[Illustration]




The Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus




LONG’S TRANSLATION

EDITED BY EDWIN GINN




Contents

 PREFACE
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
 THE THOUGHTS
 PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS
 GENERAL INDEX




[TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE: All the footnotes have been moved to the end of
the text. I have also relabeled the book headings; [I., II., … XI.] has
been changed to [BOOK I., BOOK II., … BOOK XI.] at the start of each
Section. I have also added a “1.” before the first “thought” in each
BOOK.]




PREFACE.


Perhaps some may question the wisdom of putting out the Thoughts of
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to be used as a Reader by children in the
schools. It may appear to them better suited to the mature mind. The
principle, however, that has governed us in selecting reading for the
young has been to secure the best that we could find in all ages for
grown-up people. The milk and water diet provided for “my dear
children” is not especially complimentary to them. They like to be
treated like little men and women, capable of appreciating a good
thing. One finds in this royal philosopher a rare generosity, sweetness
and humility, qualities alike suited to all ages.

Adopting the philosopher’s robe at twelve, he remains a student all his
life. The precepts that he would give for the government of others, he
has practised upon himself. In his time, as in ours, there were good
physicians for the mind and body, who could make wise prescriptions for
the government of their neighbors, but were unable to apply them to
themselves. The faults of our fellows are so numerous and so easy to
cure that one is readily tempted to become the physician, while our own
faults are so few and so unimportant that it is hardly worth while to
give any attention to them. Hence we have a multitude of physicians for
humanity in general, and a scarcity of individual healers.

It was the doctrine of Marcus Aurelius that most of the ills of life
come to us from our own imagination, that it was not in the power of
others seriously to interfere with the calm, temperate life of an
individual, and that when a fellow being did anything to us that seemed
unjust he was acting in ignorance, and that instead of stirring up
anger within us it should stir our pity for him. Oftentimes by careful
self-examination we should find that the fault was more our own than
that of our fellow, and our sufferings were rather from our own
opinions than from anything real. The circle of man’s knowledge is very
limited, and the largest circles do not wholly include the smallest.
They are intersecting and the segment common to any two is very small.
Whatever lies outside this space does not exist for both. Hence arise
innumerable contests. The man having the largest intelligence ought to
be very generous to the other. Being thankful that he has been blessed
in so many ways, he should do all in his power to enlighten his less
favored fellow, rather than be angry with him on account of his
misfortune. Is he not sufficiently punished in being denied the light?

Assisting his uncle in the government of the great Roman Empire at
seventeen, it was his aim constantly to restrain the power of the
strong and to assist the weak. He studied the laws of his country, not
for wisdom alone, but that he might make them more beneficial to his
people. All his life he tried to bring his fellows to a higher level,
and to think charitably of each other. Occupying himself a palace he
lived simply, like other men. It was his greatest delight to retire to
his country home and there, dwelling among his books, to meditate upon
the great problems of life. He claimed that a man’s life should be
valued according to the value of the things to which he gave his
attention. If his whole thought was given to clothing, feeding and
housing himself comfortably, he should be valued like other well-housed
and well-fed animals. He would, however, derive the greatest pleasure
and benefit in this life by acting in accordance with reason, which
demands of every human being that his highest faculties should govern
all the rest, and that each should see to it that he treated his fellow
kindly and generously and that if he could not assist him to a higher
level he should at least not stand in his way. When he speaks of the
shortness of time and the value of fame, riches and power, for which
men strive in this world, he speaks not from the standpoint of one who
would wish to obtain these things, but as a Roman emperor enjoying the
highest honors that man might expect to attain in this world. He
certainly was in a position to speak intelligently concerning these
matters, and his opinions ought to have weight with the coming
generations. Children may not prefer to read such thoughts; perhaps the
majority of children do not prefer the Bible to other books. Still, we
all think it is well for them to be obliged to read it. Perhaps
requiring the use of such literature in the schools might be as
valuable as the adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing of
interminable numbers, the memorizing of all the capes, bays and rivers
in the world, and the dates of all the battles that have occurred since
the creation of man. We should strive to stimulate the thinking powers
of children, leading them to form wise judgments concerning the
important things of life, without catering too much to their own wishes
at an age when they cannot form an intelligent opinion of what is best
for themselves.

At our first reading of the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, we
marked many sentences that appeared to us specially good; in the
second, twice as many more. Where all is good it is hard to emphasize,
but we will cite just one of his reflections, as illustrating the trend
of his mind: “I have often wondered,” he says, “how it is that every
man loves himself more than all the rest of men, and yet sets less
value on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others.”

We have given Long’s translation of the Thoughts complete, as published
by Messrs. Little, Brown & Co., but we have omitted some unimportant
portions of the biography and philosophy in the interest of space and
economy. We have also given the philosophy in a supplement, thinking it
better that it should come after the Thoughts themselves. We shall
issue a pocket edition on very thin paper for the convenience of such
as wish to make a special study of the work. We also propose to issue a
similar edition of the writings of Epictetus.

EDWIN GINN.


January 20, 1893.




BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.


M. Antoninus, the son of Annius Verus and Domitia Calvilla, was born at
Rome, A.D. 121. The Emperor T. Antoninus Pius married Faustina, the
sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently the uncle of M. Antoninus.
When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and declared him his successor in
the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus and M.
Antoninus, generally called M. Aurelius Antoninus.

The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (I. 17)
that he had good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good
teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything
good. He had the happy fortune to witness the example of his uncle and
adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (I.
16; VI. 30) the virtues of this excellent man and prudent ruler. Like
many young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric.
There are letters extant showing the great affection of the pupil for
the master, and the master’s great hopes of his industrious pupil.

When he was eleven years old he assumed the dress of philosophers,
something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most
laborious, abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. He
abandoned poetry and rhetoric for philosophy, and attached himself to
the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, which
was a useful preparation for the high place which he was designed to
fill. We must suppose that he learned the Roman discipline of arms,
which was a necessary part of the education of a man who afterwards led
his troops to battle against a warlike race.

Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers, and
the obligations which he owed to each of them. The way in which he
speaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or
self- praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has
expressed himself; but if anyone draws this conclusion, he will be
mistaken. Antoninus means to commemorate the merits of his several
teachers, what they taught, and what a pupil might learn from them.
Besides, this book, like the eleven other books, was for his own use;
and if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was
written during one of M. Antoninus’ campaigns against the Quadi, at a
time when the commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers
might remind him of their lessons and the practical uses which he might
derive from them.

Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson
of Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by himself
(I. 9). His favorite teacher was Rusticus (I. 7), a philosopher, and
also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the
adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are
destined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about
them, their companions and teachers; and I do not know any example of a
young prince having had an education which can be compared with that of
M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their
acquirements and their character will hardly be collected again; and as
to the pupil, we have not had one like him since.

Hadrian died in July, A.D. 138, and was succeeded by Antoninus Pius. M.
Antoninus married Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably
about A.D. 146, for he had a daughter born in A.D. 147. He received
from his adoptive father the title of Caesar, and was associated with
him in the administration of the state. The father and the adopted son
lived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a
dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him.

Antoninus Pius died A.D. 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M.
Antoninus to take the sole administration of the empire, but he
associated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius
Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first
time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure, and
unworthy of his station. Antoninus however bore with him, and it is
said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect
due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived
together in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus
giving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla.

The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which
Verus was sent to command; but he did nothing, and the success that was
obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was
due to his generals. This Parthian war ended in A.D. 165. Aurelius and
Verus had a triumph (A.D. 166) for the victories in the East. A
pestilence followed, which carried off great numbers in Rome and Italy,
and spread to the west of Europe.

The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the
Alps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic.
These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations
had attempted near three hundred years before; and the rest of the life
of Antoninus, with some intervals, was employed in driving back the
invaders. In A.D. 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered
the state alone.

During the German wars Antoninus resided for three years on the Danube
at Carnuntum. The Marcomanni were driven out of Pannonia and almost
destroyed in their retreat across the Danube; and in A.D. 174 the
emperor gained a great victory over the Quadi.

In A.D. 175, Avidius Cassius, a brave and skilful Roman commander who
was at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself
Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so
the rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his
treatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius; and his letter to
the Senate, in which he recommends mercy, is extant.

Antoninus set out for the East on hearing of Cassius’ revolt. Though he
appears to have returned to Rome in A.D. 174, he went back to prosecute
the war against the Germans, and it is probable that he marched direct
to the East from the German war. His wife Faustina, who accompanied him
into Asia, died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus, to the great grief
of her husband. Capitolinus, who has written the life of Antoninus, and
also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of scandalous infidelity to her
husband and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus says that Antoninus
either knew it not or pretended not to know it. Nothing is so common as
such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is
full of them. Antoninus loved his wife, and he says that she was
“obedient, affectionate, and simple.” The same scandal had been spread
about Faustina’s mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was
perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says after her death
in a letter to Fronto that he would rather have lived in exile with his
wife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who
would give their wives a better character than these two emperors.
Capitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to
tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biographer. Dion Cassius, the
most malignant of historians, always reports and perhaps he believed
any scandal against anybody.

Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return
to Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries.
It was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites
of the age, and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We
cannot conclude from this that he was a superstitious man, though we
might perhaps do so if his book did not show that he was not. But this
is only one among many instances that a ruler’s public acts do not
always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly
oppose even the superstitions of his people; and though he may wish
that they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by
offending their prejudices.

Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph, perhaps for
some German victories, A.D. 176. In the following year Commodus was
associated with his father in the empire, and took the name of
Augustus. This year A.D. 177 is memorable in ecclesiastical history.
Attalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their adherence to the
Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is a letter
preserved by Eusebius. It contains a very particular description of the
tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that
while the persecution was going on, Attalus, a Christian and a Roman
citizen, was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the
amphitheatre; but the governor ordered him to be reserved, with the
rest who were in prison, until he had received instructions from the
emperor. Many had been tortured before the governor thought of applying
to Antoninus. The imperial rescript, says the letter, was that the
Christians should be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they
must be released. On this the work began again. The Christians who were
Roman citizens were beheaded; the rest were exposed to the wild beasts
in the amphitheatre.

The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted
during the visit of Antoninus to the East, and on his return the
emperor again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people
were defeated in a great battle A.D. 179. During this campaign the
emperor was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the
camp, A.D. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus
was with him. The body, or the ashes probably, of the emperor were
carried to Rome, and he received the honor of deification. Those who
could afford it had his statue or bust; and when Capitolinus wrote,
many people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or
household deities. He was in a manner made a saint. Commodus erected to
the memory of his father the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza
Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line
round the shaft commemorate the victories of Antoninus over the
Marcomanni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which
refreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue
of Antoninus was placed on the capital of the column, but it was
removed at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put
in the place by Pope Sixtus the fifth.

In order to form a proper notion of the condition of the Christians
under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan’s time. When the younger
Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those
parts, and the worshippers of the old religion were falling off. The
temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no
purchasers of victims for sacrifice. Those who were interested in the
maintenance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in
danger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought before
the governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to
no other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be
Christians and persevered in their religion ought to be punished; if
for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes
proved against the Christians, and he could only characterize their
religion as a depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be
stopped if the people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny
wrote this in a letter to Trajan. He asked for the emperor’s
directions, because he did not know what to do. He remarks that he had
never been engaged in judicial inquiries about the Christians, and that
accordingly he did not know what to inquire about or how far to inquire
and punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to examine into a
man’s profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan’s
rescript is extant. He approved of the governor’s judgment in the
matter, but he said that no search must be made after the Christians;
if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not
be punished if he affirmed that he was not a Christian and confirmed
his denial by showing his reverence to the heathen gods. He added that
no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such things were
of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man; and both motives of
mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of
the Christians as he could, to let them live in quiet if it were
possible. Trajan’s rescript is the first legislative act of the head of
the Roman state with reference to Christianity, which is known to us.
It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed under his
reign.

In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possible for the Roman
government to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the
hostility of the common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces
were willing to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of
the heathen community, who looked on the Christians as atheists. The
Jews too, who were settled all over the Roman Empire, were as hostile
to the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian begin
the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling
towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to Minucius
Fundanus, the Proconsul of Asia, which stands at the end of Justin’s
first Apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be
troubled, and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from
them; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form, and
no attention must be paid to popular clamors; when Christians were
regularly prosecuted and convicted of illegal acts, they must be
punished according to their deserts; and false accusers also must be
punished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published rescripts to the
same effect. The terms of Hadrian’s rescript seem very favorable to the
Christians; but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only
to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no
meaning, for that could have been done without asking the emperor’s
advice. The real purpose of the rescript is that Christians must be
punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their
renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion.

In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new
belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen religion
urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions
of the Christian faith. Melito in his Apology to M. Antoninus
represents the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial
orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the
property of others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who
were doing no harm. He doubts if a just emperor could have ordered
anything so unjust; and if the last order was really not from the
emperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their
enemies. We conclude from this that there were at least imperial
rescripts or constitutions of M. Antoninus which were made the
foundation of these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now
a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their religion. Then
come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place in
A.D. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of
the provinces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in
Trajan’s rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the
fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if they
were unwilling. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all
the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained
that all the heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared
war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to observe
that this was a declaration of hostility against the Roman government,
which tolerated all the various forms of superstition that existed in
the empire, and could not consistently tolerate another religion, which
declared that all the rest were false and all the splendid ceremonies
of the empire only a worship of devils.

If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman
emperors attempted to check the new religion; how they enforced their
principle of finally punishing Christians, simply as Christians, which
Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that
he tells the truth; how far popular clamor and riots went in this
matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians—for there
were many such—contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side
and to imbitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new
religion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified,
and what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated; but the fact is
certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the heathen populations were
in open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus’ rule men
were put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius, in the
preface to his fifth book, remarks that in the seventeenth year of
Antoninus’ reign, in some parts of the world, the persecution of the
Christians became more violent, and that it proceeded from the populace
in the cities; and he adds, in his usual style of exaggeration, that we
may infer from what took place in a single nation that myriads of
martyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation which he alludes
to is Gallia; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the churches
of Vienna and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true
cause of the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that
both governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these
disturbances. How far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceedings
we do not know, for the historical records of his reign are very
defective. He did not make the rule against the Christians, for Trajan
did that; and if we admit that he would have been willing to let the
Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it
would be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited
authority which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was limited
by certain constitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the precedents
of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active
persecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain
that he had no good opinion of the Christians, as appears from his own
words. But he knew nothing of them except their hostility to the Roman
religion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the
state, notwithstanding the professions false or true of some of the
Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to
state all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and
subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I
admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether
clear from the charge of even allowing any persecutions; but as I seek
the truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever
blame is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not
derive any of his ethical principles from a religion of which he knew
nothing.

There is no doubt that the Emperor’s Reflections—or his Meditations, as
they are generally named—is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks
of himself, his family, and his teachers; and in other books he
mentions himself.

It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as
the occasions arose; and since they were intended for his own use, it
is no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him
written with his own hand; for it is not likely that so diligent a man
would use the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his
most secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the
book for his son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father’s
philosophy.

The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in
Simplicius’ Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was
not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a
time when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really
religious man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the
Deity which no Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to
Simplicius, a period of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy
formed the characters of some of the best and greatest men. A man’s
greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor
yet in his intellectual capacity, which is often associated with the
meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high
places, and arrogance to the poor and lowly; but a man’s true greatness
lies in the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a
just estimate of himself and everything else, on frequent
self-examination, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to
be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not,
about what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do
that which he thinks and says and does.




THE THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.




BOOK I.


1. From my grandfather Verus [I learned] good morals and the government
of my temper.

2. From the reputation and remembrance of my father, modesty and a
manly character.

3. From my mother, piety and beneficence, and abstinence, not only from
evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts; and further, simplicity in my
way of living, far removed from the habits of the rich.

4. From my great-grandfather, not to have frequented public schools,
and to have had good teachers at home, and to know that on such things
a man should spend liberally.

5. From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the blue party
at the games in the Circus, nor a partisan either of the Parmularius or
the Scutarius at the gladiators’ fights; from him too I learned
endurance of labor, and to want little, and to work with my own hands,
and not to meddle with other people’s affairs, and not to be ready to
listen to slander.

6. From Diognetus, not to busy myself about trifling things, and not to
give credit to what was said by miracle-workers and jugglers about
incantations and the driving away of daemons and such things; and not
to breed quails [for fighting], nor to give myself up passionately to
such things; and to endure freedom of speech; and to have become
intimate with philosophy; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,
then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dialogues in my
youth; and to have desired a plank bed and skin, and whatever else of
the kind belongs to the Grecian discipline.

7. From Rusticus I received the impression that my character required
improvement and discipline; and from him I learned not to be led astray
to sophistic emulation, nor to writing on speculative matters, nor to
delivering little hortatory orations, nor to showing myself off as a
man who practices much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to
make a display; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and fine
writing; and not to walk about in the house in my outdoor dress, nor to
do other things of the kind; and to write my letters with simplicity,
like the letter which Rusticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and
with respect to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong,
to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as they
have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read carefully, and not
to be satisfied with a superficial understanding of a book; nor hastily
to give my assent to those who talk overmuch; and I am indebted to him
for being acquainted with the discourses of Epictetus, which he
communicated to me out of his own collection.

8. From Apollonius I learned freedom of will and undeviating steadiness
of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not even for a moment, except
to reason; and to be always the same, in sharp pains, on the occasion
of the loss of a child, and in long illness; and to see clearly in a
living example that the same man can be both most resolute and
yielding, and not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had
before my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience and his
skill in expounding philosophical principles as the smallest of his
merits; and from him I learned how to receive from friends what are
esteemed favors, without being either humbled by them or letting them
pass unnoticed.

9. From Sextus, a benevolent disposition, and the example of a family
governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of living conformably to
nature; and gravity without affectation, and to look carefully after
the interests of friends, and to tolerate ignorant persons, and those
who form opinions without consideration: he had the power of readily
accommodating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was more
agreeable than any flattery; and at the same time he was most highly
venerated by those who associated with him: and he had the faculty both
of discovering and ordering, in an intelligent and methodical way, the
principles necessary for life; and he never showed anger or any other
passion, but was entirely free from passion, and also most
affectionate; and he could express approbation without noisy display,
and he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.

10. From Alexander the grammarian, to refrain from fault-finding, and
not in a reproachful way to chide those who uttered any barbarous or
solecistic or strange-sounding expression; but dexterously to introduce
the very expression which ought to have been used, and in the way of
answer or giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing
itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.

11. From Fronto I learned to observe what envy and duplicity and
hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally those among us who are
called Patricians are rather deficient in paternal affection.

12. From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without necessity
to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have no leisure; nor
continually to excuse the neglect of duties required by our relation to
those with whom we live, by alleging urgent occupations.

13. From Catulus, not to be indifferent when a friend finds fault, even
if he should find fault without reason, but to try to restore him to
his usual disposition; and to be ready to speak well of teachers, as it
is reported of Domitius and Athenodotus; and to love my children truly.

