THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN

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                                  THE

                         MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN


                                   BY

                               FRANZ BOAS


            A COURSE OF LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE LOWELL
               INSTITUTE, BOSTON, MASS., AND THE NATIONAL
                    UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO, 1910-1911




                                New York

                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

                                  1921

                         _All rights reserved_

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                            COPYRIGHT, 1911,
                       BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

                             --------------

          Set up and electrotyped. Published September, 1911.




                             Norwood Press
                 J. S. Cushing Co.—Berwick & Smith Co.
                         Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

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                                PREFACE


THE problem discussed in the following pages has occupied my attention
for many years, and I have at various times dealt with it in brief
essays. Some of these, in revised form and enlarged, are embodied in the
present volume:—

  Human Faculty as determined by Race (_Proceedings of the
      American Association for the Advancement of Science_, vol.
      xliii [1894], pp. 301-327).

  The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology
      (_Science_, N. S., vol. iv [1896], pp. 901-908).

  The Mind of Primitive Man (_Journal of American Folk-Lore_, vol.
      xiv [1901], pp. 1-11).

  Some Traits of Primitive Culture (_Ibid._, vol. xvii [1904], pp.
      243-254).

  Race Problems in America (_Science_, N. S., vol. xxix [1909],
      pp. 839-849).

  Psychological Problems in Anthropology (_American Journal of
      Psychology_, vol. xxi [1910], pp. 371-384).

I have also utilized a small part of the Introduction to my “Handbook of
American Indian Languages” (Bulletin 40 of the Bureau of American
Ethnology), and some of the results of my report on “Changes in Bodily
Form of Descendants of Immigrants” (vol. 39, Reports of the Immigration
Commission, Washington, Government Printing Office).

                                                             FRANZ BOAS.

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                                CONTENTS


 CHAPTER                                                            PAGE

 I.      RACIAL PREJUDICES                                             1

         Racial achievement and aptitude, 1.—The white race,
           having achieved the highest civilization, represents
           the highest physical type, 2.

         Does cultural achievement depend upon hereditary aptitude
           alone? 5.—Many races have contributed to the origin of
           civilization, 5.—Early civilization in America,
           7.—Interpretation of rapidity of development, 8.—The
           spread of civilization, 10.—Summary, 16.

         Are anatomical characteristics of foreign races
           expressions of inferiority? 17.—Lower characteristics
           of various parts of the body, 18.—Development in
           different races of traits differentiating man from
           animal, 21.—Significance of these traits for discussion
           of mental character, 22.—Size of brain, 24.—Lack of
           correlation between size of brain and ability,
           28.—Structure of brain, 29.—Summary, 29.


 II.     INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENT UPON HUMAN TYPES                    30

         Problems of racial and social characteristics,
           30.—Definition and description of variability of types,
           31.

         Differences between civilized and primitive members of
           the same race, 39.—Problem of stability of type of the
           human species, 41.—Evolution of human species,
           41.—Problem of stability of races, 44.—Variations due
           to changes in rate of growth, 45.—Arrest of growth,
           49.—Variations not due to growth, 50.—Differences
           between rural and urban types, 50.—Influence of
           selection, 53.—Changes in bodily form of American
           immigrants, 53.—Explanation of changes, 57.—Range of
           changes, 63.—Changes of mental traits, 64.

         Domestication, 65.—Changes due to environment,
           70.—Changes due to selection, 72.—Changes due to
           crossing, 73.


 III.    INFLUENCE OF HEREDITY UPON HUMAN TYPES                       76

         Importance of heredity, 76.—Alternating and mid-parental
           heredity, 77.—Heredity in race-mixture,
           78.—Intra-racial heredity, 80.—Regression to ancestral
           types, 81.—Similarity of brothers and sisters,
           83.—Mendelian inheritance, 84.

         Origin of local types, 84.—Descent in large and in small
           communities, 84.—Johannsen’s observations on plants,
           89.—Mixture of local types, 90.—Variability in local
           types and in races, 91.


 IV.     THE MENTAL TRAITS OF PRIMITIVE MAN AND OF CIVILIZED MAN      95

         Method of approach, 95.—Animal and man, 96.—Primitive man
           and civilized man, 97.—Historical notes, 99.—Racial and
           social problem, 101.

         Mental characteristics of primitive man regardless of
           race, 104.—Inhibition, 106.—Improvidence, 109.
           Attention, 110.—Originality of thought,
           111.—Quantitative character of racial differences,
           114.—Differences between closely related groups of
           people, 116.—Effects of malnutrition, 117.—Experimental
           method, 117.

         Influence of continued civilization, 118.—Relapse of
           individuals into primitive life, 120.—Influence of
           early habits, 121.—Summary, 122.


 V.      RACE AND LANGUAGE                                           124

         Is language an expression of the mental development of a
           race? 124.

         Relations between type, language, and culture,
           125.—Classifications from these three points of view
           irreconcilable, 126.—Permanence of type and change of
           language, 127.—Permanence of language and change of
           type, 129.—Permanence of type and language and change
           of culture, 132.—Hypothesis of original correlation
           between type, language, and culture, 134.

         Are there “lower” and “higher” languages? 140.—Phonetics,
           140.—Classification of ideas, 142.—Examples,
           145.—Holophrasis, 147.—Necessity of formal elements,
           147.—Relations between language and thought,
           148.—Abstract terms, 149.—Numeral systems, 152.


 VI.     THE UNIVERSALITY OF CULTURAL TRAITS                         155

         Similarities of cultural traits, 155.—Explained as due to
           the influence of environment, 159.—Cases of lack of
           adjustment to environment, 162.—Influence of former
           environment, 163.—Similarities explained as survivals
           of times antedating dispersion of human species,
           164.—Dissemination, 166.—Areas of dissemination,
           169.—Similarities explained as due to sameness of
           elementary ideas, 171.—Psychological explanation, 173.


 VII.    THE EVOLUTIONARY VIEWPOINT                                  174

         Does human culture represent an evolutionary series?
           174.—Examples: Social organization, 176.—Inventions,
           177.—Agriculture, 178.—Art, 179.—Religion,
           180.—Parallelism of cultural development,
           181.—Dissimilarity of sequence in industrial
           development, 182.

         Convergent development, 184.—Lack of comparability of
           data, 188.—Examples: Life after death, 189.—Totemism,
           190.—Ethics, 191.

         Types of development from simple to complex forms, and
           _vice versâ_, 193.


 VIII.   SOME TRAITS OF PRIMITIVE CULTURE                            197

         Mental re-actions of primitive and of civilized man,
           197.—Classification of phenomena, 198.—With the advance
           of civilization, principles of classification rise into
           consciousness, 201.—Effect of traditional material upon
           thought, 203.—Example of development of ethical
           concepts, 206.

         Types of association in civilized society,
           209.—Associations due to customary re-actions, and
           their emotional value, 211.—Secondary explanations,
           214.

         Types of association in primitive society, 220.—Their
           unconscious origin, 221.—Their rise into consciousness,
           224.—Secondary explanations, 225.—Associations peculiar
           to primitive life, 228.—Ritual, 229.—Myth,
           230.—Decorative art, 231.—Totemism, 235.—Origin of
           associations, 237.—Importance of emotional elements in
           establishing associations, 237.


 IX.     SUMMARY                                                     244


 X.      RACE PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES                          251

         Origins of the American nation, 252.—Characteristics of
           race-mixture in the United States and in Europe,
           254.—Amalgamation of distinct types, 258.—Effects of
           change of environment and of mixture, 261.—The negro
           problem, 268.


 NOTES                                                               279

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                       THE MIND OF PRIMITIVE MAN

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                          I. RACIAL PREJUDICES


PROUD of his wonderful achievements, civilized man looks down upon the
humbler members of mankind. He has conquered the forces of nature and
compelled them to serve him. He has transformed inhospitable forests
into fertile fields. The mountain fastnesses are yielding their
treasures to his demands. The fierce animals which are obstructing his
progress are being exterminated, while others which are useful to him
are made to increase a thousand-fold. The waves of the ocean carry him
from land to land, and towering mountain-ranges set him no bounds. His
genius has moulded inert matter into powerful machines which await a
touch of his hand to serve his manifold demands.

With pity he looks down upon those members of the human race who have
not succeeded in subduing nature; who labor to eke a meagre existence
out of the products of the wilderness; who hear with trembling the roar
of the wild animals, and see the products of their toils destroyed by
them; who remain restricted by ocean, river, or mountains; who strive to
obtain the necessities of life with the help of few and simple
instruments.

Such is the contrast that presents itself to the observer. What wonder
if civilized man considers himself a being of higher order as compared
to primitive man, if he claims that the white race represents a type
higher than all others!

Before accepting this conclusion which places the stamp of eternal
inferiority upon whole races of man, we may well pause, and subject the
basis of our opinions regarding the aptitude of different peoples and
races to a searching analysis. The naïve assumption of the superiority
of the European nations and their descendants is obviously based upon
their wonderful achievements. We conclude that, as the civilization is
higher, the aptitude for civilization is also higher; and, as the
aptitude for civilization presumably depends upon the perfection of the
mechanism of body and mind, the inference is drawn that the white race
represents the highest type of perfection. In this conclusion, which is
reached through a comparison of the social status of civilized man with
that of primitive man, the tacit assumption is made that achievement
depends solely, or at least primarily, upon the aptitude for an
achievement.

The assertion of a higher aptitude of the European nations leads at once
to a second inference relating to the significance of difference in type
between the European race and the races of other continents, or even of
differences between various European types. The line of thought which we
unconsciously pursue is about as follows. Since the aptitude of the
European is highest, his physical and mental type is also highest, and
every deviation from the white type necessarily represents a
characteristic feature of a lower type.

That this unproved assumption underlies our judgments of races, appears
from the fact, that, other conditions being equal, a race is commonly
described as the lower, the more fundamentally it differs from the white
race. Its effect may also be noticed in the long-continued discussions
of the occurrence of anatomical peculiarities in primitive man which
would characterize him as a being of lower order in the zoölogical
series, and in the emphasis laid upon the non-occurrence of such traits
in primitive man and their occurrence in the European race.

The subject and form of these discussions show that the idea dwells in
the minds of investigators that we should expect to find in the white
race the highest type of man.

In drawing inferences from social distinctions, the same point of view
is frequently held. It is assumed, that, as the mental development of
the white race is the highest, it also has the highest aptitude in this
direction, and therefore its mind is supposed to have the most subtile
organization. As the ultimate psychical causes are not so apparent as
anatomical characteristics, the judgment of the mental status of a
people is generally guided by the difference between its social status
and our own: the greater the difference between their intellectual,
emotional, and moral processes and those which are found in our
civilization, the harsher the judgment on the people. It is only when a
Tacitus finds the virtues of past stages of the life of his own people
among foreign tribes that their example is held up to the gaze of his
fellow-citizens, who probably had a pitying smile for the dreamer who
clung to the ideas of a time which they had left far behind.

In order to understand clearly the relations between race and
civilization, the two unproved assumptions to which I have referred must
be subjected to a searching analysis. We must investigate in how far we
are justified in assuming that achievement is primarily due to
exceptional aptitude, and in how far we are justified in assuming that
the European type—or, taking the notion in its extreme form, that the
North European type—represents the highest development of mankind. It
will be advantageous to clear up these points before we take up the
detailed inquiry.

In regard to the former point, it might be said, that, although
achievement is not necessarily a measure of aptitude, it seems
admissible to judge the one by the other. Have not most races had the
same chances for development? Why, then, did the white race alone
develop a civilization which is sweeping the whole world, and compared
to which all other civilizations appear as feeble beginnings cut short
in early childhood, or arrested and petrified in an early stage of
development? Is it not, to say the least, probable that the race which
attained the highest stage of civilization was the most gifted one, and
that those races which remained at the bottom of the scale were not
capable of rising to higher levels?

In order to find an answer to these questions, let us consider briefly
the general outlines of the history of civilization; let our minds go
back a few thousand years, until we reach the time when the
civilizations of eastern and of western Asia were in their infancy. As
time passed on, these civilizations were transferred from one people to
another; some of those who had represented the highest type of culture
sinking back into obscurity, while others took their places. During the
dawn of history we see civilization cling to certain districts, in which
it is taken up, now by one people, now by another. In the numerous
conflicts of these times the more civilized people were often
vanquished. The conqueror, however, learned the arts of life from the
conquered, and carried on the work of civilization. Thus the centres of
civilization were shifting to and fro over a limited area, and progress
was slow and halting. At the same period the ancestors of the races that
are now among the most highly civilized were in no way superior to
primitive man as we find him now in regions that have not come into
contact with modern civilization.

Was the civilization attained by these ancient people of such character
as to allow us to claim for them a genius superior to that of any other
race?

First of all, we must bear in mind that none of these civilizations was
the product of the genius of a single people. Ideas and inventions were
carried from one to the other; and, although intercommunication was
slow, each people which participated in the ancient development
contributed its share to the general progress. Proofs without number
have been forthcoming which show that ideas have been disseminated as
long as people have come into contact with one another, and that neither
race nor language nor distance limits their diffusion. As all have
worked together in the development of the ancient civilizations, we must
bow to the genius of all, whatever group of mankind they may
represent,—Hamitic, Semitic, Aryan, or Mongol.

We may now ask, Did no other races develop a culture of equal value? It
would seem that the civilizations of ancient Peru and of Central America
may well be compared with the ancient civilizations of the Old World. In
both we find a high stage of political organization: we find division of
labor and an elaborate ecclesiastical organization. Great architectural
works were undertaken, requiring the co-operation of many individuals.
Animals and plants were domesticated, and the art of writing had been
invented. The inventions and knowledge of the peoples of the Old World
seem to have been somewhat more numerous and extended than those of the
races of the New World, but there can be no doubt that the general
status of their civilization was nearly equally high.[1] This will
suffice for our consideration.

What, then, is the difference between the civilization of the Old World
and that of the New World? It is essentially a difference in time. The
one reached a certain stage three thousand or four thousand years sooner
than the other.

Although much stress has been laid upon this greater rapidity of
development in the Old World, I think that it is not by any means proof
of greater ability of the races of the Old World, but that it is
adequately explained by the laws of chance. When two bodies run through
the same course with variable rapidity, sometimes quickly, sometimes
slowly, their relative position will be more likely to show accidental
differences, the longer the course which they run. Thus two infants a
few months old will be much alike in their physiological and psychical
development; two youths of equal age will differ much more; and two old
men of equal age may, the one still be in full possession of his powers,
the other on the decline, due mainly to the accidental acceleration or
retardation of their development. The difference in period of
development does not signify that the one is by heredity structurally
inferior to the others.

Applying the same reasoning to the history of mankind, we may say that
the difference of a few thousand years is insignificant as compared to
the age of the human race. The time required to develop the existing
races is entirely a matter of conjecture, but we may be sure that it is
long. We also know that man existed in the Eastern and Western
Hemispheres at a time that can be measured by geological standards only.
Penck’s recent investigations on the glacial age in the Alps have led
him to the conclusion that the age of man must be measured by a span of
time exceeding one hundred thousand years, and that the highly
specialized civilization of the Magdalenian is not less than twenty
thousand years old. There is no reason to believe that this stage was
reached by mankind the world over at the same period, but we must assume
as the initial point the remotest times in which we find traces of man.
What does it mean, then, if one group of mankind reached the same stage
at the age of a hundred thousand years as was reached by the other at
the age of a hundred and four thousand years? Would not the life-history
of the people, and the vicissitudes of its history, be fully sufficient
to explain a delay of this character, without necessitating us to assume
a difference in their aptitude to social development? (See Waitz.) This
retardation would be significant only if it could be shown that it
occurs independently over and over again in the same race, while in
other races greater rapidity of development was found repeatedly in
independent cases.

The fact deserves attention, however, that at present practically all
the members of the white race participate to a greater or less degree in
the advance of civilization, while in none of the other races has the
civilization that has been attained at one time or another been able to
reach all the tribes or peoples of the same race. This does not
necessarily mean that all the members of the white race had the power of
originating and developing the germs of civilization with equal
rapidity; for there is no evidence that the cognate tribes which have
all developed under the influence of a civilization originated by a few
members of the race, would not, without this help, have required a much
longer time to reach the high level which they now occupy. It seems to
show, however, a remarkable power of assimilation, which has not
manifested itself to an equal degree in any other race.

Thus the problem presents itself of discovering the reason why the
tribes of ancient Europe readily assimilated the civilization that was
offered to them, while at present we see primitive people dwindle away
and become degraded before the approach of civilization, instead of
being elevated by it. Is not this a proof of a higher organization of
the inhabitants of Europe?

I believe the reasons for this fact are not far to seek, and do not
necessarily lie in a greater ability of the races of Europe and Asia.
First of all, in appearance these people were alike to civilized man of
their times. Therefore the fundamental difficulty for the rise of
primitive people—namely, that an individual who has risen to the level
of the higher civilization is still looked upon as belonging to an
inferior race—did not prevail. Thus it was possible that in the colonies
of ancient times society could grow by accretion from among the more
primitive people.

Furthermore, the devastating influences of diseases which nowadays begin
to ravage the inhabitants of territories newly opened to the whites were
not so strong, on account of the permanent contiguity of the people of
the Old World, who were always in contact with one another, and
therefore subject to the same influences. The invasion of America and
Polynesia, on the other hand, was accompanied by the introduction of new
diseases among the natives of these countries. The suffering and
devastation wrought by epidemics which followed the discovery are too
well known to be described in full. In all cases in which a material
reduction in numbers occurs in a thinly settled area, the economic life,
as well as the social structure, is almost completely destroyed.

In addition to this, it may be said that the contrast between the
culture represented by the modern white and that of primitive man is far
more fundamental than that between the ancients and the people with whom
they came in contact. Particularly, the methods of manufacture have
developed so enormously, that the industries of the primitive people of
our times are exterminated by the cheapness and large quantity of the
products imported by the white trader, because primitive man is unable
to compete with the power of production of the machines of the whites,
while in olden times the superior hand-product rivalled the hand-product
of a lower type. When a day’s work suffices for obtaining efficient
tools or fabrics from the trader, while the manufacture of the
corresponding implement or material by the native himself would have
required weeks, it is but natural that the slower and more laborious
process should be given up speedily. It must also be considered that in
several regions, particularly in America and in parts of Siberia, the
primitive tribes are swamped by the numbers of the immigrating race,
which is crowding them so rapidly out of their old haunts that no time
for gradual assimilation is given. In olden times there was certainly no
such immense inequality in numbers as we observe in many regions
nowadays.

We conclude, therefore, that the conditions for assimilation in ancient
Europe were much more favorable than in those countries where in our
times primitive people come into contact with civilization. Therefore we
do not need to assume that the ancient Europeans were more gifted than
other races which have not become exposed to the influences of
civilization until recent times (Gerland, Ratzel).

This conclusion may be corroborated by other facts. In the middle ages
the civilization of the Arabs had reached a stage which was undoubtedly
superior to that of many European nations of that period. Both
civilizations had sprung largely from the same sources, and must be
considered branches of one tree. The Arabs who were the carriers of
civilization were by no means members of the same race as the Europeans,
but nobody will dispute their high merits. It is of interest to see in
what manner they influenced the negro races of the Soudan. At an early
time, principally between the second half of the eighth century and the
eleventh century of our era, the Soudan was invaded by Hamitic tribes,
and Mohammedanism was spreading rapidly through the Sahara and the
western Soudan. We see that since that time large empires have been
formed, and have disappeared again in struggles with neighboring states,
and that a relatively high degree of culture has been attained. The
invaders intermarried with the natives; and the mixed races, some of
which are almost purely negro, have risen high above the level of other
African negroes. The history of Bornu is perhaps one of the best
examples of this kind. Barth and Nachtigal have made us acquainted with
the history of this state, which has played a most important part in the
history of North Africa.

Why, then, have the Mohammedans been able to civilize these tribes, and
to raise them to nearly the same standard which they had attained, while
the whites have not been capable of influencing the negro in Africa to
any considerable extent? Evidently on account of the different method of
introduction of culture. While the Mohammedans influence the people in
the same manner in which the ancients civilized the tribes of Europe,
the whites send only the products of their manufactures and a few of
their representatives into the negro country. A real amalgamation
between the more highly educated whites and the negroes has never taken
place. The amalgamation of the negroes by the Mohammedans is facilitated
particularly by the institution of polygamy, the conquerors taking
native wives, and raising their children as members of their own family.

The spread of the Chinese civilization in eastern Asia may be likened to
that of the ancient civilization in Europe. Colonization and
amalgamation of kindred tribes, and in some cases extermination of
rebellious subjects, with subsequent colonization, have led to a
remarkable uniformity of culture over a large area.

When, finally, we consider the inferior position held by the negro race
of the United States, although the negro lives in the closest contact
with modern civilization, we must not forget that the old race feeling
of the inferiority of the colored race is as potent as ever, and is a
formidable obstacle to its advance and progress, notwithstanding that
schools and universities are open to them. We might rather wonder how
much has been accomplished in a short period against heavy odds. It is
hardly possible to say what would become of the negro if he were able to
live with the whites on absolutely equal terms. Miss Ovington’s
discussion of the opportunities of the negro in the United States is a
convincing proof of the inequality of the conditions of economic advance
of the negro and of the white, even after the abolition of legal
inequality.

Our conclusion drawn from the foregoing considerations is the following:
Several races have developed a civilization of a type similar to the one
from which our own had its origin. A number of favorable conditions
facilitated the rapid spread of this civilization in Europe. Among
these, common physical appearance, contiguity of habitat, and moderate
difference in modes of manufacture, were the most potent. When, later
on, civilization began to spread over other continents, the races with
which modern civilization came into contact were not equally favorably
situated. Striking differences of racial types, the preceding isolation
which caused devastating epidemics in the newly discovered countries,
and the greater advance in civilization, made assimilation much more
difficult. The rapid dissemination of Europeans over the whole world
destroyed all promising beginnings which had arisen in various regions.
Thus no race except that of eastern Asia was given a chance to develop
an independent civilization. The spread of the European race cut short
the growth of the existing independent germs without regard to the
mental aptitude of the people among whom it was developing. On the other
hand, we have seen that no great weight can be attributed to the earlier
rise of civilization in the Old World, which is satisfactorily explained
as a chance. In short, historical events appear to have been much more
potent in leading races to civilization than their faculty, and it
follows that achievements of races do not warrant us in assuming that
one race is more highly gifted than the other.

After having thus found an answer to our first problem, we turn to the
second one: In how far are we justified in considering those anatomical
traits in regard to which foreign races differ from the white race as
marks of inferiority? In one respect the answer to this question is
easier than that to the former. We have recognized that achievement
alone does not justify us in assuming greater mental ability for the
white race than for others, unless we can sustain our claim by other
proofs. It follows from this, that differences between the white race
and other races must not be interpreted to mean superiority of the
former, inferiority of the latter, unless this relation can be proved by
anatomical or physiological considerations.

It may not be amiss to illustrate by an example the logical error which
is committed with great ease and great frequency. In a painstaking
investigation made a few years ago, Mr. R. B. Bean demonstrated certain
characteristic differences between the form of the whole and of the
parts of the brain of the Baltimore negro and of the Baltimore
white,—differences which consist in the form and relative size of the
frontal and occipital lobes and in the size of the _corpus callosum_.
The interpretation of the difference is, that the smaller size of the
anterior lobes and of the _callosum_ indicates a lower mental
development, a conclusion which has been refuted by Franklin P. Mall. It
may suffice here, where we are interested chiefly in the logical fallacy
of such conclusions, to call attention to the fact that a comparison of
long-headed and short-headed individuals of the same race—or, let us
say, of long-headed North French and of short-headed Central
French—would result in similar differences, but that in a case of this
kind the inference regarding greater or lesser ability would not be made
with the same readiness.

There is, of course, no doubt that great differences exist in the
physical characteristics of the races of man. The color of the skin, the
form of the hair, and the configuration of lips and nose, distinguish
the African clearly from the European. The question to decide is, What
relations have these features to the mental aptitude of a race? Two
points of view may be brought forward in relation to this question.
First, we may claim that a race in which peculiarities are found that
are characteristic of lower stages in the animal series will be in all
respects of an inferior type. Secondly, we may direct our attention
primarily to the central nervous system and investigate whether the
anatomical structure in one race is superior to that found in another
race.

To illustrate the former viewpoint, I will mention a few of the
formations in man which have been described as characterizing lower
races, because they are found as typical developments in animals. One of
these is a variation in the form of the temporal bone, which in man is
ordinarily separated from the frontal bone by the sphenoid and parietal
bones. It has been found that in some individuals the temporal bone
encroaches upon the sphenoid and parietal, and comes into contact with
the frontal bone. This formation is the prevalent one among the apes. It
has been proved that this variation is found among all races, but with
unequal frequency.

The peculiar formation of the tibia known as platycnemism (lateral
flatness) has been observed in skeletons of the oldest remains of man in
Europe, and also in the skeletons of various races. Other
characteristics which remind us of lower forms are peculiarities in the
formation of the articular surfaces of tibia and femur, which have been
found in a number of human types; the _os Incæ_, or interparietal bone,
which occurs among all races, but most frequently among the Peruvians
and the inhabitants of the ancient pueblos; the smallness of the nasal
bones and their synostosis with the maxilla; the so-called pre-nasal
fossæ; and certain variations in the arrangement of arteries and of
muscles. All these variable features are found among all races, but the
degree of variability is not everywhere the same. Presumably such
variations may be considered human characteristics which have not yet
had time to become stable, and which in this sense may be considered as
still in process of evolution. If this interpretation be correct, it
might seem that we can consider those races in which the characteristic
human features are more stable as those which are more highly organized.

It is also possible to arrange the races according to various typical
features in such a manner that one appears farthest removed from the
types of higher animals, others less so. In all these arrangements the
gap between man and animal is a wide one, and the variations between the
races are slight as compared to it. Thus we find, that, in comparison to
the skull, the face of the negro is larger than that of the American,
whose face is, in turn, larger than that of the white. The lower portion
of his face has larger dimensions. The alveolar arch is pushed forward,
and thus gains an appearance which reminds us of the higher apes. There
is no denying that this feature is a most constant character of the
black races, and that it represents a type slightly nearer the animal
than the European type. The same may be said of the broadness and
flatness of the noses of the negro and the Mongol.

If we accept the general theories of Klaatsch, Stratz, and Schoetensack,
who consider the Australian as the oldest and most generalized type of
man, we might also call attention to the slenderness of the vertebræ,
the undeveloped curvature of the vertebral column, to which Cunningham
first called attention, and the traits of the foot, which recall the
needs of an animal living in trees, and whose feet had to serve the
purpose of climbing from branch to branch.

In relation to the interpretation of all these observations, it must be
strongly emphasized that the races which we are accustomed to call
“higher races” do not by any means stand in all respects at the end of
the series, and are farthest removed from the animal. The European and
the Mongol have the largest brains; the European has a small face and a
high nose;—all features farther removed from the probable animal
ancestor of man than the corresponding features of other races. On the
other hand, the European shares lower characteristics with the
Australian, both retaining in the strongest degree the hairiness of the
animal ancestor, while the specifically human development of the red lip
is developed most markedly in the negro. The proportions of the limbs of
the negro are also more markedly distinct from the corresponding
proportions in the higher apes than are those of the European.

When we interpret these data in the light of modern biological concepts,
we may say that the specifically human features appear with varying
intensity in various races, and that the divergence from the animal
ancestor has developed in varying directions.

When all these differences between races are given, the question arises,
whether they have any significance in regard to mental faculty. I may be
permitted to disregard for the moment differences in the size and
structural development of the nervous system, and confine myself to the
mental significance of other traits. The general analogy of mental
development of animals and of man prompts us to associate lower mental
traits with theromorphic features. In our naïve, every-day parlance,
brutish features and brutality are closely connected. We must
distinguish here, however, between the anatomical characteristics of
which we have been speaking and the muscular development of the face,
trunk, and limbs, due to habitual activity. The hand, which is never
employed in activities requiring those refined adjustments which are
characteristic of psychologically complex actions, will lack the
modelling brought about by the development of each muscle. The face
whose muscles have not responded to the innervations accompanying deep
thought and refined sentiment will lack in individuality and refinement.
The neck that has supported heavy loads, and has not responded to the
varied requirements of delicate changes of position of head and body,
will appear massive and clumsy. These physiognomic differences must not
mislead us in our interpretations. But even without them, we are
inclined to draw inferences in regard to mentality from a receding
forehead, a heavy jaw, large and heavy teeth, perhaps even from an
inordinate length of arms or an unusual development of hairiness.

From a strictly scientific point of view, these inferences seem to be
open to the most serious doubt. Only a few investigations have been made
in relation to these problems, but their results have been entirely
negative. Most important among them is the elaborate attempt made by
Karl Pearson to investigate the relationship of intelligence to size and
shape of the head. His conclusions are so significant that I will repeat
them here: “The onus of proof that other measurements and more subtle
psychological observations would lead to more definite results may now,
I think, be left to those who _a priori_ regard such an association as
probable. Personally, the result of the present inquiry has convinced me
that there is little relationship between the external physical and the
psychical character in man.” I think all the investigations that have
been made up to the present time compel us to assume that the
characteristics of the osseous, muscular, visceral, or circulatory
system, have practically no direct relation to the mental ability of man
(Manouvrier).

We will now turn to the important subject of the size of the brain,
which seems to be the one anatomical feature which bears directly upon
the question at issue. It seems plausible that the greater the central
nervous system, the higher the faculty of the race, and the greater its
aptitude to mental achievements. Let us review the known facts. Two
methods are open for ascertaining the size of the central nervous
system,—the determination of the weight of the brain and that of the
capacity of the cranial cavity. The first of these methods is the one
which promises the most accurate results. Naturally, the number of
Europeans whose brain-weights have been taken is much larger than that
of individuals of other races. There are, however, sufficient data
available to establish beyond a doubt the fact that the brain-weight of
the whites is larger than that of most other races, particularly larger
than that of the negroes. That of the white male is about 1360 grams.
The investigations of cranial capacities are quite in accord with these
results. According to Topinard, the capacity of the skull of males of
the neolithic period in Europe is about 1560 cc. (44 cases); that of
modern Europeans is the same (347 cases); of the Mongoloid race, 1510
cc. (68 cases); of African negroes, 1405 cc. (83 cases); and of negroes
of the Pacific Ocean, 1460 cc. (46 cases). Here we have, therefore, a
decided difference in favor of the white race.

In interpreting these facts, we must ask, Does the increase in the size
of the brain prove an increase in faculty? This would seem highly
probable, and facts may be adduced which speak in favor of this
assumption. First among these is the relatively large size of the brain
among the higher animals, and the still larger size in man. Furthermore,
Manouvrier has measured the capacity of the skulls of thirty-five
eminent men. He found that they averaged 1665 cc. as compared to 1560
cc. general average, which was derived from 110 individuals. On the
other hand, he found that the cranial capacity of forty-five murderers
was 1580 cc., also superior to the general average. The same result has
been obtained through weighings of brains of eminent men. The brains of
thirty-four of these showed an average increase of 93 grams over the
average brain-weight of 1357 grams. Another fact which may be adduced in
favor of the theory that greater brains are accompanied by higher
faculty is that the heads of the best English students are larger than
those of the average class of students (Galton). The force of the
arguments furnished by these observations must, however, not be
overestimated.

First of all, the brains of not all eminent men are unusually large. On
the contrary, a few unusually small brains have been found in the
series. Furthermore, most of the brain-weights constituting the general
series are obtained in anatomical institutes; and the individuals who
find their way there are poorly developed, on account of malnutrition
and of life under unfavorable circumstances, while the eminent men
represent a much better nourished class. As poor nourishment reduces the
weight and size of the whole body, it will also reduce the size and
weight of the brain. It is not certain, therefore, that the observed
difference is entirely due to the higher ability of the eminent men.
This may also explain the larger size of the brains of the professional
classes as compared to those of unskilled laborers (Ferraira). An
additional number of restricting facts must be enumerated. The most
important among these is the difference in brain-weight between men and
women. When men and women of the same stature are compared, it is found
that the brain of woman is much lighter than that of man. Nevertheless
the faculty of woman while perhaps qualitatively different from that of
man, cannot be deemed to be of an inferior character. This is therefore
a case in which smaller brain-weight is accompanied throughout by equal
faculty. We conclude from this fact that it is not impossible that the
smaller brains of males of other races should do the same work as is
done by the larger brain of the white race. But this comparison is not
quite on equal terms, as we may assume that there is a certain
structural difference between male and female, which causes the
difference in size between the sexes; so that comparison between male
and female is not the same as comparison between male and male.

Notwithstanding these restrictions, the increase of the size of the
brain in the higher animals, and the lack of development in
microcephalic individuals, are fundamental facts which make it more than
probable that increased size of the brain causes increased faculty,
although the relation is not quite as immediate as is often assumed.

The reason for a lack of close correlation between brain-weight and
mental faculties is not far to seek. The functioning of the brain
depends upon the nerve cells and fibres, which do not constitute, by any
means, the whole mass of the brain. A brain with many cells and complex
connections between the cells may contain less connective tissue than
another one of simpler nervous structure. In other words, if there is a
close relation between form and ability, it must be looked for rather in
the morphological traits of the brain than in its size. A correlation
exists between size of brain and number of cells and fibres, but the
correlation is weak (Donaldson).

Notwithstanding the numerous attempts that have been made to find
structural differences between the brains of different races of man that
could be directly interpreted in psychological terms, no conclusive
results of any kind have been attained. The status of our present
knowledge has been well summed up by Franklin P. Mall, to whose
investigation I referred before. He holds, that, on account of the great
variability of the individuals constituting each race, racial
differences are exceedingly difficult to discover, and that up to the
present time none have been found that will endure serious criticism.

We may now sum up the results of our preliminary inquiry. We have found
that the unproved assumption of identity of cultural achievement and of
mental ability is founded on an error of judgment; that the variations
in cultural development can as well be explained by a consideration of
the general course of historical events without recourse to the theory
of material differences of mental faculty in different races. We have
found, furthermore, that a similar error underlies the common assumption
that the white race represents physically the highest type of man, but
that anatomical and physiological considerations do not support these
views.

-----

Footnote 1:

  For authorities, see note to this page at end of book.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




             II. INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENT UPON HUMAN TYPES


AFTER having seen that the high estimate of our civilization does not
necessarily imply that the carriers of this civilization have an
anatomical organization superior to that of all other races, we may turn
our attention to a closer investigation of the characteristics of
different divisions of mankind. It is clear that our investigations
cannot be based on vague descriptions of travellers,—who remark upon the
enormous digestive organs of primitive man, or on his small size, or on
the lack of development of his limbs, or even upon his resemblance to
apes,—but on serious studies of anatomical characteristics.

Two problems may be distinguished here which have too often been
confounded in discussions of the mental characteristics of civilized man
and of primitive man. The one relates to the distinctions between races;
the other, to distinctions between the social strata of the same race.
According to the meaning of the terms “civilized” and “primitive,” it is
perfectly conceivable that there may be civilized groups belonging to
different races (like the Chinese and Europeans), and civilized as well
as primitive groups, both belonging to the same race (like the Yukaghir
of Siberia and the Chinese, or like the group of educated negroes in the
United States and the primitive tribes of the coasts of Africa). The
problems presented by the differences between the various races of man,
and by the differences between social groups in the same races, are, of
course, entirely distinct, and each requires separate treatment.

