MEXICO ***




                                 No. I.

         ------------------------------------------------------

                            MEXICAN LETTERS

                                WRITTEN

                  DURING THE PROGRESS OF THE LATE WAR

                              BETWEEN THE

                             UNITED STATES

                                  AND

                                MEXICO,



                                   BY



                         B. H. M. BRACKENRIDGE:



    NOW COLLECTED AND REPUBLISHED, WITH NOTES AND CORRECTIONS, TO BE
                       COMPLETED IN TWO NUMBERS.



                                ────────
                         _Genus audax Japeti._
                                ────────



                              WASHINGTON:
                      PRINTED BY ROBERT A. WATERS.
                                 1850.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                PREFACE.


                               ----------


One who thinks for himself, is very apt to think alone, or with a
minority, especially in our free republic, where there is such proneness
in opinion to run into party. The individual is restrained by party
trammels from asserting his independence, and he must adopt all the
articles of political, as well as religious creeds, or be expelled from
the church. Although agreeing with the whigs generally, I could not
agree with them in our late war with Mexico, that justice was on the
side of that republic; still less could I approve of the constant
condemnation of the war in which we were engaged. I applied the same
principle to that war that I did to the late war with Great Britain,
that is to say, that it becomes every citizen to sustain his country
against the common enemy, both by word and deed.

The letters now collected and submitted to the public, were written in
this spirit. The author has endeavored to treat with respect the
opinions of those who differed from him. He does not think he can be
justly censured by any one for attempting to prove by fair and honest
reasoning, that his country was in the right, and the enemy in the
wrong. He may be condemned by his party at the present day, but at a
future day the judgment may be reversed. These letters may serve as
materials for history. There will be no difficulty in finding the
records of the arguments of the administration party, which promoted and
defended the war; or of the opposition, which denounced it. But before
making up a verdict, the voice of the small number dissenting from the
latter ought also to be heard. It is with this view chiefly, that these
letters are collected and preserved. There is, besides, usually a
freshness in the commentaries on contemporary or passing events, which
cannot be attained by historical compilation, however elegant and
philosophic, while the former, may be but rude and unpolished.

The author, although desirous of the annexation of Texas, was fearful of
the consequences of any acquisition of territory on our southern
borders, for the single reason, that it might endanger the harmony of
the Union. He foresaw great evils and dangers arising from the _quasi_
independence of Texas, and from the certainty of the occupation of Upper
California by Great Britain, in case it did not fall into our hands.
Looking into the future, both of these points presented the probability
of fearful collisions with that power. We had a Scylla and Charybdis
before us; our bark could not strike upon both; but whether it will
escape both, the Almighty, who has thus far favored us in a peculiar
manner, can alone determine. As to Mexico, I have long been of opinion,
that we could never have a peace on a lasting foundation, without a war.
If that neighboring and jealous people had still remained united to the
Spanish monarchy, it would have been the same thing. This event was but
removed farther off, or postponed by the acquisition of Louisiana and
the Mississippi, but soon or late, a collision was inevitable; and
nothing else would determine the terms on which we should live in
future, as neighbors. To other persons, all this may appear visionary
and idle, the mere dreams of the closet. Be it so—let my opinions pass
for what they are worth; they are, at least, those of a thinker, an
observer, and an actor on the scene.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 1.


         _Justice on the side of Texas in her war with Mexico._

                                            JUNE, 1846.

    _To the Editor of the Commercial Journal_:

    We continually meet with the phrases in newspapers, English and
    American, and especially in Mexican documents, “the robbery and
    plunder of Mexico, of her province of Texas,” and of the
    “ingratitude of the people of Texas.” These expressions, from
    frequent use, have come to have some meaning attached to them
    with those who are not acquainted with the true history of the
    case. Now what is Mexico, and what particular right had she ever
    to Texas? She was once a vice-royalty of Spain, composed of
    various Intendencies, or local and subordinate Governments.
    These Intendencies, taking advantage of the troubles of old
    Spain, set up for themselves, and endeavored to throw off the
    Spanish dominion, practising the same thing that Texas has done
    as respects Mexico; and if Texas has been ungrateful to Mexico,
    for the same reason Mexico has been ungrateful to Spain. But the
    struggle for independence was carried on by them separately, and
    independently of each other; not united like the British
    Colonies in the Revolutionary War. It may be new to some to be
    told that Texas not only achieved her own independence without
    the aid of any Mexican Province or Intendency, but was actually
    the means, through the Americans then inhabiting the country,
    with the aid of citizens of the United States, of enabling the
    other Mexican Provinces to gain _their_ independence. Before I
    am done this will be demonstrated. Mexico owes a debt to the
    American people of Texas and of the United States, for her
    independence, _if it be worth anything_, and, consequently, the
    ingratitude is on her side. But her efforts were finally
    successful through the treachery of Iturbide. He was a traitor
    to Spain, in whose employment he was, and by one of those
    military revolts, since of daily recurrence in the mis-named
    Republic of Mexico, overturned the Spanish authority, and
    proclaimed himself Emperor! The empire was soon after overturned
    by something approaching nearer to a popular revolution in the
    Intendencies or Provinces. An attempt at something like a
    Republic, followed the downfall of the Emperor. States were
    formed out of the Intendencies, and a confederated Republic, in
    imitation of the United States, was established in form, but in
    form only. Texas, with parts of two other Intendencies, was
    constituted one of these States. The confederated Republic was
    not long lived. It fell to pieces or was overturned by the
    military chiefs, and then each State, was again compelled to
    look out for itself. Some submitted, some were subdued by this
    military power, the only real power; and others still retain
    their preference for the federative system, although compelled
    to submit to the central authority. The only one which _did not
    submit to the overthrow of the Constitution by a military
    usurper, was ungrateful Texas_.

    Santa Anna, after having expelled Iturbide, next overturned the
    federative system, restored the central power of the city of
    Mexico, and at the same time grasped the substance of absolute
    power, prudently avoiding the name of Emperor. Troops were sent
    to Texas, and these _ungrateful_ people were generously called
    upon, _to give up their religion and surrender their rifles_!
    The consequence was, that Coss and his fourteen hundred men were
    driven over the Rio Grande. People talk of the Texans having no
    cause of war, now I ask any one, who has a drop of American
    blood in his veins, to say, what he would think of an order by a
    military despot, to the people of Alleghany county for instance,
    _to give up their religion and their arms_? But then did not
    Mexico make grants of land to these ungrateful American
    settlers, and did not that entitle her to call upon those
    settlers to comply with her moderate requests?[1] It is true,
    Mexico did make grants of land in Texas; yes, of land which did
    not belong to her, for they were won from Spain by the Texan
    Americans themselves, who constituted nine tenths of the people
    of that part of the country. And what was the next movement on
    the part of Mexico? These grants were made during the federative
    system—Americans were invited on account of their valuable
    assistance in contending against the Spanish monarchy, and
    guarding the frontier against hostile Indians—but when they were
    no longer needed, when the lands improved by them, tempted the
    cupidity of the military despots, and when their sturdy habits
    of independence and love of liberty stood in the way of the
    despotic schemes of the military aspirants and plunderers of
    Mexico, the next thing was to expel, or exterminate, the
    ungrateful and hated North Americans. Santa Anna marched at the
    head of ten thousand men for this holy purpose. We may judge of
    the humane and civilized spirit of these barbarians, (for whom
    so much sympathy is ignorantly felt by some of our fellow
    citizens,) by the murder of Fanning and four hundred American
    Texans in cold blood, after a surrender as prisoners of war!
    This more than diabolical atrocity, is scarcely equalled by the
    murder of the Huguenots by the fanatical ruffian, Pedro
    Menendez.

Footnote 1:

      Terms of reproach like these have been applied to the Texans,
      even from the pulpit, by learned divines, who are better
      theologians, than jurists or statesmen. As moral men, they
      ought to beware how they cast reproach on their neighbors,
      without being sure of their facts; and even then, tempered by
      charity. If the allusion is to the grants of land made by
      Mexico, those grants were made from the most interested
      motives. Texas contained but two small towns, San Antonio and
      Nacogdoches; all the rest was a wilderness, wandered over by
      the Camanches and Lipans, and other hostile Indians, with the
      exception of the few American settlements formed by hardy
      American pioneers, and maintained by the rifle, at the
      constant risk of life. The object of the Mexican Government
      was to cover their frontier from Indian depredations by
      placing an advanced guard of our countrymen between them and
      their savage enemies. The lands of Texas were worse than
      useless and worthless to Mexico, because they merely served as
      the place of refuge for her savage enemies; she, in fact, gave
      nothing that was of any value to her; on the contrary, the
      grants were intended for her own advantage and security. But
      for these settlements, her whole frontier would have been laid
      waste; and many a bloody battle was fought, and many a Texan
      life was lost in the border war of which the Mexican Provinces
      reaped the benefit. But for the Texans, it is difficult to
      say, what would have been the condition of the internal
      provinces at this day. After expending millions in money and
      labor—after opening farms, building towns, and rearing vast
      herds of cattle, the Mexicans begin to discover its value, and
      conceived the idea of placing their peon slaves on the
      improved lands, which were to be parcelled out among military
      chiefs. Besides, the sturdy republican predilections of the
      Americans settled in Texas, and their intelligence, were
      annoying to the leaders of the military despotism of Mexico.
      It was conceived, that the purpose for which they were invited
      to take possession of the dangerous post of frontier settlers,
      was now accomplished, and that their further services could be
      dispensed with; and, at the same time, gratify the cupidity of
      their military chieftains. It was they who were frustrated in
      the _attempt to steal the Texan lands_, while the Texans did
      nothing more than defend their own—that which they had
      created, _and which had never been the property of Mexico_.

    I am disgusted when I hear persons talk of the injured Mexicans,
    when such butcheries as these are passed _in almost approving
    silence_. But Santa Anna met, not indeed _with the fate he
    deserved_, but such an overthrow, as every true lover of liberty
    and political justice ought to desire. His forces were driven
    across the Rio Grande; Texas declared her independence; she
    successfully maintained it, and proclaimed the Rio Grande as her
    boundary, and has devolved that _claim_ upon us. Upon this mere
    outline of facts, I appeal to every just and unprejudiced,
    unbigoted man, to say, how has Texas been ungrateful to Mexico,
    and how have we, or Texas, been guilty of robbing Mexico of an
    independent State, which has fairly united her fate with ours?
    Mr. Webster says, Mexico is “the most ill-governed country on
    earth;” and I will add, that her Government is the most
    faithless, unprincipled, and cruel. For the honor of humanity,
    there are noble exceptions, doubtless, among the people and her
    public officers, nevertheless, such, with too much truth, is the
    general character of both.

    In 1812, a young man of the name of Magee, who had been a
    Lieutenant in the United States service, after resigning for the
    purpose, assembled a force of American riflemen between the
    Sabine and the Trinity Rivers, and raised the standard of revolt
    against Spain, ostensibly under a native named Bernardo. At this
    time, the different attempts at revolution throughout the
    vice-royalty, had been completely put down, and the last rebel,
    Hidalgo, publicly executed. Magee took Nacogdoches, then marched
    to La Bahia, where, with four hundred Americans, he withstood a
    siege of three months, the American riflemen making such havoc
    among the Spanish soldiers in their occasional sorties, that
    their commander was compelled to raise the siege and retreat to
    St. Antonio; Magee, in the meantime died, not more than
    twenty-two years of age. The Americans, in all, about three
    hundred, and one hundred Indians, pursued the royal troops until
    within twelve miles of St. Antonio. Here they were drawn up
    twelve hundred strong, with six pieces of artillery. A charge
    was made by the American riflemen, the artillery taken; and on
    the same day they took possession of the town. About six months
    after this, General Elisondo, with sixteen hundred men, who had
    approached the place, was attacked by the Americans with about
    nine hundred, (three or four hundred of them native Texans,) and
    completely routed. Two Spanish armies were thus entirely
    destroyed. A third, under Arredondo, would have shared the same
    fate, but for the desertion of Manchaco who led the Texan
    Spaniards.

    It thus appears, that the revolutionary fire was kept alive in
    Texas when every where else extinguished. It was the means of
    exciting other revolutionary attempts in different parts of
    Mexico. Even after Texas was reduced by the Spanish troops, new
    attempts were continually made by Americans, and with partial
    success, to regain it. It was, through the medium of Texas, that
    supplies were continually obtained to aid the Mexicans in all
    their struggles for independence. Hundreds of Americans
    sacrificed their lives in every part of Mexico in support of the
    cause. In the unfortunate expedition of General Mina, not less
    than three hundred Americans embarked, few of whom ever
    returned. I am well convinced that without the aid of the
    ungrateful Texans, in the supply of men, arms, and means of war,
    Mexico could not have gained her independence. And what was the
    return made to the citizens of the United States for this, and
    for being first to take her by the hand, and recognize her as an
    independent Republic? It was natural for Americans to sympathize
    with their countrymen in Texas when oppressed by Mexico, and a
    determination avowed to exterminate them; and hence, the
    principal cause of offence to Mexico, which instigated the
    shocking treatment of American citizens engaged in their lawful
    pursuits in that country, under the faith of treaties. Nothing
    was more common than the imprisonment of Americans in the horrid
    prisons of Mexico; for personal liberty, which to us, is the
    dearest thing on earth; with them, is the cheapest. Our trade
    with Mexico was almost annihilated. In every instance in which
    American vessels were seized under some frivolous pretext as an
    excuse for plunder, every one on board was thrown into prison
    among the vilest malefactors, and compelled, for an indefinite
    period, to undergo every kind of suffering, under which a large
    proportion actually perished. A stupid and barbarous prejudice—a
    fiendish hostility, seems to prevail among the great body of
    that people where no opportunity has been afforded of becoming
    personally acquainted with us. It reminds one of the ignorant
    self-conceit and arrogance of the Chinese, and there seems to be
    no way of securing their esteem and respect, but by adopting the
    course pursued by the English with the “Celestials.” Our long
    forbearance has doubtless tended to encourage this insolence.
    They received a timely check from the French when the castle of
    Ulloa was battered down with so little ceremony, and the
    authorities required to pay on the deck of Admiral Baurin’s
    vessel, a million of dollars, as the estimated value of their
    plunder of French subjects. They now entertain a high opinion of
    French civilization and politeness. England has always held them
    under her thumb, by loans, investments, and cajolery, and they
    now look to her for aid, support, and sympathy. England has a
    deep stake in Mexico; it is to be expected therefore, that she
    will sympathize with _her own interests_; that she will do all
    she can to excite against us the prejudices of the Mexicans,
    exhibiting our conduct through a jaundiced medium, both to
    Mexicans and Europeans. No pains will be spared to place us
    before the world as in the wrong in this contest. American
    editors ought to be on their guard against such partial and
    interested representations as that of J. D. Powell’s, “Chairman
    of the South American and Mexican Association,” as well as
    against the low and scurrilous slanders of the British presses
    of Montreal.

                                            H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 2.


       _The first blow of the War—Fortunate result—Reflections._

                                            JULY, 1846.

    Never was a country more suddenly raised up from a state of
    depression, to the most enthusiastic rejoicing and gladness,
    than we have been since the late glorious intelligence from the
    Rio Grande! We may talk about the justice of the war, and there
    may be fanatics who would rejoice in the defeat of our armies,
    but the people, true to patriotic feeling, rejoice with one
    heart over the glorious achievements of our countrymen. We are
    the same people that we were at the capture of Cornwallis, and
    at the defeat of the British at New Orleans.

    There was a gloom settling over the public mind, and fears began
    to be entertained of news like that from Detroit, at the opening
    of that unfortunate campaign. To all appearance, General Taylor
    and his gallant army were shut up in Fort Brown, and suddenly
    cut off by an overwhelming force of Mexicans, from his military
    depot at Point Isabel. If that depot, defended by less than a
    thousand men, its fortifications incomplete, should be assailed
    by the whole force of Arista and Ampudia, its safety appeared to
    be hopeless. If taken, the army of General Taylor, shut up in
    Fort Brown, with supplies only for a few weeks, would be either
    compelled to surrender, or attempt to retreat to Corpus Christi.
    The consequences, in either case, would be a triumph for the
    Mexican arms, fatal to all hope of peace.

    I passed some sleepless nights in revolving the subject in my
    mind. The idea constantly recurred to me, as a sort of waking
    dream, that General Taylor would leave a force in Fort Brown and
    with the main body of his army cut his way to Point Isabel. I
    was disposed to blame him for suffering himself to be separated
    from his depot of supplies; but the war itself came on him
    suddenly, and he was obliged to _wait the first blow_. In this
    feverish state of mind, a friend came to my house early one
    morning with two newspaper slips containing the accounts of the
    two battles of Palo Alto, and Resaca. Never was the anxiety of a
    people more suddenly and joyfully relieved! It was like the
    anxiety felt by a family for the fate of those nearest and
    dearest to it. We are peculiarly a national people; for every
    man has a share in the Government; feels an interest in it, as a
    part owner, and he feels his own safety and honor embarked in
    the same bottom with the safety and honor of the nation.

    Thank God, we are safe! They must be very short sighted men who
    could wish success to the Mexicans. We should have had scenes of
    bloodshed and devastation unparalleled. Our preparations for war
    would have had to be renewed on a vast and expensive scale; the
    most extravagant hopes in the presumptuous and barbarous enemy
    would have been encouraged; while even the Sabine, for a
    boundary, would not have contented them. Their demands would
    have known no bounds, and the prospects of peace, would have
    been remote indeed. Now, humbled and broken, their country
    exposed to invasion and conquest, if we only will it; undeceived
    in their fancied military pre-eminence, they must be insane if
    they do not hasten to sue for peace. I confess, I did not look
    for such decided success in the first blow, which, in wars and
    battles, is often so important; and that, over a people who have
    been continually practising the art of war, and who ought to
    excel in it, if they can excel in any thing. If the history of
    nations be a history of battles, (as it is said to be) Mexico
    will claim a conspicuous page in that history. European nations,
    who have been in the habit of judging others, chiefly by their
    military prowess, will open their eyes when they receive the
    news; for they have already prognosticated according to their
    wishes, that we must be disgraced in the trial of arms with
    Mexico.