14. From my brother Severus, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to
love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius,
Cato, Dion, Brutus; and from him I received the idea of a polity in
which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard
to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly
government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed; I
learned from him also consistency and undeviating steadiness in my
regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do good, and to give to
others readily, and to cherish good hopes, and to believe that I am
loved by my friends; and in him I observed no concealment of his
opinions with respect to those whom he condemned, and that his friends
had no need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was
quite plain.

15. From Maximus I learned self-government, and not to be led aside by
anything; and cheerfulness in all circumstances, as well as in illness;
and a just admixture in the moral character of sweetness and dignity,
and to do what was set before me without complaining. I observed that
everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in all that he
did he never had any bad intention; and he never showed amazement and
surprise, and was never in a hurry, and never put off doing a thing,
nor was perplexed nor dejected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his
vexation, nor, on the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious.
He was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to forgive,
and was free from all falsehood; and he presented the appearance of a
man who could not be diverted from right, rather than of a man who had
been improved. I observed, too, that no man could ever think that he
was despised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better man.
He had also the art of being humorous in an agreeable way.

16. In my father I observed mildness of temper, and unchangeable
resolution in the things which he had determined after due
deliberation; and no vain-glory in those things which men call honors;
and a love of labor and perseverance; and a readiness to listen to
those who had anything to propose for the common weal; and undeviating
firmness in giving to every man according to his deserts; and a
knowledge derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action
and for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all passion for
boys; and he considered himself no more than any other citizen; and he
released his friends from all obligation to sup with him or to attend
him of necessity when he went abroad, and those who had failed to
accompany him, by reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him
the same. I observed, too, his habit of careful inquiry in all matters
of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never stopped his
investigation through being satisfied with appearances which first
present themselves; and that his disposition was to keep his friends,
and not to be soon tired of them, nor yet to be extravagant in his
affection; and to be satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful; and to
foresee things a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without
display; and to check immediately popular applause and all flattery;
and to be ever watchful over the things which were necessary for the
administration of the empire, and to be a good manager of the
expenditure, and patiently to endure the blame which he got for such
conduct; and he was neither superstitious with respect to the gods, nor
did he court men by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering
the populace; but he showed sobriety in all things and firmness, and
never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty. And the things
which conduce in any way to the commodity of life, and of which fortune
gives an abundant supply, he used without arrogance and without
excusing himself; so that when he had them, he enjoyed them without
affectation, and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one
could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a [home-bred]
flippant slave or a pedant; but every one acknowledged him to be a man
ripe, perfect, above flattery, able to manage his own and other men’s
affairs. Besides this, he honored those who were true philosophers, and
he did not reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet was
he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversation, and he made
himself agreeable without any offensive affectation. He took a
reasonable care of his body’s health, not as one who was greatly
attached to life, nor out of regard to personal appearance, nor yet in
a careless way, but so that through his own attention he very seldom
stood in need of the physician’s art or of medicine or external
applications. He was most ready to give without envy to those who
possessed any particular faculty, such as that of eloquence or
knowledge of the law or of morals, or of anything else; and he gave
them his help, that each might enjoy reputation according to his
deserts; and he always acted conformably to the institutions of his
country, without showing any affectation of doing so. Further, he was
not fond of change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same
places, and to employ himself about the same things; and after his
paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and vigorous to his
usual occupations. His secrets were not many, but very few and very
rare, and these only about public matters; and he showed prudence and
economy in the exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction
of public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such things,
for he was a man who looked to what ought to be done, not to the
reputation which is got by a man’s acts. He did not take the bath at
unseasonable hours; he was not fond of building houses, nor curious
about what he ate, nor about the texture and color of his clothes, nor
about the beauty of his slaves.[1] His dress came from Lorium, his
villa on the coast, and from Lanuvium generally.[2] We know how he
behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his pardon; and
such was all his behavior. There was in him nothing harsh, nor
implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may say, anything carried to the
sweating point; but he examined all things severally, as if he had
abundance of time, and without confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously
and consistently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded of
Socrates, that he was able both to abstain from, and to enjoy, those
things which many are too weak to abstain from, and cannot enjoy
without excess. But to be strong enough both to bear the one and to be
sober in the other is the mark of a man who has a perfect and
invincible soul, such as he showed in the illness of Maximus.

17. To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers, good
parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates, good kinsmen
and friends, nearly everything good. Further, I owe it to the gods that
I was not hurried into any offence against any of them, though I had a
disposition which, if opportunity had offered, might have led me to do
something of this kind; but, through their favor, there never was such
a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further, I am
thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up with my
grandfather’s concubine, and that I preserved the flower of my youth,
and that I did not make proof of my virility before the proper season,
but even deferred the time; that I was subjected to a ruler and a
father who was able to take away all pride from me, and to bring me to
the knowledge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without
wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and statues,
and such-like show; but that it is in such a man’s power to bring
himself very near to the fashion of a private person, without being for
this reason either meaner in thought, or more remiss in action, with
respect to the things which must be done for the public interest in a
manner that befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a
brother, who was able by his moral character to rouse me to vigilance
over myself, and who at the same time pleased me by his respect and
affection; that my children have not been stupid nor deformed in body;
that I did not make more proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other
studies, in which I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I
had seen that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to place
those who brought me up in the station of honor, which they seemed to
desire, without putting them off with hope of my doing it some other
time after, because they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius,
Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and frequent impressions about
living according to nature, and what kind of a life that is, so that,
so far as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and
inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living according to
nature, though I still fall short of it through my own fault, and
through not observing the admonitions of the gods, and, I may almost
say, their direct instructions; that my body has held out so long in
such a kind of life; that I never touched either Benedicta or
Theodotus, and that, after having fallen into amatory passions, I was
cured, and though I was often out of humor with Rusticus, I never did
anything of which I had occasion to repent; that, though it was my
mother’s fate to die young, she spent the last years of her life with
me; that, whenever I wished to help any man in his need, or on any
other occasion, I was never told that I had not the means of doing it;
and that to myself the same necessity never happened, to receive
anything from another; that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so
affectionate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good masters for
my children; and that remedies have been shown to me by dreams, both
others, and against bloodspitting and giddiness …; and that, when I had
an inclination to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any
sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of histories], or
in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself about the
investigation of appearances in the heavens; for all these things
require the help of the gods and fortune.

Among the Quadi at the Granua.[3]




BOOK II.


Begin the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet with the busybody,
the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful, envious, unsocial. All these
things happen to them by reason of their ignorance of what is good and
evil. But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful,
and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong,
that it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that
it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of
the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can
fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate
him. For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like
eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one
another, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one
another to be vexed and to turn away.

2. Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath, and the
ruling part. Throw away thy books; no longer distract thyself: it is
not allowed; but as if thou wast now dying, despise the flesh; it is
blood and bones and a network, a contexture of nerves, veins, and
arteries. See the breath also, what kind of a thing it is; air, and not
always the same, but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The
third, then, is the ruling part, consider thus: Thou art an old man; no
longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings like a
puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dissatisfied with thy
present lot, or shrink from the future.

3. All that is from the gods is full of providence. That which is from
fortune is not separated from nature or without an interweaving and
involution with the things which are ordered by providence. From thence
all things flow; and there is besides necessity, and that which is for
the advantage of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that
is good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole brings,
and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the universe is preserved,
as by the changes of the elements so by the changes of things
compounded of the elements. Let these principles be enough for thee;
let them always be fixed opinions. But cast away the thirst after
books, that thou mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and
from thy heart thankful to the gods.

4. Remember how long thou hast been putting off these things, and how
often thou hast received an opportunity from the gods, and yet dost not
use it. Thou must now at last perceive of what universe thou art now a
part, and of what administrator of the universe thy existence is an
efflux, and that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost
not use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go and thou
wilt go, and it will never return.

5. Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou
hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,
and freedom, and justice, and to give thyself relief from all other
thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief if thou dost every act of
thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and
passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and
self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to
thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays hold
of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like the
existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require nothing
more from him who observes these things.

6. Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no
longer have the opportunity of honoring thyself. Every man’s life is
sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences
not itself, but places thy felicity in the souls of others.

7. Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give
thyself time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled
around. But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other
way; for those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by
their activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every
movement, and, in a word, all their thoughts.

8. Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has
seldom been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the
movements of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

9. This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,
and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind
of a part it is of what kind of a whole, and that there is no one who
hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are
according to the nature of which thou art a part.

10. Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts—such a comparison as
one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind—says,
like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through
desire are more blamable than those which are committed through anger.
For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with a
certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through
desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more
intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly, then, and in a
way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed
with pleasure is more blamable than that which is committed with pain;
and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been first
wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other is
moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing
something by desire.

11. Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very
moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from
among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the
gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or
if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live
in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence? But in truth they
do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put all the
means in man’s power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as
to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for
this also, that it should be altogether in a man’s power not to fall
into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a
man’s life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having the
knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct these things,
is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked them; nor
is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either through want
of power or want of skill, that good and evil should happen
indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly, and
life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,—all these things equally
happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither better
nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

12. How quickly all things disappear,—in the universe the bodies
themselves, but in time the remembrance of them. What is the nature of
all sensible things, and particularly those which attract with the bait
of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapory fame;
how worthless, and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead
they are,—all this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to
observe. To observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give
reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in
itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their
parts all the things which present themselves to the imagination in it,
he will then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of
nature; and if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a
child. This, however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is
also a thing which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too
how man comes near to the Deity, and by what part of him, and when this
part of man is so disposed (VI. 28).

13. Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a
round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,
and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbors, without
perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,
and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in
keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction
with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit
veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be dear
to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move
our pity by reason of men’s ignorance of good and bad; this defect
being not less than that which deprives us of the power of
distinguishing things that are white and black.

14. Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand years, and as
many times ten thousand years, still remember that no man loses any
other life than this which he now lives, nor lives any other than this
which he now loses. The longest and shortest are thus brought to the
same. For the present is the same to all, though that which perishes is
not the same; and so that which is lost appears to be a mere moment.
For a man cannot lose either the past or the future: for what a man has
not, how can any one take this from him? These two things then thou
must bear in mind; the one, that all things from eternity are of like
forms and come round in a circle, and that it makes no difference
whether a man shall see the same things during a hundred years, or two
hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the longest liver
and he who will die soonest lose just the same. For the present is the
only thing of which a man can be deprived, if it is true that this is
the only thing which he has, and that a man cannot lose a thing if he
has it not.

15. Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the Cynic
Monimus is manifest: and manifest too is the use of what was said, if a
man receives what may be got out of it as far as it is true.

16. The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it
becomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor on the universe, so far as
it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens is a separation of
ourselves from nature, in some part of which the natures of all other
things are contained. In the next place, the soul does violence to
itself when it turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with
the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who are
angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself when it is
overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly, when it plays a part, and
does or says anything insincerely and untruly. Fifthly, when it allows
any act of its own and any movement to be without an aim, and does
anything thoughtlessly and without considering what it is, it being
right that even the smallest things be done with reference to an end;
and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and the law of
the most ancient city and polity.

17. Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux,
and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject
to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and fortune hard to divine, and
fame a thing devoid of judgment. And, to say all in a word, everything
which belongs to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is
a dream and vapor, and life is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and
after—fame is oblivion. What then is that which is able to conduct a
man? One thing, and only one, philosophy. But this consists in keeping
the daemon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to
pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely
and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man’s doing or not
doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that
is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he
himself came; and, finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as
being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every
living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements
themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man
have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the
elements? For it is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is
according to nature.

This in Carnuntum.




BOOK III.


1. We ought to consider not only that our life is daily wasting away
and a smaller part of it is left, but another thing also must be taken
into the account, that if a man should live longer, it is quite
uncertain whether the understanding will still continue sufficient for
the comprehension of things, and retain the power of contemplation
which strives to acquire the knowledge of the divine and the human. For
if he shall begin to fall into dotage, perspiration and nutrition and
imagination and appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will
not fail; but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the
measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances, and
considering whether a man should now depart from life, and whatever
else of the kind absolutely requires a disciplined reason,—all this is
already extinguished. We must make haste, then, not only because we are
daily nearer to death, but also because the conception of things and
the understanding of them cease first.

2. We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the
things which are produced according to nature contain something
pleasing and attractive. For instance, when bread is baked some parts
are split at the surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a
certain fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker’s art, are
beautiful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for
eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape open; and in
the ripe olives the very circumstance of their being near to rottenness
adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit. And the ears of corn bending down,
and the lion’s eyebrows, and the foam which flows from the mouth of
wild boars, and many other things,—though they are far from being
beautiful if a man should examine them severally,—still, because they
are consequent upon the things which are formed by nature, help to
adorn them, and they please the mind; so that if a man should have a
feeling and deeper insight with respect to the things which are
produced in the universe, there is hardly one of those which follow by
way of consequence which will not seem to him to be in a manner
disposed so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real
gaping jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those which
painters and sculptors show by imitation; and in an old woman and an
old man he will be able to see a certain maturity and comeliness; and
the attractive loveliness of young persons he will be able to look on
with chaste eyes; and many such things will present themselves, not
pleasing to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar
with Nature and her works.

3. Hippocrates, after curing many diseases, himself fell sick and died.
The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them
too. Alexander and Pompeius and Caius Caesar, after so often completely
destroying whole cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten
thousands of cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from
life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the conflagration of
the universe, was filled with water internally and died smeared all
over with mud. And lice destroyed Democritus; and other lice killed
Socrates. What means all this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the
voyage, thou art come to shore; get out. If indeed to another life,
there is no want of gods, not even there; but if to a state without
sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and pleasures, and to be
a slave to the vessel, which is as much inferior as that which serves
it is superior: for the one is intelligence and deity; the other is
earth and corruption.

4. Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others,
when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility.
For thou losest the opportunity of doing something else when thou hast
such thoughts as these,—What is such a person doing, and why, and what
is he saying, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving,
and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from the observation
of our own ruling power. We ought then to check in the series of our
thoughts everything that is without a purpose and useless, but most of
all the over-curious feeling and the malignant; and a man should use
himself to think of those things only about which if one should
suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with perfect openness
thou mightest immediately answer, This or That; so that from thy words
it should be plain that everything in thee is simple and benevolent,
and such as befits a social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts
about pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry or
envy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst blush if
thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For the man who is
such, and no longer delays being among the number of the best, is like
a priest and minister of the gods, using too the [deity] which is
planted within him, which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure,
unharmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feeling no wrong, a
fighter in the noblest fight, one who cannot be overpowered by any
passion, dyed deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything
which happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and not often, nor
yet without great necessity and for the general interest, imagining
what another says, or does, or thinks. For it is only what belongs to
himself that he makes the matter for his activity; and he constantly
thinks of that which is allotted to himself out of the sum total of
things, and he makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his
own portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man is
carried along with him and carries him along with it. And he remembers
also that every rational animal is his kinsman, and that to care for
all men is according to man’s nature; and a man should hold on to the
opinion not of all, but of those only who confessedly live according to
nature. But as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what
kind of men they are both at home and from home, both by night and by
day, and what they are, and with what men they live an impure life.
Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from such
men, since they are not even satisfied with themselves.

5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest,
nor without due consideration, nor with distraction; nor let studied
ornament set off thy thoughts, and be not either a man of many words,
or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in
thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and
engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken
his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life,
and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man’s
testimony. Be cheerful also, and seek not external help nor the
tranquillity which others give. A man then must stand erect, not be
kept erect by others.

6. If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth,
temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own
mind’s self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do
according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to
thee without thy own choice; if, I say, thou seest anything better than
is, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found
to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the Deity
which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy
appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates
said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has
submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if thou findest
everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to
nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge and incline to it, thou
wilt no longer without distraction be able to give the preference to
that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own; for it is
not right that anything of any other kind, such as praise from the
many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition
with that which is rationally and politically [or practically] good.
All these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves [to the
better things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once,
and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the
better, and hold to it.—But that which is useful is the better.—Well,
then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it; but if
it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy
judgment without arrogance: only take care that thou makest the inquiry
by a sure method.

7. Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel
thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man,
to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to desire anything which
needs walls and curtains: for he who has preferred to everything else
his own intelligence and daemon and the worship of its excellence, acts
no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much
company; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either
pursuing or flying from [death]; but whether for a longer or a shorter
time he shall have the soul enclosed in the body, he cares not at all:
for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he
were going to do anything else which can be done with decency and
order; taking care of this only all through life, that his thoughts
turn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and
a member of a civil community.

8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no
corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his
life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who
leaves the stage before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there
is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to
other things], nor yet detached [from other things], nothing worthy of
blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.

9. Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it
entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any
opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational
animal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and
friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods.

10. Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which are few;
and besides, bear in mind that every man lives only this present time,
which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is
either past or it is uncertain. Short then is the time which every man
lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives; and short too
the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a
succession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know
not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.

11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:
Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is
presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is
in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell
thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has
been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so
productive of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically
and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always
to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe
this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value
everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to
man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities
are like families; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and
how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now makes an
impression on me, and what virtue I have need of with respect to it,
such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity,
contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on every occasion a man should
say: This comes from god; and this is according to the apportionment
and spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and
chance; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and
partner, one who knows not, however, what is according to his nature.
But I know; for this reason I behave towards him according to the
natural law of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same
time, however, in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value
of each.

12. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right
reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to
distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldst be
bound to give it back immediately; if thou holdest to this, expecting
nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity
according to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound
which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is
able to prevent this.

13. As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for
cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles
ready for the understanding of things divine and human, and for doing
everything, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which
unites the divine and human to one another. For neither wilt thou do
anything well which pertains to man without at the same time having a
reference to things divine; nor the contrary.

14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own
memoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the
selections from books which thou wast reserving for thy old age. Hasten
then to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle
hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it
is in thy power.

15. They know not how many things are signified by the words stealing,
sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done; for this
is not effected by the eyes, but by another kind of vision.

16. Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the
soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the
impressions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals;
to be pulled by the strings of desire belongs both to wild beasts and
to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a
Nero: and to have the intelligence that guides to the things which
appear suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods,
and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have
shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have
mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be
pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is
spun for him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his
breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it
tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything
contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if
all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented
life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from
the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come
pure, tranquil, ready to depart, and without any compulsion perfectly
reconciled to his lot.




BOOK IV.


1. That which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so
affected with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily
adapts itself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it
requires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under
certain conditions, however; and it makes a material for itself out of
that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by
which a small light would have been extinguished: but when the fire is
strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on
it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.

2. Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than according
to the perfect principles of art.