There is one peculiarity common to both problems, which must be
described before we can properly take up their treatment. When we
compare the individuals comprising any one racial or social type, we
find that they are not by any means uniform, but exhibit considerable
variation. When we try to think of a Norwegian and of a negro, two
entirely distinct types will be present to our minds,—the Norwegian,
tall, with blond and somewhat wavy hair, blue eyes, light complexion,
delicate face and nose; the negro, of medium stature, with black and
frizzly hair, dark eyes, dark skin, projecting jaw, and heavy flat nose.
Still, these pictures are only abstractions of what we think we have
noticed most commonly in each type. When we compare the Norwegians among
themselves, or the negroes among themselves, we find that each
individual in each series has his peculiarities, which the others do not
share. There are tall and short Norwegians; their hair is blond or dark,
straight or wavy; their eyes vary from brown to blue; their complexion
is light or dark, their faces more or less delicate. And so with the
negroes. The degree of blackness, the amount of projection of the chin,
the flatness of the nose,—all show very considerable variations.
Experience has demonstrated that in all cases of this kind, one certain
type, one certain combination of features, is most common; and that
deviations in either direction from this type become the rarer, the
greater their amount. Thus the Norwegians show a prevalence of a certain
blond color. Individuals with a color of hair much lighter than the most
common color are the rarer, the greater the difference of their
hair-color from the most common one; and in the same way individuals
with a color of hair much darker than the most common color are the
rarer, the greater the deviation of their color of hair from the common
one. The extent to which such variations occur is not always the same.
In some cases the individuals constituting the group show a remarkable
similarity or uniformity of type; in other cases the diversity of types
occurring in the same community is quite remarkable. We call a series
the more variable, the more frequently deviating types occur in it; so
that the average amount of differences between the individuals
constituting the series and the most common type may be used as a
measure of the variability of the series.

These considerations are of prime importance in all attempts to compare
different races. In some cases differences are found which are
sufficiently fundamental to distinguish easily and definitely one from
another. Thus the color of the skin, color and form of the hair, and
configuration of lips and nose, distinguish the African negro definitely
from the North European. When, however, we compare all the races and
types of man, we find that innumerable transitions exist, which would
make it difficult to state that any one particular feature belongs to
all the individuals of one type, to the exclusion of all others. Thus it
would not be difficult to find among members of the American race, for
instance, lips and nose which approach in form those of the negro. The
same may be said of color. This indefiniteness of distinctions between
different types is due to the variability of the types, which has been
described before, and to the comparatively small differences between the
types.

To give an instance. Negroes have thick lips. Nevertheless the thickness
is not the same among all of them. In some cases it is quite small, in
others very large. Europeans have thin lips, but we can find individuals
whose lips have very considerable thickness. Thus it happens that there
are some negroes whose lips deviate from the normal type in being
unusually thin, and whose lips are therefore similar to those of
Europeans whose lips are unusually thick. The less distinct two types
are, the greater will be the number of individuals in both groups that
are alike. It follows also, from what has been said, that the greater
the variability of each type, the greater will be the probability that
some individuals of the two types compared will be alike. We may perhaps
best express this by saying that the varieties constituting each race
overlap. In many cases, and in some of those that are most important for
our inquiry, this overlapping is extended. Thus I have pointed out the
differences in average brain-weight between different races.
Brain-weights are, however, so variable, that a considerable overlapping
occurs, and that even the average sizes of the brains of the white race
are numerously represented among other races. Medium-sized brains of
whites may be represented by the group of individuals having skull
capacities of from 1450 cc. to 1650 cc. This group embraces 55 per cent
of the Europeans, 58 per cent of the African negroes, and 58 per cent of
the Melanesians. The same result appears when we compare the number of
individuals having great cranial capacities. We find that 50 per cent of
all whites have a capacity of the skull greater than 1550 cc., while 27
per cent of the negroes and 32 per cent of the Melanesians have
capacities above this value. If we were to assume a direct relation
between size of brain and ability,—which, as we have seen before, is not
admissible,—we might, at most, anticipate a lack of men of high genius,
but should not expect any great lack of faculty among the great mass of
negroes living among the whites, and enjoying the advantages of the
leadership of the best men of that race.

On the other hand, we find characteristics in different races so far
apart and so little variable, that an overlapping is entirely or
practically excluded. Examples of these are the frizzly hair of the
negro as compared with the straight hair of the Mongol; the elevation
and narrowness of the nose of the Armenian, and the flatness of the
negro nose; the differences in pigmentation of the North European and of
the Central African.

Investigations on the character of variability, which have been based on
the measurements of the body, on social and economic phenomena, and also
on variable physical phenomena, such as meteorological data, have
resulted in the discovery that almost always the same law nearly covers
the distribution of the numerical values of the observations (Lock,
Bowley).

[Illustration: FIG. 1.]

It has been shown that the values which represent the phenomenon are so
distributed that certain numerical values occur very frequently, and
that the greater the difference between an observation and the value at
which the greatest number of cases are found, the less will be the
number of these observations. The character of this distribution is
shown in Fig. 1, in which the horizontal line represents the numerical
values of the observations, while the vertical distances represent the
frequency of that observation to which the vertical distance belongs. In
the theoretical distribution which is represented in Fig. 1, the
following values of the stature of a number of men are found:—

                        1415-1455 mm.    5 cases
                        1455-1495 mm.   11 cases
                        1495-1535 mm.   44 cases
                        1535-1575 mm.  135 cases
                        1575-1615 mm.  325 cases

                        1615-1655 mm.  607 cases
                        1655-1695 mm.  882 cases
                        1695-1735 mm. 1000 cases
                        1735-1775 mm.  882 cases
                        1775-1815 mm.  607 cases

                        1815-1855 mm.  325 cases
                        1855-1895 mm.  135 cases
                        1895-1935 mm.   44 cases
                        1935-1975 mm.   11 cases
                        1975-2015 mm.    5 cases

When we compare two series of this class which are grouped around
different values, they may overlap each other. For instance, in a people
of tall stature and another one of lower stature, the following
theoretical distribution of numerical values of stature would be
possible:—

                   I       │      II       │
            1415-1455 mm.  │1425-1455 mm.  │        5 cases
            1455-1495 mm.  │1455-1485 mm.  │       11 cases
            1495-1535 mm.  │1485-1515 mm.  │       44 cases
            1535-1575 mm.  │1515-1545 mm.  │      135 cases
            1575-1615 mm.  │1545-1575 mm.  │      325 cases
                           │               │
            1615-1655 mm.  │1575-1605 mm.  │      607 cases
            1655-1695 mm.  │1605-1635 mm.  │      882 cases
            1695-1735 mm.  │1635-1665 mm.  │     1000 cases
            1735-1775 mm.  │1665-1695 mm.  │      882 cases
            1775-1815 mm.  │1695-1725 mm.  │      607 cases
                           │               │
            1815-1855 mm.  │1725-1755 mm.  │      325 cases
            1855-1895 mm.  │1755-1785 mm.  │      135 cases
            1895-1935 mm.  │1785-1815 mm.  │       44 cases
            1935-1975 mm.  │1815-1845 mm.  │       11 cases
            1975-2015 mm.  │1845-1875 mm.  │        5 cases

[Illustration: FIG. 2.]

In these two series the group of statures from 1575 mm. to 1695 mm.
occurs 1814 times in the first series, 3371 times in the second; that is
to say, 1814 individuals are found in both classes, and 1557 (i.e.,
3371-1814) are found only in the class of people of tall stature. In
Fig. 2 I have represented these two series in one system of coordinates.
Evidently all the individuals who belong to both series, and who are
shown in the surface enclosed between both curves, are found in both
series; and only the others, who are outside of this surface, and who
belong to one of the groups, are not found in the other one.

Bearing in mind these facts relating to types and variability, we are in
a position to turn to a consideration of the characteristics of
primitive man and of civilized man, and of members of distinct races.

We will first direct our attention to the differences between civilized
man and primitive man, both being members of the same race. For the
white race this difference can no longer be observed, because there are
no primitive white men in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we
may discover certain analogues. Some of the peasants in the remote
mountain districts of southeastern Europe do not live in a manner so
very different from the way of living of what we ordinarily call
primitive people; for the mode of life of the agricultural Indians of
North America at the time of Columbus, or that of some agricultural
negro tribes, is, so far as nutrition and occupation are concerned,
quite similar to theirs. Also some of the fishermen on the coast of
Europe may well be compared, in their mode of life, with the fishermen
of America or Asia. More direct comparisons may be made among the people
of eastern Asia, where we may contrast the cultured Chinese and the
primitive Amur River tribes, the northern Japanese and the Ainu, the
civilized Malay and the mountain tribes of Sumatra or the Philippines.
Similar comparisons are possible for the negro race when we contrast the
small educated class of negroes in America and the African tribesmen;
and for the American race when we compare the educated Indians,
particularly of Spanish America, and the tribes of the prairies and of
the virgin forests.

It is obvious that in all these cases we are comparing groups of the
same descent, but living in distinct economic, social, and other
environmental conditions. If we find differences among them, they can
only be due, directly or indirectly, to environment. Thus the
fundamental problem presents itself, In how far are human types stable,
in how far variable under the influences of environment?

It is difficult to take up this inquiry on the basis of a direct
comparison between primitive and civilized types belonging to the same
races, partly because material is hard to obtain, partly because the
homogeneity of the race is often open to doubt; but it is at once
apparent that every inquiry into the variability of human types living
under the effect of different types of environment will help us to gain
an insight into the question at issue, so that we are led to a more
general discussion of the problem of the stability or variability of the
form of the human body.

The principles of biological science forbid us to assume a permanent
stability of bodily form. Our whole modern concept of the development of
varieties and of species is based on the assumption of cumulative or
sudden variation. The variations that have been found in the human body
are quite in accordance with this view, and I may quote here a few words
from Wiedersheim’s admirable treatise on the structure of man as an
index of his past history: “In the course of Phylogeny the body of Man
has undergone a series of modifications which still in part find
expression in his ontogeny. There are indications that changes in his
organization are still continuing, and that the Man of the future will
be different from the Man of to-day.” The best illustrations of those
changes are found in the forms of organs which are undergoing reduction.
Thus we may observe that in modern man the little toe is often
two-jointed, a phenomenon presumably due to lack of functional use. This
condition has been observed in races going barefooted as well as in
those wearing shoes, so that it cannot be ascribed to artificial causes.
The teeth also show a tendency to gradual reduction, especially in the
variable size of the molars and of the upper outer incisors. The third
molar, or wisdom tooth, is often retained, and is in most races
considerably reduced in size. Retention or slight development of the
upper outer incisor is also of frequent occurrence. A similar reduction
may be observed at the lower end of the thorax, where the development of
ribs and sternum shows great variations.

The significance of these phenomena lies in the fact that in the
evolutionary series the abnormal occurrences, which are found in
different races in varying frequency, appear as new developments, which,
if they should become normal, would increase the differentiation between
man and the lower forms. The actual proof of increasing frequency of
these features, and of their becoming permanent characteristics, has not
been given, but seems more than plausible.

This inference is strongly supported by the occurrence of rudimentary,
functionless organs, and by the temporary appearance of lower features
during ontogenetic development.

It has been shown that some of these reductions—like the retention of
outer incisors—are hereditary, and thus liable to perpetuate themselves.
To a certain extent this explains the observation that certain
variations occur with greater frequency among primitive tribes than in
civilized man. Most primitive tribes are very small in numbers, or for
long periods, during which they increased in numbers, have had little
intercourse with foreign people. If in such a group any of the original
families showed a certain peculiarity, it must now be found more
frequently than in any other tribes. A case of this kind is the
frequency of supernumerary vertebræ among the Indians of Vancouver
Island, and probably also the frequency of the _torus palatinus_ among
the Lapps. It may be left an open question, whether the frequent
occurrence of the _os Incæ_ among the Pueblo Indians and Peruvians may
be explained by the same consideration. Therefore it may be that the
greater variability of certain races, in regard to these phenomena, is
not an expression of a lower or higher degree of development of the
whole group, as the case may be, but of the presence of a great number
of members of a family which possessed the peculiar character. We do not
deal in these cases with spontaneous variations, but with their
hereditary re-appearance. In other words, if we are to admit the
conclusion that greater variability means a lower or higher stage of
development, it will be necessary first to prove that these variations
appear spontaneously in any member of the group, and do not belong to
certain families in which the feature is hereditary. Otherwise it will
be necessary to prove that in larger groups of mankind the families
exhibiting the particular anomaly had a greater probability of surviving
than others.

However this may be, the occurrence of these variations shows that man
cannot be assumed to have a stable form. It is of course an entirely
open question, how long a time may be required to fix any one of the
variations that we are here discussing.

The general tendency of anthropological inquiry has been to assume the
permanence of the anatomical characteristics of the present races,
beginning with the European races of the early neolithic times.
Kollmann, the most pronounced advocate of this theory, claims that the
oldest remains of man found in the neolithic deposits of Europe
represent types which are still found unchanged among the modern
civilized population of the continent. He has tried to identify all the
varieties found in the neolithic prehistoric population with those
living at the present time.

All studies of the distribution of head-forms and of other
anthropometric traits have shown uniformity over considerable continuous
areas and through long periods; and the natural inference has been that
heredity controls anthropometric forms, and that these are therefore
stable (Deniker).

There is only one exception to this rule. In all cases in which the
anthropometric traits undergo very considerable changes during the
period of growth, the influence of favorable or unfavorable causes makes
itself felt. The investigations conducted by Gould and Baxter during the
war of the Rebellion have shown that the representatives of European
nationalities born in America have statures higher than the
representatives of the same nationalities born in Europe; and it has
been assumed that better nutrition, or perhaps better hygienic and
economic conditions in general, might increase the stature of a people.
These conclusions were confirmed by Bowditch’s measurements of the
school-children of Boston, and by Peckham’s anthropometric work in
Milwaukee. These changes in stature, due to changed conditions, have
recently been demonstrated also in Europe, where Ammon has shown that
the population of Baden has materially increased in size during the last
thirty years. Other corroborative evidence has been obtained from the
study of various social classes, in which Bowditch found an increase of
stature, beginning with the children of unskilled laborers, and
increasing among those of skilled laborers, members of the mercantile
class and of the professional class; and from the observations showing a
correlation between the character of streets occupied by the well-to-do
and the poor, and the stature of their inhabitants (Ripley).
Nevertheless these changes of stature were not interpreted as changes in
type, because they may well be understood to be due to the elimination
of retarding influences, which prevent many individuals from attaining
their normal growth.

The results of the observations on stature are substantiated by other
anthropometrical studies of various occupations. The best-authenticated
fact, because based on the greatest number of observations, is the
difference in type between sailors and soldiers who were measured during
the war of the Rebellion. It was found that sailors had legs as long as
those of the negroes, and correspondingly a shorter trunk, while their
arms were equally as long as those of the soldiers of the army. We may
also call to mind the investigations carried on in the gymnasiums of our
colleges, which show that a series of measurements which depend largely
upon the functions of groups of muscles change very rapidly under the
influence of practice. It will be acknowledged at once that differences
in the use of muscles during childhood, and continued in later life,
must result in differences of structure, either permanent, or at least
temporary.

A study of the conditions of growth shows how such changes in the form
of the body must develop. Setting aside the prenatal development, we
find that at the time of birth some parts of the body are so fully
developed that they are not far removed from their final size, while
others are quite undeveloped. Thus the skull is, comparatively speaking,
large at the time of birth, grows rapidly for a short time, but very
soon approaches its full size, and then continues to grow very slowly.
The limbs, on the other hand, grow rapidly for many years. Other organs
do not begin their rapid development until much later in life. Thus it
happens that retarding or accelerating influences acting upon the body
at different periods of growth may have quite different results. After
the head has nearly completed its growth, retarding influences may still
influence the length of the limbs. The face, which grows rapidly for a
longer period than the cranium, can be influenced later than the latter.
In short, the influence of environment may be the more marked, the less
developed the organ that is subject to it. Data on the unequal rate of
growth of different parts of the body have been furnished by
Weissenberg.

The influence of retardation, so far as it has been studied, seems to be
lasting. In other words, a retardation in development is never
completely made good by long-continued development. When a child,
through unfavorable influences, has grown slowly during a number of
years, it will probably continue to grow longer than other, normal
children; but the total amount of its growth will always remain too
small (Boas and Wissler). On the other hand, children whose development
has been accelerated will reach the adult stage early, but nevertheless
the total amount of their growth will be relatively great. It follows
from this consideration of the effect of retardation and of difference
in period, that not only the absolute size, but also the relative
proportions, of the body, must be influenced by periods of retardation
or acceleration.

The whole trend of the studies of growth thus emphasizes the importance
of the effect of rate of development upon the final form of the body.
Illness in early childhood, malnutrition, lack of fresh air and physical
exercise, are so many retarding causes, which bring it about that the
growing individual of a certain age is in its physiological development
younger than the healthy, well-nourished individual, who has plenty of
fresh air, and who puts his muscular system to good use. Retardation or
acceleration has, however, the effect of modifying the later course of
development; so that the final stage will be the more favorable, the
less the retarding causes.

It seems more than likely, judging from the course of development of a
few simple mental activities that have been made the subject of study,
that mental development follows laws quite analogous to those of
physical development (Meumann).

These facts relating to growth are of fundamental importance for a
correct interpretation of the oft-discussed phenomena of early arrest of
growth. We have seen that among members of the same race a prolonged
period of growth goes hand in hand with unfavorable development, while
an abbreviated period of growth results in larger dimensions of all
physical measurements, and in a superiority of mental activity. In this
statement pathological cases of complete premature arrest of
development, or of over-development, are of course excluded,—cases of
dwarfish growth or of microcephaly, as well as cases of hypertrophic
growth of organs. It follows, that, in judging the physiological value
of arrest of growth, the mere fact that growth ceases in one race at an
earlier time than in another cannot be considered as significant in
itself without observations on the rapidity of growth.

So far, the question still remains open, in how far there may be changes
in the types of man that cannot be explained by acceleration or
retardation of growth.

An attempt has been made by Rieger to explain differences in head-form
as due to the effect of physiological and mechanical conditions, and
Engel emphasizes the effect of pressure of the muscles upon the forms of
the head. Walcher tries to explain different head-forms by the
consideration of the position of the infant in the cradle. He believes
that position on the back produces round heads; position on the side,
long heads. It would seem, however, that the difference of head-form in
large areas of Europe, in which infants are treated in the same manner,
are too great to make this explanation acceptable.

A number of observations have been made, however, which demonstrate
conclusively a difference between urban and rural types. These
observations were first made by Ammon, who showed that the urban
population in Baden differs from the rural population in head-form,
stature, and pigmentation. He accepts the conclusion that we have here
an actual change in type; due, however, not to a direct effect of
environment, but rather to an elimination of certain types in city life:
in other words, an effect of natural selection. This observation is in
accord with observations made by Livi in the cities of Italy, which show
also a difference when compared to the surrounding country. Comparisons
of the normal and hospital populations of London, made by Shrubsall, are
not unfavorable to the assumption of a certain amount of correlation
between morbidity and physical type, although the homogeneity of
material from a metropolis like London, drawn from different social
strata of a large city, remains always open to doubt.

Another explanation, given by Livi, seems to account adequately for the
difference between city and country population, without necessitating
the assumption of any considerable effect of natural selection, which
presupposes an improbable correlation between mortality and fertility on
the one hand, and traits like head-form and pigmentation on the other.
The change of type in cities, so far as it has been observed, is of such
character, that the city always shows greater resemblance to the average
type of the whole large district in which it is located. If the local
rural population is markedly short-headed, the general type over a
larger area from which the city population is drawn more long-headed,
then the city population will be more long-headed, and _vice versâ_.
Unless selection can be demonstrated to occur in a sufficient number of
definite families, this explanation seems simpler and adequate.

Up to quite recent times no evidence of actual changes of type was
available, except the observations by Ammon and those by Livi on the
physical characteristics of rural and urban populations, to which I have
just referred, and some others on the influence of altitude upon
physical form. In the discussions of the distribution of different types
of man in Europe, peculiarities of body-form in certain areas—as in the
mountains of central France, in parts of Tuscany, in the province of
Zealand in Holland, in southwestern Norway—have been explained as due to
the survival of old racial types, to the influence of natural selection,
or to the direct influence of environment, according as the necessities
of the case prompted the investigator to adduce the one cause or the
other, or a combination of any two or of all, as a convenient
explanation of the difficult phenomenon (Ripley). It goes without saying
that haphazard application of unproved though possible theories cannot
serve as proof of the effectiveness of selection or of environment in
modifying types. The effectiveness of selection can be proved only by an
investigation of the surviving members of a type as compared to those
eliminated by death, or of a shifting of population connected with the
selection of a certain type. The influence of environment requires the
direct comparison of parents living under one environment with children
living under another environment.

I cannot give any example in which the influence of selection has been
proved beyond cavil. It seems plausible that in the criminal colonies of
earlier periods, and in the settling of the West by the most vigorous
members of our Eastern population, and in the complementary weeding-out
of strong elements in some parts of New England, this principle may have
been active; but we have no actual data which would connect with
physical types the selection that has undoubtedly taken place.

On the other hand, it has been my good fortune to be able to demonstrate
the existence of a direct influence of environment upon the bodily form
of man by a comparison of immigrants born in Europe and their
descendants born in New York City (Boas). I have investigated four
groups of people,—the South Italians, representing the Mediterranean
type of Europe, which is characterized by short stature, elongated head,
dark complexion and hair; the Central European type, which is
characterized by medium stature, short head, light hair and lighter
complexion; the Northwest European type, which is characterized by tall
stature, elongated head, light complexion, and blond hair. Furthermore,
I have investigated an extended series of East European Hebrews, who
resemble in some respects the Central European group. The traits which I
selected for examination are head-measurements, stature, weight, and
hair-color. Among these, only stature and weight are closely related to
the rate of growth, while head-measurements and hair-color are only
slightly subjected to these influences. Differences in hair-color and
head-development do not belong to the group of measurements of which I
spoke before, which depend in their final values upon the physiological
conditions during the period of growth. From all we know, they are
primarily dependent upon heredity.

The results of our inquiry have led to the unexpected result that the
American-born descendants of these types differ from their parents; and
that these differences develop in early childhood, and persist
throughout life. It is furthermore remarkable that each type changes in
a peculiar way. The head of the American-born Sicilian becomes rounder
than that of the foreign-born. This is due to a loss in length and an
increase in width. The face becomes narrower, the stature and weight
decrease. The head of the American-born Central European loses both in
length and width, more so in width, and thus becomes more elongated. The
face decreases very much in width; stature and weight increase. The
modifications of the American-born descendants of the Scotch type are
not marked, except that stature and weight increase. The American-born
Hebrew has a longer and narrower head than the European-born; the head
is therefore considerably more elongated. His face is narrower; stature
and weight are increased. In none of the types have marked differences
in color of hair between American-born and foreign-born been found.

In order to understand the causes which bring about these alterations of
type, it is necessary to know how long a time must have elapsed since
the immigration of the parents before a noticeable change of type of the
offspring is brought about. This investigation has been carried out
mainly for the cephalic index, which, during the period of growth of the
individual, undergoes only slight modifications. The investigation of
the Hebrews shows very clearly that the cephalic index of the
foreign-born is practically the same, no matter how old the individual
at the time of immigration. This might be expected when the immigrants
are adult or nearly mature; but it is of interest to note that even
children who come here when one year or a few years old develop the
cephalic index characteristic of the foreign-born. This index ranges
around 83. When we compare the value of this index with that of the
index of the American-born, according to the time elapsed since their
immigration, we find a sudden change. The value drops to about 82 for
those born immediately after the immigration of their parents, and drops
to 79 in the second generation; i.e., among the children of
American-born children of immigrants. In other words, the effect of
American environment makes itself felt immediately, and increases slowly
with the increase of time elapsed between the immigration of the parents
and the birth of the child.

The conditions among the Sicilians and Neapolitans are quite similar to
those observed among the Hebrews. The cephalic index of the foreign-born
remains throughout on almost the same level. Those born in America
immediately after the arrival of their parents show an increase of the
cephalic index. In this case, the transition, although rapid, is not
quite so sudden as among the Hebrews, probably because among those born
a year before or after immigration there is some doubt as to the place
of their birth. These uncertainties are due to the habit of the Italians
to migrate back and forth between Italy and America before finally
settling here, and to the indefiniteness of their answers in regard to
the places of birth of the child, which sometimes had to be inferred
from the age of the child and the year of immigration of the mother. As
long as this uncertainty exists, which is hardly present at all in the
data relating to the Hebrews, it does not seem necessary to assume any
other cause for the more gradual change of the cephalic index about the
time of immigration.

The Italian immigration is so recent, that individuals who were born
many years after the arrival of their parents in America are very few in
number, and no individuals of the second generation have been observed.
For this reason it is hardly possible to decide whether the increase of
the cephalic index continues with the length of time elapsed between the
immigration of the parents and the birth of the child.

The explanation of these remarkable phenomena is not easy. Whatever
their causes may be, the change in form cannot be doubted. It might,
however, be claimed that the changes are not due to deep physiological
causes, but to the changes of certain external factors. The composition
of the immigrant population might be such that the people who came here
at different periods had distinct physical characteristics, and that
these are now reflected in the descendants of the older generations when
compared with the more recent immigrants. It can be shown, however, that
the differences between the Hebrews who immigrated at different periods
between 1860 and 1909 are so slight that they cannot account for the
type of the descendants of immigrants. This important point can be
elucidated more definitely by the application of a different method. For
this purpose I have compared the cephalic index of all immigrants of a
certain year with that of their descendants. It appears from these
comparisons that the differences which are exhibited by the whole series
exist also between the immigrants who arrived here in a certain year and
their descendants. This purely statistical explanation of the phenomenon
may therefore be dismissed.

More difficult to investigate is the hypothesis that the mechanical
treatment of infants may have a decided influence upon the form of the
head, and that the changes in cradling and bedding which are made by
some immigrants almost immediately after their arrival in America
account for the changes of head-form. If this were true, the continued
changes among the Hebrews might indicate merely that the American method
of cradling is used the more frequently, the longer the family has
resided in this country. A number of investigators have claimed that the
position of the child on the back tends to produce short-headedness, and
that the position on the side tends to produce long-headedness
(Walcher). There is good evidence that a flattening of the occiput
occurs when a very hard pillow is used and the child lies permanently on
its back. This is the case, for instance, among many Indian tribes, and
similar results might obtain if a swathed child were to lie permanently
on its back. The prevalence of rachitis in New York would favor
distortion due to pressure.

While I cannot disprove the existence of such influences, I think
weighty considerations are against their acceptance. If we assume that
among the Hebrews the children born abroad have a lesser length of head
than those born here because they are swathed and lie more permanently
on their backs than the American-born children, who can move about
freely, we must conclude that there is a certain compensatory decrease
in the other diameters of the head of the American-born. Since this
compensation is distributed in all directions, its amount in any one
direction will be very small (Boas).

The decrease in the width of head that has been observed is so large
that it cannot be considered simply as an effect of compensation; but we
have to make the additional hypothesis that the American-born children
lie so much on their sides that a narrowing of the head is brought about
by mechanical pressure. The same considerations hold good in all the
other types. If, therefore, in one case the greater freedom of position
of the child increases the length of its head, it is difficult to see
why, among the Bohemians, the same causes should decrease both
horizontal diameters of the head, and why, among the Sicilians, the
length should decrease, the width increase.

The development of the width of the face seems to my mind to show most
clearly that it is not the mechanical treatment of the infant that
brings about the changes in question. The cephalic index suffers a very
slight decrease from the second year to adult life. It is therefore
evident that children who arrive in America very young cannot be much
affected by American environment in regard to their cephalic index. On
the other hand, if we consider a measurement that increases appreciably
during the period of growth, we may expect that in children born abroad
but removed to America when young, the total growth may be modified by
American environment. The best material for this study is presented by
the Bohemians, among whom there are relatively many full-grown
American-born individuals. The width of face of Bohemians, when arranged
according to their ages at the time of immigration, shows that there is
a loss among those who came here as young children,—the greater, the
younger they were. Continuing this comparison with the Americans born
one, two, and more years after the arrival of their mothers, the width
of face is seen to decrease still further. It appears, therefore, that
the American environment causes a retardation of the growth of the width
of face at a period when mechanical influences are no longer possible.

I have not carried through the analogous investigation for stature,
because in this case the increase might simply be ascribed to the better
nutrition of most of the north and central European immigrants after
their immigration into this country.

There is another hypothesis which might account for the observed changes
of type. If it were assumed that among the descendants of immigrants
born in America there are an appreciable number who are in reality
children of American fathers, not of their reputed fathers, a general
assimilation by the American type would occur. Socially this condition
is not at all plausible; but, on account of the importance of the
phenomenon that we are discussing, it should be considered. I do not
think that any of the observations that have been made are in favor of
this theory. The changes that occur in the Bohemians who arrive here as
young children, the different directions of the changes in distinct
types, particularly the shortening of the head of Bohemians and of
Italians, do not favor the assumption. Furthermore, if the modifications
were due to race-mixture, the similarity between fathers and
American-born children should be less than the similarity between
fathers and foreign-born children, but there is no indication that this
is the case.

This hypothesis is also shown to be untenable by the comparisons of
fathers and mothers with their own foreign-born children. These
comparisons show that the differences are the same in the case of
fathers and children, and of mothers and children; so that obviously the
same conditions must control the relations between fathers and their
children, and mothers and their children. In other words, the fathers
must be considered as the true fathers of their children.

Earnest advocates of the theory of selection might claim that all these
changes are due to the effects of changes in death-rate among
foreign-born and American-born; that either abroad or here individuals
of certain types are more liable to die, and that thus these changes are
gradually brought about. On the whole, it seems to my mind, the burden
of proof would be entirely on those who claim such a correlation between
head-index, width of face, etc., and death-rate,—a correlation which I
think is highly improbable, and which could be proposed only to sustain
the theory of selection, not on account of any available facts. I grant
the desirability of settling the question by actual observations; but,
until these are available, we may point out that the very suddenness of
the changes after immigration, and the absence of changes due to
selection by mortality among the adult foreign-born, would require such
a complicated adjustment of cause and effect in regard to the
correlation of mortality and bodily form, that the theory would become
improbable on account of its complexity.

It would be saying too much to claim that all the distinct European
types become the same in America, without mixture, solely by the action
of the new environment. First of all, I have investigated only the
effect of one environment, and there is every reason to believe that a
number of distinct types are developing in America; but we will set
aside this point, and discuss only our New York observations. Although
the long-headed Sicilian becomes more round-headed in New York, the
round-headed Bohemian and Hebrew more long-headed, the approach to a
uniform general type cannot be established, because we do not know yet
how long the changes continue, and whether they would all lead to the
same result. I confess, I do not consider such a result as likely,
because the proof of the plasticity of types does not imply that the
plasticity is unlimited. The history of the British types in America, of
the Dutch in the East Indies, of the Spaniards in South America, favors
the assumption of a strictly limited plasticity. Certainly our
discussion should be based on this more conservative basis until an
unexpectedly wide range of variability of types can be proved. It is one
of the most important problems that arise out of this investigation, to
determine how far the instability or plasticity of types may extend.

Whatever the extent of these bodily changes may be, if we grant the
correctness of our inferences in regard to the plasticity of human
types, we are necessarily led to grant also a great plasticity of the
mental make-up of human types. We have observed that features of the
body which have almost obtained their final form at the time of birth
show modifications of great importance in new surroundings. We have seen
that others which increase during the whole period of growth, and are
therefore subject to the continued effect of the new environment, are
modified even among individuals who arrived here during their childhood.
From these facts we must conclude that the fundamental traits of the
mind, which are closely correlated with the physical condition of the
body, and whose development continues over many years after physical
growth has ceased, are the more subject to far-reaching changes. It is
true that this is a conclusion by inference; but if we have succeeded in
proving changes in the form of the body, the burden of proof will rest
on those who, notwithstanding those changes, continue to claim the
absolute permanence of other forms and functions of the body.

In order to gain a correct understanding of the importance of changes in
the frame of the human body, it seems desirable to view the type of
modern man from a somewhat different standpoint.

It is quite a number of years since Fritsch, in his studies of the
anthropology of South Africa, pointed out that a peculiar difference
exists in the form of the body of the Bushman and the Hottentot as
compared to that of Europeans, in that the former exhibit slenderer
forms of the bones, that the bone is very solid in its structure; while
in the European the skeleton appears heavier, but of more open
structure. Similar differences may be observed in a comparison between
the skeletons of wild animals and those of domesticated animals; and
this observation has led to the conclusion that the Bushmen are in their
physical habitus to a certain extent like wild animals, while the
Europeans resemble in their structure domesticated animals.

This point of view—namely, that the human race in its civilized forms
must be compared, not with the forms of wild animals, but rather with
those of domesticated animals—seems to me a very important one; and a
somewhat detailed study of the conditions in which various races are
found suggests that at the present time, even among the most primitive
types of man, changes incident to domestication have taken place almost
all over the world.

There are three different types of changes due to domestication which
must be clearly distinguished. On the one hand, the bodies of
domesticated animals undergo considerable transformations, owing to the
change in nutrition and use of the body. On the other hand, selection
and crossing have played an important part in the development of races
of domesticated animals.

Some changes of the former class are due to the more regular and more
ample nutrition; other changes are due to modifications of the kinds of
food which the domesticated animal uses when compared with the wild
animal of the same species; still others are due to the different manner
in which the muscular and the nervous systems are put into use. These
changes are not quite the same among carnivorous and among herbivorous
animals. The dog and the cat, for instance, are fairly regularly fed
when they are found in domestication; but the food which is given to
them is of a quite different character from the food which the wild dog
and cat eat. Even among people whose diet consists almost entirely of
meat, dogs are generally fed with boiled meat, or rather with the
boiled, less nutritious parts of animals; while, among other tribes
which utilize to a great extent vegetable food, dogs are often fed with
mush and other vegetable material. The same is true of our cats, whose
diet is not by any means entirely a meat diet. The exertions which wild
carnivorous animals undergo to obtain food are incomparably greater than
those of domesticated carnivorous animals; and it is obvious that for
this reason the muscular system and the central nervous system may
undergo considerable changes.

The muscular exertions of herbivorous animals, so far as they are fed on
pastures, are not so materially changed. The grazing habits of cattle
and sheep in domestication are about the same as the grazing habits of
wild animals of the same class; but the rapid movements and the
watchfulness required for protecting the herd against carnivorous
animals have completely disappeared. Stable-fed animals live under
highly artificial conditions, and material changes may occur in them.

I think the changes due to these causes may be observed in the oldest
types of domesticated animals, such as are found in the neolithic
villages of Europe, in which native European species appear in
domesticated form (Keller). They may also be observed in the dogs of the
various continents, which differ markedly from the wild species from
which they are derived. Even the Eskimo dog, which is a descendant of
the gray wolf and still interbreeds with the gray wolf, differs in
bodily form from the wild animal (Beckmann). Modifications may also be
observed in newly domesticated animals, like the Chukchee reindeer,
which differs in type from the wild reindeer of the same area (Bogoras).
I think it very unlikely, judging from our knowledge of the methods of
domestication of tribes like the Eskimo and Chukchee, that any material
amount of selection has contributed to the modifications of form which
are found in these races of primitive domesticated animals. Their
uniformity is still fairly well marked, although they have assumed types
different from the wild species.

A more marked differentiation of domesticated forms does not seem to
occur until man begins to select and to isolate, more or less
consciously, particular breeds. Opportunity for such isolation has been
the greater, the older the domestication of any particular species. We
find, therefore, that the number of distinct breeds have come to be
greatest in those animals which have been under domestication for the
longest periods.

The number of varieties of domesticated species has also been increased
by unintentional or intentional crossing of different species, from
which are derived many breeds whose ancestry it is often so difficult to
unravel.

It appears, therefore, that there are three distinct causes which bring
about the development of different types in domesticated animals: first,
the influence of change of nutrition and mode of life; secondly,
conscious selection; and, thirdly, crossing.

Among these causes, the first and the third have been most strongly
active in the development of the races of man. The condition of the
tribes of man the world over is such, that there are only very few whose
mode of nutrition is analogous to that of wild animals, and a
consideration of the stages of human culture shows that similar
conditions have prevailed for a long period. I think we may safely say
that in all those cases in which man practises agriculture, when he is
the owner of herds of domesticated animals which are used for food, the
food-supply has become regular, and is obtained by an application of the
muscular system in highly specialized directions. Examples of this
condition are, for instance, the central African negroes, who have their
gardens near their villages, the cultivation of the gardens being
essentially the work of the women, while the men are engaged in various
specialized industrial pursuits. Neither is the manner of the use of the
body which is applied by wild animals for protection against enemies
found among these tribes. The manner of combat is one in which muscular
strength alone is not decisive, but where excellence of weapons and
strategy count as much as mere strength and agility. The conditions
among the American agricultural Indians of the Mississippi Valley or of
those of the South American forests are similar in character.

