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THE

OLYNTHIACS

AND THE

PHILIPPICS

OF

DEMOSTHENES

_Literally Translated, with Notes_

BY

CHARLES RANN KENNEDY






THE ORATIONS OF DEMOSTHENES.

       *       *       *       *       *




THE FIRST OLYNTHIAC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  Olynthus was a city in Macedonia, at the head of the Toronaic
  gulf, and north of the peninsula of Pallene. It was colonized
  by a people from Chalcis in Euboea, and commanded a large
  district called Chalcidice, in which there were thirty-two
  cities. Over all this tract the sway of Olynthus was
  considerable, and she had waged wars anciently with Athens
  and Sparta, and been formidable to Philip's predecessors on
  the throne of Macedon. Soon after Philip's accession, the
  Olynthians had disputes with him, which were at first
  accommodated, and he gratified them by the cession of
  Anthemus. They then joined him in a war against Athens, and
  he gave up to them Potidaea, which had yielded to their
  united arms. After the lapse of some years, during which
  Philip had greatly increased his power, and acquired
  considerable influence in Thessaly and Thrace, the Olynthians
  became alarmed, and began to think him too dangerous a
  neighbor. The immediate cause of rupture was an attack which
  he made on one of the Chalcidian towns. An embassy was
  instantly sent to Athens, to negotiate an alliance. Philip,
  considering this as an infraction of their treaty with him,
  declared war against them, and invaded their territory. A
  second embassy was sent to Athens, pressing for assistance.
  The question was debated in the popular assembly. Demades,
  an orator of considerable ability, but profligate character,
  opposed the alliance. Many speakers were heard; and at
  length Demosthenes rose to support the prayer of the embassy,
  delivering one of those clear and forcible speeches, which
  seldom failed to make a strong impression on his audience.
  The alliance was accepted, and succors voted.

  The orator here delicately touches on the law of Eubulus,
  which had made it capital to propose that the Theoric fund
  should be applied to military service. This fund was in fact
  the surplus revenue of the civil administration, which by the
  ancient law was appropriated to the defense of the
  commonwealth; but it had by various means been diverted from
  that purpose, and expended in largesses to the people, to
  enable them to attend the theatre, and other public shows and
  amusements. The law of Eubulus perpetuated this abuse. (See my
  article _Theorica_ in the Archaeological Dictionary.)
  Demosthenes, seeing the necessity of a war supply, hints that
  this absurd law ought to be abolished, but does not openly
  propose it.

  There has been much difference of opinion among the learned
  as to the order of the three Olynthiac orations; nor is it
  certain, whether they were spoken on the occasion of one
  embassy, or several embassies. The curious may consult Bishop
  Thirlwall's Appendix to the fifth volume of his Grecian
  History, and Jacobs' Introduction to his translation. I have
  followed the common order, as adopted by Bekker, whose edition
  of Demosthenes is the text of this translation; and indeed my
  opinion is, on the whole, in favor of preserving the common
  order, though the plan of this work prevents my entering into
  controversy on the question. To enable the reader more fully
  to understand the following orations, I have in an Appendix
  to this volume given a brief account of Olynthus, showing its
  position with reference to Macedonia, and the importance of its
  acquisition to Philip. The historical abstract prefixed to this
  volume is intended chiefly to assist the reader in reference to
  dates. Such occurrences only are noticed as may be useful to
  illustrate Demosthenes.


I believe, men of Athens, you would give much to know, what is the true
policy to be adopted in the present matter of inquiry. This being the
case, you should be willing to hear with attention these who offer you
their counsel. Besides that you will have the benefit of all
preconsidered advice, I esteem it part of your good fortune, that many
fit suggestions will occur to some speakers at the moment, so that from
them all you may easily choose what is profitable.

The present juncture, Athenians, all but proclaims aloud, that you must
yourselves take these affairs in hand, if you care for their success. I
know not how we seem disposed in the matter. [Footnote: This is a
cautious way of hinting at the general reluctance to adopt a vigorous
policy. And the reader will observe the use of the first person, whereby
the orator includes himself in the same insinuation.] My own opinion is,
vote succor immediately, and make the speediest preparations for sending
it off from Athens, that you may not incur the same mishap as before;
send also embassadors, to announce this, and watch the proceedings. For
the danger is, that this man, being unscrupulous and clever at turning
events to account, making concessions when it suits him, threatening at
other times, (his threats may well be believed,) slandering us and
urging our absence against us, may convert and wrest to his use some of
our main resources. Though, strange to say, Athenians, the very cause of
Philip's strength is a circumstance favorable to you. [Footnote: After
alarming the people by showing the strength of their adversary, he turns
off skillfully to a topic of encouragement.] His having it in his sole
power to publish or conceal his designs, his being at the same time
general, sovereign, paymaster, and every where accompanying his army, is
a great advantage for quick and timely operations in war; but, for a
peace with the Olynthians, which he would gladly make, it has a contrary
effect. For it is plain to the Olynthians, that now they are fighting,
not for glory or a slice of territory, but to save their country from
destruction and servitude. They know how he treated those Amphipolitans
who surrendered to him their city, and those Pydneans who gave him
admittance. [Footnote: Amphipolis was a city at the head of the
Strymonic gulf, in that part of Macedonia which approaches western
Thrace. It had been built formerly by an Athenian colony, and was taken
by the Spartan general Brasidas in the Peloponnesian war. Ever since
Athens regained her character of an imperial state, she had desired to
recover Amphipolis, which was important for its maritime position, its
exportation of iron, and especially from the vicinity of the forests
near the Strymon, which afforded an inexhaustible supply of ship-timber.
But she had never been able to accomplish that object. Philip, who at
that time possessed no maritime town of importance, was for obvious
reasons anxious to win Amphipolis for himself; and he got possession of
it partly by force of arms, partly by the treachery of certain
Amphipolitans who were attached to his interest. It seems the Athenians
had been amused by a promise of Philip to give up the town to them. The
non-performance of this compact led to their first long war with him.
Immediately after the capture of Amphipolis, Philip marched against
Pydna, and was admitted into the town.] And generally, I believe, a
despotic power is mistrusted by free states, especially if their
dominions are adjoining. All this being known to you, Athenians, all
else of importance considered, I say, you must take heart and spirit,
and apply yourselves more than ever to the war, contributing promptly,
serving personally, leaving nothing undone. No plea or pretense is left
you for declining your duty. What you were all so clamorous about, that
the Olynthians should be pressed into a war with Philip, has of itself
come to pass, [Footnote: Compare Virgil, Aen. ix. 6.

  Turne, quod optanti Divum promittere nemo
  Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro.]

and in a way most advantageous to you. For, had they undertaken the war
at your instance, they might have been slippery allies, with minds but
half resolved perhaps: but since they hate him on a quarrel of their
own, their enmity is like to endure on account of their fears and their
wrongs. You must not then, Athenians, forego this lucky opportunity, nor
commit the error which you have often done heretofore. For example, when
we returned from succoring the Euboeans, and Hierax and Stratocles of
Amphipolis came to this platform, [Footnote: The hustings from which the
speakers addressed the people. It was cut to the height of ten feet out
of the rock which formed the boundary wall of the assembly; and was
ascended by a flight of steps.] urging us to sail and receive possession
of their city, if we had shown the same zeal for ourselves as for the
safety of Euboea, you would have held Amphipolis then and been rid of
all the troubles that ensued. Again, when news came that Pydna,
[Footnote: Potidaea was in the peninsula of Pallene, near Olynthus, and
was therefore given by Philip to the Olynthians, as mentioned in the
argument. Methone and Pydna are on the Macedonian coast approaching
Thessaly. Pagasae is a Thessalian town in the Magnesian district. It was
the sea-port of Pherae, capital of the tyrant Lycophron, against whom
Philip was invited to assist the Thessalians. Philip overcame Lycophron,
and restored republican government at Pherae; but Pagasae he garrisoned
himself, and also Magnesia, a coast-town in the same district.]
Potidaea, Methone, Pagasae, and the other places (not to waste time in
enumerating them) were besieged, had we to any one of these in the first
instance carried prompt and reasonable succor, we should have found
Philip far more tractable and humble now. But, by always neglecting the
present, and imagining the future would shift for itself, we, O men of
Athens, have exalted Philip, and made him greater than any king of
Macedon ever was. Here then is come a crisis, this of Olynthus,
self-offered to the state, inferior to none of the former. And methinks,
men of Athens, any man fairly estimating what the gods have done for us,
notwithstanding many untoward circumstances, might with reason be
grateful to them. Our numerous losses in war may justly be charged to
our own negligence; but that they happened not long ago, and that an
alliance, to counterbalance them, is open to our acceptance, I must
regard as manifestations of divine favor. It is much the same as in
money matters. If a man keep what he gets, he is thankful to fortune; if
he lose it by imprudence, he loses withal his memory of the obligation.
So in political affairs, they who misuse their opportunities forget even
the good which the gods send them; for every prior event is judged
commonly by the last result. Wherefore, Athenians, we must be
exceedingly careful of our future measures, that by amendment therein we
may efface the shame of the past. Should we abandon these men [Footnote:
Here he points to the Olynthian embassadors.] too, and Philip reduce
Olynthus, let any one tell me, what is to prevent him marching where he
pleases? Does any one of you, Athenians, compute or consider the means,
by which Philip, originally weak, has become great? Having first taken
Amphipolis, then Pydna, Potidaea next, Methone afterward, he invaded
Thessaly. Having ordered matters at Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, every
where exactly as he pleased, he departed for Thrace; where, after
displacing some kings and establishing others, he fell sick; again
recovering, he lapsed not into indolence, but instantly attacked the
Olynthians. I omit his expeditions to Illyria and Paeonia, that against
Arymbas, [Footnote: Arymbas was a king of the Molossians in Epirus, and
uncle of Olympias, Philip's wife.] and some others.

Why, it may be said, do you mention all this now? That you, Athenians,
may feel and understand both the folly of continually abandoning one
thing after another, and the activity which forms part of Philip's habit
and existence, which makes it impossible for him to rest content with
his achievements. If it be his principle, ever to do more than he has
done, and yours, to apply yourselves vigorously to nothing, see what the
end promises to be. Heavens! which of you is so simple as not to know,
that the war yonder will soon be here, if we are careless? And should
this happen, I fear, O Athenians, that as men who thoughtlessly borrow
on large interest, after a brief accommodation, lose their estate, so
will it be with us; found to have paid dear for our idleness and
self-indulgence, we shall be reduced to many hard and unpleasant shifts,
and struggle for the salvation of our country.

To censure, I may be told, is easy for any man; to show what measures
the case requires, is the part of a counselor. I am not ignorant,
Athenians, that frequently, when any disappointment happens, you are
angry, not with the parties in fault, but with the last speakers on the
subject; yet never, with a view to self-protection, would I suppress
what I deem for your interest. I say then, you must give a two-fold
assistance here; first, save the Olynthians their towns, [Footnote: The
Chalcidian towns. See the Argument. Philip commenced his aggressions
upon the Olynthians by reducing several of these.] and send out troops
for that purpose; secondly, annoy the enemy's country with ships and
other troops; omit either of these courses, and I doubt the expedition
will be fruitless. For should he, suffering your incursion, reduce
Olynthus, he will easily march to the defense of his kingdom; or, should
you only throw succor into Olynthus, and he, seeing things out of danger
at home, keep up a close and vigilant blockade, he must in time prevail
over the besieged. Your assistance therefore must be effective, and
two-fold.

Such are the operations I advise. As to a supply of money: you have
money, Athenians; you have a larger military fund than any people; and
you receive it just as you please. If ye will assign this to your
troops, ye need no further supply; otherwise ye need a further, or
rather ye have none at all. How then? some man may exclaim: do you move
that this be a military fund? Verily, not I. [Footnote: There is some
studied obscurity in this passage, owing to the necessity under which
the speaker lay of avoiding the penalty of the law and a little quiet
satire on his countrymen, who seemed desirous of eating their pudding
and having it too. The logic of the argument runs thus--My opinion is,
that we ought to have a military fund, and that no man should receive
public money, without performing public service. However, as you prefer
taking the public money to pay for your places at the festivals, I will
not break the law by moving to apply that money to another purpose. Only
you gain nothing by it; for, as the troops must be paid, there must be
an extraordinary contribution, or property tax, to meet the exigency of
the case.] My opinion indeed is, that there should be soldiers raised,
and a military fund, and one and the same regulation for receiving and
performing what is due; only you just without trouble take your
allowance for the festivals. It remains then, I imagine, that all must
contribute, if much be wanted, much, if little, little. Money must be
had; without it nothing proper can be done. Other persons propose other
ways and means. Choose which ye think expedient; and put hands to the
work, while it is yet time.

It may be well to consider and calculate how Philip's affairs now stand.
They are not, as they appear, or as an inattentive observer might
pronounce, in very good trim, or in the most favorable position. He
would never have commenced this war, had he imagined he must fight. He
expected to carry every thing on the first advance, and has been
mistaken. This disappointment is one thing that troubles and dispirits
him; another is, the state of Thessaly. [Footnote: Philip's influence in
Thessaly was of material assistance to him in his ambitious projects. It
was acquired in this way. The power established by Jason of Pherae, who
raised himself to a sort of royal authority under the title of Tagus,
had devolved upon Lycophron. His sway extended more or less over the
whole of Thessaly; but was, if not generally unpopular, at least
unacceptable to the great families in the northern towns, among whom the
Aleuadae of Larissa held a prominent place. They invoked Philip's aid,
while Lycophron was assisted by the Phocian Onomarchus. After various
success, Onomarchus was defeated and slain, and Lycophron expelled from
Pherae. This established Philip's influence, and led to his being
afterward called in to terminate the Sacred war. How far the assertions
of Demosthenes, respecting the discontent of the Thessalians, are true,
can not exactly be told. They are confirmed, however, in some degree by
the fact, that at the close of the Sacred war Philip restored to them
Magnesia. A new attempt by the regnant family caused Philip again to be
invited, and Thessaly became virtually a province of Macedonia. Among
other advantages therefrom was the aid of a numerous cavalry, for which
Thessaly was famous.] That people were always, you know, treacherous to
all men; and just as they ever have been, they are to Philip. They have
resolved to demand the restitution of Pagasae, and have prevented his
fortifying Magnesia; and I was told, they would no longer allow him to
take the revenue of their harbors and markets, which they say should be
applied to the public business of Thessaly, not received by Philip. Now,
if he be deprived of this fund, his means will be much straitened for
paying his mercenaries. And surely we must suppose, that Paeonians and
Illyrians, and all such people, would rather be free and independent
than under subjection; for they are unused to obedience, and the man is
a tyrant. So report says, and I can well believe it; for undeserved
success leads weak-minded men into folly; and thus it appears often,
that to maintain prosperity is harder than to acquire it. Therefore must
you, Athenians, looking on his difficulty as your opportunity, assist
cheerfully in the war, sending embassies where required, taking arms
yourselves, exciting all other people; for if Philip got such an
opportunity against us, and there was a war on our frontier, how eagerly
think ye he would attack you! Then are you not ashamed, that the very
damage which you would suffer, if he had the power, you dare not seize
the moment to inflict on him?

And let not this escape you, Athenians, that you have now the choice,
whether you shall fight there, or he in your country. If Olynthus hold
out, you will fight there and distress his dominions, enjoying your own
home in peace. If Philip take that city, who shall then prevent his
marching here? Thebans? I wish it be not too harsh to say, they will be
ready to join in the invasion. Phocians? who can not defend their own
country without your assistance. Or some other ally? But, good sir, he
will not desire! Strange indeed, if, what he is thought fool-hardy for
prating now, this he would not accomplish if he might. As to the vast
difference between a war here or there, I fancy there needs no argument.
If you were obliged to be out yourselves for thirty days only, and take
the necessaries for camp-service from the land, (I mean, without an
enemy therein,) your agricultural population would sustain, I believe,
greater damage than what the whole expense of the late war [Footnote:
The Amphipolitan war, said to have cost fifteen hundred talents.]
amounted to. But if a war should come, what damage must be expected?
There is the insult too, and the disgrace of the thing, worse than any
damage to right-thinking men.

On all these accounts, then, we must unite to lend our succor, and drive
off the war yonder; the rich, that, spending a little for the abundance
which they happily possess, they may enjoy the residue in security; the
young, [Footnote: Strictly, _those of the military age_, which was
from eighteen years to sixty. Youths between eighteen and twenty were
liable only to serve in Attica, and were chiefly employed to garrison
the walls. Afterward they were compellable to perform any military
service, under the penalty of losing their privileges as citizens. The
expression in the text, it will be seen, is not rendered with full
accuracy; as those of the military age can only be called _young_
by comparison. But a short and apt antithesis was needed. Sometimes I
have "the service-able" or "the able-bodied." Jacobs: _die
waffenfahigen Junglinge_, and elsewhere, _die Rustige_.] that,
gaining military experience in Philip's territory, they may become
redoubtable champions to preserve their own; the orators, that they may
pass a good account [Footnote: Every man, who is required to justify the
acts for which he is responsible, may be said to be "called to account."
But Demosthenes spoke with peculiar reference to those accounts, which
men in official situations at Athens were required to render at the
close of their administration.] of their statesmanship; for on the
result of measures will depend your judgment of their conduct. May it
for every cause be prosperous.




THE SECOND OLYNTHIAC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  The Athenians had voted an alliance with the Olynthians, and
  resolved to send succors. But the sending of them was delayed,
  partly by the contrivance of the opposite faction, partly
  from the reluctance of the people themselves to engage in a
  war with Philip. Demosthenes stimulates them to exertion, and
  encourages them, by showing that Philip's power is not so
  great as it appears.


On many occasions, men of Athens, one may see the kindness of the gods
to this country manifested, but most signally, I think, on the present.
That here are men prepared for a war with Philip, possessed of a
neighboring territory and some power, and (what is most important) so
fixed in their hostility, as to regard any accommodation with him as
insecure, and even ruinous to their country; this really appears like an
extraordinary act of divine beneficence. It must then be our care,
Athenians, that we are not more unkind to ourselves than circumstances
have been; as it would be a foul, a most foul reproach, to have
abandoned not only cities and places that once belonged to us, but also
the allies and advantages provided by fortune.

To dilate, Athenians, on Philip's power, and by such discourse to incite
you to your duty, I think improper: and why? Because all that may be
said on that score involves matter of glory for him, and misconduct on
our part. The more he has transcended his repute, [Footnote: Jacobs
otherwise: uber sein Verdienst gelungen.] the more is he universally
admired; you, as you have used your advantages unworthily, have incurred
the greater disgrace. This topic, then, I shall pass over. Indeed,
Athenians, a correct observer will find the source of his greatness
here, [Footnote: In this assembly, by the contrivance of venal orators,
or through the supineness of the people. In the first Philippic there is
a more pointed allusion to the practices of Philip's adherents, who are
charged with sending him secret intelligence of what passed at home.
Such men as Aristodemus, Neoptolemus, perhaps Demades and others are
referred to. Aeschines had not yet begun to be a friend of Philip.] and
not in himself. But of measures, for which Philip's partisans deserve
his gratitude and your vengeance, I see no occasion to speak now. Other
things are open to me, which it concerns you all to know, and which
must, on a due examination, Athenians, reflect great disgrace on Philip.
To these will I address myself.