3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores,
and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much.
But this is altogether a mark of the most common sort of men, for it is
in thy power whenever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For
nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man
retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such
thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect
tranquillity; and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the
good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this
retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and
fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be
sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free
from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with
what art thou discontented? With the badness of men? Recall to thy mind
this conclusion, that rational animals exist for one another, and that
to endure is a part of justice, and that men do wrong involuntarily;
and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred,
and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes; and be quiet
at last.—But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is assigned
to thee out of the universe.—Recall to thy recollection this
alternative; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous
concurrence of things]; or remember the arguments by which it has been
proved that the world is a kind of political community [and be quiet at
last].—But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon
thee.—Consider then further that the mind mingles not with the breath,
whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart
and discovered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast
heard and assented to about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at
last].—But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment
thee.—See how soon everything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of
infinite time on each side of [the present], and the emptiness of
applause, and the changeableness and want of judgment in those who
pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space within which it
is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole earth is a
point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are
there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee.

This then remains: Remember to retire into this little territory of thy
own, and above all do not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and
look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal.
But among the things readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let
there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the
soul, for they are external and remain immovable; but our perturbations
come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these
things which thou seest, change immediately and will no longer be; and
constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already
witnessed. The universe is transformation: life is opinion.

4. If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of
which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is
the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do; if this is
so, there is a common law also; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens;
if this is so, we are members of some political community; if this is
so, the world is in a manner a state. For of what other common
political community will any one say that the whole human race are
members? And from thence, from this common political community comes
also our very intellectual faculty and reasoning faculty and our
capacity for law; or whence do they come? For as my earthly part is a
portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from
another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar
source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also
returns to non-existence), so also the intellectual part comes from
some source.

5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; composition out
of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same; and altogether
not a thing of which any man should be ashamed, for it is not contrary
to [the nature of] a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason
of our constitution.

6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it
is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not
allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind,
that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon
not even your names will be left behind.

7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint,
“I have been harmed.” Take away the complaint, “I have been harmed,”
and the harm is taken away.

8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make
his life worse, nor does it harm him either from without or from
within.

9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled
to do this.

10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou
observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with
respect to the continuity of the series of things, but with respect to
what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing
its value. Observe then as thou hast begun; and whatever thou dost, do
it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which
a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action.

11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee
wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are
in truth.

12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one to
do only whatever the reason of the ruling and legislating faculty may
suggest for the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there
is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion.
But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion,
as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, not because it
appears pleasant or brings reputation.

13. Hast thou reason? I have.—Why then dost not thou use it? For if
this does its own work, what else dost thou wish?

14. Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that which
produced thee; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal
principle by transmutation.

15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar: one falls before,
another falls after; but it makes no difference.

16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now
a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy principles and the
worship of reason.

17. Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years. Death
hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good.

18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what his
neighbor says or does or thinks, but only to what he does himself, that
it may be just and pure; or, as Agathon says, look not round at the
depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without
deviating from it.

19. He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does not consider
that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very
soon; then again also they who have succeeded them, until the whole
remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through
men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will
remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal,
what then is this to thee? And I say not what is it to the dead, but
what is it to the living. What is praise, except indeed so far as it
has a certain utility? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of
nature, clinging to something else….

20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself,
and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither
worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this
also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for
example, material things and works of art. That which is really
beautiful has no need of anything; not more than law, not more than
truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is
beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed? Is such a
thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it is not praised? or
gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub?

21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from
eternity?—But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have
been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation of these
bodies after a certain continuance, whatever it may be, and their
dissolution make room for other dead bodies, so the souls which are
removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted and
diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal
intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh
souls which come to dwell there. And this is the answer which a man
might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must
not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also
of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other
animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in
the bodies of those who feed on them! And nevertheless this earth
receives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood,
and the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.

What is the investigation into the truth in this matter? The division
into that which is material and that which is the cause of form [the
formal].

22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to
justice, and on the occasion of every impression maintain the faculty
of comprehension [or understanding].

23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O
Universe. Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time
for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature:
from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things
return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say,
Dear city of Zeus?

24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if thou
wouldst be tranquil.—But consider if it would not be better to say, Do
what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is
naturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only
the tranquillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes
from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do
being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure
and less uneasiness. Accordingly, on every occasion a man should ask
himself, Is this one of the unnecessary things? Now a man should take
away not only unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus
superfluous acts will not follow after.

25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is
satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own
just acts and benevolent disposition.

26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb
thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong? It is to
himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee? Well:
out of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has
been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short.
Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice.
Be sober in thy relaxation.

27. Either it is a well-arranged universe[4] or a chaos huddled
together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in
thee, and disorder in the All? And this too when all things are so
separated and diffused and sympathetic.

28. A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn character,
bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent,
tyrannical.

29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in
it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it.
He is a runaway, who flies from social reason; he is blind, who shuts
the eyes of the understanding; he is poor, who has need of another, and
has not from himself all things which are useful for life. He is an
abscess on the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the
reason of our common nature through being displeased with the things
which happen, for the same nature produces this, and has produced thee
too: he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who tears his own soul
from that of reasonable animals, which is one.

30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a
book: here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I
abide by reason—and I do not get the means of living out of my
learning, and I abide [by my reason].

31. Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be
content with it; and pass through the rest of life like one who has
intrusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making
thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man.

32. Consider for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou wilt see all
these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying,
warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering,
obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some to die,
grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring
consulship, kingly power. Well, then, that life of these people no
longer exists at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all
is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other
epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great
efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou
shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting
themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accordance
with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be
content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the
attention given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For
thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller
matters no further than is fit.

33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated: so also
the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner
antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after
also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus.
For all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete
oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a
wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their
breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the
matter, what is even an eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then
is that about which we ought to employ our serious pains? This one
thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a
disposition which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as
usual, as flowing from a principle and source of the same kind.

34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing
her to spin thy thread into whatever thing she pleases.

35. Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers and that
which is remembered.

36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and
accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the universe loves
nothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new
things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of
that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast
into the earth or into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.

37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from
perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things,
nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost thou yet place wisdom only in
acting justly.

38. Examine men’s ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind
of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.

39. What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling principle of
another; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering.
Where is it then? It is in that part of thee in which subsists the
power of forming opinions about evils. Let this power then not form
[such] opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it,
the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness,
nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be
quiet; that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which
can happen equally to the bad man and the good. For that which happens
equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives
according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to
nature.

40. Constantly regard the universe as one living being, having one
substance and one soul; and observe how all things have reference to
one perception, the perception of this one living being; and how all
things act with one movement; and how all things are the co-operating
causes of all things which exist; observe too the continuous spinning
of the thread and the contexture of the web.

41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to
say (I. C. 19).

42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things
to subsist in consequence of change.

43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a
violent stream; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried
away, and another comes in its place, and this will be carried away
too.

44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose
in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is disease, and death, and
calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them.

45. In the series of things, those which follow are always aptly fitted
to those which have gone before: for this series is not like a mere
enumeration of disjointed things, which has only a necessary sequence,
but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are
arranged together harmoniously, so the things which come into existence
exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonderful relationship (VI.
38; VII. 9; VII. 75, note).

46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth
is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the
death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who
forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with
which they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs
the universe; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them
strange: and consider that we ought not to act and speak as if we were
asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak; and that we ought
not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and
speak as we have been taught.

47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or certainly on
the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care much whether it was on
the third day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in the highest degree
mean- spirited; for how small is the difference. So think it no great
thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than
to-morrow.

48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often
contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how many astrologers
after predicting with great pretensions the deaths of others; and how
many philosophers after endless discourses on death or immortality; how
many heroes after killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used
their power over men’s lives with terrible insolence, as if they were
immortal; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice
and Pompeii and Herculaneum, and others innumerable. Add to the
reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after
burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him; and all
this in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephemeral and
worthless human things are, and what was yesterday a little mucus,
to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space
of time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as
an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it,
and thanking the tree on which it grew.

49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break,
but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it.

Unhappy am I because this has happened to me? Not so, but happy am I,
though this has happened to me, because I continue free from pain,
neither crushed by the present nor fearing the future. For such a thing
as this might have happened to every man; but every man would not have
continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a
misfortune than this a good fortune? And dost thou in all cases call
that a man’s misfortune which is not a deviation from man’s nature? And
does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man’s nature, when it
is not contrary to the will of man’s nature? Well, thou knowest the
will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from
being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against
inconsiderate opinions and falsehood; will it prevent thee from having
modesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man’s
nature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion
which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle: not that this is
a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.

50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death,
to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more
then have they gained than those who have died early? Certainly they
lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus,
Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be
buried, and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the interval
is small [between birth and death]; and consider with how much trouble,
and in company with what sort of people, and in what a feeble body this
interval is laboriously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of
any value. For look to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the
time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity
then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him
who lives three generations?

51. Always run to the short way; and the short way is the natural:
accordingly say and do everything in conformity with the soundest
reason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble, and warfare, and
all artifice and ostentatious display.




BOOK V.


1. In the morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be
present,—I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I
dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for
which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to
lie in the bed-clothes and keep myself warm?—But this is more
pleasant.—Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for
action or exertion? Dost thou not see the little plants, the little
birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order
their several parts of the universe? And art thou unwilling to do the
work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is
according to thy nature?—But it is necessary to take rest also.—It is
necessary. However, Nature has fixed bounds to this too: she has fixed
bounds to eating and drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds,
beyond what is sufficient; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou
stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for
if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who
love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them unwashed
and without food; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner
values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of
money values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And
such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither
to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care
for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and
less worthy of thy labor?

2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is
troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in all tranquillity.

3. Judge every word and deed which are according to nature to be fit
for thee; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any
people nor by their words, but if a thing is good to be done or said,
do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their
peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement; which
things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own nature
and the common nature; and the way of both is one.

4. I go through the things which happen according to nature until I
shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of
which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of which my
father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the
milk; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food
and drink; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many
purposes.

5. Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.—Be it so:
but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not
formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are
altogether in thy power, sincerity, gravity, endurance of labor,
aversion to pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things,
benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling,
magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities thou art immediately
able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of natural incapacity and
unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark? or
art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to
murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with thy
poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to
be so restless in thy mind? No, by the gods; but thou mightest have
been delivered from these things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst
be charged with being rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must
exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking
pleasure in thy dulness.

6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it
down to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do
this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and
he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what
he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks
for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a
horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when
it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not
call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as
a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.—Must a man then
be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing
it?—Yes.—But this very thing is necessary, the observation of what a
man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of the social
animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to
wish that his social partner also should perceive it.—It is true what
thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said: and
for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before,
for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt
choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for
this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

7. A prayer of the Athenians: Rain, rain, O dear Zeus, down on the
ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains.—In truth we ought
not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this simple and noble
fashion.

8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius
prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in cold water, or
going without shoes, so we must understand it when it is said, That the
nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease, or mutilation,
or loss, or anything else of the kind. For in the first case Prescribed
means something like this: he prescribed this for this man as a thing
adapted to procure health; and in the second case it means, That which
happens to [or suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably
to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are
suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the
pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in
some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony].
And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as
it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny] is made up to
be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant
understand what I mean; for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought
this to such a person.—This then was brought and this was prescribed to
him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which
Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his
prescriptions are disagreeable, but we, accept them in the hope of
health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the
common nature judges to be good, be judged by thee to be of the same
kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it
seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the
universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For
he would not have brought on any man what he has brought, if it were
not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever
it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is
directed by it. For two reasons then it is right to be content with
that which happens to thee, the one, because it was done for thee and
prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally
from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny; and the other,
because even that which comes severally to every man is to the power
which administers the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, nay
even of its very continuance. For the integrity of the whole is
mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction
and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost
cut off, as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and
in a manner triest to put anything out of the way.

9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost
not succeed in doing everything according to right principles, but when
thou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part
of what thou dost is consistent with man’s nature, and love this to
which thou returnest; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a
master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge
and egg, or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water. For
thus thou wilt not fail to obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. And
remember that philosophy requires only the things which thy nature
requires; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according
to nature.—It may be objected, Why, what is more agreeable than this
[which I am doing]?—But is not this the very reason why pleasure
deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity,
equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more agreeable
than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy
course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and
knowledge?

10. Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have seemed to
philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether
unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult
to understand. And all our assent is changeable; for where is the man
who never changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves,
and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may
be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a robber. Then turn to the
morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure
even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly
able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt, and in so
constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of
things moved, what there is worth being highly prized, or even an
object of serious pursuit, I cannot imagine. But on the contrary it is
a man’s duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural
dissolution, and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these
principles only: the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not
conformable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that it is in
my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon: for there is no
man who will compel me to this.

11. About what am I now employing my own soul? On every occasion I must
ask myself this question, and inquire, What have I now in this part of
me which they call the ruling principle? and whose soul have I
now,—that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a
tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast?

12. What kind of things those are which appear good to the many, we may
learn even from this. For if any man should conceive certain things as
being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he
would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to
anything which should not be in harmony with what is really good. But
if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the
many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable
that which was said by the comic writer. Thus even the many perceive
the difference. For were it not so, this saying would not offend and
would not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it
is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as
said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think
those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the
mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied,—that he who
has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in.

13. I am composed of the formal and the material; and neither of them
will perish into non-existence, as neither of them came into existence
out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change
into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another
part of the universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a
change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on forever in the
other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the
universe is administered according to definite periods [of revolution].

14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are
sufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from
a first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the
end which is proposed to them; and this is the reason why such acts are
named Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they
proceed by the right road.

15. None of these things ought to be called a man’s which do not belong
to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man’s nature
promise them, nor are they the means of man’s nature attaining its end.
Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that
which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids
towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things
did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and
to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who
showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted
himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But
now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other
things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more
patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better
man.

16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character
of thy mind; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a
continuous series of such thoughts as these: for instance, that where a
man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a
palace; well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again,
consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for
this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried; and its
end is in that towards which it is carried; and where the end is, there
also is the advantage and the good of each thing. Now the good for the
reasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has been
shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exists for the sake of
the superior? But the things which have life are superior to those
which have not life, and of those which have life the superior are
those which have reason.

17. To seek what is impossible is madness: and it is impossible that
the bad should not do something of this kind.

18. Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to
bear. The same things happen to another, and either because he does not
see that they have happened, or because he would show a great spirit,
he is firm and remains unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and
conceit should be stronger than wisdom.

19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree; nor
have they admission to the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul:
but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and whatever judgments it
may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which
present themselves to it.

20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do
good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves
obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which
are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it
is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to
my effects and disposition, which have the power of acting
conditionally and changing: for the mind converts and changes every
hindrance to its activity into an aid; and so that which is a hindrance
is made a furtherance to an act; and that which is an obstacle on the
road helps us on this road.

21. Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is that
which makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like
manner also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the
same kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of
everything else is this, and thy life is directed by this.

22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen.
In the case of every appearance of harm apply this rule: if the state
is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed,
thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him
where his error is.

23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and
disappear, both the things which are and the things which are produced.
For substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities
of things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite
varieties; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And
consider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past
and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a
fool who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes
himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time.

24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small
portion; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible
interval has been assigned to thee; and of that which is fixed by
destiny, and how small a part of it thou art.

25. Does another do me wrong? Let him look to it. He has his own
disposition, his own activity. I now have what the universal nature
wills me to have; and I do what my nature now wills me to do.

26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by
the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it
not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those
affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by
virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is
all one, then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is
natural: but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the
opinion that it is either good or bad.

27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly
shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is
assigned to him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which
Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of
himself. And this is every man’s understanding and reason.

28. Art thou angry with him whose armpits stink? art thou angry with
him whose mouth smells foul? What good will this anger do thee? He has
such a mouth, he has such armpits: it is necessary that such an
emanation must come from such things; but the man has reason, it will
be said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he
offends; I wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast
reason: by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty; show him
his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and
there is no need of anger.

29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, … so it is in thy
power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out of
life, yet so as if them wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and
I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as
nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall
hinder me from doing what I choose; and I choose to do what is
according to the nature of the rational and social animal.

30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made
the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the
superior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated,
co-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has
brought together into concord with one another the things which are the
best.

31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren,
children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy
friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto
behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee,—

“Never has wronged a man in deed or word.”


And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through,
and how many things thou hast been able to endure and that the history
of thy life is now complete and thy service is ended; and how many
beautiful things thou hast seen; and how many pleasures and pains thou
hast despised; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned;
and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposition.

32. Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who has skill and
knowledge? What soul then has skill and knowledge? That which knows
beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance,
and through all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the
universe.

33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a
name or not even a name; but name is sound and echo. And the things
which are much valued in life are empty and rotten and trifling, and
[like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling,
laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and
justice and truth are fled

Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.
          HESIOD, _Works, etc_. v. 197.


What then is there which still detains thee here, if the objects of
sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of
perception are dull and easily receive false impressions, and the poor
soul itself is an exhalation from blood? But to have good repute amid
such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in
tranquillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to
another state? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what
else than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men,
and to practice tolerance and self-restraint; but as to everything
which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remember
that this is neither thine nor in thy power.

34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou
canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These
two things are common both to the soul of God and to the soul of man,
and to the soul of every rational being: not to be hindered by another;
and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the
practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.

35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness,
and the common weal is not injured, why am I troubled about it, and
what is the harm to the common weal?

36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of
things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their
fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are
indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage; for it is a bad habit.
But as the old man, when he went away, asked back his foster-child’s
top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.

When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what
these things are?—Yes; but they are objects of great concern to these
people—wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things? I was once a
fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how.—But fortunate means that
a man has assigned to himself a good fortune: and a good fortune is
good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions.




BOOK VI.


1. The substance of the universe is obedient and compliant; and the
reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it
has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed
by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason.

2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if
thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with
sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or praised; and whether dying or doing
something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we
die: it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in
hand (vi. 22, 28).

3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its
value escape thee.

4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to
vapor, if indeed all substance is one, or they will be dispersed.

5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what
it does, and on what material it works.

6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like [the wrong-
doer].

7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from one
social act to another social act, thinking of God.

8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and
while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also
makes everything which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills.

9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is
accomplished; for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature
that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which externally
comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature,
or a nature external and independent of this (XL 1; VI. 40; VIII. 50).

10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of
things, and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If
then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a fortuitous
combination of things and such a disorder? and why do I care about
anything else than how I shall at last become earth? and why am I
disturbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do?
But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I
trust in him who governs (IV. 27).

11. When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be disturbed in a
manner, quickly return to thyself, and do not continue out of tune
longer than the compulsion lasts; for thou wilt have more mastery over
the harmony by continually recurring to it.

12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou
wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst
constantly return to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to
thee stepmother and mother: return to philosophy frequently and repose
in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to
thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.

