A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT




  A HISTORY OF
  SOCIAL THOUGHT

  BY
  EMORY S. BOGARDUS, PH.D.

  _Professor and Head of Department of Sociology and Social Work
  University of Southern California_

  _Author of_
  INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY
  ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
  ESSENTIALS OF AMERICANIZATION


  1922
  UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PRESS
  3474 UNIVERSITY AVENUE
  LOS ANGELES




  Copyright 1922, University of Southern California Press


  JESSE RAY MILLER
  UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PRESS
  LOS ANGELES




  DEDICATED TO MY STUDENTS
  WHO ARE TRANSFORMING THEIR SOCIAL THOUGHT
  INTO HELPFUL LIVING




CONTENTS


   1. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL THOUGHT                            11

   2. EARLIEST SOCIAL THOUGHT                                 20

   3. THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS             36

   4. THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE HEBREWS                       54

   5. PLATO AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT                        74

   6. ARISTOTLE AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT                   101

   7. ROMAN SOCIAL THOUGHT                                   114

   8. EARLY CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT                         121

   9. SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES                      145

  10. MORE AND UTOPIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT                        154

  11. INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT                         173

  12. MALTHUS AND POPULATION CONCEPTS                        199

  13. COMTE AND POSITIVE SOCIAL THOUGHT                      209

  14. MARX AND SOCIALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT                    226

  15. BUCKLE AND GEOGRAPHIC SOCIAL THOUGHT                   246

  16. SPENCER AND ORGANIC SOCIAL THOUGHT                     257

  17. THE SOCIOLOGY OF LESTER F. WARD                        277

  18. ANTHROPOLOGIC SOCIOLOGY                                301

  19. EUGENIC SOCIOLOGY                                      325

  20. CONFLICT THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY                         338

  21. CO-OPERATION THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY                     352

  22. PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT                              367

  23. PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT (_continued_)                389

  24. THE TREND OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY                         423

  25. THE RISE OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY                      442

  26. THE SOCIOLOGY OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY                   451

  27. METHODS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION                  475

  28. THE DISSEMINATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT              489

      INDEX                                                  504




PREFACE


This book is written for the world of students. In it any
seriously-minded person should find a fundamental background for
understanding the central theme of human progress, a substantial basis
for attacking the most important problems of the day, and a call to
renew his faith in the soundness of human aspirations.

Inasmuch as this treatise is written for students, it is not intended
to be the last word on the subject, but simply a first word. The theme
of each chapter is in itself a subject for further investigation.
In fact, the student with an alert mind will find in each chapter
many subjects concerning which he will want to learn more. If the
discussions in this book stimulate the student to make inquiries on his
own initiative, they will have accomplished more than the author could
have expected.

                                                    EMORY S. BOGARDUS.

  _University of Southern California.
  June 1, 1921._




A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT




CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL THOUGHT


Man faces a world of social problems. As a result he is perplexed
beyond description; his thinking often ends in confusion. Inasmuch as
the average citizen, for the first time in the world’s history, is
beginning to attack social problems, he is entitled to all the aid
that can be made available. Upon the success of the average person in
mastering the intricacies of social thinking, the cause of democracy
depends.

A large proportion of the analyses of social questions has been
academic. These discussions have often terminated in quibbles or
erudite generalizations. Insofar as social theories have been correct
they have unfortunately been reserved for the theorists alone. The
people themselves have not understood the nature of social thought;
they have not benefited; and hence, they have held social thought in
contempt. Sound social thought needs to be democratized, that is, to be
made available for all people.

In thinking about social problems, the so-called practical person has
proceeded in his own way. He has had personal experience--and that to
him has been sufficient. He has been motivated by a sense of injustice,
and stung into fervid thought by circumstances which seemed to him
unfair; he has concocted a make-shift remedy, or impulsively accepted a
ready-made program. Perhaps he has urged a single cause for all social
ills and prescribed a single remedy for all social diseases. Usually,
he has been very limited in his observations, untrained in making
proper inductions, and hence, narrow and intolerant in his conclusions.
He has been entirely baffled, or else he has felt cock-sure.

The practicalist is often a poor theorist. He may be even the most
dangerous type of theorist. He has scoffed at theory and then fallen
into the pit of incorrect theory. He has failed to see, for example,
that a good bridge does not project itself across a chasm, but that a
correct bridge-building theory is essential. With social practicalists
and theorists calling each other names, instead of co-operating and
unselfishly giving the world of people the benefit of their combined
points of view, the world has floundered and its social problems have
piled up, mountains high.

Another difficulty in the pathway of sound social thinking is found in
an absence of proper backgrounds. People are prone to offer solutions
for social questions without first equipping themselves with a
knowledge of foundational elements. Moreover, they are often unwilling
to acquaint themselves with these necessary factors. It is only by
accident, however, that current social movements can be understood
unless the historical sequences of social cause and effect are
perceived. Nearly all social problems are essentially the outcroppings
of tendencies which have had a long human history. A current social
maladjustment is generally indicative of a long line of antecedent
factors. A knowledge of societary fundamentals is essential to sound
thinking about present-day evils. A history of social thought furnishes
a minimum social background for the understanding of current social
processes and problems.

Social thought, as distinguished from individual thought, treats of
the welfare of one’s associates and of groups. It may be very simple,
merely observational, the result of daily experience, or it may be a
scientific study of social processes. Sociology as an organized science
has developed only during the past few decades. Inasmuch as sociology
has simply begun its work of formulating the principles of societary
progress, a large proportion of the thinking that has thus far been
done in human history about the welfare of _socii_ or associates is
either individual or social, rather than sociological. A history of
social thought, therefore, includes the larger social field as well as
the more specific one of recent development, namely, the sociological.
The time is hardly ripe for a history of distinctly sociological
thought.

Social thought, as here used, is a synthesis of the observations of
individuals about the welfare of other individuals, considered as
individuals or as groups. The focus of social thought is not the
welfare of the ego but of the alter, not of the self but of others,
not of the individual but of the class, group, organization, or
process. Social thought draws from the thought-life of persons who
have done unselfish thinking and who have focalized their attention
upon the nature and principles of associative activities. It tests
group progress by the degree in which human personalities secure
constructive, co-operative expression. It measures the individual in
his relationships to the social whole, whether that unit be the family,
school, church, state, or the world society. It rates the individual in
terms of a functioning unit in group life. It evaluates the group both
in regard to the quality of the personalities which it produces in its
membership, and to the loyalty which it manifests as a unit of a larger
group, even of human society itself.

Social thought is both concrete and abstract. Concrete thinking rarely
goes deep. It asks few questions, raises few doubts, and perceives few
connections. Abstract thinking seeks causal explanations, classifies
concretenesses, penetrates relationships, and proposes well-balanced
procedures. The distinction, however, is largely one of degree.
Concrete thinking is characteristic of every normal person, but
abstract perceptions are uncommon. The ability to do abstract thinking,
to get at the deeper meanings of phenomena, to penetrate the mysteries
of life, is rare. Concrete thinking constitutes the major sector of the
thought-life of every person, nearly all the time.

Here and there, however, in human history we find individuals who have
been freed or who have freed themselves from the daily struggle for a
living, from the race to make money, or from the selfish enticements
of life-long loafing, and have joined the world of scholars, seeking
to know the truth, the truth which makes men and women free--free to
develop useful personalities in a vast, changing complex of human
living. When man, having leisure to think abstractly, has set himself
to the task of thought research, his mind has ventured along at least
five pathways.

(1) Man has given considerable attention to his relation to the
universe. Primitive man conceived of a personal universe, peopled with
spirits. Throughout human history man has been a religious being,
trying to solve the problems of a universe ruled by spirits and gods
or by one supreme God. This type of thought has produced polytheisms,
monotheisms, theocracies. It has formulated theological creeds and led
to bitter ecclesiastical controversies. It has created fears, hopes,
faiths, social ideals, and sacrificial standards.

(2) Irrespective of religious needs, man has endeavored to discover
proper relations to his universe. He has philosophized. He has tried
to reduce to terms of thought this baffling, intangible, universal
environment. He has searched for a specific ground for explaining the
universe. He has sought unity in change and monism in multiplicity. He
has proclaimed that change itself is Lord of the universe, or perhaps
he has found solace in a creative evolution. At any rate, he has sought
ultimate meanings in as unbiased an interpretation of the universe as
is humanly possible.

(3) From the far-flung horizons of religious and philosophic theory,
man has turned his thought in an opposite direction--he has directed
his thought upon itself. He has maneuvered his thought processes
introspectively. He has puzzled over the structure and functions of his
own mind. These series of studies have led on the one hand to treatises
such as the _Critique of Pure Reason_, and on the other hand to the
current expressions of behavioristic psychology or of psychoanalysis.

(4) Man has sought to fathom the material secrets of the earth. Since
the Industrial Revolution in England, inquiring minds have focussed
tremendous energies upon attempts to master the physical elements.
Rocks and strata of rocks have been caused to yield a wealth of ores,
and subterranean caverns have been made to pour forth reservoirs of
gas and oil. Modern transportation has been made possible by the use of
steam, gasoline, electricity. Mechanical inventions have followed one
another in unanticipated fashion, paying awe-inspiring tribute to the
genius of man. Abstract thinking has given man a marvelous degree of
control over the material side of life.

(5) Recently, the problem of man’s adjustment and responsibility to his
fellowmen is being accorded a worthy hearing at the bar of scientific
thought. For millenniums man has pondered hard over his relations and
obligations to his God and to his universe, over the nature of his mind
and spirit, over ways and means of acquiring individual success through
a manipulation of the material resources of the earth. Incomprehensible
as it may seem, it is true, however, that man has neglected almost
wholly, until recently, the very heart of all successful living,
namely, his relations and obligations to his fellow men and to society.
Social thought, the center of all sound thinking, has been ignored.
Consequently, the world, beneath its load of social ills, has slipped
backward nearly as often as it has advanced.

In the present age, however, the world is making unprecedented
demands upon social thought, long before social thought is adequately
prepared for its gigantic tasks. Religion is seeking re-vitalization
through socialized thinking. In its modern endeavor to win the world,
Christianity is making tremendous demands upon applied sociology.

After many vain searches among false theories and impersonal ends,
philosophy is seeking to find itself in a social universe. Psychology,
likewise, is no longer individual, structural, and formal; it is now
trying to interpret itself in terms of human behavior. Group processes
are being searched for the origins of stimuli that will explain
individual conduct.

Economic thought, too, has reached a stage where it is endeavoring to
re-define its concepts in the light of sociological knowledge. The
material resources of the earth as well as industrial and business
enterprises, in fact all economic values, are being measured, and
re-valued in terms of their societary significance. The meaning of
industrial democracy is being sought in sociological terms.

In the distinctively associative life enormous demands are being made
upon sociology. It is invited to formulate the criteria by which the
worth of an educational system may be determined. Groups are trying to
provide for the use of the leisure time of their members by methods
that are socially valuable. Many attempts are being made for restoring
to the family its fundamental prerogatives as a social institution.

The history of social thought rises out of the beginnings of human life
on earth and with jagged edges extends along the full sweep of the
changing historical horizon. It finds expression through some of the
world’s best minds. Our quest will bring us in contact with the most
vital moments of the world’s most valuable thinkers.




CHAPTER II

EARLIEST SOCIAL THOUGHT


Primitive people were inquisitive. They thought about what happened
and they sought explanations. Their attention was centered on the
tangible phenomena of life. Their imagination worked out fantastic
and superstitious interpretations. They reasoned about the daily
occurrences of life in concrete, graphic, and personal terms.

Primitive people everywhere, apparently, sensed in a piecemeal and
microscopic way the meaning of social relationships. Archeological
records disclose crude and simple, but nevertheless genuine social
implications. Early mythologies recognize the importance of social
bonds. Out of the dim dawn of tribal life there appeared a rough-hewn
sense of social property. The proverbs of primitive people include
implications, if not definite statements, of social responsibility.

Primitive people lived simple group lives. If the paternal relationship
was not always known or recognized, the maternal relationship
functioned for at least a few years. The loose family ties harbored a
degree of social responsibility. Wherever ancestor worship developed,
the family group assumed large proportions and manifested strong
social characteristics. The clan, or _gens_, betokened social fealty.

Communal property testified to communal thinking. The existence of
common hunting grounds and tribal flocks was indicative of folk
thought. Group dances, feasts, building enterprises, celebrations
delineated the social spirit. Warfare produced bursts of tribal
loyalty. An examination of the folkways reveals indistinct but
incipient notions of societal welfare. Such a treatise as Sumner’s
_Folkways_ chronicles a vast amount of elemental folk thinking.

Folk thinking permeated primitive religions. The earliest forms of
religion presupposed societies of spirits or gods. The conduct of the
individual was regulated by his ideas concerning the ways in which he
had pleased or offended the spirits or gods. An infant was born into
a society peopled with human and spirit beings. The latter were often
more numerous than the former; they frequently were more feared; and
hence were more powerful. The living people, the departed spirits, and
the gods in a hierarchal order constituted an effective society for the
exercise of many vigorous forms of social control.

If pestilence came, it was because the gods had been offended by some
human being. As a result of the offense of one individual, the whole
tribe was considered to be liable to punishment. Consequently, the
tribe in turn would punish the offending member and through the use
of force and fear would exert a tremendous power over the conduct and
thought of individuals.

Primitive people were dominated by custom. They were subject to the
autocracy of the past. They were hopelessly caught between ancestral
ascendance and current fears. They threaded their way, mentally,
through tantalizingly uncertain and narrow apertures. They learned the
meaning of obedience, but obedience to a harsh and rigorous past and a
fickle and disconcerting future. Leadership was drastic and capricious;
followership was frantic and tremulous.

Some of the incipient social concepts of primitive peoples have been
preserved in the form of proverbs, maxims, fables, and myths. Many
of the subtler social relationships of life were recognized by early
man. His limited thinking drifted into simple formulae. His vocabulary
was scanty; his ideas were few. He spoke in conventional sayings.
“Primitive man spoke in proverbs.”

Many folkthoughts, or primitive conceptions of social obligations,
have been preserved. The early proverbs of man reveal the beginnings
of social thought. Equally valuable and similar materials are found
in the sayings of the tribes which today are in a state of arrested
development. A few illustrations of embryonic social thought will be
given here.[II-1]

The first examples will be selected from the folkthoughts of the
Africans of the Guinea Coast. The proverb, Ashes fly back in the face
of him who throws them, recognizes that evil deeds return upon the
doer, or as moderns declare, Curses come home to roost. In the saying,
Cowries are men, primitive man roughly but succinctly stated the
theory of the economic determination of human history. It is cowries,
or money, which molds human thought, determines human evaluations
and attitudes, gives social power, and “makes the man.” An age-long
conception, indicative of a low sense of social feeling, but possessing
great force in society, is revealed in the dictum, Full-belly child
says to hungry-belly child, “Keep good cheer.” Throughout human
history, the fortunate glutton has always recommended patience and
tranquility to the unfortunate, hard-working brother. An eminent
American financier of the multi-millionaire class expressed pity
for telephone girls who undergo hard labor, but declared that their
harsh conditions were what the good Lord had made for them. But how
far has this well-groomed citizen of our century advanced beyond the
“full-belly” social philosophy of savage man?

In the observation, A fool of Ika and an idiot of Iluka meet together
to make friends, the African has noted that friends are persons of
similar types, of similar minds, of similar prejudices, and that “birds
of a feather flock together.” Whether conscious or unconscious,
association occurs among persons of a kind, among fools of Ika and
idiots of Iluka.

Romantic love, evidently, has always been fickle, for the African has
discovered that “quick loving a woman means quick not loving a woman.”
If this naïve but shrewd reflection concerning lovemaking were taken
at its real worth at the present time, it would be crystallized into
a federal marriage law requiring that a license to marry should be
obtained at least fifteen or thirty days before the marriage could be
celebrated.

A rather keen sense of social injustice is expressed in the monologue:
“The ground-pig said: ‘I do not feel so angry with the man who killed
me as with the man who dashed me on the ground afterward.’” Here the
injustice of striking an individual when he is down is depicted. Even
primitive man has a sense of sympathy for the defeated and helpless.

“Three elders cannot all fail to pronounce the word _ekulu_ (antelope):
one may say _ekúlu_; another _ekulú_; but the third will say, _ékulu_
(which is correct).” In other words, several heads are better than
one; or, in a multitude of counsellors there is safety. It was this
simple social precept which a highly individualistic man like Roosevelt
used frequently to the advantage of himself and the nation. When a
perplexing problem would confront President Roosevelt, he was wont to
invite to the White House persons whose beliefs were contrary to his
own in order to secure their opinions. He acted independently, but
after taking counsel with several “elders.”

In _Thinking Black_, Daniel Crawford has presented phases of the
colored man’s philosophy.[II-2] While much is individual, more is
social philosophy. Custom imitation prevails. The social philosophy
of the African Negro is summarized in the rule: Follow your leader.
Social precedent, not principle, is the guide to conduct. If you are
a follower, follow patiently; if you are a leader, lead drastically.
“If thou art an anvil, be patient ... but if thou art a hammer, strike
hard.”

The African understands the social psychology of language. He watches
the eyes more carefully than the voice. To him the human eye speaks all
languages under the sun. Mr. Crawford says that the wary eye of the
African “can easily fish news out of the two deep liquid pools of your
eye-balls.” If your eye says one thing and your tongue another, then
the African “will plump for the verdict of the eye.”

The aphorism, There is no pocket in a shroud, warns the individual
against the possibility of taking his material goods into the next
world. To share with other persons is rated a higher act than to store
from others. He is richest who shares most. Among the Africans with
whom Mr. Crawford worked, the word for criminal was not applied to
the person who had stolen property or who had taken life, but to the
one who eats alone. “The high crime and misdemeanor of the town is to
dine alone;” the criminal above other criminals is “Mr. Eat-Alone.”
He who refuses to share his food with those who are less fortunate
than himself is an arch-devil. Such a vice is common among beasts; it
is beneath the dignity of man--according to the African. When several
primitives were taken to London and shown the wealthy and the poor
sections of that city, they were dumbfounded. They were utterly unable
to understand how any persons with the slightest spark of human nature
in them could endure to live to themselves in wealth when in the same
city there were the wretched and prostrated multitudes of Whitechapel
and the other cheerless slums.

“What baby lion ever trembled at his father’s roaring?” A few mornings
ago, I heard an angry parent yelling at his son, but the disobedient
child kept on in his own way. I wondered how far this father had
advanced in parental influence and discipline beyond the stage
represented by the African seer who drew his social images from a
lion-frequented environment. “If a tree has grown up crooked, it is
because no one straightened it when young.” This statement postulates
social responsibility for juvenile delinquency and even for adult
crime. The underlying principle is the same as that in the Hebraic
injunction: Train up a child in the way he should go; and when he is
old, he will not depart from it. The principle has received current
recognition in the doctrine of contributory negligence of parents.
The modern observation full of socially dangerous implications, that
parents are blind to the weaknesses of their children, has its African
counterpart: The beetle is a beauty in the eyes of its mother. A gleam
of light is thrown upon the current discussions concerning social
parasitism by the African’s assertion: The parasite has no roots.

The Australian Blackfellow who goes upon a journey, sometimes takes
a handful of mother earth with him. In this way he testifies to his
loyalty to home, and provides against the rise of lonesomeness which
he will experience during tribal hunts. His act crudely represents the
essence of the concept of patriotism. A sense of justice is common
to primitive Australians. Among the Whayook of Australia a man who
has wounded a fellow tribesman is required to present himself to the
injured in order to receive a similar wound.[II-3] Among the Wumbais, a
person who is absent when a relative dies must not speak on his return
to camp to anyone until he has had spears thrown at him.[II-4] Spencer
and Gillen report that the Australian primitive regards any offense as
wiped out by a suitable proffer of atonement.[II-5]

The Filipino declares: A piece of green wood will burn if placed
near the fire. In other words, temptation is a subtle element
that ultimately may destroy even persons who are supposedly
temptation-proof. In the proverb, Boastfulness drives away wisdom, the
Filipino has pointed out that the desire to make a strong impression
upon associates hinders intellectual progress. The chief danger of
luxury is stated in the saying: He who is raised in ease, is usually
destitute. The leading result of being financially fortunate is
summarized thus: Easy earning means quick spending. The evils of
hypercriticism are bluntly phrased: The fault-finder has the biggest
faults. The law of social compensation is stated as follows: You laugh
today; I laugh tomorrow. The organic nature of society is implied in
the truism: The pain of a finger is the suffering of the whole body.
The need for independent thinking is urged in the declaration: Whoever
believes everything said, has no mind of his own. On the other hand,
the egocentric mind receives solemn warning in the dictum: He who
despises counsel is on the way to misfortune. The value of a social
spirit is proclaimed as follows: Kindness is a great capital; and
again: Good deeds are more precious than gold or silver. A gentle hint
of social importance is given in the formula: Kindness is with kindness
to be paid, not with gold or silver. In these and related proverbs the
earliest social thought of the Filipino mind is indicated.

Let us now examine a few ancient Japanese axioms. (1) The mouth of
the mass melts gold. This proverb refers to the fundamental force
of public opinion. (2) The world is like a looking-glass; if you
smile, others also smile. Here is depicted the elemental character
of unconscious imitation. (3) What the ruler wants, the ruled also
wants. In other words, what the upper classes desire, the lower classes
long for; or, as Tarde has said: “The superior are imitated by the
inferior.” (4) Three men get together and have knowledge equivalent
to that of Monju (a famous Buddhist thinker). The African, Filipino,
and English equivalents of this adage have already been given. All
races, apparently, have early observed the safety which comes from
taking counsel. (5) The net of Heaven is rough, but will never miss one
victim. Our equivalent, of Graeco-Latin origin, is: The mills of the
gods grind slowly, but exceedingly small. Evil brings its own rewards
sooner or later. The law of retribution cannot be overcome, even by
social manipulations. (6) If one dog barks a falsehood, ten thousand
others spread it as a truth. In these words, gossip is condemned, and
the humanity-wide tendency of hearsay evidence to gain social force
is pictured. (7) The tongue is but three inches long, but it can kill
a man six feet high. Again, the vicious nature of gossip is shown.
Further, the severest punishment is not always physical; it may come
from the human tongue. (8) A man takes a drink; then the drink takes
the man. In this dramatic description, the drinking of intoxicating
liquors is effectively indicted. (9) Applause is the root of abuse.
Even the Japanese have recognized the force of opinion in influencing
the individual, and of favorable opinion in unduly expanding the ego. A
unique characteristic of many Japanese proverbs is the fundamental and
deep-moving knowledge of social psychology which they show. Judged by
their proverbs, the Japanese possess an unusual understanding of human
nature.

Bulgarian proverbs disclose social thought. The “full-belly” philosophy
of the African, or the pig-trough philosophy that has been analyzed by
T. N. Carver, has its Bulgarian counterpart: The satiated man cannot
believe the hungry man. The South Slavs are noted for their weddings
which often continue for three days. When these festivities are over,
the bride enters upon a more or less monotonous round of bearing and
rearing children. These social conditions are aptly described:

    Dum! Dum! for three days;
    Oh dear! Oh dear! for all days.

Patience is enjoined in the Bulgarian adage: Endure, O horse, until the
time of green grass. Hope that rises in the heart of man is paid homely
but genuine tribute in the rural Slavic proverb: The hungry hen dreams
of millet.

The Danes have many sayings which emphasize social dependence. The
individual is instructed: Act so in the valley that you need not fear
those that stand on the hill. The shrewd man is socially dangerous,
for: Cunning has little honor. Gossip is shown as a swift messenger in
the axiom: A man’s character reaches town before his person. The most
serious result of cheating others is the effect upon the cheater, or:
He is most cheated who cheats himself. The common character of sin
is recognized in the Danish proverb: He must be pure who would blame
another. Custom is a powerful agency of control. The Danes command:
Follow the customs, or fly the country.

The Portuguese have a social saying to the effect: He buys very
dear who begs. The unscientific nature of love is indicated in the
Portuguese declaration: Love has no law. The frequent antithesis
between money lending and friend making is succinctly phrased: Money
lent, an enemy made.

A few Arabian proverbs state social ideas. The laws of human
association and imitation can be found in the following axiom: A wise
man associating with the vicious becomes an idiot; a dog traveling with
good men becomes a rational being. The strength which comes from unity
is forcibly phrased: Three if they unite against a town will ruin it.
The transforming power of love is recognized: Love can make any place
agreeable. An idealistic social standard is set for the individual in
the aphorism: It is more noble to pardon than to punish. On the other
hand, mercy may be misplaced: Mercy to the criminal may be cruelty to
the people. The individual must beware of being an ingrate; he must not
permit his selfish desires to crush out the spirit of gratitude: A tree
that affords thee shade, do not order it cut down. The omnipresence of
envy is understood: Envy assails the noblest; the winds howl around
the highest peaks. The anti-social tendency of a vicious habit is
well described: A hand accustomed to take is far from giving. Perhaps
the Malthusian advocate will find solace in the simple dictum: If
the sailors become too numerous, the boat will sink. He who pleases
everybody has done so at the expense of his own character, or as the
Arabs say: He deserves no man’s good will of whom all men speak well.

From Ceylon comes the philanthropic request: When you eat, think of the
poor. The Cingalese, however, recognize the importance of maintaining
the scientific attitude in charity, for they have a saying: He who
gives alms must do it with discretion. The blighting influence of
wealth is stated in the Cingalese axiom: A covetous man has two sources
of iniquity--how to amass money, and how to use it.

Among Mexican proverbs, social ideas are not missing. The reader will
catch the social significance of the following: (1) A howling cat is
not a good hunter; (2) Everybody can climb up the limbs of the fallen
tree; (3) A rich widow cries with one eye and rings the wedding bells
with the other; (4) The tongue slow, the eyes quick; (5) From January
to January the bankers have all the money.

The illustrations which have been given from several racial sources
will suffice to show the nature of the earliest social thought of
primitive peoples. By way of comparison, a few social proverbs which
are common among English, Scotch, French, and German speaking peoples,
and which are of various origins, will be given. It will be unnecessary
to comment upon the social thought which is stated or implied in these
proverbs.

    That is not lost which a friend gets.
    The shortest road is where the company’s good.
    A man is known by the company he keeps.
    Do unto others as you would have others do to you.
    A man who would have friends must show himself friendly.
    One bad example spoils many precepts.
    Honesty is the best policy.
    One good turn deserves another.
    Birds of a feather flock together.
    As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined.
    People who live in glass houses mustn’t throw stones.
    Bare is the gift without the giver.
    What is not good for the swarm is not good for the bee.
    He laughs best who laughs last.
    To make a happy couple, the husband must be deaf and the wife blind.
    Charity gives itself rich; covetousness hoards itself poor.

The nature of the primitive social thought that has been preserved
through proverbs and sayings justifies the following observations.
(1) Primitive social thought was exceedingly simple, crude, and
undeveloped. (2) It was uncorrelated and unsystematic. (3) A
classification of the total number of known proverbs of any primitive
people into individual and social types shows that not more than ten
per cent are social. Primitive thinking was done in terms of the
welfare of the individual himself. The social thought was commonly of
individualistic origin. A social idea was originally not suggested
for its own sake or disinterestedly, but for the reason that its
observance would enable individuals to live together more harmoniously
and prosperously. (4) Social proverbs employ figures of speech. Similes
from nature are frequent; physical analogies are not uncommon. Many of
these figures disclose a rural or bucolic mind. (5) Frequently, the
social proverbs of the various races pertain to family and community
relationships. The sense of social responsibility does not penetrate
as a rule beyond the small group. The responsibility of group to group
is rarely expressed or implied. The social vision does not extend
to large groups. (6) A comparative study of primitive social sayings
indicates countless similarities, and testifies to the uniformity
of human experiences and social needs, irrespective of racial
distinctions. These resemblances do not imply collaboration, collusion,
or imitation. They mean that the needs of primitive individuals in
various and unrelated parts of the world have everywhere led the human
mind out in search of socially satisfactory explanations. Primitive
thinking produced fundamental social concepts, such as kinship,
authority, dependence, and tribal loyalty.




CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS


In this chapter the discussion of earliest social thought will be
presented from the standpoint of the ancient civilizations of Egypt,
Babylonia and Assyria, India, China, and Persia. The evidences of
social thought are meagre and inchoate. Nevertheless, there are data
which cannot be ignored. Inferential evidence and proverbial references
constitute the main portion of these data.

(1) The ancient Egyptian social order was bureaucratic and autocratic.
The king was supreme. With the rise of the Theban hierarchy, the
priestly class came to power and established a theocratic régime. Then
military leaders came into prominence and overthrew the theocracy of
the priests.

With the historical rise of Egypt, about 4000 B. C., the emphasis upon
law as the basis of the social order stands out prominently. The books
of laws early acquired sacred significance. They were reputed to be of
divine and monarchical origins; they provided courts of justice; and
they prescribed punishments for offenses.

The social ideas are to be gleaned almost entirely from proverbial
sayings. Egyptian scholars refer to collections of these moral precepts
as being of a practical rather than a systematic philosophical nature.
The most frequently mentioned of the Egyptian books of proverbs are the
Proverbs of Ptah-hotep, and the Prescriptions of Ani.

The social order was dominated as a rule by the king, who was supposed
to be divine. The king and a relatively small number of nobles owned
the land. The large percentage of the people were serfs and slaves.
Throughout ancient Egyptian history, the middle class must have been
weak, and small in numbers. When the lands passed under the control of
the temple authorities no change occurred in the social conditions of
the masses. The priests shared the authority with their auxiliaries,
the soldiers. The unprivileged classes included the farmers, boatmen,
mechanics, trades-people, besides the slaves.[III-1]

Egyptian life was rural. Commerce was undeveloped. Higher education
was reserved for the very few, although it appears that elementary
education was widespread. The priests often used their educational
advantages to prey upon and excite the superstitions of the people,
thereby strengthening the social control which they enjoyed.

An anomalous phase of the Egyptian mind was that it shifted back
and forth from a hedonistic enjoyment of the moment to a serious
contemplation of the future life. Amusements were fostered; the
drinking of intoxicating liquors was extensive, and music was promoted.
The game of draughts was perhaps the national pastime. The people were
not warriors. They employed mercenaries, who ultimately became socially
powerful.

Polygamy was countenanced and practised, but only of course among the
wealthy. A relatively high degree of freedom was granted the women
among the privileged classes. They appeared in public with their
husbands; they publicly engaged in religious ceremonies; and they were
given unusual property rights. At one time it is reported that Egyptian
women could not only own property, but could dispose of it as they
wished, or could loan money at interest to their husbands. At another
time the following injunction seems to have been issued: “Thou shalt
never forget thy mother, and what she has done for thee, that she bore
thee, and nurtured thee in all ways.” Children were enjoined to obey
their parents, to be respectful to their superiors, and to be reserved.
Greatness was identified with kindness. Justice and kindliness were
urged upon the leaders.[III-2]

The belief in the future world claimed a lion’s share of the attention
of the Egyptian. As a result, sculpture flourished. It was believed
that if the human figure was copied and the copy preserved, the spirit
and the body of the departed person could be more easily re-united.
Architecture developed, but with the tombs or pyramids and other
monuments as the chief forms. Urban mural divisions and fortified walls
are still to be found as evidences of Egyptian social institutions.

It was taught that in the next world the individual would be held
accountable for his deeds in this life. This belief acted as a powerful
social control; it involved specific social obligations. The individual
must deal openly with his fellowmen. He must observe the rights of the
weaker members of society. For example, he must not make false charges
against a slave to the master of the slave. He must show that he has
respected the social rights that were invested in property. From the
moral and social writings of the Egyptian scribes, it is apparent that
in religious matters, the individual was moved to give thought to his
duties as a citizen and as a neighbor.

(2) The ancient Babylonian and Assyrian social order was similar in
many ways to Egyptian civilization. The Babylonian description of a
great deluge resembles the account of the Flood that is given in the
Old Testament, and indicates thought about morals and social life. Both
Babylon and Assyria developed a religion which was expressed in terms
of the nation-group. The boundaries of one, with Merodach at the head,
and of the other with Assur in supreme control, marked the national
group divisions. Merodach, it was believed, accompanied the king in the
wars and fought for the nation. He was concerned entirely, according
to traditions, with the welfare of Babylonia as a population group.

The attitude in Babylonian society toward the institution of slavery
was distinctly different from that in Rome, but similar to the Egyptian
practices. The slave was considered in a more social way than by the
Romans. He was frequently regarded as one of the family; he could even
become a free member of society. “Slavery was no bar to his promotion.”
Moreover, slavery did not necessarily imprint a social stigma upon the
slave.

The social rights of women were similar to the Egyptian customs.
The married woman of the ruling classes possessed definite property
rights. She could use the property that she owned as she saw fit;
she could even bequeath it as she chose. Her dowry gave her economic
independence; it was her absolute property, which she could bequeath by
will in any way that she desired.

The earliest well-known Babylonian ruler was Hammurapi (2124–2081). He
is known best through his famous book of laws, the Code of Hammurapi.
The Code bespeaks for the author the desire to rule Babylonian society
justly. There are minute regulations of private business and of labor
conditions which give the Code some of the characteristics of modern
mercantilistic thought.

The Code contains perhaps the earliest forms of labor legislation that
were enacted. Hammurapi sought through legislation to determine wages
for different classes of labor. The Code prescribed severe punishment
for anyone who sheltered a runaway slave. In this and similar ways,
property rights were protected and human elements subordinated. It was
not until the Deuteronomic Code was written that the rights of labor
received legislative recognition.

Hammurapi stood for a paternalistic control of society. His idea
of justice was literally that of an eye for an eye. “If a man has
caused the loss of a patrician’s eye, his eye shall one cause to be
lost.”[III-3] Justice, moreover, was subject to the law of social
gradation. An offense against a man of lower rank might be atoned by
paying money. “If a man has caused a poor man to lose his eye, he
shall pay one mina of silver.”[III-4] Additional light is thrown on
the concept of justice by other passages from the Code, especially by
this one: “If a builder has built a house for a man and has not made
strong his work, and the house he has built has fallen, and he has
caused the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put
to death.”[III-5]

The intellectual progress and the inventions of the Babylonians are
indicative of social status. The development along artistic lines,
particularly in architecture and sculpture, must have exerted an
indirect but important social influence. Significant advances in
surgery had been made preceding the reign of Hammurapi. In medicine,
however, the demonic theory of the causes of disease enslaved the
people.

The Assyrians, who lived to the north of the Babylonians, were less
social in type. They were little concerned about the future life; their
religion was relatively undeveloped. The Assyrian artists gave their
attention chiefly to the king, the court, and to war. They reproduced
in artistic form the king and the soldier, but ignored the life and
customs of the people.

(3) When we turn to early East Indian records, we find a higher
development of social ideals than among any peoples which have thus
far been considered. In the Vedic documents there is considerable
evidence of communal life and of a remarkable degree of social spirit
and brotherliness. In the East Indian account of a Deluge--similar
to the Deluge that is described in Genesis--there is a conception
of punishment that falls upon the group because of the sins of
individuals. Sacrifice, among the Vedic believers, had acquired a
positive social function. It was considered as a social act, in which
the worshipper and the god took part. The food strengthened the god and
the spiritual contact strengthened the worshiper. Hence mutual sympathy
was generated.

With the rise of Brahmanism, the caste system developed. It divided
society. It gave structure to the concept that some people are
naturally--and artificially--superior to other people. In the laws of
Manu, several social concepts are broached. The nature of marriage and
the duties of a householder are explained. The duties of a woman are
prescribed. The nature of private and public law is noteworthy, and
the recognition of the obligation of one caste to another in times of
distress marks the beginning of a reaction against the caste system.
It was considered possible for an individual to fall from a caste
to the one below, but not for an individual to rise in caste. The
moral standards for individuals reached a level comparable to those
represented in certain of the teachings of Jesus. For example, notice
this instruction:

Let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, nor
become anybody’s enemy for the sake of this perishable body. Against an
angry man let him not in return show anger; let him bless when he is
cursed.

Buddhism inaugurated a set of social ideas which involved the abolition
of the caste system. In the fourth of the “Four Noble Truths” the
principles which are formulated, are partly of social import.
Commendation is extended to right speech--speech that is friendly, and
sincere toward others. The requirements include right conduct--conduct
which is peaceable and honorable toward other persons. Stress is placed
upon right means of securing livelihood--methods which do not involve
the injury or the taking of life. There are types of modern business
enterprise that are extolled in our Christian America which would fall
under the ban of the “Noble Truths” in pagan India.

Among the “ten commandments” of Buddha, eight represent social ideas
and obligations:

(1) Not to kill any living being.

(2) Not to take that which is not given (not to steal).

(3) To refrain from adultery.

(4) To speak no untruth (not to lie to other people).

(5) To abstain from intoxicating liquors.

(6) Not to slander.

(7) Not to covet.

(8) Not to be angry.

Buddha taught that hatred is to be repaid by love, that life is to be
filled with kindness and compassion, that the widest toleration is to
be practised. The teachings of Buddha engendered a delicate social
consciousness regarding the relation of the individual to his fellows.
The precepts were strong enough to break down rigid class barriers. The
underlying conception was broadly human.

Additional light is thrown on the social thought of Buddha by the
following sayings which are credited to him:

Pity and sympathy is the Buddha’s mind.

Pity to his parents is the Supreme Law.

Honesty is the Paradise of the Bodhisattva.

O my Disciples, flee from fornication, know how to be content with your
own wife, and do not even for a single moment lust after another woman.

A state without a ruler is like a body without a head; it cannot exist
very long.

The king looks upon his subjects with a heart of mercy, as if they were
his children; and the people regard the king as their father.

If there is no Buddha in the world, be good to your parents; for to be
good to one’s parents is to minister unto Buddha.

Nursing a sick man is the great field where the righteous tree of mind
grows.

Even a strong man cannot lift himself.

Ten people have ten colors (opinions).

The paint which is painted by ten fingers (men) is accurate. (In the
multitude of counsellors there is safety.)

The sayings of Buddha may be summed up in the statement that, like
many of the teachings of Jesus, they accent the gentle virtues and
the passive traits of a people bearing a yoke against which they are
powerless to revolt, the virtues of obedience, respect to those in
authority, long-suffering, patience, even resignation.

(4) The social thought of early China can best be gleaned from the
writings of Confucius. This scholar was not a reformer or a religious
leader, but primarily a conserver. He was interested in civil and
political affairs. His books reflect not his own ideas, for his
originality was not great, but the concepts which had been worked out
before his time. In the _Li Ki_, or Record of Rites, there are many
social and domestic precepts. In a way the _Li Ki_, “the Chinamen’s
manual of conduct,” is a treatise on social as well as individual
ethics. Around the family group, Chinese social ideas revolved. On the
death of his mother, Confucius, for example, went into seclusion for
twenty-seven months. On sacrificial occasions the living members and
the departed spirits of the household were accustomed to gather in one
filial communal group. The welfare of the individual was completely
subordinated to the interests of the family group of spirits.

The Chinese worship, or honor, their ancestors. The worship of the past
has paralyzed new thought. Custom imitation has ruled and tradition has
been reverenced.

Marriage receives special attention, but the arrangements are made by
parents or “go-betweens.” Socially, the sexes do not intermingle. The
parents exercise complete control over the children; the mother bears
a considerable portion of the burdens of parental discipline. Filial
piety is the cardinal virtue. Although polygamy is discountenanced,
concubinage is permitted. The sexes dress very much alike, except in
headdress and footgear. The style of wearing apparel is not only simple
and aesthetic, but it “minimizes the visible distinctions of sex.”

Confucius, or Kung-fu-tsze, believed in the efficacy of setting good
examples. Imitation would then accomplish the desired results. By
these methods, Confucius expected that society would be improved.
Fundamental principles of a stable social order, more than of
social progress, were in the mind of Confucius. He conceived of the
universe as a perfect order. Likewise, he thought of the state as a
perfect social order. Confucius urged that the individual strive for
perfection. According to the Confucian doctrine of the Superior Man,
the individual should master his own passions and desires, substituting
an enjoyment of music, ceremony, and of friendship, for the enjoyment
that comes from the exercise of the bodily passions. He should seek
salvation through the study of nature and of things. Moral character
and intelligence if accompanied by bravery will produce the highest
type of personality.

In Chinese social thought the family and state were early recognized
as the two leading institutions in society. In the civil organization
it is worth while to note the _hien_, or city district. The _hien_ has
been pronounced “the real unit of Chinese corporate life”; and the
_hien_ magistrate, “the heart and soul of all official life.” Since
this magistrate keeps closely in touch with the masses, he is called by
the people “the father and mother officer.” The _hien_ contains some of
the germ ideas of democracy; it emphasizes local self-government.

The ancient laws were elaborate, giving an unusual degree of power
to the judges. Although customs ruled, the judges often possessed a
liberal margin of freedom in determining the nature of punishments.
Contrary to Western procedure, the Chinese consider an accused man
as guilty until proved otherwise. Excessive corporate punishment is
deplored.[III-6] Confucius objected to the maintenance of a government
by the use of fear and of coercive measures. He predicted that capital
punishment (even in a land ruled by custom) would be abolished in a
hundred years.

The ideas of peace and harmonious social relationships have long held
sway in China. Militarism has been scorned, and war held in contempt.
It is ironical that as China begins to function as a world power in
contact with Western and Christian nations, she is compelled to find
her chief defense in an uncivilized and unChristian militarism.

Sympathy is a fundamental concept among the Chinese. Unfortunately,
it has been instrumental in producing a highly specialized and
professionalized class of beggars. Industry and patience are
characteristic social virtues. Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism and a
contemporary of Confucius, taught the social precept: Recompense injury
with kindness. Confucius, who disagreed, taught that kindness should
be paid with kindness, and injury with injury. This conception led
Confucius to formulate his golden rule of human conduct: Do not do to
others what you would not have others do to you.

Obedience to authority has been for centuries a cardinal social
principle of the Chinese. It was enunciated by Confucius, who spoke
as a representative of the ruling classes. In stressing obedience to
temporal authorities and in shunning the gods, Confucius has been
accused of fostering a materialistic philosophy. This charge is partly
offset by his ethical teachings. Confucius was a humanitarian rather
than a materialist; he was a utilitarian rather than an idealist. In
these attitudes he reflects not his own opinions so much as the thought
of the generations which preceded him.

Mencius, who lived shortly after Confucius, was an environmentalist in
the sense that he believed that external evil influences have corrupted
man’s original good nature. On the other hand, Mencius urged progress
through regeneration of the heart. Mencius was a more thoroughgoing
humanist than Confucius, for he made the happiness of the people the
supreme goal for the individual. He condemned war and warriors alike
and declared that generals are criminals. He asserted that it is wrong
to conquer a territory against the will of the people of that territory.

Additional sidelights upon early Chinese social thought are afforded by
the following social proverbs of ancient Chinese origin:

If a cat cries after eating the mouse, this is false sympathy.

Follow good, learn good; follow beggar, learn to beg.

Gentlemen use heart; lesser men use strength.

New clothes but old friends are good.

Within the four seas all are brothers.

If two people were 1000 miles apart and be like-minded, they will come
together; if they sit opposite one another and are not like-minded
there will be no mutual acquaintance.

Speak language fitting to station of man you meet.

All under heaven is one home.

Although a man is away from home, his heart is there.

The big fish eat the little ones, the little ones eat the shrimps, and
the shrimps are forced to eat mud (applied to the classes of society
who pay taxes).

He who praises me on all occasions is a fool who despises me or a knave
who wishes to cheat me.

Govern thyself, and you will be able to govern the world.

The hearts of the people are the only legitimate foundations of an
empire.

By nature all men are alike; but by education, widely different.

For the sake of one good action, a hundred evil ones should be
forgotten.

To forget one’s ancestors is to be a brook without a source, a tree
without a root.

Rogues differ little; each began first as a disobedient son.

Of all man’s actions, there is none greater than filial piety.

When they saw an old man, people walking or driving gave him the road.
Men who had white hairs mingling with the black did not carry burdens
along the highways (care for the aged).

When the man of high station is well instructed, he loves men; when the
man of low station is well instructed, he is easily ruled.

Three friendships are advantageous: friendship with the upright,
friendship with the sincere, and friendship with the man of
observation. Three are injurious: friendship with a man of spurious
airs, friendship with the insinuatingly soft, and friendship with the
glib-tongued.

Who taught you politeness? The impolite.

To be a successful monarch, one must be a just monarch.

Of the different peoples which have thus far been considered, the
Chinese have furnished the most elaborate degree of social thought.
While the social ideals of the Chinese are largely unsystematic, they
accent the family and the state as essential social institutions. They
also reveal even a significant conception of world brotherliness.
The Chinese have probably created more social proverbs than any
other people, past or present. For the stage of civilization that
is represented by proverbs and sayings, the social thought of the
Chinese is unsurpassed. In this regard the Chinese have but one close
competitor, the ancient Hebrews.

(5) The Persians, who after their defeat by Alexander the Great in
331 B. C. have been credited with having turned over the torch of
civilization to the Greeks, made a contribution to social thought
similar to that of the other ancient peoples. Under Cyrus the Great,
Darius, and Xerxes a system of state education was fostered which
was designed chiefly to train soldiers. It did not stress social and
intellectual development, although it existed in a land that produced
the Magi. The individuals who were not in the army received slight
educational benefits.

It is in the teachings of Zoroaster of the sixteenth century B. C.
that we first find the main trend of Persian social thought. The Zend
Avesta, the document from which Zoroasterism and the modern Parsee
religion have evolved, emphasizes the principle of kindliness in all
important human relationships. Sanitation, business honesty, and
chastity in family relationships are taught.

The ancient Hebrews and the Greeks each made such large contributions
to social thought that separate chapters will be devoted to these
peoples. In a summary of the social thought of the Egyptians,
Babylonians and Assyrians, East Indians, Chinese, and Persians, it may
be said that there is a rather uniform emphasis upon the elemental
virtues, particularly upon kindliness. While the individual’s
salvation is given prominence, the individual is urged to be socially
considerate and to cultivate sympathetic relationships with the gods
and with his fellow human beings.




CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE HEBREWS


Ancient Egyptian, Babylonian and Assyrian, East Indian, Chinese, and
Persian records disclose a set of elemental and yet more or less
passive social backgrounds against which the social ideals of the
Hebrew prophets shine forth like stars of the first magnitude. The
Pentateuch and the writings of the Hebrew wise men are rich in gleams
of a social spirit, while the Hebrew prophets, notably, Amos, Hosea,
Isaiah, and Jeremiah, uttered flaming indictments of social evils.

The Hebrews stood head and shoulders above their contemporaries in
social thinking. They left a series of historical documents, covering
several centuries and revealing a specific evolution in social
concepts. They expressed the fundamentals from which Christian social
thought developed, and from which much of the ethical and social
thinking of Western civilization on its practical side has evolved.

The social thought of the Hebrews was born of group suffering. Through
the mists of the earliest Hebrew traditions we discern that conflicts
occurred in the Euphrates Valley which sent Abraham out on his
perilous journey toward unknown and hostile Canaan. The gaunt spectre,
famine, brought distress to the household of the domestic-loving
Abraham and drove him to Egypt where he sojourned for a time. Abram,
exalted father, or Abraham, father of a multude, became the founder in
a sense of three world religions, for to him Judaism, Christianity, and
Mohammedanism trace their origins.

Throughout the years of migration, exile, and suffering, Abraham
maintained his religious faith and belief. By means of his simple
religion he was able to interpret sanely the troubles and conflicts of
life. Out of suffering interpreted religiously, Abraham developed a
remarkably well-balanced and social personality. From this beginning,
Hebrew social thought evolved. Ultimately, Israel created social
concepts which has won for her the distinction of being “the leading
social teacher of the human race.”[IV-1]

As a social entity the Hebrews were the result of “a titanic social
struggle;” they arose out of an industrial crisis. The scene was
laid in Egypt. The descendants of Jacob were working long hours with
little pay, as slaves, and under harsh social conditions. One of their
number, more favored than the rest by heredity and environment, saw a
Hebrew workman being beaten by an Egyptian “boss.” The favored one,
Moses, felt the surging passions of social injustice rising within his
breast--and he slew the boss. Moses thereby became the founder of the
world’s labor movement. By an act of violence in the impassioned days
of youth, Moses became “a social agitator”; by years of patient service
of his people in the name of Jehovoh, he became one of the world’s
greatest social seers.

Rameses II was “an unprincipled captain of industry.” He was haughty,
hard-hearted, and without social conscience. Moses was sympathetic,
socially sensitive, and keenly religious. Rameses II was a leading
representative of an ancient aristocracy; Moses was the first great
exponent of an incipient democracy, and “the first man in history with
a well-developed social consciousness.”

According to the Exodus record Moses, as the murderer of an Egyptian
boss, felt no qualms of conscience, but he did fear the mighty Pharaoh.
At that time in history it was a minor matter to kill a slave; but
to have killed a boss was vastly different. The slave represented
weakness; the boss was the official representative of political and
financial power. Consequently, Moses fled the country. In Egypt he was
helpless, and in danger of losing his life. He fled to Midian.

In Midian, Moses pondered over the economic and social injustices to
which his people were being subjected. He communed with God, from whom
he received the motive power to correct a gigantic social wrong. His
vision of Jehovah gave him the conviction that Jehovah is a God of
justice and mercy who understands social and industrial evils and
sympathizes with the socially defeated classes. Moses reports this
remarkable social message from Jehovah:

“I have surely seen the affliction of my people that are in Egypt, and
have heard their cry of anguish because of their taskmasters, for I
know their sorrows, and I am come down to deliver them out of the power
of the Egyptians.”[IV-2]

In other words, against the union of great wealth and political
power in the hands of an unjust man, God revolted, and God said to
Moses: “Rescue this Israelitish people from the heels of autocracy.”
Moses conceived of Jehovah as a God who is “full of sympathy for the
afflicted and dependent and ever eager to champion their cause against
cruel oppression.” Moses’ conception of Jehovah as a socially spirited
God is unique for that day in human history. God is described as a
lover of justice and even a lover of mankind. When God speaks, it is
usually in terms of democracy. The first social teachings of the Old
Testament, considered chronologically, are those against social and
industrial oppression.

A momentous conflict ensued. Fired by the promises and presence and
power of Jehovah, Moses journeyed back to Egypt. He proceeded to
organize the first labor strike known to mankind. Thereupon, the angry
Pharaoh commanded the workers to make brick without straw. And when
the workers cried out against the impositions and burdens, the agents
of “the first great captains of industry” taunted the workers and cried
at them: “Ye are idle, ye are idle.” But God and Moses won against the
hosts of autocracy and plutocracy. The workers were freed.

Out of these struggles the Hebrew nation took form. Group loyalty, or
patriotism, became a conscious Hebrew concept. The idea of kinship
was supplemented by an appreciation of the meaning of national life.
Furthermore, a sense of social and economic justice received a
clear-cut and positive human expression and divine approval. For the
first time the social problem was defined.

The major social chord which the Hebrew prophets kept vibrating was
justice. Some of the recurring interpretations of the needs of the
hour were: Let justice roll down like waters; Rulers shall govern in
justice; Hear, I pray you, ye heads of Israel, is it not for you to
know justice?

The Hebrew word for the English “justice” is _mishpat_. It is used in
various senses, such as, justice, order, law, right, legal right. Amos
wanted _mishpat_ established in the land. Micah asserted that Jehovah
requires the individual to do _mishpat_, and to love kindness, and to
walk humbly with his God. Isaiah urged the people to do well and to
seek _mishpat_; he pronounced woe upon those who turned aside the needy
from _mishpat_; he declared Jehovah to be a God of _mishpat_. Jeremiah
made plain that Jehovah exercises mercy and _mishpat_ among the people.

Amos protested vigorously against special class privileges. He
denounced the wealthy classes because of their social arrogance and
economic injustice. In describing them, he points out a fundamental
principle of social procedure. By their repression of those who are
protesting, they “are heaping up violence”; that is, autocratic
repression will never right injustice, but will foster ultimate
revolution. Amos charged the rulers and all persons in positions of
social power with the primary obligation of seeing that the poor and
the outcast are protected from exploitation. What satire in a day when
rulers were noted for their exploitation of the weak social classes!

A special responsibility rests upon judges. Amos severely arraigned all
who turn judgment to wormwood and cast righteousness to the ground.
Anathemas were heaped upon the takers of bribes, especially if they sit
in places of public authority and wear the robes of law and patriotism.
Hot denunciation fell also upon the private doer of injustice; upon the
merchant who makes smaller the measure and perverts the false balances;
upon all who trample in any way upon the needy, who trample on the head
of the poor, who sell the righteous for silver, who turn aside the
way of the humble.[IV-3] The concept of justice was vividly defined
by Amos. Moreover, the shepherd prophet of Tekoa had the courage and
ability to make the concept clear to all who would listen to him.
Amos spoke for justice on the throne, on the judge’s bench, in the
activities of the wealthy, in the transactions of merchants, and in the
daily dealings of individuals with one another.

The campaign against injustice is carried forward by the first Isaiah,
the statesman and orator. In the Kingdom of Judah, Isaiah found the
same social evils that Amos had earlier preached against in the
Northern kingdom. The boldness of his attack is startling:

Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves: everyone loveth
gifts, and followeth after rewards: they judge not the fatherless,
neither does the cause of the widow come unto them.[IV-4]

Then Isaiah enters upon perhaps the most open, daring, and indignant
challenge to doers of social iniquity that is to be found anywhere:

Ye have eaten of the vineyard; the spoil of the poor is in your houses.
What mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of
the poor?[IV-5]

After the manner of Amos, Isaiah protested vigorously against the
judges and officers of the law who for a bribe vindicate the wicked and
deprive the innocent man of his innocence. He denounced in no doubtful
language the scribes who devote themselves to writing oppression, who
turn aside the dependent from securing justice, who prevent Jehovah’s
followers from receiving honest treatment, who prey upon widows and
despoil orphans. Special condemnation was heaped upon those who set up
iniquitous decrees.

Isaiah was a forerunner in an indirect sense of Henry George, for he
vehemently rebuked land monopolists. His new principle is contained
in a pronouncement of woes upon the persons who join house to house
and add field to field, until there is no land left except for the
monopolist who dwells as a lord over all. Isaiah protested against
social injustice not only because of the harmful effects upon the
individual but also because of the destructive and enervating national
results.

After the fashion of Amos and Isaiah, Micah conceived of Jehovah as a
just God. Micah depicts the social injustice of his day in terms of the
persons who hate the good and love the evil, who pluck off the skin of
the weak, even the flesh from the bones of Jehovah’s followers; “who
also eat the flesh of my people, and flay their skin from off them; and
they break their bones, and chop them in pieces, as for the pot, and as
flesh within the caldron.”[IV-6]

Micah unhesitatingly condemns the priests who are giving oracles for
a reward, and the prophets who are divining for silver and who are
trusting in Jehovah to protect them. Micah was perhaps the first
person to describe the activities of the criminaloid which have
been so carefully analyzed by Professor E. A. Ross. He grasped the
concept of the social sinner who keeps within the law. He attacked
wealthy landowners who crush the small holders; he spared neither high
officials, nor priests. He presented his social concepts with precision
and effectiveness.

The invectives against social injustice are carried into the teachings
of Jeremiah. They appear later in the Deuteronomic Code. The Psalmists
deprecated injustice. The wisdom teachers uttered profound warnings on
the subject. The writer of Job deplored injustice. Throughout the Old
Testament the almost countless references justify the conclusion that
justice is the leading social concept which is presented by ancient
Hebrew thought.

The Old Testament parallels its denunciation of unjust social
relationships with diatribes against luxury. The evil effects of great
riches are again and again described. Amos boldly pointed the finger
of scorn at the idle rich, at those who “lie upon beds of ivory and
stretch themselves upon their couches.”

The possession of vast wealth has usually been considered by those
persons who are immediately concerned as an expression of divine favor.
Amos exposed the fallacies in this belief, commanded the owners of
wealth to assume social responsibility, and instantly to cease their
unholy practices of securing gain.

Isaiah united with Amos in treating the possession of wealth not
as a matter of favor or luck, but as a social trust. With one
stroke Jeremiah tore off the gilded frame from about the life of
the self-indulgent, luxury-loving King Jehoiakim. What powerful and
autocratic monarch was ever charged with indulging in luxury in such
relentless and uncompromising language as this?

Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness, and his
chambers by injustice....

Shalt thou reign, because thou closest thyself in cedar?...

But thine eyes and thine heart are not but for thy covetousness, and
for to shed innocent blood, and for oppression, and for violence, to do
it.

The ways of the dishonest rich are vividly described by Jeremiah.
They set snares and catch people with lying. Their houses are full of
evidences of their crooked dealings. They maintain themselves in luxury
despite wanton expenditures by violating the needs of the fatherless
and the needy.

Zephaniah was no less direct in pointing out the dangers in wealth. He
declared that ill-gotten gains shall themselves become a prey and that
the houses of the sinful rich shall become desolate. All their silver
and their gold shall not be able to deliver them from their ultimate
desolation.

In a beautiful and effective style the Wisdom writer in Proverbs
unconsciously sums up the Old Testament philosophy concerning wealth:

Labor not to become rich; cease from thine own wisdom. Wilt thou set
thine eyes upon that which is not? For riches certainly make themselves
wings; they fly away as an eagle toward heaven.

The Old Testament with surprising uniformity supports the cause of
labor. The welfare of the slave is frequently espoused. According
to the Deuteronomic Code a runaway slave who was caught did not
necessarily need to be returned to his owner. In fact, a person who
harbored such a slave was expressly enjoined not to return him. By
this injunction the rights of property and vested interests in slaves
were ignored. Such an attitude was in opposition to the Code of
Hammurapi and to the codes of vested interests throughout history.
Slavery, however, was a well-established institution among the ancient
Hebrews.[IV-8]

Although the law book of Hammurapi fixed the wages of laborers, the
Old Testament law book restricted the hours of labor. Not only is the
master to limit his labor to six days a week, but he is commanded to
see that his slaves, male and female, do not work more than six days.
Modern industry, even twentieth century manufacturing enterprise in
the United States, has been persistently violating the labor rules of
the Hebrew law-givers. Employers are commanded not to take advantage
of poor and needy hired servants. They shall not oppress labor simply
because they are powerful and labor is weak. Even the poor immigrant
laborer is not to be exploited!

The first legislation in behalf of immigrants is found in Deuteronomy.
Employers must respect the needs of alien workers. The foreigner
shall not be oppressed. In the ordinary dealings between citizens and
foreigners, justice must not be perverted. The Hebrew law makers even
went so far as to issue the command: Love ye therefore the strangers,
for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.

The institution of marriage is early accented in the Old Testament. In
the second chapter of Genesis divine approval is placed upon marriage.
In accordance with biological and social needs the institution of
marriage is made sacred. Although the Hebrews are noted for their
emphasis upon the responsibility of children to parents, the husband is
ordered to forsake his father and his mother and cleave unto his wife.
A man’s obligation to his helpmate exceeds even his obligations to his
father and mother.

The concept of a long-suffering, patient husband is extensively
elaborated in the teachings of Hosea. This prophet of the eighth
century, B. C., demonstrated the sanctity of the marriage relation by
remaining true to it even after his wife bore children of whom he was
not the father. It is remarkable that Hosea should not have divorced
his wife at once when he learned of her unfaithfulness to the marriage
vow. Hosea taught, by example, that divorce should be the last resort
after all the means of love have been used in trying to win back the
erring partner.

The description of Hosea’s domestic difficulties, whether allegorical
or not, is an early protest against the double standard of morals for
man and woman. The attitude of people in modern society who blame and
shun the fallen woman but permit the guilty man to continue to enjoy
the company of respectable men and women is vigorously challenged by
Hosea.

The last word against sex immorality was pronounced by Hosea. His
description of the effects of widespread sex immorality is brief but
incisive.

Whoredom and wine and new wine take away the heart.

Their glory shall fly away like a bird, from the birth, and from the
womb, and from the conception.

Their root is dried up, they shall bear no fruit.

In the Deuteronomic laws we find the duties of parents to children and
of children to parents carefully outlined. Parents, primarily, are made
responsible for moral and religious education in the home; and children
are under obligations to obey their parents. This teaching is summed
up in the injunction:[IV-10] Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy
days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee; and
in the imprecation: Whoso curseth his father or his mother, his lamp
shall be put out in obscure darkness.[IV-11]

The Wisdom writers dwell at considerable length upon the proper
relationships of husbands and wives and of parents and children.
They point the finger of shame at the quarrelsome woman. They warn
against the woman whose chief asset is her beauty. A virtuous wife is
a crown to her husband, but an immoral wife is as rottenness in his
bones.[IV-12]

The Wisdom teachers do not minimize the importance of parental
discipline. On occasion parents must act with force. Correction of
children is commanded. The situation is pictured in the following
language:[IV-13]

The word and reproof give wisdom; but a child left to himself bringeth
his mother to shame.

In other words, it is necessary that parents assume a positive,
definite attitude in regard to child nurture. They must see that their
children are actually trained in the ways in which they should go. Even
the loving parent must sometimes show his affection for his child by
chastising the child. Only by such a procedure do children grow up to
be a comfort to parents in their old age.

On the other hand the child must assume his share of responsibility. It
is the part of wisdom for children to receive willingly the instruction
that parents can give. The wise son loves parental advice. He listens
gladly to his father; he does not despise his mother’s counsels.

It has already been intimated that the Old Testament writers frequently
stress the importance of high standards of conduct for women. Amos
rebuked the wives of nobles and the wealthy who fritter away their best
impulses in idleness and sinful living and who dissipate their deepest
instincts in debauchery. Amos and Isaiah agreed, apparently, that a
nation’s welfare depends on the attitudes of its women. The wrath of
God will fall upon women who are haughty, who walk with heads held high
and with wanton glances, who go tripping along, “making a tinkling with
their feet.”

The anti-social character of sin was pointed out in Genesis. Cain was
the first to raise naïvely and blandly the question: Am I my brother’s
keeper? Sinful living narrows the soul, increases selfishness, and
vitiates a genuine social attitude. Sinning is repudiating social
responsibility. Amos advanced the idea that selfish living was nothing
less than disloyalty to one’s country. To dissipate one’s energy is to
undermine one’s usefulness to his country.

Intemperance was deplored. Isaiah has been called the first temperance
reformer of the world. His impassioned and classic utterances are well
represented by the following lines:[IV-14]

Woe unto them that rise up early in the morning that they may follow
strong drink; that continue until night, till wine inflame them.

Isaiah warned especially the priests and prophets of the evils of
intemperance. Wine will swallow them up, it will put them out of the
way, it will cause them to err in wisdom and to stumble in judgment.

In both Leviticus and Numbers the danger that lurks in the wine cup is
recognized. The special servants of Jehovah are commanded to separate
themselves from wine and strong drink. In Proverbs the Wisdom writer
declares:[IV-15] Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging and whoever
is deceived thereby is not wise. The same authority admonishes rulers
and judges not to drink wine lest they forget the law and pervert the
judgment of the afflicted. On the other hand, a reversion to a lower
standard is made in Proverbs when the legitimacy of giving strong drink
to the poor and miserable is recognized, so that they may forget their
poverty and misery.[IV-16] The general teaching, however, is that
strong drink leads to social inefficiency and the disintegration of
human personalities.

The cities of refuge represent a new social idea. A person who has
taken life without intention may flee to and find protection in the
cities of refuge. The altar and the sanctuary are designated as places
to which persons may flee who are not wilful murderers.[IV-17]

The social concept of democracy occupies an interesting place in the
Old Testament literature. In the days of Abraham the kinship group
prevailed. Within this group there were many households, ruled by
patriarchs. Within the kinship groups high standards of honor were
maintained, but anti-social attitudes toward outside and foreign groups
were encouraged. It was justifiable, for example, to lie to foreign
groups and even to kill the representatives of such peoples.

The concept of democracy developed _pari passu_ with the evolution of
the idea of Jehovah. In the minds of the Hebrews, Jehovah, or Jahweh,
was first a tribal god, then a national god; and finally, a universal
God, that is, a being who is interested in the welfare of all peoples,
and not simply in the welfare of “the chosen people.”

The Hebrew conception of the state contained several democratic
elements. The fundamental purpose of the state was declared to be the
welfare not of an irresponsible monarch, but of the people themselves.
This idea stands out in marked contradiction to the practices of the
Canaanites, who submitted themselves helplessly to capricious and
autocratic rulers.

The Hebrews treated the state as a part of a theocracy. But when
Jehovah spoke, he usually arraigned false wealth, arbitrary political
power, selfish ambition of kings, luxurious living, and special
privileges. Jehovah spoke for the oppressed, the poor, the defeated,
the laborer,[IV-8] in short, for humanity.

Consequently, loyalty to the nation was positive and persistent.
Consider this statement from Psalm 137 of Hebrew patriotism on the
part of exiled Hebrews who longed for their native land:

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we
remembered Zion.

We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof....

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.

If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my
mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy.

According to Hosea, Jehovah charged the citizens of the land to deal
with one another on the basis of fidelity and true love, and to stamp
out all social evils, such as perjury, stealing, committing adultery,
and mob violence. The writer of the Book of Job portrayed a good
citizen as one who delivers the poor, who helps those about to perish,
who causes the widow’s heart to sing for joy.[IV-18] He is eyes to the
blind, feet to the lame, and a father to the needy. He searches out the
cause of social evils. Moreover, he breaks the jaws of the unrighteous,
and plucks the prey from their mouths. He defends the blameless. He
does not put his confidence in gold or rejoice at his enemies when
evils beset them or they are destroyed. It may be truly said that
fundamental ideas of democracy were originated by the Hebrews.

Amos raised the question of internationalism. For the first time in
history, the idea of a universal God was postulated. Amos pronounced
Jehovah the God of other peoples besides the Israelites. “Have not I
brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt?” said Jehovah, “and the
Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?”[IV-19] The day
would come, according to Isaiah and Micah, when Jehovah would judge
over many peoples and rebuke strong nations. The conception of Jehovah
as a Being who transcends both time and space gave to the Hebrew mind
at its best a broader cast and a more universal comprehension than the
peoples of contemporary tribes and nations possessed.

The concept of universal peace was invented by the Hebrews. Isaiah and
Micah share the honor of being the first persons to advocate world
peace, and to predict the day when all nations shall worship a just God
and thereby be enabled to beat their swords into plowshares and their
spears into pruning-hooks, when nation shall not stand against nation,
and when the methods of warfare shall no longer be taught. The spirit
of hatred and of blind, selfish antagonism shall pass away. No modern
writer has ever spoken the doom of militarism so trenchantly as the Old
Testament prophet, Isaiah, who said, according to the translation by
Charles Foster Kent:[IV-20]

    “For every boot of the warrior with noisy tread,
    And every war-cloak drenched in the blood of the slain,
    Will be completely burned up as fuel for the flame.”

The Hebrews strongly emphasized laws as a social dynamic. Love will
make socialized individuals. It will demonstrate to a person his
responsibilities as a member of society and his duties to his fellow
human beings. It will stifle hatred. It will even return good for evil.
It is the cardinal virtue and an eternal principle of right living.

The Old Testament teaches social salvation. Jehovah is fundamentally
interested in the improvement of social and living conditions. He
commanded the socialization of all human relationships. His teachings,
as given by the prophets and Wisdom writers, take cognizance of the
influence of environment upon character.

Hebrew social thought deals largely with social injustice. Social
evils are vividly described and evil-doers, chiefly kings and judges,
are vigorously and fearlessly arraigned. The family is made the chief
social institution, and love is crowned servant of all. Education is
centered in the home, and moral discipline is made the keynote of
education; hence the Hebrews survived the Greeks and Romans. A new
and perfect social order, directed by a just Jehovah, and motivated
throughout all its individual and social relationships by love, is
prophesied.




CHAPTER V

PLATO AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT


In turning to a study of Grecian civilization we find a development of
social thought which on the rational side excels in many particulars
the social thinking of the Hebrews, but which in its affective elements
falls far below the quality of Hebrew social thought. We may expect to
find, therefore, in Grecian social thought important new contributions
which are complementary to the legacies from the Hebrews, and which
when taken in conjunction with the early Christian forms of Hebrew
social thought constitute the main foundations of modern social thought.

The thought life of the Greeks reached the crescendo in the idealism of
Plato (427–347 B. C.) and the opportunism of Aristotle (384–322 B. C.).
In an idea-world Plato depicted an ideal society. After studying
158 constitutions, Aristotle formulated rules of practical social
procedure. Plato’s _Republic_ and Aristotle’s _Politics_ are the two
leading source books of Grecian social thought.

Plato and Aristotle were the first two thinkers in history who left
definitely organized analyses of societary life. Although in point of
time they stand close together, in content of social reasoning they
are at many places antagonistic. However, their high rank as thinkers
need not blind anyone to the fact that their social thought was in part
an outgrowth of theories held by predecessors. Antecedent to Plato
was Socrates and the Sophists; antecedent to these scholars was a
large number of thinkers who, incidentally to their main intellectual
efforts, gave expression to isolated but significant social ideas.

As early as the ninth century, B. C., Lycurgus declared that the state
owned the child, and urged a system of education which would prepare
the child for the state. Despite, however, of a similar emphasis by
many later Greek leaders, “Hellas” never developed a genuine national
unity. She experienced a temporary national patriotism only when
attacked by the Persians and at the seasons when the national games
were at their height.

It was Hesiod, the founder of Greek didactic poetry, who about 700
B. C. described the Golden Age and the subsequent ages of society.
Hesiod protested mildly against the social injustice in his time.[V-1]
In the following century, Anaximander, the philosopher, and Theognis,
the elegiac poet,[V-2] discussed the value to society of providing that
children should be well born and well trained--the fundamental concepts
of current eugenics and euthenics.

Solon, the Athenian lawgiver, about 590 B. C., began to put into
legislative practice certain ideas of social reform, thereby preventing
revolution. At that time it was customary to sell persons into slavery
who could not pay their debts--a procedure which Solon ended. The cost
of living was very high, consequently Solon forbade the export of food
products and thereby reduced prices for the consumer. He introduced
a measure which today would be considered revolutionary, namely, the
limiting of the amount of land which an individual might hold. For
the classification of people on the basis of wealth, he substituted
a classification on the basis of income. He lessened the severity of
the laws of Draco, and in other ways increased the freedom of the
individual. Although Solon’s régime was followed by a tyranny, Solon is
credited with initiating certain essential ideas of democracy.

After the Tyrants, Athens under the leadership of men like Cleisthenes
became “a pure democracy.” Cleisthenes democratized the Athenian
Constitution. For the four phylae he substituted ten phylae, or
units of government, thus securing a new and better distribution
of authority. He is credited with introducing ostracism as a mode
of punishment; he, it is alleged, was the first individual to be
ostracised by his government.

The fifth century precursors of Plato and Aristotle were numerous.
Aeschylus (525–456 B. C.), the first of the famous Athenian tragic
poets, described in general terms the evolution of civilized
society.[V-3] The artistic historian, Herodotus, developed through his
imagination a world point of view. From an almost unlimited store of
legendary and ethnological materials, he elaborated a planetary theme
which had its beginning in the Trojan War and its culmination in the
conflict between Eastern and Western civilizations. The basic social
principle in the writings of Herodotus is that downfall awaits the
insolent autocrats of earth. Herodotus describes the customs and habits
of the peoples[V-4] whom he visited on his numerous foreign travels
in such a detailed and elaborate fashion that he has been styled the
world’s first descriptive sociologist.

Pericles (495?-429 B. C.), perhaps the greatest statesman of Greece,
furthered the cause of democracy. His conception of democracy led
him to make the entire body of citizens eligible to office-holding.
Pericles initiated a social program which in certain aspects was
paternalistic. He instituted the plan of granting allowances for
performing public duties. As a result, unselfish public service was
minimized and political morale was weakened. Pericles was led into this
error[V-5] by the desire to compete for public esteem with Cimon, who
made extensive gifts to the poor in the form of dinners and clothes.

In his tragedies, Euripides (480–406 B. C.), aroused interest in the
experiences, not of legendary characters as many of his predecessors
had done, but of the ordinary members of Athenian society. He was a
spokesman for the emancipation of woman;[V-6] his writings reveal the
social changes that were occurring in the fifth century in Athens.
Likewise, the comedies of Aristophanes reflected social changes, and,
in addition, caricatured social conditions.

Hippocrates, the so-called father of medical science, wrote several
works which attracted the studious attention of Plato. He gave as
the first of two chief causes of disease, the influence of climate,
seasons, weather on the individual.[V-7] He might be called the
first anthropo-geographer. At any rate he opened the field which has
recently been so well covered by Ellen C. Semple in her _Influences of
Geographic Environment_.

By their disconcerting and sceptical teachings the Sophists, who
also lived in the fifty century, B. C., stimulated the intellectual
activities of Socrates. The influence of the Sophist leaders, such
as Protagoras, Gorgas, Callicles, Thrasymachus, brought forward the
problem of training pupils to solve civic questions rather than
scientific or philosophical questions. According to Plato, Callicles
believed that government was an instrument for exploiting the masses.
Thrasymachus argued that so-called justice is that type of activity
which favors the interest of the strongest members of society, and
that might determines what is called right.[V-8] Epaminondas, the
Theban statesman, personified in his own career an unusually high
interpretation of the concept of patriotism, perhaps a more unselfish
expression of patriotism than is represented by any other political
spokesman of the Hellenic states.