    I have no doubt, that President Polk will lay hold of this
    occasion to offer terms of peace. I am not one of those whigs
    who believe, that it was the predetermined plan of this
    administration to involve the country in a war with Mexico. I
    rather accuse them of a want of foresight, as to the inevitable
    result of the annexation of Texas. If they had been convinced,
    that war would have been the consequence of that measure, I
    honestly think, there would have been no annexation. The
    repeated declarations, that it would not be followed by war, I
    believe, were made in sincerity. For my part, I thought
    differently; the issue seemed to me to be this—shall we take
    Texas, _and war_, or leave the numerous questions of policy
    arising out of the independence of Texas, to take care of
    themselves, and our relations with Mexico to remain in the same
    embroiled state for an indefinite period? There is a providence
    in the affairs of men, which shapes their fortunes, “rough hew
    them as they will.”

    I neither approve nor condemn the course of the administration
    in relation to this war. I am convinced it would not,
    intentionally, endanger its popularity on such rocks and shoals,
    as the expense and casualty of war necessarily present. A
    demonstration was thought to be sufficient to secure the
    advantages of a treaty of peace and limits, settling all our
    differences, and gratifying the nation, by a great acquisition
    of territory. A small share of the glory and popularity which
    may attend this war, will be reaped by the administration! These
    will be bestowed on those who are immediately engaged on the
    scene of action. Our friends are doing all they can to make it
    Mr. Polk’s war; but the people will persist in looking upon it,
    as General Scott’s and General Taylor’s war; so far, at least,
    as the glory is concerned; if it should prove disastrous, then,
    indeed, the administration will come in for a share.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 3.

    _The annexation of Texas, the unavoidable cause of war—The
      energetic prosecution of the war the only way to obtain
      peace._

                                            SEPTEMBER, 1846.

    SIR: If the editor of the “Commercial Journal,” will look over
    his files he will find, that two years ago I gave my opinion,
    that the annexation of Texas would not merely _lead_ to war, but
    would be war—that it would be a long war, and that if we carried
    the war into Mexico, would require an addition to our regular
    force of at least thirty thousand men, and an annual expenditure
    of thirty millions of dollars. I ask you whether my prediction
    has not been fulfilled? Yet, you must suppose, that I say this
    from friendship to Mexico; I have no sympathy with either her
    people or her military despotism. I feel interested in the honor
    of my own country, and all my hopes and wishes are for the
    success of her arms.

    I do, moreover, honestly believe, that as respects Mexico, our
    cause is just. Whether it was within the scope of possibility
    for the Government, (I mean the whole Government, not the
    Executive branch alone,) by prudent measures, and by
    forbearance, to avoid hostilities, is a question which I do not
    choose to discuss at present. But I contend, that Texas had a
    right to annex herself to the United States, if she chose; that
    we neither violated any right of Mexico nor any treaty
    stipulation in accepting the offer, although, there is no doubt
    that, looking at things as they actually exist, the joint
    resolution of Congress annexing Texas would, inevitably be
    followed by war.

    Mexico has rejected, and continues to reject, all overtures of
    peace, excepting on the condition of our retiring beyond the
    Sabine, and making compensation for the wrong alleged to have
    been done her, by the annexation and military occupation of her
    province of Texas. Having thus got into war in consequence of
    this step, the war has become the act of the nation, and there
    is no hope of peace without concessions, which we cannot make.
    It is useless for highly sublimated moralists, and highly
    honorable statesman, to propose such concessions—every one
    knows, as a matter of mere fact, that the nation will not
    consent to them. We are in for the war, and must fight it out.
    Judging of nations and men as they are, and not, perhaps, as
    they ought to be, there is no other course.

    Besides, there are points in which we are bound by positive
    obligations, not by mere abstract morality. We are bound to
    maintain the right of Texas to the boundary of the Rio Grande,
    and we are bound to secure the amount of spoliations due by the
    Mexican Government to our own citizens. As we are now at war,
    (and it is not material as to this, whether by our act, or that
    of Mexico,) the payment of that debt must be secured by
    sequestration of California or other territory, and at the same
    time, there must be indemnity for the expenses of the war. As to
    the prospects ahead, that is, as to the results of the war, they
    do not appear to me encouraging, and as to the prospects of
    peace, they are still more gloomy.

    I believe there is no nation on the Globe more powerful for
    defence, than we are. But our power for warlike conquest, is an
    idea which ought not to be encouraged, and no people had ever
    less necessity for it. In order to be conquerors, we must have
    regular standing armies; we must have tributary provinces as
    Rome had, and, consequently, a system incompatible with our
    simple democratic republican institutions. Unoccupied countries,
    like California, may be conquered by our settlements, as Texas
    and some of our States were conquered. In the course of time,
    the whole of North America, and, perhaps South America, will
    gradually and imperceptibly, yield to this kind of conquest. But
    at present, the countries beyond the Rio Grande are inhabited by
    a different race of people, too numerous to be at once absorbed
    or displaced, and whose habits and character do not fit them to
    become integral portions of our confederacy. Mere dependencies
    and colonies do not suit the spirit of our free institutions.

    The western side of the Rio Grande presents a very different
    case from that of Texas, settled by our own people, and which
    but a few years ago was little better than a wilderness, a
    frontier to Mexico, as well as to us. The States of New Leon,
    Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, contain half a million of people, have
    been settled two hundred years, and contain ancient cities and
    towns. They are spread over a surface as large as Virginia and
    the Carolinas, and backed by other more extensive States towards
    Mexico. If the struggle lay only between the Mexican military
    and our armies, a few decisive battles might end the contest.
    But we have to overcome the prejudices, ignorance, and
    antipathies of the population, a conquest a thousand times more
    difficult than that of arms. And are we certain that the people
    of those States will remain perfectly passive, and that their
    countrymen beyond the Sierra Madre, cannot be rendered
    formidable as guerrillas? Our estimate of them may be too low.
    In case of some severe reverse, their numbers, should they rise
    _en masse_, may overwhelm detached bodies of our troops. The
    proclamation of Ampudia, denouncing as traitors, all who will
    hold intercourse with our people, has had its effect. The people
    will become exasperated at the outrages which will, in all
    probability, be committed by our irregular troops, and the
    guerrilla warfare will bristle over the whole country. Few among
    us are aware of its vast extent. It is for the greater part
    composed of barren mountains and arid plains, interspersed with
    fertile valleys, and entirely unlike our western States. We will
    have to guard a frontier of two thousand miles, from Santa Fee
    to Matamoras, without mentioning California. We will have to
    garrison all the principal towns between the Rio Grande and the
    Sierra Madre. If we attempt to advance beyond Monterey, we must
    force our way through a population of several millions, after
    crossing a desert of several hundred miles. Conquests are easy
    enough, when people are willing to be conquered, but when they
    determine to resist, it is a very different matter. When
    Napoleon attempted the conquest of Spain, after the manner that
    Edward I undertook that of Scotland, he had possession of Madrid
    and all the principal cities, with five hundred thousand of the
    best troops in the world, and yet, in less than three years, his
    Generals were driven out with a remnant of thirty thousand men!
    The capture of Burgoyne and of Cornwallis, show what a critical
    thing it is for an invading army to penetrate an enemy’s
    country, with the wave of an unconquered people closing behind
    them. Our armies are about to operate in a country without
    roads, without supplies or resources, through defiles, over
    deserts without water, and under a burning sun. I have great
    confidence in them, and I believe that whatever can be done,
    they will do, but shall not expect impossibilities of them. They
    may reach and take Monterey, after hard fighting and much
    suffering, and then be compelled, by superior numbers, to fall
    back on the Rio Grande, and fortifying themselves, carry on a
    war of detachments with little prospect of any definitive
    result. There is no hope of bringing the war to a speedy close
    without putting in the field at least twenty thousand regulars
    and thirty thousand volunteers, and their advancing from
    Monterey and Vera Cruz, after taking those places. The advance
    on the capital ought to be made at the same time, so as to
    compel Santa Anna to divide his force.

    A good deal has been said about the extension of slavery beyond
    the Rio Grande. My design in these letters is simply to state
    facts and give honest opinions. I am not an abolitionist, nor
    interested in the question of slavery, nor will I suffer my
    party feelings to bias my judgment in relation to Mr. Polk and
    the democratic administration. The idea of negro slavery beyond
    the Rio Grande, is, in my opinion, erroneous. The climate is
    doubtless, adapted to the culture of sugar and cotton; but then
    negro slaves cannot be retained on the Mexican frontier longer
    than they shall think proper to remain in slavery. They would
    escape into Mexican territory when they pleased; and there being
    but few negroes in that country, and none having been held in
    slavery, they would enjoy a consideration there, unknown even in
    the free States of the Union. The wealthy Mexicans would not
    want their services, as they have already a cheaper kind of
    servitude in their peons, or half indian laborers. Negro slavery
    was once attempted to be introduced into Mexico for the culture
    and manufacture of the sugar cane, but failed, and the slaves
    set free. The peons, with a nominal freedom, are actually
    slaves. They receive trifling wages, scarcely sufficient to
    provide them with the bare necessaries of life. It is even
    doubtful, whether a slave population can be placed nearer than
    the Nueces, on account of their facilities for escape. A large
    proportion of Southern Texas presents the same objection to the
    removal of the Southern planter. These Mexican acquisitions, or
    proposed acquisitions, are greatly overrated in the slave
    holding States, and the danger is equally magnified in the minds
    of those who are opposed to the further extension of slavery.
    Neither of these parties are disposed to view the subject in a
    practical light; it is like the dispute in the fable about the
    color of the Chameleon—one asserted that it was black, and the
    other that it was white, but when exposed to view, it proved to
    be green!


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 4.

             _Victory of Monterey.—The prospects of peace._

                                            SEPTEMBER, 1846.

    SIR: Another glorious victory has been achieved by our gallant
    army! I begin to think that there is scarcely any thing
    impossible for such men, with such leaders as Taylor and Worth.
    The incidents of the taking of Monterey would afford materials
    not merely for a chapter, but a volume.

    Surely Mexico will now embrace our offer of peace. The inability
    of the Mexicans to cope with us is now placed beyond a doubt. We
    have beaten them in the field two to one, they attacking us; and
    we have taken one of their strongest cities in spite of
    fortifications and barricades, and superior numbers. The
    magnanimity and generosity of the conquerors surely must have
    some effect on them, unless they are absolutely mad.

    The distance of our army from Saltillo is about eighty miles,
    the way lying through mountain gorges and narrow defiles capable
    of complete defence in the hands of a brave and determined
    people. It seems there is something wanting in these people,
    which puzzles me. It must be, either want of skill and courage
    in the officers, or a want of patriotism and bravery in the
    soldiery and inhabitants.

    Saltillo may be regarded as the pass of the Sierra Madre, rather
    than Monterey; because, from Saltillo there is a road to
    Presidio on the Rio Grande, and thence to San Antonio of Texas.
    There should be another division, or rather army, to take this
    road, and form a junction with General Taylor at Saltillo.
    Perhaps, that under General Wool, instead of proceeding to
    Chewawa, may take that course.[2] The range of mountains called
    the Sierra Madre, forms an impenetrable barrier between the
    States west of the Rio Grande and the other Mexican States.
    There are said to be but three passes: the first, from Tampico,
    by following the Panuco river from the head of its navigation,
    but affording only a mule track; the second, that of Saltillo;
    and the third, by the Rio Conchas to Chewawa. The distance from
    Saltillo to Tampico, is not less than six hundred miles; and
    after ascending the mountains to the table land, there is
    nothing but a dreary desert for at least three hundred miles.
    This, at once suggests the difficulty of the march to Mexico;
    and, also, the difficulty on the part of Mexico of sending
    armies to recover the country between the mountains and the Rio
    Grande. If the war should continue, which I hope may not be the
    case, these, and other passes (for I have no doubt there are
    others) should be seized and fortified, instead of making the
    Rio Grande the line of defence; establishing fifty assailable
    points, instead of three, for an enemy’s concentrated force to
    strike wherever that enemy may choose. If conquest be intended,
    or result from the war, this line of defence along the Sierra
    Madre would be absolutely necessary to the planting States, as
    slavery could not be maintained with the Rio Grande as the
    boundary. In my opinion, the only real advantage which will be
    gained by this extension of our territory, will be the
    navigation of the Rio Grande, which will open a trade with the
    Internal Provinces capable of vast extension. Few southern
    planters would run the risk of taking their slaves west of the
    Rio Grande, even with the Sierra Madre as the boundary. They
    would, of course, migrate in single families, and their negroes
    could escape, if they thought proper, as fast as they came. I
    have no doubt, many of them would remain of choice, with their
    owners; but they would be insecure as property, and that would
    discourage the importation. The navigation of the Rio Grande is
    capable of great improvement, and it is ascertained that there
    is an abundance of coal on its banks. These banks will, some
    day, be crowded with towns and cities, and their fertile soil
    will support as large a population as the Nile.

Footnote 2:

      General Wool marched from Paras to Saltillo.

    There are but two roads by which the city of Mexico can be
    approached by our invading armies. The first is, from Saltillo,
    through the populous States of Zacatecas, Guadalajara,
    Guanahwato, San Louis, and Queretaro, containing near four
    millions. Now, is it probable, that these States will offer no
    resistance to the long march of General Taylor at the head of a
    handful of men? I do not doubt, but that in the open field, at
    the head of ten thousand men, he would beat three times that
    number; but the heavy loss sustained at Monterey must satisfy us
    that such victories will be dearly bought. It cannot be said
    that the Mexican soldiers have not fought, and on some
    occasions, have not fought well, and they may learn to fight
    better. But let us consider again, what an immense commissariat
    must accompany an army on such a march, to afford the necessary
    supplies. Those who are urging the march of General Taylor on
    Mexico, are, perhaps, not as well acquainted as he is with what
    is necessary for such an undertaking. The second road is from
    Vera Cruz, the distance of three hundred miles, through a
    thickly settled country, but with numerous defiles, and where
    there must be fighting at every step. Vera Cruz may be taken,
    and will be taken, and then the Castle will fall. Here will be a
    depot to supply the invading army as it shall advance, step by
    step; and is it likely we can land an invading army of
    sufficient strength to crush the forces of the Republic under
    Santa Anna? If the Mexicans make but an indifferent use of the
    means in their power, it would seem to me impossible for us to
    reach their capital! The province of Mexico alone, not as large
    as one of our counties, contains a million and a half of people.
    If they are like our countrymen, I should say it would be
    impossible for an invading army of thirty thousand men to
    penetrate three hundred miles through a country so well
    fortified by nature. We must expect to fight our way through
    fifty thousand men at least, which Santa Anna could bring into
    the field. The country is now united against us, under his sway,
    by every consideration of hatred and religious feeling, if not
    of patriotism. I consider it madness to undertake such a march
    with twenty thousand men, regulars and volunteers, however
    chivalrous they may be, if Santa Anna should throw himself
    between Vera Cruz and Mexico, with the army he has been
    collecting and training, with so much industry at San Louis
    Potosi.

    We may hold the other side of the Rio Grande; and as soon as our
    people crowd into it, and bear some proportion to the population
    already there, it may be regarded as conquered. As to
    California, it is already ours, and we must soon be complete
    masters of it, for it will be occupied by our people. The Texan
    side of the Rio Grande will be ours in consequence of the towns,
    garrisons, and settlements which will be rapidly established
    there. We may take Tampico, and hold it; and we may also take
    Vera Cruz, and retain it until Mexico comes to terms; and it
    seems to me impossible that she will not do this in order to
    regain her only seaport, while we, at the same time, cut off all
    her foreign trade! Nothing but the most stupid, blind, and
    ignorant obstinacy would prevent her from treating with us under
    such circumstances. I approve the taking California, and New
    Mexico, for the purpose of holding them under sequestration,
    until Mexico shall be willing to make peace on just and
    reasonable terms. Since the armistice, on the surrender of
    Monterey, two months must elapse before any further steps can be
    taken by General Taylor. He was in no condition to advance
    further than Saltillo; at any rate; and, perhaps, without
    completing his conquests of the country east of him, towards the
    gulf, it would have been unwise to have moved beyond Monterey.
    He had important preparations to make, of a very different
    character from those of his forced march on that city. And,
    besides, he entertained hopes, as we all did, that during the
    breathing spell, some means might be found to put an end to the
    war. In the capitulation of Monterey, he has shown himself as
    humane as he is brave.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 5.


        _Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico._

                                            OCTOBER 26, 1846

    SIR: When I wrote my last letter I had not seen the capitulation
    of Monterey, at least the official report. It appears, that the
    terms were conditional, and allow no more time than is
    absolutely requisite for Gen. Taylor to make his arrangements
    for ulterior movements. The city was taken by a forced march,
    with only a part of the troops. The attempt to cast censure, by
    indirection, on this meritorious officer, betrays a jealousy of
    his growing popularity. The capture of Monterey is of immense
    importance, as well on account of its being one of the keys of
    Mexico, as on account of the vast amount of public property, in
    arms and munitions captured, which Mexico is in no condition to
    replace. That city was a stronghold under the Spaniards before
    the Mexican revolution, and contained a great quantity of
    cannon, transported with immense difficulty and expense, from
    the city of Mexico. It was in fact, the metropolis of the
    provinces of the Rio Grande; and if a new confederacy should be
    formed by those States, it would be the seat of the federal
    Government. In a few weeks, the sickly season will be over; the
    surviving sick will be again fit for duty, the commissariat will
    be enabled to complete its supplies, and transportation for the
    army, considerable reinforcements will reach the seat of war,
    and then we may expect an onward movement.