13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the
impression that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead
body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that this Falernian is only a
little grape-juice, and this purple robe some sheep’s wool dyed with
the blood of a shell-fish: such then are these impressions, and they
reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind
of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through
life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our
approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness
and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward
show is a wonderful perverter of the reason, and when thou art most
sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then
that it cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xenocrates
himself.

14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to
objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by
cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig-trees,
vines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little
more reasonable, are referred to the things which are held together by
a living principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men
who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by
a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational so far as
it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or
simply rational so far as it possesses a number of slaves. But he who
values a rational soul, a soul universal and fitted for political life,
regards nothing else except this; and above all things he keeps his
soul in a condition and in an activity comformable to reason and social
life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same
kind as himself.

15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying
out of it; and of that which is coming into existence part is already
extinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world,
just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the
infinite duration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there
is no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a
man would set a high price? It would be just as if a man should fall in
love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already passed
out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man,
like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For
such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back,
which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole
respiratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and
the day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst
first draw it.

16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor
respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts, nor the
receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved
by desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being
nourished by food; for this is just like the act of separating and
parting with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being
valued? To be received with clapping of hands? No. Neither must we
value the clapping of tongues; for the praise which comes from the many
is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this
worthless thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing? This,
in my opinion: to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to
thy proper constitution, to which end both all employments and arts
lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made
should be adapted to the work for which it has been made; and both the
vine planter who looks after the vine, and the horsebreaker, and he who
trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of
youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and
the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else.
Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too? Then thou wilt be
neither free, nor sufficient for thy own happiness, nor without
passion. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious
of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who
have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be
altogether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these things;
and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence
and honor thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in
harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising
all that they give and have ordered.

17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the
motion of virtue is in none of these: it is something more divine, and
advancing by a way hardly observed, it goes happily on its road.

18. How strangely men act! They will not praise those who are living at
the same time and living with themselves; but to be themselves praised
by posterity, by those whom they have never seen or ever will see, this
they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou
shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not
praise thee.

19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think
that it is impossible for man: but if anything is possible for man and
conformable to his nature, think that this can be attained by thyself
too.

20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with
his nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well,
we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we
suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow; and yet we are on our
guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but
we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be
in all the other parts of life; let us overlook many things in those
who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I
said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.

21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think
or act rightly, I will gladly change; for I seek the truth, by which no
man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and
ignorance.

22. I do my duty: other things trouble me not; for they are either
things without life, or things without reason, or things that have
rambled and know not the way.

23. As to the animals which have no reason, and generally all things
and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make
use of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human
beings, as they have reason, behave in a social spirit. And on all
occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length
of time in which thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are
sufficient.

24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the
same state; for either they were received among the same seminal
principles of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the
atoms.

25. Consider how many things in the same indivisible time take place in
each of us,—things which concern the body and things which concern the
soul: and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all
things which come into existence in that which is the one and all,
which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.

26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name
Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter
each letter? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt
thou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in
this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts.
These it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or showing
anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish
that which is set before thee.

27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which
appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet
in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed
because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things
because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable
to them.—But it is not so.—Teach them then, and show them without being
angry.

28. Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of
the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the
discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh
(II. 12).

29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life,
when thy body does not give way.

30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not
dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple,
good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a
worshipper of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper
acts. Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee.
Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one
fruit of this terrene life,—a pious disposition and social acts. Do
everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his constancy in every
act which was conformable to reason, and his evenness in all things,
and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness,
and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things;
and how he would never let anything pass without having first most
carefully examined it and clearly understood it; and how he bore with
those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in return; how he
did nothing in a hurry; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how
exact an examiner of manners and actions he was; and not given to
reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how
little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants;
and how laborious and patient; and how he was able on account of his
sparing diet to hold out to the evening; and his firmness and
uniformity in his friendships; and how he tolerated freedom of speech
in those who opposed his opinions; and the pleasure that he had when
any man showed him anything better; and how religious he was without
superstition. Imitate all this, that thou mayest have as good a
conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had.

31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and when thou
hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only
dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the
things about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams].

32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all
things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But
to the understanding those things only are indifferent which are not
the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its
own activity, all these are in its power. And of these however only
those which are done with reference to the present; for as to the
future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the
present indifferent.

33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is
contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot’s work and the
hand the hand’s. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor
contrary to nature, so long as it does the things of a man. But if the
labor is not contrary to his nature, neither is it an evil to him.

34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides,
tyrants.

35. Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up
to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their
craft,—nevertheless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their
art, and do not endure to depart from it? Is it not strange if the
architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the
principles] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is
common to him and the gods?

36. Asia, Europe, are corners of the universe; all the sea a drop in
the universe; Athos a little clod of the universe: all the present time
is a point in eternity. All things are little, changeable, perishable.
All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either
directly preceding or by way of sequence. And accordingly the lion’s
gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a
thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beautiful. Do not
then imagine that they are of another kind from that which thou dost
venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all (VII. 75).

37. He who has seen present things has seen all, both everything which
has taken place from all eternity and everything which will be for time
without end; for all things are of one kin and of one form.

38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe
and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are
implicated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one
another; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by
virtue of the active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of
the substance (ix. 1).

39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and
the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it
truly [sincerely].

40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has
been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the
things which are held together by nature there is within, and there
abides in, them the power which made them; wherefore the more is it fit
to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act
according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to
intelligence. And thus also in the universe the things which belong to
it are in conformity to intelligence.

41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt
suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if
such a bad thing befall thee, or the loss of such a good thing, thou
wilt not blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of
the misfortune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely
to be the cause; and indeed we do much injustice because we make a
difference between these things [because we do not regard these things
as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our
power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding
fault with God or standing in a hostile attitude to man.

42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and
design, and others without knowing what they do; as men also when they
are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are
laborers and co-operators in the things which take place in the
universe. But men co-operate after different fashions: and even those
co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who
try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of
such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what
kind of workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will
certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some
part of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end.
But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the
play, which Chrysippus speaks of.

43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius
the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth]? And how is it with respect to
each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to
the same end?

44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which
must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even
to imagine a deity without forethought; and as to doing me harm, why
should they have any desire towards that? for what advantage would
result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object
of their providence? But if they have not determined about me
individually, they have certainly determined about the whole at least,
and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general
arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with
them. But if they determine about nothing,—which it is wicked to
believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor pray nor
swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods were
present and lived with us,—but if however the gods determine about none
of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself,
and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is useful to
every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But
my nature is rational and social; and my city and country, so far as I
am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The
things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.

45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the
universal: this might be sufficient. But further thou wilt observe this
also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is
profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word
profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the
middle kind [neither good nor bad].

46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the
continual sight of the same things, and the uniformity make the
spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life; for all things
above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then?

47. Think continually that all kinds of men and men of all kinds of
pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down
even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to
the other kinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where
there are so many great orators, and so many noble philosophers,
Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and so
many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these, Eudoxus,
Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute natural talents, great
minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the
perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like
him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust.
What harm then is this to them; and what to those whose names are
altogether unknown? One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy
life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars
and unjust men.

48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those
who live with thee; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty
of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality
of a fourth. For nothing delights so much as the examples of the
virtues, when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with
us and present themselves in abundance, as far as is possible.
Wherefore we must keep them before us.

49. Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest only so
many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatisfied then that thou
must live only so many years and not more; for as thou art satisfied
with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be
content with the time.

50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will,
when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by
using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and
tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the
exercise of some other virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a
reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do
impossibilities. What then didst thou desire?—Some such effort as
this.—But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast
moved are [not] accomplished.

51. He who loves fame considers another man’s activity to be his own
good; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations; but he who has
understanding considers his own acts to be his own good.

52. It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and not to be
disturbed in our soul; for things themselves have no natural power to
form our judgments.

53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another,
and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker’s mind.

54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the
bee.

55. If sailors abused the helmsman, or the sick the doctor, would they
listen to anybody else; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of
those in the ship, or the doctor the health of those whom he attends?

56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone
out of it.

57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad
dogs water causes fear; and to little children the ball is a fine
thing. Why then am I angry? Dost thou think that a false opinion has
less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is
bitten by a mad dog?

58. No man will hinder thee from living according to the reason of thy
own nature: nothing will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the
universal nature.

59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what
objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon will time cover all things,
and how many it has covered already.




BOOK VII.


1. What is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the
occasion of everything which happens keep this in mind, that it is that
which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the
same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the
middle ages and those of our own day; with which cities and houses are
filled now. There is nothing new: all things are both familiar and
short-lived.

2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impression [thoughts]
which correspond to them are extinguished? But it is in thy power
continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that
opinion about anything which I ought to have. If I can, why am I
disturbed? The things which are external to my mind have no relation at
all to my mind.—Let this be the state of thy affects, and thou standest
erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as
thou didst use to look at them; for in this consists the recovery of
thy life.

3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep,
herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of
bread into fishponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings
about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings—[all alike].
It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and
not a proud air; to understand however that every man is worth just so
much as the things are worth about which he busies himself.

4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement
thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see
immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully
what is the thing signified.

5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is sufficient,
I use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature.
But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and
give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some
reason why I ought not to do so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to
help me the man who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is
now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by
myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to
that which is useful and well suited to society.

6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to
oblivion; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long
been dead.

7. Be not ashamed to be helped; for it is thy business to do thy duty
like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou
canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of
another it is possible?

8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if
it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou
usest for present things.

9. All things are implicated with one another, and the bond is holy;
and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For
things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same
universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and
one god who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one]
common reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth; if indeed
there is also one perfection for all animals which are of the same
stock and participate in the same reason.

10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole;
and everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the
universal reason; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed
in time.

11. To the rational animal the same act is according to nature and
according to reason.

12. Be thou erect, or be made erect (III. 5).

13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in
one, so it is with rational beings which exist separate, for they have
been constituted for one co-operation. And the perception of this will
be more apparent to thee if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a
member of the system of rational beings. But if thou sayest that thou
art a part, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart; beneficence does
not yet delight thee for its own sake; thou still dost it barely as a
thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.

14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the
effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt will complain, if
they choose. But I, unless I think that what has happened is an evil,
am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so.

15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good; just as if the gold,
or the emerald, or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one
does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color.

16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not
frighten itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten
or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own
opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if
it can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But
the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has
completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will
suffer nothing, for it will never deviate into such a judgment. The
leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for
itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded,
if it does not disturb and impede itself.

17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then
art thou doing here, O imagination? Go away, I entreat thee by the
gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come
according to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee: only go away.

18. Is any man afraid of change? Why, what can take place without
change? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal
nature? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change?
and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change? And
can anything else that is useful be accomplished without change? Dost
thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and
equally necessary for the universal nature?

19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all
bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating
with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a
Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already
swallowed up! And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to
every man and thing (V. 23; VI. 15).

20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the
constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not
allow, or what it does not allow now.

21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness
of thee by all.

22. It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this
happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen,
and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that
soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done
thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was
before.

23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were
wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the
material for a tree, then for a man, then for something else; and each
of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship
for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being
fastened together (VIII. 50).

24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural; when it is often
assumed,[5] the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is
so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all.
Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For
if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is
there for living any longer?

25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which
thou seest, and out of their substance will make other things, and
again other things from the substance of them, in order that the world
may be ever new (XII. 23).

26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what
opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen
this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For
either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or
another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But
if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more
readily be well disposed to him who is in error.

27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but
of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how
eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the
same time, however, take care that thou dost not through being so
pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be
disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them.

28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this
nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and
so secures tranquillity.

29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine
thyself to the present. Understand well what happens either to thee or
to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal]
and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done
by a man stay there where the wrong was done (VIII. 29).

30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter
into the things that are doing and the things which do them (VII. 4).

31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty, and with indifference
towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind.
Follow God. The poet says that law rules all—And it is enough to
remember that law rules all.

32. About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into
atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.

33. About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off; but that
which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own
tranquillity by retiring into itself, and the ruling faculty is not
made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they
can, give their opinion about it.

34. About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe
what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of
things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one
another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before
are soon covered by those which come after.

35. From Plato: The man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of
all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it possible for him to
think that human life is anything great? It is not possible, he
said.—Such a man then will think that death also is no evil.—Certainly
not.

36. From Antisthenes: It is royal to do good and to be abused.

37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to
regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not
to be regulated and composed by itself.

38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought
about it.

39. To the immortal gods and us give joy.

40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn. One man is born;
another dies.

41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for
it.

42. For the good is with me, and the just.

43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.

44. From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is
this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for
anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and
should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is
doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.

45. For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man has placed
himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a
commander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the
hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything
else, before the baseness [of deserting his post].

46. But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble and good
is not something different from saving and being saved; for as to a man
living such or such a time, at least one who is really a man, consider
if this is not a thing to be dismissed from the thoughts: and there
must be no love of life: but as to these matters a man must intrust
them to the Deity and believe what the women say, that no man can
escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best live the
time that he has to live.

47. Look around at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert going
along with them; and constantly consider the changes of the elements
into one another, for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene
life.

48. This is a fine saying of Plato: That he who is discoursing about
men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some
higher place; should look at them in their assemblies, armies,
agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the
courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barbarians,
feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly
combination of contraries.

49. Consider the past,—such great changes of political supremacies;
thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will
certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should
deviate from the order of the things which take place now; accordingly
to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have
contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see?

50.

That which has grown from the earth to the earth,
But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,
Back to the heavenly realms returns.


This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the atoms, or
a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements.

51.

With food and drinks and cunning magic arts
Turning the channel’s course to ’scape from death.
The breeze which heaven has sent
We must endure, and toil without complaining.


52. Another may be more expert in casting his opponent; but he is not
more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that
happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his
neighbors.

53. Where any work can be clone conformably to the reason which is
common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear; for where we are
able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and
proceeds according to our constitution, there no harm is to be
suspected.

54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce
in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about
thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing
shall steal into them without being well examined.

55. Do not look around thee to discover other men’s ruling principles,
but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the
universal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own
nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being
ought to do that which is according to its constitution; and all other
things have been constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as
among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but
the rational for the sake of one another.

The prime principle then in man’s constitution is the social. And the
second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body,—for it is the
peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to circumscribe
itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses
or of the appetites, for both are animal; but the intelligent motion
claims superiority, and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the
others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of
them. The third thing in the rational constitution is freedom from
error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to
these things go straight on, and it has what is its own.

56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to
the present time; and live according to nature the remainder which is
allowed thee.

57. Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the thread of
thy destiny. For what is more suitable?

58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the
same things happened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as
strange things, and found fault with them: and now where are they?
Nowhere. Why then dost thou too choose to act in the same way; and why
dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to nature to
those who cause them and those who are moved by them; and why art thou
not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things
which happen to thee? For then thou wilt use them well, and they will
be a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and
resolve to be a good man in every act which thou dost: and remember….

59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever
bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig.

60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in
motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining
in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be
required also in the whole body. But all these things should be
observed without affectation.

61. The art of life is more like the wrestler’s art than the dancer’s,
in respect of this, that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets
which are sudden and unexpected.

62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to
have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt
neither blame those who offend involuntarily, nor wilt thou want their
approbation, if thou lookest to the sources of their opinions and
appetites.

63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of
truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and
temperance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most
necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more
gentle towards all.

64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no
dishonor in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for
it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the intelligence
is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed in the case of most pains
let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable
nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if
thou addest nothing to it in imagination: and remember this too, that
we do not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are
the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched
by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art discontented
about any of these things, say to thyself that thou art yielding to
pain.

65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman as they feel towards men.

66. How do we know if Telauges was not superior in character to
Socrates? For it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death,
and disputed more skilfully with the Sophists, and passed the night in
the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon
of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked
in a swaggering way in the streets—though as to this fact one may have
great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire what kind of a
soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content
with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly
vexed on account of men’s villainy, nor yet making himself a slave to
any man’s ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his
share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor
allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the
miserable flesh.

67. Nature has not so mingled [the intelligence] with the composition
of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing
thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy
own; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as
such by no one. Always bear this in mind; and another thing too, that
very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because
thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the
knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being
both free and modest, and social and obedient to God.

68. It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the greatest
tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as
much as they choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members
of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders
the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in
tranquillity and in a just judgment of all surrounding things and in a
ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the
judgment may say to the thing which falls under its observation: This
thou art in substance [reality], though in men’s opinion thou mayest
appear to be of a different kind; and the use shall say to that which
falls under the hand: Thou art the thing that I was seeking; for to me
that which presents itself is always a material for virtue both
rational and political, and in a word, for the exercise of art, which
belongs to man or God. For everything which happens has a relationship
either to God or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but
usual and apt matter to work on.

69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing
every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor
torpid nor playing the hypocrite.

70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a
time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of
them bad; and besides this, they also take care of them in all ways.
But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring
the bad, and this too when thou art one of them?

71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness,
which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men’s badness, which is
impossible.

72. Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds to be
neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to
itself.

73. When thou hast done a good act and another has received it, why
dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do,
either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a
return?

74. No man is tired of receiving what is useful. But it is useful to
act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is
useful by doing it to others.

75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either
everything that takes place comes by way of consequence or
[continuity]; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power
of the universe directs its own movement are governed by no rational
principle. If this is remembered, it will make thee more tranquil in
many things (vi. 44; ix. 28).




BOOK VIII.


1. This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty
fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy
life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher;
but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far
from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no
longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy
plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the
matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others],
and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as
thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else
distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without
having found happiness anywhere,—not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor
in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In
doing what man’s nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he
has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What
principles? Those which relate to good and bad: the belief that there
is nothing good for man which does not make him just, temperate, manly,
free; and that there is nothing bad which does not do the contrary to
what has been mentioned.

2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect
to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I am dead, and all is
gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an
intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the
same law with God?

3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with
Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates? For they were acquainted with
things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling
principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their
pursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for,
and to how many things were they slaves!

4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even
though thou shouldst burst.

5. This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are
according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou
wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. In the next
place, having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and
at the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and
what man’s nature demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as
it seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition and
with modesty and without hypocrisy.

6. The nature of the universal has this work to do,—to remove to that
place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away
hence, and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not
fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us]; but the
distribution of them still remains the same.

7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well;
and a rational nature goes on its way well when in its thoughts it
assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its
movements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and
aversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is
satisfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature.
For of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the
nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in
the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not
perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the nature of
man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is
intelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions
and according to its worth, times, substance, cause [form], activity
and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared
with any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all
the parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts
together of another.

8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure
[or ability] to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to
pleasure and pain: thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame,
and not to be vexed at stupid and ungrateful people, nay even to care
for them.

9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or
with thy own (V. 16).

10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something
useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the
perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever
repent of having refused any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither
good nor useful.

11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution! What is
its substance and material? And what its causal nature [or form]? And
what is it doing in the world? And how long does it subsist?

12. When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember that it is
according to thy constitution and according to human nature to perform
social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But
that which is according to each individual’s nature is also more
peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also
more agreeable (V. 1).

13. Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every
impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic,
and of Dialectic.

14. Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What
opinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to
pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and
ignominy, death and life, he has such and such opinions, it will seem
nothing wonderful or strange to me if he does such and such things; and
I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.

15. Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-tree
produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and
such things of which it is productive; and for the physician and the
helmsman it is a shame to be surprised if a man has a fever, or if the
wind is unfavorable.

16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects
thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is to persist in thy
error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to
thy own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own
understanding too.

17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it? but if it is
in the power of another, whom dost thou blame,—the atoms [chance] or
the gods? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst,
correct [that which is the cause]; but if thou canst not do this,
correct at least the thing itself; but if thou canst not do even this,
of what use is it to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done
without a purpose.

18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays
here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts,
which are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too
change, and they murmur not.

19. Everything exists for some end,—a horse, a vine. Why dost thou
wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of
the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou,—to enjoy
pleasure? See if common sense allows this.

20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the
beginning and the continuance, just like the man who throws up a ball.
What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to
come down, or even to have fallen? and what good is it to the bubble
while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be
said of a light also.

21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is;
and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it
is diseased.

Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer
and the remembered: and all this in a nook of this part of the world;
and not even here do all agree, no, not any one with himself: and the
whole earth too is a point.

22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion
or an act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly: for thou choosest
rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day.

23. Am I doing anything? I do it with reference to the good of mankind.
Does anything happen to me? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and
the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived.

24. Such as bathing appears to thee,—oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water,
all things disgusting,—so is every part of life and everything.

25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus
die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then
Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died.
Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And
those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where
are they,—for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the
Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them? All ephemeral, dead
long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time,
and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have
disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little
compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be
extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere.

26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it
is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise
the movements of the senses, to form a just judgment of plausible
appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of
the things which happen in it.

27. There are three relations [between thee and other things]: the one
to the body which surrounds thee; the second to the divine cause from
which all things come to all; and the third to those who live with
thee.

28. Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it
thinks of it—or to the soul; but it is in the power of the soul to
maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain
is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is
within, and no evil ascends so high.

29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: Now it is in
my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire, nor any
perturbation at all; but looking at all things I see what is their
nature, and I use each according to its value.—Remember this power
which thou hast from nature.

30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be,
appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain discourse.

31. Augustus’ court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors, sister,
Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius, Maecenas, physicians, and
sacrificing priests,—the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest,
not considering the death of a single man [but of a whole race], as of
the Pompeii; and that which is inscribed on the tombs,—The last of his
race. Then consider what trouble those before them have had that they
might leave a successor; and then, that of necessity some one must be
the last. Again, here consider the death of a whole race.

32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act; and if
every act does its duty as far as is possible, be content; and no one
is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty.—But
something external will stand in the way.—Nothing will stand in the way
of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately.—But perhaps some
other active power will be hindered.—Well, but by acquiescing in the
hindrance and by being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is
allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee
in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to
this ordering of which we are speaking.

33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be ready to
let it go.

34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying
anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself,
as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates
himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast
detached thyself from the natural unity,—for thou wast made by nature a
part, but now thou hast cut thyself off,—yet here there is this
beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself.
God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and
cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the kindness by which
he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be
separated at all from the universal; and when he has been separated, he
has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a
part.

35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being
all the other powers that it has, so we have received from it this
power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its
predestined place everything which stands in the way and opposes it,
and makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is
able to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such
purposes as it may have designed.

36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let
not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou
mayest expect to befall thee: but on every occasion ask thyself, What
is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt
be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the
future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is
reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest
thy mind if it is unable to hold out against even this.

37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus? Does
Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus? That would be
ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be
conscious of it? and if the dead were conscious would they be pleased?
and if they were pleased, would that make them immortal? Was it not in
the order of destiny that these persons too should first become old
women and old men and then die? What then would those do after these
were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag.

38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely, says the
philosopher.

39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is
opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of
pleasure, and that is temperance.

40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give
thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security.—Who is this
self?—The reason.—But I am not reason.—Be it so. Let then the reason
itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let
it have its own opinion about itself (VII. 16).

41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal
nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the
animal nature. And something else also is equally an impediment and an
evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance
to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all
these things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure effect
thee? The senses will look to that. Has any obstacle opposed thee in
thy efforts towards an object? If indeed thou wast making this effort
absolutely [unconditionally, or without any reservation], certainly
this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But
if thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou
hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which
are proper to the understanding no other man is used to impede, for
neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches it in any way.
When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere (XI, 12).

42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never
intentionally given pain even to another.

43. Different things delight different people; but it is my delight to
keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man
or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and
receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its
value.

44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself: for those who
rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after
time will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now; and both
are mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after
time utter this or that sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?

45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall keep my
divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act
conformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place]
sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse then it was,
depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find
which is sufficient reason for this?

46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to
an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine
which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is
not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is
usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common nature
brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.

47. If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that
disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to
wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition
gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion? And even
if thou art pained because thou art not doing some particular thing
which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than
complain?—But some insuperable obstacle is in the way?—Do not be
grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on
thee.—But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done.—Take
thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in
full activity, and well pleased too with the things which are
obstacles.

48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-collected
it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not
choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it
be when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and
deliberately? Therefore the mind which is free from passions is a
citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge
and for the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this is an
ignorant man; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is
unhappy.

49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report.
Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks
ill of thee. This has been reported; but that thou hast been injured,
that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see; but
that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first
appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing
happens to thee. Or rather add something like a man who knows
everything that happens in the world.

50. A cucumber is bitter—Throw it away.—There are briers in the
road—Turn aside from them.—This is enough. Do not add, And why were
such things made in the world? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who
is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter
and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their
workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet
they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings,
and the universal nature has no external space; but the wondrous part
of her art is that though she has circumscribed herself, everything
within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she
changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very
same, so that she requires neither substance from without nor wants a
place into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then
with her own space, and her own matter, and her own art.

51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without
method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul
inward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to
have no leisure.

Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then
can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise,
sober, just? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure
spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water;
and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse
them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt
thou possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well]? By forming
thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with contentment, simplicity, and
modesty.

52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is.
And he who does not know for what purpose the world exists, does not
know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one
of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself.
What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of
those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who
they are?

53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice
every hour? Wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please
himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything
that he does?

54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which
surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with
the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power
is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is
willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to
respire it.

55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe; and
particularly the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is
only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it as
soon as he shall choose.

56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as
indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we are made
especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each
of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor’s wickedness would
be my harm, which God has not willed in order that my unhappiness may
not depend on another.

57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it
is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffusion is extension:
Accordingly its rays are called Extensions because they are extended.
But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the
sun’s light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for
it is extended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets
with any solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air
beyond; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall
off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the
understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an
extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with
the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall down, but be fixed,
and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of
the illumination, if it does not admit it.

58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a
different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation,
neither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt acquire another kind
of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou
wilt not cease to live.

59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with
them.

60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind
indeed, both when it exercises caution and when it is employed about
inquiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object.

61. Enter into every man’s ruling faculty; and also let every other man
enter into thine.




BOOK IX.


1. He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature
has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one
another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one
another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety
towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety
to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things
that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come
into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and
is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies
intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by
deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at
variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the
order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights
against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth,
for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he
is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who
pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of
impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the
universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the
good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the
enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure,
but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.
And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of
some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is
impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice,
and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards
which the universal nature is equally affected,—for it would not have
made both, unless it was equally affected towards both,—towards these
they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and
equally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death
and life, or honor and dishonor, which the universal nature employs
equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting
impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally,
instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in
continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a
certain original movement of Providence, according to which it moved
from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having conceived
certain principles of the things which were to be, and having
determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such like
successions (VII. 75).

2. It would be a man’s happiest lot to depart from mankind without
having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride.
However, to breathe out one’s life when a man has had enough of these
things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined
to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from
this pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a
pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of
this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence
of animals so far as they are animals; but the other is a pestilence of
men so far as they are men.

3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is
one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young
and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, and to have
teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to
bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of
thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent
with the character of a reflecting man,—to be neither careless nor
impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as
one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when
the child shall come out of thy wife’s womb, so be ready for the time
when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest
also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be
made best reconciled to death by observing the objects from which thou
art going to be removed, and the morals of those with whom thy soul
will no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with
men, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently;
and yet to remember that thy departure will not be from men who have
the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be
any, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life,—to be
permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves.
But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the
discordance of those who live together, so that thou mayest say, Come
quick, O death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.

4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly
acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.

5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he
who does a certain thing.

6. Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy present
conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of
contentment with everything which happens—that is enough.

7. Wipe out imagination: check desire: extinguish appetite: keep the
ruling faculty in its own power.

8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed; but
among reasonable animals one intelligent soul is distributed: just as
there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we
see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty
of vision and all that have life.

9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all
move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Everything
which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid
flows together, and everything which is of an aerial kind does the
same, so that they require something to keep them asunder, and the
application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the
elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the
fire which is here, that even every substance which is somewhat dry is
easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is
a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly, then, everything also which
participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner
towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more.
For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in
the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused
with that which is akin to it. Accordingly among animals devoid of
reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of
young birds, and in a manner, loves; for even in animals there are
souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert
itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been
observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals
there are political communities and friendships, and families and
meetings of people; and in wars, treaties, and armistices. But in the
things which are still superior, even though they are separated from
one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent
to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which
are separated. See, then, what now takes place; for only intelligent
animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in
them alone the property of flowing together is not seen. But still,
though men strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by
it, for their nature is too strong for them; and thou wilt see what I
say, if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will one find anything
earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing, than a man
altogether separated from other men.

10. Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at the proper
seasons each produces it. But and if usage has especially fixed these
terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Reason produces
fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other
things of the same kind as reason itself.

11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong; but if
thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this
purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to such persons; and for some
purposes they even help them to get health, wealth, reputation; so kind
they are. And it is in thy power also; or say, who hinders thee?

12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be
pitied or admired: but direct thy will to one thing only,—to put
thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires.

13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all
trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions.

14. All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephemeral in
time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in
the time of those whom we have buried.

15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither
knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it,
then, which does judge about them? The ruling faculty.

16. Not in passivity but in activity lie the evil and the good of the
rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in
passivity but in activity.

17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down,
nor indeed any good to have been carried up (VIII. 20).

18. Penetrate inwards into men’s leading principles, and thou wilt see
what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of
themselves.

19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous
mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole
universe too.

20. It is thy duty to leave another man’s wrongful act there where it
is (VII. 29; IX. 38).

21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and
in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the
consideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy
manhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is
this anything to fear? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy
grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under
thy father; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and
terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear? In like manner,
then, neither are the termination and cessation and change of thy whole
life a thing to be afraid of.

22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling faculty and that of the universe
and that of thy neighbor: thy own that thou mayst make it just; and
that of the universe, that thou mayst remember of what thou art a part;
and that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted
ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that
his ruling faculty is akin to thine.

23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let
every act of thine be a component part of social life. Whatever act of
thine then has no reference either immediately or remotely to a social
end, this tears asunder thy life, and does not allow it to be one, and
it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a
man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement.

24. Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spirits
carrying about dead bodies [such is everything]; and so what is
exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead strikes our
eyes more clearly.

25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it
altogether from its material part, and then contemplate it; then
determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is
naturally made to endure.

26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented
with thy ruling faculty when it does the things which it is constituted
by nature to do. But enough [of this].

27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee
anything injurious, approach their poor souls, penetrate within, and
see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no
reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion
about thee. However, thou must be well disposed towards them, for by
nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by
dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they
set a value.

28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down
from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in
motion for every separate effect, and if this is so, be thou content
with that which is the result of its activity: or it puts itself in
motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence in a manner;
or indivisible elements are the origin of all things.—In a word, if
there is a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be
governed by it (VI. 44; VII. 75).

Soon will the earth cover us all: then the earth, too, will change, and
the things also which result from change will continue to change
forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes
and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and
their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable (XII.
21).

29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries everything
along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are
engaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the
philosopher! All drivellers. Well then, man: do what nature now
requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look
about thee to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato’s
Republic: but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and
consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change men’s
opinions? and without a change of opinions what else is there than the
slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey? Come now and tell
me of Alexander and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They
themselves shall judge whether they discovered what the common nature
required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like
tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and
modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and
pride.

30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their
countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms
and calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live
together, and die. And consider, too, the life lived by others in olden
time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now
lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and
how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising
thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is
of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else.

31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things
which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the
things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be
movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is
according to thy nature.

32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those
which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy opinion; and thou wilt
then gain for thyself ample space by comprehending the whole universe
in thy mind, and by contemplating the eternity of time, and observing
the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from
birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as well as
the equally boundless time after dissolution!

33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been
spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish too. And he who
dies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition
with him who died prematurely.

34. What are these men’s leading principles, and about what kind of
things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and
honor? Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they
think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an
idea!

35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights
in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and
from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time
without end. What, then, dost thou say,—that all things have been and
all things always will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in
so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned
to be bound in never ceasing evil (IV. 45; VII. 88)?

36. The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of everything:
water, dust, bones, filth: or again, marble rocks, the callosities of
the earth; and gold and silver, the sediments; and garments, only bits
of hair; and purple dye, blood; and everything else is of the same
kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing
of the same kind, changing from this to that.

37. Enough of this wretched life and murmuring and apish tricks. Why
art thou disturbed? What is there new in this? What unsettles thee? Is
it the form of the thing? Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it.
But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then, now become
at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we examine these
things for a hundred years or three.

38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has
not done wrong.

39. Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and come
together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what
is done for the benefit of the whole; or there are only atoms, and
nothing else than mixture and dispersion. Why, then, art thou
disturbed? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou
corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast,
dost thou herd and feed with the rest?

40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they
have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why
dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any
of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things
which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray
that any of these things should not happen or happen? for certainly if
they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate for these purposes.
But perhaps thou wilt say the gods have placed them in thy power. Well,
then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man than
to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who
has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are
in our power? Begin, then, to pray for such things, and thou wilt see.
One man prays thus: How shall I be able to lie with that woman? Do thou
pray thus: How shall I not desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:
How shall I be released from this? Another prays: How shall I not
desire to be released? Another thus: How shall I not lose my little
son? Thou thus: How shall I not be afraid to lose him? In fine, turn
thy prayers this way, and see what comes.

41. Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not about my
bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such subjects to those
who visited me; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as
before, keeping to this main point, how the mind, while participating
in such movements as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from
perturbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give
the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they
were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do,
then, the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in
any other circumstances; for never to desert philosophy in any events
that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant
man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a principle of all schools
of philosophy; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing
and on the instrument by which thou dost it.

42. When thou art offended with any man’s shameless conduct,
immediately ask thyself, Is it possible, then, that shameless men
should not be in the world? It is not possible. Do not, then, require
what is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men who
must of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be
present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man,
and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that
thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men
should not exist, thou wilt become more kindly disposed towards every
one individually. It is useful to perceive this, too, immediately when
the occasion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to
every wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote against
the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind of man some other
power. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching
the man who is gone astray; for every man who errs misses his object
and is gone astray. Besides, wherein hast thou been injured? For thou
wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has
done anything by which thy mind could be made worse; but that which is
evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what
harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been
instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou
shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a
man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason
to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet
thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all
when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself.
For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a
man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when
conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in
such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what
more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? art thou not
content that thou hast done something comformable to thy nature, and
dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a
recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members
are formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their
several constitutions obtain what is their own; so also as man is
formed by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything
benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has
acted conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own.




BOOK X.


1. Wilt thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and
naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee? Wilt thou
never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never
be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor
desiring anything, either animate or inanimate, for the enjoyment of
pleasures? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer
enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom
thou mayest live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy
present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt
thou convince thyself that thou hast everything, and that it comes from
the gods, that everything is well for thee, and will be well whatever
shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of
the perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which
generates and holds together all things, and contains and embraces all
things which are dissolved for the production of other like things?
Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods
and men as neither to find fault with them at all, nor to be condemned
by them?

2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by
nature only: then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou
art a living being, shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must
observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And
all this thou mayest allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a
rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal
is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules,
then, and trouble thyself about nothing else.

3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art
formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not formed by nature to
bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by
nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by
nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not
formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after
it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature
to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion
to make it endurable and tolerable, by thinking that it is either thy
interest or thy duty to do this.

4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error.
But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself.

5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all
eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the
thread of thy being, and of that which is incident to it (III. II; IV.
26).

6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a
system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole
which is governed by nature; next, I am in a manner intimately related
to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering
this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the
things which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is
injurious to the part if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the
whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage; and all natures
indeed have this common principle, but the nature of the universe has
this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any
external cause to generate anything harmful to itself. By remembering,
then, that I am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with
everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately
related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do
nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which
are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to
the common interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now, if these
things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayest
observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of
action which is advantageous to his fellow citizens, and is content
with whatever the state may assign to him.

7. The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is naturally
comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish; but let this be
understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is
naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would
not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to
change and constituted so as to perish in various ways, For whether did
Nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of
herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into
evil, or have such results happened without her knowing it? Both these
suppositions, indeed, are incredible. But if a man should even drop the
term Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these things
as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time
that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and
at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were
happening contrary to nature, particularly as the dissolution of things
is into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is
either a dispersion of the elements out of which everything has been
compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy
to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal
reason, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed
by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part
belongs to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its
accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the
food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which has received [the
accretion], changes, not that which thy mother brought forth. Hut
suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very
much with that other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change],
this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.

8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a
man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care that thou dost not change
these names; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them.
And remember that the term Rational was intended to signify a
discriminating attention to every several thing, and freedom from
negligence; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the
things which are assigned to thee by the common nature; and that
Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the
pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and above that poor
thing called fame, and death, and all such things. If, then, thou
maintainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring
to be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and
wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast
hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is
the character of a very stupid man and one over-fond of his life, and
like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts who, though covered
with wounds and gore, still entreat to be kept to the following day,
though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and
bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names: and
if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to
certain islands of the Happy. But if thou shalt perceive that thou
fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously
into some nook where thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once
from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty,
after doing this one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have
gone out of it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these
names, it will greatly help thee if thou rememberest the gods, and that
they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be
made like themselves; and if thou rememberest that what does the work
of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a
dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does
the work of a man is a man.

9. Mimi, war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those
holy principles of thine. How many things without studying nature dost
thou imagine, and how many dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to
look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of
dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty
is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the knowledge of each
several thing is maintained without showing it, but yet not concealed.
For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the
knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and
what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist,
and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who
are able both to give it and take it away?

10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has
caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a
net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has
taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these
robbers, if thou examinest their opinions?