To call him perjured and treacherous, without showing what he has done,
might justly be termed idle abuse. But to go through all his actions and
convict him in detail, will take, as it happens, but a short time, and
is expedient, I think, for two reasons: first, that his baseness may
appear in its true light; secondly, that they, whose terror imagines
Philip to be invincible, may see he has run through all the artifices by
which he rose to greatness, and his career is just come to an end. I
myself, men of Athens, should most assuredly have regarded Philip as an
object of fear and admiration, had I seen him exalted by honorable
conduct; but observing and considering I find, that in the beginning,
when certain persons drove away the Olynthians who desired a conference
with us, he gained over our simplicity by engaging to surrender
Amphipolis, and to execute the secret article [Footnote: A secret
intrigue was carried on between Philip and the Athenians, by which he
engaged to put Amphipolis in their hands, but on the understanding that
they would deliver up Pydna to him. Demosthenes only mentions the former
part of the arrangement, the latter not being honorable to his
countrymen.] once so famous; afterward he got the friendship of the
Olynthians, by taking Potidaea from you, wronging you his former allies,
and delivering it to them; and lastly now the Thessalians, by promising
to surrender Magnesia, and undertake the Phocian war on their behalf. In
short, none who have dealt with him has he not deceived. He has risen by
conciliating and cajoling the weakness of every people in turn who knew
him not. As, therefore, by such means he rose, when every people
imagined he would advance their interest, so ought he by the same means
to be pulled down again, when the selfish aim of his whole policy is
exposed. To this crisis, O Athenians, are Philip's affairs come; or let
any man stand forward and prove to me, or rather to you, that my
assertions, are false, or that men whom Philip has once overreached will
trust him hereafter, or that the Thessalians who have been degraded into
servitude would not gladly become free.

But if any among you, though agreeing in these statements, thinks that
Philip will maintain his power by having occupied forts and havens and
the like, this is a mistake. True, when a confederacy subsists by
good-will, and all parties to the war have a common interest, men are
willing to co-operate and bear hardships and persevere. But when one has
grown strong, like Philip, by rapacity and artifice, on the first
pretext, the slightest reverse, all is overturned and broken up.
[Footnote: The original [Greek: _anechaitise_] is "shakes off," or
"throws off," as a horse does his rider, when he rears and tosses up his
neck. It will be observed that Demosthenes is very high-flown in his
language here, passing from one metaphor to another. Leland translates
these words, "overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to
the ground." Francis: "hath already shaken off the yoke and dissolved
their alliance." Wilson: "turneth all things upside down and layeth it
flat in the end." Auger, better: _suffisent pour l' ebranler et la
dissoudre_. Jacobs: _reicht Alles umzusturzen, und aufzulosen_.
Pabst, very nearly the same.] Impossible is it,--impossible,
Athenians,--to acquire a solid power by injustice and perjury and
falsehood. Such things last for once, or for a short period; maybe, they
blossom fairly with hope; [Footnote: So in Henry VIII. Act iii. Sc. 2.

  Such is the state of man: to-day he puts forth
  The tender leaves of hope, to-morrow blossoms,
  And wears his blushing honors thick upon him.]

but in time they are discovered and drop away. [Footnote: Like the
leaves of a flower; pursuing the last metaphor. So says Moore, in _The
Last Rose of Summer_: "the gems drop away." Jacobs: _fallt sie von
selbst zusammen_. Pabst: _sturet in sich selbst zusammen_.] As a
house, a ship, or the like, ought to have the lower parts firmest, so in
human conduct, I ween, the principle and foundation should be just and
true. But this is not so in Philip's conduct.

I say, then, we should at once aid the Olynthians, (the best and
quickest way that can be suggested will please me most,) and send an
embassy to the Thessalians, to inform some of our measures, and to stir
up the rest; for they have now resolved to demand Pagasae, and
remonstrate about Magnesia. But look to this, Athenians, that our envoys
shall not only make speeches, but have some real proof that we have gone
forth as becomes our country, and are engaged in action. All speech
without action appears vain and idle, but especially that of our
commonwealth; as the more we are thought to excel therein, the more is
our speaking distrusted by all. You must show yourselves greatly
reformed, greatly changed, contributing, serving personally, acting
promptly, before any one will pay attention to you. And if ye will
perform these duties properly and becomingly, Athenians, not only will
it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor
state of his native empire and power will be revealed.

To speak roundly, the Macedonian power and empire is very well as a
help, as it was for you in Timotheus' time against the Olynthians;
likewise for them against Potidaea the conjunction was important; and
lately it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the
regnant house: and the accession of any power, however small, is
undoubtedly useful. But the Macedonian is feeble of itself, and full of
defects. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's
greatness, his wars and his expeditions, have made it more insecure than
it was originally. Think not, Athenians, that Philip and his subjects
have the same likings. He desires glory, makes that his passion, is
ready for any consequence of adventure and peril, preferring to a life
of safety the honor of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did
before. They have no share in the glorious result; ever harassed by
these excursions up and down, they suffer and toil incessantly, allowed
no leisure for their employments or private concerns, unable even to
dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed
on account of the war. By this then may easily be seen, how the
Macedonians in general are disposed to Philip. His mercenaries and
guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained
soldiers, but, as I heard from one who had been in the country, a man
incapable of falsehood, they are no better than others. For if there be
any among them experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous
of such men and drives them away, he says, wishing to keep the glory of
all actions to himself; his jealousy (among other failings) being
excessive. Or if any man be generally good and virtuous, unable to bear
Philip's daily intemperances, drunkenness, and indecencies, [Footnote:
The original signifies a certain lascivious dance, which formed a part
of riotous festivities. We gather from history that the orator's
description here is not wholly untrue, though exaggerated. Thirlwall
thus writes of Philip: "There seem to have been two features in his
character which, in another station, or under different circumstances,
might have gone near to lower him to an ordinary person, but which were
so controlled by his fortune as to contribute not a little to his
success. He appears to have been by his temperament prone to almost
every kind of sensual pleasure; but as his life was too busy to allow
him often to indulge his bias, his occasional excesses wore the air of
an amiable condescension. So his natural humor would perhaps have led
him too often to forget his dignity in his intercourse with his
inferiors; but to Philip, the great king, the conqueror, the restless
politician, these intervals of relaxation occurred so rarely, that they
might strengthen his influence with the vulgar, and could never expose
him to contempt." It has been observed, that Philips partiality for
drinking and dancing, his drollery, and a dash of scurrility in his
character, endeared him especially to the Thessalians. See Jacobs' note
on this passage.] he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest
about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character, who
will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you. My
information is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as
worse rascals than mountebanks, Callias the town-slave and the like of
him, antic-jesters, [Footnote: [Greek: _Mimous geloion_], players
of drolls, mimes, or farces. Our ancient word _droll_ signifies,
like [Greek: _mimos_], both the actor and the thing acted.] and
composers of ribald songs to lampoon their companions, such persons
Philip caresses and keeps about him. Small matters these may be thought,
Athenians, but to the wise they are strong indications of his character
and wrong-headedness. Success perhaps throws a shade over them now;
prosperity is a famous hider of such blemishes; but, on any miscarriage,
they will be fully exposed. And this (trust me, Athenians) will appear
in no long time, if the gods so will and you determine. For as in the
human body, a man in health feels not partial ailments, but, when
illness occurs, all are in motion, whether it be a rupture or a sprain
or any thing else unsound; so with states and monarchs, while they wage
eternal war, their weaknesses are undiscerned by most men, but the tug
of a frontier war betrays all.

If any of you think Philip a formidable opponent, because they see he is
fortunate, such reasoning is prudent, Athenians. Fortune has indeed a
great preponderance--nay, is every thing, in human affairs. Not but
that, if I had the choice, I should prefer our fortune to Philip's,
would you but moderately perform your duty. For I see you have many more
claims to the divine favor than he has. But we sit doing nothing; and a
man idle himself can not require even his friends to act for him, much
less the gods. No wonder then that he, marching and toiling in person,
present on all occasions, neglecting no time or season, prevails over us
delaying and voting and inquiring. I marvel not at that; the contrary
would have been marvelous, if we doing none of the duties of war had
beaten one doing all. But this surprises me, that formerly, Athenians,
you resisted the Lacedaemonians for the rights of Greece, and rejecting
many opportunities of selfish gain, to secure the rights of others,
expended your property in contributions, and bore the brunt of the
battle; yet now you are both to serve, slow to contribute, in defense of
your own possessions, and, though you have often saved the other nations
of Greece collectively and individually, under your own losses you sit
still. This surprises me, and one thing more, Athenians; that not one of
you can reckon, how long your war with Philip has lasted, and what you
have been doing while the time has passed. You surely know, that while
you have been delaying, expecting others to act, accusing, trying one
another, expecting again, doing much the same as ye do now, all the time
has passed away. Then are ye so senseless, Athenians, as to imagine,
that the same measures, which have brought the country from a prosperous
to a poor condition, will bring it from a poor to a prosperous?
Unreasonable were this and unnatural; for all things are easier kept
than gotten. The war now has left us nothing to keep; we have all to
get, and the work must be done by ourselves. I say then, you must
contribute money, serve in person with alacrity, accuse no one, till you
have gained your objects; then, judging from facts, honor the deserving,
punish offenders; let there be no pretenses or defaults on your own part
for you can not harshly scrutinize the conduct of others, unless you
have done what is right yourselves. Why, think you, do all the generals
[Footnote: A system of employing mercenary troops sprang up at the close
of the Peloponnesian war, when there were numerous Grecian bands
accustomed to warfare and seeking employment. Such troops were eagerly
sought for by the Persian satraps and their king, by such men as Jason
of Pherae, Dionysius of Syracuse, or Philomelus of Phocis. Athens, which
had partially employed mercenaries before, began to make use of them on
a large scale, while her citizens preferred staying at home, to attend
to commerce, politics, and idle amusements. The ill effects however were
soon apparent. Athenian generals, ill supplied with money, and having
little control over their followers, were tempted or obliged to engage
in enterprises unconnected with, and often adverse to, the interests of
their country. Sometimes the general, as well as the troops, was an
alien, and could be very little depended on. Such a person was
Charidemus, a native of Oreus in Euboea, who commenced his career as
captain of a pirate vessel. He was often in the service of Athens, but
did her more harm than good. See my article _Mercenarii_, Arch.
Dict.] whom you commission avoid this war, and seek wars of their own?
(for of the generals too must a little truth be told.) Because here the
prizes of the war are yours; for example, if Amphipolis be taken, you
will immediately recover it; the commanders have all the risk and no
reward. But in the other case the risks are less, and the gains belong
to the commanders and soldiers; Lampsacus, [Footnote: Chares, the
Athenian general, was said to have received these Asiatic cities from
Artabazus, the Persian satrap, in return for the service he had
performed. Probably it was some authority or privileges in those cities,
not the actual dominion, that was conferred upon him. Sigeum, which is
near the mouth of the Hellespont, and was a convenient situation for his
adventures, was the ordinary residence of Chares.] Sigeum, the vessels
which they plunder. So they proceed to secure their several interests:
you, when you look at the bad state of your affairs, bring the generals
to trial; but when they get a hearing and plead these necessities, you
dismiss them. The result is that, while you are quarreling and divided,
some holding one opinion, some another, the commonwealth goes wrong.
Formerly, Athenians, you had boards [Footnote: This refers to the
institution of the [Greek: _summoriai_], or boards for management
of the property-tax at Athens, as to which see Appendix IV. The argument
of Demosthenes is as follows--The three hundred wealthier citizens, who
were associated by law for purposes of taxation, had become a clique for
political purposes, with an orator at their head, (he intentionally uses
the term [Greek: _haegemon_], _chairman of the board_,) to
conduct the business of the assembly, while they stood to shout and
applaud his speeches. The general, who held a judicial court to decide
disputes about the property-tax, and who in matters of state ought to be
independent, was subservient to the orator, who defended him in the
popular assembly.] for taxes; now you have boards for politics. There is
an orator presiding on either side, a general under him, and three
hundred men to shout; the rest of you are attached to the one party or
the other. This you must leave off; be yourselves again; establish a
general liberty of speech, deliberation, and action. If some are
appointed to command as with royal authority, some to be ship-captains,
tax-payers, soldiers by compulsion, others only to vote against them,
and help in nothing besides, no duty will be seasonably performed; the
aggrieved parties will still fail you, and you will have to punish them
instead of your enemies. I say, in short; you must all fairly
contribute, according to each man's ability; take your turns of service
till you have all been afield; give every speaker a hearing, and adopt
the best counsel, not what this or that person advises. If ye act thus,
not only will ye praise the speaker at the moment, but yourselves
afterward, when the condition of the country is improved.




THE THIRD OLYNTHIAC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  The Athenians had dispatched succors to Olynthus, and
  received, as Libanius says, some favorable intelligence; more
  probably, however, some vague rumors, which led them to
  imagine the danger was for the time averted. They began, very
  prematurely, as the result showed, to be confident of success,
  and talked of punishing Philip for his presumption. In this
  they were encouraged by certain foolish orators, who sought to
  flatter the national prejudices. Demosthenes in this oration
  strives to check the arrogance of the people; reminds them of
  the necessity of defensive rather than offensive measures, and
  especially of the importance of preserving their allies.
  He again adverts (and this time more boldly) to the law of
  Eubulus, which he intimates ought to be repealed; and he
  exhorts the Athenians generally to make strenuous exertions
  against Philip,


Not the same ideas, men of Athens, are presented to me, when I look at
our condition and when at the speeches which are delivered. The
speeches, I find, are about punishing Philip; but our condition is come
to this, that we must mind we are not first damaged ourselves.
Therefore, it seems to me, these orators commit the simple error of not
laying before you the true subject of debate. That once we might safely
have held our own and punished Philip too, I know well enough; both have
been possible in my own time, not very long ago. But now, I am
persuaded, it is sufficient in the first instance to effect the
preservation of our allies. When this has been secured, one may look out
for revenge on Philip; but before we lay the foundation right, I deem it
idle to talk about the end.

The present crisis, O Athenians, requires, if any ever did, much thought
and counsel. Not that I am puzzled, what advice to give in the matter; I
am only doubtful, in what way, Athenians, to address you thereupon. For
I have been taught both by hearsay and experience, that most of your
advantages have escaped you, from unwillingness to do your duty, not
from ignorance. I request you, if I speak my mind, to be patient, and
consider only, whether I speak the truth, and with a view to future
amendment. You see to what wretched plight we are reduced by some men
haranguing for popularity.

I think it necessary, however, first to recall to your memory a few past
events. You remember, Athenians, when news came three or four years ago,
that Philip was in Thrace beieging Heraeum. [Footnote: A fortress on the
Propontis,(now Sea of Marmora,) near Perinthus. This was a post of
importance to the Athenians, who received large supplies of corn from
that district.] It was then the fifth month, [Footnote: Corresponding
nearly to our November. The Attic year began in July, and contained
twelve lunar months, of alternately 29 and 30 days. The Greeks attempted
to make the lunar and solar courses coincide by cycles of years, but
fell into great confusion. See _Calendarium_ in Arch. Dict.] and
after much discussion and tumult in the assembly you resolved to launch
forty galleys, that every citizen under forty-five [Footnote: This large
proportion of the serviceable citizens, [Greek: _ton en haelikia_],
shows the alarm at Athens. Philip's illness seems to have put a stop to
his progress in Thrace at this period. Immediately on his recovery he
began his aggression against Olynthus. See the Chronological Abstract
prefixed to this volume.] should embark, and a tax be raised of sixty
talents. That year passed; the first, second, third month arrived; in
that month, reluctantly, after the mysteries, [Footnote: The Eleusinian
Mysteries, in honor of Ceres and Proserpine, called The Mysteries from
their peculiar sanctity.] you dispatched Charidemus with ten empty ships
and five talents in money; for as Philip was reported to be sick or
dead, (both rumors came.) you thought there was no longer any occasion
for succors, and discontinued the armament. But that was the very
occasion; if we had then sent our succors quickly, as we resolved,
Philip would not have been saved to trouble us now.

Those events can not be altered. But here is the crisis of another war,
the cause why I mentioned the past, that you may not repeat your error.
How shall we deal with it, men of Athens? If you lend not the utmost
possible aid, see how you will have manoeuvred every thing for Philip's
benefit. There were the Olynthians, possessed of some power; and matters
stood thus: Philip distrusted them, and they Philip. We negotiated for
peace with them; this hampered (as it were) and annoyed Philip, that a
great city, reconciled to us, should be watching opportunities against
him. We thought it necessary by all means to make that people his
enemies; and lo, what erewhile you clamored for, has somehow or other
been accomplished. Then what remains, Athenians, but to assist them
vigorously and promptly? I know not. For besides the disgrace that would
fall upon us, if we sacrificed any of our interests, I am alarmed for
the consequences, seeing how the Thebans are affected toward us, the
Phocian treasury exhausted, nothing to prevent Philip, when he has
subdued what lies before him, from turning to matters here. Whoever
postpones until then the performance of his duty, wishes to see the
peril at hand, when he may hear of it elsewhere, and to seek auxiliaries
for himself, when he may be auxiliary to others; for that this will be
the issue, if we throw away our present advantage, we all know pretty
well.

But, it may be said, we have resolved that succors are necessary, and we
will send them; tell us only how. Marvel not then, Athenians, if I say
something to astonish the multitude. Appoint law-revisers: [Footnote: A
provision was made by Solon for a periodical revision, of the Athenian
laws by means of a legislative committee, called [Greek:
_Nomothetai_]. See my article _Nomothetes_, Arch. Dict.) They
were chosen by lot from the judicial body, on a reference to them by a
vote of the popular assembly, Demosthenes says, "enact no statutes,"
instead of saying, "let the committee enact no statutes." This is
because the committee would be taken from the people themselves, and the
part are treated as the whole. So in speeches to juries we shall
frequently observe that in mentioning the decision of some other jury he
says, "you did this or that," as if they were the same persons.] at
their session enact no statutes, for you have enough, but repeal those
which are at present injurious; I mean, just plainly, the laws
concerning our theatrical fund, and some concerning the troops, whereof
the former divide the military fund among stayers-at-home for theatrical
amusement, the latter indemnify deserters, and so dishearten men well
inclined to the service. When you have repealed these, and made the road
to good counsel safe, then find a man to propose what you all know to be
desirable. But before doing so, look not for one who will advise good
measures and be destroyed by you for his pains. Such a person you will
not find, especially as the only result would be, for the adviser and
mover to suffer wrongfully, and, without forwarding matters, to render
good counsel still more dangerous in future. Besides, Athenians, you
should require the same men to repeal these laws, who have introduced
them. It is unjust, that their authors should enjoy a popularity which
has injured the commonwealth, while the adviser of salutary measures
suffers by a displeasure that may lead to general improvement. Till this
is set right, Athenians, look not that any one should be so powerful
with you as to transgress these laws with impunity, or so senseless as
to plunge into ruin right before him.