    General Taylor having now gained a safe footing, must go to work
    to consolidate his occupation, or if you will, his conquest of
    the country between the Rio Grande, the mountains, and the Gulf.
    This extensive tract of country, as large as Italy, and
    resembling it in scenery, climate, and soil, is now cut off by
    our arms and by its natural boundary, from the rest of Mexico.
    It ought to be completely occupied, by fortifying the principal
    points on the Rio Grande, the mountain passes of the Sierra
    Madre, and also by the occupation of the chief towns of New
    Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas. Tampico, of course, must be
    taken by a combined land and naval attack. It has a shallow sea
    coast from Tampico to the mouth of the Rio Grande, of four
    hundred miles, whilst it stretches east and west, between the
    mountains and the river, nearly double that distance. Here is an
    extent of surface equal to that from the Potomac to the Savannah
    and east of the Appalachian chain. It is capable of containing
    four millions of souls, and in the hands of Americans, would be
    rapidly filled up by them and European emigrants. The climate is
    said to be delightful, and much more temperate than might be
    expected from its latitude. I have rated its population at five
    hundred thousand; this estimate may be too high; but it is
    possible, that the common estimate may be too low. The following
    is that given by a recent pamphlet, including Chewawa:


              New Leon,    100,000   Monterey,     15,000
              Tamaulipas,   150,000   Tampico,       6,000
              Coawilla,    125,000   Monclova,      3,000
              Chewawa,     112,000   Chewawa,      30,000
                            ──────
                           487,000


    This population, it is true, is scattered over a very large
    space, and more occupied in pastoral, than in agricultural
    pursuits, with little trade or manufactures. Their flocks of
    sheep and horned cattle, are immense, while they raise vast
    numbers of horses and mules. Being shut out from all
    communication with the Southern provinces, they can be conquered
    by our arms, and made to stay conquered, by the American
    emigrants who will immediately pour into every habitable
    district. A small, well appointed regular army of five thousand
    men, with an equal number of volunteers, replacing each other at
    intervals, will be sufficient for the purpose.

    The occupation of this important country, should be complete
    before attempting any thing further. By grasping at too much, we
    may fail to realize any thing. If our object be _conquest_, it
    will be one of the greatest (even thus circumscribed) ever
    effected by the same numerical force. After consolidating this
    splendid acquisition, instead of marching on the city of Mexico,
    I would take the course to Durango, and thence to Mazatlan, on
    the Pacific, thus cutting off one half of the mine district, and
    giving us a direct communication with that ocean, of such
    immense importance to us in a commercial as well as political
    point of view. If, however, the object be merely to _conquer a
    peace_ with Mexico, the fear of losing at least one half of the
    territory of the Republic, and the hope of regaining possession
    of it, would be an inducement to treat, which nothing but the
    most brutish stupidity can resist. I fear she will persist in
    the same arrogant folly which induced her to declare, _that she_
    _would be satisfied with no boundary short of the Sabine_. She
    will not consent to receive back her territory by treaty, to the
    Rio Grand—her wounded pride must be appeased by regaining it by
    arms—and she will not consent under any circumstances, to yield
    up California and Santa Fee! We shall be compelled, if she
    persists in the determination, to hold to the line of the Sierra
    Madre, and make our boundary from Tampico to Mazatlan. There is
    no doubt that the administration would now gladly treat for the
    boundary of the Rio Grand and a portion of Upper California. But
    if Mexico persists in her obstinacy, we cannot retreat with
    safety or honor; we may possibly be compelled to adopt the
    tropic of Cancer, as the line from ocean to ocean, and thus add
    to our confederacy a region as extensive as Europe.

    But will England and France look with indifference on this vast
    acquisition of territory? And suppose they shall be displeased,
    what can they allege against us? The necessity of the conquest
    will have been forced upon us by the refusal of Mexico to treat.
    It is probable, that to the boundary of the Rio Grand, and to
    the acquisition of a portion of California, with the barren
    mountains and plains of New Mexico, they may be, comparatively,
    indifferent. Not so with respect to the wholesale acquisition
    just mentioned. But what can they say—what can they do? They
    must address themselves to Mexico, and compel her to negotiate
    with us, which she still persists in refusing, except on terms
    which she knows it is impossible for us to concede. In the
    meantime, let us not follow the example of our proud and
    arrogant enemy, and refuse all friendly mediation which may lead
    to an amicable adjustment on reasonable terms.

    If, for the next three months, there should be no treaty of
    peace with Mexico, I shall begin to fear we have entered upon an
    experiment which may be attended with momentous consequences. It
    will be a new and fearful career of conquest. I cannot agree
    with those who propose a retreat; and I know that the American
    people will never consent to it! Yet, I am well aware of the
    danger to our confederacy, from such a conquest as that of all
    Mexico. We must follow the war wherever it may lead; and if it
    lead to victory it must end in conquest or a magnanimous peace,
    when Mexico shall be at our feet.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 6.


      _Difficulties of the conquest of Mexico. The acquisition of
                              California._

                                            NOVEMBER 2, 1846.

    SIR: The conquest of Mexico is talked of as a thing settled, and
    yet, how few have examined the nature of the undertaking and the
    difficulties to be encountered and overcome! To form some idea
    of these, we must take into consideration the number of the
    inhabitants and the extent of the country to be conquered. It is
    true, the warlike character and resources of such a country, may
    not be in proportion, as is the case with the Chinese, from
    unwillingness to keep pace with other nations in the arts of
    peace and war. The Mexicans are not in this condition; they
    either have adopted or may adopt all the improvements in war, at
    least, of modern European nations. Their military strength ought
    to bear some proportion to their numbers and resources. If the
    Indian population is destitute of patriotism, their religious
    feelings and the influence of the priesthood, over them, ought,
    in some measure, to supply the deficiency. Let us now consider,
    what we may expect to encounter in the invasion of Mexico.

    The population is estimated at eight millions; of these, five
    millions are contained in a comparatively small space, of which
    the capital is the centre. Four fifths of this number are Indian
    peasantry; the others, either of the pure Spanish race or mixed
    with the Indian. The whole Mexican territory is said to be a
    million and a half of square miles—the whole of the portion
    containing the five millions does not exceed three hundred
    thousand square miles. The two roads, as already mentioned, are
    from Saltillo and from Vera Cruz. Let us see what States and
    population General Taylor would have to pass through, and then
    we may form some idea of the kind of resistance he may meet, if
    any defence at all be attempted:


            _States._                   _Chief
                                       Cities._
           Zacatecas,      272,000   Zacatecas,       40,000
           Guanawhato,     500,000   Guanawhato,      60,000
           San Louis,      250,000   San Louis,       25,000
           Queretaro,      200,000   Queretaro,       30,000
           Guadelahara,    800,000   Guadelahara,     90,000
           Mexico,       1,500,000   Mexico,         200,000
                            ──────
                         3,522,000


    All the above States must be traversed or passed through—they
    must be occupied in such a manner as to keep open the line of
    march of the army. We must not think that our marches will be
    similar to an insurrectionary movement among themselves. A
    Mexican General, at the head of a column, approaches the city
    of Mexico, or Guadelahara, a _pronunciamento_ takes places
    among the soldiers and citizens, and they invite the insurgent
    army to enter as friends and countrymen. If we look for such
    _pronunciamentos_ in favor of an American invading army,
    especially of heretics, we will be disappointed. There was
    nothing of this at Monterey, and the further we penetrate to
    the interior, the less there will be, of this kind of
    fraternization.

    But did not Cortez take the city of Mexico with only nine
    hundred men? Not exactly; Cortez had, as his allies, two hundred
    thousand Indian warriors, twenty thousand of whom were
    Tlascalans, the bravest of that region. The taking the city
    occupied seventy days, after a terrific slaughter. He divided
    his army into four divisions, of fifty thousand each, entering
    the city at different points, and leveling the houses in the
    way, until the different armies met in the great square. Even if
    the Mexican armies should avoid pitched battles, they can
    fortify strong natural positions, and being well provided with
    artillery, and having good engineers, it would be strange if
    they did not avail themselves of these advantages. We must
    expect hard fighting in the mountain passes which abound and
    also in taking towns entirely constructed of brick or stone, and
    incombustible. General Whitlock attempted to take the city of
    Buenos Ayres, which had little to no defence, except the
    barricades across the streets and the flat roofs of the houses;
    his army was twelve thousand strong, and was repulsed with great
    loss. The Texan mode of burrowing through the houses had not
    then been invented. I do not say, that General Taylor would not
    be able to reach Mexico, but it would be very hard fighting.

    Let us now consider what it is to be overcome on the Vera Cruz
    line of march.


            _States._                   _Chief
                                       Cities._
           Mexico,       1,500,000   Mexico,         200,000
           [!]Michuacan,    450,000   Valladolid,      25,000
           [!]Wahaca,      600,000   Wahaca,          40,000
           Puebla,         900,000   Puebla,          60,000
           Vera Cruz,      200,000   Vera Cruz,       15,000
           Chiapa,         100,000   Chiapa,           3,000
           Tobasco,         75,000   Tobasco,          5,000
                            ──────
                         4,347,000

    ! I have endeavored to accommodate the spelling to the
    pronunciation.


    The army, by way of Vera Cruz, would have to pass through four
    millions, and would meet with greater difficulties on the way
    than that from Saltillo. I am supposing that while the invading
    army advances from this latter place, the States along the other
    road will remain passive; and so of the army taking its march
    from Vera Cruz, that the northern States will not take part. But
    this will not be the case. It will, therefore, be necessary to
    take both roads at once, and advance with two armies
    simultaneously, at an enormous expense and loss of life. It is
    true, we may find efficient allies in the discords among the
    Mexicans themselves, which may prevent them from uniting against
    us. The Indians may remain perfectly passive; the men of
    property, tired of internal revolutions, and despairing of ever
    seeing a settled government in their country, may desire to seek
    security and peace under the wings of the American eagle. These
    dissensions and jealousies, although of a different kind from
    those which favored the conquest by Cortez, may lead to the same
    result. If they were a patriotic and united people, the attempt
    to conquer them would seem to me hopeless. Yet, when we consider
    the force they can bring into the field in defence of their
    homes, and as they believe, of their altars, instigated by
    hatred towards us, and that sense of degradation, which even the
    dullest of the human race must feel at the idea of subjugation
    by a foreign enemy, we cannot but expect a powerful resistance.
    They ought to be able to arm and embody two hundred thousand men
    for defence. This is a very different affair from marching an
    army a thousand miles to attack Texas. They would be called out
    to defend the very soil on which they exist, and it seems
    incredible, that they would not respond to the call.

    And should we make ourselves masters of the capital, will this
    be the conquest of the whole country? When Cortez took the city,
    he, at the same time, overturned the dynasty and Empire of
    Montezuma, which had become odious to the surrounding nations.
    It was, in fact, those nations which overthrew that empire,
    under the guidance and with the aid of the Spaniards, little
    thinking, that they were only fighting for a change of masters.
    And suppose, that notwithstanding our signal success in taking
    the Metropolis, the Mexican Congress retiring to some other city
    should still persist in refusing to make peace on our terms, or
    on any terms, what are we then to do? We must go on to conquer,
    and hold each separate State, or we must retire, without either
    conquering the country or conquering a peace. We should bring
    back laurels and glory, but foiled and baffled in the objects
    for which we made such mighty efforts. And I confess, I should
    be sorry to annex such a population, incapable of defending
    themselves, incapable of self-government, and who must be our
    dependants, or rather bondsmen. The conquests and annexation of
    nations on the soil of Italy, gave strength to Rome, but when
    she acquired distant provinces as dependencies, and established
    colonies, the government became hopelessly corrupt, and the
    empire fell by its own weight. It is not so much the annexation
    of territory, as of people unfitted for republican government,
    that I dread. If it be necessary to govern them as dependencies,
    a degree of corruption will be so rapidly introduced into our
    Government, that its whole character will be changed, and
    republican virtue will hardly be a name among us.

    These, after all, are but speculations, and may prove to be
    visionary. Our scope of vision into the future is very limited.
    The great event of the war, in my estimation, is the taking of
    California. As respects Mexico, it was a mere waif or derelict,
    liable to be seized by the first comer; and, in fact, we were
    only about a week before the British squadron, who were utterly
    astonished to see our flag flying at Monterey and San Francisco,
    when it was their design to place St. George’s Cross there. It
    was merely a question as to who should occupy the country, and
    surely, in such an alternative, no American can hesitate to say,
    that possession should be taken by us. It was lost to Mexico, at
    any rate; and, in the hands of Great Britain, would have been an
    endless source of vexation to us, and, perhaps, lead to ultimate
    rupture with that country. We have now a sea coast on the
    Pacific corresponding to that on the Atlantic. Our republic
    stretches from sea to sea, and in time, a land communication
    will be established between the two, reducing the distance more
    and more every day. The Republic thus fronts Europe on the east,
    and Asia on the west, with an ocean boundary, beyond which we
    cannot go. Here let our proud progress be stayed! Let us be
    content with filling up the vast space, and improving our
    condition and the condition of our fellow men. An immense
    commerce must spring up in less than half a century, from our
    Pacific coast, with the five hundred millions of people, who
    inhabit the shores washed by the western and Indian oceans!


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 7.


       _The War will make us better acquainted with each other._

                                            DECEMBER 5, 1846.

    There is one advantage we shall derive from the war: we shall
    become better acquainted with our southern neighbor, and she
    will become better acquainted with us. Even in a geographical
    point of view, in spite of all the writers, from Humboldt down
    to the latest, and in spite of all the map makers, the American
    public, is very imperfectly acquainted with Mexico. In nothing
    is this more remarkable than in the extent of surface, distance
    of places, and in the amount of population, of which we have no
    adequate conception. The ignorance of the Mexicans respecting
    the United States is, of course, still greater. When Santa Anna
    invaded Texas he actually spoke of marching to Washington in
    case our Government interfered! We have very little idea of the
    distance from the Rio Grande to the capital of Mexico; but the
    thousands who have marched over it in various directions, and
    the numerous publications giving accounts of military
    expeditions, will render the country more familiar to our people
    than it could be in the usual course of things, in fifty years.

    In our imaginations, it has been a region of romance, associated
    with gold and silver, with a climate and beauty of an earthly
    paradise. Our soldiers and volunteers will return with very
    different impressions; taken as a whole, it is vastly inferior
    to the United States, in natural wealth, in fertility of soil,
    in climate, and in everything calculated to minister to human
    happiness. That incessant craving for the delights of the land
    of Montezuma, will be effectually cured, and with it, that wild
    spirit of conquest, which has prevailed until now, in the
    southern and western portions of the confederacy. It will be
    effectually cured, and nothing else would have cured it. We
    shall rest satisfied that our own is, incomparably, a finer
    country, and, in fact, one of the most favored portions of the
    Globe. We have no _tierras calientes_, where the vegetable
    growth is, indeed, most luxuriant, but man looses all his
    energy, and becomes little better than a vegetable. Their
    _tierras templadas_, or temperate lands, in general, are barren
    rocks or dry plains, which cannot be cultivated without
    irrigation. And when we look at the population, their want of
    well ordered government, the barbarous ignorance and indolence
    of the masses, their religious, or rather superstitious bigotry,
    their robberies and assassinations in cold blood, where is the
    American who would not prefer his own country? We have, no
    doubt, many things among us to deplore and to amend; but what
    are these in comparison to the state of things continually
    presented in those countries which are said to be “blessed of
    God and cursed of man?” I do not assent to the first part of
    this expression, for, I believe, there is no portion of the
    earth, of the same extent, “so blessed of God,” as these United
    States.

    In one thing we have been undeceived; we supposed that the
    Mexicans are a rich people; that is, possessed abundant stores
    of the necessaries and luxuries of life. So far from it, that we
    have been compelled to draw nearly all of our supplies for our
    armies from the States. There are, doubtless, rich individuals
    among them, but the mass of the people are miserably poor. They
    lay up no stores, and have little beyond what is required by
    their immediate wants. The very abundance of the productions of
    nature may be one of the causes of this general poverty. As a
    people, they are sunk in sloth, in vice and ignorance. I speak
    in general, for there are, no doubt, numerous exceptions. Their
    opinions of the “Yankees,” as they call us, in contempt and
    derision, is likely to undergo an entire change. They will
    entertain a different opinion of us; they will look upon us with
    fear and respect, and will be as anxious to cultivate a good
    understanding as they were to insult us and ill treat our
    citizens. Hereafter, their Government will take a second thought
    before it countenances the plunder and murder of Americans.
    Treaties of peace will be respected, and we may venture into the
    country without danger to person or property, provided we
    conduct ourselves with propriety.

    There are many of the geographical features of so vast a
    country, especially as to its mountains, table lands, and
    rivers, differing entirely from our portion of the continent.
    For instance, the character of the table lands beyond Monterey
    would not be understood without the explanation, that the
    Mexican mountains are not in regular ranges or ridges like the
    Alleghanies, with intervening valleys, but present, on the
    eastern side, the appearance of giant ramparts of naked rock,
    through which fissures have been made by torrents; while on
    their summit, a vast plain, six or seven thousand feet above the
    sea, like a table raised above the floor, stretches out for
    hundreds of miles, with occasional depressions and peaks piled
    up to the height of five or six thousand feet more, and covered
    with perpetual snow. We have no such mountains. The sides of our
    mountains are nearly all fertile, at least, east of the
    Mississippi. The precipitous sides of the _Sierra Madre_ are
    broken through by several rivers, which, in the course of a
    hundred miles, descend six or seven thousand feet, and in
    consequence of this, excepting a short distance from their
    mouths in the Gulf of Mexico, are not fit for navigation. It is
    along the courses of these rivers, that the passes are found:
    such as that of the Panuco from Tampico; that of the Tula, near
    Victoria; that of the San Juan, from Monterey to Saltillo, and
    the Conchas, towards Chewawa. The want of good roads from the
    interior, and good harbors on the Gulf, essentially render the
    eastern portion of Mexico, an inland country. The Alvarado,
    Guasacualco, and Tobasco, are almost the only exceptions. The
    States north and east of the Sierra Madre, comprising those
    which we now hold, although not yet completely subdued, have no
    water transportation to the coast, excepting by means of the Rio
    Grande. The want of a carriage road is exemplified by the fact,
    that the British company engaged in working the mines of
    Catorce, which are not more than three hundred miles in a direct
    line from Tampico, having landed their engines at that place,
    could not transport them direct to San Luis, but were obliged to
    go north towards Matamoras, and then take the direction of
    Monterey and Saltillo. From the latter place, after ascending to
    the table land, they proceed to San Louis, making a circuit of
    more than twelve hundred miles, and which consumed four months.

