troops. The ammunition columns and the two field
hospitals are to halt at Ladysburg; all the others halt at Woodsburg.
You issue this order at 10 o’clock in the evening and you sign it
yourself, and you send copies of this, your 10th field order of the
campaign, to all officers who come to your headquarters to receive
orders.


(4) THE DEFENSE ORDER

2.—You are Major General Standish. You have just received word that
the enemy to which you are opposed has been very heavily reenforced
and has now about two divisions in the town of Taneytown. Your main
army is not going to leave until the 19th, and then it will get as
far as Marshall probably. You are in command of the 21st division of
the 8th corps, and you are south of Emmitsburg on the 17th day of
May, 1945. You decide that you can’t do anything else but take up a
defensive position. You accordingly want to make your division occupy
a position extending from McKee Knob to the northeast. You want the
second brigade, which is going to be reenforced by the first cavalry
and also by the 2d battalion, 1st field artillery to cover this
movement, to take up a defensive position. General Calhoun of the
second brigade has to put in place of the infantry of his brigade on
the southern line of outpost, certain cavalry patrols. These cavalry
patrols will come from two corps which have been sent to General
Calhoun, or at least have been ordered to report to him at Motters
at one o’clock in the morning. General Calhoun should relieve the
outpost of the third brigade at two o’clock in the morning, and of
the first at three o’clock in the morning. The first brigade, after
its outpost is relieved, should immediately take up the march, going
up the road which runs through Emmitsburg and Liberty Hall School
House. It should halt when it gets northeast of 656. General Calhoun
has to be placed in command in order to carry out his part of the
situation as to certain other troops—in fact, the 2d battalion of the
1st field artillery, and the 1st cavalry, should now become a part
of his command. The 2d battalion of the 1st field artillery is at
the northeastern outskirts of the town of Emmitsburg, and the 1st
cavalry has its headquarters at Fairplay; he will begin to command
these troops at two o’clock in the morning. You write, at 11 o’clock
at night, your sixth field order and send copies by Lieut. Fright to
Generals Byrd, Carr, Dale, and to Colonel Fink and Captain Hervey.
You read the message off to your staff and report by telegraph to
army headquarters what you have done. You decide to have your third
brigade, after this outpost is relieved, march by way of Emmitsburg
from Four Points. Then the brigade is to march by the road just east
of McKee Knob to a position half a mile north of 587; there the
brigade will halt. General Calhoun should delay the crossing of the
river by the enemy. He should do this as much as he is able, but he
should not become too closely engaged with the enemy. You decide
that you will be at Emmitsburg until after 5 o’clock in the morning;
then you are going to be at Liberty Hall School House. The signal
company will take up what lines it has laid down after two o’clock in
the morning. Then one-half of the company will report to Brigadier
General Calhoun, and the remainder of the signal company will proceed
to join the 3d brigade. You want your entire command to know that
there is to be on no occasion any unnecessary noise and that this
noise is to be avoided at all hazards. You do not wish a bugle call
to be sounded before the sun rises.

3.—On the 4th of June, 1964, you are Major General Boswell in command
of the first division of the fourth army corps. Your division is west
of Gettysburg. You hear that the enemy in your front is at Cashtown
and has been heavily reenforced. The troops for these reenforcements
have come from his main army. This gives you the idea that you had
better take up a defensive position; you had better take up this
position astride the road which you now are on and you must hold
this position throughout the day. Your third brigade should start
right away to make preparations for the defense. They should take up
a line in their defense preparations extending from somewhere east
of Seven Stars, and should continue this line to the southwest for
about three-quarters of a mile. The first cavalry should send two
platoons to report to the Major who commands the engineer battalion
near Moonsburg. These should be sent if the enemy advance in force,
and they should be sent with the patrol on your right flank. The main
body of this cavalry should patrol the left of your line to cover it.
The 2d brigade will prepare for defense a line extending from near
Seven Stars northwest. It should extend this line until it reaches
the farm road which crosses the ridge. The 1st brigade will be the
reserve. They are going to be under your direct orders; they should
therefore remain midway between Knoxburg and 597. There is a road
fork there where they should stay. The engineer battalion will go at
once and prepare the high ground southwest of Moonsburg for defense,
and in this defense which they will make at this point, they are to
act as a right flank guard. The ambulance companies will be held near
the north end of Herr Ridge. You have a second field hospital which
you have established at Gettysburg and you want it to stay there. You
want your first, third, and fourth field hospitals at the western
outskirts of Gettysburg. You want these first, third, and fourth
field hospitals to assemble by the road somewhere there. Company A
of your signal corps you decide to have lay certain lines. All these
lines should go from the position of the reserve to the second field
artillery, and on this line there should be a station so that the
commander of the second brigade could cut in, and then Company A also
should lay a line from the first field artillery to the reserve.
On this line also, the commander of the third brigade should have a
station where he can go. The signal company also ought to arrange to
have receiving stations for flag signals for the engineer battalion,
and ought to do the same thing for the cavalry on the left flank. Two
wagon companies of small arms ammunition should be held near 585, and
another wagon company of artillery ammunition near 587. You are going
to be at Division Headquarters at 597. Your second field artillery
should set out at once to the road leading southwest about half a
mile from Moonsburg; it should move around the Moonsburg road to do
this. It should then go by this road, which leads southwest, to an
intersection of that road to the next farm road. The Colonel of the
second field artillery should prepare a position in this vicinity
which would be capable of supporting the entire line of defense when
this line was attacked. The first field artillery should go about
half a mile south of this camp; it should proceed around by the road
parallel to the Chambersburg road, and should go as far as a point
one mile south of Seven Stars. When it gets there it should select
and prepare a position to support the defense. You want all the
other trains which you have not mentioned not to move out from where
they are, but want them to be ready to move in any direction at your
command. You know that your main army is going to attack the weaker
hostile force, which is in its front, on the very morning your order
is issued. You also know that if your own army is successful in this
attack, it will send you later some reenforcements if you really need
them. You write this order at twenty minutes of five in the morning.
You send copies of this, your sixth field order, since the beginning
of the campaign, to all officers who have been sent under your order
to receive them.


(5) RETREAT ORDER

4.—On May the 2d, 1919, at 4 a. m., you wish copies of this your 12th
field order since the beginning of the year sent to the commanders
of the first brigade, the artillery brigade, and the 10th cavalry by
Lieut. Alber; to the commanders of the second brigade, the engineer
battalion, the signal company, and the chief surgeon by Captain
Cutts; to the commander of the third brigade, and to Major Quincy by
Sgt. Donohue. Your name is Major General Slump. You are in command
of the second division of the third army corps. Your division is at
Platte City, Missouri. There are two divisions of the enemy who are
coming down against Platte City from the north. You know this to
be reliable information, and you know, also, that one division of
the enemy went into camp last night before you found out that the
outposts of that division were six miles north of Tracy on the road
that runs through Tracy and Severn. The other division, you know,
camped six miles further to the north. You give, in your order, the
direction that the first brigade is to take up a position on the
west end of the farm road which runs west from Nile. You want this
brigade to be prepared to make all sorts of resistance—in fact, you
want it to delay the enemy’s advance, and to hold this position
until you order it to retire further. You decide really that your
whole division should go into a position west of the Platte river.
Your idea is that it should hold back the enemy there, and should
hold it back sufficiently until the trains can be withdrawn. When
the trains are all withdrawn, then you ought to be able to make
an orderly retreat in the general direction of the Nile. At the
crack of dawn the next day, you figure that the cavalry ought to
begin going out and looking for the enemy with all possible speed
and vigilance. And then, too, you think that the cavalry ought to
look out especially for your left flank. Your second brigade should
start out at ten minutes to five the next morning. It should go to
“E” and should close up off the road near “E,” and should march by
the B-D road. This brigade is to be the second line and it should
take up such a position and be in such a state as to hold back any
movement of the enemy which should come in this direction. If it
is going to be necessary, this second brigade ought to cover the
troops of the first line who are withdrawing. The engineer battalion
should be ready to march out at half past four; it ought to follow
immediately behind the artillery brigade until the engineer battalion
gets somewhere beyond Tracy. The signal company will be ready to
march at twenty-five minutes of five and to follow the battalion of
engineers until the signal company gets to the southeast corner of
Tracy. The advance should move out in this way: the supply trains,
the ammunition columns, the bridge train, and the field hospital will
march at a quarter of four and they should march toward Leavenworth.
They should go by the road that runs two miles east of Platte City
through 56 and 54. The field train of the first brigade will clear
“15” at 4 o’clock. The field train of the second brigade, the
engineer battalion, the signal company, ambulance companies, and
division headquarters, in the order named, will move out toward
56 at half past five in the morning. These trains just enumerated
will follow the division trains. The baggage of the third brigade,
and the artillery brigade will proceed to Leavenworth and will go
by the road which runs through 56 and 54. The baggage will go any
prescribed distance as far as 50; during this move it will follow the
third brigade. You want Major Quincy to be put in charge of all the
division trains—in fact, you want him to be put in charge of all the
trains that join his column, and you want him to regulate the march.
You want messages sent to you between five o’clock in the morning and
the time of the withdrawal of the first line to the small orchard
which is between 13 and 15. After that time you want messages sent
to you at “12.” One section of your artillery ammunition, and one
section of your small arms ammunition are to be at a point between
50 and 52 at six o’clock in the morning. All the other sections of
the ammunition column will be on the road between Alexander and
“50” after one o’clock in the morning. The ambulance companies will
march at 5:30 a. m., and park by the road near “B.” The road fork at
“14” will be the collecting station for the slightly wounded. The
artillery brigade will get into position as follows: one regiment
about one mile north of “15,” the other somewhere near a mile north
on the road 1,100 yards northwest of 13. The artillery command should
open fire as soon as the enemy is seen anywhere, or, in any strength,
at any time.


(6) PURSUIT ORDER

5.—You are Major General Jervey in command of the 12th division 6th
corps. You have just defeated the enemy, and you have defeated him
so badly that he is retreating in great disorder in the direction
of Gettysburg. You are near Cashtown when you issue your 12th field
order of the campaign. It is twenty minutes to four in the afternoon,
June 12, 1925, when you issue to your brigade commanders, and to Lt.
Col. Miles, Colonel Forse, Major Good, and Captain Harrow copies of
your order. You decide to pursue the enemy without any delay. You
want your second brigade, which is now without the 6th infantry which
ordinarily belongs to that brigade, to reform itself, and you want
the second brigade at half past four to follow the third brigade
in the general direction of Gettysburg. The third brigade, which
is under the command of Brigadier General Dunn, you think ought to
advance at once. You are going to reenforce it, however, with the
second infantry, the second field artillery, and the first cavalry.
The third brigade ought, by all reasonable surmise, to drive the
enemy inside of Gettysburg or even beyond Gettysburg. After the third
brigade with this reenforcement has done so, it ought to seize the
whole of the McPherson Ridge and hold it. Two companies from the
second brigade ought to be detailed to report to the division surgeon
there. They should assist him in policing all the field. You are
going to be at Seven Stars as soon as you can get there and you are
going to start at five o’clock. All but one squadron of the first
cavalry will move out by the north of Gettysburg. You plan that it
shall be the first cavalry’s object to interrupt communication and
delay traffic on the railroad there, and then it ought to reconnoiter
in the general direction of the east. The first brigade you think
ought to follow the first field artillery. The first brigade you
figure should select two companies from its organization and detail
them to report to the division surgeon. Those two companies should
assist in policing all the battle-field. The first field artillery
will follow the second brigade: this regiment should detail an
officer and thirty men, and this officer and thirty men ought to
do the same thing as the two companies from the first brigade were
detailed to do. The division will have entire charge of the policing
of the field. A field hospital ought to be established at Cashtown.
Cars will be available for the division surgeon by five o’clock at
Ortanna. The evacuation of the wounded, therefore, should be through
Ortanna. The whole of the first battalion of engineers will report to
the division surgeon and go under his orders.


(7) HALT ORDER

6.—You are Brigadier General Short; you are in command of a
detachment from the first division. You have just decided that your
whole command should go into camp for the whole night. Your command
is at Bonnyville. You want to let your troops know that your cavalry
has come in contact with hostile cavalry, and that this attack was
made near Whitehall. About an hour after the issue of your message
your cavalry drove back the hostile cavalry toward Littlestown. You
want the second infantry to camp in a field southwest of the town in
which your division is now located. You want your first battalion
of your fourth artillery to camp in a field northwest of the same
town. You understand from a patrol which has just reported to you,
that at noon a column of the enemy was on the march going west, and
that at that time the advance guard of this column of the enemy was
at Center School House. You decide to place the first infantry in a
camp northwest of Sweet Home School House. There this first infantry
is to establish an outpost. The outpost is to extend from Hill 627
on the north, along through St. Luke’s Church up into a place called
Coshun. You want to notify the first infantry of your command, that
in case it is attacked, the line which has just been designated will
be the one to be held. Your third infantry you want to have camp in a
field north of the town in which you are. You want your field trains
to join their organizations; that is, the organization to which they
ordinarily belong, and you want this done right away. You yourself
at your own headquarters are going to camp where the main street
comes out of the western end of this town at which you are located.
At one o’clock in the afternoon of June 2, 1930, you deliver this
order verbally to your advance guard commander, to all your columns
of infantry, to your artillery commander, and all your staff; you
send one of your aides with a copy of the order to Major Kline of the
fifth cavalry, Captain Quigley who is in charge of the train, and to
Captain Supple of the signal corps. This is the 7th field order you
have written in this campaign. Signal Company A is to be camped west
of the second infantry, and the first ambulance company is to be near
the signal company. All the ammunition companies are to be camped
near the farm house called Lawrence. The first squadron of the 5th
cavalry ought, you figure, to camp somewhere near and west of the
artillery.

7.—The enemy has been retreating; he is continuing his retreat. Your
troops know that he has been retreating, but they do not know that
he is continuing his retreat. In fact, he is retreating in great
disorder. He is retreating in such great disorder that he is offering
no show of resistance to any of your troops who are pursuing him.
You are Major General Plight in command of the first division of the
first army corps. You are on the Baltimore Turnpike near White Run.
You decide to have your advance guard camp north of Two Taverns and
to establish an outpost line. They are to have a line of observation
and keep on the alert on that line of observation which will extend
from Bonnyville through Germantown to the cross-roads at 568. The
first brigade will come between the two branches of White Run, which
are north of the road just mentioned. The artillery brigade, with
one battalion gone, will camp along the road which runs through the
western branch of White Run. The ambulance companies, you figure,
should camp south on the road just mentioned and west of White Run.
Your division headquarters you decide to have placed west of the farm
house. This farm house is located west of where the road you are on
crosses over Rock Creek. You wish to tell your command that orders
will be issued from these headquarters at nine o’clock. Your whole
command, you decide, should halt for the whole night. Your second
brigade should camp just north of the road where you are located, and
just west of a road known by the name of Low Dutch. This 2d brigade
should have a detached post which it will detail for outpost duty.
Such a post should be in observation of the cross-roads at 530. This
cross-roads is just west of the Mt. Vernon School House. The engineer
battalion should camp south of the road you are on and east of White
Run. The signal company should camp at a spot where the road you are
on goes across Rock Creek. You want the signal company to lay a wire
from there to the outpost, and you want the signal company to have a
station on this wire or line at a place indicated by 489. You want
your outpost to know that if they are attacked they will be supported
by you. You give copies of this order to the officers who are sent
from the various commands to get the orders. You issue the order at
a quarter after two in the afternoon of June 2, 1935. They are the
77th field orders you have issued in this campaign. Your field trains
ought to join their commands right off. You want the remaining trains
to go into park on the main battle-field of Gettysburg. You decide
that issues of supplies will be best made from the supply column and
that these issues should be made at half past five in the morning.
The place you decide from which such issues should be made is 523.
Your supply wagons, which have been emptied, ought to proceed to
Ortanna for the night. There they should fill up with supplies and
come back and join early the next day.


(8) THE OUTPOST ORDER

8.—You are Colonel Fluke of the 99th infantry, and you are located
near Bonnyville. You decide to establish an outpost, and you decide
that your regiment should go into camp in the vicinity of Sweet Home
School House. The outpost should extend from Hill 627 at the northern
extremity, and then go on through St. Luke’s Church, and should
extend to the right fork at 587 at its southern extremity. This
road fork at 587 is south of the Coshun place. You want the line of
support to be held if you are attacked. Your line of support will be
at one, two, three, four, and five, in order. Your support No. 1 will
take a position near the road fork at 587, about a mile southwest of
Bonnyville. This support will cover the sector from the stream on
the west to the first stream on its east both inclusive. Frequent
patrols will be made to the Baltimore Turnpike. You issue this, your
first field order, at half past one on the afternoon of June 2,
1950. You deliver this order in person by reading it after you have
assembled all your field officers, your staff officers, and your
company commanders. You decide that you will be at the Sweet Home
School House during the continuation of the outpost. Your cavalry on
this very day came in contact with some cavalry of the enemy. About
noon at Whitehall this occurrence took place. There your cavalry
drove back the enemy’s cavalry toward Littlestown. From reliable
patrols you get a report that at noon, the very same time that this
occurrence took place, a large column of the enemy was seen to be
coming west. The head of the advance guard of this platoon of the
enemy was then at Center School House. Your Support No. 1, in command
of Captain Link, will consist of Company G and four mounted scouts.
Support No. 3, you decide to go into a position near St. Luke’s
Church. It ought to be responsible for the sector of ground which
you designate to extend from the stream about 500 yards south of St.
Luke’s Church, on to a farm house 1,000 yards northeast from a point
500 yards south of St. Luke’s Church. You wish to include both these
extremities in the sector of Support No. 3. Support No. 3 ought to
patrol the road which runs past Whitehall School House. The reserve
ought to camp near the Sweet Home School House. Support No. 5 should
take a position on the north slope Hill 627; the duty of Support No.
5 ought to consist of connecting with Support No. 3, and of covering
by their observations the road forks of 601 and 598. Support No. 5
will consist of 2d Lieut. Prince and the first section of Company I.
Support No. 4 should go and take a position at a point on the Hanover
road. This point is the place where the Hanover road joins with the
Bihl farm road. Support No. 4 will cover the ground around Support
No. 3, and the road fork at 597. This road fork is north of Square
Corners. Support No. 4 will include in its observations the points
mentioned as the extremities of this section. Support No. 2 should
take a position somewhere near the road fork of 617; this road fork
is just about a mile and a quarter south of the camp where you are.
Support No. 2 should cover the territory which is included in the
ground around the stream, which is west on the road for 617, to a
point 500 yards east of this road fork. The reserve should consist of
the first infantry, of which five companies will already have been
taken out, and also fourteen scouts. You want the wagons of the field
trains to go ahead right away and join the organizations to which
they ordinarily belong. Support No. 3 is to be under the command of
Captain Nutt, and is to consist of Company H and six mounted scouts.
Those wagons of the field trains, which belong to the companies in
support, will join the wagons of the regimental headquarters; they
will do this by eight o’clock in the evening. Support No. 3, under
the command of Captain Nelson, will consist of Company I, excepting
the first section, and two mounted orderlies. Support No. 2, under
the command of Major King, will consist of the second battalion,
all except Companies G and H and will also consist of four mounted
scouts. You want to tell your troops that your brigade to which
your regiment belongs is about to go into camp in the vicinity of
Bonnyville.