Another thing, too, you should observe, Athenians, that a decree is
worth nothing, without a readiness on your part to do what you
determine. Could decrees of themselves compel you to perform your duty,
or execute what they prescribe, neither would you with many decrees have
accomplished little or nothing, nor would Philip have insulted you so
long. Had it depended on decrees, he would have been chastised long ago.
But the course of things is otherwise. Action, posterior in order of
time to speaking and voting, is in efficacy prior and superior. This
requisite you want; the others you possess. There are among you,
Athenians, men competent to advise what is needful, and you are
exceedingly quick at understanding it; ay, and you will be able now to
perform it, if you act rightly. For what time or season would you have
better than the present? When will you do your duty, if not now? Has not
the man got possession of all our strongholds? And if he become master
of this country, shall we not incur foul disgrace? Are not they, to whom
we promised sure protection in case of war, at this moment in
hostilities? Is he not an enemy, holding our possessions--a barbarian
[Footnote: _Barbarians_ (among the Greeks) designates persons who
were not of Hellenic origin. Alexander, an ancestor of Philip, had
obtained admission to the Olympic games by proving himself to be of
Argive descent. But the Macedonian people were scarcely considered as
Greeks till a much later period; and Demosthenes speaks rather with
reference to the nation than to Philip personally.]--anything you like
to call him? But, O heavens! after permitting, almost helping him to
accomplish these things, shall we inquire who were to blame for them? I
know we shall not take the blame to ourselves. For so in battles, no
runaway accuses himself, but his general, his neighbor, any one rather;
though, sure enough, the defeat is owing to all the runaways; for each
one who accuses the rest might have stood his ground, and had each done
so they would have conquered. Now then, does any man not give the best
advice? Let another rise and give it, but not censure the last speaker.
Does a second give better advice? Follow it, and success attend you!
Perhaps it is not pleasant: but that is not the speaker's fault, unless
he omits some needful prayer. [Footnote: Demosthenes sneers at the
custom of introducing into the debate sententious professions of
good-will, and prayers for prosperity; a poor substitute (he would say)
for good counsel. Compare Virg. Georg. III. 454.

      Alitur vitium vivitque tegendo,
  Dum medicas adhibere manus ad vulnera pastor
  Abnegat, et meliora, Deos sedet omina poscens.]

To pray is simple enough, Athenians, collecting all that one desires in
a short petition: but to decide, when measures are the subject of
consideration, is not quite so easy; for we must choose the profitable
rather than the pleasant, where both are not compatible.

But if any one can let alone our theatrical fund, and suggest other
supplies for the military, is he not cleverer? it may be asked. I grant
it, if this were possible: but I wonder if any man ever was or will be
able, after wasting his means in useless expenses, to find means for
useful. The wishes of men are indeed a great help to such arguments, and
therefore the easiest thing in the world is self-deceit; for every man
believes what he wishes, though the reality is often different. See
then, Athenians, what the realities allow, and you will be able to serve
and have pay. It becomes not a wise or magnanimous people, to neglect
military operations for want of money, and bear disgraces like these;
or, while you snatch up arms to march against Corinthians and Megarians,
to let Philip enslave Greek cities for lack of provisions for your
troops.

I have not spoken for the idle purpose of giving offense: I am not so
foolish or perverse, as to provoke your displeasure without intending
your good: but I think an upright citizen should prefer the advancement
of the commonweal to the gratification of his audience. And I hear, as
perhaps you do, that the speakers in our ancestors' time, whom all that
address you praise, but not exactly imitate, were politicians after this
form and fashion;--Aristides, Nicias, my namesake, [Footnote:
Demosthenes, the general so distinguished in the Peloponnesian war, who
defeated the Spartans at Pylus, and afterward lost his life in Sicily.]
Pericles. But since these orators have appeared, who ask, What is your
pleasure? what shall I move? how can I oblige you? the public welfare is
complimented away for a moment's popularity, and these are the results;
the orators thrive, you are disgraced. Mark, O Athenians, what a summary
contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours.
It is a tale brief and familiar to all; for the examples by which you
may still be happy are found not abroad, men of Athens, but at home. Our
forefathers, whom the speakers humored not nor caressed, as these men
caress you, for five-and-forty years took the leadership of the Greeks
by general consent, and brought above ten thousand talents into the
citadel; and the king of this country was submissive to them, as a
barbarian should be to Greeks; and many glorious trophies they erected
for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are
the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown superior to
envy. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece: see what they
were at home, both as citizens and as men. Their public works are
edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and
consecrated furniture, that posterity have no power to surpass them. In
private they were so modest and attached to the principle of our
constitution, that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had,
or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no
grander than those of the neighbors. Their politics were not for
money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth.
[Footnote: As Horace says:--

  Privatus illis census erat brevis,
  Commune magnum.]

By a conduct honorable toward the Greeks, pious to the gods, brotherlike
among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.

So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have mentioned. How
fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness
or resemblance? I pass over other topics, on which I could expatiate;
but observe: in this utter absence of competitors, (Lacedaemonians
depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the
supremacy with us,) when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate
the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory,
and spent above fifteen hundred talents to no purpose; the allies, whom
we gained in war, these persons have lost in peace, and we have trained
up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. Or let any one come
forward and tell me, by whose contrivance but ours Philip has grown
strong. Well, sir, this looks bad, but things at home are better. What
proof can be adduced? The parapets that are whitewashed? The roads that
are repaired? fountains, and fooleries? [Footnote: Jacobs: _und
solches Geschwatz_. The proceedings of Eubulus are here more
particularly referred to.] Look at the men of whose statesmanship these
are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, or from
obscurity to honor; some have made their private houses more splendid
than the public buildings; and in proportion as the state has declined,
their fortunes have been exalted.

What has produced these results? How is it that all went prosperously
then, and nowgoes wrong? Because anciently the people, having the
courage to be soldiers, controlled the statesmen, and disposed of all
emoluments; any of the rest was happy to receive from the people his
share of honor, office, or advantage. Now, contrariwise, the statesmen
dispose of emoluments; through them every thing is done; you the people,
enervated, stripped of treasure and allies, are become as underlings and
hangers-on, happy if these persons dole you out show-money or send you
paltry beeves; [Footnote: Entertainments were frequently given to the
people after sacrifices, at which a very small part of the victim was
devoted to the gods, such as the legs and intestines, the rest being
kept for more profane purposes. Tho Athenians were remarkably
extravagant in sacrifices. Demades, ridiculing the donations of public
meat, compared the republic to an old woman, sitting at home in slippers
and supping her broth. Demosthenes, using the diminutive [Greek:
_boidia_], charges the magistrates with supplying lean and poor
oxen, whereas the victims ought to be healthy and large, [Greek:
teleia]. See Virgil, Aen. xi. 739.

  Hic amor, hoc studium; dum sacra secundus aruspex
  Nuntiet, ac lucos vocet hostia pinguis in altos.]

and, the unmanliest part of all, you are grateful for receiving your
own. They, cooping you in the city, lead you to your pleasures, and make
you tame and submissive to their hands. It is impossible, I say, to have
a high and noble spirit, while you are engaged in petty and mean
employments: whatever be the pursuits of men, their characters must be
similar. By Ceres, I should not wonder, if I, for mentioning these
things, suffered more from your resentment than the men who have brought
them to pass. For even liberty of speech you allow not on all subjects;
I marvel indeed you have allowed it here.

Would you but even now, renouncing these practices, perform military
service and act worthily of yourselves; would you employ these domestic
superfluities as a means to gain advantage abroad; perhaps, Athenians,
perhaps you might gain some solid and important advantage, and be rid of
these perquisites, which are like the diet ordered by physicians for the
sick. As that neither imparts strength, nor suffers the patient to die,
so your allowances are not enough to be of substantial benefit, nor yet
permit you to reject them and turn to something else. Thus do they
increase the general apathy. What? I shall be asked: mean you
stipendiary service? Yes, and forthwith the same arrangement for all,
Athenians, that each, taking his dividend from the public, may be what
the state requires. Is peace to be had? You are better at home, under no
compulsion to act dishonorably from indigence. Is there such an
emergency as the present? Better to be a soldier, as you ought, in your
country's cause, maintained by those very allowances. Is any one of you
beyond the military age? What he now irregularly takes without doing
service, let him take by just regulation, superintending and transacting
needful business. Thus, without derogating from or adding to our
political system, only removing some irregularity, I bring it into
order, establishing a uniform rule for receiving money, for serving in
war, for sitting on juries, for doing what each according to his age can
do, and what occasion requires. I never advise we should give to idlers
the wages of the diligent, or sit at leisure, passive and helpless, to
hear that such a one's mercenaries are victorious; as we now do. Not
that I blame any one who does you a service: I only call upon you,
Athenians, to perform on your own account those duties for which you
honor strangers, and not to surrender that post of dignity which, won
through many glorious dangers, your ancestors have bequeathed.

I have said nearly all that I think necessary. I trust you will adopt
that course which is best for the country and yourselves.




THE FIRST PHILIPPIC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  Philip, after the defeat of Onomarchus, had marched toward
  the pass of Thermopylae, which, however, he found occupied by
  the Athenians, who had sent a force for the purpose of
  preventing his advance. Being baffled there, he directed his
  march into Thrace, and alarmed the Athenians for the safety
  of their dominions in the Chersonese. At the same time he sent
  a fleet to attack the islands of Lemnos and Imbrus, infested
  the commerce of Athens with his cruisers, and even insulted
  her coast. In Thrace he became involved in the disputes
  between the rival kings Amadocus and Cersobleptes, espousing
  the cause of the former; and for some time he was engaged in
  the interior of that country, either at war with Cersobleptes,
  or extending his own influence over other parts of Thrace,
  where he established or expelled the rulers, as it suited him.
  It was just at that time that Demosthenes spoke the following
  oration, the first in which he called the attention of his
  countrymen to the dangerous increase of Philip's power. He had
  become convinced by the course of events, and by observing the
  restless activity of Philip, that Athens had more to fear from
  him than from Thebes, or from any new combination of the
  Grecian republics. The orator himself, perhaps, hardly
  appreciated the extent of Philip's resources, strengthened as
  he was now by the friendship of Thessaly, possessed of a navy
  and maritime towns, and relieved from the presence of any
  powerful neighbors. What were the precise views of Demosthenes
  as to the extent of the impending danger, we can not say. It
  was not for him to frighten the Athenians too much, but to
  awaken them from their lethargy. This he does in a speech,
  which, without idle declamation or useless ornament, is
  essentially practical. He alarms, but encourages, his
  countrymen; points out both their weakness and their strength;
  rouses them to a sense of danger, and shows the way to meet it;
  recommends not any extraordinary efforts, for which at the
  moment there was no urgent necessity, and to make which would
  have exceeded their power, but unfolds a scheme, simple and
  feasible, suiting the occasion, and calculated (if Athenians
  had not been too degenerate) to lay the foundation of better things.


Had the question for debate been any thing new, Athenians, I should have
waited till most of the usual speakers [Footnote: By an ancient
ordinance of Solon, those who were above fifty years of age were first
called on to deliver their opinion. The law had ceased to be in force;
but, as a decent custom, the older men usually commenced the debate.
There would be frequent occasions for departing from such a custom, and
Demosthenes, who was now thirty-three, assigns his reason for speaking
first.] had been heard; if any of their counsels had been to my liking,
I had remained silent, else proceeded to impart my own. But as the
subjects of discussion is one upon which they have spoken oft before, I
imagine, though I rise the first, I am entitled to indulgence. For if
these men had advised properly in time past, there would be no necessity
for deliberating now.

First I say, you must not despond, Athenians, under your present
circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as
regards the past, is best for the future. What do I mean? That our
affairs are amiss, men of Athens, because you do nothing which is
needful; if, notwithstanding you performed your duties, it were the
same, there would be no hope of amendment.

Consider next, what you know by report, and men of experience remember;
how vast a power the Lacedaemonians had not long ago, yet how nobly and
becomingly you consulted the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war
[Footnote: He refers to the war in which Athens assisted the Thebans
against Lacedaemon, and in which Chabrias won the naval battle of Naxos.
That war commenced twenty-six years before the speaking of the first
Philippic, and would be well remembered by many of the hearers. See the
Historical Abstract in this volume.] against them for the rights of
Greece. Why do I mention this? To show and convince you, Athenians, that
nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared, nothing, if you are
negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples the strength of the
Lacedaemonians then, which you overcame by attention to your duties, and
the insolence of this man now, by which through neglect of our interests
we are confounded. But if any among you, Athenians, deem Philip hard to
be conquered, looking at the magnitude of his existing power, and the
loss by us of all our strongholds, they reason rightly, but should
reflect, that once we held Pydna and Potidaea and Methone and all the
region round about as our own, and many of the nations now leagued with
him were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had
Philip then taken it into his head, that it was difficult to contend
with Athens, when she had so many fortresses to infest his country, and
he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he
have undertaken, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion.
But he saw well, Athenians, that all these places are the open prizes of
war, that the possessions of the absent naturally belong to the present,
those of the remiss to them that will venture and toil. Acting on such
principle, he has won every thing and keeps it, either by way of
conquest, or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side
with and respect those, whom they see prepared and willing to make
proper exertion. If you, Athenians, will adopt this principle now,
though you did not before, and every man, where he can and ought to give
his service to the, state, be ready to give it without excuse, the
wealthy to contribute, the able-bodied to enlist; in a word, plainly, if
you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing
himself, while his neighbor does every thing for him, you shall then
with heaven's permission recover your own, and get back what has been
frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine, that his empire is
everlastingly secured to him as a god. There are who hate and fear and
envy him, Athenians, even among those that seem most friendly; and all
feelings that are in other men belong, we may assume, to his
confederates. But now they are all cowed, having no refuge through your
tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith. For you
see, Athenians, the case, to what pitch of arrogance the man has
advanced, who leaves you not even the choice of action or inaction, but
threatens and uses (they say) outrageous language, and, unable to rest
in possession of his conquests, continually widens their circle, and,
while we dally and delay, throws his net all around us. When then,
Athenians, when will ye act as becomes you? In what event? In that of
necessity, I suppose. And how should we regard the events happening now?
Methinks, to freemen the strongest necessity is the disgrace of their
condition. Or tell me, do ye like walking about and asking one
another:--is there any news? Why, could there be greater news than a man
of Macedonia subduing Athenians, and directing the affairs of Greece? Is
Philip dead? No, but he is sick. And what matters it to you? Should any
thing befall this man, you will soon create another Philip, if you
attend to business thus. For even he has been exalted not so much by his
own strength, as by our negligence. And again; should any thing happen
to him; should fortune, which still takes better care of us than we of
ourselves, be good enough to accomplish this; observe that, being on the
spot, you would step in while things were in confusion, and manage them
as you pleased; but as you now are, though occasion offered Amphipolis,
you would not be in a position to accept it, with neither forces nor
counsels at hand. [Footnote: Important advice this, to men in all
relations of life. Good luck is for those who are in a position to avail
themselves of it.

  Illi poma cadunt qui poma sub arbore quaerit.]

However, as to the importance of a general zeal in the discharge of
duty, believing you are convinced and satisfied, I say no more.

As to the kind of force which I think may extricate you from your
difficulties, the amount, the supplies of money, the best and speediest
method (in my judgment) of providing all the necessaries, I shall
endeavor to inform you forthwith, making only one request, men of
Athens. When, you have heard all, determine; prejudge not before. And
let none think I delay our operations, because I recommend an entirely
new force. Not those that cry, quickly! to-day! speak most to the
purpose; (for what has already happened we shall not be able to prevent
by our present armament;) but he that shows what and how great and
whence procured must be the force capable of enduring, till either we
have advisedly terminated the war, or overcome our enemies: for so shall
we escape annoyance in future. This I think I am able to show, without
offense to any other man who has a plan to offer. My promise indeed is
large; it shall be tested by the performance; and you shall be my
judges.

First, then, Athenians, I say we must provide fifty warships, [Footnote:
The Athenian ship of war at this time was the Trireme, or galley with
three ranks of oars. It had at the prow a beak ([Greek:
_embolon_]), with a sharp iron head, which, in a charge, (generally
made at the broadside,) was able to shatter the planks of the enemy's
vessel. An ordinary trireme carried two hundred men, including the crew
and marines. These last ([Greek: _epibatai_]) were usually ten for
each ship, but the number was often increased. The transports and
vessels of burden, whether merchant vessels or boats for the carriage of
military stores, were round-bottomed, more bulky in construction, and
moved rather with sails than oars. Hence the fighting ship is called
[Greek: _tacheia_], _swift_. It carried a sail, to be used
upon occasion, though it was mainly worked with oars.] and hold
ourselves prepared, in case of emergency, to embark and sail. I require
also an equipment of transports for half the cavalry [Footnote: The
total number was one thousand, each tribe furnishing one hundred.] and
sufficient boats. This we must have ready against his sudden, marches
from his own country to Thermopylae, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and any
where he likes. For he should entertain the belief, that possibly you
may rouse from this over-carelessness, and start off, as you did to
Euboea, [Footnote: The expedition about five years before, when the
Thebans had sent an army to Euboea, and Timotheus roused his countrymen
to expel them from the island. Of this, Demosthenes gives an animated
account at the close of tho oration on the Chersonese.] and formerly
(they say) to Haliartus, [Footnote: B. C. 395, when the war between
Thebes and Sparta had begun and Lysander besieged Haliartus. He was
slain in a sally by the Thebans and Athenians.] and very lately to
Thermopylae. And although you should not pursue just the course I would
advise, it is no slight matter, that Philip, knowing you to be in
readiness--know it he will for certain; there are too many among our own
people who report every thing to him--may either keep quiet from
apprehension, or, not heeding your arrangements, be taken off his guard,
there being nothing to prevent your sailing, if he give you a chance, to
attack his territories. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be
agreed upon and provided. But besides, men of Athens, you should keep in
hand some force, that will incessantly make war and annoy him: none of
your ten or twenty thousand mercenaries, not your forces on paper,
[Footnote: Literally "written in letters," that is, promised to the
generals or allies, but never sent. Jacobs: _eine Macht die auf dem
Blatte steht_. Compare Shakspeare, Henry IV, Second Part, Act i.

  We fortify in paper and in figures.
  Using the names of men instead of men.]

but one that shall belong to the state, and, whether you appoint one or
more generals, or this or that man or any other, shall obey and follow
him. Subsistence too I require for it. What the force shall be, how
large, from what source maintained, how rendered efficient, I will show
you, stating every particular. Mercenaries I recommend--and beware of
doing what has often been injurious--thinking all measures below the
occasion, adopting the strongest in your decrees, you fail to accomplish
the least--rather, I say, perform and procure a little, add to it
afterward, if it prove insufficient. I advise then two thousand soldiers
in all, five hundred to be Athenians, of whatever age you think right,
serving a limited time, not long, but such time as you think right, so
as to relieve one another; the rest should be mercenaries. And with them
two hundred horse, fifty at least Athenians, like the foot, on the same
terms of service; and transports for them. Well; what besides? Ten swift
galleys: for, as Philip has a navy, we must have swift galleys also, to
convoy our power. How shall subsistence for these troops be provided? I
will state and explain; but first let me tell you why I consider a force
of this amount sufficient, and why I wish the men to be citizens.