As an example of a pastoral people among whom considerable regularity in
nutrition obtains, we might mention the reindeer-breeders of Siberia or
the cattle-breeders of Africa.

We know, of course, that among all these people, periods of starvation
occur, due to a failure of the crops or to epidemics in the herds; but
the normal condition is one of fairly regular and ample food-supply.

The conditions among fishing tribes are not very different; and we find
that, owing to methods of storing provisions, and to the superabundance
of food-supply obtained in one season and sufficient to last for the
rest of the year, the nutrition of these people is also fairly regular.
In this case, also, the kind of muscular exertion required for obtaining
food is specialized, and differs from that required from the simple
pursuit of game.

The only modern tribes among which the effects of civilization on bodily
activities are slight are those who, like the Bushmen of South Africa,
the Australians, the Eskimo of Arctic America, the Veddahs of Ceylon,
obtain their livelihood by the constant, daily-repeated pursuit of
animals, or by the gathering of plants or small invertebrates which grow
scattered over a wide area.

Connected with these conditions are also the characteristic selections
of food-stuffs by different tribes, such as the exclusive meat diet of
some tribes (perhaps most pronounced among the Eskimo) and the exclusive
vegetable diet of others, well developed, for instance, in southern
Asia. Both of these have, in all probability, a far-reaching effect upon
the bodily form of these races.

The second group of causes which is most potent in developing distinct
races of domesticated animals—namely, conscious selection—has probably
never been very active in the races of man. We do not know of a single
case in which it can be shown that intermarriage between distinct types
of the same descent was prohibited; and whatever selection there may
have been in the development of primitive society seems to have been
rather that type of natural selection which encourages the mating of
like with like, or such intricate selection as is due to the social laws
of intermarriage, which prevented intermarriages of relatives of certain
grades, and often also of members of different generations. Thus a very
common form of marriage restriction brings it about that among certain
tribes the children of brother and sister intermarry, while the children
of brothers and the children of sisters are not allowed to intermarry.
Similar restrictions are found in great number, and may possibly have
had a certain selective effect, although their operation can hardly be
assumed to have had very marked results upon the form of the human body
(Pearson).

In some cases social laws have had the indirect effect of perpetuating
distinctions between separate parts of a population, or at least of
retarding their complete amalgamation. This is the case where laws of
endogamy relate to groups of distinct descent, and may be observed, for
instance, among the castes of Bengal, where the low castes are of the
characteristic South Indian type, while the highest castes preserve the
type of the tribes of northwestern India (Risley and Gait). The numerous
intermediate castes show, however, that the laws of endogamy, even where
they are as stringent as those of India, cannot prevent blood-mixture.
Whether or not in extreme cases endogamy in small groups, as among the
ancient Egyptians, has led to the development of well-defined types, is
a question that cannot be answered; but it is certain that none of these
types, when found in a large population, have survived.

The third element of domestication, on the other hand, has probably been
very important in the development of the races of man. Crossings between
distinct types are so markedly common in the history of primitive
people, and so markedly rare in the history of wild animals, that in
this case the analogy between domesticated animals and man becomes very
clear. Cases of hybrid forms in nature are almost everywhere rare;
while, as I have pointed out before, domesticated animals have been
crossed and recrossed without end. Crossings between the most distinct
types of man are also of very common occurrence. As an instance, I might
mention the intermarriages between the Hamitic tribes of the Sahara and
the negro tribes of the Soudan (Nachtigal); the mixtures between the
Negritos and Malay, which are of such common occurrence in the Malay
Peninsula (Martin), and which are probably to a great extent the cause
of the peculiar distribution of types in the whole Malay Archipelago;
the mixtures which have taken place in Fiji; that of the Ainu and
Japanese in the northern part of Japan; of European and Mongol in
eastern Europe; not to speak of the more recent mixtures between
European and other races which were incident to the gradual distribution
of the European race over the whole world.

This point of view—namely, the consideration of man as a domesticated
being (with the sole exception, perhaps, of a few hunting tribes)—is
also of great importance for a clear understanding of his mental
activities. The behavior of primitive domesticated animals, like that of
the Eskimo dog or of the Chukchee reindeer, is decidedly different from
the behavior of wild animals. We might perhaps say that the range of
mentality of the domesticated forms seems to be, on the whole, wider,
and this condition increases with increasing degree of domestication.
Cases in which the mental activities of domesticated animals are more
deficient than those of the wild animals, do occur, but are not as
frequent as the reverse cases. An example of this kind is furnished by
sheep.

We are thus led to the conclusion that environment has an important
effect upon the anatomical structure and physiological functions of man;
and that for this reason differences of type and action between
primitive and civilized groups of the same race must be expected. It
seems plausible that one of the most potent causes of these
modifications must be looked for in the progressive domestication of man
incident to the advance of civilization.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




              III. INFLUENCE OF HEREDITY UPON HUMAN TYPES


WE will now turn to the consideration of another element which
determines the physical type of man. Although we have seen that
environment, particularly domestication, has a far-reaching influence
upon the bodily form of the races of man, these influences are of a
quite secondary character when compared to the far-reaching influence of
heredity. Even granting the greatest possible amount of influence to
environment, it is readily seen that all the essential traits of man are
due primarily to heredity. The descendants of the negro will always be
negroes; the descendants of the whites, whites; and we may go even
considerably further, and may recognize that the essential detailed
characteristics of a type will always be reproduced in the descendants,
although they may be modified to a considerable extent by the influence
of environment. I am inclined to believe that the influence of
environment is of such a character, that, although the same race may
assume a different type when removed from one environment to another, it
will revert to its old type when replaced in its old environment. This
point has not been proved by actual anthropological evidence; but it
seems reasonable to make this assumption by analogy with what we know of
the behavior of plants and animals. It would, of course, be highly
desirable to clear up this question by appropriate investigations.

In order to obtain a clearer understanding of the racial problem, it
seems necessary to describe more definitely the characteristics of
heredity. In the discussion of modern anthropology, two theories have
been advocated relating to the manner in which parental traits are
inherited by children. Francis Galton and his adherents have assumed
that the form of the body of an individual is determined by the racial
type to which the parents belong, modified, however, by the tendency of
reversion to a type intermediate between the special variations
presented by the parents. When, for instance, the father of an
individual is unusually tall, his mother somewhat taller than the
average, it is assumed that the tendency of the children would be to
develop a stature which is somewhat near the general type, but at the
same time dependent upon the intermediate value located between the
stature of the mother and that of the father. On the other hand, the
development of the Mendelian doctrine (Lock, Bateson) of heredity has
led other investigators to assume that the offspring of two distinct
types may be a mixed type, but that his descendants will tend to revert
either to one parental type or to the other, or that one of the parental
types may dominate over the influence of the other parental type.
Investigations relating to this problem are not very numerous; but, on
the whole, it would appear that the results so far obtained are in favor
rather of a modified form of Mendelian inheritance than of an
inheritance characterized by reversion of the children to a middle type
between the parents, or to a type dependent upon such a middle type.

A number of years ago I had an opportunity to investigate a considerable
number of Indian half-bloods; that is to say, of descendants of Indian
mothers and white fathers. The most characteristic difference between
the American Indian race and the European race, so far as these
differences can be expressed in metrical form, is found in the width of
the face. An extensive series of measurements of width of face made
among half-bloods showed conclusively that the width of face does not
tend to range around a certain intermediate value located between the
width of face of the white race and that of the Indian race, but there
was a decided tendency in the children to resemble either the Indian
race or the white race; in other words, that feature of Mendelian
inheritance which brings about the occurrence of mixed characteristics
in the first hybrid generation was not found, but instead of this a
decided tendency of reversion to either type, and to comparative rarity
of intermediate forms. The results seem also to indicate that the Indian
form in this mixture seems to dominate over the white form, but not in
the Mendelian sense, which would require the presence of dominant
features in a certain definite number of individuals, but only in the
sense that the Indian type was a little more frequent than the European
type, with the effect that the average width of face of the whole series
was a little nearer to the Indian group than to the white group.

While this single observation is not by any means sufficient to
determine fully the characteristic traits of heredity which govern the
phenomenon in question, they indicate decidedly and beyond cavil that,
in this case at least, we find what has been called by Karl Pearson
“alternating inheritance.” It is worth remarking that not all the
features of the body of the half-blood Indian exhibit the same tendency;
that, for instance, in the case of stature, a general increase in the
stature of the mixed people over that of the pure races may be observed.

Attention has been called by Felix von Luschan to a similar phenomenon
which occurs in the mixed population of southern Asia Minor, where he
believes to have found an alternating inheritance of the head-form,
particularly of the proportions between width and length of head; some
of the people retaining the short, high head-forms of the Armenoid type
of the interior of Asia Minor, while the others have the long, low head
of the Semites of Syria.

For a clear understanding of the laws of heredity, it seems important to
know whether a similar alternating inheritance occurs in marriages of
members of the same type. I have been enabled to investigate this
question by a study of the East European Hebrews living in New York. A
simple consideration shows, that, if the children tend to follow a type
intermediate between the type of their parents, then the children of one
family will show the same degree of resemblance among themselves, no
matter how great the difference between the parents; for, if they simply
tend to reproduce a middle type, it would not make any difference
whether the mother is excessively short and the father excessively tall,
or whether both parents are of middle stature. In both of these cases
the intermediate value would be the same, and we should therefore expect
that the effect upon the children would be the same. If, on the other
hand, there is any kind of alternation in inheritance, the effect upon
the family would be quite different. We should expect, in a family of
which both parents are near the typical average, to find the children
also to be near this average. On the other hand, if the mother is
excessively short and the father excessively tall, we should expect some
of the children to follow the mother in regard to shortness of stature,
others to follow the father in regard to tallness. It will therefore be
seen that in the case of alternating inheritance, we must expect an
increased variability among the children. The compilation of material
obtained from several thousand families shows very definitely that the
variability among children both of whose parents belong to the same
racial type, even to the same local type, increases quite considerably
with the increased difference of the parents; so that we may assume a
decided tendency to alternating inheritance in these cases. There is,
however, no evidence whatever of the dominance of one type over another.

Quite a number of investigations have been made in relation to the
intensity of heredity of parents and of grandparents; and,
notwithstanding the uncertainty of the quantitative result, it seems
reasonably certain that the intensity of heredity for each parent may be
expressed by the value of about one-third (Pearson, Boas). It is
somewhat difficult to explain clearly the significance of this value. I
may, however, briefly indicate it in the following manner. Provided the
mother differs in her stature by an amount of 9 cm. from the racial
norm,—for instance, if she is 9 cm. taller than the average
individual,—then we may expect the child to be one-third of 9 cm., or 3
cm., above the average. It will thus be seen that if both parents differ
in the same direction from the average, the effect of both will be
cumulative; and if both differ from the average of their people by the
same amount, the joint effect of the two parents may be expressed by the
coefficient of about two-thirds. In case, for instance, both father and
mother should be 9 cm. above the type average, we should expect the
child to be about two-thirds of 9 cm., or 6 cm., above the average.

Although definite information on the amount of heredity of previous
generations is not yet available, the probability seems to be that the
grandparents have jointly an influence of about two-ninths, the
great-grandparents jointly of about two twenty-sevenths, etc., upon the
offspring.

When we study these problems according to statistical theories, and take
into consideration the observations on the resemblance of brothers and
sisters, it can be shown that the theory of alternating inheritance
cannot be taken too literally; for, if there were an absolute reversion
of any one trait to pure ancestral types, we might say that the
probability would be very small that two brothers should happen to
repeat the bodily form of the same ancestor, because the number of
ancestors in remote generations is very large. In other words, there
must be an additional cause of resemblance between brothers and sisters.
It is possible to show, that in case the inheritance has the strength
denoted before, and if bodily form of a certain generation were due only
to alternating inheritance acting from parents, grandparents,
great-grandparents, and so on, and directly upon the generation in
question, and without an occurrence of the same individuals in various
places in the line of ancestors, then the resemblance between brothers
and sisters, or, as we say, between the members of a fraternity, would
result in a degree of resemblance which is much lower than the one
actually observed. When the total number of ancestors is small, the
recurrence of the same forms would become more probable, and the
similarity of the series would increase. On the whole, the data seem to
be best explained if we assume that there is not only alternating
inheritance, but also a direct dependence upon the combination of the
two parental types.

I should like to repeat here that these results have not been obtained
with absolute certainty, and that it seems improbable that the laws of
heredity in regard to various ancestral traits are the same. I do not
enter into a discussion of the question of in how far these traits
follow the laws of Mendelian inheritance,—a question that cannot be
answered definitely at the present time (Davenport).

These problems have a fundamental importance for a clearer
interpretation of the conditions which prevail in the form of local
types of man.

In a large population which is as little stable in its habits as that of
modern Europe and modern America, the number of ancestors of a single
person increases very rapidly, the number of parents being two; of
grandparents, four; of great-grandparents, eight; the theoretical number
of ancestors twenty generations back would be over a million, or, more
accurately, 1,048,576. Twenty generations represent, according to the
rate of increase of modern times, about seven hundred years; according
to the rate of increase of older times, about four hundred years as a
minimum. These figures would apply to the series of generations
represented by first-born males; for first-born females the respective
numbers would be about five hundred years and three hundred and fifty
years. If we consider, however, the actual descent of families,
including individuals later born, we might perhaps assume that twenty
generations in Europe would represent from eight hundred to nine hundred
years, and among primitive peoples perhaps only little less, since in
former times the differences between the rapidity of successive
generations in Europe and among primitive peoples was not very great.
This makes it obvious that it is entirely impossible that as great a
number of ancestors as the theory requires can have contributed to the
development of the individuals of the present generation. The reason for
this is plain. Owing to intermarriages between the same families, large
numbers of ancestors will be duplicated in different paternal and
maternal lines; and in this way the real ancestry of each individual
appears to be much more complex than the purely arithmetical treatment
would suggest. The calculation for the ancestor table of the German
Emperor, for instance, is instructive. According to O. Lorenz, the
numbers of his ancestors in successive generations were as follows:—

             ═════════════════════╤═══════════╤═══════════
                     GENERATION   │THEORETICAL│  ACTUAL
                                  │  NUMBER   │  NUMBER
             ─────────────────────┼───────────┼───────────
                 I                │          2│          2
                II                │          4│          4
               III                │          8│          8
                IV                │         16│         14
                 V                │         32│         24
                VI                │         64│         44
               VII                │        128│         74
              VIII                │        256│     116[2]
                IX                │        512│     177[2]
                 X                │       1024│     256[2]
                XI                │       2048│     342[2]
               XII                │       4096│     533[2]
             ═════════════════════╧═══════════╧═══════════

A series of forty royal families gives the following averages:—

               ═══════════════════════════════╤══════════
                            GENERATION        │ AVERAGE
                                              │  NUMBER
               ───────────────────────────────┼──────────
                   I                          │      2.00
                  II                          │      4.00
                 III                          │      7.75
                  IV                          │     13.88
                   V                          │     23.70
                  VI                          │     40.53
               ═══════════════════════════════╧══════════

When we compare these conditions in the thickly populated parts of
modern Europe and of America, with their unstable population, with the
conditions among primitive tribes, it becomes at once apparent that the
total number of ancestors of each type in small communities must be much
less than the number of ancestors in the modern states just referred to.
A characteristic example is presented by the Eskimo of Smith Sound in
North Greenland. From all we know, it seems extremely unlikely that this
community ever consisted of more than a few hundred individuals. From
what we know about the history of Eskimo communities, we might much
rather assume that originally it consisted of a very few families only.
The community has been cut off from the outer world for very long
periods; and while there may have been accessions of new individuals
from outside once each century, on the whole it has remained completely
isolated. It is therefore obvious that the ancestry of this group cannot
contain anything like the million of people required by the theory, but
that all the individuals must be interrelated through their remote
ancestry.

Considering, now, the laws of inheritance as outlined before, it would
appear that in a community of this type, the members of which number
little more than two hundred individuals, the ancestor of every single
individual from the eighth generation back must have been the same,
because the eighth generation would require theoretically two hundred
and fifty-six individuals,—a greater number than are actually found in
the community; and the occurrence of any individuals who have not a good
many near and remote ancestors in common with the whole rest of the
community is highly improbable, if not impossible.

It follows from this at once that the variability of the whole series
around its typical average must be rather small, because all the members
of the group will have a certain amount of family resemblance. This
uniformity of type will, of course, be the greater, the more uniform the
ancestral group.

On the other hand, these conditions bring about another peculiar
characteristic of the isolated group. Owing to the constant recurrence
of the same ancestral types among the whole group, the type of the whole
people becomes very similar to the characteristic traits of the small
ancestral group; and the smaller this group, the stronger will be the
probability of the type of the local group being quite distinct from the
type of the whole people to which they belong.

It seems to my mind that these conditions explain to a considerable
extent the occurrence of distinct local types in primitive races. When
we find, for instance, that in North America a very marked type belongs
to the Arctic coast of the continent, that a quite distinct type is
found in the Mackenzie basin, still others in well-defined localities on
the Pacific coast, again others in the Mississippi basin, one in the
southeast, and one along the Rio Grande and in Mexico,—it seems
plausible to ascribe their origin to the increase of small isolated
groups, which, as we have seen, must necessarily lead to differentiation
of type.

This view of the origin of local races is quite in accord with the
remarkable results obtained by Johannsen in his studies of heredity. He
repeated artificially the conditions which prevail in a small community,
and exaggerated them by selecting types of equal form, and by
propagating them by self-fertilization. He raised in this way
bean-plants from beans of equal weight, and was able to restrict
variation of the type, so that practically any kind of bean of
particular weight and particular form could be bred true to the type of
its ancestor, and without perpetuating the accidental variations of the
ancestors. In cases where the ancestry goes back to a limited number of
individuals, as among our isolated tribes, the variation will, of
course, not be restricted to the same extent; but the characteristic
development of a stable type is quite analogous to the experiment made
by Johannsen.

Another phenomenon may be pointed out here which is still little
investigated, but which deserves careful attention. We have seen that in
stable communities in sparsely settled countries the relationship
between members of a tribe will be quite close, and that this
relationship will necessarily affect the type and its variability. In
course of time two areas whose population has thus developed may be
thrown into contact, and numerous intermarriages may occur. It will be
seen at once, that, although the differences between the two types may
be apparently only slight, a complete disturbance in the forms of
heredity will result, because a great number of individuals of distinct
ancestry are thrown together. To give an example. The South Italians and
the Spaniards represent two types not very distinct in physical
features, but separated for centuries. The small village communities of
Italy, as well as those of Spain, have all the characteristics of
communities in which endogamic marriages have been continued for a long
period. In the Argentine Republic these two types come into contact and
intermarry frequently. We have no observations on the result of this
mixture upon physical characteristics, but it has been noted that the
distribution of male and female births is quite different from that
prevailing in families in which both parents are either Spanish or
Italian (Pearl). It is also conceivable that this may be one of the
elements bringing about the change of type of urban populations when
compared to rural populations in Europe, and that it may have been
active in the change of type observed among the descendants of European
immigrants in America; for, although the observations have been made on
pure types, in America cases of intermarriages of natives of different
villages are much more common than in Europe.

After we have thus considered the influences of heredity and
environment, so far as they determine the characteristics of distinct
types of man, it remains to add a few words on the individuals
constituting each type, and on the different distribution of individuals
in distinct types.

I have had to refer repeatedly to the phenomena of variation in the
races of man; and I have pointed out before, that, so far as individual
features are concerned, we find that the range of variations in each
human type is so great, that overlapping of the range of variation in
different types is of constant occurrence. We have seen, for instance,
that the medium brains of the Europeans occur with considerable
frequency among negroes, and that only the excessively small negro
brains have no parallel forms among the Europeans; and correspondingly
that the excessively large European brains have no parallel forms among
the brains of the negroes. The amount of variability in regard to
various physical traits differs very considerably in different races.
Most of the European types, for instance, are remarkable for their high
variability. The same is true of the Polynesians and of some negro
tribes. On the other hand, people like the European Hebrews, and, even
more so, the North American Indians, are characterized by, comparatively
speaking, much greater uniformity. The amount of variability differs
considerably with regard to different physical features. It is, for
instance, obvious that the hair-color and hair-form of North Europeans
is much more variable than the hair-color and hair-form of the Chinese.
In Europe the colors vary from flaxen to black, with a considerable
number of individuals with red hair, and the form varies from straight
to high degrees of waviness. Among the Chinese, on the other hand, we do
not find equal variations in the darkness of color, since blondes and
curly-haired individuals are absent. Similar observations may be made in
regard to stature, head-form, or any other feature of the body that can
be expressed by measurements.

The reason for the differences in variability is partly given in our
previous remarks. We have seen, when a people is descended from a small
uniform group, that then its variability will decrease; while on the
other hand, when a group has a much-varied origin, or when the ancestors
belong to entirely distinct types, the variability may be considerably
increased. In all cases which have been investigated, even in those in
which the variability is small, there still remain considerable
differences in bodily appearance among the individuals constituting a
tribal or national or other social unit; and what is true of the
physical traits is obviously no less true of the mental traits, but it
is difficult to express mental characteristics in numerical terms of
variability. An acquaintance with tribes which are apparently on the
simplest level socially, however, shows the existence of certain
individuals of most diverse types of disposition and intellect; and as
might be expected, if we consider mental condition as dependent upon
bodily form, the great variability, even in the most uniform group, of
the structure of the body, particularly of the brain, makes it plausible
that very large differences in individual disposition may be expected.

What we have said before in regard to the overlapping of variations
among different races and types, and the great range of variability in
each type, may also be expressed by saying that the differences between
different types of man are, on the whole, small as compared to the range
of variation in each type.

The importance of these observations in the domain of mental development
will be the subject of our future discussions.

-----

Footnote 2:

  These generations are not completely known. The values here given are
  the maximum values which would be found provided the unknown
  individuals had had no “loss of ancestors.”

------------------------------------------------------------------------




      IV. THE MENTAL TRAITS OF PRIMITIVE MAN AND OF CIVILIZED MAN


IN the preceding chapters we have discussed the biological conditions of
various races and of different social groups, in so far as they form the
basis of mental activity. We must now turn our attention to the
psychological characteristics of mankind under the varying conditions of
race and environment.

When we consider our problem from a purely psychological point of view,
we have to follow out the same lines of thought which we pursued in our
discussion of the anatomical problem. We must try to enumerate clearly
the typical differences between the human mind and the animal mind,
which must serve as the background of our discussions. In the treatment
of the psychic differences between civilized man and primitive man, we
must distinguish the two problems of differences in cultural state of
members of the same race, and differences in characteristics of
different races; in other words, the problems of environmental
influences and of influences of heredity.

For the purposes of our investigation, we do not need to enter deeply
into a discussion of the first-named problem, the differences between
the minds of the animal and of man. The differences are so striking that
little or no diversity of opinion exists. The two outer traits in which
the distinction between the minds of animal and of man finds expression
are the existence of organized articulate language in man, and the use
of utensils of varied application. Both of these are common to the whole
of mankind. No tribe has ever been found that does not possess a
well-organized language; no community that does not know the use of
instruments for breaking, cutting, or drilling, the use of fire and of
weapons with which to defend themselves and to obtain the means of
living. Although means of communication by sound exist in animals, and
although even lower animals seem to have means of bringing about
co-operation between different individuals, we do not know of any case
of true articulate language from which the student can extract abstract
principles of classification of ideas. It may also be that higher apes
employ now and then limbs of trees or stones for defence, but the use of
complex utensils is not found in any representative of the animal
series. Only in the case of habitations do we find an approach to more
complex activities, which, however, remain absolutely stable in each
species,—as we say, instinctive,—and bear no evidence of any individual
freedom of use, which constitutes the primary character of human
inventions. The origin of the instinctive activities of animals which
lead to the construction of complex mechanical devices is still a hidden
secret; but the relation of the individual of the species to these
activities differs from that of man to his inventions in the complete
lack of freedom of control.

We are accustomed to say that the essential characteristic of the mental
processes of man is the power of reasoning. While animals as well as man
may perform actions suited to an end, based on memory of the results of
previous actions, and suitable selection of actions fitting a certain
purpose, we have no evidence whatever that would show that the abstract
concepts accompanying the action can be isolated by animals, while all
groups of man, from the most primitive to the most highly developed,
possess this faculty.

These few remarks on the common mental traits of man will suffice. When
we turn to a consideration of the racial and social characteristics of
the human mind, we find ourselves confronted by a peculiar difficulty.
In all our thoughts we think in terms of our own social environment. But
the activities of the human mind exhibit an infinite variety of form
among the peoples of the world. In order to understand these clearly,
the student must endeavor to divest himself entirely of opinions and
emotions based upon the peculiar social environment into which he is
born. He must adapt his own mind, so far as feasible, to that of the
people whom he is studying. The more successful he is in freeing himself
from the bias based on the group of ideas that constitute the
civilization in which he lives, the more successful he will be in
interpreting the beliefs and actions of man. He must follow lines of
thought that are new to him. He must participate in new emotions, and
understand how, under unwonted conditions, both lead to actions.
Beliefs, customs, and the response of the individual to the events of
daily life, give us ample opportunity to observe the manifestations of
the mind of man under varying conditions.

Apparently the thoughts and actions of civilized man, and those found in
more primitive forms of society, prove, that, in various groups of
mankind, the mind responds quite differently when exposed to the same
conditions. Lack of logical connection in its conclusions, lack of
control of will, are apparently two of its fundamental characteristics
in primitive society. In the formation of opinions, belief takes the
place of logical demonstration. The emotional value of opinions is
great, and consequently they quickly lead to action. The will appears
unbalanced, there being a readiness to yield to strong emotions and a
stubborn resistance in trifling matters.

Unfortunately the descriptions of the state of mind of primitive people,
such as are given by most travellers, are too superficial to be used for
psychological investigation. Very few travellers understand the language
of the people they visit; and how is it possible to judge a tribe solely
by the descriptions of interpreters, or by observations of disconnected
actions the incentive of which remains unknown? But even when the
language of the people is known to the visitor, he is generally an
unappreciative listener to their tales. The missionary has his strong
bias against the religious ideas and customs of primitive people, and
the trader has no interest in their beliefs and in their barbarous arts.
The observers who seriously tried to enter into the inner life of a
people, the Cushings, Callaways, and Greys, are few in number, and may
be counted on one’s fingers. Nevertheless the bulk of the argument is
always based on the statements of hasty and superficial observers.

Numerous attempts have been made to describe the peculiar psychological
characteristics of primitive man. Among these I would mention those of
Klemm, Carus, De Gobineau, Nott and Gliddon, Waitz, Spencer, and Tylor.
Their investigations are of merit as descriptions of the characteristics
of primitive people, but we cannot claim for any of them that they
describe the psychological characters of races independent of their
social surroundings. Klemm and Wuttke designate the civilized races as
active, all others as passive, and assume that all elements and
beginnings of civilization found among primitive people—in America or on
the islands of the Pacific Ocean—were due to an early contact with
civilization. Carus divides mankind into “peoples of the day, night and
dawn.” De Gobineau calls the yellow race the male element, the black
race the female element, and calls only the whites the noble and gifted
race. Nott and Gliddon ascribe animal instincts only to the lower races,
while they declare that the white race has a higher instinct which
incites and directs its development.

The belief in the higher hereditary powers of the white race has gained
a new life with the modern doctrine of the prerogatives of the
master-mind, which have found their boldest expression in Nietzsche’s
writings.

All such views are generalizations which either do not sufficiently take
into account the social conditions of races, and thus confound cause and
effect, or were dictated by scientific or humanitarian bias, by the
desire to justify the institution of slavery, or to give the greatest
freedom to the most highly gifted.

Tylor and Spencer, who give an ingenious analysis of the mental life of
primitive man, do not assume that these are racial characteristics,
although the evolutionary standpoint of Spencer’s work often seems to
convey this impression.

Quite distinct from these is Waitz’s point of view. He says, “According
to the current opinion the stage of culture of a people or of an
individual is largely or exclusively a product of his faculty. We
maintain that the reverse is at least just as true. The faculty of man
does not designate anything but how much and what he is able to achieve
in the immediate future and depends upon the stages of culture through
which he has passed and the one he has reached.”

The views of these investigators show that in the domain of psychology a
confusion prevails still greater than in anatomy, as to the
characteristics of primitive races, and that no clear distinction is
drawn between the racial and the social problem. In other words, the
evidence is based partly on the supposed mental characteristics of
races, no matter what their stage of culture; partly on those of tribes
and peoples on different levels of civilization, no matter whether they
belong to the same race or to distinct races. Still these two problems
are entirely distinct. The former is a problem of heredity; the latter,
a problem of environment.

Thus we recognize that there are two possible explanations of the
different manifestations of the mind of man. It may be that the minds of
different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the
laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may
also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all
races of man; that mental activity follows the same laws everywhere, but
that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual
experience that is subjected to the action of these laws.

It is quite evident that the activities of the human mind depend upon
these two elements. The organization of the mind may be defined as the
group of laws which determine the modes of thought and of action,
irrespective of the subject-matter of mental activity. Subject to such
laws are the manner of discrimination between perceptions, the manner in
which perceptions associate themselves with previous perceptions, the
manner in which a stimulus leads to action, and the emotions produced by
stimuli. These laws determine to a great extent the manifestations of
the mind. In these we recognize hereditary causes.

But, on the other hand, the influence of individual experience can
easily be shown to be very great. The bulk of the experience of man is
gained from oft-repeated impressions. It is one of the fundamental laws
of psychology that the repetition of mental processes increases the
facility with which these processes are performed, and decreases the
degree of consciousness that accompanies them. This law expresses the
well-known phenomena of habit. When a certain perception is frequently
associated with another previous perception, the one will habitually
call forth the other. When a certain stimulus frequently results in a
certain action, it will tend to call forth habitually the same action.
If a stimulus has often produced a certain emotion, it will tend to
reproduce it every time. These belong to the group of environmental
causes.

The explanation of the activity of the mind of man, therefore, requires
the discussion of two distinct problems. The first bears upon the
question of unity or diversity of organization of the mind, while the
second bears upon the diversity produced by the variety of contents of
the mind as found in the various social and geographical environments.
The task of the investigator consists largely in separating these two
causes, and in attributing to each its proper share in the development
of the peculiarities of the mind.

We will first devote our attention to the question, Do differences exist
in the organization of the human mind? Since Waitz’s thorough discussion
of the question of the unity of the human species, there can be no doubt
that in the main the mental characteristics of man are the same all over
the world; but the question remains open, whether there is a sufficient
difference in grade to allow us to assume that the present races of man
may be considered as standing on different stages of the evolutionary
series, whether we are justified in ascribing to civilized man a higher
place in organization than to primitive man.

The chief difficulty encountered in the solution of this problem has
been pointed out before. It is the uncertainty as to which of the
characteristics of primitive man are causes of the low stage of culture,
and which are caused by it; or which of the psychological
characteristics are hereditary, and would not be wiped out by the
effects of civilization. The fundamental difficulty of collecting
satisfactory observations lies in the fact that no large groups of
primitive man are brought nowadays into conditions of real equality with
whites. The gap between our society and theirs always remains open, and
for this reason their minds cannot be expected to work in the same
manner as ours. The same phenomenon which led us to the conclusion that
primitive races of our times are not given an opportunity to develop
their abilities, prevents us from judging their innate faculty.

It seems advantageous to direct our attention first of all to this
difficulty. If it can be shown that certain mental traits are common to
all members of mankind that are on a primitive stage of civilization, no
matter what their racial affinities may be, the conclusion will gain
much in strength, that these traits are primarily social, or based on
physical characteristics due to social environment.

I will select a few only among the mental characteristics of primitive
man which will illustrate our point,—inhibition of impulses, power of
attention, power of original thought.

We will first discuss the question, in how far primitive man is capable
of inhibiting impulses (Spencer).

It is an impression obtained by many travellers, and also based upon
experiences gained in our own country, that primitive man of all races,
and the less educated of our own race, have in common a lack of control
of emotions, that they give way more readily to an impulse than
civilized man and the highly educated. I believe that this conception is
based largely upon the neglect to consider the occasions on which a
strong control of impulses is demanded in various forms of society.

Most of the proofs for this alleged peculiarity are based on the
fickleness and uncertainty of the disposition of primitive man, and on
the strength of his passions aroused by seemingly trifling causes. I
will say right here that the traveller or student measures the
fickleness of the people by the importance which he attributes to the
actions or purposes in which they do not persevere, and he weighs the
impulse for outbursts of passion by his standard. Let me give an
example. A traveller desirous of reaching his goal as soon as possible
engages men to start on a journey at a certain time. To him time is
exceedingly valuable. But what is time to primitive man, who does not
feel the compulsion of completing a definite work at a definite time?
While the traveller is fuming and raging over the delay, his men keep up
their merry chatter and laughter, and cannot be induced to exert
themselves except to please their master. Would not they be right in
stigmatizing many a traveller for his impulsiveness and lack of control
when irritated by a trifling cause like loss of time? Instead of this,
the traveller complains of the fickleness of the natives, who quickly
lose interest in the objects which the traveller has at heart.

The proper way to compare the fickleness of the savage and that of the
white is to compare their behavior in undertakings which are equally
important to each. More generally speaking, when we want to give a true
estimate of the power of primitive man to control impulses, we must not
compare the control required on certain occasions among ourselves with
the control exerted by primitive man on the same occasions. If, for
instance, our social etiquette forbids the expression of feelings of
personal discomfort and of anxiety, we must remember that personal
etiquette among primitive men may not require any inhibition of the same
kind. We must rather look for those occasions on which inhibition is
required by the customs of primitive man. Such are, for instance, the
numerous cases of taboo,—that is, of prohibitions of the use of certain
foods, or of the performance of certain kinds of work,—which sometimes
require a considerable amount of self-control. When an Eskimo community
is on the point of starvation, and their religious proscriptions forbid
them to make use of the seals that are basking on the ice, the amount of
self-control of the whole community which restrains them from killing
these seals is certainly very great. Other examples that suggest
themselves are the perseverance of primitive man in the manufacture of
his utensils and weapons; his readiness to undergo privations and
hardships which promise to fulfil his desires,—as the Indian youth’s
willingness to fast in the mountains, awaiting the appearance of his
guardian spirit; or his bravery and endurance exhibited in order to gain
admittance to the ranks of the men of his tribe; or, again, the
often-described power of endurance exhibited by Indian captives who
undergo torture at the hands of their enemies.

It has also been claimed that lack of control is exhibited by primitive
man in his outbursts of passion occasioned by slight provocations. I
think that in this case also the difference in attitude of civilized man
and of primitive man disappears if we give due weight to the social
conditions in which the individual lives.

What would a primitive man say to the noble passion which preceded and
accompanied the war of the Rebellion? Would not the rights of slaves
seem to him a most irrelevant question? On the other hand, we have ample
proof that his passions are just as much controlled as ours, only in
different directions. The numerous customs and restrictions regulating
the relations of the sexes may serve as an example. The difference in
impulsiveness may be fully explained by the different weight of motives
in both cases. In short, perseverance and control of impulses are
demanded of primitive man as well as of civilized man, but on different
occasions. If they are not demanded as often, the cause must be looked
for, not in the inherent inability to produce them, but in the social
status which does not demand them to the same extent.

Spencer mentions as a particular case of this lack of control the
improvidence of primitive man. I believe it would be more proper to say,
instead of improvidence, optimism. “Why should I not be as successful
to-morrow as I was to-day?” is the underlying feeling of primitive man.
This feeling is, I think, no less powerful in civilized man. What builds
up business activity but the belief in the stability of existing
conditions? Why do the poor not hesitate to found families without being
able to lay in store beforehand? We must not forget that starvation
among most primitive people is an exceptional case, the same as
financial crises among civilized people; and that for times of need,
such as occur regularly, provision is always made. Our social status is
more stable, so far as the acquiring of the barest necessities of life
is concerned, so that exceptional conditions do not prevail often; but
nobody would maintain that the majority of civilized men are always
prepared to meet emergencies. We may recognize a difference in the
degree of improvidence caused by the difference of social status, but
not a specific difference between lower and higher types of man.