11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into
one another, and constantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about
this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce
magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he
must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave
everything here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all his
actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself to the
universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him
or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself contented
with these two things,—with acting justly in what he now does, and
being satisfied with what is now assigned to him; and he lays aside all
distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else than to
accomplish the straight course through the law, and by accomplishing
the straight course to follow God.

12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to
inquire what ought to be done? And if thou seest clear, go by this way
content, without turning back: but if thou dost not see clear, stop and
take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on
according to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which
appears to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou
dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason
in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also
cheerful and collected.

13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep whether it
will make any difference to thee if another does what is just and
right. It will make no difference (VI. 32; VIII. 55).

Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume arrogant airs
in bestowing their praise or blame on others are such as they are at
bed and at board, and thou hast not forgotten what they do, and what
they avoid, and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob,
not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of
which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth,
law, a good daemon [happiness] (VII. 17)?

14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is
instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt; take back what thou
wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently, and well pleased
with her.

15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a
mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here,
if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [political
community]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according
to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is
better than to live thus [as men do].

16. No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good man ought
to be, but be such.

17. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of
substance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are
a grain of a fig, and as to time the turning of a gimlet.

18. Look at everything that exists, and observe that it is already in
dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefaction or dispersion,
or that everything is so constituted by nature as to die.

19. Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping, generating,
easing themselves, and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when
they are imperious and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their
elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and
for what things; and after a little time consider in what a condition
they will be.

20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature
brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings
it.

21. “The earth loves the shower”; and “the solemn ether loves”; and the
universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the
universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that
“this or that loves [is wont] to be produced”?

22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it,
or thou art going away, and this was thy own will; or thou art dying
and hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is
nothing. Be of good cheer, then.

23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like
any other; and that all things here are the same with things on the top
of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be.
For thou wilt find just what Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a
city as in a shepherd’s fold on a mountain. [The three last words are
omitted in the translation.]

24. What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what nature am I now
making it? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of
understanding? is it loosed and rent asunder from social life? is it
melted into and mixed with the poor flesh so as to move together with
it?

25. He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law is master,
and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And he also who is grieved or
angry or afraid, is dissatisfied because something has been or is or
shall be of the things which are appointed by him who rules all things,
and he is Law and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who fears
or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.

26. A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then another cause
takes it, and labors on it and makes a child. What a thing from such a
material! Again, the child passes food down through the throat, and
then another cause takes it and makes perception and motion, and in
fine, life and strength and other things; how many and how strange!
Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden way, and
see the power just as we see the power which carries things downwards
and upwards, not with the eyes, but still no less plainly (VII. 75).

27. Constantly consider how all things such as they now are, in time
past also were; and consider that they will be the same again. And
place before thy eyes entire dramas and stages of the same form,
whatever thou hast learned from thy experience or from older history;
for example, the whole court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of
Antoninus, and the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for
all those were such dramas as we see now, only with different actors.

28. Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or discontented to be
like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and screams.

Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments the bonds in
which we are held. And consider that only to the rational animal is it
given to follow voluntarily what happens; but simply to follow is a
necessity imposed on all.

29. Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest, pause and
ask thyself if death is a dreadful thing because it deprives thee of
this.

30. When thou art offended at any man’s fault, forthwith turn to
thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err thyself; for
example, in thinking that money is a good thing, or pleasure, or a bit
of reputation, and the like. For by attending to this thou wilt quickly
forget thy anger, if this consideration also is added, that the man is
compelled: for what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away
from him the compulsion.

31. When thou hast seen Satyron the Socratic, think of either Eutyches
or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Euphrates, think of Eutychion or
Silvanus, and when thou hast seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and
when thou hast seen Xenophon, think of Crito or Severus, and when thou
hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the case of
every one do in like manner. Then let this thought be in thy mind,
Where then are those men? Nowhere, or nobody knows where. For thus
continuously thou wilt look at human things as smoke and nothing at
all; especially if thou reflectest at the same time that what has once
changed will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But
thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And why art thou
not content to pass through this short time in an orderly way? What
matter and opportunity [for thy activity] art thou avoiding? For what
else are all these things, except exercises for the reason, when it has
viewed carefully and by examination into their nature the things which
happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have made these things
thy own, as the stomach which is strengthened makes all things its own,
as the blazing fire makes flame and brightness out of everything that
is thrown into it.

32. Let it not be in any man’s power to say truly of thee that thou art
not simple or that thou art not good; but let him be a liar whoever
shall think anything of this kind about thee; and this is altogether in
thy power. For who is he that shall hinder thee from being good and
simple? Do thou only determine to live no longer unless thou shalt be
such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou art not
such.

33. What is that which as to this material [our life] can be done or
said in the way most conformable to reason? For whatever this may be,
it is in thy power to do it or to say it, and do not make excuses that
thou art hindered. Thou wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in
such a condition that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such
shall be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented to
thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to man’s
constitution; for a man ought to consider as an enjoyment everything
which it is in his power to do according to his own nature. And it is
in his power everywhere. Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move
everywhere by its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to
anything else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul, for
the things which check them and stand in the way are many. But
intelligence and reason are able to go through everything that opposes
them, and in such manner as they are formed by nature and as they
choose. Place before thy eyes this facility with which the reason will
be carried through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards,
as a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing further.
For all other obstacles either affect the body only, which is a dead
thing; or, except through opinion and the yielding of the reason
itself, they do not crush nor do any harm of any kind; for if they did,
he who felt it would immediately become bad. Now, in the case of all
things which have a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to
any of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently worse; but
in the like case, a man becomes both better, if one may say so, and
more worthy of praise by making a right use of these accidents. And
finally remember that nothing harms him who is really a citizen, which
does not harm the state; nor yet does anything harm the state, which
does not harm law [order]; and of these things which are called
misfortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law does not
harm either state or citizen.

34. To him who is penetrated by true principles even the briefest
precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind him that he
should be free from grief and fear. For example,—

“Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground—
So is the race of men.”


Leaves, also, are thy children; and leaves, too, are they who cry out
as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their praise, or on the
contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer; and leaves, in like
manner, are those who shall receive and transmit a man’s fame to
after-times. For all such things as these “are produced in the season
of spring,” as the poet says; then the wind casts them down; then the
forest produces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is
common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all things as
if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou shalt close thy eyes;
and him who has attended thee to thy grave another will soon lament.

35. The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to say, I
wish for green things; for this is the condition of a diseased eye. And
the healthy hearing and smelling ought to be ready to perceive all that
can be heard and smelled. And the healthy stomach ought to be with
respect to all food just as the mill with respect to all things which
it is formed to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding ought
to be prepared for everything which happens; but that which says, Let
my dear children live, and let all men praise whatever I may do, is an
eye which seeks for green things, or teeth which seek for soft things.

36. There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by him when he
is dying some who are pleased with what is going to happen. Suppose
that he was a good and wise man, will there not be at last some one to
say to himself, Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from this
schoolmaster? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I
perceived that he tacitly condemns us.—This is what is said of a good
man. But in our own case how many other things are there for which
there are many who wish to get rid of us. Thou wilt consider this,
then, when thou art dying, and thou wilt depart more contentedly by
reflecting thus: I am going away from such a life, in which even my
associates in behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared,
themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some little
advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a longer stay here? Do
not however for this reason go away less kindly disposed to them, but
preserving thy own character, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and
on the other hand not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies
a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the body, such
also ought thy departure from men to be, for nature united thee to them
and associated thee. But does she now dissolve the union? Well, I am
separated as from kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without
compulsion; for this, too, is one of the things according to nature.

37. Accustom thyself as much as possible on the occasion of anything
being done by any person to inquire with thyself, For what object is
this man doing this? But begin with thyself, and examine thyself first.

38. Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing which is
hidden within: this is the power of persuasion, this is life, this, if
one may so say, is man. In contemplating thyself never include the
vessel which surrounds thee and these instruments which are attached
about it. For they are like to an axe, differing only in this, that
they grow to the body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts
without the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver’s
shuttle, and the writer’s pen, and the driver’s whip.




BOOK XI.


1. These are the properties of the rational soul: it sees itself,
analyses itself, and makes itself such as it chooses; the fruit which
it bears itself enjoys,—for the fruits of plants and that in animals
which corresponds to fruits others enjoy,—it obtains its own end,
wherever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and in a
play and in such like things, where the whole action is incomplete if
anything cuts it short; but in every part, and where-ever it may be
stopped, it makes what has been set before it full and complete, so
that it can say, I have what is my own. And further it traverses the
whole universe, and the surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and
it extends itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and
comprehends the periodical renovation of all things, and it comprehends
that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor have those
before us seen anything more, but in a manner he who is forty years
old, if he has any understanding at all, has seen by virtue of the
uniformity that prevails all things which have been and all that will
be. This too is a property of the rational soul, love of one’s
neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself,
which is also the property of Law. Thus then right reason differs not
at all from the reason of justice.

2. Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing and the
pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of the voice into its
several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if thou art mastered by
this; for thou wilt be prevented by shame from confessing it: and in
the matter of dancing, if at each movement and attitude thou wilt do
the same; and the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all
things, then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply
thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to value
them little: and apply this rule also to thy whole life.

3. What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it must be
separated from the body, and ready either to be extinguished or
dispersed or continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes from a
man’s own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,
but considerately and with dignity and in a way to persuade another,
without tragic show.

4. Have I done something for the general interest? Well then I have had
my reward. Let this always be present to thy mind, and never stop
[doing such good].

5. What is thy art? To be good. And how is this accomplished well
except by general principles, some about the nature of the universe,
and others about the proper constitution of man?

6. At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of reminding
men of the things which happen to them, and that it is according to
nature for things to happen so, and that, if you are delighted with
what is shown on the stage, you should not be troubled with that which
takes place on the larger stage. For you see that these things must be
accomplished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out, “O
Cithaeron.” And, indeed, some things are said well by the dramatic
writers, of which kind is the following especially:—

“Me and my children if the gods neglect,
This has its reason too.”


And again,—

“We must not chafe and fret at that which happens.”


And,—

“Life’s harvest reap like the wheat’s fruitful ear.”


And other things of the same kind.

After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a magisterial
freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of speaking was useful in
reminding men to beware of insolence; and for this purpose too Diogenes
used to take from these writers.

But as to the middle comedy, which came next, observe what it was, and
again, for what object the new comedy was introduced, which gradually
sank down into a mere mimic artifice. That some good things are said
even by these writers, everybody knows: but the whole plan of such
poetry and dramaturgy, to what end does it look?

7. How plain does it appear that there is not another condition of life
so well suited for philosophizing as this in which thou now happenest
to be.

8. A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of necessity be cut
off from the whole tree also. So too a man when he is separated from
another man has fallen off from the whole social community. Now as to a
branch, another cuts it off; but a man by his own act separates himself
from his neighbor when he hates him and turns away from him, and he
does not know that he has at the same time cut himself off from the
whole social system. Yet he has this privilege certainly from Zeus, who
framed society, for it is in our power to grow again to that which is
near to us, and again to become a part which helps to make up the
whole. However, if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes
it difficult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and
to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch, which from
the first grew together with the tree, and has continued to have one
life with it, is not like that which after being cut off is then
ingrafted, for this is something like what the gardeners mean when they
say that it grows with the rest of the tree, but that it has not the
same mind with it.

9. As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art proceeding
according to right reason will not be able to turn thee aside from thy
proper action, so neither let them drive thee from thy benevolent
feelings towards them, but be on thy guard equally in both matters, not
only in the matter of steady judgment and action, but also in the
matter of gentleness to those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble
thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as well as to
be diverted from thy course of action and to give way through fear; for
both are equally deserters from their post,—the man who does it through
fear, and the man who is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman
and a friend.

10. There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts imitate
the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature which is the most
perfect and the most comprehensive of all natures, cannot fall short of
the skill of art. Now all arts do the inferior things for the sake of
the superior; therefore the universal nature does so too. And, indeed,
hence is the origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have
their foundation: for justice will not be observed, if we either care
for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived and
careless and changeable (V. 16, 30; VII. 55).

11. If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoidances of
which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to them. Let then thy
judgment about them be at rest, and they will remain quiet, and thou
wilt not be seen either pursuing or avoiding.

12. The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure when it is
neither extended towards any object, nor contracted inwards, nor
dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by light, by which it sees
the truth,—the truth of all things and the truth that is in itself
(VIII. 41, 45; XII. 3).

13. Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that himself. But
I will look to this, that I be not discovered doing or saying anything
deserving of contempt. Shall any man hate me? Let him look to it. But I
will be mild and benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even
him his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display of my
endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Phocion, unless
indeed he only assumed it. For the interior [parts] ought to be such,
and a man ought to be seen by the gods neither dissatisfied with
anything nor complaining. For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now
doing what is agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that
which at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since
thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what is for the
common advantage may be done in some way?

14. Men despise one another and flatter one another; and men wish to
raise themselves above one another, and crouch before one another.

15. How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have determined to deal
with thee in a fair way!—What art thou doing, man? There is no occasion
to give this notice. It will soon show itself by acts. The voice ought
to be plainly written on the forehead. Such as a man’s character is, he
immediately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forthwith
reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who is honest and good
ought to be exactly like a man who smells strong, so that the bystander
as soon as he comes near him must smell whether he choose or not. But
the affectation of simplicity is like a crooked stick. Nothing is more
disgraceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid this
most of all. The good and simple and benevolent show all these things
in the eyes, and there is no mistaking.

16. As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul, if it be
indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it will be
indifferent, if it looks on each of these things separately and all
together, and if it remembers that not one of them produces in us an
opinion about itself, nor comes to us; but these things remain
immovable, and it is we ourselves who produce the judgments about them,
and, as we may say, write them in ourselves, it being in our power not
to write them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments
have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them out; and if
we remember also that such attention will only be for a short time, and
then life will be at an end. Besides, what trouble is there at all in
doing this? For if these things are according to nature, rejoice in
them and they will be easy to thee: but if contrary to nature, seek
what is conformable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even if
it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek his own good.

17. Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it consists, and
into what it changes, and what kind of a thing it will be when it has
changed, and that it will sustain no harm.

18. [If any have offended against thee, consider first]: What is my
relation to men, and that we are made for one another; and in another
respect I was made to be set over them, as a ram over the flock or a
bull over the herd. But examine the matter from first principles, from
this: If all things are not mere atoms, it is nature which orders all
things: if this is so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the
superior, and these for the sake of one another (II. 1; IX. 39; V. 16;
III. 4).

Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in bed, and so
forth: and particularly, under what compulsions in respect of opinions
they are; and as to their acts, consider with what pride they do what
they do (VIII. 14; IX. 34).

Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not to be
displeased: but if they do not right, it is plain that they do so
involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every soul is unwillingly
deprived of the truth, so also is it unwillingly deprived of the power
of behaving to each man according to his deserts. Accordingly men are
pained when they are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a
word wrong-doers to their neighbors (VII. 62, 63; II. 1; VII. 26; VIII.
29).

Fourth, consider that thou also dost many things wrong, and that thou
art a man like others; and even if thou dost abstain from certain
faults, still thou hast the disposition to commit them, though either
through cowardice, or concern about reputation, or some such mean
motive, thou dost abstain from such faults (I. 17).

Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand whether men are
doing wrong or not, for many things are done with a certain reference
to circumstances. And in short, a man must learn a great deal to enable
him to pass a correct judgment on another man’s acts (IX. 38; IV. 51).

Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that man’s life is
only a moment, and after a short time we are all laid out dead (VII.
58; IV. 48).

Seventh, that it is not men’s acts which disturb us, for those acts
have their foundation in men’s ruling principles, but it is our own
opinions which disturb us. Take away these opinions then, and resolve
to dismiss thy judgment about an act as if it were something grievous,
and thy anger is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By
reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on thee: for
unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also must of necessity
do many things wrong, and become a robber and everything else (V. 25;
VII. 16).

Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and
vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we
are angry and vexed (IV. 39, 49; VII. 24).

Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine,
and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most
violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition
towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him
and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to
do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature
for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art
injuring thyself, my child.—And show him with gentle tact and by
general principles that this is so, and that even bees do not do as he
does, nor any animals which are formed by nature to be gregarious. And
thou must do this neither with any double meaning nor in the way of
reproach, but affectionately and without any rancor in thy soul; and
not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander may
admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are present….[6]

Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them as a gift
from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while thou livest. But
thou must equally avoid flattering men and being vexed at them, for
both are unsocial and lead to harm. And let this truth be present to
thee in the excitement of anger, that to be moved by passion is not
manly, but that mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to
human nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses these
qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and not the man who
is subject to fits of passion and discontent. For in the same degree in
which a man’s mind is nearer to freedom from all passion, in the same
degree also is it nearer to strength: and as the sense of pain is a
characteristic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain
and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both submit.

But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the leader of the
[Muses, Apollo], and it is this,—that to expect bad men not to do wrong
is madness, for he who expects this desires an impossibility. But to
allow men to behave so to others, and to expect them not to do thee any
wrong, is irrational and tyrannical.

19. There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty
against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and when thou
hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out and say on each
occasion thus: This thought is not necessary: this tends to destroy
social union: this which thou art going to say comes not from the real
thoughts; for thou shouldst consider it among the most absurd of things
for a man not to speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when
thou shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence of
the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yielding to the less
honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and to its gross
pleasures (IV. 24; II. 16).

20. Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled in thee,
though by nature they have an upward tendency, still in obedience to
the disposition of the universe they are overpowered here in the
compound mass [the body]. And also the whole of the earthy part in thee
and the watery, though their tendency is downward, still are raised up
and occupy a position which is not their natural one. In this manner
then the elemental parts obey the universal; for when they have been
fixed in any place, perforce they remain there until again the
universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it not then
strange that thy intelligent part only should be disobedient and
discontented with its own place? And yet no force is imposed on it, but
only those things which are comformable to its nature: still it does
not submit, but is carried in the opposite direction. For the movement
towards injustice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is
nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature. And also
when the ruling faculty is discontented with anything that happens,
then too it deserts its post: for it is constituted for piety and
reverence towards the gods no less than for justice. For these
qualities also are comprehended under the generic term of contentment
with the constitution of things, and indeed they are prior to acts of
justice.

21. He who has not one and always the same object in life, cannot be
one and the same all through his life. But what I have said is not
enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as
there is not the same opinion about all the things which in some way or
other are considered by the majority to be good, but only about some
certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so
also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a
common kind [social] and political. For he who directs all his own
efforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will
always be the same.

22. Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of the alarm
and trepidation of the town mouse.[7]

23. Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name of
Lamiae,—bugbears to frighten children.

24. The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set seats in
the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down anywhere.

25. Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas for not going to him, saying,
It is because I would not perish by the worst of all ends; that is, I
would not receive a favor and then be unable to return it.

26. In the writings of the [Ephesians] there was this precept,
constantly to think of some one of the men of former times who
practised virtue.