Of that amount, Athenians, because it is impossible for us now to raise
an army capable of meeting him in the field: we must plunder [Footnote:
Make predatory incursions, as Livy says, "popula bundi magis quam justo
more belli." Jacobs: _den Krieg als Freibeuter fahren_. Another
German: _Streifzuge zu machen_ (guerilla warfare). Leland: "harass
him with depredations." Wilson, an old English translator: "rob and
spoil upon him."] and adopt such kind of warfare at first: our force,
therefore, must not be over-large, (for there is not pay or
subsistence,) nor altogether mean. Citizens I wish to attend and go on
board, because I hear that formerly the state maintained mercenary
troops at Corinth, [Footnote: He alludes to the time when Corinth,
Athens, Thebes, and Argos, were allied against Sparta, and held a
congress at Corinth, B. C. 394. The allies were at first defeated, but
Iphicrates gained some successes, and acquired considerable reputation
by cutting off a small division (_mora_) of Spartan infantry.]
commanded by Polystratus and Iphicrates and Chabrias and some others,
and that you served with them yourselves; and I am told, that these
mercenaries fighting by your side and you by theirs defeated the
Lacedaemonians. But ever since your hirelings have served by themselves,
they have been vanquishing your friends and allies, while your enemies
have become unduly great. Just glancing at the war of our state, they go
off to Artabazus [Footnote: Diodorus relates that Chares, in the Social
war, having no money to pay his troops, was forced to lend them to
Artabazus, then in rebellion against the king of Persia. Chares gained a
victory for the satrap, and received a supply of money. But this led to
a complaint and menace of war by the king, which brought serious
consequences. See the Historical Abstract.] or any where rather, and the
general follows, naturally; for it is impossible to command without
giving pay. What therefore ask I? To remove the excuses both of general
and soldiers, by supplying pay, and attaching native soldiers, as
inspectors of the general's conduct. The way we manage things now is a
mockery. For if you were asked: Are you at peace, Athenians? No, indeed,
you would say; we are at war with Philip. Did you not choose from
yourselves ten captains and generals, and also captains and two generals
[Footnote: There were chosen at Athens every year

  Ten generals (one for each tribe), [Greek: _strataegoi_].
  Ten captains (one for each tribe), [Greek: _taxiarchoi_].
  Two generals of cavalry, [Greek: _ipparchoi_].
  Ten cavalry officers (one for each tribe), [Greek: _phularchoi_].

In a regular army of citizens, when each tribe formed its own division,
both of horse and foot, all these generals and officers would he
present. Thus, there were ten generals at Marathon. A change took place
in later times, when the armies were more miscellaneous. Three Athenian
generals were frequently employed, and at a still later period only one.
Demosthenes here touches on a very important matter, which we can well
understand, viz. the necessity of officering the foreign mercenaries
from home.] of horse? How are they employed? Except one man, whom you
commission on service abroad, the rest conduct your processions with the
sacrificers. Like puppet-makers, you elect your infantry and cavalry
officers for the market-place, not for war. Consider, Athenians, should
there not be native captains, a native general of horse, your own
commanders, that the force might really be the state's? Or should your
general of horse sail to Lemnos, [Footnote: To assist at a religious
ceremony held annually at Lemnos, where many Athenians resided.] while
Menelaus commands the cavalry fighting for your possessions? I speak not
as objecting to the man, but he ought to be elected by you, whoever the
person be.

Perhaps you admit the justice of these statements, but wish principally
to hear about the supplies, what they must be and whence procured. I
will satisfy you. Supplies, then, for maintenance, mere rations for
these troops, come to ninety talents and a little more: for ten swift
galleys forty talents, twenty minas a month to every ship; for two
thousand soldiers forty more, that each soldier may receive for rations
ten drachms a month; and for two hundred horsemen, each receiving thirty
drachms a month, twelve talents. [Footnote: As to Athenian money, see
Appendix II.] Should any one think rations for the men a small
provision, he judges erroneously. Furnish that, and I am sure the army
itself will, without injuring any Greek or ally, procure every thing
else from the war, so as to make out their full pay. I am ready to join
the fleet as a volunteer, and submit to any thing, if this be not so.
Now for the ways and means of the supply, which I demand from you.

[_Statement of ways and means_.]

[Footnote: Here the clerk or secretary reads the scheme drawn up by
Demosthenes, in the preparing of which he was probably assisted by the
financial officers of the state. What follows was according to
Dionysius, spoken at a different time. The curious may consult Leland,
and Jacobs' introduction to his translation.]

This, Athenians, is what we have been able to devise. When you vote upon
the resolutions, pass what you [Footnote: _I. e._ some measure, if
not mine, whereby the war may be waged effectually. The reading of
[Greek: _poiaesate_], adopted by Jacobs after Schaefer, is not in
congruity with the sentence.] approve, that you may oppose Philip, not
only by decrees and letters, but by action also.

I think it will assist your deliberations about the war and the whole
arrangements, to regard the position, Athenians, of the hostile country,
and consider, that Philip by the winds and seasons of the year gets the
start in most of his operations, watching for the trade-winds [Footnote:
The Etesian winds blowing from the northwest in July, which would impede
a voyage from Athens to Macedonia and Thrace.] or the winter to commence
them, when we are unable (he thinks) to reach the spot. On this account,
we must carry on the war not with hasty levies, (or we shall be too late
for every thing,) but with a permanent force and power. You may use as
winter quarters for your troops Lemnos, and Thasus, and Sciathus, and
the islands [Footnote: As Scopelus, Halonnesus, Peparethus, which were
then subject to Athens.] in that neighborhood, which have harbors and
corn and all necessaries for an army. In the season of the year, when it
is easy to put ashore and there is no danger from the winds, they will
easily take their station off the coast itself and at the entrances of
the sea-ports.

How and when to employ the troops, the commander appointed by you will
determine as occasion requires. What you must find, is stated in my
bill. If, men of Athens, you will furnish the supplies which I mention,
and then, after completing your preparations of soldiers, ships,
cavalry, will oblige the entire force by law to remain in the service,
and, while you become your own paymasters and commissaries, demand from
your general an account of his conduct, you will cease to be always
discussing the same questions without forwarding them in the least, and
besides, Athenians, not only will you cut off his greatest revenue--What
is this? He maintains war against you through the resources of your
allies, by his piracies on their navigation--But what next? You will be
out of the reach of injury yourselves: he will not do as in time past,
when falling upon Lemnos and Imbrus he carried off your citizens
captive, seizing the vessels at Geraestus he levied an incalculable sum,
and lastly, made a descent at Marathon and carried off the sacred galley
[Footnote: A ship called Paralus generally used on religious missions or
to carry public dispatches.] from our coast, and you could neither
prevent these things nor send succors by the appointed time. But how is
it, think you, Athenians, that the Panathenaic and Dionysian festivals
[Footnote: The Panathenaic festivals were in honor of Pallas or Athene,
the protectress of Athens, and commemorated also the union of the old
Attic towns under one government. There were two, the greater held every
fourth year, the lesser annually. They were celebrated with sacrifices,
races, gymnastic and musical contests, and various other amusements and
solemnities, among which was the carrying the pictured robe of Pallas to
her temple. The Dionysia, or festival of Bacchus, will be spoken of more
fully hereafter.] take place always at the appointed time, whether
expert or unqualified persons be chosen to conduct either of them,
whereon you expend larger sums than upon any armament, and which are
more numerously attended and magnificent than almost any thing in the
world; while all your armaments are after the time, as that to Methone,
to Pagasae, to Potidaea? Because in the former case every thing is
ordered by law, and each of you knows long before-hand, who is the
choir-master [Footnote: The choregus, or choir-master, of each tribe,
had to defray the expense of the choruses, whether dramatic, lyric, or
musical, which formed part of the entertainment on solemn occasions.
This was one of the [Greek: _leitourgiai_], or burdensome offices,
to which men of property were liable at Athens, of which we shall see
more in other parts of our author.] of his tribe, who the gymnastic
[Footnote: The gymnasiarch, like the choregus, had a burden imposed on
him by his tribe, to make certain provisions for the gymnasium, public
place or school of exercise. Some of the contests at the festivals being
of a gymnastic nature, such as the Torch-race, it was his duty to make
arrangements for them, and more particularly to select the ablest youths
of the school for performers.] master, when, from whom, and what he is
to receive, and what to do. Nothing there is left unascertained or
undefined: whereas in the business of war and its preparations all is
irregular, unsettled, indefinite. Therefore, no sooner have we heard any
thing, than we appoint ship-captains, dispute with them on the
exchanges, [Footnote: For every ship of war a captain, or trierarch, was
appointed, whose duty it was, not merely to command, but take charge of
the vessel, keep it in repair, and bear the expense (partly or wholly)
of equipping it. In the Peloponnesian war we find the charge laid upon
two joint captains, and afterward it was borne by an association formed
like the Symmoriae of the Property Tax. Demosthenes, when he came to the
head of affairs, introduced some useful reforms in the system of the
Trierarchy.

The exchange, [Greek: _antidosis_], was a stringent but clumsy
contrivance, to enforce the performance of these public duties by
persons capable of bearing them. A party charged might call upon any
other person to take take the office, or exchange estates with him. If
he refused, complaint was made to the magistrate who had cognizance of
the business, and the dispute was judicially heard and decided.] and
consider about ways and means; then it is resolved that resident aliens
and householders [Footnote: Freedmen, who had quitted their masters'
house, and lived independently.] shall embark, then to put yourselves on
board instead: but during these days the objects of our expedition are
lost; for the time of action we waste in preparation, and favorable
moments wait not our evasions and delays. The forces that we imagine we
possess in the mean time, are found, when the crisis comes, utterly
insufficient. And Philip has arrived at such a pitch of arrogance, as to
send the following letter to the Euboeans:

[_The letter is read_.]

Of that which has been read, Athenians, most is true, unhappily true;
perhaps not agreeable to hear. And if what one passes over in speaking,
to avoid offense, one could pass over in reality, it is right to humor
the audience; but if graciousness of speech, where it is out of place,
does harm in action, shameful is it, Athenians, to delude ourselves, and
by putting off every thing unpleasant to miss the time for all
operations, and be unable even to understand, that skillful makers of
war should not follow circumstances, but be in advance of them; that
just as a general may be expected to lead his armies, so are men of
prudent counsel to guide circumstances, in order that their resolutions
may be accomplished, not their motions determined by the event. Yet you,
Athenians, with larger means than any people--ships, infantry, cavalry,
and revenue--have never up to this day made proper use of any of them;
and your war with Philip differs in no respect from the boxing of
barbarians. For among them the party struck feels always for the blow;
[Footnote: Compare Virgil, Aen. ix 577.

      Ille manum projecto tegmine demens
  Ad vulnus tulit.]

strike him somewhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look in the
face he can not nor will. So you, if you hear of Philip in the
Chersonese, vote to send relief there if at Thermopylae, the same; if
any where else, you run after his heels up and down, and are commanded
by him; no plan have you devised for the war, no circumstance do you see
beforehand, only [Footnote: This loose mode of expression, which is
found in the original, I designedly retain.] when you learn that
something is done, or about to be done. Formerly perhaps this was
allowable: now it is come to a crisis, to be tolerable no longer. And it
seems, men of Athens, as if some god, ashamed for us at our proceedings,
has put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain
quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing
further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of
things, which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and the
foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after
more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I
marvel, indeed, that none of you, Athenians, notices with concern and
anger, that the beginning of this war was to chastise Philip, the end is
to protect ourselves against his attacks. One thing is clear: he will
not stop, unless some one oppose him. And shall we wait for this? And if
you dispatch empty galleys and hopes from this or that person, think ye
all is well? Shall we not embark? Shall we not sail with at least a part
of our national forces, now though not before? Shall we not make a
descent upon his coast? Where, then, shall we land? some one asks. The
war itself, men of Athens, will discover the rotten parts of his empire,
if we make a trial; but if we sit at home, hearing the orators accuse
and malign one another, no good can ever be achieved. Methinks, where a
portion of our citizens, though not all, are commissioned with the rest,
Heaven blesses, and Fortune aids the struggle: but where you send out a
general and an empty decree and hopes from the hustings, nothing that
you desire is done; your enemies scoff, and your allies die for fear of
such an armament. For it is impossible--ay, impossible, for one man to
execute all your wishes: to promise, [Footnote: Chares is particularly
alluded to. The "promises of Chares" passed into a proverb.] and assert,
and accuse this or that person, is possible; but so your affairs are
ruined. The general commands wretched unpaid hirelings; here are persons
easily found, who tell you lies of his conduct; you vote at random from
what you hear: what then can be expected?

How is this to cease, Athenians? When you make the same persons
soldiers, and witnesses of the generals conduct, and judges when they
return home at his audit; [Footnote: The audit or scrutiny of his
conduct which every officer of the republic had to undergo, before a
jury, if necessary, at the end of his administration. In the case of a
general, the scrutiny would be like a court-martial. The Athenian
people, (says Demosthenes,) as represented by the citizen soldiers,
would themselves be witnesses of the general's conduct. These same
soldiers, when they came home, or at least a portion of them, might
serve on the jury; and so the people would be both witnesses and
judges.] so that you may not only hear of your own affairs, but be
present to see them. So disgraceful is our condition now, that every
general is twice or thrice tried [Footnote: Chares was tried several
times. Capital charges were preferred also against Autocles,
Cephisodotus, Leosthenes, Callisthenes.] before you for his life, though
none dares even once to hazard his life against the enemy: they prefer
the death of kidnappers and thieves to that which becomes them; for it
is a malefactor's part to die by sentence of the law, a general's to die
in battle. Among ourselves, some go about and say that Philip is
concerting with the Lacedaemonians the destruction of Thebes and the
dissolution of republics; some, that he has sent envoys to the king;
[Footnote: The king of Persia, generally called _the king_ by the
Greeks.] others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria: so we wander
about, each inventing stories. For my part, Athenians, by the gods I
believe, that Philip is intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits,
and has many such dreams in his imagination, seeing the absence of
opponents, and elated by success; but most certainly he has no such plan
of action, as to let the silliest people among us know what his
intentions are; for the silliest are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss
such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy, who robs us of our
own and has long insulted us; that wherever we have expected aid from
any quarter, it has been found hostile, and that the future depends on
ourselves, and unless we are willing to fight him there, we shall
perhaps be compelled to fight here. This let us remember, and then we
shall have determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You
need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves it will be
disastrous, unless you attend to your duty, and are willing to act as
becomes you.

As for me, never before have I courted favor, by speaking what I am not
convinced is for your good, and now I have spoken my whole mind frankly
and unreservedly. I could have wished, knowing the advantage of good
counsel to you, I were equally certain of its advantage to the
counselor: so should I have spoken with more satisfaction. Now, with an
uncertainty of the consequence to myself, but with a conviction that you
will benefit by adopting it, I proffer my advice. I trust only, that
what is most for the common benefit will prevail.




THE SECOND PHILIPPIC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  Soon after the close of the Phocian war, the attention of
  Philip was called to Peloponnesus, where the dissensions
  between Sparta and her old enemies afforded him an occasion
  of interference. The Spartans had never abandoned their right
  to the province of Messenia, which had been wrested from them
  by Epaminondas; and since Thebes was no longer to be feared,
  they seem to have conceived hopes of regaining their lost
  power. The Argives and the Arcadians of Megalopolis were in
  league with Messenia, but Sparta had her allies in the
  Peloponnesus, and even Athens was suspected of favoring her
  cause. It does not appear that any open hostilities had taken
  place; but about this time the fears of the Messenians induced
  them to solicit the alliance of Philip. He willingly promised
  them his protection, and sent a body of troops into the
  Peninsula. The progress which Macedonian influence was making
  there having alarmed the Athenians, they sent Demosthenes with
  an embassy to counteract it. He went to Messene and to Argos,
  addressed the people, and pointed out the dangers, to which
  all Greece was exposed by Philip's ambition. It seems that he
  failed in rousing their suspicions, or they were too much
  occupied by an immediate peril to heed one that appeared
  remote. Philip however resented this proceeding on the part of
  the Athenians, and sent an embassy to expostulate with them,
  especially on the charge of bad faith and treachery which had
  been preferred against him by Demosthenes. Embassadors from
  Argos and Messene accompanied those of Macedon, and complained
  of the connection that appeared to subsist between Athens
  and Lacedaemon, hostile (they thought) to the liberties of
  Peloponnesus. In answer to these complaints, Demosthenes
  addressed his second Philippic to the Popular Assembly;
  repeating the substance of what he had said to the
  Peloponnesians, vindicating his own conduct, and denouncing
  the Macedonian party at Athens. The embassy led to no immediate
  result; but the influence of Demosthenes at home was increased.


In all the speeches, men of Athens, about Philip's measures and
infringements of the peace, I observe that statements made on our behalf
are thought just and generous, [Footnote: _Generous_, as regards
the Greek states, whose independence the Athenians stand up for. This
praise Demosthenes frequently claims for his countrymen, and, compared
with the rest of the Greeks, they deserved it. Leland understood the
word [Greek: _philanthropous_] in the same sense, though he
translates it _humane_. We use the term _philanthropic_ in a
sense not unlike that of the orator; but, as Leland truly observes, "the
distinction of Greek and barbarian precluded the rest of mankind from a
just share in Grecian philanthropy;" and he might have added, that their
notions of slavery were not in accordance with an enlarged humanity.
Therefore, I prefer a word of a less arrogant meaning. Jacobs:
_billig_. Francis: "filled with sentiments of exceeding
moderation."] and all who accuse Philip are heard with approbation; yet
nothing (I may say) that is proper, or for the sake of which the
speeches are worth hearing, is done. To this point are the affairs of
Athens brought, that the more fully and clearly one convicts Philip of
violating the peace with you, and plotting against the whole of Greece,
the more difficult it becomes to advise you how to act. The cause lies
in all of us, Athenians, that, when we ought to oppose an ambitious
power by deeds and actions, not by words, we men of the hustings
[Footnote: Auger has: "nous qui montons a la tribune."] shrink from our
duty of moving and advising, for fear of your displeasure, and only
declaim on the heinousness and atrocity of Philip's conduct; you of the
assembly, though better instructed than Philip to argue justly, or
comprehend the argument of another, to check him in the execution of his
designs are totally unprepared. The result is inevitable, I imagine, and
perhaps just. You each succeed better in what you are busy and earnest
about; Philip in actions, you in words. If you are still satisfied with
using the better arguments, it is an easy matter, and there is no
trouble: but if we are to take measures for the correction of these
evils, to prevent their insensible progress, and the rising up of a
mighty power, against which we could have no defense, then our course of
deliberation is not the same as formerly; the orators, and you that hear
them, must prefer good and salutary counsels to those which are easy and
agreeable.

First, men of Athens, if any one regards without uneasiness the might
and dominion of Philip, and imagines that it threatens no danger to the
state, or that all his preparations are not against you, I marvel, and
would entreat you every one to hear briefly from me the reasons, why I
am led to form a contrary expectation, and wherefore I deem Philip an
enemy; that, if I appear to have the clearer foresight, you may hearken
to me; if they, who have such confidence and trust in Philip, you may
give your adherence to them.

Thus then I reason, Athenians. What did Philip first make himself master
of after the peace? Thermopylae and the Phocian state. Well, and how
used he his power? He chose to act for the benefit of Thebes, not of
Athens. Why so? Because, I conceive, measuring his calculations by
ambition, by his desire of universal empire, without regard to peace,
quiet, or justice, he saw plainly, that to a people of our character and
principles nothing could he offer or give, that would induce you for
self-interest to sacrifice any of the Greeks to him. He sees that you,
having respect for justice, dreading the infamy of the thing, and
exercising proper forethought, would oppose him in any such attempt as
much as if you were at war: but the Thebans he expected (and events
prove him right) would, in return for the services done them, allow him
in every thing else to have his way, and, so far from thwarting or
impeding him, would fight on his side if he required it. From the same
persuasion he befriended lately the Messenians and Argives, which is the
highest panegyric upon you, Athenians; for you are adjudged by these
proceedings to be the only people incapable of betraying for lucre the
national rights of Greece, or bartering your attachment to her for any
obligation or benefit. And this opinion of you, that (so different) of
the Argives and Thebans, he has naturally formed, not only from a view
of present times, but by reflection on the past. For assuredly he finds
and hears that your ancestors, who might have governed the rest of
Greece on terms of submitting to Persia, not only spurned the proposal,
when Alexander, [Footnote: Alexander of Macedon, son of Amyntas, was
sent by Mardonius, the Persian commander, to offer the most favorable
terms to the Athenians, if they would desert the cause of the Greeks.
The Spartans at the same time sent an embassy, to remind them of their
duty. The spirited reply which the Athenians made to both embassies is
related by Herodotus. The Thebans submitted to Xerxes, and fought
against the Greeks at the battle of Plataea. The Argives were neutral,
chiefly from jealousy of Sparta. They demanded half the command of the
allied army, as a condition of their assistance, but this could not be
complied with.] this man's ancestor, came as herald to negotiate, but
preferred to abandon their country and endure any suffering, and
thereafter achieved such exploits as all the world loves to mention,
though none could ever speak them worthily, and therefore I must be
silent; for their deeds are too mighty to be uttered [Footnote: The
simple [Greek: _eipein_] in the original is more forcible than if
it had been [Greek: _epainein_], or the like. Compare Shakspeare,
Coriolanus, Act ii. sc. 2.