The argument of the Sophists that what is best for the individual is
best for society aroused the antagonism of Socrates (469–399 B. C.),
whose ideas are reported by Plato and Xenophon. Socrates, the son of
an Athenian sculptor, asserted that the qualities of justice, wisdom,
temperance, and courage, which make a person a good member of society
and which increase social welfare, are the same qualities which make
a person a good individual and secure his individual advancement.
Socrates spent many years at the market places, on the streets where
people congregate and at the public resorts in studying the actions of
individuals and in engaging them in conversation concerning their moral
life. As a result Socrates evolved a significant social philosophy.
The heart of this philosophy is found in the statements that virtue is
knowledge, not in the sense of mere memorized facts but of a thorough
understanding. If a person understands completely the good and evil
phases of a proposed act, he will choose the right. For example, when
one is completely convinced of the harmful effects of poor teeth, he
will employ the regular services of a dentist to keep his teeth in good
condition. When he perceives the evil effects of dishonesty, he will
establish honest habits. The conclusion might be drawn that social
virtue rests upon societary knowledge.

Socrates was convinced that something was fundamentally wrong with
Athenian society. Everywhere he saw that ignorance led to vice. Only
in the mechanical and professional activities did he discover correct
action, but this was preceded by correct knowledge.[V-9]

A good carpenter is an individual who thoroughly understands carpentry;
a good man is an individual who truly knows the value of good actions.
Similarly, it might be said that a good urban resident is an individual
who deeply appreciates what it means to have a city of mutually
developing people.

Socrates wished to make all men intelligent. His teachings raised the
deep-seated social question: How can social organization be made highly
advantageous to the individual, and the individual made so aware of
these advantages that he will always act socially?[V-10] Inasmuch as
Socrates left no writings, it is impossible to explain with certainty
his teachings. Fortunately, he left a permanent impress of his
personality on the lives of his associates, and particularly, upon his
able and brilliant pupil, Plato.

In the fundamental dictum that virtue is knowledge, Socrates is
theoretically correct, but practically he ignores the overpowering
influence that oftentimes is exerted by the instincts and established
habits. He underestimates the power that is represented by a deeply
ingrained instinct or a habit which has existed for several years.
Instincts and nearly all habits are firmly established neurologically,
whereas knowledge is often new to the individual and merely a veneer on
the surface of the individual’s life. The acquisition of knowledge is
no guarantee that instincts centuries old will be promptly overcome or
re-directed.

Furthermore, with a young child the instinctive tendencies begin to
assert themselves and to give direction to the growth of the character
of the child, long before his mentality has unfolded and developed
to the point where he is capable of genuinely understanding the real
meaning of many forms of activity, and where many phases of knowledge
are entirely beyond his ability to comprehend.

Little is known concerning Plato’s early life and training. The most
influential factors were the life and teachings of Socrates. The strong
Socratic personality left its indelible impress upon the thought-life
of Plato. As a young man, Plato became greatly interested in Athenian
social and civic life. When he was perhaps twenty-three years of age,
the self-styled “Fair and Good” rulers came into control of Athens. The
failure of these men, whom history calls the Thirty Tyrants, to govern
wisely, produced an attitude of thorough disgust in the mind of Plato.
Further, the legalized murder of Socrates by the restored democracy in
399 B. C. aroused the bitter antagonism of Plato to the existing forms
of government. In the years which followed the death of Socrates,
popular rule produced loose and licentious social conditions. As a
consequence, Plato turned to the realms of the thought world in order
to find a perfect society. As a result of his contact with every-day
life and government, Plato evolved in his mind an ideal republic.

The Socratic principle that virtue is knowledge was accepted by Plato.
In Plato’s thinking this proposition led to the generalization that
education is the most important thing in the world. Upon this doctrine
more than any other, Plato’s twentieth century influence thrives.

What shall be the nature of a world-molding education? Theoretically,
Plato gives his answer in his epistemology. Ideas are the ruling forces
in life. Over against the uncertain fluctuating sense world, Plato set
up a realm of eternal, changeless ideas. An individual man is simply an
ephemeral expression of Man. Plato created a concept of unchangeable
reality which he found in Ideas. These, alone, are the permanent,
worth-while elements which man must seek to know and understand.

Because of his aristocratic attitudes and of his early disgust with
the experiments in democracy in his day, Plato turned away in his
social philosophy from the direct study of the people, such as had
engaged the attention of Socrates, to a search for a just society in
the world of ideas. This line of thinking found expression chiefly in
the _Republic_, written during Plato’s mature manhood. A discussion of
these idealistic concepts is found in the _Laws_ and the _Politicus_,
the latter being written in Plato’s old age and representing a
partial reaction from the idealism of the _Republic_. Because of its
consideration of nearly every aspect of social life from a specific
viewpoint, the _Republic_ may be called the first treatise in social
philosophy. While it falls below the social writings of the Hebrews
in its dynamic and practical phases, it excels them in its unity, its
profundity, and its philosophic quality.

Inasmuch as Plato had turned away from an inviting though strenuous
public career to a private life of scholarly thought, his perfect
society assumed characteristics that were far from mundane. Because
Plato lived in a day of small political groups and in a country of
limited size, he limited his ideal society--to a group represented by
5040 heads of families. Consequently it is impossible to apply Plato’s
social ideas with accuracy to a modern metropolitan center of 5,000,000
people, or to a nation-state of 100,000,000 people. Several phases of
Plato’s thought, however, were given a practical turn in the _Laws_. In
revealing Plato’s social philosophy, the _Politicus_, or _Statesman_
ranks third.[V-12]

In Plato’s ideal society there is a hierarchy of rank, which
includes three classes of people: the rulers, or true guardians; the
soldiers, or auxiliaries; and the artisans, or the industrial and
agricultural workers. In introducing the ideal state Plato uses mature
individuals.[V-13] Out of the needs and through the activities of
fully-developed persons, Plato builds an ideal commonwealth.

No individual is self-sufficing. Each has his peculiar bias, or
ability. By uniting, all will profit. There are not only specialized
classes, but there is specialization within the occupational groups.
An essential rule for the building of a just society is that each
individual shall find his place in the social order and shall fulfil
his special function. Plato recognized the need for correlating the
diversities of nature and the different types of occupation.[V-14]

The common people are engaged in the foundational occupations as
skilled artisans. The advantages of a special education are not open to
them. They receive the common education, including gymnastic and music
training. But, in accordance with the aristocratic strain in Plato’s
social philosophy, it is useless to try to give a higher education to
that large proportion of the population who are mentally incapable of
profiting by higher education. The logic is good but the major premise
is faulty in this pedagogical rule.

The second class, the soldiers, will maintain order at home, repel
invaders, and conduct territorial wars. The growth of population will
create a demand for more territory. Other states likewise will need
more territory, and war will become inevitable.[V-15] Plato frankly
admits the territorial basis of wars. From this factor he sees no
escape, although he declares peace to be better than war.[V-16] In his
_Tamias_ and _Critias_ he pictured a peace-state, “Atlantis.”

The soldier’s occupation is an art which requires years of training.
The chief physical trait of a true soldier is courage. The social
psychological significance of a military régime is that soldiers
are continually inciting their country to go to war. Such a régime
raises up enemies against itself, many and mighty, and results
either in ruining the specific people or in enslaving the foes of
these people.[V-17] On the other hand, the non-soldier classes,
since they prefer to lead a peaceful life and seek to conduct their
affairs quietly, unduly endeavor to avoid war. By degrees they become
unwarlike; their children develop a like attitude. Eventually, they
find themselves at the mercy of their enemies and are enslaved.[V-18]

Among the members of the state there will be a few especially able
individuals, destined by birth and reinforced by training to be rulers
and true guardians of the welfare of all.[V-19] They are lovers
of wisdom and philosophy. Flabbiness of character, drunkenness,
selfishness are unbecoming to them.[V-20] Selfish living is
condemned.[V-21] The guardians are characterized, according to Plato,
by the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country.
They show utter repugnance to anything that is contrary to the best
interests of the state.[V-22]

The guardians, however, rule aristocratically.[V-23] They do not
inquire of the citizens the kind of laws which they want passed, for
the same reason that a physician does not ask the patient the kind of
medicine which he wants. In the _Republic_, the _Laws_, and the other
dialogues where the nature of rulers and philosophers is discussed,
Plato’s “best men” show an indifference to earthly or material things
and uniformly seek righteousness, even social righteousness.

The candidates for guardianship receive first the elements of
education. At twenty years of age they must pass a general education in
order that they may go on with a special course, including arithmetic,
geometry, and astronomy.[V-24] At thirty they are subjected to a
further examination, after which the successful individuals devote
five years to the study of philosophy. At thirty-five they enter
practical life, hold minor offices, balance their theoretical training
by practical studies, and submit to diverse temptations.[V-25] They
undergo a civil service examination which extends over a period of
years. At the close they are subjected to a final series of three-fold
tests. The first test is that of logic; they must argue successfully
that it pays an individual, especially a guardian, to serve society.
The second test is that of fear; they are faced with dangers, for
example, the dangers to life, which beset those who undertake to
rule without favoritism and without compromising their principles
when confronted with the ambitions and desires of powerful selfish
interests. The third test is that of pleasure; they are submitted
to all the pleasures which thrill the heart of man. In other words,
they must show proof that the highest interest of the state is to be
the ruling interest of their lives.[V-26] Neither pain nor threats
must affect their loyalty. The temptations which come from pleasures
and enchantments must not disturb their self-control or weaken their
qualities of guardianship. From these requirements it will be seen that
Plato provided for a long period of intensive and extensive training
for the rulers. His idea varied widely from the ancient theory of the
divine right of kings and from the current practice of distributing
political spoils to friends.

Plato saw that the rulers when once selected and installed in office
would be tempted to become avaricious at the expense of the state.
Instead of becoming and remaining allied to all the citizens, they
will be prone to become tyrannical.[V-27] Plato perceived that it
would be difficult, after good rulers had been selected, to keep them
on the plane of good rulership. In order to preserve their virtue as
guardians and to remove the powerful temptation to wink at exploitation
that is carried on by the economically powerful, Plato indicated
certain protective devices. The guardians shall be permitted no private
property beyond a few incidentals. They shall not live in private
houses, but shall dwell and eat together. They shall receive a fixed
salary, sufficient to meet necessary expenses but no more. They shall
not be allowed to touch gold and silver or to wear gold and silver
ornaments. They shall be taught that they are made of divine gold and
silver, and therefore shall have no need of the earthly dross. They
shall not be subject to pollution from any earthly contacts. If the
guardians should acquire lands or moneys or homes of their own, they
would be unable to give their undivided attention to the state, and
they would become not guardians of the welfare of the citizens, but
tyrants, plotting and being plotted against.[V-28] In his zealous care
that the rulers might not be distracted from guarding with undivided
attention the interests of the state, Plato advocated community of
wives and children for the rulers.[V-29]

The question arose: Will the people be content to accept the division
of the population into hierarchal classes? In reply, Plato suggested
that the power of public opinion be utilized, and that all the
inhabitants of the state be taught that they are brothers, that is,
children of their common Mother Earth. This instruction will serve to
keep the masses in a humble attitude. Further, they are to be told that
different metals have been used by Mother Earth in making different
individuals. Those persons in whose make-up gold has been mingled have
the power of command and may become rulers. Others who are made of
silver may become auxiliaries, or soldiers; while the masses, being
made of brass and iron, are destined to become artisans.[V-30]

The objection is raised that people will not believe this “audacious
fiction.” The truth of the objection is admitted, and a solution of the
problem is offered. Teach the children the gold, silver, brass and iron
fiction; and they will believe it. When they grow to maturity, they
will tell their children, who in turn will teach it. Posterity, thus,
will accept it.[V-31] In this way Plato founded his social philosophy
upon education. Plato made clear that any kind of social or economic
theory can be foisted upon a whole people through the utilization of
the educational processes. A few selfish exploiters, by controlling the
educational system, can ruin a nation in a generation.

The guardians are instructed to examine the children in order to
discover of what metals they are made. Plato admitted a democracy of
talent in the sense that talent is likely to appear in the children
of brass and iron parents, while gold parents may beget brass and
iron children. If a gold child is found among the children of the
artisans, he is to be encouraged and trained to become a guardian.
If a brass and iron child is found among the children of the gold
parents, he must descend the social scale and be trained for husbandry
or artisanship.[V-32] Plato foresaw the fact, now scientifically
established, that geniuses are born indiscriminately among all classes
of society from the highest to the lowest. They are just as likely
to be born in the hovel or overcrowded tenement as in the spacious
and luxuriant palace. Consequently, society should seek out potential
genius and give it opportunities commensurate with its possibilities
and not allow its dynamic and divine spark to be snuffed out in a
heavy-laden tenement atmosphere.

Furthermore, according to Plato, the guardians are to seek out the
imperfect children and put them out of the way as easily as possible
and without attracting public attention.[V-33] If the capable must
devote their energies to the care of imperfect children, they would
presumably be wasting their ability and would be prevented from
devoting themselves to upbuilding the state. This doctrine neglects
the consideration of the harsh, unsympathetic attitude which it would
engender. Although rigorously eugenic, the doctrine is undemocratic,
unchivalric, and unChristian. It is thoroughly aristocratic.

The guardians are to supervise marriage. Plato especially deplores
the fact that almost all persons choose their life-partners in
marriage without proper regard to the kind of children that will be
procreated.[V-34] The marriage relationship should not be primarily
an individual affair, but should be governed by the thought of the
children that are not yet born and by due regard to the welfare of the
state and society.[V-35] The true purpose of marriage is not found in
wealth or power or rank, but in the procreation of healthy minded
children. Marriage is sacred in the highest degree because it is
socially necessary. Plato deplores class marriages, that is, marriage
within temperamentally similar groups. Persons of gentle nature seek
persons of gentle nature; the courageous seek the courageous. It would
be better if the gentle would seek the courageous in marriage, and
vice versa.[V-36] Marriage is sacred, and hence should be subjected to
strict eugenic safeguards.

The guardians shall prevent the extremes of poverty and riches.
With far-sighted social wisdom Plato points out that poverty is the
parent of meanness and viciousness, and that wealth leads to luxury
and indolence.[V-37] Both result in discontent and both cause the
deterioration of the arts. The poor man cannot properly equip or train
himself, or enter into his work painstakingly; the rich man will grow
careless and no longer act diligently when he comes into the possession
of unlimited wealth.[V-38]

In the acquisition of wealth the laws of imitation function powerfully.
One person accumulates property; others are immediately stimulated to
do likewise. In consequence, all the citizens may become lovers of
money.[V-39] But a money-loving public would be disastrous to the state.

The larger the amount of wealth that an individual accumulates, the
more he will want to accumulate. The momentum of the desire for
money-getting is socially destructive. The more the individual is
hypnotised by the wealth-getting delusion, the less attention does he
give to the maintenance of virtue. When the desire for virtue is in
competition with the desire for riches, the former decreases as the
latter increases.[V-40]

When the state becomes established on a property basis, the rich
exercise power and the poor are deprived of it.[V-41] In ordinary
times the rich are as indifferent to the welfare of the poor as to
the development of virtue, but in times of group crises they will not
despise the poor. In the days of prosperity and peace the poor man is
given the hindmost position, but when war comes, “the wiry, sunburnt
poor man” is placed in battle at the side of the wealthy man[V-42]--and
social democracy obtains. But in battle the poor man fights longer
and better than the rich man “who has never spoilt his complexion and
has plenty of superfluous flesh.” In the words of the poor man Plato
draws the astounding conclusion that many persons are rich because no
one has had the courage to despoil them.[V-43] At this point Plato has
given a striking explanation of the rise of socialism, syndicalism, and
economic radicalism.

When you see paupers, according to Plato, you may safely conclude that
somewhere there are also present thieves, robbers of temples, and
malefactors.[V-44] The causes of pauperism are given as (1) a lack of
proper education, (2) ill-training, and (3) unjust social laws and an
unjust constitution of the state.[V-45]

Plato suggested two instruments for preventing extreme wealth and
poverty--legislation and education. Each individual is to be guaranteed
a minimum amount of property. He may acquire as much as four times
this amount, but above the maximum a one hundred per cent excess tax
operates.[V-46] Plato planned a form of communism, not primarily to
secure the material well-being of the state, but to safeguard the
rulers against falling before selfish temptations. Plato also wanted to
protect the state from splitting asunder because of the distractions
that arise from labor-capital controversies. By educational means the
children are to be trained to be satisfied with the necessaries of
life[V-47]--at least some children are to be so trained. Parents should
bequeath to their children not riches but the spirit of reverence.[V-48]

The guardians shall be censors. They shall establish a censorship over
the arts in order to protect the children from seeing indecent sights
and hearing vulgar sounds. The works of fiction shall be censored in
order to prevent the children from reading and adopting bad ideas. The
creative artists shall be prevented from exhibiting forms of vice and
intemperance, in order that the future guardians may not grow up in an
atmosphere contaminated by images of moral deformity, and in order that
all children may develop in an environment of fair sights and should
and may receive unhindered and unhampered the good in everything.[V-49]

The guardians shall protect the _mores_. When Plato described a
perfect state, any change in the established customs would mean
retrogression.[V-50] Hence, the rulers should jealously guard the
customs, allowing no insidious innovations. Further, if any change is
permitted to take place in small things, there may be no stopping the
spirit of change.

Plato rested his argument for an ideal society upon the education of
wise leaders. Their judgment is better even than government by law.
Law is too rigid and inflexible. In view of the changeable character
of human conditions, which Plato recognized, no final or absolute laws
can be laid down.[V-51] The chief advantage of laws, however, is not
that they make men honest but that they make men act uniformly, and
hence in a socially reliable way. Laws are to be respected because they
represent the ripe fruits of long experience.[V-52]

Considerable attention is given to penology in the _Laws_.[V-53] In
view of the sanctity of custom and of the necessity of law, obedience
is a highly important social virtue. In theory Plato is modern and
scientific, for he advocated punishment, not as a vindictive but as
a preventive and reformatory measure.[V-54] Reformation is the true
aim of punishment.[V-55] In practice Plato is rigid and harsh. For
example, beggars are simply to be sent out of the city and out of the
country.[V-56] The death penalty is utilized freely.[V-57]

Plato opened all occupations to women as well as men, even the highest,
that of ruling.[V-58] The only difference between the sexes that needs
to be recognized occupationally is that men are stronger physically
than women.[V-59] Women, like men, vary in occupational temperament.
One individual is fitted for one kind of vocation; another, for some
other type of work.

Although the fundamental importance of bearing children is appreciated,
Plato observed that it is unnecessary that a woman devote her whole
life to the rearing of children. All women should have opportunities
for the development of their personalities. Those women who have
special talent for public service should enter thereupon. Although
a social conservative Plato admits an innovation in the ideal
republic--universal woman suffrage.

Since women have the same duties as men, they receive the same
opportunities for training. Women must share in the toils of war and
the defense of their country.[V-60] Women are priestesses;[V-61] they
serve on committees for the regulation of marriage, and for deciding
divorce cases.[V-62]

Although Plato was averse to change, he advocated a dynamic type of
education. This educational system, however, is to be definitely
controlled by the guardians. It is also paternalistic. Common education
shall be of two kinds: gymnastic, for the body; music, for the
soul.[V-63] Gymnastic training will produce a temper of hardness, and
music will lead to gentleness. The extreme of the one is ferocity and
brutality; the extreme of the other is softness and effeminacy.[V-64]
When taken together, they produce a well-ordered personality. The one
sustains and makes bold the reason, the second moderates and civilizes
the mildness of passion.[V-65] Gymnastic exercises provide for the
care and training of the body through childhood and youth so that in
maturity the body may best serve the soul.[V-66] Music, including
literature, trains through the influence of its qualities of harmony
and rhythm. For example, through exercises in harmony the child
develops a harmonious temperament.

Education is not a process of acquisition, but of the development of
the powers within the individual.[V-67] It is a life-long process;
it begins with birth and continues until death. It, however, slows
up as the individual grows old. An aged person cannot learn much, no
more than he can run much.[V-68] Education in the early years of life
is the most important. As a child is educated, so will his future
be determined.[V-69] A child should be taught early to respect his
parents. Great care should be given to the first years of life. From
three to six years of age the children in Plato’s republic come under
the supervision of chosen matrons and nurses.

Education shall be universal, but not compulsory, that is, all shall
be taught, but not compelled to learn. Education shall be made
attractive, almost a form of government.[V-70] The laws of imitation
shall be utilized. The tutor shall carry out his teachings in
practice.[V-71]

A well-trained individual is a replica of a just society. Plato draws
a parallelism, which is inaccurate, between the three classes in
society and three traits of the individual. The rulers, soldiers, and
artisans are compared respectively to the reason, the spirit, and the
passions of the individual. The passions must be subordinated to the
spirit, and both must be controlled by reason. The result will be a
just individual.[V-72] In society a similar hierarchal relation shall
hold between the rulers, soldiers, and artisans. The fundamental aim
in education shall be to secure a change in the attitudes of people.
Such changes are more important than modification in external matters.
Thus, according to Plato, the divine foundations of a state are laid in
education.

Religion plays a basic rôle in the ideal Republic. Plato held that
belief in God superseded in importance the doctrine that might is
right. Impiety undermines the strength of the social kingdom. God
created the individual for the whole, but not the whole for the
individual. The worship of God is necessary for the individual in
order to prevent him from reverting to selfishness and from making his
humanitarian beliefs purely egoistic phenomena.

Inasmuch as Plato outlined at the start a perfect republic, any change
would likely constitute a deterioration. But even an ideal state is not
immune to the entry of destructive ideas. The wise men, the rulers,
are not proof against the temptations of absolute power. To remove
the stirrings of self-interest in the minds of the guardians, Plato
planned a communistic order. He overlooked, however, the weaknesses of
communism, but these were pointed out at a later time by Aristotle.

In spite of excellent safeguards the wisdom of the best rulers will
occasionally fail them. Sooner or later they will err. In examining
the youth they will allow warrior youth to be trained for the guardian
class. With their spirit of contention and of ambition for honor these
adventitious guardians will start the perfect state upon the downward
road.[V-74] When the rulers seek personal power and honor, the ideal
republic will be superseded by a timocracy.

In a timocracy the ruler with the most private wealth will possess the
greatest personal power and receive the highest honor. Moreover, other
persons will be stimulated, thereby, to acquire wealth and power. In
the meantime the masses will lose nearly everything. The result is an
oligarchy in which the wealthy are honored and made rulers.[V-75] The
poor are treated with dishonor and deprived of position.

In such an oligarchic state there is a fundamental division; there are
two states instead of one. In spirit, the rich and the poor comprise
separate states. They live in the same territory but are conspiring
against one another.[V-76] Social stability is destroyed by the
conflicts between the extremes of countless riches and utter poverty.
The propertyless hate and conspire against the propertied.[V-77] Civil
war ensues. Because the wealthy have fallen into carelessness and
extravagance, and because the poor possess superior numbers, the poor
are the victors. A democracy--the rule of the Demos--comes into being.
Everyone rules.

But the populace is not fitted to rule. They are without experience.
Since the drones are numerous among the common people, the drones
manage almost everything in a democracy.[V-78] Excess of liberty
among people untrained for liberty leads to anarchy. Individuals will
set themselves up as the special friends of the common people. These
self-appointed friends of the people will prove to be self-seeking
tyrants; the democracy will be transformed into a tyranny--the lowest
state of all in Plato’s five-fold devolution.

With distrust of the masses and with a paternalistic government, Plato
coupled a belief that the individual must participate in the life of
society. Social justice does not consist in doing good to one’s friends
and ill to one’s enemies, or in catering to the interests of the most
powerful. The theory that might is right is repudiated.[V-79] A just
society is one in which every person has found his place of greatest
usefulness to the state and fulfils his entire obligations in that
place. On the whole Plato exhibited an impassioned faith in the moral
and social order.

Plato believed that Ideas are real and that they are the tools with
which the world is made over. He perceived perfect Forms, even a
perfect social Form. Through intellectual control, Plato planned a new
social order.




CHAPTER VI

ARISTOTLE AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT


Aristotle (384–322 B. C.), the distinguished pupil of Plato, did not
make, like his master, a unified contribution to social thought.
He sacrificed unity for the examination of parts. Aristotle was an
opportunist, a pragmatist, and a practical student of conditions and
constitutions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not look for Ideas separate
from but in things.

Aristotle studied 158 constitutions inductively and comparatively. His
primary attention was given to what is, rather than to what ought to
be. His eyes were directed first of all to the parts, and then to the
whole. In this examination he found that the parts are related, and
further, that they hold a developmental relation. Instead of Plato’s
perfection, we shall now consider Aristotle’s process of becoming.
Although unsystematic, the social ideas of Aristotle reveal the
concepts of process and progress.

In Aristotle’s _Ethics_ the discussion of virtue is socially valuable.
Virtue is a mean. Virtue is an impulse which is expressed neither in
excess or in deficiency. It is an impulse expressed temperately until
it becomes a habit. Excess and deficiency are equally fatal. The coward
is he who avoids and fears anything; the foolhardy is he who rushes
into danger anywhere.[VI-1] Liberality is the mean between prodigality
and avarice; civility is the mean between obsequiousness and insolence.
Virtue itself is the mean between self-indulgence and asceticism. In
virtue, lies happiness, man’s _summum bonum_.

Aristotle’s _Politics_ affords a searching analysis of many phases
of societary life. The family and the state are by nature prior to
the individual, since the whole must exist before any individual
part.[VI-2] When isolated, the individual is not self-sufficient.
Thus, the state is founded on the social needs of the individual. By
virtue of these social needs, man possesses the gregarious, or social,
instinct. By nature, man is a political animal,[VI-3] that is, he is a
being who by nature or necessity lives in association with his kind.
Man can attain his highest good only as a member of society.

Property is accorded by Aristotle a fundamental social position.
Physical necessities can best be provided through the efforts of
individuals. Communal ownership of property on a large scale will
fail. In referring to Plato’s communism, Aristotle declared: “For that
which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed
upon it.”[VI-4] Further, when one feels a thing to be his own, how
much greater is his pleasure in it.[VI-5] Then, if one has private
property, he may have the great pleasure which comes from making
gifts to others. Moreover, communism will lead to an unusual amount
of quarrelling; those who work faithfully will feel aggrieved when
they see that those who work dilettantishly receive and consume a full
portion.[VI-6]

Aristotle deprecated land equalization. Equalization of the desire for
land is urged. Instead of dividing land equally or of establishing
communism in land, Aristotle advocated that the higher classes be
trained not to desire more land. He also stated that speculators and
land schemers should be prevented from getting more land.[VI-7]

The communism in wives and children that Plato suggested, Aristotle
denounced as impracticable and foolish. Such a procedure will weaken
friendship and destroy love. Moreover, it will break up the unity of
the state.[VI-8]

Aristotle held the prevalent disdainful attitude toward manual labor,
and theoretically justified slavery. A slave is a person who by nature
is a slave, a person who by nature expresses himself through bodily
action. He is unable to guide himself by means of reason.[VI-9]

The subject of social control and government received extended
treatment from Aristotle. After considering a great variety of forms
of government, he avoided a dogmatic choice of any particular form.
He arrived at what is the modern, scientific conclusion, namely, that
no one form of government is to be worshipped to the exclusion of
all other types. A successful, or virtuous, government depends on
the attitude of the people. Human nature must be changed. All people
must become socially virtuous before a perfected government can be
established.

Theoretically, Aristotle believed that the best government would
come through the absolute rulership of one man, provided that there
is available a man pre-eminently wise and virtuous. But practically,
Aristotle held that in choosing a form of government which will
succeed, it is necessary to consider the actual social conditions, the
state of development of the people, and the attitude of the ruler or
rulers. It does not matter whether one person, or a few persons, or a
large number of persons perform the function of ruler so long as the
best interests of the state are kept uppermost. If the interests of the
entire group are the guiding principles, then royalty, aristocracy, or
constitutionalism is commendable. The one, the few, or the many are
good rulers, providing they are dominated by the common interests. In
these declarations Aristotle overlooked the fact that participation in
government by the governed is essential. He also neglected the fact
that a “best” ruler would be subject to very many temptations as a
result of personifying in himself all the forms of political, economic,
and social power that exist within the state. After a period of time
he would probably yield to some interests which are inimical to the
welfare of the whole.[VI-10]

When private interests control the government, the resultant forms of
government are either tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy. According to
Aristotle the chief difference between oligarchy and democracy is that
an oligarchy is the rule of the rich and a democracy is the rule of
the poor. Evidently, he believed that the poor are as selfish as the
rich and that the poor are incapable of being trained to the levels of
virtuous citizenship.

Although Aristotle is aristocratic in his political science and
advocated frequently the rule of the best few, he endorsed a
constitutional republic. Such a form of government will succeed where
there are many wise and virtuous individuals. He admitted that in large
numbers there is a stability of judgment and that common sense bulks
large. Under constitutional government, the extremes will cancel one
another, and the virtuous mean will rule. Large numbers of persons are
less likely to be corrupted than a few persons or even the one best
person.[VI-11]

There are two fundamentals in a good government: first, actual
obedience of the laws by the citizens; second, the social goodness
of the laws. Aristotle’s formula for an ideal society is this:
virtuous people and good laws, both judged by the common welfare.
And practically, the form of political organization--a monarchy, an
aristocracy, or a constitutional republic--depends upon the place of
the members of the social order on the incline of socialization.

If a constitutional republic is established, then rotation in office
should be practiced. The tenure of office should be restricted to six
months.[VI-12] An office should rarely be held more than once by the
same person.

On the other hand, the laws should be changed slowly.[VI-13] Law has no
power to make people obey in spirit, except through force of habit. The
state must guard itself against small changes in laws. Any apparently
slight neglect or disregard of law is insidious; transgression creeps
in unperceived.[VI-14] At first, small transgressions may not be
observed; then, they may gain such momentum that they will ruin the
state. Hence, there should be at all times strict observance of laws.

The major chord in Aristotle’s ideal society is the social mean. The
existence of two classes only, the very rich and the very poor, will
bring disaster to the state. The very wealthy consider themselves
above legalistic or social authority; the very poor are too degraded
to understand the necessity for and the reason for authority.[VI-15]
In fact, all who possess, not simply an unusual degree of wealth, but
great beauty, great strength or a “noble” birth feel that they should
be accorded special privileges. Further, not only those who are very
poor, but also the persons who are very weak, or very disgraced find
it difficult to follow the dictates of law or of social reason. With
the privileged characters who possess a superabundance of advantages,
the arrogant attitude developed when they were yet children. At home,
they received special considerations; they did not learn obedience
within the small family group. In consequence, how could they be
expected to be obedient citizens within the larger nation-group?
The rich are likely to become insolent and avaricious; they will
rule despotically.[VI-16] Not everyone can bear either prosperity or
adversity. An increase in prosperity in any part of society should
be carefully noted, and that part of society should be placed under
surveillance. No one should receive extraordinary power, either from
friends or through money. Even the pre-eminent are not above egotism.

A society is safest when the middle class is in control.[VI-17] The
states will likely be well administered in which the middle class is
numerous. Persons of about equal condition do not plot against others;
neither are they plotted against. A middle class prevents both the
arrogant wealthy and the impetuous proletariat from dominating the
state. “Inequality is the source of all revolutions.”

Poverty is a cause of revolution and crime.[VI-18] In time of war,
it is important that the poor be well fed else they will cause
disturbances. Aristotle might have added that in time of peace the poor
should be able to feed themselves well else they will in due season
cause revolution.

But poverty is not the only cause of crime. Riches often lead to crime.
Wealth causes the commitment of greater crimes than does poverty. The
greatest offenses are not occasioned by necessity but by excess.[VI-19]
In order to gratify some passion or desire, crime is often committed.
Of the passions ambition and avarice are the chief causes of
crime.[VI-20] Intoxication produces crime.[VI-21]

The causes of social revolution are manifold. The desire for equality
and the desire for inequality are common factors.[VI-22] Inferiors
revolt in order that they may attain a state of equality with other
persons. Equals revolt in order that they may gain superior levels of
honor and status. Aristotle cited a long list of additional factors in
social revolution: insolence, fear, political graft, a disproportionate
increase of wealth in some part of the state, neglect of trifles in
the observance of laws, dissimilarity in elements such as racial. The
fundamental cause, however, of social revolution is love of gain and
honor.

Aristotle was not a militarist, for he believed that war in itself is
not a social good. No people should be trained to conquer and obtain
dominion over neighboring states.[VI-23] Military states are safe only
when they are at war. After they declare peace the weight of their
military burdens brings about their downfall.[VI-24]

The principle of social telesis, which has been recently developed by
Lester F. Ward, was foreseen by Aristotle. A society of individuals,
like the individual himself, has a work to do.[VI-25] It should adapt
itself to its task.

Aristotle was a public health advocate. The location for an ideal city
should be carefully chosen. It should be selected, first of all, with
reference to the health of the citizens. This point is of greater
importance than that of locating a city wisely for the purpose of
public administration or war.[VI-26] The importance of a pure water
supply is given almost a modern emphasis.

The question of eugenics received the attention of Aristotle. In order
that children may be as physically sound as possible, legislators
should give special attention to the institution of marriage. Youthful
marriages are condemned because the children that are born to such
unions will be wanting in respect for their parents.[VI-27] Late
marriages will be unsatisfactory because there will be too great
difference between the ages of the parents and their children. The
marriage of a man and a woman whose ages are widely disproportionate
will lead to misunderstandings and quarrels. According to the rigorous,
unsympathetic dictum of Aristotle, no deformed child shall be permitted
to live.[VI-28] Even the advocates of modern birth control may turn for
encouragement to Aristotle.

In the marriage relation there is inequality. The man is by
nature better fitted to command than the woman.[VI-29] The chief
characteristic of a good wife is obedience to her husband--a doctrine
which is patriarchal. Unfaithfulness of either sex in marriage is
disgraceful.[VI-30]

Aristotle, like Plato, considers education the leading social force.
There is a fundamental educational problem: Shall youth be trained
primarily (1) to do useful work, (2) to be virtuous, or (3) to gain
higher knowledge?[VI-31] No final answer is given. Aristotle’s
conception of education, however, is paternalistic.

Utilitarian education possesses a danger line. To be seeking always
after the useful prevents one from developing a free and exalted
soul.[VI-32] Utilitarian education should cease when it cramps the body
or spirit and makes either less fit for the practice of virtue.

Gymnastic education should never be professionalized or allowed
to hinder the individual’s higher education.[VI-33] The excessive
training which leads to Olympic victories is anti-social, because the
constitution of the given individual is exhausted. Music is valuable
inasmuch as it has the power of forming character.[VI-34] The persons
who are engaged in seriously-minded occupations need amusements which
will give relaxation.

In summary of Aristotle’s social thought it may be said that the
Stagirite introduced the comparative method of studying human
institutions. He demonstrated the relative value of institutions,
showing that those which are best for one age of society will be
worthless for a later period. In order to meet changing social needs
and conditions, institutions must change. There is a fundamental
evolution in social changes.

A communistic social organization, according to Aristotle, is
psycho-sociologically untenable. The importance of the middle
classes is socially inestimable. Laws should be respected in small
particulars. The attitude of the members of society toward their social
organizations is more important than the type of organization itself.
Human conduct in the mass is to a degree predictable.

After the time of Aristotle, Hellenic life degenerated. Political
corruption, military intrigue, and intellectual scepticism vitiated the
Hellenic morality that was founded on custom. The ideal, held by Plato
and Aristotle, of man as an integral part of a constructive social
order was supplanted by a philosophy of pure individualism.

In Athens, Epicurus (341–270 B. C.) became the leader of the popular
hedonistic philosophy with its emphasis upon pleasure. Self-sacrifice
and noble conduct in the social sense are foreign to Epicureanism.
Friends should be sought, not for the sake of cultivating their
friendship, but for the pleasure to the seeker. If you treat other
persons unjustly, they will retaliate; therefore, treat others justly.

Stoicism which was founded in Athens by Zeno reached its culmination
among the Romans and hence will be discussed in the following
chapter. Polybius (203–121 B. C.), known as the last Hellenic social
philosopher, developed a theory of social evolution, based on the
belief that people associate because of the selfish benefits that
accrue, and on the fact that group approval and disapproval play a
leading part in the development of human attitudes.

Grecian social thought is noteworthy because of its intellectual
foundations. It ignored many affective elements, and for that reason it
became one-sided and unbalanced. It was rational rather than affective
or supernatural. It was designed to meet the needs of this life. It
moved away from authority and towards opportunism.

Economically, Hellenic social thought assumed or justified human
slavery. It postulated a democracy, but a democracy builded on the
backs of thousands of slaves. In practice at the height of the Athenian
democracy there were only about 25,000 free Athenians as against
300,000 slaves. Women were not enfranchised. The governments put slaves
into the armies, and ultimately attempted to throw out a commercial net
over the other Mediterranean states. As a result they lost the spirit
of democracy. The whole system and concept of democracy was undermined
by the debilitating influences of an industrial autocracy. The social
thought of the Greek was limited in its actual application largely
to the privileged few, who aristocratically ignored the needs of the
helpless many.

Grecian social thought at the height of the Athenian democracy did
achieve, however, for its day and epoch, a unique degree of expression
among the free citizens. For example, in the matter of athletics and
recreation, the Athenians worked together in furnishing themselves
organized group activities. Their athletic contests were of a free
community nature, untrammelled by commercialized motives. In furnishing
recreation for themselves, they co-operated, they acted as community
units. Moreover, in these community activities they generated in
themselves the spirit of a genuine democratic consciousness.

The fundamentals of Grecian social thought were preserved by the
Romans, without being augmented by them. Together with the Hebrew
and early Christian social thought, Grecian social thought laid
the foundations for the rise of modern social science, and even of
sociology.




CHAPTER VII

ROMAN SOCIAL THOUGHT


Roman social thought is an outgrowth of Hellenic philosophic movements.
It is represented in part by the codification of important phases of
societary control--the product of the legalistic genius of the Romans.
Stoicism, moreover, greatly affected and conditioned the meager social
thinking of the Roman scholars.

Lucretius (99–55 B. C.) was the chief Roman exponent of Epicureanism.
In his story of social evolution he began with the various phases
of the biological struggle for existence, and proceeded to depict
in a remarkably significant fashion the origins of social practices
and customs.[VII-1] Although his data are of questionable value, his
descriptions of social origins often run strangely parallel to modern
findings.

The ideal commonwealth of Cicero (106–43 B. C.) is founded on the
belief that Rome has the possibility of becoming an ideal state.[VII-2]
The best ideas in this connection were selected by Cicero from the
Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic philosophies. Cicero was apparently
an exponent of honest statesmanship and finally gave his life for
civic efficiency. He argued that a child should not be punished by
either a parent or a teacher in a fit of anger. Corporal punishment
should be considered only when other methods fail to discipline.

The descriptive studies of Julius Caesar (100–44 B. C.) are noteworthy.
The _Commentaries_ present social studies of contemporary conditions;
they possess modern value. In a large number of instances the accuracy
of Caesar’s social notes has been verified.

The teachings of the Roman Stoics may be traced back to the Socratic
formula: Virtue is knowledge. Virtue is knowledge which grows out of
practical human conduct. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics believed that
sympathy is a disease. It is pathological and hence must be overcome.
In helping other people the wise individual does not allow the emotion
of pity to appear.

Contrary to the theory of the Epicureans, the Stoics taught that
pleasure is a tiresome and sickly goal. Seneca (4 B. C.-65 A. D.), a
leading Roman Stoic, declared: “I am seeking to find what is good for a
man, not for his belly.”[VII-3] Virtue, according to Stoic philosophy,
consists in living a free and undisturbed life. A line was drawn
between the virtuous and non-virtuous, between a few virtuous and a
multitude of fools. This doctrine tends to engender in the few virtuous
a contemptuous regard for the pig-trough philosophy of the many.

This tendency, however, was offset by the Stoic belief that all
persons originally possess the same nature and that all are children
of the same universal Spirit. Social differences, hence, are external
and superficial. Beneath the surface of human nature there is a
cosmopolitanism which constitutes a passive brotherhood of man.
Brotherly love should rule, according to the Stoics, but it should rule
temperately, and not in such a way as to disturb the individual’s self
control. Brotherly love should be not a passionate but an intellectual
element.

In his treatise on Benefits, Seneca makes benevolence the most
social of all virtues; and ingratitude the most venal of all crimes.
Marcus Aurelius (121–180 A. D.) gave the social injunction: Love
mankind.[VII-4] Living should consist in passing from one social act to
another.[VII-5] This is a social world; men exist for the sake of one
another.[VII-6]

The Stoic Emperor declared that God is social and that individuals are
part of God’s universe. Each individual is a component part of the
social system, and hence every act of the individual is an integral
phase of social life.[VII-7] Inasmuch as the Intelligence of the
universe is social, human society functions as a phase of the cosmic
co-ordination. We are all co-laborers and co-operators. Even the
persons who find fault and who hinder what happens, are performing
useful co-operative functions.[VII-8] That which is harmful to the
swarm is likewise harmful to the individual. Man is a citizen of the
world.[VII-9] The services of a good citizen are never lost. The good
citizen does good chiefly by the example he sets.[VII-10]

But the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics never extended beyond a passive
interest in the world of affairs. It meant that the individual should
be agreeable with other persons, that he should be tolerant of the
weaknesses of others, and that he should be aware constantly that
others are watching him and likely to copy the example he sets.[VII-11]
Stoicism requires the suppression of anger and the exercising of
clemency toward all human beings. While Stoicism does not extend so far
in its profession as Christianity’s doctrine of brotherhood of man, it
represents a broader viewpoint of life than any code of conduct which
previously had developed in the non-Christian world.

The purpose of punishment, according to Seneca, is two-fold: either
to reform the evil-doer; or to prevent the operation of his evil
influence and to stop him from setting harmful examples.[VII-12] The
social medicine must be determined, quantitatively and qualitatively,
by the nature of the offender and the offense. Above all things else,
he who administers punishment must not act in anger. Justice cannot be
angry.[VII-13] Lynch procedure is entirely contrary to the teachings of
Stoicism.

First of all, thieves and robbers should be instructed in the error
of their ways. Obtain their point of view and administer punishment
accordingly. Pity them. The individual who understands why criminals
commit offenses is prevented from becoming angry with them.[VII-14]
Aurelius, like Jesus,[VII-15] gave the injunction: Love even those who
do wrong. Aurelius, like Paul,[VII-16] urged an attitude of charity
toward wrong-doers.[VII-17]

The Stoics condemned luxurious living and fashion racing. True riches
consists not in augmenting one’s fortune, but in abating the desires
for securing material wealth.[VII-18] The words of Emperor Aurelius
regarding ostentatious living do not seem out of place when applied to
the modern display of wealth. Seneca asserted that he would despise
wealth as much when he has it as when he does not possess it.

Stoicism urged the Aristotelian social mean regarding property. Much
property is a burden and a cause of worry and fear. It excites envy
in others. The best society is that which is characterized by neither
poverty nor plenty. The poor should not condemn riches, and the
wealthy err in extolling the benefits of poverty--each is speaking of
a situation which is objective to him and outside his sphere. Since it
is objective to him, he is not qualified to speak concerning it. The
individual is a great man who is not corrupted by his wealth; but he
is a greater man who is honestly poor in the midst of plenty.[VII-19]
Riches constitute a power to do evil, hence mediocrity of fortune with
a gentleness of mind represents the best status.[VII-20]

Stoicism enunciated excellent social ideals, which were, however,
passively intellectual. They were not affectively dynamic. Despite
their implications, they begat social inertia. The teachings of the
Stoics removed rather than instilled a sense of public responsibility.
The doctrines are available to the few rather than to the masses,
although a Roman slave, Epictetus, as an exception, rose to a full
interpretation of Stoic principles. The social ideals and concepts of
the Stoics did not possess enough power to regenerate a degenerate
society. They had sufficient strength, however, to maintain themselves
in a voluptuous and pleasure-seeking world. They performed the
exceedingly useful function of preparing the way for the invasion
of the Roman Empire by the new and active Christian propaganda.
The teachings of the Stoics made easier the conquest of Rome by
Christianity. They softened a little an otherwise hard-hearted world.

As a class the Romans were men of action. They were soldiers and
administrators. The name of Rome is still synonymous with power. On
the whole it must be said that the Romans made little contribution to
societary thought.

The constructive work of the Romans was legal and administrative. They
built up a special social science--legal science. The legal genius of
the Romans emphasized the rights of contract, of private property, of
interest. Although this attention to the development of individualistic
institutions was fatal to the rise of new social attitudes and to an
increase in the sense of social responsibility, it nevertheless was
instrumental in constructing a stable framework for the evolution of
the social process.

The Romans preserved a portion of Hellenic culture. The teachings of
Plato and Aristotle were saved to modern civilization. Credit is due
the Romans for receiving, keeping, working over, and handing on a part
of the best Hellenic civilization.

Roman thought accentuated military principles of authority, even to the
point of autocracy. It tended to crush the unprivileged populace. It
tried to keep the masses contented by generous state aid. It denied to
personality its complete individual and social expressions. In building
an individualistic framework which would provide an orderly _milieu_
for the rise of the institution of private property, it ignored the
needs of the uneducated and poverty-enslaved masses for a full measure
of liberty.

Rome developed the concept of organized power. The organizing ability
of the Romans was marvelous, an organizing power that lives today in
and through the Catholic Church.

The greatest gift of Rome was its Stoic concepts. Although these
originated in Hellas, they attained their maturity in Rome. They opened
the way for the reception of the Christian social concepts of love,
service, brotherhood of man.




CHAPTER VIII

EARLY CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT


Christian social thought is the direct outgrowth of Hebrew social
concepts. Amos and Hosea and Isaiah paved the way for the social
teachings of Jesus. The social commandments of the Old Testament
were the progenitors of the modified social injunctions of the New
Testament. Job, the social citizen, was not an unworthy precursor of
Jesus, the lover of humanity. Out of the love and tender care for
children which thrived in Hebrew homes there arose the concept of
the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God--the two cardinal
principles of Christianity.

Jesus gave expression to no system of social thought, but uttered
social principles and concepts which, when put together, constituted
the basis of a new social order. He dealt with personalities rather
than with institutions. He looked to the individual rather than to the
mass. He emphasized functions rather than structures. He proclaimed
the need for socio-religious personalities. If he could get these,
he was sure of the ultimate societal results. He foresaw a perfect
society--the Kingdom of God.

Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Jesus was a continual student of everyday
life. Like Socrates, Jesus was fond of people. He was a student of
individual and social affairs. He mixed with all types of human beings.
Like Socrates, he wrote practically nothing. Unlike Socrates, Jesus had
a dynamic element in his nature which forbade him to remain content
to argue with people (after the Socratic manner), but which drove him
to help and to heal. He went about doing good. The Gospel records are
replete with instance after instance of his work in healing the sick of
their infirmities. He was not, however, a physician but a teacher and a
savior from sin and evil.

Behind all the teachings of Jesus, there is the concept of a perfect
human order. This Kingdom begins in the hearts of individuals.[VIII-1]
It is a spirit or an attitude of mind which leads the individual toward
co-operative living. The Kingdom may come on earth as well as in
heaven. Consider the picture of a harmonious community life which Jesus
gave when lamenting over Jerusalem: “How often would I have gathered
thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood together under
her wings, and ye would not!”[VIII-2]

Jesus extended the concept of brotherhood. Whoever shall do the will of
God is a brother to me.[VIII-3] The world, under God, is one family.
The Kingdom, therefore, is to include all human beings, who worship God
in spirit and in truth and who at the same time love their fellowmen
in justice and co-operative living.

The ideal society is organic. It grows from good examples. Live so that
other persons, seeing the helpfulness of your life, may live likewise.
The Kingdom grows like a grain of mustard seed, which finally becomes
a tree in whose branches the birds find homes.[VIII-4] Love grows, and
like leaven, permeates and transforms the whole mass,--the result is
the perfect Kingdom.

God is the spiritual leader of the new society, to whom Jesus prayed in
the social term, Our Father. God is the personification of love. God
loved the sinful world so much that he gave his only son to the task
of saving not simply the Jews or modern Europeans, but the whole world
from all sins. The Star which guided the Magi was God’s service Star,
announcing that he had given his only son in the war against sin.

Love is the new note that is to re-form the world. Love is the
scientific principle from which all other true sociological concepts
are derived. Love received the most perfect human expression in the
personality and life of Jesus, who came not for self glory but to save
people from hate and sin; who sought not the sheep to oppress and slay
them for his own gratification, but to direct them, when lost, back
to safe living; who sought not to weigh down the burdened with unjust
taxes and harsh living conditions, but to relieve and give rest to the
heavy-laden: who cared less for the upper Four Hundred than for the
lower Four Hundred Million.

The principle of love compels the members of the Kingdom to show mercy.
God is full of mercy, therefore, let his followers show mercy. Love
forgives. The Christian citizen is instructed to become reconciled with
his brother citizen before worshipping at the altar of God.[VIII-6] If
the individual would be forgiven of his sins, he must acquire the habit
of forgiving other persons. He must be careful not to judge harshly,
lest other persons judge him harshly. He should forgive others seventy
times seven times, that is, without stint or measure.

St. Luke, the physician, recites the story of a loving father. The
prodigal son impetuously demanded his share of the inheritance, and
going into a far country, wasted his substance in riotous living. But
upon showing true remorse for these exceedingly grave offenses, his
father received him back with a loving, forgiving heart, a feast, the
best robes, and music and dancing. One of the malefactors who was
crucified with Christ, showed a penitent heart at the last moment and
received forgiveness from the loving, dying Christ. Since no one is
without sin, no one has a right to be unforgiving. Even the woman taken
in adultery came within the law of forgiving love.

The societary principle of love is the major chord of Christianity.
It is Christianity’s unscientific but greatest gift to sociology. It
has become the fundamental concept of sociology. To the Old Testament
type of love which urged the individual to love his neighbor and to
love the alien and stranger, Jesus repeatedly insisted upon a love
that is still greater, namely, a love which will include enemies. Love
your enemies.[VIII-7] Jesus himself exemplified this form of love. He
made no idle interpretation of an impossible love, but demonstrated
and lived a love which forgave his enemies, even those who mockingly,
shamelessly nailed him to a cross. So great is the drawing power of
this almost superhuman love which Jesus expressed in deeds that he
himself predicted that if he were lifted up he would draw all people
unto him.

Love fills people with compassion. The Gospels are replete with
references to the fact that wherever Jesus saw sickness, poverty, sin,
he was moved with compassion. The illustrations range from the blind
men by the wayside to the bread-hungry multitudes, from the unclean
leper in Galilee to murderous Jerusalem.

Love is cosmopolitan. All peoples are entitled to know the meaning of
Christian love.[VIII-8] Both Jew and Gentile shall feel its warming
glow. The Samaritan lives it. Loving neighborliness includes more than
priestly and Levitical acts; it involves Samaritan kindness. The love
in the heart of Jesus reached first to a few close friends, then to
sinners and outcasts, then to the Samaritans and the Gentiles, and
finally to the whole world. It led ultimately to that most unselfish
of all human enterprises--the missionary movement.

Love leads to humility and self-sacrifice. Alms-giving is done in
private, not for social plaudits. The individual prays, not to be seen
of men and thereby to be accounted good.[VIII-9] He who seeks to save
his life shall lose it; whoever loses his life for the sake of the
Kingdom shall save it. He who stores up for himself the wealth of the
world shall lose himself. Salutations in the market places and chief
seats in the synagogues in themselves are unworthy. The poor in spirit
are blessed.

Love shuns positions of worldly power, lest they be secured at the
loss of one’s soul.[VIII-10] The best positions in life are not to
be seized; they are obtained through the exercise of love; they are
bestowed in recognition of merit and worth. He who exalts himself will
be abased; the humble will be exalted.

Love creates true greatness. The members of the society of perfect
love are characterized by the sincerity, purity, humility of little
children.[VIII-11] He who serves most is greatest. The Kingdom of God
is an aristocracy, not of Might but of Service. The Son of God came to
serve, not to be served. For the sake of those outside the Kingdom,
Jesus sanctified himself, sacrificing even his life in that cause.

Love makes the Golden Rule the best sociological proposition in Hebrew
and Jewish literature. “Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them.” In reply to a lawyer of the Pharisees, Jesus
enunciated a two-fold commandment, the first part of which invoked
complete love to God; and the second part, to man. The love of the
individual for his fellow man as shown in both attitude and deeds is
the test of the love of the individual for God. Love means service.
Love does not connote lip-service; neither does it mean divided
service. No one can serve two masters, God and mammon.

Christian love implies definite and continued public service. Social
service is the test of entrance to the Kingdom, and of the sincerity
of the individual’s religious profession.[VIII-12] On the judgment day
those on the right hand will be blessed and given life eternal, and to
them the king of the judgment will say:

    I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat;
    I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink;
    I was a stranger, and ye took me in;
    Naked and ye clothed me;
    I was in prison, and ye came unto me.

Then the righteous, with surprise, will inquire of the Lord of the
judgment: When did we see you hungry and feed you; or thirsty, and give
you drink? When did we see you a stranger and take you in? Then the
Lord of the judgment will answer them that when they had served the
weak and poor and the heavy-laden on earth, they had been serving him
and thereby had proved their loyalty to God and earned the rewards
of everlasting life. And those who fail to measure up to the social
service test, whether professing Christians or not, will be turned away.

The importance and nature of religio-social service is indicated by
Jesus when he symbolizes the giving of a cup of cold water in his name
as a test for receiving eternal life.[VIII-13] He who has two coats
should give one to him who has none. The sharing of food with those who
have no food is commanded. Give liberally; give all thou hast.[VIII-14]
It is blessed to give under all circumstances. Material riches are
insignificant in value when compared with spiritual wealth. To give the
things of this world is to receive the greater things of the spirit. He
is richest who gives most, both of material and spiritual goods. As an
expression of his love for God, Jesus lived a life of social and human
service.

Whenever Jesus mentioned the ten commandments--all three synoptic
writers agree on this point--he omitted the four commandments of
individual import and repeated only the social rules, or principles:

  (1) Thou shalt do no murder,
  (2) Thou shalt not commit adultery,
  (3) Thou shalt not steal,
  (4) Thou shalt not bear false witness,
  (5) Honor thy father and mother,
  (6) Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

After the fashion of the major social prophets, Jesus cried out
vehemently against social injustice. He denounced the persons who
devour widows’ houses, or who lay unnecessary economic burdens upon
their fellowmen.

Anti-social religion, above all things else, angered Jesus. He wanted
no followers who were practicing social or political injustice. Cursed
are those persons who appear righteous, who make long prayers, or who
go about in long robes, but who inwardly are hypocrites, are full of
dead men’s bones, of uncleanness, of extortion and excess.[VIII-15] The
shedding of innocent blood is condemned. The paying of money in order
to expiate sin will avail nothing. Such money is tainted; it is blood
money.[VIII-16]

Anti-social and commercialized religion so angered Jesus that, contrary
to his customary attitudes toward sinners, he committed violence on
one occasion against offenders. He overthrew the tables of the money
changers in the temple, and, making a scourge of small cords, he drove
out the money changers. In so doing, he declared that the worship of
God should not be commercialized.[VIII-17] He would not have the house
of worship turned into a cultured den of thieves.

So furious were the scribes and the chief priests because of the attack
of Jesus upon anti-social religious practices that they planned how
they might kill him.[VIII-18] It appears that as a direct result of the
antagonism of Jesus to the anti-social practices of the religious, or
temple, authorities and of the other religious leaders the conspiracy
against Jesus finally brought about his death. Jesus went about
stirring up the common people in a democratic movement against the
autocratic, hypocritical, anti-social religious leaders among the Jews.
He met his death while championing the needs of the masses who were
being exploited in the name of religion.

Jesus was the highest type of social democrat. The perfected social
order which he foresaw is a democracy, ruled by the principles of love
and service in the name of God. Furthermore, no one shall be compelled
to come into the Kingdom. The good tidings shall be presented to all
individuals, but the liberty of the individual shall not be violated.
The principle of voluntary assent, not compulsion or conscription,
rules in recruiting for the Kingdom. Moreover, within the Kingdom,
compulsion is unknown. Love sufficeth.

Jesus hated sin. To him, sin was anything which overcomes love and
which causes the individual or society to disintegrate. Sin is that
which defeats or hinders the coming of the Kingdom of Love. Sin breaks
up or holds back the social process. Sin, like love, is organic. Sin
grows. An evil tree brings forth evil fruit; grapes and figs are not
gathered from thorns or thistle-bearing plants.

Jesus forgave sinners; even social sinners. By means of his
imagination, he put himself in the place of the sinner and sought
to understand the causes of the sinning. As his mind filled with an
understanding of sin, his heart overflowed with pity and forgiveness
for the sinner. He sought primarily to reclaim; he thought secondarily
of punishment. Even in the case of the adulterous woman, he sought to
save what was left of the broken spirit rather than to punish. His
cardinal penological principle was reformation.

It is significant that the social institution which Jesus supported
above all others, even above the church and the state, was the family.
Jesus spoke frequently for the family. He commanded that children
should unwaveringly act loyally toward parents; he used not only the
clear-cut terms of the writer of Exodus but added a curse of death upon
those who abuse their parents.[VIII-19]

An even stronger command was given by Jesus concerning loyalty to
the marriage relation. A man’s genuine loyalty to his parents,
undiminished in intensity, must be subordinated to faithfulness to his
wife.[VIII-20] This social theory is opposite in character to that of
Confucius concerning attitudes toward parents and wives. The conception
which Jesus urged leads to social progress, while the teaching of
Confucius leads to social stagnation.

A man and woman who have been spiritually joined together in wedlock
are one flesh, above and beyond separation by civil authorities. Jesus
uttered the stern and awe-inspiring sanction: What therefore God hath
joined together, let not man put asunder. The family as an institution
is accorded a sacredly fundamental place in the social order.

Jesus recognized woman as equal with man spiritually. His attitude
toward his mother and the other women of his day was one of respect,
chivalry, and gentleness. He laid the foundations of a social process
in which women function on terms of equality with men.

Honor to parents and honor to wife must be supplanted by honor to
children. Jesus worshiped little children. In them he saw the innocence
and purity of God. When he wished to describe the attributes of the
Kingdom, he selected a little child and held him up as typifying the
simple, natural spirit of perfect living. Although without children
himself, Jesus loved little children, choosing them for special honors,
and declaring that of such is the Kingdom of God. It is not God’s will
that one of these little ones should perish; it is the stupidity of man
and the lack of social conscience that causes a high mortality rate of
little children. He who harms the trustful child shall be cursed. It
were better for such a miscreant that a millstone were tied about his
neck and that he were thrown into the sea.[VIII-21]

In regard to the influence of private property Jesus was fearful.
His zeal for and whole-hearted loyalty to spiritual values made him
suspicious of vested interests. He repeatedly warned in vigorous
language against the lure of gold and the baneful influences of
material wealth upon the attitudes and acts of the individual. He
himself showed no interest in owning property. He lived without a home
of his own and without private means. If he had possessed these, his
life-work probably would have failed. He urged his disciples to remain
free from the desire for money; he even commanded them to rely for the
means of material subsistence upon the people with whom they labored.
Jesus believed that private property hindered the realization of the
principle of brotherhood of man. He made a sharp distinction between
the interests of God and mammon. He believed that these two sets of
interests are diametrically opposed to each other. To the extent that
the individual relies upon property, he separates himself from God and
the things of the Spirit. The disciples were instructed to scorn, not
only the earning of wealth, but if they possessed earthly goods, they
were to sell these and give the proceeds to the poor.[VIII-22] The
disciple of the spiritual life must divorce himself from the love of
monetary gain.

Toward the poor, Jesus was sympathetic. The Gospel shall be preached
chiefly to the poor, not because the poor, _per se_, need it more than
the rich and not because the poor should be specially favored, but
because they recognize their needs. They are in a receptive attitude
whereas the attitude of the rich has been calloused by their wealth.
The response to the Gospel is not likely to be whole-hearted by persons
who possess an extensive interest in riches.

Jesus taught a spiritual socialism. He thought in terms of spiritual
love for all persons, not of material well-being for the proletariat.
But he seemed to prefer the company of the poor. Blessed are the poor,
was his attitude; for they are in a frame of mind which makes them fit
subjects for the perfect Kingdom. The possession of property gives
the individual a feeling of self-exaltation; poverty gives rise to
humility--a cardinal virtue of the Kingdom.

Jesus did not attack poverty with preventive measures. Poverty will
continue to exist.[VIII-23] Perhaps it is well that it should continue,
for a nation of economically satisfied people might not be religiously
minded. It is harder for a camel to go through a needle’s eye than for
a rich man to get into the swing of an untrammeled social process. Woe
unto the rich, because they are self-centered, materially inclined, and
pleasure-loving. The man who pulled down his barns in order to build
larger barns, saying to himself, “Take thine ease, eat, drink, and be
merry,” is scathingly condemned by Jesus.[VIII-24] He is ostracized
from the ideal society. In the story of Lazarus and the rich man, the
former is carried to Abraham’s bosom, but the latter, in torments, begs
for a cup of water and the company of Lazarus. He wanted Lazarus sent
to him; he longed for the company of him whom he once ignored. The
attention of Jesus was continually centered on the dangers of wealth,
but rarely on the need of preventing poverty.

Zaccheus, a rich man, was called as a disciple of Jesus. But before
the discipleship began, the superintendent not only had to come down
from the mulberry tree and declare his allegiance to God, but he had to
become socially converted as well. He promised to give one-half of his
wealth to the poor and to restore falsely acquired possessions fourfold.

Then there was the rich young man who came to Jesus, asking how he
might obtain admittance to the Kingdom, declaring that he observed the
commandments. One more thing, however, was required of him, namely,
that he sell all his possessions and give the returns to the poor. Only
by so giving might he have treasure in the social Kingdom.

The teaching of Jesus concerning the Sabbath throws light on the
exceedingly human element in his thought. The Sabbath is a special
day for doing good deeds.[VIII-25] The Sabbath is to be treated not
primarily from the standpoint of religious rites but from the viewpoint
of human welfare. Works of necessity, and deeds of mercy and kindness
to man and beast are proper to the Sabbath.[VIII-26] Man was not made
for the Sabbath, but the day of rest and good deeds was designed for
the benefit of man.

The attitude of Jesus toward the problem of peace versus war has
aroused considerable controversy. There are certain of his sayings
which seem to contradict each other. But an analysis of all his
teachings demonstrates that his emphasis was on peace. The exceptions
to the rule will be stated first.[VIII-27] On one occasion he said: I
came not to send peace, but a sword. The context shows that Jesus was
speaking in an individual and not a national way. He had in mind the
conflicts which arise between the individuals who are converted to
the ideals of the Kingdom and those who are not. Jesus explained that
those who love him must do so even at the expense of forsaking father
and mother.[VIII-28] Loyalty to the Kingdom may mean that the son will
oppose the practices of his father in business, the daughter will
object to the time wasted in the unChristian practices of her mother,
the parents will protest the sowing of “wild oats” by son or daughter.

In the temple, on one occasion, Jesus displayed anger and used
violence. He was dealing, however, with a group of criminals, cultured
criminals, who apparently would respond to no treatment except
violence. They would not cease their nefarious practices except through
compulsion.

On the other hand, the illustrations are many where Jesus used love
in order to change the ways of people. He never used force in his own
behalf, even to save his life. He rebuked Simon Peter for drawing his
sword and cutting off the right ear of the servant of the high priest
who in company with others were seeking Jesus in order to bind him and
kill him.[VIII-29] At another time Jesus specifically enjoined: Resist
not evil; and instructed his followers when smitten upon the right
cheek to turn the left also. Those who take the sword shall perish
by the sword; the nation that builds itself up by the sword shall be
destroyed by it.[VIII-30]

The birth of Jesus was accompanied by glad tidings and song,
proclaiming peace on earth and good will toward men.[VIII-31] Blessed
are the peacemakers. In the perfect society, good will by all to all
will be shown, perfect love will reign, and permanent peace will
prevail.

Jesus may or may not have expressed himself on several important issues
of his day. The incomplete records do not indicate his attitude upon
many vital social problems. It appears that Jesus usually spoke in
remedial rather than preventive social terms. However, beneath this
remedial terminology there are fundamental social principles, which,
if put into common practice, would solve all social problems. Jesus
proposed to build an ideal society by re-making and regenerating
individuals. He dared to promulgate the radical program of re-making
human nature itself. He commanded that all selfish impulses and
instincts be completely subordinated to the altruistic and socializing
desires.

Jesus insisted throughout his life-work upon the principle that
material factors must be subjected to spiritual values. In order to
make this principle clear he often took particular pains to treat
material goods with the utmost insignificance. He perceived that
individuals are made slaves by the worship of wealth, either on the
part of themselves, of the privileged classes, or of society itself. He
inaugurated a program of spiritualization which would free the world
from the slavery which may come from economic forces.

Although a religious teacher above all things else, Jesus insisted upon
the necessity of the existence of something more than saving faith
alone. He required a social attitude of mind, a heart of social love,
and a spirit of service. Give freely to others. Serve others. By giving
himself for others, the individual will function in the Kingdom of
perfect love, and win other individuals to that Kingdom.

Jesus required that love be substituted for hate. Unkind deeds must
be supplanted by kind deeds. According to this principle, employers
and employees must learn to love one another; and business must be
put upon the basis of love and service. Government must be a series
of mutual services. Religion must harbor no selfishness. In all human
relationships, Jesus reiterated the principle: Love, love, love. This
is the spiritualizing and socializing principle by which Jesus proposed
to make over the social process.

Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, by virtue of unique experiences
and many travels, possessed a cosmopolitan attitude of mind. He gave
a practical application of the teaching of Jesus concerning the
brotherhood of man. He urged the equal treatment of Jews and Gentiles,
bond and free.[VIII-32] He preached the essential unity of mankind. God
is no respecter of persons; his Kingdom is a spiritual democracy. We
are all--Jew and Gentile--children of the same Father, who gave his son
in service for all.[VIII-33] To the call to come over into Macedonia
for the purpose of rendering aid, Paul responded immediately and
favorably. By so doing he believed that he was carrying out the true
implications of the love of God.

The greatest tribute that has ever been paid to love as a social force
was given by Paul.[VIII-34] Although possessing the highest educational
qualifications and being able to speak with the greatest eloquence,
any individual leads a practically useless life unless that life is
motivated by love. Giving one’s possessions to the poor and sacrificing
one’s body counts little if one does these things in any other spirit
than that of love. Love protects the individual from envying his
neighbors, from becoming proud and haughty and boastful. Love is the
greatest principle of life.

The members of the Kingdom of God should love one another under
all circumstances.[VIII-35] They should bear one another’s
burdens.[VIII-36] They should do good to all men, even to those who
persecute. Above all, they should not recompense any man with evil
for evil, or fail to feed their enemies if the latter hunger. Love is
the law of God. Perfect love is more powerful than principalities and
powers and even death.[VIII-37] Love conquers all evil. Love is more
powerful than might. A practical, cosmopolitan brotherhood of man is
one of the fundamental concepts of Paul’s teachings.

Paul taught the organic unity of mankind. In the perfect Christian
order each individual has a specific function to perform which is a
part of the whole process. Paul compares this situation to the human
body in which there are many organs, each performing its individual but
correlated function.[VIII-38] No one liveth to himself, no one dieth
to himself.[VIII-39] Every individual, even in dying, influences the
social equilibrium and affects group progress. All individuals in the
perfect Kingdom are co-laborers and co-operators. Whatever weakens
one individual weakens society; whatever strengthens the individual
strengthens society, providing that strength is used societarily.

Another fundamental element in the social thought of Paul was his
concept of sin. Sin is socially and individually destructive. The wages
of sin--a generic term--is death. Paul made a long list of social
sins, namely: covetousness, maliciousness, drunkenness, wantonness,
dishonesty, fraud, stealing, fornication, murder. In nearly all his
letters, Paul warned his followers against the evils which beset
mankind. He urged people to beware of the appearance of doing evil.
Paul’s rule of conduct was the Aristotelian mean: Be temperate in all
things.

On the other hand, Paul cited long lists of virtues. Love is
continually urged. Temperance, meekness, gentleness, honesty, purity,
and justice are repeatedly stressed. Paul’s description of a good man
and bishop is the delineation of the character of a social citizen, who
is temperate, a good husband, who is not mercenary nor covetous, and
who ruleth well his household, with good reputation and character.

In all Paul’s thought, righteous living was uppermost. Cheerful giving
was commended. The strong should bear the infirmities of the weak, not
only for the sake of the weak, but in order that the strong may not
become self-centered.

Paul taught a gospel of peace. He deprecated strife between
individuals. He trusted in the operation of the law of love. Love will
bring order out of confusion, and peace out of discord. The social
Kingdom of God, motivated by love, moves orderly, harmoniously, and
constructively.

Paul firmly supported the family as an essential institution of
society. He admonished children to obey their parents, to honor their
fathers and mothers. He commanded wives to obey their husbands, and
husbands to love their wives even as Christ loved the church and as
men love themselves.[VIII-40] He commanded men to remain true in the
marriage relation, and to keep the single standard of morals inviolate.

The dangers of wealth were frequently pointed out by Paul. We brought
no riches into this life: we can not take any riches out. Riches
continually subject us to temptations, snares, and lusts. The love of
money is the root of all evil.[VIII-41] The greatest wealth which any
person can acquire is the wealth of good deeds done to other persons.

The thought of Paul concerning law is exceedingly modern. Law is not
for the righteous; law is for the lawless and disobedient. The honest
and righteous and just are above the law in the sense that a well-mated
husband and wife are above the law of divorce. If there were none
other than happily-mated husbands and wives, there would be no need of
divorce laws. In a similar way, if perfect love prevailed among all
people, law could be entirely discarded. The teachings of Paul run the
gamut of brotherly love. Paul thought in terms of concepts such as
these: being well-grounded in love; abounding in love; let brotherly
love continue; the love of Christ constraineth. Paul carried a message
of love to all men, and established the church as a home for all who
would accept Christ’s message of love.

The apostle James spoke in no uncertain terms of the democracy of
God, the need of helping the weak, the dangers of riches, the evils
of strife, and the social commandments. James made social service a
fundamental test of religion.[VIII-42]

Peter attacked the same social sins that Jesus and Paul had flayed,
argued in behalf of the justice of God, and proclaimed with new vigor
the law of love.

John is the chief exponent of the principle of love. God is love. The
reign of God is a reign of love; the Kingdom of God is a Kingdom of
perfect love. In the Book of Revelation, John describes two cities;
one wicked; and the other, perfect. The first is elegantly clothed
in purple and gold, bedecked with precious stones. But her heart
is rotten. Lust and vice have ruined her. Her dominating sins are
sex immorality and luxury. The perfect city is the new Jerusalem, a
community of happy people, motivated in all things by love. Nothing
that defileth is permitted in the New Jerusalem, nor anything that
worketh abomination, or maketh a lie.[VIII-43]

The fundamentals of early Christian social thought may now be
summarized. The New Testament authorities offered no system of
sociology; they did not submit a scientific program for the social
reorganization of the world, but made, however, substantial
contributions.

(1) Early Christian social thought represented a system of changing
the attitudes of individuals. By making over individuals the world
can be improved. The individual is exalted. The individual must be
re-educated. The right sort of men will produce the right sort of
social structure and the proper type of social process and society.
Christianity indicated socialized principles of conduct which the
disciples of Christianity must accept.

(2) The Fatherhood of God is made a cardinal principle of the Kingdom.
When all persons recognize the Fatherhood of God, they will have a
strong tie binding them together and impelling them to regenerated
living.

(3) The universal brotherhood of man is a natural corollary of the
principle of the Fatherhood of God. When everyone recognizes the
underlying brotherhood of all individuals, the prejudices of race which
now so bitterly divide mankind will begin to dissolve.

(4) Marriage is a divine right, and husbands and wives shall work
together in behalf of their children. The family is the chief social
institution which the New Testament writers supported.

(5) Little children set examples of simple faith and trust. They call
for sacrifice and transform parents into altruistic beings.

(6) Early Christian thought was missionary. It was not self-centered.
It said: Go. It drove out its adherents unto all forms of unselfish
living. It required that its followers help the sick, preach the
gospel, travel into foreign lands. It was an activity religion. It
defined in living terms the dynamic and driving principle of love.




CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES


The social thought of the Middle Ages was in part a reflection of the
unsettled social conditions, and in part an outgrowth of the thought
and life of the five centuries which intervened between the beginning
of the Christian Era and the Fall of Rome. During these centuries the
Church Fathers moved away from the pristine Christian teachings. While
they accepted the underlying social nature of mankind and believed that
government and social organization were necessary in order to curb evil
tendencies, their teachings treated government as a divine institution
and transformed rulers into super-powerful beings with divine rights.
The autocratic rather than the democratic element in government
received support.

The strong Roman bias for organization and administration was builded
into the church--the result was the powerful Church of Rome with its
hierarchal structure. After the Fall of Rome, the Roman proclivity for
centralization of government lived on and produced within the Church a
center of power that has been the marvel of church history.