Related to the lack of power of inhibition is another trait which has
been ascribed to primitive man of all races,—his inability of
concentration when any demand is made upon the more complex faculties of
the intellect. I will mention an example which seems to make clear the
error committed in this assumption. In his description of the natives of
the west coast of Vancouver Island, Sproat says, “The native mind, to an
educated man, seems generally to be asleep.... On his attention being
fully aroused, he often shows much quickness in reply and ingenuity in
argument. But a short conversation wearies him, particularly if
questions are asked that require efforts of thought or memory on his
part. The mind of the savage then appears to rock to and fro out of mere
weakness.” Spencer, who quotes this passage, adds a number of others
corroborating this point. I happen to know through personal contact the
tribes mentioned by Sproat. The questions put by the traveller seem
mostly trifling to the Indian, and he naturally soon tires of a
conversation carried on in a foreign language, and one in which he finds
nothing to interest him. As a matter of fact, the interest of those
natives can easily be raised to a high pitch, and I have often been the
one who was wearied out first. Neither does the management of their
intricate system of exchange prove mental inertness in matters which
concern the natives. Without mnemonic aids, they plan the systematic
distribution of their property in such a manner as to increase their
wealth and social position. These plans require great foresight and
constant application.

Finally I wish to refer to a trait of the mental life of primitive man
of all races which has often been adduced as the primary reason why
certain races cannot rise to higher levels of culture; namely, their
lack of originality. It is said that the conservatism of primitive man
is so strong, that the individual never deviates from the traditional
customs and beliefs (Spencer). While there is certainly truth in this
statement in so far as more customs are binding than in civilized
society, at least in its most highly developed types, originality is a
trait which is by no means lacking in the life of primitive people. I
will call to mind the great frequency of the appearance of prophets
among newly converted tribes as well as among pagan tribes. Among the
latter we learn quite frequently of new dogmas which have been
introduced by such individuals. It is true that these may often be
traced to the influence of the ideas of neighboring tribes, but they are
modified by the individuality of the person, and grafted upon the
current beliefs of the people. It is a well-known fact that myths and
beliefs have been disseminated, and undergo changes in the process of
dissemination (Boas). Undoubtedly this has often been accomplished by
the independent thought of individuals, as may be observed in the
increasing complexity of esoteric doctrines intrusted to the care of a
priesthood. I believe one of the best examples of such independent
thought is furnished by the history of the ghost-dance ceremonies in
North America (Mooney). The doctrines of the ghost-dance prophets were
new, but based on the ideas of their own people, their neighbors, and
the teachings of missionaries. The notion of future life of an Indian
tribe of Vancouver Island has undergone a change in this manner, in so
far as the idea of the return of the dead in children of their own
family has arisen. The same independent attitude may be observed in the
replies of the Nicaraguan Indians to the questions regarding their
religion as were put to them by Bobadilla, and which were reported by
Oviedo.

It seems to my mind that the mental attitude of individuals who thus
develop the beliefs of a tribe is exactly that of the civilized
philosopher. The student of the history of philosophy is well aware how
strongly the mind of even the greatest genius is influenced by the
current thought of his time. This has been well expressed by a German
writer (Lehmann), who says, “The character of a system of philosophy is,
just like that of any other literary work, determined first of all by
the personality of its originator. Every true philosophy reflects the
life of the philosopher, as well as every true poem that of the poet.
Secondly, it bears the general marks of the period to which it belongs;
and the more powerful the ideas which it proclaims, the more strongly it
will be permeated by the currents of thought which fluctuate in the life
of the period. Thirdly, it is influenced by the particular bent of
philosophical thought of the period.”

If such is the case among the greatest minds of all times, why should we
wonder that the thinker in primitive society is strongly influenced by
the current thought of his time? Unconscious and conscious imitation are
factors influencing civilized society, not less than primitive society,
as has been shown by G. Tarde, who has proved that primitive man, and
civilized man as well, imitates not such actions only as are useful, and
for the imitation of which logical causes may be given, but also others
for the adoption or preservation of which no logical reason can be
assigned.

I think these considerations illustrate that the differences between
civilized man and primitive man are in many cases more apparent than
real; that the social conditions, on account of their peculiar
characteristics, easily convey the impression that the mind of primitive
man acts in a way quite different from ours, while in reality the
fundamental traits of the mind are the same.

This does not mean that no differences exist or can be found, only that
the method of investigation must be different. It does not seem probable
that the minds of races which show variations in their anatomical
structure should act in exactly the same manner. Differences of
structure must be accompanied by differences of function, physiological
as well as psychological; and, as we found clear evidence of difference
in structure between the races, so we must anticipate that differences
in mental characteristics will be found. Thus, a smaller size or lesser
number of nervous elements would probably entail loss of mental energy,
and paucity of connections in the central nervous system would produce
sluggishness of the mind. As stated before, it seems probable that some
slight differences of this character will be found between the white and
the negro, for instance, but they have not yet been proved. As all
structural differences are quantitative, we must expect to find mental
differences to be of the same description; and as we found the
variations in structure to overlap, so that many forms are common to
individuals of all races, so we may expect that many individuals will
not differ in regard to their faculty, while a statistical inquiry
embracing whole races would reveal certain differences. Furthermore, as
certain anatomical traits are found to be hereditary in certain
families, and hence in tribes, and perhaps even in peoples, in the same
manner mental traits characterize certain families, and may prevail
among tribes. It seems, however, an impossible undertaking to separate
in a satisfactory manner the social and the hereditary features.
Galton’s attempt to establish the laws of hereditary genius, and later
endeavors in the same direction, point out a way of treatment for these
questions which will prove useful in so far as it opens a method of
determining the influence of heredity upon mental qualities.

After we have thus found that the alleged specific differences between
civilized and primitive man, so far as they are inferred from complex
psychic responses, can be reduced to the same fundamental psychical
forms, we have the right to decline as unprofitable a discussion of the
hereditary mental traits of various branches of the white race. Much has
been said of the hereditary characteristics of the Jews, of the Gypsies,
of the French and Irish, but I do not see that the external and social
causes which have moulded the character of members of these people have
ever been eliminated satisfactorily; and, moreover, I do not see how
this can be accomplished. A number of external factors that influence
body and mind may easily be named,—climate, nutrition, occupation,—but
as soon as we enter into a consideration of social factors and mental
conditions, we are unable to tell definitely what is cause and what is
effect. An apparently excellent discussion of external influences upon
the character of a people has been given by A. Wernich in his
description of the character of the Japanese. He finds some of their
peculiarities caused by the lack of vigor of the muscular and alimentary
systems, which in their turn are due to improper nutrition; while he
recognizes as hereditary other physiological traits which influence the
mind. And still, how weak appear his conclusions, after the energy and
endurance exhibited by the Japanese in their modern development and in
their conflict with Russia!

Effects of malnutrition continued through many generations might be
expected to affect the mental life of the Bushmen and the Lapps
(Virchow); and still, after the experience just quoted, we may well
hesitate before we express any definite conclusions.

It would seem, therefore, that we have no right to explain difference in
mental attitude of different groups of people, particularly of closely
related ones, as due to hereditary causes, until we have been able to
prove that physiological and the correlated psychological traits are
hereditary, regardless of social and natural environment.

A beginning in work of this kind has been made in the experimental
investigations of school-children in regard to simple mental activities
and simple physiological processes; in the work of the Cambridge
Scientific Expedition to Torres Strait (Rivers), in which the first
systematic attempt has been made to study the simple psychical
re-actions of primitive people; and in the investigations carried on
systematically by Dr. Woodworth on the primitive people exhibited at the
World’s Fair of St. Louis. Up to this time the results are, on the
whole, not favorable to the theory of the occurrence of very fundamental
differences between different races.

One additional point of our inquiry into the organic basis of mental
activity remains to be investigated; namely, the question, Has the
organic basis for the faculty of man been improved by civilization, and
particularly may that of primitive races be improved by this agency? We
must consider both the anatomical and the psychological aspects of this
question. I have already pointed out that civilization causes anatomical
changes of the same description as those accompanying the domestication
of animals. It is likely that changes of mental character go hand in
hand with them. The observed anatomical changes are, however, limited to
this group of phenomena. We cannot prove that any progressive changes of
the human organism have taken place; and particularly no advance in the
size or complexity of the structure of the central nervous system,
caused by the cumulative effects of civilization, can be proved.

The difficulty of proving a progress of faculty is still greater. It
seems to me that the probable effect of civilization upon an evolution
of human faculty has been much overestimated. The psychical changes
which are the immediate consequence of domestication or civilization may
be considerable. They are changes due to the influence of environment.
It is doubtful, however, if any progressive changes, or such as are
transmitted by heredity, have taken place. The number of generations
subjected to this influence seems altogether too small. For large
portions of Europe we cannot assume more than forty or fifty
generations; and even this number is probably considerably too high,
inasmuch as in the middle ages the bulk of the population lived on very
low stages of civilization.

Besides this, the tendency of human multiplication is such, that the
most highly cultured families tend to disappear, while others which have
been less subjected to the influences regulating the life of the most
cultured class take their place. Therefore it is much less likely that
advance is hereditary than that it is transmitted by means of education.

In illustrating the improving effects of civilization through
transmission, much weight is generally laid upon cases of relapse of
individuals belonging to primitive races who have been educated. These
relapses are interpreted as proofs of the inability of the child of a
lower race to adapt itself to our high civilization, even if the best
advantages are given to it. It is true that a considerable number of
such cases are on record. Among these I will mention Darwin’s Fuegian,
who lived in England for a few years and returned to his home, where he
fell back into the ways of his primitive countrymen; and the West
Australian girl who was married to a white man, but suddenly fled to the
bush after killing her husband, and resumed life with the natives. Cases
of this kind are true, but not one of them has been described with
sufficient detail. The social and mental conditions of the individual
have never been subjected to a searching analysis. I should judge that
even in extreme cases, notwithstanding their better education, their
social position was always one of isolation, while the ties of
consanguinity formed a connecting link with their uncivilized brethren.
The power with which society holds us and does not give us a chance to
step out of its limits cannot have acted as strongly upon them as upon
us. On the other hand, the station obtained by many negroes in our
civilization seems to me to have just as much weight as the few cases of
relapse which have been collected with much care and diligence. I should
place side by side with them the cases of white men who live alone among
native tribes, and who sink almost invariably to a semi-barbarous
position, and the members of well-to-do families who prefer unbounded
freedom to the fetters of society, and flee to the wilderness, where
many lead a life in no way superior to that of primitive man.

In the study of the behavior of members of foreign races educated in
European society, we should also bear in mind the influence of habits of
thought, feeling, and action acquired in early childhood, and of which
no recollection is retained. If S. Freud is right in assuming that these
forgotten incidents remain a living force throughout life,—the more
potent, the more thoroughly they are forgotten,—we should have to
conclude that many of the small traits of individuals which we
ordinarily believe to be inherited are acquired by the influence of the
individuals among whom the child spends the first five years of its
life. All observations on the force of habit and the intensity of
resistance to changes of habit are in favor of this theory.

Our brief consideration of some of the mental activities of man in
civilized and in primitive society has led us to the conclusion that
these functions of the human mind are common to the whole of humanity.
It may be well to state here, that, according to our present method of
considering biological and psychological phenomena, we must assume that
these have developed from lower conditions existing at a previous time,
and that at one time there certainly must have been races and tribes in
which the properties here described were not at all, or only slightly,
developed; but it is also true that among the present races of man, no
matter how primitive they may be in comparison with ourselves, these
faculties are highly developed.

It is not impossible that the degree of development of these functions
may differ somewhat among different types of man; but I do not believe
that we are able at the present time to form a just valuation of the
hereditary mental powers of the different races. A comparison of their
languages, customs, and activities suggests that their faculties may be
unequally developed; but the differences are not sufficient to justify
us to ascribe materially lower stages to some peoples, and higher stages
to others. The conclusions reached from these considerations are
therefore, on the whole, negative. We are not inclined to consider the
mental organization of different races of man as differing in
fundamental points. Although, therefore, the distribution of faculty
among the races of man is far from being known, we can say this much:
the average faculty of the white race is found to the same degree in a
large proportion of individuals of all other races, and, although it is
probable that some of these races may not produce as large a proportion
of great men as our own race, there is no reason to suppose that they
are unable to reach the level of civilization represented by the bulk of
our own people.

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                          V. RACE AND LANGUAGE


IN the last chapter I tried to show that the principal characteristics
of the mind of primitive man occur among primitive tribes of all races,
and that therefore the inference must not be drawn that these traits of
the mind are racial characteristics. This negative conclusion, which is
based entirely on the consideration of a few selected points that occur
with great regularity in the description of primitive tribes, does not
give us, however, proof positive of the lack of all correlation between
mental life and racial descent, and we must direct our attention to
those cases in which an immediate relationship between the two may be
and has been claimed.

This has occurred particularly in regard to language and racial types.
Indeed, the opinion is still held by some investigators that linguistic
relationships and racial relationships are in a way interchangeable
terms. An example illustrating this point of view may be seen in the
long-continued discussions of the home of the “Aryan race,” in which the
blond northwest European type is identified with the ancient people
among whom the Indo-European or Aryan languages developed.

If it could be shown that distinct languages belong to distinct racial
types, and that these languages exhibit different levels of development
or indicate different types of thought, we should have gained a sound
basis which would allow us to discuss the genius of each people as
reflected in its language. If, furthermore, we could show that certain
cultural types belong to certain races and are foreign to the genius of
others, our conclusions would be founded on much firmer ground.

Thus we are led to a consideration of the all-important question whether
types, languages, and cultures are so intimately connected that each
human race is characterized by a certain combination of physical type,
language, and culture.

It is obvious, that, if this correlation should exist in a strict sense,
attempts to classify mankind from any one of the three points of view
would necessarily lead to the same results; in other words, each point
of view could be used independently or in combination with the other
ones, to study the relations between the different groups of mankind. As
a matter of fact, attempts of this kind have often been made. A number
of classifications of the races of man are based wholly on anatomical
characteristics, yet often combined with geographical considerations;
others are based on the discussion of a combination of anatomical and
cultural traits which are considered as characteristic of certain groups
of mankind; while still others are based primarily on the study of the
languages spoken by people representing a certain anatomical type.

The attempts that have thus been made have led to entirely different
results (Topinard). Blumenbach, one of the first scientists who
attempted to classify mankind, distinguished five races,—the Caucasian,
Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, and Malay. It is fairly clear that this
classification is based as much on geographical as on anatomical
considerations, although the description of each race is primarily an
anatomical one. Cuvier distinguished three races,—the white, yellow, and
black. Huxley proceeded more strictly on a biological basis. He combined
part of the Mongolian and American races of Blumenbach into one,
assigned part of the South Asiatic peoples to the Australian type, and
subdivided the European race into a dark and a light division. The
numerical preponderance of the European types evidently led him to make
finer distinctions in this race, which he divided into the xanthochroic
or blond, and melanochroic or dark races. It would be easy to make
subdivisions of equal value in other races. Still clearer is the
influence of cultural points of view in classifications like those of
Gobineau and of Klemm, the latter of whom distinguished the active and
passive races according to the cultural achievements of the various
types of man.

The most typical attempt to classify mankind from a consideration of
both anatomical and linguistic points of view is that of Friedrich
Müller, who takes as the basis of his primary divisions the form of
hair, while all the minor divisions are based on linguistic
considerations.

An attempt to correlate the numerous classifications that have been
proposed shows clearly a condition of utter confusion and contradiction;
so that we are led to the conclusion that type, language, and type of
culture, may not be closely and permanently connected. We must therefore
consider the actual development of these various traits among the
existing races.

At the present period we may observe many cases in which a complete
change of language and culture takes place without a corresponding
change in physical type. This is true, for instance, among the North
American negroes, a people by descent largely African; in culture and
language, however, essentially European. While it is true that certain
survivals of African culture and language are found among our American
negroes, their culture is essentially that of the uneducated classes of
the people among whom they live, and their language is on the whole
identical with that of their neighbors,—English, French, Spanish, and
Portuguese, according to the prevalent language in various parts of the
continent. It might be objected that the transportation of the African
race to America was an artificial one, and that in earlier times
extended migrations and transplantations of this kind have not taken
place.

The history of mediæval Europe, however, demonstrates that extended
changes in language and culture have taken place many times without
corresponding changes in blood.

Recent investigations of the physical types of Europe have shown with
great clearness that the distribution of types has remained the same for
a long period. Without considering details, it may be said that an
Alpine type can easily be distinguished from a North European type on
the one hand, and a South European type on the other (Ripley). The
Alpine type appears fairly uniform over a large territory, no matter
what language may be spoken and what national culture may prevail in the
particular district. The Central European Frenchmen, Germans, Italians,
and Slavs are so nearly of the same type, that we may safely assume a
considerable degree of blood-relationship, notwithstanding their
linguistic differences.

Instances of similar kind, in which we find permanence of blood with
far-reaching modifications of language and culture, are found in other
parts of the world. As an example may be mentioned the Veddah of Ceylon,
a people fundamentally different in type from the neighboring
Singhalese, whose language they seem to have adopted, and from whom they
have also evidently borrowed a number of cultural traits (Sarasin).
Still other examples are the Japanese of the northern part of Japan, who
are undoubtedly, to a considerable extent, Ainu in blood (Bälz); and the
Yukaghir of Siberia, who, while retaining to a great extent the old
blood, have been assimilated in culture and language by the neighboring
Tungus (Jochelson).

While it is therefore evident that in many cases a people, without
undergoing a considerable change in type by mixture, has changed
completely its language and culture, still other cases may be adduced in
which it can be shown that a people has retained its language while
undergoing material changes in blood and culture, or in both. As an
example of this may be mentioned the Magyar of Europe, who have retained
their old language, but have become mixed with people speaking
Indo-European languages, and who have, to all intents and purposes,
adopted European culture.

Similar conditions must have prevailed among the Athapascans, one of the
great linguistic families of North America. The great body of people
speaking languages belonging to this linguistic stock live in the
northwestern part of America, while other dialects are spoken by small
tribes in California, and still others by a large body of people in
Arizona and New Mexico.[3] The relationship between all these dialects
is so close that they must be considered as branches of one large group,
and it must be assumed that all of them have sprung from a language once
spoken over a continuous area. At the present time the people speaking
these languages differ fundamentally in type, the inhabitants of the
Mackenzie River region being quite different from the tribes of
California, and these, again, differing from the tribes of New Mexico
(Boas). The forms of culture in these different regions are also quite
distinct: the culture of the California Athapascans resembles that of
other Californian tribes, while the culture of the Athapascans of New
Mexico and Arizona is influenced by that of other peoples of that area
(Goddard). It seems most plausible to assume in this case that branches
of this stock migrated from one part of this large area to another,
where they intermingled with the neighboring people, and thus changed
their physical characteristics, while at the same time they retained
their speech. Without historical evidence, this process cannot, of
course, be proved.

These two phenomena,—retention of type with change of language, and
retention of language with change of type,—apparently opposed to each
other, are still very closely related, and in many cases go hand in
hand. An example of this is, for instance, the distribution of the Arabs
along the north coast of Africa. On the whole, the Arab element has
retained its language; but at the same time intermarriages with the
native races were common, so that the descendants of the Arabs have
often retained their old language, and have changed their type. On the
other hand, the natives have to a certain extent given up their own
languages, but have continued to intermarry among themselves, and have
thus preserved their type. So far as any change of this kind is
connected with intermixture, both types of changes must always occur at
the same time, and will be classed as a change of type or a change of
language, as our attention is directed to the one people or the other,
or, in some cases, as the one or the other change is more pronounced.
Cases of complete assimilation without any mixture of the people
involved seem to be rare, if not entirely absent.

Cases of permanence of type and language and of change of culture are
much more numerous. As a matter of fact, the whole historical
development of Europe, from prehistoric times on, is one endless series
of examples of this process, which seems to be much easier, since
assimilation of cultures occurs everywhere without actual blood-mixture,
as an effect of imitation. Proof of diffusion of cultural elements may
be found in every single cultural area which covers a district in which
many languages are spoken. In North America, California offers a good
example of this kind; for here many languages are spoken, and there is a
certain degree of differentiation of type, but at the same time a
considerable uniformity of culture prevails (Kroeber). Another case in
point is the coast of New Guinea, where, notwithstanding strong local
differentiations, a certain fairly characteristic type of culture
prevails, which goes hand in hand with a strong differentiation of
languages. Among more highly civilized peoples, the whole area which is
under the influence of Chinese culture might be given as an example.

These considerations make it fairly clear that, at least at the
present time, anatomical type, language, and culture have not
necessarily the same fates; that a people may remain constant in type
and language, and change in culture; that it may remain constant in
type, but change in language; or that it may remain constant in
language, and change in type and culture. It is obvious, therefore,
that attempts to classify mankind, based on the present distribution
of type, language, and culture, must lead to different results,
according to the point of view taken; that a classification based
primarily on type alone will lead to a system which represents more or
less accurately the blood-relationships of the people, which do not
need to coincide with their cultural relationships; and that in the
same way classifications based on language and culture do not need at
all to coincide with a biological classification.

If this be true, then a problem like the Aryan problem, to which I
referred before, really does not exist, because the problem is primarily
a linguistic one, relating to the history of the Aryan languages; and
the assumption that a certain definite people whose members have always
been related by blood must have been the carriers of this language
throughout history, and the other assumption, that a certain cultural
type must have always belonged to this people,—are purely arbitrary
ones, and not in accord with the observed facts.

Nevertheless it must be granted that in a theoretical consideration of
the history of the types of mankind, of languages, and of cultures, we
are led back to the assumption of early conditions, during which each
type was much more isolated from the rest of mankind than it is at the
present time. For this reason the culture and the language belonging to
a single type must have been much more sharply separated from those of
other types than we find them to be at the present period. It is true
that such a condition has nowhere been observed; but the knowledge of
historical developments almost compels us to assume its existence at a
very early period in the development of mankind. If this is true, the
question would arise, whether an isolated group at an early period was
necessarily characterized by a single type, a single language, and a
single culture, or whether in such a group different types, different
languages, and different cultures may have been represented.

The historical development of mankind would afford a simpler and clearer
picture if we were justified in assuming that in primitive communities
the three phenomena had been intimately associated. No proof, however,
of such an assumption, can be given. On the contrary, the present
distribution of languages, as compared with the distribution of types,
makes it plausible that even at the earliest times the biological units
may have been wider than the linguistic units, and presumably also wider
than the cultural units. I believe it may be safely said that all over
the world the biological unit—disregarding minute local differences—is
much larger than the linguistic unit; in other words, that groups of men
who are so closely related in bodily appearance that we must consider
them as representatives of the same variety of mankind, embrace a much
larger number of individuals than the number of men speaking languages
which we know to be genetically related. Examples of this kind may be
given from many parts of the world. Thus, the European race—including
under this term roughly all those individuals who are without hesitation
classed by us as members of the white race—would include peoples
speaking Indo-European, Basque, and Ural-Altaic languages. West African
negroes would represent individuals of a certain negro type, but
speaking the most diverse languages; and the same would be true, among
Asiatic types, of Siberians; among American types, of part of the
Californian Indians.

So far as our historical evidence goes, there is no reason to believe
that the number of distinct languages has at any time been less than it
is now. On the contrary, all our evidence goes to show that the number
of apparently unrelated languages was much greater in earlier times than
at present. On the other hand, the number of types that have presumably
become extinct seems to be rather small, so that there is no reason to
suppose that at an early period there should have been a nearer
correspondence between the number of distinct linguistic and anatomical
types; and we are thus led to the conclusion that presumably at an early
time each human type may have existed in a number of small isolated
groups, each of which may have possessed a language and culture of its
own.

Incidentally we may remark here, that, from this point of view, the
great diversity of languages found in many remote mountain areas should
not be explained as the result of a gradual pressing-back of remnants of
tribes into inaccessible districts, but appears rather as a survival of
an older general condition of mankind, when every continent was
inhabited by smaller groups of people speaking distinct languages. The
present conditions would have developed through the gradual extinction
of many of the old stocks and their absorption or extinction by others,
which thus came to occupy a more extended territory.

However this may be, the probabilities are decidedly in favor of the
assumption that there is no necessity to assume that originally each
language and culture were confined to a single type, or that each type
and culture were confined to one language; in short, that there has been
at any time a close correlation between these three phenomena.

The assumption that type, language, and culture were originally closely
correlated would entail the further assumption that these three traits
developed approximately at the same period, and that they developed
conjointly for a considerable length of time. This assumption does not
seem by any means plausible. The fundamental types of man which are
represented in the negroid race and in the mongoloid race must have been
differentiated long before the formation of those forms of speech that
are now recognized in the linguistic families of the world. I think that
even the differentiation of the more important subdivisions of the great
races antedates the formation of the existing linguistic families. At
any rate, the biological differentiation and the formation of speech
were, at this early period, subject to the same causes that are acting
upon them now, and our whole experience shows that these causes may
bring about great changes in language much more rapidly than in the
human body. In this consideration lies the principal reason for the
theory of lack of correlation of type and language, even during the
period of formation of types and of linguistic families.[4]

What is true of language is obviously even more true of culture. In
other words, if a certain type of man migrated over a considerable area
before its language assumed the form which can now be traced in related
linguistic groups, and before its culture assumed the definite type the
further development of which can now be recognized, there would be no
possibility of ever discovering a correlation of type, language, and
culture, even if it had ever existed; but it is quite possible that such
correlation has really never occurred.

It is quite conceivable that a certain racial type may have scattered
over a considerable area during a formative period of speech, and that
the languages which developed among the various groups of this racial
type came to be so different that it is now impossible to prove them to
be genetically related. In the same way, new developments of culture may
have taken place which are so entirely disconnected with older types
that the older genetic relationships, even if they existed, can no
longer be discovered.

If we adopt this point of view, and thus eliminate the hypothetical
assumption of correlation between primitive type, primitive language,
and primitive culture, we recognize that any attempt at classification
which includes more than one of these traits cannot be consistent.

It may be added that the general term “culture,” which has been used
here, may be subdivided from a considerable number of points of view;
and different results again might be expected when we consider the
inventions, the types of social organization, or beliefs, as leading
points of view in our classification.

After we have thus shown that language, culture, and type cannot be
considered as constantly associated, and after we have recognized that
the same type of man has developed distinct languages, the question
still remains open, whether the languages developed by any one stock
bear marks of superiority or inferiority. It has been claimed, for
instance, that the highly developed inflected languages of Europe are
much superior to the cumbersome agglutinative or polysynthetic languages
of northern Asia and of America (Gabelentz). We have also been told that
lack of phonetic discrimination, lack of power of abstraction, are
characteristics of primitive languages. It is important to show whether
these traits are really associated with any languages of primitive man.
In a way this consideration leads us back to the study of alleged mental
characteristics of distinct human types.

The view of the lack of phonetic differentiation is based on the fact
that certain sounds of primitive languages are interpreted by the
European sometimes as one of our familiar sounds, sometimes as another;
they have been called alternating sounds. A better knowledge of
phonetics has shown in all these cases, however, that the sounds are
quite definite, but that owing to the manner of their production they
are intermediate between sounds familiar to us. Thus an _m_ produced by
a very weak closing of the lips, and with half-open nose, sounds to our
ear a little like _m_, a little like _b_, and a little like _w_; and
according to slight accidental changes, it is sometimes heard as one of
these sounds, sometimes as another, without, however, being in reality
more variable than our _m_. Cases of this kind are quite numerous, but
it would be a misinterpretation to adduce them as proof of lack of
definiteness of the sound of primitive languages (Boas). In fact, it
would seem that limitation in the number of sounds is necessary in each
language in order to make possible rapid communication. If the number of
sounds that are used in any particular language were unlimited, the
accuracy with which the movements of the complicated mechanism required
for producing the sounds are performed, would presumably be lacking; and
consequently rapidity and accuracy of pronunciation, and with them the
possibility of accurate interpretation of the sounds heard, would be
difficult or even impossible. On the other hand, limitation of the
number of sounds brings it about that the movements required in the
production of each become automatic; that the association between the
sound heard and the muscular movements, and that between the auditory
impression and the muscular sensation of the articulation, become firmly
fixed. Thus it would seem that limited phonetic resources are necessary
for easy communication.

The second point that is often brought up to characterize primitive
languages is the lack of power of classification and abstraction. Here,
again, we are easily misled by our habit of using the classifications of
our own language, and considering these, therefore, as the most natural
ones, and by overlooking the principles of classification used in the
languages of primitive people.

It may be well to make clear to our minds what constitutes the elements
of all languages. It is a fundamental and common trait of articulate
speech that the groups of sounds which are uttered serve to convey
ideas, and each group of sounds has a fixed meaning. Languages differ
not only in the character of their constituent phonetic elements and
sound clusters, but also in the groups of ideas that find expression in
fixed phonetic groups.

The total number of possible combinations of phonetic elements is also
unlimited, but only a limited number are used to express ideas. This
implies that the total number of ideas that are expressed by distinct
phonetic groups is limited in number. We will call these phonetic groups
“word-stems.”

Since the total range of personal experience which language serves to
express is infinitely varied, and its whole scope must be expressed by a
limited number of word-stems, it is obvious that an extended
classification of experiences must underlie all articulate speech.

This coincides with a fundamental trait of human thought. In our actual
experience no two sense-impressions or emotional states are identical.
Nevertheless we classify them, according to their similarities, in wider
or narrower groups, the limits of which may be determined from a variety
of points of view. Notwithstanding their individual differences, we
recognize in our experiences common elements, and consider them as
related or even as the same, provided a sufficient number of
characteristic traits belong to them in common. Thus the limitation of
the number of phonetic groups expressing distinct ideas is an expression
of the psychological fact that many different individual experiences
appear to us as representatives of the same category of thought.

As an instance we may mention the color terms of different languages.
Although the number of shades of color that may be distinguished is very
great, only a small number are designated by special terms. The number
of these terms has considerably increased in recent times. In many
primitive languages the groupings of yellow, green, and blue do not
agree with ours. Often yellow and the yellowish-greens are combined in
one group; green and blue, in another. The typical feature which occurs
everywhere is the use of one term for a large group of similar
sensations.

This trait of human thought and speech may be compared in a certain
manner to the limitation of the whole series of possible articulating
movements by selection of a limited number of habitual movements. If the
whole mass of concepts, with all their variants, were expressed in
language by entirely heterogeneous and unrelated sound-complexes or
word-stems, a condition would arise in which closely related ideas would
not show their relationship by the corresponding relationship of their
sound-symbols, and an infinitely large number of distinct word-stems
would be required for expression. If this were the case, the association
between an idea and its representative word-stem would not become
sufficiently stable to be reproduced automatically without reflection at
any given moment. In the same way as the automatic and rapid use of
articulations has brought it about that a limited number of
articulations only, each with limited variability, and a limited number
of sound-clusters, have been selected from the infinitely large range of
possible articulations and clusters of articulations, so the infinitely
large number of ideas have been reduced by classification to a lesser
number, which by constant use have established firm associations, and
which can be used automatically.

It seems important at this point of our considerations to emphasize the
fact that the groups of ideas expressed by specific word-stems show very
material differences in different languages, and do not conform by any
means to the same principles of classification. To take the example of
English, we find that the idea of “water” is expressed in a great
variety of forms: one term serves to express water as a liquid; another
one, water in the form of a large expanse (lake); others, water as
running in a large body or in a small body (river and brook); still
other terms express water in the form of rain, dew, wave, and foam. It
is perfectly conceivable that this variety of ideas, each of which is
expressed by a single independent term in English, might be expressed in
other languages by derivations from the same term.

Another example of the same kind, the words for “snow” in Eskimo, may be
given. Here we find one word expressing “snow on the ground;” another
one, “falling snow;” a third one, “drifting snow;” a fourth one, “a
snowdrift.”

In the same language the seal in different conditions is expressed by a
variety of terms. One word is the general term for “seal;” another one
signifies the “seal basking in the sun;” a third one, a “seal floating
on a piece of ice;” not to mention the many names for the seals of
different ages and for male and female.

As an example of the manner in which terms that we express by
independent words are grouped together under one concept, the Dakota
language may be selected. The terms “to kick,” “to tie in bundles,” “to
bite,” “to be near to,” “to pound,” are all derived from the common
element meaning “to grip,” which holds them together, while we use
distinct words for expressing the various ideas.

It seems fairly evident that the selection of such simple terms must to
a certain extent depend upon the chief interests of a people; and where
it is necessary to distinguish a certain phenomenon in many aspects,
which in the life of the people play each an entirely independent rôle,
many independent words may develop, while in other cases modifications
of a single term may suffice.

Thus it happens that each language, from the point of view of another
language, may be arbitrary in its classifications; that what appears as
a single simple idea in one language may be characterized by a series of
distinct word-stems in another.

The tendency of a language to express a complex idea by a single term
has been styled “holophrasis” (Powell), and it appears therefore that
every language may be holophrastic from the point of view of another
language. Holophrasis can hardly be taken as a fundamental
characteristic of primitive languages.

We have seen before that some kind of classification of expression must
be found in every language. This classification of ideas into groups,
each of which is expressed by an independent word-stem, makes it
necessary that concepts which are not readily rendered by a single stem
should be expressed by combinations or by modifications of the
elementary stems in accordance with the elementary ideas to which the
particular idea is reduced.

This classification, and the necessity of expressing certain experiences
by means of other related ones,—which, by limiting one another, define
the special idea to be expressed,—entail the presence of certain formal
elements which determine the relations of the single word-stems. If each
idea could be expressed by a single word-stem, languages without form
would be possible. Since, however, ideas must be expressed by being
reduced to a number of related ideas, the kinds of relation become
important elements in articulate speech; and it follows that all
languages must contain formal elements, and that their number must be
the greater, the less the number of elementary word-stems that define
special ideas. In a language which commands a very large, fixed
vocabulary, the number of formal elements may become quite small.

After we have thus seen that all languages require and contain certain
classifications and formal elements, we will turn to a consideration of
the relation between language and thought. It has been claimed that the
conciseness and clearness of thought of a people depend to a great
extent upon their language. The ease with which in our modern European
languages we express wide abstract ideas by a single term, and the
facility with which wide generalizations are cast into the frame of a
simple sentence, have been claimed to be one of the fundamental
conditions of the clearness of our concepts, the logical force of our
thought, and the precision with which we eliminate in our thoughts
irrelevant details. Apparently this view has much in its favor. When we
compare modern English with some of those Indian languages which are
most concrete in their formative expression, the contrast is striking.
When we say, “The eye is the organ of sight,” the Indian may not be able
to form the expression “the eye,” but may have to define that the eye of
a person or of an animal is meant. Neither may the Indian be able to
generalize readily the abstract idea of an eye as the representative of
the whole class of objects, but may have to specialize by an expression
like “this eye here.” Neither may he be able to express by a single term
the idea of “organ,” but may have to specify it by an expression like
“instrument of seeing,” so that the whole sentence might assume a form
like “an indefinite person’s eye is his means of seeing.” Still it will
be recognized that in this more specific form the general idea may be
well expressed. It seems very questionable in how far the restriction of
the use of certain grammatical forms can really be conceived as a
hindrance in the formulation of generalized ideas. It seems much more
likely that the lack of these forms is due to the lack of their need.
Primitive man, when conversing with his fellow-man, is not in the habit
of discussing abstract ideas. His interests centre around the
occupations of his daily life; and where philosophic problems are
touched upon, they appear either in relation to definite individuals or
in the more or less anthropomorphic forms of religious beliefs.
Discourses on qualities without connection with the object to which the
qualities belong, or of activities or states disconnected from the idea
of the actor or the subject being in a certain state, will hardly occur
in primitive speech. Thus the Indian will not speak of goodness as such,
although he may very well speak of the goodness of a person. He will not
speak of a state of bliss apart from the person who is in such a state.
He will not refer to the power of seeing without designating an
individual who has such power. Thus it happens that in languages in
which the idea of possession is expressed by elements subordinated to
nouns, all abstract terms appear always with possessive elements. It is,
however, perfectly conceivable that an Indian trained in philosophic
thought would proceed to free the underlying nominal forms from the
possessive elements, and thus reach abstract forms strictly
corresponding to the abstract forms of our modern languages. I have made
this experiment, for instance, in one of the languages of Vancouver
Island, in which no abstract term ever occurs without its possessive
elements. After some discussion, I found it perfectly easy to develop
the idea of the abstract term in the mind of the Indian, who stated that
the word without a possessive pronoun gives good sense, although it is
not used idiomatically. I succeeded, for instance, in this manner, in
isolating the terms for “love” and “pity,” which ordinarily occur only
in possessive forms, like “his love for him” or “my pity for you.” That
this view is correct, may also be observed in languages in which
possessive elements appear as independent forms; as, for instance, in
the Siouan languages. In these, pure abstract terms are quite common.