  I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
  Should not be uttered feebly----
                          For this last
  Before and in Corioli, let me say,
  I can not speak him home.]

in words. But the forefathers of the Argives and Thebans, they either
joined the barbarian's army, or did not oppose it; and therefore he
knows that both will selfishly embrace their advantage, without
considering the common interest of the Greeks. He thought then, if he
chose your friendship, it must be on just principles; if he attached
himself to them he should find auxiliaries of his ambition. This is the
reason of his preferring them to you both then and now. For certainly he
does not see them with a larger navy than you, nor has he acquired an
inland empire and renounced that of the sea and the ports, nor does he
forget the professions and promises on which he obtained the peace.

Well, it may be said, he knew all this, yet he so acted, not from
ambition or the motives which I charge, but because the demands of the
Thebans were more equitable than yours. Of all pleas, this now is the
least open to him. He that bids the Lacedaemonians resign Messene, how
can he pretend, when he delivered Orchomenos and Coronea to the Thebans,
to have acted on a conviction of justice?

But, forsooth, he was compelled,--this plea remains--he made concessions
against his will, being surrounded by Thessalian horse and Theban
infantry. Excellent! So of his intentions they talk; he will mistrust
the Thebans; and some carry news about, that he will fortify Elatea. All
this he intends and will intend I dare say; but to attack the
Lacedaemonians on behalf of Messene and Argos he does not intend; he
actually sends mercenaries and money into the country, and is expected
himself with a great force. The Lacedaemonians, who are enemies of
Thebes, he overthrows; the Phocians, whom he himself before destroyed,
will he now preserve?

And who can believe this? I can not think that Philip, either if he was
forced into his former measures, or if he were now giving up the
Thebans, would pertinaciously oppose their enemies; his present conduct
rather shows that he adopted those measures by choice. All things prove
to a correct observer, that his whole plan of action is against our
state. And this has now become to him a sort of necessity. Consider. He
desires empire: he conceives you to be his only opponents. He has been
for some time wronging you, as his own conscience best informs him,
since, by retaining what belongs to you, he secures the rest of his
dominion: had he given up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he deemed himself
unsafe at home. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against
you, and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have
intelligence, he thinks you must hate him; he is alarmed, expecting some
disaster, if you get the chance, unless he hastes to prevent you.
Therefore he is awake, and on the watch against us; he courts certain
people, Thebans, and people in Peloponnesus of the like views, who from
cupidity, he thinks, will be satisfied with the present, and from
dullness of understanding will foresee none of the consequences. And yet
men of even moderate sense might notice striking facts, which I had
occasion to quote to the Messenians and Argives, and perhaps it is
better they should be repeated to you.

Ye, men of Messene, said I, how do ye think the Olynthians would have
brooked to hear any thing against Philip at those times, when he
surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia
claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidaea,
taking on himself your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think
ye they expected such treatment as they got, or would have believed it
if they had been told? Nevertheless, said I, they, after enjoying for a
short time the land of others, are for a long time deprived by him of
their own, shamefully expelled, not only vanquished, but betrayed by one
another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are
not safe for republics. The Thessalians, again, think ye, said I, when
he ejected their tyrants, and gave back Nicaea and Magnesia, they
expected to have the decemvirate [Footnote: Thessaly was anciently
divided into four districts, each called a _tetras_, and this, as
we learn from the third Philippic, was restored soon after the
termination of the Sacred war. The object of Philip in effecting this
arrangement was, no doubt, to weaken the influence of the great
Thessalian families by a division of power; otherwise the Pheraean
tyranny might have been exchanged for an oligarchy powerful enough to be
independent of Macedonia. The decemvirate here spoken of (if the text be
correct) was a further contrivance to forward Philip's views; whether we
adopt Leland's opinion, that each tetrarchy was governed by a council of
ten, or Schaefer's, that each city was placed under ten governors.
Jacobs understands the word _decemvirate_ not to refer to any
positive form of government, but generally to designate a
_tyranny_, such as that which the Lacedaemonians used to introduce
into conquered cities. So, for example, the Romans might have spoken of
a decemvirate after the time of Appius. However this be, Philip seems to
have contrived that the ruling body, whether in the tetrarchy or the
decadarchy, should be his own creatures. Two of them, Eudicus and Simus,
are particularly mentioned by Demosthenes as traitors.] which is now
established? or that he who restored the meeting at Pylae [Footnote:
_Pylae_, which signifies _gates_, was a name applied by the
Greeks to divers passes, or defiles, but especially to the pass of
_Thermopylae_, which opened through the ridges of Mount Oeta into
the country of the Epicnemidian Locrians, and was so called from the hot
sulphureous springs that gushed from the foot of the mountain.] would
take away their revenues? Surely not. And yet these things have
occurred, as all mankind may know. You behold Philip, I said, a
dispenser of gifts and promises: pray, if you are wise, that you may
never know him for a cheat and a deceiver. By Jupiter, I said, there are
manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities, as
ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like: these are all made with hands,
and require expense; but there is one common safeguard in the nature of
prudent men, which is a good security for all, but especially for
democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this, hold
to this; preserve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye
desire? Freedom. Then see ye not that Philip's very titles are at
variance therewith? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an
antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, I said, lest, seeking
deliverance from war, you find a master?

They heard me with a tumult of approbation; and many other speeches they
heard from the ambassadors, both in my presence and afterward; yet none
the more, as it appears, will they keep aloof from Philip's friendship
and promises. And no wonder, that Messenians and certain Peloponnesians
should act contrary to what their reason approves; but you, who
understand yourselves, and by us orators are told, how you are plotted
against, how you are inclosed! you, I fear, to escape present exertion,
will come to ruin ere you are aware. So doth the moment's case and
indulgence prevail over distant advantage.

As to your measures, you will in prudence, I presume, consult hereafter
by yourselves. I will furnish you with such an answer as it becomes the
assembly to decide upon.

[_Here the proposed answer was read_]

[Footnote: Whether this was moved by the orator himself, or formally
read as his motion by the officer of the assembly, does not appear.]

It were just, men of Athens, to call the persons who brought those
promises, on the faith whereof you concluded peace. For I should never
have submitted to go as ambassador, and you would certainly not have
discontinued the war, had you supposed that Philip, on obtaining peace,
would act thus; but the statements then made were very different. Ay,
and others you should call. Whom? The men who declared--after the peace,
when I had returned from my second mission, that for the oaths, when,
perceiving your delusion, I gave warning, and protested, and opposed the
abandonment of Thermopylae and the Phocians--that I, being a
water-drinker, [Footnote: It was Philocrates who said this. There were
many jokes against Demosthenes as a water-drinker.] was naturally a
churlish and morose fellow, that Philip, if he passed the straits, would
do just as you desired, fortify Thespiae and Plataea, humble the
Thebans, cut through the Chersonese [Footnote: This peninsula being
exposed to incursions from Thrace, a plan was conceived of cutting
through the isthmus from Pteleon to Leuce-Acte, to protect the Athenian
settlements. See the Appendix to this volume, on the Thracian
Chersonese.] at his own expense, and give you Oropus and Euboea in
exchange for Amphipolis. All these declarations on the hustings I am
sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries.
And, the most disgraceful thing of all, you voted in your confidence,
that this same peace should descend to your posterity; so completely
were you misled. Why mention I this now, and desire these men to be
called? By the gods, I will tell you the truth frankly and without
reserve. Not that I may fall a-wrangling, to provoke recrimination
before you, [Footnote: Similarly Auger: "Ce n'est pas pour m'attirer les
invectives de mes anciens adversaires en les invectivant moi-meme."
Jacobs otherwise: _Nicht um durch Schmahungen mir auf gleiche Weise
Gehor bei Euch zu verschaffen_. But I do not think that [Greek:
_emauto logon poiaeso_] can bear the sense of [Greek: _logon
tuchoimi_], "get a hearing for myself." And the orator's object is,
not so much to sneer at the people by hinting that they are ready to
hear abuse, as to deter his opponents from retaliation, or weaken its
effect, by denouncing their opposition as corrupt. Leland saw the
meaning: "Not that, by breaking out into invectives, I may expose myself
to the like treatment."] and afford my old adversaries a fresh pretext
for getting more from Philip, nor for the purpose of idle garrulity. But
I imagine that what Philip is doing will grieve you hereafter more than
it does now. I see the thing progressing, and would that my surmises
were false; but I doubt it is too near already. So when you are able no
longer to disregard events, when, instead of hearing from me or others
that these measures are against Athens, you all see it yourselves, and
know it for certain, I expect you will be wrathful and exasperated. I
fear then, as your embassadors have concealed the purpose for which they
know they were corrupted, those who endeavor to repair what the others
have lost may chance to encounter your resentment; for I see it is a
practice with many to vent their anger, not upon the guilty, but on
persons most in their power. While therefore the mischief is only coming
and preparing, while we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though
he knows it well, to be reminded, who it was [Footnote: He means
Aeschines.] persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylae, by the
command of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnesus,
and has brought it to this, that your deliberation must be, not about
claims and interests abroad, but concerning the defense of your home and
a war in Attica, which will grieve every citizen when it comes, and
indeed it has commenced from that day. Had you not been then deceived,
there would be nothing to distress the state. Philip would certainly
never have prevailed at sea and come to Attica with a fleet, nor would
he have marched with a land-force by Phocis and Thermopylae: he must
either have acted honorably, observing the peace and keeping quiet, or
been immediately in a war similar to that which made him desire the
peace. Enough has been said to awaken recollection. Grant, O ye gods, it
be not all fully confirmed! I would have no man punished, though death
he may deserve, to the damage and danger of the country.




THE THIRD PHILIPPIC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  This speech was delivered about three months after the last,
  while Philip was advancing into Thrace, and threatening both
  the Chersonese and the Propontine coast. No new event had
  happened, which called for any special consultation; but
  Demosthenes, alarmed by the formidable character of Philip's
  enterprises and vast military preparations, felt the necessity
  of rousing the Athenians to exertion. He repeats in substance
  the arguments which he had used in the Oration on the
  Chersonese; points out the danger to be apprehended from the
  disunion among the Greek states, from their general apathy
  and lack of patriotism, which he contrasts with the high and
  noble spirit of ancient times. From the past conduct of Philip
  he shows what is to be expected in future; explains the
  difference between Philip's new method of warfare and that
  adopted in the Peloponnesian war, and urges the necessity of
  corresponding measures for defense. The peaceful professions
  of Philip were not to be trusted; he was never more dangerous
  than when he made overtures of peace and friendship. The most
  powerful instruments that he employed for gaining ascendency
  were the venal orators, who were to be found in every Grecian
  city, and on whom it was necessary to inflict signal punishment,
  before they had a chance of opposing foreign enemies. The advice
  of Demosthenes now is, to dispatch reinforcements to the
  Chersonese, to stir up the people of Greece, and even to solicit
  the assistance of the Persian king, who had no less reason than
  themselves to dread the ambition of Philip.

  The events of the following year, when Philip attacked the
  Propontine cities, fully justified the warning of Demosthenes.
  And the extraordinary activity, which the Athenians displayed
  in resisting him, shows that the exertions of the orator had
  their due effect. Even Mitford confesses, with reference to the
  operations of that period, that Athens found in Demosthenes an
  able and effective minister.


Many speeches, men of Athens, are made in almost every assembly about
the hostilities of Philip, hostilities which ever since the treaty of
peace he has been committing as well against you as against the rest of
the Greeks; and all (I am sure) are ready to avow, though they forbear
to do so, that our counsels and our measures should be directed to his
humiliation and chastisement: nevertheless, so low have our affairs been
brought by inattention and negligence, I fear it is a harsh truth to
say, that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass
resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not
methinks be worse off than we are. A variety of circumstances may have
brought us to this state; our affairs have not declined from one or two
causes only; but, if you rightly examine, you will find it chiefly owing
to the orators, who study to please you rather than advise for the best.
Some of whom, Athenians, seeking to maintain the basis of their own
power and repute, have no forethought for the future, and therefore
think you also ought to have none; others, accusing and calumniating
practical statesmen, labor only to make Athens punish Athens, and in
such occupations to engage her, that Philip may have liberty to say and
do what he pleases. Politics of this kind are common here, but are the
causes of your failures and embarrassment. I beg, Athenians, that you
will not resent my plain speaking of the truth. Only consider. You hold
liberty of speech in other matters to be the general right of all
residents in Athens, insomuch that you allow a measure of it even to
foreigners and slaves, and many servants may be seen among you speaking
their thoughts more freely than citizens in some other states; and yet
you have altogether banished it from your councils. The result has been,
that in the assembly you give yourselves airs and are flattered at
hearing nothing but compliments, in your measures and proceedings you
are brought to the utmost peril. If such be your disposition now, I must
be silent: if you will listen to good advice without flattery, I am
ready to speak. For though our affairs are in a deplorable condition,
though many sacrifices have been made, still, if you will choose to
perform your duty, it is possible to repair it all. A paradox, and yet a
truth, am I about to state. That which is the most lamentable in the
past is best for the future. How is this? Because you performed no part
of your duty, great or small, and therefore you fared ill: had you done
all that became you, and your situation were the same, there would be no
hope of amendment. Philip has indeed prevailed over your sloth and
negligence, but not over the country: you have not been worsted; you
have not even bestirred yourselves.

If now we were all agreed that Philip is at war with Athens and
infringing the peace, nothing would a speaker need to urge or advise but
the safest and easiest way of resisting him. But since, at the very time
when Philip is capturing cities and retaining divers of our dominions
and assailing all people, there are men so unreasonable as to listen to
repeated declarations in the assembly, that some of us are kindling war,
one must be cautious and set this matter right: for whoever moves or
advises a measure of defense, is in danger of being accused afterward as
author of the war.

I will first then examine and determine this point, whether it be in our
power to deliberate on peace or war. If the country may be at peace, if
it depends on us, (to begin with this,) I say we ought to maintain
peace, and I call upon the affirmant to move a resolution, to take some
measure, and not to palter with us. But if another, having arms in his
hand and a large force around him, amuses you with the name of peace,
while he carries on the operations of war, what is left but to defend
yourselves? You may profess to be at peace, if you like, as he does; I
quarrel not with that. But if any man supposes this to be a peace, which
will enable Philip to master all else and attack you last, he is a
madman, or he talks of a peace observed toward him by you, not toward
you by him. This it is that Philip purchases by all his expenditure, the
privilege of assailing you without being assailed in turn.

If we really wait until he avows that he is at war with us, we are the
simplest of mortals, for he would not declare that, though he marched
even against Attica and Piraeus, at least if we may judge from his
conduct to others. For example, to the Olynthians he declared, when he
was forty furlongs from their city, that there was no alternative, but
either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia; though before that time,
whenever he was accused of such an intent, he took it ill and sent
embassadors to justify himself. Again, he marched towards the Phocions
as if they were allies, and there were Phocian envoys who accompanied
his march, and many among you contended that his advance would not
benefit the Thebans. And he came into Thessaly of late as a friend and
ally, yet he has taken possession of Pherae: and lastly he told these
wretched people of Oreus, [Footnote: When he established his creature
Philistides in the government of Oreus, as mentioned in the last oration
and at the end of this.] that he had sent his soldiers out of good-will
to visit them, as he heard they were in trouble and dissension, and it
was the part of allies and true friends to lend assistance on such
occasions. People who would never have harmed him, though they might
have adopted measures of defense, he chose to deceive rather than warn
them of his attack; and think ye he would declare war against you before
he began it, and that while you are willing to be deceived? Impossible.
He would be the silliest of mankind, if, while you the injured parties
make no complaint against him, but are accusing your own countrymen, he
should terminate your intestine strife and jealousies, warn you to turn
against him, and remove the pretexts of his hirelings for asserting, to
amuse you, that he makes no war upon Athens. O heavens! would any
rational being judge by words rather than by actions, who is at peace
with him and who at war? Surely none. Well then; Philip immediately
after the peace, before Diopithes was in command or the settlers in the
Chersonese had been sent out, took Serrium and Doriscus, and expelled
from Serrium and the Sacred Mount the troops whom your general had
stationed there. [Footnote: This general was Chares, to whom
Cersobleptes had intrusted the defense of those places. The Sacred Mount
was a fortified position on the northern coast of the Hellespont. It was
here that Miltocythes intrenched himself, when he rebelled against
Cotys; and Philip took possession of it just before the peace with
Athens was concluded, as being important to his operations against
Cersobleptes. The statement of Demosthenes, that the oaths had then been
taken, is, as Jacobs observes, incorrect; for they were sworn afterward
in Thessaly. But the argument is substantially the same, for the peace
had been agreed to, and the ratification was purposely delayed by
Philip, to gain time for the completion of his designs.] What do you
call such conduct? He had sworn the peace. Don't say--what does it
signify? how is the state concerned?--Whether it be a trifling matter,
or of no concernment to you, is a different question: religion and
justice have the same obligation, be the subject of the offense great or
small. Tell me now; when he sends mercenaries into Chersonesus, which
the king and all the Greeks have acknowledged to be yours, when he avows
himself an auxiliary and writes us word so, what are such proceedings?
He says he is not at war; I can not however admit such conduct to be an
observance of the peace; far otherwise: I say, by his attempt on Megara,
[Footnote: Not long before this oration was delivered, Philip was
suspected of a design to seize Megara. Demosthenes gives an account, in
his speech on the Embassy, of a conspiracy between two Megarians,
Ptaeodorus and Perilaus, to introduce Macedonian troops into the city.
Phocion was sent by the Athenians to Megara, with the consent of the
Megarian people, to protect them against foreign attack. He fortified
the city and port, connecting them by long walls, and put them in
security. The occupation of Megara by Philip must have been most
perilous to Athens, especially while Euboea and Thebes were in his
interest; he would thus have inclosed her as it were in a net.] by his
setting up despotism in Euboea, by his present advance into Thrace, by
his intrigues in Peloponnesus, by the whole course of operations with
his army, he has been breaking the peace and making war upon you; unless
indeed you will say, that those who establish batteries are not at war,
until they apply them to the walls. But that you will not say: for
whoever contrives and prepares the means for my conquest, is at war with
me, before he darts or draws the bow. What, if any thing should happen,
is the risk you run? The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of
Megara and Euboea to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnesians with
him. Then can I allow, that one who sets such an engine at work against
Athens is at peace with her? Quite the contrary. From the day that he
destroyed the Phocians I date his commencement of hostilities. Defend
yourselves instantly, and I say you will be wise: delay it, and you may
wish in vain to do so hereafter. So much do I dissent from your other
counselors, men of Athens, that I deem any discussion about Chersonesus
or Byzantium out of place. Succor them--I advise that--watch that no
harm befalls them, send all necessary supplies to your troops in that
quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as
being in the utmost peril. I must tell you why I am so alarmed at the
state of our affairs: that, if my reasonings are correct, you may share
them, and make some provision at least for yourselves, however
disinclined to do so for others: but if, in your judgment, I talk
nonsense and absurdity, you may treat me as crazed, and not listen to
me, either now or in future.