The Church Fathers directed the attention of the people to the next
world and to preparation therefor. Sacramental and sacrificial methods
of salvation were elaborated. The importance of improving social
conditions was ignored. In fact, the injustices in the current social
order were considered as disciplinary measures for the soul in its
preparation for the next world. The improvement of living conditions
was considered to be wasted effort, if not indicative of heretical
tendencies of mind.

By the third century, loyalty to creed had become a dominant note in
Christianity. The poor constituted a decreasing influence in church
life; wealth was exerting unChristian influences. The aristocratic
elements in church organization began to transform the poor into a
special class within the church. Poverty was not viewed preventively.
By the time of the Fall of Rome the poor had become objects upon which
to bestow alms as a means of expiating sin.

The greatest of the Latin Fathers was Saint Augustine (354–450). Among
other works, he wrote a large set of twenty-two volumes under the title
of _The City of God_. In this gigantic undertaking social thought was
submerged beneath theological discussions. A part of the argument is
devoted to an explanation of the Fall of Rome. The leading causal
elements are described as economic factors, such as the rise of luxury;
and religious unbelief, such as the worship of pagan gods. Augustine
describes two cities, one of this world, materialistic and debasing;
and one of the next world--the City of God, which through the will of
God will finally triumph.

During the first half of the Middle Ages the dominant tendencies are
Roman and Christian. The Roman power of organization gains increasing
strength in its new form--the Church. The Christian influences were
expressed in high ideals, new duties, and asceticism. The church acted
as a soothing and quieting force in the centuries of unrest. It built
elaborate monasteries and gathered together under its protecting wing
large numbers of people, chiefly the poor. Under the supervision of the
church, these religious believers lived in communal and sympathetic
fashion. Along with these developments the church also manifested grave
abuses. At the expense sometimes of the ignorant and the poor the
church grew powerful.

Out of the period of social disorder which characterized the early
Middle Ages there developed educational movements, such as that which
Charlemagne sponsored, and the system of Feudalism, which gave to the
Middle Ages its most distinctive set of characteristics. Feudalism made
land the central institution of society. The ownership of land gave
power; land constituted social and political power. Land was parcelled
out upon the receipt of oaths of homage and fealty. Under this land
system there were three classes of people: the nobles, the clergy,
and the peasants. The nobles were the rulers and exercised military
prerogatives. The clergy were either the privileged subjects of the
nobles, or else through the institution which they represented they
acquired land power. The peasants often despised the nobles, although
they worked for and supported them.

As an outgrowth of feudal industry various forms of guilds or
industrial organizations flourished from the tenth to the fifteenth
centuries. Sometimes the masters and workmen jointly belonged to
guilds, as in the case of the merchant guilds. Sometimes the guilds
became local monopolies. Always they possessed the aim of improving the
conditions of the membership.

The religious wars, or Crusades, of the eleventh to the thirteenth
centuries inaugurated many changes. They gave the restless nobility
major themes of attention and even removed many nobles through death in
battle from the European arena. They created intellectual unrest. They
enlarged the horizons of many individuals and gave rise to skepticism.
They led to the Reformation.

Social thought in the Middle Ages received a considerable stimulus from
Teutonic sources. The barbarous Teutons contributed ideas of freedom.
They increased the emphasis upon the individual. They were rough,
bold exponents of “personal liberty,” and disregarded mere churchly
procedure, social traditions, and some of the finer ideals of life and
character. On the other hand, chivalry and knighthood were perhaps of
Teutonic origin.

The church utilized chivalry. It became the duty of the knight to
defend the church and that which belonged to the church. Chivalry
became a form of social discipline which ruled in the latter part of
the Middle Ages. It softened manners and became the sponsor for virtue.
It remained, however, a modified military structure with military
traditions.

The rise of scholasticism took place in opposition to monasticism.
In the ninth century the leading thinkers had not advanced beyond
the conception of a natural social state, characterized by chaotic
conditions, and organized by political machinery. By the twelfth
century only the faintest glimmerings of a doctrine of popular
sovereignty had begun to appear. The thought of the day was largely
theological.

The church through its systems of monasteries had maintained centers
where religious and intellectual traditions had been preserved. These
centers were undoubtedly important factors in conserving much that
was valuable in an age when ruthless disregard for civilized values
prevailed.

Because of the abuses which sprang up in connection with the
monasteries, certain positive reactions against the monasteries arose.
St. Francis of Assisi (1181–1226) turned from the monastery to actual
life. He inaugurated a method for the regeneration of society. He
and his followers lived and spent themselves among the actual poor,
subjecting themselves to the economic conditions of the poor. They
helped the poor, not by giving alms as an expiation for sin and to
secure self-salvation, but by the first-hand giving of their lives.
St. Francis ignored the regular ecclesiastical conception of charity
and gave it all the reality of a new and genuine social force. By
renouncing the possession of property and living as the poor live, he
obtained what he could secure in no other way--the poor man’s point of
view. In this way, also, he secured an entrance into the poor man’s
mind and heart that could not be had so well by any other method. By
renouncing wealth and accepting literal poverty he reached the core of
the problem of poverty. St. Francis was motivated by a desire to live a
life of love. He spent not wealth but his life for the poor.

Scholasticism developed as a reaction against churchly asceticism.
According to scholasticism the individual should look to reason
rather than to church dogma for religious and spiritual guidance.
Scholasticism repudiated church traditions as a guide for individual
action; it turned to Aristotelian logic for its technique. Thomas
Aquinas (1226–1274), the best known of the scholastic philosophers,
pushed forward the Aristotelian premises as follows: Man is a social
being: he unites with other individuals in a social organization in
order to gain his own purposes. The individual looks to able rulers
for wise political guidance; he accords the requisite power to these
rulers. Aquinas thus recognized a tacit social compact, or contract,
foreshadowing Rousseau.

In religion, scholasticism reduced religious mysticism to rational
forms. It based religion on learning rather than on authority; it
pursued the methods of reasoning rather than of contemplation.

Scholasticism furthered the advancement of learning; it aided and
developed the life of the universities. It encouraged the growth of
independent thinking, although its decline set in about the fourteenth
century, before it had had a fair opportunity to inaugurate a movement
which would lead to an inductive or a positivistic philosophy, or
sociology.

Various other thought elements appeared in the closing centuries of the
Middle Ages. As early as the ninth century a maritime code, a military
code, and a rural code were formulated in the Byzantine Empire in
order to meet new social needs. Until the fall of Constantinople the
Byzantine influence was a deterrent against the forces from the East.
Byzantium preserved and gave a new impetus to Grecian literature, art,
architecture, and law.

In Arabia the celebrated historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun
(1332–1406), made a detailed and surprisingly accurate description of
the social life of the Arab tribes. With the evolution of the life of
the individual, he compared the development of the successive stages
in social life. This distinguished historian urged that history should
consider not simply rulers, dynasties, and wars, but also racial
factors, climatic forces, the laws of association, and the stages of
associative life. He wished to make history scientific, even a social
science. He formulated an evolutionary doctrine of social progress. He
evolved a spiral theory of social evolution, beginning with the crudest
primitive life and ending with the most civilized urban life.

In the latter part of the fourteenth century, England’s great popular
poet, William Langland, wrote an allegorical poem entitled, _Piers
Ploughman_. In this work the oppressed laboring and peasant classes
cry aloud their longings for improved conditions. They are personified
in Piers the Ploughman, who as a dignified laborer, plays for the
first time the leading rôle in serious thought. He is the leader of
a field of all types of people who are laboring together and longing
for a better social order. Along with the agricultural laborers we see
weavers and tailors, friars and minstrels, merchants and knights. Labor
of every sort is dignified. All living laborers who work with their
hands and minds, truly earning, living in love and according to the
laws of social order and progress, will become the pure and perfected
leaders of truth.

Langland depicted well the living and working conditions of the English
laboring classes. Productive toil, he argued, will receive its crown
of glory. But he did not indicate practical solutions. Langland
was sure, however, that the service of labor to society is sacred.
He pronounced patient poverty to be the prince of all virtues. He
personified Jesus in the form of a working man. Langland’s fourteenth
century social message was that the individual should renounce wealth,
join the honest laboring poor, and follow Christ’s example of living a
life of labor and love.[IX-1]

Social thought in the Middle Ages is fragmentary. While several
centuries are included in the period, new social ideas are very few.
The centuries of unrest and transition, the paucity of great leaders,
the intellectual stagnation, and the prevalent illiteracy of the masses
produced situations in which little social thinking of importance was
stimulated. New thought of any type was almost negligible except as an
isolated individual stood forth, such as Augustine, Charlemagne, Ibn
Khaldun, Aquinas. A portion of the social thinking of the preceding
age, however, was preserved, constituting a foundation for the
renaissance of social thought that was coming.




CHAPTER X

MORE AND UTOPIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT


Shortly after the close of Middle Ages with its modicum of social
thinking, the idealism of Plato appeared in a new form, namely, in
descriptive utopias. Of these, the chief and subtlest was the work of
England’s sane, shrewd, tolerant student of society, Sir Thomas More
(1478–1535). More’s _Utopia_ deserves a degree of attention which is
not customarily accorded it.

More mediated Plato to modern social philosophy; he moved in the field
of Platonic ideas and ideals. He was also indebted to Plutarch’s
account of Spartan life. At the dawn of the Renaissance he presented
the concept of a perfect commonwealth.

If one would understand the social thought of More, a contemporary
of Columbus, he must put himself under the spell of fifteenth and
sixteenth century conditions in England. He must remind himself of
Henry VII and Henry VIII, two autocratic rulers whom it was difficult
for any individually-minded person to please. The living conditions
of the peasants were almost intolerable. Unemployment was common.
Punishments were severe and brutalizing. Even thieves were subject to
capital punishment. If an individual stole a loaf of bread, he might as
well kill the person who saw him steal the bread. In fact, by so doing,
he might be better off--the only witness to his theft would thus be
unable to testify against him.

Sir Thomas More could not have openly criticised the unjust social
conditions of his day, and long escaped death. It was necessary for
him to put his radical ideas into the mouth of a fictitious traveler,
Raphael Hythloday, and thereby disown them. At is was, More became a
martyr to his religious faith and to the cause of social freedom.

More wrote the _Utopia_ in two parts. Part one was written as an
explanation, or introduction, to part two. In part one a conversation
involving three persons is reported. A conservative Dutch citizen of
Antwerp converses with Raphael Hythloday, an experienced traveler, and
with More. Hythloday, however, is the chief speaker. He is well versed
in Latin and especially in Greek culture. Moreover, he has traveled
extensively, even with Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine navigator. In
this way he is given prestige in the mind of the reader. It is not
impossible in part one of _Utopia_ to recognize a distinct resemblance
to the dialogue form of Plato.

Part one describes certain factors in the political situation in
England. The untoward phases of poverty and the vicious forms of
punishment that prevailed are painted in gloomy colors. The reader is
glad to turn from this unpleasant social picture to the description in
part two of _Utopia_, where the people are living under well-ordered
conditions.

The ideal commonwealth is located on the mystical island of Amaurote,
where Raphael Hythloday lived for five years. On this island the
economic and social life is communistic, somewhat after the manner
of Plato’s _Republic_. It is a fundamental communism which More
postulates. Complete communism of goods exists on Amaurote.[X-1] All
possess equal portions of wealth. The Utopian communistic state implies
a radical change in human nature. More justifies communism on the
grounds that it roots out that serious social evil, covetousness.[X-2]
Likewise, the incentive for stealing and plundering is removed. If
there is a scarcity of economic commodities in any part of Utopia,
the surplus in any other part is immediately drawn upon to meet the
need. Thus the whole land conducts itself as if it were one family or
household.[X-3] The guiding principle in regard to economic goods is
that of human needs.

In Utopia everyone finds his greatest pleasure in giving to others. The
strongest league of peoples or of nations is not that which is united
chiefly by covenants or treaties, but one which is knit together by
love and a benevolent attitude.[X-4] The strongest league in the world
is that which is based on the fellowship of kindred natures--a genuine
Christian brotherhood of nations.

In Utopia, agriculture is the most highly respected occupation.
Agriculture is a science in which all Utopian men and women are expert.
In the harvest days the urban people, both men and women (farmerettes)
go out into the country and help gather in the crops.[X-5] Urban and
rural co-operation at harvest time solves the farmer’s employment
problems to the pleasure, good feeling, and advantage of all concerned.
The food question is considered of paramount national importance. The
agriculturist is equipped with the best tools and follows intensive
methods.[X-6]

In addition to agricultural science, every citizen of Utopia learns
at least one trade or craft.[X-7] Even every woman learns a skilled
trade. The advantages of learning a trade by every citizen are
obvious--they include a great increase in the potential industrial
resources of a people. The question may be raised here, if it would
not be a worth-while asset for every citizen in our modern days to
learn a trade. Such an accomplishment would give a sense of economic
independence to every individual; it would afford to everyone the point
of view of the skilled workman; it would add a gigantic potential force
to production.

In Utopia, there is one leader, or syphogrant, to every thirty
families. Although there are other officers, including a prince for
each city and a king for the island, the syphogrants are in reality
the leading officials. It is noteworthy that no public matters are to
be decided until they have been considered and debated for at least
three days. By this scientific procedure the necessity of rescinding
hasty legislative action is reduced to a minimum.

An important duty of the syphogrants is to regulate employment. Not
only is everyone in Utopia to have a trade, but all are to work.
There are no idle poor or idle rich. All rich men, commonly called
“gentlemen,” all women, priests, monks, and friars (except a few)
engage in productive labor. Even the syphogrants, or officials, work
spontaneously. All useless occupations are prohibited. In countries
where the dollar rules, there are many vain occupations which serve
only to augment riotous superfluities.[X-8] Thus, since all persons
work and since only needed occupations are permitted in Utopia, the
working day is shortened to six hours.

In the case of a season of unemployment, the simple device is adopted
of shortening temporarily the labor day. By cutting down the hours of
labor to four a day during an unemployment period, work is provided for
all. When an individual, it may be added, visits his friends, he works
the same as if he were at home. He sets himself to the task in which
his friends are engaged. No one in Utopia is encumbered with visitors
who sit about doing nothing and at the same time hinder their hosts
from productive activities.

The syphogrants prevent idleness; they also prevent overwork. They
permit no one to work at a task like a laboring and toiling beast; they
allow no one to become a slave to his labor.

Laws in Utopia are few in number. Inasmuch as all the people are well
instructed and socially minded, many laws are needless.[X-9] Each
citizen is above the law in the same way that an honest person is above
the law against stealing. In the case of those disputes which must
necessarily arise, the plaintiff and defendant go before the judge and
plead for themselves. Utopia is noted for its scarcity of laws and the
absence of attorneys. No crafty and subtle interpretation of laws by
attorneys is permitted. Every man is his own attorney and simply states
the facts in the given dispute; the judge knows the law and decides the
case.

The organization of the cities is interesting. In the middle of each
quarter of each city there is a market place for the exchange of all
manner of goods. Public _abattoirs_ are in operation. Splendidly
appointed hospitals are located outside the cities in a quiet
environment. Contagious wards are provided. So excellent is the care
which is afforded the patients in the public hospitals that any person
who falls sick prefers to go to a hospital than to be cared for by the
kindly ministrations of relatives at home. It may be noted that every
city is provided with a hall of fame.

Every urban community is a garden city; every house has a garden plot.
Furthermore, the people take much pride in their gardens; they compete
with one another, endeavoring to excel in the fruitage and in the
beauty of the gardens.[X-10]

City planning rules in Utopia.[X-11] Overcrowding is not permitted;
whenever a city exceeds the norm, a new city is established. New urban
communities are established by public action.

Social centers are common on the island of Amaurote. In the winter when
the people cannot work in their gardens after the supper hour, they
gather in their community halls, where they engage in music, wholesome
conversation, and games. Dice-play and similar foolish and pernicious
games are unknown.[X-12] Wine taverns, alehouses, “stewes,” lurking
corners, and places of wicked counsels are prohibited.[X-13]

Good health is a virtue in Amaurote; great pleasure is derived from
possessing a well-ordered state of public health. Health is considered
a sovereign pleasure in itself.[X-14] Preventive measures are
substituted for remedial medicines.

Fashions are regulated rigidly. Fashion imitation is prevented. The
garments for men are all of one mode; and for women, of another
mode.[X-15] The married are distinguished from the unmarried by the
style of wearing apparel. Thus, there are simply four sets of styles in
Amaurote. Coats of uniform colors--the natural color of wool--are worn.
It is argued that coats of many colors are no warmer and hence no more
practical than coats of the one natural color; they are more expensive
and hence more wasteful.

In Utopia, gold and silver are held in reproach. They are not
considered to be as useful as iron. Consequently, the Utopians load
down their slaves with gold and silver ornaments and pearls.[X-16] In
this connection the description of the visit of a group of ambassadors
to Amaurote is amusing. The ambassadors from an adjoining country were
dressed in gorgeous apparel like the very gods. They came to Amaurote
wearing chains of gold and displaying peacock feathers. The citizens of
Amaurote, coming out to meet the guests, rushed past the ambassadors
and saluted the plainly dressed slaves of the ambassadors. They mistook
the ambassadors for fools and knaves. Even the little children of
Amaurote, when they saw the jewelry of the ambassadors, looked at
their mothers and said: “See, how great a lubber doth wear pearls and
precious stones, as if he were still a little child.”[X-17] After being
in Amaurote a short time, the ambassadors perceived how foolish it was
to set emphasis on the doubtful glistenings of trifling stones. They
recognized that it is foolish to consider oneself nobler than other
selves because one can wear clothes that are spun from finer wool than
the clothes of other persons. After all, whether the wool is coarse or
fine, it may have come from the self-same sheep.

An individual does not become a god by wearing precious stones. The
more the individual burdens himself with heavy stones and gorgeous
apparel, the more insignificant he is.

Although in Utopia no man is wealthy, yet in a sense, all men are
wealthy. All live joyfully, without worrying, and without fearing that
they or their children will fall into poverty. Amaurote is a gigantic
household, wherein the more able take a personal interest in the less
able and in the unfortunate. No one lives in idleness and no one lives
by virtue of any form of unnecessary economic enterprise. Rich men are
not permitted by either private fraud or common law to snatch away
from the poor man some portion, great or small, of his daily earnings.
There are no idle rich, conniving how they may keep their unearned
wealth or how they may grind down the poor in order to get more wealth.
Since the love of money is unknown in Amaurote, other passions are also
absent. Since the people do not love money, they have lost the desire
to perpetrate the money crimes, such as fraud, theft, murder, treason.
Likewise, pride which measures its satisfaction, not in terms of its
own merits, _per se_, but by comparison with the poverty of human
beings, is destroyed. The Utopians have conquered materialism. They
are not subject to the death grapples which are caused by the love of
money. Luxuries have been suppressed and the leisure class has been
eliminated. Social extremes are unknown.

People are honored, not for their wealth but for their serviceableness
to the community.[X-18] In the halls of fame, to which allusion has
already been made, benefactors of the commonwealth are rewarded by
having images of themselves set up in perpetual memory of their good
deeds to their fellows.

The family is the fundamental social unit, but it is of the patriarchal
type. Pure monogamic love is idealized. Especial care is taken that
neither of the parties of a marriage vow possesses any hidden vices.
Adultery is the chief justification for breaking the marriage bond. A
single standard of morals for both husband and wife is set. Love may
be won by beauty, but it can be kept and preserved only by virtue and
obedience.

Because of freedom from long hours of monotonous labor, nearly every
one in Utopia is able to maintain his intellectual interests and to
experience intellectual growth throughout life. It is the solemn
custom to have daily lectures early every morning and it is the habit
of multitudes of people of all types to attend.[X-19] All of the time
that it is possible to spare from the necessary occupations is devoted
to the development and garnishing of the mind.[X-20] Nearly all the
citizens devote their extra-occupational hours throughout their lives
to the arts and sciences. The chief felicity of life is said to be
found in learning. In training the mind, the Utopians never weary.
As a matter of course, a common school education is provided for
every individual. Classes for adults and adult education are made the
outstanding features of the public school system in Amaurote. One must
learn to live and must go on learning throughout life. Hence, the
provisions of public education should be adequate for the adult as well
as for the adolescent.

Religious education and practice are considered essential. More’s
tolerant attitude in an age of brutal intolerance is shown by the
fact that the Utopians are permitted whatever religion they prefer.
Superstitious beliefs are taboo. More makes a subtle thrust when he
observes that the priests of Amaurote are possessed of great holiness
and hence are few in number.[X-21] It is no esoteric or monastic
religion which More endorses. Future happiness may be secured best by
busy labors and social efforts in this life.[X-22] Public service,
including the care of the sick, is religiously emphasized.

War is beastly. Contrary to the attitudes of the people in all other
countries, the people of Amaurote count nothing so inglorious as the
glory that is obtained in fighting and killing.[X-23] No imagination is
necessary in order to understand the courage which More displayed in
making a vigorous attack in the sixteenth century upon war.

Under limited conditions, however, war is justifiable. More gives
three worthy reasons for declaring war: (1) the defense of one’s own
country; (2) the defense of the country of one’s friendly neighbors;
and (3) delivering oppressed peoples anywhere from the yoke and bondage
of tyranny.[X-24] From the twentieth century point of view, these
justifications of war are sound.

These reasons are all “defense” factors,--which is remarkable in view
of the fact that they were enunciated in an age when “offensive” wars
were common. The only reason for assuming the offensive in matters of
war is the social one of taking land away from people who deliberately
withhold land from cultivation and fail to produce food for the
nourishment of mankind.[X-25] By this plan, More severely indicts the
holders of large landed estates which are held chiefly for the selfish
gratification of the owners.

Hired or mercenary soldiers are employed in war. The people of Amaurote
employ hideous, savage fighters from the wild woods and the high
mountains to do their fighting for them. The larger the number of these
impetuous barbarians who are killed in battle, the better off is the
world.

More opposed conscription. Ordinarily, no one is forced to fight,
because under such circumstances he will not fight well. In the case,
however, of defending Amaurote, the cowards are distributed among the
bold-hearted. In warfare, the people of Amaurote do not allow their
warriors to lay waste or destroy the land of their enemies. Neither
foraging nor the burning of food supplies is permitted. No one who is
unarmed is to be hurt.

More’s penological ideas are modern. He points out the folly of making
theft a capital offense the same as murder. The temptation will be to
steal, or rob, and to kill also, whereas under a more reasonable law
the temptation in many cases would be to steal only. A law which makes
theft a capital offense is harsher than even the harsh Mosaic law of
an eye for an eye, a life for a life, because the former justifies
the government in taking the life of an individual who is guilty of
stealing money. In Utopia the thief is compelled to restore the stolen
goods to the person from whom he stole, and not to the king, as in many
lands in More’s time. The thief is put at common labor, not thrown into
a city or county jail and left in idleness. Compulsory labor is the
common method of punishment.[X-26]

The fundamental penological principle which More developed was that
crime should be prevented by taking away the occasion of offense.[X-27]
He condemned the prevailing method in England of allowing wickedness
to increase, and then of punishing the sinners after they had been
permitted to grow up in an environment of sin. He objected to taking
men from the trades for war service and then later irresponsibly
discharging them, leaving many of them industrially stranded,
unemployed, and subject to the temptation of stealing. More’s dictum
was: Show people how to live; do not let them steal and then take their
lives away. Life in Utopia is more or less equally divided between
five factors: industry, study, music, travel, and domesticity.

In the _Utopia_, Sir Thomas More made a direct criticism of conditions
in England; he showed himself an able student of social problems; and
his ideas are noted for their “modernness.” Altogether, the _Utopia_
has made a remarkable impression, not simply upon social idealists but
also upon practical thinkers. As a literary invention for shrewdly
suggesting criticisms of vicious but entrenched social wrongs it has
been followed by imitations, but remains unparalleled in quality.

In the _New Atlantis_, Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1628), wrote an
unfinished description of a utopian island where there is a high degree
of social welfare and where “social salvation by scientific education”
obtains. An Order or Society of “Solomon’s House” is established
which sends out every twelve years merchants of light (intellectual)
who travel for the following period of twelve years, gathering facts
in all branches of science and art.[X-28] Upon being relieved by the
next group of traveler scholars, they return home and contribute their
knowledge to the acquired store, which in the meantime has been added
unto by many trained experimenters and research scholars. Airplanes,
horseless wagons, and submarines are not unknown in the _New Atlantis_.
Superstition is banished. Social knowledge will lead to a nation of
socialized persons,--this is the Baconian implication.

Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639), a monk, a philosopher, and an Italian
contemporary of Francis Bacon, urged that human nature should be
studied rather than books. Because of so-called heretical ideas, he was
imprisoned for twenty-seven years. Shortly after his release he fled
to Paris, where he died. In prison he wrote _The City of the Sun_, a
crude but significant psychological analysis of society. It is a social
order based on the balanced relations of the three principles of Power,
Intelligence, and Love. These forces are equally expressed in the
social process and produce a perfect society.

_Oceana_, “a Midsummer Night’s Dream of politics,” is the title of a
romance which was written by James Harrington (1611–1677). His social
order rests on economic factors, chiefly landed estates. However, the
author advocates the election of rulers by ballot every three years and
the choosing of the rulers from the intellectually élite.

In this chapter it is impossible to note all the “utopias” that have
been written. The utopian and communistic systems of socialists, such
as Fourier, Saint Simon, and Owen will be referred to in Chapter XIV.
There are other important utopian contributions, such as those by
William Morris and Edward Bellamy. In _News from Nowhere_, William
Morris (1834–1896), an English artist and socialist, describes his
native England as a perfected society under a régime of socialism.
Because of its American setting, Bellamy’s _Looking Backward_ will be
presented in some detail in the following paragraphs.

In recent decades the utopian postulates of Edward Bellamy (1850–1898),
in _Looking Backward_ and _Equality_ have had a wide reading. The
author was the first American to command attention in the field of
utopian thought. Bellamy presents a plan of industrial organization on
a national scale with individuals sharing equally in the products of
labor, or in public income, in the same way that “men share equally in
the free gifts of nature.” Bellamy protests against an economic order
whose chief evil is summed up in the following question: How can men be
free who must ask the right to labor and to live from their fellows,
and seek their bread from the hand of others?

Society is likened to a gigantic coach to which the masses of humanity
are harnessed, toiling along a very hilly and sandy road. The best
seats are on top of the coach. The occupants of the elegant seats are
constantly in fear of falling from their cushions of ease, splendor,
and power,--and hence their interest in the toilers.

In _Looking Backward_ the entire social process is made an expression
of service. Service is a matter of course, not of compulsion. No
business is so fundamentally the public’s business as the industry and
trade on which the livelihood of the public depends.[X-29] Therefore,
to intrust industry and commerce to private persons to be managed
for private profit is a folly “similar to that of surrendering the
functions of political government to kings and nobles for their
personal glorification.”

Buying and selling are pronounced anti-social. They are an
education in self-seeking at the expense of others.[X-30] Citizens
who are so trained are unable to rise above a very low grade of
civilization.[X-31] They are sensible chiefly to such motives as fear
of want and love of luxury. For buying and selling, credit books are
substituted which are good at any public warehouse. In place of higher
wages, the chief motives to activity are honor, men’s gratitude, the
inspiration of duty, patriotism, the satisfaction of doing one’s work
well--in other words, the same motives that now influence, for example,
the members of the teaching profession.

The arduousness of the trades are equalized, so that all shall
be equally attractive, by making the hours of labor in different
trades to differ inversely according to arduousness.[X-32] Everyone
works as a common laborer for three years and then chooses an
occupation--agriculture, mechanics, the professions, art. The working
life is twenty-four years long, from the ages of twenty-one to
forty-five, after which all may devote themselves to self-improvement
and enjoyment, but subject to emergency calls along industrial and
other social service lines.

Bellamy challenges an individualism which incapacitates people for
co-operation. He builds his society upon solidarity of race and
brotherhood of man. He does not fear corruption in a society “where
there is neither poverty to be bribed nor wealth to bribe.”[X-33]

All cases of criminal atavism are treated in hospitals. There are no
jails. Under capitalism nineteen-twentieths of misdemeanors are due to
economic inequality. The remainder are the outcropping of ancestral
traits. In Bellamy’s ideal society there are no private property
disputes and no lawyers.

The educational system in _Looking Backward_ does not educate some
individuals highly and leave others untrained.[X-34] It gives everyone
“the completest education that the nation can give,” in order that
individuals may enjoy themselves, in order that they may enjoy one
another, and in order that the unborn may be guaranteed an intelligent
and refined parentage.

Bellamy holds that human nature in its essential quality is good, not
bad, and that men are naturally generous, not selfish; pitiful, not
cruel; godlike in aspirations, moved by divine impulses of goodness,
images of God and not the travesties upon Him which they have
seemed.[X-35] It is our economic order which has fostered shameless
self-assertion, mutual depreciation, a stunning clamor of conflicting
boasts, and a stupendous system of brazen beggary.

In three utopias, H. G. Wells portrays societary conditions that
are kinetic rather than static and world-wide rather than local in
scope.[X-36] While the author provides a changed economic system,
socialistic in nature, he urges that changed social attitudes are also
needed.

In the utopian social thought that has been presented in this chapter
and in similar works which are not mentioned here there is generally
displayed (1) a common weakness of impracticability under current
circumstances, (2) an over-emphasis upon simply changing the economic
order, and (3) static rather than dynamic principles. The strength of
utopian social thought is found (1) in its drastic criticism of current
social evils, (2) in its relative harmlessness at the given time, (3)
in the force of its indirect suggestion, (4) in the widespread hearing
which it secures, and (5) in its social idealism.




CHAPTER XI

INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT


At the dawn of the Renaissance, tradition and dogmatism were ruling
mankind. Here and there, however, individuals were perceiving the
nature of the bondage. Occasionally a cry for individual freedom was
uttered. Petrarch dared to say that the world was made for man’s
enjoyment. The early Teutons crudely developed the idea of personal
liberty. In France a movement arose which culminated in the doctrines
of natural rights and “Back to Nature.” The stress upon individualism
in England became so deeply ingrained that it exists today as a
powerful form of traditionalism. The United States was founded, in
part, upon a doctrine of natural rights.

Absolutely unlike Sir Thomas More in many ways, Niccolo Machiavelli
(1469–1527), an Italian contemporary, broke with tradition and received
the sobriquet, the Galileo of social science. Unfortunately, many
people think of the Italian writer in terms of the adjective which
bears his name, Machiavellism, or political intrigue. While he deserves
this reputation, he also should be considered in another light. He cut
loose from the customary ways of thinking of his time and asserted
that it is not necessary to take all things on fiat or alleged
divine decree. Although this may be dangerous doctrine, it serves a
useful and constructive purpose when people are ruled by political
and ecclesiastical autocrats. Machiavelli was no idealist in the
accepted sense of the term, but a man who mixed with people, traveled
extensively, and studied actual conditions. He declared that people
should be considered as they are, and not according to false teachings
about them.

A century before the time of Sir Francis Bacon, the inaugurator of the
so-called inductive or scientific method of study, Machiavelli was
observing human conditions and upon the basis of these observations
was drawing conclusions. He believed that it does not pay to be guided
in one’s conduct by abstract ethics or impracticable ideals--and said
so, in an age when imprisonment, exile, or death awaited anyone who
opposed the autocratic authorities. From abstract ethics, Machiavelli
swung to the extreme of concrete expediency. He lived and thought in
the exigencies of the moment. He is an example of one who reacts so
strongly against the stress and strain of the hour that he cannot
get the larger vision that is necessary for balanced thinking on
fundamental issues.

Machiavelli wrote on the subject of leadership and government.
He advocated either an autocratic or democratic form of
government--according to the conditions of the time and place. In the
_Prince_ he described with noteworthy accuracy the traits and methods
of a leader whose constituents must be treated with absolute authority.
In the _Discourses_ he dealt with a democratic-republican type of
leadership and control.

The succesful prince, or leader, in the selfish sense, makes himself
both beloved and feared by his people.[XI-1] On occasion he uses
force and even fraud. Sometimes he must either exterminate or be
exterminated. He must repeal or suppress old laws and make new ones to
fit the social situation. He seeks to be considered merciful rather
than cruel. He exercises universal pity in order to prevent social
disorders from occurring and producing rapine and murder.[XI-2] He
does not allow his mercy to be taken advantage of by ungrateful and
hypocritical persons. He is strong-minded; he is either a sincere
friend or a generous foe. He is paternalistic, urging that his
subjects be well-fed and have a good livelihood,[XI-3] thus gaining
and maintaining the affection of the people. In international affairs
he acts with a strong hand, fortifying well his city or nation, and
providing good laws for internal growth.[XI-4] He errs grossly,
however, in his fundamental philosophy that any plan or action that is
for the welfare of the state, or nation, considered as a supreme unit
of authority in itself, is morally sound.

Sir Francis Bacon, whose contribution to utopian social thought
has been indicated in the foregoing chapter, placed all social and
sociological thinkers under deep obligations by his emphasis upon
inductive reasoning. He helped to free the individual from control by
dogma and superstition. He provided the individual with a technique
for securing a new sense of individual freedom. In freeing himself
the individual discards his irrational pre-judgments, whether
socially inherited or individually developed. He protects himself
from anthropomorphic judgments, i. e., from judgments which he makes
because he looks upon life and the universe through human eyes. These
pre-judgments are common to all mankind--they are “the idols of the
tribe.” On the other hand, the individual avoids purely personal
preferences, which he is likely to hold because of his own peculiar
experiences, and which thus place him outside the pale of common
experience--these are “the idols of the cave.”

Then there are “the idols of the forum,” which cause the individual to
give undue dependence to words and language. “The idols of the theater”
are traditional systems of thought. Bacon’s dictum has been stated as
follows: Get as little of yourself and of other selves as possible in
the way of the thing which you wish to see.

Having eliminated human predispositions, the individual is ready to
gather facts, arrange them in groups, draw conclusions from them, and
act according to the resultant laws. Knowledge gives power.[XI-4]
Social knowledge gives power to improve human conditions and makes
possible wise social control. Thus, Bacon opened the road to individual
freedom.

Too much individual freedom, however, destroys government and the
social order. If each individual is a law unto himself, anarchy reigns
and progress is prevented. Consequently, the question arises: How can
individually free persons unite in a society without giving up their
freedom? The answer to this question took the form of a controversy on
the subject of the social contract, i. e., the contract or agreement of
individuals, as units, to form and maintain societies. This controversy
arose in the seventeenth century and was waged vigorously in the
eighteenth century.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1678), the distinguished social philosopher of
England, introduced his analysis of society with the idea that man was
originally self-centered, egoistic, and pleasure-loving. He was an
independent center. His interest in other people was based on their
ability to cater to his own good. He and they desired the same things
in life. His hand was thus raised, in competition, against every other
man. This state of continual conflict became mutually destructive
and unbearable.[XI-5] In consequence, each individual agreed to give
over some of his precious, inalienable rights to a central authority
or sovereign, whose decrees should constitute law and serve as the
guide for conduct. The war of each against all, with the concomitant
state of fear, was thus supplanted by a mutual contract, conferring
sovereignty by popular agreement upon the ruler. In this way Hobbes met
the dilemma of supporting an absolute form of government in which he
believed and of denying the divine right of kings which he abhorred.
Hobbes performed a useful service in intellectually destroying the
idea of the divine right of kings, but urged after all an undemocratic
political absolutism. Hobbes conferred humanly derived but irrevocable
authority upon the king. He, however, traced sovereignty back to the
people rather than to a divine right.

In getting away from the conditions “of Warre of every one against
every one” in the natural state where “every man has a Right to
everything,” Hobbes swung to an undemocratic extreme. His Puritanic
training gave an undue severity to his social thought. The Puritans,
however, believed in the complete eradication of the savage human
tendencies and also in the ultimate elimination of kings. Hobbes did
not analyze deeply the instinctive bases of human nature. He built his
_Leviathan_ out of natural human qualities and tied its units together
by means of a strong, central will--this was his perfect society.

Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), the Portuguese Jewish philosopher of
Holland, improved the social contract idea. He believed that man was
originally of an anti-social and a tooth-and-fang nature, possessing
only incipient social impulses. Hence, man is not naturally bad, but
naturally anti-social. Social organization was effected for purposes
of individual gain and glory; it was promulgated and furthered by
individuals in order that they might escape the miseries of unregulated
conflict. Agreements were made whereby sovereignty was embodied in a
ruler, but if the ruler abused the sovereignty entrusted to him, it
reverted immediately to the people. This democratic conception was
vastly superior to the idea of Hobbes, that sovereignty is delegated by
the people to the king as an irresponsible monarch.

John Locke (1632–1704) strengthened the social contract theory,
elaborating the idea that sovereignty reverts to the people whenever
the king becomes a tyrant. He held that the natural state of
individuals is a condition of perfect freedom to order their actions,
not asking leave of any man.[XI-6] This state of liberty is not
a state of license to individuals to destroy themselves or their
neighbors.[XI-7] The state of liberty has the law of nature to govern
it. Since all are equal, no one ought to harm another in his liberty or
possessions.

Locke affirmed that men are in a state of nature until by their own
consent they join in a political society.[XI-8] In order to meet their
needs effectively, they join in societies. One of these important needs
is the preservation of property. Locke defended private property on the
ground that it is a normal expression of individuality and necessary
to individuality.

Right and wrong are not determined by the ruler or the state; they
existed before society developed. Here the Puritanism of Locke enters.
He stressed moral values. He made the natural rights of individuals
supreme; individuals may even overturn the government and still keep
within their rights.

Locke’s justification of revolution is his most startling doctrine.
Imagine the heart-throb of the common people who heard Locke’s
contention that the end of government is the good of mankind, that
people should not submit to tyranny, that whoever uses his force
without right and law puts himself in a state of war with those against
whom he uses it, and that in such a state the people have a right to
resist and defend themselves.[XI-9] Further, the people have a right to
act as the supreme social force and to put legislation into new forms
and into the hands of new executives. By these bold declarations Locke
created a new public opinion, and aroused new moral power in the minds
and hearts of the common people.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the concept of individual
freedom became crystallized in the doctrines of the natural rights
of the individual, the contractual societary relationships between
independent individuals, and the _laissez faire_ principle in
governmental science. The physiocrats, who took up the ideas of natural
liberty and economic freedom, exercised a tremendous influence in
France during the three decades following 1750. Their leaders were
Quesnay, de Gournay, Condorcet, and Turgot. They believed that there
was a natural law ruling human lives, just as there is a natural law
ruling the physical world. They chafed under social restraints. Under
the natural law, every individual has natural rights, chief of which is
the right to the free exercise of all his faculties so long as he does
not infringe on the similar right of other individuals. Unlike John
Locke and other English thinkers who accepted the idea of individual
liberty, the physiocrats argued that this natural liberty could not be
abridged by a social contract.

According to the physiocrats the chief function of governmental control
is to preserve the natural liberty of individuals. Industry and
commerce must not be governmentally regulated, for by such regulation
the rights of some men, chiefly employers, will be infringed upon.
Employees, on the other hand, who are being treated unjustly will
freely quit a harsh employer and obtain employment with considerate
masters. Thus, an unjust employer will be unable to secure workers
and be forced to discontinue his unjust practices--without government
regulation. Likewise, a dishonest merchant will lose his customers and
be forced to become honest or to close his shop--and again without
government regulation. The physiocrats became known by their famous
phrase, _laissez faire, laissez passer_.

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), an able but baffling character,
is the best known champion of the social contract idea. Although he
advocated the family as a social institution and praised fatherhood,
he reports that he carried his own children to a foundling asylum.
He deprecated the disintegrating elements in civilization and urged
a return to nature’s simple ways. In his chief works, the _Contrat
social_ and _Emile_, he attacked civilization vigorously. He asserted
that civilization had almost destroyed the natural rights of man. His
dictum was: Trust nature.

According to Rousseau the early life of mankind was nearly ideal in
its simplicity and pleasantness. War and conflict were relatively
unknown. In his later writings, Rousseau modified his belief and
asserted that primitive confusion made necessary some kind of social
organization. On the other hand, it became the belief of Rousseau
that civilization generates social evils and results sooner or later
in social deterioration. Corruption in society has become notorious.
Social inequality is rampant and unbearable. “Man is born free, and
is everywhere in chains.” People have become so engrossed in the
artificialities of social life and so bewildered by its complexities
that happiness has been lost.

Leave the individual free to carry out his own plans, untrammelled
by complex social rules, restrictions, and duties. There is no
social sanction at all; there is no authority except nature, which is
necessity. In _Emile_, Rousseau takes his two leading characters to an
island, where they live alone--happily! Liberty not authority reigns.
But Emile, who has declared for liberty as opposed to authority,
insists in his discussions of domestic relationships that “woman is
made to please man.” The “unselfish, unsocial life” of Emile and Sophie
turns out to be more than purely individualistic--it is anarchic
and sensual. Emile fails to demonstrate the merit of Rousseau’s own
theories, such as “Man is good naturally but by institutions he is made
bad,” and “Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author
of Nature; everything degenerates in the hands of man.”

Slavery is wrong, according to Rousseau.[XI-11] It is a contract or
agreement, at the expense of the slave and for the profit of the
slaveholder, in which the slaveholder asserts: I’ll observe the
agreement and you will observe it--as long as it pleases me.

Strength does not make right. Strength and moral force are not
necessarily the same. Strength may often be ironically accepted in
appearance and established in principle. By a social contract man
loses his natural liberty and gains civil and moral liberty.[XI-12]
In this connection Rousseau was simply the spokesman of a point of
view which found frequent expression in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. For example, in 1635, John Winthrop, the first governor of
the Massachusetts colony, made a clear-cut distinction between natural
liberties, and civil and moral liberties. Natural liberty is liberty to
do what one lists, to do evil as well as good. Civil, or moral, liberty
is liberty under the covenant between God and man, under the political
covenants between men and men, and under the moral law. It is a liberty
to do only that which is good, just, and honest.[XI-13]

It was Rousseau who contended that life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness are man’s inalienable rights. It was this doctrine which
profoundly influenced Thomas Jefferson, as evidenced in the Declaration
of Independence. Sovereignty rests not in a ruler or monarch but in the
community of people--this was perhaps Rousseau’s main contribution to
social thought.

Before Rousseau, however, wrote the _Contrat social_, the social
contract theory had been overthrown. The writings of Montesquieu
(1689–1755) offer an elaborate analysis of social and political
processes. These analyses are similar, in some ways, to Aristotle’s
analyses of 158 constitutions. Montesquieu discussed the doctrine of
natural rights, but did not believe that the natural state of mankind
was one of conflict, in which social organization was forced as a
means of meeting the needs of individual protection. He asserted that
there was a natural, innate tendency in man toward association. In the
support of this belief, Montesquieu drew facts from the lives of the
individual members of the primitive tribes which were extant in his
day. The influence of Montesquieu was clearly inimical to the social
contract doctrine.

In the _Esprit des lois_, Montesquieu dissected the laws of many
nations and tried to show the relations between these laws and social
and political conditions. The general implication is that laws are a
natural outgrowth of life conditions rather than of formal contractual
agreements. Hence, society is a natural evolution rather than a
contract.

Perhaps the chief antagonist in the eighteenth century of the social
contract theory was David Hume (1711–1776), the father of social
psychology. According to Hume, the origin of society was not in a
contract arrived at by intellectual processes; it was instinctive.
Man is a social animal. At the basis of this sociability lies the sex
instinct, which resulted in the establishment of the family. The sex
instinct is strongly supported by the sentiment of sympathy, which
also is innate, and which may develop into intelligent co-operation.
Man is not entirely self-centered; he takes pleasure in other people’s
pleasures and suffers when others are in pain, or the victims of
disease, or are dying.

Sympathy, like the sex instinct, is a genuinely fundamental element in
human nature and in society. However, the combination of sympathy and
the sex instinct is not strong enough to support the family in either
its simple or complex stages from the attacks upon it that are made by
inherent human selfishness. Hence, social and political organizations
are necessary to hold the selfish impulses and interests of mankind
in check. Intellectual control of society thus becomes necessary and
consciously recognized. Environment alone does not cause people in
a given community to act alike. It is imitation, primarily, which
operates to bring about group conformity.[XI-14]

Man in a large measure is governed by interest. It is impossible for
men to consult their interests “in so effective a manner as by a
universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which
alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into
that wretched and savage condition, which is commonly represented as
the state of nature.”[XI-15]

According to the contract theory, people expect protection and
security. If they meet with tyranny and oppression, they are freed from
their promises and return to that state of liberty which proceeded the
institution of government. But Hume maintained that if people entered
into no contract and made no promises, government would still be
necessary in all civilized societies. The obligation of submission to
government is not derived from any promise of the subjects.[XI-16]

Adam Ferguson (1723–1816) wrote an _Essay on the History of Civil
Society_ and _The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman
Republic_. He argued that social institutions and social convenience
lead to inherent sociability, and pointed out that competition and
conflict are vital to social development. Thomas Paine (1737–1809)
asserted that man is inherently social and that social organization is
a natural development.

The natural rights theory and the resultant individualism not only
repudiated their false derivative, the social contract concept, but
also wrestled with considerable success with the socio-economic concept
of mercantilism. Mercantilism was a system of regulating industrial
enterprise by governments in order to build up strong nation-states.
Mercantilism reached its strictest form in France in the writings of
Colbert (1619–1683). It prevailed in Europe during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and the first four decades of the eighteenth
century. It was a system which grew out of feudalism and the city-state
type of society. It operated to bring together towns and cities into
national unities. Under feudalism, the town had regulated industry for
its own advancement and against the welfare, perchance, of neighboring
towns. Mercantilism served to unite towns and to create in townspeople
a national loyalty.

Under mercantilism, the nation entered upon the task of regulating
industry and finance so as to build a strong state. A favorable balance
of trade was sought in order to add to the bullion within the state.
High tariffs were enacted, which sometimes defeated the intended
purposes. A dense population was favored as a means of securing cheap
labor, and hence of furthering manufacture, which in turn would develop
foreign trade and bring in the coveted bullion--the heralded strength
of a nation.

In the eighteenth century, mercantilism in France and England met
defeat in the contest with the _laissez faire_ theory, with which the
names of the physiocrats and of Adam Smith are inseparably connected.
It often fathered too stringent regulations. Instead of supporting
national ends, mercantilistic measures frequently furthered private
interests. Mercantilism, however, played a strong part in building up
the concepts of national unity and loyalty.

In the German states and Austria, cameralism represented the ideas for
which mercantilism stood in England, France, and elsewhere in Western
and Southern Europe. Among the leading cameralists were Seckendorf,
Horing, Justi, and Sonnenfels. Cameralism obtained a far deeper hold
upon the German states than mercantilism did, for example, in England.
The _laissez faire_ philosophy was never able to make a deep inroad
upon cameralism. In fact, the _laissez faire_ philosophy did not
receive serious consideration in the German states before 1800, and
did not strike deep. National self-sufficiency, paternalistic control,
minute regulation of internal affairs, rearing of large families, and
subordination of the welfare of the state--these are the concepts which
ruled in Germany.

Adam Smith (1723–1790), primarily an economist and often referred
to as the father of political economy, exerted a profound influence
upon social thought. He coupled a modified natural rights theory
with a doctrine of sympathy; he spoke for the natural rights of the
individual, of the poorer classes in society, and of the smaller
nations. He vigorously attacked mercantilism with its system of
minute regulation of individuals. He objected to promoting unduly
the interests of one class of men in a country, for by so doing, the
interests of all other classes in that country and of all persons in
all other countries are harmed.[XI-17] He pointed out the fallacy of
building a nation of shopkeepers, for in so doing the government of
such a nation will be unduly influenced and controlled by the interests
of shopkeepers. The interests of other classes will be more or less
ignored. Adam Smith protested against Great Britain’s methods of
regulating the American colonies. To prohibit the American colonies
from making all they could of every part of their own produce or from
employing their stock and industry in the way that they judged most
advantageous to themselves, was “a manifest violation of the most
sacred rights of mankind.”[XI-18]

Mercantilism made use of monopoly of one kind or another, and hence
is objectionable, according to Smith. Mercantilism is regulation,
and regulation is often carried on for the benefit of the rich and
powerful, thus neglecting and oppressing the poor.[XI-19] Smith failed
to note, however, that the _laissez faire_ policy likewise favored the
rich and powerful and neglected the poor. Mercantilism, according to
Smith, considers production and not consumption as the end of industry
and commerce, and thus favors one class at the expense of other classes.

“Wherever there is great property,” said Smith, “there is great
inequality.” For every very rich man there must be at least 500 poor
men, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the
many.[XI-20] But no society can be flourishing and happy wherein the
greater part of the members are poor and miserable.[XI-21] The laboring
men should have “such a share of the produce of their own labor as to
be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged.” Poverty does
not prevent the procreation of children, but is on the other hand
extremely unfavorable to the rearing of children.[XI-22]

Smith pointed out four causes of social inequality:[XI-23] (1)
Superiority in personal qualifications, such as strength, beauty,
agility of body; or wisdom, virtue, prudence, justice, fortitude,
moderation of mind. (2) Superiority of age and experience. (3)
Superiority of fortune. Riches give social authority; riches possess
power to buy. (4) Superiority of birth, based on family prestige.

Smith extolled the merits of division of labor in industry with the
resultant increase in the quantity of work. There are three sets of
causal circumstances:[XI-24] (1) the increase of dexterity; (2) the
saving of time in passing from one kind of work to another; and (3)
the invention of a large number of machines. Smith, however, deplored
the deadening effect upon the individual of repeating over and over
a simple process, hundreds or thousands of times daily. In summary,
Adam Smith (1) applied the concept of natural rights to industrial
conditions; (2) developed Hume’s concept of sympathy into a theory of
mutual aid between individuals, classes, and nations; and (3) supported
the necessity of division of labor.

The natural rights and social contract theories affected in one way
or another the thinking not only of the men who have already been
considered in this chapter, but also of many other individuals.
Blackstone (1723–1780) held that man’s weakness in isolation led to
association. The primary group was the patriarchal family. Blackstone
was not an advocate of social regulation. His exposition of English law
in the _Commentaries_ stood for law itself, and became the bulwark at
once of the doctrines of individual rights and property rights in both
England and the American colonies. In the United States, its influence
remained dominant for more than a century after the founding of the
republic.

Although Edmund Burke (1729–1797) believed in a corporate unity of
society, he became in his century the chief spokesman of humanity for
humanity’s sake. He pleaded for justice for and conciliation with the
American colonies; he spoke for the benighted Hindus who were being
plundered by English stockholders; and he championed the rights of
slaves. He failed, on the other hand, to appreciate the struggles of
the French people which culminated in the French Revolution.

Immanuel Kant (1724–1817) declared man in a natural state is both
social and unsocial and referred to the “unsocial sociableness” of man.
“Man cannot get on with fellows and he cannot do without them.” Man has
an inclination to associate with others and also a great propensity
to isolate himself from others. He wishes to direct things according
to his own ideas and thus courts resistance and conflict. It is this
conflict, however, which leads to individual advancement.

Kant laid great stress upon a good will.[XI-25] The individual may have
intelligence and sagacity, power and wealth, but he may still be a
pernicious and hurtful member of society. He is not even worthy to be
happy unless he possesses a good will. A man’s will is good not because
of the end he seeks nor because of the results of his activities but
because he inherently wills the good. It is this “good will” of Kant
which is in conflict with the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, and
also with modern behavioristic psychology and objective sociology. To
Kant, morality is subjective. Social laws may regulate and control
man’s conduct but they cannot control his motives.

Johann Fichte (1762–1814) joined with Kant in the interpretation of a
good will. He held that property is essential to the development of
freedom. However, he pushed the social contract idea to an extreme and
developed a doctrine of an idealistic state socialism, including the
superiority of Germany among the nations of the world.

Hegel (1770–1831) supported cameralism by developing the State idea,
with the implication that Germany would become the supreme State in the
world. Hegel even asserted that man has his existence and his ethical
status “only in being a member of the State.”[XI-26] Morality is not a
matter of striving independently to realize one’s inner self, but of
living in accord with the traditions of one’s State.

Perhaps the individual rights theory never manifested a greater
aberration than in the mind of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). Power
is supreme. The individual or the nation with the greatest power has
the greatest right to live. Against this idea or the expressions of
this idea, the weaker individuals tend to combine and to extol their
weaknesses as virtues, even building a religion out of these glorified
weaknesses, for example, Christianity. Nietzsche’s doctrine of the
superman and the superstate will be discussed in Chapter XXI.

Closely related to the discussions concerning natural rights and the
social contract is the doctrine of utilitarianism, a modified form
of individualism with certain objective standards. Jeremy Bentham
(1748–1832) made utilitarianism well-known, and particularly the
standard: The greatest good of the greatest number. In accordance with
a formal idea of social change, Bentham urged that social improvements
be made by legislation. He demanded objective standards as opposed to
Kant’s emphasis on the inner motive. Where Kant accented the “how” of
conduct, Bentham insisted on the “what” of conduct. He pointed out
the need for improved forms of government, apparently ignoring or at
least greatly underestimating the fact that real progress comes chiefly
through modifying organic processes. However, Bentham may be rated a
virile social reformer, for he strongly advocated such measures as the
secret ballot, woman suffrage, trained statesmancraft. He made social
welfare a main goal.

The doctrine of utilitarianism was carried forward by James Mill
(1773–1836) and was brought to its highest fruition by the son, John
Stuart Mill (1806–1873). The elder Mill contended that utility is
morality. Like Bentham the elder Mill urged many social reforms.

John Stuart Mill adopted a modified form of the natural rights theory.
He asserted that the individual should have all the rights that he
can exercise without infringing upon the equal rights of other
individuals. Mill recognized a gradation in the pleasures which satisfy
individuals. He declared that it is better to be a man dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; he objected to the prevailing classification of
people on the basis of poverty and wealth, and urged the substitution
of standards of personal worth, honor, and true leadership as bases for
social classification.

Sir Henry Maine (1832–1888) invented the phrase: From status to
contract. He applied this phrase to a program of social welfare. There
are many illustrations, he pointed out, in business and industrial
life, and even in political and fraternal activities where people
make social contracts. The marriage contract also has many of the
characteristics of a genuine social contract. Maine pushed the social
contract idea to its furthest practical point; but deprecated the
possibility that the masses might come into power. His individualism
deprived him of a faith in the possible social development of the
uneducated.

Herbert Spencer, whose ideas will be discussed more extensively in a
subsequent chapter, became one of the chief exponents of the doctrine
of _laissez faire_ in governmental matters. He brought a vast reading
knowledge and able arguments to the support of individualistic
doctrines. He added very little that was new to individualistic and
_laissez faire_ theories although he was at one time perhaps their
leading exponent. One of his chief contributions to social thought
was indirect and unintentional, namely, the way in which his writings
challenged the attention of an American paleontologist, Lester F.
Ward, and led him to point out the psychical nature and hence telic
possibilities of civilization. In consequence of this challenge Spencer
fell, and Ward rose to the rank of dean of American sociologists. An
entire chapter will be devoted to the sociology of Lester F. Ward.

William G. Sumner (1840–1910) was the last noted champion of a
governmental _laissez faire_ doctrine. He held that the State owes
nothing to anybody except peace, order, and the guarantee of rights.
It is not true that the poor ought to care for each other, and that
the churches ought to collect capital and spend it for the poor; it is
not true that if you get wealth you should support others; and that
if you do not get wealth others ought to support you. In a society
based on contract there is no place for sentiment in public or common
affairs.[XI-28] Every individual will develop the self-reliance of
a free person, if he is not taught that others will care for him in
case he fails to care for himself. Sumner spoke vigorously as well as
harshly in support of liberty, contract, and private property. Although
he took an extreme and untenable position his ideas will bear careful,
unbiased study, for they contain a large amount of common sense. His
ethnological work will be indicated at some length in another chapter.

A noteworthy statement which has come from a current American school
of legal thinkers concerning individualistic social thought, is found
in the writings of Professor Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School. In
“A Theory of Social Interests” he has summed up the new point of
view.[XI-29] In the last century all interests were thought of in terms
of individual interests, all were reduced to their purely individual
elements and considered as rights.

In this century, Dean Pound indicates that law, for example, aims
primarily to conserve some general social interest. It conserves the
social interest in the general security, that is, in public health and
in peace. It conserves the social interest in institutions,--domestic,
religious, political. It conserves the social interest in natural
resources, preventing the waste of oil and gas and protecting water
rights. It conserves the social interest in general progress, in
economic, political, cultural progress, although its main contribution
in other fields, such as promoting the esthetic interests, are yet to
be made. It conserves the social interests in individual life and in
seeing that people live humanly and that the will of the individual
is not trodden upon. Legal processes have thus become types of social
engineering.

The doctrine of natural rights reached its largest degree of acceptance
in England, France, and the United States. It was not only reflected
in the thought of Thomas Jefferson but in the fundamental principles
upon which the United States was established. It suffered an aberration
in the form of the social contract theory which in its extreme forms
was later repudiated. Its greatest weakness was the exaggerated form
which it assumed, especially in England and the United States. In the
latter country it became greatly magnified through contact with the
spirit of discovery, invention, and pioneering which prevailed for over
a century. Consequently, it dominated the thought life of the United
States throughout the nineteenth century. It permitted captains of
industry to exploit the helpless masses, and encouraged politicians
to pursue selfish practices until governments became honeycombed with
graft. It nearly capsized the good Ship of State--Democracy.

Theories of natural rights have been supplanted by considerations
of natural needs, both individual and social. Human needs are now
considered the only imperatives, but even they are relative and
changing.




CHAPTER XII

MALTHUS AND POPULATION CONCEPTS


A unique and distinctive trend in social thought with important
sociological implications developed in the closing years of the
eighteenth century, namely, Malthusian thought regarding population.
Malthusianism, however, was preceded by the ideas of William Godwin
and Adam Smith. In 1775, Adam Smith had stated that “every species
of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their
subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it.”[XII-1]
Scanty subsistence, however, destroys a large percentage of offspring.
Inasmuch as men, like all other animals, multiply naturally in
proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always, more
or less, in demand; and food, or the cost of living, regulates
population.[XII-2] City people must depend upon the country for their
subsistence, whereas seaport towns can command food resources from all
parts of the earth.

The population ideas of William Godwin (1756–1836) were the immediate
stimuli which set Malthus at work. In 1793, Godwin’s _Enquiry
Concerning Justice_ was published. Godwin elaborated several radical
social ideas of the French Physiocratic philosophers. He declared
that human misery is caused by coercive institutions. Government,
he asserted, is an evil and should be abolished. He urged also the
abolition of strict marriage relations, although he personally
acquiesced in the custom and in his last days he commended marriage.
He thought that no social group should be larger than a parish, and
that there should be an equal distribution of property. Godwin thus
carried the doctrine of natural rights to the verge of anarchy and
licentiousness. His ideas furnished a basis for the nineteenth century
experiments in communism. But what is more important, Godwin’s ideas
regarding the reconstruction of society stimulated Thomas Malthus,
who developed what is commonly known as the Malthusian doctrine of
population.

In 1798, under an assumed name, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766–1834)
offered to the world the first carefully collected and elaborated body
of data, dealing with what he called _the_ social problem, namely:
What is the underlying cause of human unhappiness? This study may be
counted, in a sense, the beginning of modern sociological study. Early
in life Malthus showed an interest in social questions. Godwin’s ideas
had centered Malthus’ attention on population. Malthus’ well-known
treatise entitled, _An Essay on the Principle of Population as it
Affects the Future Improvement of Society_, undertook two important
tasks: (1) To investigate the causes that have impeded the progress of
mankind toward happiness, and (2) to examine probabilities of a total
or partial removal of these causes.[XII-3]

Among both plants and animals there is a constant tendency to reproduce
numerically beyond the subsistence level. Wherever there is liberty,
this power of increase blindly asserts itself. Afterwards, a lack of
nourishment and of room represses the superabundant numbers.[XII-4]
It appears, therefore, that the ultimate check to population is lack
of food, due to the fact that population increases faster than food
supply. Nature, in other words, sets a harsher law over the increase
of subsistence than she does over the birth rate. Man fails to take
cognizance of this law and brings untold misery upon himself. The lower
economic classes are the chief victims, and the giants of poverty
and pauperism rule over whole sections of human population. Malthus
considers the question of population the fundamental social problem.

Since population outruns food supply, dire human consequences
naturally follow. Food supply, as a check upon population, operates
harshly; it is but representative of an entire series of rigorous
natural, or positive, checks upon population. In this list there are
unwholesome occupations; forms of severe labor; extreme poverty;
damp and wretched housing conditions; diseases, epidemics, plagues,
poor nursing; intestine commotion, martial law, civil war; wars of
all forms; excesses of all kinds.[XII-5] These positive checks upon
population are the results of two main causes, namely, vice and misery.
As a result of the operation of these factors, population is being
continually cut down and kept near the mere subsistence plane.

Malthus pointed out another check upon population, the preventive.
The fear of falling into poverty causes many young people to postpone
marriage until they can safely marry--economically. This check so
far as voluntary is peculiar to man and, to the extent that it is
not followed by irregular sex gratification, is prudential. The
actual pressure of population upon food supply, or the fear of this
impingement, prevents people from marrying earlier than they do and
from reproducing their kind faster than they would do otherwise. This
pressure, or the fear of it, cuts down the marriage rate in times of
economic depression. But let prosperity come and the marriage rate
leaps upward, especially among the poorer classes.

The positive and preventive checks upon population hold a definite
relation to each other. “In every country where the whole of the
procreative power cannot be called into action, the preventive and the
positive checks must vary inversely as each other.”[XII-6] That is to
say, when positive checks, such as famine and war, slay large numbers
of people, moral restraint is diminished and the population numbers
rapidly increase. When the preventive check expresses itself strongly,
the population is kept down numerically, and positive checks, such as
famine or even war, are defeated.

Malthus attempted to establish three propositions:

(1) The limitation of population by the restriction of the means of
subsistence.

(2) The invariable increase of population whenever the means of
subsistence increase, unless prevented by powerful checks.

(3) The factors which keep population on a level with the means of
subsistence are all resolvable into three: moral restraint, vice, and
misery.[XII-7]

No one can gainsay the importance or the seriousness of the problem of
population. Plato wrestled with it, and urged that procreation when it
goes on too fast or too slow should be regulated by the state--through
a proper distribution of marks of ignominy or of honor. The number of
marriages should be determined by the magistrates.

Aristotle suggested that the ages of marriage for both sexes should be
regulated; he even advocated the regulation of the number of children
for each marriage. Additional children should be aborted.

Malthus, however, was wiser than either Plato or Aristotle, for he
observed that the cause which has the most lasting effect in improving
the condition of the poorer classes is the conduct and prudence of
the individuals themselves.[XII-8] Malthus asserted that it is in the
power of each individual to avoid all the evil consequences to himself
and society which result from the principle of population, “by the
practice of a virtue clearly dictated to him by the light of nature and
expressly enjoined in revealed religion.”[XII-9]

Malthus demonstrated clearly the weakness of liberal poor-laws. Give
more food to the poor, and they will produce more children, and suffer
more misery. Poor-laws increase the numbers of children of the poor,
and hence increase the amount of misery. Both private benevolence and
poor-laws increase the number of marriages and of children.[XII-10]

Education is the solution which Malthus demanded.[XII-11] Educate the
poor to postpone marriage, to keep the birth rate down, and to practice
economic thrift. To a great extent education will secure the operation
of the prudential check upon population. The science of moral and
political philosophy should not be confined within such narrow limits
that it is unable to overcome in practical ways the obstacles to human
happiness which arise from the law of population.[XII-12]

There are factors in the population situation which did not exist
at the time of Malthus, or which he did not see. Today there are
additional preventive checks upon population, for example, the rise
of democracy in the family whereby the wife and mother no longer
is dominated by the husband and father, but has a voice of her own
regarding domestic matters, such as the number of children. Closely
related to this tendency is the feminist movement, or woman’s rights
movement, whereby women are demanding that they not be confined to
the sphere of bearing and rearing children. Increasing intelligence
and foresight has served as a powerful preventive check upon
population. The current emphasis upon luxury is inimical to the birth
rate. A higher economic status almost uniformly cuts down the birth
rate. Within the last score of years the new science of eugenics
has attracted widespread attention. Eugenics stresses quality of
population. It would effect a decrease in the numbers of children
born among the lower classes, among the poorer stocks, and prevent
procreation among the mentally deficient. It would increase the birth
rate among the cultured and the high grade stocks.

Malthus appreciated the dependence of urban population upon rural
districts, but he could not foresee the degree to which cities would
grow in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The relative decrease
of agricultural labor and the proportional increase in non-agricultural
labor has thrown a burden upon the food supply which even Malthus could
not forecast.

On the other hand, Malthus did not realize the extent to which new
countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina would
contribute to the world’s means of subsistence. He could not predict
the way in which invention would be applied in solving agricultural
problems, and how today one man with improved machinery and intensive
methods can produce a hundred ears of corn where one was produced a
century ago. Nevertheless, the “new country” argument against Malthus’
principle of population is ultimately fallacious, for new countries
soon become old, the supply of new countries becomes exhausted, and
there is even a limit to soil productiveness. The very pressure of
population against means of subsistence is, however, a cause of
inventiveness, so that unanticipated increases in food supply may occur
at any time.

Socialism has criticized Malthus severely. Socialism holds that at
a given time the food supply is sufficient to meet human needs but
that it is poorly or unjustly distributed. With just distribution of
the returns from industry, food supply would not impinge strongly on
population. But socialism might greatly endanger the prudential check
on population, and hence result in an increased birth rate; which in
turn would more than balance any release from human misery that a just
distribution of the returns from industry would effect.

Another point which Malthus did not observe is that the increase in
technical skill which comes with vocational education is overcome by
the tendency of the world’s population to overtake the world’s food
productiveness. With increase in population, the price of land rises,
the rent for land increases, the cost of living mounts upward, and the
purchasing power of the dollar, or its equivalent, declines.

Some of the followers of Malthus have advocated birth control as an
artificial means of regulating population. Birth control prevents by
physical means the birth of children. It is a useful weapon against
sexually brutal husbands. It does not provide for self control or moral
control of the sexual impulses. It encourages rather than controls
gratification of the sexual desires. By it a gain is made in protecting
helpless women and in cutting down the birth rate among the lower moral
classes, whether wealthy or poor, but the gain is more than lost by the
opportunity which birth control gives to the irregular gratification of
sexual impulses and by the resultant weakening of moral fibre.

Thomas N. Carver, whose work will be referred to again in subsequent
chapters, has developed an interesting population theory which is
partly Malthusian.[XII-13] The increase in population from both
immigration sources and the birth rate should be cut down, thereby
decreasing the percentage of unskilled labor. Further, persons should
be trained out of the unskilled group into the skilled group and then
into the _entrepreneur_ class. Thus, by greatly decreasing the number
of unskilled laborers and by increasing the number of entrepreneurs,
wages will advance and profits will be increasingly subdivided. The
poor will become well-to-do, and poverty as it is now known will
tend to disappear. This theory underestimates the importance of
psychological motives and of social attitudes under a system where a
marked degree of competition is encouraged.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the principle of population as
given by Malthus is fundamental to an understanding of the problems
of social progress.[XII-14] There is a positive relation between
population and means of subsistence. Positive and preventive checks
upon population are continually at work. Moral restraint and self
control, based on scientifically devised human laws, create a better
moral fibre than birth control. The quality of personality is far more
important than mere numbers of population. The struggle for quality in
personality must be supplemented by justice in industrial and social
processes before the population problem can be solved.




CHAPTER XIII

COMTE AND POSITIVE SOCIAL THOUGHT


An organized foundation for the field of social thought was not laid
until near the close of the first half of the nineteenth century.
At that time Auguste Comte (1798–1857) gave at least an organized
groundwork, if not a synthetic introduction to sociology. He was
the first to stake out the territory of social thought, to show
the relation of social thought to other fields of knowledge, and
to separate social statics from social dynamics. He was the first
important social philosopher, and his _Positive Philosophy_ the first
treatise roughly to outline the field of sociology.

Auguste Comte invented the term, sociology, by which he meant the
science of human association. While he did not contribute much to
the science itself, he laid important foundation stones. He reacted
against all forms of loose thinking about man, rejected metaphysical
and theological speculations, and insisted upon the observation and
classification of social phenomena. He repudiated attempts to discover
causes of social uniformities, and coined the name, positivism, for the
philosophical system upon which he founded sociology. The bases of
positivism may be found in the ideas of Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes.
As each of these three men broke with tradition and sought observed
facts in their respective fields, so Comte was likewise prompted to do
in the field of social thought.

Auguste Comte was born at Montpelier, France, the son of humble and
law-abiding Catholic parents. At the age of nine he displayed unusual
mental ability, a strong character, and a tendency to defy authority.
He is described as brilliant and recalcitrant. He possessed a wonderful
memory and a remarkable avidity for reading. In school he won many
prizes, and took a position of leadership among his fellow students,
who called him “the philosopher.” At the age of sixteen he was devoting
his energies and abilities to the study of mathematics.

As a youth Comte demanded the resignation of one of his instructors,
criticized Napoleon, and disregarded both ecclesiastical and parental
authority. He especially enjoyed to point out the stupidity of his
superiors and to oppose tyranny.

At the age of nineteen Comte made the acquaintance of Saint Simon, the
well-known socialist. The friendship lasted for only a few years, but
long enough to exert a deep influence upon the youthful mathematician.
Saint Simon (1760–1825) had indicated the need for a scientific
classification of the sciences with political science at the head of
the list, and had developed a new fraternalism under the name of _Le
nouveau Christianisme_. This system was optimistic and humanitarian,
but dreamy. Comte was dissatisfied with it, and undertook to work out a
better scheme of social analysis and organization.

In 1822, Comte’s first important work was published. It contained
an introduction by Saint Simon, and was entitled _A Prospectus of
the Scientific Works Required for the Reorganization of Society_. It
represented an important beginning of the task on which Comte was to
spend his life. Upon the problem Comte read and worked assiduously,
save as he was interrupted by an unhappy married life and by mental
aberrations, due to overwork. He gave courses of public lectures, but
insisted upon working gratuituously. He would not accept royalties
from the sale of his books, despite the fact that he lived continually
on the verge of starvation. His friends, however, made him gifts and
established a subsidy. He insisted upon the rule that all his literary
productions should be given to the public gratuitously.[XIII-1]

His method of composition has been commented upon by his biographers.
As a result of his unusual memory and the high degree of mental
concentration to which he attained, he was able to plan chapters and
volumes in their smallest details, and then from memory to put them
into written form. This method enabled him to secure “an extraordinary
unity of conception and organic symmetry of plan.”

Comte manifested an unusual regard for the truth. This attitude
required him to modify and qualify statements of fundamental principles
at great length. As a result his works are often tedious reading. He
preferred, however, to write meticulously and thus to safeguard truth,
rather than speak in epigrams and sacrifice truth.

Comte’s two leading works are: the _Positive Philosophy_ and the
_Positive Polity_. The first appeared in six volumes during the years
from 1830 to 1842. The second work, in four volumes, was published
in the years from 1851 to 1854. It is not the equal of the _Positive
Philosophy_, which was translated into English in 1853 by Harriet
Martineau.

John Stuart Mill has referred to Comte as among the first of European
thinkers; and, by his institution of a new social science, in some
respects the first.[XIII-2] George Henry Lewes called Comte the
greatest of modern thinkers. John Morley, the English statesman and
author, says of Comte: “Neither Franklin, nor any man that has ever
lived, could surpass him in the heroic tenacity with which, in the
face of a thousand obstacles, he pursued his own ideal of a vocation.”
Harriet Martineau summarizes his methods as follows: “There can be
no question but that his whole career was one of the most intense
concentration of mind, gigantic industry, rigid economy, and singular
punctuality and exactness in all his habits.”[XIII-3]

In laying the foundations for a new social science, Comte began with
an analysis of types of thinking. (1) Primitive and untrained persons
everywhere think in supernatural terms. They suppose that all physical
phenomena are caused by the immediate action of capricious supernatural
beings. The primitive man believes in all kinds of fetishes in
which spirits or supernatural beings live. Fetishism admitted of no
priesthood, because its gods are individual, each residing in fixed
objects.[XIII-4]

As the mind of primitive man became better organized, fetishism
became cumbersome. Too many fetishes produced mental confusion. A
coalescence of gods resulted and polytheism arose. The polytheistic
gods represented different phases of life. This state in human thought
is well illustrated by the Homeric gods.

But a large number of capricious divinities are mentally
unsatisfactory. They create mental contradictions. Consequently,
the gods are arranged in a hierarchy. Finally, the idea of one God,
or of monotheism, developed. The belief arose that every phenomenon
is produced by the immediate action of the one God. As man’s vision
widened and his observations increased in scope and depth, the concept
of a monotheistic universe became clarified. Monotheism is the climax
of the theological stage of thinking.

But rationalism argues that God does not stand directly behind every
phenomenon. Pure reason insists that God is a First Cause or an
Abstract Being. Pure reason speaks in terms of inalienable rights:
metaphysical explanations, however, are unsatisfactory to the mind.

Hence, Comte developed his concept of positivism, which is a purely
intellectual way of looking at the world. Comte held that the mind
should concentrate on the observation and classification of phenomena.
He believed that both theological and metaphysical speculations, as
he used the terms, were as likely to be fiction as truth, and that
there is no way of determining which is the case. Thus it will be more
profitable if the individual should direct his thoughts to the lines
of thinking which are most truly prolific, namely, to observation and
classification of data.