MARCH ORDERS WITH ADVANCE AND REAR GUARD

9.—On the 4th of September, 1956, you are Major Britton. You are
in command of the fourth division of the 19th army corps and you
are about to issue an order which will keep your division on the
march on the next morning; you have been marching. At 10 o’clock
at night you issue your order near Abbottstown, stating that you
yourself are going to be at the head of your main body. You feel
that you should march in the general direction of York on the next
day. Your main body in this order of march will consist of the first
infantry, of the second battalion of the 8th field artillery, of
the third brigade, of signal company “D,” and of the four ambulance
companies. Your main body should move out so as to come along behind
the advance guard, so that the tail of the advance guard will be
1,000 yards ahead of the head of the main body itself. Wagon trains
should move out so that they in turn will come along behind the main
body, so that the head of the lead horses will be 1,000 yards behind
the tail of the main body. You are in such a position between two
large forces of the enemy that you must have a rear guard. This rear
guard will be in command of Major General Huff. It will consist of
the first cavalry division, of the second brigade, of the 7th field
artillery, of the 4th battalion of engineers, and of the 1st, 2d,
and 3d ambulance companies. You hear that the enemy has probably been
reenforced and that this reenforcement probably consists of a brigade
of cavalry. You also hear, just when you issue this, your 7th field
order of the campaign, that there are some hostile infantrymen near
York, say, about a brigade. The rear guard, you figure, ought indeed
to keep the enemy in check. A rear guard of this nature ought to
resist any advancement on the part of the enemy until your advance
guard can open a road through York. The first cavalry division, you
have knowledge, is bivouacking near where you are. It has, indeed,
reported for duty in connection with the work of the division.

       *       *       *       *       *

The idea of the last two chapters has been to put a jumbled military
decision into good working form. The object has not been to solve
tactical problems, but rather to put the ideas correctly expressed
into their logical places.




CHAPTER IX

THE VERBAL FIELD ORDER


“The initial combat orders of a division are almost invariably
written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is
preferable and is used wherever time permits. Subsequent orders are
likewise written either as field orders or messages.”[14] In chapters
VII and VIII we actually practiced the expression of the field orders
for the higher units. We illustrated to ourselves how difficult it
was to express disordered and straggling thoughts in the most direct
way. We did this work for two purposes: first, to gain facility in
dealing with language, and second, to go through with a part of the
mental process demanded of commanders in the field. We should have
found out how perplexing it is to put the new-born decision into form.

We now progress in our development to a more difficult performance.
We are going to discard our pencil. Just as we took up the practice
of speaking a field message after we had been drilled in writing it,
so here we are going to learn to dictate the field order after we
have been schooled in composing it.

“The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given
verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are
intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the
situation and plan can be explained. Subsequent orders are verbal or
are in the form of verbal or written messages.”[15] The verbal field
order, then, may be divided into two classes:

(1) The initial combat order.

(2) The subsequent order, in the form of a field message.

Number 1 follows implicitly the sequence of the body of the written
field order. Number 2 follows the form of the written or verbal
message.

What really happens in action is this. A regiment or battalion
commander, after he has arrived at a decision by way of his estimate
of a situation, assembles his subordinate officers. He recites
to them his order. He points out on the map and on the ground
the various places to which he refers in his order. He gives an
opportunity, when he has finished, for his officers to ask questions.
He then dismisses them.

The asking of questions is delaying. It mars efficiency; and it
points either to faulty expression on the part of the commander or to
inattention on the part of his audience.

After the subordinates have returned to their commands and have
set out upon the accomplishment of the mission, it is of course
impossible to reassemble them during the progress of the engagement.
Often, too, the colonel or major desires to issue instructions to but
one or two officers of the command at a time. Number 2, therefore,
becomes the natural means of communication until the conflict is over
or the situation is passed. When a new situation arises the commander
assembles his officers as before, and the procedure throughout is
repeated.

Let us suppose, now, that a colonel, faced with a new or changed
situation, wishes to make his will known to his subordinates. When
his officers are assembled he speaks as follows:

“It is reliably reported that two battalions of the enemy are
entrenching on that hill (he points out the hill) one mile to the
southeast of here. Their position extends from the Jordan River to
the Wellington Road, both inclusive. Our main body is at Tarrytown.
(He points toward Tarrytown both on the ground and map.) We will
attack at once enveloping the enemy’s left.

The First Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Jordan
River, exclusive, to the Darlington House, exclusive. The Second
Battalion will attack the hostile trenches from the Darlington House,
inclusive, to the west, and will envelop the enemy’s right. The Third
Battalion and machine gun companies, in reserve, will follow the
Second Battalion. Ambulances and combat wagons will assemble at Main
Station. Battalions will maintain semaphore communications with the
reserve where I shall be.”

The Regimental Adjutant writes down this order immediately after its
issue, gives it its proper heading and ending, and files it away. It
thus becomes a written field order and a part of the records of the
regiment. Copies of it are sent to higher commanders.

Let us imagine that the attack is well under way, and that the
regiment is holding its own, but is not progressing as it should.
The colonel decides to increase the size of the enveloping body. He
therefore calls a staff officer to him and says:

“Go over to Major Swift, in command of the third battalion, and tell
him to send K and L Companies to extend our right. Repeat.”

The staff officer replies,—“I am to go to Major Swift, in command
of the third battalion and am to say to him that the Regimental
Commander directs him to have K and L Companies extend the right of
our line.”

We must notice that the initial field order, when spoken, has exactly
the same arrangement and brevity of expression as when written. Of
course, the heading and ending are omitted. But the distribution of
troops, if necessary for small units, would follow what would be
paragraph 2 in a written order. The relation which exists between
the verbal and written message holds true in principle for the field
order.

In the following problems read over the matter several times. Put it
in orderly arrangement in your mind before you speak. Then utter it
in the most brief and unmistakable form.

Cautions.—(1) _Only oral solutions will prove valuable in working
these problems. The student should make only such notes as will
enable him to carry the problem in his mind. Proper notes would
include the organizations, their present situations, etc.—things
which an actual commander would know as a matter of course._

(2) _Once begun on the order, the student should pay no heed to a
false start, but should continue to the end. It is better to remake
the entire order, than to patch the faults. He should not permit
himself to change a previous statement, begin a new sentence in the
midst of an unfinished one, or hesitate unreasonably. He must take
care not only to express the matter in proper form, but also to
enunciate so distinctly that any one within hearing may understand
him._

Intentional rhetorical errors will be found in the problems which
follow. Watch for them.


PROBLEMS IN THE VERBAL FIELD ORDER

1.—You are Colonel Foote, halted with your regiment in Goldenville.
You have previously sent out Lieutenant Lasker toward Gettysburg for
information. He has just sent you a message. You have made up your
mind from the facts in his message that you will march south at once
and that you will march in the direction of Gettysburg. You desire
the first battalion and the Machine Gun Company to be the Advance
Guard for your regiment. The remainder of the regiment will follow
the first battalion in order as follows: second battalion, third
battalion, band, and ambulances. The field trains are not to move
out but are to stay behind until they get orders from you. They are
to remain at Texas. The message from Lieutenant Lasker stated that
about a regiment of the enemy was throwing up intrenchments north of
Penn College. The message also stated that about half of the regiment
of the enemy consisted of recruits. You want the main body of your
regiment to follow the tail of the Advance Guard so that there will
be a distance of a half mile between the tail of the Advance Guard
and the head of the main body. You want to notify your troops where
the Regimental Headquarters will march so that the troops will know
where to send messages. You decide to have the Headquarters march
between the Advance Guard and the main body. The Advance Guard is to
march at once and it is to proceed south by way of the Hamilton Farm
and the Boyd School House. You assemble your majors, their staffs and
your staff, and you issue verbally the decision which you have just
made. You issue it in the shape of a verbal order.

2.—You are Major Black in command of the Advance Guard mentioned in
the preceding problem. It is now your mission, of course, to form the
advance guard and to tell your captains that you are going to do so,
and that you are going to be reinforced by the machine gun company.
You ought also to tell them just where your regiment is going to
march. You want Companies C and D and the machine gun company to
march in the order mentioned, and they are to follow Company B as
soon as that company has got its distance. Company C will be the
company which is to regulate the pace. Company A is to go out and act
as a left flank guard. It is to move by way of the eastern branch of
the Carlisle Road while it is on this duty. You ought also to let
your captains know all the information about the enemy which has been
given to you by your colonel. You want Company B to be the advance
party; you want it to go ahead of the remainder of the battalion so
that there will be four hundred yards distance between it and the
main body. You want to attach Lieutenant Kay, the Battalion Adjutant,
and his orderly, to Company B. You want to direct the march of the
advance party so that it will know where it is to go. You decide that
it shall go by the railroad to the Carlisle Road, and then by the
Stock Farm, and on down to the Boyd School House. You are going to be
right behind the advance on the march. You want the combat wagons to
move out right away, and you want them to go by the cross-roads which
is one-quarter of a mile west of Goldenville, and then south on the
Carlisle Road, and finally, to join the tail of Company D where the
railroad crosses the road.

3.—You are the Company Commander of Company A of the preceding
problem. You call your officers and non-commissioned officers
together and you give them a verbal order. You tell them that your
company is to march as the flank guard of the battalion to which
you belong, and you tell them that the enemy possibly has about
a regiment in Gettysburg; at least, that is the belief of the
Regimental Commander. Your regiment is on its way to Gettysburg. The
First Battalion and the machine gun company is going as the advance
guard. You want to let your command know that all of the battalion,
except yourselves is leaving on the road to the west. You want
Lieutenant Johnson, the Second Lieutenant of your company, and the
Fourth Platoon, to act as the advance guard to the flank guard, which
is the duty on which the company is acting. You want this platoon
to march by the country road east of the knoll marked 651, and then
you want it to march along the east branch of the Carlisle Road. The
distance you decide upon for the advance guard to be in front of the
main body is 500 yards.

4.—You are Major Simpson, and you are halted with your battalion
at the cross-roads 621, near Goldenville. Your mission is, with
your battalion, to act as outpost during the coming night for your
regiment; you have the machine gun company attached to you. You
are operating toward the south. You want company C and one of the
platoons of the machine gun company to take station on the ridge
north of the point where you are. This ridge has the figure 707 on
it. It shall be the duty of this detachment to secure that sector
between Goldenville and Five Forks, just a little off the map,
about 1,500 yards west of the Carlisle Road. You want Company C to
establish communication with Texas by signals on this hill, where
they are to be located. If you are going to be attacked on that hill,
instead of falling back, you want them to hold the ridge. You want
a platoon of Company C to be sent over to Hamilton Farm to act as a
picket there. You have received reports from Lieutenant Finley of
your command that there are no detachments of the enemy or patrols
which have come north of the Stock Farm at any time. You want to tell
your captains that the remainder of the outpost is going into camp at
Texas, and that the regiment itself is moving into camp just north
of the Conewago. You want the rations and baggage of Company C to
be sent up to the company, but you want the wagons to be returned
immediately after they have been there, to Texas for the night.

5.—You are in command of Company C which was to go to Hill 707 in
the preceding problem. You want to notify your company what you are
going to do; in other words, you want to deliver to them verbally
your field order. For this purpose you assemble your officers and
non-commissioned officers and the lieutenant who is in charge of
the machine gun. You state that the outguards will be posted as
follows: Corporal Browning, with his squad as No. 1, is to be posted
at the Five Forks 679, three-quarters of a mile west of where you
are; Corporal Martin, with his squad as No. 3, is to be posted at
the road-fork numbered 621, which is on the Carlisle Road; Corporal
Denton, with Privates Noonan, Ogden, and Prince will go as No. 4.
His post will be posted at the railroad crossing in Goldenville.
You, as Company Commander, deliver the information about the enemy
which has been received through your major. Corporal Calhoun, with
Johnson, Kelly, and Latham are to go as No. 2, and they are to be
posted at the cross-roads 648, which is 500 yards west of the point
where you are located—Goldenville. You state that this company and
that a platoon of machine guns is to take station on the ridge to the
north of the road on which you are located, and is to go as support
to the outpost. Lieutenant Haskins will take the 4th platoon and will
proceed as a picket down to the Hamilton Farm. This farm is a mile
and a quarter south of here on the Carlisle Road. Lieutenant Haskins
is to get some sort of flag communication with Hill 707. He is also
to send small patrols down as far south as Boyd’s School House.
Corporal Roberts will go to the top of Hill 707; he will take four
signalers with him. He will get in communication with Texas and keep
in communication. He will do the same for each one of the outguards
and he will also do the same for Lieutenant Haskins’ picket.

6.—You are Major Perkins and you are in command of a squadron of
cavalry. You are between Goldenville and the bottom of the map. You
receive word that the enemy is somewhere to the north, and you get
messages from your commanding officer stating that you are to go
as independent cavalry for your brigade. Reports also come in to
you that the enemy, which consists of about 1,000 men, is occupying
Carlisle. You have assembled your captains, and you state to them
that Troop A will make up the Advance Guard. You state also, that
it will keep a small patrol about two or three miles to the front
in the direction in which it is going. You tell Troop A, also, that
its average rate of speed should be about four miles per hour, and
that this rate includes halts. You know that your main body is going
to march at 6 o’clock the next morning in the direction of Carlisle
and you know that it is only going to advance 15 miles on that day.
You know, also, that it is going by the Gettysburg—Table Rock—Center
Mills—Carlisle Road. You want your main body to follow the advance
guard, which you have already mentioned, so that there will be a
distance between the advance guard and the main body of about a mile.
The main body is to march from front to rear—Troops B, C, and D. You
wish to inform everybody present that Lieutenant Butler and Sgt.
Clifford are out with patrols and that these patrols are very far out
to the flank of the line of march. You decide to ride in this march
of the independent cavalry near the head of the main body. You want
your officers to know that both of the patrols which you have just
mentioned are going to send reports to you, and that these reports
should arrive at the squadron when the main body is about two miles
north of the Conewago. You desire wheel transportation of all kinds
to join the advance of the main body of infantry back near Gettysburg.

7.—You are Captain Small in command of Troop A of the preceding
problem. You are to constitute, as you remember, the advance guard
of the squadron of independent cavalry. You wish to tell your
officers and non-commissioned officers, whom you have assembled, that
Lieutenant Butler and Sgt. Clifford are out with patrols, and you
want to give them the information you have got from your major in
regard to your own troops and the enemy. You want Corporal Dillingham
to take four men and to go ahead of the troop. He is to go at a rate
of about six miles per hour until Conewago Creek is crossed; after
that, he is to go about four miles an hour. When he gets about a mile
north of Gettysburg he is to take the right-hand road which goes
through Table Rock and Center Mills. He is to give quick and prompt
warning of the appearance of any of the enemy or hostile troops
which he encounters. He is also to report promptly any places in
the road which cannot be crossed by troops or vehicles. In fact, he
is to report any information which will interfere with the march of
the squadron. You, as the captain of the troop, are going to march
between the advance party and the support.

8.—You are Major Adams and you are in command of a squadron of
cavalry which is mounted and ready for action at D-6. You see a
squadron of the enemy in an open field to the west, about 600 yards
west of the woods where you are located. You see the guidons mounted,
and you see that the remainder of the men are leading their horses
into line or are saddling up. You note, also, through your glasses,
that the guidons are facing in your direction. You note, also,
that the wagons have left the camp and have gone around the woods
just north. You call your captains together and you issue a verbal
order—you have decided to attack the hostile squadron at once, and
to attack that squadron while you are mounted. You want Troops D and
C, commanded by Captain Denton, who is senior to Captain Clifford,
to form the main attacking line. You want Captain Denton to take
advantage of an opening in the woods which is about 150 yards to
your front. He is to attack the enemy in close order, mounted, as
soon as he has cleared the woods in which you are all located. You
give to the captains the information which you have got through your
field glasses. You also state that Captain Billings with his troop,
Troop B, is to go in rear of Troops D and C and form the supporting
line, keeping a distance of about 150 yards, and at the same time he
is to look out for the right flank. You want Lieutenant Fink, who
is the squadron adjutant, and who has seen the same things through
his glasses as you have seen, to accompany Captain Denton with his
two troops to the edge of the woods, where he is to point out to
Captain Denton the enemy’s position. You yourself are going to be
with the reserve. Captain Andrews with his troop, Troop A, is to
constitute the reserve. Captain Andrews with his command is to follow
the attacking line at a distance of 400 yards. He is to echelon his
command with the left flank. You want the whole command to move out
at once.

9.—You are General Temple and you are 700 yards northwest of Hermans
with your brigade when you receive a message from Lieutenant Kline,
Aeroplane No. 7. The substance of this message states that the left
of the enemy has extended itself by a battalion from a regiment
which is northwest of 501 cross-roads. He also states that there is
another battalion from a regiment near 504, and that this battalion
is moving toward Varney. He states that there is a regiment of
artillery posted on Oak Ridge, and that there is another regiment of
artillery which has its right flank at the Stock Farm and its left
flank near 531 road fork. You assemble your regimental commanders
and your cavalry commander; also, your artillery commander. You
state that the artillery battalion which is with you is to go into
a position near where you are and that it is to operate against the
artillery of the enemy and the attacking infantry of the enemy. This
your artillery battalion is to do at first, but later it will support
your attack. The first battalion of the first infantry you want to
have assigned as a support to the artillery. You want the first
infantry, minus its first battalion which is going to go as support
to the artillery, to advance in the direction of Herman’s Farm House;
then it is to deploy and attack. It is to attack so that the right of
the regiment will pass through the J. Weaver Farm House. The third
infantry is to be the reserve; it will be under your command and it
will move out and go forward to the Good Intent School House. The
first platoon of Troop A and the first cavalry will take a position
on the hill which is designated by the figures 651. This platoon
will cover your right flank and report immediately any changes which
take place in the disposition of the enemy. Your station for the
slightly wounded will be at Table Rock. You are going to be at the
Good Intent School House, where messages are going to reach you. Of
course, you give your officers whom you have assembled, the contents
of the aeroplane message which you received. You want the infantry
combat wagons to assemble at Table Rock, and you want them to go
there after all the troops have cleared the road. You want the second
infantry to get under cover from the enemy and to go toward Hill 586;
this hill is northeast of Varney. When they are deployed they will
attack so that their left will pass through Hill 586.