That Philip from a mean and humble origin has grown mighty, that the
Greeks are jealous and quarreling among themselves, that it was far more
wonderful for him to rise from that insignificance, than it would now
be, after so many acquisitions, to conquer what is left; these and
similar matters, which I might dwell upon, I pass over. But I observe
that all people, beginning with you, have conceded to him a right, which
in former times has been the subject of contest in every Grecian war.
And what is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing
and pillaging the Greeks, one after another, attacking and enslaving
their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three
years, [Footnote: This would be from about the end of the Persian war to
the end of the Peloponnesian, B. C. 405. Isocrates speaks of the Athenian
sway as having lasted sixty-five or seventy years. But statements of
this kind are hardly intended to be made with perfect accuracy. In the
third Olynthiac, as we have seen, Demosthenes says, the Athenians had
the leadership by _consent of the Greeks_ for forty-five years.
This would exclude the Peloponnesian war.] the Lacedaemonians for
twenty-nine; [Footnote: From the end of the Peloponnesian war to the
battle of Naxos, B. C. 376.] and the Thebans had some power in these
latter times after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you, my
countrymen, nor Thebans nor Lacedaemonians, were ever licensed by the
Greeks to act as you pleased; far otherwise. When you, or rather the
Athenians at that time, appeared to be dealing harshly with certain
people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens,
thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her.
So, when the Lacedaemonians became masters and succeeded to your empire,
on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations,
[Footnote: The Spartans, whose severe military discipline rendered them
far the best soldiers in Greece, were totally unfit to manage the
empire, at the head of which they found themselves after the humiliation
of Athens. Their attempt to force an oligarchy upon every dependent
state was an unwise policy, which made them generally odious. The
decemvirates of Lysander, and the governors ([Greek: _armostai_])
established in various Greek cities to maintain Lacedaemonian influence,
were regarded as instruments of tyranny. It was found that Spartan
governors and generals, when away from home, gave loose to their vicious
inclinations, as if to indemnify themselves for the strictness of
domestic discipline. It became a maxim in their politics, that the end
justified the means. The most flagrant proof was given by the seizure of
the Cadmea at Thebes; a measure, which led to a formidable confederacy
against Sparta, and brought her to the verge of destruction.] a general
war was declared against them, even by such as had no cause of
complaint. But wherefore mention other people? We ourselves and the
Lacedaemonians, although at the outset we could not allege any natural
injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done
to our neighbors. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those
thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less, men of
Athens, than the wrongs which, in thirteen incomplete years that Philip
has been uppermost, [Footnote: _I. e._ in power; but, as Smead, an
American editor, truly observes, [Greek: _epipolyxei_] has a
contemptuous signification, Jacobs: _oben schwimmt_. The thirteen
years are reckoned from the time when Philip's interference in Thessaly
began; before which he had not assumed an important character in
southern Greece.] he has inflicted on the Greeks: nay they are scarcely
a fraction of these, as may easily be shown in a few words. Olynthus and
Methone and Apollonia, and thirty-two cities [Footnote: The Chalcidian
cities.] on the borders of Thrace, I pass over; all which he has so
cruelly destroyed, that a visitor could hardly tell if they were ever
inhabited: and of the Phocians, so considerable a people exterminated, I
say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken
away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to
parcel her out, [Footnote: This statement does not disagree with the
mention of the [Greek: _dekadarchia_] in the second Philippic.
Supposing that Thessaly was not only divided into tetrarchics, four
provinces or cantons, but also governed by decemvirates of Philip's
appointment, placed in divers of her cities, then by the former
contrivance she might be said [Greek: _donlenein kat ethnae_], by
the latter [Greek: _kata poleis_]. It is not clear indeed whether
several decemvirates, or one for the whole country, is to be understood.
The singular number is equally capable of either interpretation.] not
only by cities, but also by provinces, for subjection? Are not the
Euboean states governed now by despots, and that in an island near to
Thebes and Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at
peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Nor does he write so and
not act accordingly. He is gone to the Hellespont; he marched formerly
against Ambracia; Elis, such an important city in Peloponnesus, he
possesses; [Footnote: That is to say; a Macedonian faction prevailed in
Elis. The democratical party had some time before endeavored to regain
the ascendency, by aid of the Phocian mercenaries of Phalaecus; but they
had been defeated by the troops of Arcadia and Elis.] he plotted lately
to get Megara: neither Hellenic nor Barbaric land contains the man's
ambition. [Footnote: So Juvenal, Sat X. 160:

  Aestuat infelix angusto limite mundi,
  Ut Gyarae clausus scopulis parvaque Seripho.

And Virgil, Aen. IX. 644:

  Nee te Troja capit.]

And we the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending
embassies to one another about it and expressing indignation, are in
such a miserable state, so intrenched in our miserable towns, that to
this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we
can not combine, or form any association for succor and alliance; we
look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving (methinks)
to enjoy the interval that another is destroyed in, not caring or
striving for the salvation of Greece: for none can be ignorant, that
Philip, like some course or attack of fever or other disease, is coming
even on those that yet seem very far removed. And you must be sensible,
that whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedaemonians or from us,
was at least inflicted by genuine people of Greece; and it might be felt
in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune,
committed some fault or error in the management of it; on that ground
one would consider him open to censure and reproach, yet it could not be
said that he was an alien, and not heir to the property which he so
dealt with. But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoiled what
he had no interest in--Heavens! how much more heinous and hateful would
all have pronounced it! And yet in regard to Philip and his conduct they
feel not this, although he is not only no Greek and noway akin to
Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honorable to mention; in
fact, a vile fellow of Macedon, from which a respectable slave could not
be purchased formerly.

What is wanting to make his insolence complete? Besides his destruction
of Grecian cities, does he not hold the Pythian games, the common
festival of Greece, and, if he comes not himself, send his vassals to
preside? Is he not master of Thermopylae and the passes into Greece, and
holds he not those places by garrisons and mercenaries? Has he not
thrust aside Thessalians, ourselves, Dorians, the whole Amphictyonic
body, and got preaudience of the oracle, [Footnote: This privilege,
which had belonged to the Phocians, was transferred to Philip. It was
considered an advantage as well as an honor in ancient times; for there
were only certain days appointed in every month, when the oracle could
be consulted, and the order of consultation was determined by lot in
common cases. The Delphians used to confer the right of pre-consultation
on particular states or persons as a reward for some service or act of
piety. Thus the Spartans received it; and Croesus, king of Lydia, for
the magnificent presents which he sent to the temple.] to which even the
Greeks do not all pretend? Does he not write to the Thessalians, what
form of government to adopt? send mercenaries to Porthmus, [Footnote:
Porthmus was the port of Eretria, on the strait, opposite Athens. The
circumstances are stated by Demosthenes at the latter end of the speech.
By expelling the [Greek: _daemos_] of Eretria, he means of course
the popular party, _die Volkspartei_, as Pabst has it; but they
would by their own partisans be called the people.] to expel the
Eretrian commonalty; others to Oreus, to set up Philistides as ruler?
Yet the Greeks endure to see all this; methinks they view it as they
would a hailstorm, each praying that it may not fall on himself, none
trying to prevent it. And not only are the outrages which he docs to
Greece submitted to, but even the private wrongs of every people:
nothing can go beyond this! Has he not wronged the Corinthians by
attacking Ambracia [Footnote: Divers colonies were planted on the
northwestern coast of Greece by the Corinthians, and also by the
Coreyraeans, who were themselves colonists from Corinth. Among them were
Leucas, Ambracia, Anactorium, Epidamnus, and Apollonia. Leucas afterward
became insular, by cutting through the isthmus. Philip's meditated
attack was in 343 B. C. after the conquest of Cassopia. Leucas, by its
insular position, would have been convenient for a descent on
Peloponnesus. We have seen that this design of Philip was baffled by the
exertions of Demosthenes.] and Leucas? the Achaians, by swearing to give
Naupactus [Footnote: Naupactus, now _Lepanto_, lay on the northern
coast of the Corinthian gulf. At the close of the Peloponnesian war it
came into the hands of the Achaians, from whom it was taken by
Epaminondas, but after his death they regained it. The Aetolians got
possession of the town some time after, perhaps by Macedonian
assistance.] to the Aetolians? from the Thebans taken Echinus?
[Footnote: The Echinus here mentioned was a city on the northern coast
of the Maliac gulf in Thessaly.] Is he not marching against the
Byzantines his allies? From us--I omit the rest--but keeps he not
Cardia, the greatest city of the Chersonese? Still under these
indignities we are all slack and disheartened, and look toward our
neighbors, distrusting one another, instead of the common enemy. And how
think ye a man, who behaves so insolently to all, how will he act, when
he gets each separately under his control?

But what has caused the mischief? There must be some cause, some good
reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are eager
for servitude. There was something, men of Athens, something in the
hearts of the multitude then, which there is not now, which overcame the
wealth of Persia and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not
under any battle by land or sea; the loss whereof has ruined all, and
thrown the affairs of Greece into confusion. What was this? Nothing
subtle or clever: simply that whoever took money from the aspirants for
power or the corruptors of Greece were universally detested: it was
dreadful to be convicted of bribery; the severest punishment was
inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The
favorable moments for enterprise, which fortune frequently offers to the
careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against
those that discharge all their duty, could not be bought from orators or
generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and
barbarians, nor any thing of the kind. But now all such principles have
been sold as in open market, and those imported in exchange, by which
Greece is ruined and diseased. [Footnote: [Greek: _Apolole_] in
reference to foreign affairs; [Greek: _nenosaeken_] in regard to
internal broils and commotions. Compare Shakspeare, Macbeth IV. 8.

  O nation miserable,
  When shalt thou see thy wholesome days again?]

What are they? Envy where a man gets a bribe; laughter if he confesses
it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those that denounce the crime: all
the usual attendants upon corruption. [Footnote: He glances more
particularly at Philocrates, Demades, and Aeschines.] For as to ships
and men and revenues and abundance of other materials, all that may be
reckoned as constituting national strength--assuredly the Greeks of our
day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than
Greeks of the olden time. But they are all rendered useless,
unavailable, unprofitable, by the agency of these traffickers.

That such is the present state of things, you must see, without
requiring my testimony: that it was different in former times, I will
demonstrate, not by speaking my own words, but by showing an inscription
of your ancestors, which they graved on a brazen column and deposited in
the citadel, not for their own benefit, (they were right-minded enough
without such records,) but for a memorial and example to instruct you,
how seriously such conduct should be taken up. What says the inscription
then? It says: "Let Arthmius, son of Pythonax the Zelite, [Footnote:
Zelea is a town in Mysia. Arthmius was sent by Artaxerxes into
Peloponnesus, to stir up a war against the Athenians, who had irritated
him by the assistance which they lent to Egypt. Aeschines says that
Arthmius was the [Greek: _proxenos_] of Athens, which may partly
account for the decree passed against him.] be declared an outlaw,
[Footnote: Of the various degrees of [Greek: _atimia_] at Athens I
shall speak hereafter. I translate the word here, so as to meet the case
of a foreigner, who had nothing to do with the franchises of the
Athenians, but who by their decree was excommunicated from the benefit
of all international law.] and an enemy of the Athenian people and their
allies, him and his family." Then the cause is written why this was
done: because he brought the Median gold into Peloponnesus. That is the
inscription. By the gods! only consider and reflect among yourselves,
what must have been the spirit, what the dignity of those Athenians who
acted so! One Arthmius a Zelite, subject of the king, (for Zelea is in
Asia,) because in his master's service he brought gold into
Peloponnesus, not to Athens, they proclaimed an enemy of the Athenians
and their allies, him and his family, and outlawed. That is, not the
outlawry commonly spoken of: for what would a Zelite care, to be
excluded from Athenian franchises? It means not that; but in the
statutes of homicide it is written, in cases where a prosecution for
murder is not allowed, but killing is sanctioned, "and let him die an
outlaw," says the legislator: by which he means, that whoever kills such
a person shall be unpolluted. [Footnote: That is, his act being
justifiable homicide, he shall not be deemed (in a religious point of
view) impure. As to the Athenian law of homicide, see my article
_Phonos_ in the Archaeological Dictionary.] Therefore they
considered that the preservation of all Greece was their own concern:
(but for such opinion, they would not have cared, whether people in
Peloponnesus were bought and corrupted:) and whomsoever they discovered
taking bribes, they chastised and punished so severely as to record
their names in brass. The natural result was, that Greece, was
formidable to the Barbarian, not the Barbarian to Greece. 'Tis not so
now: since neither in this nor in other respects are your sentiments the
same. But what are they? You know yourselves: why am I to upbraid you
with every thing? The Greeks in general are alike and no better than
you. Therefore I say, our present affairs demand earnest attention and
wholesome counsel. Shall I say what? Do you bid me, and won't you be
angry?

[_Here is read the public document which Demosthenes produces, after
which he resumes his address_.]

[Footnote: The Secretary of the Assembly stood by the side of the
orator, and read any public documents, such as statutes, decrees, bills
and the like, which the orator desired to refer to or to verify. It does
not appear what the document was, which Demosthenes caused to be read
here. If we may judge from the argument, it was some energetic
resolution of the people, such as he would propose for an example on the
present occasion.]

There is a foolish saying of persons who wish to make us easy, that
Philip is not yet as powerful as the Lacedaemonians were formerly, who
ruled every where by land and sea, and had the king for their ally, and
nothing withstood them; yet Athens resisted even that nation, and was
not destroyed. I myself believe, that, while every thing has received
great improvement, and the present bears no resemblance to the past,
nothing has been so changed and improved as the practice of war. For
anciently, as I am informed, the Lacedaemonians and all Grecian people
would for four or five months, during the season [Footnote: The
campaigning season, during the summer and fine time of the year. The
Peloponnesians generally invaded Attica when the corn was ripe, burning
and plundering all in their route. Thucydides in his history divides the
year into two parts, summer and winter.] only, invade and ravage the
land of their enemies with heavy-armed and national troops, and return
home again: and their ideas were so old-fashioned, or rather national,
they never purchased [Footnote: Compare the old lines of Ennius:

  Non cauponantes bellum sed belligerantes
  Ferro, non auro, vitam cernamus utrique.]

an advantage from any; theirs was a legitimate and open warfare. But now
you doubtless perceive, that the majority of disasters have been
effected by treason; nothing is done in fair field or combat. You hear
of Philip marching where he pleases, not because he commands troops of
the line, but because he has attached to him a host of skirmishers,
cavalry, archers, mercenaries, and the like. When with these he falls
upon a people in civil dissension, and none (for mistrust) will march
out to defend the country, he applies engines and besieges them. I need
not mention, that he makes no difference between winter and summer, that
he has no stated season of repose. You, knowing these things, reflecting
on them, must not let the war approach your territories, nor get your
necks broken, relying on the simplicity of the old war with the
Lacedaemonians, but take the longest time beforehand for defensive
measures and preparations, see that he stirs not from home, avoid any
decisive engagement. For a war, if we choose, men of Athens, to pursue a
right course, we have many natural advantages; such as the position of
his kingdom, which we may extensively plunder and ravage, and a thousand
more; but for a battle he is better trained than we are. [Footnote:
Chaeronea proved the wisdom of this advice. Similar counsel was given by
Pericles in the Peloponnesian war. Had the Athenians attempted to meet
the invading army in the field, they must inevitably have been defeated
in the early period of the war.]

Nor is it enough to adopt these resolutions and oppose him by warlike
measures: you must on calculation and on principle abhor his advocates
here, remembering that it is impossible to overcome your enemies abroad,
until you have chastised those who are his ministers within the city.
Which, by Jupiter and all the gods, you can not and will not do! You
have arrived at such a pitch of folly or madness or--I know not what to
call it: I am tempted often to think, that some evil genius is driving
you to ruin--for the sake of scandal or envy or jest or any other cause,
you command hirelings to speak, (some of whom would not deny themselves
to be hirelings,) and laugh when they abuse people. And this, bad as it
is, is not the worst: you have allowed these persons more liberty for
their political conduct than your faithful counselors: and see what
evils are caused by listening to such men with indulgence. I will
mention facts that you will all remember.

In Olynthus some of the statesmen were in Philip's interest, doing every
thing for him; some were on the honest side, aiming to preserve their
fellow-citizens from slavery. Which party now destroyed their country?
or which betrayed the cavalry, [Footnote: After Olynthus was besieged by
Philip, various sallies were made from the city, some of which were
successful. But the treachery of Lasthenes and his accomplices ruined
all. A body of five hundred horse were led by him into an ambuscade, and
captured by the besiegers. See Appendix I.] by whose betrayal Olynthus
fell? The creatures of Philip; they that, while the city stood,
slandered and calumniated the honest counselors so effectually, that the
Olynthian people were induced to banish Apollonides.

Nor is it there only, and nowhere else, that such practice has been
ruinous. In Eretria, when, after riddance of Plutarch [Footnote: When he
was expelled by Phocion after the battle of Tamynae, B. C. 354.] and his
mercenaries, the people got possession of their city and of Porthmus,
some were for bringing the government over to you, others to Philip. His
partisans were generally, rather exclusively, attended to by the
wretched and unfortunate Eretrians, who at length were persuaded to
expel their faithful advisers. Philip, their ally and friend, sent
Hipponicus and a thousand mercenaries, demolished the walls of Porthmus,
and established three rulers, Hipparchus, Automedon, Clitarchus. Since
that he has driven them out of the country, twice attempting their
deliverance: once he sent the troops with Eurylochus, afterward those of
Parmenio.

What need of many words? In Oreus Philip's agents were Philistides,
Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus, who now hold the government:
that was quite notorious: one Euphraeus, a man that formerly dwelt here
among you, was laboring for freedom and independence. How this man was
in other respects insulted and trampled on by the people of Oreus, were
long to tell: but a year before the capture, discovering what
Philistides and his accomplices were about, he laid an information
against them for treason. A multitude then combining, having Philip for
their paymaster, and acting under his direction, take Euphraeus off to
prison as a disturber of the public peace. Seeing which, the people of
Oreus, instead of assisting the one and beating the others to death,
with them were not angry, but said his punishment was just, and rejoiced
at it. So the conspirators, having full liberty of action, laid their
schemes and took their measures for the surrender of the city; if any of
the people observed it, they were silent and intimidated, remembering
the treatment of Euphraeus; and so wretched was their condition, that on
the approach of such a calamity none dared to utter a word, until the
enemy drew up before the walls: then some were for defense, others for
betrayal. Since the city was thus basely and wickedly taken, the
traitors have held despotic rule; people who formerly rescued them, and
were ready for any maltreatment of Euphraeus, they have either banished
or put to death; Euphraeus killed himself, proving by deed, that he had
resisted Philip honestly and purely for the good of his countrymen.