    The delightful country which I have described, as the States of
    New Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, is equal in extent to the
    eastern parts of Virginia and North and South Carolina, and
    large enough for a kingdom. It is, in general a plain, but not
    flat; on the contrary, picturesque, with a fine soil, admirably
    adapted to all the productions of the temperate climates, but
    free from frosts. This country we shall be compelled to hold,
    even if our conquests should extend no further. We cannot
    abandon it _without a treaty of peace and boundaries_, and to
    which, from present appearances, Mexico will not agree. We shall
    not give it up unless for a complete cession of California and
    New Mexico, with the boundary of the Rio Grande. The population
    of those States is, now, perhaps, equal to that of our Southern
    States during our revolutionary war, and would easily contain
    four or five millions. For defence, it ought now to bring
    fifteen or twenty thousand fighting men into the field, in
    guerrilla parties, and poorly armed. If supported by some
    regular troops, the rancheros might give us trouble. But cut off
    from all supplies, with no rallying points or fortified places,
    we could by pushing the war vigorously, effectually subdue them.
    If we fall back on the Rio Grande, we leave the whole country
    west of it, open to the operations of Santa Anna; and we shall
    be compelled to establish a chain of fortifications along the
    great river, for at least two thousand miles. On the other hand,
    the table land of the Sierra Madre, and on the west, towards the
    Pacific, being only accessible by a few passes, the inhabitants
    once completely subdued, must remain so. That mountain boundary
    is, infinitely, more easy to defend, than the line of the river;
    a river, which would be bordered in its whole length by an
    enemy, who might send detachments at any moment to make
    destructive inroads. It would be necessary to have both sides of
    the river, without which, it would be a bad boundary. If we
    confine ourselves to the east side of it, the inhabitants on the
    other bank, in case of hostilities, can at any time call in the
    aid of the Mexican Government. Collisions will be unavoidable,
    and Texas will be continually threatened, unless we keep up, at
    great expense, a permanent force along the line. But taking the
    mountains as the boundary, we could keep Mexico in her shell,
    until the valley shall be filled by American and European
    population. There is, no doubt, unappropriated land; but, even
    supposing the whole to be claimed under grants to the church,
    and to individuals, these might justly be subjected to
    forfeitures and confiscations, partial or total, in case of
    refusal to own allegiance. The tenures of all these lands are,
    in their nature, feudal; that is, the fee is in the sovereign,
    whoever that may be, and subject to be resumed and regranted at
    the pleasure of the sovereign. The tenure or holding, is not
    allodial as with us; it is rather political or military, if I
    may so express myself, than legal.[3] This subject is not
    generally understood among us, and it would occupy too much
    space to explain it more fully. If Mexico compels us to conquer
    the country described, we must annex it, but cannot do this
    without republicanizing it first; and this, again, cannot be
    done without abolishing the feudal system, and changing the
    tenure of the lands. Still, I am no advocate of conquest; I
    would rather take the boundary of the Rio Grande by fair treaty,
    than hold the States bordering on that river, by the rights of
    war, which are regarded by all barbarous nations, and by Mexico
    herself, is the highest, and most glorious of all titles.

Footnote 3:

      I speak of the large grants, the smaller are allodial, as
      also, the grants on condition of settlement.

    The policy of Santa Anna, at present, is to act on the
    defensive, preparatory to taking the offensive. He is now at
    work at San Luis, in collecting and organizing a powerful army,
    the most formidable ever yet seen in the republic. He will
    address himself to the Mexicans, with such appeals as may rouse
    them to a sense of their danger, and will, perhaps, attempt to
    lay hold of the immense riches of the church, to sustain the
    national cause. In the latter, he will probably fail; it is the
    greater power in Mexico, for power does not centre exclusively
    in the army, and but a small portion of it in the people, if
    there can be said to be a people at all. His object is, no
    doubt, to make himself a _dictator_, or an absolute despot; and
    this he cannot accomplish, without, in the first instance,
    having the support of the church. When sufficiently strong by
    means of the army, he can then use the church as a part of his
    machinery. Every thing depends on his success in this war. If he
    succeeds in repelling the invasion, he will, in all probability,
    be able to establish his power on a permanent footing of
    hereditary despotism. To conquer the country, our shortest
    course is, to deal at once with the church and the great land
    holders, and make them responsible for their peons; for the
    proprietors not only own the land, with but few exceptions, but
    also own the population, just as the Russian noble owns the
    serfs of his estate.

    Since the Mexican revolution, the States and territories north
    and west of the line from Tampico to Mazatlan, and even the
    States which I have mentioned, directly west of the great river,
    have been rapidly returning to their original state of
    barbarism. Contrary to the usual course of things on this
    continent, the indian tribes have here been, for years,
    encroaching on the whites, instead of being encroached upon and
    driven back. In the States of Durango, Chewawa, Sonora, Sinaloa,
    and in Lower California, the Apaches and Camanches, are
    continually laying waste, robbing, plundering, and murdering,
    and each succeeding year, their ravages are becoming more and
    more extensive. Under the royal government, posts were
    established every where, troops were kept up, and the
    inhabitants protected, by pursuing the marauding parties, the
    only way in which a country can be protected from savages. But
    they did not arm the inhabitants, and require them to assist in
    defending themselves. There was no militia, and consequently,
    when left to themselves, they are perfectly helpless. There
    could be no greater blessing to them, than to be placed under
    the protection of the United States. I repeat, that my object is
    not to encourage a spirit of conquest. In indulging in these
    speculations, I endeavor to be guided by the spirit of truth.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 8.


    _Slight hopes of peace—State of the war—The situation of General
                                Taylor._

                                            JANUARY, 1847.

    SIR: When Santa Anna declares, that there can be no negotiations
    for peace until the _national_ territory shall have been
    evacuated by the troops of the United States, he means by the
    _national_ territory, from the Rio Grande to the Sabine, as well
    as those portions of Mexico, which we now hold by invasion. Not
    a single official declaration on the part of the Mexican
    Government can be produced, in which any other boundary than the
    Sabine is even supposed. In the last proclamation of Almonte,
    this is the only boundary acknowledged by him. As long as this
    is maintained by Mexico, peace is impossible. The Rio Grande was
    the boundary of the Province of Texas, under the Spanish
    Government, and as such, was claimed, both by France and the
    United States, as part of Louisiana, under the treaty of
    Ildefonso, when ceded by Spain. It is the boundary claimed by
    Texas after her separation from Tamaulipas and Coawilla, with
    which Texas had, for a time, been united, to form a State of the
    Mexican confederacy; and on separating from that confederacy,
    she returned to the ancient limits. It is this ancient Texas we
    claim, and not the Texas arranged in connection with Tamaulipas
    and Coawilla. But Santa Anna and Almonte now acknowledge no
    boundary but the Sabine, notwithstanding their treaty with
    Texas, expressly establishing the Rio Grande.

    Persons not reflecting on our present position, as respects our
    enemy, exclaim, “let us make peace—let us put an end to this
    unfortunate war”. This supposes, that it is _in our power_ at
    any moment, to make peace, when, from the very declarations of
    Mexico, she is unwilling to treat with us, unless we first
    acknowledge ourselves vanquished, and agree to retire, yielding
    every thing we have been contending for! ONE may make war, but
    it takes TWO or more, to make peace. We may, indeed, fall back
    on the Rio Grande, and then to the Sabine, thus exposing
    ourselves to the contempt and derision of the world; and there
    are well meaning people, who propose this course. But, judging
    from a knowledge of human nature, it is not difficult to
    perceive, that the great majority of the people of the United
    States will never consent to such a degrading submission, even
    if it were prudent, as a mere matter of interest, which it is
    plainly not, however it may be recommended by abstract
    considerations of moral or religious duty, or rather of sickly
    sentimentality.

    Let us consider what are the steps to be taken to bring about
    negotiations for peace. The olive branch ought to be continually
    held out to the enemy; and our agents should not be prevented by
    pride or offended dignity, from renewing at every moment, the
    offer to treat. It would be magnanimous on our part, and also
    continue us in the right. Suppose the proposition come from
    Mexico, what will it be, and how made? It is not probable that
    commissioners will be sent direct to Washington, or invited from
    us, to Mexico. A communication may be addressed to our
    Government declaring a willingness to treat, in all probability,
    clogged with conditions of the withdrawal of our naval and
    military forces, and proposing an armistice pending
    negotiations. To the latter, we cannot accede, without giving
    decided advantage to the enemy. The evacuation of the country we
    now hold would not be listened to for a moment; it would at once
    be yielding all the advantages we have gained at so much cost,
    as the _means of coercing Mexico to treat of peace_. The attempt
    at negotiation may thus fail at various stages, and it may fail
    entirely; at all events, there will be unavoidable delay. There
    is nothing before us, at present, but as a vigorous prosecution
    of the war, _and at the same time, preparations on a much larger
    scale than we have hitherto made_.

    What is the state of the war at this moment? We have made
    wonderful progress, if not towards conquest, at least, towards
    bringing the enemy to terms. But we are obliged to keep up three
    very extensive lines, without speaking of California and New
    Mexico. The first, is along the Rio Grande, from Presidio to
    Matamoras, of seven hundred miles; the next, that from Comargo
    to Monterey; and the third, from Tampico to the same place, a
    distance of nearly six hundred. It is absolutely necessary to
    keep up the two first, in order to furnish supplies for our
    troops in all their operations; although, since the occupation
    of Tampico, a portion of these may be obtained from that
    quarter. But, between the mountains and the river, there is an
    enemy’s country, which, although thinly inhabited, is capable of
    interrupting our communications by their rancheros, aided by
    Mexican troops, and led by Mexican officers, even if they cannot
    bring a sufficient force at any point, to meet ours in the
    field. We hear of large bodies of irregular cavalry, which may
    prove formidable in case the war be prolonged. This kind of
    force, thus far, appears to have been much overrated, but it may
    take lessons from us, and improve. Their horses, although small,
    may be better trained, and their riders, equal to any in the
    world, may be provided with better arms—the sabre, and pistol,
    and carbine, instead of the lance and lasso.

    It was supposed that there were but two passes through the
    mountains to the table land; but a third, that of Tula, near
    Victoria, is now spoken of. This river, appears to penetrate the
    great barrier between Tampico and Monterey, and takes its rise
    in the table land, between San Luis, and Zacatecas. It is
    possible, that the army of Santa Anna may, by this route, keep
    open a communication with the valley of the Rio Grande, and even
    send large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry through this
    pass, so as to threaten our lines on the Rio Grande and Tampico.
    According to the last accounts, our troops were marching towards
    Victoria. I should think it all important to take possession of
    that pass, and close it completely.

    There are still paragraphs in the papers, speaking of the
    intended march from Monterey, or Tampico, to San Luis. I think
    this highly improbable. It will be unsafe for us to move until
    we are completely masters of the whole country between the river
    and the mountains, and of all the passes to the table land. It
    would not do to leave this country in our rear, with all our
    military depots, but weakly guarded. Of one thing I will speak
    with confidence; that we shall need all the troops we have on
    the present scene of operations, and all we shall be able to
    send for some time. The descent on Vera Cruz, which is said to
    be in preparation, under the immediate direction of the
    commander in chief, General Scott, will require, at least,
    twenty thousand men, and if any considerable proportion be
    withdrawn from General Taylor, it will leave him in a very
    perilous situation. What is to prevent Santa Anna from making
    his head quarters at Victoria? It is said, that cannon cannot be
    transported by the Tula pass. This may, or may not be. Things
    deemed impossible have been accomplished by men of bold and
    enterprising spirit, as he is said to be. Napoleon crossed the
    Alps in spite of impossibilities, and appeared suddenly in the
    plains of Lombardy; and I should think the difficulties a
    hundred times greater than would be encountered by the Mexican
    Napoleon. I confess, I entertain serious apprehensions for our
    troops, although of the best materials, and admirably commanded.

    Santa Anna has, at this moment, a great advantage; he is posted
    at San Luis with an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
    Thus concentrated at one point, he will be enabled to strike,
    with his whole force, or the greater part of it, at Tampico,
    Saltillo, or Victoria, while our forces, are necessarily divided
    into comparatively small bodies. He can act with perfect
    secrecy, in a friendly country, and with a perfect knowledge of
    all our movements, while we are ignorant of his. If he should
    attack us with his whole force at any one point, he may roll
    back the tide of war, and drive us beyond the Rio Grande. Under
    present circumstances, instead of weakening our lines, prudence
    requires that we should strengthen them.

    Looking to the hazzards of war, and the _dangers_ following on
    conquests, the idea has suggested itself, of inviting the States
    of the lower Rio Grande to establish a separate confederacy,
    under our protection; and if Mexico persists in refusing to
    treat, then, to enter into a treaty of peace, alliance, and
    limits with this new confederacy, thus indemnifying ourselves
    for Mexican spoliations, by taking California and New Mexico,
    with the right of way to Mazatlan, and leaving Mexico to repent
    of her folly at leisure.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 9.


    _Present advantageous position of our army—The necessity for
      greater efforts—Our present force insufficient to march from
      Vera Cruz to Mexico._


                                            FEBRUARY 13TH, 1847.

    SIR: The last intelligence from the seat of war has given much
    relief to those who were beginning to feel uneasy about the
    situation of our troops. Generals Taylor and Patterson have
    taken Victoria or New Santander, and the line is therefore
    established from Saltillo to Tampico. The line of the Sierra
    Madre has already been described; it is certainly of a very
    peculiar character; it now presents only three points of attack,
    and that of Saltillo, the only one practicable for wheel
    carriages, and consequently, for the advance of an army with its
    parks of artillery. It is from this quarter, alone, that General
    Taylor need fear the march of Santa Anna; but he will have to
    cross at least three hundred miles of arid plains; and it is
    said, that the water tanks have been destroyed by his order,
    which looks as if he intended to prevent the march of General
    Taylor on San Luis, rather than undertake the march to Saltillo.
    It appears, that he has a large force at Tula, about
    equi-distant from Saltillo and Victoria.

    By guarding this line, the valley can be cut off from all
    supplies from Mexico; with the exception of a small quantity of
    indian corn, and the herds of the ranchos, very little can be
    procured in it for the support of an army. Our own safety
    requires, that we should take possession of all the principal
    towns as soon as possible, and garrison them with a sufficient
    force. It will, also, be necessary to establish civil authority,
    for the country thus cut off from the central Government. Its
    head must necessarily be military, as also the local superior
    authorities, although using the machinery of Alcaldes &c., for
    the purpose of carrying it on. The political Government, must be
    suspended, as the consequence of being cut off from both the
    State and federal authorities of Mexico.

    It would now seem to be the general impression, that nothing
    effectual can be done to bring Mexico to terms without taking
    Vera Cruz, and marching to the capital; and this appears to be
    the opinion of General Taylor at least, that if the march be
    resolved upon, then Vera Cruz, is the proper point to start from
    and not from Saltillo. A short time will determine.

    We have, thus far, been operating at vast expense, with an army
    of fifteen thousand men, about one half regulars, and the other
    half, volunteers, on the remote, thinly inhabited, northern
    frontier of Mexico; and we talk of marching through a densely
    peopled country with numerous defiles! If there be any thing
    like the resistance made by us during the revolutionary war,
    thirty thousand men, at least, will be required for the march
    from Vera Cruz to Mexico. A part of the force under General
    Taylor may now be spared, but not so as to weaken and disable
    him from repelling a part of the army of Santa Anna, if he
    should think proper to detach it, for the purpose of attacking
    Saltillo. It would be presumptuous in me to venture an opinion
    on military movements; but considering the formidable army now
    organized by Santa Anna, and the uncertainty as to the point
    which he means to attack, I should think, that it would not be
    safe to draw off any very considerable portion of General
    Taylor’s force from the defence of the lines they at present
    occupy.

    It is in our power to seize all her ports, and cut off all the
    trade of Mexico; and then, holding the lines we now occupy, it
    will be strange, if she persists in refusing to make peace. The
    fear of the loss of the interior and northern provinces, and the
    interruption in her trade, thus shut up in her shell, may have
    that effect, if any thing can. We have for the present, given
    stability to her Government by outward pressure. Our only
    security is to retain the hold we have; and perhaps, it may be
    necessary to attempt something on a still larger scale; but for
    this, we are not yet prepared. General Scott may take Vera Cruz,
    and then block up the road to Mexico, but I have seen no force
    yet, even on paper, sufficient to undertake the march to that
    capital. If, by withdrawing a large portion of General Taylor’s
    force, the line he now occupies be too much weakened, Santa
    Anna, will at once, take advantage of it, and regain the country
    on that side of the Rio Grande. In doing this, he will compel
    the army which may be landed at Vera Cruz, to return in all
    haste to Tampico, or Point Isabel. The crisis is now fast
    approaching, when it will become a question of national
    prowess—shall we cry, “hold, enough!” or make a mighty effort to
    obtain the victory? I wish to see my country do right, and
    justice to all nations; at the same time, I should be sorry to
    see our flag humbled, under any circumstances, and in a war with
    any nation on the Globe! I wish to see that flag wave proudly,
    and respected, wherever it may be carried, not tarnished and
    humbled, by defeat—insulted, scorned, treated with contempt,
    instead of affording a shelter and protection to our citizens,
    wherever they may be. But, firmly convinced, as I am, that our
    country is in the right, and our enemy in the wrong, I should
    feel the mortification ten fold, if we failed to obtain a just
    and honorable peace by the only means left us, _after our enemy
    has repeatedly spurned the olive branch_.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 10.


    _Annexation of Texas—The suspension of diplomatic relations, the
                     immediate causes of the war._

                                            FEBRUARY, 1847.