27. The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the heavens that we
may be reminded of those bodies which continually do the same things
and in the same manner perform their work, and also be reminded of
their purity and nudity. For there is no veil over a star.

28. Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed himself in a skin,
after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone out, and what Socrates
said to his friends who were ashamed of him and drew back from him when
they saw him dressed thus.

29. Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay down
rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to obey rules
thyself. Much more is this so in life.

30. A slave thou art: free speech is not for thee.


31. And my heart laughed within.
     _Odyssey_, IX. 413.


32. And virtue they will curse, speaking harsh words.
     HESIOD, _Works and Days_, 184.


33. To look for the fig in winter is a madman’s act: such is he who
looks for his child when it is no longer allowed (Epictetus, III. 24,
87).

34. When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should whisper to
himself, “To-morrow perchance thou wilt die.”—But those are words of
bad omen.—“No word is a word of bad omen,” said Epictetus, “which
expresses any work of nature; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad
omen to speak of the ears of corn being reaped” (Epictetus, III. 24,
88).

35. The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are changes,
not into nothing, but into something which exists not yet (Epictetus,
III. 24).

36. No man can rob us of our free will (Epictetus III. 22, 105).

37. Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules] with
respect to giving his assent; and in respect to his movements he must
be careful that they be made with regard to circumstances, that they be
consistent with social interests, that they have regard to the value of
the object; and as to sensual desire, he should altogether keep away
from it; and as to avoidance [aversion], he should not show it with
respect to any of the things which are not in our power.

38. The dispute then, he said, is not about any common matter, but
about being mad or not.

39. Socrates used to say, What do you want, souls of rational men or
irrational?—souls of rational men.—Of what rational men, sound or
unsound?—Sound.—Why then do you not seek for them?—Because we have
them.—Why then do you fight and quarrel?




BOOK XII.


1. All those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a circuitous
road thou canst have now, if thou dost not refuse them to thyself. And
this means, if thou wilt take no notice of all the past, and trust the
future to providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety
and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayest be content with the
lot which is assigned to thee, for nature designed it for thee and thee
for it. Conformably to justice, that thou mayest always speak the truth
freely and without disguise, and do the things which are agreeable to
law and according to the worth of each. And let neither another man’s
wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the sensations
of the poor flesh which has grown about thee; for the passive part will
look to this. If, then, whatever the time may be when thou shalt be
near to thy departure, neglecting everything else thou shalt respect
only thy ruling faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt
be afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if thou
shalt fear never to have begun to live according to nature,—then thou
wilt be a man worthy of the universe which hast produced thee, and thou
wilt cease to be a stranger in thy native land, and to wonder at things
which happen daily as if they were something unexpected, and not to be
dependent on this or that.

2. God sees the minds [ruling principles] of all men bared of the
material vesture and rind and impurities. For with his intellectual
part alone he touches the intelligence only which has flowed and been
derived from himself into these bodies. And if thou also usest thyself
to do this, thou wilt rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who
regards not the poor flesh which envelops him, surely will not trouble
himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and such like
externals and show.

3. The things are three of which thou art composed: a little body, a
little breath [life], intelligence. Of these the first two are thine,
so far as it is thy duty to take care of them; but the third alone is
properly thine. Therefore if thou shalt separate from thyself, that is,
from thy understanding, whatever others do or say, and whatever thou
hast done or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee
because they may happen, and whatever in the body which envelops thee
or in the breath [life], which is by nature associated with the body,
is attached to thee independent of thy will, and whatever the external
circumfluent vortex whirls round, so that the intellectual power exempt
from the things of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is
just and accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt
separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which are attached
to it by the impressions of sense, and the things of time to come and
of time that is past, and wilt make thyself like Empedocles’ sphere,

“All round and in its joyous rest reposing”;


and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life, that is,
the present,—then thou wilt be able to pass that portion of life which
remains for thee up to the time of thy death free from perturbations,
nobly, and obedient to thy own daemon [to the god that is within thee]
(II. 13, 17; III. 5, 6; XI. 12).

4. I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more
than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own opinion of
himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher
should present himself to a man and bid him to think of nothing and to
design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it,
he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have
we to what our neighbors shall think of us than to what we shall think
of ourselves.

5. How can it be that the gods, after having arranged all things well
and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some
men, and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most
communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious
observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have
once died should never exist again, but should be completely
extinguished?

But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise,
the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be
possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it
so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou
convinced that it ought not to have been so: for thou seest even of
thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the Deity; and we
should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent
and most just; but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything
in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and
irrationally.

6. Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest of
accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffectual for all
other things for want of practice, holds the bridle more vigorously
than the right hand; for it has been practised in this.

7. Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man should be
when he is overtaken by death; and consider the shortness of life, the
boundless abyss of time past and future, the feebleness of all matter.

8. Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things bare of their
coverings; the purposes of actions; consider what pain is, what
pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is to himself the cause of his
uneasiness; how no man is hindered by another; that everything is
opinion.

9. In the application of thy principles thou must be like the
pancratiast, not like the gladiator; for the gladiator lets fall the
sword which he uses and is killed; but the other always has his hand,
and needs to do nothing else than use it.

10. See what things are in themselves, dividing them into matter, form,
and purpose.

11. What a power man has to do nothing except what God will approve,
and to accept all that God may give him.

12. With respect to that which happens conformably to nature, we ought
to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong either voluntarily or
involuntarily, nor men, for they do nothing wrong except involuntarily.
Consequently we should blame nobody (II. 11, 12, 13; VII. 62; VIII. 17,
18).

13. How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised at
anything which happens in life.

14. Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a kind
providence, or a confusion without a purpose and without a director
(IV. 27). If then there is an invincible necessity, why dost thou
resist? But if there is a providence which allows itself to be
propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the divinity. But if
there is a confusion without a governor, be content that in such a
tempest thou hast in thyself a certain ruling intelligence. And even if
the tempest carry thee away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor
breath, everything else; for the intelligence at least it will not
carry away.

15. Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splendor until
it is extinguished; and shall the truth which is in thee and justice
and temperance be extinguished [before thy death]?

16. When a man has presented the appearance of having done wrong [say],
How then do I know if this is a wrongful act? And even if he has done
wrong, how do I know that he has not condemned himself? And so this is
like tearing his own face. Consider that he who would not have the bad
man do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree bear
juice in the figs, and infants cry, and the horse neigh, and whatever
else must of necessity be. For what must a man do who has such a
character? If then thou art irritable, cure this man’s disposition.

17. If it is not right, do not do it: if it is not true, do not say it.
[For let thy efforts be—]

18. In everything always observe what the thing is which produces for
thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it into the formal, the
material, the purpose, and the time within which it must end.

19. Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and more
divine than the things which cause the various effects, and as it were
pull thee by the strings. What is there now in my mind,—is it fear, or
suspicion, or desire, or anything of the kind (V. 11)?

20. First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose. Second,
make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social end.

21. Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, nor will
any of the things exist which thou now seest, nor any of those who are
now living. For all things are formed by nature to change and be turned
and to perish, in order that other things in continuous succession may
exist (IX. 28).

22. Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.
Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner who
has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, everything stable, and
a waveless bay.

23. Any one activity, whatever it may be, when it has ceased at its
proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased; nor he who has done
this act, does he suffer any evil for this reason, that the act has
ceased. In like manner then the whole which consists of all the acts,
which is our life, if it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for
this reason, that it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series
at the proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper time and
the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the peculiar nature of
man, but always the universal nature, by the change of whose parts the
whole universe continues ever young and perfect. And everything which
is useful to the universal is always good and in season. Therefore the
termination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it
shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not opposed to
the general interest, but it is good, since it is seasonable, and
profitable to and congruent with the universal. For thus too he is
moved by the Deity who is moved in the same manner with the Deity, and
moved towards the same things in his mind.

24. These three principles thou must have in readiness: In the things
which thou dost do nothing either inconsiderately or otherwise than as
Justice herself would act; but with respect to what may happen to thee
from without, consider that it happens either by chance or according to
providence, and thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence.
Second, consider what every being is from the seed to the time of its
receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to the giving back
of the same, and of what things every being is compounded, and into
what things it is resolved. Third, if thou shouldst suddenly be raised
up above the earth, and shouldst look down on human things, and observe
the variety of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst
see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell all around
in the air and the ether, consider that as often as thou shouldst be
raised up, thou wouldst see the same things, sameness of form and
shortness of duration. Are these things to be proud of?

25. Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders thee from
casting it away?

26. When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast forgotten this,
that all things happen according to the universal nature; and forgotten
this, that a man’s wrongful act is nothing to thee; and further thou
hast forgotten this, that everything which happens, always happened so
and will happen so, and now happens so everywhere; forgotten this too,
how close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race, for it
is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of intelligence. And
thou hast forgotten this too, that every man’s intelligence is a god
and is an efflux of the Deity; and forgotten this, that nothing is a
man’s own, but that his child and his body and his very soul came from
the Deity; forgotten this, that everything is opinion; and lastly thou
hast forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and loses
only this.

27. Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have complained
greatly about anything, those who have been most conspicuous by the
greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities or fortunes of any kind: then
think where are they all now? Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a
tale. And let there be present to thy mind also everything of this
sort, how Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in
his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae, and
Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia]; and in fine think of the eager
pursuit of anything conjoined with pride; and how worthless everything
is after which men violently strain; and how much more philosophical it
is for a man in the opportunities presented to him to show himself
just, temperate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all
simplicity: for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is the
most intolerable of all.

28. To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods, or how dost thou
comprehend that they exist and so worshippest them, I answer, in the
first place, they may be seen even with the eyes;[8] in the second
place, neither have I seen even my own soul, and yet I honor it. Thus
then with respect to the gods, from what I constantly experience of
their power, from this I comprehend that they exist, and I venerate
them.

29. The safety of life is this, to examine everything all through, what
it is itself, that is its material, what the formal part; with all thy
soul to do justice and to say the truth. What remains, except to enjoy
life by joining one good thing to another so as not to leave even the
smallest intervals between?

30. There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by walls,
mountains, and other things infinite. There is one common substance,
though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their
several qualities. There is one soul, though it is distributed among
infinite natures and individual circumscriptions [or individuals].
There is one intelligent soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in
the things which have been mentioned, all the other parts, such as
those which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no
fellowship: and yet even these parts the intelligent principle holds
together and the gravitation towards the same. But intellect in a
peculiar manner tends to that which is of the same kin, and combines
with it, and the feeling for communion is not interrupted.

31. What dost thou wish,—to continue to exist? Well, dost thou wish to
have sensation, movement, growth, and then again to cease to grow, to
use thy speech, to think? What is there of all these things which seems
to thee worth desiring? But if it is easy to set little value on all
these things, turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and
God. But it is inconsistent with honoring reason and God to be troubled
because by death a man will be deprived of the other things.

32. How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time is assigned
to every man, for it is very soon swallowed up in the eternal! And how
small a part of the whole substance; and how small a part of the
universal soul; and on what a small clod of the whole earth thou
creepest! Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except
to act as thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common
nature brings.

33. How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all lies in
this. But everything else, whether it is in the power of thy will or
not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.

34. This reflection is most adapted to move us to contempt of death,
that even those who think pleasure to be a good and pain an evil still
have despised it.

35. The man to whom that only is good which comes in due season, and to
whom it is the same thing whether he has done more or fewer acts
conformable to right reason, and to whom it makes no difference whether
he contemplates the world for a longer or a shorter time,—for this man
neither is death a terrible thing (II. 7; VI. 23; X. 20; XII. 23).

36. Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the world]; what
difference does it make to thee whether for five years [or three]? for
that which is conformable to the laws is just for all. Where is the
hardship then, if no tyrant nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away
from the state, but nature, who brought thee into it? the same as if a
praetor who has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage.—“But I
have not finished the five acts, but only three of them.”—Thou sayest
well, but in life the three acts are the whole drama; for what shall be
a complete drama is determined by him who was once the cause of its
composition, and now of its dissolution: but thou art the cause of
neither. Depart then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is
satisfied.




THE PHILOSOPHY OF MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS.


It has been said that the Stoic philosophy first showed its real value
when it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his
successors were well suited to the gravity and practical good sense of
the Romans; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a
man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died
consistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says
Cicero, who embraced the Stoic philosophy from conviction; not for the
purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life
conformable to the Stoic precepts. In the wretched times from the death
of Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic
philosophy which could console and support the followers of the old
religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal corruption. There
were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a
good conscience and an elevated idea of the purposes of man’s
existence. Such were Paetus Thrasca, Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C.
Musonius Rufus, and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose energetic
language and manly thoughts may be as instructive to us now as they
might have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero’s
bloody reign; but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant
Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian. His
best precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced
in his finest verses by the unrivalled vigor of the Latin language.

The best two expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek
slave and a Roman emperor. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to
Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the
freedman of his unworthy master, Epaphroditus. Like other great
teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grateful pupil
Arrian for what we have of Epictetus’ discourses. Arrian wrote eight
books of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four remain and
some fragments. We have also from Arrian’s hand the small Enchiridion
or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable
commentary on the Enchiridion by Simplicius, who lived in the time of
the emperor Justinian.

Antoninus in his first book (I. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates
his obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by
Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also
in other passages (IV. 41; XI 34, 36). Indeed, the doctrines of
Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best
authority for the explanation of the philosophical language of
Antoninus and the exposition of his opinions. But the method of the two
philosophers is entirely different. Epictetus addressed himself to his
hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple manner.
Antoninus wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short,
unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure.[9]

The want of arrangement in the original and of connection among the
numerous paragraphs, the corruption of the text, the obscurity of the
language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confusion in the
writer’s own ideas,—besides all this, there is occasionally an apparent
contradiction in the emperor’s thoughts, as if his principles were
sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who
leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at
home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind
at ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not
been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might
turn out to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude
realities of human existence. Fine thoughts and moral dissertations
from men who have not worked and suffered may be read, but they will be
forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth anything, if the
teacher has not lived the “life of an apostle,” and been ready to die
“the death of a martyr.” “Not in passivity (the passive affects) but in
activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just
as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity” (IX.
16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he
followed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him
above all want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately
as the poorest philosopher. Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that
he always had the little that he wanted and he was content with it, as
he had been with his servile station. But Antoninus after his accession
to the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an
empire which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold
mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa; and we may imagine,
though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the
troubles, the anxiety, and the sorrows of him who has the world’s
business on his hands, with the wish to do the best that he can, and
the certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he
wishes.

In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, general corruption, and
with the weight of so unwieldy an empire upon him, we may easily
comprehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to
support him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of
weakness; but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again
from their depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus
does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in
his Epistle is of the same mind; that the world is full of envious,
jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out
of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he
holds most firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they
are evidence of the struggles which even the noblest of the sons of men
had to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor
remark it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging
way, that the emperor’s reflections show that he had need of
consolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his
death. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he
found it. He constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the
universe is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must
conform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity
has done is good, that all mankind are a man’s brethren, that he must
love and cherish them and try to make them better, even those who would
do him harm. This is his conclusion (II. 17): “What then is that which
is able to conduct a man? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this
consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from violence and
unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a
purpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of
another man’s doing or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all
that happens and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever
it is, from whence he himself came; and finally waiting for death with
a cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the
elements of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no
harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into
another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and
dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according to
nature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature.”

The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe,
of its government, and of the relation of man’s nature to both. He
names the universe (VI. 1), “the universal substance,” and he adds that
“reason” governs the universe. He also (VI. 9) uses the terms
“universal nature” or “nature of the universe.” He (VI. 25) calls the
universe “the one and all, which we name Cosmos or Order.” If he ever
seems to use these general terms as significant of the All, of all that
man can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other occasions
plainly distinguishes between Matter, Material things, and Cause,
Origin, Reason. This is conformable to Zeno’s doctrine that there are
two original principles of all things, that which acts and that which
is acted upon. That which is acted on is the formless matter: that
which acts is the reason, God, who is eternal and operates through all
matter, and produces all things. So Antoninus (V. 32) speaks of the
reason which pervades all substance, and through all time by fixed
periods (revolutions) administers the universe. God is eternal, and
Matter is eternal. It is God who gives form to matter, but he is not
said to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old as
Anaxagoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter.
This doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence
both of matter and of God. The Stoics did not perplex themselves with
the insoluble question of the origin and nature of matter. Antoninus
also assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them; but his
language is sometimes very obscure.

Matter consists of elemental parts of which all material objects are
made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe,
according to Antoninus’ expression (IV. 36), “loves nothing so much as
to change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For
everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be.
But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or
into a womb: but this is a very vulgar notion.” All things then are in
a constant flux and change: some things are dissolved into the
elements, others come in their places; and so the “whole universe
continues ever young and perfect.”

When we look at the motions of the planets, the action of what we call
gravitation, the elemental combination of unorganized bodies and their
resolution, the production of plants and of living bodies, their
generation, growth, and their dissolution, which we call their death,
we observe a regular sequence of phenomena, which within the limits of
experience present and past, so far as we know the past, is fixed and
invariable. But if this is not so, if the order and sequence of
phenomena, as known to us, are subject to change in the course of an
infinite progression,—and such change is conceivable,—we have not
discovered, nor shall we ever discover, the whole of the order and
sequence of phenomena, in which sequence there may be involved
according to its very nature, that is, according to its fixed order,
some variation of what we now call the Order or Nature of Things. It is
also conceivable that such changes have taken place,—changes in the
order of things, as we are compelled by the imperfection of language to
call them, but which are no changes; and further it is certain that our
knowledge of the true sequence of all actual phenomena, as for instance
the phenomena of generation, growth, and dissolution, is and ever must
be imperfect.

We do not fare much better when we speak of Causes and Effects than
when we speak of Nature. For the practical purposes of life we may use
the terms cause and effect conveniently, and we may fix a distinct
meaning to them, distinct enough at least to prevent all
misunderstanding. But the case is different when we speak of causes and
effects as of Things. All that we know is phenomena, as the Greeks
called them, or appearances which follow one another in a regular
order, as we conceive it, so that if some one phenomenon should fail in
the series, we conceive that there must either be an interruption of
the series, or that something else will appear after the phenomenon
which has failed to appear, and will occupy the vacant place; and so
the series in its progression may be modified or totally changed. Cause
and effect then mean nothing in the sequence of natural phenomena
beyond what I have said; and the real cause, or the transcendent cause,
as some would call it, of each successive phenomenon is in that which
is the cause of all things which are, which have been, and which will
be forever. Thus the word Creation may have a real sense if we consider
it as the first, if we can conceive a first, in the present order of
natural phenomena; but in the vulgar sense a creation of all things at
a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause, and an
abandonment of all sequences of Phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to
the other words that people may use, is absolutely absurd.

Man being conscious that he is a spiritual power or an intellectual
power, or that he has such a power, in whatever way he conceives that
he has it,—for I wish simply to state a fact,—from this power which he
has in himself, he is led, as Antoninus says, to believe that there is
a greater power, which, as the old Stoics tell us, pervades the whole
universe as the intellect pervades man.