10.—Major Quincy, in charge of the artillery battalion of the
preceding problem, assembles the captains of his batteries and issues
his instructions covered by the following data: he wishes Batteries
A and B to attack the hostile artillery, and he wishes them to take
up a position on the north end of the field near where the brigade
is halted. He wants Battery C to go to Hill 592. From that point
he wants that Battery to attack the hostile infantry. He gives to
his commanders the information which was contained in the aeroplane
message of the preceding problem. He also states that the enemy in
superior force is attacking from the west. He points out also that
between 3,000 and 4,000 yards to the southwest can be seen a long
line of artillery of the enemy and that this artillery is in action.
He also states that the first battalion of the first infantry, which
is now marching down the road, which is the support of the artillery,
will occupy Hill 592. Battery A’s target is to be the further half
of the line of the enemy’s guns, and Battery B’s target is to be the
nearer half. He states to his Battery Commanders that he has already
marked the position that they are to occupy with their commands,
and he tells them that they are to occupy this position at once and
prepare for immediate action. He tells Battery A that the adjutant
will give them the firing data and they are to range by volleys. They
are to report to him when ready, and they are to be on the alert and
await his order to commence firing. He also states that the advance
cavalry is on the Hill 651 south of Goldenville, and that they
are covering the right of the line. He wishes to tell his battery
commanders that the infantry is marching in a general direction
south, and that it is going from here to begin an attack against the
left of the enemy. He wishes to tell them also that he is to be,
during the action, on the left of Battery A.




CHAPTER X

THE OPERATION ORDER, ORDERS, LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION


Before August, 1914, the _Operation order_ was the English term for
our _Field order_. Both orders had the same functions and about the
same form. At times, the term _operation order_ was used by us to
include only battle orders, but on the whole, the terms _Operation
orders_ and _Field orders_ practically amounted to American and
English designations of the same thing.

In the beginning of the present war, after a few weeks of open
conflict, this kind of fighting in France gave way to a vast siege.
The English found themselves, after some cross-country fighting,
in the trenches. There the operation order which had provided for
situations of march, halt, bivouac, and battle, was gradually made
over to suit the peculiar needs of defenses, raids, and frontal
attacks. The barrage fire, bombs, mortars, machine guns, and
intricate lines of communication added to the number of details to
be considered. Little by little the will of the commander expressed
itself in such completeness that the former size of his operation
order passed all bounds. It was natural, then, that although the
scope and character of the English order steadily changed, its name
remained the same.

When the Americans came to take part in the war, the operation
order had during the previous years of struggle developed out of
all resemblance to its former self. It was no longer a field order
as we know the term. It was fully grown to meet the tremendous
progress of English experience in the trenches. The consequence was
that the American, finding both the state of siege and the order
to cover it beyond his experience, associated the English name with
the novel warfare. Thus, today, the operation order is a term used
in connection with the disposition of troops on the battle fronts of
Europe.

We should bear in mind, then, that the operation order is nothing
more than a field order fitted to trench conditions. We must not gain
the idea that it has supplanted the order which goes with mobile
exercises on open ground. Open warfare began this conflict, and will,
provided it be ended by martial victory, bring it to a close. Open
warfare has been the rule on the long Russian, Italian, Serbian,
Turkish, and Roumanian fronts. We must not be led astray in our
estimate of the proportions because the front in France and Belgium
is the most vital one to us from a strategic standpoint. Field
orders, which are the accompaniments of open warfare, should still
form the larger part of our study.

Nevertheless, the operation order is the order next in importance to
the field order. It must be framed with mathematical precision under
fire.

It has the greatest conciseness, but is not brief. It goes into
the minutest details, but its details are tersely put. In certain
parts it is telegraphic like the field message; in others it has
completed sentences like those of the field order. It has an orderly
arrangement of paragraphs and brief and unmistakable language. If
we are able to compose a good field message and order, we should
find, after we have familiarized ourselves with the technique of the
trenches, that the construction of the operation order will fall
naturally into place in our minds.

Unfortunately, we are forbidden to place an example of one of our own
operation orders upon these pages. But we may have the opportunity of
viewing a German one, which contains the principles of our own. The
example given was issued by a regimental commander for a raid. The
action actually took place near La Boisselle, April 11, 1916.


110th Reserve Infantry Regiment. In the field, 6th April, 1916.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR A RAID ON THE SPION

              1. The raid will probably take place at dusk the 11th of
              April.

              2. _Organization of the raiding party_—

              _In command._—Captain Wagener, assisted by Lieutenant
              Boening, Assistant-Surgeon Wisser, one bugler and six
              stretcher bearers.

              _Patrol commanders._—Lieutenants Stradtmann, Freund,
              Dumas, and Böhlefeld.

              _Raiding party._—50 men of the 110th Reserve Infantry
              Regiment and four Pioneers of the 1st Reserve Company,
              13th Pioneer Battalion.

              3. Upon the day fixed, _the raiding party_ will be
              assembled in Dug-outs Nos. 1-10, on the right wing of
              the left-hand battalion. Dug-out No. 9 will be used as
              advanced regimental command post.

              The assaulting party must not exceed three officers and
              30 men. The remaining officers and men will be at Captain
              Wagener’s disposal for use as supports.

  _Captain    Shortly after dusk the assaulting party will leave the
  Wagener’s   Blaue Stellung by Sap No. 3 with the object of breaking
  Orders—     into the enemy’s position in the neighborhood of the
  Appendix    Süd Spion, from which point the enemy’s trenches will
  1._         be cleared northwards, if possible, as far as the Spion.
              Unless prevented by the enemy’s fire, the raiding party
              will return to our Blaue Stellung by the same way.

  _Table of   4. For 25 minutes before the commencement of the
  distrib-    raid, _the artillery_ will prepare for the assault by
  ution of    shelling the enemy’s trenches between Besenhecke and
  artillery   the Windmühle, and also the Weisse Steinmauer. During
  fire—       the raid the artillery will control by its fire all the
  Appendix    enemy’s trenches likely to prove a source of danger to
  2._         the enterprise.

  _Special    5. In order to draw the fire of the enemy’s artillery
  Orders for  away from the spot to be raided, a _feint attack_ against
  feint       the enemy’s position just north of La Boiselle Cemetery
  attack—     will start 15 minutes after the artillery opens fire.
  Appendix
  3._         6. In order that the registration of the objective by the
              heavy artillery and Minenwerfer shall not be apparent, on
  _Special    the morning of the day before the raid—probably the 10th
  Orders for  April—a feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-79 will
  this bom-   be carried out, combined with a mine explosion, _with
  bardment—   the object of misleading the enemy_. The exact time will
  Appendix    be fixed beforehand by the artillery commander, Officer
  4._         Commanding Ersatz Abteilung, 76th Artillery Regiment.

              7. _The machine gun officer_ will arrange that, during
              the whole time of the raid, the enemy’s rear trenches in
              Target-sectors 76-81 are kept under a constant fire, with
              a view to causing him all possible loss, and, at the same
              time, to safeguarding our patrol against counter-attacks.

              8. _The Officer Commanding 1st Reserve Company, 13th
              Pioneer Battalion_, will arrange for a gallery of the
              left-hand minefield to be ready charged by the morning
              of the day before the raid, and for a gallery of the
              right-hand minefield to be ready charged by the evening
              of the raid. The former will be sprung at the conclusion
              of the feint bombardment, the latter as an introduction
              to the feint attack.

              From today, the “earth mortars” (_Erdmörser_) will
              systematically cut the enemy’s wire opposite the
              Blinddarm. On the day before the raid, they will
              coöperate with all other close-range weapons to assist
              in the feint bombardment of Target-sectors 76-78. On the
              evening of the raid, they will assist in the feint attack
              by bombarding Target-sectors 76 and 77 (_see_ Appendices
              3 and 4).

              Throughout the raid, the “_Albrecht-Mörser_,” in position
              on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will heavily bombard the enemy’s
              trenches in the Nordrondell. Particular care will be
              taken that the enemy’s machine guns do not interfere with
              the raid from that quarter (_see_ Appendix 1).

              9. _The Officer Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company_
              will register the enemy’s wire at the point of entry
              with one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer in the course
              of the feint bombardment on the day before the raid.
              He will also take part in this bombardment and fire
              30 medium Minenwerfer shells at the Weisse Steinmauer
              (_see_ Appendix 4). On the afternoon of the same day,
              with both medium Minenwerfer mounted in the Minenwerfer
              Weg, he will cut the enemy’s wire at 76y, and throughout
              the whole night and the following day will keep up a
              desultory fire.

              On the evening of the raid, the wire in front of
              the point of entry of the raiding party will be cut
              on a width of 50 meters by the heavy and two medium
              Minenwerfer (_see_ Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the two other
              medium Minenwerfer will take part in the feint attack
              against 76y (_see_ Appendix 3). The light Minenwerfer at
              the disposal of the 228th Minenwerfer Company will take
              part in the feint bombardment and in the feint attack,
              in accordance with the orders (para. 8) issued for the
              close-range weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th
              Pioneer Battalion (_see_ Appendices 3 and 4). The Officer
              Commanding 228th Minenwerfer Company will receive further
              detailed instructions from Captain Wagener.

              10. On the evening of the raid, _battalions_ will
              hold themselves in a state of readiness for an alarm.
              Arrangements will be made that, in the event of the enemy
              opening a barrage on our trenches, as may well happen,
              the number of sentries will be reduced to a minimum. Gas
              masks and other gas equipment must be held ready for use.

              11. I shall be at the regimental command post from the
              morning of the day before the raid. From 6 p. m. of
              the evening of the raid, I shall be in the advanced
              regimental command post in Dug-out No. 9 on the right
              wing of the left-hand battalion. Captain Wagener will
              maintain constant communication with me. The artillery
              liaison officer will also be with me.

                                   (Signed) FRHR. V. VIETINGHOFF.

                  _Distribution_

                         { Headquarters                          2
                         { 3 Battalions                          3
              110th      { 12 Companies                         12
              Reserve    { Labor Company                         1
              Infantry   { 1st Machine Gun Company               1
              Regiment   { 2nd Machine Gun Company               2
                         { 55th Machine Gun Section              1
                         { Captain Wagener                       2

              29th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment              1
              Ersatz Abteilung, 176th Field Artillery Regiment   1
              1st Abteilung, 29th Regiment Field Artillery       1
              1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer Battalion        1
              228th Minenwerfer Company                          1
              Division                                           1
              Brigade                                            1
              109th Reserve Infantry Regiment                    1
              111th Reserve Infantry Regiment                    1
              Spare copies                                       5
                                                                ——
                                                                37


APPENDIX I

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR THE RAID ON THE SPION

              1. _Organization of the raiding party_—

              _Commander._—Captain Wagener; with him, Bugler Held.

              _Stradtmann’s patrol._—Lieutenant Stradtmann and 10 men.

              _Dumas’ patrol._—Lieutenant Böhlefeld and 10 men.

              _Supports_, at my disposal.—Lieutenant Freund and 24 men.

              In addition to the latter party, at my disposal—Boening,
              and Assistant-Surgeon Wiser and six stretcher bearers.

              2. _Dress and equipment._—Attack order without greatcoat
              or cap, belts to be worn without pouches, gas masks to be
              slung and tucked into tunic.

              The Stradtmann, Dumas, and Böhlefeld patrols will each
              be equipped, half with rifles and half with pistols and
              wire-cutters.

              The supports will carry rifles, five men will carry
              pistols, each man will carry two grenades.

              As a distinguishing mark each man will wear a triangle of
              white linen sewn on the breast and back.

  _Minutes.   3. _Time table._—_The artillery_ will open fire with gas
  O′ The time shells on the enemy’s trenches on both sides of the point
  of starting of entry and on the objectives opposite the southwest
  will be     corner of La Boisselle, where the feint attack is to
  communi-    take place.
  cated, in
  good time,  For a quarter of an hour, all the enemy’s trenches likely
  on the day  to prove of importance to the raiding party will be
  of the      brought under fire. At the same time, the _close-range
  raid._      weapons of the 1st Reserve Company, 13th Pioneer
              Battalion_, with the two medium and the light Minenwerfer
              of the _228th Minenwerfer Company_, will fire with
              maximum rapidity on the enemy’s trenches opposite the
              southwest corner of La Boisselle.

       7′     The one heavy and two medium Minenwerfer of the _228th
              Minenwerfer Company_ will open fire with the object of
              cutting the wire in front of the point of entry.

     14′45″   On the right flank of the minefield _a shallow gallery
              will be fired_.

       15′   _The artillery_, which was firing on the southwest corner
              of La Boiselle, will increase its range and shell the
              trenches in rear.

              _The close-range weapons_ will cease fire.

              _The machine guns_ will sweep communication trenches in
              this sector and in the Galgen.

     15′30″   In the Blinddarm and just south of the same, isolated
              groups of _dummies_ will be exposed in order to make the
              enemy think an attack is pending. From now on, _artillery
              and Minenwerfer_ fire will increase to its maximum
              intensity on the real objective.

              The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
              Pioneer Battalion_, in position on the Lehmgrubenhöhe,
              will bombard the Nordrondell with the utmost intensity.

       20′    _The patrols_ will leave their dug-outs and take up their
              positions in readiness, in accordance with direct orders
              received from me, in the Hohlweg by Sap No. 3.

       23′    _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will leave the Hohlweg at “_a_” and
              crawl forward as far as “_b_.”

              _Lieutenant Boening_ will post the _stretcher bearers_ as
              connecting files between _Stradtmann’s patrol_ and myself.

       25′    _The artillery_ will lift its fire from the objective
              between Besenhecke and the Windmühle to the targets in
              rear, and will open a barrage on those of the enemy’s
              trenches which may prove a source of danger to the raid.

              _The Minenwerfer_ will cease fire.

              _The machine guns_ will open fire on positions in rear
              and on the communication trenches which lead to the
              objective from both sides.

              The “Albrecht-Mörser” of the _1st Reserve Company, 13th
              Pioneer Battalion_, on the Lehmgrubenhöhe, will continue
              to bombard the Nordrondell. _All close-range weapons and
              the artillery_, which from 0′ to 15′ had been bombarding
              the enemy’s position opposite the southwest corner of La
              Boisselle, will reopen fire on these targets with renewed
              vigor.

     25′15″   _Stradtmann’s patrol_ will break into the enemy’s
              trenches at the Süd Spion and, at point 1 (_see_ Sketch
              No. 1), will defend the point of entry from the direction
              of the enemy.

              On orders received from me personally, _Dumas’ patrol_
              will follow Stradtmann’s patrol and advance southwards
              along the enemy’s trench as far as point 2.

              On orders received from me personally also, _Böhlefeld’s
              patrol_ will follow Dumas’ patrol and, once in the
              enemy’s trench, will push on towards the Spion.

              _The stretcher bearers_ will act as connecting files
              between Stradtmann’s patrol and myself.

              _The supports_ will hold themselves in readiness at 4,
              so as to be able to push on after the other patrols
              immediately on receipt of an order from me.

              If the enemy opens a barrage on our position and on the
              Hohlweg before the patrols come out of their dug-outs, I
              shall either lead the patrol to the enemy’s position by
              another route, or cancel the raid.

              4. _Duty of the patrols._—As many of the enemy as
              possible must be made prisoners; in addition, rifles,
              machine guns, rifle grenade stands, trench mortars, etc.,
              as well as filled packs are to be brought back. Should it
              be found impossible to carry back all the booty owing to
              the small numbers of the raiding party, but if, as far as
              regards the enemy’s fire it could be done, report will be
              passed on to me by Stradtmann’s patrol.

              5. _Return._—On a signal given by Lieutenant Stradtmann,
              or on the “Charge” being blown by my bugler, the raiding
              party will make its way back from the Süd Spion to the
              Hohlweg by the shortest way, and immediately make for the
              same dug-outs whence it started. In the dug-outs, I shall
              ascertain whether everyone has returned. Prisoners and
              booty will be taken into the dug-outs.

              During the raid, if the enemy should open a heavy barrage
              on the trenches on the Schwabenhohe and on the Hohlweg,
              the raiding party will remain in the enemy’s trench and
              acquaint me of the fact by firing a red flare. I shall
              then endeavor to reach the party and lead them back by
              some other way. Should I not arrive, the senior officer
              present will lead the entire party.

              6. Assistant-Surgeon Wisser will organize No. 1 Dug-out
              as a first aid post and will remain there until the
              conclusion of the raid.

              7. Until the 15th minute I shall be in the advanced
              regimental command post; after that time in the Hohlweg,
              which will be connected by telephone with the advanced
              regimental command post.

                                           (Signed) WAGENER,
                                     _Captain and Company Commander_.

                                   Verbally and in writing to
                                   participants in the raid.

                                   Copy to the regiment.
                                            W.

To quote Appendices 2, 3, and 4 would take up too much space and
would add very little to the purpose of the example. Number 2
consists of a five-page table of the kinds and time of fire, the
batteries of fire, and the targets; number 3, of detailed orders for
a feint attack; and number 4, for a feint bombardment.

The object of the quotation is to show the accuracy and detail of an
operation order. Since the German subject matter and treatment are
about the same as our own, we ought to gain from it a conception of
the requirements of framing an operation order.

_Note._—The meager space devoted to the Operation Order in this
course of lessons should in no way reflect on its relative importance
among military communications. Only because the treatment of our
own examples is forbidden and because our experience is slight, do
we leave it without further practice. Those who are armed with the
confidential documents of the War Department may look into our own
operation order more closely; and those who have conscientiously
applied themselves to the work of the preceding lessons ought to have
no trouble with its composition.


THE ORDER

Our Field Service Regulations state[16] that “_orders_ in
contra-distinction to field, general, and special orders, are used
by commanders of divisions and separate brigades for regulating the
movements and resupply of the field trains, fixing the position
of distributing points (rations and forage), authorizing the use
of reserve rations, providing for the refilling of combat trains
after combat or a march, providing for ambulance or hospital
service in camps, and for furnishing such other similar information
or instructions as it is desired to communicate to troops. They
also include such instructions as may be sent to the commander of
trains, relative to the movements and disposition of the trains and
information with regard to the arrangements made with the line of
communication relative to the positions of refilling, rendezvous, and
evacuation points.”

Thus, when separate orders are necessary for such conditions as
cited, they are called simply _orders_. They may be transmitted as
field messages between commanders or as more formal documents. In
either case they are usually addressed to the person concerned.

Examples of _orders_ follow:

                                             51st Division, 9th Corps,
                                                        Gettysburg,
                                                3 June ’19, 6-30 p. m.

  To Commander of Trains:

  Have one wagon company small arms ammunition at cross-roads near
  EPPLEY at 8 p. m.

  Have one wagon company artillery ammunition at north edge of
  McPHERSON RIDGE at 8 p. m.

  Have 1st Section, supply, ready to issue at Central Square in
  GETTYSBURG at 8 p. m.

  Have empty wagons return to LITTLESTOWN tonight to refill; have
  them report en route to Field Hospital No. 1 at the crossing of
  ROCK CREEK to carry back wounded. Have them well filled with straw
  or hay.

                                                          MABIE,
                                                     _Chief of Staff_.

  Telegraphed to Commander of Trains.
  Copies to Regimental Commanders.


                                                19th Division,
                                                       Marysville,
                                                5 Oct. ’22, 6-45 p. m.

  To Officer in Charge of Trains:

  You will move with your trains at 3-45 a. m., by corduroy road
  JEPSOM-SMALLEY-SAINT MARYS.

  Arrange your columns as follows: one section artillery ammunition,
  one section small arms ammunition, bridge train, supply column,
  field hospitals, remainder of ammunition column.

  On reaching SAINT MARYS have the two sections ammunition turn north
  and, when they have cleared the road, halt and await orders.

  Have the remainder of the ammunition columns halt beside the road
  between SAINT MARYS and ALEXANDER and await orders. Have the field
  hospitals park off the road near HILLIS.

  On the march, as you overtake, or are joined by, the field trains
  of the troops, you will assume command.

                      Hasten your march until you are clear of JEPSOM.
                                                   SMITH,
                                              _Chief of Staff_.

  Copies to all Commanders.
  By Lieut. Jones to officer in charge of trains.


                                               Birmingham,
                                               8 Sept. ’25, 9-50 a. m.

  To Captain Mott, commanding trains:

  Our advance guard met at 9-30 a. m. two battalions hostile infantry
  at GARLINGTON.

  Have trains keep well closed and follow main body without distance.

                                                         NORTON,
                                                _Colonel, commanding_.


The first two examples are of the formal type. The third one is less
so.

_Verbal orders_ are usually transmitted by officers. However, if the
order consists of a single sentence such as, “The trains will halt
two hours at Bingham,” it may be transmitted by an enlisted man.

Although there is more latitude in the form of written _order_
than in that of the field order, the one should be as brief and
unmistakable in its construction as the other. The paragraph
structure and sequence should be as logical and unified as English
composition can make them.

With your book open at the extract from Field Service Regulations in
regard to _the order_, compose enough imaginary _orders_ to cover all
the instances therein given.


LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION

_Letters of Instruction_ chiefly differ from orders, operation
orders, and field orders in their lack of definition of specific
tactical duties. They are truly instructions. They deal mainly with
strategic considerations and general plans, because the writer is
usually far away from, or not in direct command of, the units which
are going to carry out the general plans.

At the beginning of campaigns _letters of instruction_ enumerate the
troops of the various commands and the corresponding leaders.

“In armies, combat orders will often be in the form of, or a part
of, letters of instruction to the commanding generals in the field
armies composing the army. But where the field armies are within
supporting distance of each other and can mutually coöperate in the
task assigned them, formal combat orders may be issued. Such orders
are necessarily general in character and consist of a statement
of the objective sought by the army commander, and of the part he
expects each field army to play in attaining this objective. The army
commander, either by means of letters of instruction or by personal
conferences with his field army commanders, fully acquaints them not
only with the immediate end in view, but also with so much of his
future plans as may be necessary to insure thorough cooperation on
their part.”[17]


In the illustration which follows, President Lincoln outlines a
general offensive to the various armies. As commander-in-chief he
issues the substance of a letter of instructions in the form of an
executive order. In it we shall notice that he does not prescribe any
specific movement of troops.

                         Executive Mansion, Washington, Jan. 27, 1862.

  _President’s General War Order, No. 1._

  Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a
  general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States
  against the insurgent forces.

  That, especially,

  The army at and about Fortress Monroe,

  The army of the Potomac,

  The army of West Virginia,

  The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky,

  The army and flotilla at Cairo,

  And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that
  day.

  That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
  commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
  additional orders when duly given.

  That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries
  of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the
  General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of
  land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and
  full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

                                                      ABRAHAM LINCOLN.


The following is a more usual form of letter of instructions.
This time it goes directly from the commander-in-chief to the
general-in-chief:

                                                    May 24, 1862.
                                                From Washington, 24th.

  Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—

  I left General McDowell’s camp at dark last evening. Shield’s
  command is there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before
  Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th). We have so thinned our
  line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday
  at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one (1) regiment
  infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some
  peril.

  The enemy’s forces under General Anderson, now opposing General
  McDowell’s advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the
  road to Richmond.

  If, in conjunction with McDowell’s movement against Anderson, you
  could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy’s supplies
  from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2)
  forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy’s retreat, you will
  prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession
  of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men, and if you
  succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad
  for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do
  this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy
  bridges? McDowell and Shields both say you can, and positively
  will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and
  safely.

  You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely
  as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the twenty-first
  (21st).

                                                       A. LINCOLN,
                                                          _President_.


As you see, the above example does no more than suggest to General
McClellan from a strategic standpoint certain courses open to him.
The general-in-chief on the spot is the one to make the decision.

To progress in our examples, let us take one issued by the
general-in-chief to one of his subordinate generals.

                                         Headquarters of the Army,
                                            Washington, Feb. 23, 1862.
  Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler,
        U. S. Volunteers,—

  _General_:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces
  destined to coöperate with the navy, in the attack upon New
  Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a
  profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception
  of your chief-of-staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The
  force at your disposal will consist of the first 13 regiments named
  in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th
  Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan (old and good regiments from Baltimore).

  The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and the 6th Michigan, will await
  your orders at Fort Monroe.

  Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well-drilled as heavy
  artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will
  be sufficient for your purposes.

  After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the
  country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the
  conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped and (1) one
  without horses, will be all that are necessary.

  This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680
  artillery; total 15,255 men.

  The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized
  to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably
  give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.

  The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the
  capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi
  River, and the first obstacle to be encountered (perhaps the only
  one) is in the resistance of Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is
  expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you
  will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in them
  to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on
  the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at
  Pilot Station (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in
  the event of disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be
  removed as soon as the forts are captured.

  Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces
  and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their
  fire, and carry them by assault.

  The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there
  are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to
  land your troops and coöperate with the naval attack, although it
  is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish
  the result. If these works are taken, the city of New Orleans
  necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to
  occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern
  bank of the river above the city; it may be necessary to place
  some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears
  sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for
  purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city.

  After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to
  reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and
  particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay,
  and Fort Livingston will next claim your attention.

  A feint at Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I
  need not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession
  of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of
  obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton
  Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished
  as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then
  endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by
  the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying
  Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either
  after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to
  divert you from obtaining possession of all the approaches to New
  Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it
  will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to
  gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the
  railway terminus at the city.

  In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as the
  operations of the northern column develop themselves.

  I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition
  are: _First_, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches:
  then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, Galveston, etc. It
  is probable that by the time New Orleans has been reduced it will
  be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces
  sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you
  will please give all the assistance in your power to the army
  and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the
  fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm
  retention of New Orleans.

                                 I am, etc.,
                                          GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
                                            _Maj.-Gen. Com’g U. S. A._


General McClellan goes more into detail than does the President. He
is considering the situation on more technical lines. Yet he does
not go beyond the limits of strategy in outlining the general plan.
He still conforms to the principles of letters of instruction. If we
were to follow General Butler in his journey to the Gulf, we should
perceive in his orders the disappearance of the strategic and the
appearance of the tactical idea. Later we should discover one of his
brigade commanders actually issuing a field order.

Notice in the last example how, on account of its length, General
McClellan has made a neat summary of the whole. Notice that in all of
these letters the writers have adhered to the principles of rhetoric;
and that they have given to the recipient a unified and coherent
production. Why? Because the will of the commander is transmitted
more quickly in that way.

We have now completed the consideration of the expression which
directly affects troops in the field. We have written the _field
message_ which brings information to commanders and which helps them
to make an estimate of a situation. We have framed the _field order_
which grows out of that estimate and which transforms the decision
into action. We have viewed the _operation order_ which is no more
than a field order made to fit trench warfare. We have seen _orders_
which are issued in connection with combat so as to govern the
movement of trains. We have read letters of _instruction_ which are
written by higher commanders in order to regulate in a general way
extensive movements. All of these communications bear specifically
upon the effort of troops toward success in battle—the ultimate
object of all military training.

In leaving this most important part of our professional work, we
might take with us this one idea. We can best express ourselves
in any of the communications we have studied by having all the
thoughts of one kind together and the different kinds in an orderly
arrangement. Whenever it is possible we should keep the paragraph
sequence,

            (a) Enemy.
            (b) Own troops.
            (c) Plan.




CHAPTER XI

THE WAR DIARY—THE REPORT—ROUTINE ORDERS


We have heretofore considered those communications which aid combat.
We now take up those which have no direct bearing upon the outcome of
an engagement. We have seen how the _field message_ makes possible
by its fresh information the plan for battle, how the _field_ and
_operation orders_ frame that plan for battle, how the _order_
maneuvers the trains in connection with battle, and how _letters_
of _instruction_ issue general directions for a campaign of many
battles. We now come to the place where the maneuver, enterprise, or
undertaking is over. For a variety of future benefits we must have a
record of those occurrences. The _War Diary_ and _The Report_ are the
communications which perform that office.


THE WAR DIARY

Just as certain individuals keep journals of their lives, so the
higher military units keep diaries of their existences. “The War
Diary is a record of events kept in campaign by each battalion and
higher organization and by each ammunition, supply, engineer, and
sanitary train. Entries are made daily and should form a concise
history of the military operations. A day comprises 24 hours covered


Each day’s record will commence with a march table, or statement of
the operations or location of the organization, including an account
of weather, roads, camp, health of troops, etc., and a statement of
the supply of ammunition, rations, and forage. This will be followed
by a chronological record of events, including time and place of
issue and receipt of orders and messages, with a copy or a synopsis
of contents.

It is of especial importance that the exact hour and place at which
movements are begun and ended, and orders or important messages sent
or received be noted. After an engagement, the war diary will contain
a report of losses and captures and will be accompanied by a sketch
showing the positions of the command at the most important phases.

Each day’s record will be attested by the commander or by the
adjutant; and, with attached copies of orders and messages sent and
received, will be forwarded daily to the next higher commander, who
as soon as practicable, after the receipt thereof, will forward the
war diary direct to the War Department.

Commanders of armies, or of units not components of a higher command,
will forward their war diaries direct to the War Department.”[18]
Thus these documents become the authentic material for our military
history.

To go into the War Diary more specifically, let us tabulate what we
might actually state therein. We should start with the heading:

                                                   War Diary,
                                           3d Battalion, 72d Infantry,
                                                  3 May, 1920.

The date in this case would cover the whole period from midnight May
2/3 to midnight May 3/4.

Since a march would most likely be the first happening of any note
after midnight May 2/3, the diary would start with a march table.

        Reveille, 3-30 a. m.
        Breakfast, 3-45 a. m.
        First call, 4-10 a. m.
        Assembly, 4-15 a. m.
        Head of column moved out, 4-17 a. m.
        First Halt at SQUARE CORNERS, 5-02 a. m.
        Second Halt at LIBERTY, 5-51 a. m.
        Third Halt at MILES RIVER, 6-41 a. m.
        Fourth Halt at SMITH’S FARM, 7-47 a. m.
        Message from C. O., 72d Infantry; received 400 yards west HOPE
            FARM, 8-40 a. m.
        Fifth Halt at Orchard near HOPE FARM, 8-47 a. m.
        Extent of march: 13-2 miles.

  Went into defensive position on SILERS RIDGE at 9-15 a. m. Right of
  I Company at SILERS FARM—Left of M Company at rail fence corner.
  Began building standing trench at 9-25 a. m. Dinner, cooked ration,
  11 a. m. Finished trenches, saps, and entanglements 4 p. m. Supper,
  4-30 p. m. Bivouacked 800 yds. in rear of trenches at 8 p. m.
  Enemy’s harassing patrol wakened command at 11 p. m.; otherwise no
  activity.

  Weather: clear and cool. Slight rain between second and third halts.

  Roads: good metal roads entire march.

  Camp: Bivouac grassy gentle slope—dry ground.

  Water: Spring 200 yds. rear of center of position—capacity for
  regiment.

  Health: Command generally exhausted after march with full packs
  and with 60 rounds per man, and especially after digging. On sick
  report—16; absent sick—8.

  Ammunition: On hand, including amount on persons of men—118,200
  rounds. 1 ammunition wagon returned to LIBERTY at 12, noon, for
  refilling.

  Rations: 4 days’ supply on hand.

  Forage: 1 day’s forage on hand. 1 wagon returned to LIBERTY at 2 p.
  m. to refill.

  Losses: 1 private, K Company, killed by enemy’s harassing patrol.

  Captures: none.

  Road and Position sketches covering day’s operations enclosed.

  Copies of battalion commander’s march and defense orders, also
  copies of one message from regimental commander, enclosed.

  By order of Major Jenkins:

                                               H. E. BOTTOMLY,
                                           1st Lieut., Bn, Adj. 3d Bn.

The original of the above is sent to the regimental commander and a
copy is retained by the battalion.

The above data, supplemented with the sketches, messages, and orders
enclosed, furnish a complete history of the battalion’s doings for
the day.

Blanks are furnished from the War Department from time to time to
enable Adjutants (whose duty it is to keep the War Diary) to fill in
the data more quickly.


REPORTS

Reports cover a wide range of subjects. When a leader is in doubt as
to whether an event is important enough to report, he had better take
the wise course and send in his description of what has happened.
Very few occurrences in the military service are so unessential as to
be rightfully ignored.

They may take either one of two forms: either they may be dated,
headed “Report on so-and-so” (see example on following), and inclosed
with a letter of transmittal; or they may themselves be in the form
of letters addressed directly to the person or office for whom they
are destined.

Reports may consist of expository description on the one hand or of a
narration on the other, but they usually consist of a combination of
the two.

Here is an example of highly expository description. It is the report
upon the German raid which was given us under _Operation Orders_.

                                       In the field, 12th April, 1916.

  CAPTAIN WAGENER’S REPORT ON THE RAID ON THE EVENING OF 11TH APRIL,
  1916

  At 4 p. m. the raiding party marched from Martinpuich through
  Pozières, then by the Lattorf Graben—Regimentstrichter—Krebs Graben
  to the Appointed dug-outs on the left of Sap No. 3, where the
  evening meal was found ready prepared.

  At 8 p. m. the artillery preparation commenced as prearranged.
  Shortly after fire was opened, the whole of the enemy’s position
  from Windmühle to Besenhecke was wrapped in greyish-white smoke,
  which the wind drove back over Sap No. 3 into our lines.

  By 8.10 p. m. it was impossible to remain in our trench east of Sap
  No. 3 without wearing a gas mask. This was still the case at 8.20
  p. m., when the patrols moved forward from their dug-outs to the
  Hohlweg, in the order Stradtmann, Dumas, Böhlefeld, and Freund.
  Lieutenant Boenig followed close behind Lieutenant Stradtmann.

  By 8.25 p. m. the party was posted ready in the Hohlweg. The clouds
  of gas and smoke, however, still hung so thick over the enemy’s
  trenches that it was impossible to distinguish whether our own
  shells were still falling on the point of entry or whether our
  artillery had already lengthened their range.

  At 8.27 p. m. Lieutenant Stradtmann received the order to advance
  to the attack with his patrol. Lieutenant Boenig, with the six
  stretcher bearers, left the Hohlweg simultaneously and in rear of
  Stradtmann’s patrol, and posted connecting files, whose positions
  were marked by red signal lamps shaded to the front and to the
  sides.

  At 8.28 p. m. Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s patrols advanced. Following
  the line of connecting files, they reached the point of entry, to
  find that Stradtmann’s patrol was already in possession of 16 yards
  of trench, and had captured three prisoners. The latter had come
  out of their dug-outs just as Lieutenant Stradtmann appeared in
  front of the enemy’s trench. They carried hand grenades and rifles
  with bayonets fixed, but were immediately disarmed by Lieutenants
  Boenig and Stradtmann.

  Dumas’ patrol immediately turned to the left down the trench,
  and, in a few steps, came upon a half-destroyed machine gun
  emplacement. Reservist Nadolny, of Stradtmann’s patrol, was already
  occupied in digging out the buried machine gun. Lieutenant Dumas
  penetrated further along the enemy’s trench, and soon reached the
  communication trench which runs, roughly along the dividing line
  between Target Sectors 79 and 80, towards the Weisse Steinmauer.
  At this point a large dug-out had been wrecked, apparently by a
  direct hit. Lieutenant Dumas had previously sent three men of
  his patrol along behind the enemy’s trench; they reached the
  communication trench about 11 yards behind the front line trench.
  A few Englishmen, who came out of this communication trench,
  endeavored to reach the parados of the front line trench, whence
  they evidently intended to defend it. They were, however, surprised
  by our three men and bayoneted.

  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Dumas, with the rest of his men, forced his
  way further along the trench, and just north of Besenhecke reached
  the communication trench which leads to the brown prolongation
  of the Weisse Steinmauer (white stone wall). They passed another
  wrecked dug-out, in which dead bodies were seen. Adjoining the
  above-mentioned communication trench, another large dug-out was
  found, which the patrol intended to clear. As, however, a number
  of Englishmen advanced upon Dumas’ patrol from the communication
  trench and alongside it, a mêlée ensued with grenades, rifles and
  pistols, in the course of which the enemy, after suffering evident
  loss, either retreated or surrendered, while none of Dumas’ patrol
  received wounds of any account.

  Meanwhile, Lieutenant Böhlefeld advanced along the enemy’s trench
  to the right of the point of entry, and, in a few yards, came to
  three large dug-outs, of which one was wrecked and full of dead
  and wounded. At his summons, the enemy came out of the others
  and surrendered without more ado. Lieutenant Böhlefeld sent back
  the prisoners and asked for reinforcements in order to clear the
  dug-outs, undertaking, meanwhile, to hold the enemy’s trench with
  two men.

  At 8.30 p. m., as no noise came from the point of entry, or from
  the right of the same, while from a point some 65 yards to the
  left shots and reports of grenades could be heard, I ordered
  Vice-Sergeant Major Elb to advance with five men and reinforce
  Dumas’ patrol. Lieutenant Erb, the regimental adjutant, attached
  himself to this party. He was wearing an oxygen-breathing apparatus
  and had been waiting in the Hohlweg. Shortly after, the sounds of
  fighting ceased on the left, and the first batch of prisoners was
  brought back from the enemy’s trench. I had come to the conclusion
  that we had the upper hand everywhere, especially on the right, and
  with a view to exploiting fully our success, I ordered Lieutenant
  Freund to cross the enemy’s trench at the point of entry with 15
  men of the supports, and to attack the Spion from the rear. At the
  same time, I sent forward Vice-Sergeant Major Wölfle with 4 men to
  reinforce Lieutenant Böhlefeld.

  In order to have a reserve in hand for meeting all eventualities,
  I ordered up the commanders of the two groups on the flank of the
  12th Company, which was stationed immediately to the right of
  Sap No. 3. The groups had been warned in the afternoon and given
  the necessary instructions. Whilst Vice-Sergeant Majors Elb and
  Wölfle, with their men, went in search of Dumas’ and Böhlefeld’s
  patrols, Lieutenant Freund dashed across the enemy’s trench at the
  point of entry and followed it along to the right as far as the
  communication trench which leads into the front line trench near
  the Spion. Freund’s patrol leapt into the enemy’s front line trench
  on both sides of the communication trench, captured 10 men almost
  without a struggle, and secured several rifles and articles of
  equipment. A few Englishmen who offered resistance were bayoneted;
  Volunteer Herrmann, of the 7th Company, and Lance Corporal
  Haufler, of the 4th Company, particularly distinguished themselves.
  A few Englishmen attempted to get away, but were shot dead.

  Volunteer Herrmann further discovered an extemporized trench
  mortar. The latter could not be carried off, however, as it was
  securely built in. Vice-Sergeant Major Wölfle, who arrived on the
  scene shortly after, destroyed the trench mortar as well as he
  could with hand grenades and pistol shots.

  Böhlefeld’s reinforced patrol had accompanied the advance of
  Freund’s patrol along the trench, and came across three or four
  more wrecked dug-outs, which were filled with dead. Individuals
  standing about in the trench were killed by the patrol or made
  prisoner. During this affair, Under Officer Nössler, of the 11th
  Company, repeatedly distinguished himself.

  Whilst our party was breaking into the enemy’s trenches or perhaps
  even before, a party of the enemy, approximately 25 to 30 strong,
  succeeded in getting away from the front line trench and making
  their way back to the Weisse Steinmauer, but were again driven back
  by our artillery fire, and now came running towards Stradtmann’s
  patrol. The latter, apprehending a counter-attack, opened fire.
  Ersatz Reservist Walzer, of the 11th Company, followed by Under
  Officer Staiger, of the 10th Company and others, raised a cheer and
  charged the Englishmen, bayoneting two of them. Those who did not
  put up their hands and surrender, were killed.

  Lieutenant Erb had soon caught up Dumas’ patrol and took part in
  the subsequent fighting, which was practically continuous, for
  almost every one of the enemy offered resistance. With hand grenade
  and pistol, Dumas’ patrol killed more than 20 of the enemy, besides
  wounding a large number. In this fighting Volunteer Hees, of the
  6th Company, particularly distinguished himself. Always to the
  fore, he alone accounted for several Englishmen. On our side only
  one man was slightly wounded.

  In consequence of the events described above, Dumas’ patrol
  remained in the enemy’s trench considerably longer than intended.
  When all the other patrols had returned to the Hohlweg, the
  Dumas-Erb patrol was still missing.

  Hereupon, Lieutenants Boenig and Stradtmann, with several
  non-commissioned officers and men, went back to the enemy’s lines
  and searched the trench to the left until they met the Dumas-Erb
  patrol on its way back. Here again Under Officer Nössler, of the
  11th Company, 110th Reserve Infantry Regiment, distinguished
  himself.

  At 8.50 p. m., the last men of the entire party had returned to the
  Hohlweg and went back to their dug-outs.

  At 8.51 p. m., the first shell fell on the front line trenches east
  of Sap No. 3.

  At 8.57 p. m., the artillery commander was informed that the
  artillery fire could be gradually broken off.

  At 9 p. m., a heavy battery near Albert dropped a few shells near
  Sap No. 3.

  At 9.05 p. m., the conclusion of the operation was reported.

  The following were captured: 24 unwounded and 5 wounded prisoners,
  1 Lewis gun, 1 rifle with telescopic sights, 20 ordinary rifles,
  and a large number of steel helmets, belts with ammunition pouches,
  packs, haversacks, and gas helmets.

  Our casualties consisted of one man slightly wounded in the
  forehead by a splinter from a hand grenade. He was bandaged in the
  advanced dressing-station and immediately returned to the patrol.

                                            (Signed)       WAGENER,
                                      _Captain and Company Commander_.

            40 copies, as appendices to the Report of the 110th
            Reserve Infantry Regiment on the raid of the 11th April,
            1916.


A more narrative form of report is represented by the following
extract from Gen. Bragg’s report during the Civil War:

  “To meet our successful advance and retrieve his losses in the
  front of his left, the enemy early transferred a portion of his
  reserve from his left to that flank, and by 2 o’clock had succeeded
  in concentrating such a force on Lieutenant General Hardee’s front
  as to check his further progress. Our two lines had, by this time,
  become almost blended, so weak were they by losses, exhaustion,
  and extension to cover the enemy’s whole front. As early as 10
  a. m. Major General Breckinridge was called on for one brigade,
  and soon after for a second, to reinforce or act as a reserve to
  General Hardee. His reply to the first call represented the enemy
  as crossing Stone’s River in heavy force in his immediate front;
  and on receiving the second order he informed me they had already
  crossed in heavy force and were advancing on him in two lines. He
  was immediately ordered not to wait attack but to advance and meet
  them. About this same time a report reached me that a heavy force
  of the enemy’s infantry was advancing on the Lebanon Road about
  five miles in Breckinridge’s front. Brigadier General Pegram, who
  had been sent to that road to cover the flank of the infantry with
  the cavalry brigade (save two regiments, detached with Wheeler
  and Wharton), was ordered forward immediately to develop such
  movement. The orders for the two brigades from Breckinridge were
  countermanded, whilst dispositions were made at his request to
  reinforce him. Before they could be carried out, the movements
  ordered disclosed the facts that no force had crossed Stone’s
  River; that the only enemy in our immediate front there was a small
  body of sharpshooters, and that there was no advance on the Lebanon
  Road.

  “These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field
  (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld
  from active operation three fine brigades until the enemy had
  succeeded in checking our progress, had reëstablished his lines,
  and had collected many of his broken battalions.”


The above example, in addition to its value as a narrative report,
illustrates the dependence of a commander upon proper information.


ROUTINE ORDERS

Routine Orders preserve their normal tenor in peace or war. They have
to do with the administration of the military service, so that a
state of campaign has very little influence upon their character.

                  { General Orders.
                  { Special Orders.
  They consist of { Circulars.
                  { Bulletins.
                  { Memoranda.

_General Orders_ “include generally, (1) all detailed instructions
necessary in carrying out certain general regulations or orders
issued from superior headquarters; (2) all standing instructions, to
the end that frequent repetitions may be avoided; and (3) proceedings
of general and special courts-martial.”

General Orders are issued by commanders of armies, field armies,
corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, separate battalions, posts,
departments, and districts.

“When necessary, _orders_ are used by commanders of battalions
forming parts of regiments, and for smaller units and detachments,
for the same class of instructions as are promulgated by higher
commanders in general orders.” In other words _orders_ is a term
used to designate those instructions issued by commanders of
divisions and of separate brigades in regard to trains, and also
a term used by battalions and smaller units to designate those
instructions corresponding to general orders for higher units.

Here is an example of a General Order from the War Department.

  GENERAL ORDERS,                                WAR DEPARTMENT,
  No. 2                                 Washington, January 4, 1917.

  1. An examination of majors, captains, and first lieutenants of
  the Regular Army, with a view to their selection for appointment
  to fill vacancies in the grade of major in the Judge Advocate
  General’s Department, will be held at the headquarters of the
  Eastern, Central, Western, Southern, Hawaiian Departments, the
  headquarters of the United States troops in the Panama Canal Zone,
  the headquarters of the Philippine Department, and the headquarters
  of the 15th infantry, Tientsin, China, beginning at 8 a. m., on
  May 10, 1917, or as soon thereafter as practicable. No officer
  who has not served as a commissioned officer of the Regular Army
  for at least eight years will be regarded as eligible to take the
  examination.

  2. Eligible officers who desire to take the examination will make
  application to the commanding officer of that one of the commands
  mentioned in the preceding paragraph in which they are stationed,
  and each of such commanding officers is authorized to issue the
  necessary orders to assemble applicants at his headquarters on the
  date set for the examination. * * * *

  3. The examination will be supervised at each headquarters by the
  judge advocate or the officer acting as such. If the acting judge
  advocate shall apply to take the examination and is the only judge
  advocate present at such headquarters, the commanding officer of
  the command will detail some other suitable officer to supervise
  the examination.

  4. On the day and hour set for the beginning of the examination,
  each candidate will deliver to the officer supervising the
  examination a signed statement including:

  (a) A brief statement concerning the candidate’s education and
  experience both legal and general;

  (b) A list of persons who are familiar with the candidate’s
  qualifications along legal lines, with the address of each person;

  (c) One or more briefs or other law memoranda, not exceeding ten,
  prepared by the candidate and made use of by him in the solution of
  legal questions, whether moot or practical;

  (d) A specific list, as complete as practicable, of general
  court-martial or civil court trials in which the candidate has
  participated either as prosecutor or counsel;

  (e) Copies of or specific references to the applicant’s published
  writings, whether of legal or other character, which he may desire
  to have considered;

  (f) Outline of service of candidate since his entry into the
  military establishment;

  (g) Any other matter the candidate may desire to present for
  consideration.

      (2507125, A. G. O.)
  By order of The Secretary of War:

                                                H. L. SCOTT,
                                        Major General, Chief of Staff.

  Official:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.


Here is an example of a General Order publishing the result of a
General Court-Martial.

  GENERAL ORDERS,                                 WAR DEPARTMENT,
  No. 3                                 Washington, January 5, 1917.

  Before a general court-martial which convened at Nogales, Ariz.,
  October 25, 1916, pursuant to Special Orders, No. 268, October 14,
  1916, as amended in Special Orders, No. 273, October 19, 1916,
  Southern Department, and of which Lieut. Col. George A. Skinner,
  Medical Corps, was president, and Capt. Sherman A. White, 12th
  Infantry, judge advocate, was arraigned and tried—

  Capt. John Smith, U. S. Infantry.

  Charge I.—“Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
  discipline in violation of the 62d Article of War.”

  One specification.

  Charge II.—“Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman in
  violation of the 61st Article of War.”

  Two specifications.

  To which charges and specifications the accused pleaded “Not
  Guilty.”


  FINDINGS

  Of the Specification, 1st Charge, and of the 1st Charge, “Not
  Guilty.”

  Of the Specifications, 2d Charge, and of the 2d Charge, “Guilty.”


  SENTENCE

  “To be dismissed the service of the United States.”

  The sentence having been approved by the convening authority and
  the record of trial forwarded for the action of the President under
  the 106th Article of War, the following are his orders thereon:

  The sentence of dismissal imposed by the general court-martial in
  the foregoing case of Captain John Smith, U. S. Infantry, is hereby
  confirmed and will be carried into execution.

                                                       Woodrow Wilson.
  The White House,
    3 January, 1917.

  Capt. John Smith, U. S. Infantry, ceases to be an officer of the
  Army from January 6, 1917.

  (2495592, A. G. O.)

  By Order of The Secretary of War:

                                                      H. L. SCOTT.
                                        Major General, Chief of Staff.
  OFFICIAL:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.


Here is an example of a _General Order_ of a Territorial Department.

  GENERAL ORDERS, }                             HEADQUARTERS EASTERN
       No. 1.     }                                  DEPARTMENT,

                             Governors Island, N. Y., January 1, 1916.

  This order supersedes General Orders, No. 1, Headquarters Eastern
  Department, dated January 1, 1915, and all amendatory orders
  thereto, together with all bulletins published heretofore.

                           BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL WOOD:
                                                EDWIN F. GLENN,
                                            Colonel, General Staff,
                                                       Chief of Staff.
  Official:
    W. A. SIMPSON,
      Adjutant General,
        Adjutant.


The above order is the first page of an alphabetical list of general
orders in force in the Department. Some of them have been originated
by the Department Commander and some have been made to comply with
War Department instructions.

The general order of a Department covering court-martial cases is the
same as that of the War Department, with the exception of the caption
which is given below.

  General Court-Martial }                       HEADQUARTERS EASTERN
      Orders, No. 6.    }                             DEPARTMENT.

                               Governors Island, N. Y., Jan. 22, 1916.


Here is an example of a Post General Order.

                      Headquarters United States Military Academy,
                                 West Point, N. Y., February 27, 1917.

  General Orders, }
      No. 7.      }

  1. A vertical filing system (the War Department Correspondence
  File, a subjective decimal classification for arranging and
  filing War Department correspondence) will be used exclusively in
  recording and filing correspondence at these headquarters and also
  in the offices of the Quartermaster and of the Treasurer on and
  after March 1, 1917.

  2. The operation of General Orders, No. 92, War Department, 1909,
  as modified by subsequent orders, prescribing the card record
  system now in use generally at administrative headquarters, has
  been suspended by the War Department as far as these headquarters
  is concerned.

  3. The name of the writer signing an original paper will be
  inserted on carbon copies that are forwarded. One carbon copy of
  all typewritten reports, letters, and indorsements (except short,
  routine indorsements), will be made on standard letter size paper
  (not perforated) for use in the records at these headquarters. Such
  copy will be distinctly marked “For Headquarters Records,” and will
  not be withdrawn at subordinate offices.

  4. Copies of the publication entitled “War Department
  Correspondence File” and Circular No. 1, War Department, March 24,
  1914, explaining and giving instructions as to the operation of
  this system, will be supplied by The Adjutant General of the Army
  upon application direct.

  By order of Colonel Biddle:

                                                   C. C. CARTER,
                                                     Major, C. A. C.,
                                                           _Adjutant_.


If a Post General Order covers a court-martial case tried by a
general court, the order number will appear thus:

  General Court-Martial }
      Orders, No. 4.    }


If it covers one tried by a special court, it will appear thus:

  Special Court-Martial }
      Orders, No. 4.    }


The separate battalion or company would issue _orders_ on the same
general plan as post general orders. The order number would appear
thus:

  Orders: }
  No. 6.  }


SPECIAL ORDERS differ from _General Orders_ in that the former refer
to individuals.

Here is an example of a War Department Special Order.

  SPECIAL ORDERS }                                WAR DEPARTMENT,
      No. 289.   }                    Washington, December 11, 1916.

  1. The leave of absence on account of sickness granted John J.
  Nobbo, First Lieutenant, 13th Cavalry, in Special Orders, No.
  196, War Department, August 22, 1916, is extended three months on
  surgeon’s certificate of disability, and upon the expiration of
  this leave Lieut. Nobbo will report to the commanding officer, Fort
  Riley, Kan., for examination as to his physical condition by the
  surgeon at the post.

       *       *       *       *       *

These Special Orders then take up twenty different individuals in
twenty paragraphs and end with,—

  22. Capt. Alfred W. Perkins, Infantry, Detached Officers’ List,
  will repair to this city and report in person to the Chief of Staff
  for duty in connection with the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps,
  and upon completion of this duty will return to his proper station.
  The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

     (2503282, A. G. O.)
  By Order of The Secretary of War:

                                                   H. L. SCOTT,
                                        Major General, Chief of Staff.
  OFFICIAL:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.


The separate paragraphs are also made up into extract copies as
follows:

  SPECIAL ORDERS, }
      No. 289.    }

                                                 WAR DEPARTMENT,
                                        Washington, December 11, 1916.

  _Extract_

       *       *       *       *       *

  3. Private Clifford H. Worthington, Military Academy Detachment
  of Field Artillery, West Point, N. Y., is transferred as private
  second class to the Ordnance Department and is assigned to duty at
  that post.

       *       *       *       *       *

                          BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
                                                      H. L. SCOTT,
                                 Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.
  OFFICIAL:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.


Departments, Posts, Regiments, Brigades, Divisions, Corps, Field
Armies, and Armies follow the same scheme as above for their _Special
Orders_.

CIRCULARS are issued seldom but have great force. They are signed
directly by the heads of the War Department, Quartermaster Corps,
Ordnance Department or of whatever bureau prints the circular.

Here is an example of a _Circular_ issued by the War Department.

                                                 WAR DEPARTMENT,
                                         Washington, January 24, 1917.

  CIRCULAR:

  The following resolution was adopted by the Senate on January 16,
  1908, and is now one of its standing rules:

  Resolved, That no communications from heads of departments,
  commissioners, chiefs of bureaus, or other executive officers,
  except when authorized or required by law, or when made in response
  to a resolution of the Senate, will be received by the Senate
  unless such communications shall be transmitted to the Senate by
  the President.

       *       *       *       *       *

  Chiefs of bureaus and others, in preparing communications for the
  signature of the Secretary of War, will please conform to the
  foregoing rules and instructions.

                                                 NEWTON D. BAKER,
                                                     Secretary of War.


Here is a _Circular_ issued by the Quartermaster Corps.

                                               WAR DEPARTMENT,
                  Office of the Quartermaster General, U. S. Army,
                                   Washington, D. C., August 27, 1917.
  Circular, }
   No. 9.   }

  Purchases of Supplies

  1. During the continuance of the present emergency the following
  regulations are prescribed under the authority contained in the act
  of March 4, 1915:

  (a) Where the time for delivery is not to exceed 30 days from date
  of acceptance of the award, irrespective of the amount involved,
  supplies may be procured by contract of brief form after the manner
  of proposal and acceptance agreement, in accordance with form to be
  authorized therefor.

  (b) The regulations prescribed by Circular No. 7, Office of the
  Quartermaster General, March 23, 1915, so far as in conflict with
  the foregoing, are hereby suspended during the continuance of the
  present emergency.

                                             HENRY G. SHARPE,
                                    Quartermaster General, U. S. Army.

  10916—17


BULLETINS are issued by the War Department and territorial
Departments. Their purpose is the publication of information. They
are more numerous than _Circulars_.

Here is the first page of a Bulletin of the War Department.

  BULLETIN }                                      WAR DEPARTMENT,
   No. 18. }                              Washington, April 6, 1917.

  The following digest of opinions of the Judge Advocate General of
  the Army, for the month of March, 1917, and of certain decisions
  of the Comptroller of the Treasury and of courts, together with
  notes on military justice prepared under the direction of the Judge
  Advocate General, and a compilation of Federal and State laws
  prohibiting discrimination against the uniform, is published for
  the information of the service in general.

  (2526413 B-A. G. O.)

                            BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
                                                     H. L. SCOTT,
                                        Major General, Chief of Staff.
  OFFICIAL:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.
    89793-17—1

Then follow twenty-three pages of the opinions of the Judge Advocate
General.


Here is another first page of a War Department Bulletin.

  BULLETIN  }                                     WAR DEPARTMENT,
   No. 14.  }                            Washington, March 12, 1917.

  The accompanying tabulated statement shows the standing of
  organizations of the Coast Artillery Corps based on figures of
  merit attained at target practice during the year 1916, and the
  hits by calibers at various ranges in 1916.

  Slight errors in the figures of merit have been corrected without
  returning the reports to the organizations concerned.

  (2537101, A. G. O.)

                            BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
                                                     H. L. SCOTT,
                                        Major General, Chief of Staff.
  OFFICIAL:
    H. P. McCAIN,
      The Adjutant General.
    83601-17—1

What follows for nine pages is a table of statistics on Coast
Artillery firing records.


Territorial Departments issue _Bulletins_ seldom. The pamphlets when
they do appear, follow the same plan as those of the War Department.

_MEMORANDA_, are issued by posts, regiments, and separate
battalions—by the smaller units. _Memoranda_ deal with subjects which
are not so important in a military way as the foregoing orders.
They may be numbered, as in the following case, when they are of a
permanent nature.

                        HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY,
                                   West Point, N. Y., October 8, 1917.

  Memorandum, }
    No. 34.   }

  To prevent damage and danger from fires, parents and others will
  exercise great care in allowing children under age of discretion to
  have access to, or to handle matches, or in allowing them to burn
  leaves or other combustibles in any part of the Post.

  (680.23)

  By order of Colonel Tillman:
                                                 D. H. TORREY,
                                               Captain of Infantry,
                                                             Adjutant.


They may be unnumbered, as in the following case, when they are of a
temporary nature.

                                 West Point, N. Y., February 27, 1917.

  MEMORANDUM:

  Residents of the Post are informed that a case of chicken pox
  exists at the Hotel.

  The usual precautions against spreading the disease are enjoined.

  (Tel. memo. Surgeon.)

  By order of Colonel Biddle:
                                                   C. C. CARTER,
                                                  Major, C. A. C.,
                                                            Adjutant.

NOTE.—The War Department issues also certain _Special Regulations_
for particular General Orders to which it wishes to call attention,
and puts out in pamphlet form _Changes_ to _Regulations_. Both
_Special Regulations_ and _Changes_ belong to the class of the
General Order, and, therefore, are not taken up separately here.




CHAPTER XII

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE—EXPLANATIONS—LECTURES


_Official Correspondence_ includes official letters, rolls, returns,
estimates, requisitions, and routine reports.

The _Official Letter_ includes (1) letters to persons in the military
service, (2) letters to persons outside the military service, and (3)
official telegrams.

Number 1 has its particular military form which must be precisely
followed. It consists of

            { The Brief
            { The Body
            { The Ending
            { Indorsements
            { Enclosures

_The Brief_ consists of the following in the order

            { The Heading
            { From Whom Sent
  given     { To Whom Sent
            { The Subject

An example of a _Brief_ would be:

                                         Hq. Eastern Department,
                                Governors Island, N. Y., May 21, 1940.

From: The Adjutant.

  To:      Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.
             (Through C. O. Madison Barracks, N. Y.)
  Subject: Delay in submitting report.


Another example would be:

                                       Company A, 99th Infantry,
                                Madison Barracks, N. Y., Jan. 9, 1940.

  From:    Commanding Officer, Co. A, 99th Inf.
  To:      The Commanding Officer.
  Subject: Insufficiency of shoes.


Another example of a _Brief_ would be:

                                           Madison Barracks, N. Y.,
                                                        Jan. 10, 1940.

  From:    Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.
  To:      The Adjutant General of the Army
             (Through C. O. Madison Barracks, N. Y.)
  Subject: Request for leave of absence.

The heading consists of the name of the office, place, and date. In
the first example the name of the office was “Headquarters, Eastern
Department.” In the second, “Company A, 99th Infantry.” In the third,
there was no office named because the letter was written by an
officer as an individual and not as an executive of an organization.
The place is the post-office address of an officer’s station in any
case. “Indefinite expressions of locality, which do not indicate
where the letter was written,”[19] should never be used. The date
is written on the same line as the place, except where no office is
designated; and it is written _not_ as in communications dealing with
combat, but in the ordinary way.

The “From” in the _From Whom Sent_ begins one line (if typed, two
lines) below the heading and at the left-hand margin. It is followed
by the official designation of the writer, or in the absence of any
official designation, the name of writer with his rank and regiment,
corps, or department. The rank is written before the name; and the
regiment, corps, or department after the name.

Directly below the “From” is placed the “To” in _To Whom Sent_,
followed by the official designation or name of the person addressed.
What follows “To” is written in the same manner as what follows
“From.”

Directly below the “To” comes the word “Subject” which is followed by
an expression which will give the gist of the _Body_ of the letter.
This expression will be boiled to a minimum and will not exceed ten
words.

The words “From,” “To,” and “Subject” will be immediately followed by
colons, and the “F,” “T,” and “S” will be on the same vertical line.

The _Body_ of the letter will comprise one subject only. A leave
of absence and a decision, for instance, will not be requested in
the same letter. Two separate communications will be written. This
procedure is merely that of carrying out the principle of unity in
the whole composition. A violation in this regard causes endless
worry to the receiving office and a deserved rebuke for the writer.

When typewritten, the body of the letter will be single-spaced.
Double spaces will be used between paragraphs. The body should begin
on the second fold of the paper.

The paragraphs will be numbered, will each contain _one_ topic, and
will be arranged in a logical sequence of topics.

Thus if we were to write out the _Body_ of the letter for the last
illustration of the _Brief_, we should have it appear about as
follows:

  1.—I request a leave of absence for five months to take effect on
  or about February 1, 1940.

  2.—My reasons for this request are very urgent at this time. I have
  had ten years of continuous service without a leave of any kind,
  and I feel the need of more than an ordinary rest. Besides, my
  private affairs are in such shape that the matter of straightening
  them out will require at least all of the period requested.

  3.—My address while on leave will be care of Astor Hotel, New York
  City.


_The Ending_

              { The Signature.
  consists of { The Rank.
              { The Regiment, Corps, or Department.

“Official communications will be signed or authenticated with the pen
and not by facsimiles, and if written by order, it will be stated
by whose order. Signatures will be plainly and legibly written. By
virtue of the commission and assignment to duty, the adjutant of any
command transacts the business or correspondence of that command over
his signature; but when orders or instructions of any kind are given,
the authority by which he gives the order must be stated.”[20]

“The _Body_ of the letter will be followed by the _Signature_. If
the _Rank_ and the _Regiment_, _Corps_ or _Department_ of the writer
appear at the beginning of the letter, they will not appear after his
name; but if they do not appear at the beginning of the letter, they
will follow under his name.”[21]

To illustrate fully what we have said, let us write the _Body_ and
_Ending_ of the first illustration of the _Brief_:

  The Department Commander directs that you submit without delay the
  report of your recent inspection of the Organized Militia of the
  State of New York, and that you also submit an explanation of your
  failure to comply with par. 6, S. O. 25, c. s., these headquarters.

                                                    J. L. Thurst,
                                                Lieut. Col., 24th Cav.

One-half inch below the Ending of the letter comes the first of the
_Indorsements_, and the succeeding _Indorsements_ follow one another
serially, with a space of about one-half inch between _Indorsements_.

Letters in the military service are not answered in the sense in
which we use the term in civilian life. In other words, the person
who receives a letter does not retain it and reply thereto by
another. Instead he states what he has to say in an _Indorsement_,
which is put down in continuation of the original letter. Thus
everything which has been written in regard to the contents of a
letter appears as a part of the letter when it is finally filed.

When Captain Douglas’ request for leave of absence, for example,
reaches the headquarters of his regiment, it has added to it the
Colonel’s indorsement which appears as follows, provided the Colonel
wishes the Captain to obtain the leave:

      1st Ind.

  Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Barracks, N. Y., Jan. 11, 1940—
  To the Comdg. Gen., Dept. of the East.

  Approved recommended.
                                                    E. F. Hush,
                                          Colonel, 99th Inf., Comdg.

The serial number of indorsements, the place, the date, and to whom
written, will be written as shown above. When typewritten, they will
be written single-spaced, with a double space between paragraphs.

Should one or more additional sheets be necessary for the _Body_ or
_Indorsements_, sheets of the same size as the first will be added.
Only one side of the paper will be used for writing.

Indorsements of a routine nature such as referring, transmitting,
forwarding, and returning papers, will not be signed with the full
name, but with initials.

When the letter of the Department Commander to Captain Douglas
reaches the Commanding Officer, Madison Barracks, N. Y., who is also
Commanding Officer, 99th Infantry, the latter may do either of two
things. He may simply forward the letter to Captain Douglas without
comment, because he deems the letter sufficient for the purpose; or
he may add a disciplinary word also.

In the first case the indorsement would appear as follows:

      1st Ind.

  Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Barracks, N. Y., May 23, 1940—To
  Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf., Forwarded,
  A. D. T.

In the second case the indorsement would appear as follows:

      1st Ind.

  Hq. 99th Inf., Madison Bks., N. Y., May 23, 1940—To
  Captain James L. Douglas, 99th Inf.

For compliance.

                                      By order of Colonel Maish,
                                                     A. D. Thomas,
                                                    Capt. 99th Inf.,
                                                             Adjutant.

The _Body_ and _Indorsements_ of letters are signed by the Adjutant
when the letters are addressed to those lower in rank than the
Commanding Officer. They are signed by the Commanding Officer himself
when addressed to those higher in rank than the Commanding Officer.
Letters are never addressed to adjutants.

In connection with indorsements it might be well to quote what Army
Regulations say in their regard.

“Communications, whether from a subordinate to a superior, or
vice versa, will pass through intermediate commanders. This rule
will not be interpreted as including matters in relation to which
intermediate commanders can have no knowledge, and over which they
are not expected to exercise control. Chiefs of War Department
bureaus are intermediate commanders between higher authority and the
officers and enlisted men of their respective corps or departments,
who are serving under the exclusive control of themselves and their
subordinates. Verbal communications will be governed by the same
rules as to channels as written communications. When necessity
requires communications to be sent through other than the prescribed
channel, the necessity therefor will be stated.

Communications from superiors to subordinates will be answered
through the same channels as received.

Except as provided above, all communications, reports, and estimates
from officers serving at a military post, and communications of every
nature addressed to them relating to affairs of the post, will pass
through the post commander.

Officers who forward communications will indorse thereon their
approval or disapproval, with remarks. No communication will be
forwarded to the War Department by a department commander or other
superior officer for the action of the Secretary of War without some
recommendations or expression of opinion.”

It may often be necessary to enclose other letters, certain
documents, or even bulkier material with a letter. Such addition to
a letter is called an _Inclosure_ and is submitted as part of the
letter. _Inclosures_ to the original communication will be noted
on the face of the letter at the left-hand margin opposite the
signature, thus:

  2 Incls.                                        J. L. Douglas,
                                                     Capt. 99th Inf.

The inclosures themselves will be numbered on the outside. The two
inclosures of the above example would be marked 1 and 2.

If others are added when an indorsement is made, their number will
be noted at the foot of the indorsement and upon themselves, as just
described for the original communication.

If few in number or not bulky, inclosures may be kept inside the
original paper; otherwise they should be folded together in a wrapper
marked “Inclosures.” If kept within the paper they lie between folds
_a_ and _b_ below.

Now that we have discussed in order the different parts of an
official letter to a person in the military service, let us see how
the various parts appear when assembled.


       +--------------------------------------------------------------+
      {|                                                              |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  2039                    Company B, 40th Infantry,           |
      {|           Fort William H. Seward, Alaska, July 19, 1912.     |
      {|                                                              |
  _a_ {|  From:    The Commanding Officer, Co. B, 40th Inf.           |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  To:      The Adjutant General of the Army.                  |
      {|           (Through military channels.)                       |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  Subject: Philippine campaign badges.                        |
      {|                                                              |
      {|                                                              |
       +······························································+
      {|                                                              |
      {|    Inclosed are lists in duplicate of enlisted men of        |
      {|  Company B, 40th Infantry, entitled to the Philippine        |
      {|  campaign badge.                                             |
      {|                                          John A. Brown,      |
      {|  2 Incls.                                   Capt., 40th Inf. |
      {|                                                              |
  _b_ {|  824                    1st Ind.                             |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  Hq. Ft. William H. Seward, Alaska, July 19, 1912— To the    |
      {|  Comdg. Gen. Dept., of the Columbia.                         |
      {|                                     S. F. Thomas,            |
      {|  2 Incls.                        Col., 40th Inf., Comdg.     |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  (Stamp) Rec’d Western Dept., July 30, 1912.                 |
      {|                                                              |
       +······························································+
      {|                                                              |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  8043                   2d Ind.                              |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  Hq. Western Dept., San Francisco, Cal., July 31, 1912— To   |
      {|  The Adjt. Gen. of the Army, Washington, D. C.               |
      {|                                                              |
  _c_ {|                                   Arthur E. Green,           |
      {|  2 Incls.                  Col., Gen. Staff, in absence      |
      {|                            of the Department Commander.      |
      {|                                                              |
      {|  (Stamp) Rec’d A. G. O., Aug. 5, 1912.                       |
      {|                                                              |
      {|                                                              |
       +--------------------------------------------------------------+


       +--------------------------------------------------------------+
       |                                                              |
       | 1942286                   3d Ind.                            |
       |                                                              |
       | War Dept., A. G. O., Aug. 8, 1912— To the C. O., Co. I,      |
       | 50th Inf., through the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department.   |
       |                                                              |
       |   1. Information is requested as to whether the records of   |
       | the company show that Corporal Doe, Co. I, 50th Inf., served |
       | in the field against hostile natives on the Island of Panay  |
       | during July, 1907.                                           |
       |                                                              |
       |   2. The early return of these papers is desired.            |
       |                                                              |
       |   By order of the Secretary of War:                          |
       |                                                              |
       |                                  Thomas H. Smith,            |
       | 2 Incls.                                   Adjt. Gen.        |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d Phil. Dept., Sept. 14, 1912.                   |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 79935                     4th Ind.                           |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Philippine Department, Manila, P. I., Sept. 15, 1912—To  |
       | the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf., through the Comdg. Gen., Dist.  |
       | of Mindanao.                                                 |
       |                                                              |
       | 2 Incls.                                        A. M. B.     |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d Dist. Mind., Sept. 24, 1912.                   |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 3467                      5th Ind.                           |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Dist. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Sept. 25, 1912—To   |
       | the C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf., Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I.,    |
       | through the Post Commander.                                  |
       |                                                              |
       | 2 Incls.                                        S. V. B.     |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 1132                       6th Ind.                          |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Sept. 28, 1912—To the       |
       | C. O., Co. I, 50th Inf.                                      |
       |                                                              |
       | 2 Incls.                                        E. F. H.     |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d Co. I, 50th Inf., Sept. 29, 1912.              |
       |                                                              |
       +--------------------------------------------------------------+


       +--------------------------------------------------------------+
       |                                                              |
       | 512                       7th Ind.                           |
       |                                                              |
       | Co. I, 50th Inf., Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Oct. 4, 1912— |
       | To the Comdg. Gen., Dist. of Mindanao, through the C. O.,    |
       | Camp Keithley, P. I.                                         |
       |                                                              |
       |   1. Inclosed are extracts from the post orders and morning  |
       | report of this company, which contain all that there is of   |
       | record regarding the service of Corporal Doe referred to     |
       | herein. Inclosed also is affidavit of Corporal Jones as to   |
       | Corporal Doe’s service.                                      |
       |                                                              |
       |   2. It is believed that the records of the headquarters,    |
       | District of Mindanao, may contain the information desired.   |
       |                                                              |
       | (3 incls. added.)                   Edward French,           |
       | 5 Incls.                        Capt., 50th Inf., Comdg.     |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, Camp Keithley, Oct. 5, 1912.             |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       |                           8th Ind.                           |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Camp Keithley, Mind., P. I., Oct. 5, 1912— To the        |
       | Comdg. Gen., District of Mind.                               |
       |                                                              |
       | 5 Incls.                             A. C. Douglas,          |
       |                                 Maj., 50th Inf., Comdg.      |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, Dist. Mind., Oct. 6, 1912.               |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 3467                      9th Ind.                           |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Dept. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Oct. 12, 1912—To    |
       | the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department.                      |
       |                                                              |
       | There is nothing on file at these headquarters bearing on    |
       | the service of Corporal Doe referred to herein.              |
       |                                                              |
       |                                      William Jones,          |
       | 5 Incls.                             Brig. Gen., Comdg.      |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, Phil. Dept., Oct. 23, 1912.              |
       |                                                              |
       +--------------------------------------------------------------+

       +--------------------------------------------------------------+
       |                                                              |
       | 79935                     10th Ind.                          |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Philippines Department, Manila, P. I., Oct. 24, 1912—    |
       | To the Comdg. Gen., Dist. of Mindanao, with directions to    |
       | withdraw affidavit of Corporal Jones, it being proposed to   |
       | inclose an affidavit from Sergeant Blank, who is on duty     |
       | at these headquarters and who is prepared to furnish a       |
       | more complete affidavit than that furnished by Corporal      |
       | Jones. By command of Major General White:                    |
       |                                                              |
       |                                   Andrew Brown,              |
       | 5 Incls.                                  Adjt. Gen.         |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, Dist. Mind., Nov. 3, 1912.               |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 3467                      11th Ind.                          |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Dist. of Mindanao, Zamboanga, P. I., Nov. 4, 1912— To    |
       | the Comdg. Gen., Philippine Department, the foregoing        |
       | directions have been complied with.                          |
       |                                                              |
       | (Incl. 5 withdrawn.)              William Jones,             |
       | 4 Incls.                          Brig. Gen., Comdg.         |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, Phil. Dept., Nov. 15, 1912.              |
       |                                                              |
       |                                                              |
       | 79935                     12th Ind.                          |
       |                                                              |
       | Hq. Philippine Department, Manila, P. I., Nov. 16, 1912— To  |
       | the Adjutant General of the Army, inviting attention         |
       | to the preceding indorsements and to the accompanying        |
       | inclosures.                                                  |
       |                                                              |
       | (1 Incl. added.)                                             |
       |                                                              |
       | 5 Incls.                          Maj. Gen., Comdg.          |
       |                                                              |
       | (Stamp) Rec’d back, A. G. O., Dec. 23, 1912.                 |
       |                                                              |
       +--------------------------------------------------------------+

The dotted lines on page 1 of the model represent the creases between
the folds _a_, _b_, and _c_. _a_ contains the _Brief_ in the relative
position shown and is folded away from _b_, the crease between the
two being toward the reader. _b_ begins the _Body_ and may contain
it or only a part of it according to its length. _c_ contains the
continuation of the Body or the whole or parts of indorsements, as
the case may be. _b_ and _c_ are folded toward each other, the crease
between the two being away from the reader.

Page 2 contains the body or indorsements of the letter. All pages are
folded as page 1 in three equal folds.

When foolscap is used instead of the ordinary sized letter paper as
above, the only difference is that there is an extra fold. Imagine
this fold to be tacked on to the bottom of page 1 in the example and
to be marked _d_. _d_ and _c_ would be folded just as _b_ and _c_.
The page would contain a third crease and be a fold longer. Otherwise
the letter would be the same as the first one described.

The number at the upper left-hand corner is the filing number of the
office.

It will be noticed in the seventh indorsement that three inclosures
have been added. The whole transaction is noted in the proper place.
The eleventh and twelfth indorsements should be noticed in the same
regard.

Where “stamp” appears in parenthesis, the word does not actually
occur in letters. It indicates that the office which received the
letter noted by means of a rubber stamp at that particular place
on the letter the date on which the communication was received or
received back. In other words, what follows “(Stamp)” was placed
there by some one of the office force as soon as the letter was
received in that office.

The writing on all pages should begin one inch from the top. The
pages, beginning with the first will be numbered serially. The
number will be placed half way between the edges and one inch above
the bottom of the page. In referring to an indorsement by number, the
number of the page will also be given, thus: “5th Ind., page 3.”

All ceremonial forms at the beginning and end of letters such
as “Sir,” “I have the honor,” “I would respectfully,” “Very
respectfully” and the like will be omitted. In referring,
transmitting, forwarding, and returning papers, the expressions
“Respectfully referred,” “Respectfully transmitted,” “Respectfully
forwarded,” and “Respectfully returned,” will also be omitted.

“An officer will not be designated in orders nor addressed in
official communications by any other title than that of his actual
rank.”[22] Wherever appropriate the name should be supplanted by the
title, such as “Commanding Officer, Co. A, 99th Infantry” in place of
“Captain James L. Douglas.”

“All letters and indorsements which are typewritten, excepting
letters of transmittal, reports of taking leave of absence,
periodical reports, and communications of a similar nature, will
be made with two carbon copies. One copy will be retained for the
records of the office in which the letter was written, and the other
will be forwarded with the communication for the files of the first
office in which a complete copy is required for the records, but such
copy will not be regarded as an enclosure. It will be initialed by
the person responsible for the communication.”

“In official correspondence between officers or between officers
and officials of other branches of the public service, and
especially in matters involving questions of jurisdiction, conflict
of authority, or dispute, officers of the Army are reminded that
their correspondence should be courteous in tone and free from any
expression partaking of a personal nature or calculated to give
offense. Whenever questions of such character shall arise between
officers and officials of other branches of the public service,
and it is found that they cannot be reconciled by an interchange
of courteous correspondence, the officer of the Army, as the
representative of the interests of the War Department in the matter
involved, will make a full presentation of the case to the Secretary
of War through the proper military channels, in order that the same
may be properly considered.

In order to reduce the possibility of confidential communications
falling into the hands of persons other than those for whom they
are intended, the sender will enclose them in an inner and outer
cover; the inner cover to be a sealed envelope or wrapper addressed
in the usual way, but marked plainly “Confidential” in such a manner
that the notation may be most readily seen when the outer cover is
removed. The package thus prepared will then be enclosed in another
sealed envelope or wrapper addressed in the ordinary manner with no
notation to indicate the confidential nature of the contents.

The foregoing applies not only to confidential communications
entrusted to the mails or to telegraph companies, but also to such
communications entrusted to messengers passing between different
offices of the same headquarters, including the bureaus and offices
of the War Department.”


We have so far discussed in this chapter official letters to persons
in the military service. We now come to consider the second form of
official letter—the one to persons outside the military service.
Often an adjutant or quartermaster is called upon to write to
individuals or firms not conversant with the military forms. For a
variety of reasons, the business form in that case is best.

In general the two forms present the following differences and
likenesses. The headings are the same. The business form substitutes
the _Address_ of the _Recipient_ and the _Salutation_ for the _From
Whom Sent_, _To Whom Sent_, and _Subject_ of the military form. The
_Body_ in each case follows the principles of paragraphing, and unity
and coherence of the whole, as set down for the military form. In
the business form the paragraphs need not be numbered. The business
form has a complimentary close before the signature, rank, and
organization of the writer. Letters are retained by the recipient
and answered by him with a new letter, the sender retaining a carbon
copy. Indorsements are not used in the business form.

An example of a good business form appears below.

                                  Office of the Quartermaster,
                                                West Point, N. Y.,
                                                       August 7, 1930.

  Messrs. D. C. Johnson and Company,
    312 High Street,
      Boston, Massachusetts.

  Gentlemen:

  In reference to your letter of the 5th inst., I desire to inform
  you that there is no need here at present for the roofing mentioned.

  I regret that we cannot at this time become customers of your firm,
  but we shall hold you in mind when the necessity for roofing arises.

                                      Yours very truly,
                                                   J. H. Smith,
                                       Major, Q. M. Corps, U. S. A.
                                                        Quartermaster.

The entire _address_ of the recipient had best be written before the
_salutation_.

Other proper _salutations_ are:

  My dear Sir:
  My dear Madam:
  Ladies:

Other proper _Complimentary Closings_ are:

  Yours truly,
  Yours respectfully,

Stick close to the forms of the model above. A very slight departure
will make you appear crude. For instance, to say

  D. C. Johnson,
    Boston, Mass.
    Messrs.—

would be entirely wrong.

As to the _Body_ of the letter, however, write it your own way so
long as you use words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs,
of a kind we have striven to attain throughout this work. Do not make
your letter telegraphic; complete your sentences.

The instructions given for the attainment of the proper forms in
ordinary business communications are in no sense as rigid as those
given for the military communication. Many officers now use the
military forms for their correspondence with business firms, and,
indeed, many of these firms have themselves adopted the military form.

The third type of official letter is that of the official telegram.
It does not differ in principle from the ordinary telegram, and
therefore does not require separate practice. Those who have
conquered the field message should have no trouble in its composition.

It is written on an official telegraph blank which may be obtained
from the Quartermaster. The blank is for the purpose of having
the message go at Government expense. Army Regulations state that
“telegrams will be followed by official copies sent by the first
mail in cases of financial transactions of more than trifling
importance, and in cases in which chiefs of bureaus of the War
Department may deem it necessary themselves to send, or to require
officers serving under their immediate control to send them, such
copies.” It is a good thing in any case to mail a copy of a telegram.

The other kinds of official correspondence which need no letters to
accompany them are _Rolls_, _Returns_, _Estimates_, _Requisitions_,
and _Routine Reports_. A study of these forms of communication
belongs properly to the subject of administration. They are,
therefore, simply mentioned here.

The principal Rolls with which the novice in the military service is
confronted are the _Muster_ and _Pay Rolls_. The former is rendered
every two months and the latter every month.[23] Full instructions as
to what is required in each set of rolls are found on the last page
of each form. On application to the Adjutant General of the Army, a
list of _model remarks_ for the rolls will be furnished.

The principal _Returns_ with which the novice should become familiar
are the _Ration_, _Clothing_, _Ordnance_, _Company_ (monthly), and
_Field_ Returns.

_Estimates_ and _Requisitions_ are used most frequently by the Supply
Departments. But organizations must prepare _Estimates_ of what they
will need, and must prepare _Requisitions_ for the desired articles
when needed. The _Clothing Estimate_ and _Clothing Requisition_ are
two common and important forms.

Among the _Routine Reports_ in the military service should be
mentioned the _Morning_, _Inventory_ and _Inspection_, _Sick_, and
certain _Reports_ in official letter form.

The form of _Routine Report_ which is most common is the _Morning
Report_.


EXPLANATIONS

As we took up in each case after written work pertaining to combat
the similar verbal task, so now after we have discussed written
correspondence we are going to dwell upon the ordinary verbal labor
incumbent upon officers and non-commissioned officers in the military
service.

In war or peace a military leader is useless without an effective
tongue. We have demonstrated his uselessness in combat; we shall see
that he is just as unsatisfactory in training men for combat.

The work of any military individual in command of men is not only
that of _doing_ but also that of telling others _how_ to do. The
_Explanation_ of the efficient leader is a continuous process from
morning until night. He is constantly called upon to make his words
count. If he halts, he loses time. If he hesitates, he makes his men
restless. He must speak straight through to the end in a clear-cut
way, never hedging or repeating; and when he has finished, the
listeners should feel that the subject has been completely covered.

If he does not form the habit of so talking, he forfeits his power
of leadership. For what good is an intelligent or inventive officer,
if he cannot put his intelligence or invention out through his lips?
The military profession is one which depends upon quick instruction
by word of mouth. The officer who does his own work and the work of
his sergeants too, is plainly inefficient. He has avoided the harder
task—that of teaching others how to carry on the work. He has done
worse. He has lessened the value of his organization as an automatic
machine. When he leaves it, it will either fall to pieces or place a
weighty burden on the officer relieving him.[24]

There is one caution which a military man should observe in his
speech on the drill ground, in barracks, or in the field. He should
not repeat unnecessarily. He should not allow his men to gain the
idea that if they do not listen at once he will tell them later. It
should be an understood fact that his _Explanation_, once stated,
stands. Of course he may reiterate during his talk for the sake
of emphasis. But he should by practice be so capable of telling
everything so unmistakably the first time over that no reasonable
question can be asked.

Good explanations make for attention on the part of his men, and
attention makes for an increase of good work. Sooner or later the
achievements of his organization contrast it favorably with other
organizations and his brother officers say, “He has made a success.”
Much of that success has come to him because he has set for himself,
and followed these simple rules:

(1) “I will try today not to say anything which is not exactly
expressive of what I mean.”

(2) “I will try whenever I write to make myself unmistakable.”

(3) “I will try whenever I speak to make every word distinct from
every other word.”

(4) “I will try whenever I read to see how others express themselves
so that I may at the next opportunity imitate that part of their
style which says most in the simplest way.”

(5) “I will make every good new word my own, because the vocabulary
of my present life is limited.”

(6) “I will do all this because by so doing I shall develop myself in
my profession, and because I may some day fail that profession if I
neglect that development now.”


LECTURES

_Lectures_ are but extended _Explanations_. Officers are more and
more being called upon to appear before large audiences of educated
people in order to give to the country military knowledge. Training
Camps and war are increasing the necessity for the delivery of
lectures.

Because the _Lecture_ takes more time, it should be more carefully
developed than the _Explanation_. The subject should be divided into
its various parts in a logical way. It should be bound together
coherently. And each part should have in it only what belongs there.
This process is simply that of following the rules of English with
which we are already acquainted. The purpose is speed and clearness.

There are other elements which enter into the betterment of a long
talk. Since an audience is human, there is reason in helping it
through a dry subject. The treatment of the _Lecture_ may in this
way, besides aiding the interest, make the points stick longer.
Two qualities which help to attain this treatment are _Humor_ and
_Presence_.

Ordinarily the American does not need to be told to cultivate humor.
He reeks with it. But there are some instructors whose minds work
along so impassively that it is difficult for them to be wakened
from their gravity. To them the conscious development of the short
anecdote, homely illustration, and incongruous phrase is a splendid
aid. The great majority, however, must be guarded in the use of
humor. The quality itself may be overworked so that the proportion
of matter in the Lecture is small in comparison to the witticisms.
Humor is but a means to an end. Its sole object should be to lighten
the talk in order to help the subject into the auditor’s mind more
easily. Fun should be incidental and made without effort.

As to _Presence_ more can be said in its favor. It is an
indispensable quality in a speaker. If his diaphragm is in his mouth
during his delivery, or if his heart action is violent, the audience
cannot be fooled. It will be made uncomfortable. A speaker should
have such ordinary fluency of accurate expression through practice
that he entertains no fears of obscure or halting language. He should
be so familiar with the sensations of looking into a number of faces
that he will feel at ease. He should impress his audience that he
enjoys standing before them for the purpose of imparting interesting
knowledge. Such _Presence_ can be attained only by taking advantage
of every opportunity for correct public and private speech. The
military novice should enter every impersonal discussion he can find,
and should urge himself to speak whenever possible to more than a
dozen people at a time.

He must be more than an ordinary talker, for he must have speed and
interest as ready agents of his ideas. To gain those qualities is a
matter of constant attention to speaking and to writing exactly what
he wishes to say.

We have now covered the territory of military communications. We
have seen the necessity for correct expression, and the difficulty
of its attainment. What we have done should be but a beginning. It
may be a long struggle to gain brevity and clarity—the terse and
the unmistakable. But achievement will come with practice and will
repay us fully in future satisfaction, and increased worth in our
profession.




APPENDICES[25]

APPENDIX


FORMS OF COMPLETE FIELD ORDERS

While the following forms are given for the convenience of officers
in the field, and with a view of securing uniformity in the service,
it must be remembered that no two military situations are the
same. The sequence in paragraph 3 is not obligatory, the commander
arranging the details according to his best judgment.

_For an advance._

  Field Orders                               [Title]
    No. —                                      [Place]
    [Reference to map used]                      [Date and hour]
        Troops               1. [Information of enemy and of our
                           supporting troops]
  (a) Independent Cavalry:   2. [Plan of commander]
        [Commander]          3. (a) [Instructions for independent
          [Troops]         cavalry—place and time of departure, roads
                           or country to be covered, special mission]
  (b) Advance Guard:         (b) [Instructions for advance guard—place
        [Commander]        and time of departure, or distance at
          [Troops]         which it is to precede the main body, route,
                           special mission]
  (c) Main Body—in           (c) [Instructions for main body—distance
       order of march:     at which it is to follow the advance guard,
        [Commander][26]     or place and time of departure]
  (d) Right [left] Flank     (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place
       Guard:              and time of departure, route, special mission]
        [Commander]          (e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines
          [Troops]         of information to be established, special
  (e) Signal Troops:       mission]
        [Commander]          (x) [Instructions for outpost—when relieved,
          [Troops]         subsequent duties]
                             4. [Instructions for field train—escort,
                           distance in rear of column, or destination
                           when different from that of main body, if
                           disposition not previously covered in “Orders”]
    [Instructions for sanitary, ammunition, supply and engineer trains,
  when necessary]
    5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]
                                            [Authentication]
    [How and to whom issued]


_For advance guards._

  Field Orders                           [Title]
     No. —                                 [Place]
   [Reference to map used]                   [Date and hour]
         Troops              1. [Information of enemy and of our
                           supporting troops]
  (a) Advance Cavalry:       2. [Plan of commander]
        [Commander]          3. (a) [Instructions for advance
          [Troops]         cavalry—place and time of departure, roads
  (b) Support:             or country to be covered, special mission]
        [Commander]          (b) [Instructions for support—place and
          [Troops]         time of departure, route, special mission]
  (c) Reserve—in order       (c) [Instructions for reserve—distance at
       of march:           which it is to follow support]
           [Troops]          (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place
  (d) Right [left] Flank   and time of departure, route, special mission]
       Guard:                 4. [Instructions for field train—generally
        [Commander]        to join train of column if not previously
          [Troops]         covered in orders]
                              5. [Place of commander or where messages
                           may be sent, location of lines of information]
                                                    [Authentication]
      [How and to whom issued]


_A halt for the night—Camp with outpost._

  Field Orders                                [Title]
     No. —                                      [Place]
     [Reference to map used]                      [Date and hour]

    1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops, including
  independent cavalry]
    2. [Plan of commander—to encamp or bivouac]
    3. (a) [Designation of commander and troops of outpost,[27] general
  line to be held, special reconnaissance, connection with other
  outposts, if any]
     (b) [Instructions for troops not detailed for outpost duty—location
  of camp, designation of camp commander,[28] observation of flanks
  and rear when necessary, lines of information, conduct in case of
  attack]
    4. [Instructions for field train—generally to join troops, though
  if near enemy, field train of outpost troops may be held in rear][29]
  [Instructions for sanitary, ammunition, supply, and engineer
  trains, when necessary]
  5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]
                                                   [Authentication]
     [How and to whom issued]


_For outposts._

  Field Orders                            [Title]
     No. —                                  [Place]
   [Reference to map used]                    [Date and hour]

      Troops                 1. [Information of enemy and of our
                           supporting troops]
  (a) Advance Cavalry:       2. [Plan of commander—to establish outpost
        [Commander]        approximate line of resistance]
          [Troops]           3. (a) [Instructions for advanced cavalry
  (b) Supports:[30]         contact with enemy, roads or country to be
      No.1[Commander]      specially watched, special mission]
            [Troops]         (b) [Instructions for supports—positions
      No.2[Commander]      they are to occupy, and sections of line of
            [Troops]       resistance which they are to hold, intrenching,
      No.3[Commander]      etc.]
            [Troops]         (c) [Instructions for detached post—position
  (c) Detached Post:       to be occupied, duties, amount of
        [Commander]        resistance]
          [Troops]           (d) [Instructions for reserves—location,
  (d) Reserve:             observation of flanks, conduct in case of
        [Commander]        attack, duties of special troops]
          [Troops]           4. [Instruction for field train if necessary]
                             5. [Place of commander or where messages
                           may be sent, location of lines of information]
                                                   [Authentication]
     [How and to whom issued][31]

It is sometimes necessary to issue two outpost orders; the first as
above, containing general instruction; the second, issued after an
inspection of the line, and containing more definite instructions or
involving changes.