There is also evidence that other specializing elements, which are so
characteristic of many Indian languages, may be dispensed with when, for
one reason or another, it seems desirable to generalize a term. To use
an example of a western language,[5] the idea “to be seated” is almost
always expressed with an inseparable suffix expressing the place in
which a person is seated, as “seated on the floor of the house, on the
ground, on the beach, on a pile of things,” or “on a round thing,” etc.
When, however, for some reason, the idea of the state of sitting is to
be emphasized, a form may be used which expresses simply “being in a
sitting posture.” In this case, also, the device for generalized
expression is present; but the opportunity for its application arises
seldom, or perhaps never. I think what is true in these cases is true of
the structure of every single language. The fact that generalized forms
of expression are not used, does not prove inability to form them, but
it merely proves that the mode of life of the people is such that they
are not required; that they would, however, develop just as soon as
needed.

This point of view is also corroborated by a study of the numeral
systems of primitive languages. As is well known, many languages exist
in which the numerals do not exceed two or three. It has been inferred
from this that the people speaking these languages are not capable of
forming the concept of higher numbers. I think this interpretation of
the existing conditions is quite erroneous. People like the South
American Indians (among whom these defective numeral systems are found),
or like the Eskimo (whose old system of numbers probably did not exceed
ten), are presumably not in need of higher numerical expressions,
because there are not many objects that they have to count. On the other
hand, just as soon as these same people find themselves in contact with
civilization, and when they acquire standards of value that have to be
counted, they adopt with perfect ease higher numerals from other
languages, and develop a more or less perfect system of counting. This
does not mean that every individual who in the course of his life has
never made use of higher numerals would acquire more complex systems
readily; but the tribe as a whole seems always to be capable of
adjusting itself to the needs of counting. It must be borne in mind that
counting does not become necessary until objects are considered in such
generalized form that their individualities are entirely lost sight of.
For this reason it is possible that even a person who owns a herd of
domesticated animals may know them by name and by their characteristics,
without ever desiring to count them. Members of a war expedition may be
known by name, and may not be counted. In short, there is no proof that
the lack of the use of numerals is in any way connected with the
inability to form the concepts of higher numbers when needed.

If we want to form a correct judgment of the influence that language
exerts over thought, we ought to bear in mind that our European
languages, as found at the present time, have been moulded to a great
extent by the abstract thought of philosophers. Terms like “essence” and
“existence,” many of which are now commonly used, are by origin
artificial devices for expressing the results of abstract thought. In
this way they would resemble the artificial, unidiomatic abstract terms
that may be formed in primitive languages.

Thus it would seem that the obstacles to generalized thought inherent in
the form of a language are of minor importance only, and that presumably
language alone would not prevent a people from advancing to more
generalized forms of thinking, if the general state of their culture
should require expression of such thought; that under these conditions,
the language would be moulded rather by the cultural state. It does not
seem likely, therefore, that there is any direct relation between the
culture of a tribe and the language they speak, except in so far as the
form of the language will be moulded by the state of culture, but not in
so far as a certain state of culture is conditioned by morphological
traits of the language.

Thus we have found that language does not furnish the much-looked-for
means of discovering differences in the mental status of different
races.

-----

Footnote 3:

  See map in Handbook of American Indians (Bulletin 30 of the Bureau of
  American Ethnology), part i (1907).

Footnote 4:

  This must not be understood to mean that every primitive language is
  in a constant state of rapid modification. There are many evidences of
  a great permanence of languages. When, however, owing to certain outer
  or inner causes, changes set in, they are apt to bring about a
  thorough modification of the form of speech.

Footnote 5:

  The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                VI. THE UNIVERSALITY OF CULTURAL TRAITS


THERE remains one question to be discussed; namely, whether some tribes
represent a lower cultural stage when looked at from an evolutionary
point of view.

Our previous discussion has shown that almost all attempts to
characterize the mind of primitive man do not take into account racial
affiliations, but only stages of culture, and the results of our efforts
to determine characteristic racial differences have been of doubtful
value. It appears, therefore, that modern anthropologists not only
proceed on the assumption of the generic unity of the mind of man, but
tacitly disregard quantitative differences which may very well occur. We
may therefore base our further considerations on the theory of the
similarity of mental functions in all races.

Observation has shown, however, that not only emotions, intellect, and
will-power of man are alike everywhere, but that much more detailed
similarities in thought and action occur among the most diverse peoples.
These similarities are apparently so detailed and far-reaching, that
Bastian was led to speak of the appalling monotony of the fundamental
ideas of mankind all over the globe.

Thus it has been found that the metaphysical notions of man may be
reduced to a few types which are of universal distribution. The same is
the case in regard to the forms of society, laws, and inventions.

Furthermore, the most intricate and apparently illogical ideas, and the
most curious and complex customs, appear among a few tribes here and
there in such a manner that the assumption of a common historical origin
is excluded. When studying the culture of any one tribe, more or less
close analogues of single traits of its culture may be found among a
great diversity of peoples. Instances of such analogues have been
collected to a vast extent by Tylor, Spencer, Frazer, Bastian, Andree,
Post, and many others, so that it is not necessary to give here any
detailed proof of this fact. A few examples will suffice. Among the more
general ideas, I may mention the belief in a land of the souls of the
deceased, located in the west, and reached by crossing a river,—known to
all of us from Greek mythology, but well known also among the native
tribes of America and Polynesia. Another example is the idea of a
multiplicity of worlds,—one or more spanned over us, others stretching
under us, the central one the home of man; the upper or lower, the home
of the gods and happy souls; the other, the home of the unhappy,—an idea
familiar to us from the positions of heaven and hell, but no less
developed in India, Siberia, and arctic America. The idea of the ability
of man to acquire protecting guardian spirits offers another example.
Another domain of mental life furnishes equally striking instances. The
universal knowledge of the art of producing fire by friction, the
boiling of food, the knowledge of the drill, illustrate the universality
of certain inventions. Still other phenomena of this class are furnished
by certain elementary features of grammatical structure, like the use of
expressions for the three persons of the pronoun,—namely, the speaker,
the person addressed, and the person spoken of,—or the frequent
distinction of singularity and plurality.

Special curious analogues that occur in regions far apart may be
exemplified by such beliefs as the possibility of foretelling the future
by the cracking of burnt bones (Andree), the occurrence of the Phaëton
legend in Greece and northwest America (Boas), the bleeding of animals
by the use of a small bow and arrow (Heger), the development of
astrology in the Old World and the New, the similarity of basketry
technique and design in Africa and America (Dixon), the invention of the
blow-gun in America and Malaysia.

These examples will suggest the classes of phenomena to which I refer.
It follows from these observations that when we find analogues of single
traits of culture among distinct peoples, the presumption is, not that
there has been a common historical source, but that they have arisen
independently; and the theory suggests itself that a common cause
accounts for the constant recurrence of these phenomena among the most
varied members of mankind, no matter to what race they may belong.

Further investigation shows that these customs are not quite evenly
distributed, but that certain more or less intimate associations exist
between the industrial development, social organization, and religious
beliefs of the peoples of the world; so that, among people with simple
industries, thoughts are found that differ somewhat from those of people
who have advanced further in the development of material culture. It has
also been noticed that a relation exists between the ethnic life of a
people and the geographical environment that favors or hinders their
material development.

The common cause for this similarity of actions and beliefs of peoples
and tribes widely separated, belonging to different races, and being on
certain stages of cultural development, has been looked for in several
ways.

Some investigators—like Ratzel, and in older times Karl Ritter and
Guyot—have laid particular stress upon the influence of geographical
environment upon the life of man, and emphasize those similarities which
appear in similar types of environment.

Others believe that many of the customs, beliefs, and inventions common
to people who live in regions far apart are an old heritage derived from
the earliest times, when mankind was still confined to a small part of
the earth’s surface.

Still others have tried to isolate the most generalized forms of similar
ethnic phenomena. Bastian, the most important representative of this
group of investigators, has called these forms “elementary ideas,” and
has tried to show that they are unexplainable.

Psychologists finally have endeavored to explain the similarities by an
analysis of mental processes.

It seems necessary to discuss these four methods of approach a little
more fully.

It is not difficult to illustrate the important influence of
geographical environment upon forms of inventions. The variety of
habitations used by tribes of different areas offer an example of its
influence. The snow house of the Eskimo, the bark wigwam of the Indian,
the cave dwelling of the tribes of the desert, may serve as
illustrations of the way in which protection against exposure is
attained, in accordance with the available materials. Other examples may
be found in the forms of more special inventions: as in the complex bows
of the Eskimo, which seem to be due to the lack of long elastic material
for bow-staves; and in the devices for securing elasticity of the bow
where elastic wood is difficult to obtain, or where greater strength of
the bow is required; and in the skin receptacles and baskets which often
serve as substitutes for pottery among tribes without permanent
habitation. We may also mention the dependence of the location of
villages upon the food-supply, and of communication upon available
trails or upon the facility of communication by water. Environmental
influences appear in the territorial limits of certain tribes or
peoples, as well as in the distribution and density of population. Even
in the more complex forms of the mental life, the influence of
environment may be found; as in nature myths explaining the activity of
volcanoes or the presence of curious land forms, or in beliefs and
customs relating to the local characterization of the seasons.

When, in our theories, we lay stress alone on observations which show
that man is dependent upon geographical environment, and upon the
assumption of a sameness or similarity of the mind in all races of
mankind, we are necessarily led to the conclusion that the same
environment will produce the same cultural results everywhere.

This is obviously not true, for the forms of culture of peoples living
in the same kind of environment show often marked differences. I do not
need to illustrate this by comparing the American settler with the North
American Indian, or the successive races of people that have settled in
England, and have developed from the Stone Age to the modern English. It
may, however, be desirable to show that even among primitive tribes,
geographical environment alone does not by any means determine the type
of culture. Proof of this fact may be found in the mode of life of the
hunting and fishing Eskimo and the reindeer-breeding Chukchee (Bogoras);
the African pastoral Hottentot and the hunting Bushmen in their older,
wider distribution (Schultze); the Negrito and the Malay of southeastern
Asia (Martin).

A second and more important element to be considered is the social
status of each people, and it would seem that environment is important
only in so far as it limits or favors the activities that belong to any
particular group. It may even be shown that old customs, that may have
been in harmony with a certain type of environment, tend to survive
under new conditions, where they are of disadvantage rather than of
advantage to the people. An example of this kind, taken from our own
civilization, is our failure to utilize unfamiliar kinds of food that
may be found in newly settled countries. Another example is presented by
the reindeer-breeding Chukchee, who carry about in their nomadic life a
tent of most complicated structure, which corresponds in its type to the
older permanent house of the coast dwellers, and which contrasts in the
most marked way with the simplicity and light weight of the Eskimo tent
(Bogoras). Even among the Eskimo, who have so marvellously well
succeeded in adapting themselves to their geographical environment, we
may recognize customs that prevent the fullest use of the opportunities
offered by the country, an example of which is the law forbidding the
promiscuous use of caribou-meat and of seal-meat (Boas).

Thus it would seem that environment has an important effect upon the
customs and beliefs of man, but only in so far as it helps to determine
the special forms of customs and beliefs. These are, however, based
primarily on cultural conditions, which in themselves are due to
historical causes.

At this point the students of anthropo-geography who attempt to explain
the whole cultural development on the basis of geographical
environmental conditions are wont to claim that these historical causes
themselves are founded on older conditions, in which they have
originated under the stress of environment. It seems to my mind that
this claim is inadmissible as long as the investigation of every single
cultural feature demonstrates that the influence of environment brings
about a certain degree of adjustment between environment and social
life, but that a complete explanation of the prevailing conditions,
based on the action of environment alone, is never possible. We must
remember, that, no matter how great an influence we may ascribe to
environment, that influence can become active only by being exerted upon
the mind; so that the characteristics of the mind must enter into the
resultant forms of social activity. It is just as little conceivable
that mental life can be explained satisfactorily by environment alone,
as that environment can be explained by the influence of the people upon
nature, which, as we all know, has brought about changes of
water-courses, the destruction of forests, and changes of fauna. In
other words, it seems entirely arbitrary to disregard the part that
psychical elements play in determining the forms of activities and
beliefs which occur with great frequency all over the world.

The second theory that has been advanced to explain the sameness of a
number of fundamental ideas and inventions is based on the assumption
that they represent old cultural achievements belonging to a period
previous to the general dispersion of the human race.

This theory is based on the universal distribution of certain cultural
elements. Obviously it can apply only to features that occur the world
over; for, if we should admit the loss of some of them in the course of
historical development, the door would be open to the most fanciful
conclusions. A few ethnological data seem to favor this theory, and make
us inclined to believe that some of the universal traits of culture may
go back to a very early time before that dispersion of mankind which is
demanded on biological grounds. Most important among these is perhaps
the occurrence of the dog as a domesticated animal in practically all
parts of the world. It is true that in all probability native wild dogs
constitute the principal ancestry of the dogs of the various continents;
but nevertheless, it seems plausible that the living-together of man and
dog developed in the earliest period of human history, before the races
of northern Asia and America separated from those of southeastern Asia.
The introduction of the dingo (the native dog) into Australia seems to
be most easily explained when we assume that it accompanied man to that
remote continent.

Other very simple activities may perhaps be derived from achievements of
the earliest ancestors of man. The art of fire-making, of drilling,
cutting, sawing, work in stone, belonged probably to this early age, and
may have been the heritage on which each people built up its own
individual type of culture (Weule). If archæological investigations
should show that implements and other evidences of human achievement are
found in a geological period during which mankind had not attained its
present world-wide distribution, we should have to infer that these
represent the early cultural possessions of man, which he carried with
him all over the world. In this lies the great and fundamental
importance of the eolithic finds that have been discussed so extensively
during the last few years. Language is also a trait common to all
mankind, and one that therefore may have its roots in earliest times.

The activities of the higher apes seem to favor the assumption that
certain arts may have belonged to man before his dispersion. Their habit
of making nests, that is, habitations, the use of sticks and stones,
point in this direction.

All this makes it plausible that certain cultural achievements date back
to the origin of mankind. The defenders of this theory, like Weule and
Graebner, also believe that a sporadic occurrence of certain inventions
like the boomerang, among races that are held to be akin in descent, may
have originated before the differentiation and dispersion of these
races.

In the case of many of the phenomena which may be explained from these
points of view, it is quite impossible to give incontrovertible
arguments which would prove that these customs are not due to parallel
and independent development rather than to community of origin: the
decision of this problem will be found largely in the results of
prehistoric archæology on the one hand, and in those of animal
psychology on the other.

The problem is made still more difficult by the dissemination of
cultural elements from tribe to tribe, from people to people, and from
continent to continent, which can be proved to have existed from the
earliest times on. As an instance of the rapidity with which cultural
achievements are transmitted may be mentioned the modern history of some
cultivated plants. Tobacco and cassava were introduced into Africa after
the discovery of America, and it took little time for these plants to
spread over the whole continent; so that at present they enter so deeply
into the whole culture of the negro, that nobody would suspect their
foreign origin (Hahn). We find in the same way that the use of the
banana has pervaded almost the whole of South America (Von den Steinen);
and the history of Indian-corn is another example of the incredible
rapidity with which a useful cultural acquisition may spread over the
whole world. It is mentioned as known in Europe in 1539, and, according
to Dr. Laufer, had reached China by way of Tibet between 1540 and 1570.

It is easy to show that similar conditions prevailed in earlier times.
Victor Hehn’s investigations show the gradual and continuous increase of
the number of domesticated animals and cultivated plants, due to their
importation from Asia. The same process was going on in prehistoric
times. The gradual spread of the Asiatic horse, which was first used as
a draught animal, later on for riding, the spread of cattle over Africa
and Europe, the development of European grains, may serve as
illustrations. The area over which these additions to the stock of human
culture were spread is very large. We see most of them travel westward
until they reach the Atlantic coast, and eastward to the shores of the
Pacific Ocean. They also penetrated the African Continent. It may be
that the use of milk was disseminated in a similar way; for when the
people of the world enter into our historic knowledge, we find milk used
all over Europe, Africa, and the western part of Asia.

Perhaps the best proof of transmission is contained in the folk-lore of
the tribes of the world. Nothing seems to travel as readily as fanciful
tales. We know of certain complex tales, which cannot possibly have been
invented twice, that are told by the Berbers in Morocco, by the
Italians, the Russians, in the jungles of India, in the highlands of
Tibet, on the tundras of Siberia, and on the prairies of North America;
so that perhaps the only parts of the world not reached by them are
South Africa, Australia, Polynesia, and South America. The examples of
such transmission are quite numerous, and we begin to see that the early
inter-relation of the races of man was almost world-wide.

It follows from this observation that the culture of any given tribe, no
matter how primitive it may be, can be fully explained only when we take
into consideration its inner growth as well as its relation to the
culture of its near and distant neighbors, and the effect that they may
have exerted.

It may be well to indicate here that there seem to have been two
enormously large areas of extended diffusion. Our brief remarks on the
distribution of cultivated plants and domesticated animals prove the
existence of interrelations between Europe, Asia, and North Africa, from
the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Other cultural traits corroborate
this conclusion. The gradual spread of bronze from Central Asia westward
and eastward, all over Europe and over China, the area in which the
wheel is used, where agriculture with plough and with the help of
domesticated animals is practised, show the same type of distribution
(Hahn). We may recognize the sameness of characteristic traits in this
area also in other respects. Oath and ordeal are highly developed in
Europe, Africa, and Asia excepting the northeastern part of Siberia,
while in America they are hardly known (Laasch). Other common features
of the cultural types of the Old World appear also most clearly by
contrast with conditions in America. One of these features is the
importance of formal judicial procedure in the Old World, and its almost
entire absence among all the tribes of North and South America, who, in
their general cultural development, might well be compared with the
African negroes. In the domain of folk-lore I would mention the
frequency of the riddle, the proverb, and the moralizing fable, which
are so characteristic of an enormous part of the Old World, while they
are lacking in northeastern Siberia and in America. In all these
features, Europe, a large part of Africa, and Asia except in its extreme
northeastern part, and its island connection east of the Malay
Archipelago, form a unit.

In a similar manner we may trace certain very general traits over a
large part of America. Most convincing among these is the use of
Indian-corn all over that part of America in which agriculture is
practised; but we might also mention the development of a peculiar type
of ceremonialism and of decorative art. It would seem as though the
middle parts of America had played a rôle similar to that of Central
Asia in the Old World, in so far as many of the most characteristic
traits of civilization may have had their home here before the higher
type of Central American and South American civilizations were
developed.

The third point of view is represented by Bastian, who recognizes the
great importance of geographical environment in modifying the analogous
ethnic phenomena, but does not ascribe to them creative power. To him
the sameness of the forms of thought found in regions wide apart
suggested the existence of certain definite types of thought, no matter
in what surroundings man may live, and what may be his social and
psychical relations. These fundamental forms of thought, “that develop
with iron necessity wherever man lives,” were called by him “elementary
ideas.” He denies that it is possible to discover the ultimate sources
of inventions, ideas, customs, and beliefs, which are of universal
occurrence. They may be indigenous, they may be imported, they may have
arisen from a variety of sources, but they are there. The human mind is
so formed that it invents them spontaneously, or accepts them whenever
they are offered to it. Bastian’s theory of the permanence of these
forms of thought seems to me related to Dilthey’s conception of the
limitation of possible types of philosophy; and the similarity of lines
of thought of these two men appears also clearly in Bastian’s constant
references to the theories of philosophers as compared to the views held
by primitive man. The important phenomenon in Bastian’s mind was the
fundamental sameness of forms of human thought in all forms of culture,
no matter whether they were advanced or primitive.

In the views as propounded by him, a certain kind of mysticism may be
recognized, in so far as the elementary ideas are to his mind intangible
entities. No further thought can possibly unravel their origin, because
we ourselves are compelled to think in the forms of these elementary
ideas.

To a certain extent a clear enunciation of the elementary idea gives us
the psychological reason for its existence. To exemplify: The fact that
the land of shadows is so often placed in the west suggests its
localization at the place where the sun and the stars vanish. The mere
statement that primitive man considers the animals as gifted with all
the qualities of man shows that the analogy between many of the
qualities of animals and human qualities has led to the view that all
the qualities of animals are human. In other cases the causes are not so
self-evident; for example, in the instance of widespread customs of
restrictions of marriage which have puzzled many investigators. The
difficulty of this problem is proved by the multitude of hypotheses that
have been invented to explain it in all its varied phases.

The problem of the origin of elementary ideas has, however, been
discussed from a psychological point of view; and the elaborate attempt
by Wundt to work out a theory of folk-psychology, as well as the studies
of psychological sociologists, indicate lines of attack of the problem.
To illustrate this point, I may mention the general discussion of the
function of association in the beliefs of primitive people, given by
Wundt, or the study of suggestion and hypnotism in primitive life, made
by Stoll. A more detailed discussion of this method of treatment of the
common elementary ideas may be deferred until a later time (see Chapter
VIII).

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                    VII. THE EVOLUTIONARY VIEWPOINT


I HAVE pointed out before that some of the older authors, like Gobineau,
Klemm, Carus, Nott and Gliddon, assume characteristic mental differences
between the races of man; and these have been revived by the growth of
modern nationalism, with its exaggerated self-admiration of the Teutonic
race, its Pan-slavism, and similar symptoms developing in other parts of
the world; but these views are not supported by the results of unbiassed
research.

There remains, however, one point of view to be considered, which might
furnish a basis for investigation. The variety of forms in which the
fundamental ideas occur were early correlated with general impressions
regarding the degrees of civilization, and attention was directed to the
recurrence of similar forms the world over, which appear to present an
increasing degree of complexity of culture. This led anthropologists to
the conclusion that the types of human culture represent an evolutionary
series; that the primitive tribes of our times represent an older stage
of cultural development, through which the more advanced types passed in
earlier periods. If this is true, and if, furthermore, it could be shown
that the single tribes develop independently, we might well say that
those races must be less favorably developed in which earlier types of
culture are found with great frequency, later developments rarely. I
have referred to this possibility at another place (p. 125). For this
reason the theory of a uniform development of human civilization must be
considered in our investigation of the relation between racial types and
cultural progress. The investigations of Tylor and Bachofen, Morgan and
Spencer, fixed the attention upon the data of anthropology as
illustrating the gradual development and rise of civilization. The
development of this side of anthropology was stimulated by the work of
Darwin and his successors, and its fundamental ideas can be understood
only as an application of the theory of biological evolution to mental
phenomena. The conception that the manifestations of ethnic life
represent a series, which from simple beginnings has progressed to the
complex type of modern civilization, has been the underlying thought of
this aspect of anthropological science.

The arguments in support of the theory that the development of
civilization has followed a similar course everywhere, and that among
primitive tribes we may still recognize the stages through which our own
civilization has passed, are largely based on the similarities of types
of culture found in distinct races the world over, but also on the
occurrence of peculiar customs in our own civilization, which can be
understood only as survivals (Tylor) of older customs, that had a deeper
significance at an earlier time, and which are still found in full vigor
among primitive people.

It is necessary to point out at least a few of the aspects of this
general problem, in order to make clear the significance of the
evolutionary theory of human civilization.

The social organization of primitive tribes shows similar traits in many
different parts of the world. Instead of counting descent in the way we
do, many tribes consider the child as a member only of its mother’s
family, and count blood-relationship only in the maternal line, so that
cousins on the mother’s side are considered as near relatives, while
cousins on the father’s side are considered as only distantly related;
other tribes have a strict paternal organization, so that the child
belongs only to the father’s family, not to the mother’s; while still
others follow the same principles as we adhere to, reckoning
relationship in both directions. Connected with these customs is the
selection of the domicile of the newly married couple, who sometimes
reside with the wife’s tribe or family, sometimes with the man’s tribe
or family. When the couple take up their residence with the social group
to which the wife belongs, it is often found that the man is treated as
a stranger until his first child is born. These phenomena have been made
the subject of thorough studies, and the observation has been made that
apparently the customs of residence and of descent are closely
associated (Tylor). As a result of these inquiries, the conclusion has
been drawn that everywhere maternal institutions precede paternal
institutions, and that the social organization of mankind was such that
originally perhaps no distinct family organization existed; that later
on maternal institutions developed, which in turn were followed by
paternal institutions, and again by the system of counting
blood-relationship equally in maternal and paternal lines.

Similar results were obtained by the study of human inventions. It has
been noted before that apes and monkeys sometimes use stones for
defence, and in a way the artificial shelters of animals indicate the
beginnings of invention. In this sense we may seek for the origin of
implements and utensils among animals. In the earliest times when human
remains appear on the surface of the earth, we find man using simple
stone implements which are formed by rough chipping, but the
multiplicity of forms of implements increases gradually. Since many
implements may have been made of perishable materials, we are not able
to tell whether at a very early time the implements and utensils used
were really confined to the few stone objects that may now be recovered;
but certainly the implements were few, and, comparatively speaking,
simple. From this time on, the uses of fire, and of tools for cutting
and striking, for scraping and perforating, have increased in number and
complexity, and a gradual development may be traced from the simple
tools of primitive man to the complex machinery of our times. The
inventive genius of all races and of unnumbered individuals has
contributed to the state of industrial perfection in which we find
ourselves. On the whole, inventions once made have been kept with great
tenacity, and, owing to incessant additions, the available resources of
mankind have constantly been increased and multiplied.

An excellent example of the general theory of evolution of civilization
is found in the theory of evolution of agriculture and of the
domestication of animals as outlined by Otis T. Mason, W J McGee, and
Hahn. They point out how, in the earliest beginnings of social life,
animals, plants, and man lived together in a definite surrounding, and
how, owing to the conditions of life, certain plants multiplied to the
exclusion of others, and how certain animals were suffered in the
neighborhood of the human camp. Through this condition of mutual
sufferance and promotion of mutual interests, if I may use this term, a
closer association between plants, animals, and man developed, which
ultimately led to the beginnings of agriculture and to the actual
domestication of animals.

Researches on art have led to similar results. Investigators have
endeavored to show, that, since the cave-dwellers of France drew the
outlines of the reindeer and mammoth on bone and antler, man has tried
to reproduce in pictographic design the animals of the region in which
he lived. In the artistic productions of many people, designs have been
found which are readily associated with pictographic presentations,
which, however, have lost their realism of form, and have become more
and more conventional; so that in many cases a purely decorative motive
has been interpreted as developed from a realistic pictograph gradually
breaking up under the stress of æsthetic motives. The islands of the
Pacific Ocean, New Guinea, South America, Central America, prehistoric
Europe, have furnished examples for this line of development (see March,
Haddon, Von den Steinen, Holmes), which therefore was recognized as one
of the important tendencies of the evolution of human decorative art,
which was described as beginning with realism, and as leading through
symbolic conventionalism to purely æsthetic motives.

Religion has furnished another example of typical evolution in human
thought. At an early time man began to think and ponder about the
phenomena of nature. Everything appeared to him in an anthropomorphic
form of thought; and thus the first primitive concepts regarding the
world came into being, in which the stone, the mountain, the heavenly
orbs, were viewed as animate anthropomorphic beings endowed with
will-power, and willing to help man or threatening to endanger him. The
observation of the activities of man’s own body and of his mind led to
the formulation of the idea of a soul independent of the body; and with
increasing knowledge and with increasing philosophic thought, religion
and science grew out of these simple beginnings.

The sameness of all these phenomena in different parts of the world has
been considered as proof not only of the fundamental unity of the mind
of all the races of man, but also of the truth of the theory of
evolution of civilization; and thus a grand structure has been reared,
in which we see our present civilization as the necessary outcome of the
activities of all the races of man that have risen in one grand
procession, from the simplest beginnings of culture, through periods of
barbarism, to the stage of civilization that they now occupy. The march
has not been equally rapid; for some are still lagging behind, while
others have forged forward, and occupy the first places in the general
advance.

It seems desirable to understand more clearly what this theory of
parallelism of cultural development implies. It seems to mean that
different groups of mankind started at a very early time from a general
condition of lack of culture; and, owing to the unity of the human mind
and the consequent similar response to outer and inner stimuli, they
have developed everywhere approximately along the same lines, making
similar inventions and developing similar customs and beliefs. It also
seems to involve a certain correlation between industrial development
and social development, and therefore a definite sequence of inventions
as well as of forms of organization and of belief.

In the absence of historical data in regard to the earliest history of
primitive man the world over, we have only three sources of historical
proof of this assumption,—the evidence contained in the earliest history
of the civilized people of the Old World, survivals in modern
civilization, and archæology. The last-named is the only method by means
of which we can approach the problem in regard to people that have no
history.

While it is certainly true that analogues can be found between the types
of culture represented by primitive people and those conditions which
prevailed among the ancestors of the present civilized peoples at the
dawn of history, and that these analogues are supported by the evidence
furnished by survivals, the evidence of archæology does not support the
complete generalization. The theory of parallel development, if it is to
have any significance, would require that among all branches of mankind
the steps of invention should have followed, at least approximately, in
the same order, and that no important gaps should be found. The facts,
so far as known at the present time, are entirely contrary to this view.
We find, for instance, large areas of the world inhabited by people well
advanced in the arts of life, but who have never made the discovery of
pottery, one of the essential steps in the advance of civilization.
Pottery is not found in the extreme southern parts of Africa, in
Australia, in northeastern Siberia,[6] in the whole northwestern part of
North America, and in the extreme south of South America. According to
what has been said before (p. 169), it would seem as if Old-World
pottery covers about the same territory as the other characteristic
traits referred to before, while in America its centre lies in the area
of more advanced culture in the middle part of the continent. Thus it
happens that the well-advanced tribes of Northwest America have no
pottery, and its presence or absence seems to be due more to
geographical location than to general cultural causes.

The same may be said in regard to the use of metals. The invention of
metallurgy, which marks so important an advance of European
civilization, does not appear associated with analogous levels of
development in other parts of the world. Similar remarks may be made in
regard to the development of agriculture and of the domestication of
animals. People whom in a general way we ought to class as on the same
level of culture may some possess the art of agriculture, others may
have domesticated animals, while still others may rely upon the bounty
of the sea or upon the natural vegetable products of their home.[7] As
soon as we begin to investigate the industrial achievements of different
types belonging to different races, parallelism of industrial
development does not seem to exist in any degree of detail. Only one
general trait of industrial development remains; namely, the constant
addition of new elements to the older stock of knowledge and an
increasing refinement of methods and of results, setting aside periods
of temporary regression.

Thus it does not seem to be certain that every people in an advanced
stage of civilization must have passed through all the stages of
development, which we may gather by an investigation of all the types of
culture which occur all over the world.

A still more serious objection is based on another observation. The
validity of the general sameness of the evolution of mankind is based on
the assumption that the same cultural features must always have
developed from the same causes, and that all variations are only minor
details of the grand uniform type of evolution. In other words, its
logical basis is the assumption that the same ethnical phenomena are
always due to the same causes. Thus the inference in regard to the
sequence of maternal and paternal institutions, to which I referred
before, is based on the generalization that because in a few cases
paternal families have developed from maternal ones, therefore all
paternal families have developed in the same way. If we do not make the
assumption that the same phenomena have everywhere developed in the same
way, then we may just as well conclude that paternal families have in
some cases arisen from maternal institutions, in other cases in other
ways.

In the same way it is inferred that because many conceptions of the
future life have evidently developed from dreams and hallucinations, all
notions of this character have had the same origin. This is true only if
it can be shown that no other causes could possibly lead to the same
ideas.

To give another example. It has been claimed that among the Indians of
Arizona, pottery developed from basketry, and it has been inferred that
all pottery must therefore be later in the cultural development of
mankind than basketry. Evidently this conclusion cannot be defended, for
pottery may develop in other ways.

As a matter of fact, quite a number of cases can be given in which
convergent evolution, beginning from distinct beginnings, has led to the
same results. I have referred before to the instance of primitive art,
and have mentioned the theory that geometrical form develops from
realistic representations, which lead through symbolic conventionalism
to purely æsthetic motives. We may remark here that a great diversity of
objects might in this way have given rise to the same decorative
motives, so that the survival of the same decorative motive would not
lead back to the same realistic origin; but more important than this, we
may point out that geometrical motives of the same type have developed
from the tendency of the artist to play with his technique as the
virtuoso plays on his instrument; that the expert basket-weaver, by
varying the arrangement of her weave, was led to the development of
geometrical designs of the same form as those that were developed in
other places from realistic representations. We may even go a step
farther, and recognize that geometrical forms developed from the
technique suggested animal forms, which later on were modified so as to
assume realistic forms; so that in the case of decorative art the same
forms may just as well stand at the beginning of a series of development
as at the end (Von den Steinen).

Another example may not be amiss. The use of masks is found among a
great number of peoples. The origin of the custom is by no means clear
in all cases, but a few typical forms of their use may easily be
distinguished. They are intended to deceive spirits as to the identity
of the wearer, and may thus protect him against attack; or the mask may
represent a spirit which is personified by the wearer, who in this way
frightens away supernatural enemies. Still other masks are
commemorative, the wearer personifying a deceased friend. Masks are also
used in theatrical performances illustrating mythological incidents
(Andree). While it is not at all necessary to assume that these
explanations given by the wearer of masks represent the actual
historical development of the custom, the explanations themselves
suggest the improbability of a single origin of the custom.

I will give another example. Primitive tribes are very often divided
into a definite number of subdivisions. There is little doubt that this
form of social organization has arisen independently over and over
again. The conclusion is justified that the psychical conditions of man
favor the existence of such an organization of society, but it does not
follow that it has developed everywhere in the same manner. Dr.
Washington Matthews has shown that the groups of the Navaho have arisen
by the association of independent elements. Captain Bourke has pointed
out that similar occurrences have given rise to the Apache groups, and
Dr. Fewkes has reached the same conclusion in regard to some of the
Pueblo tribes. On the other hand, we have proof that such groups may
originate by division. Such events have taken place among the Indians of
the North Pacific coast (Boas). Other divisions of tribes seem to have
had an entirely different origin; as, for instance, the frequent twofold
exogamic division of tribes, which may, perhaps, be adequately explained
by the application of the laws of exogamy in a small community. Thus it
would seem that a variety of causes has led to results which appear
identical to all intents and purposes.

The principal obstacle in the way of progress on these lines seems to my
mind to be founded on the lack of comparability of the data with which
we are dealing. Attention has been directed essentially to the
similarity of ethnic phenomena, while the individual variations were
disregarded. As soon as we turn our attention in this direction, we
notice that the sameness of ethnic phenomena is more superficial than
complete, more apparent than real. The unexpected similarities have
attracted our attention to such an extent that we have disregarded
differences; while in the study of the physical traits of distinct
social groups, the reverse mental attitude manifests itself. The
similarity of the main features of the human form being self-evident,
our attention is directed to the minute differences of structure.

Instances of such lack of comparability can easily be given. When we
speak of the idea of life after death as one of the ideas which develop
in human society as a psychological necessity, we are dealing with a
most complex group of data. One people believes that the soul continues
to exist in the form that the person had at the time of death, without
any possibility of change; another one believes that the soul will be
reborn in a child of the same family; a third one believes that the
souls will enter the bodies of animals; and still others believe that
the shadows continue our human pursuits, waiting to be led back to our
world in a distant future. The emotional and rationalistic elements
which enter into these various concepts are entirely distinct; and we
can readily perceive how the various forms of the idea of a future life
may have come into existence by psychological processes that are not at
all comparable. If I may be allowed to speculate on this question, I
might imagine that in one case the similarities between children and
their deceased relatives, in other cases the memory of the deceased as
he lived during the last days of his life, in still other cases the
longing for the beloved child or parent, and again the fear of
death,—may all have contributed to the development of the idea of life
after death, the one here, the other there.