What can be the reason--perhaps you wonder--why the Olynthians and
Eretrians and Orites were more indulgent to Philip's advocates than to
their own? The same which operates with you. They who advise for the
best can not always gratify their audience, though they would; for the
safety of the state must be attended to: their opponents by the very
counsel which is agreeable advance Philip's interest. One party required
contribution; the other said there was no necessity: one were for war
and mistrust; the other for peace, until they were ensnared. And so on
for every thing else; (not to dwell on particulars;) the one made
speeches to please for the moment, and gave no annoyance; the other
offered salutary counsel, that was offensive. Many rights did the people
surrender at last, not from any such motive of indulgence or ignorance,
but submitting in the belief that all was lost, Which, by Jupiter and
Apollo, I fear will be your case, when on calculation you see that
nothing can be done. I pray, men of Athens, it may never come to this!
Better die a thousand deaths than render homage to Philip, or sacrifice
any of your faithful counselors. A fine recompense have the people of
Oreus got, for trusting themselves to Philip's friends and spurning
Euphraeus! Finely are the Eretrian commons rewarded, for having driven
away your embassadors and yielded to Clitarchus! Yes; they are slaves,
exposed to the lash and the torture. Finally he spared the Olynthians,
who appointed Lasthenes to command their horse, and expelled
Apollonides! It is folly and cowardice to cherish such hopes, and, while
you take evil counsel and shirk every duty, and even listen to those who
plead for your enemies, to think you inhabit a city of such magnitude,
that you can not suffer any serious misfortune. Yea, and it is
disgraceful to exclaim on any occurrence, when it is too late, "Who
would have expected it? However--this or that should have been done, the
other left undone." Many things could the Olynthians mention now, which,
if foreseen at the time would have prevented their destruction. Many
could the Orites mention, many the Phocians, and each of the ruined
states. But what would it avail them? As long as the vessel is safe,
whether it be great or small, the mariner, the pilot, every man in turn
should exert himself, and prevent its being overturned either by
accident or design: but when the sea hath rolled over it, their efforts
are vain. And we, likewise, O Athenians, while we are safe, with a
magnificent city, plentiful resources, lofty reputation--what [Footnote:
Smead remarks here on the adroitness of the orator, who, instead of
applying the simile of the ship to the administration of the state,
which he felt that his quick-minded hearers had already done, suddenly
interrupts himself with a question, which would naturally occur to the
audience.] must we do? Many of you, [Footnote: _You_, [Greek: _oi
kathaemenoi_]. See my observations in the preface. I can not forbear
noticing the manner in which Francis translates the following [Greek:
_nae Di ero_]. "Let Jupiter be witness, with what integrity I shall
declare my opinion." The original means nothing of the kind. It is rare
that [Greek: _nae Dia_] can be translated literally with effect.
Jacobs here has _wohlan_.] I dare say, have been longing to ask.
Well then, I will tell you; I will move a resolution: pass it, if you
please.

First, let us prepare for our own defense; provide ourselves, I mean,
with ships, money, and troops--for surely, though all other people
consented to be slaves, we at least ought to struggle for freedom. When
we have completed our own preparations and made them apparent to the
Greeks, then let us invite the rest, and send our embassadors every
where with the intelligence, to Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios, to
the king, I say; (for it concerns his interests, not to let Philip make
universal conquest;) that, if you prevail, you may have partners of your
dangers and expenses, in case of necessity, or at all events that you
may delay the operations. For, since the war is against an individual,
[Footnote: Because a state is a permanent power; a single man is liable
to a variety of accidents, and his power terminates with his life.] not
against the collected power of a state, even this may be useful; as were
the embassies last year to Peloponnesus, and the remonstrances with
which I and Polyeuctus, that excellent man, and Hegesippus, and
Clitomachus, and Lycurgus, and the other envoys went round, and arrested
Philip's progress, so that he neither attacked Ambracia nor started for
Peloponnesus. I say not, however, that you should invite the rest
without adopting measures to protect yourselves: it would be folly,
while you sacrifice your own interest, to profess a regard for that of
strangers, or to alarm others about the future, while for the present
you are unconcerned. I advise not this: I bid you send supplies to the
troops in Chersonesus, and do what else they require; prepare yourselves
and make every effort first, then summon, gather, instruct the rest of
the Greeks. That is the duty of a state possessing a dignity such as
yours. If you imagine that Chalcidians or Megarians will save Greece,
while you run away from the contest, you imagine wrong. Well for any of
those people, if they are safe themselves. This work belongs to you:
this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you, the prize of many
perilous exertions. But if every one will sit seeking his pleasure, and
studying to be idle himself, never will he find others to do his work,
and more than this, I fear we shall be under the necessity of doing all
that we like not at one time. Were proxies to be had, our inactivity
would have found them long ago; but they are not.

Such are the measures which I advise, which I propose: adopt them, and
even yet, I believe, our prosperity may be re-established. If any man
has better advice to offer, let him communicate it openly. Whatever you
determine, I pray to all the gods for a happy result.




THE FOURTH PHILIPPIC.

  THE ARGUMENT.

  The subject of this Oration is the same as the last, viz.,
  the necessity of resistance to Philip. The time of its
  delivery would appear to have been a little later, while
  Philip was yet in Thrace, and before he commenced the siege
  of the Propontine towns. No new event is alluded to, except
  the seizure of Hermias by the satrap Mentor, the exact date
  of which is uncertain. The orator urges here, still more
  strongly than he had done in the third Philippic, the
  necessity of applying to Persia for assistance. His advice
  was followed, and a negotiation was opened with that
  monarchy, which led to the effective relief of Perinthus.
  There is a remarkable passage in this speech, on the
  importance of general unanimity, which seems to imply that
  disputes had arisen between the richer and poorer classes,
  chiefly in regard to the application of the public revenue.
  The view which is here taken on the subject of the Theoric
  distributions is so different from the argument in the
  Olynthiacs, that modern critics have generally considered
  this Oration to be spurious. Another ground for such opinion
  is, that it contains various passages borrowed from other
  speeches, and not very skillfully put together. Yet the
  genuineness seems not to have been doubted by any of the
  ancient grammarians.


Believing, men of Athens, that the subject of your consultation is
serious and momentous to the state, I will endeavor to advise what I
think important. Many have been the faults, accumulated for some time
past, which have brought us to this wretched condition; but none is
under the circumstances so distressing as this, men of Athens; that your
minds are alienated from public business; you are attentive just while
you sit listening to some news, afterward you all go away, and, so far
from caring for what you heard, you forget it altogether.

Well; of the extent of Philip's arrogance and ambition, as evinced in
his dealings with every people, you have been informed. That it is not
possible to restrain him in such course by speeches and harangues, no
man can be ignorant: or, if other reasons fail to convince you, reflect
on this. Whenever we have had to discuss our claims, on no occasion have
we been worsted or judged in the wrong; we have still beaten and got the
better of all in argument. But do his affairs go badly on this account,
or ours well? By no means. For as Philip immediately proceeds, with arms
in his hand, to put all he possesses boldly at stake, while we with our
equities, the speakers as well as the hearers, are sitting still,
actions (naturally enough) outstrip words, and people attend not to what
we have argued or may argue, but to what we do, All our doings are not
likely to protect any of our injured neighbors: I need not say more upon
the subject. Therefore, as the states are divided into two parties, one
that would neither hold arbitrary government nor submit to it, but live
under free and equal laws; another desiring to govern their
fellow-citizens, and be subject to some third power, by whose assistance
they hope to accomplish that object; the partisans of Philip, [Footnote:
I agree with Pabst and Auger that [Greek: _ekeinon_] signifies
Philip. Schaefer takes it neutrally.] who desire tyranny and despotism,
have every where prevailed, and I know not whether there is any state
left, besides our own, with a popular constitution firmly established.
And those, that hold the government through him, have prevailed by all
the means efficacious in worldly affairs; principally and mainly, by
having a person to bribe the corruptible; secondly, a point no less
important, by having at their command, at whatever season they required,
an army to put down their opponents. We, men of Athens, are not only in
these respects behindhand; we can not even be awaked; like men that have
drunk mandrake [Footnote: Used for a powerful opiate by the ancients. It
is called Mandragora also in English. See Othello, Act III. Sc. 3.

                  Not poppy, nor mandragora,
  Nor all the drowsy sirups of the world,
  Shall ever medicine thee to that sweet sleep
  Which thou ow'dst yesterday.]

or some other sleeping potion; and methinks--for I judge the truth must
be spoken--we are by reason thereof held in such disrepute and contempt,
that, among the states in imminent danger, some dispute with us for the
lead, some for the place of congress; others have resolved to defend
themselves separately rather than in union with us.

Why am I so particular in mentioning these things? I seek not to give
offense; so help me all the powers of heaven! I wish, men of Athens, to
make it clear and manifest to you all, that habitual sloth and
indolence, the same in public matters as in private life, is not
immediately felt on every occasion of neglect, but shows itself in the
general result. [Footnote: Auger: "presentent a la fin un total
effrayant."] Look at Serrium and Doriscus; which were first disregarded
after the peace. Their names perhaps are unknown to many of you: yet
your careless abandonment of these lost Thrace and Cersobleptes your
ally. Again, seeing these places neglected and unsupported by you, he
demolished Porthmus, and raised a tyrant in Euboea like a fortress
against Attica. This being disregarded, Megara was very nearly taken.
You were insensible, indifferent to all his aggressions; gave no
intimation that you would not permit their continuance. He purchased
Antrones, [Footnote: A town in Thessaly. We do not know all the details
of Philip's proceedings in that country, but we have seen enough to
know, first under the guise of a protector he was not far short of being
the master of the Thessalian people. Some of these towns were actually
in his possession, as Pherae and Pagasae. But that the Thesssalians were
never entirely subjugated to Macedonia, and still retained a hankering
after independence, was proved at a later period by their desertion of
Antipater.] and not long after had got Oreus into his power. Many
transactions I omit; Pherae, the march against Ambracia, the massacres
at Elis, [Footnote: The Elean exiles, having engaged in their service a
body of the Phocian mercenaries, made an incursion into Elis, but were
repelled. A large number of prisoners were taken and put to death. This
happened B. C. 343. The government of Elis was at that time in the hands
of a Macedonian party.] and numberless others: for I have not entered
upon these details, to enumerate the people whom Philip has oppressed
and wronged, but to show you that Philip will not desist from wronging
all people and pursuing his conquests, until an effort is made to
prevent him.

There are persons whose custom it is, before they hear any speech in the
debate, to ask immediately--"What must we do?"--not with the intention
of doing what they are told (or they would be the most serviceable of
men), but in order to get rid of the speaker. Nevertheless, you should
be advised what to do. First, O my countrymen, you must be firmly
convinced in your minds, that Philip is at war with our state, and has
broken the peace; that, while he is inimical and hostile to the whole of
Athens, to the ground of Athens, and I may add, to the gods in Athens,
(may they exterminate him!) there is nothing which he strives and plots
against so much as our constitution, nothing in the world that he is so
anxious about, as its destruction. And thereunto he is driven in some
sort by necessity. Consider. He wishes for empire: he believes you to be
his only opponents. He has been a long time injuring you, as his own
conscience best informs him; for by means of your possessions, which he
is able to enjoy, he secures all the rest of his kingdom: had he given
up Amphipolis and Potidaea, he would not have deemed himself safe even
in Macedonia. He knows therefore, both that he is plotting against you,
and that you are aware of it; and, supposing you to have common sense,
he judges that you detest him as you ought. Besides these important
considerations, he is assured that, though he became master of every
thing else, nothing can be safe for him while you are under popular
government: should any reverse ever befall him, (and many may happen to
a man,) all who are now under constraint will come for refuge to you.
For you are not inclined yourselves to encroach and usurp dominion; but
famous rather for checking the usurper or depriving him of his
conquests, ever ready to molest the aspirants for empire, and vindicate
the liberty of all nations. He would not like that a free spirit should
proceed from Athens, to watch the occasions of his weakness; nor is such
reasoning foolish or idle. First then you must assume, that he is an
irreconcilable enemy of our constitution and democracy; secondly, you
must be convinced, that all his operations and contrivances are designed
for the injury of our state. None of you can be so silly as to suppose,
that Philip covets those miseries in Thrace, (for what else can one call
Drongilus and Cabyle and Mastira and the places which he is said now to
occupy?) and that to get possession of them he endures hardships and
winters and the utmost peril, but covets not the harbors of Athens, the
docks, the galleys, the silver mines, the revenues of such value, the
place and the glory--never may he or any other man obtain these by the
conquest of our city!--or that he will suffer you to keep these things,
while for the sake of the barley and millet in Thracian caverns he
winters in the midst of horrors. [Footnote: See the note in the Oration
on the Chersonese, page 108, where the same words nearly are repeated.]
Impossible. The object of that and every other enterprise of Philip is,
to become master here.

So should every man be persuaded and convinced; and therefore, I say,
should not call upon your faithful and upright counselor to move a
resolution for war: [Footnote: He deprecates here, as elsewhere, the
factious proceedings of certain opponents, who sought to fasten the
responsibility of a war on the orator, by forcing him to propose a
decree. This (argues Demosthenes) was unnecessary, as they were at war
already.] such were the part of men seeking an enemy to fight with, not
men forwarding the interests of the state. Only see. Suppose for the
first breach of the treaty by Philip, or for the second or third, (for
there is a series of breaches,) any one had made a motion for war with
him, and Philip, just as he has now without such motion, had aided the
Cardians, would not the mover have been sacrificed? [Footnote: Pabst,
following Wolf, takes this in the more limited sense of being carried
off to prison: _ins Gefangniss geworfen_. The English translators,
who have "torn to pieces," understand the word in the same sense that I
do, as meaning generally "destroyed, exterminated."] would not all have
imputed Philip's aid of the Cardians to that cause? Don't then look for
a person to vent your anger on for Philip's trespasses, to throw to
Philip's hirelings to be torn in pieces. Do not, after yourselves voting
for war, dispute with each other, whether you ought or ought not to have
done so. As Philip conducts the war, so resist him: furnish those who
are resisting him now [Footnote: Referring to Diopithes and his troops
in the Chersonese.] with money and what else they demand; pay your
contributions, men of Athens, provide an army, swift-sailing galleys,
horses, transports, all the materials of war. Our present mode of
operation is ridiculous; and by the gods I believe, that Philip could
not wish our republic to take any other course than what ye now pursue.
You miss your time, waste your money, look for a person to manage your
affairs, are discontented, accuse one another. How all this comes about,
I will explain, and how it may cease I will inform you.

Nothing, O men of Athens, have you ever set on foot or contrived rightly
in the beginning: you always follow the event, stop when you are too
late, on any new occurrence prepare and bustle again. But that is not
the way of proceeding. It is never possible with sudden levies to
perform any essential service. You must establish an army, provide
maintenance for it, and paymasters, and commissaries, so ordering it
that the strictest care be taken of your funds; demand from those
officers an account of the expenditure, from your general an account of
the campaign; and leave not the general any excuse for sailing elsewhere
or prosecuting another enterprise. If ye so act and so resolve in
earnest, you will compel Philip to observe a just peace and remain in
his own country, or will contend with him on equal terms; and perhaps,
Athenians, perhaps, as you now inquire what Philip is doing, and whither
marching, so he may be anxious to learn, whither the troops of Athens
are bound, and where they will make their appearance.

Should any man think that these are affairs of great expense and toil
and difficulty, he thinks rightly enough: but let him consider what the
consequences to Athens must be, if she refuse so to act, and he will
find it is our interest to perform our duties cheerfully. Suppose you
had some god for your surety--for certainly no mortal could guarantee a
thing so fortunate--that, although you kept quiet and sacrificed every
thing, Philip would not attack you at last, yet, by Jupiter and all the
gods, it would be disgraceful, unworthy of yourselves, of the dignity of
your state, and the deeds of your ancestors, for the sake of selfish
indolence to abandon the rest of Greece to servitude. For my part, I
would rather die than have advised such a course: however, if any other
man advises it, and can prevail on you, be it so; make no defense,
abandon all. But if no man holds such an opinion, if on the contrary we
all foresee, that, the more we permit Philip to conquer, the more fierce
and formidable an enemy we shall find him, what subterfuge remains? what
excuse for delay? Or when, O Athenians, shall we be willing to act as
becomes us? Peradventure, when there is some necessity. But what may be
called the necessity of freemen is not only come, but past long ago; and
that of slaves you must surely deprecate. What is the difference? To a
freeman shame for what is occurring is the strongest necessity; I know
of none stronger that can be mentioned: to a slave, stripes and bodily
chastisement; abominable things! too shocking to name!

To be backward, men of Athens, in performing those services to which the
person and property of every one are liable, is wrong, very wrong, and
yet it admits of some excuse: but refusing even to bear what is
necessary to be heard, and fit to be considered, this calls for the
severest censure. Your practice however is, neither to attend until the
business actually presses, as it does now, nor to deliberate about any
thing at leisure. When Philip is preparing, you, instead of doing the
like and making counter-preparation, remain listless, and, if any one
speaks a word, clamor him down: when you receive news that any place is
lost or besieged, then you listen and prepare. But the time to have
heard and consulted was then when you declined; the time to act and
employ your preparations is now that you are hearing. Such being your
habits, you are the only people who adopt this singular course: others
deliberate usually before action, you deliberate after action. One thing
[Footnote: He means negotiation with Persia, to obtain pecuniary
assistance.] remains, which should have been done long ago, but even yet
is not too late: I will mention it. Nothing in the world does Athens
need so much, as money for approaching exigencies. Lucky events have
occurred, and, if we rightly improve them, perhaps good service may be
done. In the first place, those, [Footnote: The Thracians, who had
always been regarded as benefactors of the Persian king, since they
assisted Darius on his invasion of Scythia. Philip was making war in
Thrace at this time, and had subjected a considerable part of the
country.] whom the king trusts and regards as his benefactors, are at
enmity and war with Philip. Secondly, the agent and confidant [Footnote:
Hermias, governor of Atarneus in Mysia, who for his treasonable
practices against Artaxerxes was seized by Mentor and sent in chains to
Susa, where he was put to death. He was a friend of Aristotle, who was
at his court, when he was taken prisoner. The philosopher afterward
married his sister.] of all Philip's preparations against the king has
been snatched off, and the king will hear all the proceedings, not from
Athenian accusers, whom he might consider to be speaking for their own
interests, but from the acting minister himself; the charges therefore
will be credible, and the only remaining argument for our embassadors
will be, one which the Persian monarch will rejoice to hear, that we
should take common vengeance on the injurer of both, and that Philip is
much more formidable to the king, if he attack us first; for, should we
be left in the lurch and suffer any mishap, he will march against the
king without fear. On all these matters then I advise that you dispatch
an embassy to confer with the king, and put aside that nonsense which
has so often damaged you--"the barbarian," forsooth, "the common
enemy"--and the like. I confess, when I see a man alarmed at a prince in
Susa and Ecbatana, and declaring him to be an enemy of Athens, him that
formerly [Footnote: In the confederate war, when the Persian fleet
enabled Conon to defeat the Lacedaemonians at Onidus, B. C. 394.]
assisted in re-establishing her power, and lately made overtures
[Footnote: Artaxerxes had applied both to Athens and Lacedaemon to aid
him in the recovery of Egypt, which for many years had been held in a
state of revolt. Both these states refused to assist him. He then
applied to Thebes and Argos, each of which sent an auxiliary force.]--if
you did not accept them, but voted refusal, the fault is not his--while
the same man speaks a different language of one who is close at our
doors, and growing up in the centre of Greece to be the plunderer of her
people; I marvel, I dread this man, whoever he is, because he dreads not
Philip.

There is another thing too, the attacking of which by unjust reproach
and improper language hurts the state, and affords an excuse to men who
are unwilling to perform any public duty: indeed you will find that
every failure to discharge the obligation of a citizen is attributable
to this. I am really afraid to discuss the matter; however, I will speak
out.

I believe I can suggest, for the advantage of the state, a plea for the
poor against the rich, and for men of property against the indigent;
could we remove the clamor which some persons unfairly raise about the
theatric fund, [Footnote: Boeckh, Schaefer, and others, regard it as
conclusive against the genuineness of this Oration, that a different
view is here taken on the subject of the Theoric fund from that which
Demosthenes had expressed in the Olynthiacs. And certainly it is a
strong argument. It is possible, however, that circumstances may have
induced him to modify his opinion, or he may have thought it dangerous
to meddle with the law of Eubulus at the present crisis, which called
for the greatest unanimity among all classes. We may partly gather from
this speech, that there had been some agitation among the lower classes,
occasioned by the complaints of the wealthy against this law. Any
agitation tending to a spirit of communism must have been extremely
dangerous at Athens, where the people had such power of muleting the
higher classes by their votes in the popular assembly and courts of
justice. It might therefore be better to let the people alone with their
theatrical treats, their fees and largesses, than to provoke retaliation
by abridging such enjoyments. Leland observes on the subject as
follows--"All that the orator here says in defense of the theatrical
appointments is expressed with a caution and reserve quite opposite to
his usual openness and freedom; and which plainly betray a consciousness
of his being inconsistent with his former sentiments. How far he may be
excused by the supposed necessity of yielding to the violent
prepossessions of the people, and giving up a favorite point, I can not
pretend to determine. But it is certainly not very honorable to
Demosthenes, to suppose with Ulpian, that his former opposition was
merely personal, and that the death of Eubulus now put an end to it."]
and the fear that it can not stand without some signal mischief. No
greater help to our affairs could we introduce; [Footnote: Viz., than
the removal of this clamor and alarm about the theatric fund.] none that
would more strengthen the whole community. Look at it thus. I will
commence on behalf of those who are considered the needy class. There
was a time with us, not long ago, when only a hundred and thirty talents
came into the state; [Footnote: This must be understood (according to
Boeckh) of the tribute only, which came in from the allies. The total
revenue of Athens must have greatly exceeded this.] and among the
persons qualified to command ships or pay property-tax, there was not
one who claimed exemption from his duty because no surplus existed:
[Footnote: There was as much ground for legal exemption then as there is
now; and yet it was never claimed. Why should the rich seek to be
relieved from their burdens because of an abundance of revenue? That
abundance is for the general benefit of the state, not for theirs in
particular. Such appears to be the argument, perhaps not quite
satisfactory; but such it is. Pabst, apparently reading [Greek: _aph
heautou_], has: _der nicht aus eigenem Antrieb seine Schuldigkeit
zu thun bereit war, weil kein Gelduberschuss vorhanden war_.] galleys
sailed, money was forthcoming, every thing needful was done. Since that
time fortune happily has increased the revenue, and four hundred talents
come in instead of one, without loss to any men of property, but with
gain to them; for all the wealthy come for their share of the fund, and
they are welcome to it. [Footnote: _I. e._ the Theoric fund, in
which every member of the commonwealth had a right to share.] Why then
do we reproach one another on this account, and make it an excuse for
declining our duties, unless we grudge the relief given by fortune to
the poor? I would be sorry to blame them myself, and I think it not
right. In private families I never see a young man behaving so to his
elders, so unfeeling or so unreasonable, as to refuse to do any thing
himself, unless all the rest will do what he does. Such a person would
certainly be amenable to the laws against undutiful conduct: [Footnote:
Pabst: _die Gesetze wegen ungebuhrlicher Behandlung der Eltern_.
[Greek: _Kakosis_], "maltreatment", was a technical term in the
Attic law, denoting a failure of duty on the part of husbands, children,
or guardians, toward their wives, parents, or wards, for which they were
liable to be tried and punished in a suit called [Greek: _kakoseos
dikae_]. The jurisdiction over this offense belonged to the Archon,
who was the protector of all family rights.] for I ween there is a
tribute assigned to parents both by nature and by law, which ought to be
cheerfully offered and amply paid. Accordingly, as each individual among
us hath a parent, so should we regard the whole people as parents of the
state, and, so far from depriving them of what the state bestows, we
ought, in the absence of such bounty, to find other means to keep them
from destitution. If the rich will adopt this principle, I think they
will act both justly and wisely; for to deprive any class of a necessary
provision, is to unite them in disaffection to the commonwealth.

To the poor I would recommend, that they remove the cause, which makes
men of property discontented with the present system, and excites their
just complaints. I shall take the same course on behalf of the wealthy
as I did just now, and not hesitate to speak the truth. There can not, I
believe, be found a wretch so hard-hearted--I will not say among
Athenians, but among any other people--who would be sorry to see poor
men, men without the necessaries of life, receiving these bounties.
Where then is the pinch [Footnote: The expression "Where is the rub?"
would be still nearer to the original, and the expression reminds one of
the line in Hamlet:

  To sleep! perchance to dream! ay, there's the rub.

Reiske says the simile is taken from the collision of chariots in the
race; but this is confining it too much. His vernacular explanation is:
_woran stosst es sich? wo ist der Haken?_ Pabst has: _woran
stosst sich die Sache, und was erzeugt den Verdruss?_] of the matter?
where the difficulty? When they see certain persons transferring the
usage established for the public revenue to private property, and the
orator becoming immediately powerful with you, yea, (so far as privilege
can make him,) immortal, and your secret vote contradicting your public
clamor. [Footnote: Having admonished the higher classes to pay their
property-tax and perform their public services cheerfully, and without
seeking to be relieved at the expense of the public revenue, he proceeds
to remind the lower classes of their duty. He warns them, that, while
they receive a benefit from the funds of the state, they must not
endeavor to increase those funds unduly by an invasion of the rights of
property. His language is not open, but would easily be understood by
his audience. The Athenians ought not to promote lawsuits to increase
court-fees; not to encourage prosecutions against wealthy citizens, in
order to obtain fines and confiscations. He insinuates that there was
too much cause for complaint already. [Greek: _Ton legonta_] is,
not as Schaefer contends, the rich man pleading his cause before the
people, but, as Wolf explains it, the popular orator or informer, who
speedily rose to favor and influence, of which it was not easy to
deprive him. His opponent, speaking in a just cause, might be applauded
at the time, but the votes showed what was the real bias of the people.
In courts of justice at Athens the voting was usually by a secret
ballot; (see my article _Psephus_ in the Archaeological
Dictionary;) and there being a large number of jurors, it would be
difficult to discover by whose votes the verdict was obtained. It is
impossible to read the frequent appeals made by Athenian speakers to the
passions and prejudices of the jury, without seeing that there was some
ground for the insinuations of the orator in this passage.] Hence arises
mistrust, hence indignation. We ought, O ye men of Athens, to have a
just communion of political rights; the opulent holding themselves
secure in their fortunes, and without fear of losing them, yet in time
of danger imparting their substance freely for the defense of their
country; while the rest consider the public revenue as public, and
receive their share, but look on private property as belonging to the
individual owner. Thus it is that a small commonwealth becomes great,
and a great one is preserved. To speak generally then, such are the
obligations of each class; to insure their performance according to law,
some regulation should be made.

The causes of our present troubles and embarrassment are many and of
ancient date: if you are willing to hear, I will declare them. You have
quitted, O Athenians, the position in which your ancestors left you; you
have been persuaded by these politicians, that to stand foremost of the
Greeks, to keep a permanent force and redress injured nations, is all
vanity and idle expense; you imagine that to live in quiet, to perform
no duty, to abandon one thing after another and let strangers seize on
all, brings with it marvelous welfare and abundant security. By such
means a stranger has advanced to the post which you ought to have
occupied, has become prosperous and great, and made large conquest;
naturally enough. A prize there was, noble, great, and glorious, one for
which the mightiest states were contending all along; but as the
Lacedaemonians were humbled, the Thebans had their hands full through
the Phocian war, and we took no regard, he carried it off without
competition. The result has been, to others terror, to him a vast
alliance and extended power; while difficulties so many and so
distressing surround the Greeks, that even advice is not easy to be
found.

Yet, perilous as I conceive the present crisis to be for all, no people
are in such danger as you, men of Athens; not only because Philip's
designs are especially aimed at you, but because of all people you are
the most remiss. If, seeing the abundance of commodities and cheapness
in your market, you are beguiled into a belief that the state is in no
danger, your judgment is neither becoming nor correct. A market or a
fair one may, from such appearances, judge to be well or ill supplied:
but for a state, which every aspirant for the empire of Greece has
deemed to be alone capable of opposing him, and defending the liberty of
all--for such a state! verily her marketable commodities are not the
test of prosperity, but this--whether she can depend on the good-will of
her allies; whether she is puissant in arms. On behalf of such a state
these are the things to be considered; and in these respects your
condition is wretched and deplorable. You will understand it by a simple
reflection. When have the affairs of Greece been in the greatest
confusion? No other time could any man point out but the present. In
former times Greece was divided into two parties, that of the
Lacedaemonians and ours: some of the Greeks were subject to us, some to
them. The Persian, on his own account, was mistrusted equally by all,
but he used to make friends of the vanquished parties, and retain their
confidence, until he put them on an equality with the other side; after
which those that he succored would hate him as much as his original
enemies. Now however the king is on friendly terms with all the Greeks,
though least friendly with us, unless we put matters right. Now too
there are protectors [Footnote: This is said with some irony: many
states offer to come forward as protectors, but only on condition of
taking the lead: they will not join the common cause on fair terms. Many
of the translations miss the sense here. Leland understands it rightly:
"there are several cities which affect the character of guardians and
protectors." Auger confounds this sentence with the next: "il s' eleve
de tous cotes plusieurs puissances qui aspirent toutes a la primaute."]
springing up in every quarter, and all claim the precedency, though some
indeed have abandoned the cause, or envy and distrust each other--more
shame for them--and every state is isolated, Argives, Thebans,
Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, Arcadians, and ourselves. But, divided as
Greece is among so many parties and so many leaderships, if I must speak
the truth freely, there is no state whose offices and halls of council
appear more deserted by Grecian politics than ours. And no wonder; when
neither friendship, nor confidence, nor fear leads any to negotiate with
us.

This, ye men of Athens, has come not from any single cause, (or you
might easily mend it,) but from a great variety and long series of
errors. I will not stop to recount them, but will mention one, to which
all may be referred, beseeching you not to be offended, if I boldly
speak the truth.

Your interests are sold on every favorable opportunity: you partake of
the idleness and ease, under the charm whereof you resent not your
wrongs; while other persons get the reward. [Footnote: Schaefer rightly
explains [Greek: _timas_] to mean the price received for treason.
But most of the translators, following Wolf, understand it to mean the
honors won by Philip. [Greek: _Tois adikousin_] is rendered by
Auger, Leland, and Francis, "the traitors." I think it rather refers to,
or at least includes, the enemies who profited by the treason, and made
conquests from Athens: of course meaning Philip in particular.] Into all
these cases I could not enter now: but when any question about Philip
arises, some one starts up directly and says--"We must have no trifling,
no proposal of war"--and then goes on to say--"What a blessing it is to
be at peace! what a grievance to maintain a large army!"--and
again--"Certain persons wish to plunder the treasury"--and other
arguments they urge, no doubt, in the full conviction of their truth.
[Footnote: There is no difficulty in this, if we understand it to be
ironical; and no need of any amendment.] But surely there is no need of
persuading you to observe peace, you that sit here persuaded already. It
is Philip (who is making war) that needs persuasion: prevail on him, and
all is ready on your part. We should consider as grievous, not what we
expend for our deliverance, but what we shall suffer in case of refusal.
Plunder of the treasury should be prevented by devising a plan for its
safe custody, not by abandoning our interests. Yet this very thing makes
me indignant, that some of you are pained at the thought of your
treasury being robbed, though it depends on yourselves to guard it and
to punish the criminal, but are not pained to see Philip plundering
Greece, plundering as he does one people after another, to forward his
designs upon you.

How comes it, ye men of Athens, that of this flagrant aggressor, this
capturer of cities, no one has ever declared that he commits hostility
or injustice, while those who counsel against submission and sacrifice
are charged as the authors of war? The reason is, that people wish to
cast upon your faithful counselors the blame of any untoward events in
the war; for war must necessarily be attended with many misfortunes.
They believe that, if you resist Philip with one heart and mind, you
will prevail against him, and they can be hirelings no longer; but that
if on the first outcry [Footnote: Leland: "the first unhappy accident."
Francis gives the right meaning, but with too many words; "the first
tumults occasioned by any unfortunate success." Spillau: "the first
alarm."] you arraign certain persons and bring them to trial, they by
accusing such persons will gain a double advantage, repute among the
Athenians and recompense from Philip; and that you will punish your
friendly advisers for a cause for which you ought to punish the
traitors. Such are the hopes, such the contrivance of these charges,
"that certain persons wish to kindle a war." I am sure, however, that,
without any Athenian moving a declaration of war, Philip has taken many
of our possessions, and has recently sent succor to Cardia. If we choose
to assume that he is not making war against us, he would be the simplest
of mankind to convince us of our mistake: for when the sufferers
disclaim the injury, what should the offenders do? But when he marches
to attack us, what shall we say then? He will assure us that he is not
making war, as he assured the Orites, when his troops were in their
country, as he assured the Pheraeans before he assaulted their walls,
and the Olynthians in the first instance, until he was in their
territories with his army. Shall we then say, that persons who bid us
defend ourselves kindle a war? If so, we must be slaves; for nothing
else remains.

But remember: you have more at stake than some other people. Philip
desires not to subjugate your city, but to destroy it utterly. He is
convinced, you will not submit to be slaves; if you were inclined, you
would not know how, having been accustomed to command: you will be able,
should occasion offer, to give him more trouble than any people in the
world. For this reason he will show us no mercy, if he get us into his
power: and therefore you must make up your minds, that the struggle will
be one for life and death. These persons, who have openly sold
themselves to Philip, you must execrate, you must beat their brains out:
for it is impossible, I say impossible, to vanquish your foreign
enemies, until you have punished your enemies within the city: these are
the stumbling-blocks that must cripple your efforts against the
foreigner.

From what cause, do ye think, Philip insults you now; (for his conduct,
in my judgment, amounts to nothing less;) and while he deceives other
people by doing them services--this at least is something--you he
threatens already? For example, the Thessalians by many benefits he
seduced into their present servitude: no man can tell how he cheated the
poor Olynthians, giving them first Potidaea and many other places: now
he is luring the Thebans, having delivered up Boeotia to them, and freed
them from a tedious and harassing war. Of these people, who each got a
certain advantage, some have suffered what is notorious to all, others
have yet to suffer what may befall them. As to yourselves; the amount of
your losses I do not mention: but in the very making of the peace how
have you been deceived! how plundered! Lost you not the Phocians,
Thermopylae, country toward Thrace, Doriscus, Serrium, Cersobleptes
himself? Holds he not Cardia now, and avows it? Why then does he behave
thus to other people, and in a different way to you? Because our city is
the only one where liberty is allowed to speak for the enemy, where a
man taking a bribe may safely address the people, though they have been
deprived of their possessions. It was not safe at Olynthus to advocate
Philip's cause, without the Olynthian people sharing the benefit by
possession of Potidaea. It was not safe to advocate Philip's cause in
Thessaly, without the people of Thessaly sharing the benefit, by
Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the Pylaean Synod. It was
not safe at Thebes, until he restored Boeotia to them, and destroyed the
Phocians. But at Athens, though Philip has taken from you Amphipolis and
the Cardian territory, and is even turning Euboea into a hostile post,
and advancing to attack Byzantium, it is safe to speak on Philip's
behalf. Yea, among these men, some have risen rapidly from poverty to
wealth, from meanness and obscurity to repute and honor, while you, on
the contrary, have fallen from honor to obscurity, from wealth to
indigence. For the riches of a state I consider to be allies,
confidence, good-will; of all which you are destitute. And by your
neglecting these things and suffering your interests thus to be swept
away, Philip has grown prosperous and mighty, formidable to all the
Greeks and barbarians, while you are forlorn and abject, in the
abundance of your market magnificent, but in your national defenses
ridiculous. [Footnote: The whole of the foregoing passage is taken, with
some little variation, from the speech on the Chersonese. It certainly
would seem strange, if this Oration had been forged by any grammarian,
that he should have borrowed thus by wholesale from Demosthenes. There
is perhaps less difficulty in the supposition that Demosthenes repeated
his own words.]

Some of our orators, I observe, take not the same thought for you as for
themselves. They say that you should keep quiet, though you are injured;
but they can not themselves keep quiet among you, though no one injures
them. Come, raillery apart, suppose you were thus questioned,
Aristodemus, [Footnote: This man was a tragic actor, and charged by
Demosthenes with being a partisan of Philip. He was the first person who
proposed peace with Macedonia, shortly before the embassy of ten. See
the Argument to the Oration on the Peace.]--"Tell me, as you know
perfectly well, what every one else knows, that the life of private men
is secure and free from trouble and danger, while that of statesmen is
exposed to scandal [Footnote: I have taken [Greek: _philaition_] in
the passive sense, as it is explained by Reiske and Schaefer, though it
scarcely suits the character of the word. Compare Shakspeare, Henry V.
Act IV. Sc. 1.

  O hard condition, twin-born with greatness,
  Subjected to the breath of every fool!
  What infinite heart's ease must kings neglect
  That private men enjoy!]

and misfortune, full of trials and hardships every day, how comes it
that you prefer, not the quiet and easy life, but the one surrounded
with peril?"--what should you say? If we admitted the truth of what
would be your best possible answer, namely, that all you do is for honor
and renown, I wonder what puts it into your head, that you ought from
such motives to exert yourself and undergo toil and danger, while you
advise the state to give up exertion and remain idle. You can not surely
allege, that Aristodemus ought to be of importance at Athens, and Athens
to be of no account among the Greeks. Nor again do I see, that for the
commonwealth it is safe to mind her own affairs only, and hazardous for
you, not to be a superlative busy-body. [Footnote: All the translators
have mistaken [Greek: _ton allon pleon_], which is simply "more
than others," as Wolf explains it.] On the contrary, to you I see the
utmost peril from your meddling and over-meddling, to the commonwealth
peril from her inactivity. But I suppose, you inherit a reputation from
your father and grandfather, which it were disgraceful in your own
person to extinguish, whereas the ancestry of the state was ignoble and
mean. This again is not so. Your father was a thief, [Footnote: This
seems to shock Leland, who spoils the pungency of the expression, by
rendering it: "Your father was like you, and therefore base and
infamous." Auger remarks: "L'invective de Demosthene est fort eloquente,
mais bien violente. L'amour de la patrie, contre laquelle sans doute
agissait Aristodeme, peut seul en excuser la vivacite."] if he resembled
you, whereas by the ancestors of the commonwealth, as all men know, the
Greeks have twice been rescued from the brink of destruction. Truly the
behaviour of some persons, in private and in public, is neither
equitable nor constitutional. How is it equitable, that certain of these
men, returned from prison, should not know themselves, while the state,
that once protected all Greece and held the foremost place, is sunk in
ignominy and humiliation?

Much could I add on many points, but I will forbear. It is not, I
believe, to lack of words that our distresses have been owing either now
or heretofore. The mischief is when you, after listening to sound
arguments, and all agreeing in their justice, sit to hear with equal
favor those who try to defeat and pervert them; not that you are
ignorant of the men; (you are certain at the first glance, who speak for
hire and are Philip's political agents, and who speak sincerely for your
good;) your object is to find fault with these, turn the thing into
laughter and raillery, and escape the performance of your duty.

Such is the truth, spoken with perfect freedom, purely from good-will
and for the best: not a speech fraught with flattery and mischief and
deceit, to earn money for the speaker, and to put the commonwealth into
the hands of our enemies. I say, you must either desist from these
practices, or blame none but yourselves for the wretched condition of
your affairs.