    SIR: In these letters, I have endeavored to repress all party
    feeling, thinking it a duty, in a contest with a foreign nation,
    in time of actual war, to take the side of my country, unless so
    grossly and palpably in the wrong, as to admit of no
    justification or defence. I repeat, that it is my sincere
    conviction, that justice is on our side, and this after as full,
    and dispassionate an examination of the subject as I am able to
    bestow. The contrary, is generally assumed, or taken for
    granted, by the party to which I belong; and yet the speech of
    Mr. Webster, at Philadelphia, which expresses the same opinion,
    is highly applauded. He condemns the administration of Mr. Polk,
    (not the cause of the country,) solely on the ground of bringing
    on a state of actual hostilities, without the previous
    approbation of Congress, while he admits, that Mexico is in the
    wrong in the causes which led to it the annexation of Texas. But
    the act of the President, is a domestic question between him and
    American people. The causes previously existing, and which would
    have justified Congress in making war, constitute a different
    question from that of expediency, or of the distribution of
    powers, under the Constitution. He concedes, that if the
    constituted authorities of the Union had thought proper to
    resort to this course, there was ample cause to justify it. To
    this, I assent, and will endeavor to give the reasons on which
    my opinion is founded, according to my view of the subject;
    professing, at the same time, a sincere respect for the opinion
    of those who may differ from me. I admit that the march from the
    Nueces to the Rio Grande, had the effect of _hastening_
    hostilities; but, in my opinion, it did do more than hasten, for
    the appeal of arms was inevitable on the annexation of Texas,
    unless Mexico receded entirely from the ground she had taken; of
    which, I did not see the slightest probability, unless compelled
    to do so, by the consequences of war, whether begun by her or by
    us.

    Mexico denounces the war as being aggressive on our part, but in
    all the official State Papers of the high functionaries of that
    Republic, (I do not refer to subordinate officers or generals,)
    in all their manifestos, that aggression is distinctly declared
    to _be the annexation of Texas_. It was on this ground, that she
    put an end to all diplomatic intercourse, after having
    previously announced that she would consider annexation as
    equivalent to a declaration of war, on our part. It was on this
    ground, that she refused to _resume_ a diplomatic intercourse,
    and enter into negotiation for a peaceful adjustment of existing
    differences, until satisfaction should first be made for the
    alleged wrong. She has not limited her complaints of alleged
    aggression to the march of our troops to the Rio Grande; her
    complaint is, the being deprived of her province of Texas, which
    she will never renounce; and she declares her determination
    never to listen to overtures of peace, until that province shall
    be evacuated by us. Has she, on any occasion, shown a
    willingness to accept any other boundary than the Sabine? I have
    seen no intimation of this kind, emanating from her President or
    Congress. The contrary is unchangeably persisted in.[4] In fact,
    it could not occur while she persists in her right to the whole
    of Texas. The annexation is the _casus belli_ on the part of
    Mexico—the paramount consideration—every thing else, is but
    incidental, or subordinate. The very idea of fixing any other
    boundary, would imply a relinquishment of her claim.

Footnote 4:

      There is no distinct assertion of boundary in any of her
      official papers down to the _war proclamation_ of the 23d of
      April, 1846.

    Now, that great statesman, Mr. Webster, has proved on various
    occasions, and especially in his Philadelphia speech, that
    annexation of Texas to the United States was no cause of war,
    because Texas was as much an independent State as Mexico. The
    act was no more a cause of war on the part of Mexico, than her
    annexation to the United States would have been a cause of war
    on the part of Texas. If Mr. Webster be correct, and I think
    his argument unanswerable, was Mexico justifiable in the
    course pursued by her towards us on account of that act? Was
    she justifiable in withdrawing her minister, and ordering away
    the minister of the United States? These were very high handed
    and insulting measures, and attended, necessarily, with the
    serious consequence of putting an end to all peaceful modes of
    adjusting differences, and leaving the only alternatives of,
    submission, or war, on our part. But, under the circumstances
    in which Mexico was placed towards us, it was an act of gross
    injustice, as well as insult. _She had a treaty obligation to
    fulfil, in the payment of several millions, as the indemnity
    for wrongs done to American citizens, and demands had been
    made upon her for several millions more, which remained
    unadjusted._ There was, also, a question of boundary to
    settle—all these matters must be settled either peaceably, or
    by war—if peaceably, the continuance, or re-establishment of
    diplomatic intercourse, was indispensable. Her conduct was
    like that of the debtor who cuts the acquaintance of his
    creditor, and thinks by that means, to avoid fulfilling his
    obligations. Let me ask, what would have been the course
    pursued, (if placed in our situation,) by England or France,
    or any other high minded Government? I ask any candid man to
    say, whether they would have borne it as patiently as we have
    done? I would ask whether there was as much forbearance shown
    by us with Louis Philippe, on the subject of the French
    indemnity, or with England in the Northern boundary, and
    Oregon question? That nation assumes an awful responsibility,
    which, like Mexico, puts an end to the peaceable ways of
    diplomacy, leaving no alternative but horrid war, or base
    submission. Mexico should have paid her debt before she put an
    end to peaceful intercourse, and she could not do it without
    injustice, while there were claims still depending. All
    arguments drawn from considerations of forbearance, humanity,
    generosity, expediency, are for ourselves—Mexico is entitled
    to no part in them. In my estimation, the great _error_ of
    Mexico, if so mild a term can be applied, consists in her
    having terminated all peaceful modes of settling differences;
    for, as there is no common arbiter between independent
    nations, their differences in that case, must be settled by
    war, or not at all.

    I am again sustained, by the opinion of Mr. Webster, in respect
    of the refusal of Mexico to the re-establishment of diplomatic
    relations proposed by us; and again, in her refusal to meet the
    more recent overtures for negotiation. The first improper
    conduct of Mexico has been greatly aggravated by these acts. It
    has been urged, that Mexico was willing to receive a
    _commissioner_, to treat in relation to Texas. It is surprising
    to me, that any one should not see the folly of this
    proposition. It was only saying, “as you have wronged us, in the
    annexation of Texas, we will permit you to offer us suitable
    reparation, and this must precede all other matters between us.”
    The ignorance and presumption of such an idea, is truly Mexican.
    [5]If they were sincere in their desire to discuss the subject,
    what objection could there be to receiving an ambassador,
    clothed with full powers to settle all matters in dispute? What
    right had Mexico to require us to _admit_, that annexation was
    an aggression on her rights? There was no proposition to discuss
    the question of _boundary_, as is frequently asserted, which
    would be inconsistent with her pretensions. But even that could
    be more fully settled by one having full authority, than by a
    mere special commissioner, with limited powers. The whole was
    but a diplomatic quibble—a deceitful evasion. In the opinion of
    Mr. Webster, Mexico was wrong in putting an end to diplomatic
    relations; she was wrong in rejecting our minister under a
    frivolous pretext, and she continues in the wrong in rejecting
    overtures of peace, after the commencement of hostilities. Here
    was a direct advance on our part, superseding the necessity of
    mediation, a measure only adopted to save the pride of either
    party, in being the _first_ to propose a peace. In all this,
    Mexico is in the wrong; and here is the whole question, as
    between her and the United States. The degree of forbearance to
    be shown, is a question for ourselves alone. The first blow was
    struck by Mexico, unless the provocation of our march to the Rio
    Grande, _be considered the first blow_. There is nothing left
    for us, but to prosecute the war until Mexico shall be willing
    to enter into peaceable negotiation. Some appear to think that
    she would be most likely to re-establish diplomatic relations,
    by our withdrawing our fleets and armies. But this would only be
    an experiment, and might fail; and if it should fail, our work
    would have to begin again. This was done when Mr. Slidell landed
    at Vera Cruz, but without success. Can we place sufficient
    confidence in Mexico, even after the most positive and distinct
    assurances, and still less without any such assurances? For my
    part, I have no confidence either in the good faith of her
    present rulers, or in the stability of her Government. What,
    then, is to be done? I see no way but to retain the advantages
    we already possess, and to prosecute the war on her territory,
    as other wars, under like circumstances, would be prosecuted by
    other nations. What is there to prevent her from entering into
    negotiations at once? Pride—folly—but we were not too proud to
    negotiate with England, at the moment when the war was hottest.
    At the very moment of signing the treaty of Ghent, the British
    Commissioner supposed, and ours also, that the British troops
    were in possession of Louisiana, and one of them observed to the
    American Commissioner. “You have reason to be satisfied, for you
    have now regained New Orleans.” The idea of falling back on the
    Rio Grande, in the visionary hope of coaxing Mexico to make
    peace, and then in case of her refusal, retaking Monterey and
    Tampico, and the valley of the Rio Grande, would be like the
    fisherman, who after having one good haul, throws back the best
    fish into the sea, for the pleasure of retaking them!

Footnote 5:

      Mr. Gallatin makes a strange mistake, when he says, that the
      refusal, was to receiving a _resident minister_. The refusal
      was on account of his not being a mere Commissioner on the
      _single subject of Texas_! What reasonable objection could
      there be to a resident minister, after a treaty of peace? And
      if no such treaty were made, then the minister clothed with
      those powers would take his _departure_, as a matter of
      course. Mr. Gallatin speaks very _lightly_ of a _suspension_
      of diplomatic intercourse! I regard this, under the
      circumstance, as most serious. But there was more than
      suspension; Mexico declared _all negotiations_ at an end, and
      war was, therefore, the only alternative.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 11.

        _The causes of the war.—The complaints on either side._

                                            FEBRUARY, 1847.

    SIR: The tendency of public opinion throughout the civilized
    world, and especially in the United States, against all wars,
    may be justly set down as an evidence of the progress of
    civilization. There are many who regard all war, defensive as
    well as offensive, as wicked and inexcusable. Others, justify
    defensive wars only, as if it were possible for one to defend
    himself by merely warding off the blows of the assailant. Some
    regard wars made for conquest merely, as unlawful, and no sound
    moralist can approve of a war instigated by a motive so unjust
    and dishonest. But when war is once begun, it unavoidably
    becomes offensive, as well as defensive, in order to bring the
    opposite party to terms—it necessarily becomes a war of conquest
    by holding the enemy’s territory as a lawful acquisition, until
    restored by treaty of peace, if restored at all. No one nation
    has yet abandoned the practice of war, and I cannot well
    understand how it can do so, while it is continued by others. In
    the present unregenerated state of the world, wars are therefore
    regarded by practical men, as sometimes unavoidable, and even
    necessary and just. It was the opinion of Washington, that the
    best security for peace, is in being well prepared for war; and
    it may be added, to impress other nations with respect or fear
    of our military prowess. I am convinced, that our last three
    years war with Great Britain, ensured us a long peace, not only
    with that power, but with others. I am equally certain, that but
    for our seven years of revolutionary war, we should have been
    neither a free nor an independent nation—our magnificent country
    would not have been “the land of the free, and the home of the
    brave.” If all wars are “murders and robberies,” as some
    philanthropists contend, there must be a revolution in our
    sentiments towards Washington and his brave companions in arms,
    who offered up their lives for the blessings of freedom and
    self-government, and of peace, which we have enjoyed.

    But I am free to admit, that a civilized nation cannot, without
    just reproach, engage in a war that is unjust, and that is not,
    in a certain sense, unavoidable. The nation ought to go beyond,
    rather than fall short of the strict measure of justice, and she
    ought to exhaust every means of maintaining peace, before
    resorting to the _ultimate ratio_.

    It is my intention in this letter to took into the causes which
    have led to the war in which we are now engaged with Mexico. I
    must premise, that we must take the world as we find it, and we
    must decide according to the ethicks and practice of the most
    civilized nations, and not according to standards of morality,
    which, although perfect in themselves, are inapplicable to the
    present imperfect state of mankind. It is again to be observed,
    that among nations, there is no common judge, to whom they are
    willing to submit their differences, and to obey the decision.
    Each is the judge in its own case, and if one should be disposed
    to do even more than justice, the demands of the other may be
    out of all reason. It is a rare thing in modern times, for two
    powerful civilized nations to be involved in hostilities,
    without previous differences, misunderstandings, or mutual
    aggressions, and without, also, previous unsuccessful attempts
    to adjust their differences in a peaceful way. Let us first
    consider the complaints of Mexico.

    These consisted, in the first instance, in the aid afforded by
    citizens of the United States in the struggle of Texas with
    Mexico for her independence. But this did not begin with that
    struggle, but with the efforts of Mexico herself to throw off
    the allegiance of Spain, in which she was so materially aided by
    the Americans of Texas, and who continued to be invited into
    that country for the purpose of giving strength to the Mexican
    cause. Serious offence was given to Spain in consequence of this
    volunteer aid of our citizens to her revolted provinces, but,
    certainly, there was no complaint on the part of those
    provinces. Their situation changed as soon as they won their
    independence, and when Texas revolted in consequence of alleged
    oppression, Mexico assumed the position before occupied by
    Spain, and complained of the aid afforded by citizens of the
    United States to Texas. Here is, no doubt, the ground of the
    ill-feeling on the part of Mexico towards us. How far we are
    responsible for the acts of our citizens, beyond our
    jurisdiction, is a question which opens a wide field for
    discussion, and is one which cannot be discussed in these
    cursory letters. All I shall say, is, that Mexico had the same
    right to complain that Spain had, and no more and even less, for
    it was the consequence of her own act, in calling in our
    countrymen to help her against Spain. I avoid saying any thing
    here, as to the merits of the quarrel between Texas and Mexico.

    In the contest which ensued between these belligerents, Mexico
    put forth her whole strength—she entered Texas with a powerful
    army, commanded by her Chief Magistrate in person, who was at
    the same time her most distinguished military leader—a leader,
    who had put down the constitution of 1824, and concentrated the
    whole power of the State in his own person, and in the person of
    his own military subordinates. The invasion was followed by the
    signal defeat at San Jacinto, by General Houston, and a treaty,
    _acknowledging the independence of Texas, and recognizing the
    Rio Grande as the Southern boundary_. I do not mean to discuss
    the diplomatic question involved in this treaty, my object being
    in this place, merely to state facts.[6] Subsequently, with the
    exception of some inroads on either side, the war ceased—the
    cause of Mexico became hopeless—the independence of Texas was
    not only recognized by us, but also by other neutral nations.
    Her inability to re-conquer Texas, was confessed by Mexico
    herself; she was even willing to acknowledge her independence on
    the condition that Texas would not unite herself to the United
    States—condition which no nation in our place would fail to
    regard as offensive. Next follows the act on our part in which
    was merged all other offences, and was, before-hand, declared by
    Mexico, not only as a cause of war, but equivalent to a
    declaration of war—the annexation of Texas with its consent. The
    act has been generally condemned by the whig press, and yet, it
    is sustained by very high authority: Mr. Webster, as Secretary
    of State, holds this language: “Mexico may have chosen to
    consider Texas as having been at all times since 1835, and still
    continuing, a rebellious province, but the world has been
    obliged to take a different view of the matter. From the time of
    the battle of San Jacinto to the present moment, Texas has
    continued to exhibit the same internal signs of national
    independence as Mexico herself, and with quite as much stability
    of government.” Again he repeats, “since 1837, the United States
    have regarded Texas as an independent sovereignty as much as
    Mexico.” He says further, “the constitution, public treaties,
    and laws, oblige the President to regard Texas as an independent
    State, _and its territory no part of the territory of Mexico_.”
    In a late public speech at Springfield, Mr. Webster uses the
    following language, “I do not admit that it was a just ground of
    complaint on the part of Mexico, that the United States annexed
    Texas to themselves.” From my own unassisted reasoning, I had
    arrived at the same conclusion with Mr. Webster. The ground
    taken by the great statesman against the war, was not on account
    of the annexation of Texas, but of the march of Gen. Taylor, by
    the order, or sanction of Mr. Polk, whose practical result was
    inevitable hostilities, which ought not to have been brought on
    without the express sanction of Congress, and while there was
    still a possibility of negotiating. The first, is a question
    between Mr. Polk and his country, with which Mexico has nothing
    to do; the other, is a mere question of probability, depending
    on the willingness on our side to negotiate, and the
    willingness, or the contrary, on this part of Mexico, to meet
    us. I will add, that the taking of California and New Mexico are
    acts arising out of the war, and not causes leading to it.

Footnote 6:

      The able speech of Mr. Kauffman in Congress on this subject is
      not easily refuted. As a jurist, I do not hesitate to
      pronounce the treaty valid.

    Let us now consider the provocations and complaints on our side;
    these commenced before any of the alleged grievances on the part
    of Mexico. They may be placed under two heads; first, the
    refusal to pay American citizens the debts contracted by their
    government for the means of carrying on their war of
    independence; and secondly, for outrages committed on the
    persons of our people while in the pursuit of their lawful
    business, and for the illegal seizure and confiscation of their
    property. The second head covers much the largest amount of
    injuries complained of: they consist of seizure of vessels in
    port on false or frivolous pretexts; of goods and merchandise
    for public use; of forced loans and civil injuries to persons,
    and wanton confinement to loathsome prisons, where many perished
    or lost their health. There were beside, anomalous cases,
    [7]some of them involving immense losses, breaking up mercantile
    establishments, producing ruin, and irreparable injury.

Footnote 7:

      Such as that of Aaron Ligett, who introduced steamboats on the
      Tobasco river, according to a contract with the government;
      his boats were seized for public use, his merchandize
      confiscated, and business and credit destroyed. There is the
      case of Dr. Baldwin, who was induced to establish saw mills,
      which were seized when they became profitable, and the lands
      purchased by him confiscated. There is the case of the
      empressario contracts in Texas, where lands were granted by
      Mexico, on condition of colonizing, and when the company
      brought out colonies at great expense, they were forcibly
      prevented from taking possession—colonists driven off or
      imprisoned, and the goods and effects of the company seized.

    We find as early as the first term of Gen. Jackson, the most
    ruinous complaints on the part of our fellow-citizens of the
    wrongs inflicted on them by Mexico. They are such, says he, “as
    cannot be tolerated by any government endued with a just
    self-respect, with a proper regard for the opinions of other
    nations, or with enlightened concern for the permanent welfare
    of those portions of its people who may be interested in foreign
    commerce.” After enumerating the various classes of outrages, he
    adds, “citizens of the United States have been imprisoned for
    long periods of time, without being informed of the offences
    with which they were charged. Others have been murdered and
    robbed on the high seas by Mexican officers, without any attempt
    to bring the guilty to justice.” In a subsequent message to
    Congress, he declares, “that such conduct _would justify
    immediate war, in the eyes of all nations_.” The same language
    was repeated by the subsequent administration, in still stronger
    terms. All this was previous to the alleged wrongs on our part,
    in respect to Texas, and the only excuse was the revolutionary
    state, and the consequent disorders under which Mexico was then
    a sufferer; and this plea, untenable as it is, was respected to
    such a degree, as to amount to a denial of justice to our own
    citizens. The American sufferings were aggravated by seeing the
    prompt and decisive measures of the French to redress similar
    outrages, when Admiral Baudin blew up the castle of San Juan de
    Ulloa, and compelled the Mexican government to pay a million of
    dollars on the deck of his vessel. How is it possible, after
    these facts, to say, that our complaints against Mexico were
    fictitious or exaggerated? Under the commission extorted from
    her, without which, an open rupture must have followed, after
    ascertaining three millions of just claims, an amount much
    larger was left unadjusted, in consequence of the expiration of
    the time limited for the duration of the commission, and even
    that time shortened one half by the delays of the Mexican
    commissioners. Instead of exacting payment at once, of the debt
    thus ascertained and admitted to be due, we showed her every
    indulgence, by consulting her convenience as to the time and
    mode of payment. That debt still remains unpaid, and the
    remaining claim unadjusted. Now, I would ask, whether, under the
    circumstances, she was not bound to keep open diplomatic
    relations for the purpose of providing payment for the amount
    due, and for a proper adjudication of the remainder? She has
    thought proper to take offence at the annexation of Texas, and
    to put an end to diplomatic relations, and of course, of
    peaceful negotiation on that, as well as on other subjects. The
    act of recalling a minister, and sending passports to the
    foreign plenipotentiary, according to the modern law of nations,
    is equivalent to an express declaration of war, and hostilities
    might be expected to follow as a matter of course.[8] It looks
    very much as if the annexation was merely laid hold of as a
    pretext to avoid paying her debts, and making compensation for
    the wrongs she had perpetrated on our citizens. The closing of
    diplomatic relations was itself a great outrage, considering the
    relation in which she stood towards us. There was, certainly, no
    obligation on our part to take any step towards a renewal of
    those relations—we might have proceeded according to the usages
    of nations to take the law on our own hands, and compel her to
    give, what we might consider, a just indemnity. But unlike other
    nations, we pursued a humane and moderate course; we attempted
    again and again, to negotiate, but without success; and perhaps,
    at the expense of national dignity. And even after the
    commencement of hostilities, after every success obtained by our
    army, the olive branch was held forth, and as often rejected.

Footnote 8:

      See _Kent’s Commentaries._—“Since the time of Binkershock, it
      has been settled by the practice of Europe, that war may
      lawfully exist by a declaration which is unilateral only, _or
      without any declaration on either side_.”

      In the war between England and France in 1778, the first
      public act on the part of the English government, was
      recalling its minister, and that single act was considered by
      France as the breach of the peace between the two countries.
      There was no other declaration of war, though each government
      afterwards published a manifesto in vindication of its claim
      and conduct. The same things may be said of the war which
      broke out in 1793, and again in 1803.

      The act of withdrawing a minister, is one of a most decisive
      character, for _actual hostilities_ may exist without a state
      of war, as in the war of 1756 between France and England, and
      between us and France in 1798. The act of taking the fort of
      Mobile under Mr. Madison’s administration in 1812, was an act
      of hostility, and yet our diplomatic relations still
      continued—it was made the subject of complaint by Spain, and
      defended or excused by our government. If diplomatic relations
      had been discontinued, there would have been no redress for
      Spain, but in returning the blow. Hence, I contend, that the
      party which closes these relations, and prevents the peaceful
      adjustment of injuries, is responsible for all the
      consequences.

    It has been said, that the annexation of Texas by us was virtual
    war, that is, equivalent to an express declaration. If so, it
    was in consequence of the declaration of Mexico, that she would
    so consider it, but not as in its very nature precluding
    negotiation. On the contrary, the administration has been blamed
    for not negotiating, and that too, _whether Mexico would or
    not_. No—the act of war, was in closing the door to peaceful
    settlement, by means of plenipotentiaries, authorized to adjust
    not a single isolated question, _but all matters in dispute_.

    A minister, clothed with full powers, was sent by us to Mexico
    after the hasty and inconsiderate step taken by her, a piece of
    condescension, which can only be ascribed to an extreme desire
    on our part to preserve peace. Our plenipotentiary was not
    received, and for what reason? Was it because he was not
    accredited, or not clothed with sufficient power to adjust _all_
    existing differences, the only grounds which could be fairly
    assigned? No—the objection was, that these powers were _too
    full_, instead of being confined to one topic, the annexation of
    Texas. He was told, that a commissioner with powers to settle
    that single question, would be received, but without power to
    discuss any other, and consequently, without power to discuss
    even that, which was necessarily complicated with others. The
    representative, of course, could not divest himself of his
    powers—he went not only to do justice to Mexico, but demand
    justice of her. But, this is but a very imperfect view of the
    case. The willingness to receive _a commissioner_, went on the
    assumption, that we were in the wrong in the question of
    annexation, notwithstanding the ground taken by Mr. Webster, as
    Secretary of State, in his letter to Bocanega. Let us look at
    the letter of Pena y Pena, of the 15th October, 1845:

    “In answer, I have to say to you, that although the Mexican
    nation is _deeply injured_ by the United States, through the
    acts _committed by them in the department of Texas_, which
    belongs to this nation, my government is disposed to receive the
    commissioner _to settle the present dispute_, in a peaceful,
    reasonable, and honorable manner, thus giving a new proof, that
    even in the midst of its injuries, and of its firm decision to
    _exact adequate reparation_ for them, it does not _repel_ with
    _contumely_, the measure of reason and peace to which it is
    uninvited by its adversary.”

    It seems then that Mexico does not _repel with contumely_, the
    commissioners sent to make _ample reparation_ for the wrong done
    her in the department of Texas! The wrong done, _is to be taken
    for granted_, not to be discussed; the _measure of reparation_
    only, is to be debated. It is impossible to conceive of any
    thing more humiliating and insulting, whether it proceed from
    design or stupidity. A high minded nation could not brook such
    arrogance for a moment, and this from a power which admitted
    herself to be our debtor to the amount of millions which she is
    unable to pay! It would have been much more in place, for our
    minister to say, that the payment of that debt ought to precede
    any demand for _reparation_, on account of the alleged injury
    from annexation of Texas. I verily believe, that Mexico is the
    only power in the world to whom we should permit such language.
    At her instance, we had previously withdrawn our squadron from
    her coast; and now, forsooth, she condescends to permit us to
    ask her forgiveness, and make ample reparation for what she
    pleases to consider the injuries done her in her department of
    Texas.[9]

Footnote 9:

      The battles afterwards fought, appear to have enlarged the
      vision of our enemy. No objections in the subsequent attempts
      at negotiation with Mr. Trist, were alleged against his too
      ample powers. She was willing to yield California for a
      consideration, and Texas, with the boundary of the Nuesees,
      then mentioned for the first time; and provided, slavery was
      not introduced in the ceded territories, and provided, also,
      that _religious toleration_ were secured! No one, after this,
      will deny, that the war has been productive of something to
      compensate for its horrors.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 12.


      _Struggle between Santa Anna and General Taylor.—The turning
                           point of the War._

                                            MARCH, 1847.

    The accounts from the seat of war in the States of the Rio
    Grande, are becoming every day more serious; perhaps, I should
    say, alarming. It is now placed beyond all doubt, that Santa
    Anna, instead of throwing himself between the city of Mexico and
    the expected march of General Scott, has suddenly advanced on
    General Taylor at Saltillo. We now see the effect of weakening
    the army of the Rio Grande, under the supposition, that the
    Mexican Commander could make no other military movement than
    that of covering the national capital. The American General, by
    extraordinary exertion, has collected all his disposable force
    at the point where he can most advantageously arrest the march
    of Santa Anna; but his division does not exceed five thousand
    men, not more than half of them regulars, while the Mexican army
    is not short of twenty thousand, and by far the most formidable
    ever yet embodied in that country. We have every confidence in
    General Taylor and his gallant officers and soldiers; he is one
    of those, whose resources of mind have always been brought out
    by emergencies, and always found equal to them; but it must be
    confessed, the odds, at present, are fearfully against him.

    It is said, that General Taylor has received orders (perhaps
    discretionary) both from the war department, and the commander
    in chief, to retreat to Monterey. This, I am confident, he will
    never do. He must meet Santa Anna on the edge of the desert of
    three hundred miles, which he is compelled to cross, and he will
    make his stand at the admirably chosen battle field of Buena
    Vista, which, according to the description of Captain Hughes, is
    a defile just suited for an army like that of General Taylor to
    defend, and to withstand the shock of an attacking force, four
    times its numbers. Here is exactly one of those cases, where
    every thing must be put to “the hazzard of the dye,” or every
    thing must be lost.

    Let us for a moment consider the consequences of the retreat of
    General Taylor to Monterey or of his defeat at Buena Vista.
    Santa Anna once at Saltillo, will find every thing necessary to
    refresh his troops, after the sufferings and fatigues of their
    march. The retreat of the American General will be regarded as a
    victory for Santa Anna, and it will cause the rancheros of New
    Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas, to rise _en mass_. General
    Urrea, it is said, is at the head of ten thousand men near
    Victoria, so that our army will be shut up in Monterey, and all
    communications cut off with the Rio Grande. It is true, a
    portion of General Taylor’s force may be detached to defend some
    narrow pass between Monterey and Saltillo, and attempt to oppose
    the advance of Santa Anna. But may not Monterey be turned by
    Urrea, and thus place himself in the rear of that detachment,
    while a portion of the Mexican army shall advance in front?
    Although Santa Anna may not be able to transport his artillery,
    is it impossible for him to enter the valley of the Rio Grande
    with his infantry and cavalry, by some circuitous way? I set up
    no pretensions to being a military critic; my suggestions are
    merely thrown out for what they are worth, and they may be worth
    nothing. But I can conceive it possible, for Santa Anna, with
    his whole army, to enter New Leon and Tamaulipas, and the
    necessary consequence must be, that all our military stores at
    Comargo and Matamoras, must fall into his hands. He will sweep
    the whole valley of the Rio Grande, and in all probability, will
    not stop there, but cross into Texas, now almost defenceless,
    there being no force at any point capable of opposing his
    progress. Admit that these are bare possibilities, these may
    become probabilities, and probabilities, may become realities.

    The supposed retreat, or defeat of our army, will change the
    whole face of the war. Should either of these events take place,
    (and such is my confidence in General Taylor, that I firmly
    believe they will not) then the descent on Vera Cruz, and the
    march to Mexico, under the commander in chief, will have to be
    abandoned, and a retrograde movement undertaken to the Rio
    Grande, which cannot be effected without great difficulty and
    delay.

    Very serious charges have been made against the administration
    for aiding the return of Santa Anna to Mexico. I look upon this
    as an error on the part of Mr. Polk, and as a proof of his
    extreme desire for the restoration of peace. The favor shown to
    the Mexican President, it was thought, would be followed by
    treaty; but the suspicious position in which he would be placed
    before his own countrymen, would compel him to prosecute the war
    with extraordinary vigor. It would only be, after a series of
    glorious victories, and the expulsion of the invaders by force
    of arms, that he could venture to talk of peace.

    Our whole country waits with breathless anxiety, the issue of
    the conflict between General Taylor and Santa Anna. It is the
    turning point of this war—if our arms prove successful, there
    will be every thing to hope, and peace will have been conquered;
    but if we fail, the prospect before us will be dark and gloomy
    indeed.[10]

Footnote 10:

      This letter was not published in the series—after being
      transcribed for publication, the copy was thrown into the
      fire, as presenting too discouraging a picture.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 13.

             _The battle of Buena Vista, and its results._

                                            APRIL, 1847.

    SIR: We have at length authentic accounts of the great battle
    fought at Buena Vista; it is certainly one of the most
    extraordinary on record, and its consequences are even more
    important than the event itself. These are of such magnitude,
    that Santa Anna never would have made his daring movement if he
    had not been certain of success. Who could have supposed that
    twenty thousand men, under a high state of discipline, and
    perfectly provided with every thing necessary to constitute an
    army, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, should be totally
    defeated by two thousand five hundred regulars, and an equal
    number of volunteers? Such an idea certainly never entered the
    mind of any Mexican, at least. It appears that his army is
    entirely disorganized, and it is doubtful, whether he will ever
    be able to reach San Louis with the fourth of those who marched
    from that place. But the moral influence throughout Mexico must
    be incalculable—the Mexicans may now say as the subjects of
    Montezuma said of the Spaniards: “the gods of the strangers are
    stronger than our gods.”

    The reliance of the Mexicans for the defence of the Capital is
    destroyed and gone. Had Santa Anna been successful against
    Taylor, no other defence of the Capital would have been
    necessary; the descent on Vera Cruz would have been at once
    abandoned, and our troops recalled for the purpose of covering
    our own frontier. Instead of being broken and dispirited, the
    Mexicans every where, would have risen up in arms, and, perhaps,
    would for the first time, have exhibited a national spirit—the
    contrary of this effect has been produced. It will require a
    prodigious effort, and much time, to organize another army; and
    the greater part will be new conscripts, if they can be
    dignified even with that name, where there is no voluntary
    enlistment, or fair and regular draft, but where the poor
    peasant is seized by force, and driven, tied with ropes, to the
    places of rendezvous, like a brute beast, to be beaten, and
    broken into the trade of war. And now from Tampico to Saltillo,
    from the Sierra Madre to the Sabine, the war is over—_all that
    is necessary is to consolidate the conquest of the beautiful
    country west of the Rio Grande_.

    I can readily conceive the effect of this uninterrupted series
    of successful military events, and extraordinary battles, both
    on the Mexican and the European mind. The slumbering military
    might existing in our republic, ready to be called forth by
    events, must strike Europeans with amazement; and its secret
    lies in the freedom of our institutions, the same which gave to
    Greece and Rome their pre-eminence. One trait has been
    exhibited, in even a higher degree, than in Greece—the emulation
    or rivalry of States; and even of a higher kind than that which
    was displayed at Platea and Marathon; Kentucky has vied with
    South Carolina, and Massachusetts with Mississippi—MAY THE
    CHERISHED REMEMBRANCE, LONG SERVE TO BIND THEM TOGETHER IN
    FRATERNAL AFFECTION! The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca, were
    decisive as to the superiority of our arms, especially of our
    artillery, and of the inferiority of the enemy in cavalry, whose
    efficiency was so much overrated. At Monterey, with every
    advantage of numbers, walls, and fortresses, they were literally
    crushed; and then, to crown all, at Buena Vista, in spite of the
    immense disparity, and the enemy attacking, their army was
    annihilated in the open field. Can it be possible that Mexico
    will not now sue for peace, and accept any terms we may choose
    to dictate? I have no doubt we shall soon hear of General Scott
    making good his landing at Vera Cruz, and taking the Castle of
    San Juan. We shall then hear of Mexican plenipotentiaries
    advancing towards him with the olive branch, before he takes up
    his line of march for the capital of the Astecs. Surely they
    will not invite him, “to revel in the halls of the Montezumas.”

    It must be admitted, that Santa Anna, however detestable his
    character, has displayed great military talent. He led his
    troops to battle under circumstances, he was well aware, would
    cause them to fight with desperation. They were not only filled
    with confidence from their immense superiority of numbers, but
    rendered desperate by hunger and the hope of booty, which he had
    promised them, and which supplied the want of higher motives of
    action, such as inspired the superior race with which they had
    to contend. In the words of Byron:

            “Th’Assyrian came down like a wolf on the plain,”

    but the shepherd was prepared to receive him, and drive him back
    howling to the desert. The sudden retreat of General Taylor from
    his advanced position to his chosen battle ground, no doubt
    unexpected, must have had the effect of disconcerting the enemy.
    By thus meeting him at the edge of the desert, he availed
    himself, like a skilful commander, of all the advantages of
    circumstances. What events the war may bring forth, if it should
    continue, it is impossible to foretell, but it is certain, that
    the series of victories which have been thus far achieved by
    him, have not been surpassed in our military history, while that
    of Buena Vista, stands unequalled.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               LETTER 14.


      _Shall we organize Territorial Governments in the conquered
                             Territories._

                                            MARCH, 1847.

    Both political parties seem to take it for granted, that
    annexation must immediately follow the conquest of the whole or
    any portion of Mexico, by which is meant, the formation of new
    States to be added to the confederacy. But this is by no means a
    necessary consequence. Louisiana was not brought within the pale
    of the Constitution for eight years, Missouri for a longer time,
    and Florida for sixteen. They were placed under a first, and
    then a second grade of territorial government, over which the
    Constitution was not extended; rather their Courts, executive,
    judicial, or legislative branches, were not constitutional
    authorities, but depending on Congress for their being and
    power. It has been argued, that the acquisition of territory,
    either by purchase or conquest, (to which the same reason
    applies,) is not constitutional; and of this opinion, were Mr.
    Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and I think I may add, Mr.
    Madison. But public opinion, and public necessity, have
    overruled them, not by fair reasoning, but by “jumping to the
    conclusion.”

    Under the territorial government, the territory has no vote in
    Congress, and no representation in the Senate, although allowed
    a delegate on the floor of the House of Representatives, with
    the liberty of speech, but without the right to vote. The
    territories of Louisiana, Missouri, and Florida, had their own
    legislatures, retained their own laws, and enacted new ones, but
    in this case, subject to the repealing power of Congress. They
    had also their own judiciary, with the exception of the Judges
    of the Superior Court, who, together with the Executive, were
    appointed under the organic law by the President of the United
    States; that organic law, emanating from Congress, and which was
    for the territories, what State and United States constitutions,
    were for the States, might have given the power to the
    territories to elect their Governors and Judges, as well as
    their Legislators. This was in the pleasure of Congress, which
    had acquired the rights of the former sovereign, and might
    exercise it under the _limitations_ of the Constitution, not
    because it was extended to the acquired territories, but as a
    restraint on Congress in its own sphere of action; and whatever
    Congress was expressly forbidden to do generally, it was
    forbidden to do in any case, unless the exception was express.
    The organic law or territorial constitution, extended the great
    prerogative writs of _habeas corpus_, _mandamus_, and _quo
    warranto_, for the benefit and safe guard of persons, property,
    and religion of every citizen. The Government of each territory,
    as to all local subjects of legislation, was as completely at
    their own hands, as any of the States. But has not Congress
    power of regulation over local subjects? I do not find it in the
    Constitution, excepting over its real or moveable property. The
    District of Columbia stands on an anomalous principle; and
    besides, in respect to that district, Congress acts in two
    distinct capacities: first, in its general character of a
    legislature for the whole Union; and secondly, as a local
    legislature for the district; and in this respect, the other
    States, have no more right to interfere, than they have a right
    to interfere with each other. Its local legislation, must be
    directed by its local wants, with which the people of
    Massachusetts or New York, have no concern.

    The only acts of Congress extended to the territories are always
    expressly named, and they are those relating to the revenue, the
    slave trade, those regulating commerce and the public lands;
    while the great body of the acts of Congress, have application
    only to the members of the confederacy. The general Government,
    in virtue of its sovereignty, had the control over all foreign
    intercourse, and undertook the military defence and protection.
    Having lived under these protective Governments, I must candidly
    confess, that they possess many advantages. They are entirely
    unlike the condition of colonies and conquered provinces,
    subject to onerous exactions, or restrictions. Their burthens
    were even lighter than those of the citizens of the States, in
    consequence of not being represented in Congress, as it would be
    against a fundamental principle to bind them by laws, which they
    had no share in enacting. Many of the territorial inhabitants
    regret the change from the quiet of their territorial
    Government, to the turbulence and expense of the State
    constitution. They preferred this state of things to the
    ambition of being able to disturb the balance of power among the
    States, by a voice in the Senate, or even in the House of
    Representatives. But the admission into the Union (or admission
    as States,) “as soon as consistent with the principles of the
    Constitution,” was an express stipulation, under the treaties
    which ceded those territories; and in the case of Texas,
    immediate annexation as a State, was the principal consideration
    of the compact. Where there is no such stipulation, as in the
    case of countries acquired by conquest, like those of the Rio
    Grande, the acquisition is unconditional, and the territorial
    state may be continued indefinitely, or the admission of the
    whole or part, be determined at our pleasure. According to the
    laws of nations, their local laws remain in force; and according
    to our Constitution, Congress has no power to legislate in local
    matters for them, although it may create a local legislature for
    that purpose; for, in my opinion, it cannot constitute itself a
    local legislature for the purpose, as in the anomalous case of
    the District of Columbia.

    The Supreme Court is often regarded as the sole arbiter in all
    constitutional questions. This is to be understood with some
    comitations. For instance, it would not consider itself at
    liberty to decide the question, whether the acquisition of
    foreign territory is constitutional or not; the other branches
    of the Government, the Legislation, the treaty making power, the
    Executive, having determined the high political question
    involved, the Supreme Court conforms to that decision. It,
    therefore, moves in a groove, and is not Supreme over all. Yet
    it has decided, in the case of Cairter, that the Courts of the
    territory are not constitutional Courts, and the Judges not
    constitutional Judges; consequently its inferior Courts not
    inferior Courts of the United States.

    We must distinguish between Political, and Municipal or local
    laws; the former are abrogated _ipso facto_, by the charge of
    sovereignty, the later continue in force until repealed. For
    instance the whole body of the Spanish law was repealed in
    Louisiana, by an edict of Governor O’Reilly, and in Missouri,
    the Spanish code, continue to Paris and we, were abrogated by
    the Governor and Judges, under the first grade of Government,
    and the common law with the statutes of one of the States,
    substituted in their place. One of the earliest decisions of the
    Supreme Court, was that the United States had no code of
    municipal law, but must resort to the municipal law of the State
    in which it happened to sit.

    Let us suppose the whole of Mexico conquered by our arms, it may
    be divided, in the first instance, into four or five
    territories, which may be retained in that form of government at
    least as long as Florida, and be, afterwards, admitted as
    States, or be permitted to establish independent governments,
    bound to us by treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive. I
    hold it as a settled principle, that we cannot hold conquered
    countries like ancient or modern nations; and we cannot, without
    violating the spirit of our institutions, deny them the right of
    self-government, or at least, of representation. The conquests
    we may make, cannot fail to better the condition of the
    conquered, by affording them better political institutions than
    those they before possessed. Surely, nothing can be worse than
    the present military anarchy of Mexico. They would obtain
    security for their rights, and obtain new ones, which they never
    enjoyed before; they would have peace within their borders, and
    safety from without. We should repel with indignation, the terms
    of reproach heaped upon us by the “tory” paper of England, the
    “Times.” Our free governments carry blessings with them wherever
    they appear. Plunder and devastation, form no part of the
    American character, as is proved by the progress of our arms,
    marked by a degree of humanity unexampled in the annals of war
    and conquest. The affectation of concern for their religion,
    manifested by the Mexicans, is truly ridiculous in those who
    tolerate no religion but that of the State.

    The subject of slavery is one of local, that is, of State or
    territorial legislation, except as to the foreign slave trade,
    which belongs to Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce.
    In the territory Northwest of the Ohio, there could not be said
    to be any system of law, it being uninhabited, or at least, the
    population was so inconsiderable, that it was not taken into
    consideration in establishing the ordinance of 1787, before the
    adoption of the present Constitution. It is in the nature of a
    compact between the States, and is not a case in point. But in
    Louisiana, the institution of slavery was already there, and
    could not be destroyed without interfering with a subject of
    local regulation of those territories, together with other
    subjects of domestic concern. Congress reserved to itself only a
    right to repeal, resembling a veto, except that the laws enacted
    continued in force until repealed; but, in no instance did
    Congress take the initiative in this local legislation. We may
    often discover the best expositions of the power of the
    Government, or any branch of it, by strict enquiry into the
    history of its practical operation.

    Suppose the laws of Mexico _prohibit_ slavery, would the simple
    repeal of the laws _establish_ it? I do not see by what
    reasoning it would do so. Is it probable, I would almost say
    possible, that slavery will be introduced by positive enactment?
    This would not only be local legislation, and on that account
    objectionable, even if it were possible, _as Congress is at
    present constituted_. It is said to be carried there by the
    Constitution. How can this be, if the Constitution does not
    extend there? A part cannot be extended without extending the
    whole. Congress is forbidden by the Constitution to legislate on
    certain subjects. This is true, but it is a limitation on its
    own powers, the effects of which are felt by the territories, as
    well as the States, but is no argument to prove, that the
    Constitution extends to the former as well as to the latter. I
    cannot see by what reasoning the Constitution is extended to
    them, and yet, I can readily see many curious, inconvenient, and
    unjust consequences arising from this view of the subject. It is
    impossible to avoid such consequences, when we attempt to reason
    from false premises. We have started wrong in acquiring
    territory, when such acquisition was not contemplated by the
    Constitution; and that error is the cause of other errors. I see
    no way of surmounting these difficulties, but by mutual
    forbearance, reciprocal respect for each others feelings and
    interests.[11]

Footnote 11:

      The claim of the right to go to the acquired, or conquered
      territories with their slave property, is insisted on by the
      South. The attempted exclusion creates strong feelings, as it
      is regarded as offensive and unjust. If, according to my view
      of the subject, the conquered or acquired territory, is
      neither a part of any State, nor a part of the Union, the
      sovereignty is either in Congress, or in the inhabitants.
      According to European reasoning the sovereignty is in the
      Government; according to ours it is in the inhabitants;
      because with us, power travels upwards from the people, but
      according to the old reasoning, instead of ascending, it
      descends. But, if it be _assumed_, that the Constitution
      follows our flag, even if it be to the Typce(TN) Islands, then
      it would appear to me, that no citizen can be directly, or
      indirectly, excluded, on account of his carrying with him,
      persons _bound to service_, for that is a condition, or
      relation recognized by the Constitution. Such servants are
      recognized if not as _property_, for taxation, yet as
      _persons_ for representation. If the Constitution comes in
      conflict with the local laws, the latter must give way; this
      is the necessary consequence it is contended of extending the
      Constitution to the territories. Laying aside all this fine
      spun reasoning, there is a common sense ground of justice and
      equal right, in the claim to equal participation in the
      property acquired by common means, and even the appearance of
      the denial, must be offensive. The party thus denied, might
      exclaim “if it be arsenic, I will have my share.”

      The necessity of some legislation for the new territories, is
      evident, even if the first, or second grade of government, be
      not given to them. They are but _fragments_ of other
      governments, depending on their superior, and their
      organization incomplete, when cut off from that superior. The
      jurisdiction of their courts was limited, or subject to
      appeal; their political, and military offices, acted under the
      order of their chief. The President of the United States as
      commander in chief, would command the military; but the United
      States judiciary could not entertain appeals, without
      authority of Congress; and neither could the President
      exercise civil control, without the same authority. The
      organic law, provides for the trial by jury, for the security
      of person, and conscience, not provided for in despotic
      countries. The laws regulating intercourse with the indians,
      the Post office, and many and on other subjects require to be
      specially extended. It is possible that by some indispensable
      legislation of this kind, the new acquisition, may get along
      for a while, by supplying the deficiency out of that original
      stock of power, which men possess in a state of nature, when
      compelled to do so by necessity. The attempt was made in
      Florida during a short interval, and it gave rise to much
      animadversion. I admit, that it may be in some manner
      obviated, by special legislation on the part of Congress, if
      _from any cause_, it should be deemed inexpedient to establish
      territorial governments, even of the first grade. In Louisiana
      as in Florida, a Governor was appointed, clothed with the
      powers of the late Captain General, until Congress could act.

    Much has been said on the subject of the laws of Mexico
    abolishing slavery, and no little merit is ascribed to her for
    her course on this head. When her pretensions are examined, it
    will be seen, that she is entitled to no credit whatever.
    African slavery was not introduced into that country, because
    the native indians, who had been reduced to a real bondage,
    already formed a cheaper slavery, than the African. In the time
    of the conquerors, _villages_ and _districts_ were granted to
    them, the soil being only of secondary consideration. Their
    inhabitants were condemned to the severest labor, and were, in
    fact, slaves. The Spanish monarchs struggled with the wealthy
    proprietors to alleviate the condition of the unfortunate
    indians, and with success, so far as to rescue them from their
    original servitude; but, they are, at this day, little better
    off. Under the system of peonage, and the authority exercised by
    the alcaldes, their freedom is but nominal. This kind of slavery
    _is not abolished_; and as to abolishing negro slavery, it
    scarcely existed there. According to Mr. Ward, a few negroes
    were introduced about thirty years ago, but on finding the
    Indian labor much cheaper, they were suffered to go where they
    pleased. The only slavery in Mexico, except peonage, was in
    Texas.[12] This system is founded on a law of the _Siete
    Partidas_, which exempts females, ecclesiastics, military
    persons, scholars, and _gentlemen_, (hidalgos) from
    imprisonment, or liability of person, for debt! The poor Indian
    is, therefore, the only subject for the law to operate on. This
    kind of slavery commands the labor of the adult laborer, without
    the burthen of the aged and helpless, as is the case of negro
    slavery, which is not only a _relation_, but a _community_,
    where the able-bodied provide for the helpless. This pretention
    to merit on account of the abolition of slavery, is only an
    after thought arising out of the hostility to Texas. It was a
    subject of State legislation as with us, until the Mexicans
    found that they could make capital out of it with our
    abolitionists, and their English coadjutors. I detest hypocrisy,
    and never was there any thing of this kind more palpable, than
    the affectation of hostility to slavery by _Mexican
    philanthropists_! In enumerating the causes of difference
    between Mexico and Texas, I passed this topic in silence,
    because I know it to be hollow and insincere, when put forth by
    a country where human rights are held so cheap.


Footnote 12:

  It is not long, since a list of the peons who had escaped from the
  other side of the Rio Grande was published, and bitter complaints made
  by their masters to the Mexican Government, which was petitioned for
  redress! It is said that some proprietors own thousands, and they are
  a part of their estates. It is probable that neither slavery nor
  peonage can continue on the borders of the Rio Grande. During our
  military operations a large number of persons were freed by earning
  the means of paying the debts for which they were bound.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                               APPENDIX.


                         [_From the Republic._]

    MESSRS. EDITORS: Some time last Spring, I published in the
    “Commercial Journal,” of Pittsburgh, some views on the subject
    of the California gold region, which have been confirmed by
    observations on the spot, published in the “_Alta California_,”
    and by accounts still more recent from that country.

    In order to understand the views referred to, it is necessary,
    in the first place, to give a sketch of the geological features
    of the country. A valley of six hundred miles in length, and
    from fifty to a hundred in width, is formed by the Sierra
    Nevada, or Snowy range on the east, and by the coast range on
    the west. This valley is watered by two rivers, the Sacramento
    and the San Joachim; one rising due north, the other due south,
    and running towards each other; after uniting their waters they
    enter the bay of San Francisco, which partly bounds the western
    side of the valley. These rivers may be said to wash the base of
    the Sierra Nevada, their waters being supplied, almost
    exclusively, by streams which take their rise in that range of
    mountains. In this manner they form a continued line although
    coming from opposite directions, receiving the drainings and
    detritus brought down by the innumerable torrents which cut the
    sides of the Sierra. The alluvial and diluvial deposites are,
    therefore, almost exclusively on the eastern side; and this
    accounts, also, for the overflow of the river on that side. On
    looking at the map of Colonel Fremont, I was struck with the
    extraordinary number of these ravines. They look like so many
    streaks on the map, or, rather, lines drawn by artificial
    agency; but that agency is the sudden melting of the snows, and
    heavy rains of that climate. One cause of this great quantity of
    water discharged by the short mountain torrents, is the want of
    sufficient elevation of the mountain, in that latitude, to
    retain the snows until they can melt gradually, as is the case
    of the Andes of Peru and Chili; and yet sufficiently elevated to
    receive a great depth of snow. This, when melted by the rains,
    rushes down with great force, carrying detritus along with it,
    and cutting through all the incumbent strata, until it reaches
    the level of the rivers, although still above the trap, or
    granite, which forms the nucleus of the mountain.

    As this detritus is carried down, it becomes more and more
    disintegrated, until its further progress is arrested by the
    course of the rivers before mentioned, and is at last deposited
    in fine sand and gravel. The metallic threads are found,
    probably, not less than one-third of the way up the mountain;
    and if a shaft were sunk at the base of the mountain, it would
    have to go a depth before reaching the vein, corresponding with
    its present elevation above the original level. The metal,
    therefore, will only be found in these alluvial deposites, not
    beyond twenty or thirty feet in depth, formed in the course of
    time by the descending torrents. The nearer the river, and the
    farther from the seam, the finer will be the particles of gold;
    and the higher up the coarser, and less separated from the
    quartz in which it is detained. The most expensive part of
    mining, reducing the quartz to sand by stamping, the amalgation
    with quicksilver, and the separation of these by distillation,
    is thus saved, and the gold obtained with comparatively little
    expense. The stamping, or breaking up of the quartz, is
    performed by the natural agency of the water, and by the rocks
    falling upon each other in the course of their descent. Until
    these deposites shall be partially exhausted, although a much
    more precarious pursuit than regular mining, the latter will not
    be generally resorted to. There is no doubt, also, that others,
    with more perfect machines for washing and amalgamation, will
    follow those pioneers, and wash the same earth and sand over
    again, to as great profit as at the first operation. When I
    examined the lead mines of Missouri, I found that those who came
    after the regular smelters, took their scoria and leavings, and
    extracted, by means of the ash furnace, about twenty-five per
    cent., in addition to the fifty already obtained, but without
    the expense and uncertainty of mining, which rendered it a sort
    of gambling pursuit.

    Having giving this brief description, I will now proceed to what
    may be called theory—that is, _facts derived from induction_.
    Let us suppose a series of horizontal strata, one above another,
    but of unequal depth, incumbent on the original unstratified
    mass, which forms the nucleus of the globe. According to
    geologists, this was the natural position. Now, in consequence
    of some powerful volcanic agency, the lower mass is thrown up
    from below, and becomes the nucleus of a mountain, and that
    which was before the lowest, now appears at the top, while the
    various strata which lay flat upon it are tilted up on its
    sides. These being cut through, in the manner described, there
    is exposed to view in these cuts, the various strata and their
    contents, in the same manner as if a shaft had been sunk through
    them in their horizontal position. If there be any metallic
    seams to the right or left of these cuts, they will be seen like
    threads, and running lengthwise with the range of mountains. The
    metals contained in the now vacant spaces of these ravines, have
    been carried away and deposited below. The masses, thus broken
    and separated, have been still further reduced in the manner
    before stated, greatly diminishing the labor of mining. The
    deposits of detritus intermixed with gold may be the work of
    thousands of years; but the quantity may be estimated by the
    number and width of the natural cuttings through the gold seams
    now disconnected. It is certain that the amount of gold at the
    bottom cannot exceed the amount carried down from these original
    deposites. Without assuming that the amount of gold deposited in
    the Sierra Nevada is actually greater than in the same range
    further south, its peculiar geological and geographical
    character, may be a reason why gold may be _found_ in California
    in greater abundance than in any other part of the world. It is
    found along this whole range from Sonora to Chili, although in
    greater or less abundance; and there is no doubt that a variety
    of other metals will be met with, perhaps as valuable, when the
    passion for gold washing shall have somewhat abated. It is
    remarkable that gold has been found almost invariably on the
    western or Pacific side of the great range, while silver,
    copper, and lead are discovered on the eastern side, and at a
    much greater elevation. It is probable that, instead of gold;
    silver and copper exist on the eastern side of the Sierra
    Nevada, towards the great Basin. What a field for the
    mineralogist!

    But, by what process, or operation of nature, came these seams,
    or veins of gold or other metals, to be thus deposited? Was it
    by the agency of fire, or by water and alluvion? I think it
    probable that both may have been at work, being the two greatest
    solvents in nature, and, at the same time, the greatest
    chrystalizers. Perhaps metallic _ores_ may be the work of
    alluvion, and the production of pure _metallic_ substances—that
    of heat. With respect to gold, I think the latter theory is the
    more reasonable, as it is always found in a pure state, while
    the quartz (or pure silex) in which it is contained may be
    alluvial, and one pf the earliest deposites from the
    decomposition of the ancient unstratified mass. But where shall
    we seek for the original supply of the precious metal? How is it
    formed, or whence has it been extracted by the agency of heat?
    It is not enough to say that, like other metals, it is found
    diffused throughout all nature, for an appreciable quantity of
    gold has been extracted from violets. In my opinion, it exists
    on the original unstratified mass, in imperceptible proportions;
    but those proportions varying a different places, other metals
    being more or less abundant. The greater proportion of our
    soils, according to Sir Humphrey Davy, is formed by the
    decomposition of the original granite; and this accounts for
    diffusion of gold in minute particles, which may be taken up by
    plants, and enter into the composition of organized bodies. If
    then, the unstratified rock is the original seat of the metal,
    but in particles infinitely minute, it may have been separated
    by a very high degree of heat, by which it would be sublimated
    or volatilized, and thus carried upwards by chemicoelectric
    force, by a process resembling distillation. In this way, it
    would penetrate the quartz rock, or be condensed in the spaces
    of the laminated strata, such as the talc, schist, or mica
    slate. Such is the theory of Trimmer, Buchland, and other modern
    mineralogists. Lyall says—“granite, syenite, and those
    porphyries, which have a granite form structure, in short all
    plutonic rocks (rocks having undergone the action of heat) are
    frequently observed to contain metals, at or near their junction
    with stratified formations. On the other hand, the veins which
    traverse stratified rocks are, as a genera] law, more
    metalliferous near such junctions, than in other portions. Hence
    it has been inferred that these metals may have been spread in a
    _gaseous form_, through the fused mass, and that the contact of
    another rock, of a different state of temperature or sometimes
    the existence of rents in other rocks in the vicinity, may have
    caused the sublimation of the metals.”

    One thing is certain, as may be at once seen by those who have
    examined the larger masses of gold brought from California, that
    the finer particles of gold have been run together, by a second
    operation of heat, sufficient only to fuse them and separate
    them from the quartz. The first was distillation, the second
    smelting, or rather simple fusion. It is possible that these
    great operations of nature have been repeated at different
    intervals, and different seams of quartz and gold, may be found
    in ascending the ravines; the lower, more completely scattered
    (but in finer particles) through the quartz, and the higher
    having afterwards undergone simple fusion.

    I think it premature to offer any conjecture as to the amount of
    gold which may be expected from California; but I cannot but
    think that it will be sufficient to produce a perceptible effect
    on its commercial value. According to Mr. PRESCOTT, the sudden
    influx of gold from Mexico and Peru reduced its value, as
    compared to commodities, about two-thirds in the course of
    twenty years. A new stimulus has been given to the pursuit of
    gold mining throughout the world, in consequence of the
    discoveries of our enterprising countrymen in California. The
    extraordinary increase of gold in the Bank of England may be an
    indication that its value is decreasing as compared to silver,
    and therefore less desirable for hoarding. It it certain that it
    is a less perfect standard of value than silver, the latter
    being also a scarce metal, compared to other metals, but a
    better representative than gold, of the labor and capital
    expended in its production, while gold has been repeatedly
    thrown into circulation in sudden and unlooked-for quantities, I
    would instance the amount of gold found in Calcutta on its
    capture by Clive—an amount, although imperfectly known, admitted
    to have been immense. We may expect that the gold mines of
    Siberia, of Brazil, of Mexico and Southern America, of the
    eastern and even western parts of Europe, Hungary, Transylvania,
    Silesia, of Spain, and even of Norway and Sweden, as well as of
    the Appalachian, in our southern States, will awaken new efforts
    of combined skill, labor, and capital.

                                        H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.


------------------------------------------------------------------------


         THE EARLY DISCOVERIES OF THE SPANIARDS IN NEW MEXICO.

    MESSRS. EDITORS: One of the most difficult things I ever
    undertook has been to trace the different journeys of discovery
    of the Spaniards, in the country to which they gave the name of
    New Mexico; and it would have been impossible to have
    accomplished this undertaking, but for the assistance of that
    extraordinary and invaluable collection of maps and books on the
    subject of America, made with great expense and labor, by Mr.
    Force, of Washington. Of these difficulties no one can form a
    just idea who has not made the attempt. It may be proper to
    state, that the whole country, from the mountains east of the
    Rio Grande to the Pacific—from about 32° south to 37° north—in
    consequence of these discoveries, and on account of its great
    cities, and its numerous and civilized population, was called
    New Mexico in reference to old Mexico, as New Spain was named in
    reference to Old Spain. My principal source of information is
    the work of Gomara, and Hackluyt’s collection of voyages; but I
    was obliged to consult many other works.

    In some of the oldest maps, the Colorado of California is called
    the _Rio Grande del Norte_, and is represented as taking its
    rise in a great lake to the north east; while the _Rio Grande of
    the Gulf_, or, as it was called, the North Sea, does not appear.
    It will be readily seen that this was sufficient to account for
    much of the confusion and mistakes of the early writers, and of
    the fruitless attempts to trace the early journeys of discovery.

    The first journey was that of Marco de Nicia, a friar,
    accompanied by a small party. He set out from Pitatlan, on the
    Gulf of California, in latitude 24°, in the year 1539, about
    twelve years after the conquest. I shall not enter into details.
    After some days’ travel to the north, through populous
    countries, he came to Vacupa, where he first heard of populous
    countries to the north, of the province of Cibola, and of the
    seven great cities. After reaching, as he supposed, latitude
    26°, he found Indians who had no knowledge of christians. He was
    then about fifty leagues from the Gulf of California. He was
    informed by these indians of a great plain, about thirty days’
    further travel to the north, inhabited by people living in large
    towns, built of stone and lime, who wore cotton garments, and
    possessing abundance of gold and turquoises, sometimes called
    _emeralds_, from the affinity to that precious stone.

    Advancing still further, he sent a negro and some indians to see
    and report to him on their return, while he followed them
    slowly. Some of these indians returned, and informed him that
    they had reached Cibola, but had been badly treated, and the
    negro killed. Nicia, on his return, wrote his account which is,
    in many respects, exaggerated and fabulous; it gave rise,
    however, to an expedition under Vasques de Coronado, in 1540.
    Coronado was greatly disappointed, and freely gives the lie to
    the accounts of Nicia. He went as far as the cities of Cibola,
    which he described as consisting of five small towns, of five
    hundred houses each, well-built of stone, He heard of populous
    provinces to the north, and of cities on a great salt lake, to
    the northwest, where there was an abundance of gold. The lake
    was probably the Pacific Ocean. It is remarkable that nearly all
    the tribes on the Atlantic slope had a vague notion of the
    Pacific, and supposed it to be at a short distance from them. He
    returned with the intention of making another expedition, but
    which he never accomplished. The towns which he saw, were, no
    doubt, near the Gila, and south of that river, while the great
    province of Cibola lay to the north between that river and the
    Colorado. The unfavorable report of Coronado, and the failure of
    Cortez in his northern explorations, had the effect, no doubt,
    of discouraging further discoveries in this direction.

    No further attempts were made to explore the country for nearly
    forty years. In the mean time, the Spanish settlements had
    advanced from Guadelahara to New Biscay, and the valley of St.
    Bartholomew, or Chiwawa. In the year 1583, a well prepared
    exploring expedition was set on foot, under the command of
    Antonio de Espejo. It proceeded north to the Conchas and
    Pasaguetas, numerous tribes, who had no previous knowledge of
    the christians. Their course was along the Conchas.

    They followed the river to the Tobosos and Jumanos, where they
    found large towns, with flat roofs, built of stone and lime, and
    regularly laid out in streets. They now reached the _Rio Grande
    of the Gulf of Mexico_—here is a point of departure about which
    there can be no mistake. They proceeded about twelve days up the
    river, and came to another great nation. The inhabitants wore
    mantles of cotton with blue stripes, of handsome fabric. I have
    no doubt this was the present _Paso del Norte_. After leaving
    this, they travelled fifteen days up the river, through a
    country not admitting of population, and this is its present
    character, until they came to what may be called the valley of
    Santa Fe. They found towns with houses four and five stories
    high, warmed by stoves, and ladders to ascend from one story to
    the other. They proceeded thence to Tiguasi, where they found
    sixteen towns. Here they learned that the eastern part of Cibola
    bordered on this province, the western border of which had been
    visited by Coronado. They speak of eleven other towns containing
    forty thousand inhabitants. Whether they meant families
    (vicinos) or _souls_, I am unable to say. They proceeded up the
    Rio Grande to Cia, or Zia, the largest town they had seen,
    containing twenty thousand inhabitants and eight market-houses.
    The houses were plastered and handsomely painted, and the people
    civilized. At this place, hearing of a great province to the
    northwest, they took that direction. They heard of seven large
    towns, but did not go to see them. Fifteen leagues further,
    still going west, they came to a great town called Acoma,
    situated on a high rock, accessible only by a way cut in the
    rock. The inhabitants were supplied with water by cisterns.
    Twenty-four leagues further, they came to the province of Zuni,
    called by the Spaniards Cibola, where the inhabitants had
    information of the visit of Coronado. They were informed that,
    at the distance of eighty leagues, there was a great lake, many
    large towns, and plenty of gold—probably California. The main
    party now returned towards the Rio Grande, while Espejo and nine
    companions went further west. After travelling twenty-eight
    leagues, they found a great province, containing fifty thousand
    inhabitants, called Zaguato. They heard much of the cities of
    the Great Salt Lake, the Pacific and their wealth, gold, &c.
    Espejo made an excursion of forty five leagues to the northwest,
    where it was said there were silver mines, and which he found
    very rich. This was near two rivers of _reasonable_ size,
    probably the Colorado and the Jaguisita. I am satisfied that the
    country thus explored lay between the Gila and the Colorado.

    On the return of Espejo, the main party determined to return to
    New Biscay, or Chiwawa, but he resolved to ascend higher up the
    river. The only mention of degrees of latitude is on one
    occasion, when they speak of having reached the 37th degree; but
    this was probably mere guess-work.

    Espejo now ascended the river sixty leagues to Quires; thence,
    going east, he came to Hubites, containing twenty-five thousand
    inhabitants, and he heard of the Tamas, containing forty
    thousand. Whether these were towns or provinces is not stated.
    All the places visited had gold, and turquoises, and
    manufactured fine cotton cloths. The myriads of buffalo, or
    crooked backed oxen, which covered the whole face of the country
    were mistaken for domestic herds; no country on the globe was
    ever so abundantly supplied with the means of subsistence
    through this animal, as were the aborigines of the interior of
    North America. So that particular districts might be most
    thickly populated, while vast unoccupied regions lay around
    them, swarming with the buffalo, or rather the bison, which is
    the true name of that animal. Their skins were elegantly dressed
    by them; and, for the finer kinds, the mountain sheep, or goat,
    or chamois, as the Spaniards called it, furnished an abundant
    supply. Espejo resolved to return by a different course, and was
    conducted by the Indians down the _Rio de las Vacas_, which he
    followed 120 leagues, meeting with no inhabitants, but vast
    numbers of _cattle_. But without seeing any habitations, the
    herdsmen appearing to live among their herds. The use of
    fire-arms has no doubt rendered them more shy, and at one time
    they literally blackened the face of the western prairies. Their
    range was limited both to the south and north. He then struck
    across to the Rio Grande, and came to the Conchas, by which he
    returned to New Biscay. The Rio de las Vacas is evidently the
    Rio Puerco, or Pecos. Here closes the expedition. Having the
    point of departure fixed, and at the same time the point of
    termination equally ascertained, I think the whole mystery of
    these expeditions has been cleared up.

    The question will naturally present itself, what has become of
    the millions of civilized people who occupied New Mexico? I will
    ask, what has become of the millions of Yucatan, of Chiapas, and
    of Old Mexico? The reduction to slavery, their wars, and other
    causes, are not sufficient to account for the disappearance of
    the great nations of the west, or of the Atlantic slope. In
    looking for a cause, I have found one fully adequate, in that
    horrid plague and scourge, the small-pox. Let any one read the
    accounts of McKenzie, Carver, and Catlin, and I think he will
    seek no further for it. To the indian it is peculiarly fatal,
    not only from his want of skill in treating it, but from his
    physical organization; his skin is so remarkably thick that the
    pustules cannot break through it, and the disease is almost
    always fatal. When among the Arikaras, I was informed by them
    that they were but the remnant of seventeen towns lower down the
    river, and I traced their former abode for seven miles. The
    Arikaras and Mandans have since disappeared from the earth.
    After the greater part had been carried off by the small-pox,
    the survivors abandoned these towns and fled, covering their
    trails as they went, as if pursued by an enemy; but that mortal
    foe still followed them to annihilation. I have not been able to
    find any account of the nations of New Mexico from the year 1583
    until 1698; and it is perhaps during that interval, that the
    rapid destruction of the American tribes and nations took place,
    while there was no one to record the desolation of the provinces
    of Cibola, or the country of the Buffaloe, which is the meaning
    of the word. The ruins, of cities on the Gila, and between it
    and the Colorado, remain to prove the fact that they once
    existed. Yet, there are some remnants of their former
    civilization in the Nabahoes, and the Pumas one on the Gila, the
    other on the heads of the Colorado, who still live in well-built
    houses, and manufacture their beautiful blankets. The suggestion
    I have made might be extended to the old world, and its ruined
    cities of Asia and Africa.

    The only recent account of the country between the Gila and the
    Colorado which I have been able to meet with, is in Pattie’s
    Narrative, a hunter of Kentucky, who trapped on the Gila and
    Colorado twenty-five years ago, whose journal is done into
    readable English by the geographer, Flint. Pattie saw many of
    these ruins; saw much fine land heavily timbered; and by the
    friendship of the Nabahoes, was directed through a pass at the
    head of the Colorado which carried him to the Platt of the
    Missouri. This is, possibly, the pass sought for by Colonel
    Fremont. Pattie went through it in May; if it was bad then, what
    must it have been in the depth of winter! I am of opinion, that
    between 32° and 37° there is sufficient land to make two States,
    without going east of the Rio Grande del Norte. Yet, it was but
    partially seen by Pattie. It appears to be a mountainous
    country, well watered, and no doubt abounding in minerals, and
    having many rich valleys adapted to cultivation. The Colorado is
    a fine river, navigable eight hundred or a thousand miles with
    steamboats, unless there be obstructions that we do not know of.
    In extent, it is equal to Pennsylvania or Virginia. It will not
    be long before it will be thoroughly explored by our countrymen.
    Pattie says that it contains numerous bands of the most savage
    and ferocious Indians, armed with bows and arrows pointed with
    flint, who have had no intercourse or knowledge of the whites.
    He says that the country in some respects reminded him of parts
    of Kentucky, his native State.

                                            H. M. BRACKENRIDGE.


------------------------------------------------------------------------




                DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIANS BY SMALL-POX.

    I could bring together numerous separate accounts of the fatal
    ravages of this disease among the Indians in different portions
    of the continent. Bernal Dias, _incidentally_ mentions, that it
    carried off a _million_ shortly after the conquest, but how many
    more we are not told. The disease, no doubt, appeared at
    different intervals. A sermon by a New England divine, (in the
    collection of Mr. Force) of 1621, mentions that not more than
    one in twenty of the natives then remained, the rest having been
    carried off by the small-pox. In a Jesuit account which I found
    in the same collection, it appears that it broke out among the
    Indians in Chiwawa in 1617, and carried off whole tribes of
    Indians. There was no escape from it, for as long as two
    remained together the contagion might be there; it was,
    therefore, more fatal than an atmospheric epidemic, which might
    be checked by change of place or season. The Indian fled from
    his village or town, and never returned to it; he never dared to
    approach it afterwards, believing it to be haunted by evil
    spirits. In many places, this superstitious dread prevails to
    this day.

    McKenzie gives the following account of the destruction of the
    Knistenew and Chippowyen tribes in 1780: “This was the small pox
    which spread its destructive and desolating power, as the fire
    consumes the dry grass of the field. The fatal infection spread
    round with a baneful rapidity which no flight could escape, and
    with a fatal effect that nothing could resist. It destroyed with
    its pestilential breath whole families and tribes; and the
    horrid scene presented to those who had the melancholy and
    afflicting opportunity of beholding it, a combination of the
    dead, the dying, and such, as to avoid the horrid fate their
    friends around them, prepared to disappoint the plague of its
    prey, by terminating their own existence.

    “The habits and lives of those devoted people, which provided
    not to-day for the wants of to-morrow, must have heightened the
    pains of such an affliction, by leaving them not only without
    remedy; but even without alleviation. Nought was left to those
    but to submit in agony and despair.”

    “To aggravate the picture, if aggravation were possible, may be
    added, the putrid carcasses which the wolves, with a furious
    voracity, dragged from the huts, or which were mangled within
    them by the dogs, whose hunger was satisfied with the disfigured
    remains of their masters. Nor was it uncommon for the father of
    a family whom the infection had not reached, to call them around
    him, to represent the cruel sufferings and horrid fate of their
    relations, from the influence of some evil spirit who was
    preparing to exterpate their race, and to invite them to baffle
    death with all its horrors, by their own poignards. At the same
    time, if their hearts failed them in this necessary act, he was
    himself ready to perform the deed of mercy with his own hand, as
    the last act of his affection; and instantly follow them to the
    common place of rest and repose from human evil.

    “It was never satisfactorily ascertained by what means this
    malignant disorder was introduced, but it was generally supposed
    to be from Missouri by a war party.”


------------------------------------------------------------------------




    ● Transcriber’s Notes:
       ○ This might be the Spice Islands.
       ○ Missing or obscured punctuation was silently corrected.
       ○ Typographical errors were silently corrected.
       ○ Inconsistent spelling and hyphenation were made consistent
         only when a predominant form was found in this book.
       ○ Text that:
         was in italics is enclosed by underscores (_italics_).