Another instance will corroborate this point of view. One of the
striking forms of social organization which occurs in many regions wide
apart is what we call “totemism,”—a form of society in which certain
social groups consider themselves as related in a supernatural way to a
certain species of animals or to a certain class of objects. I believe
this is the generally accepted definition of “totemism;” but I am
convinced that in this form the phenomenon is not a single psychological
problem, but embraces the most diverse psychological elements. In some
cases the people believe themselves to be descendants of the animal
whose protection they enjoy. In other cases an animal or some other
object may have appeared to an ancestor of the social group, and may
have promised to become his protector, and the friendship between the
animal and the ancestor was then transmitted to his descendants. In
still other cases a certain social group in a tribe may have the power
of securing by magical means and with great ease a certain kind of
animal or of increasing its numbers, and the supernatural relation may
be established in this way. It will be recognized that here again the
anthropological phenomena which are in outward appearances alike are,
psychologically speaking, entirely distinct, and that consequently
psychological laws covering all of them cannot be deduced from them
(Goldenweiser).

Another example may not be amiss. In a general review of moral standards
we observe that with increasing civilization a gradual change in the
valuation of actions takes place. Among primitive man, human life has
little value, and is sacrificed on the slightest provocation. The social
group among whose members any altruistic obligations are binding is
exceedingly small; and outside of the group any action that may result
in personal gain is not only permitted, but even approved; and from this
starting-point we find an ever-increasing valuation of human life and an
extension of the size of the group among whose members altruistic
obligations are binding. The modern relations of nations show that this
evolution has not yet reached its final stage. It might seem, therefore,
that a study of the social conscience in relation to crimes like murder
might be of psychological value, and lead to important results, clearing
up the origin of ethical values; but I think here the same objections
may be raised as before; namely, the lack of comparable motives. The
person who slays an enemy in revenge for wrongs done, a youth who kills
his father before he gets decrepit in order to enable him to continue a
vigorous life in the world to come, a father who kills his child as a
sacrifice for the welfare of his people, act from such entirely
different motives, that psychologically a comparison of their activities
does not seem permissible. It would seem much more proper to compare the
murder of an enemy in revenge with destruction of his property for the
same purpose, or to compare the sacrifice of a child on behalf of the
tribe with any other action performed on account of strong altruistic
motives, than to base our comparison on the common concept of murder
(Westermarck).

These few data may suffice to show that the same ethnic phenomenon may
develop from different sources; and we may infer that the simpler the
observed fact, the more likely it is that it may have developed from one
source here, from another there.

When we base our study on these observations, it appears that serious
objections may be made against the assumption of the occurrence of a
general sequence of cultural stages among all the races of man; that
rather we recognize a peculiar tendency of diverse customs and beliefs
to converge towards similar forms. In order to interpret correctly these
similarities in form, it is necessary to investigate their historical
development; and only when the historical development in different areas
is the same, will it be admissible to consider the phenomena in question
as equivalent. From this point of view the facts of cultural contact
assume a new importance (see p. 166).

An important theoretical consideration has also shaken our faith in the
correctness of the evolutionary theory as a whole. It is one of the
essential traits of this theory that, in general, civilization has
developed from simple forms to complex forms, and that extended fields
of human culture have developed under more or less rationalistic
impulses. Of late years we are beginning to recognize that human culture
does not always develop from the simple to the complex, but that in many
aspects two tendencies intercross,—one from the complex to the simple,
the other from the simple to the complex. It is obvious that the history
of industrial development is almost throughout that of increasing
complexity. On the other hand, human activities that do not depend upon
reasoning do not show a similar type of evolution.

It is perhaps easiest to make this clear by the example of language,
which in many respects is one of the most important evidences of the
history of human development. Primitive languages are, on the whole,
complex. Minute differences in point of view are given expression by
means of grammatical forms; and the grammatical categories of Latin, and
still more so those of modern English, seem crude when compared to the
complexity of psychological or logical forms which primitive languages
recognize, but which in our speech are disregarded entirely. On the
whole, the development of languages seems to be such, that the nicer
distinctions are eliminated, and that it begins with complex and ends
with simpler forms, although it must be acknowledged that opposite
tendencies are not by any means absent (Boas).

Similar observations may be made on the art of primitive man. In music
as well as in decorative design we find a complexity of rhythmic
structure which is unequalled in the popular art of our day. In music,
particularly, this complexity is so great, that the art of a skilled
virtuoso is taxed in the attempt to imitate it (Stumpf). If once it is
recognized that simplicity is not always a proof of antiquity, it will
readily be seen that the theory of the evolution of civilization rests
to a certain extent on a logical error. The classification of the data
of anthropology in accordance with their simplicity has been
reinterpreted as an historical sequence, without an adequate attempt to
prove that the simpler antedates the more complex.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the assumption of a uniform
development of culture among all the different races of man and among
all tribal units is true in a limited sense only. We may recognize a
certain modification of mental activities with modifications of form of
culture; but the assumption that the same forms must necessarily develop
in every independent social unit can hardly be maintained. Thus the
question with which we began our consideration—namely, whether the
representatives of different races can be proved to have developed each
independently, in such a way that the representatives of some races
stand on low levels of culture, while others stand on high levels of
culture—may be answered in the negative. If we should make the attempt
to arrange the different types of man in accordance with their
industrial advancement, we should find representatives of the most
diverse races—such as the Bushman of South Africa, the Veddah of Ceylon,
the Australian, and the Indian of Terra del Fuego—on the same lowest
level. We should also find representatives of different races on more
advanced levels, like the negroes of Central Africa, the Indians of the
Southwestern pueblos, and the Polynesians; and in our present period we
may find representatives of the most diverse races taking part in the
highest types of civilization. Thus it will be seen that there is no
close relation between race and culture.

-----

Footnote 6:

  In a few localities in this district pottery is found, perhaps due to
  a late local introduction.

Footnote 7:

  The cultural conditions of Melanesia Northwest America, and of some of
  the nomadic tribes of Africa, might thus be compared.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                 VIII. SOME TRAITS OF PRIMITIVE CULTURE


IT now remains to formulate more clearly the difference between the
forms of thought of primitive man and those of civilized man, regardless
of their racial descent.

Even a superficial observation demonstrates that groups of man belonging
to distinct social strata do not behave in the same manner. The Russian
peasant does not re-act to his sense-experiences in the same way as does
the native Australian; and entirely different from theirs are the
re-actions of the educated Chinaman and of the educated American. In all
these cases the form of re-action may depend to a slight extent upon
hereditary individual and racial ability, but it will to a much greater
extent be determined by the habitual re-actions of the society to which
the individual in question belongs.

It seems necessary, therefore, as a last step in our discussion, to
define and explain the mental re-actions which distinguish primitive man
and civilized man of all races.

We must confine this discussion to a very few examples of fundamental
psychological facts.

One of the most striking features in the thoughts of primitive people is
the peculiar manner in which concepts that appear to us alike and
related are separated and rearranged. According to our views, the
constituting elements of the heavens and of the weather are all
inanimate objects; but to the mind of primitive man they appear to
belong to the organic world. The dividing-line between man and animal is
not sharply drawn. What seem to us conditions of an object—like health
and sickness—are considered by him as independent realities. In short,
the whole classification of experience among mankind living in different
forms of society follows entirely distinct lines.

I have illustrated the necessity of classification in a previous
chapter, when speaking of the relation of language and cultural
development (p. 143). Incidentally I have also pointed out that the
principles of classification which are found in different languages do
not by any means agree.

The behavior of primitive man makes it perfectly clear that all these
linguistic classes have never risen into consciousness, and that
consequently their origin must be sought, not in rational, but in
entirely unconscious, processes of the mind. They must be due to a
grouping of sense-impressions and of concepts which is not in any sense
of the term voluntary, but which develops from entirely different
psychological causes. It is a characteristic of linguistic
classifications that they never rise into consciousness; while other
classifications, although the same unconscious origin prevails, often do
rise into consciousness. It seems very plausible, for instance, that the
fundamental religious notions, like the idea of will-power immanent in
inanimate objects, or the anthropomorphic character of animals, are in
their origin just as little conscious as the fundamental ideas of
language. While, however, the use of language is so automatic that the
opportunity never arises for the fundamental notions to emerge into
consciousness, this happens very frequently in all phenomena relating to
religion.

These observations may be applied equally well to other groups of
concepts.

The primary object of these researches is the determination of the
fundamental categories under which phenomena are classified by man in
various stages of culture. Differences of this kind appear very clearly
in the domain of certain simple sense-perceptions. For instance, it has
been observed that colors are classified according to their similarities
in quite distinct groups, without any accompanying difference in the
ability to differentiate shades of color. What we call green and blue
are often combined under some such term as “gall-like color”; or yellow
and green are combined into one concept, which may be named
“young-leaves color.” The importance of the fact that in thought and in
speech these color-names convey the impression of quite different groups
of sensations can hardly be overrated.

Another group of categories that offer a field of fruitful investigation
are those of object and attribute. The concepts of primitive man make it
quite clear that the classes of ideas which we consider as attributes
are often considered as independent objects. The best-known case of this
kind, one to which I have referred incidentally before, is that of
sickness. While we consider sickness as a condition of an organism, it
is believed by primitive man, and even by many members of our own
society, to be an object which may enter the body, and which may be
removed. This is exemplified by the numerous cases in which a disease is
extracted from the body by sucking or by other processes, in the belief
that it may be thrown into people, or that it may be enclosed in wood in
order to prevent its return. Other qualities are treated in the same
way. Thus the conditions of hunger, exhaustion, and similar bodily
feelings, are considered by certain primitive tribes as independent
objects which affect the body. Even life is believed to be a material
object that may become separated from the body. The luminosity of the
sun is considered as an object that the Sun himself may put on or lay
aside.

I have indicated before that the concept of anthropomorphism seems to be
one of the important categories underlying primitive thought. It would
seem that the power of motion of the self, and the power of motion of an
object, have led to the inclusion of man and movable objects in the same
category, with the consequent imputation of human qualities to the
moving objective world.

While in many cases we can see with a fair degree of clearness the
fundamental concepts underlying these categories, in other cases these
are not by any means clear. Thus the concept of incest groups—those
groups in which intermarriage is strictly forbidden—is omnipresent; but
no satisfactory explanation has so far been given for the tendency to
combine certain degrees of blood-relationship under this viewpoint.

Another fundamental difference between the mental life of primitive man
and that of civilized man lies in the fact that we have succeeded in
developing, by the application of conscious reasoning, better systems
from these crude, unconscious classifications of the sum total of our
knowledge, while primitive man has not done so. The first impression
gained from a study of the beliefs of primitive man is, that while the
perceptions of his senses are excellent, his power of logical
interpretation of perceptions seems to be deficient. I think it can be
shown that the reason for this fact is not founded on any fundamental
peculiarity of the mind of primitive man, but lies, rather, in the
character of the traditional ideas by means of which each new perception
is interpreted; in other words, in the character of the traditional
ideas with which each new perception associates itself. In our own
community a mass of observations and of thoughts is transmitted to the
child. These thoughts are the result of careful observation and
speculation of our present and of past generations; but they are
transmitted to most individuals as traditional matter, much the same as
folk-lore. The child associates new perceptions with this whole mass of
traditional material, and interprets his observations by its means. I
believe it is a mistake to assume that the interpretation made by each
civilized individual is a complete logical process. We associate a
phenomenon with a number of known facts, the interpretations of which
are assumed as known, and we are satisfied with the reduction of a new
fact to these previously known facts. For instance, if the average
individual hears of the explosion of a previously unknown chemical, he
is satisfied to reason that certain materials are known to have the
property of exploding under proper conditions, and that consequently the
unknown substance has the same quality. On the whole, I do not think
that we should try to argue still further, and really try to give a full
explanation of the causes of the explosion.

The difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and that of
civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of
the traditional material with which the new perception associates
itself. The instruction given to the child of primitive man is not based
on centuries of experimentation, but consists of the crude experience of
generations. When a new experience enters the mind of primitive man, the
same process which we observe among civilized man brings about an
entirely different series of associations, and therefore results in a
different type of explanation. A sudden explosion will associate itself
in his mind, perhaps, with tales which he has heard in regard to the
mythical history of the world, and consequently will be accompanied by
superstitious fear. When we recognize that neither among civilized men
nor among primitive men the average individual carries to completion the
attempt at causal explanation of phenomena, but carries it only so far
as to amalgamate it with other previously known facts, we recognize that
the result of the whole process depends entirely upon the character of
the traditional material. Herein lies the immense importance of
folk-lore in determining the mode of thought. Herein lies particularly
the enormous influence of current philosophic opinion upon the masses of
the people, and herein lies the influence of the dominant scientific
theory upon the character of scientific work.

It would be vain to try to understand the development of modern science
without an intelligent understanding of modern philosophy; it would be
vain to try to understand the history of mediæval science without a
knowledge of mediæval theology; and so it is vain to try to understand
primitive science without an intelligent knowledge of primitive
mythology. “Mythology,” “theology,” and “philosophy” are different terms
for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and
which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the
phenomena of nature. To primitive man,—who has been taught to consider
the heavenly orbs as animate beings; who sees in every animal a being
more powerful than man; to whom the mountains, trees, and stones are
endowed with life,—explanations of phenomena will suggest themselves
entirely different from those to which we are accustomed, since we base
our conclusions upon the existence of matter and force as bringing about
the observed results. If we should not consider it possible to explain
the whole range of phenomena as the result of matter and force alone,
all our explanations of natural phenomena would take a different aspect.

In scientific inquiries we should always be clear in our own minds of
the fact that we always embody a number of hypotheses and theories in
our explanations, and that we do not carry the analysis of any given
phenomenon to completion. In fact, if we were to do so, progress would
hardly be possible, because every phenomenon would require an endless
amount of time for thorough treatment. We are only too apt, however, to
forget entirely the general, and for most of us purely traditional,
theoretical basis which is the foundation of our reasoning, and to
assume that the result of our reasoning is absolute truth. In this we
commit the same error that is committed, and has been committed, by all
the less civilized peoples. They are more easily satisfied than we are
at the present time; but they also assume as true the traditional
element which enters into their explanations, and therefore accept as
absolute truth the conclusions based on it. It is evident that the fewer
the number of traditional elements that enter into our reasoning, and
the clearer we endeavor to be in regard to the hypothetical part of our
reasoning, the more logical will be our conclusions. There is an
undoubted tendency in the advance of civilization to eliminate
traditional elements, and to gain a clearer and clearer insight into the
hypothetical basis of our reasoning. It is therefore not surprising,
that, with the advance of civilization, reasoning becomes more and more
logical, not because each individual carries out his thought in a more
logical manner, but because the traditional material which is handed
down to each individual has been thought out and worked out more
thoroughly and more carefully. While in primitive civilization the
traditional material is doubted and examined by only a very few
individuals, the number of thinkers who try to free themselves from the
fetters of tradition increases as civilization advances.

An example illustrating this progress and at the same time the slowness
of this progress is found in the relations between individuals belonging
to different tribes. There are a number of primitive hordes to whom
every stranger not a member of the horde is an enemy, and where it is
right to damage the enemy to the best of one’s power and ability, and if
possible to kill him. This custom is founded largely on the idea of the
solidarity of the horde, and of the feeling that it is the duty of every
member of the horde to destroy all possible enemies. Therefore every
person not a member of the horde must be considered as belonging to a
class entirely distinct from the members of the horde, and is treated
accordingly. We can trace the gradual broadening of the feeling of
fellowship during the advance of civilization. The feeling of fellowship
in the horde expands to the feeling of unity of the tribe, to a
recognition of bonds established by a neighborhood of habitat, and
further on to the feeling of fellowship among members of nations. This
seems to be the limit of the ethical concept of fellowship of man which
we have reached at the present time. When we analyze the strong feeling
of nationality which is so potent at the present time, we recognize that
it consists largely in the idea of the pre-eminence of that community
whose member we happen to be,—in the pre-eminent value of its language,
of its customs, and of its traditions, and in the belief that it is
right to preserve its peculiarities and to impose them upon the rest of
the world. The feeling of nationality as here expressed, and the feeling
of solidarity of the horde, are of the same order, although modified by
the gradual expansion of the idea of fellowship; but the ethical point
of view which makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the
well-being of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value
one’s own civilization as higher than that of the whole rest of mankind,
are the same as those which prompt the actions of primitive man, who
considers every stranger as an enemy, and who is not satisfied until the
enemy is killed. It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the
value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that
we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling
all our actions since the time of our birth; but it is certainly
conceivable that there may be other civilizations, based perhaps on
different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and
reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be
impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up
under their influence. The general theory of valuation of human
activities, as developed by anthropological research, teaches us a
higher tolerance than the one which we now profess.

After we have thus seen that a large number of traditional elements
enter into the reasoning of primitive man and of civilized man as well,
we are better prepared to understand some of the more special typical
differences in the thought of primitive man and of civilized man.

A trait of primitive life that early attracted the attention of
investigators is the occurrence of close associations between mental
activities that appear to us as entirely disparate. In primitive life,
religion and science; music, poetry, and dance; myth and history;
fashion and ethics,—appear inextricably interwoven. We may express this
general observation also by saying that primitive man views each action
not only as adapted to its main object, each thought related to its main
end, as we should perceive them, but that he associates them with other
ideas, often of a religious or at least of a symbolic nature. Thus he
gives them a higher significance than they seem to us to deserve. Every
taboo is an example of such associations of apparently trifling actions
with ideas that are so sacred that a deviation from the customary mode
of performance creates the strongest emotions of abhorrence. The
interpretation of ornaments as charms, the symbolism of decorative art,
are other examples of association of ideas that, on the whole, are
foreign to our mode of thought.

In order to make clear the point of view from which these phenomena seem
to fall into an orderly array, we will investigate whether all vestiges
of similar forms of thought have disappeared from our civilization. In
our intense life, which is devoted to activities requiring the full
application of our reasoning-powers and a repression of the emotional
life, we have become accustomed to a cold, matter-of-fact view of our
actions, of the incentives that lead to them, and of their consequences.
It is not necessary, however, to go far afield to find a state of mind
which is open to other aspects of life. If those among us who move in
the midst of the current of our quickly pulsing life do not look beyond
their rational motives and aims, others who stand by in quiet
contemplation recognize in it the reflection of an ideal world that they
have built up in their own consciousness. To the artist the outer world
is a symbol of the beauty that he feels; to the fervent religious mind
it is a symbol of the transcendental truth which gives form to his
thought. Instrumental music that one enjoys as a work of purely musical
art calls forth in the mind of another a group of definite concepts that
are connected with the musical themes and their treatment only by the
similarity of the emotional states they evoke. In fact, the different
manner in which individuals re-act to the same stimulus, and the variety
of associations elicited by the same sense-impression in different
individuals, are so self-evident that they hardly call for special
remarks.

Most important for the purpose of our investigation is the fact that
there are certain stimuli to which all of us who live in the same
society re-act in the same way without being able to express the reasons
for our actions. A good example of what I refer to are breaches of
social etiquette. A mode of behavior that does not conform to the
customary manners, but differs from them in a striking way, creates, on
the whole, unpleasant emotions; and it requires a determined effort on
our part to make it clear to ourselves that such behavior does not
conflict with moral standards. Among those who are not trained in
courageous and rigid thought, the confusion between traditional
etiquette—so-called good manners—and moral conduct is habitual. In
certain lines of conduct the association between traditional etiquette
and ethical feeling is so close, that even a vigorous thinker can hardly
emancipate himself from it. This is true, for instance, of acts that may
be considered breaches of modesty. The most cursory review of the
history of costume shows that what was considered modest at one time has
been immodest at other times. The custom of habitually covering parts of
the body has at all times led to the strong feeling that exposure of
such parts is immodest. This feeling of propriety is so erratic, that a
costume that is appropriate on one occasion may be considered
opprobrious on other occasions; as, for instance, a low-cut evening
dress in a street-car during business hours. What kind of exposure is
felt as immodest depends always upon fashion. It is quite evident that
fashion is not dictated by modesty, but that the historical development
of costume is determined by a variety of causes. Nevertheless fashions
are typically associated with the feeling of modesty, so that an
unwonted exposure excites the unpleasant feelings of impropriety. There
is no conscious reasoning why the one form is proper, the other
improper; but the feeling is aroused directly by the contrast with the
customary. Every one will feel instinctively the strong resistance that
he would have to overcome, even in a different society, if he were
required to perform an action that we are accustomed to consider as
immodest, and the feelings that would be excited in his mind if he were
thrown into a society in which the standards of modesty differed from
our own.

Even setting aside the strong emotions of modesty, we find a variety of
reasons which make certain styles of dress appear improper. To appear in
the fashion of our forefathers of two centuries ago would be entirely
out of the question, and would expose one to ridicule. To see a man wear
a hat in company indoors nettles us: it is considered rude. To wear a
hat in church or at a funeral would cause more vigorous resentment, on
account of the greater emotional value of the feelings concerned. A
certain tilt of the hat, although it may be very comfortable to the
wearer, would stamp him at once as an uneducated brute. Other novelties
in costume may hurt our æsthetic feelings, no matter how bad the taste
of the prevailing fashions may be.

Another example will make clear what I mean. When we consider our table
manners, it will readily be recognized that most of them are purely
traditional, and cannot be given any adequate explanation. To smack
one’s lips is considered bad style, and may excite feelings of disgust;
while among the Indians it would be considered bad taste not to smack
one’s lips when invited to dinner, because it would suggest that the
guest does not enjoy his meal. Both for the Indian and for ourselves the
constant performance of these actions which constitute good table
manners make it practically impossible to act otherwise. An attempt to
act differently would not only be difficult on account of the lack of
adjustment of muscular motions, but also on account of the strong
emotional resistance that we should have to overcome. The emotional
displeasure is also released when we see others act contrary to custom.
To eat with people having table manners different from our own excites
feelings of displeasure which may rise to such an intensity as to cause
qualmishness. Here, also, explanations are often given which are
probably based solely on attempts to explain the existing manners, but
which do not represent their historical development. We often hear that
it is improper to eat with a knife because it might cut the mouth; but I
doubt very much if this consideration has anything to do with the
development of the custom, for the older type of sharp steel forks might
as easily hurt the mouth as the blade of the knife.

It may be well to exemplify the characteristics of our opposition to
unwonted actions by a few additional examples, which will help to clear
up the mental processes that lead us to formulate the reasons for our
conservatism.

One of the cases in which the development of such alleged reasons for
behavior is best traced is that of the taboo. Although we ourselves have
hardly any definite taboos, to an outsider our failure to use certain
animals for food might easily appear from this point of view. Supposing
an individual accustomed to eating dogs should inquire among us for the
reason why we do not eat dogs, we could only reply that it is not
customary; and he would be justified in saying that dogs are tabooed
among us, just as much as we are justified in speaking of taboos among
primitive people. If we were hard pressed for reasons, we should
probably base our aversion to eating dogs or horses on the seeming
impropriety of eating animals that live with us as our friends. On the
other hand, we are not accustomed to eat caterpillars, and we should
probably decline to eat them from feelings of disgust. Cannibalism is so
much abhorred, that we find it difficult to convince ourselves that it
belongs to the same class of aversions as those mentioned before. The
fundamental concept of the sacredness of human life, and the fact that
most animals will not eat others of the same species, set off
cannibalism as a custom by itself, considered as one of the most
horrible aberrations of human nature. In these three groups of
aversions, disgust is probably the first feeling present in our minds,
by which we re-act against the suggestion of partaking of these kinds of
food. We account for our disgust by a variety of reasons, according to
the groups of ideas with which the suggested act is associated in our
minds. In the first case there is no special association, and we are
satisfied with the simple statement of disgust. In the second case the
most important reason seems to be an emotional one, although we may feel
inclined, when questioned regarding the reasons of our dislike, to bring
forward also habits of the animals in question that seem to justify our
aversion. In the third case the immorality of cannibalism would stand
forth as the one sufficient reason.

Other examples are the numerous customs that had originally a religious
or semi-religious aspect, and which are continued and explained by more
or less certain utilitarian theories. Such are the whole group of
customs relating to marriages in the incest group. While the extent of
the incest group has undergone material changes, the abhorrence of
marriages inside the existing group is the same as ever; but instead of
religious laws, ethical considerations, often explained by utilitarian
concepts, are given as the reason for our feelings. People affected with
loathsome diseases were once shunned because they were believed to be
stricken by God, while at present the same avoidance is due to the fear
of contagion. The disuse into which profanity has fallen in English was
first due to religious re-action, but has come to be simply a question
of good manners.

For another example we need go back only a short period in history. It
is not so many years ago that dissension from accepted religious tenets
was believed to be a crime. The intolerance of diverging religious views
and the energy of persecution for heresy can be understood only when we
recognize the violent feelings of outraged ethical principles that were
aroused by this deviation from the customary line of thought. There was
no question as to the logical validity of the new idea. The mind was
directly agitated by the opposition to an habitual form of thought which
was so deeply rooted in each individual that it had come to be an
integral part of his mental life.

It is important to note that in all the cases mentioned the
rationalistic explanation of the opposition to a change is based on that
group of concepts with which the excited emotions are intimately
connected. In the case of costume, reasons are adduced why the new style
is improper; in the case of heresy, proof is given that the new doctrine
is an attack against eternal truth; and so with all the others.

I think, however, that a close introspective analysis shows these
reasons to be only attempts to interpret our feelings of displeasure;
that our opposition is not by any means dictated by conscious reasoning,
but primarily by the emotional effect of the new idea which creates a
dissonance with the habitual.

In all these cases the custom is obeyed so often and so regularly that
the habitual act becomes automatic; that is to say, its performance is
ordinarily not combined with any degree of consciousness. Consequently
the emotional value of these actions is also very slight. It is
remarkable, however, that the more automatic an action, the more
difficult it is to perform the opposite action, that it requires a very
strong effort to do so, and that ordinarily the opposite action is
accompanied by strong feelings of displeasure. It may also be observed
that to see the unusual action performed by another person excites the
strongest attention, and causes feelings of displeasure. Thus it happens
that when an infraction of the customary occurs, all the groups of ideas
with which the action is associated are brought into consciousness. A
dish of dog’s meat would bring up all the ideas of companionship; a
cannibal feast, all the social principles that have become our second
nature. The more automatic any series of activities or a certain form of
thought has become, the greater is the conscious effort required for
breaking away from the old habit of acting and thinking, and the greater
also the displeasure, or at least the surprise, produced by an
innovation. The antagonism against it is a reflex action accompanied by
emotions not due to conscious speculation. When we become conscious of
this emotional re-action, we endeavor to interpret it by a process of
reasoning. This reason must necessarily be based on the ideas which rise
into consciousness as soon as a break in the established custom occurs;
in other words, our rationalistic explanation will depend upon the
character of the associated ideas.

It is therefore of great importance to know whence the associated ideas
are derived, particularly in how far we may assume that these
associations are stable. It is not quite easy to give definite examples
of changes of such associations in our civilization, because, on the
whole, the rationalistic tendencies of our times have eliminated many of
the lines of association, even where the emotional effect remains; so
that the change, on the whole, is one from existing associations to loss
of associations.

We may sum up these observations by saying, that, while each habit is
the result of historical causes, it may in course of time associate
itself with different ideas. As soon as we become conscious of an
association between a habit and a certain group of ideas, we are led to
explain the habit by its present associations, which probably differ
from the associations prevailing at the time when the habit was
established.

We will now turn to a consideration of analogous phenomena in primitive
life. Here the dislike of that which deviates from the custom of the
land is even more strongly marked than in our civilization. If it is not
the custom to sleep in a house with feet turned towards the fire, a
violation of this custom is dreaded and avoided. If in a certain society
members of the same clan do not intermarry, the most deep-seated
abhorrence against such unions will arise. It is not necessary to
multiply examples, for it is a well-known fact that the more primitive a
people, the more it is bound by customs regulating the conduct of daily
life in all its details. I think we are justified in concluding from our
own experience, that as among ourselves, so among primitive tribes, the
resistance to a deviation from firmly established customs is due to an
emotional re-action, not to conscious reasoning. This does not preclude
the possibility that the first special act, which became in course of
time customary, may have been due to a conscious mental process; but it
seems to me likely that many customs came into being without any
conscious activity. Their development must have been of the same kind as
that of the categories which are reflected in the morphology of
languages, and which can never have been known to the speakers of these
languages. For instance, if we accept Cunow’s theory of the origin of
Australian social systems,[8] we may very well say that originally each
generation kept by themselves, and therefore marriages between members
of two succeeding generations were impossible, because only marriageable
men and women of one generation came into contact. Later on, when the
succeeding generations were not so diverse in age, and their social
separation ceased, the custom had been established, and did not lapse
with the changed conditions.

There are a number of cases in which it is at least conceivable that the
older customs of a people, under a new surrounding, develop into taboos.
I think, for instance, that it is very likely that the Eskimo taboo
forbidding the use of caribou and of seal on the same day may be due to
the alternating inland and coast life of the people. When they hunt
inland, they have no seals, and consequently can eat only caribou. When
they hunt on the coast, they have no caribou, and consequently can eat
only seal. The simple fact that in one season only caribou can be eaten,
and that in another season only seal can be eaten, may have easily led
to a resistance to a change of this custom; so that from the fact that
for a long period the two kinds of meat could not be eaten at the same
time, the law developed that the two kinds of meat must not be eaten at
the same time. I think it is also likely that the fish taboo of some of
our Southwestern tribes may be due to the fact that the tribes lived for
a long time in a region where no fish was available, and that the
impossibility of obtaining fish developed into the custom of not eating
fish. These hypothetical cases make it clear that the unconscious origin
of customs is quite conceivable, although of course not necessary. It
seems, however, certain that even when there has been a conscious
reasoning that led to the establishment of a custom, it soon ceased to
be conscious, and instead we find a direct emotional resistance to an
infraction of the custom.

Other actions which are considered proper or improper are continued
solely through the force of habit; and no reasons are assigned for their
occurrence, although the re-action against an infringement of the custom
may be strong. If among the Indians of Vancouver Island it is bad form
for a young woman of nobility to open her mouth wide and to eat fast, a
deviation from this custom would also be deeply felt, but in this case
as an impropriety which would seriously damage the social standing of
the culprit. The same group of feelings are concerned when a member of
the nobility, even in Europe, marries below his or her station. In
other, more trifling cases, the overstepping of the boundaries of custom
merely exposes the offender to ridicule, on account of the impropriety
of the act. All these cases belong psychologically to the same group of
emotional re-actions against breaks with established automatic habits.

It might seem that in primitive society opportunity could hardly be
given to bring into consciousness the strong emotional resistance
against infractions of customs, because they are rigidly adhered to.
There is one feature of social life, however, that tends to keep the
conservative attachment to customary actions before the minds of the
people. This is the education of the young. The child in whom the
habitual behavior of his surroundings has not yet developed will acquire
much of it by unconscious imitation. In many cases, however, it will act
in a way different from the customary manner, and will be corrected by
its elders. Any one familiar with primitive life will know that the
children are constantly exhorted to follow the example of their elders,
and every collection of carefully recorded traditions contains numerous
references to advice given by parents to children, impressing them with
the duty to observe the customs of the tribe. The greater the emotional
value of a custom, the stronger will be the desire to inculcate it in
the minds of the young. Thus ample opportunity is given to bring the
resistance against infractions into consciousness.

I believe that these conditions exert a very strong influence upon the
development and conservation of customs; for, as soon as the breach of
custom is raised into consciousness, occasions must arise when people,
either led by children’s questions or following their own bent to
speculation, find themselves confronted with the fact that certain ideas
exist for which they cannot give any explanation except that they are
there. The desire to understand one’s own feelings and actions, and to
get a clear insight into the secrets of the world, manifests itself at a
very early time, and it is therefore not surprising that man in all
stages of culture begins to speculate on the motives of his own actions.

As I have explained before, there can be no conscious motive for many of
these, and for this reason the tendency develops to discover the motives
that may determine our customary behavior. This is the reason why, in
all stages of culture, customary actions are made the subject of
secondary explanations that have nothing to do with their historical
origin, but which are inferences based upon the general knowledge
possessed by the people. I think the existence of such secondary
interpretations of customary actions is one of the most important
anthropological phenomena, and we have seen that it is hardly less
common in our own society than in more primitive societies. It is a
common observation that we desire or act first, and then try to justify
our desires and our actions. When, on account of our early bringing-up,
we act with a certain political party, most of us are not prompted by a
clear conviction of the justice of the principles of our party, but we
do so because we have been taught to respect it as the right party to
which to belong. Then only do we justify our standpoint by trying to
convince ourselves that these principles are the correct ones. Without
reasoning of this kind, the stability and geographical distribution of
political parties as well as of church denominations would be entirely
unintelligible. A candid examination of our own minds convinces us that
the average man, in by far the majority of cases, does not determine his
actions by reasoning, but that he first acts, and then justifies or
explains his acts by such secondary considerations as are current among
us.

We have discussed so far only the class of actions in which a break with
the customary brings into consciousness the emotional value of the
action in question, and releases a strong resistance to change, which is
secondarily explained by certain reasons that forbid a change. We have
seen that the traditional material with which man operates determines
the particular type of explanatory idea that associates itself with the
emotional state of mind. Primitive man generally bases these
explanations of his customs on concepts that are intimately related to
his general views of the constitution of the world. Some mythological
idea may be considered the basis of a custom or of the avoidance of
certain actions, or the custom may be given a symbolic significance, or
it may merely be connected with the fear of ill luck. Evidently this
last class of explanations is identical with those of many superstitions
that linger among us.

The essential result of this inquiry is the conclusion that the origin
of customs of primitive man must not be looked for in rational
processes. Most investigators who have tried to clear up the history of
customs and taboos express the view that their origin lies in
speculations on the relations between man and nature; that to primitive
man the world is filled with agencies of superhuman power, which may
harm man at the slightest provocation, and that attempts to avoid
conflict with these powers dictate the innumerable superstitious
regulations. The impression is given that the habits and opinions of
primitive man had been formed by conscious reasoning. It seems evident,
however, that this whole line of thought would remain consistent if it
is assumed that the processes were all subconscious.

Even granting this, I believe that these theories need extension,
because it would seem that many cases of this kind may have arisen
without any kind of reasoning, conscious or subconscious; for instance,
cases in which a custom became established by the general conditions of
life, and came into consciousness as soon as these conditions changed. I
do not doubt at all that there are cases in which customs originated by
more or less conscious reasoning; but I am just as certain that others
originated without, and that our theories should cover both points.

The study of primitive life exhibits a large number of associations of a
different type, which are not so easily explained. Certain patterns of
associated ideas may be recognized in all types of culture.

Sombre colors and depressed feelings are closely connected in our minds,
although not in those of peoples of foreign culture. Noise seems
inappropriate in a place of sadness, although among primitive people the
loud wail of the mourner is the natural expression of grief. Decorative
art serves to please the eye, yet a design like the cross has retained
its symbolic significance.

On the whole, such associations between groups of ideas apparently
unrelated are rare in civilized life. That they once existed is shown by
historical evidence as well as by survivals in which the old ideas have
perished, although the outer form remains. In primitive culture these
associations occur in great numbers. In discussing them we may begin
with examples that have their analogues in our own civilization, and
which therefore are readily intelligible to us.

The most extended domain of such customs is that of ritual. Accompanying
important actions we find numerous stated ritual forms which are
constantly applied, although their original significance has been lost
entirely. Many of them are so old that their origin must be looked for
in antiquity or even in prehistoric times. In our day the domain of
ritual is restricted, but in primitive culture it pervades the whole
life. Not a single action of any importance can be performed that is not
accompanied by proscribed rites of more or less elaborate form. It has
been proved in many cases that rites are more stable than their
explanations; that they symbolize different ideas among different people
and at different times. The diversity of rites is so great, and their
occurrence so universal, that here the greatest possible variety of
associations is found.

It seems to my mind that we may apply this point of view to many of the
most fundamental and inexplicable traits of primitive life, and that
when considered as associations between heterogeneous thoughts and
activities, their rise and history become more readily intelligible.

In our modern society the consideration of cosmic phenomena is
constantly associated with the efforts to give adequate explanations for
them, based on the principle of causality. In primitive society the
consideration of the same phenomena leads to a number of typical
associations which differ from our own, but which occur with remarkable
regularity among tribes living in the most remote parts of the world. An
excellent instance of this kind is the regular association of
observations relating to cosmic phenomena with purely human happenings;
in other words, the occurrence of nature myths. It seems to my mind that
the characteristic trait of nature myths is the association between the
observed cosmic events and what might be called a novelistic plot based
on the form of social life with which people are familiar. The plot as
such might as well develop among the peoples themselves; but its
association with the heavenly bodies, the thunder-storm, or the wind,
makes it a nature myth. One distinction between folk-tale and nature
myth lies solely in the association of the latter with cosmic phenomena.
This association does not naturally develop in modern society. If it is
still found every now and then, it is based on the survival of the
traditional nature myth. In primitive society, on the other hand, it is
found constantly. The investigation of the reason for this association
is an attractive problem, the solution of which can only in part be
surmised.

A number of other examples will demonstrate that the kind of association
here referred to is quite common in primitive life. An excellent
instance is furnished by certain characteristics of primitive decorative
art. With us almost the sole object of decorative art is æsthetic. We
wish to beautify the objects that are decorated. We recognize a certain
appropriateness of decorative motives in accordance with the uses to
which objects are to be put, and the emotional effect of the decorative
motive. In primitive life the conditions are quite different. Extended
investigations on decorative art in all continents have proved that
practically everywhere the decorative design is associated with a
certain symbolic significance. There is hardly a case known where a
primitive tribe cannot give some sort of explanation for the designs in
use. In some cases the symbolic significance may be exceedingly weak,
but ordinarily it is highly developed. The triangular and quadrangular
designs of our Plains Indians, for instance, almost always convey
definite symbolic meanings. They may be records of warlike deeds, they
may be prayers, or they may in some way convey other ideas relating to
the supernatural. It would almost seem that among primitive tribes
decorative art for its own sake does not exist. The only analogies in
modern decorative art are such as the use of the flag, of the cross, or
of emblems of secret societies, for decorative purposes; but their
frequency is insignificant as compared to the general symbolic
tendencies of primitive art. Thus it will be seen that we have here
again a type of association in primitive society quite different from
the type of association found among ourselves. Among primitive people
the æsthetic motive is combined with the symbolic, while in modern life
the æsthetic motive is either quite independent or associated with
utilitarian ideas.

On the North Pacific coast of America the animal design, which is found
in many other parts of the world, has associated itself firmly with the
totemic idea, and has led to an unparalleled application of animal
motives. This may also have helped to preserve the realistic character
of this art. Among the Sioux the high valuation of military prowess, and
the habit of exploiting deeds of war before the tribe, have been the
causes that led the men to associate the decoration on their garments
with events of war; so that among them a military symbolism has
developed, while the women of the same tribe explain the same design in
an entirely different manner (Wissler). It seems to me that in this last
case we have no particular difficulty in following the line of thought
that leads to the association between forms of decoration and military
ideas, although in general our minds require a much more conscious
effort than that of primitive man. The very fact of the well-nigh
universal occurrence of decorative symbolism shows that this association
must establish itself automatically and without conscious reasoning.

In both mythology and art the tendency to give rationalistic
explanations for the peculiar associations that have developed may be
observed in those cases in which styles of art or myths are borrowed.
The fact that decorative art among primitive people is almost everywhere
symbolic does not preclude the possibility of designs, and even of the
whole style, of one region, being borrowed from the people of another
region. This has been the case, for instance, among the tribes of our
Northwestern Plains, who have borrowed much of their art from their more
southern neighbors; but they have not adopted at the same time its
symbolical interpretations, but invented interpretations of their own. I
imagine that this is the outcome of a mental process which set in when
the designs were found pleasing, and, according to the general character
of primitive thought, a symbolic interpretation was expected. This was
then secondarily invented in accordance with the ideas current among the
tribe.

The same observation may be made in primitive mythology. The same kind
of tales are current over enormous areas, but the mythological use to
which they are put is locally quite different. Thus an ordinary
adventure relating to the exploits of some animal may sometimes be made
use of to explain some of its peculiar characteristics. At other times
it may be made use of to explain certain customs, or even the origin of
certain constellations in the sky. There is not the slightest doubt in
my mind that the tale as such is older than its mythological
significance. The characteristic feature of the development of the
nature myth is, first, that the tale has associated itself with attempts
to explain cosmic conditions (this has been referred to before); and,
secondly, that when primitive man became conscious of the cosmic
problem, he ransacked the entire field of his knowledge until he
happened to find something that could be fitted to the problem in
question, giving an explanation satisfactory to his mind. While the
classification of concepts, the types of association, and the resistance
to change of automatic acts, developed unconsciously, many of the
secondary explanations are due to conscious reasoning.

I will give still another example of a form of association
characteristic of primitive society. In modern society, social
organization, including the grouping of families, is essentially based
on blood-relationship and on the social functions performed by each
individual. Except in so far as the Church concerns itself with birth,
marriage, and death, there is no connection between social organization
and religious belief. These conditions are quite different in primitive
society, where we find an inextricable association of ideas and customs
relating to society and to religion. As in art form tends to associate
itself with ideas entirely foreign to it, so the social unit tends to
associate itself with various impressions of nature, particularly with
the divisions of the animal world. This form of association seems to me
the fundamental trait of totemism as found among many American tribes,
as well as in Australia, Melanesia, and in Africa. I have described
before its characteristic trait, which consists in a peculiar connection
that is believed to exist between a certain class of objects, generally
animals, and a certain social group. Further analysis shows very clearly
that one of the underlying ideas of totemism is the existence of
definite groups of man that are not allowed to intermarry, and that the
limitations of these groups are determined by considerations of
blood-relationship. The religious ideas found in totemism refer to the
personal relation of man to certain classes of supernatural powers, and
the typical trait of totemism is the association of certain kinds of
supernatural power with certain social groups. This granted, the
establishment of association with the supernatural world becomes at
least intelligible. That such feelings are not by any means improbable,
or even rare, is sufficiently shown by the exclusiveness of the European
high nobility, or by the national emotions in their pronounced form. It
is not at all difficult to understand how an overbearing enthusiasm of
self-appreciation of a community may become a powerful emotion or a
passion, which, on account of the lack of rational explanation of the
world, will tend to associate the members of the community with all that
is good and powerful. Psychologically, therefore, we may compare
totemism with those familiar forms of society in which certain social
classes claim privileges by the grace of God, or where the patron saint
of a community favors its members with his protection. It will be
recognized that we have here again a type of association in primitive
society which has completely changed with the development of
civilization.

However these associations may have been brought about, there is no
doubt that they do exist, and that, psychologically considered, they are
of the same character as those previously discussed, and that the
rationalizing mind of man soon lost the historic thread, and
reinterpreted the established customs in conformity with the general
trend of thought of his culture. We are therefore justified in
concluding that these customs must also be studied by the pragmatic
method, because their present associations are not likely to be
original, but rather secondary.

It is perhaps venturesome to discuss at the present moment the origin of
these types of association; yet it may be admissible to dwell on a few
of the most generalized facts which seem to characterize primitive
culture as compared to civilization. From our point of view, the
striking features of primitive culture are the great number of
associations of entirely heterogeneous groups of phenomena, such as
natural phenomena and individual emotion, social groupings and religious
concepts, decorative art and symbolic interpretation. These tend to
disappear with the approach to our present civilization, although a
careful analysis reveals the persistence of many, and the tendency of
each automatic action to establish its own associations according to the
mental relations in which it regularly occurs. One of the great changes
that has taken place may perhaps best be expressed by saying that in
primitive culture the impressions of the outer world are associated
intimately with subjective impressions, which they call forth regularly,
but which are determined largely by the social surroundings of the
individual. Gradually it is recognized that these connections are more
uncertain than others that remain the same for all mankind, and in all
forms of social surroundings; and thus sets in the gradual elimination
of one subjective association after another, which culminates in the
scientific method of the present day. We may express this also by saying
that when we have our attention directed to a certain concept which has
a whole fringe of incident concepts related to it, we at once associate
it with that group which is represented by the category of causality.
When the same concept appears in the mind of primitive man, it
associates itself with those concepts related to it by emotional states.

If this is true, then the associations of the primitive mind are
heterogeneous, and ours homogeneous and consistent only from our own
point of view. To the mind of primitive man, only his own associations
can be rational. Ours must appear to him just as heterogeneous as his to
us, because the bond between the phenomena of the world, as it appears
after the elimination of their emotional associations, which is being
established with increasing knowledge, does not exist for _him_, while
we can no longer feel the subjective associations that govern his mind.

This peculiarity of association is also another expression of the
conservatism of primitive culture and the changeability of many features
of our civilization. We tried to show that the resistance to change is
largely due to emotional sources, and that in primitive culture
emotional associations are the prevailing type: hence resistance against
the new. In our civilization, on the other hand, many actions are
performed merely as means to a rational end. They do not enter
sufficiently deeply into our minds to establish connections which would
give them emotional values: hence our readiness to change. We recognize,
however, that we cannot remodel, without serious emotional resistance,
any of the fundamental lines of thought and action which are determined
by our early education, and which form the subconscious basis of all our
activities. This is evinced by the attitude of civilized communities
towards religion, politics, art, and the fundamental concepts of
science.

In the average individual among primitive tribes, reasoning cannot
overcome this emotional resistance, and it therefore requires a
destruction of the existing emotional associations by more powerful
means to bring about a change. This may be effected by some event which
stirs up the mind of the people to its depths, or by economic and
political changes against which resistance is impossible. In
civilization there is a constant readiness to modify those activities
that have no emotional value. This is true not only of activities
designed to meet practical ends, but also of others that have lost their
associations, and that have become subject to fashion. There remain,
however, others which are retained with great tenacity, and which hold
their own against reasoning, because their strength lies in their
emotional values. The history of the progress of science yields example
after example of the power of resistance belonging to old ideas, even
after increasing knowledge of the world has undermined the ground on
which they were erected. Their overthrow is not brought about until a
new generation has arisen, to whom the old is no longer dear and near.

Besides this, there are a thousand activities and modes of thought that
constitute our daily life,—of which we are not conscious at all until we
come into contact with other types of life, or until we are prevented
from acting according to our custom,—that cannot in any way be claimed
to be more reasonable than others, and to which, nevertheless, we cling.
These, it would seem, are hardly less numerous in civilized than in
primitive culture, because they constitute the whole series of
well-established habits according to which the necessary actions of
ordinary every-day life are performed, and which are learned less by
instruction than by imitation.

We may also express these conclusions in another form. While in the
logical processes of the mind we find a decided tendency, with the
development of civilization, to eliminate traditional elements, no such
marked decrease in the force of traditional elements can be found in our
activities. These are controlled by custom almost as much among
ourselves as they are among primitive man. We have seen why this must be
the case. The mental processes which enter into the development of
judgments are based largely upon associations with previous judgments.
This process of association is the same among primitive men as among
civilized men, and the difference consists largely in the modification
of the traditional material with which our new perceptions amalgamate.
In the case of activities, the conditions are somewhat different. Here
tradition manifests itself in an action performed by the individual. The
more frequently this action is repeated, the more firmly it will become
established, and the less will be the conscious equivalent accompanying
the action; so that customary actions which are of very frequent
repetition become entirely unconscious. Hand in hand with this decrease
of consciousness goes an increase in the emotional value of the omission
of such activities, and still more of the performance of actions
contrary to custom. A greater will-power is required to inhibit an
action which has become well established; and combined with this effort
of the will-power are feelings of intense displeasure.

Thus an important change from primitive culture to civilization seems to
consist in the gradual elimination of what might be called the social
associations of sense-impressions and of activities, for which
intellectual associations are gradually substituted. This process is
accompanied by a loss of conservatism, which, however, does not extend
over the field of habitual activities that do not come into
consciousness, and only to a slight extent over those generalizations
which are the foundation of all knowledge imparted in the course of
education.

-----

Footnote 8:

  Some Australian tribes are divided into four exogamic groups. The laws
  of exogamy demand that a member of the first group must marry a member
  of the second group, and a member of the third group one of the fourth
  group. CUNOW explains these customs by showing that when custom
  provides that a man in a tribe that is divided into two exogamic
  units, and in which only members of the same generation are allowed to
  intermarry, conditions like those found in Australia will naturally
  develop, if each group has a name, and one set of names are used for
  the first, third, fifth, generations, and another set of names for the
  second, fourth, sixth, generations, etc. If we should designate the
  two tribal divisions by the letters A and B, the generations by 1 and
  2, the names of the four divisions would be A1, A2, B1, B2; and in
  marriages in which is placed first the sex that determines the group
  to which the offspring belongs, we find that—

               A1 must marry B1, and his children are A2
               B1  "     "   A1,  "   "     "      "  B2
               A2  "     "   B2,  "   "     "      "  A1
               B2  "     "   A2,  "   "     "      "  B1

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                              IX. SUMMARY


I MAY now be allowed to pass once more briefly over the whole ground
that we have covered. First of all, we tried to understand the reasons
for our belief in the existence of gifted races and of others less
favorably endowed, and found that it was based essentially on the
assumption that higher achievement is necessarily associated with higher
mental faculty, and that therefore the features of those races that in
our judgment have accomplished most are characteristics of mental
superiority. We subjected these assumptions to a critical study, and
discovered little evidence to support them. So many other causes were
found to influence the progress of civilization, accelerating or
retarding it, and similar processes were active in so many different
races, that, on the whole, hereditary traits, more particularly
hereditary higher gifts, were at best a possible, but not a necessary,
element determining the degree of advancement of a race.

The second part of the fundamental assumption seemed even less likely.
Hardly any evidence could be adduced to show that the anatomical
characteristics of the races possessing the highest civilization were
phylogenetically more advanced than those on lower grades of culture.
The various races differ in this respect; the specifically human
characteristics being most highly developed, some in one race, some in
another. Furthermore, it appeared that a direct relation between
physical habitus and mental endowment does not exist.

After thus clearing away the racial prejudice, the most formidable
obstacle to a clear understanding of our problem, we turned to an
investigation of the question whether human types are stable, more
particularly whether environment may change the anatomical structure of
man, and thus of his mental make-up, and to the correlated question,
what man owes to heredity. In treating the general question of the
stability of human types, we described some rudimentary organs and some
peculiar anatomical traits which prove a phylogenetic development of
man, traces of which were found in all races. The influence of
environment was demonstrated in all those cases in which changes in the
rate of growth affected the final form of the body; and we saw
particularly that early arrest of development does not necessarily mean
unfavorable development, because in many cases the rapidity and short
period of development seemed favorable elements. We saw that other
changes in human types may be brought about by selection, and that
environment itself seems to have a direct effect upon bodily form, as
was proved by the changes of type due to the transfer from a rural
environment to city life, and to the immigration of various
nationalities from Europe to America. We saw, however, that there is no
evidence at present to prove that these changes exceed certain definite
limits. Special attention was directed to those features of the bodily
form that characterize man as a domesticated animal, and which are due
to the peculiarities of human nutrition, and which facilitate crossing
of distinct types. The mentality of man appeared also to be influenced
by the degree of his domestication.

Turning to the influence of heredity, we recognized that by it are
determined all the most fundamental features of each race and type of
man, and that often the individual reverts to the traits of the one or
the other of his parents, or of his remote ancestors, in such manner
that one trait may belong to one ancestor, another to another. This
tendency seemed to explain the development of local types, and we
recognized the importance of the breaking of old fines of heredity, in
cases of intermarriages of branches of the same race that had long been
separated. By analogy we concluded that possibly, or probably, similar
tendencies may exist in the mental life of man.

After we had thus gained an insight into the physical characteristics of
the races and social groups of man, we took up a consideration of his
mental life. The mental traits common to all mankind are those which
appear by contrasting man with animals; and we pointed out briefly that
articulate language, the use of implements, and the power of reasoning,
belong to all members of the human species as opposed to the higher
animals. Before we entered into the comparison of the mental life of
primitive man and of civilized man, we had to clear away a number of
misconceptions caused by the current descriptions of the life of
primitive man. We saw that the oft-repeated claim that he has no power
to inhibit impulses, no power of attention, no originality of thought,
no power of clear reasoning, could not be maintained; and that all these
faculties are common to primitive man and to civilized man, although
they are excited on different occasions. This led us to a brief
consideration of the question whether the hereditary mental faculty was
improved by civilization, an opinion that did not seem plausible to us.

The study of the problem of the relation of racial descent to cultural
advancement required a determination of the question in how far these
are correlated. We endeavored to gain an insight into this problem by
following out the relations between human types, languages, and
cultures. A general lack of correlation appeared, which led us to infer
that the present types of man are older than the present linguistic
families, and that each type developed a number of languages. Since
these must be considered the product of the mental activities of each
type, uninfluenced or almost uninfluenced by other types, we tried to
discover whether one language could be shown to be superior to others,
and whether some languages made higher forms of thought impossible. The
results of this inquiry were quite analogous to those obtained in our
inquiry into the physical characteristics of man, and showed similar
traits in all languages, and also that languages were moulded by
thought, not thought by languages.

There still seemed to be a possibility of proving the backwardness of
certain tribes, if it could be shown that members of certain races were
all on early levels of culture, while those of other races had
independently reached later stages of development. This would presuppose
that the general course of cultural development is the same everywhere,
and that types of culture can be ascribed to definite stages of
development. The theory of such general parallelism of the history of
human culture is based on the similarity of cultural traits in all parts
of the world. Our analysis showed that the similarities were more
apparent than real, that they often developed by convergent development
from distinct sources, and that not all stages have been present in all
types of cultures. Thus all attempts to correlate racial types and
cultural stages failed us, and we concluded that cultural stage is
essentially a phenomenon dependent upon historical causes, regardless of
race.

Finally we attempted to describe the mental characteristics of primitive
man, regardless of his racial affiliations. We pointed out the
differences in principles of classification of experience found on
different social stages, and the differences in logical conclusions
reached by primitive and civilized man owing to the difference in the
character of knowledge accumulated by preceding generations. We then
followed out the emotional associations of habitual activities, and the
tendency to invent for them rationalistic explanations. We found them
quite common in primitive life, and noticed the great variety of ideas
and activities that were thus brought into contact so as to produce a
number of peculiar concepts and activities. Other peculiar associations
are not due to strong emotional causes, but to all of them is common the
tendency of taking on rationalistic explanations of varied character.
The change from primitive to civilized society includes a lessening of
the number of the emotional associations, and an improvement of the
traditional material that enters into our habitual mental operations.

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                 X. RACE PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES


WE will now turn to the question what these results of our inquiry teach
us in regard to the problems that confront our modern civilization,
particularly our nation. The development of the American nation through
the amalgamation of diverse European nationalities, the presence of the
Negro, Indian, and Chinese, and the whole ever-increasing heterogeneity
of the component elements of our people, involve a number of problems to
the solution of which our inquiries contribute important data.

Our previous considerations make clear the hypothetical character of
many of the generally accepted assumptions, and indicate that not all of
the questions involved can be answered at the present time with
scientific accuracy. It is disappointing that we have to take this
critical attitude, because the political question of dealing with all
these groups of people is of great and immediate importance. However, it
should be solved on the basis of scientific knowledge, not according to
emotional clamor. Under present conditions, we seem to be called upon to
formulate definite answers to questions that require the most
painstaking and unbiassed investigation; and the more urgent the demand
for final conclusions, the more needed is a critical examination of the
phenomena and of the available methods of solution.

Let us first represent to our minds the facts relating to the origins of
our nation. When British immigrants first flocked to the Atlantic coast
of North America, they found a continent inhabited by Indians. The
population of the country was thin, and vanished comparatively rapidly
before the influx of the more numerous Europeans. The settlement of the
Dutch on the Hudson, of the Germans in Pennsylvania, not to speak of
other nationalities, is familiar to all of us. We know that the
foundations of our modern state were laid by Spaniards in the Southwest,
by French in the Mississippi Basin and in the region of the Great Lakes,
but that the British immigration far outnumbered that of other
nationalities. In the composition of our people, the indigenous element
has never played an important rôle, except for very short periods. In
regions where the settlement progressed for a long time entirely by the
immigration of unmarried males of the white race, families of mixed
blood have been of some importance during the period of gradual
development, but they have never become sufficiently numerous in any
populous part of the United States to be considered as an important
element in our population. Without any doubt, Indian blood flows in the
veins of quite a number of our people, but the proportion is so
insignificant that it may well be disregarded.

Much more important has been the introduction of the negro, whose
numbers have increased many fold, so that they form now about one-eighth
of our whole nation. For a certain length of time the immigration of
Asiatic nations seemed likely to become of importance in the development
of our country, but the political events of recent years have tended to
decrease their immediate importance considerably, although we do not
venture to predict that the relation of Asiatics and white Americans may
not become a most important problem in the future. These facts, however,
are familiar to all of us, and stand out clearly to our minds.

More recent is the problem of the immigration of people representing all
the nationalities of Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. While
until late in the second half of the nineteenth century the immigrants
consisted almost entirely of people of northwestern Europe, natives of
Great Britain, Scandinavia, Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, and
France, the composition of the immigrant masses has changed completely
since that time. With the economic development of Germany, German
immigration has dwindled down; while at the same time Italians, the
various Slavic peoples of Austria, Russia, and the Balkan Peninsula,
Hungarians, Roumanians, East European Hebrews, not to mention the
numerous other nationalities, have arrived in ever increasing numbers.
There is no doubt that these people of eastern and southern Europe
represent physical types distinct from the physical type of northwestern
Europe; and it is clear, even to the most casual observer, that their
present social standards differ fundamentally from our own. Since the
number of new arrivals may be counted in normal years by hundreds of
thousands, the question may well be asked, What will be the result of
this influx of types distinct from our own, if it is to continue for a
considerable length of time?

It is often claimed that the phenomenon of mixture presented in the
United States is unique; that a similar intermixture has never occurred
before in the world’s history; and that our nation is destined to become
what some writers choose to term a “mongrel” nation in a sense that has
never been equalled anywhere.

When we try to analyze the phenomenon in greater detail, and in the
fight of our knowledge of conditions in Europe as well as in other
continents, this view does not seem to me tenable. In speaking of
European types, we are accustomed to consider them as, comparatively
speaking, pure stocks. It is easy to show that this view is erroneous.
It is only necessary to look at a map illustrating the racial types of
any European country—like Italy, for instance—to see that local
divergence is the characteristic feature, uniformity of type the
exception. Thus Dr. Ridolfo Livi, in his fundamental investigations on
the anthropology of Italy, has shown that the types of the extreme north
and of the extreme south are quite distinct,—the former tall,
short-headed, with a considerable sprinkling of blond and blue-eyed
individuals; the latter short, long-headed, and remarkably dark. The
transition from one type to the other is, on the whole, quite gradual;
but, like isolated islands, distinct types occur here and there. The
region of Lucca in Tuscany, and the district of Naples, are examples of
this kind, which may be explained as due to the survival of an older
stock, to the intrusion of new types, or to a peculiar influence of
environment.

Historical evidence is quite in accord with the results derived from the
investigation of the distribution of modern types. In the earliest times
we find on the peninsula of Italy groups of heterogeneous people, the
linguistic relationships of many of which have remained obscure up to
the present time. From the earliest prehistoric times on, we see wave
after wave of people invading Italy from the north. Very early Greeks
settled in the greater part of southern Italy, and Phœnician influence
was well established on the west coast of the peninsula. A lively
intercourse existed between Italy and northern Africa. Slaves of Berber
blood were imported, and have left their traces. Slave trade continued
to bring new blood into the country until quite recent times, and Livi
believes that he can trace the type of Crimean slaves who were
introduced late in the middle ages in the region of Venice. In the
course of the centuries, the migrations of Celtic and Teutonic tribes,
the conquests of the Normans, the contact with Africa, have added their
share to the mixture of people on the Italian peninsula.

The fates of other parts of Europe were no less diversified. The
Pyrenæan Peninsula, which at present seems to be one of the most
isolated parts of Europe, had a most checkered history. The earliest
inhabitants of whom we know were presumably related to the Basques of
the Pyrenees. These were subjected to Oriental influences in the
pre-Mycenæan period, to Punic influences, to Celtic invasions, Roman
colonization, Teutonic invasions, the Moorish conquest, and later on to
the peculiar selective process that accompanied the driving-out of the
Moors and the Jews.

England was not exempt from vicissitudes of this kind. It seems
plausible that at a very early period the type which is now found
principally in Wales and in some parts of Ireland occupied the greater
portion of the islands. It was swamped by successive waves of Celtic,
Roman, and Anglo-Saxon migration. Thus we find change everywhere.

The history of the migrations of the Goths, the invasions of the Huns,
who in the short interval of one century moved their habitations from
the borders of China into the very centre of Europe, are proofs of the
enormous changes in population that have taken place in early times.

Slow colonization has also brought about fundamental changes in blood as
well as in diffusion of languages and cultures. Perhaps the most
striking recent example of this change is presented by the gradual
Germanization of the region east of the Elbe River, where, after the
Teutonic migrations, people speaking Slavic languages had settled. The
gradual absorption of Celtic communities, of the Basque, in ancient
times the great Roman colonization, and later the Arab conquest of North
Africa, are examples of similar processes.

Intermixture in early times was not by any means confined to peoples
which, although diverse in language and culture, were of fairly uniform
type. On the contrary, the most diverse types of southern Europe,
northern Europe, eastern Europe, and western Europe, not to mention the
elements which poured into Europe from Asia and Africa, have been
participants in this long-continued intermixture.

There is, however, one fundamental difference in regard to the early
European migrations and the modern transatlantic migration. On the
whole, the former took place at a period when the density of population
was, comparatively speaking, small. There is no doubt that the number of
individuals concerned in the formation of the modern types of Great
Britain were comparatively few as compared with the millions who come
together to form a new nation in the United States; and it is obvious
that the process of amalgamation which takes place in communities that
must be counted by millions differs in character from the process of
amalgamation that takes place in communities that may be counted by
thousands. Setting aside social barriers, which in early times as well
as now undoubtedly tended to keep intermingling peoples separate, it
would seem that in the more populous communities of modern times a
greater permanence of the single combining elements might occur, owing
to their larger numbers, which make the opportunities for segregation
more favorable.

Among the smaller communities the process of amalgamation must have been
an exceedingly rapid one. After the social distinctions have once been
obliterated, pure descendants of one of the component types decrease
greatly in number, and the fourth generation of a people consisting
originally of distinct elements will be almost homogeneous. I shall
revert to this phenomenon later on.

It might be objected to this point of view, that the very diversity of
local types in Europe proves the homogeneity of race types,—as, for
instance, of the northwestern European type, the Mediterranean type, the
East European type, or the Alpine type,—but it must be remembered that
we have historical proof of the process of mixture, and that the
relative number of component elements is sufficient to account for the
present conditions.

I think we may dismiss the assumption of the existence of a pure type in
any part of Europe, and of a process of mongrelization in America
different from anything that has taken place for thousands of years in
Europe. Neither are we right in assuming that the phenomenon is one of a
more rapid intermixture than the one prevailing in olden times. The
difference is based essentially in the masses of individuals concerned
in the process.

If we confine our consideration for the present to the intermixture of
European types in America, I think it will be clear, from what has been
said before, that the concern that is felt by many in regard to the
continuance of racial purity of our nation is to a great extent
imaginary. The history of Europe proves that there has been no racial
purity anywhere for exceedingly long periods, neither has the continued
intermixture of European types shown any degrading effect upon any of
the European nationalities. It would be just as easy to prove that those
nations that have been least disturbed have lacked the stimulus to
further advance, and have passed through periods of quiescence. The
history of Spain might be interpreted as an instance of an occurrence of
this kind.

The question as to the actual effects of intermixture will not, however,
be answered by a generalized historical treatment such as we have
attempted here. The advocates of the theory of a degradation of type by
the influx of so-called “lower” types, will not be silenced by reference
to earlier mixtures in Europe, the course of which can no longer be
traced in actual detail; for we do not know to what extent actual
intermarriages have taken place, and what the development of families of
mixed descent as compared with those of pure descent has been. It seems
necessary that the problem should be approached from a biological
standpoint. It has seemed well, however, to gain first a clearer view of
the historical relations of our problem. A knowledge of the events of
the past tends to lay our apprehensions, that make the problem exciting,
and which for this reason fill the observer with a strong bias for the
results which he fears or desires.

Two questions stand out prominently in the study of the physical
characteristics of the immigrant population. The first is the question
of the influence of selection and environment in the migration from
Europe to America. The second is the question of the influence of
intermixture.

We have been able to throw some light upon both of these.

We found that the types which come to our shores do not remain stable,
but show such important modifications, that many of the differences of
the human types of Europe seem rather ephemeral than permanent,
determined more by environment than by heredity. The characteristics
which belong to the influences of environment belong to the most
fundamental traits of the body. Stature, form of head, and size of face,
seem to be equally subject to these influences; and the modifications
are the more marked, the less developed the organ in question at the
time of birth, the longer it is therefore subject to the influences of
environment. This fact allows us to assert with a high degree of
confidence that mental traits as well as physical traits will be
modified by the effect of environment. When, furthermore, we recall that
we could not discover any proofs of the superiority of one type over
another, we may feel safe when we state that the dangers to the vigor of
the American nation, due to an influx of alien European types, is
imaginative, not real.

A number of data have also been obtained for a better understanding of
the significance of race-mixture. Let us recall that one of the most
powerful agents modifying human types is the breaking-up of the
continuance of certain strains in small communities by a process of
rapid migration, which occurs both in Europe and in America, but with
much greater rapidity in our country, because the heterogeneity of
descent of the people is much greater than in the countries of Europe.

What effect these processes may have upon the ultimate type and
variability of the American people cannot be determined at the present
time; but no evidence is available that would allow us to expect a lower
status of the developing new types of America. Much remains to be done
in the study of this subject; and, considering our lack of knowledge of
the most elementary facts that determine the outcome of this process, I
feel that it behooves us to be most cautious in our reasoning, and
particularly to refrain from all sensational formulations of the problem
that are liable to add to the prevalent lack of calmness in its
consideration; the more so, since the answer to these questions concerns
the welfare of millions of people.

The problem is one in regard to which speculation is as easy as accurate
studies are difficult. Basing our arguments on ill-fitting analogies
with the animal and plant world, we may speculate on the effects of
intermixture upon the development of new types—as though the mixture
that is taking place in America were in any sense, except a sociological
one, different from the mixtures that have taken place in Europe for
thousands of years; looking for a general degradation, for reversion to
remote ancestral types, or towards the evolution of a new ideal type—as
fancy or personal inclination may impel us. We may enlarge on the danger
of the impending submergence of the northwest European type, or glory in
the prospect of its dominance over all others. Would it not be a safer
course to investigate the truth or fallacy of each theory rather than
excite the public mind by indulgence in the fancies of our speculation?
That these are an important help in the attainment of truth, I do not
deny; but they must not be promulgated before they have been subjected
to a searching analysis, lest the credulous public mistake fancy for
truth.

If I am not in a position to predict what the effect of mixture of
distinct types may be, I feel confident that this important problem may
be solved if it is taken up with sufficient energy and on a sufficiently
large scale. An investigation of the anthropological data of people of
distinct types,—taking into consideration the similarities and
dissimilarities of parents and children, the rapidity and final result
of the physical and mental development of children, their vitality, the
fertility of marriages of different types and in different social
strata,—such an investigation is bound to give us information which will
allow us to answer these important questions definitely and
conclusively.

The final result of race-mixture will necessarily depend upon the
fertility of the present native population and of the newer immigrants.
It has been pointed out repeatedly that the birth-rate of Americans has
declined with great rapidity, and that in the second and third
generations of descendants of immigrants the same decline makes itself
felt. It will therefore be important to know what the fertility of
different types may be.

If the fertility of foreigners continues high without a correspondingly
higher death-rate of children, we may anticipate a gradual increase of
the physical influence of the more fertile type. The immigration of the
divergent types of southern and eastern Europe is, however, so recent,
that this question cannot be answered until at least twenty years more
have elapsed.

No less important than the fertility of each immigrant type by itself is
the question in how far they tend to intermarry. The data presented in
our census reports do not give a clear insight into this tendency among
various nationalities. The difficulties of collecting significant
statistics on the problem are very great. They appear particularly
clearly in the case of Italians. Married men from Italy come to the
United States, earn some money, and go back to rejoin their families.
They may come again, and, when conditions are propitious, they may
finally send for their families to follow them. Thus we find among the
Italian immigrants very large numbers who were married before they came
here. It seems almost impossible to separate the contingent of couples
married before their arrival here from those married after their
arrival, and the chief point of interest to us lies in the
intermarriages of children born in this country. It is natural that in
large cities, where nationalities separate in various quarters, a great
amount of cohesion should continue for some time; but it seems likely
that intermarriages between descendants of foreign nationalities are
much more common than the census figures would make it appear. Our
experience with Americans whose grandparents immigrated into this
country is, on the whole, that most social traces of their descent have
disappeared, and that many do not even know to what nationalities their
grandparents belonged. It might be expected—particularly in Western
communities, where a rapid change of location is common—that this would
result in a rapid mixture of the descendants of various nationalities.
This inquiry, which it is quite feasible to carry out in detail, seems
indispensable for a clear understanding of the situation.

It is somewhat difficult to realize how rapidly intermixture of distinct
types takes place if the choice of mates is left entirely to accident. I
have made this calculation, and I find that in a population in which two
types intermingle, and in which both types occur with equal frequency,
there will be in the fourth generation less than one person in ten
thousand of pure descent. When the proportion of the two original types
is as eight to one, there will be among the more numerous part of the
population less than thirty in one thousand in the fourth generation
that will be of pure blood. Taking these data as a basis, it is obvious
that intermixture, as soon as the social barriers have been removed,
must be exceedingly rapid; and I think it safe to assume that one
hundred years from now, in the bulk of our population, very few pure
descendants of the present immigrants will be found.

Unfortunately, however, we do not know the influence of racial cohesion.
Obviously this is one of the fundamental points that ought to be known
in order to gain a clear insight into the effect of recent immigration.
Without this information, the whole discussion of the effect of
intermixture remains speculative. The results of the present census will
give us a certain amount of much-needed information on these points.

In these remarks on the problems of European immigration I have confined
myself entirely to the biological problem, because all our
considerations have shown conclusively that mental life is so plastic,
that no hereditary inability can be assumed to exist in any of the
peoples of Europe.

When we turn our attention to the negro problem as it presents itself in
the United States, we must remember our previous considerations, in
which we found that no proof of an inferiority of the negro type could
be given, except that it seemed possible that perhaps the race would not
produce quite so many men of highest genius as other races, while there
was nothing at all that could be interpreted as suggesting any material
difference in the mental capacity of the bulk of the negro population as
compared to the bulk of the white population.

Much has been said about the shorter period of growth of the negro child
as compared to the white child, but no convincing data have been
forthcoming. Considering the great variation in the duration of growth
and development in different individuals and in various social classes,
according to the more or less favorable nutrition of the child, the
information that we possess in regard to the negro child is practically
without value. We have not even evidence that would prove that a shorter
period of development must be unfavorable in its results. Neither do we
know at what period and in what manner develop the typical negroid
features, which are much less pronounced in the new-born than in adults.

It is surprising, that, notwithstanding their importance, no attempts
have been made to gain a better insight into these anatomical and
physiological problems, some of which might be solved without much
difficulty. As it is, almost all we can say with certainty is, that the
differences between the average types of the white and of the negro,
that have a bearing upon vitality and mental ability, are much less than
the individual variations in each race.

This result is, however, of great importance, and is quite in accord
with the result of ethnological observation. A survey of African tribes
exhibits to our view cultural achievements of no mean order. To those
unfamiliar with the products of native African art and industry, a walk
through one of the large museums of Europe would be a revelation. None
of our American museums has made collections that exhibit this subject
in any way worthily. The blacksmith, the wood-carver, the weaver, the
potter,—these all produce ware original in form, executed with great
care, and exhibiting that love of labor, and interest in the results of
work, which are apparently so often lacking among the negroes in our
American surroundings. No less instructive are the records of
travellers, reporting the thrift of the native villages, of the extended
trade of the country, and of its markets. The power of organization as
illustrated in the government of native states is of no mean order, and
when wielded by men of great personality has led to the foundation of
extended empires. All the different kinds of activities that we consider
valuable in the citizens of our country may be found in aboriginal
Africa. Neither is the wisdom of the philosopher absent. A perusal of
any of the collections of African proverbs that have been published will
demonstrate the homely practical philosophy of the negro, which is often
proof of sound feeling and judgment.