_For positions in readiness._

  Field Orders                           [Title]
     No. —                                 [Place]
    [Reference to map used]                  [Date and hour]

    1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
    2. [Plan of commander—to take up a position in readiness at or
  near ——]
    3. (a) [Instructions for cavalry—to reconnoiter in direction of
  enemy, special mission]
     (b) [Instructions for artillery—position or place of assembly]
     (c) [Instructions for infantry—position or place of assembly,
  points to be especially held, reconnaissance]
     (d) [Instructions for engineers—position or place of assembly]
     (e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines of information]
    4. [Instructions for field trains, sanitary, ammunition, supply and
  engineer trains if not previously covered in orders—generally to halt
  at designated localities in rear, ready to move in any direction]
    5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]
                                                   [Authentication]
    [How and to whom issued]


_For defense positions._

  Field Orders                            [Title]
     No. —                                  [Place]
    [Reference to map used]                  [Date and hour]

    1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
    2. [Plan of commander—to take up a defensive position at or
  along ——, for the purpose of ——]
    3. (a) [Instructions for artillery—position, target, intrenching,
  etc.]
     (b) [Instructions for fighting line—division of front into sections
  and assignment of troops thereto, intrenching, etc.]
     (c) [Instructions for reserve—troops and position]
     (d) [Instructions for cavalry—usually to cover with its main
  force the more exposed flank, a detachment being sent to patrol the
  other; reconnaissance]
     (e) [Instructions for engineer—defensive work, clearing field of
  fire, preparation of obstacles, opening roads, etc.]
     (f) [Instructions for signal troops—to establish lines of
  information]
    4. [Instructions for sanitary train—location of dressing stations
  and station for slightly wounded]
  [Instructions for ammunition train—location of ammunition distributing
  stations]
  [Instructions for field and supply trains, if not previously covered
  in orders]
    5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]
                                                  [Authentication]
    [How and to whom issued]


_For an attack._

  Field Orders                           [Title]
    No. —                                  [Place]
   [Reference to map used]                  [Date and hour]

    1. [Information of enemy and of our supporting troops]
    2. [Plan of commander—indicating the general plan of attack,
  usually to envelop a flank]
    3. (a) [Information for artillery—position, first target, generally
  hostile artillery]
     (b) [Instructions for holding attack[32]—commander, troops,
  direction and objective]
     (c) [Instructions for main attack—commander, troops, direction
  and objective]
     (d) [Instructions for reserve—commander, troops, position]
     (e) [Instructions for cavalry—generally to operate on one or both
  flanks, or to execute some special mission]
     (f) [Instructions for engineers—any special mission]
     (g) [Instructions for signal troops—to establish lines of
  information between the commander and the main and secondary attacks,
  artillery, reserves, etc.]
    4. [Instructions for sanitary train—location of dressing stations
  and stations for slightly wounded when practicable]
  [Instructions for ammunition train—location of ammunition distributing
  stations]
  [Instructions for field and supply trains, if not previously covered
  in orders]
    5. [Place of commander or where messages may be sent]
                                                    [Authentication]
    [How and to whom issued]

_Note._—In war it is not always possible to issue a complete attack
order like the above, disposing of an entire command. In unexpected
encounters, for instance, orders must be given as the situation
develops.


_For a retreat._

  Field Orders                          [Title]
    No. —                                 [Place]
   [Reference to map used]                  [Date and hour]

         Troops              1. [Information of enemy and of our
  (a) Leading Troops:      supporting troops]
       [Commander]           2. [Plan of commander—to retire in
          [Troops]         direction of ——]
  (b) Main Body—in           3. (a) [Instructions for leading
        order of march:    troops—place and time of departure, route,
           [Troops]        special mission]
  (c) Rear Guard:             (b) [Instructions for main body—place
         [Commander]       and time of departure, route]
           [Troops]           (c) [Instructions for rear guard—distance
  (d) Right [left] Flank   from the main body or place and time of
        Guard:             departure, special mission]
         [Commander]          (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place
           [Troops]        and time of departure, special mission]
  (e) Signal Troops:          (e) [Instructions for signal troops—lines
         [Commander]       of information]
           [Troops]           (x) [Instructions for outposts—when
                           relieved, subsequent duties—usually forming
                           the rear guard]
                             4. [Instructions for field and divisional
                           trains—place and time of departure, route,
                           escort; these trains are generally some
                           distance ahead of the column]
                             5. [Place of commander or where messages
                           may be sent]
                                                    [Authentication]
     [How and to whom issued]


_For rear guards._

  Field Orders                                   [Title]
    No. —                                          [Place]
   [Reference to map used]                           [Date and hour]

        Troops               1. [Information of enemy and of our
                           supporting troops]
  (a) Reserve—in order       2. [Plan of commander—mission of rear
       of march:           guard]
          [Troops]           3. (a) [Instructions for reserve—place and
  (b) Support:             time of departure, or approximate distance
        [Commander]        from main body, reconnaissance]
          [Troops]              (b) [Instructions for support—place and
  (c) Rear Cavalry:        time of departure or distance from reserve,
        [Commander]        any special reconnaissance]
          [Troops]              (c) [Instructions for rear cavalry—place
  (d) Right [left] Flank   and time of departure, road or country to be
       Guard:              covered, special mission]
         [Commander]            (d) [Instructions for flank guard—place
           [Troops]        and time of departure, route, special mission]
                             4. [Instructions for field train when
                           necessary—usually to join the train of main
                           body]
                             5. [Place of commander or where messages
                           may be sent—location of lines of information]
                                                   [Authentication]
    [How and to whom issued]


MARCH TABLE

In movements of large forces on several roads, it is sometimes
desirable to prescribe the daily marches of the various columns for
two or more days. In such cases the order may often be simplified by
appending or incorporating a march table usually in the following
form, each column providing its own security.


_March Table._

—— Army, from —— [date], to —— [date].

[Reference to map used.]

  =====+===================+===================+==================
  Date |    —— Division    |    —— Division    |     Army Hq.
  -----+-------------------+-------------------+------------------
       |   Location of main|   Location of main|   Location at end
       | body or of advance| body or of advance| of each day’s
       | guard at end of   | guard at end of   | march.
       | each day’s march, | each day’s march, |
       | and line of march,| and line of march,|
       | if necessary.     | if necessary.     |
  =====+===================+===================+==================




APPENDIX 2

Abbreviations


FIELD MAPS AND SKETCHES

The following abbreviations and signs are authorized for use on
field maps and sketches. For more elaborate map work the authorized
conventional signs as given in the manual of “Conventional Signs,
United States Army Maps,” are used.

Abbreviations other than those given should not be used.


_Abbreviations._

  A.        Arroyo.
  abut.     Abutment.
  Ar.       Arch.
  b.        Brick.
  B. S.     Blacksmith Shop.
  bot.      Bottom.
  Br.       Branch.
  br.       Bridge.
  C.        Cape.
  cem.      Cemetery.
  con.      Concrete.
  cov.      Covered.
  Cr.       Creek.
  cul.      Culvert.
  d.        Deep.
  D. S.     Drug Store.
  E.        East.
  Est.      Estuary.
  f.        Fordable.
  Ft.       Fort.
  G. S.     General Store.
  gir.      Girder.
  G. M.     Gristmill.
  i.        Iron.
  I.        Island.
  Jc.       Junction.
  k.p.      King-post.
  L.        Lake.
  Lat.      Latitude.
  Ldg.      Landing.
  L. S. S.  Life-Saving Station.
  L. H.     Lighthouse.
  Long.     Longitude.
  Mt.       Mountain.
  Mts.      Mountains.
  N.        North.
  n. f.     Not fordable.
  P.        Pier.
  pk.       Plank.
  P. O.     Post Office.
  Pt.       Point.
  q.p.      Queen-post.
  R.        River.
  R. H.     Roundhouse.
  R. R.     Railroad.
  S.        South.
  s.        Steel.
  S. H.     Schoolhouse.
  S. M.     Sawmill.
  Sta.      Station.
  st.       Stone.
  str.      Stream.
  T. G.     Tollgate.
  Tres.     Trestle
  tr.       Truss.
  W. T.     Water Tank.
  W. W.     Water Works.
  W.        West.
  w.        Wood.
  wd.       Wide.


Tactical organizations:

  3d Div.                Third Infantry Division.
  1st Cav. Div.          First Cavalry Division.
  1st Sep. Brig.         First Separate Brigade.
  8th Brig. 3d Div.      Eighth Infantry Brigade of Third Infantry
                           Division.
  2d Brig. 1st Cav.      Div. Second Cavalry Brigade of First Cavalry
                           Division.
  4th Brig. F. A.        Fourth Brigade of Field Artillery.
  5th Hv. A.             Fifth Regiment of Heavy Artillery.
  4th M. A.              Fourth Regiment of Mountain Artillery.
  1st Pon. Bn.           First Ponton Battalion.
  1st Aero Sq.           First Aero Squadron.
  3d Inf.                Third Regiment of Infantry.
  2d Cav.                Second Regiment of Cavalry.
  3d L. A.               Third Regiment of Light Artillery.
  6th H. A.              Sixth Regiment of Horse Artillery.
  1st Bn. Engrs.         First Pioneer Battalion of Engineers.
  1st Bn. mtd. Engrs.    First Pioneer Battalion of Engineers, Mounted.
  1st Bn. Sig.           First Field Battalion Signal Troops.
  1st Bn. Sig. cav.      First Field Battalion Signal Troops, Cavalry.
  1st Tel. Bn.           First Telegraph Battalion.


Trains:

  C. Tn.                 Combat train.
  F. Tn.                 Field train.
  B. Sec. F. Tn.         Baggage section field train.
  R. Sec. F. Tn.         Ration section field train.
  Am. Tn.                Ammunition train.
  Sp. Tn.                Supply train.
  Sn. Tn.                Sanitary train.
  1st Amb. Co.           First Ambulance Company.
  2d F. Hosp. Co.        Second Field Hospital Company.
  1st Med. Res. Co.      First Medical Reserve Company.
  Engr. Tn.              Engineer train.


Columns (1 of c):

  Am. Col.               Ammunition column.
  Sp. Col.               Supply column.
  Sn. Col.               Sanitary column.
  Engr. Col.             Engineer column.


_Fractional Organization._

Infantry:

  3d Div. (less cav. and 1 bn. F. A.)
  2d Brig. (less 1 regt.)
  1st Inf. (less 6 cos. and M. G. Co.)
  1 bn. 6th Inf.
  1st Bn. 6th Inf. (less 1 co.)
  Co. A 1st Inf. (less 1 plat.)


Cavalry:

  1st Cav. Div. (less 1 brig.)
  2d Brig. (less 1 regt.)
  3d Cav. (less 1 sq. and M. G. detch.)
  1 Sq. 4th Cav.
  1st Sq. 4th Cav. (less 1 tr.)
  Tr. C 4th Cav. (less 2 plats.)


Artillery:

  4th Brig. F. A. (less 1 bn.)
  3d L. (less 1 bn.)
  1 bn. 1st L. A. (less 1 btry.)
  1st L. A. (less 2 btries.)
  Btry A 6th H. A.
  5th Hv. A. (less 1 bn. 6″ How.)
  1 Bn. 4.7″ How., 5th Hv. A.
  1 Btry. 4.7″ gun, 5th Hv. A.


Engineers:

  1st Bn. Engrs. (less 1 co.)
  Co. A Engrs. (less 1 sec.)
  2 Secs. Engrs.
  1st Pon. Bn. (less 1 co. heavy equip.)
  1 pon. co. light equip. (less 2 bridge div.)


Signal:

  1st Bn. Sig. (less 1 wire plat.)
  1 rad. Co. Sig.
  1 wire Co. Sig.
  1 rad. sec. pack, Sig.
  1 rad. plat. wagon, Sig.
  1 wire Sec. Sig.
  1 wire plat. Sig.


Miscellaneous:

  Adj.                   adjutant.
  Adm. Sec. G. S.        administrative section, general staff.
  A. D. of Ry.           assistant director of railways.
  Am.                    ammunition.
  Adv. Gd.               advance guard.
  Adv. Sec. L. of C.     advance section, line of communications.
  Asst. C. of S.         assistant chief of staff.
  Base Sec. L. of C.     base section, line of communications.
  Brig. Gen.             brigadier general.
  Capt.                  captain.
  C. G.                  commanding general.
  C. G. L. of C.         commanding general, line of communications.
  C. O.                  commanding officer.
  Col.                   colonel.
  C. of S.               chief of staff.
  Comdg.                 commanding.
  Comb. Sec. G. S.       combat section, general staff.
  Detch.                 detachment.
  D. of Ry.              director of railways.
  E. O.                  engineer officer.
  F. O.                  field order.
  F. S. R.               field service regulations.
  Gd.                    guard.
  Gen.                   general.
  G. O.                  general order.
  Insp.                  inspector.
  Int. Sec. G. S.        intelligence section, general staff.
  Inter. Sec. L. of C.   intermediate section, line of communications.
  J. A.                  judge advocate.
  L. of C.               line of communications.
  Lt.                    lieutenant.
  Lt. Col.               lieutenant colonel.
  Lt. Gen.               lieutenant general.
  Maj.                   major.
  Maj. Gen.              major general.
  M. P.                  military police.
  N. C. O.               non-commissioned officer.
  O. O.                  ordnance officer.
  Q. M.                  quartermaster.
  S. A. Am.              small arms ammunition.
  Sig. O.                signal officer.
  S. O.                  special order.
  Surg.                  surgeon.




       *       *       *       *       *


Army Changes

EDITED BY

COLONEL JAMES A. MOSS

_Published Quarterly and dated Jan. 1, April 1, July 1, and Oct. 1._


Every number gives ALL changes in the Army Regulations, Manual of
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of _Army Changes_ is complete in itself, and upon receipt of the
last number the previous one may be discarded. And it is issued
_promptly_, while the changes are still new.

The changes are printed on one side of the page only, so that
“posting” can be done the same as with Changes as issued by the War
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FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Appendix.

[2] Letters on Applied Tactics.

[3] Seventy Problems—Infantry Tactics.

[4] Par. 141.

[5] Infantry Drill Regs.

[6] Field Service Regs.

[7] Morrison’s Infantry Tactics.

[8] Buddecke’s Tactical Decisions and Orders.

[9] F. S. R., par. 90.

[10] F. S. R., par. 92.

[11] F. S. R., par. 93.

[12] F. S. R., par. 94.

[13] See 1st par., Appendix.

[14] Infantry Drill Reg. par. 378.

[15] Infantry Drill Reg. par. 379.

[16] Par. 87.

[17] Par. 143, F. S. R.

[18] Par. 35, F. S. R.

[19] Par. 777, A. R.

[20] 779, A. R.

[21] G. O., 23, W. D., 1912.

[22] Par 780, A. R.

[23] See A. R., Par. 807.

[24] Compare “Winning and Wearing of Shoulder Straps”—a convincing
treatment of this subject by Lt.-Col. Chas. F. Martin, Cavalry.

[25] F. S. Regs.

[26] If a commander is designated for the main body, his name is
inserted here.

[27] Where the advance guard is large the order may direct the
advance guard commander to establish the outpost.

[28] Omitted when the chief exercises immediate command of the camp.

[29] May be provided for in “order” issued subsequently.

[30] Numbered from the right.

[31] For small outposts it may be more convenient to write this order
without a marginal distribution of troops.

[32] The term “holding attack” as used in this form is for
convenience only; it is never used in actual orders, as the vigor of
an attack might be lessened if the troops knew it was “holding” only.




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Footnote [5] has two anchors on page 60 and 61. Footnotes [6]
  and [7] each have three anchors on page 61.

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Some hyphens in words have been silently removed, some added,
  when a predominant preference was found in the original book.

  Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
  and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

  ToC (Table of Contents): page number ‘164’ replaced by ‘165’.
  ToC: page number ‘186’ replaced by ‘187’.
  Pg 18: ‘Cambrai and has’ replaced by ‘CAMBRAI and has’.
  Pg 68: ‘start at 5:30’ replaced by ‘start at 5-30’.
  Pg 70: ‘the nothern exit’ replaced by ‘the northern exit’.
  Pg 79: ‘You haev heard’ replaced by ‘You have heard’.
  Pg 109: ‘to salve tactical’ replaced by ‘to solve tactical’.
  Pg 127: ‘Ersatz Abeiltung’ replaced by ‘Ersatz Abteilung’.
  Pg 128: ‘Albrechtmörser’ replaced by ‘Albrecht-Mörser’.
  Pg 130: ‘Ersatz Abeiltung’ replaced by ‘Ersatz Abteilung’.
  Pg 130: ‘1st Abeiltung’ replaced by ‘1st Abteilung’.
  Pg 163: ‘Departments issues’ replaced by ‘Departments issue’.
  Pg 181: ‘Your respectfully,’ replaced by ‘Yours respectfully,’.
  Pg 190: ‘of where messages’ replaced by ‘or where messages’.
  Pg 196: ‘(les 1 bn.)’ replaced by ‘(less 1 bn.)’.