Comte even took the position that it is futile to try to determine
causes. We can observe uniformities, or laws, but it is mere
speculation to assign causes to these uniformities. Positivism deified
observation and classification of data. Its weaknesses should not
hinder the student, however, from seeing the importance of its emphasis
upon the scientific procedure of observing and classifying data in an
age when dogmatism and speculation were rife.

The three stages of thought which Comte described are not three levels
of thought, as Comte contended, but, as Herbert Spencer indicated, they
may represent the same plane of thinking. Each requires about the same
degree of thinking ability. Moreover, as John Fiske argued, the three
methods of approach to problems are often pursued simultaneously by
a given person. Some phenomena are explained theologically; others,
metaphysically; and others, positively.

A second main contribution which Comte made to social thought is that
each of the three modes of thinking determines and corresponds to a
type of social organization. Speaking from the standpoint of his own
religious contacts, he declared that theological thinking leads to a
military and monarchial social organization, with God at the head of
the hierarchy as King of kings and a mighty warrior, and with human
beings arranged in a military organization. Divine sanction rules. As
expressed through the human leaders, this divine sanction must not be
questioned. Dogmatism must be meekly endured, or else its threatened
punishments will be turned loose upon helpless offenders. Divine rights
rule.

Metaphysical thinking produces a government dominated by doctrines of
abstract rights. Natural rights are substituted for divine rights.
A priesthood is furthered. Social organization becomes legalistic,
formal, structural, without adequate content.

Positive thinking produces practical results in the form of industrial
enterprises, and ushers in an industrial age. It inquires into the
nature and utilization of natural forces. It transforms the material
resources of the earth, and produces material inventions.

Comte failed to postulate a fourth mode of thinking, namely, socialized
thinking, or a system of thought which would emphasize not simply
the use of natural forces, but the use of natural forces for social
ends, for the purpose of building constructive, just, and harmonious
societies, and of developing personalities who will evaluate life in
terms of the welfare of other personalities. Comte, however, should be
credited with opening the way for the rise of socialized thinking.

A third phase of Comte’s system was his classification of the sciences,
with sociology as the latest and greatest of the group. The Greek
thinkers, it will be recalled, undertook to classify all knowledge
under three headings: physics, ethics, and politics. Bacon made the
divisions correlative to the so-called mental faculties of memory,
imagination, and reason, namely: history, poetry, and science.

Comte chose as his principle of classifying knowledge, the order of
increasing dependence. He arranged the sciences so that each category
may be grounded on the principal laws of the preceding category, and
serve as a basis for the next ensuing category.[XIII-5] The order,
hence, is one of increasing complexity and decreasing generality. The
most simple phenomena must be the most general--general in the sense
of being everywhere present.[XIII-6]

Comte began with mathematics, the tool of the mind. Accurate thinking
is always done in terms of mathematics. With mathematics as its chief
tool, the mind of man can go anywhere in its thinking. Mathematics
is the most powerful instrument which the mind may use in the
investigation of natural laws.[XIII-7]

Mathematics is not a constituent member of the group of sciences. It is
the basis of them all. It holds the first place in the hierarchy of the
sciences, and is the best point of departure in all education, whether
general or special.[XIII-8] It is the oldest and most perfect of all
the sciences.[XIII-9]

Mathematics is the science which measures precisely the relations
between objects and ideas. It is _the_ science.[XIII-10] The Greeks
had no other. Its definition is the definition of all science. Its
function is that of ascertaining relationships, a process which is
basic to scientific thinking in all fields. Education that is based on
any other method is faulty, inexact, and unreliable. It is only through
mathematics that we can understand science.

The highest form of mathematics is calculus. There is no scientific
inquiry in which calculus is not used. Even the physician in
prescribing for the cure of a disease, must provide for the mixing
together of different quantities of different medicines, so that,
when taken at determined intervals of time, they will possess the
right qualities for bringing the human body back to its normal state.
Calculus is the branch of science which has the highest intellectual
dignity. In it the proportion of reasoning to observation is greater
than elsewhere.

With mathematics as the tool, the classification of knowledge may
proceed. All natural phenomena fall into two grand divisions: inorganic
and organic. The inorganic are more general and should be considered
first. Inorganic phenomena are of two classes: astronomical and
terrestrial. Astronomical phenomena are the most general of all. The
stars and planets appear under the least varied aspects.[XIII-12]
Astronomy is the science by which the movements of the heavenly bodies,
including the earth, are measured. How can we thoroughly understand any
terrestrial phenomena without considering the nature of the earth and
its relation to the other units of the solar system?[XIII-13]

Terrestrial physics includes two fields: physics proper and chemistry.
Material bodies may be regarded in either their physical or chemical
aspects. Physics is more general than chemistry; it deals with masses
rather than elements. Chemical phenomena depend upon the laws of
physics, without being influenced by them in turn. Chemical action is
conditioned by the laws of weight, heat, electricity. The study of
inorganic phenomena thus falls under three scientific heads: astronomy,
physics, and chemistry.

Organic phenomena include two types: individual and group. The first
refers to the function and structure of all individual forms in the
plant and animal worlds. It is general physiology, or, in modern
terms, biology. It involves the study of all life and the general laws
pertaining to the individual units of life.

Biology rests on chemistry, because it is in chemistry that all
reliable knowledge about nutrition or secretion is found. Biology is
indebted to physics for knowledge concerning the weight of, temperature
of, and related facts about living organisms. Biological laws are
partially determined by astronomical factors. If the earth were to
rotate faster than it does, the course of physiological phenomena would
be accelerated, and the length of life would be shortened.[XIII-14]
If the orbit of the earth were to become as eccentric as that of a
comet, changes of a fatal nature would occur to all life on the earth.
If there were no inclination of the earth’s axis, the seasons would
be unknown, and the geographical distribution of living species would
be vastly different from the present situation. All accurate work
in biological studies is mathematical in character. Thus biology,
the science of organic phenomena, is dependent on all the preceding
divisions on the scale of knowledge.

The study of gregarious or associative life is a special field.
Comte called this science social physics, and for it invented the
specific term, sociology. It rests in turn upon biological, chemical,
physical, astronomical knowledge and uses mathematics as its tool.
Comte virtually defines six sciences: mathematics, astronomy, physics,
chemistry, biology, and sociology. He treats of transcendental biology,
which is the basis of modern psychology. Comte urged that no science
could be effectually studied without competent knowledge concerning
the sciences on which it depends. It is necessary not only to have a
general knowledge of all the sciences but that they should be studied
in order--this is Comte’s dictum to the student of sociology. Comte
insisted that one general science could not develop beyond a given
point until the preceding science has passed a given stage.

Each of the six general sciences has passed through the three stages
of thought. Mathematics, which has advanced furthest into the positive
stage, is still connected with superstition, such as that which hovers
round the number 13. The other general sciences are less further along.
Sociology, the latest science to develop, Comte hoped by his works to
push over into the positive stage.

Comte divided sociology, or social physics, into social statics and
social dynamics. Social statics is the study of the laws of action
and reaction of the different parts of the social order, aside for
the time being from the general social movements which are modifying
them.[XIII-15] Social dynamics considers the laws of progress. Social
statics inquires into the laws of co-existence of social phenomena;
social dynamics examines the laws of social succession. Sociology is
the study of social organization and of social progress.

Society is in a state of anarchy. Individuals with the best of purposes
are continually weakening the efforts of each other. Powerful persons
are crushing the weak. The defeated are conniving against the strong.
Why all this social anarchy? To Comte the answer is clear. Behind moral
and social anarchy there is intellectual anarchy. People do not have a
knowledge of the fundamental laws of social order and social progress.

Moreover, people fail to appreciate the necessity of knowledge of
social laws. They are insensible to the value of sound social theory.
They want nothing but the “practical,” unmindful of the fact that the
“practical” is as likely to be based on incorrect social theory as upon
sound social conceptions.

The necessity of fundamental concepts concerning society underlies
social organization. In the absence of these general ideas, there
is “no other daily resource for the maintenance of even a rough and
precarious social order than an appeal, more or less immediate, to
personal interests.”[XIII-16] In the absence of a moral authority, the
material order requires the use of either terror or corruption; the
latter is less inconvenient and more in accordance with the nature
of modern society.[XIII-17] Moreover, politicians and other public
men work against the elaboration of the social theory which is
necessary for the salvation of society. They sneer at the development
of social science. Many of those who occupy the chief political
stations regard with antipathy the true reorganization of society.
Social principles are not even sought. On the other hand, social
charlatanism attracts by the magnificence of its promises and dazzles
by its transient successes. Comte deplored attempts to re-make society
through institutionalism, regardless of social theory. He stressed
the fundamental importance of social principles as the only means
of guaranteeing a correct institutional procedure. As a practical
principle of social adjustment, Comte endorsed the Catholic ideal: In
necessary things, unity; in doubtful things, liberty; in all things,
charity.

Comte protested vigorously against materialism. He pointed out that for
three centuries the best minds had been devoted to material science and
had neglected societary problems.[XIII-18] Material institutions should
be modified and made to harmonize with the underlying laws of social
evolution. A moral reorganization of society must precede and direct
the material and political reorganization.[XIII-19]

Social improvement is a result of mental development. This development
favors the preponderance of the noblest human tendencies. Prevision
and science when applied to society will bring out the best phases of
human nature, and thus result in social improvement. Although the lower
instincts will continue to manifest themselves in modified action,
their less sustained exercise will debilitate them by degrees.[XIII-20]

The three chief causes of social variation result from, first, race;
second, climate; and third, political action in its whole scientific
content. The first and second factors cannot be changed greatly, but
the political influences are wide open to modification by social
prevision. In this connection sociology finds its manifestation.

With the development of society, intellectual activity and
gregariousness slowly overcome the preponderance of the affective
over the intellectual phases of life. But even in the best natures
the personally affective elements are more powerful than the social
affections. Real intellectual development, however, will strengthen
man’s empire over his passions, refine his gregariousness, and release
his energies for social activities.

Comte makes the family the social unit. Man cannot live in isolation,
but the family can survive by itself.[XIII-21] The striking
characteristic of domestic organization is its establishment of the
elementary idea of social perpetuity, by directly and irresistibly
connecting the future with the past.[XIII-22] Family life will
always be the school of social life, both for obedience and for
command.[XIII-23] Comte failed to escape the logic of the patriarchal
family life. He did credit women, however, with being superior to men
in the spontaneous expansion of sympathy and sociality, although
inferior in understanding and reason.

The direction of social evolution is toward further development of the
noblest dispositions and the most generous feelings, and away from the
expression of the animal appetites and the material desires.[XIII-24]
The trend is from the satisfaction of the selfish impulses to the
habitual exercise of the social impulses. Happiness depends on the
presence of new stimuli in one’s form of activity. A life of labor that
is full of constructive stimuli is after all the fittest to develop
personality.

Comte was the friend of popular education.[XIII-25] He based his
contention on the invariable homogeneity of the human mind. The minds
of people of all races are potentially similar. All members of the race
are capable of development to a common plane.

In his _Positive Polity_, Comte made important changes in his thinking.
This work was the product of his later years, and shows the effects
of deprivation and struggle. It is inferior in quality to his earlier
treatise on _Positive Philosophy_. It is a question, therefore, how
far his later ideas should be permitted to supersede his thinking
when he was in his prime. In his later thought-life he receded from
his emphasis upon the intellectual nature and stressed the importance
of the affections. He made affection the central point of life and
developed the concept of love. We tire of thinking and even of acting,
he asserted, but we never tire of loving.[XIII-26]

The Comtean ideal became a disinterested love of mankind. Comte
developed a religion of humanity. His contact with Christianity gave
him the belief that it is chiefly ecclesiastical. He did not see in
Christianity a social keynote. Hence, he attempted to create a purely
social religion. He made mankind an end in itself; he failed to see
that human society is probably an outcropping of universal purpose.

If we judge Comte by his own time and age, we shall see the importance
of his contributions to social thought, which were as follows: 1.
There is need for accurate thinking about society. Mathematics is the
best tool for obtaining social accuracy. 2. Comte developed positivism
with its emphasis upon observation and classification of social data.
3. Knowledge has scientific divisions, according to the principles of
increasing dependence and decreasing generality. This scale begins
with mathematics and astronomy, includes physics, chemistry, biology,
in order, and ends with the social sciences, particularly sociology.
4. Sociology deals with the static and dynamic phases of human
association. 5. Comte developed a humanitarian philosophy. 6. Comte
insisted on an intellectual understanding of social processes as the
only true basis for overcoming social anarchy and for solving the
problems of society.




CHAPTER XIV

MARX AND SOCIALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT


Socialism proper had its beginning in the second and third decades of
the nineteenth century. It developed primarily in continental Europe
and in England. Although Plato’s communism and More’s utopianism were
forerunners of socialism, the social unrest in Europe in the early
years of the nineteenth century was the direct causal factor. Socialism
also represented a reaction against the prevailing _laissez faire_
thought regarding the evils of society and the suffering of the poorer
classes.

Socialism began with the concepts and experiments of Saint Simon
and Fourier in France, of Robert Owen in England, and of Rodbertus,
Lassalle, Marx, and Engels in Germany. In France the movement was
carried forward by Proudhon and Blanc; and in England by the Christian
socialists, chiefly Maurice and Kingsley. In Germany, Marx maintained
the position of leadership for many decades, and finally became the
best known exponent of socialist thought in the world.

In his _New Christianity_, Saint Simon, who was referred to in the
preceding chapter, made a unique contribution to social thought. His
thinking was not deep, or systematic, but characterized by ingenuity.
Saint Simon advocated a society in which only useful things are
produced. In this industrial order, men of science will be in control.
Saint Simon was greatly interested in the welfare of the poorest
classes. His _New Christianity_ was essentially a plea that the whole
world devote itself to the improvment of the living conditions of the
very poor. The influence which Saint Simon had upon Comte has already
been mentioned.

Another important socialistic ideal was developed by Fourier
(1772–1837), who worked out a social system in which the _phalange_
is the chief instrument in securing a perfect society. The phalange
is composed of from twenty-four to thirty-two groups of people. Each
group comprises from seven to nine individuals. The unifying bond is
natural attraction, or free elective love and sympathy. The members
of each phalange live communistically in a large commodious structure
called a _phalanstère_. The phalanges were to unite in one large world
federation, with headquarters at Constantinople.

The people work according to their interests, frequently changing
occupations. The products of labor are subdivided; a minimum goes
equally to all, irrespective of any conditioning factors; of the
remainder five-twelfths goes to labor, three-twelfths to special
ability, and four-twelfths to capital. Difficult common labor is paid
the most, on the assumption that he who does pleasant labor receives
pay in mental ways. Every individual should have an opportunity to
become a capitalist; and every woman should be enabled to become
independent economically. These utopian plans of Fourier called for a
sudden and complete transformation of human nature. They underestimated
the force of human selfishness.

Socialistic thought was carried into politics by Louis Blanc
(1811–1882). He declared that no genuine reformation of society could
take place until political machinery was organized democratically.
The democratic state would endow national workshops. These workshops
would be operated by industrial associations composed of workingmen,
who would elect their own officers, regulate their own industries, and
provide for the distribution of the returns from industry. Once started
by the state these industrial associations will expand and increase in
number until the whole nation, and then the world, will be organized in
this way.

Blanc participated in the French Revolution of 1848 and became a member
of the provisional government. His national workshop idea failed
in practice. His enemies were partly responsible for this defeat,
because the essentials of productive work and guarantees of character
which Blanc urged were disregarded. The fact, however, that these two
essentials were considered necessary for the successful development
of national workshops indicates that the system, under average
conditions, might not be a success.

Nearly all the early socialists were evolutionists rather than
revolutionists. They did not advocate class struggle theories. They
developed bourgeois rather than proletariat ideas. An outstanding
exception to these statements is found in the radical attitude of
Babeuf (1760–1797), who was essentially a forerunner of Marxian
socialism and also of the anarchistic philosophy of Proudhon and
Bakunin. Babeuf vigorously proclaimed the sovereignty of the
proletariat, and advocated the abolition of inheritance laws and
of private property. He urged that the property of corporations be
confiscated, and that a communistic state be established.

The well-known principles of justice, liberty, and equality were
utilized by Proudhon (1809–1865), a philosophic anarchist. He would
have the same wages paid to an unskilled workman as to a successful
business or professional man. He predicted that equalization of
opportunity would bring about an equalization of ability.

Proudhon attacked property rights. He declared that property is theft.
In itself property is lifeless, but it nevertheless demands rent,
interest, or profits, or all three. It protects itself behind law, and
in order to guarantee its alleged rights, it calls out the militia,
evicts families, and takes bread from the mouths of little children. It
robs labor of its just returns.[XIV-1]

By unsatisfactory reasoning Proudhon urged the free development of
individuals in society, whereby each individual would learn to govern
himself so well in society that government would no longer be needed.
This theory is Proudhon’s concept of anarchy. In this doctrine Proudhon
neglects to provide an adequate dynamic or to foresee the ultimate
complexity of human relations.

In England, Robert Owen (1771–1858) became a founder of socialism. As
a factory manager, Owen developed social ideas. Living in an age of
long hours, woman and child labor of the worst forms, and deplorable
housing conditions, Owen deserves the credit of inaugurating a
twentieth century program of welfare work. It was Owen’s theory that
the workingman is so subject to his environment that even his character
is determined for him. Owen attempted in theory and practice to
prevent the impingement of the economic environment upon the workers.
He believed in self-governing organizations of labor. He inaugurated
the co-operative movement as a means of securing industrial justice
and of giving the workingman a chance at the free development of his
personality.

Owen objected to Malthus’ doctrine of population on the ground that it
failed to consider the marvelous increase in the means of subsistence
which might come from the application of inventive genius to the
sources of the food supply. He also protested against the Malthusian
argument for the restriction of population, because this argument did
not give due weight to the unjust distribution of wealth and to the
enslaving social organization to which labor is subject.

Owen’s experiments, particularly at New Harmony, Indiana, demonstrated
that a communistic organization of society in itself cannot save
society. The strength of Owen’s social thought lay in its accentuation
of the need for providing labor with opportunities of industrial
initiative and co-operation.

During the middle of the nineteenth century in England, the Christian
socialists flourished. The founders of this movement were Frederick
Maurice and Charles Kingsley. These men were clergymen who became
greatly interested in the welfare of the working classes. They made
clear the evils of the prevailing economic order, the formality of the
Manchester school of economics, and proposed to apply the principles of
Christianity to the economic system of the day. They opposed economic
competition. For this method they urged the substitution of the ethical
and spiritual principles of co-operation and love in industrial
relationships--for both employer and employee in all their dealings
with each other. Their socialism is essentially a vigorous application
of Christian love to every-day relationships.

The influence of Christian socialism strengthened the experiment
of the Rochdale weavers who in 1844 had organized a consumers’
co-operative society. The concept of consumers’ co-operation received
its original impetus from the thought and practice of Robert Owen,
achieved a measurable degree of concreteness under the efforts of the
Rochdale weavers, and through Maurice and Kingsley won the assistance
of Christianity.

In Germany, Rodbertus, Lassalle, Marx and Engels molded the thinking of
socialists about the nature of human society. Rodbertus (1805–1875),
the son of a university professor, was a quiet, deep thinker about
social processes. According to his analysis of social development,
three stages may be pointed out. The first was marked by slavery, or
by private property in human beings. The second state is an indirect
form of the first, namely, one of private property in land and capital.
Through this type of ownership the economically fortunate or shrewd
are able to exercise widespread power over the unfortunate and the
uneducated. In the third state, toward which society is trending,
the concept of service will rule, and private property as a dominant
concept will be compelled to take a thoroughly subordinate place in
human activities. The ultimate goal, according to Rodbertus, is a world
communist society, with land and capital as national property, and with
labor rewarded according to its productiveness.[XIV-2]

Rodbertus denied the validity of the wages fund theory and argued
that wages are not paid by capital; it is that part of the productive
earnings of labor which labor receives. His fundamental thesis is
that labor is the source and measure of all value. He advocated an
evolutionary procedure whereby the state should pass legislation that
would guarantee just returns to labor. This form of state socialism is
to be gradually developed, until a scientific socialism is reached with
its emphasis upon a government of labor, for labor, and by labor.

The founder of Social Democracy in Germany, Ferdinand Lassalle
(1825–1864), wrote two significant treatises, the _Bastiat-Schulze_
and the _Working Men’s Programme_. Lassalle believed that natural
conditions are productive of misery and vice, and that it is the
chief business of the state to extricate men from this thraldom. The
state should provide means for lifting the laboring man to a level of
industrial freedom.

Lassalle objected to the theory known as the iron law of wages. He
protested against the smallness of the share of his earnings which the
laborer really receives. He advocated the establishment of productive
associations wherein labor might perform the double function of
workman and capitalist. In order that these productive associations
might be started, the state should advance funds. After the productive
associations have secured momentum they will continue by virtue of
their own strength. Ultimately, industry will be conducted exclusively
through productive associations; both industrial and social democracy
will finally rule in political life. Lassalle became the founder of
the Social Democratic party in Germany. Lassalle boldly denounced the
reactionary classes that were in political power in his time and led
the workers in a movement to overthrow the existing social order.[XIV-3]

The name of Karl Marx (1818–1883) is supreme on the list of socialists.
Marx was born in Germany of Jewish parents, and educated at the
universities of Bonn and Berlin. He became a journalist, but the paper
which he edited was considered too liberal and was suppressed. Marx
went to Paris in 1842, where he continued editorial work. At this
time he was influenced by French socialism and its leader, Proudhon.
In 1845, he was expelled from Paris at the request of the Prussian
government. He went to Brussels. In the meantime a deep friendship with
Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) had been established.

In 1847, Marx and Engels issued the Communist Manifesto.[XIV-4] This
radical document was circulated widely and became extensively accepted
by social revolutionists. Its doctrines were:

1. Abolition of property in lands; rents to be used for public purposes.

2. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.

3. Progressive income tax.

4. Nationalization of the means of transportation and commerce.

5. Extension of productive enterprises by the state.

6. Compulsory labor.

7. Free education; no child labor.

8. Elimination of the distrust between town and country.

Marx returned to Germany and established the _Neue Rheinische Zeitung_
in Cologne in 1848. Engels served as editor. Because of revolutionary
activity, Marx was forced to leave Germany in 1849. He went to Paris
and then to London, where he became a newspaper correspondent and where
he lived until his death in 1883.

In 1859, the _Kritik der politischen Oekonomie_ was published. It
contains the essential principles of Marx’s system of thought. In 1864,
Marx found the opportunity for which he had long been seeking, namely,
to organize the workers of the world into one large association. On
September 28, in St. Martin’s Hall, Marx in the presence of a vast
concourse of people, he initiated the “International Workingmen’s
Association.” The fundamental idea was to organize the societies of
workingmen which have a common purpose, namely, the emancipation of the
working classes, into a world or international union for co-operative
purposes. The International proposes that governments shall put the
interests of the working classes to the forefront of national concern,
and subordinate the present attention they give to war, diplomacy, and
national jealousies.

In 1869, Marx, aided by Karl Liebknecht (1826–1900), Engels and others,
organized in Germany the Social Democratic Labor Party. The movement
which Lassalle had started became united with the Marxian movement,
and in 1875 the German Social Democracy presented a united front to
capitalism. Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and Bebel are its best-known
leaders. Bismarck was forced to acknowledge its power, and condescended
to inaugurate a system of social insurance in order to appease its rank
and file.

In 1867, 1885, and 1895, the three volumes of _Das Kapital_ appeared,
in chronological order.[XIV-5] By this work, _Capital_, Marx is known
throughout the world. The style is laborious; the analyses are minute
and in places difficult to follow. The method is historical. Marx
analyzes social evolution. He traces the rise of capitalism from its
humble beginnings to its autocratic fruition. In this development the
instruments of capital showed a tendency to congregate in a decreasing
number of hands. By this token it will be seen that the number of the
propertyless ever increases. Likewise, their influence decreases. In
this way, the proletariat is developed, a product of capitalism.

A definite class, the capitalist, acquires increasing industrial,
political, and social power. The proletariat suffer increasing misery.
They own nothing except their ability to labor. They are forced to
throw this human quality on the commercial market and sell it to the
highest bidder. But capitalism increases the number of the proletariat.
This tendency, together with the increase in population, creates a
superabundance of labor. Laborers are forced to compete in the labor
market. The laborers who will sell their labor for the least wages will
be employed. Capitalism thus forces wages to a mere subsistence level,
with the result that the misery and suffering of the proletariat are
greatly augmented. In this way the laborer is crushed by the operation
of the iron law of wages.

By the operation of the iron law, the capitalist is enabled to
appropriate to himself an increasing amount of the earnings of labor.
This appropriated amount is called the surplus value. Marx developed at
length the concept of surplus value. Capitalism exploits the laborer by
taking possession of as large a proportion of the earnings of labor as
it can obtain--through its might and its shrewdness.

The growth of capitalism, also, causes a class consciousness to develop
among the members of the proletariat. This class consciousness is
increasing. It produces labor organizations; these organizations are
acquiring vast power. The struggles between them and the capitalistic
classes go on. The two groups have little in common. By force of
numbers the proletariat are bound finally to win, and to overthrow the
capitalistic classes which are now in power. They will seize the means
of production and manage them for the good of all.

Marx did not outline an utopia. He described the historical evolution
of society as he saw it, and he participated in plans for the
organization of all laborers for their common good. Inasmuch as Marx
advocated compulsory labor, the laboring class under Marxian socialism
would include all people. Marx advocated an equal distribution of
wealth, not in the sense of the popular misconception of that term, but
in the sense that the earnings from the industry shall be distributed
to the workers in proportion to their achievements.

In Russia, Marxian socialism in 1918 came into power. The Bolsheviki
represent the radical wing of the Marxian followers. They established
essentially a dictatorship of the proletariat, substituting it for the
dictatorship of capitalists which existed under the reign of the czars.
Bolshevism substitutes occupation for geographic area as a basis of
representative government. This program is deficient and sociologically
untenable, because occupational groups do not encompass all phases of
human personality. A government based on occupational group needs is
representative of only a portion of the elements of human life. When
seventy-five per cent of the people are illiterate, as has been the
case in Russia, no form of government whether democratic or not can be
other than a dictatorship.

Revolutionary socialism coincides, in part, with syndicalism, a
movement which developed in France and England. Syndicalism is a
radical form of trade unionism. It declares that workingmen cannot
hope for genuine betterment through politics. They must organize and
inaugurate a general strike. This universal strike will paralyze the
present régime and render it helpless. As a result the workers will
come into power. In the meantime, the workers must keep up a running
warfare with capitalists and the government which supports capitalism.
Sabotage is a common concept among syndicalists. It implies a program
of destroying machinery, hindering the production of economic goods,
and creating inefficiency in capitalistic industry. In both England
and the United States, syndicalism has appeared. In the United States,
the Industrial Workers of the World, or I. W. W., confess to doctrines
similar to those which have been espoused in Europe under the name of
syndicalism. The philosophic exponent of syndicalism has been George
Sorel.

Revolutionary socialism has been paralleled in certain ways by
anarchism. These teachings first acquired force through the writings
of Proudhon. Another leading anarchist was the Russian nobleman and
military officer, Michael Bakunin (1814–1876). Although of aristocratic
birth, Bakunin became furious when he observed the human misery among
the masses which Russian autocracy was producing. He became an
agitator. He was confined in dungeons and exiled to Siberia. He escaped
from Siberia, and by way of California went to England and then to
Switzerland. His chief work is _God and the State_. Vital, vigorous,
magnetic, fearless--these are the adjectives which describe the
personality of Bakunin.

Bakunin scorned rank, birth, and fortune. He attacked external
authority of all kinds. He denied the validity of concepts such as
“God” and the “state”; they are parts of systems which enslave the free
will of man. Classes must be abolished and the masses of individuals
freed from all enslaving institutions, such as marriage, the church,
the state.

In a related way Prince Kropotkin (1842–1921) developed anarchistic
principles. Peter A. Kropotkin was of aristocratic Russian birth and
a person of mild, courteous manners. His father was a serf owner; the
son could not bear to see the sufferings which the serfs underwent.
He threw away the privileges of rank and became a defender of the
oppressed. He attempted to correlate the theories of anarchism
with those of mutual aid, and fought socialism with the concept of
centralized control on the ground that it would destroy individual
liberty.[XIV-6] In Chapter XXII, Kropotkin’s theory of mutual aid will
be analyzed.

Anarchism and socialism make similar attacks upon the evils of
capitalism. Both are determined to overthrow capitalism. Both believe
in revolt. They part ways when they advocate a constructive program for
the new order which shall follow the violent overthrow of capitalism.
Unlike socialism, anarchism holds that all government is an evil and
that industry can go on without organization. It advocates a free
communism.

One of the essentials in the Communist Manifesto was the appropriation
of rents for public purposes. Starting from a viewpoint distinctly
different from that of Karl Marx, Henry George (1839–1897) became the
founder of single tax propaganda. In early manhood Henry George came
to San Francisco and established a struggling newspaper. At once he
found himself practically overwhelmed by the brutal competition of the
metropolitan press and telegraphic news service. George was crushed by
monopoly. It was this defeat which gave him a new idea--an idea that
was to command the attention of the world.

As George walked the streets of New York City he puzzled over the
existence of indescribable destitution and suffering in the shadow
of the princely rich with their ostentatious luxuries.[XIV-7] Why in
a land blessed with generous natural resources should there be such
poverty? Although discovery has followed discovery and invention has
followed invention, neither has lessened the toil of those who most
need respite. With material progress poverty takes on a larger aspect.
Material progress may be likened to an immense wedge which is being
forced, not underneath society, but through society. “Those who are
above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are
crushed down.”[XIV-8] George set himself the task of finding out why
poverty is associated with progress.

This cause George found in the land situation. As land increases
in value, poverty increases. The price of land is an index of the
disparity in the economic conditions of the people at the extremes of
the social scale. Land is more valuable in New York City than in San
Francisco, and there is more squalor and misery in New York City than
in San Francisco. Land is more valuable in London than in New York
City, and likewise there is more squalor and destitution in London than
in New York City.

When increasing numbers of people live in a limited area under a system
of private property in land, rents are raised and land values go up.
The cost of living mounts, wages are kept to a minimum, overcongestion
of population ensues; and again, rents and land values are increased.

Upon what does title to land rest? Where did it originate? In force.
But has the first comer at a banquet the right to turn back all the
chairs, and claim that none of the other guests shall partake of the
food that has been provided? Does the first passenger who enters a
railroad car thereby possess the right to keep out all other persons,
or admit them only upon payment to him of sums of money? “We arrive
and we depart, guests at a banquet continually spread, spectators
and participants in an entertainment where there is room for all who
come.”[XIV-10] These illustrations are pertinent to the unjust elements
in the present economic order.

As a result of private property in land, the owner possesses power over
the tenant, a power which is tantamount to a system of slavery. There
is nothing strange, therefore, in the poverty phenomena of the world.
The Creator has not placed in the world the taint of injustice. The
fact that amid our highest civilization men faint and die with want,
is not because of the niggardliness of nature or the injustice of the
Creator, but is due to the injustice of man.[XIV-11] Since the owner of
land receives wealth without labor to an increasing degree, so there is
an increasing robbery of earnings of those who labor.

George attacked Malthusianism, and pointed out the deficiencies in the
proposed remedies for poverty, such as greater economy in government,
diffusion of knowledge, and improved habits of industry. He then
proceeded to give his own and well known solution, namely, making land
common property through a system of taxation of land values alone.
Since land, not labor, is the source of all wealth, it is just and
necessary to make land common property.

The weakness of Henry George’s argument lies in his single panacea
for securing justice. He over-emphasized the importance of one line
of procedure. He neglects other important factors, such as a selfish
human nature. He rendered, however, a splendid service in showing
the weaknesses in the system of private property in land. In this
connection he has been unequaled in his contribution to social thought.

In this discussion of the contributions of socialism to social thought,
many types or expressions of socialism have not been presented. The
educational propaganda of the Fabian socialists in England should be
mentioned as being very effective. Although small in number this group
of intellectuals, the best known being Sidney and Beatrice Webb, have
exerted a constructive and practical influence upon social thought.

Socialism has assumed various phases. (1) It originated in utopianism
and in a loose, broad type of communism. (2) It then took the form
of associationism, urging the organization of groups of associated
individuals, such as phalanges. As utopianism was in part the
expression of a poetic imagination, so associationism represented a
bourgeois philosophy. (3) In the next place socialism assumed political
aspirations, and advocated a governmental program whereby the existing
governments shall gradually extend their power until they exercise
control over rent-producing land and interest-producing capital. (4)
State socialism, however, was supplanted in many minds by ideas of
more radical procedure. Marxian socialism holds that a class conflict
is inevitable and that the workers must overthrow the capitalists,
together with the governments which they control. (5) To the other
radical extreme is philosophic anarchism, with its emphasis upon
the abolition of all existing governments and the establishment of
individual autonomy.

Socialism has made several contributions to social thought. (1) It has
called the attention of civilized mankind, and particularly of the
economically wealthy classes, to the needs of the weaker classes. It
has introduced humanitarian concepts into the minds of the socially
unthinking educated classes. (2) It has jolted many economic autocrats
from their thrones of power. It has thrown the spot light of publicity
upon the selfish and wicked ostentation of the hereditary leisure
classes. (3) It has held social theory to a more practical course
and to developing more immediate social solutions than it otherwise
would have achieved. (4) It has developed a power equal to that held
by individualism. It has helped to demonstrate the dualistic nature
of social evolution, that is, that there are two poles to human life
rather than one.




CHAPTER XV

BUCKLE AND GEOGRAPHIC SOCIAL THOUGHT


It has long been observed that climate, fertility of soil, rainfall,
and similar factors have had a powerful influence upon human nature
and upon the development of civilization. The chief founders of this
line of thought were Buckle and Ratzel. In recent years Semple and
Huntington have become well-known authorities. Many other thinkers
have contributed to the present knowledge concerning the interactions
between geographic factors and human development.

One of the first writers to elaborate a climatic theory of social
evolution was Bodin (1530–1596). Hot climates, he observed, further the
rise of all kinds of superstitious beliefs. Cold climates produce brute
will-power. Temperate climates constitute an essential basis for the
development of reason. In the ideal commonwealth which Bodin described,
all three types of climate are represented.[XV-1] The northern zone
furnishes the fighters and the workers. The southern zone produces
poets, priests, and artists. The temperate zone is the parent of
legislative, judicial, and scholarly leaders.

In the _Spirit of Laws_ to which reference was made in Chapter XI,
Montesquieu accentuated the importance of environmental influences on
social processes. He attempted to show the effects of climate upon
social institutions. Montesquieu did important pioneer work in what is
now known as the field of anthropo-geography.

By way of contrast, the attitude of Hume, whose contributions to social
psychology have already been noted, stands out sharply. According to
Hume, physical causes have no particular effect on the human mind. No
geographic factors influence either the temperament, disposition, or
ability of people. Hume was led to this extreme position by his staunch
faith in the subjective and psychological factors of human nature.

The distinguished German scientist, Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859),
travelled extensively throughout the world, observing the physical
geography of many lands in conjunction with the meteorological
conditions of each. At the same time von Humboldt was a careful
observer of the customs, manners, and standards of the various
peoples with whom he came in contact. In these travels and studies,
von Humboldt was careful to note relationships between soils and
civilizations. His contributions to social thought were of this
descriptive nature, based on first-hand observations in many parts of
the world.

The writings of Henry Thomas Buckle (1821–1862) contain an extensive
and detailed explanation of the ways in which geographic and natural
factors modify human life. Buckle starts with a decidedly dualistic
universe--a dualism which is disjunctive. The dualism consists of
nature and mind, each subject more or less to its own laws. Rejecting
both the doctrine of free will and of predestination, Buckle concludes
that the actions of men are determined solely by their antecedents
and that they have a character of uniformity.[XV-2] Man modifies
nature, and nature modifies man, but in the past in many parts of the
world the thoughts and desires of men are more influenced by physical
phenomena than they influence such phenomena. Because of this dominant
activity of the physical forces, these should be studied as a basis for
understanding the history of man.

The physical factors which have powerfully influenced men are four:
climate, food, soil, and the general aspects of nature. By the fourth,
Buckle refers to those appearances which are presented chiefly through
the medium of sight and which produce their chief results by exciting
the imagination and suggesting superstitions. The three first-mentioned
factors do not operate on the mind directly.[XV-3]

The first effect of climate, food, and soil upon man that may be
noted is that they lead man to accumulate wealth. These accumulations
permit that degree of leisure from “making a living” which enables
some members of society to acquire knowledge. Upon these acquisitions
of knowledge, particularly of socialized knowledge, civilization
depends. This progress in the early stages of civilization rests on
two circumstances: “First, on the energy and regularity with which
labor is conducted, and second, on the returns made to that labor
by the bounty of nature.”[XV-4] Both these causes are the results
of physical antecedents. The returns which are made to labor are
regulated by the fertility of the soil. Moreover, Buckle asserted, the
energy and regularity with which labor is conducted will be entirely
dependent on the influence of climate.[XV-5] When heat is intense, men
will be indisposed and partly unfitted for active industry. Climate
also affects the regularity of the habits of laborers. In very cold
climates, the weather interferes with regular habits and produces
desultoriness. In southern countries regular labor is likewise
prevented--this time by the heat. Thus, in the early stages of
civilization the fundamental law may be stated: the soil regulates the
returns made to any given amount of labor; the climate regulates the
energy and constancy of labor itself.[XV-6]

Of the two primary causes of primitive societary growth, the fertility
of the soil is more important than the climatic influences. It is only
where soil fertility exists that civilization can arise at all.[XV-7]
But in Europe, climate has been more effective than soil fertility. In
Europe a climate has existed which has stimulated human activities.

Since the mental powers of man are unlimited they are more important,
once they get started, than the powers of nature, which are limited
and stationary. Man has endless capacity, through his dynamic mental
tendencies to develop the physical resources of the earth.

The birth rate depends on food supply. In hot countries, where
less food per capita is required than in cold countries, and where
an abundance of food exists, the birth rate is very high. In cold
countries highly carbonized food is necessary, but this food is largely
animal in origin and great risk is involved in procuring it. Hence the
people of cold countries become adventuresome.[XV-8]

By the study of physical laws it is possible to determine what the
national food of a country will be. In India, for example, the physical
conditions are decidedly favorable to the growth of rice, which is the
most nutritive of all cereals, and which, consequently, is a causal
factor in a high birth rate.

But where there is a cheap national food, the increase in population
becomes very great. As a result, there are multitudes of people who are
able to keep just above the subsistence level. A few individuals who
understand the operation of these physical laws are able to manipulate
the multitudes in such a way as to make themselves immensely wealthy.
Since wealth, after intellect, is the most permanent source of power,
a great inequality of wealth has been accompanied by a corresponding
inequality of social and political power.[XV-9] It produces classes
and even castes. Poverty provokes contempt. Class conflict results. The
poor are ground low, murmur, and are again subjected to ignominy. Under
such conditions democracy has a hard struggle. When physical conditions
favor one class, that class will constitute itself the government and
bitterly oppose the extension of government to all other classes. In
Europe there was no cheap national food, no blind multiplication of
population, and hence no such disparity between classes as in India. In
Europe it has been easier for democratic movements to spread.

Early civilization developed in the Euphrates valley, the Nile valley,
and in the exceedingly fertile regions of Peru, Central America, and
Mexico. Modern civilization is found largely in fertile river valleys,
such as the Thames, Seine, Rhine, Po, Danube, Hudson, Mississippi. But
in the Amazon valley, the fertility of soil has not invited the growth
of a large population. The trade winds have brought in a superabundance
of moisture, producing torrential rains, and a luxuriance of plant life
and a complexity of virile animal life which thus far have defied the
skill of man to overcome.

The fourth physical factor which Buckle presents is the general aspects
of nature. Of these the first class excites the imagination and the
second stimulates the rational operations of the intellect.[XV-10]
In regard to natural phenomena it may be said that whatever inspires
feelings of terror, of the vague and uncontrollable, and of great
wonder tends to inflame the imagination and to cause it to dominate
the intellectual processes. Where nature is continually exhibiting its
power, man feels his inferiority. He assumes a helpless attitude. He
ceases to inquire or to think. His imagination, rather than his reason,
reigns. On the other hand, where nature works smoothly and quietly, man
begins to assert his individuality. He even essays to dominate nature
and other men. His cognition develops and his volition expresses itself
vigorously.

All early civilizations were located in the tropics or sub-tropics.
In these regions nature is dangerous to man. Earthquakes, tempests,
hurricanes, pestilences prevail. Consequently, the imagination of man
takes exaggerated forms. The judgment is overbalanced; thought is
paralyzed. The mind is continually thrown into a frantic state. These
reactions throw human life into feeling molds, into poetic rather
than scientific forms. Religious feelings are promoted. The leading
religions of the world originated in the sub-tropical and tropical
regions of the earth.

East Indian literature and thought illustrate the effect of nature upon
the feelings and the imagination. The works of the East Indians on
grammar, law, history, medicine, even on mathematics, geography, and
metaphysics are nearly all poems.[XV-11] Prose writing is despised.
The Sanscrit language boasts of more numerous and more complicated
metres than can any European tongue. The East Indian literature is even
calculated to set the reason of man at defiance.[XV-12]

The imagination, for example, in India has produced an exaggerated
respect for the past; it is this situation which has led poets to
describe a Golden Age in the remote past. In the literature of India
there is recorded the statement that in ancient times the average
length of life of common men was 80,000 years. There are instances of
poets who lived to be half a million years old.

In Greece, on the other hand, nature is more quiet and the mind of man
functioned in a reasoning way. In the North Temperate zone science
developed. “The climate was more healthy; earthquakes were less
frequent; hurricanes were less disastrous; wild beasts and noxious
animals less abundant.”[XV-13] Buckle, in other words, insists that
everywhere the hand of nature is upon the mind of man.

The work of Buckle, the chief exponent of the influence of physical
nature upon mental man, accentuates important phases of the growth
of civilization. Buckle over-emphasized his anthropo-geographic
observations. However, they constitute a part of the whole picture of
human progress, and when seen in the light of modern mental growth and
control of environment they shrink into proper proportions.

The field which Buckle opened has been developed extensively by
Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904). This German scholar, traveler, and
geographer is generally credited with putting anthropo-geography on a
scientific basis. Miss Ellen Semple attempted to translate his work on
_Anthropo-Geographie_ into English, but found the German constructions
so difficult to handle accurately that it was necessary for her to put
Ratzel’s observations into her own words. She also points out in Buckle
a lack of system and an undue tendency to follow one generalization
after another. Her own _Influences of Geographic Environment_ has now
become a standard work on the ways in which physical nature affects
mankind.

Miss Semple, following but improving upon Ratzel, has shown in turn the
influences of geographical location, area, and boundaries upon people.
She indicates the various ways in which oceans, rivers, and coast lines
have molded human minds; she distinguishes between mountain, steppe,
and desert effects upon mankind. She describes man as a product of
the earth’s surface. She stresses unduly the physical influences; she
considers nature the dominating force. Even where civilized man has
developed inventive powers and spiritual prowess, nature is given
the credit.[XV-14] Nevertheless, Miss Semple has marshalled facts in
powerful array and increased their force by literary skill. No student
or teacher can afford to neglect Miss Semple’s extensive survey of the
interactions between physical nature and human progress.

Among the many other writers upon the relation of geographic factors
to civilization the investigations of Ellsworth Huntington are
significant.[XV-15] He has described the climatic conditions that
are most favorable to mental stimulation and growth, and then has
classified all districts of the earth according to the degree in which
they stimulate or arrest mental advance.

In this same connection William Z. Ripley has investigated the relation
of climate to races.[XV-16] After analyzing races and distinguishing
between them and the geographic influences upon pigmentation, head,
form, stature, and other traits, mainly structural, he classifies
climatic elements in order of importance, as follows: humidity, heat,
and monotony. A high humidity, excessive heat, and long series of
sunshine or of cloudy weather produce mental enervation, stagnation,
and retrogression.

Acclimatization of races is a very slow process, according to Ripley.
It requires centuries. Perhaps the white race can never become truly
acclimated in the tropics. Racial differences he shows are due to
environmental factors far more than is ordinarily supposed.

In conclusion, it may be said that physical forces have operated
strongly on man. But when man has developed modern mental tools,
he has been able to escape a part of the enslaving environmental
influences. The history of the relation of geographic factors to human
progress indicates a fundamental but a proportionate decrease in those
influences.




CHAPTER XVI

SPENCER AND ORGANIC SOCIAL THOUGHT


In the second half of the last century social thought passed under
biological influence. Society was discussed in terms of biological
analogies, that is, it was compared in its structure and functions
to organic life. Herbert Spencer was the leader among those writers
who attempted to analyze society in terms of biological figures of
speech. He also stressed the structural nature of society, and in
his _Principles of Sociology_ he went into great detail in giving a
historical description of social institutions.

The Greek writers, the Hebrews before them, the founder of Christianity
made references to the likenesses between human society and plant and
animal life. Mankind has often been compared to a tree or a plant with
its manifold, evolving branches and fruit.

Spencer’s famous organic analogies were preceded by the studies of
biologists, such as Lamarck and Darwin. Lamarck (1744–1829) argued that
by activity and use man could develop traits which would be transmitted
by inheritance. Although this theory has been undermined by Weismann,
it served as a basis for the further study of the biological laws of
human evolution.

The thought of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) upon the nature of evolution
was stimulated in part by Malthus’ doctrine of surplus population
and the consequent struggle for existence. He also based his ideas
on the Lamarckian theory of transmission of acquired characters. He
developed the concepts of the prodigality of nature and the struggle
for existence, which led to the resultant concept of natural selection
and survival of the fittest. The process of natural selection accounts
for the instincts, imitation, imagination, reason as well as for
self-consciousness, and the esthetic and religious impulses. In this
way man, according to the Darwinian formula, has ascended by stages
from the lower orders of life.

The fittest to survive, concluded Darwin, are those individuals who
are best fitted to meet the conditions of their environment. If the
environment be competitive, savage, brutal, then the fittest will be
the strongest physically and the most vicious. If the environment be
co-operative, then the fittest will be the individuals who co-operate
best. With the development of intelligence and sagacity in early human
society, individuals otherwise cruel learned to co-operate. A tribe
of co-operating individuals would be victorious in a conflict with a
tribe of non-co-operating members. Thus co-operation and a co-operating
environment themselves are the result of natural selection.

Unfortunately, Darwin’s concept of natural selection has been grossly
distorted. Upon this misapprehension, a doctrine of “social Darwinism”
has gained recognition. According to this false interpretation of
Darwinism, the tooth and fang struggle for existence among animals is
the normal procedure among human beings. The most brutal, cruel, and
shrewd men are “fitted” to survive in an environment of physical and
mental competition. Likewise, the nations which can marshal together
the most powerful armies and navies are the “fittest” to survive in a
world where each nation is accountable unto itself alone. Thus, it is
seen that human society is simply an extension of the animal society
and that the fundamental law of social progress is the law of force and
might, first physical, and then physical and psychical.

But this interpretation is false to Darwin’s own principles. While
Darwin did describe and lay great emphasis upon the tooth and fang
struggle for existence, he noted and stressed the fact that even
among animals, modifying influences were at work. He made clear that
co-operation exists among many species of animal life, and that this
co-operative tendency is an important survival factor. He also saw
that among the highest types of animals there were new and complex
expressions of co-operation, and that the higher mental activity
of these animal types seemed to be a correlate in some way of the
greater co-operative spirit. The application of this principle to human
progress implies that the co-operative spirit may ultimately become
the chief survival force, and that some day the “fittest” to survive
will be those individuals or groups of individuals who co-operate most
wisely. This theory will be developed further in the chapter upon
“Co-operation Theories in Sociology.” The chief contributors have been
Kropotkin and Novicow.

Darwin made another important contribution to social science in his
theory of sexual selection. This idea is a phase of natural selection.
Among the higher animals the females choose their mates. The males,
for example, with the singing voice and beautiful plumage, are the
most likely to be chosen. These males thus become the progenitors of
the next generation of the given species; the less attractive males
mate if at all with the inferior types of females. Thus signs of male
attractiveness come to possess survival value.[XVI-1]

Among human beings the principle of sexual selection operates, but in
a reversed sexual form. During the earlier centuries of human history
the custom developed whereby the males took the initiative in choosing
mates. As a result, the females resorted to all sorts of devices to
make themselves “attractive” and to get themselves “selected.”

The social theories of Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) have caused more
controversy than those of any other writer in the sociological field.
The fact that in these controversies the ideas of Spencer have usually
been worsted will not blind the fair-minded seeker after truth to the
important rôle which Spencer took in the field of social thought.

Spencer early developed the habit of causal thinking, that is, he
believed in causes, and hence searched everywhere for causes. Because
of the acrimonious discussions which took place between his father
and mother, and because of his own independent nature, he repudiated
the orthodox religious explanations of the universe. He was trained
for the profession of civil engineering. His studies in mathematics
and mechanics accentuated his precise and somewhat materialistic
interpretation of the universe. His social theories are an outgrowth in
part of his emphasis upon the laws of co-existence and sequences in the
physical world.

In order to understand Spencer’s social laws it is necessary first to
consider his general law of evolution. He traced everything in the
world back through causal chains to two fundamental factors, namely,
matter and motion--two aspects of force. As a result of the operation
of some First Cause, an integration of matter began to take place,
accompanied by a concomitant dissipation of motion. As a result, matter
passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity. During this process the unexpended motion
undergoes a similar change.[XVI-2]

The best explanation of this law of evolution can be found in its
application to societary phenomena. Suppose that a modern city
neighborhood undertakes to organize itself. It possesses physical
resources and mental abilities. The “neighbors” are all more or less
untrained in community organization activities. In this sense they are
homogeneous. At first they are unable to work together; in fact they
do not know what to do; thus, they form “an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity.” But with experience in community organization activities,
the individuals of the neighborhood learn to work together. Each finds
the type of work which he can do best. All work toward a definite
goal. Thus, a definite, coherent heterogeneity arises. Further, the
unexpended energies of the people are influenced and transformed by the
pattern ideas which experience in community organization measures has
taught.[XVI-3]

This application of Spencer’s law of evolution to human progress
has weak as well as strong points. There is not always an original
homogeneity. Upon close examination this homogeneity disappears
before a variegated conglomeration of heterogeneous experiences and
potentialities of all the individuals who are concerned. It is not
necessary to point out additional errors. Spencer deserves credit,
however, for developing the concept of social evolution as a phase of
natural evolution and for stressing the idea of natural causation in
societary matters.

Spencer began his _Principles of Sociology_ with a very elaborate
description of primitive man--the original societary unit corresponding
to the biological cell. The physical, emotional, and intellectual
life of primitive man is given prominence. An analysis is made of the
behavior of man, the original social unit, when he is exposed to the
various environing conditions--inorganic, organic, and super-organic.
The emphasis upon “man” as the primary unit neglects the importance
of the “group” in the social evolutionary process. Moreover, Spencer
underrated the intellectual nature of primitive man; he denied to early
man the qualities involving excursiveness of thought, imagination, and
original ideas.[XVI-4]

Spencer’s discussion of primitive ideas shows widespread reading of
volumes of source materials. The “inductions” are often influenced
by preconceived notions of human life, despite Spencer’s sincere
desire and effort to be scientific. While the horde, the family, and
other groups are described, the influences which are the result of
the interaction of individual minds and the interactions between the
individual and his group are scarcely recognized.

In regard to the state, Spencer carried forward the theories which have
already been noted, namely, of individual rights. He repudiated the
state which is the product of the military organization of society.
Such a régime is primordial and uncivilized. It is an organization of
homogeneous units in which the units, or the individuals, are slaves to
the organization.

Spencer believed in a new industrial development whereby individuals
would become differentiated and developed, and whereby individuals
would be shifted from an autocratic maximum to a democratic maximum. To
Spencer, man is vastly superior to the state. In the coming industrial
order Spencer foresaw an era in which the main business of society will
be to defend the rights of individuals. Spencer forecasted an epoch
of industrial states which have abolished war. In such a day the only
conflicts that will take place between states will be natural. These
will be only the competitions that arise naturally between states that
are engaged in building up the best individuals, that is, those persons
who develop their individuality most freely and harmoniously.

The rise of industrial states with a minimum emphasis upon government
and a maximum emphasis upon individuality will produce a world order
in which national barriers will slowly melt away and a planetary
unity will develop. Spencer’s industrialism, however, has fundamental
weaknesses. It implies that social organization is more important than
social process. It neglects to provide for inherent psychical changes.
It assumes that an industrial society, _per se_, will be peaceful. It
underestimates the importance of socializing motives.

In the changes from a military to an industrial organization
of society, the six main sets of social institutions undergo
deep-seated changes. Spencer describes at length these six
institutional structures, namely, the domestic, ceremonial, political,
ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial. Two, the political and
industrial, have been mentioned on the preceding page. Spencer’s
treatment of the other four is accurate to a degree but at fundamental
points is unreliable--judged by current conceptions and data.

Perhaps Spencer is best known for his treatment of the organic analogy.
He set up the hypothesis that society is like a biological organism and
then proceeded to defend his thesis against all objections with great
logical force. But logic was his sociological downfall, for it overcame
his scientific insight.

Spencer found four main ways in which society resembles an
organism.[XVI-5] (1) In both cases growth is attended by augmentation
of mass. (2) In each instance growth is accomplished by increasing
complexity of structure. (3) In the organism and in society there is an
interdependence of parts. (4) The life of society, like the life of an
organism, is far longer than the life of any of the units or parts.

But there are ways in which society and an organism are unlike.[XVI-6]
These were analyzed by Spencer and determined to be merely superficial
differences. There are four of these main differences. (1) Unlike
organisms, societies have no specific extensive form, such as a
physical body with limbs or a face. (2) The elements of society do not
form a continuous whole as in the case of an animal. The living units
composing society are free, and not in contact, being more or less
dispersed. (3) The parts of society are not stationary and fixed in
their positions relative to the whole. (4) In an organism consciousness
is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate, while in society
consciousness is diffused. The alleged superficiality in this
difference between society and an organism was difficult for Spencer to
maintain.

In discussing the organic analogy further, Spencer compared the
alimentary system of an organism to the productive industries, or the
sustaining system in the body politic.[XVI-7] Furthermore, there is a
strong parallelism between the circulatory system of an organism and
the distributing system in society with its transportation lines; but
more particularly, its commercial classes and media of exchange. Then,
in both cases there has developed regulating systems. In an organism
there is a dominant center and subordinate centers, the senses, and
a neural apparatus. A similar structure appears in society in the
form of an adjustive apparatus, or government, for the purpose of
adjudicating the differences between the producers and the consumers.
These parallelisms throw only a small measure of light upon the nature
of society. They appear ridiculous when carried to an extreme, for
example, to the extreme to which Spencer himself went when he compared
the King’s Council to the medulla oblongata, the House of Lords to the
cerebellum, and the House of Commons to the cerebrum.

Spencer uses his analogies very extensively and vigorously, and later
refers to them as merely a scaffolding for building a structure of
deductions. This conclusion contains contradictory elements. When the
scaffolding is removed, society is left standing as a more or less
intangible affair. If a society is like an organism, it experiences a
natural cycle of birth, maturity, old age, and death. But according to
the telic concept of progress that was advanced by Lester F. Ward and
developed by later writers, the death of society does not come with
organic inevitableness, but depends on the vision, plans, courage, and
activities of that society’s members. A society need never die.

For many years it has been popular to criticise Spencer. Nearly all
the criticisms are justified. Moreover, they have been so numerous
that little of worth seems to be left in Spencer’s writings. However,
Spencer’s contributions to social thought are not negligible for
several reasons. (1) He emphasized the laws of evolution and natural
causation. (2) He described social evolution as a phase of natural
evolution. (3) He pointed out the likenesses between biological
organisms and human society. (4) He made the rôle of social structures,
or institutions, to stand out distinctly. (5) He stressed the
importance of individuality. (6) He undermined the idea that the State
is a master machine to which all the individual citizens must submit
automatically.

In the United States, Spencer possessed an able and loyal friend
in John Fiske (1842–1901). Fiske built his social thought upon
the evolutionarily formulae of Darwin and Spencer. In his _Cosmic
Philosophy_, or philosophy of the universe, Fiske contended that
the evolution of man produced fundamental changes in the nature of
cosmic evolution. With the development of man there appears a new
force in the universe, the human spirit, or soul. The advent of this
psychical entity has produced a subordination of the purely bodily,
physical, material forces and established a control by spiritual
forces. Moreover, in human evolution there has been a slowly increasing
subordination of the selfish phases of spiritual life to the
altruistic. With the apparent cessation in important bodily changes
there have come unheralded and unanticipated psychical inventions,
which have released man from the passive adaptation to environment
which animals manifest, and given to him an increasingly positive
control over the processes of adaptation. Humanity as the highest
product of the evolutionary processes has the power to change the
whole course of cosmic development. Fiske distinctly emphasized the
psychical forces in evolution and the part which they are playing
in making mankind purposeful and in organizing groups on social
principles. Humanity is not a mere incident in evolution; it is the
supreme factor.[XVI-9] The main purpose of man is not the perpetuation
of the species, but the development of increasingly higher and more
social purposes.

Following the ideas of Maine, Tylor, McLennan, and Lubbock, Fiske
concluded that social evolution originated when families, “temporarily
organized among all the higher gregarious mammals, became in the case
of the highest mammal permanently organized.”[XVI-10] Gregariousness
developed into definite family relationships and responsibilities.
Social evolution produced an increased complexity and specialty in
intelligence, which in turn required a lengthening of the period
“during which the nervous connections involved in ordinary adjustments
are becoming organized.” Such a transformation requires time, and hence
the need for a period of infancy which is not common to the lower
animals. Accompanying this period of infancy, there is the development
of strong affection of relatively short duration among higher animals.
Among mankind parental love takes on the characteristics not only
of intensity and unselfishness but of duration and forgiveness. In
this phase of evolution there is a correlative development of three
factors, namely, the prolongation of infancy, the rise of parental
affection, and increasing intelligence. The gradual prolongation of the
period of infancy is partly a consequence of increasing intelligence,
and in turn the prolongation of infancy affords the circumstances for
the establishment of permanent relationships, of reciprocal behavior,
of sociality.

Fiske was one of the first social philosophers to point out the
significance of foresight as a phase of evolutionary development.
Perhaps the chief way in which civilized man is distinguished from the
barbarian is in his ability “to adapt his conduct to future events,
whether contingent or certain to occur.” Civilized man has the power to
forego present enjoyment in order to safeguard himself against future
disaster.[XVI-12] This quality is the essence of prudence and is due
in large part to civilized man’s superior power of self-restraint,
one of the chief elements in moral progress. It is equally important
as “an indispensable prerequisite to the accumulation of wealth in
any community.” It is the basic factor in civilized man’s elaborate
scientific provisions and in his numerous far-reaching philosophic and
religious systems.

Paul von Lilienfeld (1829–1903) made the organic analogy a definite
part of his theory of society. He compared the individual to the
cells in an organism; the governmental and industrial organizations,
to the neural system; and the cultural products of society, to the
intercellular parts of an organism.[XVI-13]

Lilienfeld compared the stages of growth of the individual to the
stages of racial development, namely, savage, barbarian, and civilized.
This analogy was made use of by Fiske. Although somewhat true in a very
general sense, this recapitulation theory cannot be carried into minute
details.

The concept of social capitalization was originated by Lilienfeld. By
it he meant the ability of society to store up useful ideas and methods
and transmit them from generation to generation. In this way each
generation becomes the inheritor of all the human experiences that have
gone before.

Lilienfeld was one of the first sociological writers to develop the
definite concept of social pathology.[XVI-14] His treatment of this
theme, however, was exceedingly weak. He distinguished between a
normal and diseased organism and then, by analogy, between a normal
and diseased society. Social pathology, according to Lilienfeld, deals
with three sets of diseases, namely, of industry, of justice, and of
politics. Lilienfeld carried the organic analogy to a ridiculous and
puerile extreme when he compared the diseases of industry to insanity;
of justice, to delirium; of politics, to paralysis. He also elaborated
a system of social therapeutics to correspond to the diseases.

In Albert Schaeffle (1831–1903), the organic analogy found another
disciple, but a more worthy one than either Spencer or Lilienfeld. In
the thought of Schaeffle, society is not primarily a large organism but
a gigantic mind. Schaeffle presented a functional analogy rather than a
biological analogy. Whereas Spencer was especially interested in social
structures, Schaeffle set his attention upon social functions.

In his functional analogies Schaeffle compared the reason with the
legislature in society; the will, with the executive officers; and
the esthetic judgment, with the judiciary. Schaeffle’s psychology is
inaccurate and on the whole unscientific; his analogies add little
to an understanding of society. Nevertheless, his thought on these
subjects represents an advance over the ideas of Spencer.

In the _Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers_, Schaeffle undertook
to develop a complete sociological system. His teachings follow
the principle that “function leads structure and structure limits
function.” Activities produce developments in bodily structure, and
also cause the formation of new social institutions. Bodily structures
and social institutions alike limit activities and usefulness. These
propositions are a reversal of the emphasis which Spencer maintained.
They are fundamentally correct.

Although Schaeffle referred frequently to the “social body,” he did not
give the concept a specific meaning. He introduced the term “social
process,” but did not analyze its nature. He repudiated the idea that
the individual is the social unit; he considered the group to be the
all-important unit in society. Natural selection in social evolution
manifests itself in conflicts between the ideals of different groups.
René Worms, it may be added, has assumed the existence of a social
consciousness apart from the consciousness of individuals, and argued
that the chief difference between biological organisms and social
organizations is one of degree.

Schaeffle considered that government justifies itself in protecting
the weaker members of society, and in maintaining the highest welfare
of all. He pointed out the social responsibility which rests upon the
best educated and most fortunate members of society. Schaeffle wisely
emphasized the development of purposeful activity on the part of both
the individual and society.

The ideas of John Stuart Mackenzie differ from those of Spencer,
Lilienfeld, and Schaeffle. Mackenzie does not use the figure of an
organic analogy; he speaks in terms of homologies. According to
Mackenzie, society is not like an organism; it is organic.

The organic nature of society is three-fold. (1) There is an intrinsic
relation between the parts of society and the whole. The individual
reflects the culture of the group in which he has been trained. (2) The
development of a group is by virtue of intrinsic processes. A group
builds on ideas derived from both the past and from other groups, but
it does not genuinely grow unless it takes these ideas and makes them
over into a part of its own nature. (3) Society develops towards ends
which are discoverable in society itself. By analysis of the ideals and
motive forces of a group, it is possible to determine in what direction
the group is moving.

Mackenzie argues for the inner principle of things and particularly
of society. He believes, however, that knowledge concerning this
inner principle and the essential unity of mankind cannot be reduced
to a science, but will constitute the basis of a social philosophy.
Social philosophy does not supply facts, but seeks to interpret the
significance of the special aspects of human life with reference to the
social unity of mankind.[XVI-15]

The family and the state are the two forms of association in which
the most intimate bonds of union are nurtured. Language, if it can
be called a social institution, is perhaps the most fundamental
institution of all, because it produces that community of spirit
whereby intimacy in social intercourse can take place and whereby the
realization of a common good can be achieved.[XVI-16]

According to Mackenzie, there are three main lines of social progress,
and hence three main types of social control to be encouraged.[XVI-17]
(1) The control of natural forces by human agencies. (2) The control of
individuals by the communal spirit. (3) Self control.

The road of social advance is beset with obstacles. The chief are
these: (1) The dominance of vegetative needs. These economic factors
are so universal and insistent that they are likely at any time to
override all other human needs. (2) The insistence of animal impulses,
chiefly love and strife. While love promotes unity, it generally
produced a limited unity. Moreover, one mode of unity is apt to
conflict with other types of unity, and thus lead to intense strife.
(3) The mastery of mechanism. Life is easily crushed under the weight
of organization; thought, by scholastic pedantry; industry, by economic
systems; nationality, by soulless bureaucracy. (4) Anarchism. The
remedy for over-organization is not anarchy, for life and society are
composed of numbers of conflicting tendencies, which must be controlled
by the power of thought. But the exercise of merely individual thought
will not suffice. Individual thought is likely to be egocentric, to
evade the problems of group life, or to solve them selfishly. (5)
Conservatism. An established and successful civilization is in danger
of relying too much on its past. It often carries within itself the
canker of decay, and frequently lacks any clear vision of higher
development.

Mackenzie is committed to internationalism. It is no longer fitting
for anyone to think of his own country as an exclusive object of
devotion. “The earth is our country, and all its inhabitants are our
fellow-citizens; and it is only the recognition of this that entitles
us to look for any lasting security.”

Mackenzie advances beyond the organic analogists when he describes
the ways in which society is organic. As a social philosopher he has
contributed important pattern-ideas. He has escaped from the foibles of
the organic analogy and at the same time indicated the values that lie
beneath that concept.

This chapter deals with a significant period in the history of social
thought. The biology of the time was very faulty and the sociological
applications of biological knowledge were consequently of little merit.
The early years of the present century were characterized by noteworthy
improvements in biological thinking. The facts about the laws of
heredity and variation increased in number; a science of heredity was
established. The first decade of the present century also marks the
rise of the science of eugenics. In a later chapter the contributions
of recent scientific biology, and particularly of eugenics, to social
thought will be presented.




CHAPTER XVII

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LESTER F. WARD


The name of Lester F. Ward (1841–1913) stands forth between the old
and new eras of social thought. Ward belongs to both the old and
new. He adopted Comtean positivism and built in part upon Spencer’s
evolutionary principles, but opposed Spencer’s _laissez faire_ ideas
and his evolutionary determinism, especially in regard to education.
Perhaps his most notable work was the way in which he shocked a
Spencerian-tinged world of social thought into a new method of thinking.

Ward became the ardent advocate of social telesis. Man can modify,
defeat, or hasten the processes of nature. Ward brought the concept
of dynamic sociology to the attention of the world. Although he was
interested in social statics, his primary concern was in the fact that
man through the use of his intelligence can transform not only the
natural world but the social world, and that he can harness not only
the natural forces to social ends, but even the social forces to social
purposes. Hence it is that Ward holds rank today, despite his monistic
philosophy and his false psychological beliefs, as one of the world’s
leading sociologists.

Lester F. Ward was born in Joliet, Illinois. He received a limited
schooling, and early went to work, first on a farm and then as a
wheelwright. He manifested an unusual liking for books and to a
great extent was self-educated. He entered the employment of the
United States Government, where he remained for more than forty
years, after he was honorably discharged from service in the Civil
War. In the Government service he held the positions of geologist
and paleontologist. Despite his strenuous and efficient work for the
Government, he found time to think through and write out an elaborate
sociological system of thought.

Ward’s published works in sociology began with his _Dynamic Sociology_
(1883) and ended with the _Glimpses of the Cosmos_ (1913) in several
volumes, which, with the exception of volume one, have been published
posthumously. The intermediate books of importance in order were: _Pure
Sociology_, _Applied Sociology_, and _Psychic Factors of Civilization_.

Ward was characterized by an impressive command of his subject and “a
terrific mental drive.” In 1906, he began the unique experiment of
teaching sociology at the age of 65. As a professor of sociology he
served Brown University until his death--for a period of seven years.
He was supported by the indefatigable assistance of his wife, as shown
by the many files which she kept of “Reviews and Press Notices”,
“Autograph Letters,” and “Biography.”

Ward was led to produce the _Dynamic Sociology_ because of his
observation that preceding 1875 there was an essential sterility in
social science thinking. Ward observed that the prevalent teachings of
Herbert Spencer were statical, and that the ideas of Spencer’s American
disciples were only passively dynamic. Ward believed that before the
science of society could be truly established the active dynamic
factors must be described. A science which fails to benefit mankind
is lifeless. To save sociology from the lifelessness which it was
manifesting, Ward wrote the _Dynamic Sociology_. He contemplated social
phenomena “as capable of intelligent control by society itself in its
own interest.”[XVII-1] His main thesis in the _Dynamic Sociology_ is
“the necessity for universal education as the one clear, overshadowing,
and immediate social duty to which all others are subordinate.”
He argued for a truly progressive system of popular scientific
education.[XVII-2] He declared that not one-hundredth of the facts
which original research has already brought forth are today obtainable
by a one-hundredth of the members of society, and hence not one truth
in ten thousand is fully apprehended.[XVII-3]

The prevailing doctrine in social thought, that of _laissez faire_ as
championed by Spencer, drew forth Ward’s best intellectual efforts as
a challenger. Ward protested against the teaching that natural forces
are operating only as elements in the all-powerful evolutionary
process. He pointed out that man is distinguished from animals by
the development of his psychical nature, i. e., of his foresight and
reason. He demonstrated that by this development man is able to master
and regulate the operation of the blind evolutionary forces. Hence,
the doctrine of _laissez faire_ is not only false but pernicious. It
defeats social progress. The truth is, said Ward, society is able to
improve itself, and it should set itself scientifically at once to the
opportunity.

Passive, or negative, progress is represented by the social forces
operating in their natural freedom, subject only to general
evolutionary laws.[XVII-4] Active, or positive, progress is represented
by the social forces guided by conscious human purposes. Social statics
deals with the nature of social order; social dynamics treats of the
laws of social progress. Social dynamics concerns itself with two
types of studies. One line analyzes and describes what is going on in
society under the influence of natural laws--this is pure sociology.
It is pure diagnosis; it has nothing to do with what society ought to
be. It describes the phenomena and laws of society as they are.[XVII-5]
The other procedure discusses the application of human purpose to the
natural social forces--this is applied sociology. It studies the art of
applying the active, or positive, forces to the natural evolution of
society. This method is distinctly a human process and “depends wholly
on the action of man himself.” Applied sociology treats of social ends
and purposes.

Pure sociology describes the spontaneous development of society;
applied sociology deals with the artificial means of accelerating
the spontaneous processes in society.[XVII-6] Pure sociology treats
of achievement; applied sociology, of improvement. But applied
sociology is not social reform; “it does not itself apply sociological
principles, it seeks only to show how they may be applied.” It lays
down principles as guides to social action. The carrying of these
principles into social and political practice is social reform.

The distinction is now clear between natural and artificial
progress.[XVII-7] The former is a blind growth; the latter, a
purposeful manufacture. One is a genetic process; the other,
a teleological process. One is characterized by increasing
differentiation; the other, by a process of calculation. Artificial
progress is considered superior to natural progress.

Ward was a monist. He believed in the absolute unity of nature, from
the revolutions of celestial orbs to the vicissitudes of social
customs and laws.[XVII-8] He held that “life is a property of matter,”
and naïvely declared that “it is simply the result of the movements
going on among the molecules composing a mass of protoplasm.”[XVII-9]
Psychic phenomena are “the relations which subsist among the material
molecules of the brain and nervous system and between these and the
material objects of the outside world....” Since mind is relational,
it is immaterial, but it has matter for its basis. Relations, however,
constitute the properties of matter, and hence mind, as well as life,
is a property of matter.[XVII-10] The logical length to which Ward goes
in supporting his monistic doctrine is in itself a proof of his error.

Unlike Comte, Ward believed that man originally was anti-social and
completely selfish. In the earliest stage of human existence, man lived
a life almost solitary, or at least in small groups.[XVII-11] He was
surrounded by destructive forces both inorganic and organic. Against
the wild and ferocious beasts he found himself almost physically
helpless. Some of his number overcame their physical defenselessness
by using their “wits.” Through sagacity and cunning they were able to
withstand the attacks of the wild beasts, to survive, and to propagate
their young. Along with increased cunning there went an increased
brain size in proportion to size of body, and also an improved brain
structure qualitatively.

This brain development is the essential prerequisite for perceiving the
advantages of association.[XVII-12] Man early recognized the merits
of association, and moved up from the solitary, or autarchic, stage
of social life to the second, or constrained aggregate stage. This
second stage does not contain the elements of permanency because of its
forced nature. The tendencies toward association are often counteracted
and at times destroyed by fierce contests for the limited natural
foods. In contending that man’s early ancestors were very irascible
and quarrelsome beings, Ward went beyond the limits of scientific
induction. In believing that altruism is an outgrowth of egoism, Ward
again violates the best scientific thought. The probabilities are that
both egoism and altruism have developed _pari passu_, and in part from
different causes. During the second stage human speech became an art.
It was a natural outgrowth of the associational life.

The rise of the rudiments of an established government marks the
beginning of the third period in human society. For protection,
tribes unified themselves under central controls. Through compulsion
or interest, and for protective reasons, tribes united; the spheres
of social organization thus were enlarged. But government, which was
established for the purpose of securing peace, became one of the chief
causes of external wars. Governments, autocratic control, and territory
hunger led peoples into destructive war. The world is still in this
third stage.

But some day, according to Ward, wars between nations will cease,
national prejudices will soften, diversity of language will be
overcome, and all governments probably will be consolidated into one.
This picture represents the fourth, or ideal, level of societary life,
and may never be attained. Ward cherishes the strong belief that the
present national stage will be succeeded by the cosmopolitan, or
pantarchic, age. Ward perceives an ultimate triumph of humanitarian
sentiments, which will be also “a triumph of practical interests, that
shall sweep away the present barriers of language, national pride,
and natural uncongeniality, and unite all nations in one vast social
aggregate with a single political organization.”[XVII-13]

Ward’s analysis of social evolution rests on his conception of the
social forces. The primary social force is desire. Desire is the
expression of any of the native impulses which, at the given moment,
has not been gratified. This striving for gratification constitutes
desire and the moving force in the societary world. “Desire is the
essential basis of all actions.”

The desires are numerous and complex, but upon examination lend
themselves to classification. There are two fundamental and primary
sets of desires, the nutritive and the reproductive. The end of the
first is to preserve the individual; and of the second, to preserve and
maintain the race.

“The first desire of all creatures is for nourishment.” This desire
remains dominant throughout life. The human race, Ward summarizes,
spent its infancy--thousands of years--in the single pursuit of
subsistence.[XVII-14] When the natural food supply failed, man was
forced to be inventive and to labor or die. Too many individuals in one
place meant either the migration of some individuals or that others
must compel nature through labor to increase her normal yield of
subsistence.[XVII-15]

The nutritive desire has led man to labor. Labor, however, is not
the natural condition of man.[XVII-23] Work, according to Ward, is
unnatural and irksome. The constant spur of hunger transformed man
into a working man. To be useful, however, work must be continuous and
applied steadily to a given object until that object is attained. This
process is the essence of invention, the highest and most useful form
of labor. Without wings, valuable weapons of offense and defense, claws
for digging, man has had but one line of advance open to him, namely,
invention, whereby he could overcome his limitations and master nature.

Ward overlooked what Veblen has called the instinct of workmanship. Man
has a desire to do, to achieve, to be active--only so can he escape
the terrors of ennui. He secures illimitable enjoyment from seeing the
crude materials of nature change under the manipulations of his hand
and mind into works of art.

Nevertheless, the need of nutrition was probably the chief factor in
the invention of tools and in the storing of food against the hungry
day. These tools and stores constituted property. Property at once
represented power. The law of acquisition soon exerted a great force.
Intense rivalries in acquiring property developed. “The grand rivalry
was for the object, not the method; for the end regardless of the
means.”[XVII-16] Through the centuries and until the present hour, the
morality of obtaining wealth has rarely risen to the morality of many
other phases of life.

Deception early came into prominence. We deceive an animal, in order
to catch and domesticate or kill him. We deceive a fellow human being
and take his hard earned property away from him. Society, blindly, has
praised deception even when used by one individual against the welfare
of his fellows. Society has honored him who could “drive a bargain.”

Ward declared that the desire to acquire property regardless of the
method is as strong as ever.[XVII-17] The only changes that have
come are a mitigation of the harshness of the method and the rise of
compulsory laws and codes which force individuals to “drive their
bargains” and to practice their deceptions within prescribed limits.
The acquisitive impulses have created major social evils, as evidenced
by “the exceeding indigence of the poor and the exceeding opulence
of the rich,” and by a relatively large proportion of non-producing
rich people to the entire number of wealthy.[XVII-18] On the other
hand, those who are poor because they are indolent are only a small
proportion of those who are poor and industrious.

The evils of acquisitiveness cannot be overcome by softening the human
heart. Ward would make it impossible for individuals to take away the
property of others by making it to the interest of all individuals not
to act in that way. And then he would teach them, through the social
sciences, that such conduct is against their own highest development.

Ward pronounced the money-making tendency one of the most useful and
at the same time “one of the coarsest and cheapest of all mental
attributes.”[XVII-19] It is useful because it is “the spur of all
industry and commerce; it provides the leisure which makes intellectual
pursuits possible; it encourages exploration, discovery, and invention;
it is the basis of all large business undertakings; and it has been an
essential force in the development of civilization. Since civilization
is so exclusively artificial, money can buy a vast variety of objects
of human desire; hence, the possession of money is strenuously sought.

On the other hand, money-making confers a pleasure which after all is
sordid.[XVII-21] It often leads to avarice. It has produced a pecuniary
inequality of mankind which socially admits of little justification.
From a moral viewpoint the great struggle for pecuniary possession
has been man’s greatest curse.[XVII-22] Because of it, many infants
have opened their eyes as millionaires in a world of boundless plenty;
others (equally worthy) have opened their eyes as beggars in a world of
abject poverty.

Society becomes divided into two main classes: the industrials and
the non-industrials, or parasites. The non-industrials use their
cunning in various ways.[XVII-24] The leading non-industrial modes of
acquisition are these: robbery, theft, war, statecraft, priestcraft,
and monopoly. This list represents the chronological order and history
of non-industrial types of acquisition.

Robbery is the coarsest manner of acquisition. Theft represents the
lowest order of cunning. Wars of conquest are robbery on so large a
scale that they arouse group patriotism. Cunning and treachery in war
have given way to strategy. Statecraft has often been characterized by
the egoistic attempts of a few shrewd individuals, who have devised
means for supplying the wants of the many, and appropriated rich
rewards for themselves from “the befriended and grateful community.”
Priestcraft as represented by many of the priests of Brahma, Buddha,
Osiris, Ormuzd, Mahomet and even Jesus have developed successful modes
of acquisition. They have often stood at the gates of death, and for
pay guaranteed to the stricken and fearful friends of a departed loved
one a safe journey through the perils following death. Monopoly takes
cunning advantage of a scarcity of the means of substance, or creates
an artificial and false scarcity. Monopoly has organized the fields of
transportation, exchange, finance, labor, manufacture.

The non-industrials co-operate better than the industrials and against
the welfare of the latter. The industrials, unfortunately, do not
understand the principles of co-operation very well and do not
have the intelligence to carry them into practical operation. They
receive less education than the non-industrials; the years of their
industrial apprenticeship are taken from their school days. After their
apprenticeship begins, the fatigue of their labor gives them little
time or energy for intellectual improvement.[XVII-25] In pronouncing
co-operation the product of superior intelligence Ward neglects
the rôle played by the gregarious, parental, and related social
instincts. Ward sees only part of the truth when he calls competition
a natural law, and co-operation artificial. He wisely observes,
however, that those who co-operate thrive at the expense of those who
compete.[XVII-26] In the same way that individuals co-operate in order
to secure their own gain, society must organize to secure the progress
of all.

The second primary set of fundamental forces is the reproductive.
These operate for the future and for the species. In animals they
operate without arousing shame or modesty. Among human beings they are
manipulated through the agencies of the reason and the imagination and
give rise to the sentiments of shame and modesty.[XVII-27] They are so
clouded in secrecy that they arouse dangerous forms of curiosity.

Among animals the choice of mates is largely determined by the females.
In fact, among the lowest types of animals there are no males. Among
certain higher forms of animal life the male appears as a mere
adjunct. But among human beings, male sexual selection developed.
This change in sexual selection is one of the differences between the
brute and the human worlds. This transition is explained by the fact
that the higher a being rises in the scale of development the more
sensitive its organs become, and by the correlated fact that the male
human being through his reason is able to arouse and satisfy a thousand
desires within the female, and thus cause her to look to him for “that
protection and those favors which he alone can confer.”[XVII-28]

In the human world the reproductive forces have first produced a crude
sexual love, animal in its nature, but far-reaching in its basic
implications. Sexual love is an unconscious but dominant factor in
courtship. In its refined form, and modified by the addition of genuine
but often short-lived affective elements, it becomes romantic love.
Romantic love, according to Ward, unfits lovers for the normal pursuits
of life. While under its spell they are unable to enjoy anything but
each other’s presence. “The man is unfitted for business, the woman for
social life, and both for intellectual pursuits. The only spur that can
make either party pursue other things, is the sense of doing something
that the other desires.”[XVII-29]

In the sense that natural, or sexual, love becomes the basis of
romantic love, so romantic love in turn represents the genesis of a
still higher form of love, namely, conjugal love. The love of a man
for his wife or of a woman for her husband is, however, fundamentally
different from romantic love. It is more stable, less disturbing to the
normal processes of life, and makes the home and the family socially
productive institutions. It often reaches a high state of refinement
and develops its beauty of content from the sharing together by husband
and wife of great joys and sorrows.

Maternal love, an outgrowth of maternity, manifests startling degrees
of courage even among animals. Under the spur of the need for defending
her young, a mother will often perform miraculous deeds. In its highest
form maternal love manifests a remarkable strength throughout life and
an extra-human power of forgiveness.

Then there is consanguineal love, which according to Ward includes
paternal and fraternal affections. It becomes the blood bond or feeling
of attachment that exists among the members of a primitive kinship
group, and it leads to feelings of race and world solidarity and
attachment.

Ward also pointed out that for each of these forms of love there is a
correlative hate. This force of repulsion is often greater than the
correlative love. Jealousy often leads to violent and destructive
actions. Race hatred frequently becomes a vicious, brutal, and
widespread sentiment that paralyzes all tendencies toward world
progress.

Marriage institutions have developed from the operation of the
reproductive forces. Polygamy, polyandry, and a score of other types of
marriage have arisen, although monogamy has demonstrated itself to be
the superior type of marriage institution.

The reproductive forces have led to numerous sexuo-social inequalities.
Men and women have come to occupy separate spheres of activity, and to
represent distinct social conditions.[XVII-30] Although the two sexes
live together and appear to be companions, they are in fact dwelling in
separate worlds and on different planes. There are several principal
inequalities. (1) There is an inequality of dress, which has loaded
woman with ornaments and caused her an enormous amount of disease and
suffering. (2) There is an inequality of duties, which has kept woman
confined to the house, and made a slave or a pampered pet of her.
(3) There is an inequality of education. Society has shut woman in
the past from all opportunities for gaining knowledge by experience.
Moreover, society has seen fit to debar women from the knowledge that
is acquired by instruction. (4) An inequality of rights has meant that
women have been discriminated against before the law. Without direct
representation in legislatures, women have suffered in proprietary
matters. (5) A general sex inequality has at times made woman the
property or the slave of man. In short, women have been denied, until
with recent years, entrance to the higher intellectual forms of
activity and at the same time denied social and political rights.

Reverting to Ward’s classification of desires, we may now proceed
to a discussion of the third set of forces, the sociogenetic. In
contradistinction to the nutritive and the reproductive desires, or
to the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic forces, respectively, the
sociogenetic forces lead directly to race, or social, improvement. The
ontogenetic forces guarantee individual preservation; the phylogenetic,
race preservation; and the sociogenetic, race and social progress.
Ward classified the sociogenetic forces as moral, esthetic, and
intellectual.[XVII-31]

Morality is either racial or individual. Race morality is largely
an outgrowth of custom. Duty, according to Ward, is conduct
favorable to race safety, while virtue is “an attitude of life and
character consistent with the preservation and continuance of man on
earth.”[XVII-32] Individual morality on the other hand, is based on
altruism. Altruism is the expenditure of energy in behalf of other
individuals, and involves the power of representing the psychic states
of others to one’s self. Morality leads to humanitarianism, whose
aim is meliorism. Meliorism aims to reorganize society so that the
minimum pain and the maximum enjoyment may be insured. Meliorism is
a non-sentimental improvement or amelioration of the human or social
state.[XVII-33]

Ward holds that the esthetic forces consist of a desire for open or
deep-seated symmetrical forms. Behind a landscape which at first
appears irregular and jagged, there is a fundamental symmetry and
balance. Sculpture, painting, and landscape-gardening are largely
imitations of nature. Architecture, however, emphasizes straight lines,
regular curves, and other symmetrical and geometrical figures.[XVII-34]
Because of the invention of popular musical instruments, music is open
to and enjoyed by the common people. No such invention, unfortunately,
has taken place in the fields of painting and sculpture. These realms
are limited to the highest geniuses and “their choicest productions
appropriated by the few who combine wealth with taste.”[XVII-35]

The intellectual forces are chiefly the desires to know. These desires
are three-fold: (1) to acquire knowledge, (2) to discover truth, and
(3) to impart information.[XVII-36] The desire to acquire knowledge
is perhaps strongest in the young. Youth will often learn anything,
without exercising any powers of discrimination. The gratification
of the desire to discover new truth yields almost divine thrills of
satisfaction. There are four methods of imparting information to
others, viz., (1) by conversing, (2) by teaching, (3) by lecturing, and
(4) by writing.

In addition to the dynamic forces there is the directive agent in
society, namely, the intellect. Ward makes a precarious distinction
between the feelings and thought, or between intellect as a seat of
emotion, appetite and motive power, and intellect as the organ or
source of thought and ideas.[XVII-37] Ward’s psychology is admittedly
unscientific. The thought or ideational phase of the intellect Ward
divorced almost absolutely from the affective aspects of consciousness.
He failed to perceive the dynamic character of thought and ideas. He
made thought simply the directive agent in society.

In thought, Ward found the hope of the race. Thought can restrain and
control social energy. It can produce telic methods of progress which
are immeasurably superior to the blind, ruthless methods of nature.
The procedure of nature with unlimited resources is “to produce an
enormously redundant supply, and to trust the environment to select
the best.”[XVII-38] Nature secures success through “the indefinite
multiplication of chances.” Hence the survival of the fittest results
in a sacrifice of a great majority--a highly wasteful method. The
method of mind is the reverse. Though prevision, mind utilizes all the
dynamic forces of society, that is the human desires, in constructive,
orderly ways. Social waste may be reduced, by telic methods, to a
minimum. Mind can perceive the best social ends and pursue them,
whereas nature works blindly. Thought has in its power the possibility
of subjugating natural forces and turning them into contributors to
human needs.

Ward developed essentially four leading principles of social dynamics
and hence of societal progress. (1) The first law he called “difference
of potential.” This term, which he borrowed from physics, refers to the
difference in potential possibilities of individuals. This difference
is manifested, for example, in the crossing of cultures. It disturbs
social stability, and creates social liability. Sex is a device whereby
a difference of potential is maintained. While asexual reproduction
is characterized chiefly by repetition of forms, sexual reproduction
creates changes in the stock in countless directions. The difference of
potential which is caused by a crossing of strains is highly dynamic,
resulting in unnumbered variations, and hence in providing endless
opportunities for progress. In a similar way a cross fertilization of
cultures opens many opportunities for social advancement. “Progress
results from the fusion of unlike elements.”[XVII-40] Difference of
potential, again, is illustrated in the friction of mind upon mind.
Thoughts conflict, and the result is likely to be an invention.

Difference of potential may lead to creative synthesis.[XVII-41] When
two elements are joined, the result is usually more than the sum of
the parts. The combining of hydrogen and oxygen in given proportions
produces water, which manifests characteristics that are not possessed
by either of the constituents. Likewise, the combining of two ideas by
the human mind may result in a new idea, and thus in progress.

(2) A second dynamic principle is innovation, which has its biological
homologue in the sport, or mutant. Throughout nature and society,
fortuitous variations occur. Life at times breaks over the bounds of
pure heredity--the result is innovation. Variation, in the sense of
mutation or innovation, appears to be due to the exuberance of life.
At times nature appears to react against being bound by rigid laws of
heredity, to defy her own rules, and to become rampant.

Social innovation is invention. New ideas often appear accidentally.
The mind in its exuberance coins new phrases, catches new glimpses
of reality, and creates ideas which are contrary to all that is
established and supposedly true.

(3) Ward’s third law of progress is called conation. This concept
refers to social effort which is carried on naturally to satisfy
desire, to preserve or continue life, to modify the surroundings. In
satisfying normally the gregarious desires, the individual advances
the cause of social progress. In preserving the life of the child,
the mother presumably contributes to the welfare of the race. The
sacrifices which parents make in behalf of children are efforts which
further the welfare of society. Every constructive modification
of either the physical or spiritual environment benefits mankind.
Conation is thus a term which covers a multitude of activities that
are performed in the ordinary course of daily life, and which
unconsciously to the doers are adding to the sum total of human welfare.

(4) The fourth dynamic principle which Ward described has already been
discussed, namely, the principle of social telesis. The possibilities
in social telesis are illimitable. Social telesis can turn the passions
and desires of men into socially useful channels. These passions are
bad only when directed to wrong ends. They are like fire--they can
destroy or they can refine. If individuals as members of society could
develop prevision and work together for societary ends, they would be
able to transform the world.

Ward believed that greatness does not rest so much in intellectual
power as in emotional force. He had great faith in persons of average
intellectual ability who are ambitious. It thus becomes the part of
wisdom for society to educate wisely the average intelligence. Ward
challenged the idea that only a very few persons are geniuses and
that these individuals, by virtue of their superior abilities, will
uniformly overcome their environments. He held that genius is largely a
matter of focalization of psychic energy, and that by this process all
individuals may have the honor of contributing something valuable to
civilization.

Ward pointed out that geniuses are as likely to appear in one social
stratum as in another, among the poor as among the healthy, in the
hovel as in the palace. He also demonstrated how society allows genius
and talent to be ruthlessly destroyed among the lower classes through
denial of opportunity. As a solution for this problem, Ward advocated
social distribution, that is, the distribution of all useful knowledge
to all humanity everywhere. A scientific system needs to be perfected
for the more thorough and equal distribution of the great volume of
valuable knowledge which has already been discovered. Ward was a strong
advocate of the socialization of education.

In an article which appeared in the month following his death, Ward
discussed his idea of social progress under the terms, eugenics,
euthenics, and eudemics.[XVII-42] He supplemented a theory of sound
birth with a theory of sound environment. The practical result in
society would be a state of eudemics, or a society of sound people.

Ward was an advocate of sociocracy. By sociocracy he did not mean a
democracy or a rulership that is likely to be conducted selfishly by
the individuals who exercise sovereign power. Sociocracy connotes a
rulership of the people in which each individual is governed primarily
not by his own interests but by the interests of society.

Achievement was a large concept in Ward’s mind. He made “achievement”
one of the chief goals of human life. By achievement in behalf of human
progress individuals gain social immortality. The masses of humanity
are achieving little or nothing in behalf of society.

In this treatment of Ward’s sociological thought it has not been the
aim of the writer to enter upon a dissertation regarding the abstract
and philosophic implications that are involved in the subject matter.
Neither has he attempted a polemic against the weaknesses in Ward’s
thinking, except to note the defective monistic philosophy and the
erroneous “faculty” psychology. It has been his purpose to let the
strong, constructive elements in Ward’s system of sociology speak
clearly and effectively for themselves.




CHAPTER XVIII

ANTHROPOLOGIC SOCIOLOGY


Additional light upon the nature of sociological thought may be secured
by consulting the anthropologists, and particularly, the students
of social origins. The last mentioned group of scholars have been
unusually successful in making valuable contributions to sociological
thought, because they have used the psychological approach.

For more than a century the anthropologists have been searching
for materials and advancing theories concerning the origin of man,
of conflict and co-operative tendencies, and of the early ideas
and institutions of the human race. They have been aided by the
investigations of the geologists and especially of the paleontologists.
The ethnographers and ethnologists have also discovered important
data. The findings of all these groups of investigators, as far as
they relate to the main thread of this book, will be here treated
essentially as a unitary contribution. There is not space to deal
specifically with the work of anthropologists, such as Tylor, Morgan,
Pitt-Rivers, Haddon, Frazer, Goldenweiser, Keane, and a number of other
prominent authorities.

Anthropological social thought will be indicated here under several
headings. As far as possible the controversial and technical theories
in anthropology will be avoided. Certain of the ideas that have been
advanced by Sumner, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Wundt, Boas, and Thomas will
receive special attention, because they are unusually pertinent to the
main theme of this volume.

1. There is common agreement among anthropologists that man is the
descendant of a branch of higher animal life, and that the creation of
man took place by a slow, evolutionary process. The slowness of this
developmental process does not necessarily lessen the mysterious or
miraculous character of it. It places the origin of the human race at
a much earlier date than was once supposed--perhaps from 200,000 to
500,000 years ago. The animal inheritance of man need not lead anyone
to deny the correlative fact that man possesses spiritual qualities not
common to the highest developed animals.[XVIII-1]

Even the psychic equipment of man can be traced in its origins to the
primates with their individual and social instincts. The instinctive
bases of human conduct are hundreds of thousands of years old. They are
so intrinsically a part of human nature that no discussion of current
social problems will neglect the imperiousness of the ancient instinct
heritage of the human race.

2. There is extensive anthropologic evidence that mankind had a
common origin. The remains of the earliest human beings are found
in a region which extends through India from Java to England. From
these geographic centers primitive man seems to have migrated in
various directions--northeast, southwest, and finally to the Western
Hemisphere. Different climatic and environmental conditions affected
the migrating groups in different ways. Those who migrated into the
tropical regions were retarded because of the enervating climatic
factors. Those who reached the frigid zone were also retarded, or
subjected to recidivism for a different reason--a harshness of living
conditions and an excess of environmental obstacles. The north
temperate zone with its fertile lands and its invigorating climate
afforded the proper _milieu_ for the development of the race.

3. An important question relates to the alleged potential equality of
all races. The common origin of races is admitted, but the question
remains open whether, for example, the African races possess the same
innate mental abilities as the Caucasian races. The controversy here
is sharply drawn between the environmentalists and the eugenists. Each
side of the debate has collected a large body of evidence. In reality,
the question apparently boils down to this: Have the many centuries of
living under the enervating torrid zone conditions effected the African
races so deeply that under favorable cultural circumstances they have
become incapable of developing beyond a certain mental level which
is lower than that attained by the Caucasian races? In the past the
answer to this question has been a strong affirmative. The bulk of the
evidence that has been collected in recent years indicates that the
affirmative answer is incorrect.

4. It is becoming clear that every race is a composite of several
races. Ethnological data show that the five grand divisions of the
human race may be subdivided into racial stocks, and into races and
sub-races, until more than 600 races may be described; and furthermore,
that each of the 600 or more races represents an amalgamation of at
least three or four races. It is evident that no clear line of racial
demarcation can be drawn, and that purity of race may be a fictitious
term.

5. Intermarriage of the representatives of races belonging to similar
racial stocks seems advisable--according to the ethnologist. Pure
bloods apparently die out. The strongest races today are those in which
amalgamation has taken place recently--that is, within one thousand or
two thousand years, for example, the English, or the Scotch-Irish.

A mooted question of world importance relates to the intermarriage
of the representatives of races widely different, such as the white
and the yellow races, or the white and the black races. No race has
yet developed out of such combinations. Race prejudices and social
distinctions have produced conflicts which thus far have prevented
the formation of such a race. Very few scientific data are available
regarding miscegenation.

Apparently, the interbreeding of whites and blacks leads ultimately
to the elimination of the racial characteristics of the blacks and
to the complete dominance of the whites. There are some writers who
assert that this process takes place to the gain of the lower race and
to the loss of the higher race. The last-mentioned point has not yet
been proved. Miscegenation between whites and blacks occurs under such
abnormal and vicious social conditions that the racial tendencies are
definitely obscured.

6. Conflict between races is primordial; conflict between races today
is illustrated in national wars and race persecutions. Weaker races
have often combined against a stronger race; from these experiences
there has come a growing sense of the value of co-operation. Nations
with high moral principles have united against a powerful neighbor
nation with bullying tendencies. Out of these temporary combinations
there has arisen a sense of need for permanent forms of national
co-operation. This common need will ultimately lead, undoubtedly, to a
permanent association of nations.

The conflict between the grand divisions of the human race will
probably continue for a long time to come. Sometimes it is concentrated
in an antagonism between the white and yellow races; and again, it is
expressed in the more fundamental struggle between Occidentalism and
Orientalism.

7. The origin and development of primitive ways of doing constitute
a well-cultivated field of study. Anthropologists have published an
endless amount of materials on the origin of languages, religions,
occupations, sex distinctions. A portion of this work has been done
without an accurate understanding of the psychological principles that
are involved, and hence has to be viewed with caution or neglected
entirely.

W. G. Sumner, whose argument in favor of individualism and of a
_laissez faire_ governmental policy was given in Chapter XI, published
in his _Folkways_ a minute and extended account of the nature of
primitive institutions.

In the development of his theories, Sumner began with the needs of
primitive peoples and with the attempts to meet these needs. Repetition
of these acts leads to established ways of doing, that is, to folkways.
Folkways are “the widest, most fundamental, and most important
operation by which the interests of men in groups are served.”[XVIII-2]
Societal life consists chiefly in making folkways and applying them.
Even the science of society might be defined as the study of folkways.
Folkways are the product of the trial and failure method of meeting
needs. They tend to become firmly established and to be passed on from
generation to generation. They become traditional. They acquire all
the authority which is attached to the memory of respected ancestors.
Even the ghosts of ancestors stalk the earth keeping guard over the
folkways. The folkways carry with them the conviction that they are
essential to human welfare. It is this conviction which gives them
the force of _mores_. Thus the folkways are not purposeful methods of
securing progress but unconscious ways of meeting current exigencies;
they are blindly and rigorously forced upon successive generations.

8. Races are guilty of ethnocentrism.[XVIII-3] Each race considers
itself the center of mankind. It judges all other races by its own
standards, and not by a higher standard that is determined by data that
are representative of the best interests of all races. Ethocentrism
compels each race to exaggerate the importance of its own folkways and
to depreciate the folkways of other races. For example, the Romans
and Greeks called all outsiders “barbarians.” The Jews considered
themselves “the chosen people,” and the Romans and Greeks as “pagans.”

9. Sumner divided the chief motives of human action into four classes:
Hunger, sex passion, vanity, and fear (of ghosts and spirits). Behind
each of these motives there is a set of interests. (1) Hunger led
primitive man to invent simple weapons and tools, such as arrows and
hoes, and then to produce and hoard more complex forms of wealth. A
strange peculiarity of wealth is its effect on its creator; it seems to
be stronger than its creator. It often bears him down to a slavish,
materialistic, and even selfish existence. Labor in the struggle
for existence is irksome and painful. Wealth and labor, however,
are both commendatory when they are used to increase human welfare.
In this statement Sumner overlooked the fact that wealth in order
to be commendable must also be produced under constructively social
conditions, and that labor in order to be praiseworthy must in its
exercise be individually helpful. In other words, Sumner’s test of the
use to which wealth and labor are put is incomplete.

Sumner gave a new meaning to the term, slavery. He held that “men
of talent are constantly forced to serve the rest. They make the
discoveries and inventions, order the battles, write the books, and
produce the art.”[XVIII-4] Sumner deplored the tendency to call
whatever one does not like by the name of slavery. He felt that
marriage slavery, rent slavery, sin slavery are terms which are coined
by a too easily disgruntled people.

(2) The sex passion leads to sex _mores_ which cover the relations of
men and women to each other before marriage and in marriage, and the
obligations of married persons to society. The sex _mores_ determine
the nature of marriage and of divorce. Sumner derided sex equality. Man
has a more stable nervous system than woman, is more self-absorbed,
more egoistic, less tactful. Since man has greater physical strength
than woman, woman was educated by circumstances in primitive days
to adapt herself to the stronger sex, and to win by developing
charms where her lack of comparative strength rendered her helpless.
Resignation and endurance thus became acquired traits of women.

Neither renunciation nor license is the proper method of control of the
sex passions. Both produce unnecessary agony. License, for example,
“stimulates desire without limit, and ends in impotent agony.” Sumner
advocated temperance and regulation--a regulation which comes from
knowledge and judgment.

Women by necessity must bear an unequal share in the responsibilities
of sex and reproduction. Likewise, men must bear an unequal share of
the responsibilities of property, war, and politics. For the latter
types of duties women are hampered by a delicately adjusted and
cumbersome generative system which men do not possess.[XVIII-5]

Formerly women yielded to the will of men. Today, the marital state is
one of endless discussion, a defeat for one party or the other, with
unpleasant effects upon life and character. In ancient times women took
pride in the supervision which their husbands exercised over them and
valued themselves as hidden treasures.[XVIII-6] This protected position
was considered aristocratic. Under polygamy, women looked with pity and
disgust upon the man who cannot, or is unwilling to, support more than
one wife.

At this point it is interesting to note that W. I. Thomas has
distinguished between the sexes on the basis of differences in
metabolism--men being katabolic and women anabolic. Man consumes more
energy than woman.[XVIII-7] He is better fitted for bursts of energy,
while woman possesses more endurance. Man’s structural variability is
toward motion; woman’s, toward reproduction. Hence man seems to have
been assigned in primitive society to tasks requiring violence and
exertion, whereas to women fell the work requiring constant attention.

Civilization thus far has largely profited by the intelligence of man.
If to this situation it will develop and add the intelligence of women,
it will be supplanted by a higher type of civilization. Under these
conditions a large percentage of marriages will represent “the true
comradeship of like minds,” instead of being frequently, as now, an
arrangement in which woman is treated as a pet.

(3) The motive of vanity is all-powerful. “One likes to be separated
from the crowd by what is admired, and dislikes to be distinguished for
what is not admired.”[XVIII-8] To satisfy vanity, barbarian mothers
“deform their babies toward an adopted type of bodily perfection.”
Aristocracies grow up out of appeals to vanity. An aristocracy is a
group of persons closely united who define the possession of things
for which they are admired and which the masses do not possess. Vanity
leads to all types of absurdities and indecencies in dress. Teeth are
knocked out for the sake of appeasing vanity. An Indian woman puts a
board on the forehead of her baby to make the forehead recede.

(4) Fear as a motive rules the lives of primitives. Fear of ghosts and
spirits is peculiarly enslaving. Pestilence, defeat in war, bodily pain
were all considered the result of the wrath of the gods.

The mass phenomena of fear are especially pitiful. Manias of various
types rule whole masses. Witchcraft thrived for centuries on the
strength of fear. Pilgrimages and crusades were partly due to fear;
demonism was a product of fear. When fear became firmly established
in the folkways, it acted as an ever-ruling tyrant. In the _mores_
it became firmly entrenched and was a leading factor in moulding
character. Through religious practices and dogmas it defined a “hell”
and ruled with a fearful hand.

10. Upon simplest analyses, according to Sumner, four societal
values stand out with clearness: intellectual, moral, economic, and
physical.[XVIII-9] Each of these, however, is composite. The highest
societal value seems to result from a harmonious combination of the
four values enumerated. The best member of society is he in whom the
intellectual, moral, economic, and physical values are more or less
equally and harmoniously represented.

11. Sumner divided society into five main classes.[XVIII-10] (1)
The masses represent social mediocrity. They are of average social
usefulness. (2) Then there are the dependent and defective classes--a
drag upon society but not harmful or vicious. (3) The delinquent
classes are grossly harmful. They are anti-social and a grievous
burden. (4) Above the masses there are the people of talent, and (5)
above the talented are the geniuses. “A man of talent, practical
sense, industry, perseverance, and moral principle is worth more
to society than a genius who is not morally responsible, or not
industrious.”[XVIII-11]

It is a mistake to think of the masses as being at the base of society;
they are located at the core. They are traditional, conservative, and
the bearers of the _mores_. The lowest sections of the masses are a
dead weight of ignorance, disease, and crime.

12. A social institution is composed of an idea, notion, or interest,
and a resultant structure. The primary institutions are property,
marriage, and religion.[XVIII-12] These began as folkways; they became
customs. Social institutions can be modified only when the _mores_
are changed; they develop rituals, which are ceremonious, solemn, and
strongest when perfunctory and when exciting no thought.[XVIII-13]

Sumner boldly asserted that nothing but might has ever made right,
and that nothing but might makes right now.[XVIII-14] The fact that
property began in force is not proof that property is an unjust
institution. Marriage and religion also began in force, but the element
of justice in the existence of these institutions is not seriously
questioned today. Sumner, however, did not discriminate between force
as an agent or a tool, and force as a primary cause. He did not
distinguish clearly between hate and love as the dynamic factors behind
action that is decisive. He did not set forth the distinction between
harsh, material, immutable force and a kindly, spiritual, attracting
love.

13. The persistency of folkways and _mores_ is illustrated in a
thousand ways by Sumner. He described (1) their slow variability
under changed life conditions, (2) their sudden variability under
revolutionary conditions, (3) the possibility of changing them by
intelligent action, (4) the problems involved in adjusting one’s self
to the _mores_ of another group, (5) the conflicts between the _mores_
of different groups.[XVIII-15]

The _mores_ are powerful engines of societal selection. The most
important fact about the _mores_ is the power which they exert over the
individual. He does not know their source. He is born into them. He
accepts them in his early years uncritically. His habits and character
are moulded by them. If in adult life he challenges them, he is
ostracized by his group, labeled unpatriotic, and even trodden under
foot.[XVIII-16] The _mores_ develop powerful watch-words, slogans,
and even epithets of contempt and disapproval which only the most
independent and courageous individuals dare to face.

14. Ideals are entirely unscientific, declared Sumner.[XVIII-17]
They are phantasies little connected with fact. They are often formed
to pacify the restless, or to escape settling a question justly in
the present. The “poor” are told to look to the next life for their
rewards. The radicals are urged to accept the Christian virtues of
meekness and lowliness. Ideals are useful, chiefly, in homiletics,
in self-education _via_ auto-suggestion, in satisfying vanity, in
marriage. In these observations, Sumner undoubtedly pointed out genuine
weaknesses in ideals. He underestimated the psychological fact that
they spring from the very real affective phases of consciousness,
and that they can be projected rationally. He was right, however, in
deploring the chasm which exists between ideals and practices, and in
showing how ideals may become encysted in literature although not in
the _mores_. “The Greeks proved that people could sink very low while
talking very nobly.”

Immorality is conduct contrary to the _mores_ of the time and
place.[XVIII-18] Chastity is conformity to the current taboo on the
sex relation. “Modesty is reserve of behavior and sentiment.” Even
“nakedness is never shameful when it is unconscious,” that is, when
there is no consciousness of a difference between fact and the rule set
by the _mores_.

Sumner deduced an important principle when he asserted that the
“_mores_ can make anything right.” The _mores_ give usages a certain
order and form, and cover them with a protecting mantle of propriety.
The sanction of the _mores_ is utilized by the class in power in order
to maintain the established régime, even though it be one of injustice.

Sumner decried the importance which is ordinarily attached to book
learning,[XVIII-19] because it is addressed to the intellect rather
than to the feelings which are the springs of action. The real
education is that which comes through personal influence and example.
It is derived from “the habits and atmosphere of a school, not from the
school textbooks.”

15. Despite Sumner’s failure to appreciate the significance of a
thoroughgoing psychological approach to an analysis of folkways, his
description of these societal phenomena constitutes a unique and
valuable contribution to social thought. Sumner’s rigorous attitude
toward social life did not permit him to enter into an extensive
interpretation of the folkways in the light of folk ideals. He dealt
with what _is_ to the exclusion of what _ought to be_. He saw the past
so clearly, and the present so much as a reflection of the past, that
no enheartening forward look was possible. He rested his theories on
the inexorable work of the laws of biological evolution, modified
chiefly by his belief in a strong individualism.

Sumner’s fundamental theses have been developed and modified by A. G.
Kellor. Professor Kellor has projected the Darwinian principles of
variation, selection, transmission, and adaptation into societal
concepts. In fact, he has done this so well that he has given the
Darwinian principles full sway, not allowing sufficiently for the rise
and operation of complex psychic principles. He has made the folkways
the connecting link between organic and societal evolution, but has
not noted fully the new, countless, and often intangible but powerful
factors by which societal evolution is characterized.

16. The rôle that concepts of conduct have played in the evolution of
society, has been analyzed by E. A. Westermarck and L. T. Hobhouse.
The former is usually known as an anthropologist, and the latter
as a sociologist. Professor Westermarck has shown that, strictly
speaking, a custom is not merely the habit of a certain group of
people; it also involves a rule of conduct.[XVIII-21] It possesses two
characteristics--habitualness and obligatoriness.

Not every public habit, however, is a custom, involving an
obligation.[XVIII-22] There may be certain practices which are more
or less common in society, but which at the same time are generally
condemned. The disapproval of these is as a rule not very deep or
genuine.

Dr. Westermarck has indicated that there is a close similarity between
the conscience of a community and of an individual.[XVIII-23] If a
group commits a sin twice, it is likely to be considered allowable. In
order to get at the real nature of societal life, the “bad habits” as
well as the professed opinions of groups must be examined.

“Society” says Dr. Westermarck, “is the birthplace of the moral
consciousness.”[XVIII-24] Emotions which are felt by the community at
large tend to take the form of conduct standards. The moral emotions
lead to a variety of moral concepts. These fall into two main classes:
concepts of disapproval, such as the concepts, bad, vice, wrong; and
concepts of approval, such as good, virtue, and merit.

Professor Westermarck is convinced of the tremendous influence
that religious beliefs have exerted upon the moral ideas of
mankind.[XVIII-25] This influence has been exceedingly varied.
Religion has taught the principles of love and yet has indulged in
cruel persecutions. It has condemned murder and yet been a party to
child sacrifice. “It has emphasized the duty of truth-speaking, and
has itself been a cause of pious fraud.” Professor Westermarck has
contributed to social thought not only in his valuable descriptions
of the rise and evolution of moral ideas, but also in his _History of
Human Marriage_, to which reference will be made in Chapter XXIV.

The writings of L. T. Hobhouse reveal a thorough, comparative study
of the conduct rules of mankind. Professor Hobhouse has described the
evolution of ethical consciousness as displayed in the habits, customs,
and principles that have arisen in human history for the regulation of
human conduct. He has shown how, in the lowest forms of the organic
world, behavior is regulated, and directed to some purpose.[XVIII-27]
This behavior is somewhat definitely determined by the structure of the
organism itself.[XVIII-28]

There are three forces which may be called social, or which tend to
keep society together. These social bonds are: (1) the principle
of kinship, (2) the principle of authority, and (3) the principle
of citizenship.[XVIII-29] Kinship is the moving force in primitive
society. The principle of authority becomes prominent when one tribe
captures and enslaves a weaker group. This principle is also invoked in
order to secure an integration of openly diverse attitudes within the
group, even of modern national groups. It is exemplified in the various
forms of absolutism in government. The principle of citizenship finds
expression when certain individuals within the group are delegated to
perform as servants and ministers of the public as a whole.[XVIII-30]
Personal rights and the common good are the two reigning ideals. Every
individual is recognized as having a right to the conditions requisite
for the full development of his social personality. The good in life
consists “in the bringing out into full bloom of those capacities of
each individual which help to maintain the common life.”[XVIII-31] The
third principle, that of citizenship, when carried to its conclusion
reveals the possibility of a world state.[XVIII-32]

It is the contention of Professor Hobhouse that there is a close
connection between the growth of law and justice and the prevalent
forms of social organization. Organized law has developed out of a
sense of community responsibility, which, however, has expressed itself
as a rule in crude ways, and without distinguishing between accident
and design. This sense of community responsibility in primitive groups
tends to hold in check the spirit of anarchy and of self-redress.
Sooner or later, the method of community self-redress yields to
the authority of a chief or of a council representing the whole
community.[XVIII-33] Ultimately the community develops a special social
organ for adjusting disputes and preventing crime. It is then that the
ethical idea becomes separated from the conflicting passions of the
collectivity. Thus, the foundations are laid for true judicial inquiry
by evidence and genuine proof, and for a system of scientific public
justice.

17. In applying the principles of folk psychology to the anthropologic
field, William Wundt has developed a new method and new theories. Folk
psychology is the study of “the relations which the intellectual,
moral, and other mental characteristics of peoples sustain to one
another.”[XVIII-34] The term was originated by Lazarus and Steinthal,
whose works will be referred to again in Chapter XXII. In the
masterpiece on the _Elements of Folk Psychology_, Wundt has given
a psychological description of the main processes and institutions
in society, tracing them from their beginnings in the processes of
nature; he has made a survey of human progress. His study opens with
a discussion of the processes which produced the digging stick, the
club, and the hammer; it ends with an analysis of world empire, world
culture, world religions, and world history. The intervening ages are
the totemic and the age of heroes and gods.

World empire affected primarily the material aspects of the life of
peoples. It led to world intercourse, which in turn multiplied the
needs of peoples. These multiplied needs were followed by exchanges of
the means of satisfying the needs. The external and material phases of
culture are survived by the spiritual phases--thus world culture is
a sequence of world empire. It may be said that the vicissitudes of
peoples under the rule of the world empire idea brings forth a unified
history. World culture in turn creates a common mental heritage for
mankind.[XVIII-36]

In the establishment of a world culture, world religions are the
leading forces. They have been foremost in creating the idea of a
universal human community. In particular, Christianity is based on
a belief in a God who makes no distinction between race or class or
occupation. Consequently, “it has regarded missionary activity among
heathen peoples as a task whose purpose it is finally to unite the
whole of mankind beneath the cross of Christ.”[XVIII-37]

For a long time in human history, religious development was considered
to be the main connecting link--such was the contention of St.
Augustine. In 1725, Vico argued that the development of language and
jurisprudence is of universal import.[XVIII-38] Finally, world history
has become an account of the mental life of peoples--“a psychological
account of the development of mankind.”

18. The work of Professor Wundt is similar in many ways, although
characterized by a distinctive starting point and by many differences,
to the contributions of Franz Boas and W. I. Thomas. Professor Boas has
declared his belief in man’s ability to dominate the laws of organic
evolution as expressed in human life. He has brought forward a large
amount of evidence in support of the theory that environment has caused
differences between races. He has pointed out that race prejudice
is largely a product of social environment, and that under changed
conditions of life it has little place in the world. Boas is a strong
advocate of the theory, already advanced in this chapter, that all
races are potentially equal in ability, and that they would demonstrate
the truth of this statement, if given a common cultural background and
social opportunities. He has advanced the idea that “the organization
of mind is practically identical among all races of men.”[XVIII-39]

Professor Boas has amassed considerable evidence to show that in the
matter of inhibition of impulses, of power of attention, of ability to
do original thinking, primitive man compares favorably with civilized
man. Inasmuch as the social environment is powerful and education is
effective in making over social environments, education can raise all
races to the same high level, and at the same time unify them upon
the same knowledge bases. This contention is similar to the position
that Professor Hobhouse has made clear, namely: “While race has been
relatively stagnant, society has rapidly developed.” Moreover, social
progress is determined not by alterations or racial type, but by
modifications of social cultures.[XVIII-40] These modifications are
caused primarily by the interactions of social causes.

19. Noteworthy pioneering in the field of social anthropology and
social origins has been done by W. I. Thomas. He has developed the
theory that progress results from “crises.”[XVIII-41] As long as
life runs along smoothly, a lack of interest is likely to ensue. The
result is ennui. But a crisis in any of the life processes arouses
the attention, that is, produces a concentration of psychic energy. A
disturbance of any habit is a crisis. When the exigences of the crisis
are solved through a focalization of consciousness, the situation is
said to be controlled by the individual, who again lapses into a state
of disinterestedness until another disturbance of habit occurs. The new
method of control will be imitated. If imitated widely, it will mark a
rise in the level of civilization.

It will be observed at once that the power of attention to meet crises
is largely an individual matter and that the rôle of the individual is
very important. The group level of culture limits the power of the mind
to meet crises and to make adjustments.[XVIII-42] The mind is limited
by the psychic fund which the group already possesses. If there is no
knowledge of mathematics in the group, then a large banking system is
impossible. Crises, attention, control--these are the three leading
concepts in Thomas’ theory of social origins.

Control is the object of all purposeful activity.[XVIII-43] It is the
end, and attention is the means. An animal differs from a plant in
that it has a superior control over a larger environment than does the
plant. “It does not wait for food, but goes after it.” Man differs from
an animal partly in the fact that his fore limbs are free to secure
new and varied forms of control. Moreover, man through his mind has
a superior instrument of control. By the use of knowledge, mind is
effective in controlling factors that are present in neither time nor
space. Through its inventions, such as language, religious creeds,
mechanical appliances, forms of government, man has risen to a high
level of civilization.

Thomas has analyzed the social process in terms of social attitude and
social values. An attitude is a process of individual consciousness
that determines “the real or possible activity of the individual in
the social world.”[XVIII-45] A social value, on the other hand, is any
datum that has an empirical content accessible to the members of a
social group and a meaning which may make it an object of activity.
Activity is thus the bond between a social attitude and a social
value. The value is the meaning which a material or spiritual datum
may have. An attitude is a real or implied going out after value.
Social psychology is the science of social attitudes. At this point
anthropologic social thought has merged into social psychology.

Until twenty-five years ago, anthropology interpreted societary origins
pretty largely in terms of the individual. With the use of a social
psychology such as Cooley represents, “anthropology has given more
accurate explanations and become essentially a social anthropology.”

Before we discuss the different phases of psycho-sociologic thought, it
will be well to make clear the recent advances that have been made in
the biologic phases of social thought. The center of attention in this
field is the relation of the laws of heredity to human progress, which
constitutes the problem in eugenics. A discussion of eugenic social
thought will bring forward in a scientific way the chief elements
of an intellectual situation that was left, in Chapter XVI, in the
unsatisfactory Spencerian formulae. A presentation of eugenic social
thought will give a valuable background to the discussion which follows
concerning psycho-sociologic thought.




CHAPTER XIX

EUGENIC SOCIOLOGY


Eugenic social thought is the child of biological discoveries.
Eugenics, the science of good breeding, which did not achieve
scientific standing until the closing years of the last century, may
be traced back in its incipient forms to Plato, who advocated that
strength should mate only with strength, and that imperfect children
should be eliminated from society. In its scientific origins eugenics
dates from 1859, when Darwin’s _Origin of Species_ was first published.
Its beginning as a distinct field of human thinking is found in
the articles by Francis Galton on “Hereditary Talent and Genius,”
which appeared in 1865; and in 1869, in book form under the title,
_Hereditary Genius_.[XIX-1]

Eugenic social thought deals with the operation of the laws of heredity
in society. It was a part of this field which Francis Galton made
world-known by his treatises on _Hereditary Genius_ and _Inquiries into
the Human Faculty_.[XIX-2] In 1904, Galton wrote a paper entitled:
“Eugenics; Its Definition, Scope and Aims.” In this dissertation the
new science of eugenics was formally introduced to the world. Gabon’s
analysis of eugenics became its leading interpretation.[XIX-3]

The mantle of the founder fell upon Professor Karl Pearson, whose
work at times has assumed a distinctly statistical nature. Professor
Pearson’s leaning toward biometry has brought severe criticism upon
him. The statistical approach, while exact and thought-provoking, is
subject to various errors in interpretation of data. The viewpoint from
which Professor Pearson writes, however, is not one-sided. For example,
he states that “it may require years to replace a great leader of man,
but a stable and efficient society can only be the outcome of centuries
of development.”[XIX-4] He holds that group conscience ought for the
sake of social welfare to be stronger than private interest, and that
the ideal citizen should be able to form a judgment free from personal
bias.[XIX-5]

C. W. Saleeby, another English writer, has developed an independent
reputation as a eugenist.[XIX-6] In the United States, such men as
C. B. Davenport[XIX-7] and Paul Popenoe have made important eugenic
contributions. The recent tendency has been to be wary of purely
statistical studies of heredity and to rely more definitely upon case
studies. However, since eugenics is directly indebted to the studies
of heredity and since heredity must be investigated for several
generations, eugenic social thought has not yet developed far.

Galton defined eugenics as the science of good breeding. Its aim as a
pure science is to study the agencies under social control “that may
improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either
physically or mentally.” Galton’s program, as outlined by the founder
shortly before his death, insisted upon (1) a study of the laws of
heredity, (2) a dissemination of knowledge about heredity, (3) a study
of the factors underlying marriage, (4) a study of birth rates, and (5)
a case study of individual families.

Eugenic social thought holds that heredity among human beings operates
according to the same laws that govern heredity among animals. The
theory of Mendelian units becomes in practice the theory of multiple
factors. The unit characters, upon analysis, appear to be complex and
to be inherited in complex ways. Multiple factors are inherited from
generation to generation directly when pure factors are united with
pure factors. But when the pure is united with the hybrid, then the
laws of dominance and recessiveness operate. In such combinations
certain factors tend to express themselves in greater proportion
than do other elements. This failure to secure expression in a given
generation, however, means that the specific factor is recessive for
the time being. Later, it will likely appear.

Galton stated another important eugenic law, the law of regression.
Each peculiarity is inherited by the offspring on the average in a
slightly less degree than it is found in the parent. Hence, according
to Galton, good traits and poor traits alike are inherited in a
degree nearer mediocrity by the offspring than by the parents. This
law partially explains why gifted men rarely have sons who are equally
gifted. The law seems to hold good for large numbers, but not when
considered in relation to single families. It serves as a check upon
variation and mutation.

Galton and Pearson advanced another statistical law, the law of
ancestral inheritance. Galton supposed that the parents contribute
to the child one-half of his inherited factors, the grandparents
one-fourth, and so on. Pearson has secured statistical evidence which
shows that Galton’s geometric series is incorrect, and that on the
average in a large number of cases the parents together contribute to
the child .624 of his traits; the four grandparents, .198; the eight
great grandparents, .063; and so on.

The law of mutation, described by de Vries and other geneticists,
refers to the appearance of mutants, or individuals who do not
reproduce to form but represent a new line of heredity. In this way the
appearance of genius may often be accounted for. However, the factors
which explain the appearance of mutants have not yet been analyzed.

Another fundamental genetic consideration is the law of selection. If
individuals with worthy traits mate only with individuals who possess
worthy traits, a superior stock will be produced. This tendency is very
important, since it points the way to a potent method of securing
social progress.

Eugenic social thought has been developed in part on the basis of the
Weismann theory of no or slight transmission of acquired traits. The
germ-plasm is transmitted from individual to offspring in a direct
line of descent. Injuries to the parent rarely change the nature of
the germ-plasm. Only extreme malnutrition or excessive use of alcohol
apparently exerts a definite influence on the germ cells. Nature has
thus made provision for the protection of germ-plasm, whether strong
or defective. Society, then, may encourage the mating of individuals
who possess strong physical and mental traits, and discourages the
mating of individuals who are defective--thus securing its own positive
improvement.

Eugenic social thought follows two courses. Restrictive eugenics
advocates the segregation of the so-called dysgenic classes, such as
the feeble-minded, the insane, and the grossly defective criminal.
Public opinion reacts against sterilization; injustice that cannot be
remedied may be done through the use of sterilization. Segregation by
sexes, while involving expense, is a satisfactory eugenic method of
safeguarding society against the reproduction of dysgenic persons.

The other trend of eugenic thought supports the raising of the
standards of choice in mating. Constructive eugenics, as distinguished
from restrictive eugenics, urges a program of education whereby
young people will habitually rate one another by physical and mental
standards rather than by wealth and class standards.

Eugenics disapproves of random mating. It favors assortative
mating, because, for example, the “marriage of representatives of
two long-lived strains ensures that the offspring will inherit
more longevity than does the ordinary man.”[XIX-9] Eugenics thus
stresses the importance of teaching young people eugenic ideas, and
of training them to be guided by these ideals rather than by caprice
and passion.[XIX-10] Eugenic ideals include health, paternity and
maternity, and pleasing disposition. Education and character are
secondary eugenic ideals of importance.

A study of the birth rate shows that the inferior stocks and classes
of individuals produce many more children than do the superior groups.
Many cultured people do not marry, or if they marry they keep the birth
rate very low. As a result, the racial character of a whole people may
change within a few generations. The superior strains may be lost and
the inferior furnish the entire population.

The low birth rate of the superior stocks is due to several factors:
(1) The lengthening period of education and of professional training
calls for the postponement of marriage. (2) The desire to give children
the best advantages limits the birth rate. (3) The increasing spirit of
independence on the part of women causes a postponement of marriage
and a limitation of the number of children. These and other causes have
produced a differential birth rate in favor of the inferior strains.
Eugenic thought urges that the differential be reversed in favor of the
superior strains. This conclusion implies that the dysgenic classes
must be prevented from producing children, that the poor must be raised
to higher educational and economic levels and taught to limit the birth
rate, and that the eugenically superior be taught to increase the birth
rate.

Eugenics pronounces war to be both dysgenic and eugenic.[XIX-11] (1)
It is dysgenic in that the bravest and the physically best are killed
first. In the case of a long war only the weakest men physically and
mentally are left alive to propagate the race. (2) War is dysgenic
in that it produces a large number of hurried marriages. Rational
choices of mates are supplanted by sudden emotional reactions. (3) War
is dysgenic in that sex immorality greatly increases. Prostitution
flourishes in the neighborhood of military encampments, unless rigid
means of control are established. (4) Again, the dysgenic effect of war
is seen in the period of socio-mental unrest which always follows war,
and which among other things undermines rational sexual selection.

The chief eugenic effect of war is manifested during the period of
training. This preparation period accents the importance of a strong
physique and health measures. An insipid, stoop-shouldered population
of city young men may be transformed into an army of fit soldiers.
However, the conclusions are obvious that the dysgenic effects of
war are far more potent than the eugenic gains, and that the eugenic
advantages may he acquired in other ways than by promulgating war.

Eugenics looks askance at the feminism movement. Feminism once meant
the development of the womanly traits of the sex. It now refers to the
elimination as far as possible of sex differences. It would make women
as nearly as possible like men. Eugenics objects to this trend, since
it underestimates the importance of the fact that women physically
are built to be mothers. To the extent that women enter into all the
occupations, they will become men-like; and their efficiency as mothers
of the race will decrease, and the race will suffer.

The economic equality of the sexes is a satisfactory doctrine to the
eugenist if the doctrine is extended to make motherhood a salaried
occupation, like mill work or stenography.[XIX-12] “Child-bearing
should be recognized as being as worthy of remuneration as any
occupation which men enter, and should be paid for (by the state) on
the same basis.”[XIX-13]

Eugenics would throw every possible safeguard around motherhood,
especially in the period immediately before and after the birth of
the child. The mother, even the expectant mother, “is doing our
business, indispensable and exacting business, and we must take care
of her accordingly. She is not only a worker but the foremost of all
workers.”[XIX-14]

Eugenic thought as represented in the writings of C. W. Saleeby has
denominated alcohol, venereal disease, and tuberculosis as “racial
poisons.” While there is some doubt regarding the eugenic effects of
taking small amounts of alcohol into the human body, eugenists are
agreed that alcohol, when taken in excess quantities, affects the
germ-plasm and produces a neurotic taint. It appears that alcoholism
may be a cause in producing defective children. The verdicts of hygiene
and economics that alcoholism is injurious to the race is supported by
eugenics.

Venereal disease, another so-called racial poison, produces toxins
which apparently affect the germ-plasm indirectly if not directly.
It lowers the physical and moral tone and causes unfavorable racial
tendencies. Venereal disease tends to destroy the generative organs and
to cut off the birth rate entirely. It is a result of sex immorality
which in itself tends to produce children under such abnormal
conditions of vice that it becomes an anti-social, if not a dysgenic
factor, in society. To the extent of course, that venereal disease
kills off the racially useless, it may be considered eugenic.[XIX-15]
Such a point of view, however, fails to rate properly the invasions
which venereal disease is continually making upon normal and superior
types of germ-plasm.

Tuberculosis weakens the membranous tissues and probably leads in a
few generations to an unusual degree of susceptibility to the invasion
of tubercle bacilli. It is still a question, however, to what extent
tuberculosis may be counted a racial poison. Professor Hobhouse has
argued that, by the development of scientific hygiene, it will be
possible to center attention not upon eliminating a tubercular stock
but upon eliminating the tubercle bacilli.[XIX-16]

In regard to race questions the social anthropologist and the eugenist
represent different poles of thought. As was indicated in the preceding
chapter, the social anthropologists, such as Boas and Thomas, support
the theory of potential race equality. The eugenist, on the other hand,
contends that there are inherently superior and inferior racial stocks,
and that the marriages of representatives of inferior stocks with
representatives of superior stocks will produce children of a stock
distinctly lower than that of the superior stocks. The eugenists in the
United States hold that the immigration of the southern and eastern
peoples of Europe will not only supplant through a higher birth rate
the native stock of Nordic origin but, where marriages between natives
and southern and eastern European immigrants occur, it will lower the
racial quality of the population. While eugenic thought in this matter
deserves a complete and respectful hearing, it must be considered along
with the findings of social anthropology.

Eugenic thought opposes the miscegenation of the Caucasian and
African. The Negro, it is contended, is not only different from
the Caucasian but as a rule is eugenically inferior, judged by the
achievements of the Negro. Moreover, the eugenist interprets the
anthropological tests to show that the innate ability of a colored
man “is proportionate to the amount of white blood he has.” The
conclusion of eugenics is that “in general the white race loses and
the Negro gains from miscegenation,”[XIX-17]--as far as the germinal
natures of the two races are concerned. The eugenist would forbid all
intermarriage between the races, and urge that the taboo against sexual
intercourse between the races be extended.

In the light of eugenic thought genealogy may become scientific,
in fact, it may become a valuable source of scientific materials
for eugenics. Heretofore genealogy has been the concern of a few
leisure-class people, who have taken pleasure and pride in recounting
the fact that some one of a possible thousand or more ancestors several
generations back was distinguished in some way or other, and who would
have friends or the public believe that they inherited from this
ancestor of note the characteristics which made him great. Eugenics
points out a nobler purpose to which genealogy may be put. It urges
that mental and physical traits of every individual in all families
be carefully analyzed and accurately and systematically recorded. In
this way it will be possible in a generation to have available a large
amount of eugenic materials, and in a few generations a reliable body
of data for studying racial heredity.

The debate regarding the comparative influences of nature and nurture
has been long and bitter. It may be said here that both heredity and
environment are more or less equally essential in the development of
human personality. Without inherited factors in the individual the
environment has nothing upon which to work. Without a stimulating
environment the inherited traits will remain dormant. Each human being
has inherited factors which, if played upon by certain environmental
factors, may lead the individual to try to wreck society or himself
or both. Every person, also, has traits which, if stimulated by
the proper environmental elements may cause him to develop into a
useful member of society. While the environment cannot change the
inherited potentialities very much, if any, it is a prime factor of
vast importance in determining which inherited tendencies will never
find expression, which will be expressed in modified ways, and which
will reach full fruition. Eugenics insists with increasing force that
educational programs shall provide that every child be not only well
reared but also well born. A weakness in eugenic thought is that it
implies that sound racial stock is sufficient to guarantee progress;
it tends at times to overstress an aristocracy of racial stock.
It sometimes detracts from the importance of character and moral
discipline as essential elements in social progress.




CHAPTER XX

CONFLICT THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY


The concept of social conflict has already been introduced to the
reader. In the chapter on Individualistic Social Thought the prolonged
struggle between individual rights and genuine social control was
analyzed. Malthus described the conflict between population and the
means of subsistence. Comte insisted that man is not naturally a social
being. Hence this unsocial nature of mankind is a fruitful source of
human conflict. Marx pictured the class struggle; and Darwin elaborated
the doctrine of the survival of the fittest.

The slightest grasp of social thought reveals the fact that human
association is characterized at times by deep-seated and subtle
conflicts; and at other times by a fundamental co-operative spirit.
Some sociological writers have seen only or chiefly the conflicts
of life; others have sought out the co-operative activities; still
others have tried to discover the relationships between conflict and
co-operation in societal development. This chapter will deal with the
concept of social conflict, while the next chapter will be centered on
the ideal of social co-operation and upon the relationship of conflict
to co-operation in group processes.

One of the outstanding believers in the theory that conflict dominates
societal life was Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1910). His system of thought
begins with the assertion that primitive hordes were the original
units of society. Gumplowicz dissented from Herbert Spencer’s belief
in the individual as the original societary unit, although he accepted
the determinism that is inherent in Spencer’s theory of evolution.
Gumplowicz also repudiated Comte’s belief in social amelioration
through prevision, but subscribed to Comte’s positivism.

According to Gumplowicz, society began with a large number of primitive
groups, which were self-sustaining and self-conscious units. Each one
of these hordes was a warring group, possessing an instinctive hatred
of all other hordes.[XX-1] As these hordes increased in size, the
general food supply failed to meet the needs. Consequently, inter-group
struggle resulted and the members of the weaker hordes were either
destroyed or enslaved. The existence of slaves led to situations of
intra-group inequality, which in turn created problems involving
justice and injustice.

As a result of continual conflicts between groups, there are
frequent changes taking place in their personnel. The vanquished are
continually being absorbed by victorious groups. In a given successful
group two classes are at once established, namely, the victors and
the vanquished. Classes are thus continually arising out of new
juxtapositions of heterogeneous racial elements.[XX-2]

It was in an intense form of group self-interest that Gumplowicz
found the mainspring of social progress. This self-interest leads to
an exaggerated group appraisement, a strong degree of group unity, a
state of warfare between groups--and perhaps progress. Basic to this
group self-interest, there are the material needs of the members of the
group; the economic desires and the occupational interests; and the
moral and spiritual tendencies. The group is bound together by various
factors, such as a common social life, a common language, religion, and
culture.

Gumplowicz advocated a theory of potential race equality. He argued
against innate racial superiority and racial inferiority. He doubted
the existence of any pure races. Each race is a compound of other
races, and hence races are potentially similar in fundamental respects.
National progress, therefore, holds no connection with race purity.

Gumplowicz minimized the importance of the individual. Society rules.
Centuries of traditions dominate. The thoughts of the individual are
almost, if not entirely, a mere reflection of the social environment.
The group develops group pride or group disloyalty in the minds of its
members. The distinguished leader is largely the man who expresses the
will of the group during the group crisis. Gumplowicz makes only a
brief reference to the process of interaction between the individual
and the group.[XX-3] An underlying theory of natural determinism
vitiates much of Gumplowicz’s ideas concerning the individual.

Inasmuch as society, like individuals, passes through a cycle of growth
and decay, subject to unchangeable natural and societary laws, there
is no justification for individual interference with social processes.
In fact, this theory led Gumplowicz into pessimistic conclusions
concerning life. He failed to see that societal life is not necessarily
a series of hopeless cyclical conflicts, and that social processes are
becoming increasingly subject to human control--for good or ill. He did
not appreciate the fact that groups are not subject to laws of cyclical
growth and decay after the manner of individuals. Hence, his conflict
theory of societal life ended in confusion and pessimism.

A reference was made in Chapter XI to the theories of Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844–1900). This German philosopher developed the idea of
social conflict, basing it on the concept of the “will to power.”
Leaders desire power. They enjoy to exercise power and they thrive
under that exercise. Jealousy of the leaders arises. The weaker members
of society join together against the possessors of power. They develop
a will to power, but of a weaker type than that of the leaders.
Conflicts ensue between the will to power of the superior and the will
to power of the inferior.

The superior and the inferior types each possess a distinctive code
of morality.[XX-4] The supermen develop a harsh and rigorous attitude
toward themselves and others. They gird and prepare themselves for
the crises of life. They strive to augment their power. They become
self-contained. They take pride in crushing weakness and in deifying
strength. Their morality stresses those factors in life which create
power. They feel a condescending pity for the weak. They experience no
sense of responsibility for the inferior classes. Since supermen are
the supreme goal of nature, supermen feel that all persons and things
should contribute to increasing the power of supermen.[XX-5] It is a
waste of energy for supermen to give their lives in behalf of inferior
persons. They are interested only in the welfare of other supermen.

The morality of the inferior is of a type which furthers weakness. It
accents sympathy. It emphasizes gregariousness. The inferior create a
slavish, cringing, meek morality. They sacrifice themselves readily and
humbly in behalf of others who may be inferior to themselves.

Nietzsche believed in a eugenics program. He declared that marriages
should be arranged with a view to producing supermen. Nietzsche’s
deterministic view of natural evolution led him to believe, however,
that equality of privileges is unattainable. He opposed democracy
because its theory of equal opportunities contradicts the tendencies
of nature. He was no socialist. He asserted that an aristocracy of
power is the only true goal for society. He carried forward the
ruthless biological laws of tooth and fang into his conception of the
highest types of civilization.

Moreover, the superman is a biological mutant. He appears sporadically.
At this point Nietzsche’s inconsistency becomes obvious. For example,
if geniuses appear sporadically and without reference to biological
laws, why attempt to arrange marriages so as to produce supermen? To
get himself out of the dilemma, Nietzsche postulated cyclical returns
of supermen and lost his bearings in trying to interpret an endless
circular movement in social evolution, endlessly repeating itself. In
an applied form Nietzsche’s philosophy has appeared in German political
life, but to the defeat of Germany.

In starting points, Nietzsche and Gumplowicz were widely different.
Nietzsche began with an apotheosis of the man of power and extolled
the achievements of supermen. Gumplowicz had little place for the
individual, even for the most powerful. Both sets of theories ended in
a deterministic philosophy of individual and social despair.

An unusually fundamental delineation of social conflict has been
advanced by Simon N. Patten in his _Theory of Social Forces_.[XX-6]
Human society is the product largely of a pain economy in which the
requisites for survival are determined “by the enemies and pains to
be avoided.” In a like manner a pain morality and a pain religion
develop. The purpose of the pain morality is “to keep persons from
committing acts and putting themselves in situations which lead to
destruction.” The pain religion, likewise, aims to invoke the aid of
higher powers in the human conflict with enemies and death. The social
forces in a pain economy have been builded up in the form of sets of
ideals, instincts, and habits.

Society, however, is now in a transition stage--entering a pleasure
economy. A large number of the sources of pain have been eliminated
through the inventive and administrative phases of civilization.
Dangerous beasts and reptiles, barbarous invasions, and superstitious
interpretations are uncommon among the advanced human groups.

No nation, unfortunately, has been able to live under a pleasure
economy. Its members have not built up sets of instincts, habits, and
ideals that withstand the effects of a pleasure economy. Consequently,
individuals and nations have fallen into lethargy, vice, and decay. The
enemies in a pleasure economy are found within the individual; these
are as yet unconquered under the allurements of a pleasure environment.
In discussing the conflicts between these habits and ideals, Dr. Patten
may err in implying that the race once was not in a pain economy
and hence did not originally develop out of such an environment,
but he nevertheless has analyzed an important societal fact in his
pain-pleasure transition concept.

Another type of conflict theory of society is advanced by Thomas Nixon
Carver. Professor Carver begins his analysis with a discussion of the
conflict of human interests. Originally all conflicts were settled on
the basis of might. But conflicts between persons who are beginning
to think, sometimes lead one or each of the contending parties to a
consideration of adjusting the conflict by other than physical strife.
At this point the concept of justice begins to take form.

Justice, according to Dr. Carver, is “that system of adjusting
conflicting interests which makes the group strong and
progressive.”[XX-7] Virtue and strength are pronounced identical, and
strength is defined “according to its ability to make itself universal.”

Conflict arises out of scarcity. Where two men want the same thing,
conflict ensues. It is this antagonism of interests which produces
moral problems and furnishes a basis of determining justice and
injustice. One reason for the lack of supply of things which people
seek is that in society human wants are unduly expended. If wants could
be kept low and production high, an adaptation of people to things
would take place which would greatly lessen conflict.

Conflicts take place in three different fields: (1) between man
and nature, (2) between man and man, and (3) between the different
interests of the same man.[XX-8] If there were no such conflicts,
there would be no moral problems. The result would be paradise.

The institutions of property, the family, and the state have developed
out of antagonism of interests, which in turn, as has been said, is
the result of scarcity. If things were not scarce, no one would think
of claiming property in anything. In a similar way the kinship group
becomes desirous of possessing property and hence acquires unity. In
asserting that _the_ unifying principle in the family is an economic
one, Dr. Carver espouses a theory of economic determinism. In fact, he
holds that “the economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which
all other social and moral problems have grown.”[XX-9]

Dr. Carver somewhat softens his rigorous social theories when he
admits that there may be a few people in the world whose feeling of
humanity is strong enough to overbalance an antagonism of interests
and to lead them to treat the world as a normal individual treats his
family.[XX-10] A world of such people would make a world of communism.
But such a world is unthinkable, because world-loving people are social
aberrations. The individual whose altruism is such that he gladly
gives his body to a tiger, is not helping to transform the world
into a world of saints but into a world of tigers.[XX-11] Extreme
forms of benevolence and meekness constitute the very food upon which
selfishness fattens.[XX-12]

Professor Carver, therefore, points out two sources of conflict,
namely, scarcity of desirable things and self-centered appreciation.
These two bases of conflict are fundamentally natural and normal.
Conflicts appear, however, in a great variety of forms. This
classification of the methods of struggling for existence is
fourfold.[XX-13]

(1) There is a group of conflicts which are primarily destructive, such
as war, robbery, dueling, sabotage, brawling. These conflicts are all
crude, primitive, brutal. They represent man at his lowest ebb. They
are militant in character, depending upon the individual’s power to
destroy, to harm, or to inflict pain and injury.[XX-14]

(2) Deceptive conflicts are of an order slightly higher than the
militant. They include thieving, swindling, adulteration of goods,
false advertising. They imply a greater degree of intelligence than the
purely destructive types of conflict.

(3) Another form of conflict is persuasive in character, for example,
political, erotic, commercial, and legal conflicts. Political
competition includes seeking governmental appointments, running for
office, campaigning for a political party. Erotic conflicts are in
the main different forms of courtship. Commercial persuasion utilizes
the agencies of advertising and salesmanship. Legal conflicts include
litigations in the courts. In all these illustrations the individual
strives to further his own interests by his persuative ability.
Oftentimes resort is made to cheap persuasive methods, such as
demagogy or political claptrap. Sometimes the persuasion falls to the
level of deception and, occasionally, to destructive depths.

(4) The highest form of conflicts are the productive types. Some
productive conflicts refer to rivalries in producing economic
goods; others to rivalries in rendering service. In his _Essays in
Social Justice_, Professor Carver discusses three forms of economic
competition at length. Here he includes competitive production,
competitive bargaining, and competitive consumption of economic goods.
The second class has already been referred to as commercial persuasion.
Competitive production increases the supply of economic goods and
“always works well.” Competitive consumption, however, “always works
badly.” It means “rivalry in display, in ostentation, in the effort
to outshine or to outdress all one’s neighbors, or at least not to
be outshone or outdressed by them.” It is usually deceptive; it has
no productive features about it. It may even assume a form of waste
and destruction. The highest type of conflict is friendly rivalry in
rendering service to other people.

Professor Carver would have self-interest direct its efforts toward the
welfare of the nation. Since neither law nor government can eliminate
self-interest, the next best thing is to connect it with national
well-being. Nearly all useful things that are done in a community are
undertaken through self-interest.[XX-15] Even co-operation is a form
of competition.[XX-16] The purpose of co-operation is to enable groups
of individuals to compete more effectively against opposing groups.

Competition is not an evil in itself. The spirit which dominates
competition is the important thing. Some people are motivated by the
pig-trough philosophy, which emphasizes struggle for the sake of
possession and consumption of goods. The workbench philosophy accents
“action and not possession, production and not consumption.”

These theories, excellent in many particulars, apparently do not rate
at full value the fact that education and love can and do modify the
self-interest of the individual, and at the same time direct the
attention of the individual toward unselfish service. In stressing
service through achievement and production, they neglect to emphasize
achievement through service. Competition in rendering unselfish service
is underrated.

It was Novicow, the Russian sociologist, who laid bare the alleged
benefits of war, showing that the gains which come from war may be
obtained through other methods of social interaction.[XX-17] Novicow
argued forcefully that the real enemies of a group of people are
disease germs and death, not the best people of other nationality
groups. Novicow’s vision enabled him to perceive the foolishness of men
who lock themselves together in destructive conflict, when the real
enemies are microscopic disease bacteria and the gaunt black specter
of death.

Conflict bulks large in the sociology of Edward A. Ross. Any
interference with the carrying out of the individual’s plans and
with the satisfying of his interests creates opposition. The best
characteristic of the phenomenon of opposition is that it awakens and
stimulates.[XX-18] Competition operates according to psychologic laws;
for example, the intensity of competition varies according (1) to the
degree of personal liberty, (2) to the rate of social change, and (3)
inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents.[XX-19]

One of the most important forms of competition is found in
industrialism. The invention and adoption of the power-driven machine
has created an industrialism which is moulding and transforming society
in startling ways, and which is causing “its members more and more to
cluster at opposite poles of the social spindle.”[XX-20] Professor Ross
expresses slight hope that the ownership of industrial capital will be
disseminated through the working class according to the conflict rules
of the present economic system.

Other conflict theories will be presented in the following chapters;
for example, the conflict theories of Gustav Ratzenhofer and Albion
W. Small will be noted in the chapter on co-operation concepts, and
Gabriel Tarde’s analysis of conflict will be taken up in the discussion
of psycho-sociological thought.

In general, the social conflict doctrines, when carried to the extreme,
fail to recognize that conflict and co-operation are correlative
social processes. Humanly speaking, one is as old as the other. Both
spring from the deepest types of human needs. While the earliest types
of associative life may have been characterized by a predominance of
conflict, the highest stages are ruled by the co-operative spirit. This
transition together with the leading co-operation theories of social
progress will be taken up in the chapter which follows.

Suffice it to say here that conflict and competition are essential
to social advance. They are both highly useful when operating in the
fields of production and service.




CHAPTER XXI

CO-OPERATION THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY


One of the first persons to work out a systematic interpretation
of co-operation was Giovanni Vico (1668–1744), an Italian
philosopher.[XXI-1] Vico rejected the social contract idea because he
believed that it was a false interpretation of the true principle of
co-operation. The concept of a social contract embodied an artificial
and metaphysical notion of social life.

In his chief work, _Principles of a New Science Concerning the
Common Nature of Nations_, Vico inaugurated a study of actual social
phenomena. He sought to discover possible social laws. He attempted
to cast aside the accidental social elements and to organize the
regularities of social phenomena into laws. He searched for the laws
governing the growth and decay of societies. He undertook to analyze
the history of human society.

Although Vico’s important treatise was not known outside of Italy until
a century and a half after it was originally published, it contained a
statement of the factor which is basic to any sound co-operation theory
of social progress. Vico was one of the first writers to describe the
principle that all human groups have a common nature. His comparative
studies of human institutions everywhere, led him always to the belief
in the common mind of mankind, a concept which in recent years has been
ably elaborated by D. G. Brinton. For this contribution Vico has been
called “the father of sociology.”

According to Vico, the fundamental social movement is a gradual
unfolding or evolution of social institutions in response to the
common needs of people. Society owes its development in part to the
reflections of the wise, as the social contract theorists have said,
but also to the human feelings even of the brutish. This natural
sociability of man has furnished the chief basis for the rise and
development of the spirit of co-operation.

The natural sociability of human beings has led, more or less
unconsciously on the part of man, to the establishment of necessary
social relations and institutions. The purpose of social organization
is to produce perfect human personalities. Vico outlined the
evolutionary character of society according to the spiral theory,
namely, that society does return upon itself but that, when it
completes a cycle, it is upon a higher plane of co-operation than when
the given cycle began. Vico also made religion a necessary principle of
progress. Although in adjusting himself to the prevailing theological
dogmas of his time, Vico committed serious scientific errors, he
nevertheless is deserving of special credit for his emphasis upon the
common nature and natural sociability of mankind.

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), the celebrated Dutch scholar, gave to social
thought the international concept. He advanced the idea of the coming
co-operation among the nations--nations which in his time were moved
primarily by jealousy and hatred in their relations with one another.
Grotius was the originator of a definite set of principles and laws for
international co-operation. His work in this regard accentuated the
importance of like-mindedness in matters of international polity.

Spinoza, whose contributions regarding the concept of sovereignty have
already been stated, declared that the instinct to acquire is naturally
stronger than the tendency to share. Hence, man must be educated to
perceive the advantages of co-operative living. When this appreciation
occurs, when the advantages of co-operation become clear, then man will
sublimate his egoistic and self-seeking desires to altruistic communal
living. As man comes to understand, step by step, the values of
co-operative conduct, he will overcome, degree by degree, his selfish
impulses.

The references which were made in Chapter XIV to the work and writings
of certain socialists, such as Robert Owen, form another link in this
discussion of the development of the co-operation concept. While the
experiments in consumers’ co-operation, such as the activities of
the Rochdale Pioneers, have had splendid success in many countries,
they have demonstrated that they can flourish only in an environment
where the co-operative spirit rules. While the experiments in
producers’ co-operation have often failed and have not yet as a class
been successful, they have testified to the absence of a developed
co-operative spirit rather than to the failure of the principle upon
which they are based.

Peter Kropotkin, whose opposition to socialism was indicated in Chapter
XIV, rendered a useful service in writing his _Mutual Aid; a Factor
in Evolution_. Kropotkin, a loyal Darwinian, protested against the
falsely labeled “social Darwinianism.”[XXI-3] Kropotkin made plain that
Darwin’s interpretation of evolution, while stressing the struggle for
existence, also pointed out that there is in evolution a powerful tide
of co-operation. The logical conclusion of this treatment of evolution,
according to Kropotkin, is not a phase of “social Darwinianism” with
its emphasis upon a biological struggle in the highest human realms,
but a world of human association in which the co-operative spirit has
risen to a position of control over physical force and selfish desire.

Kropotkin studied animal life extensively and concluded that, although
there was among animals a severe struggle against a heartless Nature,
there was essentially no bitter struggle for existence “among animals
belonging to the same species.”[XXI-3] There is no pitiless inner war
for life within this species, and moreover, this alleged war is not a
condition of progress. War, declared Kropotkin, is not a condition of
social progress.

Kropotkin considered the clan and the tribe rather than the individual
or even the family the starting point of society. The tribe itself
developed a morale on the basis of beliefs in its common origin and
in the worship of common ancestors. Then the possession in common of
certain lands served to arouse new tribal loyalties. These loyalties
expressed themselves in the form of “con-jurations,” sworn agreements,
and ultimately in fraternities and guilds for mutual support. Kropotkin
believed that primitive man was naturally peaceful, and that he fought
from necessity rather than from ferocity.

In primitive communal organization the judge and military chief united
for “mutual insurance of domination,” drawing to their support the
slavish loyalty of the witch-doctor or priest. In the twelfth century,
however, the old communal spirit broke forth with “striking spontaneity
all over Europe;” it stopped for a time the growth of the despotic
monarchies of Europe; it produced endless numbers of communes.

The free cities developed under the shelter of communal liberties, and
in them art and invention flourished, producing the beauty of Raphael,
the vigor of Michaelangelo, the poetry of Dante, and “the discoveries
which have been made by modern science,--the compass, the clock, the
watch, printing, gunpowder, the maritime discoveries, the law of
gravitation.”[XXI-4]

Then, there came the modern State formed by a triple alliance of
the military chief, the Roman judge, and the priest. The industrial
revolution and the rise of capitalism furthered the interests of
the military-legal-priestly triumvirate. When the State and Church
were separated, the money baron took the place of the priest in
the triumvirate. With the overthrow of militarism the power of
the triumvirate is broken, and the old communal co-operative
feelings of man again begin to express themselves. Kropotkin led
the way in defining the law of co-operative individualism. He urged
decentralization in social control, and attacked monopolies of all
types, public as well as private. Although he exaggerated the rôle of
mutual aid in primitive society, considering it the main social factor,
he nevertheless rendered a valuable service in giving the world a
vigorous presentation of a significant concept.

The social process was analyzed in terms of both conflict and
co-operation by Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842–1904). It is characterized
by a continuous reappearance of the phenomena of individualization
of structures already extant.[XXI-5] Both differentiation and
socialization arise out of the operation of human interests. Both
are implicit in the nature of man. Certain human interests lead to
individualization and some to communitization.

At this point we encounter Ratzenhofer’s theory of force. Force and
interest are made the two primordial principles. These two factors work
together in order to secure for the individual the largest possible
degree of self development.

The struggle of pre-primitive men against the harsh phases of nature
established a pre-primitive sociality. Struggle has always led
to co-operation in the interests of preservation. Similarly, war
leads to co-operation. In primitive society institutions arose in
response to community needs. Among barbarians the increase in numbers
produced an increasing emphasis upon conflict, which was expressed in
robberies, wars, and enslavements. Warfare led to the formation of
classes and class conflicts. Class interests, as distinguished from
individual interests, then began to secure definition. With the rise
of capitalism, the interests of capital were asserted; and at once
the interests of labor, in apposition, assumed tangible expression.
A stage, however, of stable social conditions is coming, in which
the whole world will be organized on the basis of a single system
of economic and non-competing production and of free international
exchange.[XXI-6]

Throughout this analysis Ratzenhofer gives force a leading
place.[XXI-7] He also develops a theory of a ruling aristocracy
of supermen. Despite these unfortunate emphases, Ratzenhofer’s
contribution to social thought in his theory of interests as
dominating human factors, and his accent upon the rise of an
increasing degree of co-operation, is noteworthy.

Professor Albion Small, whose methodology will be indicated in Chapter
XXVII, has modified, corrected, and refined Ratzenhofer’s theory
of interests. “In the beginning were interests,” says Professor
Small.[XXI-8] An “interest” is defined as an unsatisfied capacity, an
unrealized condition of the organism, a tendency securing satisfaction
of an unsatisfied capacity.[XXI-9] In its subjective phase an interest
is a desire, and in its objective phase, a want. An interest is
developed when the individual knows something, feels something, or
wills something. Consequently, the whole individual or social process
consists in developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests.

The six groups into which Professor Small divides all interests are
as follows: (1) The health interest arises from the sheer interest
in keeping alive. It is expressed in the food interest, the sex
interest, the work interest and includes all the desires which find
satisfaction in the exercise of the powers of the body. (2) The wealth
interest is encompassed in the desire for mastery over things. (3)
The sociability interest is represented at its best by the appetite
for personal interchanges of stimulus of a purely spiritual nature.
(4) The knowledge interest arises from the curiosity impulses. The
limits of its possibilities are expressed in the terms, nescience
and omniscience. (5) The beauty interest secures satisfaction through
an appreciation of the symmetrical phases of material and spiritual
phenomena. (6) The rightness interest traverses the gamut of all other
interests. It results in enjoyment when it secures the sanction of the
individual’s ideal self or of his whole self.

Each of these interests tends to be absolute.[XXI-10] Each seeks
satisfaction regardless of the others. In consequence, there is a
universal conflict of interests. Moreover, there is a universal
conjunction of interests. The conflict, however, is more spectacular
than the conjunction. In the history of mankind this conflict has been
the predominating relationship. The social process has resolved itself
into a series of reactions between persons some of whose interests
comport, but others of which conflict. Furthermore, the social process
is a continual formation of groups and institutions around interests.
It is a perpetual equating and adjusting of interests;[XXI-11] it is a
rhythm of differentiations and integrations.

Professor Small points out that struggle and co-operation are always
to a certain extent functions of each other.[XXI-12] Moreover, in
the social process viewed historically, there is a movement “from a
maximum toward a minimum of conflict, from a minimum toward a maximum
of helpful reciprocity.” The social process, thus, is a perpetual
readjustment between the forces which “tend backward toward more
struggle, and those that tend forward toward more socialization.” By a
minimum of conflict, Professor Small does not mean absence of conflict,
for he recognizes that stagnation would result in a society in which
conflict was eliminated. By a maximum of co-operation he does not refer
to a state of complete social solidification, which in turn would mean
stagnation and death.

The fundamental social problem is to give free scope to those interests
which require the fullest rational development of all other interests.
The social problem is to intellectualize all the interests, and
moreover, to intellectualize the conflict of interests. Hence the
fundamental conflict today is between the knowledge interest and all
other interests.[XXI-13] Socialization, then, becomes the process of
transforming conflict into co-operation.

Sociology may be said to be the study of human interests, together with
their conflicts and reciprocities. It is an interpretation of human
association in terms of the effective interests of man. It focalizes
within one field of vision all human activities so that the persons
who have the benefit of this outlook may rate their own activities in
relation to the whole.

In a concrete, specific way Professor Small has presented his theory
of the social process in the book, _Between Eras, From Capitalism to
Democracy_. Here is a vivid picture of the conflict between labor
and capital, with the resultant misunderstandings and injustices. A
young lady, Hector, observes the essential activities of labor and
capital, and as a representative of capital perceives the relationship
which actually exists between herself and one of the working girls.
She receives large dividends, for which she puts nothing into the
productive activities of the corporation. The working girl is paid
low wages, but is giving her life to the industrial concern from
which Hector’s liberal dividends are pouring forth. The main end of
the discussion is an argument for the establishment of the principle
of industrial democracy. Professor Small urges that the employees,
_per se_, be given representation on boards of directors. While this
representation at first will necessarily be a minority one, it will
serve the useful purpose of providing for regular meetings of the
representatives of the employees around the same council table. These
council meetings will enable the representatives of either party in the
bitter labor-capital conflict to become acquainted with the problems
which the opposing group faces. In this interchange Professor Small
sees the rise of a spirit of co-operation which will melt many of the
difficulties that have sprung up in the controversy between capital
and labor.[XXI-14] Although Dr. Small’s _Between Eras_ was published
in 1913, the idea of industrial representation was not considered
seriously in the United States until about 1918. The initial steps
which have thus far been taken toward industrial representation in the
management of business and in the determination of wages, hours, and
conditions of labor, have produced noteworthy co-operative results and
have fully justified Professor Small’s prophetic recommendation for the
solution of a world-disturbing social situation.

The primordial social group, according to Professor E. A. Ross, is
a band of mothers and their children. In such groupings preliminary
socialization took place. In earliest societies definite principles of
human action made themselves evident.[XXI-15] Domination was one of the
ruling principles. Note for example the domination (1) by parents over
offspring, (2) by old over young, (3) by husband over wife, (4) by men
over women, (5) by the military over the industrial classes, (6) by the
wealthy over the poor. The chief purpose in dominating is to exploit,
that is, to use other individuals as means to one’s own ends.[XXI-16]

Socialization, or social adaptation, runs the gamut of toleration,
compromise, accommodation, and amalgamation. The simplest form of
co-operation is mutual aid, which, however, is more popular among the
lower classes than among the higher. Socialization, it may be noted
here, has been shown by E. W. Burgess to be the fundamental process in
the determination of social progress.[XXI-17]

Organization of effort is a specific societal method, which has
developed in society, for getting things done. Organization results
(1) in the accomplishment of ends which are unattainable otherwise, (2)
in arousing a common interest intermittently in all, (3) in dividing a
task into its natural parts, (4) in securing a degree of expertness,
(5) in producing a co-ordinated, intelligent plan, (6) in eliminating
needless duplication of effort.[XXI-18] On the other hand, organization
leads to wastes and abuses, which are: (1) overhead expenses; (2) undue
time devoted to making out reports and similar routine work; (3) a loss
in personal contacts; (4) a tendency to formalism and red tape; (5) an
inflexibility of machinery; (6) a misapplication of power to personal
ends; (7) too much specialization; (8) the organization becomes an end
in itself.

Socialization, in content, is the development of a we-feeling in a
number of persons, and “their growth in capacity and will to act
together.”[XXI-19] A very simple causal factor of this process is the
age-long custom of giving a banquet, that is, in eating and drinking
together. A consciousness of kind arises which, as Professor Ross
believes, is not the perception of a general resemblance but “an
awareness of likeness or agreement in specific matters.”[XXI-20]
Nationalism, or the process of creating a spirit of national
patriotism, illustrates the meaning of the socialization concept.

The sociology of L. T. Hobhouse, discussed in part in Chapter XVIII,
is largely an interpretation of society in terms of increasing
co-operation. Professor Hobhouse has defined social progress as
the development of the principle of union, order, co-operation, and
harmony among individuals. He has described a certain mutual interest,
similar to Giddings’ consciousness of kind, which has served to keep
individuals together, from the lowest groups of savages to the highest
civilized groups.[XXI-21]

The social process, as Professor Cooley analyzes it, is not a series of
futile repetitions or brutal and wasteful conflicts, but an eternal,
onward growth which produces increasingly humane, rational, and
co-operative beings. While the element of conflict is useful in that
it awakens and directs human attention and thus leads to activity, it
is limited by a superintending factor of co-operation and organization
to which the contestants must adjust themselves if they would
succeed.[XXI-22]

The discussions in this and the preceding chapter have shown that the
natural trend of evolution is away from a pitiless competitive and
destructive social process, and toward a tempered, productive, and
co-operative process. Of course, there are reactionary movements from
time to time which halt the co-operative trend. On the other hand, the
development of reason gradually eliminates the more brutal effects of
conflict. Conflict, however, will always remain, as far as can now be
seen, an essential factor in the processes of individual and societal
growth. Through rational controls, it will operate in the direction and
interest of the co-operative spirit. In the old social order, hate
and the spirit of conflict have ruled. The spirit of co-operation has
often been utilized only for selfish purposes. In the coming social
order love and the co-operative spirit will direct, while the spirit of
conflict will play a vital but secondary rôle.




CHAPTER XXII

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT


A large number of references have already been made to
psycho-sociologic thought. In origin it may be traced to the primitive
days of the race. The folkways reveal keen psycho-sociologic
observations. Undoubtedly, many phases of the psychic nature of group
activities were known to the leaders of ancient civilizations. Plato
wrote on the importance of custom and custom imitation as a societal
force. Aristotle understood the socio-psychic nature of man when he
observed that property which is owned in common is least taken care
of, and when he declared that a fundamental test of good government
may be found in the attitude of a people toward public service. In his
theory of social attitudes Aristotle made a distinct contribution to
psycho-sociologic thought.

Thomas More analyzed the causes of human actions. He was a worthy
social psychologist when he protested against heaping punishment upon
human beings, without attempting to understand the causes of criminal
conduct and without seeking to remove the societal causes of such
conduct. Bodin postulated a theory of interests in his explanation of
social evolution. He made the common economic, religious, and other
interests of man the basis of social organization. These interests,
according to Bodin, led primitive families to form a commonality of
organization or government.

It was Hobbes who believed that man originally was a being of entirely
selfish interests. Man’s interest in others was based on their ability
to cater to his own good. This theory still has strong support; there
are large numbers of individuals who today apparently are living
according to this rule. Nations oftentimes still seem to be motivated
by no higher principle. On the basis of an introspective psychology,
Hobbes made the scientific observation that “he that is going to be a
whole man must read in himself--mankind.” Such a person must not simply
find in himself this or that man’s interests, but the interests of all
mankind.

George Berkeley (1685–1753), bishop of Cloyne and eminent philosopher,
in his _Principles of Moral Attraction_ attempted to point out the
analogies between the physical and social universe. His work was
stimulated by the discoveries of Isaac Newton. He tried to apply the
Newtonian formulas to society. While his “physical analogies” are of
little value, they represent a stage in the rise of psycho-sociologic
thought. He made the social instinct, or the gregarious instinct, in
society the analogue of the force of gravitation. The centrifugal force
in society is selfishness; and the centripetal, sociability. As the
attractive force of one mass for another varies directly in relation
to the distance between them, so the attraction of individuals for
one another varies directly in proportion to their resemblances. The
physical analogies, however, could not be carried far without being
lost in the realm of absurdity.

The Scotch philosopher, David Hume, has been called the father of
social psychology because of his splendid analysis of sympathy as a
social force. “Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to
serve and obey one man, ... he will still be miserable, till you give
him some one person at least with whom he may share his happiness,
and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.”[XXII-1] “Whatever
other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice,
curiosity, revenge or lust,--the soul or animating principle of them is
sympathy.”[XXII-2]

But sympathy is not always limited in its operation to the present
moment. Through sympathy we may put ourselves in the future situation
of any person whose present condition arouses our interest in him.
Moreover, if we see a stranger in danger, we will run to his assistance.

Vice was defined by Hume as everything which gives uneasiness in
human actions. By sympathy, we become uneasy when we become aware
of injustice anywhere. “Self-interest is the original motive to the
establishment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the
source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue.”[XXII-3]
There is a continual conflict between self-interest and sympathy, both
in the individual and between individuals in society. Although at
times this self-interest seems to predominate, “it does not entirely
abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good
offices.”[XXII-4]

Sympathy causes people to be interested in the good of mankind.[XXII-5]
But whatever human factor is contiguous either in space or time has a
proportional effect on the will, passions, and imagination.[XXII-6] It
commonly operates with greater force than any human factor that lies in
a distant and more obscure light. This principle explains why people
often act in contradiction to their interests, and “why they prefer
any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in
society.”

In accordance with the analysis of sympathy by Hume, Adam Smith made
sympathy a leading concept in his theory of political economy. Smith
also carried the concept of self-interest, with the resultant conflict
between self-interest and social interest, into nearly all his economic
theories.

According to Adam Smith there are four classes of people in modern
life. (1) There are those who live by taking rent. They have social
interests but are not socially productive; they grow listless and
careless. (2) There is the class which takes wages. This group is
large, productive, and socially interested, but their widespread lack
of education makes them subject to the passions of the day, and hence
socially useless or even harmful. (3) Those who take profit have
interests at direct variance with the welfare of society. Their selfish
interests become unduly developed; their public attitudes are usually
dangerous to all except themselves. (4) The fourth group is composed
of all who derive a living from serving one or more of the three
afore-mentioned classes. The interests of the three first-mentioned
groups often clash, leading to destructive social conflicts. Despite
this conclusion, Adam Smith was an advocate of _laissez faire_. He
urged that natural laws be allowed to express themselves normally.

In 1859, Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal began to contribute
to social thought in the _Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie und
Sprachwissenschaft_. They applied psychological methods to the study
of primitive society. In this journal they made notable contributions
concerning the social customs and mental traits of early mankind.
It is in this field, which was discussed in Chapter XVIII, that the
original work of such men as Franz Boas, W. G. Sumner, W. I. Thomas,
and L. T. Hobhouse belongs. Fundamental pioneering in psycho-sociologic
thought was done by Lester F. Ward (see Chapter XVII). Ward opposed
the prevailing belief of his time, and particularly of Herbert
Spencer, that society must continue as it now is going on, namely, an
exhibition of a blind struggle of competitive forces. He not only
perceived the rise of mind out of the obscure processes of social
evolution, but more important still, he noted the part that mind may
play in modifying the course of social forces. Although he considered
the human desires to be the dynamic social elements, he gave to mind,
through its power of prevision, the prerogative of directing the
desires of mankind. Moreover, he pointed out the direction in which
mind could best guide the desires. He urged a sociocracy in which the
desires of the individual are so controlled that they operate only when
in harmony with the welfare of other individuals. For establishing
these fundamental considerations, Ward ranks high in the history of
psycho-sociologic thought.

The chief founder of social psychology was Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904).
He wrote the first important treatise in the field of the psychology of
society. The _Lois de l’imitation_ established Tarde’s reputation as a
social psychologist, and at the same time aroused the world of thought
to the existence of a new phase of social science. Tarde was a jurist
who inquired into the causes of anti-social conduct. He was greatly
impressed by the observation that criminal acts are committed in
waves. Upon examination of this fact he found imitation to be a potent
factor, and began to analyze the laws of imitation. This study soon
showed that not all is imitation but that much human conduct arises
out of opposition. His analysis of the laws of opposition led him to
the conclusion that imitation and opposition are the bases of a third
social factor, invention. The social process, as he observed it, is
characterized (1) by an ever-widening imitation of inventions, (2) by
the opposition of conflicting circles of imitation, and (3) by the rise
of new inventions (out of these oppositions), which in turn become the
centers of new imitations. Thus, the social process goes on, endlessly
and unconsciously or consciously. To understand society, Tarde believed
that one must understand how minds act and interact.

Tarde’s work, first presented is _Les Lois de l’imitation_, was
formally developed in his _Logique sociale_, and summarized in his
_Lois sociale_ (English translation, _Social Laws_). Together, these
books constitute a unique social theory. Although Tarde’s approach to
the psychology of society was objective and sociological, and although
he did not give serious attention to the purely psychological nature of
the mind nor to the instinctive bases of conduct, he nevertheless made
a contribution to social thought which is valid and enlightening.

Society, according to Tarde, is a group of people “who
display many resemblances, produced either by imitation or by
counter-imitation.”[XXII-7] Again, he says that society is “a group of
distinct individuals who render one another mutual services.”[XXII-8]
Societies are groups of people who are organized because of agreement
or disagreement of beliefs.[XXII-9] “Society is imitation.”[XXII-10]
The outstanding element in social life is a psychological process in
which inventions are followed by imitations, which when coming into
inevitable oppositions produce new inventions.

To the degree that a person is social he is imitative. In the way
that vital, or biological, resemblances are due to heredity, so human
resemblances are caused by imitation. The closer the human resemblances
between individuals, even though they be occupational competitors,
the larger will be the proportion of imitations and the closer the
social relationships. The father will always be the son’s first
model.[XXII-11] A beloved ruler will so fascinate his people that they
will imitate blindly, yea, even be thrown into a state of catalepsy by
him. In such a case imitation becomes a kind of somnambulism.[XXII-12]

Imitations are characterized by inclines, plateaus, and
declines.[XXII-13] The incline refers to the period of time which an
imitation requires for adoption. The plateau is the length of time
during which an imitation is in force. The decline, of course, has to
do with the passing away of an imitation. Each of these phases are
of varying lengths--dependent upon the operation of almost countless
socio-psychical factors. It is this career through which all imitations
must pass that is the important phase of history.[XXII-14]

There are two causal factors determining the nature of imitation:
logical, and non-logical.[XXII-15] Logical causes operate when the
imitator adopts an innovation that is in line with the principles
that have already found a place in his own mind. Extra-logical,
or non-logical, imitations are those which are determined by the
adventitious factors of place, date, or birth of the individual.

The fundamental law of imitation, stated in simplest terms, is that
the superior are imitated by the inferior, for example: the patrician
by the plebeian; the nobleman by the commoner; the beloved by the
lover.[XXII-16] A more accurate statement of the law of imitation is
that “the thing that is most imitated is the most superior one of those
that are nearest.” The term “superior” in all these cases must be
used in the subjective sense, that is to say, that which seems to the
specific individual to be superior, not necessarily that which actually
is the superior, is imitated.

A country or period of time is democratic if the distance between the
highest and lowest classes is lessened enough so that the highest may
be imitated freely by the lowest.[XXII-17] Democracy will keep the
distance between classes reduced to that minimum where imitation may
operate.

An important phase of sociology involves the knowledge and control of
imitations.[XXII-18] Sociological statistics should determine (1) “the
imitative power which inheres in every invention at any given time and
place;” and (2) “the beneficial or harmful effects which result from
the imitation of given inventions.”

Imitation is divided into sets of complementary tendencies; custom
imitation and fashion imitation; sympathy imitation and obedience
imitation; naïve imitation and deliberate imitation.[XXII-19]
Everywhere custom imitation and fashion imitation are embodied in
two parties, divisions, or organizations--the conservative and the
liberal.[XXII-20]

Through custom imitation, usages acquire autocratic power. They control
habit, regulate private conduct, and define morals and manners with
imperial authority. Usages are frequently extra-logical imitations.
Usages are commonly accepted first by the upper classes. They usually
are related primarily to objects of luxury; they stick tenaciously to
the leisure-time phases of life. Their most favorable _milieu_ is a
social and individual status of ignorance.

Fashion imitation rules by epochs, for example: Athens under Solon,
Rome under the Scipios, Florence in the fifteenth century.[XXII-21]
These epochs of fashion produce great individualities--illustrious
legislators, and founders of empire. Whenever the currents of fashions
are set free, the inventive imagination is excited and ambitions are
stimulated.

Fashion imitation has a democratizing influence. A prolonged process
of fashion imitation ends “by putting pupil-peoples upon the same
level, both in their armaments and in their arts and sciences, with
their master people.”[XXII-22] In fact, the very desire to be like the
superior is a latent democratizing force.

The counterpart of imitation is opposition. Opposition, however, may be
a very special kind of repetition. There are two types of opposition:
interference-combinations and interference-conflicts.[XXII-23]
The first type refers to the coming together of two psychological
quantities of desire and belief with the result that combination
takes place and a total gain is made. The second type refers to
the opposition resulting from incompatible forces. In this case an
individual or social loss is registered.

From another standpoint, opposition appears in one of three forms,
namely, war, competition, and discussion.[XXII-24] Conflicts often
pass through these three forms, which are obedient to the same law of
development, but in order are characterized by ever-widening areas of
pacification, alternating however with renewals of discord. As war is
the lowest, most brutal form of conflict, discussion is the highest,
most rational form.

Opposition in human life is society’s logical duel.[XXII-25] This
duel sometimes ends abruptly when one of the adversaries is summarily
suppressed by force. Sometimes a resort to arms brings a military
victory. Sometimes a new invention or discovery expels one of the
adversaries from the social scene.

The logical result of opposition is invention or adaptation.
“Invention is a question followed by an answer.”[XXII-26] Invention,
or adaptation, at its best is “the felicitous interference of two
imitations, occurring first in one single mind.”[XXII-27] Inventions
grow in two ways: (1) in extension--by imitative diffusion; and (2)
in comprehension--by a series of logical combinations, such as the
combination of the wheel and the horse in the inventions of the
horse-cart.[XXII-28]

Inventions partially determine the nature of new inventions and new
discoveries. A new invention makes possible other inventions, and so
on. Each invention is the possible parent of a thousand offspring
inventions.

To be inventive, one must be wide-awake, inquiring, incredulous, not
docile and dreamy, or living in a social sleep. The inventor is one who
escapes, for the time being, from his social surroundings.[XXII-29]
Inventing develops from wanting. A man experiences some want, and in
order to satisfy this want he invents. Inventiveness is contrary in
nature to sheepishness.

Since an invention is the answer to a problem, inventions are
the real objective factors which mark the stage of progress. But
invention, according to Tarde, becomes increasingly difficult.
Problems naturally grow increasingly complex as the simpler ones
are mastered. Unfortunately, the mind of man is not capable of
indefinite development, and therefore will reach a limit in solving
problems.[XXII-30] At this point, Tarde is on doubtful ground. His
argument can neither be proved nor disproved. Apparently, man’s
ability to solve problems increases with his training and experience in
that connection. Moreover, man appears to be at the very dawn of his
possibilities in the field of invention. He is only beginning to gather
together systematically the materials for inventing, and to understand
slightly the principles of inventing.

Inventors are imitative.[XXII-31] This statement is but another way
of saying that inventions are cumulative, that they come in droves,
that they are gregarious. A new discovery will arouse the ambition
of many wide-awake persons to make similar discoveries. “There
is in every period a current of inventions which is in a certain
general sense religious or architectural or sculptural or musical or
philosophical.”[XXII-32]

Invention and imitation represent the chief forces in society.[XXII-33]
Invention is “intermittent, rare, and eruptive only at certain
infrequent intervals.” It explains “the source of privileges,
monopolies, and aristocratic inequalities.” Imitation, on the other
hand, is democratic, leveling, and “incessant like the stream
deposition of the Nile or Euphrates.” At times the eruptions of
invention take place faster than they can be imitated. At other times
imitations flow in a monotonous circular current.

The contributions of Tarde to social thought have stimulated numerous
investigators to enter the field of social psychology. While Tarde’s
thinking has been severely criticised by the psychologists and
modified by the sociologists, it has opened mines of valuable social
ores. Not the least important consideration was the impetus which the
Tardian thought gave to American writers, such as E. A. Ross.[XXII-34]
Tarde’s name, however, will be long revered for the penetrating way
in which he developed the concept of imitation. Although Walter
Bagehot, an English publicist, in an epoch-stirring book, _Physics and
Politics_, published an important chapter on “Imitation” as early as
1872, it was Tarde’s _Lois de l’imitation_ in 1890 which at once became
the authority on the subject. In the United States, Michael M. Davis,
Jr., has written an excellent summary of Tarde’s socio-psychologic
thought.[XXII-35] As a critical digest of Tardian thought, Dr. Davis’
_Psychological Interpretations of Society_ is unsurpassed.

In 1892, Profesor H. Schmidkunz published an elaborate work on the
_Psychologie der Suggestion_. This book is an important pioneer
work. In the English language, the writings of Boris Sidis on the
psychology of suggestion are well-known. Professor E. A. Ross has given
an intensive treatment of the theme in his _Social Psychology_. In
these various discussions, however, the fact is not made clear that
suggestion and imitation are correlative phases of the same phenomenon.
The point, also, is not developed that suggestion-imitation phenomena
are natural products of social situations in which like stimuli
normally produce like responses.

In 1895, the first book by Gustave Le Bon on crowd psychology was
published. Le Bon has also written on the psychology of revolutions,
of war, and of peoples. He gave a limited definition to the term,
crowds, and then applied the term to nearly all types of group life.
He conceived of crowds as “feeling phenomena.” They are more or less
pathological. Since the proletariat are subject to crowd psychology,
they are untrustworthy and to be rewarded perpetually with suspicion.
A sounder, more synthetic, and historical position concerning the
psychology of groups and of society is taken by G. L. Duprat in _La
Psychologie sociale_.

Italian contributions in the field of crowd and group psychology are
represented by Paolo Orano’s _Psicologia sociale_, which includes only
a partial treatment of the subject that is indicated by the title;
and by Scipio Sighele’s _La foule criminelle_ and _Psychologie des
sectes_. Permanent groups, according to Sighele (following Tarde),
are either sects, castes, classes, or states.[XXII-36] The sect is a
group of individuals which possesses a common ideal and faith, such as
a religious denomination or a political party. The caste arises from
identity of profession. The class is characterized by a strong unity of
interests. States possess common bonds of language, national values,
and national prestige.

The concept of “consciousness of kind” was developed by Franklin H.
Giddings in his _Principles of Sociology_ (1896). Consciousness of kind
is the original and elementary subjective fact in society.[XXII-37]
Professor Giddings defines this term to mean “a state of consciousness
in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life,
recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself.” In its
widest meaning, consciousness of kind marks the difference between the
animate and the inanimate. Among human beings it distinguishes “social
conduct” from purely economic or purely religious activity. Around
consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, all other human
motives organize themselves.

People group together according to the development of the
consciousness of kind in them. Roughly speaking, there are four
such groupings.[XXII-38] (1) The non-social are persons in whom the
consciousness of kind has not yet developed--in whom it finds imperfect
but not degenerate expression, and from whom the other classes arise.
(2) The anti-social, or criminal, classes include those persons in
whom the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction. They detest
society. (3) The pseudo-social, or pauper, classes are characterized
by a degeneration of the genuine consciousness of kind. (4) The social
classes are noted for a high development of the consciousness of kind;
they constitute the positive and constructive elements in society. At
the head of the list are the pre-eminently social. These people devote
their lives and means to the amelioration of society; they are called
the natural aristocracy of the race, the true social élite.

Consciousness of kind is made possible in part by the operation of
physical factors. Fertility of soil is one of the sources of human
aggregation. Favorable climate makes aggregation possible. Aggregation
of population is either genetic (due to the birth rate) or congregate
(due to immigration). Aggregation leads to association--the proper
_milieu_ for the growth of consciousness of kind.

Aggregation guarantees social intercourse, which is a mode of conflict.
Conflict, according to Professor Giddings, becomes the basis of social
growth.[XXII-39] Primary conflicts are those in which one adversary
is completely outdone, and hence likely to be crushed, by the other.
Secondary conflict refers to the contests between more or less evenly
balanced forces. Primary conflict is conquest; secondary conflict is
growth. Among people secondary conflict leads to the development of
consciousness of kind through the successive steps of communication,
imitation, toleration, co-operation, alliance. The supreme result
is the production of pre-eminently social classes. Of these various
factors, Professor Giddings particularly stresses imitation. “It is
the factor of imitation in the conflict that gradually assimilates and
harmonizes.”[XXII-40]

Association reacts upon individuals and produces self-consciousness,
which in turn creates social self-consciousness, or group awareness
of itself. Social self-consciousness is characterized by rational
discussion. With the rise of discussion, social memory, or traditions,
becomes possible. Moreover, a sense of social values arises. Public
opinion springs from the passing of judgment by the members of the
group upon any matters of general interest.[XXII-41]

Social memory, or traditions, becomes highly differentiated.[XXII-42]
It consists of impressions concerning the tangible world, the
intangible world, and the conceptional world. The traditions in any
field, plus current opinion in that field, form the standards, ideals,
faiths, “isms” of the time. For example, the integration of economic
traditions with current economic opinions is the general standard
of living of the time and place. The integration of the aesthetic
tradition with current criticism is taste, and the modification of a
traditional religious belief by current religious ideas is a faith.

Inasmuch as consciousness of kind is the psychological basis of social
phenomena, it is natural that the chief social value is the kind
itself, or the type of conscious life that is characteristic of the
society.[XXII-43] The social cohesion is another important social
value. Social cohesion is vital to the unity of any group; therefore
the group is usually willing to make many sacrifices in its own behalf.
The distinctive possessions and properties of the community, such as
territory, sacred or historic places, heroes, ceremonies, constitute
the third class of social values. A fourth group is found in the
general principles which promote the growth of the group; for example,
the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The social values
largely determine the social choices of groups and the nature of social
organizations.

Professor Giddings develops an interesting theory of the dualism in
social structures. Civilization is marked by the contemporaneous
existence of public and private associations. Civilized society
affords four main sets of dualistic associations: political, juristic,
economic, and cultural. In the political field there are private
political parties and the public association, namely, the government,
or the political party in power. Among juristic associations there
are the privately-organized vigilance committees and the public
associations, such as the police, the courts, the prisons. In the realm
of economics there are private individual entrepreneurs, partnerships,
corporations; and on the other hand, there are the governmentally-owned
railroads, postal service, the water systems, the coinage systems.
In regard to cultural associations we may note the privately endowed
universities and state universities, privately organized churches and
state churches, private charities and public charities. This dualism
in social structure is supported by Professor Giddings on the grounds
that private associations are needed for purposes of initiation,
experimentation, and stimulation; and the public associations serve the
useful purposes of regulation and maintenance of balance among various
contending factors.

The highest test of social organization is the development of social
personality. An efficient social organization is one which makes its
members “more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening
consciousness of kind.”[XXII-44]

In recent works Professor Giddings has developed the concept of
pluralistic behavior. “Any one or any combination of behavior
inciting stimuli may on occasion be reacted to by more than one
individual.”[XXII-45] The character of pluralistic reactions, whether
similar or dissimilar, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal, is
determined by two variables: (1) the strength of the stimulation; (2)
the similarity or dissimilarity of the reacting mechanisms.[XXII-46]
Thus Professor Giddings considers pluralistic behavior the subject
matter of the psychology of society, or sociology.

In 1897, _Social and Ethical Interpretations_, by J. Mark Baldwin, was
printed; it bears the subtitle of “A Study in Social Psychology.” This
was the first time that the term, social psychology, had appeared in
the title of a book in America, though three years earlier, in 1894,
one of the leading parts of Small and Vincent’s _Introduction to the
Study of Society_ was designated “social psychology” and included a
discussion of social consciousness, social intelligence, and social
volition. Baldwin’s _Social and Ethical Interpretations_ and Giddings’
_Principles of Sociology_ appeared almost simultaneously, one by a
psychologist and the other by a sociologist. One was written from the
genetic viewpoint, and the other from the objective viewpoint; one
dealt primarily with social psychology, and the other with a psychology
of society; one was built around the concept of the social self, and
the other around the concept of a consciousness of kind. They both
hastened the development of an organic social psychology.

Professor Baldwin demonstrated that the self is largely a product of
the give-and-take of social life. A child becomes aware of his self by
setting himself off from other selves. It is in group life, that is, in
contact with other selves, that the child develops a self consciousness.

Moreover, the self is bi-polar. One end of the self-pole is
characterized by what one thinks of himself, and the other end by what
he thinks of other persons.[XXII-47] “The ego and the alter are to our
thought one and the same thing.”[XXII-48]

People are so much alike because they are imitative. It is imitation
which keeps people alike. Imitation integrates individuals. Imitation
is either (1) a process whereby one individual consciously or
unconsciously copies another individual, or (2) the copying of a model,
that is, adopting a model which arises in one’s own mind.[XXII-49]

Baldwin found the law of social growth in the particularization by the
individual of society’s store of material, and by the generalization
on the part of society of the individual’s particularizations. The
essence of the first phase of this process is invention and of the
second, imitation. Baldwin considered invention and imitation the two
fundamental processes of social growth.

In this chapter the strength of the psychological approach to an
understanding of societary processes has been demonstrated. In the
chapter which follows the reader will find further materials, showing
the tremendous vitality of psycho-sociologic thought.




CHAPTER XXIII

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT (CONTINUED)


In 1902, _Human Nature and the Social Order_ by Professor Charles H.
Cooley was published. This book was at once accepted as an authority
on the integral relationship of the individual self and the social
process. It was followed in 1909 by _Social Organization_, and in
1918 by _Social Process_. The three books constitute a chronological
development of a logical system of psycho-sociologic thought.

The first volume treats of the self in its reactions to group life;
the second explains the nature of primary groups, such as the family,
playground, and neighborhood, of the democratic mind, and of social
classes; the third analyzes the many elements in the processes by which
society is characterized. The chief thesis of the three volumes is that
the individual and society are aspects of the same phenomenon, and that
the individual and society are twin-born and twin-developed.[XXIII-1]

An individual has no separate existence. Through the hereditary
and social elements in his life he is inseparately bound up with
society.[XXIII-2] He cannot be considered apart from individuals. Even
the phenomena which are called individualistic “are always socialistic
in the sense that they are expressive of tendencies growing out of
the general life.”[XXIII-3] It is not only true that individuals make
society, but equally true that society makes individuals.

Professor Cooley has given an excellent presentation of what he calls
the looking-glass self. There are three distinct psychic elements in
this phenomenon: (1) the imagination of one’s appearance to another
person; (2) the imagined estimation of that appearance by the other
person; and (3) a sense of pride or chagrin that is felt by the
first person. The looking-glass self affects the daily life of all
individuals. “We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a
straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross
in the eyes of a refined one, and so on.”[XXIII-4] Even a person’s
consciousness of himself is largely a direct reflection of the opinions
and estimates which he believes that others hold of him.[XXIII-5]

Professor Cooley makes a lucid distinction between self consciousness,
social consciousness, and public consciousness. The first is what I
think of myself; the second, what I think of other people; and the
third, a collective view of the self and the social consciousness
of all the members of a group organized and integrated into
a communicating group.[XXIII-6] Moreover, all three types of
consciousness are parts of an organic whole. Even the moral life of
individuals is a part of the organic unity of society. Social knowledge
is the basis of morality. An upward endeavor is the essence of moral
progress.

The three groups which Professor Cooley has called primary are so
labeled because through them the individual gets “his earliest and
completest experience of social unity.”[XXIII-7] The family, play
groups, and neighborhoods remain throughout life as the experience
bases from which the more complex phases of life receive their
interpretation.

An unbounded faith in human nature is enjoyed by Professor Cooley.
Human nature comprises those sentiments and impulses which are
distinctly superior to those of the higher animals, such as sympathy,
love, resentment, ambition, the feeling of right and wrong.[XXIII-8]
The improvement of society, according to Professor Cooley, does not
involve any essential change in human nature but rather “a larger and
higher application of its familiar impulses.”[XXIII-9]

Communication is a fundamental concept in Professor Cooley’s system
of social thought. Communication is “the mechanism through which
human relations exist and develop.”[XXIII-10] Professor Cooley has
pointed out that not only does language constitute the symbols of the
mind, but that in a sense all objects and actions are mental symbols.
Communication is the means whereby the mind develops a true human
nature. The symbols of our social environment “supply the stimulus and
framework for all our growth.” Thus the communication concept furnishes
a substantial basis for understanding the psycho-sociologic phenomena
which are ordinarily called suggestion and imitation.

Personality has its origin partly in heredity and partly “in the stream
of communication, both of which flow from the corporate life of the
race.” A study of communication shows that the individual mind is not a
separate growth, but an integral development of the general mind.

The means of communication developed remarkably in the nineteenth
century, chiefly in the following ways: (1) in expressiveness, that
is, in the range of ideas and feelings they are competent to carry;
(2) in the permanence in recording; (3) in swiftness of communication;
and (4) in diffusion to all classes of people.[XXIII-12] Thus society
can be organized on the bases of intelligence and of rationalized and
systematized feelings rather than on authority, autocracy, and caste.

A free intercourse of ideas, that is, free and unimpeded communication,
will not produce uniformity. Self feeling will find enlarged
opportunities for expression. An increased degree of communication
furnishes the bases for making the individual conscious of the unique
part he can and should play in improving the quality of the social
whole. On the other hand, freedom of communication is tending to
produce “the disease of the century,” namely, the disease of excess, of
overwork, of prolonged worry, of a competitive race for which men are
not fully equipped.[XXIII-13]

Public opinion, according to Professor Cooley, is not merely an
aggregate of opinions of individuals, but “a co-operative product
of communication and reciprocal influence.”[XXIII-14] It is a
crystalization of diverse opinion, resulting in a certain stability
of thought. It is produced by discussion. Public opinion is usually
superior, in the sense of being more effective, than the average
opinion of the members of the public.

The masses make fundamental contributions to public opinion, not
through formulated ideas but through their sentiments. The masses
in their daily experiences are close to the salient facts of human
nature. They are not troubled with that preoccupation with ideas which
hinders them from immediate fellowship. Neither are they limited by
that attention to the hoarding of private property which prevents the
wealthy from keeping in touch with the common things of life.

The striking result of the social process is the development of
personalities. The social process affords opportunities which
individuals, ambitious and properly stimulated, may accept.
Education may perform a useful function in adjusting individuals to
opportunities. But education often fails because it requires too much
and inspires too little; it accents formal knowledge at the expense of
kindling the spirit.[XXIII-15]

Social stratification hinders.[XXIII-16] It cuts off communication.
It throws social ascendancy into the hands of a stable, communicating
minority. The majority are submerged in the morass of ignorance.
Degrading neighborhood associations, vicious parents, despised racial
connections--these all serve to produce stratification and to hinder
progress.

Professor Cooley holds that in the social process the institutional
element is as essential as the personal.[XXIII-17] Institutions
bequeath the standard gifts of the past to the individual; they give
stability. At the same time, if rationally controlled they leave energy
free for new conquests. Vigor in the individual commonly leads to
dissatisfaction on his part with institutions. Disorganization thus
arises from the reaction against institutional formalism manifested by
energetic individuals. It may be regarded as a lack of communication
between the individual and the institution. Formalism indicates that in
certain particulars there has been an excess of communication.

The economic concept of value has long been analyzed in individualistic
terms--the economic desires arise out of “the inscrutable depths of
the private mind.” To this explanation Professor Cooley replies that
economic wants, interests, and values are primarily of institutional
origin; they are socially created. Pecuniary valuations are largely
the products of group conditions and activities.

It is in a rational public will that Professor Cooley sees the
salvation of the social process. While he repeatedly expresses a
large degree of faith in human nature as it is, he looks forward to
a day, rather remote, when communication and education will enable
all individuals to take a large grasp of human situations and on the
basis of this grasp to express effectual social purposes. Unconscious
adaptation will be superseded by the deliberate self-direction of every
group along lines of broadening sympathy and widening intellectual
reaches.

Professor Cooley has earned the title of a sound, sane, and deep
sociological thinker. His contributions to social thought are found in
his lucid descriptions of the social process from which personalities
and social organizations arise, in his keen analysis of communication
as the fundamental element in progress, and in his emphasis upon
rational control through standards.

The year 1908 is a red letter year in the history of socio-psychologic
thought. In that year two important treatises appeared, one written by
William McDougall and the other by Edward Alsworth Ross. The former
was developed from the psychological standpoint; the latter, from the
sociological point of view.

Mr. McDougall considers social psychology largely as a study of the
social instincts of individuals; Professor Ross concentrates attention
upon the suggestion and imitation phases of societal life. In a sense
Professor Ross begins his analysis where Mr. McDougall concludes.

Mr. McDougall treats the instincts as the bases of social life.
He makes them the foundation of nearly all individual and social
activities.[XXIII-18] Instincts are biologically inherited; they cannot
be eradicated by the individual. Instincts constitute the materials out
of which habits are made. Consciousness arises only when an instinct or
a habit (that is, a modified instinct) fails to meet human needs.

The primary instincts are the sex and parental, the gregarious,
curiosity, flight, repulsion. Each is accompanied by its peculiar
emotion, for example, the instinct of flight by the emotion of
fear, the instinct of curiosity by the emotion of wonder. This
instinct-emotion theory is, however, drawn out until it seems to become
academic rather than actual in its details.

Professor McDougall points out that the instincts are the basic
elements upon which all social institutions are built.[XXIII-19] For
example, the sex and parental instincts are the foundations of the
family; the acquisitive instinct is an essential condition of the
accumulation of material wealth and of the rise of private property as
an institution. Pugnaciousness leads to war.

This emphasis upon the instincts reaches an extreme form in W.
Trotter’s _Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War_, where the herd
instinct is made all-dominant. According to Mr. Trotter the herd
instinct arouses fear in the individual and rules him through rigorous
conventional means--in a large percentages of cases to his detriment.

In conjunction with his theory of instincts, Professor McDougall has
advanced a noteworthy conception of the sentiments. The three leading
expressions of sentiment are love, hate, and respect. Sympathy is
regarded as an elemental sentiment, in fact, as an emotion in its
simplest form. A sentiment is “an organized system of emotional
tendencies centered about some object.” The sentiments comprise an
important phase of the self, and function powerfully in determining
social conduct.

It was in 1901 that Professor E. A. Ross made his initial contribution
to psycho-sociologic thought--seven years before his _Social
Psychology_ was published. His first great work was _Social Control_.
In this excursus he defined social psychology as the study of “the
psychic interplay between man and his environing society.”[XXIII-20]
This interplay is two-fold: the domination of society over the
individual (social ascendancy); and the domination of the individual
over society (individual ascendancy). Social ascendancy may be either
purposeless (social influence) or purposeful (social control). Social
psychology, according to Professor Ross, deals with psychic planes and
currents; it does not treat of groups, which is a part of the preserve
of psychological sociology.

The psycho-sociologic grounds of control are found in such factors as
sympathy, sociability, an elemental sense of justice, and particularly
in group needs. There are individuals whose conduct exasperates the
group. “In this common wrath and common vengeance lies the germ of a
social control of the person.”[XXIII-21]

Perhaps the best part of Professor Ross’ discussion of social control
is his analysis of the agents of control.[XXIII-22] Public opinion
and law are the two most important means of controlling individuals.
The weakness of one, in this connection, is its fitfulness; of the
other, its rigidity. Personal beliefs and ideals function widely and
effectively because of their subjective character. An individual may
escape the operation of law; he can hide away from the winds of public
opinion; but he cannot get away from his own ideas and conscience.
It is for this reason that religious convictions are powerful. Art
as a means of social control is commonly underrated. It arouses
the passions, kindles sympathies, creates a sense of the beautiful
and perfects social symbols, such as Columbia, La Belle France,
Britannia.[XXIII-23]

Systems of social control are political or moral.[XXIII-24] The
political form is more or less objective, is likely to be in the hands
of a few, is apt to be used for class benefit. The ethical arises from
sentiment rather than from utility; it is more or less subjective; it
permeates the hidden recesses of life. The ethical system is usually
mild, enlightening and suasive “rather than bold and fear-engendering.”
Individuals are ordinarily aware of political control, but the
far-reaching influences of ethical control they little suspect.

The two most difficult problems for society to solve in connection with
social control are these: (1) what measures of control may be best
imposed; and (2) how these measures should be imposed.[XXIII-25] The
variety of disciplines which society may use varies from epithets to
capital punishment. The methods vary from the democratic one of social
self-infliction to the direct autocratic procedure. Too much control
produces either stagnation or revolution, depending on the amount of
energy the rank and file may possess. Too little control leads to
anarchy, or at least to a reign of selfishness. A paternal social
control may cause resentment or a crushing of self-respect.

Suggestion and imitation are social elements that Professor Ross has
described in detail.[XXIII-26] He has demonstrated that the more
gregarious species are more suggestible than the species whose members
are more or less solitary; that southern races are more suggestible
than northern races, because of the different climatic effects upon
temperament; that children are more suggestible than adults, because
children possess a small store of facts and an undeveloped ability to
criticize; that people of a nervous temperament are more suggestible
than persons who are phlegmatic, because of difference in sensibility;
that women are more suggestible than men, because they have not had
the broadening influences which men have enjoyed, such as “higher
education, travel, self-direction, professional pursuits, participation
in intellectual and public life.”[XXIII-27]

The laws of imitation, particularly of fashion imitation and
rational imitation, which M. Tarde was the first to outline, have
been elucidated and illustrated by Professor Ross. He has cut boldly
into the shams of fashion, convention, and custom, and made a strong
plea for rationality in these fields. He has shown how mob mind,
the craze, and the fad sweep not simply the foolish and lightheaded
individuals off their feet, but also the persons who are counted as
sane and acquainted with common sense. In fact, he has made clear
that even the most level-headed are blindly or slavishly governed by
custom or fashion or both. He does not develop, however, the fact
that imitation is largely a result of like-mindedness and common
social stimuli. He implies an individual rather than a group origin of
suggestion-imitation phenomena.

It is in discussion that Professor Ross sees one of the main hopes of
progress.[XXIII-28] Discussion brings conflicts to a head, and leads
to group progress. Discussion changes a person’s opinions. Adequate
discussion leads to the settlement of a conflict and the creation of
an established public opinion, which remains in force until a new
invention occurs, a resultant conflict ensues, and a new public opinion
comes into power.

In 1920, Professor Ross made his largest and most important
contribution to social thought in his _Principles of Sociology_. This
work, however, is essentially a treatise in social psychology. The
original social forces are the human instincts, notably the fighting
instinct, the gregarious instinct, the parental instinct, the curiosity
instinct. The derivative social forces are societal complexes which
tend to satisfy instinctive cravings. Professor Ross’ classification
of the derivative social forces, or interests, is primarily fourfold.
These fundamental interests are wealth, government, religion, and
knowledge. This classification contains only two, or at best three,
of the six groups of interests which are found in Professor Small’s
exhibit.[XXIII-29]

Professor Ross’ analysis of the process of socialization has been
indicated in Chapter XXI. This phenomena is to be sharply distinguished
from ossification, which is the hardening of social life into
rigid forms.[XXIII-30] Groups often become unduly solidified. The
salvation of such a situation lies in individuation, which is a
process of pulverizing social lumps and releasing the action of their
members.[XXIII-31] Any movement that develops that spirit of personal
liberty leads to individuation.

“Commercialization is the increasing subjection of any calling or
function to the profits motive.”[XXIII-32] The various factors which
hold the profits motive in check are: (1) pleasure in creative
activity; (2) pride in the perfection of one’s product; (3) the desire
to live up to accepted standards of excellence; (4) abhorrence of sham
in one’s work; (5) interest in the welfare of the customer; (6) the
social service motive. The profits motive, however, receives support
from many social tendencies, notably: (1) the increasing distance
between producer and consumer; (2) the growing differentiation between
principals and subordinates; (3) the increasing importance of capital
in the practice of an art or occupation.

Professor Ross has set forth a valuable exhibit of the canons of social
reconstruction.[XXIII-33] (1) Reforms must not do violence to human
nature. (2) They must square with essential realities. (3) They should
be preceded by a close sociological study of the situation which it is
planned to change. (4) Reforms should be tried out on a small scale
before being adopted on a large scale. (5) A reform should be the
outcome of a social movement. (6) Under a popular government, reforms
should move according to legal and constitutional methods.

In regard to the improvement of social institutions, Professor Ross
rests his argument on the importance of standards. “Standards are,
perhaps, the most important things in society.”[XXIII-34] Although
invisible and intangible they reveal, better than anything else, the
quality of a society.

The current standards of the family may be improved through imparting
sound ideals of marriage, through fixing these ideals everywhere in
social tradition, and through making “the social atmosphere frosty
toward foolish and frivolous ideals of marriage.”[XXIII-35] Young
people may well be taught to look upon divorce as a moral shipwreck.
Loyalty to the state or society has its origin in the obedience of
children to parents in the family. A sound family life, thus, is rated
by our author as the bulwark of society.

In regard to industry, it is pointed out that the principle of
the sovyet is associated in an entirely accidental way with
Bolshevism.[XXIII-36] The sovyet may well be judged on its own merits.
The principle upon which citizens may be grouped for purposes of
securing representation in government is not yet settled. Is a given
geographical area a better unit for securing representation than
occupational areas?

State socialism is objected to by Professor Ross on the grounds that it
leaves the citizens so remote “from that which most vitally concerns
him, viz., the regulation of the industry in which he works, that his
yearly vote may be a mere fribble and he little better than a state
serf.”[XXIII-37] Guild socialism, on the other hand, urges that each
branch of industry shall organize itself democratically, and that
the state shall be organized not with provinces and localities as
semi-autonomies but with industries exercising a degree of autonomy.
Our author endorses the general shift which is occurring at the present
time from the coercive side to the service side of industrial life.

Professor Ross has deduced several important sociological principles
of general import. These he calls the principle of anticipation, the
principle of simulation, the principle of individualization, and the
principle of balance.

By the principle of anticipation, he means that a known policy of
an institution will come to be anticipated by the members of the
institution and will result in modifying behavior.[XXIII-38] Unfair
advantage is often taken of people on the basis of this principle.
For example, children frequently count on favor and leniency. The
false beggar’s whine is often effective. It is in this connection that
genuine social reform differs from a common conception of charity, for
the former method fits people to run, clears their course, and incites
them to make the race,[XXIII-39] while the latter fails to render
assistance of permanent value.

The principle of simulation refers to the common tendency of “the
unworthy to simulate every type or trait which has won social approval,
in order to steal prestige from it.”[XXIII-40] Commercial competition
has produced adulterations, misbrandings, counterfeiting. There is the
professional athlete, who sometimes poses as a sincere enthusiast for
physical development. Politicians are often expert dissemblers.

The principle of individualization refers to giving individuality
a reasonable chance for growth. As society grows more complex,
institutions more ossified, and life more standardized, the average
individual is increasingly in danger of being crushed; at least, his
opportunities for self-expression grow more slim. There is need of
constant vigilance in education in allowing for individual differences,
in industry for safeguarding the laborer in expressing his personality
in his work, in government in permitting free discussion.

The principle of balance is stated by Professor Ross as follows: “In
the guidance of society each social element should share according
to the intelligence and public spirit of its members and none should
predominate.”[XXIII-41] There has been in the past, and even now
there is in all countries, a bitter struggle taking place between
classes apparently on the basis that some one class should rule all
the other classes. Society has suffered immeasurably in this way.
Sometimes society has been the victim of the rulership of the dead,
of the rulership of masculinism, of clericalism, of militarism,
of commercialism, of legalism, of leisure class ascendancy, of
intellectualism, of proletarianism, but always by one class lording it
over the weaker classes until some one of the weaker classes acquires
strength enough to overthrow the class in power.

The socio-psychological thought of Professor Ross has penetrated
the farthermost reaches of human life. It has been stated in
lucid, stimulating language. It has commanded the attention of
socially-thinking persons in many lands. It has defined the field of
sociology, giving the psychological approach.

Special attention may be given to the concept of “the great society” as
used by Graham Wallas. The Great Society is a name for current human
society, the product of mechanical inventions, industrial production,
commercial expansion, democratic evolution--highly organized and
intricately complex. It is ruled, in the main, by men “who direct
enormous social power without attempting to form a social purpose,” and
it is composed to a surpassing degree of individuals who recognize the
power of society but dimly and who often treat society with distrust
and dislike.[XXIII-42]

Mr. Wallas substitutes organization for organism as a fundamental
social concept. He makes a distinction between thought organizations,
will organizations, and happiness organizations. Thought organizations
are those institutions in society whose main function is the
organization of thought, such as discussion groups, ranging from a
philosophical club to an ordinary committee that is called together
to plan new legislation. At this point Mr. Wallas asserts that he
has attended perhaps 3000 meetings of municipal committees, of
different sizes and for different purposes, and that he is sure that
at least half of the men and women with whom he has sat “were entirely
unaware that any conscious mental effort on their part was called
for.”[XXIII-43] They attended in the same spirit that many persons
attend church, namely, in the spirit that if they merely attend they
are doing their duty, and that some good must come of it.

Will organization comes into existence because of imperfect social
machinery. In industry three types of will organizations are striving
for mastery--the institution of private property, represented by
the individualists; the state, represented by collectivists; labor
organizations, represented perhaps by syndicalists. There is urgent
need for “the invention of means of organizing the conflicting wills of
individuals and classes within each nation more effective than reliance
upon any single ‘principle,’ whether representation, property, or
professionalism.”[XXIII-44]

The organization of happiness has not proceeded far. Efficiency has
supplanted happiness as a modern god. The ideal of making money has
shadowed the ideal of making people happy. A social system organized on
the basis of happiness avoids both destitution and superfluity, employs
the Mean as the standard for the representation of all social interests
as well as for all faculties of individuals, avoids the Extreme in all
things.[XXIII-45]

The writings of Charles A. Ellwood deal particularly with that part of
sociological thought which rests upon psychological theory. Professor
Ellwood defines a society as “a group of individuals carrying on a
collective life by means of mental interactions.”[XXIII-46] As a
result of mental interactions, co-ordination or co-adaptation of the
activities of the members is effected.

The psychological basis of social interactions is found in such
characteristics of the individual as spontaneity, instincts,
emotions, consciousness, mind. Organisms possess spontaneity, that
is, movements are set up in them without the apparent aid of external
causes.[XXIII-47] The organism, however, is dependent largely upon
the environment for the development of its potentialities, “but the
essential ground for the beginning of its activities lies within--in
its own organic needs.” Instincts, the product of natural selection,
represent preformed neurological pathways that developed “in response
to the demands of previous life conditions.” The emotions, also
hereditary, are complexes of feelings and sensations. The desires are
complex combinations of feelings and impulses which are accompanied by
an awareness of the objects that will satisfy the impulse.[XXIII-48]
Consciousness develops to solve problems which the instincts cannot
meet. At first, consciousness is largely a selective activity. It
develops, however, into a highly complex agency for mastering the
problems of life and the universe. Mind is a product of the social
life-process. It has arisen under conditions of association.

One of the most fundamental phases of the associational process
is communication. The need of acting together has given rise to
intercommunicative symbols.

Professor George H. Mead has given a thoroughgoing discussion of
communication, language, and the consciousness of meaning.[XXIII-49]
He begins with a social situation, where the actions of one person
serve as stimulations to other persons, whose responses in turn
act as stimulations to the first person. Thus life is a series of
actions, stimulations, responses, resultant stimulations--these
activities constitute gestures or symbols with meanings. Symbols and
the consciousness of meaning of these symbols are the main elements in
communication.

Communication, says Professor Ellwood, is “a device to carry on
a common life-process among several distinct, though psychically
interacting, individual units.”[XXIII-50] This definition probably
emphasizes unduly the “individual units,” which are doubtless a
product, in part, of the stream of social life. Suggestion is an
elemental, but quick form of communication, related in its simpler
phases to sympathetic emotion. Imitation is a common mechanism whereby
actions and ideas spread. Communication in the form of oral and written
language is the chief mechanistic factor in securing social change.

The contention of Ward that primitive man was anti-social is refuted by
Professor Ellwood, who points out that according to social anthropology
the so-called anti-social traits of earliest man are not found fully
developed among “savages” but among people of later ages. Primitives
were characterized by a narrow sociality, confined largely to the
family and small groups.[XXIII-51]

Professor Ellwood’s theory of social change is of a two-fold character:
unconscious and conscious,--the former being characteristic of the
lower stages of social evolution, and the latter, increasingly
characteristic of the higher stages.[XXIII-52] The forms of unconscious
social change are manifold.

Natural selection tends to crush and destroy the weaker individuals
and the weaker groups. Another type of unconscious social change is
that which comes through a gradual disuse of certain cultural elements.
One generation fails to copy the preceding in all particulars. Another
set of sources of unconscious social change is found in the shifting
relationships between individuals that is produced by “the increase of
population, a new physical environment, a new cultural contact, a new
discovery or a new invention.” In fact, Professor Ellwood states that
all social changes start in an unconscious way.[XXIII-53]

Conscious change begins with the awareness on the part of one or more
individuals that some social habit is not functioning well. Through
communication, this awareness spreads from individual to individual.
Discussion ensues. At first, discussion is largely critical of the
unsatisfactory social situation. The useless or harmful elements in the
situation receive first attention. As discussion proceeds, it takes on
a more constructive nature, that is, it becomes projective, planful,
positive. It suggests a change to be made. It becomes transformed into
a more or less stable public opinion, demanding a substitution of a
proposed way of doing for the old. The chief elements in guaranteeing
conscious readjustments are free communication, “free public
criticism, free discussion, untrammeled formation of public opinion,
free selection of social policies and social leaders.”[XXIII-54] The
selective process in conscious social change is public opinion, whose
social function it is to mediate in the transition from one social
habit to another.

Conscious social change in Western Civilization is endangered on one
hand by an excessive individualism, and on the other by a socialism
which threatens to suppress individual initiative and to underemphasize
the rôle of mental and moral character. Professor Ellwood urges the
importance of an education which will socialize the individual and at
the same time develop a high type of personal character.

Social change, also, takes place under socially abnormal conditions,
so long as societies fail to keep “a high degree of flexibility
in their habits and institutions.”[XXIII-55] Autocratic rulers,
propertied classes, ecclesiastical classes, special groups in power,
a general intellectual stagnation, are factors which tend to resist
institutional flexibility. If this adaptability does not exist, then
social conditions will produce revolutions. If the ruling autocracy
is so powerful that the lives of all objectors are snuffed out, then
revolution is indefinitely postponed. If the energetic forces within
a society are hampered greatly in securing constructive opportunities
for expression, they become forces of discontent and agents of revolt.
If a revolution comes, then much that is worthy in social organization
will be obliterated along with the unworthy, confusion will reign and a
reversion to the brutal stages of societal life is easily possible.

In his discussion of “the social problem,” Professor Ellwood points
out that the good fruits of the World War are in danger of being
destroyed by “the blindness and selfishness of some in our socially
privileged classes, the fanatic radicalism and class hatred of some
of the leaders of the non-privileged.”[XXIII-56] The forces which
are combining against making the world safe for democracy today are
national imperialism, commercialism, materialistic standards of life,
class conflicts, religious agnosticism, and a reckless attitude toward
marriage and the family.[XXIII-57] The social problem, from one angle,
becomes the problem of training people to live together justly,
constructively, and co-operatingly.

As Turgot indicated, the only way to avert social revolution is
through suitable and well-timed reforms. Today, the reforms most
urgently needed are three-fold: the substitution of an unselfish
internationalism for a selfish nationalism, of a spiritual civilization
for a rampant materialism, and of a socialized human race for
individualized peoples. To bring about these changes is a gigantic
task, namely _the_ social problem.

Civilization is a complex of social values. Professor Ellwood’s
classification of values is widely different from the analysis that
Professor Giddings has made (given in the preceding chapter). According
to Professor Ellwood, western civilization is represented by the
following groups of social values historically derived: (1) a set
of spiritual and ethical values, described by the ancient Hebrews;
(2) a set of esthetic and philosophic concepts from the Greeks; (3)
a set of administrative and legal forms of Roman origin; (4) a set
of personal liberty beliefs of early Teutonic derivation; (5) a
scientific spirit and technique, originating during the Renaissance;
(6) economic efficiency, born of the industrial revolution; and
(7) an extensive group of humanitarian values, the product of the
nineteenth century. This vast and complicated Western Civilization
needs, however, to remove from its structure the three “rotten pillars”
of hyper-individualism, materialism, and selfish nationalism,
substituting for each its spiritualized and socialized counterpart.

The nature of social control, according to the analysis by Professor
E. C. Hayes, is “to secure the completed and most harmonious
realization of good human experience, regarded as an end in
itself.”[XXIII-58] Social control should prevent activities which do
not bear the test of reason, and should elicit those which stand that
test, when judged by their own intrinsic value and by their effect
upon other values. This statement of the purpose of social control is
similar to that of other standard interpretations of the matter.

There are two types of social control.[XXIII-59] The first is control
by sanctions, and the second by social suggestion, sympathetic
radiation, and imitation. Social sanctions refer to proffered rewards
and threatened punishments. Professor Hayes, however, makes not law
but personality the ultimate basis of social order. Repression of
crime is a correct social procedure but of a distinctly lower grade
than the movement to raise the moral character of those who never go
to prison. _The_ problem of social control is to take the instinctive
tendencies of each individual when he is young and make them over into
a disposition that is characterized by the four following traits:
(1) reliability, or honesty; (2) controlled animalism, or temperance
regarding eating, drinking, and other animal propensities; (3)
steadiness in endeavor; (4) the social spirit, or justice.[XXIII-60]

Professor Hayes’ statement on the agencies of social control is similar
in purport to the list that Professor Ross has given. Education is
considered the chief agency of social control. Education can determine
the direction of ambition; education can shift the emphasis in social
valuations. Professor Hayes recognizes the import of heredity and how
the degree of individual achievement is “more dependent upon heredity
than upon the directions of effort.” Society, however, has the power
to decide which of its members shall develop as far as their potential
abilities will permit, and also the power to determine the direction
the activities of its members shall take.[XXIII-61]

Among educational agencies of control the family ranks first.[XXIII-62]
The power of the family at its best in building personality is
comparable to the influence in this connection of all other agencies
combined. The profession of mother-work is more important to society
than any other profession.

The social psychology of business enterprise, of the leisure classes,
of the machine process, of industry and workmanship have been indicated
by Thorstein Veblen. The unique, incisive work of Mr. Veblen is
presented in several books, chief of which are his _Theory of the
Leisure Class_, _Theory of Business Enterprise_, and _Instinct of
Workmanship_. Mr. Veblen’s ideas can best be illustrated by referring
to his “canons.”

The Canon of Pecuniary Emulation describes the restless straining of
certain individuals in society to outdo one another in the possession
of wealth.[XXIII-63] Such possession is interpreted as conferring honor
on its possessor. Wealth becomes intrinsically honorable. The Canon of
Pecuniary Beauty refers to the impression that things are beautiful in
proportion as they are costly.[XXIII-64] The marks of expensiveness
come to be regarded as beautiful features.

The Canon of Conspicuous Consumption is a term which describes a
method of showing off one’s wealth by an elaborate consumption of
goods.[XXIII-65] Conspicuous consumption is seen more in matters of
dress than in any other line of consumption. The Canon of Conspicuous
Leisure is the rule which some people are following when they live
a life of leisure as the readiest and most conclusive evidence of
pecuniary strength.[XXIII-66] Sometimes a man keeps his wife frittering
her time away in a doll’s house in order to show his wealth status.

The Canon of Leisure Class Conservatism is Veblen’s label for the
conservative tendencies of the wealthy. Those whom fortune has greatly
favored are likely to be content with things as they are. Such people
are averse to social change, for social innovation might upset their
comfortable existence. They have a dominant material interest in
letting things alone.

Mr. Veblen’s Canon of Pecuniary Efficiency means that many persons
conceive of efficiency largely in terms of price. The person who
can induce his fellows to pay him well is accounted efficient and
serviceable.[XXIII-67] The man who gains much wealth at little cost is
rated high in his neighbor’s esteem. The investor who at the turn of
his hand reaps $100,000 in a stock or bond deal is praised widely. In
other words, there is a common tendency to rate people high in direct
proportion to the amount of money that they are able to extract from
the aggregate product.

The Canon of Bellicoseness refers to the enthusiasm for war which the
hereditary leisure class displays. The very wealthy, not being obliged
to work for a living, find that time drags. Therefore, they seek
excitement and relief from ennui, and find these conditions in various
things, especially in war.

The Canon of Pecuniary Education covers the tendency to demand
“practical” education, which, upon examination, is education that will
guarantee individual success. “Success,” for which education is to fit
young people, turns out to be, in the eyes of the practical man, a
pecuniary success. “Practical” means useful for private gain. The test
that many persons would give to a course in education is this: Will
it help one to get an income? The Canon of Pecuniary Thinking denotes
that many occupations lead to habits of pecuniary thought. For numbers
of people the beginning and end of their more serious thought is of a
pecuniary nature.

The Canon of Machine Process Thinking is that mechanical employments
produce a type of thinking that is based more or less on material
cause and effect. The Machine knows neither morality nor dignity nor
prescriptive right. The machine process laborers, working in a world of
impersonal cause and effect, “are in danger of losing the point of view
of sin.”

Professor Veblen has developed the concept of the instinct of
workmanship at considerable length. According to this contention, it
is natural for individuals to do, to construct, to achieve, to work.
Through activity the individual expresses himself and, in so doing,
develops, and attains happiness. Every individual is a center of
unfolding impulsive activity; he is possessed of a taste for effective
work.[XXIII-68] Labor acquires a character of irksomeness by virtue of
the indignity that is falsely imputed to it by a hereditary leisure
class.[XXIII-69] It was the instinct of workmanship which brought the
life of mankind from the brute to the human plan.

The contributions of Mr. Veblen to social thought are always of a
thought-provoking nature. Sometimes they give rise to invidious
comparisons, often they antagonize, but as a rule, they are unique. No
brief reference such as is given in the foregoing paragraphs can do
justice to Mr. Veblen’s pungent criticisms of societal foibles.

It would be a decidedly incomplete treatment of the nature of
psycho-sociologic thought that did not make reference to the work of
George Elliott Howard, political scientist, historian, sociologist,
but above all, social psychologist. In each of the fields in which Dr.
Howard has achieved fame, his method of approach is psychological. He
has prepared an excellent outline of the field of social psychology,
together with a scholarly bibliography of the same. Perhaps the best
way to treat Professor Howard’s socio-psychologic thought, is to give a
sample of it, as found in his address before the American Sociological
Society when he was president of that body. The theme was, “Ideals
as a Factor in the Future Control of International Society.” This
_magnum opus_ served as an excellent introduction to the series of
papers on the subject of social control which were read at the annual
meeting of the Sociological Society in 1918, and which have been
published together with the presidential address as Volume XII of the
Publications of the Society.

By social control, Professor Howard means the standard conception of
the “ascendency of the social consciousness.”[XXIII-70] In the same
volume, however, Professor Carl Kelsey interprets social control as
“the organization and utilization of our wealth and citizens for
private purposes.”[XXIII-71] Professor Hutton Webster is inclined
to believe that the main feature of primitive social control is
“the superstitious fear of the new.”[XXIII-72] Professor F. Stuart
Chapin sees the essential element of primitive social ascendency in
the pressure upon the individual of social conditions, customs, and
conventions.[XXIII-73] Without giving additional interpretations of
social control, the reader will be referred directly to Volume XII of
the Publications as the best symposium that is available on the subject.

In discussing ideals as a phase of international control, Professor
Howard makes clear that certain ideals exert a baneful influence.
The ideal of the nation-state appears to be unmoral if not
immoral.[XXIII-74] Of four prevailing standards of ethics, namely,
personal morality, business morality, national morality for home
consumption, and “standards of international morality for use with
outlanders,” the scale is descending, and the fourth type is the
lowest. Nationalisms have been overdeveloped--at the expense of a
needed internationalism.

Another false ideal of which society needs to rid itself is its
conception of the function of war and militarism. War is not a good in
itself. War as war is not heroic. Race values constitute a third false
ideal. “Every race deems itself superior to every other race and every
race is mistaken.”[XXIII-75] Race conceit is contrary to the Christian
ideal and has steadily been supplanted by the new doctrine of the
potential equality of all races.

The ideal of democracy, on the other hand, rings true to the needs of
progress. It makes for peace. Democracy, however, must rid itself of
blemishes. Hereditary and class privilege must be abolished; political
corruption and race riots must be defeated; woman, “the original social
builder, the mother of industry, the first inventor of the arts of
peace,” must be granted a full voice in social control.

The ideal of education is exceedingly delicate, for it involves the
process of the changing of ideals. Education may prepare a people to
admire autocracy or to build a self-governing democracy.

Dr. Howard enters a strong plea for social idealism--the most effective
that has yet been written.[XXIII-76] “The idealist is the inspired
social architect, who dreams a plan for the sanitary or moral cleansing
of a great city; the campaign for purging politics of graft; a law
for saving little children from the tigerish man of the factory or
the sweatshop; a referendum for banishing from the commonwealth the
saloon, that chief breeder of pauperism, sin, and crime; a conference
for the rescuing from the hands of predacious greed, for the use of
the whole people, of the remnant of our country’s natural wealth. The
idealist is the statesman--the head of a nation--who dreams a scheme
for safeguarding democracy and guaranteeing peace throughout the world.”

It is evident from the introduction to the history of psycho-sociologic
thought that has been given in this and the preceding chapter,
supported by the materials in the chapters on social conflict and
social co-operation concepts, that psycho-sociologic thought holds
a place of first rank in the field of sociology. It bids fair to
become the central force in social thinking and to lead the social
sciences. It deals with the most vital social concepts, namely, groups,
personality, behavior, conflict, co-operation, and process. Of all the
main approaches to an understanding of societary problems, it promises
most.




CHAPTER XXIV

THE TREND OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY


In the preceding chapters the discussions have dealt primarily with the
philosophic and psychologic phases of social thought. Another important
phase of our field is applied sociology. The hosts of individuals who
have been engaged in dealing directly with societal problems have
learned valuable lessons from their personal experiences. Sometimes
they have labored according to false theories; often they have scorned
theories entirely. At the other extreme, the world has often accepted
fine theories, but made a pitiable spectacle of itself in falling away
from its idealistic professions.

As the term implies, applied sociology treats of techniques for
improving the quality of human living. The best techniques have been
developed experimentally, but by persons who have combined a high
estimate of social theory with practical programs of activity. The
useful concept of social technology, a more accurate term perhaps than
applied sociology, was given to society by Charles R. Henderson, whose
balanced thinking, sane judgment, and important ameliorative activities
made him the founder of this branch of sociological science. Dr.
Henderson’s name is synonymous with a practical interpretation of
both democracy and Christianity, with the spirit of vigorous yet
kindly reformation in penology, with the concept of prevention in
philanthropic endeavors, and with justice and love in all the fields of
human achievement. There are many other important names in the list of
those persons who helped to found applied sociology; for example, such
individuals as Canon Barnett, Arnold Toynbee, Jacob Riis, Jane Addams,
and many other social welfare saints.

Poverty and crime have been the two chief phenomena with which welfare
work has been concerned. Until the present century the attempts to meet
the problems of poverty have been largely remedial. Jesus said that the
poor are always present in any age of society. St. Francis of Assisi,
tiring of monastery life, sought out the poor in the natural walks of
life, and dedicated himself in their behalf.

For centuries England has experimented with solutions for the problems
of poverty and pauperism. She has learned that when she cares too
assiduously for the poor she encourages the spirit of pauperism and
increases the numbers of dependents. When she provided liberal aid for
illegitimate children, she found that illegitimacy was furthered.

England has had a series of important literary leaders who have
interested themselves in behalf of the poor and outcast. Dickens
drew minute word pictures of poverty. Carlyle, the iconoclast and
individualist, pierced repeatedly the shams of society which are partly
responsible for the perpetual existence of social misery. In beautiful
diction Ruskin spoke in behalf of social justice. In similar fields,
France has her Hugo and Balzac; Germany, her Hauptmann; Russia, her
Tolstoi and Gorky; Scandinavia, her Bjornson, Ibsen, and Strindberg.
Individuals of this type, however, cannot be considered social
technologists. They have directed public opinion to specific social
problems, but rarely offered technological programs of practical value.

Since 1900, the leaders in social technology, such as C. R.
Henderson,[XXIV-1] Sidney and Beatrice Webb,[XXIV-2] and E. T.
Devine,[XXIV-3] have made clear the specific conditions under which
the poor may be permanently aided.[XXIV-4] Remedial care will always
be necessary, but it must be offered in ways that will not encourage
anyone to make a living by begging. The prevailing thought today
regarding poverty is in preventive terms. The individual should be
shown how to help himself up the economic pathway. Education will make
the individual efficient and safeguard him against falling into a
chronic state of pauperism.

Above all else, social technology urges the establishment of justice
in economic conditions. As shown in Chapter XIV, Henry George, in
his _Progress and Poverty_, made a fundamental analysis of one set
of causes of poverty, which he found in the unjust factors in the
economic system. He showed how ownership in land may be traced back
to force. Shall the first person who acquires a section of land be
allowed to fence it in and to keep out all other persons unless they
pay him a price that rises rapidly as the number of other persons
increases?[XXIV-5] Why is there increasing misery amid advancing
wealth? The larger the city the greater the degree of squalor--this was
George’s perplexing observation. Material progress does not improve
the condition of the lowest classes. Prosperity under the present
economic system appears to be a heavy wedge driven into society. The
individuals who are below the line of cleavage are crushed down; those
who are above this line are hoisted upward into positions of luxury and
affluence.

Henry George, despite the large number of followers which his ideas
have today, was probably in error in believing that to take the
ownership of land out of the hands of individuals, through the method
of the single tax, would prevent poverty. However, no one should
be blind to the fact that increasing land values result from mere
increase in population. Either the birth rate or immigration increases
population and sends up land values, which in turn is accompanied by
a rising scale of rents with an elevated cost of living and increased
poverty.

The history of human thought concerning crime has run a vicissitudinous
career. It was not until the days of John Howard and Beccaria that
a truly scientific approach was made to the problem. John Howard
(1726–1790), sheriff of Bedford, became interested in criminals. He
visited jails throughout England. He traveled widely in Europe, usually
at his own expense, studying the causes of typhus fever and endeavoring
to effect a more humane treatment of offenders.

Beccaria (1735–1794), an Italian criminologist, published in 1764 a
remarkable book, _Crimes and Punishment_. Beccaria protested against
attempting to repress crime by the use of fear. Retaliation is an
entirely inadequate motive for administering punishment. Torture
is inhuman. Neither retaliation nor repression meets the problem.
Reformation was the concept with which Beccaria startled Europe.
Punishment should be administered so as to reform.

In modern days the names of Cesare Lombroso (1836–1909) stands out
prominently in the field of criminology.[XXIV-6] Lombroso was a
determinist, finding in heredity and environment all the causes of
crime, and relieving the individual of moral responsibility. The mental
defective, the alcoholic, the frantically angry are irresponsible for
the crimes they commit. By defining one irresponsible group after
another the Lombrosan school has practically included all individuals
in this classification, leaving no one responsible for his conduct.

The remedy for crime, according to Lombroso and his followers, is
found in society. Society is responsible for the criminal acts of its
members. If society should surround all individuals from infancy with
a favorable environment, then crime would end. In the writings of
Garofalo, Ferri, de Quiros, Gross and other Continental criminologists,
a broader point of view is usually taken, making the responsibility
for crime to rest on three factors, heredity, environment, and
individual morality. The margin of choice, and therefore of individual
responsibility, is usually made very slender. European criminological
experts, and even American writers, such as Parmelee, have commonly
minimized the importance of moral character and the accountability of
the individual.

In the United States the trend of interest has been penological. Since
the days of William Penn, who had been a prisoner in England, American
thought has centered on the problem of prison reform. Barrows and
Brockway devoted their lives to the reorganization of prison procedure.
Wines and Lane show lucidly the trend in penological thought, paying
splendid tribute to the achievements of Z. R. Brockway in establishing
the Elmira Reformatory (New York).[XXIV-7]

The fundamental principles of the Elmira procedure are as follows:
(1) The average prisoner can be reformed. (2) Reformation of the
prisoner is the duty of the state. (3) Prisoners must be considered as
individuals and accorded the treatment which each needs in order to
bring him to a normal attitude of life. (4) The prisoner’s reformation
requires his own co-operation in the process. (5) The prison must
have the power to lengthen or shorten the sentence according to the
offender’s stage of reformation. (6) The entire process of reformation
is educational, giving the offender opportunity for psychical, mental,
and moral growth. (7) Punishment for crime is administered in the
discipline and labor, which are unremitting and exacting.

In recent years Thomas M. Osborne has been developing the honor system
and self-government among prisoners.[XXIV-8] The idea is dramatised
by Burleigh and Bierstadt in _Punishment_.[XXIV-9] The conception is
that kindly administration and the personal touch of love will win the
offender’s heart and mind, and effect a reformation.

The last twenty years have seen a remarkable development of the concept
of prevention of crime. This theory, however, takes the problem back
to pre-adult years, to the adolescent, to childhood, and even to the
pre-natal years of the specific individual. The establishment of the
juvenile court, with the success of Judge Ben B. Lindsey, has served
to call attention to the fact that criminals are made as a rule before
they reach the age of twenty-one.

The contributors to recent thought about delinquency, such as Jane
Addams, Breckinridge and Abbott, W. R. George, Ben B. Lindsey, Mrs.
Louise de Koven Bowen, Flexner and Baldwin, are pretty largely agreed
that the causes of delinquency, and hence of criminality, are as
follows: (1) The defective home--made defective by illness, poverty,
shiftlessness, ignorance, immorality, desertion, divorce, death--is
the leading single causal element. Nearly all criminals begin their
careers as disobedient sons. The law of obedience and self-discipline,
if not observed in the home, is learned later only at the expense of
anti-social and criminal acts. (2) Mental defectiveness often causes
delinquency. The mentally defective child, if energetic, has great
difficulty in withstanding the evil temptations of life. He or she has
bodily passions that are further developed than his mental inhibitions.
In this connection the public school has an important function to
perform in detecting mental defectives and in segregating them under
special educational care. They should be segregated also by sexes, so
that they may not reproduce their kind, and they should be kept under
educational and institutional direction throughout their lives. They
can be made useful and happy under a guarded environment. (3) Civic
neglect is a third cause of delinquency and crime. Young people are
released from the public schools, often without proper home training
and supervision, and drift about in a highly complex urban environment,
full of commercialized and vicious devices for preying upon the
curious and the unsuspecting. (4) Social injustice, for example in
industry, arouses feelings of hatred of class against class, and leads
to criminal acts. (5) Moral thoughtlessness and religious indifference
are common causes. A moral and religious attitude gives a balanced
expression to personality, wholesomeness and obedience in the home;
and a deep, constant, and abiding interest in public welfare is an
invaluable preventive of sin, vice, and crime.

A growing conception relative to juvenile courts is that a
considerable portion of the work that such courts are now called on
to perform belongs to the public schools. The compulsory attendance,
child welfare, and continuation school departments may well assume
responsibility for and direction of many youth who now become court
charges. It is urged that a fully organized procedure of constructive
work and play activity under the supervision of the schools will
greatly reduce juvenile delinquency.

Another cause of juvenile delinquency is parental negligence. It is
believed by many authorities that problems of this character should
be taken care of through the domestic relations court rather than in
the juvenile court. Another causal factor is the growing disrespect
for parents on the part of children, that is, the increasing degree of
failure of children to appreciate the significance of the concept of
obedience.

In regard to labor problems, social technology has made notable
contributions. Child labor is a term which refers to the employment of
adolescent children for wages, when such children are thereby deprived
from normal opportunities of mental and physical growth. Children
should learn to work, even at unpleasant tasks, but when at an early
age they are taken out of or quit school and become gainfully employed,
they are deprived of a normal adolescence; they and society both
lose.[XXIV-10]

The problem of women in industry is due to the migration of millions of
women from the home into industry. While women are entitled to equality
of opportunity with men, they are often unmindful that constitutionally
they are not fitted to perform all the tasks that men are doing; that
if they fail in the bearing and rearing of children rationally, the
race dies; and that, if they neglect to make the home attractive, the
family as an essential social institution is undermined.

The labor problem, when applied to men, brings forth a multiplicity of
contradictory opinions. The idea of industrial democracy is the storm
center. While praising modern capitalism for its stimulus to initiative
and for its large-scale enterprises that have been highly beneficial
in many ways, the social technologist pronounces modern capitalism
undemocratic. He declares that it must purge itself or be supplanted by
another industrial order; it must take cognizance of social changes and
adjust itself accordingly or be routed.

The injustice in modern capitalism is often stressed in social
technologic thought. Only one factor, wealth, is represented in the
management of business. The skilled or unskilled laborers, often
“the hardest working partners” in the business, are not represented.
Applied sociology, unlike socialism, would keep industry in the hands
of individuals. The idea has been best developed, perhaps, by a social
theorist, Professor A. W. Small. Labor and capital must both have
representation on boards of directors, if capitalism is to prove that
it is not undemocratic.[XXIV-11]

Tripartite management of industry is a current phase of industrial
thought. Where employers and employees have reached a common ground of
co-operation, they have often joined forces in collusion against the
public and the consumer. The employer agrees to a rise in wages for
the employee, and the employee to an increase in dividends, providing
he receives a portion of the added returns--meanwhile the public is
apathetic or rages impotently. The best thought today is urging that
on boards of directors and managers all three interested parties shall
have representation, namely, labor, capital, and the public.

It is a current opinion that the failure of capitalism to democratize
itself will result in the rise of socialism by revolutionary means. If
capital with its one-sided control of industry is supplanted by labor
with another type of control, it is doubtful how much will be gained.
The labor standard is manifesting itself as a class standard, and at
times arbitrarily. To have society controlled by labor standards, no
matter under what form of socialism they may appear, will not guarantee
progress. The labor classes, the capitalist classes, the professional
classes--all must rule, and unselfishly for the welfare of society.

The current socialist thought ranges from a radical bolshevist theme of
a dictatorship of the proletariat to a conservative state socialism,
like that advocated by John Spargo. Bolshevism has the earmarks of
class autocracy. Progress cannot be secured by a social order in which
the least educated and trained are in control. On the other hand, it
is not clear that state socialism, with its governmental control of
interest-producing capital and rent-producing land, will best guarantee
progress. The socialization of individuals will probably be more
effective than the socialization of industries.

The tendency is toward the elimination of profitism. This negative
thought, it is claimed, will relieve capitalism of its worst evils, and
allow the educational process of socializing individuals to go forward.

The concept of social insurance has been given a remarkable reception
since 1882. Social insurance was introduced as a means of pacifying
labor and of making it contented under the rule of capitalism. It
was admitted into governmental economy by Bismarck as an agency
of forestalling socialism. It spread rapidly. It has met with two
setbacks. (1) In the first place it has acquired such momentum that
capitalism sees it as the entering wedge of a genuine socialism. (2)
In the second place social insurance is guaranteeing so much security
to the workingman that he is constrained at times to sacrifice his
initiative and even to become shiftless, saying in effect to himself,
“I’ll be taken care of anyway.” It is this second type of antagonistic
thought that indicates the real weakness in social insurance. It would
be better to have a society in which the workingmen as a class would
have an ample opportunity of caring for, and be stimulated to care
for, their old age and for periods of disability. For the individual
exceptions, special provisions could be made.

The unemployment problem has produced many reform theories.
Unemployment insurance, now being made the subject of experiment, is
probably not reaching the main causes. The causal factors are many
and deep-seated; they range from individual shiftlessness and mental
defectiveness on one hand, to economic injustice and social callousness
on the other.[XXIV-12] The prevailing thought urges a more efficient
training of the individual; the increasing of the workman’s opportunity
to enlarge his personality through each day’s work; the development of
industrial democracy and justice; and a complete socialization program.

Another set of problems concerning which applied sociology is
endeavoring to find solutions relates to the family, feminism,
marriage, divorce, and housing. Professor George Elliott
Howard[XXIV-13] and Dr. Edward Westermarck[XXIV-14] have traced the
development of the family and marriage throughout human history. The
primitive relationships between sexes have been described by many
anthropological writers. A history of the American family has been
written by A. W. Calhoun.[XXIV-15] Single volume treatments of the
family as a social institution have been made by Bosanquet[XXIV-16]
and Goodsell.[XXIV-17] These works essentially agree that the family
is an evolutionary product, that the primitive family centered about
the mother and child, that patriarchalism introduced a high degree of
masculine arbitrariness, and that the family is at present undergoing
marked changes whereby the spirit of democracy is gaining ground.

In the new found spirit of freedom, woman has sometimes been captivated
by the desire to follow man into all the man-made occupations. Sex
nature predestines woman to the chief occupation or profession of
all, that of motherhood. For woman to rush headlong after men into
industry may turn out to be not liberty, but license and deterioration.
Current social thought protests vigorously against the idea of women
being household drudges, and also against women wasting their time in
pluming themselves or in idling away their days in dolls’ houses,
supported dependents of men. Women are entitled to learn vocations and
to live constructive lives, in an atmosphere of the largest possible
freedom consistent with the development of themselves and the race.
On the other hand, any movement which weakens the home as a societary
training institution apparently defies the laws of social advance.

The housing problem is provoking urgent thought. With the rise of
large cities the economic order favors exorbitant land values and
extraordinarily high rents. The social increment goes into the hands of
the few. The flat and apartment house life often favors pet bulldogs
rather than children, and decreases the efficiency of the home as a
social institution. These untoward tendencies, furthermore, are being
supplemented by an attitude of more or less helpless apathy on the part
of the public.

Another field of applied sociologic thought is represented by the
terms, race problems, immigration, and naturalization. These concepts
are all outgrowths of the population concept which has been treated
in an earlier chapter. The human race with its common origin has
subdivided and wandered into all the inhabitable parts of the globe.
Climate, geography, and social environment have operated to make the
race subdivisions distinct and discriminatory. Race pride and prejudice
have raised impassable race barriers.

In the United States the leading race problem involves the Negroes.
Booker T. Washington[XXIV-18] urged that if the Negro shows himself
industrially efficient and morally worthy, the prejudice against him
will disappear. W. E. B. DuBois[XXIV-19] asks that the prejudice
against the colored race by the white race be removed in order that
the Negro may have a fair chance to show himself capable. The Southern
white people declare that the colored people must be segregated on
a lower plane than that occupied by the white race. Northern people
assert that the trouble lies chiefly in an undemocratic attitude of
Southern white people toward the colored race. Thus the currents of
thought concerning the Negro come into conflict, but without forming a
common current of action.

Another phase of the race problem is conveyed by the concept of
hyphenated interests. The Americanization movement has assumed momentum
because of the need for a more unified spirit within the nation.
Although some of the promoters of Americanization have used autocratic
means, the opinion is gaining ground that the transference of the
loyalty of the immigrant from his home country to his adopted country
can best be effected by treating the immigrant sympathetically and
democratically in all his contacts--industrial, social, political--with
the people of our land.[XXIV-20]

The public health movement has acquired force because of the belief
that only public and widespread action can remove many of the causes
of disease. Tuberculosis, for example, is a disease that is caused
by a microscopic germ which thrives and multiplies in the tissues of
susceptible and weakened organisms. Tuberculosis and unsanitary housing
conditions flourish together. The individual is often helpless, but
the thought is now well grounded that public action can stamp out the
breeding places of the tubercle bacilli and relieve the country of
the white plague. An improved economic and educational status for the
unskilled laborer and his family would also help to improve the health
level of the country. Current social thought supports the contention
that the real work of a physician is to keep people well rather than to
cure them after they have fallen seriously ill. Preventive medicine and
the public health movement are strongly urged by social technology.

Another phase of applied sociology of current significance is indicated
by the term, community organization.[XXIV-21] The idea of this
movement originated in the failure of people to develop a democratic
consciousness. Community organization refers to attempts of communities
to organize themselves for neighborhood efficiency. When a community
organizes its own recreations and amusements, it functions in two
important directions. (1) It supplants commercialized amusements,
operated for profit and often on a socially destructive basis, by
community recreation, maintained by the people themselves in socially
constructive ways and at a minimum of expense. (2) In participating in
and building up community enterprises such as community recreation,
the people of the community develop a co-operative democratic
consciousness. The problem of the use of leisure time is growing
in proportion to the extent that the laboring classes are winning
a shorter work day. In addition to community recreation, community
health movements, community newspapers, community co-operative stores,
community committees for securing needed legislation and for breaking
the force of economic monopoly, are attracting widespread attention.
The social unit and the block system of community service, are terms
which indicate variations of the community organization concept,
originally a product of the need of meeting the leisure time problem
constructively with the very important result of re-creating democracy.

Social technology has produced the survey.[XXIV-22] The social survey,
being related in its origin to the census, is an accurate method
of gathering social facts, not merely facts about the numbers of
people, the acreage, and the amount of wealth, but the facts about
the societary assets and liabilities of a city or community, and
concerning the constructive and the destructive forces. By making
surveys at regular intervals of five or ten year periods, a community
can determine the amount and direction of its own progress. The idea
of a survey is similar to that of an inventory of a business house--to
find out the gains and losses, and to plan for the future according to
the verdict of the inventory.

In recent years social case work has acquired an important rank in
the field of applied sociology. Social reform deals with methods for
improving the whole mass of individuals and for raising the level
of the entire group; social case work on the other hand stimulates
individuals to improve the quality of their lives, to adjust
themselves more adequately to their environment, and to transform
their environments. Social case work insists that sound social reforms
can be effected only on the basis of first-hand experiences with the
needs of individuals who are the victims of social imperfections or
their own shortcomings. Social work with individuals has provided a
body of specific facts of first magnitude as a foundation for measures
of social amelioration and progress; it has mirrored life which is
under the harrow of circumstances; it has portrayed life where living
conditions are harshest.

Applied sociology represents methods of social attack. It furthers
progress by planning for society on the basis of past societal
experiences and current facts and tendencies. It fulfils the demands of
social telesis.




CHAPTER XXV

THE RISE OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY


In recent decades educational leaders have been thinking in
sociological terms. In its experimental phases educational sociology
constitutes a phase of applied sociology. The principles of modern
educational sociology have a thousand sources.

Pestalozzi (1746–1827) may be considered a forerunner of current social
theories of education. He was interested in humanity for humanity’s
sake. Like St. Francis of Assisi, he lived with the poor in order that
he might teach them to be thrifty and worthy citizens. In his _Leonard
and Gertrude_, he described the life of the poor, and formulated an
educational procedure for educating the poor. He was a lover of little
children, of poor people, of anyone in trouble, of all humanity. He
spoke in dignified terms of the function of a good woman, no matter how
humble her station in life. Her first duty is to educate her children
and to meet the needs of her family. She has, also, obligations to her
neighbors and community. Others, seeing her constructive work, will be
inspired and motivated to do likewise.

In opening an industrial school for the poor, Pestalozzi recognized
that the poor have the least opportunities for development and the
largest numbers of problems to solve,--therefore they are in the
greatest need of educational advantages. He held that all the phases
of human personality should be trained, and that there should be “a
harmonious development of all human powers.” Hence, education is the
greatest gift that anyone, rich or poor, can receive. In urging that
the child should be educated in company with other children, that
is, in groups, he took an attitude superior to that of Rousseau, but
presaging that of Froebel.

Froebel (1782–1852), the founder of the kindergarten, considered
little children “as plants in a garden.” He recognized the educative
importance of the early years of life. He perceived the possibilities
of teaching through the use of plays and games. He understood the
“interests” of little children. His most important conception, perhaps,
was his recognition of the gregarious impulses as an effective setting
for the educative processes. While neo-Froebelians have sometimes
turned all work into play and have neglected to train the child in
doing some things in which he is not interested at the particular
time, the utilization of the gregarious and play impulses as vital
backgrounds for education is not unworthy. The evils in this connection
are no greater than when the Montessori method is followed, with its
emphasis upon a maximum of individual choice.

In Horace Mann (1796–1859), American education found a new social
emphasis. Education in a democracy, according to Mann, should be public
and open equally to all classes of people. Moreover, in a democracy,
education is not a mere acquisition of knowledge; it is not concealed
in college degrees as such; it is not aristocratic. It was Mann’s
contention that education should be an actual training for rearing
worthy families, for living an unselfish social life, for being a
public spirited citizen in one’s daily activities.

Mann asserted that the common school is the bulwark of the nation. He
believed that education should encourage true religion. He inaugurated
the normal training school,--in support of his theory of specially
trained teachers. His social philosophy is contained in a statement
from his last public address: “Be ashamed to die until you have won a
victory for humanity.”

During the intervening decades since the days of Horace Mann, the
social conception of education has been assuming new practical
phases. Professor John Dewey has pointed out that all communication
is education; that the terms, common, community, and communication,
possess more than a verbal relationship.[XXV-1] Anything is educative
which produces similar emotional and intellectual dispositions,
that is, like ways of responding to stimuli. Societal life, hence,
is unusually educative. Education consists of processes of
self-development, of self-continuation, of social continuation. These
processes are possible only on bases of common means of communication.
It is these means, as Professor C. H. Cooley has indicated, which make
even the powerful factors of suggestion and imitation so universal.

It is not the environment which directly implants certain desires in
individuals.[XXV-2] The environment sets up conditions which stimulate
certain ways of acting. The child gets a real idea of a hat, not by
seeing a hat, or by being told of its uses, but by actually using a
hat. The social environment, in other words, forms “the mental and
emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them
in activities” that arouse various impulses, purposes, and produces
certain consequences.[XXV-3]

As society becomes exceedingly complex, it is essential that society
provide a simplified social environment through which the child may
pass, in order that he may adjust himself the more quickly and easily
to the complex societal environment. To this end the school serves a
valuable purpose. However, in order to function best, the school must
be a replica in as many ways as possible of real society.[XXV-4]

The special social environment, namely, the school, must simplify
and arrange in an orderly way the dispositional factors it wishes
to develop in children. It must present the existing social customs
in purified and idealized forms. It must create a wider and better
balanced environment for the young than they would have if they were
not in school.

Imitation, to Dr. Dewey, is a less useful term than many social
psychologists believe. What objectively is a process of imitation is
subjectively a process of like response to like stimuli. The term
imitation does not explain; it simply describes--objectively. The
fundamental fact that the sociological student needs to keep in mind is
that “persons being alike in structure respond in the same way to like
stimuli.”[XXV-5] This conception is similar to ideas that Professors
Giddings and Cooley have elaborated. The societal significance of this
interpretation can be stated best in terms of social control. The
highest type of social control is that which plans for a common mental
disposition, a common way of understanding objects, events, and acts,
common sets of socially constructive stimuli.

Professor Dewey argues for a school life which fully connects theory
and practice. While pragmatic, he emphasizes the necessity for a
correct theory, but more particularly the combining of theory and
practice--in the school life itself. In other words, anything which
sets school life apart from actual life is a disutility; it is
educationally harmful. Hence school life must include the actual
occupations, nature study, and the like. It must relegate formal
education to a secondary position. The moral atmosphere of the
schoolroom must change from one primarily of discipline, even formal
discipline, to one of co-operation.

School life, in other terms, is properly an embryonic community life.
It is the business of the school to train each child into membership
of a little community that is a counterpart of society at large,
“saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the
instruments of effective self-direction.”[XXV-6] Professor Dewey would
make the school a miniature society, fitting its members by their daily
activities in the schools for normal membership in “a larger society
which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.”

The literature on educational sociology is growing rapidly. Within
recent years several books on educational sociology have appeared.
In the list of the authors of these works are the names of O’Shea,
Snedden, Smith, King, Clow, Betts, Dutton, and others of equal
importance.[XXV-7] Professor Walter R. Smith, for example, in applying
sociological principles to educational work, contends that normal
school graduates have been taught to look to psychology alone for
the key to sound pedagogy, whereas sociology is perhaps an equally
important key to effective teaching. Education is not entirely a
matter of training the mind of the individual; it is also a process of
acquainting the individual with the needs of society and of helping
him to participate in improving the quality of societary life. Dr.
Smith urges training not _for_ citizenship, but training _into_
citizenship.[XXV-8]

Inasmuch as men and women live and develop and work as members of
groups, it is vital, according to Dr. Snedden, that children be taught
as integral units of group life. It is sociology that must determine
the aims of education.[XXV-9] By sociological standards it has been
proved that existing curricula in the United States are excessively
individualistic in aim as well as in method. Their purpose has been to
encourage the individual to win against, rather than with, his fellows.
Our curricula provide self-culture studies and self-development
studies, but few social culture and social development studies. The
former are indispensable, but if not properly balanced by the latter
they are positively dangerous.

The responsibilities of individuals for collective thinking and acting
have never been taught to any degree in the schools, and yet these
responsibilities, not only in time of war, but increasingly so in time
of peace, must be assumed widely, else democracy itself will collapse.
By training pupils in the principles of individual success primarily,
the schools have turned out a generation of persons who are unready to
meet the new world problems that are at hand, and who are unable to
promote “constructive programs making for international co-operation
and friendliness.”[XXV-10]

Custom, not social needs, has too often controlled school curricula.
The _Anabasis_ and Caesar’s _Commentaries_, although splendid bits of
literary composition, “are about as significant to the realities of a
nineteenth or twentieth century as bows and arrows would be in modern
warfare, or Roman galleys in the naval contests of tomorrow.”[XXV-11]
The study of forgotten tongues and antiquated fragments of literature
falls far short of training twentieth century youths for the conscious
co-operative direction of the social forces of the future.

Vocational education is not all-sufficient. Youth must be taught
to be socially and morally efficient--no less than physically and
vocationally.[XXV-12] In addition to the current emphasis upon
vocational education, attention must be given to a moral education
in the schools that can produce in individuals the moral character
required to meet the needs of a highly developed democracy.

Educational sociology has viewed with alarm certain recent tendencies
in vocational guidance. It has supported heartily the plans for giving
every child an occupational training and of enabling him to earn his
own living. On the other hand, it has deplored the idea that a vocation
or earning a living is an end in itself. It has insisted that the main
reason for teaching a boy a trade is that the boy may have a larger
opportunity for developing his personality and for serving society.

Likewise, educational sociology has often looked askance at scientific
management, or the movement for educating all workingmen to the point
of highest productive efficiency. Such a training has frequently
produced a maximum increase in profits for those who have promoted it
and a minimum of increase in wages for the workers, besides tending to
turn the latter into mere machines, instead of into human leaders with
increased capacities for enjoyment and spiritual service.

The studies in all school curricula must be evaluated in terms of
social worth. For example, what is the purpose of teaching history? Is
it to give the pupil a chronology of dates and a catalogue of ignoble
kings and bloody battles, or is it to give the pupil the meaning of
social evolution, social progress, social inheritances, the rise of
social needs?[XXV-13]

Educational sociology holds the theory that training for unselfish
social living is as important as training for individual pecuniary
success. It is engaged at the present time in working out techniques
for introducing every member of the public schools to the sociological
viewpoint. The names under which such techniques appear is immaterial,
whether as community civics, American history studies, elementary
social science, or elementary sociology. The next few decades will
undoubtedly be marked by the rapid spread of educational sociology.




CHAPTER XXVI

THE SOCIOLOGY OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY


In a foregoing chapter the invaluable contribution of the Hebrews to
social thought was presented; the attack of the prophets on social
injustice was the outstanding feature. In another chapter the emphasis
by Jesus upon love as a dynamic societal principle was described. In
the centuries which followed the beginning of the Christian era, the
Church apotheosized beliefs, creeds, dogmas. Near the close of the
nineteenth century a renaissance of the social teachings of Jesus
occurred.

The trio of writers who brought forward the social ideals of
Christianity in a new, positive, and stimulating way in the closing
decades of the last century were Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong,
and Richard T. Ely. All three of these men began about 1885 to discuss
in print the social content of Christianity. These men had been
aroused by the apparent impotence of the Christian Church in face of
the increasing power of capitalism. While many church leaders allowed
themselves to be carried along in the powerful arms of capitalism,
there were a few who perceived the wreck of human lives that was often
left in the wake of the capitalistic movement. These individuals, while
not blind to the social values of capitalism, were in touch with the
laboring man, and by these contacts caught the social need of the hour.
In this social crisis they heard the still, small voice coming down
through the centuries, even the voice of Jesus as he spoke in behalf of
the poor and outcast.

It was Washington Gladden who startled and even angered the world of
religious and economic thought by protesting against the acceptance of
“tainted money.” By this term he referred to money which had been made
under a capitalistic system at the expense of the lives of men, women,
and little children in the industrial processes. Dr. Gladden weathered
the storm of protest and gave the capitalistic world a new concept
which, while it aroused anger, also brought introspection and a new
type of social conscience into the lives of many Christians.

It was Dr. Gladden’s contention that employer and employee ought to be
friends, because they are so closely associated. It is a very large
part of the business of the employer to maintain sympathetic relations
between himself and his employees.[XXVI-1] If the business man will not
let his fellowmen share in his prosperity, he will become in spite of
himself a sharer in their adversity.

The attitude of Dr. Gladden toward the acceptance of railway passes by
the clergy attracted widespread attention. He came to the conclusion
that a railroad company is bound to render an equal service to
all the people; its business is not to show special favors to the
representatives of either religion or charity.[XXVI-2] “What it has no
right to give me, I have no right to take, and for several years I have
not taken it; I pay the regular fare as all my neighbors do or ought.”

Dr. Gladden urged the abolition of city slums by governmental action.
Inasmuch as slums are rife with moral miasmas and are breeding-places
of pauperism and crime, the city has the same right to abate such
curses as to drain a morass. Moreover, individuals ought to have no
property rights “in premises which breed death and engender vice. When
they have proved that they lack the power to keep their property from
falling into such conditions, their property must be summarily taken
away from them.”[XXVI-3]

Without minimizing the importance of conflict as a principle of social
progress, Dr. Gladden stressed the concept of co-operation. For
example, in industrial matters he advocated the idea of a true trades
union--“the union of employers and employed--of guiding brains and
willing hands--all watchful of each other’s interests, seeking each
other’s welfare, working for the common good.”[XXVI-4]

In his well-known treatise on _Social Salvation_, Dr. Gladden asserts
that, in order to be soundly converted, an individual must comprehend
his social relationships and strive to fulfil them, as well as set
up right relationships with God.[XXVI-5] Sanctification consists in
fulfilling one’s social as well as one’s divine privileges, and in
living according to the needs of human society as well as according to
the needs of the human soul. An individual can no more be a Christian
by himself than he can sing an oratorio alone.[XXVI-6]

It is no purely social gospel that Dr. Gladden taught. He was correct
in protesting against the attitude of certain reformers who hold that
changing the environment is all-sufficient. It is possible to go too
far in removing temptations from the pathway of men; it would be unwise
to neglect the problem of equipping men to resist temptation, and hence
to weaken the sense of moral responsibility.[XXVI-7]

In the field of practical social reform Dr. Josiah Strong did effective
work. He also re-interpreted the social principles of Jesus, and
boldly proclaimed the spirit of love as the cardinal principle for
the organization of human society.[XXVI-8] He indicated that people
have stressed properly the importance of _believing_ the truth, but
underestimated the importance of _living_ the truth.[XXVI-9] He
protested against the tendency to separate the sacred and the secular,
and to divorce doctrine from conduct. He believed that the prevailing
religious tendency to neglect the sacred commandment, of loving one’s
neighbor as one’s self, has led to a selfish individualism on the part
of many religious people.

The contributions to social thought by Gladden and Strong were
ably supported by the social ideas of Richard T. Ely. Professor
Ely remonstrated against the tendency of many church people to
think that they can serve God without devoting their lives to their
fellowmen.[XXVI-10] He made vivid the complaint of American workingmen
that church membership on the part of employers and landlords does not
necessarily insure just and considerate treatment of employees and
tenants.[XXVI-11] Professor Ely insisted that it is as holy a work “to
lead a crusade against filth, vice, and disease in slums of cities, and
to seek the abolition of the disgraceful tenement houses of American
cities, as it is to send missionaries to the heathen.”[XXVI-12]

The pioneer work of Gladden, Strong, Ely, and others in rejuvenating
the social meaning of Christianity in the closing years of the
nineteenth century has been carried forward in the present
century by a host of able writers. The list includes the names
of well known socio-religious thinkers such as Peabody,[XXVI-13]
Mathews,[XXVI-14] Rauschenbusch,[XXVI-15] Batten,[XXVI-16]
Ward,[XXVI-17] Atkinson,[XXVI-18] Ryan,[XXVI-19] Stelzle,[XXVI-20] and
Taylor.[XXVI-21] Special attention will be given to the contributions
of Rauschenbusch and Ward, because each has been a storm-center in
socio-religious matters.

In his _Christianity and the Social Crisis_, Professor Rauschenbusch
gave a brief history of Christianity and its Hebrew antecedents,
showing first that “the essential purpose of Christianity was to
transform human society into the Kingdom of God by regenerating all
human relations and reconstituting them in accordance with the will
of God.”[XXVI-22] He then raised the question, why has Christianity
not undertaken the work of social reconstruction? He believed that if
the Church were to direct its full available force against any social
wrong, probably nothing could withstand it.[XXVI-23] Despite the
fact that Christianity has played a leading part in lifting woman to
equality and companionship with men, in changing parental despotism to
parental service, in eliminating unnatural vice, in abolishing slavery,
in covering all lands with a network of charities, in fostering
institutions of learning, in aiding the progress of civil liberty and
social justice, in diffusing a softening tenderness throughout human
life, in taming selfishness, and in creating a resolute sense of duty,
it has not yet undertaken a reconstruction of society on a Christian
basis.[XXVI-24] It has been engaged in suppressing some of the most
glaring evils in the social system of the time.[XXVI-25]

Dr. Rauschenbusch pointed out several historical factors which have
prevented Christianity from entering upon a program of reconstructing
society, many of which no longer obtain.[XXVI-26] These hindering
factors have been: (1) the moral resentment of the classes whose
interests are endangered by a moral campaign; (2) the belief in
the immediate return of Christ, which precluded a long outlook;
(3) the primitive attitude of fear and distrust toward the state;
(4) the other-worldliness of Christian desire; (5) the ascetic and
monastic ideals; (6) ceremonialism; (7) dogmatism; (8) the monarchial
organization of the church; (9) an absence of the intellectual
prerequisites for social reconstruction. To the extent that
Christianity is no longer hampered by these characteristics it is ready
to undertake the task of making over society.

The main danger in the present crisis which demands the attention
of social Christianity was found by Professor Rauschenbusch in the
autocratic, unjust phases of capitalism, with its somewhat undemocratic
wage system. To this expression of autocracy there is a three-fold
class reaction.[XXVI-27] First, there are those classes which are in
practical control of wealth; they have no reformatory program; they are
anxious to maintain the present social order intact. Second, there are
the middle social classes, which, sharing partially in the advantages
of the present social adjustment, are also chafing under social
grievances which their ideals do not allow them to attack vigorously;
they want reform work by peaceful and gradual methods. Third, there are
the disinherited classes, which see a widening chasm between themselves
and the wealthy, a chasm that “only a revolutionary lift can carry
them across.” It is around the condition and attitudes of the masses
that the social crisis revolves. This social attitude is like a tank
of gasoline, which by a single explosion will blow a car sky-high, or
which, by a series of little explosions will push a car to the top of a
mountain.[XXVI-28] Which process does Christianity wish to further? If
the latter, then Christianity must socialize first the attitude of the
classes of wealth and social power. Unfortunately, wealth often grows
stronger than the man who owns it; it may own him and rob him of his
moral and spiritual freedom.[XXVI-29] Can Christianity dissolve this
dilemma?

The principle that a Christian should seek an ascetic departure from
the world of life and work is no longer acceptable. He has two other
possibilities. He can either condemn the world and try to improve it,
or tolerate it and gradually be conformed to it.[XXVI-30] By these
sharply drawn alternatives, Professor Rauschenbusch awoke the Christian
world. While many Christians did not believe that the situation was as
crucial as thus depicted, they nevertheless were jarred from a state of
moral lethargy.

As a pastor for eleven years among the working people of New York City,
Dr. Rauschenbusch learned to understand the heart throbs and yearnings
of the masses, and dedicated his life through Christian service to
easing the pressure upon the working classes and to increasing the
forces that bear them up. He saw the solution of the social problem in
a Christian socialism that would destroy the autocracy of wealth and
establish a democratic form of industrial relationships. He believed
in the social or public ownership of the natural resources of the
earth. “It is preposterous to think that an individual or a corporation
can have absolute ownership in a vein of coal or copper. A mining
company owns the holes in the ground, for it made the holes; it does
not own the coal; for it did not make the coal. The coal is the gift of
God and belongs to the people.”[XXVI-31]

Another difficulty is found in the fact that business methods and
the principles of Christianity have always been at strife.[XXVI-32]
Individuals are struggling to get the better of their fellows. This
tendency has been institutionalized in the form of business enterprise.
Private persons have been permitted “to put their thumbs where they can
constrict the life blood of the nation at will.”[XXVI-33] Christianity,
on the other hand, lauds the principle of unselfish service, and of
ranking the individual as the greatest who gives most. Christianity is
awakening to its gigantic task of stopping the nation on “its headlong
ride on the road of covetousness.”

It is in this connection that Professor Rauschenbusch has made
famous the phrase, “Christianizing the social order.” This term
means “bringing the social order into harmony with the ethical
convictions which are identified with Christ.”[XXVI-35] Such a program
involves attacking “the last intrenchment of autocracy,” namely, in
business,--and Christianizing business. The struggle is already on.
In many of the phases of the conflict, capitalism is swallowing up
Christianity. The church becomes traditional, narrowly ecclesiastical,
dogmatic, opposing science and democracy. Where capitalism is
strongest, the churches as virile social forces are weakest.[XXVI-34]

In reply to the often repeated charge that socialized Christianity is
no Christianity at all, Professor Rauschenbusch shows that personal
religion, instead of being defeated by a socialized religion, will
gain strength and be able to present a much stronger appeal than
it now does. The advocate of the social teachings of Jesus is not
attacking personal religion, but rather endeavoring to give personal
religion a new dynamic, especially in those phases of modern life
where personal religion has lost most of its appeal. The opponents of
social Christianity cannot afford to neglect the fact that the often
one-sided, mechanical, and superficial gospel and methods of evangelism
have created a religious apathy, if not a definite reaction against
religion.[XXVI-36] It is blind foolishness to try to fence out the new
social spirit from Christianity instead of letting it fuse with the
older religious faith and “create a new total that will be completer
and more Christian than the old religious individualism at its
best.”[XXVI-37]

Dr. Rauschenbusch insisted that there must be a Christianizing of
international relations, that individuals must be taught to see
the sinfulness of the present social order, and that the popular
conception of God must be democratized.[XXVI-39] He reinterpreted the
organic unity of human society,--asserting that when one man sins,
other men suffer; and that when one class sins, other classes bear a
part of the suffering.

In 1908, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America
was organized at Philadelphia. The Council adopted with slight
modifications the resolutions which some months earlier had been
accepted by the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church
(North), and which Rev. Harry F. Ward and others had drawn up.

This Bill of Rights, as the Resolutions have been called, imposed upon
the members of the more than thirty Protestant denominations the duty
of obtaining industrial justice for the cause of labor. It spoke for
(1) the principle of arbitration in industrial dissensions, (2) the
adequate protection of workers in hazardous trades, (3) the abolition
of child labor, (4) the safeguarding of physical and moral health of
women in industry, (5) the suppression of the “sweating system,” (6)
the reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point,
(7) a living wage in all industries, (8) one day of rest in seven
for all workers, (9) the most equitable division of the products of
industry that can ultimately be devised, (10) suitable provisions for
old age or disability of workers, and (11) the abatement of poverty.

At the meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in
America at a special meeting held at Cleveland, Ohio, May 6–8, 1919,
the foregoing platform was re-affirmed; and in addition, as a means of
meeting the needs of the reconstruction days following the World War,
the following notable resolutions were adopted. The Council declared
not only that labor is entitled to an equitable share in the profits of
industry, but took the new step of expressing the belief that labor is
entitled also to an equitable share in the management of industry. “The
sharing of shop control and management is an inevitable step” in the
attainment of an ordered and constructive democracy in industry. The
Council asserted that the first charge upon industry should be wages
sufficient to support an American standard of living.

In 1919, the Committee on Special War Activities of the National
Catholic War Council published a brief but important document on social
reconstruction. In this pamphlet the defects of the capitalistic system
of industry are declared to be: “Enormous inefficiency and waste in
the production and distribution of commodities; insufficient incomes
for the great majority of wage-earners; and unnecessarily large
incomes for a small minority of privileged capitalists.”[XXVI-40]
The Committee urged that employees shall exercise a reasonable share
in the management of industrial enterprises, and that the State
should inaugurate comprehensive provisions for health insurance and
old age insurance. It recognized that the true line of progress is
in the direction of co-operative production and of co-partnership
arrangements. “In the former, the workers own and manage the industries
themselves; in the latter, they own a substantial part of the corporate
stock and exercise a reasonable share in the management.”[XXVI-41]
The Catholic pronunciamento demands that the spirit of both labor and
capital be reformed. The laborer must give up the desire of a maximum
of return for a minimum of service; he must remember that he owes
society an honest day’s work for a fair wage. On the other hand the
capitalist must learn that wealth is not possession but stewardship,
and that “profit-making is not the basic justification of business
enterprise.”[XXVI-42]

Inasmuch as the Rev. Harry F. Ward has written more extensively on
social Christianity than any other person, save Rauschenbusch, and has
created widespread and heart-searching discussions, his contributions
to socio-religious thought will be considered next. Dr. Ward does
not believe in social service as a bait for drawing people into the
church. He objects to bribing people in order to get them into an
evangelistic meeting. To him social service is a natural phase of
religion, expressing itself freely and without sinuous designs. In
his estimation, soup kitchens are not to be established as a means of
enticing the laboring man inside the church walls, but as an unselfish
expression of the Christian’s desire to be true to the Christ spirit.
Social service is not a selfish program, on the part of the church,
for increasing its membership. It is as natural to Christianity as
personal evangelism, and equally intrinsic and vital. It has won more
than national recognition. While it is radical in the eyes of the
conservative, it contains an analysis of social conditions that many
of its critics have not appreciated. It breathes a sincerity and a
straightforwardness that compels the fair-minded reader to give heed.

Slavery was rejected as the economic basis of civilization, and
monarchy has recently been rejected as the political basis. In each
instance the world came to a junction where idealistic impulse
overthrew entrenched power. It is Dr. Ward’s contention that the world
is now reaching a similar junction point, a point where idealistic
impulse will dethrone the autocracy in capitalism. The idealistic
impulse, to which reference has been made in the foregoing lines, is
germinal in the teachings of Jesus.

With prophetic vision, more organized than the vision of Amos, Hosea,
Isaiah, but equally sincere, and fearless, Dr. Ward points out the
principles of the new social order which he believes are almost upon
the world. He then describes the various factors which are struggling
each in its own way to inaugurate the new order.

The five principles of the new social order are equality, universal
service, efficiency, the supremacy of personality, and solidarity.
(1) Equality is the old word which won attention in the American and
French Revolutions. It grew out of the theory of natural rights which
was discussed in Chapter XI. The American emphasis on the principle of
equality is shown in the admiration that is accorded the achievements
of energy and toil, in the common struggle for more wealth and luxury,
in foreign missionary activities, in the rise of the democratic
conscience and the idealistic impulses of the people.

On the other hand, the principle of equality is being violated when,
instead of trying to remove the natural inequalities among folks, “we
increase them by giving special privileges to the strong as the reward
of their strength.” The United States is at the crossroads. One highway
is characterized by luxury and extravagance on one side, and by poverty
and slavery on the other; it leads to revolutionary attempts on the
part of the masses to overthrow the privileged classes. It ends in
national decadence. The second highway is characterized by justice.
Those in economic authority are willing to grant representation to
labor in the management of industry and to further the rise of the
co-operative spirit. They are willing to sacrifice their own special
privileges for the sake of the welfare of the disinherited.

The intellectuals of the middle class hold vast power. In crises, they
usually join the privileged classes rather than the masses; and hence,
their influence often swings to the side of injustice.[XXVI-43]

(2) Universal service is the principle of equal obligation. Equal
rights, by itself, may mean equal rights to cheat, to exploit. It needs
to be checked by its complement of equal obligation. During the World
War there was a frequent demonstration of the principle of universal
service. “We are engaged in helping the boys at the front” became the
slogan. At the front as well as in the home towns and cities, wealthy
and poor, capital and labor served together. The end of the War gave
prominence to this question: Will the universal service idea spread or
will it be discarded? Will industry go back to the unashamed pursuit of
private gain?[XXVI-44]

Dr. Ward makes a careful distinction between the service of democratic
mutual helpfulness and the service of a governing class, no matter how
excellent.[XXVI-45] It is a low type of service which grants Christmas
dinners to the poor with the result that the poor are thereby made
contented with their lot in life.

(3) Efficiency is a term which is the product of the mechanical era,
which originated in the business world, and which is now being applied
to all phases of social organization.[XXVI-46] Its aim is perfection
in social mechanics. Social efficiency includes not only social
engineering but social knowledge, social philosophy, social ethics,
and social religion. Evidences of social inefficiency are common; for
example, the failure to use and apply the social knowledge that we
have, and the loss of energy through an over-emphasis on competition.
Democracy will never be able to succeed merely because of its splendid
ethical ideals.[XXVI-47] The need is for an efficiency in government
that is scientific and not simply a business efficiency.[XXVI-48]
Scientific efficiency includes “the spirit of service to the common
interest by which alone democracy can live.”[XXVI-49]

(4) The supremacy of personality is a principle of life that conflicts
today with the current emphasis on economic efficiency. It is because
the latter is so often reckless of human values that the new social
order will stress the development of things of the spirit rather than
material goods; even business must practice this ideal. The World War
raised the estimate which the common people put on their own lives; but
the ultimate result will depend on whether or not people took part in
the war voluntarily and conscious of high moral purposes, and whether
or not the peace which follows shall bring a new world organization
that conserves all the advances in human living that have thus far been
made.

Institutions possess an inherent fallibility. They tend to become
mechanical and repressive, even those dedicated to high purposes,
such as institutions of democracy, of education, and of religion.
The supreme object of any social institution and organization,
no matter in what field it may exist, should be the increase of
personality.[XXVI-50]

(5) The new social order will be governed by a sense of solidarity,
that is, by a community of feeling and thought which arises when
individuals associate together in working for a common end. World
solidarity will come when all peoples learn to work together for public
welfare, and subordinate all selfish desires to this end. Christianity
is moving in this direction when it advances the concept of
“comradeship of all men with each other and with the Great Companion,”
when it gradually unfolds the idea of a unified world life, when it
applies its doctrines of brotherhood of man to the relations of the
employer and employee or to the relations of white and black races,
when it seeks the democratic solidarity of the human race rather than
the imperialistic solidarity of an overhead religious control, when it
endeavors to spread love and faith, rather than to spread dogmas and
promote organizations.[XXVI-51] Class cleavage, nationalism as distinct
from nationality, race prejudice, ignorance, and selfishness are the
main opponents of the world brotherhood principle.

Dr. Ward, having defined what he considers the chief principles
that will govern the new social order, proceeds to measure current
movements by certain standards. He reviews the declarations of the
British Labor Party, the Russian Soviet Republic, the League of
Nations, and the labor movements in the United States. These tendencies
are all expressions of a more or less blind desire for justice. In
all countries of the world the masses are restless, stirring, and
experiencing a keen sense of injustice. Their leaders are struggling,
unscientifically as a rule, toward the light of a new day of democracy.
The trend which this struggle takes depends on the given social
environment and the attitude of the persons in authority. If undue
repression and autocracy are exercised for a long period of time, as
in Russia under the Czars, revolution is the only means of escape open
to the masses. Schooled for a long time under the lash of autocracy,
when they themselves come into control, they will use the only means of
control that they know, the lash of autocracy.

The British Labor Party is moving in the direction of guild socialism,
which includes the organization of industry into large units, in charge
of the workers and relatively free from the rule of the politicians.
The national government is to have a general oversight over the large
industrial units. As immediate steps in this direction, the Labor
Party demands the nationalization of the railroads, mines, and of the
production of electric power. Municipalities participate in the common
ownership program. The method of transformation is to be gradual,
largely based on political action.

In regard to the League of Nations Covenant, which was agreed upon in
Paris in 1919, Dr. Ward takes a negative attitude. Although he believes
firmly in an organization of good will, in international friendship
and in world solidarity upon democratic bases, he asserts stoutly
that the Paris Covenant is “a symbol of the sacred right of private
property,”[XXVI-52] that it provided for an international organization
of capitalism with all the force of powerful national governments
behind it, that it represented a series of compromises between
nationally selfish units, that it was an expression of the wishes of
the rulers of the democratic states who are essentially of “the same
moral caliber as the ruling class of imperialistic militarism, and bear
a similar sinister relationship to the future welfare of the common
folk.”[XXVI-53]

The weakness of Dr. Ward’s treatment of the programs for the new social
order is that it discusses almost entirely programs, platforms, ideals,
without considerating the relations between the programs and the
actual practices of the various organizations. In contrasting the best
phases, for example, of the British Labor Party with the worst phases
of capitalism, an incomplete picture is given. However, this weakness
in method need not obscure the strength of thought which Dr. Ward
displays. Some of the most thought-provoking deductions are:

1. That individualistic Christianity is losing ground.

2. That the middle class is becoming a class of privilege.

3. That the intellectuals of the middle class, while keenly aware of
the evils in the capitalistic system, are so much indebted to that
system that they would consider themselves ingrates if they spoke out
against it, or they are simply afraid to speak out.

4. That jails and machine guns will not stop the laboring classes in
appealing for a democratic reorganization of industry, but will rather
hasten revolutions, with resultant dictatorships of the proletariat.

5. That capitalism is passing, as it is bound to do, because it is
organized selfishness--its fundamental principle is wrong.

6. That political democracy is fighting for its life today, being
attacked on the one flank by economic imperialism and on the other by
the dictatorship of the proletariat.[XXVI-54]

7. That unless the struggle can be ended by a process of reason and
orderly progress, the world is doomed to devastation by universal
conflict.

8. That the goal of social development is, in broad terms, “a fraternal
world community, the great loving family of mankind, knit together by
common needs but most of all by loyalty to common ideals, and by the
power of its common love efficiently directing and controlling its
common life.”[XXVI-55]

An important question arises: How shall the social teachings of Jesus
become widely taught? Evangelistic Christianity, with its personal
emphasis, cannot be expected adequately to carry the social message.
Preachers, theologically trained, are bound to give the social
phases of Christianity a secondary place. In recent years, however,
a movement known as religious education has been acquiring momentum.
Moreover, a social theory of religious education has been formulated.
In this connection, Dr. George Albert Coe has perhaps done the most
significant work. Our life, Dr. Coe believes, gets its largest meaning
not from the fact of individual self-consciousness alone, but from the
equally important fact that life is social.[XXVI-56] Without a belief
in social consciousness, an endless existence after death, in terms
of self-consciousness primarily, would be meaningless and probably
valueless. Religion must solve the problem of establishing a Kingdom
of Heaven on earth, and also train its votaries for a societal life
in Heaven. The latter problem will be met easily when the former
is solved. It is well illustrated by the young Christian lady from
Virginia who asked: Won’t there have to be a separate Heaven for
Negroes, since we hate them so here? In other words, will there not
have to be a thousand or a million Heavens in order to accommodate
happily all the antagonistic Christian groups now on earth? How can
the Protestant Ulstermen and Catholic Irishmen live together lovingly
in Heaven? The problem goes back to solving the social implications of
Christianity in earthly relationships.

The social aims of Christian education, according to Dr. Coe, are
as follows: (1) Social welfare, or the control of the non-human
environment in the interest of human life. (2) Social justice, or the
inauguration of fair play in all the dealings of every individual, no
matter how strong and shrewd, with every other individual, no matter
how weak and ignorant. (3) A world society or the promotion of a code
of conduct that leads to “the integration of all peoples into a single,
democratically governed mankind.” Nationalism must melt into a larger
regard for human beings; and that which is “a climactic expression of
the selfishness, that is to say the injustice that is organized in our
legal systems and our national sovereignties,” must be revealed to all,
even in the Sunday schools.[XXVI-57]

The implications of a sound social theory of religious education are
met by the religious doctrine of personal fellowship between God and
man, and between man and man; by a reorganization of the church as a
religious institution in a way which shall put religious education on
as scientific a basis as the ordinary day school education; and by
training the church school pupils in the principles of social justice,
co-operation, and love, as well as in matters pertaining to personal
salvation.

Another current development is the religious social service director.
For some time the religious education director has been a recognized
force in church work. The social service director in church life is
coming into the foreground, bearing the responsibility of working out
social welfare programs for the church services, directing the training
of the membership in volunteer social work, inaugurating religious
social surveys, in fact, carrying the social message of the church into
all the church activities.

The social service activities of the church have often been used as a
net for catching the churchless. Social service as a bribe, however,
will fail. Genuine religious social service is that which emanates
naturally and easily from the lives of the church members and of the
church itself, asking no pay and possessing no sinuous ends. The church
that inaugurates a social program for building up the family life, the
play life, the moral life, the economic life, as well as the religious
life, in the community in which it is located, most truly represents a
socialized church. The church, however, that uses its social welfare
program merely in order to build itself up, fails to understand the
social calling as a religious institution.

The social thought of the Hebrews revolved about the idea of social
justice; of Jesus, about the concept of active love; and of modern
Christianity, at its best, about an unselfish social program for
bringing about a just, co-operative, and harmonious life, ranging in
its operation from the individual in his family and local community
life to the individual as a functioning unit in a new world society.




CHAPTER XXVII

METHODS OF SOCIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION


In any line of thought or endeavor a correct method of procedure is
all-important. Inaccurate theories of procedure have wrecked nations,
hindered civilization for centuries at a time, and flooded the world
with negative and harmful ideas. It will be worth while, therefore, to
consider the methods by which sociology has advanced.

The ancient makers of social proverbs crystallized what they had
individually observed many times to be true, or what they had heard
repeated on many occasions as being true. Such methods were based on
observation and generalization, carelessly used. Moreover, the data at
the command of the makers of social proverbs were very limited.

The Hebrew prophets, fired by exalted ideas concerning the nature
of Jehovah, insisted upon a practical application of these ideas to
the daily life of the people of their time. When they perceived that
the actions and living conditions of the people fell far below the
implications of the pattern-ideas for which the name of Jehovah stood,
they vehemently proclaimed definite social ideals, and condemned all
who hindered the realization of these ideals. This method of creating
social thought is noteworthy because of the religious dynamic behind
it, and because of the social pattern-ideas which it produced.

Plato and Aristotle were pioneer social philosophers who took cosmic
views of life. One followed the method of abstract reasoning and
centered his thought in a world of Ideas; the other viewed life
pragmatically, employing a method of empirical tests. While sociology
will always have a place for methods which interpret the daily facts of
individual and social experience in their relationships to the whole
human society and to the universe, it will insist that as large a body
of societary data as possible be gathered together before philosophic
sociology speaks positively.

In the teachings of Jesus a rare insight to human nature is manifested.
Jesus studied individuals as individuals and, perceiving their selfish
natures, proclaimed a remedy in an inner transformation through
consecration to objective factors, such as persons and ideals. Jesus
was peculiarly happy in his method of moving among all classes of
people, of studying their needs, and of testing in practice his social
principles. While his acquaintance with human life was limited to
small groups of one race, he sought universal as well as particular
human tendencies. His method included an absolutely unselfish spirit,
a search for the truth, a broad viewpoint--all of which are thoroughly
scientific.

The _Utopia_ of Sir Thomas More, preceded to be sure by Plato’s
_Republic_, introduced another social thought method. The utopian
formula consists in setting forth a set of ideals which presumably are
distinctly in advance of current standards. The method of arriving at
utopian ideas is largely through the use of the imagination. Standards
are postulated so far in advance of current conditions as to make
them of little value. Utopian social thought, however, does have some
scientific merit. The imagination may be used in revealing reality to
otherwise blind individuals. A utopian thought may startle a selfish
individual out of a part of his selfishness. A utopian idea possesses
the power which is inherent in indirect suggestion; it may arouse
without antagonizing.

In the approach to the social question through an analysis of the
natural rights of the individual, the seventeenth and eighteenth social
writers fell into a deductive and a priori procedure which led them far
astray. Like the theory of individual rights, the correlative doctrine
of the social contract contained more error than truth.

The method of positivism, ordinarily connected with the writings
of Comte, essayed a scientific approach to the social question. It
insisted upon accuracy, induction, and a right emphasis upon sequence
and co-existence. But positivism, even in the hands of its exponents,
became deductive and philosophic. It promised well scientifically, but
fell into nearly all the errors which it condemned. It was, however, a
factor in producing the nineteenth century humanitarianism.

The organic analogy method of studying human society attracted
widespread attention, appealed strongly to the imagination even
of scholars, but resulted in findings of negligible value.
The parallelisms between an organism and society proved to be
scientifically valueless, except as they revealed some of the
connections between organic volution and social evolution. They created
a considerable vocabulary of bio-social terminology which has been more
of a hindrance than a help in social thinking.

The psychical approach to the study of societary life, introduced by
Lester F. Ward, and made scientific by the findings of inductive and
behavioristic psychology, has proved thus far to be the best method
of understanding the social process and of arriving at a statement of
sociological laws. This method has revealed human life as a series of
social conflicts and co-operations, and of forms of social control
designed to regulate individuals for selfish and unselfish group
purposes. An explanation of the more important phases of the psychical
methodology has been presented in several chapters of this volume.

The individual rights doctrine, the social contract theories, the
concept of positivism, and the organic analogies belong to the
unscientific age in sociological methodology. In the main these
sets of social theories were philosophic, deductive, a priori, and
argumentative. They were based chiefly on opinions, positivism alone
leaning to observation and induction but failing to live up to its
promises. On the other hand, recent decades have been marked by the
rise of scientific methods in sociology, attention has been centered
on the social process, and particularly on the psychical processes
of which the social process is an elaboration. Although he possessed
an entirely inadequate knowledge of psychology, Lester F. Ward laid
the foundations of modern sociology when he insisted that society is
a psychical affair, capable of mastering itself. As a result of this
contribution to method, not by a psychologist but by a paleontologist,
social thought moved forward into the field of scientific sociology.

There are many writers who would class Ward with the pre-scientific
contributors to sociological thought. His methods, it is true, were
largely deductive; his psychology was seriously faulty; his philosophy
was inefficient. Nevertheless, he pointed the way for sociologists so
clearly that in this treatise his work has been considered as giving
the trend to recent sociology, rather than as being the last word of
discredited types of social thought.

Then there are other types of sociological methodology of which mention
should be made, notably, the statistical, and the classificatory
procedures. The statistical approach had its origin in the early
census. There are evidences that rulers and kings, at least two or
three millenniums before Christ, had enumerations of their subjects
made. In connection with poor-law administration, people as early as
the Roman Era were counted. But it was not until the eighteenth century
that statistics became scientific, with statistical laws drawn from
a study of tabulated facts. Quetelet gives 1820 as the birth year
of statistical science. It was Frederick William I of Prussia who
is reported to have had an enumeration made of occupational facts;
and Frederick the Great, with having established a system for making
regular statistical studies of population. It is said that early in the
eighteenth century the University of Jena began to offer courses in
statistics.

In England, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, Captain John
Graunt is credited with applying methods of counting, measurement, and
induction to the births and deaths in London. His studies were referred
to as political arithmetic, and were a forerunner of the current
investigations in vital statistics. Malthus made use of statistical
methods in his work (1798) on population changes.

Quetelet (1796–1874) is usually considered the founder of statistical
science. He not only applied the method of counting to the study of
the members of human society (the census method in its common form),
but he tried to get at the problem of causation, and to indicate rules
of procedure for making causal studies in statistics. Although this
celebrated Belgian statistician tabulated and analyzed facts ranging
from the astronomical to the societary fields, his ideas can be
mentioned here only so far as they contribute to the subject of social
thought. Quetelet pointed out certain of the pitfalls in the way of
gathering accurate data. He improved the methods of census taking, and
undertook the difficult tasks that are involved in qualitative human
studies.

Among the results of Quetelet’s work, the concept of “the average man”
is well known. Quetelet defined the law of averages and described
types, especially the average individual. Although it is very important
and useful to know about the “average man,” the term is practically
fictitious, since no one even in a large group exactly fits the
description. All individuals are either “above” or “below” the average.

The contributions of Quetelet in the field of social statistics were
admirably supplemented by the achievements of Le Play (1806–1882). This
French sociologist and mining engineer applied the methods of physical
science to social science. He insisted upon observation of data and the
use of induction in making generalizations. His method is illustrated
by his studies in family budgets. In order to secure accurate data he
lived with individual families, studying at first-hand the conditions
by which they made a livelihood. Le Play opposed _laissez-faire_
theories and urged programs of reform through the journal which he
founded, namely, _La Reforme Sociale_. He rejected socialism, and
advocated the method of conciliation and sympathy for effecting
agreements among employers and employees.

Similar methods were evolved by Engels and Bücher, German
investigators. Engels’ studies of family budgets led him to draw
certain average observations. These “averages” are known as Engels’
laws, for example: (1) The smaller the income, the larger the
percentage of expenditure for food. (2) The percentage of expenditure
for clothing, and for lodging or rent, varies directly with the income.
(3) The larger the income, the larger the percentage of expenditures
for sundries (including luxuries).

The statistical method has been carried forward by a large number of
social investigators. With averages, modes, and medians, it is now
possible to make accurate quantitative studies. Current statistical
methods include the use of index numbers, frequency tables, discrete
series, deviations, skewness, correlations. Statistics has thrown
a flood of light upon important phases of societary life, such as
the economic, where wage scales and price levels are significant
concepts. Statistics has been widely utilized in the study of crime and
poverty. The various methods of graphic presentations are valuable in
interpreting tables of statistical data to the lay mind.

Statistical methods can be used, however, to prove almost anything. The
ordinary individual is helpless when statistical methods are treated
unscrupulously. On the other hand, it is probably true that social
thought will become increasingly accurate by the judicious use of
statistical studies.

A recent development, closely related to statistical science, is the
social survey. Beginning with the Pittsburg Survey in 1907–1908, the
social survey method has been widely adopted in the United States. Its
use has been applied to inventories of a specific community, such as a
rural district or a small number of city blocks. There is the specific
survey of a given social problem, such as housing or poverty. Then
there is the survey of an entire industry or a school system.

The social survey is one of the most important sources today of sound
social thinking. By it, large quantities of social facts are being
collected. Urban and rural surveys, specific and general surveys alike,
are affording the best bases at the present time for inductive social
thinking. Some of these results have been indicated in a preceding
chapter upon the contributions of applied sociology.

The nature of the classificatory method has already been indicated
in this treatise. The Greeks classified the various fields of
knowledge under three heads: physics, ethics, and politics. Francis
Bacon classified knowledge according to his understanding of mental
operations. He divided mental processes into three, namely, feeling,
memory, reasoning; and made a corresponding division of knowledge into
art, history, and science. Auguste Comte classified the social elements
into four groups: the industrial, the esthetic, the scientific, and
the philosophical (previsional). His hierarchal classification of the
sciences into mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and
sociology has been discussed in an earlier chapter.

Guillaume de Greef may be considered the best exponent of the
classificatory method. De Greef accepted Comte’s hierarchy of the
sciences with its basic principles of decreasing generality and
increasing dependence of parts, assented to Spencer’s evolutionary
dictum of increasing coherence and heterogeneity, and added his own
concept of volitional contractualism.

De Greef argued that social progress is characterized by an increasing
degree of volitional activity and freedom. This volitionalism is the
basis of rational social control. The telic factors, however, are not
well developed by de Greef. His social thought rests upon a certain
logical but inaccurate classification of the social elements.

The basis of this classification is increasing volitionalism and
particularism. De Greef gives the following classification: economic,
industrial, genetic, artistic, scientific, moral, juridical, and
political. In holding that the economic elements in society represent
the least volitionalism, and the political the most volitional
activity, with graded degrees of volitional activities represented
by the intermediate factors, the weakness of de Greef’s analysis
becomes evident. While an improvement over Comte’s classification
and superior to Spencer’s mechanistic order, de Greef’s contribution
possesses only a relative degree of logical merit. It is far from
being objectively correct, and is indicative of the difficulties in
the way of classifying social elements in an evolutionary or filial
order. There is no doubt but that any classification of merit would
have to be arranged according to some correlative plan, which would
serve the purposes of an exhibit but would not be of much scientific
value. Moreover, the classifications that are most useful are those
classifications of societary forces; these are psychical in nature and
have been treated in foregoing chapters.

De Greef perceived the importance of the principle of socialization.
He emphasized the importance of a “we” feeling in societary life.
His social unit is the primitive family. In the evolution from the
primitive family and state, the evidence of progress is the degree of
“togetherness” that has been developed. De Greef advanced the idea that
there is an increasing degree of contractualism and hence of freedom
in society. De Greef’s work may be taken as the best attempt to carry
Comte’s classification of the sciences to a logical conclusion by
furnishing a classification of the elements which function in the field
of the “highest” science of all, namely, sociology.

At this point and in concluding, the methodology of Albion W.
Small will be considered. Professor Small’s other contributions to
sociological thought have been indicated at the proper places in
earlier chapters. The correct method for pursuing sociological analyses
is to treat human society in terms of process. The main current in all
sound sociological study is the social process. The significant test of
progress in this social process is achievement.[XXVII-2] According to
Professor Small’s classification, there are six main phases of social
progress, namely:

1. Achievement in promoting health,

2. Achievement in harmonizing human relations,

3. Achievement in producing wealth,

4. Achievement in discovery and spread of knowledge,

5. Achievement in the fine arts,

6. Achievement in religion.

These grand divisions are the expressions of certain interests[XXVII-3]
that human beings possess: (1) health interests, (2) wealth interests,
(3) sociability interests, (4) knowledge interests, (5) esthetic
interests, and (6) rightness interests. As a result of the operation
of these interests, social problems are produced. Sociology is “the
science of human interests and their workings under all conditions.”

In this classification human interests serve as the main key forces to
an understanding of the social process. Upon psychological examination,
however, the interests are found to be bafflingly complex. The
psychologist has not given a satisfactory description of interests. And
yet it is clear that what people are interested in is a fair criterion
of the direction which their evolution will take. Furthermore, the
changes in the interests of people are fundamental in telic social
progress. With a correlation of interests as a subjective criterion,
and of achievement as an objective test, Professor Small has shown the
dualistic nature of the social process. Those methodologists who would
measure all things human in purely objective terms are scientifically
negligent of important human elements. Mind is not simply matter; the
social process is not entirely behavior.

Professor Small has sharpened three important tools for the use of the
sociological investigator. These are: the social process, personal
interests, and the group. His analyses are sound, except as he does
not show how “interests” usually possess social origins. Otherwise
he speaks consistently and helpfully in terms of groups and group
processes.

With concepts such as have been favorably presented in the foregoing
paragraphs--and chapters--the sociologist of the future will be able to
make contributions to thought that will help to determine educational,
religious, economic, political, and other important human aims.




CHAPTER XXVIII

THE DISSEMINATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT


Despite its youth, inchoateness, and naïveté, sociological thought is
exerting a vital influence in the world. It is giving a new rating to
all the established values of life, undermining some, strengthening
others, and creating still others.

The chief values in sociological thought are that it constitutes the
center of all worth while thought; it gives balance and proportion to
thinking in any field; it defies race prejudice and social intolerance;
it smites selfish living; it rivets attention to the essentially human
values; it stimulates personal development in harmony with group and
societary welfare. At the same time, it postulates group advancement,
not upon paternalistic or autocratic grounds, but upon a constructive
projection of personalities that harmonizes with unselfish group
service.

For centuries genuine social thinking was confined largely to a few
of the intellectually élite. These few lived, and did even their
social thinking, in a more or less isolated way. It was not until the
first decades of the last centuries that social thought began to be
scientific in character, that is, became sociological. Sociological
thinking, however, was isolated and uncorrelated for many years. In
the last decade of the nineteenth century, sociology began to develop
a considerable body of thinkers and to create a new morale. There
were many disagreements that tended to break the new science asunder.
The opening decades, however, of the twentieth century witnessed
a development of sociological thought that was followed by the
establishment of the teaching of sociology as a profession.

With the rise of professional sociologists, the dissemination of
socialized thought became noteworthy. For a long time sociology was
considered only as a post-graduate study. In the last few years,
however, sociology has been making its way downward in college and
university curricula, until it is being widely taught to college
freshmen and sophomores. In this connection there is a variety of
textbooks that have been written to meet the needs of beginning
students. There are some teachers who would introduce sociology through
anthropological studies, beginning with the origin of man. Others would
give a survey or prospectus of social institutions, processes, and
problems.[XXVIII-1] Still others would deal only with social problems.
Then there are those persons who would build a text-book around a
central theme, tracing it through social relationships. For advanced
work in sociological thought there is a variety of treatises dealing
with systems at once profound, complex, and fundamental.

For high schools, the technique of sociological teaching is in the
beginning stages. The importance in high schools of social science
teaching is generally recognized, but there has been great difficulty
in effecting an agreement among the various social science branches.
Some high school teachers prefer a “social problems” course, although
the demand is growing for a “social science” course, extending
throughout the year, dividing the time more or less evenly between
economics, sociology, and civics. There are other high school
teachers who contend that sociology can be taught best in a general
“citizenship” course. One of the specific difficulties is that the
high school curriculum is full, and that the representatives of none
of the established courses are willing to see the subjects in which
they are interested crowded out. Another difficulty is the power which
the self-culture and self-development concepts possess. The equal
importance of the social culture and social development concepts is
being recognized, but with amazing slowness.

In the grades the teaching of sociology is gaining ground. In the sense
that there is an advanced group of mathematical studies for university
men and women and an elemental mathematics for the grades, so there is
advanced sociology, and also an elemental sociology centering around
the activities of the primary groups, such as the family, play,
neighborhood, and school groups. A child who is old enough to learn
to obey is old enough to begin elemental sociology, in fact, when he
learns to obey, he is already beginning to experience the meaning of a
social, if not a sociological concept. Simple social studies are being
prepared for the grades, even beginning with the first grade.

The dissemination of sociological thought is a practical question to
which in the last score of years special attention has been given.
The universities and colleges began to establish chairs of sociology
in the closing decade of the last century. The movement has acquired
a remarkable momentum in the United States. Normal schools and high
schools have adopted the movement. Many churches are promulgating a
socialized gospel. Literature is gradually assuming an appreciation of
the sociological viewpoint.

From the social proverbs of primitive man to a treatise such as Ross’
_Principles of Sociology_, with its admirable analysis of significant
societal processes, such as equalization, domination, individuation,
socialization--this is the main span of social thought. Social
thought began in the simplest form of observations about social
relationships between individual and individual, between chieftain
and tribal member, between master and servant. It experienced various
stages of denunciation of social wrongs. It produced perspectives of
perfect societies. It moved profoundly forward in the form of social
philosophies. Now it is proceeding either as the investigator of new
social facts, or the psychological interpreter of these facts in terms
of social processes. It is assuming a scientific procedure, although a
portion of the results of its undertakings finds expression in social
philosophy. It is beginning to formulate sociological laws. It is
inaugurating a technique for preventing the maladjustments that produce
social evils; it is establishing a teaching technique. Although the
masses of the human race are beginning to feel blindly the meaning of
social values, they have not yet been able to make their highest social
aspirations rationally articulate. Until that time comes, democracy
will remain an experiment, and world progress a toy of autocratic
forces.

A history of social thought is essentially a review of an irregular
but positive acceptance of social values. Individual after individual,
leader after leader, profession after profession, group after group,
have felt and accepted the challenge of the sociological viewpoint.
They have changed from living selfishly to living socially. They have
even given up the ideal of service for self advancement, setting up in
its place the ideal of service for the welfare of others. In so doing
and living they have found expansion of personality and contributed
to the advancement of society. Since the days of Comte in particular,
the social sciences have been increasing in variety and scope until
they number a score or more, and sociological influence has been
widening until the related sciences are inviting sociology, which is
the scientific study of group phenomena, to define their objectives for
them. In fact, sociological concepts are permeating the farthermost
reaches of personal living and societal control. A history of social
thought is a history of the socializing of human attitudes and
interests, presaging a human society in which personal achievement and
group progress are equally and supremely sought.




FOOTNOTES


CHAPTER II

[II-1] W. I. Thomas, _Source Book for Social Origins_, University of
Chicago Press, 1909, p. 161.

[II-2] Daniel Crawford, _Thinking Black_, Doran, 1913.

[II-3] E. M. Curr, _The Australian Race_, Melbourne, 1883, 1:339.

[II-4] A. M. Howitt, _The Organisation of Australian Tribes_, p. 452.


CHAPTER III

[III-1] _Boulak Papyrus_, trans. by Griffith, p. 5340, _La Moral
Egyptienne_.

[III-2] _“The Instruction of Ptah-Hotep,”_ trans. by Gunn, Wisdom of
the East Series.

[III-3] Code of Hammurapi, Sect. 196.

[III-4] Ibid., Sect. 198.

[III-5] Ibid., Sect. 229.

[III-6] _Shoo King_, 27:3.


CHAPTER IV

[IV-1] C. F. Kent, _The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus_,
Scribner, 1917, p. 4.

[IV-2] Exodus, 3:7, 8.

[IV-3] Amos, 2:6, 7, 8; 3:10; 4:1, 2; 5:7, 15; 6:4.

[IV-4] Isaiah, 1:23.

[IV-5] Isaiah, 3:14, 15.

[IV-6] Micah, 3:2, 3.

[IV-7] Jeremiah, 22:13, 15, 17 (Modern Reader’s Bible).

[IV-8] Louis Wallis, _Sociological Study of the Bible_, University of
Chicago Press, 1912, Ch. VII.

[IV-9] Hosea, 4:11; 9:11, 16.

[IV-10] Exodus, 20:12.

[IV-11] Proverbs, 20:20.

[IV-12] Proverbs, 12:4.

[IV-13] Proverbs, 29:15.

[IV-14] Isaiah, 5:11.

[IV-15] Proverbs, 20:1.

[IV-16] Proverbs, 31:7.

[IV-17] Exodus, 21:13; I Kings, 1:50; 2:28.

[IV-18] Job, 31.

[IV-19] Amos, 9:7.

[IV-20] Isaiah, 9:5; cf., Kent, _The Social Teachings of the Prophets
and Jesus_, p. 112.


CHAPTER V

[V-1] Hesiod, _Work and Days_, trans. by A. W. Mains, Oxford, 1908.

[V-2] _The Works of Hesiod, Callimachus and Theognis_, trans. by Banks,
Bohn’s Classical Library, p. 227.

[V-3] Botsford and Sihler, _Hellenic Civilization_, p. 64.

[V-4] George Rawlinson, translator, _History of Herodotus_, 4 vols.

[V-5] Plutarch’s Pericles, revised by Clough, 1:234 ff.

[V-6] Botsford and Sihler, op. cit., p. 340.

[V-7] _On Air, Water and Places_ in the Genuine Works of Hippocrates,
trans. by Adams, Vol. I.

[V-8] Plato I, 338 C. All references to Plato’s _Dialogues_ in this
chapter or in later chapters are to Jowett’s translation.

[V-9] Adela M. Adam, Plato, _Moral and Political Ideals_, p. 10.

[V-10] The reader will find in Will Durant’s _Philosophy and the Social
Problem_, Ch. I, a unique although ideocentric interpretation of
Socrates.

[V-11] _Laws_, 738.

[V-12] The beginning student of Plato’s social thought should first
read the _Republic_, especially V 472 A to VII 541 B.

[V-13] _Republic_, 369 B.

[V-14] Ibid., 370 B.

[V-15] Ibid., 373.

[V-16] _Laws_, 803.

[V-17] _Statesman_, 308.

[V-18] Ibid., 307.

[V-19] Ibid., 297.

[V-20] _Republic_, 398 E, 412.

[V-21] _Laws_, 731, 732.

[V-22] _Republic_, 412.

[V-23] _Statesman_, 303.

[V-24] _Republic_, 525; cf. _Laws_, 818.

[V-25] Ibid., 537, 539, 540.

[V-26] Ibid., 413.

[V-27] Ibid., 416.

[V-28] Ibid., 416, 417.

[V-29] Ibid., 457 C, 464 C.

[V-30] Ibid., 414, 415.

[V-31] Ibid., 415.

[V-32] Loc. cit.

[V-33] Ibid., 460 C, 461 C.

[V-34] _Statesman_, 310

[V-35] _Laws_, 773.

[V-36] _Statesman_, 310.

[V-37] _Republic_, 422 A; _Laws_, 744, 745.

[V-38] _Republic_, 421.

[V-39] Ibid., 550 D, E; _Laws_, 742, 791.

[V-40] _Republic_, 550.

[V-41] Ibid., 550 C.

[V-42] Ibid., 556.

[V-43] Loc. cit.

[V-44] Ibid., 552 D.

[V-45] Ibid., 552 E.

[V-46] _Laws_, 744, 745.

[V-47] Ibid., 729.

[V-48] Loc. cit.

[V-49] _Republic_, 377, 401.

[V-50] _Laws_, 772.

[V-51] _Statesman_, 294.

[V-52] Ibid., 300.

[V-53] In books, IX-XII.

[V-54] _Laws_, 934.

[V-55] Ibid., 862 ff.

[V-56] Ibid., 936.

[V-57] Ibid., 955.

[V-58] _Republic_, 455, 456; _Laws_, 805.

[V-59] _Republic_, 451.

[V-60] Ibid., 475 A; _Laws_, 814.

[V-61] _Laws_, 759.

[V-62] Ibid., 929, 930.

[V-63] _Republic_, 457 A; _Laws_, 795 ff, 813 ff, 830 ff.

[V-64] Ibid., 410.

[V-65] Ibid., 441.

[V-66] Ibid., 498 B.

[V-67] Ibid., 518.

[V-68] Ibid., 536.

[V-69] Ibid., 425; _Laws_, 643.

[V-70] _Republic_, 537.

[V-71] _Laws_, 729.

[V-72] _Republic_, 435 ff.

[V-73] _Laws_, 903.

[V-74] _Republic_, 545–549.

[V-75] Ibid., 550, 551.

[V-76] Loc. cit.

[V-77] Ibid., 555.

[V-78] Ibid., 564.

[V-79] Ibid., 339; _Laws_, 714.


CHAPTER VI

[VI-1] _Ethics_, trans. by Welldon, II, 2.

[VI-2] _Politics_, trans. by Jowett, I, 2.

[VI-3] Loc. cit.

[VI-4] Ibid., II, 3.

[VI-5] Ibid., II, 5.

[VI-6] Loc. cit.

[VI-7] Ibid., II, 7; VII, 10.

[VI-8] Ibid., II, 4.

[VI-9] Ibid., I, 4.

[VI-10] Ibid., III, 7.

[VI-11] Ibid., III, 15.

[VI-12] Ibid., V, 8; VII, 2.

[VI-13] Ibid., II, 8.

[VI-14] Ibid., V, 8.

[VI-15] Ibid., IV, 11.

[VI-16] Ibid., V, 7.

[VI-17] Ibid., IV, 11.

[VI-18] Ibid., II, 6.

[VI-19] Loc. cit.

[VI-20] Ibid., II, 9.

[VI-21] Ibid., II, 12.

[VI-22] Ibid., V, 1.

[VI-23] Ibid., VII, 14.

[VI-24] Loc. cit.

[VI-25] Ibid., VII, 4.

[VI-26] Ibid., VII, 11.

[VI-27] Ibid., VII, 15.

[VI-28] Ibid., VII, 16.

[VI-29] Ibid., I, 12.

[VI-30] Ibid., VII, 16.

[VI-31] Ibid., VIII, 2.

[VI-32] Ibid., VIII, 3.

[VI-33] Ibid., VIII, 4.

[VI-34] Ibid., VIII, 5.


CHAPTER VII

[VII-1] Lucretius, _Dererum natura_, trans. by Muno, in Bohn’s
Libraries, V. 335 ff., 778 ff.

[VII-2] _De officiis_, trans. by Edmonds, Bohn’s Libraries, I, XVII,
XIV; _De republica_, trans. by Younge, Bohn’s Libraries, I, XXV-XXVI,
XIV.

[VII-3] _Dialogues_, VII, 9.

[VII-4] _Thoughts_, trans. by Long, VII, 31.

[VII-5] Ibid., VI, 7.

[VII-6] Ibid., VIII, 59.

[VII-7] Ibid., IX, 23.

[VII-8] Ibid., VI, 42.

[VII-9] Ibid., XII, 36.

[VII-10] Seneca, _Dial._, IX, 4.

[VII-11] Ibid., VII, 20.

[VII-12] _On Anger._

[VII-13] Loc. cit.

[VII-14] Epictetus, _Discourses_, Book I, Ch. XVIII.

[VII-15] Matthew, V, 44.

[VII-16] _Thoughts_, VII, 22.

[VII-17] Romans, XII, 17.

[VII-18] _Thoughts_, VII, 26; III, 7.

[VII-19] Seneca, _On a Happy Life_.

[VII-20] Loc. cit.


CHAPTER VIII

[VIII-1] Luke 17:20, 21.

[VIII-2] Luke 13:34.

[VIII-3] Matt. 12:48; Mark 3:34.

[VIII-4] Matt. 13:31, 32; Mark 4:30; Luke 13:18, 19.

[VIII-5] Luke 6:36.

[VIII-6] Matt. 5:23; Matt. 18:15; Luke 6:41, 42.

[VIII-7] Matt. 5:44, 46; Luke 6:20, 35.

[VIII-8] Matt. 28:20; 24:14.

[VIII-9] John 12:43; Matt. 6:5.

[VIII-10] Matt. 4:8.

[VIII-11] Luke 9:48; Mark 10:14; Matt. 18:1.

[VIII-12] Matt. 25:31–46.

[VIII-13] Mark 9:41; Matt. 10:42.

[VIII-14] Luke 6:30; 3:11.

[VIII-15] Matt. 23:23–33.

[VIII-17] John 2:13–17; Matt. 21:12, 13; Mark 11:15–17; Luke 19:45, 46.

[VIII-18] Mark 11:18; Luke 19:47.

[VIII-19] Matt. 15:4; 19:19.

[VIII-20] Mark 10:7, 8; Matt. 19:5.

[VIII-21] Mark 9:42.

[VIII-22] Matt. 19:21.

[VIII-23] John 12:8; Mark 14:7; Matt. 26:11.

[VIII-24] Luke 12:16–21.

[VIII-25] Luke 13:14; Matt. 12:2, 10–13.

[VIII-26] Mark 2:27; 3:4.

[VIII-27] Matt. 10:34–39.

[VIII-28] Luke 12:49–53.

[VIII-29] John 18:10; Matt. 26:50–56.

[VIII-30] Matt. 5:39.

[VIII-31] Luke 2:13, 14.

[VIII-32] Acts 15:9; 10:28; Galatians, 3:28.

[VIII-33] Romans 8:16; 32.

[VIII-34] I. Corinthians, Ch. 13.

[VIII-35] Galatians 5:13; Romans 12:10.

[VIII-36] Galatians 6:2; 6:10; Acts 20:35.

[VIII-37] Romans 8:35–39; 12:17; Ephesians 1:21; 2:4; 3:17, 18.

[VIII-38] Romans 12:4–8; cf. I. Corinthians 12:12.

[VIII-39] Romans 14:7.

[VIII-40] Ephesians 5:22–23; Colossians 3:18, 19; I. Corinthians 11:9,
19; I Corinthians 11:9.

[VIII-41] I. Timothy 6:7–10; 17, 18.

[VIII-42] James 1:26, 27.

[VIII-43] Revelation, Ch. 21.


CHAPTER IX

[IX-1] B text, Passus VIII. The manuscripts of _Pier’s Ploughman_
number over forty and fall into three sets: A, B, and C.


CHAPTER X

[X-1] _The Utopia of Sir Thomas More_, Bell and Sons, London, edited by
George Simpson in Bohn’s Classical Libraries, 1910, p. 75.

[X-2] Ibid., p. 104.

[X-3] Ibid., p. 111.

[X-4] Ibid., p. 153.

[X-5] Ibid., pp. 84, 93.

[X-6] Ibid., pp. 135, 84.

[X-7] Ibid., p. 93.

[X-8] Ibid., p. 97.

[X-9] Ibid., p. 92.

[X-10] Ibid., p. 88.

[X-11] Ibid., p. 90.

[X-12] Ibid., p. 96.

[X-13] Ibid., p. 110, cf. Bacon, _The New Atlantis_ in Ideal
Commonwealths, Collier, 1901, p. 125.

[X-14] Ibid., p. 131.

[X-15] Ibid., p. 93.

[X-16] Ibid., p. 115.

[X-17] Ibid., p. 117, cf. Campanella, _The City of the Sun_, in Ideal
Commonwealths, Collier, 1901, p. 157.

[X-18] Ibid., p. 174.

[X-19] Ibid., p. 95.

[X-20] Ibid., p. 101.

[X-21] Ibid., p. 175.

[X-22] Ibid., p. 174.

[X-23] Ibid., pp. 153 ff.

[X-24] Ibid., p. 154.

[X-25] Ibid., p. 103.

[X-26] Ibid., pp. 140, 141.

[X-27] Ibid., p. 67.

[X-28] Bacon, _The New Atlantis_ in Ideal Commonwealths, Collier, 1901,
pp. 135 ff.

[X-29] Bellamy, _Looking Backward_, Grosset and Dunlap, 1898, p. 57.

[X-30] Ibid., p. 88.

[X-31] Ibid., p. 89.

[X-32] Ibid., p. 67.

[X-33] Ibid., p. 192.

[X-34] Ibid., pp. 220 ff.

[X-35] Ibid., pp. 287 ff.

[X-36] H. G. Wells, _Anticipations_, _Mankind in the Making_, and _A
Modern Utopia_. See _A Modern Utopia_, Scribner, 1905, pp. 5, 11.


CHAPTER XI

[XI-1] Machiavelli, _The Prince_, Routledge, London, n.d., p. 53.

[XI-2] Ibid., pp. 104, 105.

[XI-3] Ibid., p. 71.

[XI-4] Ibid., p. 77.

[XI-5] Hobbes, _Leviathan_, Putnam, 1904, Ch. XIII.

[XI-6] Locke, _Two Treatises on Government_, Routledge, n.d., p. 18.

[XI-7] Ibid., p. 193.

[XI-8] Ibid., p. 199.

[XI-9] Ibid., p. 315.

[XI-10] Rousseau, _Contrat social_, Garnier, Paris, p. 240.

[XI-11] Ibid., p. 246.

[XI-12] Ibid., p. 249.

[XI-13] John Winthrop in _Selections from Early American Writers,
1607–1800_, edit. by W. B. Cairns, Macmillan, 1910, p. 52.

[XI-14] _A Treatise of Human Nature_, edit. by Selby-Bigge, Oxford,
1896, II:777, 114, 140, 150.

[XI-15] Ibid., p. 534.

[XI-16] Ibid., p. 546.

[XI-17] Adam Smith, _The Wealth of Nations_, Putnam, 1904, II:114.

[XI-18] Ibid., II:83.

[XI-19] Ibid., II:143.

[XI-20] Ibid., II:203.

[XI-21] Ibid., I:80.

[XI-22] Ibid., I:81.

[XI-23] Ibid., II:203–207.

[XI-24] Ibid., I:11.

[XI-25] Kant, _Theory of Ethics_, trans. by Abbott, p. 9.

[XI-26] Hegel, _Philosophy of Right_, trans. by Dyde, Part III, p. 150.

[XI-27] W. G. Sumner, _What Social Classes Owe to Each Other_, Harper,
1920, p. 12.

[XI-28] Ibid., p 25.

[XI-29] Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XV.


CHAPTER XII

[XII-1] Adam Smith, _Wealth of Nations_, Putnam, 1901, I:81.

[XII-2] Ibid., p. 147.

[XII-3] _An Essay on the Principle of Population_, eighth edit., Reeves
and Turner, 1878, p. 1; cf. W. S. Thompson, _Population: A Study in
Malthusianism_, Columbia University, 1915, Ch. I.

[XII-4] Ibid., p. 2.

[XII-5] Ibid., p. 8.

[XII-6] Ibid., p. 9.

[XII-7] Ibid., p. 13.

[XII-8] Ibid., p. 371.

[XII-9] Ibid., p. 402.

[XII-10] Ibid., p. 416.

[XII-11] Ibid., p. 437.

[XII-12] Ibid., p. 481.

[XII-13] T. N. Carver, _Essays in Social Justice_, Harvard University
Press, 1915, Ch. XIV.

[XII-14] Cf. W. S. Thompson, _Population: A Study in Malthusianism_,
Columbia University Studies, 1915.


CHAPTER XIII

[XIII-1] Auguste Comte, _Positive Philosophy_, trans. by Martineau,
Vol. I, pp. x, xi.

[XIII-2] Ibid., p. xi.

[XIII-3] Ibid., p. xv.

[XIII-4] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 13.

[XIII-5] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 26.

[XIII-6] Ibid., p. 27.

[XIII-7] Ibid., p. 34.

[XIII-8] Ibid., p. 35.

[XIII-9] Ibid., p. 36.

[XIII-10] Ibid., p. 41.

[XIII-11] Ibid., pp. 27 ff.

[XIII-12] Ibid., p. 149.

[XIII-13] Ibid., p. 153, 154.

[XIII-14] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 30.

[XIII-15] Ibid., p. 219.

[XIII-16] Ibid., p. 175.

[XIII-17] Ibid., p. 176.

[XIII-18] Ibid., p. 180.

[XIII-19] Ibid., p. 193.

[XIII-20] Ibid., p. 234.

[XIII-21] Ibid., p. 292.

[XIII-22] Ibid., p. 287.

[XIII-23] Ibid., p. 286.

[XIII-24] Ibid., p. 300.

[XIII-25] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 320.

[XIII-26] Comte, _Positive Polity_, London, 1871, I:1.


CHAPTER XIV

[XIV-1] Proudhon, _What Is Property?_ Twentieth Century Press, 1908.

[XIV-2] Rodbertus, _Overproduction and Crises_, Scribner, 1906

[XIV-3] Lassalle, _Science and the Workingman_, Kerr, 1903.

[XIV-4] Marx and Engels, _Manifesto of the Communist Party_, Kerr, 1902.

[XIV-5] Marx, _Capital_, trans. by Moore and Aveling, Kerr, 1909, I:673
ff., 834 ff.

[XIV-6] Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid; a Factor of Evolution_, Doubleday,
Page, 1902.

[XIV-7] Henry George, _Progress and Poverty_, Doubleday, Page, 1916, p.
9.

[XIV-8] Ibid.

[XIV-9] Ibid., pp. 286, 287.

[XIV-10] Ibid., p. 342.

[XIV-11] Ibid., p. 339.


CHAPTER XV

[XV-1] Jean Bodin, _The Six Bookes of A Commonwealth_, trans. by R.
Knoles, London.

[XV-2] H. T. Buckle, _History of Civilisation in England_, Appleton,
1874, 2 vols., I:14.

[XV-3] Ibid., p. 29.

[XV-4] Ibid., p. 31.

[XV-5] Ibid., p. 32.

[XV-6] Ibid., p. 33.

[XV-7] Ibid., p. 36.

[XV-8] Ibid., pp. 44 ff.

[XV-9] Ibid., p. 52.

[XV-10] Ibid., p. 85.

[XV-11] Ibid., p. 95.

[XV-12] Ibid., p. 96.

[XV-13] Ibid., p. 99.

[XV-14] Ellen Semple, _Influences of Geographic Environment_, Holt,
1911, p. 635.

[XV-15] See Ellsworth Huntington, _Civilization and Climate_, Yale
University Press, 1915.

[XV-16] W. Z. Ripley, _Races in Europe_, Appleton, 1899, p. 571.


CHAPTER XVI

[XVI-1] Charles Darwin, _The Descent of Man_, Appleton, 1904, pp. 229
ff.

[XVI-2] Herbert Spencer, _First Principles_, Appleton, 1900, Section
III-145.

[XVI-3] Spencer, _Principles of Sociology_, Appleton, 1914, I:596, 597.

[XVI-4] Ibid., p. 84.

[XVI-5] Ibid., Part II, Ch. II.

[XVI-6] Ibid., pp. 457 ff.

[XVI-7] Ibid., Part II, Ch. VI-IX.

[XVI-8] Ibid., p. 592.

[XVI-9] John Fiske, _Destiny of Man_, Houghton Mifflin, 1904, p. 12.

[XVI-10] John Fiske, _Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy_, Houghton Mifflin,
1874, Part II, pp. 340 ff.

[XVI-11] Ibid., pp. 360 ff.

[XVI-12] Ibid., pp. 303 ff.

[XVI-13] Paul von Lilienfeld, _Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der
Zukunft_, II, pp. viii ff.

[XVI-14] Lilienfeld, _Pathologie Sociale_, 1904.

[XVI-15] J. S. Mackensie, _Outlines of Social Philosophy_, Macmillan,
1918, p. 14.

[XVI-16] Ibid., p. 65.

[XVI-17] Ibid., p. 243 ff.


CHAPTER XVII

[XVII-1] Lester F. Ward, _Dynamic Sociology_, Appleton, 1911, Vol. I,
pp. XXV ff.

[XVII-2] Ibid., p. 22.

[XVII-3] Ibid., pp. 22, 23.

[XVII-4] Ibid., pp. 56, 57.

[XVII-5] Ibid., p. 60; Ward, _Pure Sociology_, Macmillan, 1914, p. 4.

[XVII-6] Lester F. Ward, _Applied Sociology_, Ginn, 1906, pp. 5 ff.

[XVII-7] _Dynamic Sociology_, Vol. I, p. 72.

[XVII-8] Ibid., p. 143.

[XVII-9] Ibid., p. 320.

[XVII-10] Ibid., pp. 408, 409.

[XVII-11] Ibid., p. 464.

[XVII-12] Ibid., p. 452.

[XVII-13] Ibid., p. 467.

[XVII-14] Ibid., p. 474.

[XVII-15] Ibid., p. 486.

[XVII-16] Ibid., p. 497.

[XVII-17] Ibid., p. 516.

[XVII-18] Ibid., pp. 518 ff.

[XVII-19] Ibid., p. 520.

[XVII-20] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 341.

[XVII-21] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 520.

[XVII-22] Ibid., p. 522.

[XVII-23] Ibid., p. 541.

[XVII-24] Ibid., p. 583.

[XVII-25] Ibid., p. 579.

[XVII-26] Ibid., p. 594.

[XVII-27] Ibid., pp. 606 ff.

[XVII-28] Ibid., p. 615.

[XVII-29] _Pure Sociology_, p. 403.

[XVII-30] _Dynamic Sociology_, Vol. I, p. 641.

[XVII-31] _Pure Sociology_, Ch. XV.

[XVII-32] Ibid., p. 420.

[XVII-33] Lester F. Ward, _Psychic Factors of Civilisation_, Ginn,
1906, Ch. XXXIV.

[XVII-34] _Dynamic Sociology_, Vol. I, pp. 669, 670.

[XVII-35] Ibid., pp. 473, 474.

[XVII-36] _Pure Sociology_, p. 438.

[XVII-37] Ibid., pp. 457 ff.

[XVII-38] Ibid., p. 469.

[XVII-39] Ibid., pp. 231 ff.

[XVII-40] Ibid., p. 237.

[XVII-41] Ibid., pp. 79 ff.

[XVII-42] Lester F. Ward, “Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics,” _Amer.
Jour. of Sociology_, 18; 737–54.


CHAPTER XVIII

[XVIII-1] H. F. Osborn, _Men of the Old Stone Age_, Scribner, 1918, Ch.
I.

[XVIII-2] W. G. Sumner, _Folkways_, Ginn, 1907, p. 43.

[XVIII-3] Ibid., p. 13.

[XVIII-4] Ibid., p. 266.

[XVIII-5] Ibid., pp. 343, 362.

[XVIII-6] Ibid., p. 378.

[XVIII-7] W. I. Thomas, _Sex and Society_, p. 51.

[XVIII-8] Ibid., p. 182.

[XVIII-9] Ibid., p. 41.

[XVIII-10] Ibid., p. 40.

[XVIII-11] Ibid., p. 41.

[XVIII-12] Ibid., p. 54.

[XVIII-13] Ibid., p. 61.

[XVIII-14] Ibid., p. 65.

[XVIII-15] Ibid., Ch. II.

[XVIII-16] Ibid., p. 76.

[XVIII-17] Ibid., p. 201.

[XVIII-18] Ibid., p. 418; cf. W. I. Thomas, _Sex and Society_,
University of Chicago Press, 1907, pp. 201–220.

[XVIII-19] Ibid., p. 629.

[XVIII-20] A. G. Kellor, _Societal Evolution_, Macmillan, 1915.

[XVIII-21] Edward Westermarck, _The Origin and Development of the Moral
Ideas_, Macmillan, 1906, I:159.

[XVIII-22] Ibid.

[XVIII-23] Ibid., p. 160.

[XVIII-24] Ibid., Vol. II. p. 740.

[XVIII-25] Ibid., II:745.

[XVIII-26] L. T. Hobhouse, _Morals in Evolution_, Holt, 1919, p. 1.

[XVIII-27] Ibid., p. 2.

[XVIII-28] Ibid.

[XVIII-29] Ibid., p. 43; cf. Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political
Theory_, Lemcke, 1911, pp. 128 ff.

[XVIII-30] Ibid., p. 60.

[XVIII-31] Ibid., p. 64.

[XVIII-32] _Social Evolution and Political Theory_, p. 148.

[XVIII-33] _Morals in Evolution_, pp. 130, 71.

[XVIII-34] William Wundt, _Elements of Folk Psychology_, trans. by
Schaub, Macmillan, 1916, p. 1.

[XVIII-35] Ibid., p. 478.

[XVIII-36] Ibid., p. 514.

[XVIII-37] Ibid., p. 515.

[XVIII-38] Ibid., p. 516.

[XVIII-39] Franz Boas, _The Mind of Primitive Man_, Macmillan, 1911, p.
102.

[XVIII-40] Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political Theory_, p. 39.

[XVIII-41] W. I. Thomas, _Source Book for Social Origins_, University
of Chicago Press, 1909, p. 18.

[XVIII-42] Ibid., p. 20.

[XVIII-43] Ibid., p. 14.

[XVIII-44] Thomas, _Sex and Society_, p. 51.

[XVIII-45] Thomas and Znaniecki, _The Polish Peasant in Europe and
America_, University of Chicago Press, 1918, I:22.


CHAPTER XIX

[XIX-1] Francis Galton, _Hereditary Genius_, Macmillan, 1914.

[XIX-2] _Inquiries into the Human Faculty_, Dutton, 1908.

[XIX-3] See C. W. Saleeby, _The Progress of Eugenics_, Funk and
Wagnalls, 1914, pp. 1 ff.

[XIX-4] Karl Pearson, _The Grammar of Science_, Black, 1911, p. 1.

[XIX-5] Ibid., p. 6.

[XIX-6] See Saleeby, _The Progress of Eugenics_, Ch. II.

[XIX-7] See C. B. Davenport, _Heredity in Relation to Eugenics_, Holt,
1911.

[XIX-8] See Popenoe and Johnson, _Applied Eugenics_, Macmillan, 1918.

[XIX-9] Ibid., p. 213.

[XIX-10] Ibid., pp. 218, 231.

[XIX-11] Ibid., Ch. XVI.

[XIX-12] Ibid., p. 381.

[XIX-13] Ibid., p. 380.

[XIX-14] Saleeby, _The Progress of Eugenics_, p. 65.

[XIX-15] Popenoe and Johnson, op. cit., p. 387.

[XIX-16] Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political Theory_, Lemcke,
1911, p. 45.

[XIX-17] Popenoe and Johnson, op. cit., p. 292.


CHAPTER XX

[XX-1] Ludwig Gumplowicz, _Der Rassenkampf_, Innsbruck, 1883, p. 64.

[XX-2] Gumplowicz, _Grundriss der Sociologie_, tr. by Moore, 1885, p.
134.

[XX-3] Gumplowicz, _Sociologie und Politik_, p. 94.

[XX-4] Friedrich Nietzsche, _Genealogy of Morals_, New York, 1897, p.
46.

[XX-5] Nietzsche, _The Will to Power_, 1889, pp. 90, 269, 660 ff.

[XX-6] S. N. Patten, _A Theory of Social Forces_, 1896, Ch. IV.

[XX-7] T. N. Carver, _Essays in Social Justice_, Harvard University
Press, 1915, pp. 30, 34.

[XX-8] Ibid., p. 46.

[XX-9] Ibid., pp. 49, 50.

[XX-10] Ibid., p. 56.

[XX-11] Ibid., p. 77.

[XX-12] Op. cit.

[XX-13] T. N. Carver, _Principles of Political Economy_, Ginn, 1919,
pp. 37 ff. Also see _Essays in Social Justice_, p. 86.

[XX-14] _Essays in Social Justice_, p. 86.

[XX-15] Ibid., p. 108.

[XX-16] _Principles of Political Economy_, p. 43.

[XX-17] J. Novicow, _War and its Alleged Benefits_, trans. by Seltzer,
Holt, 1911.

[XX-18] E. A. Ross, _Principles of Sociology_, Century, 1920, p. 167.

[XX-19] Ibid., p. 183.

[XX-20] Ibid., pp. 207, 206.


CHAPTER XXI

[XXI-1] Cf. S. H. Swinny, “Giambatista Vico,” _Sociological Review_,
Jan. 1914, pp. 50–57.

[XXI-2] Peter Kropotkin, _Mutual Aid; a Factor in Evolution_,
Doubleday, Page, 1902, p. 3.

[XXI-3] Ibid., p. VII; cf. Kropotkin, _Fields, Factories and
Workshops_, Putnam, 1901, Ch. 1.

[XXI-4] “_The State; Its Historic Role_,” London, 1898--reproduced in
_Man or the State_ by W. R. Browne, Huebsch, 1919, p. 21.

[XXI-5] Gustav Ratzenhofer, _Die sociologische Erkenntniss_, Leipzig,
1898, Sect. 22; see A. W. Small. _General Sociology_, University of
Chicago Press, 1905, Ch. XIII.

[XXI-6] _Soziologie_, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 13–17.

[XXI-7] _Die sociologische Erkenntniss_, p. 233.

[XXI-8] Albion W. Small, _General Sociology_, ibid., p. 196.

[XXI-9] Ibid., pp. 433 ff.

[XXI-10] Ibid., pp. 201 ff.

[XXI-11] Ibid., p. 217.

[XXI-12] Ibid., p. 325.

[XXI-13] Ibid., pp. 389, 390.

[XXI-14] _Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy_, Inter-Collegiate
Press, 1913, Ch. XXIII.

[XXI-15] E. A. Ross, _Principles of Sociology_, Century, 1920, p. 121.

[XXI-16] Ibid., p. 135.

[XXI-17] _The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution_, Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1916.

[XXI-18] Ross, op. cit., pp. 257 ff.

[XXI-19] Ibid., p. 395.

[XXI-20] Ibid., p. 405.

[XXI-21] L. T. Hobhouse, _Social Evolution and Political Theory_,
Lemcke, 1911, p. 127.

[XXI-22] C. H. Cooley, _Social Process_, Scribners, 1918, p. 38.


CHAPTER XXII

[XXII-1] David Hume, _A Treatise of Human Nature_, edit. by
Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1896, p. 363.

[XXII-2] Ibid., p. 362.

[XXII-3] Ibid., pp. 499, 500.

[XXII-4] Ibid., p. 521.

[XXII-5] Ibid., pp. 575 ff.

[XXII-6] Ibid., p. 535.

[XXII-7] Gabriel Tarde, _The Laws of Imitation_, tr. by Parsons, Holt,
1903, p. XVII.

[XXII-8] Ibid., p. 59.

[XXII-9] Ibid., p. 146.

[XXII-10] Ibid., p. 74.

[XXII-11] Ibid., p. 78.

[XXII-12] Ibid., p. 87.

[XXII-13] Ibid., p. 114.

[XXII-14] Ibid., p. 39.

[XXII-15] Ibid., p. 141 ff.

[XXII-16] Ibid., p. 213; cf. Tarde, _Social Laws_, trans. by Warren,
Macmillan, 1907, p. 65.

[XXII-17] _The Laws of Imitation_, p. 225.

[XXII-18] Ibid., p. 111.

[XXII-19] Ibid., p. 14.

[XXII-20] Ibid., p. 288.

[XXII-21] Ibid., pp. 341 ff.

[XXII-22] Ibid., p. 369.

[XXII-23] Ibid., p. 30.

[XXII-24] _Social Laws_, p. 132.

[XXII-25] _Laws of Imitation_, p. 169.

[XXII-26] _Social Laws_, p. 195.

[XXII-27] Ibid., p. 204.

[XXII-28] Ibid., p. 171; cf. Tarde, _La logique sociale_, Paris, 1898,
Ch. IV.

[XXII-29] _Laws of Imitation_, p. 87.

[XXII-30] Ibid., p. 138.

[XXII-31] Ibid., p. 344.

[XXII-32] Ibid.,

[XXII-33] Ibid., p. 387.

[XXII-34] E. A. Ross, _Social Psychology_, Macmillan, 1908, p. viii.

[XXII-35] M. M. Davis, Jr., _Psychological Interpretations of Society_,
Longmans, Green, 1909.

[XXII-36] Tarde, _L’opinion et la foule_, Paris, 1901, pp. 177 ff. Cf.
Sighele, _Psychologic des sectes_, Paris, 1898, pp. 45 ff.

[XXII-37] F. H. Giddings, _Principles of Sociology_, Macmillan, 1896,
p. 17.

[XXII-38] Ibid., pp. 71, 126 ff.

[XXII-39] Ibid., pp. 101 ff. Cf. Giddings, _Descriptive and Historical
Sociology_, Macmillan, 1911, Ch. III.

[XXII-40] _Principles of Sociology_, p. 109; _Descriptive and
Historical Sociology_, pp. 157 ff.

[XXII-41] _Principles of Sociology_, p. 138.

[XXII-42] Ibid., pp. 141 ff.

[XXII-43] Ibid., pp. 147 ff.

[XXII-44] _Descriptive and Historical Sociology_, p. 541. Cf. Giddings,
_Inductive Sociology_, Macmillan, 1914, Part III.

[XXII-45] _American Journal of Sociology_, Vol. XXV, p. 387.

[XXII-46] Ibid., p. 388.

[XXII-47] J. M. Baldwin, _Social and Ethical Interpretations_,
Macmillan, 1906, p. 15.

[XXII-48] Ibid., p. 18.

[XXII-49] Ibid., pp. 529 ff.


CHAPTER XXIII

[XXIII-1] C. H. Cooley, _Social Organization_, Scribner, 1909, p. 5.

[XXIII-2] C. H. Cooley, _Human Nature and the Social Order_, Scribner,
1902, p. 3.

[XXIII-3] Ibid., p. 5.

[XXIII-4] Ibid., pp. 152 ff.

[XXIII-5] _Social Organization_, ibid., p. 11.

[XXIII-6] Ibid., p. 12.

[XXIII-7] Ibid., p. 26.

[XXIII-8] Ibid., p. 28.

[XXIII-9] Ibid., p. 37.

[XXIII-10] Ibid., p. 61.

[XXIII-11] Ibid., p. 63.

[XXIII-12] Ibid., p. 80.

[XXIII-13] Ibid., p. 103.

[XXIII-14] Ibid., p. 121.

[XXIII-15] Cooley, _Social Process_, Scribner, 1918, pp. 68 ff.

[XXIII-16] _Social Organization_, ibid., Chs. XVIII, XXV-XXVII.

[XXIII-17] Ibid., p. 320; cf. _Social Process_, 297 ff.

[XXIII-18] _Introduction to Social Psychology_, Luce, 1914, pp. 23 ff.

[XXIII-19] Ibid., pp. 268, 322, 279.

[XXIII-20] E. A. Ross, _Principles of Sociology_, Century, 1920, Chs.
XXXIV, XXXV. Cf. Ross, _Social Control_, Macmillan, 1910, Chs. VII,
VIII.

[XXIII-21] _Social Control_, ibid., pp. 49 ff.

[XXIII-22] Ibid., Chs. X ff.

[XXIII-23] Ibid., pp. 257 ff.

[XXIII-24] Ibid., pp. 411 ff.

[XXIII-25] Ibid., Ch. XXXI.

[XXIII-26] Ross, _Social Psychology_, Macmillan, 1908, Ch. II.

[XXIII-27] Ibid., p. 70. Cf. McDougall, _Introduction to Social
Psychology_, ibid., Ch. IV.

[XXIII-28] Ross, _Social Psychology_, Ch. XVIII.

[XXIII-29] See Chapter XVIII of this book.

[XXIII-30] Ross, _Principles of Sociology_, Ch. XLII.

[XXIII-31] Ibid., Ch. XXXVI.

[XXIII-32] Ibid., Ch. XXXVIII.

[XXIII-33] Ibid., pp. 549 ff.

[XXIII-34] Ibid., p. 564.

[XXIII-35] Ibid., p. 590.

[XXIII-36] Ibid., p. 626.

[XXIII-37] Ibid.

[XXIII-38] Ibid., p. 632.

[XXIII-39] Ibid., p. 652.

[XXIII-40] Ibid., p. 653.

[XXIII-41] Ibid., p. 693.

[XXIII-42] Graham Wallas, _The Great Society_, Macmillan, 1914, p. 11.

[XXIII-43] Ibid., p. 276.

[XXIII-44] Ibid., p. 319.

[XXIII-45] Ibid., p. 368.

[XXIII-46] C. A. Ellwood, _Sociology in its Psychological Aspects_,
Appleton, 1912, Ch. IX.

[XXIII-47] Ibid., p. 100.

[XXIII-48] Ibid., p. 117.

[XXIII-49] G. H. Mead, “Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of
Meaning,” _Psychological Bulletin_, VII: 405.

[XXIII-50] Ellwood, _Sociology in its Psychological Aspects_, p. 153.
Cf. _Introduction to Social Psychology_, p. 149.

[XXIII-51] Ellwood, _Sociology in its Psychological Aspects_, p. 138.

[XXIII-52] Ellwood, _Introduction to Social Psychology_, p. 149.

[XXIII-53] Ibid., p. 147.

[XXIII-54] Ibid., p. 151.

[XXIII-55] Ibid., p. 170.

[XXIII-56] Ellwood, _The Social Problem_, Macmillan, 1919, p. 2.

[XXIII-57] Ibid., p. 4.

[XXIII-58] E. C. Hayes, _Introduction to the Study of Sociology_,
Appleton, 1915, p. 586.

[XXIII-59] Ibid.

[XXIII-60] Ibid., pp. 586 ff.

[XXIII-61] Ibid., pp. 664 ff.

[XXIII-62] Ibid., p. 669.

[XXIII-63] T. Veblen, _The Theory of the Leisure Class_, Macmillan,
1912, p. 31.

[XXIII-64] Ibid., p. 169.

[XXIII-65] Ibid., p. 68.

[XXIII-66] Ibid., p. 38.

[XXIII-67] Veblen, _The Instinct of Workmanship_, Macmillan, 1914, p.
349.

[XXIII-68] _The Theory of the Leisure Class_, p. 15.

[XXIII-69] Ibid., p. 17.

[XXIII-70] Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XII,
p. 2.

[XXIII-71] Ibid., p. 27.

[XXIII-72] Ibid., p. 59.

[XXIII-73] Ibid., p. 68.

[XXIII-74] Ibid., p. 3.

[XXIII-75] Ibid., p. 6.

[XXIII-76] Ibid., p. 10.


CHAPTER XXIV

[XXIV-1] For example, see C. R. Henderson, _Modern Methods of Charity_,
Macmillan, 1904.

[XXIV-2] See Webb, _The Prevention of Destitution_, Longmans, Green,
1912.

[XXIV-3] See Devine, _Misery and its Causes_, Macmillan, 1913; also
Devine, _The Principles of Relief_, Macmillan, 1904.

[XXIV-4] Also, see Amos G. Warner, _American Charities_, Crowell, 1919,
3rd. edit.

[XXIV-5] Henry George, _Progress and Poverty_, Doubleday, Page, 1916.

[XXIV-6] Lombroso, _Crime, Its Causes and Remedies_, Little, Brown,
1911.

[XXIV-7] Wines and Lane, _Punishment and Reformation_, Crowell, 1919,
Ch. X.

[XXIV-8] T. M. Osborne, _Society and Prisons_, Yale University Press,
1916.

[XXIV-9] Burleigh and Bierstadt, _Punishment_, Holt, 1916.

[XXIV-10] See G. B. Mangold, _Problems of Child Welfare_, Macmillan,
1914.

[XXIV-11] A. W. Small, _Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy_,
Inter-Collegiate Press, 1913.

[XXIV-12] See W. H. Beveridge, _Unemployment_, Longmans, Green, 1912.

[XXIV-13] George Elliott Howard, _A History of Matrimonial
Institutions_, University of Chicago Press, 1904.

[XXIV-14] Edward Westermarck, _History of Human Marriage_, Macmillan,
1902.

[XXIV-15] A. W. Calhoun, _A Social History of the American Family_,
Clark, 1917–1919.

[XXIV-16] Helen Bosanquet, _The Family_, Macmillan, 1915.

[XXIV-17] Willystine Goodsell, _A History of the Family as a Social and
Educational Institution_, Macmillan, 1915.

[XXIV-18] Booker T. Washington, _Up from Slavery_, Doubleday, Page,
1901.

[XXIV-19] W. E. B. DuBois, _Darkwater_, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920.

[XXIV-20] Peter Roberts, _The Problem of Americanization_, Macmillan,
1920.

[XXIV-21] J. K. Hart, _Community Organization_, Macmillan, 1920.

[XXIV-22] M. C. Elmer, _Technique of Social Surveys_, World Co.,
Lawrence, Kansas, 1917.


CHAPTER XXV

[XXV-1] _Democracy and Education_, Macmillan, 1916, p. 6.

[XXV-2] Ibid., p. 16.

[XXV-3] Ibid., p. 19.

[XXV-4] Ibid., pp. 26, 27.

[XXV-5] Ibid., p. 41.

[XXV-6] Cf. ibid., p. 416.

[XXV-7] See M. V. O’Shea, _Social Development and Education_, Houghton
Mifflin, 1909; David Snedden, _Sociological Determination of Objectives
in Education_, Lippincott, 1921; W. R. Smith, _Educational Sociology_,
Macmillan, 1917; Irving King, _Social Aspects of Education_, Macmillan,
1912; also King, _Education for Social Efficiency_, Appleton, 1913;
F. R. Clow, _Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications_,
Macmillan, 1920; G. H. Betts, _Social Principles of Education_,
Scribner, 1913; S. T. Dutton, _Social Phases of Education_, Macmillan,
1907.

[XXV-8] Smith, _Educational Sociology_, p. 669.

[XXV-9] Snedden, _American Journal of Sociology_, 25:132 ff.; see also,
Snedden, _Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education_,
Lippincott, 1921, p. 15.

[XXV-10] Snedden, _Sociological Determination of Objectives in
Education_, p. 94.

[XXV-11] Ibid., pp. 97, 107.

[XXV-12] Ibid., pp. 109, 267.

[XXV-13] Ibid., p. 228.


CHAPTER XXVI

[XXVI-1] Gladden, _Social Facts and Forces_, Putnam, 1897, p. 37.

[XXVI-2] Ibid., p. 152.

[XXVI-3] Ibid., p. 81.

[XXVI-4] Ibid.

[XXVI-5] Gladden, _Social Salvation_, Houghton Mifflin, 1902, p. 14.

[XXVI-6] Ibid., p. 7.

[XXVI-7] Ibid., p. 136; cf. Rauschenbusch, _A Theology for the Social
Gospel_, Macmillan, 1918, pp. 8, 91.

[XXVI-8] Strong, _The New Era_, Baker and Taylor, 1893, p. 121.

[XXVI-9] Ibid., p. 124.

[XXVI-10] Ely, _Social Aspects of Christianity_, Crowell, 1889, p. 17.

[XXVI-11] Ibid., p. 65.

[XXVI-12] Ibid., p. 73.

[XXVI-13] See Peabody, _Jesus Christ and the Social Question_,
Macmillan, 1900.

[XXVI-14] See Mathews, _The Social Teachings of Jesus_, Macmillan,
1897; _The Church and the Changing Order_, Macmillan, 1907; _The Gospel
and the Modern Man_, Macmillan, 1910.

[XXVI-15] See Rauschenbusch, _Christianity and the Social Crisis_,
Macmillan, 1913; _Christianizing the Social Order_, Macmillan, 1912; _A
Theology for the Social Gospel_, Macmillan, 1918.

[XXVI-16] See Batten, _The Social Task of Christianity_, Revell, 1911.

[XXVI-17] See Ward, _The New Social Order_, Macmillan, 1919.

[XXVI-18] See H. A. Atkinson, _The Church and the People’s Play_,
Pilgrim Press, 1915.

[XXVI-19] See John Ryan, _Distributive Justice_, Macmillan, 1910; and
_Social Reconstruction_, Macmillan, 1920.

[XXVI-20] See Charles Stelzle, _The Workingman and Social Problems_,
Revell, 1903.

[XXVI-21] See _Religion in Social Action_, Dodd, Mead, 1913.

[XXVI-22] _Christianity and the Social Crisis_, supra, p. xiii.

[XXVI-23] Ibid., p. 145.

[XXVI-24] Ibid., p. 147.

[XXVI-25] Ibid., p. 149.

[XXVI-26] Ibid., pp. 201 ff.

[XXVI-27] Ibid., p. 33.

[XXVI-28] Ibid., p. 91.

[XXVI-29] Ibid., p. 74.

[XXVI-30] Ibid., p. 342.

[XXVI-31] Ibid., p. 386.

[XXVI-32] _Christianizing the Social Order_, p. 1.

[XXVI-33] Ibid., p. 2.

[XXVI-34] Ibid., p. 125.

[XXVI-35] Ibid., p. 320.

[XXVI-36] Ibid., pp. 113, 114.

[XXVI-37] Ibid., pp. 121, 122.

[XXVI-38] _A Theology for a Social Gospel_, pp. 4, 5, 48.

[XXVI-39] Ibid., p. 182.

[XXVI-40] “Social Reconstruction,” Nat’l Catholic War Council,
Washington, 1919, p. 22.

[XXVI-41] Loc. cit.

[XXVI-42] Ibid., p. 24.

[XXVI-43] Ward, _The New Social Order_, p. 74.

[XXVI-44] Ibid., p. 112.

[XXVI-45] Ibid., p. 114.

[XXVI-46] Ibid., p. 121.

[XXVI-47] Ibid., p. 125.

[XXVI-48] Loc. cit.

[XXVI-49] Ibid.

[XXVI-50] Ibid., p. 143.

[XXVI-51] Ibid., p. 159.

[XXVI-52] Ibid., p. 287.

[XXVI-53] Ibid., p. 363.

[XXVI-54] Ibid., p. 21.

[XXVI-55] Ibid., p. 25.

[XXVI-56] Coe, _Psychology of Religion_, University of Chicago Press,
1916, p. xiv.

[XXVI-57] Coe, _A Social Theory of Religious Education_, Scribner,
1917, pp. 59, 58.


CHAPTER XXVII

[XXVII-1] De Greef, _Introduction a la Sociologie_, Paris, 1911, T. I.,
pp. 189, 202.

[XXVII-2] _General Sociology_, pp. 718 ff.

[XXVII-3] Ibid., p. 442.


CHAPTER XXVIII

[XXVIII-1] Blackmar and Gillin’s _Outlines of Sociology_ is one of the
best textbooks in sociology.




INDEX


  A

  Abstract thinking, 14.

  Achievement, 299.

  Acquisitiveness, 286.

  Adaptation, 377.

  Addams, Jane, 424, 429.

  Aeschylus, 76.

  African social proverbs, 23 ff.

  Aggregation, 383.

  Alcoholism, 333.

  Amaurote, island of, 160.

  American Sociological Society, 419.

  Americanization, 438.

  Amos, 59, 68, 71, 72.

  Amusements, 439.

  Anarchism, 240.

  Anthropology, 301.

  Anticipation, principle of, 404.

  Aquinas, Thomas, 150.

  Applied sociology, 423 ff.

  Arabian social proverbs, 31.

  Aristophanes, 78.

  Aristotle and social thought, 74, 101 ff., 203, 476.

  Association, laws of, 219, 338, 383.

  Associations, productive, 233.

  Assyrian social thought, 42 ff.

  Astronomy, 218.

  Augustine, Saint, 146.

  Aurelius, Marcus, 116.

  Australian social proverbs, 27.


  B

  Babeuf, 229.

  Babylonian social thought, 29 ff.

  Bacon, Francis, 167, 174, 175 ff.

  Bagehot, 380.

  Bakunin, 239.

  Balance, principle of, 405.

  Baldwin, J. M., 386.

  Beccaria, 427.

  Behavior, pluralistic, 386.

  Bellamy, Edward, 169.

  Bentham, 194.

  Berkeley, George, 368.

  Biology, 219.

  Birth control, 207.

  Birth rate, 250, 330.

  Blackmar and Gillin, 503.

  Blackstone, 91.

  Blanc, 228.

  Boas, Franz, 321.

  Bodin, 246, 368.

  Bolshevism, 238, 403, 434, 469.

  Bosanquet, 436.

  Brinton, D. G., 353.

  British Labor Party, 469.

  Brockway, 428.

  Brotherhood of man, 122.

  Bücher, 482.

  Buckle, 246 ff.

  Buddhism, 42.

  Bulgarian social proverbs, 30.

  Burgess, E. W., 363.

  Burke, Edmund, 191.

  Business, theory of, 169.


  C

  Caesar, Julius, 115.

  Calculus, 217.

  Calhoun, A. W., 436.

  Callicles, 78.

  Cameralism, 188 ff.

  Campanella, 168.

  Canons, social, 415 ff.

  Capital punishment, 94.

  Capitalism, 236, 433, 435, 451, 457, 451.

  Carlyle, 425.

  Carver, T. N., 207, 345.

  Caucasian, 235.

  Catholic War Council, 462.

  Censorship, 93.

  Chapin, F. S., 419.

  Chemistry, 218.

  Chinese social thought, 45 ff.

  Chinese social proverbs, 49 ff.

  Chivalry, 149.

  Christianity, social, 121 ff., 232, 423, 441.

  Church fathers, the, 146.

  Cicero, 114, 115.

  Cingalese social proverbs, 32.

  Cities of refuge, 69.

  Citizenship, 447, 491.

  City planning, 160.

  Civilization, 248, 287, 310, 385.

  Classes, 287, 311, 370, 381, 405, 457.

  Class conflict, 251, 457.

  Classification of the sciences, 216.

  Cleisthenes, 76.

  Climate, 248.

  Code of Hammurapi, 40.

  Coe, G. A., 472.

  Colbert, 187.

  Commercialization, 401.

  Commercialized religion, 129.

  Communication, 391, 409.

  Communism, 103, 111.

  Communist manifesto, 234.

  Comte, Auguste, 209 ff., 282, 485.

  Concrete thinking, 14.

  Conation, 297.

  Conflict of races, 305.

  Conflict theories, 338 ff., 383.

  Confucius, 45 ff.

  Conjugal love, 290.

  Consanguineal love, 291.

  Consciousness, 390.

  Consciousness of kind, 365, 381.

  Control, concept of, 323.

  Cooley, C. H., 324, 365, 389 ff., 445, 446.

  Co-operation, 170, 259 ff., 354.

  Crawford, Daniel, 25.

  Crime, 414, 425.

  Crises, 323, 342.

  Crusades, the, 148.

  Custom imitation, 376.

  Customs, control of, 22, 94.


  D

  Danish social proverbs, 30, 31.

  Darwin, 258, 315.

  Davenport, C. B., 326.

  Deception, 286.

  Definition of social thought, 13.

  De Greef, 484.

  Delinquency, 26, 430.

  Deluge, account of, 42.

  Democracy, 69, 70, 99, 198, 375, 420, 467.

  Democratization of social thought, 11.

  Desire, 284.

  Determinism, 346.

  Deuteronomic Code, 64, 65.

  Devine, E. T., 425.

  Dewey, John, 444, 446.

  Dickens, 424.

  Discussion, 400.

  DuBois, W. E. B., 438.

  Duprat, G. L., 381.


  E

  Earliest social thought, 20 ff.

  Early Christian social thought, 121 ff.

  Education, 73, 93 ff., 110, 163, 224, 299, 393, 415, 421.

  Educational sociology, 447, 449.

  Efficiency, 466.

  Egyptian social thought, 36 ff.

  Ellwood, C. A., 407 ff.

  Elmira reformatory, 428.

  Ely, R. T., 415, 455.

  Engels, 482.

  English social proverbs, 33 ff.

  Environment, 336, 444.

  Epaminondas, 78.

  Epicurus, 112.

  Epictetus, 119.

  Equality, 465.

  Equality of races, 303.

  Ethnocentrism, 307.

  Ethnology, 303.

  Esthetic forces, 293.

  Eugenics, 109, 325, 342.

  Euripides, 77.

  Evolution, 262, 301.


  F

  Family, the, 131, 141, 163, 223, 403, 415, 430.

  Fashion imitation, 160, 376.

  Fear, 310.

  Federal Council of the Churches, 461.

  Feminism, 204, 309, 332, 436.

  Ferguson, 186.

  Fetishism, 213.

  Feudalism, 148.

  Fichte, 193.

  Filipino social proverbs, 27, 28.

  Fiske, John, 215, 268.

  Folk psychology, 319.

  Folk thinking, 21 ff.

  Folkways, 306.

  Food supply, 201, ff.

  Fourier, 227.

  Francis, Saint, 149, 424.

  Froebel, 443.

  Functional analogies, 272.


  G

  Galton, 325.

  Genealogy, 335.

  Genius, 298.

  Geographic social thought, 246 ff.

  George, Henry, 61, 241, 425.

  Giddings, F. H., 381, 411, 446.

  Gladden, Washington, 451.

  God, kingdom of, 122 ff., 132, 454.

  Godwin, William, 198.

  Golden Rule, the, 124.

  Goodsell, W., 436.

  Government, 103 ff., 283.

  Gaunt, John, 480.

  Great Society, the, 406.

  Grecian social thought, 74 ff.

  Gregariousness, 219, 269.

  Grotius, 354.

  Group loyalty of Hebrews, 58.

  Groups, 381.

  Guardians, Plato’s, 83, 86 ff.

  Guild socialism, 403.

  Gumplowicz, 339.


  H

  Habit, 323.

  Hammurapi, 40 ff.

  Harrington, 168.

  Hayes, E. C., 414.

  Hebrew social thought, 54 ff.

  Hegel, 193.

  Henderson, C. R., 423.

  Heredity, 298, 328, 336.

  Herodetus, 76.

  Hesiod, 75.

  High school sociology, 49.

  Hippocrates, 78.

  History of social movement, 13.

  Hobbes, 177, 368.

  Hobhouse, 316 ff., 322, 334, 364.

  Hosea, 65, 71.

  Housing problems, 437.

  Howard, George Elliott, 418, 436.

  Howard, John, 427.

  Humanitarianism, 225.

  Humboldt, 247.

  Hume, 165, 247, 368.

  Huntington, E., 255.


  I

  Ibn Khaldun, 151.

  Ideals, 313, 344, 420.

  Illegitimacy, 424.

  Imitation, laws of, 272, 399, 409.

  Immigration, 437.

  Immorality, 66, 314.

  Individualism, 170, 173 ff., 389, 478.

  Individualization, 405.

  Individual responsibility, 448.

  Industry, 473.

  Industrial democracy, 362.

  Industrial thought, 16, 170.

  Industrial Workers of the World, 239.

  Innovation, 297.

  Instinct, 396.

  Insurance, social, 434.

  Institutions, social, 312, 394, 467.

  Intellectual forces, 294.

  Interest, 359, 486.

  Intemperance, 68.

  Intermarriage of races, 304.

  Internationalism, 71, 275, 283, 460.

  Invention, 373.

  Iron law of wages, 233.

  Isaiah, 60, 68, 72.


  J

  Jahweh, 58, 70 ff.

  James, the apostle, 142.

  Japanese social proverbs, 27.

  Jeremiah, 63.

  Jesus, 121 ff., 454, 471, 476.

  Job, 71.

  John, the apostle, 143.

  Justice, 58, 73, 99 ff.

  Juvenile court, 431.

  Juvenile delinquency, 26.


  K

  Kant, 192.

  Kellor, A. G., 315.

  Kelsey, Carl, 419.

  Kent, C. F., 72.

  Kingdom of God, 122 ff., 132.

  Kropotkin, 240, 355.


  L

  Labor conditions, 163, 233, 248, 432.

  Labor strikes, 57.

  Laissez faire theories, 195, 196, 266, 277.

  Lamarck, 257.

  Land equalization, 102, 147, 242.

  Langland, William, 152.

  Language, 391, 409.

  Lao-tse, 48.

  Lassalle, 233.

  Law, 142, 159, 197, 319.

  Lazarus and Steinthal, 371.

  League of Nations, 469.

  Le Bon, 381.

  Legal science, 119.

  Leisure, 416.

  Le Play, 481.

  Lewes, George Henry, 212.

  Liebknecht, 236.

  Lilienfeld, von, 270.

  Lindsey, Ben B., 429.

  Locke, John, 79.

  Lombroso, 427.

  Love, 24, 73, 123 ff., 290, 366.

  Lucretius, 114.

  Luke, Saint, 124.

  Luxury, 162.

  Lycurgus, 75.


  M

  Machiavelli, 173 ff.

  Mackenzie, J. S., 273.

  Maine, Henry, 195.

  Malthus, 200 ff.

  Malthusianism, 32, 199 ff., 230, 243.

  Mann, Horace, 144.

  Marcus Aurelius, 166.

  Manu, laws of, 42.

  Marriage, institutions of, 65, 202, 289, 330.
    Plato’s conception of, 90.
    Aristotle’s conception of, 109.
    Jesus’ conception of, 131, 132.

  Marx, 234 ff.

  Martineau, Harriet, 212.

  Materialism, 222.

  Mathematics, 217.

  Maternal love, 291.

  McDougall, William, 395.

  Mead, G. H., 409.

  Meliorism, 293.

  Mencius, 49.

  Mendelian laws, 327.

  Mental defectiveness, 430.

  Mercantilism, 187 ff.

  Metaphysics, 215.

  Methodology, 487.

  Micah, 61, 72.

  Middle classes, the, 107, 465.

  Militarism, 215.

  Mill, James, 194.

  Mill, John Stuart, 194, 212.

  Miscegenation, 334.

  Monasteries, 150.

  Money, love of, 162.

  Money-making, 287.

  Monotheism, 213.

  Montesquieu, 184, 247.

  More, Thomas, 155 ff., 173, 367, 476.

  Morris, William, 168.

  Moses, 55.

  Moral restraint, 208, 430.

  Morality, 293, 342.

  Mores, 313.

  Morley, John, 212.

  Motives, 307.

  Mutation, 328.


  N

  Natural selection, 259, 410.

  Newton, Isaac, 368.

  Nietzsche, 193, 341.

  Negro, 335, 438, 472.

  Novicow, 249.


  O

  Old Testament social thought, 55 ff.

  Oligarchy, 98.

  Opposition, 373, 377.

  Orano, P., 381.

  Organic analogies, 365 ff., 478.

  Organization, 363, 386, 406.

  Osborne. T. M., 429.

  Owen, Robert, 230, 354.


  P

  Pain economy, 344.

  Paine, T., 187.

  Parental negligence, 431.

  Patten. S. N., 343.

  Patriotism, Hebrew, 71.

  Paul, Saint, 138 ff.

  Peace, universal, 72.

  Penn, William, 428.

  Penology, 166.

  Pearson, Karl, 326.

  Pericles, 77.

  Personality, 336, 353, 392, 467.

  Persian social thought, 52 ff.

  Pestalozzi, 442.

  Petrarch, 173.

  Pharaoh, 57.

  Philosophical thought, 16.

  Physical education, 96, 110.

  Physics, 218.

  Physiocrats, 181.

  Pittsburg Survey, 483.

  Plato, 74 ff., 203, 367, 476.

  Pleasure economy, 344.

  Pluralistic behavior, 386.

  Polybius, 112.

  Polygamy, 38.

  Polytheism, 213.

  Poor-laws, 204.

  Popenoe, P., 326.

  Population theories, 199 ff., 250.

  Portuguese social proverbs, 31.

  Positivism, 214, 477.

  Pound, Roscoe, 197.

  Poverty, 59 ff., 91 ff., 107, 108, 133, 155, 190, 423, 425, 442.

  Practicalism, 12.

  Prevision, 222.

  Priestcraft, 288.

  Primitive people, 20 ff.

  Prisons, 428.

  Profitism, 402, 434.

  Progress, 281, 299.

  Proletariat, 237.

  Property, 102, 132, 229, 232, 234, 285.

  Proudhon, 229.

  Proverbs, Book of, 169.

  Proverbs, social, 23 ff.

  Psychology, 319.

  Public health, 109, 160, 438.

  Public opinion, 393.

  Punishment, 94, 166, 429.

  Pure sociology, 28.


  Q

  Quetelet, 480.


  R

  Race equality, 303, 321, 334, 340.

  Racial conflicts, 305, 438.

  Racial intermarriage, 303.

  Rationalism, 213.

  Rauschenbusch, 455 ff.

  Ratzel, 254.

  Ratzenhofer, 350, 357.

  Reform, social, 402.

  Religion, 97, 353.

  Religious education, 164, 472.

  Religious thought, 15.

  Renaissance, 173.

  Republic, Plato’s, 74.

  Reproductive forces, 289.

  Revolution, social, 108, 412.

  Ripley, 255.

  Rochdale pioneers, the, 355.

  Rodbertus, 232.

  Roman social thought, 114 ff.

  Roosevelt, 24.

  Ross, E. A., 62, 350, 363, 380, 395, 400, 403, 415.

  Rousseau, 182 ff.

  Russia, 238.


  S

  Sabotage, 239.

  Saleeby, C. W., 326, 333.

  Salvation, social, 73.

  Schaeffle, 271 ff.

  Schmidkunz, H., 380.

  Scholasticism, 150 ff.

  Sciences, classification of, 216.

  Scientific management, 449.

  Selection, natural, 259, 328, 411.

  Self, 387, 389.

  Self interest, 340.

  Semple, E. C., 78, 254.

  Seneca, 116.

  Sentiments, 397.

  Service, 138.

  Sex, 296, 308, 332, 436.

  Sex immortality, 66.

  Sex inequality, 292.

  Sighele, 381.

  Simulation, 404.

  Sin, 130, 140.

  Single tax, 241.

  Slavery, 232, 464.

  Slums, 453.

  Small, A. W., 350, 359, 433, 486.

  Smith, Adam, 89, 199, 308, 370.

  Smith, W. R., 447.

  Snedden, D., 448.

  Sociability, 353.

  Social anthropology, 334.

  Social case work, 441.

  Social centers, 160.

  Social change, 409.

  Social Christianity, 121 ff., 232, 454, 472.

  Social control, 104, 398, 414, 419.

  Social delinquency, 26.

  Social democracy, 130, 233.

  Social dynamics, 200, 280, 296.

  Social evolution, 224, 284.

  Social improvement, 222.

  Social injustice, 73, 129.

  Social institutions, 311.

  Social insurance, 334.

  Social laws, 221.

  Social process, 357, 393, 395, 487.

  Social progress, 299.

  Social proverbs, 23 ff.
    African, 24 ff.
    Arabian, 31.
    Australian, 27.
    Bulgarian, 30.
    Chinese, 49.
    Cingalese, 32.
    Danish, 30, 31.
    English, 33 ff.
    Filipino, 27, 28.

  Social psychology, 324, 380, 397.

  Social reconstruction, 402, 454.

  Social reform, 441, 454.

  Social responsibility, 68.

  Social revolution, 108.

  Social salvation, 73.

  Social service, 138, 463.

  Social service director, 473.

  Social statics, 200, 280.

  Social technology, 423, 425, 440.

  Social telesis, 108, 277, 298, 441.

  Social thought,
    Japanese, 28.
    Mexican, 32.
    Portuguese, 31.
    Assyrian, 42.
    Babylonian, 29 ff.
    Chinese, 45 ff.
    Christian, 121 ff.
    Confucian, 46 ff.
    Definition of, 13.
    Demands upon, 17.
    Democratization of, 11.
    Earliest, 20 ff.
    Early Christian, 121 ff.
    Egyptian, 36 ff.
    Eugenic, 325 ff.
    Grecian, 74 ff.
    Hebrew, 54 ff.
    Individualistic, 173 ff.
    Nature of, 14.
    Primitive, 20 ff.
    Persian, 52 ff.
    Roman, 114 ff.
    Scope of, 18.
    Stoic, 112, 115 ff.
    Vedic, 42.

  Social values, 223.

  Social variations, 223.

  Socialization, 361, 363.

  Socialism, 206, 226 ff., 244, 403.

  Sociocracy, 299.

  Sociology, 209, 361.
    Applied, 423 ff.
    Educational, 447, 449.

  Sociological investigation, 475 ff.

  Socrates, 75, 79 ff.

  Soil fertility, 248.

  Solidarity, 468.

  Solon, 75.

  Sophists, 75.

  Sorel, 239.

  Sparta, 111.

  Spencer, Herbert, 195, 214, 258 ff., 339, 371.

  Spencer and Gillen, 27.

  Spinoza, 178, 354.

  Standards, 402.

  State, doctrine of, 193, 357.

  Statistics, 482.

  Stoicism, 112, 115 ff.

  Strong, Josiah, 451, 454.

  Suggestion, 399, 409.

  Sumner, W. G., 196, 306.

  Superman, 342.

  Success, 416.

  Sympathy, 185, 369.

  Syndicalism, 239.

  Syphogrants, 157.


  T

  Tainted money, 452.

  Tarde, 350, 372 ff., 400.

  Teaching sociology, 489 ff.

  Telesis, social, 108, 277, 298, 441.

  Theocracy, 70.

  Theory, need of, 12.

  Thomas, W. I., 301, 322.

  Thrasymachus, 78.

  Timocracy, 98.

  Traditions, 384.

  Trotter, W., 397.

  Tuberculosis, 333, 439.


  U

  Unemployment, 435.

  Universal peace, 72.

  Utilitarianism, 192.

  Utopia, More’s, 156 ff.


  V

  Values, social, 311, 324.

  Vanity, 310.

  Veblen, 285, 415 ff.

  Vedic social thought, 44.

  Venereal disease, 333.

  Vice, 369.

  Vico, 351.

  Vocational education, 449.


  W

  Wages fund theory, 232.

  Wallas, Graham, 406.

  War, 108, 164, 165, 283, 331, 347, 356, 358, 417, 420.

  Ward, H. F., 461, 463 ff., 478.

  Ward, Lester F., 196, 267, 277 ff., 371, 409, 479.

  Washington, B. T., 438.

  Wealth, 91, 133, 142, 161, 250, 416.

  Webbs, the, 425.

  Webster, Hutton, 419.

  Weismann, 329.

  Wells, H. G., 171.

  Westermarck, 316.

  Western civilization, 411, 436.

  Wisdom teachers, 67.

  Woman, 309, 432.

  Work, 285.

  Workmanship, 418.

  World empire, 320.

  World peace, 72.

  World war, 412.

  Worms, Renê, 273.

  Wundt, 319.


  Z

  Zephaniah, 63.

  Zoroaster, 52.




Transcriber’s Notes


Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in the original book; otherwise they
were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced quotation
marks were remedied when the change was obvious, and otherwise left
unbalanced.

Incorrect page references in the Table of Contents were corrected.

The index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page
references.

Page 78: “fifty century” probably is an error for “Fifth century”.

Page 287: Quotation beginning “the spur of all” has no ending quotation
mark.


Footnote numbers in this eBook were made unique by prefixing the
original Arabic numbers with the Roman chapter numbers.


FOOTNOTE ERRATA

There are many mismatches and omissions between the footnote anchors in
the text and the footnotes themselves. Some of them remain unresolved;
the Transcriber changed these:

  Page 94: “2” ➝ “53”
  Page 99: “78” ➝ “76”
  Page 137: added “30”
  Page 166: “25” ➝ “26”
  Page 223: “32” ➝ “23”
  Page 402: “12” ➝ “32”
  Page 403: “38” ➝ “37”
  Page 450: “14” ➝ “13”
  Page 460: first “37” ➝ “36”
  Page 462: “50” ➝ “40”
  Page 466: second “43” ➝ “44”

These anchors appear to be either deliberate duplicates or
uncorrectable typographical or placement errors:

  Page 27: “5” refers to a non-existent Footnote
  Page 70: “8”
  Pages 175 and 177: duplicate “4”
  Page 285: “23”; page 288 is missing “23”
  Pages 459 and 460: “35” and “34” occur in reversed order
  Page 460: “37”

These anchors are missing and no likely positions for them could be
identified:

  Chapter IV: “7”, “9”
  Chapter V: “11”
  Chapter VIII: “5”
  Chapter XI: “10”
  Chapter XIII: “11”
  Chapter XIV: “9”
  Chapter XVI: “8”, “11”
  Chapter XVII: “20”, “39”
  Chapter XVIII: “20”, “26”, “35”, “44”
  Chapter XIX: “8”
  Chapter XXIII: “11”
  Chapter XXVI: “38”
  Chapter XXVII: “1”

These apparent footnote errors were corrected:

  Page 498, Chapter XIII: second Footnote “14” ➝ “15”
  Page 499, Chapter XVI: second Footnote “16” ➝ “17”
  Page 503, Chapter XXVI: first Footnote “16” ➝ “15”

This footnote error was uncorrectable:

  Page 501, Chapter XXII: Footnote 32 is missing a page reference.