It would be out of place to enlarge on this subject, because the
essential point that anthropology can contribute to the practical
discussion of the adaptability of the negro is a decision of the
question how far the undesirable traits that are at present undoubtedly
found in our negro population are due to racial traits, and how far they
are due to social surroundings for which we are responsible. To this
question anthropology can give the decided answer that the traits of
African culture as observed in the aboriginal home of the negro are
those of a healthy primitive people, with a considerable degree of
personal initiative, with a talent for organization, and with
imaginative power, with technical skill and thrift. Neither is a warlike
spirit absent in the race, as is proved by the mighty conquerors who
overthrew states and founded new empires, and by the courage of the
armies that follow the bidding of their leaders. There is nothing to
prove that licentiousness, shiftless laziness, lack of initiative, are
fundamental characteristics of the race. Everything points out that
these qualities are the result of social conditions rather than of
hereditary traits.

It may be well to state here once more with some emphasis that it would
be erroneous to assume that there are no differences in the mental
make-up of the negro race and of other races, and that their activities
should run in the same lines. On the contrary, if there is any meaning
in correlation of anatomical structure and physiological function, we
must expect that differences exist. There is, however, no evidence
whatever that would stigmatize the negro as of weaker build, or as
subject to inclinations and powers that are opposed to our social
organization. An unbiassed estimate of the anthropological evidence so
far brought forward does not permit us to countenance the belief in a
racial inferiority which would unfit an individual of the negro race to
take his part in modern civilization. We do not know of any demand made
on the human body or mind in modern life that anatomical or ethnological
evidence would prove to be beyond the powers of the negro.

The traits of the American negro are adequately explained on the basis
of his history and social status. The tearing-away from the African soil
and the consequent complete loss of the old standards of life, which
were replaced by the dependency of slavery and by all it entailed,
followed by a period of disorganization and by a severe economic
struggle against heavy odds, are sufficient to explain the inferiority
of the status of the race, without falling back upon the theory of
hereditary inferiority.

In short, there is every reason to believe that the negro, when given
facility and opportunity, will be perfectly able to fulfil the duties of
citizenship as well as his white neighbor. It may be that he will not
produce as many great men as the white race, and that his average
achievement will not quite reach the level of the average achievement of
the white race; but there will be endless numbers who will be able to
outrun their white competitors, and who will do better than the
defectives whom we permit to drag down and to retard the healthy
children of our public schools.

The anthropological discussion of the negro problem requires also a word
on the “race instinct” of the whites, which plays a most important part
in the practical aspect of the problem. Ultimately this phenomenon is a
repetition of the old instinct and fear of the connubium of patricians
and plebeians, of the European nobility and the common people, or of the
castes of India. The emotions and reasonings concerned are the same in
every respect. In our case they relate particularly to the necessity of
maintaining a distinct social status in order to avoid race-mixture. As
in the other cases mentioned, the so-called instinct is not a
physiological dislike. This is proved by the existence of our large
mulatto population, as well as by the more ready amalgamation of the
Latin peoples. It is rather an expression of social conditions that are
so deeply ingrained in us that they assume a strong emotional value; and
this, I presume, is meant when we call such feelings instinctive. The
feeling certainly has nothing to do with the question of the vitality
and ability of the mulatto.

Still the questions of race-mixture and of the negro’s adaptability to
our environment represent a number of important problems.

I think we have reason to be ashamed to confess that the scientific
study of these questions has never received the support either of our
government or of any of our great scientific institutions; and it is
hard to understand why we are so indifferent toward a question which is
of paramount importance to the welfare of our nation. The anatomy of the
American negro is not well known; and, notwithstanding the oft-repeated
assertions regarding the hereditary inferiority of the mulatto, we know
hardly anything on this subject. If his vitality is lower than that of
the full-blooded negro, this may be as much due to social causes as to
hereditary causes. Owing to the very large number of mulattoes in our
country, it would not be a difficult matter to investigate the
biological aspects of this question thoroughly. The importance of
researches on this subject cannot be too strongly urged, since the
desirability or undesirability of race-mixture should be known. Looking
into a distant future, it seems reasonably certain that with the
increasing mobility of the negro, the number of full-bloods will rapidly
decrease; and since there is no introduction of new negro blood, there
cannot be the slightest doubt that the ultimate effect of the contact
between the two races must necessarily be a continued increase of the
amount of white blood in the negro community.

This process will go on most rapidly inside of the colored community,
owing to intermarriages between mulattoes and full-blooded negroes.
Whether or not the addition of white blood to the colored population is
sufficiently large to counterbalance this levelling effect, which will
make the mixed bloods with a slight strain of negro blood darker, is
difficult to tell; but it is quite obvious that, although our laws may
retard the influx of white blood considerably, they cannot hinder the
gradual progress of intermixture. If the powerful caste system of India
has not been able to prevent intermixture, our laws, which recognize a
greater amount of individual liberty, will certainly not be able to do
so; and that there is no racial sexual antipathy is made sufficiently
clear by the size of our mulatto population. A candid consideration of
the manner in which intermixture takes place shows very clearly that the
probability of the infusion of white blood into the colored population
is considerable. While the large body of the white population will
always, at least for a very long time to come, be entirely remote from
any possibility of intermixture with negroes, I think that we may
predict with a fair degree of certainty a condition in which the
contrast between colored people and whites will be less marked than it
is at the present time. Notwithstanding all the obstacles that may be
laid in the way of intermixture, the conditions are such that the
persistence of the pure negro type is practically impossible. Not even
an excessively high mortality and lack of fertility among the mixed
type, as compared with the pure types, could prevent this result. Since
it is impossible to change these conditions, they should be faced
squarely, and we ought to demand a careful and critical investigation of
the whole problem.

It seems to my mind that the policy of many of our Southern States that
try to prevent all racial intermixture is based on an erroneous view of
the process involved. The alleged reason for this type of legislation is
the necessity of protecting the white race against the infusion of negro
blood. As a matter of fact, this danger does not exist. With very few
exceptions, the unions between whites and negroes are those of white men
and negro women. The increase of races, however, is such that the number
of children born does not depend upon the number of men, but upon the
number of women. Given, therefore, a certain number of negro women, the
increase of the colored population will depend upon their number; and if
a considerable number of their children are those of white fathers, the
race as a whole must necessarily lose its pure negro type. At the same
time no such infusion of negro blood into the white race through the
maternal line occurs, so that the process is actually one of lightening
the negro race without corresponding admixture in the white race.

It appears from this consideration that the most important practical
questions relating to the negro problem have reference to the mulattoes
and other mixed bloods,—to their physical types, their mental and moral
qualities, and their vitality. When the bulky literature of this subject
is carefully sifted, little remains that will endure serious criticism;
and I do not believe that I claim too much when I say that the whole
work on this subject remains to be done. The development of modern
methods of research makes it certain that by careful inquiry definite
answers to our problems may be found. Is it not, then, our plain duty to
inform ourselves, that, so far as that can be done, deliberate
consideration of observations may take the place of heated discussion of
beliefs in matters that concern not only ourselves, but also the welfare
of millions of negroes?

                  *       *       *       *       *

I hope the discussions contained in these pages have shown that the data
of anthropology teach us a greater tolerance of forms of civilization
different from our own, and that we should learn to look upon foreign
races with greater sympathy, and with the conviction, that, as all races
have contributed in the past to cultural progress in one way or another,
so they will be capable of advancing the interests of mankind, if we are
only willing to give them a fair opportunity.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                 NOTES


Page 8.

  A general presentation of these data will be found in F. RATZEL,
      History of Mankind; SOPHUS MÜLLER, Urgeschichte Europas.

Page 9.

  A. PENCK, “Das Alter des Menschengeschlechtes” (_Zeitschrift für
      Ethnologie_, vol. xl, pp. 390 _et seq._); PENCK AND
      BRÜCKNER, Die Alpen im Eiszeitalter (Leipzig).

Page 10.

  TH. WAITZ, Anthropologie der Naturvölker (2d ed.), vol. i, p.
      381.

Page 13.

  GEORG GERLAND, Das Aussterben der Naturvölker; F. RATZEL,
      Anthropogeographie, vol. ii, pp. 330 _et seq._

Page 14.

  1. HENRY BARTH, Travels and Discoveries in North and Central
      Africa (2d ed., London, 1857-1858), vol. ii, pp. 253 _et
      seq._; vol. iii, pp. 425 _et seq._, 528 _et seq._; vol. iv,
      pp. 406 _et seq._, 579 _et seq._

  2. GUSTAV NACHTIGAL, Sahărâ und Sûdân, vol. ii, pp. 391 _et
      seq._, 691 _et seq._; vol. iii, pp. 270 _et seq._, 355 _et
      seq._

Page 16.

  MARY WHITE OVINGTON, Half a Man, the Status of the Negro in New
      York (New York, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1911).

Page 18.

  1. ROBERT BENNETT BEAN, “On a Racial Peculiarity in the Brain of
      the Negro” (_American Journal of Anatomy_, vol. iv [1905]).

  2. Fr. P. MALL, “On Several Anatomical Characters of the Human
      Brain, said to vary according to Race and Sex, etc.”
      (_Ibid._, vol. ix, pp. 1-32).

Page 21.

  1. H. KLAATSCH, “The Skull of the Australian Aboriginal”
      (_Reports from the Pathological Laboratory of the Lunacy
      Department, New South Wales Government_, vol. i, part
      iii [Sydney, 1908], pp. 3-167); “Der primitive Mensch
      der Vergangenheit und Gegenwart” (_Verhandlungen der
      Gesellschaft deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte_, 80
      Vers. zu Cöln, part i, p. 95); Anatomische Hefte, 1902.

  2. C. H. STRATZ DEN HAAG, “Das Problem der Rasseneinteilung der
      Menschheit” (_Archiv für Anthropologie_, N. S., vol. i, pp.
      189 _et seq._).

  3. OTTO SCHOETENSACK, “Die Bedeutung Australiens für die
      Heranbildung des Menschen aus einer niederen Form”
      (_Zeitschrift für Ethnologie_, vol. xxxiii [1901], pp. 127
      _et seq._).

  4. D. J. CUNNINGHAM, “The Lumbar Curve in Man and Apes”
      (_Cunningham Memoirs_ [Dublin, 1886]).

Page 24.

  1. KARL PEARSON, “On the Relationship of Intelligence to Size
      and Shape of Head, and to other Physical and Mental
      Characters” (_Biometrika_, vol. v, pp. 136 _et seq._).

  2. L. MANOUVRIER, “Les aptitudes et les actes dans leurs
      rapports avec la constitution anatomique et avec le milieu
      extérieur” (_Bulletins de la Société d’Anthropologie de
      Paris_, 4^o series, vol. i [1890], pp. 918 _et seq._).

Page 25.

  P. TOPINARD, Éléments d’Anthropologie générale, p. 620. The
      value for African negroes is here very small. Another series
      quoted by Topinard (_Ibid._, p. 622), consisting of 100
      skulls of each group, gives the following averages:
      Parisians, 1551 cc.; Auvergnats, 1585 cc.; African negroes,
      1477 cc.; New Caledonians, 1488 cc. (a misprint in
      Topinard’s book makes this appear as 1588 cc.).

Page 26.

  1. L. MANOUVRIER, “Sur l’interprétation de la quantité dans
      l’encéphale” (_Mémoires de la Société d’Anthropologie de
      Paris_, 2d series, vol. iii, pp. 284, 277, 281).

  2. F. GALTON, “Head Growth in Students at Cambridge” (_Journal
      of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and
      Ireland_, vol. xviii, p. 156).

Page 27.

  A. DA COSTA FERRAIRA, “La capacité du crâne chez les Portugais”
      (_Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société d’Anthropologie de
      Paris_, Série V, vol. iv [1903], pp. 417 _et seq._).

Page 28.

  H. H. DONALDSON, The Growth of the Brain (1895); RAYMOND PEARL,
      “Variation and Correlation in Brain-Weight” (_Biometrika_,
      vol. iv, pp. 13 _et seq._).

Page 29.

  FRANKLIN P. MALL. See note 2 to p. 18.

Page 36.

  R. H. LOCK, Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity
      and Evolution (1906), pp. 73 _et seq._; A. L. BOWLEY,
      Elements of Statistics (1901).

Page 41.

  R. WIEDERSHEIM, Der Bau des Menschen (4th ed., 1908); The
      Structure of Man an Index to his Past History (1895).

Page 44.

  J. KOLLMANN, “Beiträge zur einer Kraniologie der Europäischen
      Völker” (_Archiv für Anthropologie_, vol. xiii; vol. xiv,
      pp. 1, 79, 179); “Die Rassenanatomie der Hand und die
      Persistenz der Rassenmerkmale” (_Ibid._, vol. xxviii, pp. 91
      _et seq._).

Page 45.

  1. J. DENIKER, The Races of Man.

  2. B. A. GOULD, Investigations in the Military and
      Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers (New York,
      1869); J. H. BAXTER, Statistics, Medical and Anthropological
      (Washington, 1875).

  3. H. P. BOWDITCH, “The Growth of Children” (_Eighth Annual
      Report of the State Board of Health of Massachusetts_
      [Boston, 1877]).

  4. GEO. W. PECKHAM, “The Growth of Children” (_Sixth Annual
      Report of the State Board of Health of Wisconsin_).

  5. OTTO AMMON, Zur Anthropologie der Badener (Jena, 1899), p.
      514; EDV. PH. MACKEPRANG, “De Värnepligtiger Legemshøjde i
      Danmark” (_Meddelelser om Danmarks Antropologi_ [Kopenhagen,
      1907], vol. i); HANS DAAE, Legemets udvikling hos Norges
      mandlige ungdom.

Page 46.

  WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, The Races of Europe (New York, 1899), p. 381.

Page 48.

  1. For general data on growth see S. Weissenberg, Das Wachstum
      des Menschen (1911).

  2. F. BOAS and C. WISSLER, Statistics of Growth (_Report of the
      U.S. Commissioner of Education for 1904_, pp. 25-132).

Page 49.

  E. MEUMANN, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle
      Pädagogik (Leipzig, 1907), vol. i.

Page 50.

  1. RIEGER, Ueber die Beziehungen der Schädellehre zu
      Psychologie, Psychiatrie und Ethnologie (1882).

  2. JOSEPH ENGEL, Untersuchungen über Schädelformen (Prag, 1851).

  3. G. WALCHER, “Ueber die Entstehung von Brachy- und
      Dolichokephalie” (_Zentralblatt für Gynäkologie_, vol. xxix
      [1904], No. 7); see also ANTON NYSTRÖM, “Ueber die
      Formenveränderungen des menschlichen Schädels und deren
      Ursachen” (_Archiv für Anthropologie_, vol. xxvii, pp. 211
      _et seq._).

  4. OTTO AMMON, Zur Anthropologie der Badener (Jena, 1899),
      p. 641; Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen (1893); see
      also DE LAPOUGE, “Recherches sur l’anthropologie de
      l’Ille-et-Vilaine” (_Bulletin de la Société scientifique
      et médicale de l’Ouest_ [Rennes, 1895]).

Page 51.

  1. RIDOLFO LIVI, Antropometria Militare (Rome, 1896), pp. 87 _et
      seq._

  2. F. C. SHRUBSALL, “Physical Characters and Morbid
      Proclivities” (_St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Reports_, 1904,
      vol. xxxix, pp. 63 _et seq._).

Page 52.

  See, for instance, W. Z. RIPLEY, The Races of Europe (New York,
      1899).

Page 53.

  FRANZ BOAS, Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants,
      being partial report on the results of an anthropological
      investigation for the U.S. Immigration Commission (Senate
      Document No. 208, 61st Congress, 2d session, Washington,
      1910); Abstract of the Report on Changes in Bodily Form of
      Descendants of Immigrants (Washington, 1911).

Page 59.

  WALCHER. See note 3 to p. 50.

Page 60.

  F. BOAS, “The Cephalic Index” (_American Anthropologist_, N. S.,
      vol. i, pp. 448 _et seq._).

Page 65.

  GUSTAV FRITSCH, Die Eingeborenen Süd-Afrikas (Breslau, 1872),
      pp. 30 _et seq._

Page 68.

  1. C. KELLER, “Die Haustiere als menschlicher Kulturerwerb”
      (_Der Mensch und die Erde_ [Berlin, 1906], vol. i, pp.
      165-304); Naturgeschichte der Haustiere (Berlin, 1905).
      Studer, Die prähistorischen Hunde in ihrer Beziehung zu den
      gegenwärtig lebenden Rassen (Zürich, 1901).

  2. BECKMANN, Geschichte und Beziehung der Rassen der Hunde
      (Brunswick, 1894-95).

Page 69.

  W. BOGORAS, The Chukchee (Publications of the Jesup North
      Pacific Expedition [Leyden, 1904-1909], vol. vii, pp. 73 _et
      seq._). Compare, however, J. A. ALLEN, “Report on the
      Mammals collected in Northeast Siberia by the Jesup North
      Pacific Expedition” (_Bulletin American Museum of Natural
      History_ [New York, 1903], vol. xix, p. 126).

Page 73.

  1. K. PEARSON, “Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of
      Evolution, III” (_Philosophical Transactions_, 1896-97, pp.
      253 _et seq._).

  2. H. H. RISLEY and E. A. GAIT, Census of India, 1901 (Calcutta,
      1903), vol. i, pp. 489 _et seq._

Page 74.

  1. G. NACHTIGAL, Sahărâ und Sûdân, vol. ii, pp. 424 _et seq._

  2. RUDOLF MARTIN, Die Inlandstämme der Malayischen Halbinsel
      (Jena, 1905), pp. 1011-1012.

Page 77.

  FRANCIS GALTON, Natural Inheritance. KARL PEARSON, “Law of
      Ancestral Heredity” (_Proceedings of the Royal Society of
      London_, vol. lxii, pp. 387, 388); “Law of Reversion”
      (_Ibid._, vol. lxvi, pp. 142 _et seq._); “On a Criterion
      which may serve to test Various Theories of Inheritance”
      (_Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie_, vol. vii
      [1904], pp. 524 _et seq._).

Page 78.

  1. R. H. LOCK, Recent Progress in the Study of Variation,
      Heredity and Evolution (1906); BATESON, Mendelism.

  2. FRANZ BOAS, “Zur Anthropologie der nordamerikanischen
      Indianer” (_Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für
      Anthropologie, Ethnologie u. Urgeschichte_, vol. xxvii
      [1895], pp. 366 _et seq._); “The Half-Blood Indian”
      (_Popular Science Monthly_, vol. xlv [1894], pp. 761 _et
      seq._).

Page 80.

  F. VON LUSCHAN, “Die Tachtadschy und andere Ueberreste der alten
      Bevölkerung Lykiens” (_Archiv für Anthropologie_, vol. xix,
      pp. 31-53).

Page 82.

  KARL PEARSON, “On the Laws of Heredity in Man” (_Biometrika_,
      vol. ii [1902-03], pp. 357 _et seq._); FRANZ BOAS, “Heredity
      in Anthropometric Traits” (_American Anthropologist_, N. S.,
      vol. ix [1907], pp. 453 _et seq._).

Page 84.

  1. CH. B. DAVENPORT, “Heredity of Eye-Color in Man” (_Science_,
      N. S., vol. xxvi [1907], pp. 589-592); “Heredity of
      Hair-Form in Man” (_American Naturalist_, vol. xlii, pp.
      341-349).

  2. G. and CH. DAVENPORT, “Heredity of Hair-Color in Man”
      (_American Naturalist_, vol. xliii, pp. 193-211).

Page 86.

  OTTOKAR LORENZ, Lehrbuch der gesammten wissenschaftlichen
      Genealogie (Berlin, 1898), pp. 289 _et seq._, 308, 310, 311.

Page 89.

  W. JOHANNSEN, Elemente der exakten Erblichkeitslehre (Jena).

Page 91.

  M. D. and RAYMOND PEARL, “On the Relation of Race Crossing to
      the Sex Ratio” (_Biological Bulletin_, vol. xv [1908], pp.
      194 _et seq._).

Page 100.

  1. GUSTAV KLEMM, Allgemeine Cultur-Geschichte (Leipzig, 1843),
      vol. i, pp. 196 _et seq._ His opinions are accepted by A.
      WUTTKE, Geschichte des Heidentums (Breslau, 1852-53), vol.
      i, p. 36.

  2. CARL GUSTAV CARUS, “Ueber die ungleiche Befähigung der
      verschiedenen Menschheitsstämme für höhere geistige
      Entwicklung” (_Denkschrift zum hundertjährigen Geburtsfeste
      Goethe’s_, Leipzig, 1849).

  3. J. A. DE GOBINEAU, Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines
      (Paris, 1853-55).

  4. NOTT and GLIDDON, Types of Mankind (Philadelphia, 1854);
      Indigenous Races of the Earth (Philadelphia, 1857).

  5. THEODOR WAITZ, Anthropologie der Naturvölker, vol. (2d ed.,
      Leipzig, 1877).

  6. HERBERT SPENCER, Principles of Sociology.

  7. EDWARD B. TYLOR, Researches into the Early History of
      Mankind; Primitive Culture.

Page 101.

  THEODOR WAITZ, Anthropologie der Naturvölker (2d ed., 1877),
      vol. i, p. 387.

Pages 106, 109.

  HERBERT SPENCER, The Principles of Sociology (New York, 1893),
      vol. i, pp. 55 _et seq._, 59-61.

Page 111.

  G. M. SPROAT, Scenes and Studies of Savage Life (1868), p. 120.

Page 112.

  1. HERBERT SPENCER, l.c., p. 70.

  2. FRANZ BOAS, “The Growth of Indian Mythologies” (_Journal of
      American Folk-Lore_, vol. ix [1896], pp. 1-11).

  3. J. MOONEY, “The Ghost-Dance Religion” (_Fourteenth Annual
      Report of the Bureau of Ethnology_, pp. 641 _et seq._).

Page 113.

  1. OVIEDO Y VALDÉS, Historia General y Natural de las Indias
      [1535-57] (Madrid, 1851-55), Bk. xlii, Chaps. 2, 3 (quoted
      from SPENCER, Descriptive Sociology, No. II, pp. 42-43).

  2. RUDOLF LEHMANN, Schopenhauer.

Page 114.

  G. TARDE, Les Lois de l’Imitation.

Page 116.

  FRANCIS GALTON, Natural Inheritance; Hereditary Genius. KARL
      PEARSON, _Biometrika_.

Page 117.

  1. A. WERNICH, Geographisch-medicinische Studien nach den
      Erlebnissen einer Reise um die Erde (Berlin, 1878), pp. 81
      _et seq._

  2. RUDOLF VIRCHOW, “Die physischen Eigenschaften der Lappen”
      (_Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie,
      Ethnologie u. Urgeschichte_, vol. vii [1875], pp. 34 _et
      seq._; also vol. xxii [1890], p. 411).

Page 118.

  1. W. H. R. RIVERS, “Observations on the Senses of the Todas”
      (_Journal of Psychology_, vol. i [1905], pp. 322 _et seq._).

  2. The complete results of this study have not been published.
      The tests on hearing were published by FRANK G. BRUNER, The
      Hearing of Primitive Peoples (New York, _Science Press_,
      1908).

Page 120.

  CHARLES DARWIN, Journal of Researches into the Natural History
      and Geology of the Countries visited during the Voyage of H.
      M. S. _Beagle_ round the World (New York, 1895), pp.
      228-229.

Page 121.

  A brief résumé of FREUD’S theory will be found in the _American
      Journal of Psychology_, vol. xxi (1910).

Page 126.

  1. For a history of these attempts, see P. TOPINARD, Éléments
      d’Anthropologie générale (Paris, 1885), pp. 1-147.

  2. H. HUXLEY, “On the Geographical Distribution of the Chief
      Modifications of Mankind” (_Journal of the Ethnological
      Society_, N. S., vol. ii [1870], pp. 404-412).

Page 127.

  FRIEDRICH MÜLLER, Allgemeine Ethnographie (Vienna, 1879).

Page 128.

  W. Z. RIPLEY, The Races of Europe (New York, 1899); J. DENIKER,
      The Races of Man (London, 1900).

Page 129.

  1. F. SARASIN, Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen
      auf Ceylon (Wiesbaden, 1892-93), vol. iii, pp. 569 _et seq._

  2. E. BÄLZ, “Menschenrassen Ost-Asiens mit specieller Rücksicht
      auf Japan” (_Verhandlungen der Berliner anthropologischen
      Gesellschaft_, vol. xxxiii [1901], pp. 166-189); H. TEN
      KATE, “Anthropologisches und Verwandtes aus Japan”
      (_Internationales Centralblatt für Anthropologie_, vol. vii
      [1902], p. 659).

  3. W. JOCHELSON, The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirized Tungus
      (_Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition_, vol.
      ix [1910], p. 59).

Page 131.

  1. FRANZ BOAS, “A. J. Stone’s Measurements of Natives of the
      Northwest Territories” (_Bulletin of the American Museum of
      Natural History_, vol. xiv [New York, 1901], pp. 53-68);
      “Zur Anthropologie der nordamerikanischen Indianer”
      (_Verhandlungen der Berliner Gesellschaft für Anthropologie,
      Ethnologie und Urgeschichte_, vol. xxvii [1895], pp. 367 _et
      seq._).

  2. PLINY EARLE GODDARD, Life and Culture of the Hupa
      (_University of California Publications, American Archæology
      and Ethnology_, vol. i [Berkeley, 1903-04]); WASHINGTON
      MATTHEWS, Navaho Legends (1897); P. A. G. MORICE, “The Great
      Déné Race” (_Anthropos_, vols. i, ii, iv [1906, 1907,
      1909]).

Page 132.

  A. L. KROEBER, Types of Indian Culture in California
      (_University of California Publications, American Archæology
      and Ethnology_, vol. ii [1904-07], pp. 81-103).

Page 140.

  See remarks in GEORG VON DER GABELENTZ, Die Sprachwissenschaft
      (Leipzig, 1891), pp. 371 _et seq._

Page 141.

  FRANZ BOAS, “On Alternating Sounds” (_American Anthropologist_,
      vol. ii [1889], pp. 47 _et seq._).

Page 147.

  J. W. POWELL, Introduction to the Study of Indian Languages (2d
      ed., Washington, Bureau of Ethnology), pp. 69 _et seq._

Page 156.

  1. E. B. TYLOR, Primitive Culture; Researches into the Early
      History of Mankind.

  2. HERBERT SPENCER, The Principles of Sociology.

  3. J. G. FRAZER, The Golden Bough; Totemism and Exogamy.

  4. A. BASTIAN, Ideale Welten (Berlin, 1892); Die Welt in ihren
      Spiegelungen unter dem Wandel der Völkergedankens (Berlin,
      1887); Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde (Berlin, 1888);
      Geographische und ethnologische Bilder (Jena, 1873); etc.

  5. RICHARD ANDREE, Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche
      (Stuttgart, 1878; Neue Folge, Leipzig, 1889).

  6. ALBERT H. POST, Grundriss der Ethnologischen Jurisprudenz
      (Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894).

Page 157.

  1. RICHARD ANDREE, “Scapulimantia,” in Boas Anniversary Volume
      (New York, G. E. Stechert, 1906), pp. 143 _et seq._

  2. FRANZ BOAS, Indianische Sagen von der Nord-Pacifischen Küste
      Amerikas (Berlin, A. Asher, 1895), pp. 338-339.

  3. FRANZ HEGER, “Aderlassgeräthe bei den Indianern und Papuas”
      (_Mittheilungen der Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien_,
      vol. xxiii [1893], Sitzungsberichte, pp. 83-87).

Page 158.

  ROLAND B. DIXON, “Basketry Designs of the Indians of Northern
      California” (_Bulletin of the American Museum of Natural
      History_, vol. xvii, p. 28).

Page 161.

  1. WALDEMAR BOGORAS, The Chukchee (_Publications of the Jesup
      North Pacific Expedition_, vol. vii [Leiden, 1904-09]);
      FRANZ BOAS, The Central Eskimo (_Sixth Annual Report of the
      Bureau of Ethnology_ [Washington, 1888]).

  2. LEONHARD SCHULTZE, Aus Namaland und Kalahari (Jena, 1907).

  3. RUDOLF MARTIN. (See note 2 to p. 74.)

Page 162.

  1. BOGORAS, l.c., pp. 177 _et seq._; BOAS, l.c., pp. 551 _et
      seq._ (see note 1, p. 161).

  2. BOAS (_Ibid._, p. 595).

Page 165.

  K. WEULE, Die Kultur der Kulturlosen (Stuttgart); F. RATZEL,
      Anthropogeographie, vol. ii (1891), p. 693.

Page 167.

  1. ED. HAHN, Die Haustiere (Leipzig, 1896), pp. 464, 465; A. DE
      CANDOLLE, Origin of Cultivated Plants (New York, 1886), pp.
      59 _et seq._, 139 _et seq._

  2. KARL VON DEN STEINEN, Durch Centralbrasilien (1886), pp. 310
      _et seq._; Unter den Naturvölkern Zentral-Brasiliens (1894),
      pp. 210-212.

  3. BERTHOLD LAUFER, “The Introduction of Maize into Eastern
      Asia” (_Congrès International des Américanistes_, xv^e
      Session, Quebec, 1907, vol. i, pp. 223 _et seq._,
      particularly pp. 250-252). Regarding the introduction of
      tobacco into eastern Asia, see J. REIN, in _Petermann’s
      Mitteilungen_, vol. xxiv (1878), pp. 215 _et seq._

  4. VICTOR HEHN, Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere (2d ed., Berlin,
      1874).

Page 169.

  1. ED. HAHN, Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur (Heidelberg, 1909).

  2. RICHARD LAASCH, Der Eid (Stuttgart, 1908). Laasch gives some
      examples of the oath in America. They are, however,
      remarkably few as compared to the vast material collected by
      him from the Old World.

Page 171.

  An exposition of BASTIAN’S point of view may be found in TH.
      ACHELIS, Moderne Völkerkunde (Stuttgart, 1896), pp. 189 _et
      seq._

Page 173.

  1. WILHELM WUNDT, Völkerpsychologie (Leipzig, Engelmann).

  2. OTTO STOLL, Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der
      Völkerpsychologie (Leipzig, 1894).

Page 176.

  E. B. TYLOR, Primitive Culture (3d ed., 1891), p. 16.

Page 177.

  E. B. TYLOR, “On a Method of Investigating the Development of
      Institutions” (_Journal of the Anthropological Institute of
      Great Britain and Ireland_, vol. xviii [1889], pp. 245 _et
      seq._).

Page 179.

  1. OTIS T. MASON, The Origins of Invention (London, 1895), pp.
      315 _et seq._

  2. W J MCGEE, “The Beginning of Zooculture” (_American
      Anthropologist_, vol. x [1897], pp. 215 _et seq._).

  3. ED. HAHN, Die Haustiere und ihre Beziehungen zur Wirtschaft
      des Menschen; Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur (Heidelberg,
      1909).

Page 180.

  1. H. COLLEY MARCH, in _Transactions of the Lancashire and
      Cheshire Antiquarian Society_, 1886, “Polynesian Ornament a
      Mythology” (_Journal of the Anthropological Institute of
      Great Britain and Ireland_, vol. xxii [1893], pp. 307 _et
      seq._). HJALMAR STOLPE, “Entwicklungserscheinungen in
      der Ornamentik der Naturvölker” (_Mittheilungen der
      Anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien_, vol. xxii [1892],
      pp. 19 _et seq._). CHARLES H. READ, “On the Origin and
      Sacred Character of Certain Ornaments of the S. E. Pacific”
      (_Journ. Anthr. Inst._, vol. xxi [1892], pp. 139 _et seq._).

  2. A. C. HADDON, “The Decorative Art of British New Guinea”
      (_Cunningham Memoirs_, No. X [Dublin, 1894]).

  3. KARL VON DEN STEINEN, Unter den Naturvölkern
      Zentral-Brasiliens (Berlin, 1894).

  4. W. H. HOLMES, “Ancient Art of the Province of Chiriqui,
      Colombia” (_Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology_
      [Washington, 1888], pp. 3 _et seq._); F. W. PUTNAM,
      “Conventionalism in Ancient American Art” (_Bulletin Essex
      Institute_, vol. xviii [1886], pp. 155-167); GEORGE GRANT
      MCCURDY, “The Armadillo in the Ancient Art of Chiriqui”
      (_Fifteenth International Congress of Americanists_ [Quebec,
      1907], vol. ii, pp. 147-163).

  5. VON DEN STEINEN, “Prähistorische Zeichen und Ornamente”
      (_Bastian Festschrift_ [Berlin, 1896], pp. 247-288). The
      general theory of ornament has been treated from this point
      of view by H. COLLEY MARCH, “The Meaning of Ornament, or its
      Archæology and its Psychology” (_Transactions of the
      Lancaster and Cheshire Antiquarian Society_, 1889). A. C.
      HADDON, Evolution in Art (1895). ERNST GROSSE, Die Anfänge
      der Kunst (1894).

Page 186.

  VON DEN STEINEN, “Die Bedeutung der Textilmuster für den
      geometrischen Stil der Naturvölker” (_Correspondenz-Blatt
      der deutschen Gesellschaft für Anthropologie, Ethnologie und
      Urgeschichte_, vol. xxxv [1904], p. 126); MAX SCHMIDT,
      Indianerstudien in Zentral-Brasilien (Berlin, 1905), pp. 330
      _et seq._; FRANZ BOAS, “The Decorative Art of the North
      American Indians” (_Popular Science Monthly_, 1903, pp.
      481-498); HEINRICH SCHURTZ, Urgeschichte der Kultur (1900),
      p. 540; A. S. F. HAMLIN, in _The American Architect and
      Building News_ (1898).

Page 187.

  1. RICHARD ANDREE, Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche
      (Neue Folge, 1889), pp. 107 _et seq._

  2. WASHINGTON MATTHEWS, “The Gentile System of the Navajo
      Indians” (_Journal of American Folk-Lore_, vol. iii [1890],
      pp. 89-110).

Page 188.

  1. JOHN G. BOURKE, “Notes upon the Gentile Organization of the
      Apaches of Arizona” (_Ibid._, pp. 111-126).

  2. J. WALTER FEWKES, “The Kinship of a Tanoan-speaking Community
      in Tusayan” (_American Anthropologist_, vol. vii [1894], pp.
      162 _et seq._).

  3. FRANZ BOAS, “The Social Organization and the Secret Societies
      of the Kwakiutl Indians” (_Report of the U. S. National
      Museum for 1895_ [Washington, 1897], p. 333); JOHN R.
      SWANTON, “Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida”
      (_Publications of the Jesup North Pacific Expedition_, vol.
      ii [Leiden, 1905-09], pp. 102 _et seq._).

Page 191.

  A. A. GOLDENWEISER, “Totemism, an Analytical Study” (_Journal of
      American Folk-Lore_, vol. xxiii [1910], pp. 179 _et seq._).

Page 192.

  EDWARD WESTERMARCK, The Origin and Development of the Moral
      Ideas (London, 1906).

Page 194.

  1. For examples see, for instance, FRANZ BOAS, Handbook of
      American Indian Languages (_Bulletin 40, Bureau of American
      Ethnology_ [Washington, 1911]).

  2. CARL STUMPF, Die Anfänge der Musik (Leipzig, 1911).

Page 233.

  CLARK WISSLER, “Decorative Art of the Sioux Indians” (_Bulletin
      of the American Museum of Natural History_, vol. xviii [New
      York, 1904], pp. 231-278).

                             --------------

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                          Transcriber's Notes

 Except for the below-mentioned, all non-standard and inconsistent
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 Hyphenation has been retained from original

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 public domain.

 Pg. 19 - Corrected typo: '... primarily to the central nervous sytem' >
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 Pg. 125 - Corrected typo: missing period: '... as reflected in its
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 'conscious'

 Pg. 287 - 'HERBERT SPENCER, l. c., p. 70.' > 'l.c.' to match style