God exists then, but what do we know of his nature? Antoninus says that
the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like
animals, but we have reason, intelligence, as the gods. Animals have
life and what we call instincts or natural principles of action: but
the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul.
Antoninus insists on this continually: God is in man, and so we must
constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way
that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is
in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any
communication with the Deity; for as he says (XII. 2): “With his
intellectual part alone God touches the intelligence only which has
flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies.” In fact he
says that which is hidden within a man is life, that is the man
himself. All the rest is vesture, covering, organs, instrument, which
the living man, the real man, uses for the purpose of his present
existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to
respire; and so for him who is willing to partake of it the intelligent
power, which holds within it all things, is diffused as wide and free
as the air (VIII. 54). It is by living a divine life that man
approaches to a knowledge of the divinity. It is by following the
divinity within, as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the
Deity, the supreme good; for man can never attain to perfect agreement
with his internal guide. “Live with the gods. And he does live with the
gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with
that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon wishes,
which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, and a
portion of himself. And this daemon is every man’s understanding and
reason” (V. 27).

There is in man, that is in the reason, the intelligence, a superior
faculty which if it is exercised rules all the rest. A man must
reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we
must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must
reverence that which is supreme in ourselves; and this is that which is
of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe (V. 21).

Antoninus speaks of a man’s condemnation of himself when the diviner
part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable
and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures.

Antoninus did not view God and the material universe as the same, any
more than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no
speculations on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his
fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand. He was
satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can
only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this
imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him,
and keeping it pure.

From all that has been said, it follows that the universe is
administered by the Providence of God and that all things are wisely
ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or
states different possible theories of the constitution and government
of the universe; but he always recurs to his fundamental principle;
that if we admit the existence of a deity, we must also admit that he
orders all things wisely and well (IV. 27; VI. 1; IX. 28; XII. 5).

But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what
we call evil, physical and moral? If instead of saying that there is
evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, “what we
call evil,” we have partly anticipated the emperor’s answer. We see and
feel and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we
live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human
race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now, as our
reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and
connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the
universe of things is a contradiction; for if the whole comes from and
is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive
anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole
(VII. 55; X. 6).

Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We
might imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and
yet the whole would still subsist “ever young and perfect.”

All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms appear. All living
things undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an
evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and
man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by
his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the
largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls
his brothers. Antoninus says, (VIII. 55) “Generally, wickedness does no
harm at all to the universe; and particularly, the wickedness [of one
man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in
his power to be released from it as soon as he shall choose.” The first
part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the whole
can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the
Stoic principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our
power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. But
this is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does
wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is
evil in the wrong- doer. Antoninus (XI. 18) gives many excellent
precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts are
practical. He teaches us to bear what we cannot avoid, and his lessons
may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of
God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in
Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and
providence of God because of the moral disorder and suffering which are
in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the
supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He
says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been
otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise (XII. 5). His
conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the government of the
world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in
the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those
who would conclude from them against the being and government of God
conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the
material world, a constitution, a system, a relation of parts to one
another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the
constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for
some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and
the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant, or
the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its
changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a
fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their
uses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal
and intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses, and on
the whole man performs these uses, dies, and leaves other men in his
place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the natural
state of man,—the state for which his nature fits him, and society
amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists; and
perhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present
knowledge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish,
and that order, its governing principle may be more firmly established.
As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to deviations real or
apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole nature of things, that
which we call disorder or evil, as it seems to us, does not in any way
alter the fact of the general constitution of things having a nature or
fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that
order is not the rule, for the existence of order both physical and
moral is proved by daily experience and all past experience. We cannot
conceive how the order of the universe is maintained: we cannot even
conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we
perform the simplest movements of the body, nor how we grow and think
and act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for
all these functions. Knowing nothing then of the unseen power which
acts in ourselves except by what is done, we know nothing of the power
which acts through what we call all time and all space; but seeing that
there is a nature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is
conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal
Nature has a cause which operates continually, and that we are totally
unable to speculate on the reason of any of those disorders or evils
which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected
from all that Antoninus has said.

The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam that Zeus
has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and
that he gives to men out of each according to his pleasure; and so we
must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek
commentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we find
in the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, “Men
say that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves
through their own folly.” The answer is plain enough even to the Greek
commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately
to their several characters. Indeed, Zeus says plainly that men do
attribute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for
they are the cause of their own sorrows.

Epictetus in his Enchiridion makes short work of the question of evil.
He says, “As a mark is not set up for the purpose of missing it, so
neither does the nature of evil exist in the universe.” This will
appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus,
but he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark
in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence
Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his purpose shall
fail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the nature of evil,
as he expresses it, does not exist; that is, evil is not a part of the
constitution or nature of things. If there were a principle of evil in
the constitution of things, evil would no longer be evil, as Simplicius
argues, but evil would be good.

One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the
emperor could say: “To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a
thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but
if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human
affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or
devoid of providence? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for
human things, and they have put all the means in man’s power to enable
him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was
anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should
be altogether in a man’s power not to fall into it. But that which does
not make a man worse, how can it make a man’s life worse? But neither
through ignorance, nor having the knowledge but not the power to guard
against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the
universe has overlooked them; nor is it possible that it has made so
great a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that
good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad.
But death certainly and life, honor and dishonor, pain and pleasure,
all these things equally happen to good and bad men, being things which
make us neither better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor
evil.”

The Ethical part of Antoninus’ Philosophy follows from his general
principles. The end of all his philosophy is to live conformably to
Nature, both a man’s own nature and the nature of the universe. Bishop
Butler has explained what the Greek philosophers meant when they spoke
of living according to Nature, and he says that when it is explained,
as he has explained it and as they understood it, it is, “a manner of
speaking not loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly
just and true.” To live according to Nature is to live according to a
man’s whole nature, not according to a part of it, and to reverence the
divinity within him as the governor of all his actions. “To the
rational animal the same act is according to nature and according to
reason.” That which is done contrary to reason is also an act contrary
to nature, to the whole nature, though it is certainly conformable to
some part of man’s nature, or it could not be done. Man is made for
action, not for idleness or pleasure. As plants and animals do the uses
of their nature, so man must do his (V. 1).

Man must also live conformably to the universal nature, conformably to
the nature of all things of which he is one; and as a citizen of a
political community he must direct his life and actions with reference
to those among whom, and for whom, among other purposes, he lives. A
man must not retire into solitude and cut himself off from his
fellow-men. He must be ever active to do his part in the great whole.
All men are his kin, not only in blood, but still more by participating
in the same intelligence and by being a portion of the same divinity. A
man cannot really be injured by his brethren, for no act of theirs can
make him bad, and he must not be angry with them nor hate them: “For we
are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like
the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another then
is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed
and to turn away” (II. 1).

Further he says: “Take pleasure in one thing, and rest in it in passing
from one social act to another social act, thinking of God” (VI. 7).
Again: “Love mankind. Follow God” (VI. 31). It is the characteristic of
the rational soul for a man to love his neighbor (XI. 1). Antoninus
teaches in various passages the forgiveness of injuries, and we know
that he also practiced what he taught. Bishop Butler remarks that “this
divine precept to forgive injuries and to love our enemies, though to
be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept
of Christianity, as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than on any
other single virtue.” The practise of this precept is the most
difficult of all virtues. Antoninus often enforces it and gives us aid
towards following it. When we are injured, we feel anger and
resentment, and the feeling is natural, just, and useful for the
conservation of society. It is useful that wrong-doers should feel the
natural consequences of their actions, among which is the
disapprobation of society and the resentment of him who is wronged. But
revenge, in the proper sense of that word, must not be practiced. “The
best way of avenging thyself,” says the emperor, “is not to become
like, the wrongdoer.” It is plain by this that he does not mean that we
should in any case practise revenge; but he says to those who talk of
revenging wrongs, “Be not like him who has done the wrong. When a man
has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about
good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt
pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry” (VII. 26). Antoninus
would not deny that wrong naturally produces the feeling of anger and
resentment, for this is implied in the recommendation to reflect on the
nature of the man’s mind who has done the wrong, and then you will have
pity instead of resentment; and so it comes to the same as St. Paul’s
advice to be angry and sin not; which, as Butler well explains it, is
not a recommendation to be angry, which nobody needs, for anger is a
natural passion, but it is a warning against allowing anger to lead us
into sin. In short the emperor’s doctrine about wrongful acts is this:
wrong-doers do not know what good and bad are: they offend out of
ignorance, and in the sense of the Stoics this is true. Though this
kind of ignorance will never be admitted as a legal excuse, and ought
not to be admitted as a full excuse in any way by society, there may be
grievous injuries, such as it is in a man’s power to forgive without
harm to society; and if he forgives because he sees that his enemies
know not what they do, he is acting in the spirit of the sublime
prayer, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.”

The emperor’s moral philosophy was not a feeble, narrow system, which
teaches a man to look directly to his own happiness, though a man’s
happiness or tranquillity is indirectly promoted by living as he ought
to do. A man must live conformably to the universal nature, which
means, as the emperor explains it in many passages, that a man’s
actions must be conformable to his true relations to all other human
beings, both as a citizen of a political community and as a member of
the whole human family. This implies, and he often expresses it in the
most forcible language, that a man’s words and action, so far as they
affect others, must be measured by a fixed rule, which is their
consistency with the conservation and the interests of the particular
society of which he is a member, and of the whole human race. To live
conformably to such a rule, a man must use his rational faculties in
order to discern clearly the consequences and full effect of all his
actions and of the actions of others: he must not live a life of
contemplation and reflection only, though he must often retire within
himself to calm and purify his soul by thought, but he must mingle in
the work of man and be a fellow-laborer for the general good.

A man should have an object or purpose in life, that he may direct all
his energies to it; of course a good object (II. 7). He who has not one
object or purpose of life, cannot be one and the same all through his
life (XI. 21). Bacon has a remark to the same effect, on the best means
of “reducing of the mind unto virtue and good estate; which is, the
electing and propounding unto a man’s self good and virtuous ends of
his life, such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to
attain.” He is a happy man who has been wise enough to do this when he
was young and has had the opportunities; but the emperor seeing well
that a man cannot always be so wise in his youth, encourages himself to
do it when he can, and not to let life slip away before he has begun.
He who can propose to himself good and virtuous ends of life, and be
true to them, cannot fail to live conformably to his own interest and
the universal interest, for in the nature of things they are one. If a
thing is not good for the hive, it is not good for the bee (VI. 54).

One passage may end this matter. “If the gods have determined about me
and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined
well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought;
and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that?
For what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole,
which is the special object of their providence? But if they have not
determined about me individually, they have certainly determined about
the whole at least; and the things which happen by way of sequence in
this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be
content with them. But if they determine about nothing—which it is
wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither sacrifice nor
pray nor swear by them, nor do anything else which we do as if the gods
were present and lived with us; but if however the gods determine about
none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about
myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful; and that is
useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and
nature. But my nature is rational and social; and my city and country,
so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome; but so far as I am a man, it is the
world.”

It would be tedious, and it is not necessary to state the emperor’s
opinions on all the ways in which a man may profitably use his
understanding towards perfecting himself in practical virtue. The
passages to this purpose are in all parts of his book, but as they are
in no order or connection, a man must use the book a long time before
he will find out all that is in it. A few words may be added here. If
we analyze all other things, we find how insufficient they are for
human life, and how truly worthless many of them are. Virtue alone is
indivisible, one, and perfectly satisfying. The notion of Virtue cannot
be considered vague or unsettled, because a man may find it difficult
to explain the notion fully to himself, or to expound it to others in
such a way as to prevent cavilling. Virtue is a whole, and no more
consists of parts than man’s intelligence does; and yet we speak of
various intellectual faculties as a convenient way of expressing the
various powers which man’s intellect shows by his works. In the same
way we may speak of various virtues or parts of virtue, in a practical
sense, for the purpose of showing what particular virtues we ought to
practise in order to the exercise of the whole of virtue, that is, as
much as man’s nature is capable of.

The prime principle in man’s constitution is social. The next in order
is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, when they are not
conformable to the rational principle, which must govern. The third is
freedom from error and from deception. “Let then the ruling principle
holding fast to these things go straight on and it has what is its own”
(VII. 53). The emperor selects justice as the virtue which is the basis
of all the rest (X. 11), and this had been said long before his time.

It is true that all people have some notion of what is meant by justice
as a disposition of the mind, and some notion about acting in
conformity to this disposition; but experience shows that men’s notions
about justice are as confused as their actions are inconsistent with
the true notion of justice. The emperor’s notion of justice is clear
enough, but not practical enough for all mankind. “Let there be freedom
from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the
external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue
of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action
terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy
nature” (IX. 31). In another place (IX. 1) he says that “he who acts
unjustly acts impiously,” which follows of course from all that he says
in various places. He insists on the practice of truth as a virtue and
as a means to virtue, which no doubt it is: for lying even in
indifferent things weakens the understanding; and lying maliciously is
as great a moral offence as a man can be guilty of, viewed both as
showing an habitual disposition, and viewed with respect to
consequences. He couples the notion of justice with action. A man must
not pride himself on having some fine notion of justice in his head,
but he must exhibit his justice in act.

The Stoics, and Antoninus among them, call some things beautiful and
some ugly, and as they are beautiful so they are good, and as they are
ugly so they are evil, or bad (II. 1). All these things, good and evil,
are in our power, absolutely some of the stricter Stoics would say; in
a manner only, as those who would not depart altogether from common
sense would say; practically they are to a great degree in the power of
some persons and in some circumstances, but in a small degree only in
other persons and in other circumstances. The Stoics maintain man’s
free will as to the things which are in his power; for as to the things
which are out of his power, free will terminating in action is of
course excluded by the very terms of the expression. I hardly know if
we can discover exactly Antoninus’ notion of the free will of man, nor
is the question worth the inquiry. What he does mean and does say is
intelligible. All the things which are not in our power are
indifferent: they are neither good nor bad, morally. Such are life,
health, wealth, power, disease, poverty, and death. Life and death are
all men’s portion. Health, wealth, power, disease, and poverty happen
to men, indifferently to the good and to the bad; to those who live
according to nature and to those who do not. “Life,” says the emperor,
“is a warfare and a stranger’s sojourn, and after fame is oblivion”
(II. 17). After speaking of those men who have disturbed the world and
then died, and of the death of philosophers such as Heraclitus, and
Democritus, who was destroyed by lice, and of Socrates whom other lice
(his enemies) destroyed, he says: “What means all this? Thou hast
embarked, thou hast made the voyage, thou art come to shore; get out.
If indeed to another life, there is no want of gods, not even there.
But if to a state without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by
pains and pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel which is as much
inferior as that which serves it is superior: for the one is
intelligence and Deity; the other is earth and corruption” (III. 3). It
is not death that a man should fear, but he should fear never beginning
to live according to nature (XII. 1). Every man should live in such a
way as to discharge his duty, and to trouble himself about nothing
else. He should live such a life that he shall always be ready for
death, and shall depart content when the summons comes. For what is
death? “A cessation of the impressions through the senses, and of the
pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive
movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh” (VI. 28).
Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature (IV. 5). In another
passage (IX. 3), the exact meaning of which is perhaps doubtful, he
speaks of the child which leaves the womb, and so he says the soul at
death leaves its envelope.

Antoninus’ opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His
doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does
not perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The
opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides;
what comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven,
the divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in
Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be
conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of
clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have
rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and
consistent with the university of things.

Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,
which some Stoics practiced,—the anticipating the regular course of
nature by a man’s own act. The reader will find some passages in which
this is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are
passages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end
patiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with
all his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot
and do useful acts as long as he lives. He should not therefore abridge
the time of his usefulness by his own act.

Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic’s life. There is no rule
of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own
happiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are
only seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the
strongest that they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to
live conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness,
tranquillity of mind, and contentment (III. 12; VIII 2). As a means of
living conformably to nature he must study the four chief virtues, each
of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge of good and
evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due; fortitude, or the
enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is moderation in all
things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic obtained all
that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous life, and he
was satisfied with that.

Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and example labored to improve
themselves and others; and if we discover imperfections in their
teaching, we must still honor these great men who attempted to show
that there is in man’s nature and in the constitution of things
sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult enough to
live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live in such a
way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate degree
the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and if all
men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and religion, it
is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as much as they
can be persuaded to accept.




FOOTNOTES:


 [1] This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain.

 [2] Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there Antoninus
 was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt.

 [3] This is corrupt.

 [4] Antoninus here uses the word κόσμος both in the sense of the
 Universe and of Order; and it is difficult to express his meaning.

 [5] This is corrupt.

 [6] It appears that there is a defect in the text here.

 [7] The story is told by Horace in his Satires and by others since,
 but not better.

 [8] “Seen even with the eyes.” It is supposed that this may be
 explained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living
 being (IV. 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (VIII. 19). But
 the emperor may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he
 afterwards states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man
 has intellectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other
 way do we know it.

 [9] The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy,—Physic, Ethic, and
 Logic (VIII. 13). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by
 Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, and by Chrysippus; but
 these philosophers placed the three divisions in the following
 order,—Logic, Physic, Ethic. It appears, however, that this division
 was made before Zeno’s time, and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero
 remarks. Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower
 sense of that word.
    Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divisions, and made
    six,—Dialectic and Rhetoric, comprised in Logic; Ethic and Politic;
    Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practical use,
    for all Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic, or
    Dialectic, does not occupy the same place as in Plato: it is
    considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other
    divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic
    doctrines and of their modifications would require a volume. My
    object is to explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they
    can be collected from his book.
    According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go
    together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of
    the nature of the Deity, so far as man can understand the Deity,
    and of his government of the universe. This division or subdivision
    is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for, as already observed,
    there is no method in his book; but it is virtually contained in
    it.
    Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the
    principles of morals and the study of the constitution of civil
    society; and undoubtedly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two
    parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic; for though the two
    are intimately connected, they are also very distinct, and many
    questions can only be properly discussed by carefully observing the
    distinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is
    Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in
    life as a man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his
    doctrines about man’s nature, the Universal Nature, and the
    relation of every man to everything else. It is therefore
    intimately and inseparably connected with Physic, or the nature of
    Things, and with Theology, or the Nature of the Deity. He advises
    us to examine well all the impressions on our minds and to form a
    right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire
    into the meaning of words, and so far to apply Dialectic; but he
    has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy
    is in substance purely moral and practical. He says, “Constantly
    and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every Impression on the
    soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Ethic, and of
    Dialectic”: which is only another way of telling us to examine the
    impression in every possible way. In another passage (III. 11) he
    says, “To the aids which have been mentioned, let this one still be
    added: make for thyself a definition or description of the object
    which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a
    thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete
    entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the
    things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be
    resolved.” Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which
    Antoninus accordingly employed as a means towards establishing his
    Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles.