Pan-germany The Disease and Cure

New Hampshire League
To Provide For National Defense
and To Enforce International Peace

Branch of the National Security League

Gov. Henry W. Keyes, Honorary President
Frank S. Streeter, President

Dr. Ernest M. Hopkins, President of Dartmouth	}	Vice-Presidents
Rolland H. Spaulding, Ex-Governor

Executive Committee

Clarence E. Carr	Andover
Frank Knox	Manchester
Lester F. Thurber	Nashua
James W. Remick	Concord
Gordon Woodbury	Bedford
Nathaniel E. Martin	Concord
James F. Brennan	Peterborough
Charles R. Tilton	Tilton
Andrew L. Felker	Meredith
John S. B. Davie	Concord
John B. Jameson	Concord
Arthur M. Heard	Manchester

Secretary

Hobart Pillsbury

Manchester

Treasurer

Edward N. Pearson

Concord

Finance Committee

Gen. Elbert Wheeler	Nashua
Walter M. Parker	Manchester
Harry H. Dudley	Concord
Frederick W. Sawyer	Milford
Rodney E. Smythe	Plymouth
E. H. Hallett	Lisbon
W. H. McCarten	Lancaster
Arthur H. Hough	Lebanon
Leslie P. Snow	Rochester
W. R. Porter	Keene
Charles E. Tilton	Tilton
John Scammon	Exeter
Fred H. Perry	Charlestown
A. L. Mansfield	Hillsborough
E. Bertram Pike	Haverhill
Perley R. Bugbee	Hanover

State House, Concord, N. H., Feb. 1, 1918.

The purpose of this book is to bring to the people of New Hampshire a knowledge of the German plan to dominate the world by force and a clear view of what the Germans have done toward the success of their plan. It sounds a note of warning to every loyal American, to give his greatest help to win the war. Read this and think about it.

Henry W. Keyes. (signature)
Honorary President.

Frank S. Streeter. (signature)
President.

Clarence E. Carr. (signature)
Chairman Executive Committee.

Hobart Pillsbury. (signature)
Secretary.

[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan-German scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the distinguished French publicist, André Chéradame. For more than twenty years he has devoted all his energies and resources, physical and intellectual alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive investigation of the origin and progress of the monstrous conspiracy which threatens to overwhelm the liberties of the entire world. His books, long unheeded, now read like prophecies. The papers reprinted in this pamphlet originally appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, where they attracted very great interest. They are now published in inexpensive form, so that every American who desires a clear understanding of the meaning of this war may have a chance to read them. To careful readers we recommend M. Chéradame’s more elaborate books, “The Pan-German Plot Unmasked” and “Pan-Germanism and the United States,” published by Charles Scribner’s Sons.

A new series of articles by this author will appear in The Atlantic Monthly for 1918.]

‘Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice have fallen flat and Germany’s situation has become still more critical, we shall see Berlin play her trump card. Protests against territorial annexations will become insistent beyond the Rhine, secretly sanctioned by the German government, which will finally say to the Allies: “Let this slaughtering of one another cease! We are willing to listen to reason; we resign our claims to those territories of yours now occupied by our armies. The game has been played to a draw; so let us treat for peace on that basis.”

‘On the day when this proposition is put forward, the Allies will find themselves face to face with the most subtle move yet made by Berlin—the most insidious German snare. Then, above all things, must the steadfastness, the perspicacity,[Pg 2] and the unity of the Allies be most brilliantly made manifest. The trick of the “drawn game,” if successful, would involve an overwhelming triumph for Germany and an irreparable tragedy for the Allies and for the liberty of the world.’

Only a few months after these lines were printed, the prophecy began to be fulfilled more and more completely. Every possible step has been taken by Germany to bring about peace on the basis of a draw. The slogan, ‘Peace without annexations or indemnities,’ was coined to that end. At first the Allies believed that this formula originated in Russia; as a matter of fact, however, it was worked out in Berlin and then suggested to the Russian Socialists through secret agents whom Germany has successfully established in the Petrograd Soviet. These Socialists, doubtless well-meaning, but over-fond of theories and always ready to embrace the wildest utopian schemes,—ignorant, too, of all realities, as has been shown by the steady aggravation of the general situation in Russia since they came into power with the Revolution,—have declared enthusiastically for the ‘peace without annexations and indemnities.’ As there exist also in the other Allied countries groups of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories than on facts, and also because Allied sympathies naturally rallied strongly to the support of the Russian Revolution, the formula, ‘peace without annexations or indemnities,’ thanks to its apparent[Pg 3] origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads on a certain section of Allied public opinion.

The Stockholm manœuvres, engineered by all the powerful and varied means at the disposal of German propagandists, were designed to establish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace negotiations. When the astuteness of the Allied governments prevented the fulfillment of this attempt within the period desired by Berlin, the Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies to throw its influence on the side of peace as determined by Germany.

As a matter of fact, the Pope’s peace proposals, while not embodying the exact terms of the Kaiser’s formula, involved, in the last analysis, practically the same essential results. Berlin, therefore, in order to assure unceasing discussion of her formula,—a discussion tending at least to bring about an armistice, which would split up and morally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for her to deal with them separately,—outdid herself in mobilizing toward one end the most widely divergent forces, from the Maximalist anarchists of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries of the Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and the persistence of the amazing ‘pacifist’ offensive launched by Germany were such that the expressions ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘drawn game,’ ‘white peace,’ ‘paix boiteuse,’ have become as current in the Allied countries as if[Pg 4] they had some established connection with reality. This is entirely contrary to the fact: with the best intentions in the world, peace without annexations or indemnities, as things stand now, is impossible. There can be no ‘white peace,’ no ‘drawn game,’ no ‘paix boiteuse.’

To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has become befuddled by these formulæ of Berlin, whose function is to accomplish in the moral order the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases employed on the battlefield by the German General Staff. The result of this moral intoxication is that important groups of the Allies begin to juggle with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural outcome of giving serious thought to impossibilities, grave errors are made in weighing the present situation, with an attendant weakening of the joint action of the Allied democracies. It is imperative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, leading only to disaster, be abandoned, and that we return to those realities which alone can lead to victory and the establishment of a durable peace.

If the formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ has been allowed to insinuate itself into the general discussion, it is only because great numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand the overwhelming advantages which Germany, by means of the war, has been able to assure to herself for the present and the future. The object of[Pg 5] this paper is to show just what these advantages are, and at the same time to brand the utter hypocrisy of the slogan, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ which, regarded even in the most favorable light, would allow Germany to make off with immense booty, leaving the Allies to face the incalculable losses incurred by them in a war launched by their adversary.

The continual fall of German exchange is regarded by many of the Allies as proof of the progressive and irremediable impoverishment of Germany. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per cent in Switzerland, while the franc has depreciated only 13 per cent, Frenchmen are for the most part inclined to believe that the war has affected the two countries in relatively the same proportion; they then conclude that Germany’s financial situation is infinitely worse than that of France. In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion cannot be reached simply through the rise and fall of exchange, which reflects only certain special aspects of the financial situation of a country.

Among the various causes affecting exchange, there are two principal ones. The first is moral. It cannot be denied that the fluctuation of exchange responds to foreign confidence. If German exchange is low, it implies, to a certain extent at[Pg 6] least, the existence of a universal conviction that in the long run Germany cannot hold out against her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, there is no great demand for the currency of a state whose credit, it is thought, must finally collapse. It should be noted, however, that the reason for this fall of exchange is only a moral evaluation anticipating a probable outcome; it is not due to a mathematically certain estimate of what Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of the war.

The second great factor affecting exchange, on the other hand, is based on present realities which are susceptible of being accurately determined. Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, exports infinitely less than formerly; consequently, her ability to settle her accounts in foreign countries is limited. When she was able to sell the United States a million marks’ worth of merchandise, she then had at her disposal a million marks with which to pay cash for such imports as she needed. Now that her exports have been so reduced, she has little money to spare for spending abroad. If she wishes to increase these foreign purchases, she must export her gold and consequently reduce the security behind her banknotes. This results in a lowering of the basis of German credit, with a resulting drop in exchange.

We shall now see that this falling exchange, whatever its importance, does not take into account[Pg 7] all the elements of the general financial situation.

If the blockade of Germany seriously complicates her food problems, on the other hand it is in a way advantageous from a financial point of view. In a word, when Germany found herself blockaded she was obliged to evolve means of existing on her own resources or those of her allies. Our enemies had great difficulties of organization to overcome, but they turned them to good account: for if Germany’s exports are small, her imports have been correspondingly reduced. Hence she needs to send very little money abroad—a fact which is financially in her favor.

Now, the case of France is radically different. The French government, feeling assured of the liberty of the seas and believing that the war would be a short one, found it more expedient to place enormous orders abroad than to rely on domestic resources to supply the nation’s need. As a result, French imports, according to published statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs a month. This means that, as things stand now, France must pay to foreign countries the staggering sum of twelve billion francs a year, with no corresponding compensation, since her purchases consist of products which are destroyed in use. For this reason France is undergoing serious impoverishment while Germany gets off comparatively easily. It is therefore plain that the fluctuations[Pg 8] of exchange bear little relation to those conditions which must be taken into consideration in making an appraisal of the general situation; they reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of the financial situation as a whole. Popular conclusions drawn from the fall in the value of the mark are false when attempts are made to give them an absolute or general significance.

Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages
gained by Germany from the war

Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the ‘great illusion’ which even now prevents them, to their endless detriment, from seeing things as they actually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these states remained just as they were before the war. But these terms have no longer any relation to reality. The Quadruple Alliance of Central Europe is simply a great illusion, studiously fostered by William II, for by its means his plans are vastly facilitated. As a matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are not the allies, but the vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers at Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest are simply marionettes moved by threads which are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic needs.

Very often we hear it said, ‘Germany has created Mitteleuropa.’ This is another mistake. Geographically speaking, Mitteleuropa includes only Central Europe; and Germany’s dominion is infinitely further flung, extending as it does from the west front in France to the British front before Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the light of reality, we must say, for the present at least, ‘There is no longer any Germany; instead, there is Pan-Germany.’ This is an essential assumption if we are to reason justly. The map of Pan-Germany at the beginning of 1917, which is printed above, shows clearly the essential, but all-too-little-known elements of the present situation, which is characterized by the fact that 73 million Germans, aided by 21 million vassals,—Magyars, Slavs, and Turks,—have reduced to slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites, belonging to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, which has now almost completely reached the limits set by the Pan-German plan of 1911, consists, therefore, of one vast territory containing about 176 million inhabitants and natural resources of the greatest variety.

I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan-Germany every time it is made desirable by the text. This repeated study of the map is indispensable to a clear and complete comprehension of the demonstration which follows. As regards the profits which Germany has wrung from the war,[Pg 10] it is particularly important, in order to grasp the idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of its creation that Germany, in spite of the losses and expenses inevitably incurred by a warring nation, has been able to assure herself of certain advantages which, considered as a whole, far outbalance her losses and expenses, as we shall see.

In order to understand the nature of these advantages, one point must first be made clear.

For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the war has really cost the Germans far less than it has cost their adversaries.

1. No Experimentation. Germany, in order to produce a vast output of various types of guns and projectiles economically evolved in times of peace, needed only to extend, by means of machinery of domestic manufacture, her arsenals and munition-factories, which before the war were already considerable. On the other hand, the production of war-material in France at the outbreak of hostilities was very slack, while in England and Russia it was almost negligible. In these three countries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise, as best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip them with machinery purchased in America at vast expense, and hastily to evolve new types of cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvisation, especially in war-time, means false starts[Pg 11] and inevitable bad work, which must be paid dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur these very considerable expenses.

2. Regulated Wages. The fact that the problem of German wages was worked out at leisure in exact correlation to productions whose types were exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time certainly allowed the Germans to obtain war-materials at a lower net cost than was possible for the Allies.

3. The Prevention of Waste. The absence of experimentation and the simple extension to war-work of highly efficient industrial methods tested in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to avoid in all spheres those immense losses of material of every nature whose bad effects and heavy cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of affairs in France caused losses which were as expensive as they were inevitable. One may imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where control is far more difficult of exercise than in France.

4. Cheap Labor. The Germans have forcibly enlisted the labor of about two million prisoners of war. Moreover, the official French report of April 12, 1917, concerning acts committed by the Germans in violation of international law, asserts that in the occupied territories deportation of workers has been a general measure. It has ‘applied to the entire able-bodied population of both[Pg 12] sexes, from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting women with young children.’

Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 7,500,000 Belgians, 3,000,000 French, 4,500,000 Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians, 22,000,000 Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians—a total of 42,000,000 slaves.

Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. Take the case of a young girl of Lille, twenty years old, who was forced to work for six months, harvesting and threshing wheat and digging potatoes from six in the morning to twilight, receiving all the while the vilest food. For her six months of work she was given 9 francs, 45 centimes. The Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast reservoir of labor for which they pay next to nothing; moreover, the small amounts they do pay remain in Pan-Germany.

The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to their workers, and, when they run short, must needs pour out good gold in bringing reinforcements from Asia, Africa, and America. This means that a considerable part of the wages paid these foreign workmen will leave France or England for all time.

5. Free Coal and Iron Ore. In addition to their own mines, the Germans have seized important coal and iron mines in France, Belgium, and Poland. A vast proportion of their ore and coal therefore costs them nothing. Naturally, then, a[Pg 13] German shell made with French iron and Belgian coal costs far less than a French shell made with American steel and English coal. As a result, the net price of a greater part of German munitions is much lower than that paid by the Allies.

6. Economical Transportation. By reason of the grouping of the Central Powers,—a result of the conquest of the Danube front by the Teutons,—Germany profits by a geographical situation which is infinitely more advantageous than that of the Allies, as regards not only the speed, but also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is evident that it costs far less to send a shell from the Krupp factory to any one of the Pan-German fronts than to send an American shell to France, a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell to Roumania via Archangel, or an English shell to the army operating in Mesopotamia. By the same token, the cost of transporting a soldier of Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infinitely lighter than that of transporting Allied soldiers from Australia or America.

We should note that each one of these six factors which we have just enumerated reacts profoundly on the sum-total of general war-expenses, and that, taken together, they involve a formidable sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that Germany carries on the war much more economically than the Allies. Figures are so far lacking which will give the true proportions, but we shall[Pg 14] certainly remain well within the realities of the case if we conclude that, as a result of the six factors mentioned above, France must spend one hundred and fifty million francs for war material to every hundred million spent by Germany. When, therefore, France spends thirty billions, Germany evidently spends not more than twenty billions. And what is true of France applies even more accurately to some of the other Allied nations.

This is a fact of the greatest general importance in coming to a true understanding of the financial situation created by the war—a fact which takes on its full significance when we realize that Germany is not only carrying on the war cheaply, but that she has been enabled, by means of this war, to win very important advantages.

They consist of seven principal elements. The last six of these, it should be noted without fail, depend solely on the existence of central Pan-Germany—that is, on the hegemony exercised by Germany over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; they are therefore wholly independent of the first element, which relates to Germany’s occupation of enemy territories, particularly to the east and west. They may be summarized as follows:—

SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS

The advantages derived directly from Germany’s[Pg 15] aggression, comprised in a single element, namely, the plunder accruing from the occupation of enemy territory. This may be analyzed thus:—

(a) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres of Montenegrin, Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, Belgian, and French land held by the Germans.

This value, estimated according to the national fortunes of the respective countries before the war,—the area and population of the occupied portions being taken into consideration,—is in the neighborhood of 155 billion francs.

This figure, though naturally only approximate, is probably far below the real sum. We know that the entire national fortune of France, with its 536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war at 325 billion francs. The valuation of the 500,000 square kilometres of occupied territory at 155 billions seems therefore an underestimate, especially when one remembers that these 500,000 square kilometres include Belgium and the North of France—the richest districts in the world.

(b) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and property (laborers, war-material, provisions, minerals, raw products, manufactured products, personal property, art objects, war levies, specie, jewels, and securities) which has been going on, in some cases for as long as three years, throughout the occupied territories. This booty unquestionably represents a value of tens of billions of francs.

These tens of billions should be deducted from the total of the national fortunes of the invaded districts. The plunder in question is composed of property or supplies already used up by the Germans or taken away by them into Germany; the value it represents, therefore, no longer exists in the invaded districts.

The advantages which Germany has assured herself for the present or for the future through the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn result from

(a) Germany’s burglarization of her own allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey into a state of absolute financial dependence on Berlin.

II. The value of Germany’s monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor, resulting from the Pan-German loans.

III. The inherent value of the creation of Economic Pan-Germany. This cannot fail to be a powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth.

IV. The value of Military Pan-Germany, which is a guaranty of the security of Economic Pan-Germany.

V. The value of the enormous economic profits[Pg 17] assured to Berlin through the existence of Pan-Germany at the cost of Russia. These are a direct consequence of the establishment of Military Pan-Germany.

VI. The taking over by Germany of at least 21 billions of French credit. This is a consequence of the establishment of Economic Pan-Germany.

Let us now take up, in their order, the seven elements mentioned in the last chapter.

The first element of German advantage: the booty acquired from the occupation of enemy territory

Germany is getting direct war-profits from the enemy territories occupied by her. These territories, listed in the ascending order of their richness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres; Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 (Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary share the pillage of these four territories); dependent territories of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 29,000; and France, 20,000; making a grand total of 500,000 square kilometres.

In order to realize as clearly as possible the importance of the booty wrung by Germany from this enormous area, we may establish by means of examples or statistics that this plunder comes from nine principal sources:—

Seizure of Human Material.—Throughout these 500,000 square kilometres of occupied territory, the Germans have scientifically enslaved[Pg 19] 42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast amount of labor—this labor being all the cheaper because, as we shall see, the slaves are robbed in various ways.

Seizure of War-Material.—By reason of their lightning advances in Belgium, France, Serbia, and Roumania the Germans have taken possession of vast stores of war-material: cannon, rifles, munitions, wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as thousands of kilometres of railway, of which they make full use, representing a certain value of billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system alone is worth three billions.)

Seizure of Food-stuffs.—The official report of April 12, 1917, on the acts committed by the Germans in France contrary to international law, states: ‘The inhabitants, subjected as they were to annoyances of every sort, watched daily the theft of such food-stuffs as they happened to possess.’ Everywhere the Germans steal horses, cattle, domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food-products of all kinds, sugar, alcohol, all of which constitute the reserve supply of the occupied countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated through the cultivation of productive lands by means of labor obtained almost without cost from the enslaved peoples.

Theft of Raw Materials.—Throughout the length and breadth of the occupied territories, the Germans, at the dictates of expediency, have[Pg 20] seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, petroleum, and so forth. Metals—bronze, zinc, lead, copper, tin—have been taken from private citizens, as well as textile fabrics—wool, cotton cloth, and the like. When one learns that from the cities of the North of France alone the Germans stole 550 million francs’ worth of wool, it is easy to see that this single source of plunder has been worth a number of billions to them.

Theft of Finished Products.—Everywhere in the occupied territories, so far as means of transportation permit, motors, steam-hammers, machinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, electrical engines, looms, and so forth, have been taken to pieces by mechanics and transported into Germany. The total value of this stolen material in Belgium and the North of France alone—the richest industrial districts in the world—is almost incalculable.

Theft of Personal Property.—The official French report previously quoted states: ‘In the shops, officers and soldiers made free with whatever pleased their fancy. Every day the people witnessed the theft of property which was indispensable to them. At Ham, General von Fleck carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot’s house, where he had been quartered.’ The property thus stolen is sent to Germany, as is proved by this advertisement in the Kölnische Zeitung: ‘Furniture moved from the theatre of military[Pg 21] operations to all destinations.’ From this source, war-booty to the value of several billions has already been divided among an army of Germans.

Seizure of Works of Art.—The Germans have stolen countless works of art, ‘in order’—so runs a recent official note of their government—‘that they may be preserved as a record of art and civilization.’—‘It would be impossible,’ declares Le Temps, ‘to find a more cynical admission of the thefts committed by the German authorities in our museums and public buildings.’ If one remembers that this methodical pillage has gone merrily on among private individuals, drawing on the unlimited stores of works of art which have been accumulated throughout the centuries in Poland, and particularly in Belgium and France, it must certainly be apparent that the value of these stolen art treasures is immense.

War Imposts.—Our official report establishes that ‘Requisitions have everywhere been continuous. Towns that have had to meet the expenses of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have been overwhelmed by huge levies.’

Belgium is staggering under an annual war assessment of 480,000,000 francs. Bucharest, after its capture by the Germans, was forced to pay a levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita of the population. At Craiova the levy was 950 francs per capita. An edict forbids the circulation of paper money unless it has been specially[Pg 22] stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent of its nominal value.

In April, 1917, the Frankfurter Zeitung announced that the leaders of the Austro-German forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred million francs. In Poland, the German government has just issued a billion marks in paper money for enforced circulation. These are only single examples.

Theft of Specie, Jewels, and Securities.—In September, 1916, the Germans seized three quarters of a billion francs from the National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently transferred to Germany. In January, 1917, on the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole a million francs from a Belgian who was traveling from England, and took ten million francs’ worth of diamonds from the mail-bags. In the village of Vraignes, on March 18, 1917, the Germans, before evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 13,800 francs they had in their possession. At Noyon—we learn from the official report already quoted—the Germans broke open and pillaged the safes of banks and private citizens before retiring from the town. The securities, jewels, and silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these are only random incidents.

Taking into consideration, then, the present[Pg 23] high prices of food-products, coal, metal, petroleum, war-material, machinery, and the rest, it can be seen at a glance that each one of the nine sources of booty just enumerated, on which the Germans have been steadily drawing, in some cases for as much as three years, has unquestionably yielded the value of several billions of francs,—certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. Hence we may reasonably conclude that, without fixing a definite figure for the yield of these nine sources, the total plunder has mounted well up in the tens of billions.

Another basis for calculating the worth of the invaded territories to Germany lies in the fact that the national fortunes of these countries, according to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to about 155 billions of francs.

We shall now examine the six other elements of Germany’s present advantageous situation—those which result from the domination which the war has enabled her to exert over her own allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This domination, which amounts practically to actual seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the scheme of Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing of Serbia.

A portion of the approximate sum of 115 billion francs devoted by Germany, up to the end of July, 1917, to the carrying on of the war has enabled her to burglarize her own allies by taking advantage of the extremely bad financial situation which faced them at the end of the Balkan wars. As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the present long-drawn-out struggle, have been forced to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum total of the loans made by Germany to her allies and secured by her own war loans cannot yet be verified, but there can be no doubt that it mounts up to a respectable number of billions.

These loans have worked out to the immense advantage of Germany, for the following reasons. Established facts prove that, without the assistance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, and without the numerous products supplied her by the Orient, Germany would have been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies’ blundering. As these troops and resources are of priceless value to Germany, it would seem that she must have paid dearly for them, and in gold. However, as the reserve of the German Imperial[Pg 25] Bank was 1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 2,527,315,000 in February, 1917, it is certain that Germany has not lent gold to her allies,—in large quantities, at any rate,—but only paper, whose value depends solely on the strength of German credit.

In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keeping a printing-press busy turning out little stamped slips of paper, has obtained troops, food-stuffs, and raw materials which were indispensable to her in avoiding defeat; and at the same time she has so established herself as a creditor as to give her the right to exact final payment by her allies for advances which were primarily made to them in Germany’s own vital interest.

Now these obligations weigh so heavily on countries like Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, already in sore stress, that they incur loans which no one of these three countries can ever hope to pay off unless a victory of the Allied democracies should shatter the financial yoke of Berlin.

In order to appreciate the nature of these loans and their consequences, the example of Turkey is particularly instructive. ‘Germany’s advances to Turkey in no way represent Turkish war-expenditure. We must add to them the requisitions made in the country itself, and the war-material purchased in Germany and Austria-Hungary which is not yet paid for.’

At the beginning of 1917 Djavid Bey arranged in Berlin for a new loan of three million pounds, simply to enable Turkey to pay her debts to the Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by the different groups of financiers and the German Minister of Finance. This means, therefore, that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks in order that they may use them to consolidate the Pan-German scheme, she also finds a means of making this consignment of arms serve to entangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the financial web. ‘In Pan-Germanist circles, there has been much discussion of the compensations which Turkey must make to Germany in return for services rendered in the course of the war. It is the unanimous opinion that Germany, without gaining any territorial acquisitions in Turkey, must have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, so that the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near Berlin as Constantinople.’

What has taken place in the spheres of finance between Berlin and Constantinople has, by the very nature of things, been duplicated between Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pronounced form. Germany, therefore, by means of paper loans based on her own credit, has caused colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies—countries representing vast areas of land: Austria-Hungary with 676,616 square kilometres, Bulgaria with 114,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or[Pg 27] 2,583,620 square kilometres in all. Now these three countries are precisely the ones which are indispensable to the carrying out of the Central Pan-German ‘Hamburg to the Persian Gulf’ scheme; the loans, therefore, are Pan-Germanist loans.

It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, that although Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are financially encumbered in their quality of states, the exploitation of these countries by the Germans is very profitable. Their combined national fortunes were estimated, before the war, at about 269 billion francs. We must realize also that, although these loans granted by Berlin to her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary to Germany as closely as debtors can be bound to a creditor. None of these three countries can reasonably hope to get funds after the war from their present adversaries, who, it is certain, will have none too much money for their own needs; and so the financial situation as a whole combines with the enterprise shown by the Berlin General Staff to strengthen the grip which Germany has obtained over her allies through loans.

As this financial dependence of the three vassal states, with its tremendous consequences, is, as I have said, maintained simply by means of a printing-press and little slips of paper, which cost very little indeed; and since Germany receives in exchange[Pg 28] for these slips of paper bearing her signature, men, food-stuffs, and supplies which, but for the action of the Allies, would enable her to establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, we may safely say that the Pan-Germanist loans floated by Berlin at her allies’ expense constitute a powerful element of military advantage, which, if one but examines the conditions of its origin, must stand out as the most profitable and extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated.

The third element of German advantage: the value of a monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor

The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above takes no account of the enormous agricultural and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and unappraised, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Now, the business of tapping these vast reservoirs is entirely in the hands of the Germans, as a result of the Pan-Germanist loans.

The fourth element of German advantage: the value resulting from the creation of an economic Pan-Germany

Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by List, Roscher, Rodbertus, and other German economists,[Pg 29] may be defined as follows: A territory uniting under one supreme central control Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey—a territory large enough to include military and economic resources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of the population in times of war; and to assure its rulers in times of peace the domination of the world.

The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—all essential elements of Central Pan-Germany—was accomplished in three ways: militarily, by the supremacy acquired by the German General Staff over the troops of the vassal states; financially, by means of the paper loans granted by Germany; and diplomatically, by the treaties signed in Berlin on January 11, 1917, establishing the strongest sort of German protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. This done, the consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly undertaken by Berlin in a great number of ways.

Control of Customs.—As the establishment of the great Pan-German Zollverein (Customs Union) was not to be accomplished at one stroke, the Kaiser’s government set about preparing the necessary steps. Numerous conferences held at Berlin and attended by German, Austrian, and Hungarian statesmen and business men, resulted in the following essential provisions. (1) An economic customs agreement of long duration, which would make a single economic unit of Germany and Austria-Hungary; (2) to bring this about gradually, a[Pg 30] progressive increase of duty—free articles, and a unification of the customs charges on certain goods; (3) a close economic union between Austro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be arranged and established with the greatest possible expedition.

Ethnographic Control.—Certain nations afford considerable resistance to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are morally irreducible, are an obstacle to the permanent establishment of the Pan-German nexus between Hungary and Bulgaria; and without this the entire Pan-German programme falls flat. The systematic destruction of the Serbian people has been entrusted to the Bulgars, who, under pretext of quelling insurrections, slaughter not only the Serbian men, but also women and children, down to babies at the breast. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenians happen to occupy those regions which were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Delbrück as ‘Germanic India.’ Berlin therefore puts to good use the Turks’ inherited taste for massacres of Christians. Already more than one million Armenians have been got out of the way.

Agricultural Control.—The food crisis in Germany has led Berlin to proceed with the greatest haste toward utilizing the rich farming districts which the fortunes of war have put within her grasp. Hundreds of experts, with thousands of agricultural implements, have been sent to Roumania,[Pg 31] Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter country, two cultural centres in particular have received attention. In the province of Adana cotton-growing is being developed; on the plains of Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in progress. These energetic efforts have had a twofold result: the Turks will not revolt against Germanic domination—because of starvation, if for no other reason; and, by reason of the increasing yield of Serbian, Roumanian, and Turkish lands, more of which are continually being brought into service, the food-supply of the Central Empires becomes more and more completely assured.

Banking Control.—The exploitation of Eastern Pan-Germany calls for vast capital. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish banks have formed powerful combinations. As the leaders of this movement in Germany we find the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Kölnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the Vienna Kredit-Anstalt and the Hungarian Bank of Credit in Budapest.

Economic Control.—As the rapid exploitation of the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey is the principal economic object of the Germans, they have just established, in coöperation with King Ferdinand, the ‘Institute for Furthering Economic Relations between Germany and Bulgaria.’ In order to facilitate the Germanic penetration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys between[Pg 32] the ages of twelve and eighteen years are to come to Germany for their technical education. These young Turks, living in German families, learning German, and saturating themselves with German ideas, will soon be able collaborators with the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey and exploiting the numerous concessions which, if the war turns out successfully for them, will be wrung from the Ottoman government by the subjects of the Kaiser.

Railway Control.—The railway systems of European Pan-Germany have been brought to the highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. Out of the 2435 kilometres which separate Constantinople from Bagdad, only 583 kilometres of line remain to be constructed—and this distance is traversed by automobile roads. As for the Turkish railroads belonging to French and English companies, the German government has suggested that the Turks ‘purchase’ them. One should cherish no illusions as to the real meaning of this word ‘purchase.’ It means, according to Turco-German methods, that the expenses involved in this purchase should be set down against the war damages which the Central Powers consider to be due them from the Allies.

Canal Control.—The canal project, outlined as far back as April 26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and begun by the[Pg 33] Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met at Berlin on March 19, 1917. This project is made up of the following elements: (1) Union of the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to navigation of the Main and of the canal from the Main to the Danube. (2) Completion of the central canal joining the Vistula and the Rhine. (3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic and Black Sea. (4) Opening to navigation of the Rhine as far as Bâle. (5) Union of the Elbe with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. (6) Union of the Weser with the Main by means of the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection of the Danube and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union of the Danube with the Dniester by means of the Vistula. (9) Opening to navigation of the Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube is the base of this gigantic programme of construction. ‘The Danube means everything to us,’ declared General von Groener, in December, 1916.

This rapid sketch of the preparations now going on in the economic sphere of Pan-Germany will permit any clear-thinking man to understand the crushing power which will lie in this formidable system when all its latent resources have been developed by the Germans to the profit of their hegemony. The organization of Pan-Germany is[Pg 34] only in its first stages; nevertheless, the concentrated military, economic, and strategic strength which it has already put at the disposal of Berlin is so great that it permits Germany to baffle her far more numerous, but widely scattered, adversaries. What, then, would be the strength of a completely organized Pan-Germany? It is undeniable, in fact, that a methodical, big-scale development of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, together with the low-cost transportation afforded by a complete system of canals, would make it possible for the Germans to pay high wages to their own workmen, and yet at the same time bring about such a reduction of net prices in every line of industry as to force Pan-German products on the whole world by their sheer cheapness.

It is easy to see, then, that in the face of economic Pan-Germany’s overwhelming methods any economic revival on the part of the European nations now allied would be impossible. The economic ruin of the Allies, after so exhausting and costly a war as this, would by the nature of things bring about their political subjection to Berlin. Besides, there is not a country in the world which could escape the clutches of economic Pan-Germany on the one hand, or the consequences of the irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The fact that Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an ominous event which should receive the concentrated[Pg 35] attention of all the world’s free peoples; for it places in German hands the elements of such an overwhelming economic power as has no precedent in the world’s history.

Berlin relies, above all else, on her military resources to render secure for all time that economic Pan-Germany which is destined to provide her, in peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan-Germany is, therefore, the complement and the pledge of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser’s successful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new sources of man-power—Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new strategic points or regions of exceptional importance, located in invaded countries or in those of his own allies, has furnished him with the basis of military Pan-Germany. In 1914, Prussian militarism held sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the German Empire. At the beginning of 1917, it had been extended by consent or by force to the 176 million people of Pan-Germany.

This result—evidently the consequence of an immense extension of exclusive influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe—has permitted[Pg 36] the German General Staff to take over at will certain strategic points or regions of the greatest importance, over which it exerted no direct influence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the North Sea, for instance; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic; the Bulgarian coasts of the Ægean; the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always been strategic points or districts of exceptional value.

This value, however, has become vastly greater now that these points or districts form part of a single military system under the directing and organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At present, these essential strategic points and districts are the strongholds of the Pan-German frontiers. They are, in fact, connected by continuous fortifications, defended in the most effective way the world has ever known by an intensive system of barbed-wire entanglements, deep-dug subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and heavy artillery. The internal military organization of Pan-Germany is being carried forward with uninterrupted speed. Factories of war-material have been judiciously distributed throughout the whole territory, with the double object of utilizing raw materials near their source of origin, thus avoiding useless transportation, and of making possible the swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm,[Pg 37] at the outbreak of war, established important branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but also in Bulgaria and Turkey.

The railway system and strategic automobile roads in Pan-Germany have been developed very swiftly—notably in the Balkans and in Turkey, where the need was relatively great. Back of every military front railroads running parallel with that front have been constructed, so that reinforcements may be sent to any given point with the maximum of speed. All this, taken as a whole, has converted Pan-Germany into one gigantic, extremely powerful fortress.

A new phase is now in preparation. The Kaiser’s General Staff, not content with holding the high command of all forces in Pan-Germany, is determined to standardize as far as possible their arms, their munitions, and their methods of instruction. The Deputy Friedrich Naumann—one of the sponsors of the Mitteleuropa idea—is plainly smoothing the way toward this end, which, because of geographic reasons, most intimately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the Vossische Zeitung he has just outlined a scheme of ‘full and complete harmony of the Central Empires in so far as military matters are concerned.’ He boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remembering. ‘Mitteleuropa is in existence to-day. Nothing is lacking save its organs of movement and action. These organs can be provided by its[Pg 38] two emperors, since they have at their disposal the necessary elements for the creation of a common army.’

This prophecy merits our close attention; for it can readily be seen that, if the unification of the Armies of the two Central Empires were to take place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose military resources the German General Staff is getting an increasingly firm grip, could prevent the absorption of their armed forces into the Pan-German system.

As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, it is an easy matter to estimate it. Even if the Kaiser’s armies were to withdraw from Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany would still include 150,000,000 people. Now, as Germany has mobilized about 20 per cent of her own population and that of her allies,—who have become vassals,—we see that Central Pan Germany can count upon approximately 30,000,000 soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction by the Allies has become the true, legitimate, essential aim of the war, has therefore become far more widespread, through the carrying out of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 1914. It is proved by well-established facts that Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace campaign destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything in her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress the strength of which is unexampled in the world’s[Pg 39] history. In any case it is undeniable that, as military Pan-Germany is a pledge of the success of economic Pan-Germany, its establishment constitutes an important element of advantage for the German cause. This will be further proved when we come to examine the two final elements of advantage.

The sixth element of German advantage: the importance of the vast economic profits which accrue to Berlin at the expense of Russia through the establishment of Pan-Germany

We need only glance at the map to realize that a really free Russian republic could never range itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is self-evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in splitting Europe in two, her economic and military pressure toward the East would be irresistible. The countless agents whom Berlin already maintains in the immense territory of Russia would find their work becoming easier and easier. Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, succumbing to insoluble financial problems and unending internal difficulties, would break up, from the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of anarchistic republics—all of which is according to the plans of Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After that there would be nothing to prevent German influence from becoming the controlling force in[Pg 40] the economic exploitation of the immense natural riches of European and Asiatic Russia.

We are well within the bounds of reason in predicting such a possibility. The fact that German agents have already succeeded in stirring up most serious trouble throughout the length and breadth of Russia—that they have provoked separatist movements in Finland, Ukrainia, and the Caucasus, and that all China is seething with disturbances which react on Asiatic Russia—proves to the satisfaction of the most skeptical that the break-up of Russia into little states inevitably subject to the political and economic influence of Berlin would be an inevitable consequence of a successful Pan-Germany.

It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits which the Germans would stand to gain by such a state of affairs—a direct result of military Pan-Germany—form an element of advantage worthy of being considered by itself.

The seventh element of German advantage: the transfer to Germany of at least twenty-one billion francs of French credit

The creation of military and economic Pan-Germany makes possible a method of securing war-booty planned in advance by the Pan-Germanists, which may be stated as follows: The[Pg 41] transfer to Germany of funds owed to one of her enemies by another enemy, or by one of her own allies.

In order to understand this method of extortion one need only read a passage from Tannenberg’s book, Greater Germany, published in French translation in 1916 by the firm of Payot. This work possesses exceptional interest for two reasons: first, it appeared in Germany in 1911; its publication, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in many other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order to prepare the German people for war by promises of colossal booty; second, the facts of the case show that the German General Staff, ever since the outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the political conduct of the war on the exact lines laid down by Tannenberg, who may be said to have officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 1911.

Now, independent of the 35 billion marks—nearly 44 billion francs—which were to be imposed on France in the coming war by way of regular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of the hypothetical treaty, outlined the following additional extortion:—

‘France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 billion marks (15 billion francs) lent by her to Russia.’ This means nothing more or less than a cession of credit.

On page 308 of Payot’s edition, Tannenberg indicates as follows the use to be made by Germany of these Russian debts to France:—

‘We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukrainia, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany.

‘This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed territories for colonization.’

These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin Tägliche Rundschau thus exposed Germany’s future attitude toward Russia:—

‘If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory which we so sorely need for colonization.’

The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity, written so recently, and Tannenberg’s outline, published six years ago, is indeed striking.

Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg’s plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hypothesis.

In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia should continue to submit to anarchy fostered by German agents, her financial situation, already perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the interest on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan-Germany, now momentarily established, continues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over Russian obligations to France without the necessity of a formal treaty. In fact, the tremendous pressure against Russia, exerted by the mere geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies athwart Europe, would practically render unnecessary[Pg 44] the formal cession of French credit. Berlin, taking fullest advantage of the situation, would then say to Petrograd, ‘We consider that France owes us a considerable sum by way of war-indemnity. We are unable to collect this, but you Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore assume the position of France as your creditor, and, as the strength of Pan-Germany has put you practically at our mercy, we demand the payment of your debts in such and such a form.’

What resistance could disorganized Russia make to this claim, presented with true German cynicism?

Russian extremists need not hope, as certain of them do, to avoid paying the debts contracted by the old régime. If they do not care to fulfill their obligations to France, which is working hard to sustain the Russian Revolution, they will have to pay those same debts to Berlin, where full use would be made of them to exploit the Russian people.

Moreover, the ‘purchase’ of French- and English-owned railroads in Turkey, suggested several months ago by Berlin, of which we have already spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans intend also to follow out the system of transferring credits in cases where money is owed by Germany’s allies to Germany’s enemies. For a long period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased the state obligations of Austria-Hungary, Serbia,[Pg 45] Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is impossible to give the exact amount of French money thus invested in Pan-Germanized Central and Eastern Europe, for the securities of the above-mentioned countries were generally floated in several foreign financial centres at once; but persons who have the most thorough knowledge of French investments make a minimum estimate of six billion francs. As for the French money invested in Roumania and Serbia it will vanish into thin air as soon as the Austro-German conquests are consolidated. As for investments in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption by Germany of French credits—supposing peace to be concluded on the basis of the present war-map—would be easily accomplished if she reasoned as follows with her allies:—

‘France now owes you war indemnities which you cannot collect. By putting them down against the obligations owed by you to France, you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have lent you during the war great sums, and furnished you with supplies without which you could never have continued the struggle. Since you cannot meet these obligations we shall secure ourselves, in part at least, by assuming France’s position as your creditor.’

On the whole, if the present state of things were to continue, Berlin, by the process of transferring credit, would be able to cause France the[Pg 46] very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs owed her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Germany’s vassal states—a total of at least 21 billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has for the moment been accomplished, we can truthfully say that 21 billions of French money, at the lowest estimate, represented by Russia, Austrian, Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish securities, have been virtually Pan-Germanized.

In the preceding chapters I have pointed out that the advantages which Germany has already gained through the war, or has assured for herself in the future, if the present situation remains essentially unchanged, consist of seven chief elements. Before we arrive at final conclusions concerning these elements, let us establish the following facts:—

1. In three years of war, Germany has spent on the war 1612 francs per capita of her population. France, in the same period, has spent 2200 francs per capita—that is to say, 608 francs, or the immense figure of 38 per cent, more than Germany.

If the formula ‘without indemnity’ be adopted, with respect to the expenses of the war, far indeed from serving the cause of the Right, it would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each Frenchman who desired peace would have to bear a financial burden heavier by more than a third than that of each German and loyal subject of the Kaiser who loosed the dogs of war. Therefore this enormous difference—38 per cent—in the per capita war-expenses between France[Pg 48] and Germany would in itself suffice to make the economic—and hence the political—downfall of France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond recall.

2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, as separate states, have been ruined by their war-expenses, but this ruin is all to the advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals into a condition of absolute financial dependence. As a result, if Pan-Germany is to continue to exist, the Berlin government must be the unchallenged controller of all the financial combinations on which the peace and well-being of Pan-Germany depend. Now these combinations evidently can serve only to strengthen the German hegemony.

No parallel situation is to be found among the Entente powers. The ruin of Russia, for example, would simply make the ruin of France more inevitable, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the same time guarantee to France the legitimate reparation which alone can save her from irretrievable financial disaster.

3. If Germany can still continue to float new internal loans with comparative ease, it is because her wholesale territorial and Pan-German seizures are considered by her people as new pledges of the credit of the German state as the heart of Pan-Germany.

4. France, which has spent in three years of war 2500 francs per capita of her population, has suffered only loss: 20,000 square kilometres of her territory have been invaded, and given over to undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Germany, on the other hand, which has spent only 1691 francs per capita for the war, has occupied 500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, burglarized her own allies, and piled up huge profits from the war.

The diversity of these profits is so great, and the mortgage that they have placed on the future is so heavy, that no figures will convey the sum-total of these advantages; but enough has been said to show that the aggregate is enormous. If one deducts the 115 billions of francs devoted by Germany to the war from the total represented by all the elements of advantage already enumerated, one begins to realize that Germany has really wrung from the war present and future profits which can be computed only in hundreds of billions of francs. This war, therefore, has brought Germany boundless material gain, such as no war in history has ever brought to one people. It is equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany can utilize her advantages only on the express condition of maintaining certain indispensable conditions of the situation on which they are based. We shall now see to what minimum these conditions may be reduced.

Our table shows that out of the seven elements of advantage won by Germany from the war, the last six—that is, those in the second group—are altogether independent of the first, except for one small detail relating to the national fortunes of the territories occupied by Germany to the southeast—that is, in Albania, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia.

If, therefore, the formula, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ were actually adopted, Germany, by withdrawing from Belgium and France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, and Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia to the southeast, would renounce her first element of advantage, represented by the value of the invaded territories—that is, about 155 billion francs. From this, however, must be deducted the tens of billions’ worth of plunder carried out of the invaded territories during these three years, consisting either of products already used up by the Germans, or of material, metals, and securities which have already been removed to Germany. Her renunciation of this first element of advantage would therefore be rendered relatively incomplete were the formula adopted.

We should note also that there are excellent reasons why Germany’s renunciation could never apply in reality to the territories invaded by her to the southeast—to Serbia, at all events.

The six elements of German advantage forming[Pg 51] the second group of our table are infinitely more important to Berlin than the first element—which is in any case partially assured by the ‘no indemnity’ formula, as we have seen. Although they are less directly apparent to the Allies, the six elements of the second group are nevertheless real, for they depend on incontrovertible military, economic, and geographic facts. Now these six elements, big with possibilities for the future, depend entirely on the covert but certain seizure which the war has enabled Germany to make of her own allies. But this seizure was possible only as a result of Serbia’s destruction. Serbia, therefore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Germany had to batter down before her influence could predominate over Bulgaria and Turkey. The destruction of Serbia was the sine qua non of the establishment of Central Pan-Germany, which assures the Kaiser of the six principal elements of advantage from the war. Moreover, it is undeniable that the essential prop of Central Pan-Germany has been furnished by the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important branch, that of Belgrade-Nish-Pirot, runs across Serbia. Now, that Germany is fighting for the Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, an ally of Berlin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, in the Hungarian Chamber. (See Le Journal de Genève, December 30, 1916.)

To sum up, then, German victory and the[Pg 52] fruition of her most important war-advantages depend directly on the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now this maintenance is based on two prime conditions.

2. The preservation of the new economic and military lines of communication between Berlin on the one side and Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, the bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to practical slavery the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—the adversaries of Pan-Germany,—and then, without changing any names or long-established frontiers, to make Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of Berlin, and, consequently, active elements of Central Pan-Germany.

Finally, if the present order of things in Central Europe is preserved, Germany can maintain the Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would be assured by the adoption of the formula, ‘peace without indemnities and annexations.’ This is easily proved.

As we have already seen, even if Germany were to withdraw in the East and West, the stipulation ‘no indemnities’ would permit her to give back the territories stolen from Russia, France, Belgium,[Pg 53] and Roumania in a condition of complete economic, physical, and moral collapse: in a word, sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of ‘no indemnities,’ the reconstruction of these devastated countries would be another cause of financial exhaustion for France, Russia, Belgium, and Roumania, already overburdened with the costs of the war. But, even assuming that the Germans withdraw from these occupied territories to the East and West,—although at present there is no reason for seriously considering such an eventuality,—no one in his senses could believe that they would give up Serbia unless forced to do so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by reason of her geographic position, is absolutely essential to the existence of Central Pan-Germany, on which, in turn, Germany’s vast advantages depend.

Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany would give her signature to treaties of settlement, even involving Serbia. But treaties signed by Germany have no value whatever. ‘We snap our fingers at treaties,’ said the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing that Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, this treaty might allow Serbia to exist in theory, but not in fact. We must look the situation in the face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her population has been systematically butchered by the[Pg 54] Bulgarians, with German approval. Serbia is utterly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans have taken everything.

Now the principle ‘no indemnities’ would keep Serbia in this terrible and irremediable state of misery. It is evident that under these conditions the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. If, therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the Allies, ‘Very well; in conformity with the formula “no annexations, no indemnities,” we are willing to recognize Serbia’s dependence by treaty,’ who would be deceived by this sinister and portentous joke? Who could believe in the sincerity of a proposition which, on the face of it, is rendered impossible of fulfillment by the ‘no indemnities’ clause. And what guaranty would the Allies hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria would withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view of the fact that such a withdrawal, if bona fide, would imply Berlin’s renunciation of the whole Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attendant profits?

To suppose such a thing possible implies a complete ignorance of the Germanic spirit as it has manifested itself since the beginning of history. Besides, declarations made by the Germans themselves show that they will never recede from their position as regards Serbia. As early as December, 1916, the Frankfurter Zeitung prepared its readers in advance for the ‘pacifist’ tactics about[Pg 55] to be employed—tactics which are now being tried out with the help of the Russian anarchists, the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope.

‘Certainly,’ said the Frankfort paper, ‘if we are to make a lasting profit from the military situation, both in its favorable and in its less advantageous aspects, it is essential that special questions should be severally considered in their relation to the whole. To-day our point of view should be as follows: in the East, the formulation of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations on a flexible basis. This is not a programme but a general line of action. “Negotiation” is by no means a synonym for “renunciation.”’

This last sentence should be read and pondered over by all the Allies. Here we find an absolutely clear statement as regards the fate of Serbia, whose restoration, by means indicated later, is the one thing which can save the world from the consequences of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme.

On August 8, 1917, at a banquet given at London for M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive terms Great Britain’s obligations to Serbia—obligations which are practically those of the whole Entente.

‘What I have already said in the name of the British Government regarding Belgium, I here repeat in the name of the same Government regarding[Pg 56] Serbia. The first condition of peace must be its complete and unrestricted restoration. I have not come here to make a speech. I have simply come to say that, no matter how long the war should last, Britain has pledged her honor that Serbia shall emerge from the conflict independent and completely restored. Moreover, it is not only a matter of honor. The security of civilization is directly involved here. In the West, Belgium has blocked Germany’s way, and Serbia in the East has been the check of the Central Powers. She must continue to mount guard over the gateway to the East.’

‘Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral restoration of Serbia was an essential condition of peace and that British honor was pledged to this restoration. The war-aims of England and those of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute opposition on this point.’

‘Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. They alone will decide what disposition is to be made of King Peter’s former realm.’

There can be no illusion here. The formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ cannot apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of Pan-Germany.

We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Germany[Pg 57] from the territories of Belgium, France, and Russia now held by her were to take place, Central Pan-Germany would remain essentially intact; and her commercial competition alone would suffice to bring about the economic ruin of France, England, and Russia. The last-named countries would be staggering under their colossal war-debts, with no offsetting compensation, whereas Germany, thanks to six great elements of advantage, would find her war-losses more than counterbalanced by her profits. What chance would the Allied powers, exhausted by a deadly peace, have against the thirty million soldiers of Pan-Germany, when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should choose to renew her hold over those western territories which she had temporarily relinquished?

Is it not plain what depths of deception lie beneath that formula, ‘peace without annexations and indemnities,’ which the Russian Socialists, ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Germany from the war, have adopted at the suggestion of Berlin’s Leninist agents? Let us look at the facts, not at the words. If the formula ‘peace without annexations and indemnities’ is acceptable to the Germans, it is simply because this formula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in turn, pledges to Germany the domination of Europe and the fulfillment of all other elements of the Pan-German scheme.

Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, thus assuring to Germany all its vast attendant advantages, and leaving the Allies to face their incalculable war-losses, could such a peace properly be called a ‘white peace’? Could a peace which gave Germany the domination of Europe be called a ‘drawn game,’ a ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’? What sort of ‘limping peace’ (paix boiteuse) would permit Prussian militarism to hold sway over the 150 million people of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 1914, and put 30 million soldiers at Berlin’s disposal? What one of the exhausted states of Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? This would be no paix boiteuse; it would be the peace of slavery.

If the Allies are to understand the crucial situation which lies before them, they must realize that, as Lloyd George said, ‘The security of civilization is directly involved in the independence of Serbia.’ But the independence of Serbia can never be assured so long as Germany practically exercises hegemony over the 50 million people of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit of 118 million inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, is geographically the mistress of the Balkans. The pledge of Serbia’s independence, therefore, does not lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube. This pledge involves the liberation of the peoples under Hapsburg domination,—the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,[Pg 59] Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians,—which alone can permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong to block the Hamburg-Persian Gulf line, and, at the same time, annul the vast advantages that the definite establishment of the formidable economic and military Pan-German scheme would assure to the Kaiser and his people.

Now it is much easier to devise the destruction of Pan-Germany than is generally supposed. This fact will become plain as soon as the Allies as a whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an object of the Entente victory, but also a means to that victory. This, however, is a matter which needs greater elaboration than I can give it at this point. It is discussed at length in the concluding chapters of this volume.

In a word, the solution of the Central European problem means everything for the Allies. So long as it shall remain unsolved, victory will be out of their reach. On the other hand, when this one point has been settled, all the other special war-aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with ease.

Assuming now that the problem of Central Europe has been solved, could it be said that the resulting peace would be ‘without annexations and indemnities’? Plainly not: for this peace, if it is to break up forever the autocracies of the Central Empires, must, for reasons of nationality,[Pg 60] change the existing frontiers, which have made Austro-German imperialism possible. It might involve also certain legitimate reparations. Can it be said that peace on the terms of the Allies would be a ‘white peace’—a ‘drawn game’? Again we must say no; for such a peace would bring incalculable benefits to the world: the end of Prussian militarism, together with the possibility of organizing the society of nations under other and better conditions. Neither could it be called a ‘paix boiteuse,’ for the destruction of Prussian militarism would insure to the world a long term of rest after the present awful struggle.

The formulæ ‘peace without indemnities or annexations,’ ‘white peace,’ ‘drawn game’ and ‘paix boiteuse’ have therefore no more connection with reality in the event of an Allied victory than in that of a German victory. The truth in a nutshell is that, by virtue of the prime importance of the Central European problem, either the Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany, or else the Germans, thanks to Central Pan-Germany and its economic and military advantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. These are the two phases of the dilemma.

In any case, the fact that expressions without any practical application, and hence absurd, are constantly made use of in many Allied organs of public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned[Pg 61] by the influence of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost their sense of realities. With such insidious enemies as the Germans, this involves a real danger for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so invaluable. The Americans, through their practical common sense, can be of the greatest service in helping the European Allies to set it at naught.

President Wilson, by his message to Russia and his Flag Day address, has already done much for the common cause by clearly setting forth the concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies if they are to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has done the same by his firm stand regarding the Stockholm conference. By energetically opposing the pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has supported those real Socialists in France, England, and Russia who understand the vital importance of killing Prussian militarism.

May all true Americans continue to speak as these two men have done! The common sense of their opinions, spread broadcast among the European Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly action of those among us who have become intoxicated by theories. The cause of the Allies is an ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be insured by words; it can be compassed only by the accurate knowledge of military and economic realities.

It is now twenty years that I have worked tirelessly to tear the veil from the Pan-German scheme, which my investigations in all parts of the world have enabled me to unearth. In spite of the positive and abundant proofs of its existence which I have been publishing for nineteen years, I was unable to persuade the responsible authorities in France, Russia, or England, that a formidable peril was swiftly and more swiftly drawing near. Paris and London were steeped in blind pacifist delusions. As for Petrograd, the sinister Teutonic influences which, until only yesterday, were at work on the highest personages, prevented the great Russian people from knowing the real nature of Germany’s projects.

If the Europeans most directly interested in knowing the truth were, until the very outbreak of hostilities, completely hoodwinked as to the true intentions of William II, it is only natural that Americans should take some time to realize the staggering facts concerning the fantastic and odious plan of world-domination so toilsomely built up by the government at Berlin. In peace times, too, the affairs of old Europe, especially the[Pg 63] intricate tangle of Austro-Hungarian and Balkan politics, had no practical interest for so vast and remote a nation as the United States. This was particularly true of her Western citizens. To-day, however, Americans as well as French, British, Russians, and Italians, are faced with the obligation of mastering the problems of Central European affairs; for, without exaggeration, it is on the proper solution of these problems that the independent existence of the United States depends.

As events have justified the views I have held for a score of years, I trust my American readers will hold this fact in my favor. If I should seem to run counter to the ideas they now hold, they should realize that I do so deliberately, in order to save priceless time and better serve their own legitimate interests.

The present situation in Europe is due to two factors: first, the almost complete fulfillment by the Germans of a plan which they had long been preparing with the utmost care; second, the repeated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on of the war—mistakes which alone have permitted the Germans to consummate their plan almost without opposition.

The Pan-Germanist programme of 1911 called for the establishment of Prussian hegemony over a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square kilometres—in[Pg 64] other words, besides actual conquest in the East and West, it meant the indirect, yet effective seizure of Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey. At the beginning of 1917—before the capture of Bagdad by the English and the strategic retreat of the German troops in the West—the programme had been realized to the extent of 3,600,000 square kilometres—that is, in nine-tenths of its entirety.

The basic explanation of this achievement lies partly in the fact that, if the Germans are outlaws they are very intelligent outlaws, perfectly trained for the task of seizing the booty on which they have set their hearts; partly in the fact that the leaders of the Allies, intelligent and animated by the best intentions though they are, have been quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities of the European tangle, a thoroughgoing knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for the conduct of the terrible war in progress.

The proof of this ignorance lies in the recognized truth that the heads of the European states now in league against Germany were, without exception, taken by surprise when war broke out. Posterity will look on this fact with amazement. The governments of the Allies were no better prepared to direct the war intellectually than were their generals to carry it on materially. Now, the intellectual prosecution of this war presents unprecedented difficulties: it calls uncompromisingly[Pg 65] for a detailed knowledge, not only of matters military and naval, but of geographic, ethnographic, economic, and political questions which, by reason of the scale of the present conflict, react profoundly on all military operations of general scope. As a result of this interpenetration of all the various problems, the world-conflict is not, as many people still believe, a purely military struggle, in which the mere machinery of war plays a decisive role. In spite of appearances, mind—that is, the intellectual element—dominates the material element which, though indispensable, can attain full effectiveness only when it is employed in furtherance of a definite plan of action, backed by clear thinking; and such a plan can never be formulated unless the ethnographic, psychological, economic, and geographic factors capable of affecting every great movement of a general strategic nature are calculated as carefully as the purely military factors. By reason of the potency of these many factors—invisible, but very real and powerful—it may be said: ‘This war is not a mere war of armaments—it is a war of political science.’

It is because the strategists of Berlin have long recognized this conception of modern warfare; it is because they have at their fingers’ ends a documentation of political science, slowly accumulated and of unquestionable worth, that they are in a position to meet endless problems as they present[Pg 66] themselves, and to achieve successes against the Allies which, on the surface, appear incomprehensible.

As for the leaders of the Allies, it seems as if many of them are not alive to the element of political science in the war, even at the present moment. The reason is simple. The same men who ignored the realities of Pan-Germanism before the war are, naturally enough, unable to grasp the politico-scientific, geographic, economic, ethnographic, and psychological realities of all Europe now that the conflict has burst on us. In the realm of the intellectual there can be no improvisation. To master the politico-scientific elements necessary for the prosecution of this war, there is need of minds trained by the unremitting application of fifteen or twenty years. Among the leaders of the Entente no man is to be found who has bent his will to such intellectual effort; and the pressing problems brought forth by each day give no time for minute, deliberate study by the men who have succeeded to the seats of power since war began.

The capital mistakes in the prosecution of the war committed by the Entente proceed directly from the defective equipment of its leaders which I have just pointed out. They explain the difference in the results obtained by the two groups of[Pg 67] belligerents, although the courage and self-sacrifice of the Allies’ soldiers are as great as those of the Germans. They explain, too, why the three hundred millions of the Allies—this takes no account of their colonial resources or of the support drawn from trans-oceanic neutrals—have not yet succeeded in defeating Germany, which entered the war with a population of sixty-eight millions and one ally, Austria-Hungary, of whose thirty million people three quarters were directly antagonistic to Berlin.

These capital mistakes made by the Allies are as follows. They believed that a friendly agreement with Bulgaria was possible, although that country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constantinople long before the war. They cherished illusions concerning King Constantine, who, above all else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser. They organized the Dardanelles expedition, which should never have been attempted. Even if this operation had been judged technically feasible, its futility would have been apparent if the Allies had realized—and it was their arch-error not to realize—that the strategic key to the whole European war was the Danube. The mere occupation by the Allies of the territory stretching from Montenegro through Serbia to Roumania, would have resolved all the essential problems of the conflict. Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria and Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Balkan[Pg 68] disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found it impossible to make a strong stand against the Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough to defy them, would have been obliged to open the Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of munitions to defend them. This opening of the Straits would have been effected by a strong pressure by the Allies on the south of Hungary. Moreover, by the same action the Central Empires would have been barred from reinforcements and supplies from the Orient. Germany, finding herself cut off on land in the South as she was blockaded by sea in the North, would have been obliged to come to terms.

Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the West were not prepared to grasp the politico-scientific character of the war, especially the cardinal importance of the economic factor. This ignorance remained unenlightened until Roumania was crushed in 1916. As a result, for twenty-seven months the Balkans were looked on by the leaders in the West as being of only secondary military importance. During these twenty-seven months the Allies were obsessed by the idea that they would vanquish Germany on the Western front by a war of attrition. This conviction delayed the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition, and when it was finally undertaken, it was on too small a scale to insure success. Such a grave error would never have been committed by the Allied strategists if[Pg 69] they had fully realized that the principal objective of the Pan-German scheme, for the attainment of which Germany was primarily fighting, was the seizure of the Orient. This point of view, however, was for a long time ignored, in spite of the tireless efforts made by a few to demonstrate its vital importance.

The Austro-Germans, profiting by this basic mistake of the civil and military chiefs of the Entente, were able in October-November, 1915, to join hands with Bulgaria and Turkey over the corpse of Serbia. From that time on, the General Staff at Berlin has been profiting by this situation, improving it and consolidating it by seizing half of Roumania toward the close of 1916. The direct result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the realization of nine tenths of Pan-Germany.

This Pan-Germany is composed of two elements. First, the great occupied territories taken by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure effected by her at the expense of her own allies: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; for, as a matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kaiser for the purpose of concealing the true situation from the neutrals—particularly the United States, which was then in that category. If one wishes to see things as they are, one must realize[Pg 70] that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are not the allies—that is, the equals—of Germany. These three states are practically the vassals of Berlin, in whose sight they count for scarcely more than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal proof of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser wields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg to the British front at Bagdad.

Since the beginning of hostilities there has been a formidable extension of Prussian militarism. At first, it held in its grasp only the sixty-eight million people of the German Empire. By April, 1915, it had extended and organized its influence among the thirty millions of Austro-Hungarians, who until that time had taken orders from their own independent military chiefs. After October-November, 1915,—the date of Serbia’s downfall,—the Prussian system reached out to Bulgaria and Turkey. By taking account of these extensions and adding together the populations of the territories occupied by Germany, together with those of her infatuated allies, one finds that to-day Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight million souls, as at the beginning of the war, but about one hundred and seventy-six million European and Ottoman subjects.

This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which Americans must face if they wish to learn the sole solution of the war which will assure to them, as well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace.

The following figures will show how the three groups of the population of Pan-Germany were divided at the beginning of 1917:—

To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule over twenty-one million vassals and eighty-two million slaves,—Latin, Slavic, Semitic, belonging to thirteen different nationalities,—who are bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that the world has ever known.

It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension of Prussian militarism over a new territory has enabled Germany to prolong the struggle by obtaining new supplies of food, new reinforcements to[Pg 72] press into her service and territory to exploit, new civil populations, whose labor is made use of even in works of a military nature. As a result, the technical problem now confronting the Allies in Europe is, through the mistakes of their former leaders, infinitely more complicated than at the outbreak of hostilities.

To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism methodically and pitilessly employed, disposes of the military and economic resources of one hundred and seventy-six million people, occupying a strategic position in the centre of Europe which is all to her profit. It is this very state of things, founded on the slavery of eighty-two millions of human beings, which is intolerable.

Many times, and rightly, the Allies have declared that it was not their object to exterminate the German people and bring about their political extinction. On the other hand, it is just and essential to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be destroyed. On this depends the liberty, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should prevail with Americans, for the following reasons. Suppose that Pan-Germany were able to maintain itself in its present position. It cannot be denied that its territory contains considerable latent military and economic resources, as well as strategic[Pg 73] positions of world-significance, like the Dardanelles. If these resources were freely exploited and developed to their highest pitch by the relentless organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan-Germany, dividing Europe in two, would dominate the Continent, uncontestably and indefinitely, by means of her crushing strength. France, Russia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great powers, could only submit to Germany’s will. And Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp-Bagdad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well; for Brest has long been coveted secretly by the Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great military and commercial transatlantic port of Prussianized Europe.

Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the Allies, it is entirely probable that the General Staff of William II would launch a formidable expedition against the United States without delay, in order to allow her no time to organize herself against the Prussian tyranny hypothetically dominating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it necessary to defer this step, Americans would none the less be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and to serve an apprenticeship to militarism which would be odious to them. If Americans, then, see things as they really are, and perceive the dangers to which they are pledging their future, they will be convinced that they, as much as Europeans,[Pg 74] have a vital interest in the annihilation of Pan-Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril accruing to the United States from Europe can arise only from so formidable a power as Pan-Germany, and not from a Germany kept within her legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave herself, by the balance of other powers.

We must also realize that the moral considerations at stake are a matter of the liveliest interest to the United States. Can republican America allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of this war to triumph over the world? This spirit is made up of the following elements: the feudalism of the Prussian Junkers, chief prop and stay of the Hohenzollerns; the feudalism of the great Austrian land-owners; the feudalism of the Magyar grandees, whose caste-spirit is precisely the same as that of the Prussian lordlings; and the Turkish feudalism of Enver Bey and his friends. In other words, this four-ply feudal spirit which is the basis of Pan-Germany is in radical and absolute opposition to the democratic spirit of the modern world. Granting for a moment that Germany were victorious, Russia, after a frightful reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit once more to the yoke of autocracy. As for the peoples of Western Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, they could only renounce their dearest ideals—the ideals for which they have shed their blood for centuries.

The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle à outrance between democracy and feudalism. To Americans as well as to Europeans falls the task, not only of preserving their corporeal independence, but of saving our common civilization. This can be accomplished only by the destruction of Pan-Germanism.

It is plain that Berlin, failing so far to crush the Allies completely, is bending every effort to maintaining Pan-Germany in its present position, so that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and swiftly develop its full power. When, in December, 1916, President Wilson requested the belligerents to make known the causes for which they were fighting, the government of Berlin issued no definite statement. The reason for this attitude is plain. If Berlin still hopes to enforce her outrageous pretensions by her immense military power, she cannot possibly put down her terms in black and white, in a document subject to general perusal, without instantly calling down on her head the blazing reprobation of the civilized world.

The Allies, on the contrary, replied to Mr. Wilson’s question easily and with precision.

The universal attention drawn to this reply has entailed advantages and disadvantages. By the very nature of things, the Allies definitely announced that the smaller nationalities in Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans must be set[Pg 76] free, thus implying a radical opposition to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. This has enabled Berlin, for one thing, to bind her accomplices at Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople more closely, if possible, to her cause, and also to galvanize for a still longer period the forces of the German people, who are resolved to endure the bitterest suffering in order to insure, after peace comes, the immense advantages accruing from the fait accompli of Pan-Germanism.

By way of compensation for this, the publicity given the reply of the Allies has accomplished two excellent ends. First of all, it has permitted every one to see that the common purpose of the Allies is to solve the Central European problem, which, as a matter of fact, is not only of European, but of universal interest, since such a solution puts a quietus on German dreams of world-domination. This publicity, too, has made it possible to compare the principles invoked by the Allies in their peace-terms with those of President Wilson, proclaimed in his message to the Senate on January 22, 1917, and to establish the fact that these principles are identical.

The reason for this harmonious point of view lies in the adoption of the principle of nationality by the Allies and by President Wilson as the fundamental basis for the reconstruction of the Europe[Pg 77] of to-morrow. Because of this point in common, it is evident that the war measures of the Allies and the pacific endeavors of Mr. Wilson have in view the same general geographic solutions of the problem of organizing Europe on the lines of a durable peace. This is a fact of the utmost importance, as I tried to show with the aid of maps in an article in L’Illustration, of February 27, 1917. Allies and Americans, then, may join hands and press resolutely ahead,—especially since the Russian Revolution has come to pass,—for, with a common ideal, their general practical solutions for meeting this formidable crisis cannot but be identical.

In order to understand fully the seriousness of the situation, one must distinguish clearly between the moral position of the Allies and the strategic positions of the two groups of belligerents. The moral position of the Allies is excellent. After Washington and Peking broke with Berlin, and especially after the magnificent revolution in Russia, after Bagdad fell and a fraction of the invaded French territory was won back, the spirit of the Allies was all that could be desired. But even while recognizing the excellence of this moral strength and its potentialities of success, we must first of all consider the general strategic situation. The events of this war have plainly shown that, unfortunately, brute force in the service of the lowest passions can prevail over[Pg 78] the holiest rights, the purest aspirations. Since August, 1914, incontestable rights have been violated, and noble nations martyrized.

Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies may yet be completely vanquished if certain developments come about, or if new strategic mistakes are added to those portentous ones which nearly lost them the fight, in spite of the righteousness of their cause and their immense, if badly employed, latent resources. If we wish, then, really to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty peril which still menaces the world’s liberty, we must not shrink from meeting the realities of the military situation. We must be ready to face the most serious developments that can be conceived. Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but that readiness for the worst which lies at the root of military wisdom.

Let us now accept the following facts. The troops of France are beginning to be exhausted. The iniquitous administration of the Tsar had seriously compromised the provisioning of the Russian army with food and munitions. In that vast country, where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts shall finally succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve.[Pg 79] This would practically insure a German victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, all the forces of Pan-Germany could be flung against the Franco-British front. Moreover, if, from the moral standpoint, the Berlin government is universally to be despised, the same cannot be said about her general technical military ability, whose elements are as follows.

Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Germany—that is, she has absolute disposal of vast resources in men and in the manifold products of a great territory with a population of one hundred and seventy-six millions. The Kaiser’s Great General Staff, whose intellectual resourcefulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make the most of every lesson taught by the war. The annual levies of men from the various territories of Pan-Germany certainly outnumber the losses sustained each year by her troops. It is therefore, in my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the Allies have done, that the Germans can be beaten by mere attrition of their forces. By organizing under one uniform system the soldiery furnished by the many different countries of Pan-Germany, Prussian militarism has unquestionably given its troops a cohesion and a unity unknown to the vassal-allies of Germany before the war. This state of affairs has undoubtedly added to the military effectiveness of the vast armies which take their orders from Berlin.

The German military authorities most advantageously employed the respites given them by the strategic errors of the Allies. Never have the broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle frontiers, been more powerfully guarded than now. Never have the Germans had more abundant stores of munitions. Never has the network of railways covering the length and breadth of Pan-Germany been so complete. Never has the Great General Staff, making full use of its central position, been better able to concentrate on any front with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my opinion that we may safely say that never before has the Berlin government, from a military point of view, been so strong. The various statistics which justify such a conclusion are, I think, to be relied on. Even supposing them to be exaggerated, it is much better to run the risk of overestimating the enemy’s strength than to underestimate it. Many of the Allies’ mistakes sprang from neglect of this axiom.

As a prelude to the further consideration of certain aspects of the world-war, I should like, if I may, to quote a few paragraphs which I printed early last summer, by way of forecast, and which events have not wholly belied.

Let us now attempt to forecast the German military plans for 1917. For some weeks persistent reports have been telling of their tremendous preparations for hurling an offensive against the Russian front. As for the Franco-British front in the West, it was stated that the General Staff at Berlin would be glad to hold things stationary on that side until, after winning the victory on which they count in the East, they are free to devote their attentions to the occidental theatre. This project, of course, cannot be confirmed; but the voluntary shortening of the western line by the Germans would lend color to its probability. Moreover, such a plan would coincide perfectly with the present interests of Berlin, with the habitual methods of the Kaiser’s General Staff, with the broad Pan-Germanist scheme, and with the personal preferences of Marshal von Hindenburg.[Pg 82] It is natural also that the Germans should avail themselves of the sinister and undeniable effects of the Russian imperial administration on the army and civil population of the country before the new government at Petrograd has time to repair the all-too-abundant harm that has been wrought.

We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can dispose of the vast resources of Pan-Germany, which, to my thinking, are still taken too lightly by the Allies; while the results of the Russian Revolution are still uncertain; while the reorganization of the Muscovite armies still remains uncompleted, the government at Berlin, in spite of its serious problems connected with the food supply, is still convinced that it can win a decisive military victory by dealing with its adversaries one by one. And so we should foresee that the German General Staff will meet its problems in succession.

It seems probable, then, that it will follow the basic principles of warfare and concentrate all the forces at its disposal against the weakest front. This, without question, is the Roumano-Russian line. Its great extent, together with the formidable development of the German railway system,—infinitely superior to that of the Russians,—makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise, which is of capital importance for swift, decisive victory. The Russians, too, are certainly less well[Pg 83] provided with munitions of war than the Franco-British troops; and the Germans have succeeded in further weakening them by means of the terrible explosions recently engineered by their spies at Archangel. As a result of the execrable administration of the former government, the food situation in Russia is most critical, while the revolutionists are not yet sure of the reorganization of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, have an unquestionable interest in profiting without delay by this state of affairs.

A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is also in harmony with the Pangermanist plan, which for twenty-five years has looked forward to the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, and Odessa. And a German success in the south of Russia would be big with economic, naval, military, and moral consequences of world-import. The Germans would become masters of the rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little Russia, which, from the midst of their food-problems, they watch with greedy eyes. The capture of Odessa and the complete conquest of the Black Sea, by means of transports (sent in large numbers down the Danube, thus permitting surprise attacks at vital points), would end in the loss of the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The British, then, could no longer hold out at Bagdad. Freed by such successes from all immediate fear[Pg 84] of Russia, the Germans could then turn in enormous strength against the Balkan front of the Allies. Under these hypothetical conditions, one may assume that the Allied army north of Saloniki, demoralized by the Russian reverses, would be taken prisoners or driven into the sea.

These various operations in the East vigorously taken in hand, as the General Staff at Berlin knows so well how to do, would require four or five months for their execution. This interval of time, combined with the depressing moral effect brought about by the supposed German victories, would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation for the final Teutonic offensive on the Western front. It must be remembered that during these four or five months the submarine warfare, pursued more and more ruthlessly, would considerably impede neutral navigation and decimate the tonnage of the Franco-British merchant marine. The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the Allies would be enormously increased. Even if their pressure has forced the Kaiser to evacuate a considerable portion of France and Belgium, the importance of this retreat would be only relative, for it would be temporary. Following our hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten, the army of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis in the West intensified, the moral depression and discouragement among the soldiers and civilians of France would be most profound. Under the[Pg 85] given material and psychological conditions, the concentration of all the Pan-German forces on the Western front would probably permit them to break through. This would spell ruin for France and for England as well, and assure that decisive German victory which would mean the mastery of Europe.

If this theoretical German plan is to be accomplished in 1917, however, the general technical situation in Europe must remain much as it stands at present. No new power capable of making itself felt on the battlefield must come to the support of the Allies. It is necessary, then, that the scheme be carried out in 1917, before the Russian Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the Allies, has time to repair the damage done by the former régime, and before the United States, realizing that it is to their vital interest to take part directly and without delay in the war on the Continent, are ready to do so effectively.

The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a diplomatic rupture with Washington, consist in doing everything to avoid actual blows with the United States, while keeping up a vigorous submarine campaign, and in making frantic efforts to effect a miscarriage of American military preparation—especially as regards sending reinforcements to Europe. In pursuance of this scheme, Berlin instructed Vienna to send Washington a dilatory answer concerning submarine[Pg 86] warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and thus gain time. This procedure was specifically intended to make America believe that Austro-Hungary can act independently of Germany. And so, by virtue of this delusion, William II veils the existence of that Pan-Germany whose reality, for the sake of his plans, must not be revealed until the latest possible moment.

If the programme for 1917, which we have good reason to attribute to the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after all, this is not impossible), in six to eight months the United States would find themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the resources, not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. And, Americans, do not think your turn would be long in coming. Do not take it for granted that the German people, worn out by the endless horrors of war, would cry to their masters, ‘Peace at any price!’ The German people, as I know them, filled with enthusiasm by a victory that would be without parallel in the history of the world, maddened by incalculable plunder, would follow the lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all signs fail, they would give the United States no chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe.[Pg 87] In eight or ten months, after new advances had been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the defeat of her allies in Europe, and with the aid of the German-Mexicans and German-Americans whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze by every possible means the military organization of the United States, it would be possible to look for ruthless action against America by the Pan germanized forces of Europe.

The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no doubt seem fantastic and improbable to many of my American readers. I beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a matter of fact, if we consider all that has been achieved by the Germans since August, 1914, the events which I have forecast are much less amazing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in my book L’Europe et la Question d’Autriche au Seuil du XXe Siècle, I unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as a mere phantasmagoria—although as a matter of fact it was so real that it now stands almost completely fulfilled.

You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. Your own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts which may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves without losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situation now stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous results.[Pg 88] For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in by the Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the utmost significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented the Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable prolongation of the war.

The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle, on the hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the United States for the land of the Tsars. As we have seen, a German victory over Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, the breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the United States. American interest therefore demands, not only that support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be called on first to meet the onslaught.

On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even find it worth while to give further thought to an idea which, a few months ago, would have seemed preposterous to them. Since President Wilson cherishes the ideal of the brotherhood of nations,—a[Pg 89] noble conception, but one which can be realized only after Prussian militarism is ground in the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have gone the way of the Romanoffs,—why should not this world-crisis provide an opportunity for intimate coöperation between the United States and Japan?

Even if Americans were to admit the necessity of so doing, it will be long before they are in the position to throw into the European conflict those reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive influence, would hasten the end of the mad slaughter. At the present moment Japan alone, outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained army capable of taking the field at once. Everything considered, President Wilson might well decide that the interests of humanity called for the intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out as the great, decisive figure of the war. From the technical point of view, it is certain that victory for the Allies calls for a simultaneous concentric attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For that reason, Japanese troops on the Russian line, at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and Saloniki, would furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with the supplementary strength that they need to achieve decisive results and so hasten the end of the whole war.

Let me again urge my point that the line of[Pg 90] action morally and materially most profitable to the United States is that which, by achieving the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prussian militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. This is the moral pointed by the past. If the Allies had undertaken the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 1915, the war would have ended a year ago. If you, Americans, had cast your lot with us a year ago, it would be ending about now. If you act to-day, with all your energies, and especially if you compass the Japanese intervention, you will save the lives of millions of men who, without your military and diplomatic support, will surely be sacrificed.

The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty of the world.

In April last, when it was generally believed in Paris that the Revolution at Petrograd made certain the end of German influence over the vast former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study referred to on page 81 and reprinted here as Chapters IV and V.[1] I then said, [In Russia] ‘Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve.’

Unhappily, events have justified this word of caution in only too full measure. The efforts of the Allies to reorganize the forces of Russia have thus far met with small success. It is a task to which their duty and their interests alike make it imperative for them to devote themselves with their utmost strength. But we must cherish no illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia must inevitably be a long, arduous, and doubtful undertaking. It is advisable, therefore, to[Pg 92] consider, at the same time, if there is not some method of making up for the Russian default by bringing into play, to further the victory of the Entente, certain powerful forces which the Allies have not thus far even thought of employing.

Now, these forces and this method do exist; but in order to enforce clearly their reality, their importance, and the way to make use of them, I must, in the first place, call attention to a fundamental and enduring error of the Allies, set forth the extraordinary credulity with which they allow themselves to be ensnared in the never-ending intrigues of Berlin, and describe the principal shifts which Germany employs, with undeniable cleverness, to annul to an extraordinary degree the effect of the Allies’ efforts. These essential causes of mistaken judgment being eliminated, we shall then be able to understand what the existing forces are which will enable the Entente to make up with comparative rapidity for the Russian default, and to contribute with remarkable efficiency to the destruction of Pan-Germany.

THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF THE ALLIES

For three years past events have notoriously proved that the concrete Pangermanist scheme, developed between 1895 and 1911, has been followed[Pg 93] strictly by the Germans since the outbreak of hostilities. Now, the diplomacy of the Entente is devised as if there were no Pangermanist scheme.

This is the source of all the vital strategical and diplomatic errors of the Entente—consequences of the failure to understand the German military and political manœuvring. Here is proof derived from recent events—one of many which it would be possible to allege.

When it was announced a few weeks ago that Austria would play an apparently preponderating part in the reconstitution of Poland, a very large number of newspapers in the Entente countries decided that ‘it is perfectly evident that the Austrian policy has carried the day in Poland.’ A similar deduction has led Allied readers to believe that Vienna has prevailed over Berlin. The result has been to strengthen the faith of those who deem it possible to impose terms on Berlin through the channel of Vienna, and even to induce Austria to conclude a separate peace. Now, to convey such an impression as this to Allied public opinion is to lead it completely astray. If the Hapsburgs are playing an apparently predominant part in Poland it is solely because that part, as we are about to prove, is assigned to them by the Pangermanist scheme.

In the pamphlet, Pan-Germany and Central Europe about 1950, published in Berlin in 1895,[Pg 94] which contains the whole Pangermanist plan, we find the following:—

‘Poland and Little Russia [the kingdom to be established at Russia’s expense] will agree to have no armies of their own, and will receive in their fortresses German or Austrian garrisons. In Poland, as well as in Little Russia, the postal and telegraph services and the railways will be in German hands.’

For twenty-two years the Pangermanist scheme has been followed up. Tannenberg, in his book, Greater Germany, which appeared in 1911,—a work whose exceptional importance has been demonstrated by events, and which, in all probability, was inspired officially,—prophesies very distinctly,—

‘The new kingdom of Poland is made up of the former Russian portion, of the basin of the Vistula, and of Galicia, and forms a part of the new Austria.’

These most unequivocal words appeared, it will be admitted, three years before the war. Now Le Temps of September 7, 1917, said on the authority of the Polish agency at Berne, which is subsidized by Austria and publishes news communicated to it by the government of Vienna,—

‘Germany would take such portion of Russian Poland as she needs to rectify her “strategic frontiers.” This portion would include almost a tenth of Russian Poland. The rest would be annexed to Austria. The Emperor Charles would[Pg 95] thereupon issue a decree of annexation of Russian Poland to Galicia, under the title of Kingdom of Poland.... The dual monarchy would then become triple, and the first result of this readjustment would be to compel all Poles to undergo military service in the Austrian armies. All the deputies representing Galicia would automatically leave the Austrian Reichsrath, to enter the new Polish Parliament, which would give the German parties in the Austrian Parliament a certain absolute majority.’

This result of the present action of Vienna and Berlin, foreshadowed by the Temps apparently for the near future, has been in view for twenty-two years. In fact, in the fundamental pamphlet of 1895, already quoted, it is said that ‘Galicia and the Bukowina will be excluded from the Austrian monarchy. They will form the nucleus of the kingdoms of Poland and Little Russia ... which, however, may be united, by the personal link of the sovereign, to the reigning house of Hapsburg.’

So it is that, very far from having forced anything on Germany in relation to Poland, Charles I of Hapsburg has shown that he submits with docility to the Pangermanist decrees, since he gives his entire adhesion to the carrying into effect of the plan followed at Berlin from 1895 to 1914—for nineteen years before hostilities began! The actual fact, therefore, is the direct antithesis of what the conclusions of many Allied newspapers[Pg 96] have, of course in absolute good faith, permitted their readers to believe. Now everything goes to show that this error arises solely from a technical ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme, of which the guiding spirits of the Entente seem to have no more conception than a considerable portion of the Allied press. However, if they wish for victory, the Allies must inevitably act in systematic opposition to the Pangermanist scheme. They cannot therefore dispense with the necessity of becoming thoroughly familiar with it.

Nor is there any more reliable guide, since the events that have taken place for three years past have demonstrated the absolute accuracy of the Pangermanist outgivings anterior to the war. Knowing what the Germans are going to do, we can deduce therefrom the best means of opposing it. If this method had been followed, no serious error would have been committed by the Allies. They would have understood that Germany was making war in behalf of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise,—which was intended to supply her with the instruments of world-domination; that, consequently, the Danube front, which the Allies held, must be retained at whatever cost, which would have been, comparatively speaking, very easy, if they had recognized in time this imperative necessity.

Now, if the Allies had retained their hold of the Danube front, the war would have been over[Pg 97] nearly two years ago. It is, in fact, solely because they did not grasp the necessity of thus holding it, that the Germans have been able to carry out their Eastern plan and to constitute the Pan-Germany which must now be destroyed in order to avoid the defeat of civilization, and eventual slavery. To effect this destruction is infinitely easier than is generally believed, on the condition that the most is made of the causes tending to the internal dissolution of Pan-Germany. But, to understand these available causes, familiarity with the Pangermanist scheme is indispensable. It is urgently necessary, therefore, to put an end to this intolerable condition, namely, that, while the Allies have an extraordinary opportunity to become accurately acquainted with the whole programme of procedure at Berlin, as contained in a multitude of German documents,—that is to say, the real objects of Germany in the war,—while they have this opportunity, they go on acting and arguing as if that programme did not exist. It is this condition which proves most clearly the extraordinary and enduring credulity which the Allies exhibit in face of the endless German intrigues.

THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES

The heads of the Allied governments, moved by the best intentions but completely taken by[Pg 98] surprise by the war, are carrying it on far too much in accordance with the ordinary procedure of times of peace—negotiations, declarations, speeches. Notably in the gigantic palaver into which Maximalist Russia has developed, men fancy that they have acted when they have talked. The events of three years of war prove conclusively that the Boches, turning to their profit the predilection of the Allied leaders for verbal negotiations and manifestations,—a predilection complicated by ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme,—have succeeded in nullifying to an extraordinary degree the effect of the sacrifices of the Entente.

Until the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought to bear on the diplomacy of the Entente those allies of Germany who were then regarded by the Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published Greek White Book, have conclusively established the fact that the agreements between Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, in contemplation of this war, antedated the opening of hostilities—that certain ones of them go back as far as April, 1914. Now, it is known that the Entente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situation, and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked for three months by the Turks, for thirteen months by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King of Greece, the Kaiser’s brother-in-law, and even,[Pg 99] to a certain degree, down to a very recent period by Charles I of Hapsburg, certain Allied diplomatists having persisted in coddling the chimera of a peace with Austria against Germany.

Unhappily, to solve the present problems, which are, above all, technical, the best intentions, or even the most genuine natural intelligence, are insufficient. It is necessary to know how, and one cannot know how without having learned. The Allied Socialists who have placed themselves in the spotlight have shown themselves to be, generally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of Germany, of the German mind, of geography, ethnography, and political economy, pinning their faith, before all else, to formulas, and knowing even less than the official diplomats of the technique of the multifold problems imposed by war and peace. As the anti-Prussian German, Dr. Rosemeier, has stated it so fairly in the New York Times, these idealists, by reason of their radical failure to grasp the inflexible facts, are doing as much harm to the world in general as the Russian extremists and their German agents.

It is undeniable that Berlin has found it easy to profit by the state of mind of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente by causing its own Social Democrats to put forth the soi-disant ‘democratic’ peace formulas, which for some months past have been infecting the Allied countries with ideas that are most pernicious because they are[Pg 100] impossible of realization. Despite the efforts of realist Socialists, men like Plekhanoff, Kropotkin, Guesde, Compère-Morel, Gompers, and their like, the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its clumsiness, has helped powerfully to lead Russia to the brink of the abyss, and hence to prolong the war and the sacrifices of the Allies. In France and England a few Socialists have been so genuinely insane as to say that the occupations of territory by Germany are of slight importance; that we can begin to think about peace; that Germany is already conquered morally, and so forth. In view of such results, due to the astounding credulity of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente, it is quite natural that Germany should pursue her so-called ‘pacifist’ manœuvres.

Late in 1916, the Frankfort Gazette advised its readers of the spirit in which these intrigues were to be conducted by Berlin. ‘The point of view is as follows: to put forward precise demands in the East, and in the West to negotiate on bases that may be modified. Negotiation is not synonymous with renunciation.’

This last sentence summarizes the whole of German tactics. All the proposals of Berlin have but a single object: to deceive and sow discord among the Allies by means of negotiations which would be followed by non-execution of the terms agreed upon, Germany retaining the essential positions of to-day’s war-map which would assure[Pg 101] her, strategically and economically, the domination of Europe and the world.

Now, it is an astounding fact that the warnings given by the Germans themselves—the occupation of more than 500,000 square kilometres by the Kaiser’s troops, the burglarizing of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the government of Berlin—have not yet availed to prevent a considerable proportion of the Allies from continuing to be enormously deceived. At the very moment when the German General Staff is strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, especially about Antwerp, there are those among the Allies who seriously believe that, by opening negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Germany to evacuate that ill-fated country and to repair the immense damage that she has inflicted on her.

There are those who wonder what the objects of the war on Germany’s part can be, when the occupations of territory by Germany, corresponding exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating back twenty-two years, make these objects as clear as day.

There are those who attach importance to such declarations as the German Chancellor may choose to make, when every day that passes forces us to take note of monumental and never-ending German lies and of the unwearying duplicity of Berlin.

There are those who are willing to listen to talk about a peace by negotiation, when the facts prove that Germany respects no agreement, that a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that, furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who so declare. At the very outbreak of the war Maximilian Harden said, ‘A single principle counts—Force.’ And the Frankfort Gazette printed these words: ‘Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns, and we still have forces at our disposal.’ To Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, ‘We snap our fingers at treaties.’

After such facts and such declarations, the persistent credulity of a certain fraction of the Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for which the remedy must be found in a popular documentary propaganda, thoroughly and powerfully prepared.

The pacifist German intrigues are manifest enough. We can particularize six leading examples, employed by Berlin, either separately or in combination.

THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES

1. A separate peace between Germany and one of the Entente Allies. The Alsace-Lorraine coup

It is evident that the defection of one of the principal Allies would inevitably place all the[Pg 103] others in a situation infinitely more difficult for continuing the struggle. If we assume such a defection, the Germans might well hope to negotiate concerning peace on the basis of their present conquests.

That is why they have multiplied proposals for a separate peace with the Russians. At Berlin they are especially apprehensive of a continuance of the war by Russia because of the inexhaustible reserves of men possessed by the former Empire of the Tsars. The time will probably come when they will attempt also to lure Italy from the coalition by offering her the Trentino, and if necessary, Trieste, at Austria’s expense, this last-named cession, however, being destined, in the German plan, to be temporary only.

The desire to break up the coalition at any cost is so intense among the Germans, that we must anticipate that, at the psychological moment, they will even go so far as to offer to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France. As for the sincerity of such an offer, these words of Maximilian Harden, written early in 1916, enable us to estimate it:—

‘If people think in France that the reëstablishment of peace is possible only through the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and if necessity compels us to sign such a peace, the seventy millions of Germans will soon tear it up.’

Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for Germany, thanks to the effective forces of Central[Pg 104] Pan-Germany, than to seize Alsace-Lorraine again, very shortly, having given it up momentarily as a tactical manœuvre.

2. A separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary, and the Entente

A particularly astute manœuvre on the part of Berlin consists in favoring, under the rose, not perhaps a formally executed separate peace, but, at least (as has already taken place), semi-official negotiations for a separate peace between her own allies named above and the Entente.

The particular profit of this sort of manœuvre in relation to the definitive consummation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, is readily seen if we imagine the Allies signing a treaty of peace with Turkey, for instance. In such a hypothesis the Allies could treat only with the liegemen of Berlin at Constantinople, for all the other Turkish parties having any political importance whatsoever have been suppressed. Now, if the Allies should treat with the Ottoman government, reeking with the blood of a million Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, massacred en masse as anti-Germans and friends of the Entente, the following results would follow from this negotiation: the Entente, agreeing not to punish the unheard-of crimes committed in Turkey, would renounce its moral platform: it could no longer claim to be fighting in the name of civilization. The Turkish government,[Pg 105] which is notoriously composed of assassins, would be officially recognized; and thus the self-same group of men who sold the Ottoman Empire to Germany would be confirmed in power—the group whose leader, Talaat Pasha, declared in the Ottoman Chamber in February, 1917, ‘We are allied to the Central Powers for life and death!’ The control by Germany of the Dardanelles, a strategic position of vast and world-wide importance, guarded by her accomplices, would be confirmed; the numerous conventions signed at Berlin in January, 1917, which effectively establish the most unrestricted German protectorate over the whole of Turkey, would accomplish their full effect during a Pan-German peace.

The Bulgarian intrigues for a so-called separate peace with the Allies have been at least as numerous as those of the Turks of the same nature. In reality, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to Switzerland to inveigle certain semi-official agents of the Entente into negotiations, were there by arrangement with Berlin for the purpose of sounding the Allies, in order to determine to what degree they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians have never been really disposed to conclude peace with the Entente based on compromise upon equitable conditions. They desire a peace which will assure them immense acquisitions of territory at the expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, and, especially, the Serbians, for at Sofia they[Pg 106] crave, above all things, direct geographical contact with Hungary. Thus the great Allied Powers could treat with the Bulgarians only by being guilty of the monstrous infamy of sacrificing their small Balkan allies, and of assenting to a territorial arrangement which would permit Bulgaria to continue to be the Pangermanist bridge between Hungary and Turkey over the dead body of Serbia—an indispensable element in the functioning of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, and hence of Central Pan-Germany.

Now, this is precisely the one substantial result of the war to which Bulgaria clings above all else. So it is that a peace by negotiation—in reality a peace of lassitude—between the Allies and Bulgaria, would simply give sanction to this state of affairs.

In the same way, such a peace with Austria-Hungary could but give definitive shape to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. From the financial and military standpoint, the monarchy of the Hapsburgs, considered as a state, is to-day absolutely subservient to Germany. The reigning Hapsburg, whatever his private sentiments, can no longer do anything without the consent of the Hohenzollern. Any treaty of peace signed by Vienna would be, practically, only a treaty of which the conditions were authorized by Berlin. There must be no illusion. Nothing less than the decisive victory of the Allies will avail to make[Pg 107] Germany loosen her grip upon Austria-Hungary, for that grip is to Germany the substantial result of the war. In truth it is that grip which, by its geographic, military, and economic consequences, assures Berlin the domination of the Balkans, and of the East, hence of Central Pan-Germany, hence of Hamburg-Persian Gulf, and the vast consequences which derive therefrom.

Let us make up our minds, therefore, that all the feelers toward a separate peace with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, which have been put forth and which will hereafter be put forth, have been and will be simply manœuvres aimed at a so-called peace by negotiation, which would cloak, not simply a German, but a Pan-German peace.

Certain Allied groups having apparently made up their minds that the ‘democratization’ of Germany would suffice to put an end automatically to Prussian militarism and to German imperialism, it was concluded at Berlin that a considerable number, at least, of their adversaries, being weary of the war, might be willing to content themselves with a merely formal satisfaction of their demands, in order to have an ostensibly honorable excuse for bringing it to an end. That is why, with the aim of leading the Allies off the scent and inducing them to enter into negotiations, Berlin devoted herself during the first six[Pg 108] months of 1917, with increasing energy, to the farce called ‘the democratization of Germany.’ Meanwhile the most bigoted Pangermanists put the mute on their demands. They ceased to utter the words ‘annexations’ or ‘war-indemnities.’ They talked of nothing but ‘special political arrangements’—a phrase which in their minds led to the same result but had the advantage of not embarrassing the peace-at-any-price men in the Allied countries. The device of democratization of Germany was complementary to the Stockholm trick, which, as we know, was intended to convince the Russian Socialists that Russia had no further advantage to expect from continuing the war, since Germany in her turn, was about to enter in all seriousness upon the path of democracy—and so forth.

We must acknowledge that many among the Allied peoples allowed themselves to be ensnared for the moment by this manœuvre, and honestly believed that Germany was about to reform, of her own motion and radically. But when the German tactics had achieved the immense result of setting anarchy loose in Russia,—a state of affairs which was instantly made the most of in a military sense by the Staff at Berlin,—the farce of the democratization of Germany was abandoned. Von Bethmann-Hollweg was sacrificed to the necessity of dropping a scheme which he had managed, and Michaelis—Hindenburg’s man,[Pg 109] and therefore the man of the Prussian military party and of the Pangermanists—succeeded him.

As a matter of fact, the Germans have, for all time, had such an inveterate penchant for rapine that they are quite capable of setting up a great military republic and submitting readily enough to Prussian discipline, with a view to starting afresh upon wars for plunder.

We must bear this truth constantly in mind: if the Hohenzollerns have succeeded, in accordance with Mirabeau’s epigram, in making war ‘the national industry,’ it is because, ever since the dawn of history, the Germans have always subordinated everything to their passion for lucrative wars. The same is true of them to-day. Especially in the last twenty years the secret propaganda of the Berlin government has convinced the masses that the creation of Pan-Germany will assure them immense material benefits. It is because this conviction is so firmly rooted among them that substantially the entire body of Socialist workingmen are serving their Kaiser without flinching, and are willing to endure the horrors of the present conflict so long as it may be necessary and so long as they are not conquered in the field.

This is another of the tricks conceived at Berlin. In reality the International, having always[Pg 110] followed the direction of the German Marxists, has been the chief means employed for thirty years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now in alliance against Germany by inducing them to believe that war, thanks to the International alone, could never again break out. In a report on ‘the international relations of the German workingmen’s unions’ (1914), the Imperial Bureau of Statistics was able to proclaim as an undeniable truth: ‘In all the international organizations German influence predominates.’

The conference at Stockholm, initiated by German agents, and that at Berne, upon which they are now at work, are steps which German unionism is taking to reëstablish over the workingmen of all lands the German influence, which has vanished since the war began. The idea now is to force the proletariat of the whole world into subjection to the guiding hand of Germany. The object officially avowed is to rehabilitate the International in the interest of democracy. In reality, it is proposed, above all else, to replace in the front rank the struggle between classes in the Allied countries, in order to destroy the sacred unity that is indispensable to enable the most divergent parties to wage war vigorously against Pangermanist Germany. As the Berlin government is well aware that it has nothing to fear from its own Socialists, the vast majority of whom, even when they disown the title of Pangermanists, are partisans[Pg 111] of Central Pan-Germany, the profit of the manœuvre based on the International would inure entirely to Germany, who would retain her power of moral resistance unimpaired, while the Allied states, once more in the grip of the bitterest social discord, would find their offensive powers so diminished by this means that peace would in the end be negotiated on the basis of the present territorial occupations of Germany.

All the schemes hitherto discussed, whether employed singly or in combination, are intended, first and last, to assist in playing the armistice trick on the Allies. This is based upon an astute calculation, still founded on the weariness of the combatants, which is so easily understood after a war as exhausting as that now in progress. At Berlin they reason thus—and the reasoning is not without force: ‘If an armistice is agreed upon, the Allied troops will say, “They’re talking, so peace is coming, and, before long, demobilization.” Under these conditions our adversaries will undergo a relaxation of their moral fibre.’

The Germans would ask nothing more. They would enter upon peace negotiations with the following astute idea. If, hypothetically, the Allies should make the enormous blunder of discussing terms of peace on bases so craftily devised, Germany, being still intrenched behind her fronts[Pg 112] which had been made almost impregnable, would end by saying, ‘I am not in accord with you. After all is said, you cannot demand that I evacuate territory from which you are powerless to expel me. If you are not satisfied, go on with the war.’

Inasmuch as, during the negotiations, everything essential would have been done by German agents to accentuate the moral relaxation of the country which was most exhausted by the conflict, as they succeeded in doing in Russia in the first months of the Revolution, the immense military machine of the Entente could not again be set in motion in all its parts. The result would be the breaking asunder of the anti-German coalition, and, finally, the conclusion of peace substantially on the basis of existing conquests. Thus Berlin’s object would be attained.

The last of the German schemes, and the most dangerous of all, is that concealed under the formula, ‘No annexations or indemnities’—a formidable trap, which, as I have pointed out in earlier chapters, has for its object to confirm Germany in the possession of the gigantic advantages which she has derived from the war, and which would assure her the domination of the world, leaving the Allies with their huge war-losses, whose inevitable economic after-effects would suffice to reduce them to a state of absolute servitude with respect to Berlin.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Atlantic Monthly, June, 1917, p. 721.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN

In the wholly novel plan which I am about to set forth, the United States may play a preponderating and decisive part; but by way of preamble I must call attention to the fact that the United States is not, in my judgment, as I write these lines, in a position to give its full effective assistance in the conflict, because it is not officially and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—states in thrall to Berlin and constituent parts of Pan-Germany. This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavorable to the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes American action, for these reasons.

As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer carry on the war against the Entente save by virtue of the troops and resources which are placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. If the Allies wish to conquer Germany, their chief adversary, it is necessary that they understand that they must first of all deprive Prussian militarism of the support—apparently secondary, but really essential—which[Pg 114] it receives from its allied vassals. It is, furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be recognized in the United States that Turkish, Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism are bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order to establish a lasting peace, the disappearance of these secondary imperialisms is as necessary as that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, the fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are not officially at war with the United States enables Berlin to maintain connections in America of which we may be sure that she avails herself to the utmost.

This situation is propitious also for that German manœuvre which consists in making people think that a separate peace is possible between Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the one side and the powers of the Entente on the other. However, as the game to be played is complicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we proceed from the simple to the complex, and hence that we strike the enemy first of all in his most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall see, it is mainly in the territory of the three vassals of Germany that the new plan which I am about to set forth can be carried out in the first instance, without, however, causing any prejudice—far, far from it,—to the invaluable assistance which the Americans are preparing to bring to the Allies on the Western front. For all these reasons, it[Pg 115] seems desirable that American public opinion should admit the imperious necessity of a situation absolutely unequivocal with regard to the governments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that same token substantial pillars of Pan-Germany.

DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION

I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier chapters of this book that, because of the advantages, economic and military, which the existence of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany for both present and future, the essential, vital problem that the Allies have to solve—a problem which sums up all the others—is, how to destroy this Central Pan-Germany.

It is infinitely easier to destroy than is generally supposed among the Allies, because it contains potent sources of dissolution. The Allied leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situation the extremely careful attention which it deserves. In any event, down to the present time they have not sought to take advantage of a state of affairs which is eminently favorable to them.

To understand this situation, and how it may be utilized at once, we must set out from the following starting-point. Of about 176,000,000[Pg 116] inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 1917, about 73,000,000 Germans, with the backing of only 21,000,000 vassals—Magyars, Bulgars, Turks,—have to-day reduced to slavery the immense number of 82,000,000 allied subjects—Slavs, Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the Entente, since that alone will assure their liberation. In addition, a considerable portion of Germany’s vassals would, under certain conditions, gladly throw off the yoke of Berlin.

Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Germany we distinguish the following three groups.

Group 1. Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals capable of immediate action favorable to the Entente—say, 63,000,000, made up as follows:—

Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. A portion of them have risen in revolt in Arabia, under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz.

There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,000,000 people determinedly hostile to Germanism, forming an enormous, favorably grouped mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a part of the German lines of communication, and comparatively far from the fronts where the bulk of the German military forces is.

Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,000 human beings, subjected to the most heartless German and Bulgarian terrorism, are coming to understand better and better that the only means of escape from a ghastly slavery, from which there is no appeal, is to contribute at the earliest possible moment to the victory of the Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that have already taken place in Poland, Bohemia, and Transylvania, prove what a limitless development these outbreaks might take on if the Allies should do what they ought to do to meet this psychological condition. It is clear that, if these 55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should revolt in increasing numbers, this result would follow first of all: the default of Russia would be supplied. Indeed, the Germans, being harassed in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be considerably impeded in their military operations and in their communications. Under such conditions the attacks of the Allies would have much more chance of success than they have to-day.

Group 2. Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, who cannot stir to-day, being too near the military fronts, but whose action might follow that of the first group—nearly 16,000,000, made up as follows:—

Group 3. Vassals of Germany, possible rebels against the yoke of Berlin after the uprising of the first group—about 9,000,000.

Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are—a fact not generally known among the Allies—9,000,000 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 9,000,000 Magyar proletarians are exceedingly desirous of peace. As they did not want the war, they detest those who forced it on them. They would be quite capable of revolting at the last moment against their feudal exploiters, if the[Pg 119] Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to assure them that the victory of the Entente would put an end to the agrarian and feudal system under which they suffer.

Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable to the interests of the Allies? Would not the Germans in our place have turned it to their utmost advantage long ago? Does not common sense tell us that if, in view of the pressure on their battle fronts, the Allies knew enough to do what is necessary to induce the successive revolts of the three groups whose existence we have pointed out, a potent internal element in the downfall of Pan-Germany would become more and more potent, adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies have confined themselves thus far to putting forth on the extreme outer circumference of Pan-Germany?

Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,000 persons confined in Pan-Germany in their own despite can be obtained and made really effective.

Let us start with an indisputable fact. The immense results which the German propaganda has achieved in barely five months in boundless Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where it has brought about, in Siberia as well as in Europe, separatist movements which, for the most part,—I speak of them because I have traveled[Pg 120] and studied much in Russia,—would never have taken place but for their artificial agitation,—these results constitute, beyond dispute, a striking demonstration of what the Allies might do if they should exert themselves to act upon races radically anti-Boche, held captive against their will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter of propaganda, the Allies are very far from being as well equipped as the Germans and from knowing how to go about it as they do. But the Germans and their vassals are so profoundly detested by the people whom they are oppressing in Pan-Germany; these people understand so fully that the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the most uncompromising way; they are so clearly aware that they can free themselves from the German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result of this war and of the decisive victory of the Entente, that they realize more clearly every day that their motto must be, ‘Now or never.’

Considering this state of mind, so favorable to the Allies, a propaganda on the part of the Entente, even if prepared with only moderate skill, would speedily obtain very great results. Furthermore, the desperate efforts which Austria-Hungary, at the instigation of Berlin and with the backing of the Stockholmists and the Pope, was making to conclude peace before its threatening internal explosion, show how precarious German hegemony in Central Europe still is.[Pg 121] The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension of the local disturbances which have already taken place in Poland and Bohemia, that they have not yet dared to repress them root and branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves against these anti-German popular commotions, resort to famine. At the present moment, notably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, the Austro-Germans are removing the greatest possible quantity of provisions in order to hold the people in check by hunger. But this hateful expedient itself combines with all the rest to convince these martyrized peoples of the urgent necessity of rising in revolt if they prefer not to be half annihilated like the Serbs.

To make sure of the constant spread and certain effectiveness of the latent troubles of the oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe, there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral suasion, then of material assistance.

To understand the necessity and the usefulness of the first, it must be said that, despite all the precautions taken by the Austro-Boche authorities, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of the oppressed peoples of Central Europe become known to these latter comparatively soon, and that these declarations help greatly to sustain their morale. For example, President Wilson’s message of January 22, 1917, in which he urged the independence and unification of Poland, and[Pg 122] his ‘Flag Day’ speech, on June 15, in which he set forth the great and intolerable peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, manifestly strengthened the determination of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever cost from the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. In addition, the constantly increasing power of the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread important communications broadcast over enemy territory.

First of all, it is essential that the three races which, by reason of their geographical situation and their ethnographical characteristics are indispensable in any reconstitution of Central Europe based on the principle of nationalities, and who consequently have a leading part to play in the centre of the Pan-Germany of to-day, should be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the victory of the Entente will make certain their complete independence. The Poles have received this assurance on divers occasions, notably from President Wilson, and very recently from M. Ribot, commemorating in a dispatch to the Polish Congress at Moscow ‘the reconstitution of the independence and unity of all the Polish territories to the shores of the Baltic.’ But the 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs have not yet received from the leaders of the Entente sufficiently explicit and repeated assurances.

There are two reasons why this is so. In the[Pg 123] first place, the absolutely chimerical hope of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany has obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain exalted personages of the Entente, who, having never had an opportunity to study on the spot the latest developments in Austria, still believe in the old classic formula, ‘If Austria did not exist, we should have to create it.’ In the second place, certain other personages of the Entente incline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift victory, the problem of Central Europe is a problem to be avoided. Now, as to this point, the few men who unquestionably know Austria well—for example, the Frenchmen Louis Léger, Ernest Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain, and others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, and others—are unanimous in being as completely convinced as I myself am that the breaking-up of the monarchy of the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the establishment of a lasting peace—and furthermore, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt of the oppressed peoples is one of the most powerful instruments in the hands of the Entente to bring the war to a victorious close.

In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical laws which should guide in the reconstruction of a Europe that can endure. Now, without a free Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible—impossible, I insist—that Poland should be really[Pg 124] free, that Serbia and Roumania should be restored, that Russia should be released from the grip of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should be restored permanently to France, that Italy should be protected from German domination in the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that the United States should be warranted against the world-wide results of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of the whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the indispensable keystone of the European edifice, rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of nationalities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe. It must be, therefore, that liberty shall be master of Bohemia.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the successive uprisings of 8,500,000 Czechs and 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line with the present military interests of the Entente. Therefore, for the Allies to assume an attitude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs is as contrary to the democratic principles they invoke as to their most urgent strategic interests. But this mistake has been frequently made, solely because the exceptional importance of Bohemia has not yet been fully grasped. Mr. Asquith, in his speech of September 26 last, furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve with respect to the Czechs—a reserve which is[Pg 125] diminishing, no doubt, but which still exists. He said:—

‘If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we see purely artificial territorial arrangements, which are repugnant to the wishes and interests of the populations directly concerned, and which, so long as they remain unchanged, will constitute a field fertile in new wars. There are, first, the claims of Roumania and Italy, so long overdue; there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be restored to her home, but which is entitled to more room in which to expand nationally; and there is Poland. The position of Greece and the South Slavs must not be forgotten.’

Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best intentions toward the oppressed peoples of Central Europe, he does not even mention the Czechs, that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the promises that the Entente can make concerning Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are not capable of lasting fulfillment unless Bohemia is set free, for Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. Furthermore, Mr. Asquith’s silence as to the fate of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of uneasiness to the Czechs, who are now doing the impossible to contend with Germanism, despite the shocking terrorism which lies so heavy upon them. So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have served the interest of the Entente more effectively if he had emphatically named Bohemia and the[Pg 126] Czechs who are so much in need of being supported and encouraged by the Allies, whom they regard as their liberators.

The misconceptions that have led to the ignoring of the claims of the Central European Slavs, and of their extreme importance in the solution of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves an even heavier load to carry than those committed in Bulgaria and Greece. To put an end to these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth the leaders of the Entente should earnestly encourage, at least the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs—that is to say, about 42,000,000 slaves of Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of these peoples as a single body is indispensable, for, although the Boches are able to control the local and, so to say, individual insurrectionary movements, on the contrary, because of the vast area which a general insurrection of the 42,000,000 would involve, its repression by the Austro-Boches would be practically impossible. The example of a successful general uprising would certainly induce a similar movement by the balance of the 88,000,000 human beings who are vitally interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. To bring about this result, then, the first essential thing to be done is for the leaders of the Entente to put forth a most unequivocal declaration, giving the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance that the victory of the Entente will make certain[Pg 127] their complete liberation. It is impossible to see what there is to hinder such a declaration. Its effects would soon be discerned if it were enthusiastically supported by the Allied press and by the Allied Socialists, who, let us hope, will finally realize that, while it is impossible to bring about a revolution against Prussian militarism in Germany, it can very easily be effected in Austria-Hungary.

But, some one will say, a revolution is not possible without material resources. Naturally, I shall discuss this point only so far as the interests of the Entente will allow me to do it publicly. In the first place I will call attention to the fact that, by reason of the immensity of the territory they occupy, simple passive resistance on the part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, provided that it is offered in concert and accompanied by certain essays in the way of sabotage and strikes, which are easy enough to practice without any outside assistance, would create almost inextricable difficulties for the Austro-Germans.

But there is something much better to be done. At first sight, it seems very difficult for the Allies to bear effective material aid to the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany, because they are surrounded by impregnable military lines. In fact, by combining the results of the tremendous development of the aviation branch made possible by the adhesion[Pg 128] of the United States, with certain technical resources which are available, the Entente can, comparatively quickly and easily, supply the Poles and the rest with material assistance which would prove extraordinarily efficacious.

I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for twenty years these down-trodden races and the countries in which they live. I know about the material resources to which I refer. If I do not describe them more explicitly, it is because no one has yet thought of employing them, and in such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I am, of course, at the disposition of the American authorities if they should wish to know about the resources in question, and to study them seriously. I am absolutely convinced that, if employed with due method, determinedly, and scientifically, in accordance with a special technique, these resources, after a comparatively simple preparation,—much less in any event than those which have been made in other enterprises,—would lead to very important results which would contribute materially to the final decision.[2]

To sum up—in Central Europe, through the liberation, preceded by the legitimate and necessary revolution, of its martyred peoples, are found[Pg 129] in conjunction: (a) the means of making good the default of Russia; (b) the basis of a new and decisive conclusion of the war; (c) the possibility of destroying Central Pan-Germany; (d) the consequent wiping out of the immense advantages from the war which the mere existence of Pan-Germany assures to Germany; and (e) the elements of a lasting peace upon terms indisputably righteous and strictly in accordance with the principles of justice invoked by the Entente.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF OTHER VOLUMES
DEALING WITH THE GREAT WAR
AND PUBLISHED BY
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
THREE PARK STREET, BOSTON, MASS.
WILL BE FOUND ON THE
FOLLOWING PAGES

FOOTNOTES:

[2] To the editor, M. Chéradame has written with less reserve on this vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no more than the suggestion indicated.—The Editor of the Atlantic Monthly.

This book is a spiritual interpretation of the suffering and sacrifice of the World War, expressed in a group of three papers of kindred significance, yet written from three different points of view by a Frenchman, an Englishman, and an American. The volume includes:

Each writer is seeking in the dreadful welter of war some common revelation of spiritual comfort and advance. Is the agony of these years meaningless and wanton? Is the heartsickening struggle brutal and brutalizing, and nothing more? Each, in his or her own way, finds an answer.

One, a questioner by temperament, has come to see the regeneration of human life in the miracle which the war has worked in the younger generation. Another, by profession a soldier, found a new and vivid faith born of physical impotence and pain. The third, an American woman, has come to her new belief from far distant fields of the imagination. All three unite in confidence that the generation now culminating in manhood is passing through blackness into light brighter than any dawn the world has known.

The spirit of the volume is the spirit of youth, learning in the Book of Life, trusting that the best is yet to be, and reading with shining eyes to the end. It is the spirit or Léo Latil, a young soldier of France, who, shortly before his death on the edge of a German trench, wrote to his family, —

Our sacrifices will be sweet if we win a great and glorious victory,—if there shall be more light for the souls of men; if truth shall come forth more radiant, more beloved.

The War and the Spirit of Youth is an inspiring, heartening little volume. It is well printed, handsomely bound, and sells postpaid for one dollar.

When the World War broke out, Vernon Kellogg was Professor of Biology at Leland Stanford University. As a man of science, he was accustomed to weigh facts calmly and dispassionately. He was an admirer of Germany, a neutral, and a pacifist. With the hope of relieving human suffering, he went to Europe and became special envoy of the Committee for the Relief of Belgium at German General Headquarters and at the headquarters of General Von Bissing in Brussels.

For many months, Professor Kellogg lived with Germany’s military leaders in the West, worked with them, argued with them, learned from their own lips their aims and principles of life. He saw the workings of German autocracy among the people it had crushed, heard German methods defended by some of the ablest men in the Kaiser’s empire, tried in vain to understand the German point of view.

“Quite four nights of each seven in the week,” he says, “there were other staff officers in to dinner, and we debated such trifles as German Militarismus, the hate of the world for Germany, American munitions for the Allies, submarining and Zeppelining, the Kaiser, the German people.”

These “headquarters nights,” and the days he spent trying to assuage the misery caused by the German military system, brought about “the conversion of a pacifist to an ardent supporter, not of War, but of this war; of fighting this war to a definitive end—that end to be Germany’s conversion to be a good Germany or not much of any Germany at all.”

One of the most graphic pictures of the German attitude, the attitude which rendered this war inevitable, is contained in Vernon Kellogg’s Headquarters Nights. It is a convincing, and an evidently truthful, exposition of the shocking, the unspeakably dreadful, moral and intellectual perversion of character which makes Germany at present a menace to the whole civilized world.

Headquarters Nights is attractively printed and bound in cloth. Its price is one dollar postpaid.

During 1918, The Atlantic Monthly will not only print a new series of papers by André Chéradame, but also an extraordinarily comprehensive succession of articles dealing with every phase of the military and political significance of the Great War.

Everyone who wishes to keep informed on the issues of war and peace, absolutely vital to the world, should read these papers as they are published.

Over and above these Chéradame articles, month by month, The Atlantic debates every phase of the Great War, in papers ranging from the recital of personal adventures by fighting men to statesmanlike discussions of policy during and after the war.

Orders promptly filled by
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY PRESS
THREE PARK STREET, BOSTON, MASS.

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The Project Gutenberg eBook of Pan-Germany

PAN-GERMANY
THE DISEASE AND CURE

CHAPTER I
How Cheaply Germany Has Fought the War

SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS

CHAPTER II
How Much Germany Has Won in the War

CHAPTER III
The Necessity for a Decision

CHAPTER IV
The Allies and Pan-Germanism

CHAPTER V
Military Operations

CHAPTER VI
Pan-Germany’s Strength and Weakness

THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF THE ALLIES

THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES

THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER VII
The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany

THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN

DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION

FOOTNOTES:

Transcriber’s Notes

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

1. The Masters
	Germans	73,000,000
2. The Vassals
	Magyars	10,000,000
	Bulgars	5,000,000	21,000,000
	Turks	6,000,000
3. The Slaves
	French	(about) 3,000,000
	Belgians	7,500,000
	Alsatians, Lorrainers	1,500,000
	Danes	200,000
	Poles, Lithuanians	22,000,000
	Ruthenians	5,500,000
	Czechs	8,500,000	82,000,000
	Jugo-Slavs	11,000,000
	Roumanians	8,000,000
	Italians	800,000
	Armenians	2,000,000
	Levantines	2,000,000
	Ottoman Greeks	2,000,000
	Arabs	8,000,000
	Total		176,000,000

Polish-Lithuanians	22,000,000
Ruthenians	5,500,000
Czechs	8,500,000
Jugo-Slavs	11,000,000
Roumanians	8,000,000
	55,000,000

French	3,000,000
Belgians	7,500,000
Alsatians and Lorrainers	1,500,000
Italians	800,000
	12,800,000

The Project Gutenberg eBook of Pan-Germany

PAN-GERMANY THE DISEASE AND CURE

CHAPTER I How Cheaply Germany Has Fought the War

SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS

CHAPTER II How Much Germany Has Won in the War

CHAPTER III The Necessity for a Decision

CHAPTER IV The Allies and Pan-Germanism

CHAPTER V Military Operations

CHAPTER VI Pan-Germany’s Strength and Weakness

THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF THE ALLIES

THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES

THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES

FOOTNOTES:

CHAPTER VII The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany

THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN

DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION

FOOTNOTES:

Transcriber’s Notes

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE

PAN-GERMANY
THE DISEASE AND CURE

CHAPTER I
How Cheaply Germany Has Fought the War

CHAPTER II
How Much Germany Has Won in the War

CHAPTER III
The Necessity for a Decision

CHAPTER IV
The Allies and Pan-Germanism

CHAPTER V
Military Operations

CHAPTER VI
Pan-Germany’s Strength and Weakness

CHAPTER VII
The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany