LYNCH-LAW
   AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES


                                    BY

                        JAMES ELBERT CUTLER, PH.D.

     _Instructor in Economics in Wellesley College; sometime Henry C.
 Robinson Fellow and Instructor in Political Economy in Yale University_

                                    ❦

                         LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
                     91 AND 93 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK
                            LONDON AND BOMBAY

                                   1905




                            Copyright, 1905
                      By LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
                         _All rights reserved_


                   _The Plimpton Press Norwood Mass._




                                FOREWORD


Few people are able to read about lynch-executions, with atrocious forms
of torture and cruel death, such as have occurred from time to time
within ten years in this country, without a feeling of national shame.
It is necessary that facts should be known and that public opinion
should be corrected as to the ethics of that mode of dealing with crime.
Lynch-law is a very different thing where laws and civil institutions
are in full force and activity from what it is where they are wanting.
It is not admissible that a self-governing democracy should plead the
remissness of its own selected agents as an excuse for mob-violence. It
is a disgrace to our civilization that men can be put to death by
painful methods, which our laws have discarded as never suitable, and
without the proofs of guilt which our laws call for in any case
whatsoever. It would be a disgrace to us if amongst us men should burn a
rattlesnake or a mad dog. The badness of the victim is not an element in
the case at all. Torture and burning are forbidden, not because the
victim is not bad enough, but because we are too good. It is on account
of what we owe to ourselves that these methods are shameful to us, if we
descend to them. It is evident, however, that public opinion is not
educated up to this level. The reader of the present book will learn
very interesting facts about the causes alleged for lynching, and about
the public view of that crime. Many current errors will be corrected,
and many notions which are irrelevant, although they are popularly
believed to be germane and important, will be set aside.

                                                           W. G. SUMNER.

NEW HAVEN, CONN., February, 1905.




                                PREFACE


In making this investigation into the history of lynching in the United
States, my point of view has been that of a student of society and
social phenomena. The purpose of the investigation has not been
primarily to write the history of lynching, but to determine from the
history the causes for the prevalence of the practice, to determine what
the social conditions are under which lynch-law operates, and to test
the validity of the arguments which have been advanced in justification
of lynching.

At the present time many positive opinions are held with reference to
lynching, and these are quite at variance one with another. Any one who
attempts to investigate a subject under such conditions cannot hope to
escape criticism; neither can he hope to have given the subject equal
consideration from every standpoint. The most that one can say is that
he has pursued the investigation with perfect honesty of purpose and
with openness of mind. To this study of the history of lynching I have
brought no theories to prove and no conscious prejudices to confirm. My
first endeavor has been to obtain all the facts possible; my final
endeavor has been to point out the conclusions clearly warranted by such
facts.

The material for a study of this nature is found in a wide range of
sources and I gratefully record here my obligations to those who have
aided me in the task of collecting and sifting this material. For some
very valuable notes on the early history of lynch-law I am indebted to
Mr. Albert Matthews, of Boston, Massachusetts. Of his notes I have made
free use, indicating my obligation to him in each instance, either by
the use of the letter (M) or by special mention. Six of the chapters
have been read by him in the manuscript, and he has given me much
encouragement and kindly criticism during the preparation of these pages
for publication.

For many valuable suggestions during the prosecution of this study I am
indebted to members of the Faculty of the Social Sciences of Yale
University, especially to Professors Sumner, Farnam, Bourne, and Keller.
The editors of the _Yale Review_ have very courteously permitted me to
use in Chapter VIII the material which was published in a condensed form
in the _Yale Review_ for August, 1904. To many others whom I cannot here
mention by name I desire to express my thanks and acknowledge my
indebtedness for information given in response to inquiries.

The number of requests which have come to hand for copies of this study,
from persons living in various sections of the United States as well as
in Europe, and the attention that has been given the subject of
lynchings in newspapers and magazines, indicate a desire on the part of
the general public to learn the facts concerning lynchings. By many it
is believed that in no other respect to-day is American civilization so
open to reproach as in its toleration of the practice of lynching, and
there is an increasing demand that this summary method of administering
justice be suppressed and utterly abolished. That this book may
contribute in some measure to a better understanding of this most
serious and difficult problem is the hope with which it is placed in the
hands of the reader.

                                                                J. E. C.




                                CONTENTS


                               CHAPTER I
                                                   PAGE

                 _Introduction_                       1


                               CHAPTER II

                 _Origin of the Term Lynch-law_      13


                              CHAPTER III

                 _Early Lynch-law_                   41


                               CHAPTER IV

                 _Lynch-law 1830–1860_               90


                               CHAPTER V

                 _The Reconstruction Period_        137


                               CHAPTER VI

                 _Lynchings_                        155


                              CHAPTER VII

                 _Lynch-law and its Justification_  193


                              CHAPTER VIII

                 _Remedies_                         227


                               CHAPTER IX

                 _Some Conclusions_                 267

                 _List of Periodicals Cited_        280

                 _Index_                            282




                                 CHARTS


                                                                  FACING
                                                                    PAGE

    I. Number lynched compared with number legally executed,
         1882–1903                                                   162

   II. Number lynched according to months in different sections
         of the U. S., 1882–1903                                     163

  III. Percentages lynched for various causes by months,
         1882–1903                                                   170

   IV. Number of Whites, Negroes and Others lynched according to
         years, 1882–1903                                            171

    V. Number of women (Whites and Negroes) lynched according to
         years, 1882–1903                                            172

       Proportion lynched for various causes, 1882–1903, Women
         (Whites and Negroes).

   VI. Percentages lynched for various causes by years,
         1882–1903, Whites and Others                                173

  VII. Percentages lynched for various causes by years,
         1882–1903, Negroes                                          174

 VIII. Proportion lynched for various causes, 1882–1903, Whites
         and Others                                                  175

   IX. Proportion lynched for various causes, 1882–1903, Negroes     176

    X. Proportion lynched for various causes in Southern States,
         1882–1903, Whites and Others                                177

   XI. Proportion lynched for various causes in Southern States,
         1882–1903, Negroes                                          178

  XII. Proportion lynched for various causes in Western States,
         1882–1903                                                   179

 XIII. Proportion lynched for various causes in Eastern States,
         1882–1903                                                   180




                               LYNCH-LAW




                               CHAPTER I
                              INTRODUCTION


It has been said that our country’s national crime is lynching. We may
be reluctant to admit our peculiarity in this respect and it may seem
unpatriotic to do so, but the fact remains that lynching is a criminal
practice which is peculiar to the United States. The practice whereby
mobs capture individuals suspected of crime, or take them from the
officers of the law, and execute them without any process at law, or
break open jails and hang convicted criminals, with impunity, is to be
found in no other country of a high degree of civilization. Riots and
mob executions take place in other countries, but there is no such
frequent administration of what may be termed popular justice which can
properly be compared with lynch-law procedure in the United States. The
frequency and impunity of lynchings in the United States is justly
regarded as a serious and disquieting symptom of American society.

In general, it may be said that the practice of summarily punishing
public offenders and suspected criminals is found in two distinct types
of society: first, the frontier type where society is in a formative
state and the civil regulations are not sufficiently established to
insure the punishment of offenders; and second, the type of society
which is found in older communities with well established civil
regulations, the people of which are ordinarily law-abiding and
conservative citizens. In this second type of society, recourse to
lynch-law procedure may be had either in times of popular excitement and
social disruption, or when there is a contrast in the population such as
is to be seen in the South between the whites and the negroes, or
against disreputable characters in the community for whose punishment
under the law no tangible evidence can be adduced, or against persons
guilty of committing some heinous offense which on account of its
atrocity and fiendishness is particularly shocking to the community.

In other countries one or more of these conditions has at times existed,
and summary methods of punishment to which lynch-law procedure in the
United States bears a close resemblance have been followed. In the
course of the settlement and development of this country, however, all
of these conditions have existed almost side by side. From colonial
times down to the present day there has been a section of the country
where the frontier type of society was to be found. At the same time
there has been an older, better settled section of the country, forming
a different type of society, where, though the judiciary was well
established and the apprehension and punishment of public offenders was
well provided for in the law, circumstances have arisen of such a nature
that the regular and legal administration of justice was deemed
inadequate or defective, and was therefore disregarded. As will be made
clear in the following pages, lynch-law has been resorted to in the
United States in times of popular excitement and social disruption; it
has been inflicted upon negroes, Indians, Italians, Mexicans; it has
been inflicted upon disreputable characters; it has been inflicted upon
persons guilty of heinous offenses.

The practice of lynching does not prevail in Canada[1]; nor is a similar
practice to be found in England, France, or Germany. The nearest
approach that can be found in Europe to the American practice of
lynching exists in the rural districts of little Russia where the
peasants sometimes adopt summary measures against horse-thieves. The
Russian law provides only a light punishment for horse-stealing, and,
since the peasant’s horse is almost his only property and is his chief
instrument of labor, summary methods seem necessary in order to check
the veritable plague of horse-stealing which breaks out every year as
soon as the dark nights of autumn begin. When a thief is caught, the
common way is for the men of the village to club him to death, each
trying to strike in such a way as to inflict no injury more serious than
a bruise. Another method is to tie the criminal by the feet to the tail
of a young and active colt which is then ridden at a gallop until little
is left of the horse-thief. There is also a mode of execution whereby
the thief is bound hand and foot to a bench or log, and the women of the
village thrust needles and pins into the soles of the victim’s feet and
other sensitive parts, until death ensues.[2]

Aside from this instance which is found in the loosely organized society
of the peasants in the rural districts of Russia, nothing like lynch-law
can be said to prevail in Europe. Occasionally mobs put persons to death
who have committed some brutal and outrageous crime. A newspaper report
states that the burgomaster of Stujhely, Hungary, was lynched in
November, 1902, for having set fire to his home in which were his wife,
father, mother, and three sisters, all of whom were burned to death. The
burgomaster had become angry at the members of his family for some
trifling cause, and his method of revenge so enraged his neighbors that
they immediately “took summary measures and lynched him.”[3] A similar
report tells of the lynching of a Bohemian village schoolmaster who
suddenly became insane and began shooting his revolver right and left
among his pupils, killing three and dangerously wounding three
others.[4] People in the lower stages of civilization, such as the
Melanesians, Micronesians, and the inhabitants of the Guinea Coast of
Africa, often have secret societies which take control of important
functions, such as the initiation of young persons arriving at maturity,
or the exaction of penalties for the transgression of customs and
traditions. In most cases these societies form an essential part of the
state, holding quite the place of the chief. Occasionally they
degenerate and create a reign of terror by their extortions and
exactions. Secret tribunals for thieves and robbers, like the society of
the “Old Ox,” have existed in China.[5] Such instances, however, merely
illustrate the general truth that summary methods of punishing offenders
are sometimes resorted to in every country in times of great popular
excitement or when some peculiarly atrocious crime has been perpetrated.
They in no way invalidate the assertion that the practice of lynching is
peculiarly an American institution.

Historically some parallels may be cited showing the execution of
summary justice under frontier conditions in other countries. In
Brande’s Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art, published in 1842,
it was stated that “lynch law may be called a democratic imitation of
the old feudal _Vehmgerichte_.” Reference was there made to the
“irregular and revengeful species of justice administered by the
populace in some parts of the United States,” evidently meaning the
operation of lynch-law on the western frontier at that time. Lynch-law
in the United States has never been administered by an organization so
perfect and extensive as that of the Vehmic courts.[6] The feudal
conditions have been lacking which made that organization possible. It
is only in its _raison d’être_ that the frontier type of lynch-law may
be compared to the Vehmic courts. The early settlers in this country
felt themselves compelled to resort to summary proceedings as a means of
protection; the civil government was not sufficiently organized and
established to insure the punishment of violators of the public peace
and security. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries utter
lawlessness and disregard of authority was prevailing in Germany, and
for a time the Vehmic courts afforded some protection against the
outrages of the princes and nobles. With the increasing strength of the
regular governments, however, the need of special protection diminished
and these tribunals gradually disappeared. Like the Vehmic courts, with
the establishment of the judiciary and a more effective execution of the
laws by the officials, the administration of lynch-law in the western
half of the United States has declined.

The tendency, it may be noted, for societies secretly organized for the
arbitrary punishment of offenders to pass into the control of the
persons against whom they were originally directed, is to be seen not
only in the history of the Vehmic courts but also in the history of the
Ku-Klux Klan and numerous vigilance societies in the United States. The
proceedings of such societies necessarily awaken distrust and fear among
the more quiet in the community, while the rogues, whose characters are
not yet known, hasten to obtain admittance, both as a shield against
enemies and a cloak to cover their own misdeeds. Soon their vindictive
actions and their rascalities excite the indignation of the community; a
counterparty of “moderators” must be formed to check the “regulators”;
then begins a deadly struggle for supremacy. Such, in brief, is the
abuse of lynch-law on the frontier. The tyranny of the Vehmic courts
becomes the taking of private vengeance, the feud and the _vendetta_,
under lynch-law.

The Vehmic courts, however, give no explanation for the presence of
lynch-law as an institution in American society. No connection can be
traced further than a few similarities in the methods adopted to put
down lawlessness at a time when the civil government proved weak and
inefficient.

Some writers have stated that lynch-law was anciently known in England
by the name of Lydford law and Halifax law, and that the same thing was
known in Scotland as Cowper justice and Jeddart or Jedburg justice.
Lydford law is defined in a dictionary of the seventeenth century as “a
certain Law whereby they first hang a Man and afterwards indite him.”[7]
One of Grose’s Proverbs reads:

                  “First hang and draw,
                  Then hear the cause by Lidford law.”

Westcott, in his “History of Devonshire,” has preserved some droll
verses about the town of Lydford. The first twelve lines are as follows:

                “I oft have heard of Lydford law,
                How in the morning they hange and draw,
                And sit in judgement after;
                At first I wondered at yt much,
                But since I fynd the reasons such
                As yt deserves no laughter.

                “They have a castle on a hill,
                I tooke it for an old wyndmill,
                The vanes blowen off by weather:
                To lye therein one night, ’tis guest,
                ’Twere better to be ston’d and prest,
                Or hang’d; now chuse you whether.”[8]

It has been asserted, therefore, that “Lydford law became a proverbial
expression for summary punishment without trial.”[9] This, however, is
going further than the facts will allow, and is wholly misleading when
thus used to show the connection between Lydford law and lynch-law. It
would seem to imply that Lydford law in England was once as well known,
as a name for summary punishment, as lynch-law has become in this
country. As a proverbial expression Lydford law never came into general
use; it was confined to one section of England and never became more
than a localism.

In another part of England a certain summary procedure was known by the
name of Halifax law. In this case there was a trial followed by
immediate punishment. The trial was of a summary nature without adequate
opportunity of defense, and the punishment was irrevocable. The name,
Halifax law, originated from the so-called _gibbet law_ or custom in the
forest of Hardwick, coextensive with the parish of Halifax, under which
the frith burghers summarily tried any one charged with stealing goods
to the value of 13½ d., and could condemn him to be beheaded on the
market-day.[10]

Cowper justice is defined by Jamieson to mean “trying a man after
execution; the same with Jeddart, or Jedburgh justice,” and the latter
he defines as “a legal trial after the infliction of punishment.”
Jeddart justice refers to Jedburgh, a Scotch border town, where many of
the border raiders are said to have been hanged without the formality of
a trial. It is said that “in mockery of justice, assizes were held upon
them after that they had suffered.”[11]

All of these expressions, however, were entirely provincial. They were
merely different names used to characterize the methods employed in
various parts of England and Scotland for executing popular justice.
These practices differ from the administration of lynch-law in not
dispensing with all regular proceedings. Further, as will appear later,
the death penalty was not at first inflicted under lynch-law;
originally, lynching was synonymous with whipping. It is impossible,
therefore, to trace lynch-law back to these mediæval practices and find
in them any explanation for the existence of the practice of lynching in
the United States.

A general idea of the history of lynch-law in the United States is
obtained by noting the definitions of the term that have appeared from
time to time in the dictionaries. Brande’s Dictionary of Science,
Literature, and Art (1842)[12] contains the following: “Lynch Law. The
irregular and revengeful species of justice administered by the populace
in some parts of the United States is said to have been so called from a
Virginian farmer of the name of Lynch, who took the law into his hands
on some occasion, by chasing a thief, tying him to a tree, and flogging
him with his own hands.” A “University Edition” of Webster’s Dictionary
(1845) defines “Lynch-law” as “The practice of punishing men for crime
by private, unauthorized persons, without a legal trial”; and gives the
verb lynch meaning “to inflict punishment without the forms of law, as
by a mob.” Worcester’s Dictionary (1846) has “Lynch-law. An irregular
and revengeful species of justice, administered by the populace or a
mob, without any legal authority or trial. Brande.” For the verb lynch
the meaning is given, “To condemn and execute in obedience to the decree
of a multitude or mob, without a legal trial; sometimes practiced in the
new settlements in the southwest part of the United States. Qu. Rev.” In
Webster’s Dictionary (1848) “Lynch-law” is defined as “The practice of
punishing men for crimes or offenses by private, unauthorized persons,
without a legal trial. The term is said to be derived from a Virginia
farmer, named Lynch, who thus took the law into his own hands. (U.
S.)”[13]

Some important changes are noticeable in the definitions attached to
lynch-law forty years later. The Progressive Dictionary of the English
Language, edited by Samuel Fallows and published at Chicago in 1885,
gives this definition for the verb lynch: “To punish without the forms
of law; specifically to hang by mob-law.” In a note it is stated that
more than one etymology is claimed for the word. John S. Farmer in his
“Americanisms,” published at London in 1889, says the origin of the term
lynch-law “is wrapped in mystery; many explanations have been put
forward; none, however, are conclusive.” In Webster’s Dictionary,
edition of 1893, the following definition is found: “Lynch: To inflict
punishment upon, especially death, without the forms of law, as when a
mob captures and hangs a suspected person.” Lynch-law is defined in a
general way as “The act or practice by private persons of inflicting
punishment for crimes or offenses, without due process of law,” but this
note is added: “The term _Lynch law_ is said to be derived from a
Virginian named Lynch, who took the law into his own hands. But the
origin of the term is very doubtful.”[14]

There are two differences between the definitions formulated in the
forties and those formulated in the eighties and in recent years. In the
later definitions the operation of lynch-law is described as being much
more harsh and severe, and there is an expression of doubt as to the
origin of the term. In the earlier definitions death is not mentioned as
the ordinary penalty administered by lynch-law and the American origin
of the term is accepted without question. The doubt as to the origin
probably arose because of the number of stories which have appeared, all
claiming to account for its origin, and also because of the lack of any
careful investigation to determine the question authentically from
historical sources. The increased harshness expressed in the definitions
is, of course, due to the fact that the punishment inflicted under the
name of lynch-law has become more severe and inexorable. Lynching is now
practically synonymous with summary and illegal capital punishment at
the hands of a mob. In the following pages the history of this change
will be traced and the conditions noted which have led to the
continuance of the practice of lynching and given to it its increased
severity.

In the above citations to various definitions that have been given for
lynch-law it was noted that more than one origin has been claimed for
the term. An investigation into the circumstances surrounding its origin
will throw considerable light on the early history of lynch-law
procedure in the United States, and this question will therefore be
taken up in some detail.




                               CHAPTER II
                      ORIGIN OF THE TERM LYNCH-LAW


Many and various explanations of the origin of the term Lynch’s law, or
lynch-law, have been offered. Some of these explanations are evidently
nothing more than the offspring of minds fertile in resources; others
have the support of tradition and are entitled to consideration. Not
infrequently confusion and apparent contradiction have resulted from the
failure to distinguish clearly between the practice itself and the name
by which it has been known. To follow back through history the
successive outbreaks of such practices is not to discover the origin of
“lynch-law,” the term which has now become so firmly established in the
English language. The origin is to be found at that time when these
practices first came to be known by the name Lynch’s law or lynch-law.

According to one account, given more or less indorsement in the
encyclopedias, lynch-law owes its name to James Fitzstephen Lynch, mayor
and warden of Galway, Ireland. He was the famous “Warden of Galway” who
tried, condemned, and executed his own son in the year 1493. The story
is told with varying details. One tradition has it that the mayor sent
his son to Spain to purchase a cargo of wine. The young man squandered
the money intrusted to him, but succeeded in obtaining a cargo on credit
from a Spanish friend of his father. This gentleman’s nephew accompanied
him on the return voyage to Ireland where the money was to be paid.
Young Lynch, to conceal his misuse of the money, caused the Spaniard to
be thrown overboard and returned home in triumph with his cargo of wine.
But a sailor, on his death-bed, revealed to the mayor of Galway the
crime which his son had committed. The young man was tried before his
father, convicted and sentenced to be hanged. Another tradition states
that the son of the Spanish friend of his father was visiting him at his
home in Ireland. This son was fast supplanting him in the affections of
a Galway lady to whom he was engaged. One night, in a fit of jealous
passion, he stabbed the Spaniard to the heart and threw his body into
the sea. The crime was quickly discovered, and on being brought before
his father for trial he was condemned to die as a sacrifice to public
justice. Public sympathy, however, turned in favor of the young man, and
every effort was made to effect his pardon. The father “undauntedly
declared that the law should take its course.” On the way to the place
of execution a mob appeared, led by members of the mother’s family,
demanding mercy. The father, finding that he could not “accomplish the
ends of justice at the accustomed place and by the usual hands,”
conducted his son up a winding stairway to a window overlooking the
public street. “Here he secured the end of a rope, which had been
previously fixed around the neck of his son, to an iron staple which
projected from the wall, and, after taking from him a last embrace, he
launched him into eternity.” The people, “overawed by the magnanimous
act, retired slowly and peaceably to their several dwellings.” In the
council books of Galway there is said to be a minute that “James Lynch,
mayor of Galway, hanged his own son out of the window for defrauding and
killing strangers, without martial or common law, to show a good example
to posterity.” In commemoration of this “Roman act of justice,” a stone
sculptured with a skull and crossbones was erected in Lombard Street,
Galway, in 1524, and in 1854 was reerected on the wall of St. Nicholas
Churchyard.[15]

This “Galway story” may be dismissed with but little consideration.
Howell Colton Featherston of the Lynchburg (Va.) Bar has clearly shown
that this act of the mayor of Galway was entirely without any definition
ever attached to lynch-law and that there was no reason for bestowing
upon it any name, and more particularly his name. Mayor Lynch was the
legally constituted authority presiding over the tribunal in which his
son had had, presumably, a fair and regular trial. He merely persisted
in executing the laws in the face of popular opposition and tumult.
Lynch-law has always been considered as operating wholly without, or in
opposition to, established laws of government.[16]

Equally fanciful and fictitious but less romantic is the “pirate story”
of the origin of the name lynch-law. It is said that about 1687 one
Lynch was sent to this country from England under a commission to
suppress piracy. He is credited with having faithfully executed, without
the formality of a trial, every pirate that he captured. It is presumed
that owing to the difficulty of adhering to the usual forms of law in
the colonies, this Judge Lynch was empowered to proceed summarily
against pirates and thus gave rise to the term.[17] But whatever the
facts may be about the methods employed by this man Lynch to suppress
piracy,[18] there is no evidence to show that they were ever known as
Lynch’s law or had any connection whatever with lynch-law.

On its etymological side the word lynch has been traced to an old
Anglo-Saxon verb _linch_, meaning to beat severely with a pliable
instrument, to chastise or to maltreat, which is said to have survived
in this cognate meaning in America, as have many other words and
expressions long obsolete in Great Britain.[19] For this derivation,
however, there seems to be no authority. There is no evidence that such
a verb “survived” in America; nor is there any evidence that such an
Anglo-Saxon verb ever existed.[20] According to Skeat the name Lynch is
from _hlinc_, an Anlgo-Saxon word meaning a ridge of land.[21]
Furthermore, as was noted in the preceding chapter, when the word lynch
first came into general use, it was stamped as of American origin.[22]
No English lexicographer recognized the terms lynch or lynch-law until
1848, and in 1849 Craig gave the verb “lynch” as meaning “to punish
summarily without judicial investigation, as by a mob.—An American
word.”[23] The fact that Wright’s English Dialect Dictionary (1902) does
not contain the word lynch, and the further fact that Murray’s Oxford
Dictionary (1903) states that the term was originally used in the United
States, may be regarded as conclusive evidence that the origin of
“lynch-law” is not to be sought in England.

There is a tradition in the Drake family of South Carolina which
ascribes the origin of the term to the precipitate hanging, to prevent a
rescue, of a Tory named Major Beard, on Lynch Creek in Franklin County,
North Carolina. The following account of it is given by John H. Wheeler,
to whom it was communicated by Hon. B. F. Moore, who received it from
the Drake family:

  “The origin of lynch-law: During the revolution there was a noted
  tory ... in that portion formerly called Bute County, now embraced
  within the counties of Franklin and Nash, called Major Beard. Major
  John H. Drake lived near Hilliardston; he and his family were decided
  whigs. He had a daughter, beautiful and accomplished, by whose charms
  Beard was captivated; and the tradition runs, that the handsome figure
  and commanding air of Beard had its effect on the young lady,
  notwithstanding the difference in politics between him and her father.
  On one occasion, Beard encamped for the night near a mill on Swift
  Creek. This became known to Major Drake and other whigs, and they
  organized a force ... and captured him.... After some consultation it
  was resolved to take him as a prisoner to headquarters of Colonel
  Seawell, commanding in camp at a ford on Lynch Creek, in Franklin
  County, about twenty miles off. He was tied on his horse and carried
  under guard. After reaching camp, it was determined to organize a
  court-martial, and try him for his life. But before proceeding to
  trial, a report came that a strong body of tories were in pursuit to
  rescue him; this created a panic, for they knew his popularity and
  power, so they hung him. The reported pursuit proved a false alarm,
  and it being suggested that as the sentence had been inflicted before
  the judgment of the court had been pronounced, therefore it was
  illegal. The body was then taken down, the court reorganized, he was
  tried, condemned and re-hung by the neck until he was dead.

  “The tree on which he was hung stood not far from Rocky Ford, on
  Lynch’s Creek; and it became a saying in Franklin, when a person
  committed any offence of magnitude, that ‘he ought to be taken to
  Lynch Creek’; and so the word ‘Lynch law’ became a fixture in the
  English language.”[24]

In passing, the resemblance of this affair to Lydford law rather than
lynch-law is to be noted, and also the fact that Wheeler, in his
“History of North Carolina,” published thirty-three years earlier, gives
an account of the hanging of “Captain Beard about 1778,” but says
nothing about its being in any way connected with the origin of the term
lynch-law. Indeed, according to this earlier account there was nothing
irregular in the proceeding; he was hung in accordance with the ordinary
rules of war. Beard and one of his band, named Porch, who had been
captured with him, “were tried by a court-martial and both were
forthwith hung. Such was the end of Captain Beard.”[25] The two accounts
vary somewhat, but there is no room for doubt as to their having
reference to the same occurrence. In short, the “tradition” in the Drake
family must have arisen between 1851 and 1884. There is no evidence,
further than this statement found in Wheeler’s book, that “Lynch law”
became a fixture in the English language because of a saying common in
Franklin County, North Carolina, that any one who committed a grave
offense “ought to be taken to Lynch Creek.”

Some evidence has recently been brought forward indicating that
lynch-law may have derived its name from Lynch’s Creek, South
Carolina.[26] Some extracts from Boston newspapers in the year 1768,
dated Charlestown, South Carolina, show the existence of “Regulators” at
that time, and mention is made of a meeting that they were to have on
Lynch’s Creek “where it was expected 1,200 would be assembled.” It is
also evident that one of their methods of inflicting punishment was by
whipping. One extract states that “the people called regulators have
lately severely chastised one Lum, who is come to town; but we have not
yet learnt the real cause of this severity to him.” The assertion has
been made, therefore, that lynch-law derived its name from Lynch’s
Creek, South Carolina, because at that place the practice of lynching
began.

The practice which came to be known as “regulating” had its beginning
earlier than 1768, however, and this beginning was not in the
neighborhood of Lynch’s Creek. As early as 1766 it had begun in North
Carolina and had extended from Granville County into Orange and Anson
counties. Up to April, 1768, those who had taken part in these
proceedings in North Carolina were designated by the appellation of the
“Mob,” and seem to have adopted it themselves. But on April 4, 1768, at
a general meeting, they dropped this name and formally adopted the name
of “Regulators.”[27] When this practice of “regulating” was started in
South Carolina it was instituted by Thomas Woodward, Joseph Kirkland,
and Barnaby Pope,[28] who lived in the region between the Catawba and
the Saluda Rivers, and not on the Pedee or Lynch’s Creek. Thus, a
name—that of “Regulation,” not “Lynch Law,”—had been given this practice
before it reached the Pedee section of the Province. If the conduct of
the Regulators in South Carolina was to give the name to the practice of
illegal punishment, it would have been called, not “Lynch Law,” but
“Broad River Justice” or “Savannah Law.”[29]

No evidence has yet been found which shows any connection between “Lynch
Law” and “Regulation” at this time.[30] Alexander Gregg, writing of the
Regulator movement in the Carolinas, makes the statement: “They called
themselves ‘Regulators’; and thus ‘Lynch law’ had its origin at this
period.”[31] Dr. R. W. Gibbes had written eight years earlier than
Gregg: “The Regulation, an association of respectable planters, took the
matter in hand, and enforced order by a system of Lynch law.”[32]
Neither of these writers, however, implies that the Regulation in South
Carolina had anything to do with the origin of the term lynch-law.
Joseph Johnson, in a book published in 1851, gave a brief account of the
Regulators and Schofilites. He says, “the most respectable inhabitants
united to inflict summary justice on the depredators and called
themselves Regulators.”[33] In this connection he does not refer to
lynch-law at all. In another connection he writes: “This process, in
what is now called ‘lynch law,’ was then designated ‘regulating,’ and
the associates for this purpose were called ‘Regulators.’”[34] No
reference to lynch-law is to be found in Ramsay’s History of the
Revolution in South Carolina which was published in 1785. Both of the
accounts given by Wheeler of the occurrence at Lynch Creek, North
Carolina, referred to above, imply that the term lynch-law was not in
use any time previous to the Revolutionary War. As will appear later,
the terms regulation and lynch-law are not found together until a much
later date, and then they are not used in connection with events in the
Carolinas.

Still another “Origin of Lynch’s law” is given in Niles’ Register for
August 8, 1835.[35] An anecdote is related of an occurrence “in
Washington County, Pa., many years ago.” A poaching vagabond, long under
suspicion, was finally detected and told to leave the neighborhood in
twenty-four hours on penalty of prosecution. The poacher refused to
comply and a party of five or six of his neighbors went to his home and
“proceeded to try him in due form, choosing one of their number, a
farmer named Lynch, to be judge.” The judge “decided that the poacher
should be tied up and receive three hundred lashes, ‘well laid on,’ and
then be given twenty-four hours to leave the place under penalty of
receiving three hundred more if found after that time. The first part of
the sentence was inflicted on the spot, with such _good intent_ as to
render its repetition unnecessary. The culprit made off as fast as his
lacerated limbs would permit him.”

Nothing further is known of this farmer named Lynch, who acted as judge
at this impromptu trial, and there is no reason for regarding this
incident as in any way connected with the origin of lynch-law. It is
merely an instance of recourse to summary procedure against an unpopular
individual. It may or may not have been known at the time as punishment
by Lynch’s law.

We now come to the explanation of the origin of the term which has been
most frequently given and which was for years accepted without question.
It is to the effect that lynch-law originally had reference to the kind
of law administered by Charles Lynch, in Virginia, during the latter
part of the Revolutionary War.

It is needless to recount here all the variations in the stories
connecting the origin of lynch-law with the Lynch family in
Virginia.[36] In certain accounts Charles Lynch has been confused with
his older brother, John Lynch, who remained a Quaker all his life and
was the founder of Lynchburg, Virginia. Some accounts refer vaguely to a
Virginia farmer, or planter, by the name of Lynch, whose vigorous
methods of punishing wrongdoers gave rise to the term lynch-law.[37]
Haydn’s Dictionary of Dates (1860) apparently is responsible for the
fiction that this mode of administering justice began about the end of
the seventeenth century and derives its name from John Lynch, a farmer,
who exercised it upon the fugitive slaves and criminals dwelling in the
Dismal Swamp, North Carolina, when they committed outrages upon persons
and property which the law could not promptly repress. This story is
repeated in the editions of 1873 and 1885, and is also given in Harpers’
Popular Cyclopædia of the History of the United States,[38] and seems to
have become generally accepted in France.[39] It is, however, wholly
erroneous.

The movement for independence had from the first a great many opponents
in the mountainous sections of Virginia, and there was a considerable
number of Tories in Bedford County, where Charles Lynch lived.[40] The
unsettled condition of affairs also led many desperadoes to resort to
this section of Virginia. Both Tories and desperadoes harassed the
Continentals and plundered their property with impunity.[41] The prices
paid by both armies for horses made horse-stealing a lucrative practice,
and the inefficiency of the judiciary made punishment practically out of
the question. The county courts were merely examining courts in all such
cases, and the single court for the final trial of felonies sat at
Williamsburg, more than two hundred miles away. To take the prisoners
thither, and the witnesses necessary to convict them, was next to
impossible. Frequently the officers in charge of prisoners would be
attacked by outlaws and forced to release their men, or be captured by
British troops and themselves made prisoners.

It was under these circumstances that Colonel Lynch conferred with some
of his neighbors as to what was best to be done. After deliberation they
decided to take matters into their own hands, to punish lawlessness of
every kind, and so far as possible restore peace and security to their
community. For the purpose of attaining these ends they formed an
organization with Mr. Lynch at the head. Under his direction suspected
persons were arrested and brought to his house, where they were tried by
a court composed of himself, as presiding justice, and his three
neighbors, William Preston, Robert Adams, Jr., and James Callaway,
sitting as associate justices.

The practice of this court was to have the accused brought face to face
with his accusers, permit him to hear the testimony against himself, and
to allow him to defend himself by calling witnesses in his behalf and by
showing mitigating and extenuating circumstances. If acquitted, he was
allowed to go, “often with apologies and reparation.” If convicted, he
was sentenced to receive thirty-nine lashes on the bare back, and if he
did not then shout “Liberty Forever,” to be hanged up by the thumbs
until he did so. The execution of the sentence took place immediately
upon conviction. The condemned was tied to a large walnut tree standing
in Mr. Lynch’s yard and the stripes inflicted—with such vigor, it is
said, that even the stoutest hearted Tory shouted for “Liberty” without
necessitating a resort to further punishment.[42]

The news of the invasion of Virginia by Cornwallis gave the Bedford
Tories strong encouragement and a conspiracy was formed to overthrow the
county organization and seize, for the use of Cornwallis on his arrival,
the stores that Lynch had collected for Greene’s army in North Carolina.
The conspirator’s plans, however, became known to Colonel Lynch,
tradition says through one of their own number, and he had them all
arrested. In the case of these conspirators, who were guilty of a
treasonable offense, a more serious situation presented itself. Lynch
himself was on the point of setting out with his regiment for the east
to oppose the British under Benedict Arnold. It was not wise to inflict
the usual punishment and then give the conspirators their freedom again;
neither could he take them as prisoners along with him on the rapid
march that he was forced to make. After careful deliberation, Colonel
Lynch, as the presiding justice, sentenced them to terms of imprisonment
varying from one to five years. Robert Cowan, who had formerly been a
fellow justice on the county bench and who seems to have been the
ringleader, was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment and a fine of
£20,000.[43]

This court, even though it be considered as still the regular county
court, had clearly transcended its powers; the General Court alone had
jurisdiction in cases of treason. After the war, therefore, the Tories
who had suffered at his hands threatened to prosecute Colonel Lynch and
his friends. To avoid lawsuits and as a means of finally settling the
affair, Lynch brought the whole matter before the Virginia legislature.
After a lengthy debate, which, according to Mr. Page, “aroused the
interest of the whole country,” the following act was passed in October,
1782:

  “An act to indemnify certain persons in suppressing a conspiracy
  against this state.

  I. WHEREAS divers evil-disposed persons in the year one thousand seven
  hundred and eighty, formed a conspiracy and did actually attempt to
  levy war against the commonwealth; and it is represented to the
  present general assembly, that William Preston, Robert Adams, junior,
  James Callaway, and Charles Lynch, and other faithful citizens, aided
  by detachments of volunteers from different parts of the state, did,
  by timely and effectual measures, suppress such conspiracy: And
  whereas the measures taken for that purpose may not be strictly
  warranted by law, although justifiable from the imminence of the
  danger;

  II. BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED, That the said William Preston, Robert
  Adams, junior, James Callaway and Charles Lynch, and all other persons
  whatsoever, concerned in suppressing the said conspiracy, or in
  advising, issuing, or executing any orders, or measures taken for that
  purpose, stand indemnified and exonerated of and from all pains,
  penalties, prosecutions, actions, suits, and damages, on account
  thereof. And that if any indictment, prosecution, action, or suit,
  shall be laid or brought against them, or any of them, for any act or
  thing done therein, the defendant, or defendants may plead in bar, or
  the general issue, and give this act in evidence.”[44]

“The proceedings in Bedford, which the legislature thus pronounced to be
illegal, but justifiable, were imitated in other parts of the State, and
came to be known by the name of Lynch’s Law. In justice to Colonel
Lynch, it should be remembered that his action was taken at a time when
the State was in the throes of a hostile invasion. The General Court,
before which the conspirators should have been tried, was temporarily
dispersed. Thomas Jefferson, then the governor of the State, was proving
himself peculiarly incompetent to fill the position. The whole executive
department was in a state of partial paralysis. It was, therefore, no
spirit of insubordination or disregard of the law that induced Lynch to
act as he did. There were few men living more inclined than this simple
Quaker farmer to render due respect in word and deed to the established
authorities.”[45]

The old walnut tree on which lynch-law is said to have been first
administered was still standing, in 1900,[46] on the lawn of the Lynch
homestead, two miles from the village of Lynch Station on the Southern
Railway. A part of it was dead but the rest was still vigorous and bore
its annual crop of nuts. The death penalty, however, was never inflicted
under its shadow. Some say that the Quaker proclivities of “Judge
Lynch”[47] prevented him from passing sentence of death; others say that
it was due to his native sense of humanity. Mr. Page presents some
evidence showing that “both custom and sentiment were violently opposed
to visiting capital punishment upon the detected Tory conspirators.”[48]

In the determination of origins it is frequently impossible to obtain
direct evidence bearing on the point in question. In this case there is
direct evidence for connecting the name of Charles Lynch with the origin
of “lynch-law.”[49] In 1817 Judge Spencer Roane wrote in a letter to
William Wirt: “In the year 1792 there were many suits on the south side
of James River, for inflicting Lynch’s law.” Mr. Wirt adds, in a note
explanatory of the words “Lynch’s law,” “Thirty-nine lashes, inflicted
without trial or law, on mere suspicion of guilt, which could not be
regularly proven. This lawless practice, which, sometimes by the order
of a magistrate, sometimes without, prevailed extensively in the upper
counties on James River, took its name from the gentleman who set the
first example of it.”[50] Though Wirt does not mention Charles Lynch by
name, he does say that the lawless practice “prevailed extensively in
the upper counties on James River,” and Charles Lynch was for years
closely identified with the interests of Campbell[51] and Bedford
counties—two of the upper counties on the James River.

Henry Howe, in his “Historical Collections of Virginia,” in a section
entitled “Lynch Law,” says: “At that time (the time of the Revolution),
this country (Campbell County and vicinity) was very thinly settled, and
infested by a lawless band of tories and desperadoes. The necessity of
the case involved desperate measures, and Col. Lynch, then a leading
whig, apprehended and had them punished, without any superfluous
ceremony. Hence the origin of the term ‘Lynch Law.’ This practice of
Lynching continued years after the war, and was applied to many cases of
mere suspicion of guilt, which could not be regularly proven.”[52]

In a book written a few years later than the above, Howe has the
following to say on the same subject: “The Lynch Law, as it is termed,
originated in Virginia at the time of the American Revolution, and was
first adopted by Colonel Lynch against a lawless band of tories and
desperadoes, who infested the country at the base of the Blue Ridge.
This plan was afterwards followed in the west, and its operation was
salutary in ridding the country of miscreants whom the law was not
strong enough to punish. The tribunal of _Squire Birch_, as the person
who personated the judge was called, was established under a tree in the
woods; the culprit being usually found guilty was tied to a tree and
lashed without mercy, and then expelled from the country. In general,
‘_the regulators_’ only exercised this law upon the most base and vile
characters.”[53]

This account given by Howe cannot be considered as wholly independent of
the influence of Wirt. In his “Historical Collections of Virginia,” Howe
quotes from Wirt’s book in substantiation of his statement that the
“practice of Lynching continued years after the war.” On the other hand,
however, the fact that he repeated his assertions in regard to the
origin of “Lynch Law” in emphatic terms in his later book, and therewith
described the operation of “Lynch Law” in the west, is strong evidence
that he had other sources of information than Wirt’s book on the
matter.[54]

An account, entirely independent of any influence from either Wirt or
Howe, is found in “Colonel William Martin’s Narrative of Frontier Life,”
prepared about 1842 for Dr. Lyman C. Draper and now in the Draper MS.
Collections in the Wisconsin State Historical Society Library. It is as
follows:

  “In those times there were a great many bad men settled along the
  frontiers who by their thefts annoyed the country greatly. Insomuch
  that the people entered into combinations to suppress them and formed
  companies called regulators. They formed in military style, with
  officers, etc.

  “They also organized a court and appointed some three or four of their
  aged, discreet men judges to try criminal causes, award punishment,
  etc. The company would bring up suspected fellows and the court would
  try them. But they seldom extended punishment beyond whipping and
  driving them from the country, sometimes making them pay for property
  stolen, when they had the means.

  “This method of breaking up combinations of rogues was first set on
  foot by Col. Charles Lynch, of Bedford county, Va., where I was
  raised. He and my father were acquainted. (The same man for whom
  Lynchburg was named.) This plan was started some seventy or eighty
  years ago.[55]

  “The measure seemed to be called for from the situation of the country
  at the time. And it has been practiced more or less in the settling of
  new countries from that time until within a few years past, since the
  laws operate with more efficiency. The authorities generally connived
  at it from the necessity of the case. And perhaps nowhere has it been
  more common than in Tennessee. Lynch at first punished with
  thirty-nine stripes, taking, as I suppose, Moses for his model. And
  this was for a great while called Lynch’s law, meaning all unlawful
  whipping. Any of the old men now in the South and West can tell the
  meaning of Lynch’s law.

  “Lynch, however, has been improved upon and more severe punishments
  sometimes inflicted. I have given this feature of Western history from
  the presumption that you may not have known it.”[56]

Such is the strongest evidence bearing directly on the point under
consideration. It is true that Martin’s account, as well as Howe’s, was
not written until more than forty years after the death of Charles
Lynch. It is true, also, that many stories have referred to a man by the
name of Lynch in Virginia, sometimes specifically mentioning Charles
Lynch or Colonel Lynch, at other times naming some other Lynch.[57] But
it is likewise true that it is in this way that tradition has been
persistent in attributing the origin of lynch-law to a member of the
Lynch family in Virginia. Furthermore, since no evidence whatsoever has
been found for tracing the beginning of lynch-law to any other member of
that family, it may be said that tradition has thus persistently pointed
to Colonel Charles Lynch as the first lyncher. Traditions are in general
far from trustworthy, but, on the other hand, they usually have _some_
basis in fact. In this case Wirt’s statement gives, at the very least, a
presumption in favor of the tradition, which facts to the contrary only
can remove.[58]

The earliest use of the expression “Lynch’s law” that is known at the
present time is this one found in Wirt’s book which was published in
1818. Judge Roane wrote that there were many suits in the year 1792 for
inflicting Lynch’s law. From his statement it does not follow that the
term Lynch’s law was in use in the year 1792. It does follow, however,
that the term was at least a localism in Virginia in the year 1817.

Other terms were also in use for summary and illegal punishment in the
period 1780–1830. The following appeared in the Salem Gazette of October
2, 1812: “People who clamored violently against Mr. Adams’ ‘_gag law_’
in ‘99, see nothing to disapprove in the ‘club law’ enacted at
Baltimore, as a substitute for it.—_Messenger._”[59]

In the year 1819 two passages entitled “Summary justice” appeared in
Niles’ Register. They read as follows: “_Summary justice._—A tin pedlar
at Easton, Pa. was discovered to have two negro children in his cart. On
examination, one of the little sufferers was found to have been crammed
in such a manner, that his ear was rubbed off! The people indignantly
rose and cut off the fellow’s ear. I am no advocate for the violation of
the laws, but from my heart I can’t feel sorry for him.—_Village
Recorder._”[60] “_Summary justice._ After a late extensive fire which
happened at Charleston, a fellow was found secreting some goods that had
been stolen during the calamity. The alternative was offered to him,
whether he would be prosecuted at law, or suffer punishment on the spot;
he chose the latter, was tied to a tree, received fifty lashes well laid
on, and got off _clear_, having restored the stolen goods.”[61]

In the year 1822 Niles’ Register contained the following: “_Riot._ A
parcel of Irish laborers employed in the navy yard at Charlestown,
lately attempted to rescue some property of one of their fellows out of
the hands of the sheriff. The affray was a severe one—but ‘club law’ did
not prevail. Captain Hull exposed himself considerably to quell the
riot.”[62]

Writing under the date of November 29, 1819, W. Faux describes an
instance of the use of summary methods against an unpopular individual
in Princeton, Indiana, and says: “The people of the place deputed four
persons to inform him, that unless he quitted the town and the state
immediately, he should receive Lynch’s law, that is, whipping in the
woods.”[63] Under the date of December 16, 1819, referring to “the
Rowdies of Kentucky,” the same author writes: “These regulators are
self-appointed ministers of justice, to punish or destroy those whom the
law cannot touch.”[64]

On July 17, 1824, Niles’ Register published the information that several
murders had been committed in Kentucky “by persons who called themselves
‘regulators.’”[65]

W. N. Blane published in London in 1824 an account of his travels in
America and described “the practice of _Regulating_” that then existed
in parts of Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois. He tells how the bands of
Regulators were organized and their methods of inflicting punishment,
but does not use the term lynch or lynch-law.[66]

Judge James Hall, in his “Letters from the West,” published in 1828,
uses the following words: “No commentator has taken any notice of
_Linch’s Law_, which was once the _lex loci_ of the frontier. The
citizens formed themselves into a ‘_regulating company_.’ Sometimes the
sufferers resorted to courts of justice for remuneration, and there have
been instances of heavy damages being recovered of the regulators.”[67]

It thus appears that summary and illegal methods of punishing offenders
were known under various names between 1780 and 1830. The term Lynch’s
law was not exclusively applied to such practices. The evidence
obtainable at present, therefore, indicates that at some time between
1780 and 1817 the term Lynch’s law became a localism in Virginia in the
region of the James River. By the year 1819 it had spread as far west as
Indiana, and by 1828 it had become still more widely used but had not
superseded all other terms for the popular administration of justice.

To the question why or how Lynch’s name came to be attached to this
practice, there is at present no conclusive answer. It may be said that
Colonel Charles Lynch was a prominent man in his community, and when he
adopted extra-legal methods of punishing public offenders during the
troublous times of the Revolution, he no doubt attracted considerable
attention to himself, and thus his name became identified with such
practices. It may also be said that the uniqueness of some of his
punishments, such as compelling the Tories to shout “Liberty forever,”
probably brought his name into prominence with the practice. The fact
remains, however, that no contemporaneous evidence has yet been
discovered which will explain why Lynch’s name came to be applied to the
practice. We know definitely only that the form of the expression was at
first Lynch’s law, and that tradition, supported by all the evidence
that we have, ascribes its origin to Colonel Lynch. Equally certain it
is that Lynch’s law originally signified a whipping for reformatory
purposes with more or less disregard for its legality, and was so used
at a time subsequent to the American Revolution and not before that
time. Evidently the term originated in Virginia, and as the tide of
emigration moved westward it was carried along the frontier where
conditions were such as to encourage the use of extra-legal methods
against public offenders.

This becomes more evident when the early history of the popular
administration of punishment in the United States is taken into account.
A consideration of early lynch-law, or lynch-law down to 1830,
constitutes the following chapter.




                              CHAPTER III
                            EARLY LYNCH-LAW


In the preceding chapter we have been concerned with the origin of the
term by which the practice has come to be known. In this chapter we are
concerned with the practice itself. Something of the nature of lynch-law
procedure during the Revolutionary epoch has already become apparent,
but a more detailed investigation into the early history of such
procedure will reveal other characteristics.

It has been said by some that the first instance of the operation of
lynch-law in America was in December, 1763, at Paxtang (now Harrisburg),
Pennsylvania. Indian scalping parties had been laying waste the
settlements with relentless fury, and the appeals of the settlers to the
Quaker government for help had been treated with contempt. Exasperated
at the policy pursued by the Quakers toward the Indians, the
Scotch-Irish who had settled in Lancaster and Cumberland counties formed
several companies of Rangers to patrol the borders and give protection.
“About the middle of December, word was brought to the settlers living
at Paxtang, that an Indian known to have committed depredations in the
vicinity had been traced to Conestoga. Matthew Smith, a man of influence
and popularity among his associates, called together a number of the
Paxtang Rangers, and led them to the Conestoga settlement. One of the
men saw an Indian issuing from a house, and thought that he recognized
him as the savage who had killed his own mother. Firing his rifle, he
brought the Indian down. Then, with a loud shout, the furious mob rushed
into the cabins, and killed all the Indians whom they found there, some
six in number. Fourteen of the Conestogas managed to escape, and,
fleeing to Lancaster, were given a place of refuge in the county jail.
While there, word was again carried to the Paxtang men that an Indian,
known to have murdered the relatives of one of their number, was among
those who had received the protection of the Lancaster magistrates. This
again aroused a feeling of rage and resentment amongst the Rangers. On
December 27, some fifty of them, under the leadership of Lazarus
Stewart, marched to Lancaster, broke open the jail, and with the fury of
a mob massacred every Indian contained therein, man, woman, and
child.”[68]

In connection with this incident it has been suggested that the
Scotch-Irish are to blame for the introduction of lynch-law in America;
that they brought with them traditions of the administration of summary
justice in Mediæval Scotland, and, amidst the perils of the frontier,
quickly resorted to the ancient methods of suppressing violence and
depredation. The case of the Regulators in the Carolinas is also cited
as an instance of the Scotch-Irish backwoodsmen taking the
administration of justice into their own hands, when their rulers failed
to provide for them a safe government. It is said that this same
self-reliant spirit is exhibited in the “family feuds of Kentucky, which
for the most part seem peculiar to families bearing Scottish names.”[69]

Undoubtedly the Scotch-Irish played an important part in the early
history of lynch-law in the United States. But it was rather because
they were the vanguard of a new civilization than because they were of
Scottish descent that they played this important part. Environmental
influences of old had made them pioneers. Before coming to this country
they had behind them a century of frontier life. Their experience in
Ireland, where the soil was poor and where by reason of the difference
in religion they lived apart from, and often in open hostility to, the
natives, led them to be self-reliant and self-assertive. Their training
had thus made them sturdy frontiersmen, quite the sort to subdue the
wilderness and become the founders of a new civilization. Amid the
vicissitudes incident to settlement in a virgin territory it was often
necessary, as a matter of self-preservation, to use prompt and decisive
measures against depredators. That the early settlers did not always
observe “due process of law” can scarcely be urged as deserving
condemnation. They merely adopted the means which seemed to them the
most expedient under the existing circumstances.

The adoption of summary measures by Scotch-Irish Rangers in Pennsylvania
in 1763, however, does not furnish an isolated instance, nor indeed the
earliest instance, of the use of such measures against Indians. The
provincial governments were not infrequently called upon to take note of
such occurrences in order to preserve amicable relations with the
various Indian tribes, and considerable difficulty was commonly
experienced when the attempt was made to bring to justice white men who
had murdered Indians.

In the Province of New Hampshire in June, 1753, two white men killed two
Indians who were accused of having carried off two negroes the preceding
year. After several months the men were arrested, indicted for the
murder, placed in the jail at Portsmouth, and their trial set for March
21, 1754. The night previous to the day appointed for the trial a party
of their neighbors appeared in Portsmouth, broke open the jail and set
them free. “This outrage produced great excitement in the community—some
endeavoring to discover and retake the murderers, and others favoring
their escape. Both the murder and the rescue, however, were generally
justified in the community. And, although rewards were offered by
Governor Wentworth for the apprehension of Bowen and Morrill, yet in a
short time they went openly about their business, without fear of
molestation, and the men engaged in breaking the jail at Portsmouth,
though well known, were never called to account, but, on the contrary,
were considered as having performed a most meritorious act. In fact,
some of the most substantial men in the country were engaged in the
rescue,—by act or advice,—and the Government could not have made an
arrest had they made the attempt. Presents were afterwards made to the
relatives of these Indians by the Government of New Hampshire, and thus
the ‘blood was wiped away’ to the satisfaction of the Indians.”[70]

In May, 1795, in the county of St. Clair in the Illinois country, two
Indians were murdered while they were in the custody of the sheriff who
was conveying them to jail upon warrant. An effort was made to bring the
murderers to justice, but although “the most positive evidence was
adduced to the grand jury against two persons, inhabitants of the county
of St. Clair, that the murder was committed by them,” no bill of
indictment was found against them. Three attempts were made to secure an
indictment from the grand jury, all of which were unsuccessful.
Referring to another instance where Indians were murdered by whites,
which occurred at about the same time but the circumstances of which
were “not only not blameable but laudable,” Governor St. Clair wrote, in
his report to the Secretary of State, “had the affair been ever so
criminal in its nature, it would have been, I believe, impossible to
have brought the actors to punishment.”[71]

In several respects there is a resemblance between the means which were
employed by the early settlers for protection against Indian depredators
and the methods which have been adopted in more recent years for the
punishment of public offenders. In their purpose, in their organization,
and in their summary infliction of the death penalty, the Rangers were
not unlike the vigilance committees which have been closely identified
with the later operation of the frontier type of lynch-law. In breaking
open jails, and, as in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in massacring inmates
against whom there was a strong popular resentment, or, as in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in liberating prisoners whose criminal
conduct was generally justified in the community, there appear some of
the distinctive features which have marked the later operation of
lynch-law in well settled communities. It is also probably true that the
antagonistic relations which existed between the whites and the Indians
during the early history of this country directly encouraged a popular
disregard of all legal procedure on the part of the whites when dealing
with Indians. But the use of summary measures against Indians and the
attendant occurrences can scarcely be said to mark the beginning of the
operation of lynch-law in America. The meaning which was at first
attached to the term Lynch’s law and the nature of the practice which
first came to be known by that name preclude such a beginning for the
practice. Lynch’s law originally corresponded much more closely to what
was known as “regulating,” a practice which was early adopted not only
where the frontier type of society existed, but also where there was the
stable and better organized form of society characteristic of older
communities.

The following appeared in the New York Gazette of December 18, 1752: “We
hear from _Elizabeth-Town_, that an odd Sect of People have lately
appeared there, who go under the Denomination of _Regulars_: there are
near a Dozen of them, who dress themselves in Women’s Cloaths, and
painting their Faces, go in the Evening to the Houses of such as are
reported to have beat their Wives: where one of them entering in first,
seizes the Delinquent, whilst the rest follow, strip him, turn up his
Posteriors and flog him with Rods most severely, crying out all the
Time, _Wo to the Men that beat their Wives_:—It seems that several
Persons in that Borough, (and ’tis said some very deservedly) have
undergone the Discipline, to the no small Terror of others, who are in
any Way conscious of deserving the same Punishment. ’Twere to be wish’d,
that in order for the more equal Distribution of Justice, there wou’d
arise another Sect, under the Title of _Regulatrixes_ who should dress
themselves in Mens Cloathes, and flagilate the Posteriors of the Scolds,
Termagants, &c., &c.”[72]

In a letter dated December 7, 1753, “Prudence Goodwife,” after relating
how her husband beats and maltreats her, writes as follows: “My Case
being happily nois’d abroad, induced several generous young Men to
discipline him. These young Persons do stile, or are stiled, Regulators:
and so they are with Propriety: for they have regulated my dear Husband,
and the rest of the bad Ones hereabouts, that they are afraid of using
such Barbarity; and I must with Pleasure acknowledge, that since my
Husband has felt what whipping was, he has entirely left off whipping
me, and promises faithfully he will never begin again. Tho’ there are
some that are afraid of whipping their Wives, for fear of dancing the
same Jigg; yet I understand, they are not afraid of making Application,
in order to have those dear Regulators indicted; and if they should it
might discourage them for the future, to appear to the Assistance of the
Innocent and Helpless; and then poor Wives who have the unhappiness to
be lockt in Wedlock with bad Husbands, take care of your tender Hides;
for you may depend upon being bang’d without Mercy.”[73]

These may be regarded as sporadic cases of “regulating,” as
illustrations of the kind of “regulating” which is found in a stable and
well organized form of society. They are instances of the infliction of
summary corporal punishment upon individuals for whose punishment under
the law little tangible evidence can be adduced, and the nature of whose
offense is such that legal penalties are popularly believed to be
inapplicable.

In North Carolina, from 1765 to 1771, under frontier conditions combined
with political dissension, “regulation” assumed a well-organized form
and gained considerable strength.[74] The movement was inaugurated in
the north-central part of the province to resist what was considered
oppressive exactions laid by government officials. Specifically, the
grievances were excessive taxes, dishonest sheriffs, and extortionate
fees. A meeting “to inquire into the abuse of power and take proper
measures for amendment” was held at Maddock’s mill on October 10, 1766,
and several resolutions were drafted and adopted.[75] Nothing was done
by the authorities to alleviate the grievances, however, and a general
meeting was held on April 4, 1768, at which the organization into a body
of Regulators was perfected. An agreement was drawn up and the members
bound themselves by oath to its observance. This agreement reads as
follows:

  “We the subscribers do voluntarily agree to form ourselves into an
  association, to assemble ourselves for conference for regulating
  public grievances and abuses of power, in the following particulars,
  with others of the like nature that may occur.

  “1. That we will pay no more taxes until we are satisfied they are
  agreeable to law, and applied to the purposes therein mentioned;
  unless we cannot help it, or are forced.

  “2. That we will pay no officer any more fees than the law allows,
  unless we are obliged to it; and then to show our dislike, and bear an
  open testimony against it.

  “3. That we will attend our meetings of conference as often as we
  conveniently can, and is necessary, in order to consult our
  representatives on the amendment of such laws as may be found grievous
  or unnecessary; and to choose more suitable men than we have done
  heretofore for burgesses and vestrymen; and to petition the houses of
  assembly, governor, council, king and parliament, &c., for redress in
  such grievances as in the course of the undertaking may occur; and to
  inform one another, learn, know, and enjoy all the privileges and
  liberties that are allowed and were settled on us by our worthy
  ancestors, the founders of our present constitution, in order to
  preserve it on its ancient foundation, that it may stand firm and
  unshaken.

  “4. That we will contribute to collections for defraying necessary
  expenses attending the work, according to our abilities.

  “5. That in case of difference in judgment, we will submit to the
  judgment of the majority of our body.

  “To all which we solemnly swear, or being a quaker, or otherwise
  scrupulous in conscience of the common oath, do solemnly affirm, that
  we will stand true and faithful to this cause, till we bring things to
  a true regulation, according to the true intent and meaning hereof, in
  the judgment of the majority of us.”[76]

As this agreement indicates, this organization was primarily for the
purpose of “regulating public grievances and abuses of power,” not for
the purpose of bringing to justice public offenders beyond the reach of
law, such as horse thieves and desperadoes. Their methods of procedure,
however, closely resembled those that have been adopted by other bands
of Regulators for the purpose of meting out justice to frontier
criminals. Their favorite method seems to have been to administer
whippings. In an intercepted letter from Rednap Howell to James Hunter,
both leading Regulators, the following passage occurs: “I give out here
that the Regulators are determined to whip every one who goes to law, or
will not pay his just debts, or will not agree to leave his cause to
men, where disputed. That they will choose representatives, but not send
them to be put in jail. In short, to stand in defence; and as to
thieves, to drive them out of the country.”[77] From time to time,
however, serious disturbances and riots occurred. In September, 1770,
about 150 Regulators attacked the superior court which was in session at
Hillsboro, severely whipped several men who had incurred their enmity,
and destroyed considerable property. New laws were hurriedly enacted by
the legislature and the leaders of the riots were arrested, but the
Regulators were not easily subdued or conciliated. In 1771 Governor
Tryon called out the militia, and a battle took place between the
Regulators and the militia, in which the Regulators were utterly
defeated and their organization broken up. Each side, however, had
several men killed and many wounded.

A similar attempt at “regulating” was made in South Carolina at about
the same time.[78] The “Back Country,” as it was called, had become
infested with robbers and brigands. Prior to the year 1769 the only
court of criminal and civil jurisdiction in the Province—except the
courts of Justices of the Peace, which had jurisdiction in civil causes
as high as twenty pounds current money—“was holden in Charlestown.” This
gave practical immunity from punishment to those who were lawlessly
inclined in the distant parts of the Province. As early as the year
1752, the inhabitants along the Pedee River near the mouth of Lynche’s
Creek petitioned the Upper House of Assembly for the creation of a new
county in which twelve or more Justices should be appointed who should
have a general jurisdiction over both civil and criminal causes. This
and other petitions which were presented in the following years from
different parts of the Province received scant attention on the part of
the Provincial Government. For several years the Government did not seem
to comprehend the real nature of the evils, or the remedies necessary to
be applied. Consequently, there was a very decided opposition between
the Regulators and the Government.

The earliest account we have of the operations of the organization which
became known as the Regulators is in the South Carolina Gazette of May
26, 1767, in an extract from a letter from Pine Tree Hill (Camden),
dated May 14, 1767. It is as follows: “On the 6th inst., a number of
armed men, being in search of Horse Stealers, robbers, &c., discovered a
parcel of them in camp on Broad River, where an engagement soon ensued,
and the Thieves were put to flight; and though none of them were taken,
it is reasonable to suppose, from the quantity of blood on the ground,
that some of them were killed. They left behind them ten horses,
thirteen saddles, some guns, &c.”[79]

The South Carolina Gazette of July 27–August 3, in the same year, made
this statement: “The gang of Villains from Virginia and North Carolina,
who have for some years past, in small parties, under particular
leaders, infested the back parts of the Southern Provinces, stealing
horses from one, and selling them in the next, notwithstanding the late
public examples made of several of them, we hear are more formidable
than ever as to numbers, and more audacious and cruel in their thefts
and outrages. ’Tis reported that they consist of more than 200, form a
chain of communication with each other, and have places of general
meeting; where (in imitation of Councils of War) they form plans of
operation and defence, and (alluding to their secrecy and fidelity to
each other) call their places Free Mason Lodges. Instances of their
cruelty to the people in the back settlements, where they rob or
otherwise abuse, are so numerous and shocking, that a narrative of them
would fill a whole _Gazette_, and every reader with horror. They at
present range in the Forks between Broad, Saludy, and Savannah Rivers.
Two of the gang were hanged last week at Savannah, viz., Lundy Hart and
Obadiah Greenage. Two others, James Ferguson and Jesse Hambersam, were
killed when these were taken.”[80]

Apparently, it was for the purpose of breaking up and bringing to
justice this “gang of Villains” that Thomas Woodward, Joseph Kirkland,
and Barnaby Pope “instituted the Regulation.”[81] At any rate, an
organization had been formed in the region surrounding the Broad River,
and, as early as 1767, the members of this organization had come to be
known as Regulators. In an address to both Houses of Assembly, November
5, 1767, the Governor of the Province, referring to the “unhappy
situation in the Back Parts of this Country,” made the following
statement: “The means to suppress those licentious spirits that have so
lately appeared in the distant parts of the Province, and, assuming the
name of Regulators, have, in defiance of Government, and to the
subversion of good order, illegally tried, condemned, and punished many
persons, require an attentive deliberation.”[82]

The courts that were asked for by the inhabitants were not established,
however, and the “regulation” continued. The following is taken from the
South Carolina Gazette of June 13, 1768: “It seems hardly probable that
the disturbances in our back settlements will entirely subside,
notwithstanding all the prudent steps that have been taken, or can be
taken, by the Government to suppress them, until the late Act of the
General Assembly of this Province for establishing Circuit Courts,[83]
takes effect: for we daily hear of new irregularities committed by the
people called Regulators, who, seeming to despair of rooting out those
desperate villains that remain among them any other way, still take upon
themselves to punish such offenders as they can catch. We hear, that
within this month, one Watts and one Distoe, have received 500 lashes
each by their direction; and that an infamous woman has also received
corporal punishment. We hear, also, that one John Bowles has lately lost
his life in attempting to take Mr. Woodward, one of the leaders of the
people called Regulators. According to our account, Woodward, refusing
to surrender himself, Bowles fired at, and would have killed him, but
the ball struck the barrel of a gun which he held across his breast,
upon which, some people in company with Woodward, fired, and killed
Bowles.”[84]

On July 25, the following intelligence was given in the South Carolina
Gazette: “The last accounts from the Back Settlements say, that the
People called the Regulators were to have a meeting at Lynche’s Creek,
on last Friday, where it was expected 1200 would be assembled. The
occasion of this meeting is said to be, a Party of them lately having
been roughly used by a Gang of Banditti, consisting of Mulattoes, Free
Negroes, &c., notorious Harborers of runaway slaves, at a place called
Thompson’s Creek, whom they ordered to remove. It is added, they
anxiously wait to hear the fate of the Act for establishing Circuit
Courts in this Province, sent home for the Royal approbation, which, if
it obtains, will restore good order in those parts.”[85]

The Governor of the Province, not understanding the situation in the
remote settlements, made an attempt to enforce order and compel
obedience to law by sending an officer with full discretionary power
against the Regulators. The course of events is described by Ramsay in
the following words: “The extreme difficulty of bringing criminals from
the remote settlements to a legal condemnation had induced a number of
men, who called themselves regulators, to take the law into their hands.
They, by their own authority, inflicted corporal punishment on sundry
persons without any regular condemnation. To remedy abuses of this kind,
lord Charles Greville Montague, then governor of the province, advanced
to the rank of colonel a man of low character, of the name of Scovil,
and employed him to enforce regular law among these self-constituted
regulators. In execution of his commission he adopted severe measures,
which involved multitudes in great distress.”[86] This Colonel Scovil
(or Schovel—his name is written in various ways), instead of redressing
the grievances on both sides, armed the depredators and paraded them for
battle. Before a battle took place, however, between the Regulators and
the Schofilites, as they were known from the name of their leader, wiser
counsels prevailed and both parties sent delegates to the Governor
asking for his intervention.[87] In this way the disastrous results of
the conflict in North Carolina between the Regulators and the Government
were avoided in South Carolina.

Finally, the necessity for courts in the interior of the Province could
no longer be denied. The Royal approval was given, and in the year 1769
seven new courts, with suitable jails and court-houses, were established
in different parts of the interior.[88] This marked the end of the
Regulation movement in South Carolina. The condition of affairs which
had called it into existence had ceased to prevail and the practice of
“regulating” was, therefore, discontinued.

A single quotation will conclude all that need here be said in regard to
the Regulation in South Carolina. It is an “extract of a letter from a
Gentleman at Pedee, to his friend in Town,” and appeared in the South
Carolina Gazette, September 2, 1768. It reads as follows:

  “I wish you would inform me what is generally thought in town of the
  Regulators, who now reign uncontrolled in all the remote parts of the
  Province. In June, they held a Congress at the Congarees, where a vast
  number of people assembled; several of the principal settlers on this
  River, men of property, among them. When these returned, they
  requested the most respectable people in these parts to meet on a
  certain day; they did so, and, upon the report made to them, they
  unanimously adopted the Plan of Regulation, and are now executing it
  with indefatigable ardour. Their resolution is, in general,
  effectually to deny the Jurisdiction of the Courts holden in
  Charlestown over those parts of the Province that ought to be by right
  out of it; to purge, by methods of their own, the country of all idle
  persons, all that have not a visible way of getting an honest living,
  all that are suspected or known to be guilty of malpractices, and also
  to prevent the service of any writ or warrant from Charlestown; so
  that a Deputy Marshal would be handled by them with severity. Against
  those they breathe high indignation. They are every day, excepting
  Sundays, employed in this Regulation work, as they term it. They have
  brought many under the lash, and are scourging and banishing the baser
  sort of people, such as the above, with universal diligence.

  “Such as they think reclaimable, they are a little tender of; and
  those they task, giving them so many acres to tend in so many days, on
  pain of flagellation, that they may not be reduced to poverty, and by
  that be led to steal from their industrious neighbours. This course,
  they say, they are determined to pursue, with every other effectual
  measure, that will answer their purpose; and that they will defend
  themselves in it to the last extremity. They hold correspondence with
  others in the same plan, and are engaged to abide by and support each
  other whenever they may be called upon for that purpose. This, it
  seems, they are to continue till County Courts, as well as Circuit
  Courts, shall be rightly established, that they may enjoy, by that
  means, the rights and privileges of British subjects, which they think
  themselves now deprived of. They imagine that, as the Jurisdiction of
  the Courts in Charlestown extends all over the Province, Government is
  not a protection, but an oppression; that they are not tried there by
  their Peers; and that the accumulated expenses of a law-suit, or
  prosecution, puts justice out of their power; by which means the
  honest man is not secure in his property, and villainy becomes rampant
  with impunity.

  “Indeed, the grievances they complain of are many, and the spirit of
  Regulation rises higher and spreads wider every day. What this is to
  end in, I know not; but thus matters are situated; an account of
  which, I imagine, is not unacceptable, though perhaps disagreeable to
  hear.”[89]

This letter may be regarded, upon the whole, as an impartial account of
the Regulation movement in South Carolina.[90] It exhibits the character
of those who were taking the lead in the matter, and indicates the
objects which they proposed to accomplish. It also indicates that their
usual procedure was to whip and banish all persons whom they considered
inimical to the interests of the community. In this respect the
Regulation movement in South Carolina closely resembled the Regulation
movement in North Carolina. It may be said, therefore, that lynch-law
was in operation at this time in the Carolinas, though not known by that
name. The practice of administering corporal punishment for reformatory
or corrective purposes, the practice of “regulating” public offenders
and public grievances, is the essence of lynch-law procedure.

As events shaped themselves for the outbreak of the Revolution in 1775,
conditions became such as to encourage the frequent use of summary
methods of redressing grievances in all of the colonies. The increasing
dissatisfaction among the colonists with the way they were being
governed by the mother country, the obnoxious Stamp Act and other
measures which they thought to be unjustly imposed upon them, rendered
recourse to summary procedure not only easy but popularly
justifiable.[91] It was a time of excitement when neighbor looked upon
neighbor with suspicion and the slightest offense was deemed worthy of
severe punishment. Social conditions were unsettled; the civil
authorities were fast losing the respect and support of the people in
the community; threats and taunts, satire and insult, were
prevalent.[92] Under such conditions it is not strange that summary
procedure came to be in vogue from Maine to Georgia.

Furthermore, during the entire period of the Revolutionary War not only
were the usual unsettled conditions incident to a war prevailing, but,
in addition, there was disaffection and disagreement among the colonists
themselves. Almost every community had its Tories who frequently sought,
openly or secretly, to further the Royal cause and injure the American
cause. In return, the American sympathizers often adopted retaliatory
measures against the Tories. In such cases it was hopeless to appeal to
the civil or the judicial powers for they were badly disorganized. Not
infrequently conditions were such as to preclude action under martial
law, and thus the only recourse possible was the popular administration
of justice in the form of summary procedure of one sort or another.

Particularly characteristic of the Revolutionary period was the practice
of tarring and feathering.[93] It has been said that “this singular
punishment” was begun in America by British troops who tarred and
feathered an inhabitant of the town of Billerica, Massachusetts, on
March 9, 1775.[94] But a number of instances may be cited showing that
this punishment had been administered in more than one of the colonies
several years earlier. It is probable that many of the early immigrants
knew of this manner of punishment before they left their native
shores[95]; at any rate, they did not wait until 1775 for the British
troops to set them an example.[96]

On September 7, 1768, at Salem, Massachusetts, a “Custom-House Waiter”
informed an officer of the customs that some measures had been taken on
board a vessel, in the harbor to elude the payment of certain duties.
This “engaged the Attention of a Number of the Inhabitants. Between the
Hours of Ten and Eleven, A.M. he was taken from one of the Wharves, and
conducted to the common, where his Head, Body and Limbs were covered
with warm Tar, and then a large Quantity of Feathers were applied to all
Parts. The poor Waiter was then exalted to a Seat on the Front of a
Cart, and in this Manner led into the Main Street, where a Paper, with
the Word _Informer_ thereon, in large Letters, was affixed to his
Breast, and another Paper, with the same Word, to his Back. This Scene
drew together, within a few Minutes, several Hundred People, who
proceeded, with Huzzas and loud Acclamations, through the Town.”[97]

On Saturday, September 10, 1768, “two Informers, an Englishman and a
Frenchman, were taken up by the Populace at Newbury-Port, (Mass.) who
tarred them & feathered them; but being late they were hand-cuffed and
put into custody until the Sabbath was over:—Accordingly on Monday
Morning, they were again tarred and rolled in Feathers, then fixed in a
Cart with Halters, and carried thro’ the principal Streets of the
Town.”[98] Upon his release the Englishman, Joshua Vickery by name, went
before a justice of the peace and took oath “that he never did directly
or indirectly make or give any Information to any Officer of the Customs
nor to any other Person either against Capt. John Emmery, or any other
Man whatever; that he was no ways concerned with Francis Magno in his
Information, nor ever wrote one Line for the said Francis, on that
Account.”[99] These statements were corroborated by the Frenchman and it
was shown that the only ground for suspicion against Vickery was the
fact that he had been in the company of the Frenchman on the day that
the “Information” was given.

On the evening of May 18, 1769, at Providence, Rhode Island, Jesse
Saville, “a Tidesman belonging to the Custom-House” who was accused of
“Informing,” was seized by a number of people, stripped naked, covered
from head to foot with turpentine and feathers and severely beaten. “For
the better bringing to Justice and condign Punishment the Authors of
this daring & atrocious Outrage, the Commissioners of His Majesty’s
Customs” offered a reward of fifty pounds sterling for their discovery
and conviction.[100]

A similar case of tarring and feathering, the offender being “a Person
who had informed against a Merchant, respecting a Vessel then in the
West-Indies,” occurred in New Haven, Connecticut, in September,
1769.[101]

In New York, in October, 1769, “one Kelly, an Oysterman, Mitchner, a
Tavern-keeper, and one or two more, having, it is said, made an
Information to the Custom-House Officers, which occasioned the Seizure
of a few Casks of Wine belonging to the Mate of a Vessel, and was, it is
said, the whole Saving he had made of three Years Wages: The Populace
being greatly incensed against the Informers, after several Days Search,
found and seized them, placed and tied them in Carts, and carried them
thro’ great Part of the City, attended with many Thousand People, who
huzza’d, insulted and treated them with the utmost Indignity, often
besmearing their Faces and Clothes with Tar, and sprinkling them with
Feathers.... The Magistrates interposed, but were for some Time unable
to stop the Cavalcade, till the Populace had in some Measure satiated
their Resentment.”[102]

The Boston Chronicle for October 26–30, 1769,[103] contained the
following under the heading of “Boston”: “Last Saturday evening, a
person suspected to be an informer, was stripped naked, put in a Cart,
where he was first tarred, then feathered, and in this condition,
carried through the principal streets of the town, followed by a great
concourse of people.”

During the year 1770 there was much popular feeling against merchants
who imported goods contrary to the non-importation agreement. Such
importers were threatened with many dire punishments including tar and
feathers, and in several instances the threatened punishments were
administered.[104]

At Philadelphia, in October, 1773, a certain Ebenezer Richardson,
accused of “seeking an opportunity to distress the Trade of
Philadelphia,” was publicly notified, by “Tar _and_ Feathers,” of the
punishment which was in store for him, a punishment which he narrowly
escaped by leaving the city “closely pursued by many well-wishers to
peace and good order.”[105]

On November 1, 1773, John Malcolm who had rendered himself obnoxious “by
being an Informer” was “genteely _Tarr’d_ and _Feather’d_” by “about 30
Sailors” at Pownalborough (Mass.).[106] On January 25, 1774, Malcolm was
in Boston, and when some taunting remarks were made to him to the effect
that he had been tarred and feathered but not in the proper manner, he
dared any one to do it better and assaulted one man, slightly injuring
him. In the evening a number of people took Malcolm out, stripped him,
tarred his head and his body, feathered him, set him in a chair in a
cart, and thus carried him through the streets, finally whipping and
beating him before they let him go.[107] On the morning of January 30
the following handbill[108] was found pasted up in the most public
places:

                      BRETHREN, AND FELLOW-CITIZENS!

  This is to Certify, That the modern Punishment lately inflicted on the
  ignoble JOHN MALCOLM, was not done by our Order—We reserve that Method
  for bringing Villains of greater Consequence to a Sense of Guilt and
  Infamy.

                                                          JOYCE, jun^r.
              (_Chairman of the Committee for_ Taring _and_ Feathering.)

  ☞ If any Person should be so hardy as to tear this down, they may
  expect my severest Resentment.

                                                                 J. jun.

During the years 1773 and 1774 tea commissioners and tea consignees, in
addition to customs informers and importers of British goods, fell into
popular disfavor, and thus became subjects for tarring and feathering.
“Tiewaghnodago” in the Boston Gazette, December 20, 1773,[109] said that
he had been informed that “some _little_ Shopkeepers in this Town,”
finding that tea was not likely to be used, had raised the price of
coffee a few coppers per pound, and he asked “whether _Tar_ and
_Feathers_ would not be a constitutional encouragement for such eminent
Patriotism.”

In the period 1765–1775 there were likewise cases of mob violence where
houses were attacked and damaged by having missiles thrown at them and
where property was destroyed.[110] In one instance at least the owner of
goods which were destroyed by a mob recovered damages in the courts.
Early in the year 1772, according to S. G. Arnold,[111] there occurred
“a memorable instance of the triumph of law over popular prejudice.” One
David Hill was detected in selling goods included in the non-importation
agreement, and the goods were seized and destroyed by a mob. Hill
brought action in the Rhode Island courts, and the superior court
confirmed the judgment of the inferior court and gave the plaintiff two
hundred and eighty-two pounds damages and costs.

Tarring and feathering was not reserved for certain informers and
importers or for tea consignees alone, however. This punishment was
administered in at least two instances for offenses other than those
growing out of the political controversies of the time.

The Boston Gazette for November 6, 1769,[112] contained the following
item: “Last Thursday Afternoon a young Woman from the Country was
decoyed into one of the Barracks in Town, and most shamefully abused by
some of the Soldiers there:—the Person that enticed her thither with
promises of disposing of all her marketing there (who also belonged to
the Country) was afterwards taken by the Populace and several times
duck’d in the Water at one of the Docks in Town; but luckily for him he
made his escape from them sooner than was intended;—however, we hear,
that after he had crossed the Ferry to Charlestown, on his return home,
the People there being informed of the base part he had been acting,
took him and placed him in a Cart, and after tarring and feathering him
(the present popular Punishment for modern delinquents) they carted him
about that Town for two or three Hours, as a Spectacle of Contempt and a
Warning to others from practising such vile Artifices for the Delusion
and Ruin of the virtuous and innocent: He was then dismissed, and
permitted to proceed to the Town where he belonged, for them to act with
as they should see fit.”

In January, 1774, smallpox became prevalent in Marblehead,
Massachusetts, and an inoculating hospital was erected on Cat Island as
a private enterprise. This hospital, however, was popularly regarded
with suspicion and disfavor, for it was thought to be a source of
contagion. When four men were detected in the act of stealing clothing
from the hospital, they were promptly tarred and feathered, and, after
being placed in a cart and exhibited through the principal streets of
the town, were carried to Salem, accompanied by a procession of men and
boys, marching to the music of a fife and several drums. A number of new
cases of smallpox developed soon after this affair, and popular
indignation ran so high against the proprietors of the hospital that
they were openly threatened with personal violence and were finally
compelled to close its doors. Subsequently a rumor that the hospital was
to be opened again awakened fresh opposition, and on January 26 a party
of disguised men visited the island, and as a result of their visit the
building was completely destroyed by fire. Two men were arrested as
being implicated in the incendiarism and were confined in the Salem
jail, but a large number of men from Marblehead marched to Salem,
surrounded the jail, broke open the doors, overpowered the jailer and
his assistants, released the two prisoners and conducted them home in
triumph. A force of citizens was later organized by the sheriff for the
purpose of going to Marblehead to recapture the men, but when it became
known that an equally large force was organizing and arming in
Marblehead to protect them, the sheriff abandoned his purpose and no
further effort was made to prosecute the incendiaries. Before the
trouble connected with the hospital was finally ended, however, one of
the four men who had been tarred and feathered was again the subject of
popular indignation because of his bringing away clothing from Cat
Island. He was taken from his bed one night by a mob and carried to the
public whipping-post where he was severely whipped and beaten.[113]

During the year 1775, when the spirit of rebellion rose to the height of
armed resistance and open warfare, there was increased occasion for
recourse to summary procedure. In that year mobs gathered in many
places,[114] riots were numerous and cases of tarring and feathering
occurred in several of the colonies.

In June, 1775, Laughlin Martin and James Dealy were stripped of their
clothes, tarred and feathered, and carted through the Streets of
Charleston, South Carolina, by order of the “Secret Committee,” one of
the committees which had been formed to carry on an independent
government in that Province.[115] In August of the same year, this
committee had another man, “a Mr. Walker, Gunner of Fort Johnston,”
treated in the same way.[116]

In September, 1775, James Smith, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas
for Duchess County, New York, together with Coen Smith of the same
place, were “handsomely tarred and feathered” for acting in open
contempt of the resolves of the County Committee. “The judge undertook
to sue for, and recover the arms taken from the Tories by order of said
committee, and actually committed one of the committee, who assisted at
disarming the Tories, which enraged the people so much, that they rose
and rescued the prisoner, and poured out their resentment on this
villanous retailer of the law.”[117]

In December, 1775, “at Quibbletown, New Jersey, Thomas Randolph, cooper,
who had publicly proved himself an enemy to his country, by reviling and
using his utmost endeavors to oppose the proceedings of the continental
and provincial conventions, in defence of their rights and liberties;
and being judged a person not of consequence enough for a severer
punishment, was ordered to be stripped naked, well coated with tar and
feathers, and carried in a wagon publicly around the town—which
punishment was accordingly inflicted. As soon as he became duly sensible
of his offence, for which he earnestly begged pardon, and promised to
atone, as far as he was able, by a contrary behavior for the future, he
was released and suffered to return to his home, in less than half an
hour. The whole was conducted with that regularity and decorum that
ought to be observed in all public punishments.”[118]

In the later years of the Revolution, also, there were cases of tarring
and feathering. At Charleston, South Carolina, in 1776, “John Roberts, a
dissenting minister, was seized on suspicion of being an enemy to the
rights of America, when he was tarred and feathered; after which, the
populace, whose fury could not be appeased, erected a gibbet on which
they hanged him, and afterwards made a bonfire, in which Roberts,
together with the gibbet, was consumed to ashes.”[119]

During the campaign of April to December, 1776, for the possession of
the Hudson River, Tryon, who when governor of North Carolina had led the
militia against the Regulators, was “fomenting plots of a most dastardly
character against the persons and property of patriots. One of these was
the seizure of Washington himself. The plotters were sometimes
discovered, and, when they were, such was the exasperation of the New
York patriots that they did not hesitate to cruelly maltreat them, a
coat of tar and feathers being among the lightest penalties.”[120]

In Virginia the manner of punishing by tarring and feathering was
likewise sometimes followed. According to Wirt, “The name of ‘British
tory’ was of itself enough, at that period (the close of the
Revolution), to throw almost any company in Virginia into flames, and
was pretty generally a signal for a coat of tar and feathers; a signal
which was not very often disobeyed.”[121]

The practice of tarring and feathering was thus mainly confined to cases
in which popular indignation was aroused against Tories, or against
persons expressing Tory sentiments and conspiring to injure the American
cause. It is this fact that makes tarring and feathering particularly
characteristic of Revolutionary times. It is to be remembered, however,
that summary punishment was also administered in other ways. Various
other forms of corporal punishment, as well as the occasional infliction
of capital punishment, were very frequently adopted during the period of
the Revolution.

In the preceding chapter, in the discussion of the origin of the term
lynch-law, the legislative act was cited which indemnified Charles Lynch
and some others for the part which they had taken in suppressing a
conspiracy. A similar act of indemnification was passed by the
legislature of Virginia in the year 1779. This act reads as follows:

  “WHEREAS divers evil disposed persons on the frontiers of this
  commonwealth had broke out into an open insurrection and conspiracy,
  and actually levied war against the commonwealth, and it is
  represented to the present general assembly, that William Campbell,
  Walter Crockett, and other liege subjects of the commonwealth, aided
  by detachments of the militia and volunteers from the county of
  Washington, and other parts of the frontiers did by timely and
  effectual exertion, suppress and defeat such conspiracy: And whereas
  the necessary measures taken for that purpose may not be strictly
  warranted by law, although justifiable from the immediate urgency and
  imminence of the danger: _Be it therefore declared and enacted_, That
  the said William Campbell, Walter Crockett, and all other persons
  whatsoever concerned in suppressing the said conspiracy and
  insurrection, or in advising, issuing or executing any orders or
  measures taken for that purpose, stand indemnified and clearly
  exonerated of, and from all pains, penalties, prosecutions, actions,
  suits, and damages on account thereof: And that if any indictment,
  prosecution, action, or suit, shall be laid or brought against them,
  or any of them, for any act or thing done therein, the defendant or
  defendants may plead in bar, or the general issue, and give this act
  in evidence.”[122]

In the year 1836 the editor of the Southern Literary Messenger said that
frequent inquiry had been made in the preceding year as to the origin of
Lynch’s law. After an allusion to the historical interest of the
subject, he answered the inquiry in the following words:

  “It will be perceived from the annexed paper, that the law, so called,
  originated in 1780, in Pittsylvania, Virginia. Colonel William Lynch,
  of that county, was its author; and we are informed by a resident, who
  was a member of a body formed for the purpose of carrying it into
  effect, that the efforts of the association were wholly successful. A
  trained band of villains, whose operations extended from North to
  South, whose well concerted schemes had bidden defiance to the
  ordinary laws of the land, and whose success encouraged them to
  persevere in depredations upon an unoffending community, was dispersed
  and laid prostrate under the infliction of Lynch’s law. Of how many
  terrible, and deeply to be lamented consequences—of how great an
  amount of permanent evil—has the partial and temporary good been
  productive!

  “‘Whereas, many of the inhabitants of the county of Pittsylvania, as
  well as elsewhere, have sustained great and intolerable losses by a
  set of lawless men who have banded themselves together to deprive
  honest men of their just rights and property, by stealing their
  horses, counterfeiting, and passing paper currency, and committing
  many other species of villainy, too tedious to mention, and that those
  vile miscreants do still persist in their diabolical practices, and
  have hitherto escaped the civil power with impunity, it being almost
  useless and unnecessary to have recourse to our laws to suppress and
  punish those freebooters, they having it in their power to extricate
  themselves when brought to justice by suborning witnesses who do swear
  them clear—we, the subscribers, being determined to put a stop to the
  iniquitous practices of those unlawful and abandoned wretches, do
  enter into the following association, to wit: that next to our
  consciences, soul and body, we hold our rights and property, sacred
  and inviolable. We solemnly protest before God and the world, that
  (for the future) upon hearing or having sufficient reason to believe,
  that any villainy or species of villainy having been committed within
  our neighborhood, we will forthwith embody ourselves, and repair
  immediately to the person or persons suspected, or those under
  suspicious characters, harboring, aiding, or assisting those villains,
  and if they will not desist from their evil practices, we will inflict
  such corporeal punishment on him or them, as to us shall seem adequate
  to the crime committed or the damage sustained; that we will protect
  and defend each and every one of us, the subscribers, as well jointly
  as severally, from the insults and assaults offered by any other
  person in their behalf: and further, we do bind ourselves jointly and
  severally, our joint and several heirs &c. to pay or cause to be paid,
  all damages that shall or may accrue in consequence of this our
  laudable undertaking, and will pay an equal proportion according to
  our several abilities; and we, after having a sufficient number of
  subscribers to this association, will convene ourselves to some
  convenient place, and will make choice of our body five of the best
  and most discreet men belonging to our body, to direct and govern the
  whole, and we will strictly adhere to their determinations in all
  cases whatsoever relative to the above undertaking; and if any of our
  body summoned to attend the execution of this our plan, and fail so to
  do without a reasonable excuse, they shall forfeit and pay the sum of
  one hundred pounds current money of Virginia, to be appropriated
  toward defraying the contingent expenses of this our undertaking. In
  witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands, this 22d day September
  1780.’”[123]

The only indication of the source from which the editor obtained this
agreement is found in the reference to “a resident, who was a member of
a body formed for the purpose of carrying it into effect.” It is upon
this reference that its authenticity depends. The agreement sounds
genuine and is not out of harmony with the condition of affairs at that
time in Virginia. Nothing is known, however, of any Colonel William
Lynch in the county of Pittsylvania, Virginia.[124] It is possible that
the man referred to was Colonel Charles Lynch of Bedford County.

An instance of summary corporal punishment occurred in Virginia on
October 10, 1783, as is shown by the following act entitled “_An act of
indemnity to certain persons_”: “_Be it enacted by the General
Assembly_, That all and every person or persons who either directly or
indirectly committed any insult or injury against the person of a
certain Joseph Williamson, on the tenth day of October, in the year one
thousand seven hundred and eighty three, or breach of the peace on that
occasion, and which was previous to the ratification of the definitive
treaty between Great Britain and America, shall be, and they are hereby
respectively indemnified for the same, and shall be exonerated and
discharged of and from any fines, penalties, or forfeitures, which they
might have incurred thereby.”[125]

Judge Roane’s statement that there were many suits in 1792 for
inflicting Lynch’s law indicates that there were many cases of its
infliction in the years preceding that date. It seems probable,
therefore, that the practice of administering corporal punishment in a
summary manner was very prevalent in Virginia from 1780 to 1792.

During the period 1792–1819 accounts of lynch-law procedure are very
rare. There are but few sources of information on the subject during
that period. Indeed, it is true that the chief source of information on
the subject from 1792 to 1830 is the writings of travelers who have
chanced to witness or hear of instances of such procedure.

Under the date of November 29, 1819, W. Faux describes the treatment
given a young Yankee, of the name of Williams, near Princeton, Indiana,
two years earlier. He was suspected of having robbed a store, but only
circumstantial evidence could be adduced against him and he was
acquitted. “The people of the place, however, prejudiced against him, as
a Yankee, deputed four persons to inform him, that unless he quitted the
town and state immediately, he should receive Lynch’s law, that is, a
whipping in the woods. He departed, with his wife and child, next day,
on foot; but in the woods, four miles from Princeton, they were
overtaken by two men, armed with guns, dogs, and a whip, who said they
came to whip him, unless he would confess and discover to them the
stolen money, so that they might have it. He vainly expostulated with
them; but, in consideration of his wife’s entreaties and cries, they
remitted his sentence to thirteen lashes. One man then bound him to a
tree and lashed him with a cow-hide whip, while the other held and
gagged him; the alarmed wife, all the time, shrieking murder. He was
then untied, and told to depart from the state immediately, or he should
receive another whipping on the morrow, as a warning and terror to all
future coming Yankees.

“This poor fellow was of respectable parents at Berlin, in the state of
New York, and possessed a well-informed mind. He quitted the state, and
returning, soon after, to prosecute his executioners, died at
Evansville, before he had effected so desirable an object.”[126]

In “Letters from Illinois,” the second edition of which was published in
London in 1818, Morris Birkbeck writes:

  “There is nothing that I anticipate with so much satisfaction and
  security as the rapid development of society in our new country. Its
  elements are rude certainly, and heterogeneous. The first settlers,
  unprotected, and unassisted amid dangers and difficulties, have been
  accustomed from early youth to rely on their own powers; and they
  surrender with reluctance, and only by halves, their right of defence
  against every aggression, even to the laws which themselves have
  constituted.

  “They have been anxiously studious of mildness in the forming of these
  laws, and when, in practice, they seem inefficient, they too
  frequently proceed with Indian perseverance to acts of vengeance,
  inconsistent with the duty of forbearance essential to social man.
  Hence deeds of savage and even ferocious violence are too common to be
  viewed with the abhorrence due to them.

  “This disposition is evinced continually, and acted on without any
  feeling of private or personal animosity.

  “If a man, whom the public voice has proclaimed a thief or a swindler,
  escapes from justice for want of a legal proof of his guilt, though
  the law and a jury of his fellow citizens have acquitted him, ten to
  one but he is met with before he can quit the neighborhood, and, tied
  up to a sapling, receives a scourging that marks him for the rest of
  his life.

  “In Kentucky, whose institutions have acquired greater maturity, such
  events _have_ taken place some years ago; but now they would scarcely
  be tolerated, and they will soon be matter of history only, in Indiana
  and Illinois.

  “No crime but murder ‘of the first degree’ is punished with death, in
  any of the western states, nor, I believe, in the Union. In Kentucky
  there is a general penitentiary, for the punishment of other offences
  by imprisonment and labour.”[127]

William Newnham Blane, who traveled through the United States and Canada
in the years 1822 and 1823, described the lynch-law procedure of that
time as follows:

  “After leaving Carlyle, I took the Shawnee town road, that branches
  off to the S. E., and passed the Walnut Hills, and Moore’s Prairie.
  These two places had a year or two before been infested by a notorious
  gang of robbers and forgers, who had fixed themselves in these wild
  parts, in order to avoid justice. As the country became more settled,
  these desperadoes became more and more troublesome. The inhabitants
  therefore took that method of getting rid of them, that had been
  adopted not many years ago in Hopkinson and Henderson counties
  Kentucky, and which is absolutely necessary in new and thinly settled
  districts, where it is almost impossible to punish a criminal
  according to legal forms.

  “On such occasions therefore, all the quiet and industrious men of a
  district form themselves into companies, under the name of
  ‘Regulators.’ They appoint officers, put themselves under their
  orders, and bind themselves to assist and stand by each other. The
  first step they then take, is to send notice to any notorious
  vagabonds, desiring them to quit the State in a certain number of
  days, under the penalty of receiving a domiciliary visit. Should the
  person who receives the notice refuse to comply, they suddenly
  assemble, and when unexpected, go, in the night time, to the rogue’s
  house, take him out, tie him to a tree, and give him a severe
  whipping, every one of the party striking him a certain number of
  times.

  “This discipline is generally sufficient to drive off the culprit; but
  should he continue obstinate, and refuse to avail himself of another
  warning, the Regulators pay him a second visit, inflict a still
  severer whipping, with the addition probably of cutting off both his
  ears. No culprit has ever been known to remain after a second visit.
  For instance, an old man, the father of a family, all of whom he
  educated as robbers, fixed himself at Moore’s Prairie, and committed
  numerous thefts, &c. &c. He was hardy enough to remain after the first
  visit, when both he and his sons received a whipping. At the second
  visit the Regulators punished him very severely, and cut off his ears.
  This drove him off, together with his whole gang; and travellers can
  now pass in perfect safety, where it was once dangerous to travel
  alone.

  “There is also a company of Regulators near Vincennes, who have broken
  up a notorious gang of coiners and thieves who had fixed themselves
  near that place. These rascals, before they were driven off, had
  parties settled at different distances in the woods, and thus held
  communication and passed horses and stolen goods from one to another,
  from the Ohio to Lake Erie, and from thence into Canada or the New
  England States. Thus it was next to impossible to detect the robbers,
  or to recover the stolen property.

  “While I was staying at the house of a Mr. Mulligan in Illinois,
  thirty miles from St. Louis, one of the men, who had belonged to the
  gang near Vincennes, was taken up on the charge of passing counterfeit
  money....

  “This practice of _Regulating_ seems very strange to an European. I
  have talked with some of the chief men of the Regulators, who all
  lamented the necessity of such a system. They very sensibly remarked,
  that when the country became more thickly settled, there would no
  longer be any necessity for such proceedings, and that they should all
  be delighted at being able to obtain justice in a more formal manner.
  I forgot to mention, that the rascals punished, have sometimes
  prosecuted the Regulators, for an assault. The juries however, knowing
  the bad characters of the prosecutors, would give but trifling
  damages, which divided among so many, amounted to next to nothing for
  each individual.”[128]

In a book entitled “Letters from the West,” which was published in
London in 1828, Judge James Hall wrote on the subject of lynch-law as
follows:

  “Among the early settlers there was a way of trying causes, which may
  perhaps be new to you. No commentator has taken any notice of _Linch’s
  Law_, which was once the _lex loci_ of the frontiers. Its operation
  was as follows: When a horse thief, a counterfeiter, or any other
  desperate vagabond, infested a neighborhood, evading justice by
  cunning, or by a strong arm, or by the number of his confederates, the
  citizens formed themselves into a ‘_regulating company_,’ a kind of
  holy brotherhood, whose duty was to purge the community of its unruly
  members. Mounted, armed, and commanded by a leader, they proceeded to
  arrest such notorious offenders as were deemed fit subjects of
  exemplary justice; their operations were generally carried on in the
  night. Squire Birch, who was personated by one of the party,
  established his tribunal under a tree in the woods, and the culprit
  was brought before him, tried, and generally convicted; he was then
  tied to a tree, lashed without mercy, and ordered to leave the country
  within a given time, under pain of a second visitation. It seldom
  happened, that more than one or two were thus punished; their
  confederates took the hint and fled, or were admonished to quit the
  neighborhood. Neither the justice nor the policy of this practice can
  be defended; but it was often resorted to from necessity, and its
  operation was salutary, in ridding the country of miscreants whom the
  law was not strong enough to punish. It was liable to abuse, and was
  sometimes abused; but in general, it was conducted with moderation,
  and only exerted upon the basest and most lawless men. Sometimes the
  sufferers resorted to courts of justice for remuneration, and there
  have been instances of heavy damages being recovered of the
  _regulators_. Whenever a county became strong enough to enforce the
  laws, these high-handed doings ceased to be tolerated.”[129]

In the above extracts we have a fair description of the operation of
lynch-law as it was carried westward by the emigrants from Virginia and
the neighboring States. The weakness and inadequacy of the civil
regulations, and the presence of such criminals as the horse-thief, the
counterfeiter, the robber, and the desperado, who find the frontier both
a retreat from the consequences of past crime and a new theater for the
perpetration of crime, gave a constant justification for recourse to
lynch-law.

The usual manner of proceeding was for the settlers to consult together
and in a more or less formal way to establish “the institution of
Regulators.” Sometimes the Regulators were small bodies of men chosen by
the people to look after the interests of the community—in effect, they
were committees of safety. At other times, the Regulators were bodies of
men who voluntarily assumed the duty of policing a district. The duties
of such companies, whether known as Regulators or as Rangers or by some
other name, were to ferret out and punish criminals, to drive out
“suspicious characters,” and to exercise a general supervision over the
interests of the settlements in which they lived. Their statute-book was
the “code of his honor, Judge Lynch”[130]; their order of trial was
similar to that of a “drum-head court-martial”; the principles of their
punishment were certainty, rapidity, and inexorability. They were in
themselves judges, juries, witnesses, and executioners.

These bodies of men bound themselves by a regular compact, to the people
and to each other, to rid the community of all thieves, robbers,
plunderers, and villains of every description. Such compacts were
usually verbal but they were sometimes in writing.[131] The compact
entered into by the Regulators of North Carolina has already been cited.
If the agreement of 1780 in Virginia, to which the editor of the
Southern Literary Messenger gave his indorsement, be accepted as
genuine, we have a record of another such compact. There is recorded,
also, a compact entered into by a company of Regulators in Illinois in
1820. It reads as follows:

  “_Know all men by these presents_:

  “That we (_here follow twelve names_), citizens of —— settlement, in
  the state of Illinois, have this day, _jointly and severally_, bound
  themselves together as a company of Rangers and Regulators, to protect
  this settlement against the crimes and misdemeanors of, all and
  singular, every person or persons whomsoever, and especially against
  _all horse-thieves, and renegades, and robbers_. And we do by these
  presents, hereby bind ourselves, jointly and severally as aforesaid,
  unto each other, and to the fellow-citizens of this settlement, to
  punish, according to the code of his honor, Judge Lynch, all
  violations of the law, _against the peace and dignity of the said
  people of_ —— settlement; and to discover and bring to speedy
  punishment, _all illegal combinations_—to rid the country of such as
  are dangerous to the welfare of this settlement—to preserve the peace,
  and _generally to vindicate the law_, within the settlement aforesaid.
  All of which purposes we are to accomplish as peaceably as possible:
  _but we are to accomplish them one way or another_.

  “In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and affixed our
  seals, this twelfth day of October, _Anno Domini_, eighteen hundred
  and twenty.

                                                 (Signed by twelve men.)

  “Acknowledged and subscribed in the presence of

                                                           “C——T. H——n,
                                                           “J——P. D——n,”

and five others, who seem to have been a portion of “the fellow-citizens
of this settlement,” referred to in the document.[132]

The companies of Regulators were generally organized only temporarily to
meet some emergency in particular communities. The one striking
exception is the Regulation movement in the Carolinas. The circumstances
surrounding that movement, however, were not paralleled elsewhere. The
duration and strength of the organization there, was undoubtedly due to
the prominence of the political factor in its existence. Leaving out of
consideration the Carolina Regulation and the summary practices which
were incident to the Revolutionary War, there existed almost exclusively
down to 1830 what may be called the frontier type of lynch-law pure and
simple. This form of lynch-law procedure has always been justified on
the ground of necessity, and has been condemned only because of its
liability to abuse. As one writer has said, referring to the Regulators:
“Their acts may sometimes have been high-handed and unjustifiable, but
on the whole—and it is only in such a view that social institutions are
to be estimated—they were the preservers of the communities for whom
they acted. In time, it is true, they degenerated, and sometimes the
corps fell into the hands of the very men they were organized to punish.

“Every social organization is liable to misdirection, and this, among
others, has been perverted to the furtherance of selfish and
unprincipled purposes; for, like prejudices and habits of thought,
organized institutions frequently survive the necessities which call
them into existence. Abuses grow up under all systems; and, perhaps, the
worst abuse of all, is a measure or expedient, good though temporary,
retained after the passing away of the time for which it was
adopted.”[133]

If it be said that “all law emanates from the people, and is, in fact,
whether written or not, nothing more or less than certain rules of
action by which a people agree to be governed,” then the frontier type
of lynch-law is scarcely more than one step removed from genuine law.
For instance, in the year 1834, a large number of persons, citizens of
the United States, but of no particular state or territory, and beyond
the pale of the regular operations of the law, were collected at a place
called _Dubuque’s mines_, west of the Mississippi, and north of the
State of Missouri. On May 29 of that year, Patrick O’Conner, who had the
reputation of being a desperate character, shot and killed George
O’Keefe. O’Conner “was arrested by mutual consent of all parties, and,
on the next day, was duly tried, by a jury of twelve citizens, taken
from the multitude. Privilege was given to the prisoner to object to all
such as he chose not to be tried by, and he made no objections to the
mode of trial. He was allowed the privilege of choosing a friend to
counsel with him, and assist in conducting the trial.”

After hearing the testimony of the witnesses that were called, the jury
retired, and “after a session of about two hours,” returned the
following verdict: “We, the jury selected to try Patrick O’Conner, for
the murder of George O’Keefe, on the 29th inst. after examining the
witnesses on oath, and attentively hearing and considering the testimony
against the prisoner, do unanimously agree that the said O’Conner is
guilty of murder in the highest degree, and are of opinion that the said
O’Conner has done an act which, in a land of laws, would forfeit his
life. And inasmuch as the security of the lives of the good citizens of
this country requires that an example should be made, to preserve order
and convince evil disposed persons that this is not a place where the
lives of men may be taken with impunity—we are of opinion that the said
O’Conner should be carefully secured until the 20th day of June, and
that, at the hour of 12 o’clock, of said day, the said Patrick O’Conner
be conducted to the place of execution, and there be hung by the neck
until he is dead.” This verdict was signed by the twelve members of the
jury.

Pursuant to a public notice, a meeting of the citizens was held on June
17 to make arrangements for the execution of O’Conner on June 20. L.
Wheeler was requested to take command of a company of volunteers to act
as a guard. A committee of three was appointed to make the necessary
arrangements for the execution and burial of O’Conner. Henry Adams was
requested to act as sheriff on the day of the execution. A committee of
three was appointed to collect sums to defray the necessary expense “for
the keeping, executing, burial, &c., of said O’Conner.” It was voted
that the sheriff be allowed the sum of twenty-five dollars for the
keeping and execution of said O’Conner; and that if there were anything
over and above that amount, after all necessary expenses were paid, the
same should go to the executioner.

“At 12 o’clock, on the day of the execution, the prisoner was taken from
his place of confinement, under a guard of a company of volunteers,
commanded by L. Wheeler, to the place of execution, where had assembled
about 1,500 citizens. He was placed on a cart, the rope was made fast to
the gallows, when the cart was driven away, leaving the prisoner
suspended between the heavens and the earth.

“The whole proceedings were carried on with the utmost regularity and
good order. By mutual consent of all, every coffee house was kept
closed, and not a drop of spirits was sold until after the
execution.”[134]

At the time of this affair no judicial or civil regulations were yet
established in that region. Under these circumstances, then, was Patrick
O’Conner legally executed or was he executed by lynch-law? Doubtless
most men will agree that he was, to all intents and purposes, legally
executed, and yet many instances of the operation of lynch-law on the
frontier were scarcely less justifiable, though the trial and infliction
of punishment may have been far more summary.

In general, the punishments administered under lynch-law previous to
1830 were not severe, usually consisting of a whipping, or some other
form of corporal punishment, and banishment after a specified time.
Niles’ Register for July 17, 1824 (26: 326) contains the following:
“Kentucky.—Several murders have lately been committed in this state by
persons who call themselves ‘regulators’—but effectual measures have
been taken to arrest and punish them.” This case was evidently an abuse
of lynch-law; a band of desperadoes, presumably, adopted the name of
“regulators” as a cloak for their misdeeds, and thus sought immunity
from punishment. Capital punishment was very rarely inflicted by the
substantial and respectable settlers who sometimes found it necessary to
use lynch-law methods at this early period.

It thus appears that the summary and extra-legal methods of punishment
adopted during colonial times, and the summary practices of the time of
the Revolution, were carried by the emigrants from the original colonies
as they pushed the line of the frontier further and further to the
westward. Frequent occasion was found on the frontier for the use of
such methods and practices to curb the activity of the lawless and the
vicious. When the legislature of Virginia authoritatively declared that
circumstances may arise under which measures, though not strictly
warranted by law, are justifiable from the imminence of the danger, it
gave expression to a principle which found ready acceptance among the
early settlers exposed to the dangers and vicissitudes of frontier life.
Though the statement of the principle by the legislature of Virginia may
not have been known, and probably was not known, to very many of those
who took an active part in the subsequent history of lynch-law,
nevertheless the principle itself was a matter of common knowledge, for
it was in the air, as it were, and it was repeatedly embodied in action.
In reality, the subsequent history of lynch-law is but the working out
of this principle under varying conditions.




                               CHAPTER IV
                          LYNCH-LAW 1830–1860


With the exception of the summary practices characteristic of
Revolutionary times, the lynch-law procedure that prevailed prior to
1830 was largely of the frontier type. Even in Revolutionary times,
however, when war and political controversies had brought about a state
of social disruption leading to the adoption of lynch-law procedure in
well settled communities, many of the instances of such procedure might
properly be classified under the frontier type. In remote parts of many
of the colonies the civil regulations had never been sufficiently
established to insure the punishment of public offenders, and recourse
was had to summary and extra-legal methods on the ground that there was
a lack of courts and other requisites for legal procedure. The
Regulation movement in the Carolinas, though stimulated by political
dissension, had its basis and origin in frontier conditions; and it is
obvious that lynch-law operated under frontier conditions in the
rough-and-ready methods of administering justice which were adopted by
the pioneers who moved westward over the Alleghanies into the valley of
the Mississippi. Before about the year 1830, then, lynch-law was
confined almost entirely to the border settlements, and was generally
excused and justified on the ground of necessity. It was not regarded as
a serious menace to law and order. It was adopted merely as a temporary
expedient which was expected to fall into disuse when the civil
government and the judiciary became firmly established.

Soon after 1830 a change took place. The anti-slavery agitation was
accompanied by a revival of lynch-law, and the practice spread
throughout the country. Not only did lynch-law continue to be exercised
occasionally in the border settlements, but it was revived in
well-established communities for the purpose of putting down
abolitionism. The early thirties witnessed many acts of violence. The
following appeared in the Massachusetts Journal in the year 1831:
“Progress of Violence.—It ought to be observed that there never was a
time of peace in which violence was so common in this country as at this
period.... Citizens who feel offended take the law into their own hands
without ceremony.” Then follows a recital of thirteen cases of violence
which occurred within two or three months, including riots, duels,
insurrections of negroes, persecutions of abolitionists, &c.[135]

The following instances, selected with reference to the localities in
which they occurred, indicate the extent of territory over which
lynch-law practices prevailed at this time:

“Wilmington, N. C., Sept. 28.—Three ringleaders of the late diabolical
conspiracy were executed at Onslow Court House, on Friday evening last,
23d inst. by the people. There was a fourth, who escaped during the
tumult.”[136] The editor of the Liberator adds: “‘Executed by the
people’ doubtless means executed by a mob, on suspicion of guilt,
without investigation or trial.”

A Mr. Robinson was lashed on the bare back at Petersburg, Virginia, for
saying “that black men have, in the abstract, a right to their freedom.”
After the scourging he was told to leave Petersburg and never return or
he would be treated “worser.”[137]

In Georgia, a man, named John Lamb, was severely treated because he had
subscribed to the Liberator. “A mob of unprincipled vagabonds assembled
around his house and violently took him out and tarred and feathered
him. They then poured oil on his head and set fire to it. They next
carried him on a rail to the river and ducked him. And then they
returned with him to a post near Darraugh and Simms’ Tavern, and whipped
him.”[138]

The slave insurrection in Virginia under the leadership of Nat Turner
took place in August of the year 1831. The nature and extent of this
insurrection has been frequently misunderstood. On the one hand, it has
been represented as having been confined to a magisterial district; on
the other hand, its leader is said to have recruited his forces through
all Eastern Virginia and through North Carolina. Both of these views are
in a measure true.[139]

Nat was a negro endowed with a mind capable of high attainments. He was
a careful student of the Bible and a Baptist preacher. He read the
newspapers and every book within his reach, and he was an attentive
listener at discussions of the political and social questions of the
day. But his mind grappled with things beyond its reach. The example of
Toussaint L’Ouverture in the island of Hayti, and that of Gabriel
Prosser in Richmond in 1800, together with the speeches and writings of
abolitionists, inspired him to make an attempt to “call the attention of
the civilized world to the condition of his race.” He became a complete
fanatic and believed that the Lord had destined him to free his race.
The red tint of the autumn leaves was a sign of the blood which was to
be shed. The eclipse of the sun in February and its peculiar appearance
in August, 1831, were to him omens indicating that the time had come for
him to put his plans into operation.

For several years plans for insurrection had been maturing in Nat’s
mind, and by February, 1831, he had so far determined upon his scheme
that he related it to four of the most influential negroes of his
section. From that time every effort was made to enlist the co-operation
of other slaves, but with the greatest patience and prudence. He deemed
it possible to conquer the county of Southampton, march to the Dismal
Swamp, collecting the slaves as he went, and so gradually overcome the
State, as the Americans had the British in the Revolutionary War.

On the night of Sunday, August 21, Nat opened the insurrection. A
misunderstanding in regard to the date deprived him of a few of his
followers, but, at the head of a small party which increased in numbers
as it proceeded, he went from house to house murdering every white
person that could be found. It is characterized as a massacre “barbarous
beyond degree.” Depredations, murders, and the most revolting crimes
were committed in cold blood. Before the insurrection was put down about
sixty whites,—men, women and children,—were slaughtered. The condition
of affairs in Southampton for about ten days after the massacre is best
described by a committee of citizens in a letter to President Jackson,
on the 29th of August, of which the following is an extract: “Most of
the havoc has been confined to a limited section of our county, but so
inhuman has been the butchery, so indiscriminate the carnage, that the
tomahawk and scalping knife have now no horrors. Along the road traveled
by our rebellious blacks, comprising a distance of something like
twenty-seven miles, no white soul now lives to tell how fiendlike was
their purpose. In the bosom of almost every family this enemy still
exists. Our homes, those near the scenes of havoc, as well as others
more remote, have all been deserted and our families gathered together
and guarded at public places in the county; and, still further, the
excitement is so great that were the justices to pronounce a slave
innocent, we fear a mob would be the consequence.”[140]

Many of the rebellious slaves were shot on sight and some innocent
negroes suffered. Some prisoners taken near Cross Keys were shot by the
Murfreesboro troops and their heads were left for weeks stuck up on
poles as a warning to all who should undertake a similar plot. The
captain of the marines, as they marched through Vicksville on their way
home, bore upon his sword the head of a rebel. A negress who attempted
to kill a Mrs. Francis was dragged out, after she had been taken
prisoner, tied to an oak tree, and her body riddled with bullets. It is
said that some of the slaves suffered fearful torture, being burnt with
red-hot irons and their bodies being horribly mutilated, before death
came to their relief. Nat was persecuted with pin-pricks and soundly
whipped before he was put in jail to await his trial.

According to Drewry, however, although “much excitement and rashness had
prevailed in the pursuit and capture of the rebels, the cases of mercy
and humanity overshadow those of barbarity and leave the decision in
favor of the former.” Fifty-three of the sixty or seventy negroes
connected with the massacre were brought before the county court. Of
these seventeen were executed and twelve transported. The rest were
discharged, except the four free negroes who were sent on to the
Superior Court, three of whom were executed. Nat and his three
associate-leaders, Hark, Nelson, and Sam, were hung according to the
sentence of the court. “The bodies of those executed, with one
exception, were buried in a decent and becoming manner. That of Nat
Turner was delivered to the doctors, who skinned it and made grease of
the flesh.”

The execution of the plot was thus confined to a magisterial district of
three thousand inhabitants. Yet every effort had been made to rouse the
negroes of neighboring counties in Virginia and North Carolina. The
influence of the insurrection was wide-spread, extending to the North as
well as the South. The immediate result in many parts of the South was
the greatest excitement, alarm, and confusion. “Men went about in
groups, the militia drills were renewed, and the arms called in a few
months before, reissued.” Thomas Gray, who lived in Southampton, said:
“It is the first instance in our history of an open rebellion of the
slaves, and attended with such atrocious circumstances of cruelty and
destruction as could not fail to leave a deep impression, not only on
the minds of the community where the fearful tragedy was wrought, but
throughout every portion of our country in which this population is
found.” In the North the immediate effect was a more pronounced
conviction of the evils of slavery. In general, the effect of the
Southampton insurrection was to center public consideration on the slave
question.[141] Its influence was indirect, rather than direct, in
stimulating recourse to lynch-law in the country.

During the spring and summer of 1834 there was a great deal of rioting
in which Irishmen were principally concerned. Several riots occurred in
New York City and in Philadelphia between whites and blacks, which were
said to be due to the abolitionists having stirred up the blacks.[142]
The following appeared in the Boston Whig in October, 1834: “The history
of the proceedings of the past year furnishes examples of outrage and
violence altogether unprecedented in the annals of our country. It would
seem that the supremacy of the laws is to be no farther regarded than it
coincides with the caprices and prejudices of an infuriated and
misguided and ignorant populace.... Mobs, which now seem to be the order
of the day, are of recent origin among us.... Our newspapers now, with a
few honorable exceptions, encourage these outrages and barbarous
proceedings, and by the inflammatory articles in their columns, incite
to the commission of the most heinous crimes.”[143]

The expression “Lynch’s law” first appears in the Liberator in the issue
of September 27, 1834 (4: 153), in an extract from the Lancaster
(Pennsylvania) Journal. The passage quoted is as follows: “In our quiet
village of New Holland, we understand _Lynch’s law_ was carried into
execution last week, against a stranger who had given some offence to
the inhabitants. The man was taken from his domicile, tarred and
feathered in the true Yankee style, marched out of town and let run. We
have not heard the cause of this summary proceeding.”

Another extract from the Lancaster Journal reads as follows: “We have
heard of another case of an appeal to Lynch’s code. A celebrated
Philadelphia doctor, a disciple of the Tappan school, who could not find
room for the overflowings of his milk of human kindness in the city of
brotherly love, paid a visit to Columbia, in this county, a few days
since, prepared, it is said, to deliver a course of amalgamation
lectures. A barrel of tar was purchased, and a pillow well stuffed with
feathers procured for the occasion. A hint of these proceedings was
given to the learned Doctor’s friends, who did not keep the secret, and
the Doctor not wishing to be exhibited in the costume of a goose, took
wing in an eastern direction, and has not been heard of since.”[144]

The expression “Lynch’s law” first appears in Niles’ Register under the
date of October 5, 1833 (45: 87), in an extract from the St. Louis
Republican. The quotation is as follows: “‘Lynch’s Law.’ We have heard,
that capt. _Slick_ summoned his corps the other night, and obtained
possession of a man with whose misdeeds they had become familiar,
carried him to the prairie near town, and administered ‘Lynch’s Law’
upon him in fine style. He received about fifty lashes—and was ordered
to decamp. The offence consisted in cheating at the gaming table—whereof
he was over-fond.... Several very effective demonstrations have been
made upon the gamblers in and about town, and they have been obliged to
make themselves scarce. This is as it should be.”

Lynch-law proceedings were inaugurated against gamblers in Virginia
about a year later. Niles’ Register for October 4, 1834 (47: 66) says:
“Large nests of gamblers in Richmond and Norfolk were completely routed,
a short time ago, by summary processes—numerous bodies of young men
having taken the matter in charge. They broke into the gambling houses,
and destroyed all the apparatus and furniture—but farther than this,
committed no acts of violence. Some curious disclosures of the great
profits made by the knaves have been brought to light by these
proceedings.”

The most notorious case of an appeal to summary procedure against
gamblers occurred in July, 1835, at Vicksburg, Mississippi. Professional
gamblers had for years made Vicksburg their rendezvous and certain
sections of the city were almost wholly given over to them. Frequently,
in armed bodies, they disturbed the good order of public assemblages,
insulted citizens on the streets, and openly defied the civil
authorities. The laws were found ineffectual for their punishment; their
numbers and their crimes continually increased.[145] At a barbecue on
the Fourth of July one of these gamblers, named Cakler, became insolent
and created a disturbance. Later a meeting was held and an anti-gambling
society was organized. “It was determined to take him (Cakler) into the
woods and _Lynch_ him—which is a mode of punishment provided for such as
become obnoxious in a manner which the law cannot reach. He was
immediately carried out under a guard, attended by a crowd of
respectable citizens—tied to a tree, punished with stripes—tarred and
feathered; and ordered to leave town in forty-eight hours.” The
following morning public notice was given that all gamblers must leave
the town in twenty-four hours. That night another was “Lynched.” The
next morning the citizens understood that a noted gambler, named North,
had defied them, barricaded his house, and together with some of his
fellows had made preparations to stay in the town. The volunteers were
immediately assembled and, followed by a crowd of citizens, marched to
North’s residence and demanded an unconditional surrender. This was
refused. The house was then surrounded and an attempt made to force an
entrance. Just as the door was burst open, Dr. H. S. Bodley, a highly
respected citizen, was shot and instantly killed by the gamblers.
Greatly incensed at this, the crowd rushed into the building and dragged
out the inmates, one of whom had been seriously wounded, hurried them
without ceremony to the common gallows and hanged them. Five gamblers
were thus executed at this time and their bodies left suspended for
twenty-four hours.[146]

About the time of the Vicksburg affair suspicion was aroused in Madison
County, Mississippi, that the Murrell gang had organized the blacks for
an insurrection.[147] “Two individuals, by name Cotton and Saunders,
both of them steam doctors by profession,” were thought to be
prominently connected with the scheme. A “committee of investigation”
was appointed by a mass-meeting of the citizens and as a result of the
investigation the two “steam doctors” and three other white men were
hanged, and also several negroes, “some ten or fifteen,” without any
process at law.[148]

J. H. Ingraham, writing of conditions in Mississippi at about this time,
after describing a “chain gang” of negroes, uses the following language:
“In Natchez, negro criminals only are thus honored—a coat of tar and
feathers’ being applied to those white men who may require some kind of
discipline not provided by the courts of justice. This last summary
process of popular justice, or more properly excitement, termed ‘Lynch’s
law’, I believe, from its originator, is too much in vogue in this
state. In the resentment of public as well as private wrongs,
individuals have long been in the habit of forestalling and improving
upon the decisions of the courts, by taking the execution of the laws
into their own hands.... The want of a penitentiary has had a tendency
to keep this custom alive in this state longer than it would otherwise
have existed. When an individual is guilty of any offence, which renders
him amenable to the laws, he must either be acquitted altogether or
suffer death.”[149]

Lynch-law was also known in the eastern states at this time. Not only
were there mobs which dealt summarily with offenders, as in the year
1831, but their proceedings were known by a different name. It was now
no longer simply “mobs” and “mobocracy,” but “Lynch’s law,” and “Judge
Lynch’s court” as well. The Boston Daily Advertiser in July, 1835, gave
expression to the following, under the heading “Lynch’s Law”: “We have
had occasion of late to advert to the use of this term in our paper, as
indicating punishments, wantonly and in disregard of law, applied in
certain portions of our country to individuals suspected or guilty of
crime.”[150] On the night of September 10, 1835, a gallows was erected
in Brighton Street, Boston, in front of Mr. Garrison’s house, with two
ropes suspended therefrom. On the crossbar was the inscription “Judge
Lynch’s law.”[151]

The following appeared in Niles’ Register, October 3, 1835 (49: 76–7):
“Our village (Kanawha Salines, W. Va.) was thrown into considerable
commotion on Friday morning last in consequence of the arrival of judge
Lynch among us. His business was soon ascertained, and by his authority
four white men from Ohio were soon arrested and tried before 12
intelligent persons of our county, for endeavoring to persuade several
slaves to leave their masters, for some free state.... These congenial
spirits of Garrison, Tappan & Co. were arrested in the neighborhood of
our village, tried, condemned, and received the sentence pronounced on
them by the jury. That is to say, Joe Gill and the elder Drake to
receive nine and thirty lashes each, and leave the county in 24 hours;
the younger Drake, with Ross, to be discharged for want of evidence, but
with a promise from them that they would also quit the county in 24
hours. The evidence ... produced an unanimous verdict on the part of the
jury, that two should be _lynched_ and the other two excused, provided
they would leave this part of the country.”

The following appeared in Niles’ Register, December 5, 1835 (49: 228):
“Lynch law in Colerain. The sect known as perfectionists have recently
been making some converts in Colerain (Franklin County, Mass.), and
holding meetings there considerably to the annoyance of the majority of
the inhabitants. We learn that one of the leaders ... who was suspected
of taking with his female disciples some liberties inconsistent with the
holiness of his profession, was taken out a few days since, ridden
nearly three miles upon a rail, tarred and feathered, and dismissed,
with an admonition to quit the town—a piece of advice with which he has
since complied.”[152]

Some idea of the prevalence of mob violence and lynch-law procedure in
1835 is obtained from the following editorials in Niles’ Register:

  “Meetings have been held at Danville, Kentucky; at Richmond and
  Petersburg and many other towns in Virginia; at Charleston, South
  Carolina; at many places in Mississippi; and, indeed, it may be
  generally said in all the south and southwest in consequence of the
  flood of incendiary publications let loose by a few ‘anti-slavery’ men
  of the north, inciting the negroes to insurrection, and murder, and
  desolation; and, at as many places, perhaps, a like spirit has been
  shown against _gamblers_. Anti-gaming societies have been introduced
  in a number of cities and towns. _Executions_ by ‘Lynch law,’ have
  been numerous. Acts of personal violence, on other accounts, some of
  which are terrific, also abound. Society is in an awful state. What is
  the cause of it?”[153]

  “During the last and the present week we have cut out and laid aside
  more than 500 articles, relating to the various _excitements_ now
  acting on the people of the United States, public and private!
  _Society seems everywhere unhinged_, and the demon of ‘blood and
  slaughter’ has been let loose upon us! We have the _slave_ question in
  many different forms, including the proceedings of _kidnappers_ and
  _manstealers_—and others belonging to the _free negroes_: the
  proscription and prosecution of _gamblers_; with mobs growing out of
  _local matters_—and a great collection of acts of violence of a
  _private_, or _personal_ nature, ending in death; and regret to
  believe, also, that an awful _political_ outcry is about to be raised
  to rally the ‘poor against the rich’! We have executions, and murders,
  and riots to the utmost limits of the union. The character of our
  countrymen seems suddenly changed, and thousands interpret the law in
  their own way—sometimes in one case, and then in another, guided
  apparently only by their own will!... We lately gave, by way of a
  specimen, a few articles of a nature similar to those now in our
  possession. We cannot consent to hold up our country to the contempt
  and scorn of the old world, and shall, therefore, generally suppress
  them, though some cases of peculiar atrocity must be inserted. Let the
  laws rule. And let no one do anything that may have a tendency to
  bring them into popular disrespect!”[154]

Even though some allowance for exaggeration in the above statements may
be necessary, there yet remains unquestionable evidence of a very
unsettled state of affairs.[155] An editorial written in a less
sensational style appeared in the Register in October. The first
sentences are as follows: “Meetings of the people have been held in
nearly all the chief cities and towns in the northern states—at which
the proceedings of the abolitionists were rejected and disavowed, with
great unanimity and much zeal. And in the south we almost daily hear of
‘judge Lynch,’ and of persons who are flogged and driven away, or
‘executed,’ under sentences rendered by him.”[156]

Judge Jay in a charge to a Grand Jury at White Plains, New York, in
November, 1835, referred to the “spirit of lawless violence” that was
abroad in the land, and spoke of the danger to civil and religious
liberty if it were not arrested. About the same time, Judge Cranch, in a
similar charge to a Grand Jury in the District of Columbia, spoke of the
“state of excitement” which existed in some parts of the country.[157]

Some attributed the cause of all this excitement to the
abolitionists.[158] A correspondent of the Medina (Ohio) Free Press
early in the year 1836 wrote as follows: “When a body of men with such
feelings and principles, begin to distract the nation with their mad
schemes, it is high time for a community to notice them. I am no
advocate of Lynch law, but I must say that if Lynch law must be
practised, I know of no fitter subjects for its operation than such
fanatics.”[159] The following appears in an article on Lynch Law in
America published in England in 1877: “Among the institutions specially
American, few have had worse odour in England than what is commonly
known as ‘Lynch law.’ In the time of the anti-slavery agitation the
recourse to Lynch law by the supporters of ‘the domestic institution,’
or ‘involuntary servitude,’ as it was euphoniously called, caused just
indignation. It was by Lynch law that men who dared to speak against
slavery were silenced in the Slave States.”[160] Thus, the defenders of
slavery in the Southern States were highly incensed at the interference
of abolitionists whom they felt knew but little about the actual
conditions, and laid upon the shoulders of these “fanatics” the blame
for the necessity of resorting to lynch-law; the abolitionists, on the
other hand, said that lawless violence was the direct result of
slavery[161] and the attempt of the South to put down free discussion by
means of force.

The years of Jackson’s presidency, 1829–1837, have been distinguished by
political writers as the Jacksonian period,—a period in which there was
an unusual amount of turbulence and violence. It has been repeatedly
suggested that Jackson’s own arbitrary temperament and example did
something to set this fashion. “It is, however, more just to see, both
in the President himself and in the mobs of his time of power, symptoms
of one and the same thing; namely, a great democratic upheaval, the
wilful self-assertion of a masterful people, and of a man who was their
true representative.... During Jackson’s eight years everything is
changing; both society and politics are undergoing revolution; deep
organic processes are in progress; significant atmospheric changes are
setting in.”[162] “It is not possible that a growing nation should
spread over new territory, and feel the thrill of its own young energies
contending successfully with nature in all her rude force, without
social commotions and a certain recklessness and uproar. The contagion
of these forms of disorder produces other and less excusable
forms.”[163]

The cause for all the turbulence and violence lay deeper than
abolitionism, slavery, or the character of political leaders. These were
merely the manifestations of the disruption of underlying social forces
which were warring against each other while seeking to come to a stable
equilibrium under new and changed conditions. Society was in process of
reorganization. It was a time of social readjustment. This was the
condition of society which existed, and it was a condition conducive to
the spread of lynch-law.

It was due to this fact that the term lynch-law gained a permanent place
in the English language. Early in the forties, as mentioned in the
introduction, the dictionaries admitted the term to their list and thus
gave to it the seal of their approval. A writer in Harper’s Magazine for
May, 1859 (p. 794) says: “I think I had never heard of lynch-law until
about the year 1834, when the citizens of Vicksburg organized themselves
into a Court of Uncommon Pleas, with special reference to certain men in
their midst who were, or were said to be, ‘living on the borders of the
law.’ And I well remember, boy as I was, the sensation with which the
news of the hanging of the Vicksburg gamblers was received in the old
States, and how soon the terms ‘Lynch law’ and ‘lynching’ became
familiar as household words.” It was the application of lynch-law, then,
to the gamblers infesting the towns along the Mississippi River that
familiarized the public with the term, and it was the constant exercise
of summary methods of punishment against abolitionists and other
unpopular individuals in various parts of the country that furnished the
occasion for its continued use.

In the month of May, 1835, two negroes were burned to death near Mobile,
Alabama, for “most barbarously murdering” two children. The murderers
had their trial, the result of which is given in the following paragraph
taken from a Mobile paper: “As the Court pronounced the only sentence
known to the law—the smothered flame broke forth. The laws of the
country had never conceived that crimes could be perpetrated with such
peculiar circumstances of barbarity, and had therefore provided no
adequate punishment. Their lives were justly forfeited to the laws of
the country, but the peculiar circumstances demanded that the ordinary
punishment should be departed from—they were seized, taken to the place
where they had perpetrated the act, and burned to death.”[164]

A case of burning alive, which on account of the subsequent events
gained great notoriety, occurred at St. Louis, Missouri, April 28, 1836.
One writer designated it as “the execution of ‘Lynch Law’ upon a yellow
fellow, by means of a slow fire.” A colored man was arrested on board a
boat by a deputy sheriff and a constable. Another colored man, a free
mulatto, assisted him to escape, and the officers immediately arrested
the mulatto. He, however, turned upon the officers, drew a knife and
stabbed Deputy Sheriff Hammond, killing him instantly, and also
seriously wounded Mr. Mull, the constable. He was finally captured,
however, and locked up in the jail. Later the people assembled and,
after threatening to tear down the jail if he was not delivered to them,
secured the prisoner, conducted him to the outskirts of the city, placed
a chain round his neck and a rope round his body, and thus fastened him
to a tree a few feet from the ground. A fire was then placed round the
tree and he was roasted alive.[165]

When this case came up for consideration before the Grand Jury of St.
Louis County, Judge Lawless—according to subsequent comments rightly
named—made the following charge:

  “I have reflected much on this matter, and after weighing all the
  considerations that present themselves as bearing upon it, I feel it
  my duty to state my opinion to be, that whether the Grand Jury shall
  act at all, depends upon the solution of this preliminary question,
  namely, whether the destruction of McIntosh was the act of the ‘few’
  or the act of the ‘many.’

  “If on a calm view of the circumstances attending this dreadful
  transaction, you shall be of opinion that it was perpetrated by a
  definite, and, compared to the population of St. Louis, a _small_
  number of individuals, separate from the mass, and evidently taking
  upon themselves, as contradistinguished from the multitude, the
  responsibility of the act, my opinion is that you ought to indict them
  all, without a single exception.

  “If on the other hand, the destruction of the murderer of Hammond was
  the act as I have said, of the many—of the multitude, in the ordinary
  sense of those words—not the act of numerable and ascertainable
  malefactors, but of congregated thousands, seized upon and impelled by
  that mysterious, metaphysical, and almost electric phrenzy, which, in
  all nations and ages, has hurried on the infuriated multitude to deeds
  of death and destruction—then, I say, act not at all in the matter—the
  case then transcends your jurisdiction—it is beyond the reach of human
  law.”[166]

It was for denouncing the burning of this colored man and violently
attacking Judge Lawless in his Observer that the Rev. E. P. Lovejoy had
his printing-office destroyed by a mob in St. Louis, and was forced to
remove his paper to Alton, Illinois. He did not cease to express his
convictions, however, and neither did his persecutions cease. Three
times his press was destroyed by mobs. On November 7, 1837, while
endeavoring to protect his property, he met his death at the hands of an
Alton mob.

In an address on “The Perpetuation of our Political Institutions,”
delivered before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois, on
January 27, 1837, Abraham Lincoln characterized the spirit of the times
in the following way:

  “Accounts of outrages committed by mobs form the everyday news of the
  times. They have pervaded the country from New England to Louisiana;
  they are neither peculiar to the eternal snows of the former nor the
  burning suns of the latter; they are not the creature of climate,
  neither are they confined to the slaveholding or the non-slaveholding
  States. Alike they spring up among the pleasure-hunting masters of
  Southern slaves, and the order-loving citizens of the land of steady
  habits. Whatever then their cause may be, it is common to the whole
  country.

  “It would be tedious as well as useless to recount the horrors of all
  of them. Those happening in the State of Mississippi and at St. Louis
  are perhaps the most dangerous in example and revolting to humanity.
  In the Mississippi case they first commenced by hanging the regular
  gamblers—a set of men certainly not following for a livelihood a very
  useful or very honest occupation, but one which, so far from being
  forbidden by the laws, was actually licensed by an act of the
  legislature passed but a single year before. Next, negroes suspected
  of conspiring to rise an insurrection were caught up and hanged in all
  parts of the State; then, white men supposed to be leagued with the
  negroes; and finally, strangers from neighboring States, going thither
  on business, were in many instances subjected to the same fate. Thus
  went on this process of hanging, from gamblers to negroes, from
  negroes to white citizens, and from these to strangers, till dead men
  were literally dangling from the boughs of trees by every roadside,
  and in numbers almost sufficient to rival the native Spanish moss of
  the country as a drapery of the forest.

  “Turn then to that horror-striking scene at St. Louis. A single victim
  only was sacrificed there. This story is very short, and is perhaps
  the most highly tragic of anything of its length that has ever been
  witnessed in real life. A mulatto man by the name of McIntosh was
  seized in the street, dragged to the suburbs of the city, chained to a
  tree, and actually burned to death; and all within a single hour from
  the time he had been a freeman attending to his own business and at
  peace with the world.

  “Such are the effects of mob law, and such are the scenes becoming
  more and more frequent in this land so lately famed for love of law
  and order, and the stories of which have even now grown too familiar
  to attract anything more than an idle remark.”[167]

The following paragraph appeared in the Southern Literary Messenger in
the year 1839 (5: 218): “Forty years ago, the practice of wreaking
private vengeance, or of inflicting summary and illegal punishment for
crimes, actual or pretended, which has been glossed over by the name of
_Lynch’s Law_, was hardly known except in sparse, frontier settlements,
beyond the reach of courts and legal proceedings.”

The above quotations set forth clearly the condition of affairs in the
United States at this time. It was the spirit of the times, rather than
any particular cause, which brought about recourse to lynch-law
practices. Lynch-law was invoked for no particular offense to the
exclusion of all other offenses; neither was it peculiar to any one
section of the country. From having been practised only in the border
settlements as a temporary means of suppressing lawlessness until the
civil regulations could be established, lynch-law methods had come to
prevail even in well settled communities. Those writers who expressed
the opinion about 1830 that lynch-law was dying out did not foresee the
great popular excitement which existed during Jackson’s administration.
The anti-slavery agitation acted as a spark in a tinder-box and seemed
to beget a spirit of lawlessness in every part of the country. To the
inflamed imagination of the popular mind the slightest provocation
seemed a serious offense. The law did not reach such offenses, or they
were deemed to be inadequately punished by the law, and this seemed to
the people a justification for summary punishment.

In the slave States such punishment was generally a whipping or
flogging, often followed by tarring and feathering, inflicted upon
abolitionists or any persons suspected of “tampering with the slaves,”
or distributing “incendiary tracts.” In cases of a suspected conspiracy
for an insurrection among the slaves the supposed leaders were often
summarily punished, sometimes by the infliction of the death penalty.

Along the Mississippi River, the gamblers had aroused the resentment of
the peace-loving portion of the community by their vices and excesses of
various kinds. In many places they were able to bid defiance to the
civil authorities and laugh at threats of enforcing the law against
them. Here again the exigencies of the situation seemed to the people to
justify the adoption of lynch-law. This case of the summary treatment of
the gamblers may be regarded as a transition from the frontier type of
lynch-law to the sporadic and epidemical type which later prevailed in
the well settled States.

The author of a book published in London in 1837 wrote: “The Lynch-law,
is not, properly speaking, an opposition to the established laws of the
country, or, is at least, not contemplated as such by its adherents; but
rather as a supplement to them,—a species of _common_ law, which is as
old as the country, and which, whatever may be the notion of ‘the
_learned_ in the law,’ has nevertheless been productive of some of the
happiest results.”[168]

In 1839, F. Marryat wrote: “The Lynch law of the present day, as
practiced in the States of the West and South, may be divided into two
different heads: the first is, the administration of it in cases in
which the laws of the States are considered by the majority as not
having awarded a punishment adequate, in their opinion, to the offence
committed; and the other, when from excitement the majority will not
wait for the law to act, but inflict the punishment with their own
hands.”[169]

Occasionally innocent persons suffered the violence of lynching
mobs,[170] and sometimes damages were secured through the courts for
having suffered lynch-law. Cases of this nature were not uncommon in the
early history of the operation of lynch-law in Virginia,[171] and in the
later thirties similar suits were instituted in the courts. On September
4, 1835, certain inhabitants of Brownsville, Tennessee, constituted
themselves a lynch court for the trial of Anson Moody, suspected of
being a kidnapper, or slave stealer. They seized him in the dead of
night, tried him, convicted him, and then proceeded to punishment by
inflicting one hundred lashes with a “cowskin,” branding him on the
cheek with the letter R and commanding him to leave the country. A jury
in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West
Tennessee gave him a verdict of $2,000 and costs against five of the
members of the Lynch court.[172]

In Yazoo, Mississippi, a Mr. Harris, for some real or supposed offense,
was “severely lynched” by H. W. Dunn, C. W. Bain, and others. He
prosecuted those two individuals for the outrage, and the case was tried
in the circuit court of Yazoo County. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff of $20,000.[173]

Two young men in Fayette County, Tennessee, were sentenced to three
months’ imprisonment and to pay a fine of $50 each for assisting to ride
John T. Foster on a rail. The said Foster died in consequence of the
injuries he received during the outrage.[174]

Sherman Thompson and Samuel Thompson, of Meriden, Connecticut, were
sentenced to pay a fine of $20 each and to suffer imprisonment in the
common jail for the term of six months for having participated in an
outrage upon the Rev. Mr. Ludlow in October, 1837.[175]

The Grand Jury of Alton, Illinois, found bills of indictment against a
number of individuals concerned in the affair of November 7, 1837, when
Lovejoy was killed, but the suits were evidently not pushed against
them. In the trial of Rock, one of the assailants, which came up before
the municipal court, the jury returned a special verdict that the
defendant, in their opinion, was guilty of the various charges in the
indictment, but that they return him not guilty on a question of
jurisdiction.[176]

Previous to 1840 the verb lynch was occasionally used to include capital
punishment, but the common and general use was to indicate a personal
castigation of some sort. “To lynch” had not then undergone a change in
meaning and acquired the sense of “to put to death.”[177] Webster’s
Dictionary, edition of 1848, gives: “Lynch, v. t. To inflict pain, or
punish, without the forms of law, as by a mob, or by unauthorized
persons,” and “Lynched, pp. Punished or abused without the forms of
law.” These same definitions still stand in the edition of 1876. It was
not until a time subsequent to the Civil War that the verb lynch came to
carry the idea of putting to death. Men were punished with death “by
Lynch-law” and “by order of Judge Lynch,” but it is so stated in every
such case that death was inflicted.

A few typical instances of the use of the word will illustrate the
point. The St. Louis Bulletin, November 21, 1835, contained the
following item: “Fuller and Bridges, the men suspected of having
kidnapped Major Dougherty’s slaves ... were soundly flogged, or in other
words—_Lynched_, and set on the opposite side of the river, with the
positive assurance that, if they were again found within the limits of
the State of Missouri, their fate should be death by hanging.”[178]

Niles’ Register for December 5, 1835 (49: 228) heads a paragraph taken
from the Louisiana Advertiser “More Lynching.” The paragraph tells of
the murder of John W. Brock by John Joseph Short, who was “tried in a
summary manner, and executed, by hanging.”

Under the title “Lynchers Lynched” the following language was used in
the Liberator for September 24, 1836 (6: 155): “A party of from 6 to 12
persons proceeded to the house of Judge Bermudez last night ... their
object being, as it is supposed, to assault or Lynch the Judge.”

The following passage is from the Liberator, August 17, 1838 (8: 131):
“Lynching. A man named John Miles, who hails from Cincinnati, received
100 lashes in Adams county, Mississippi, for endeavoring to entice
negroes away.”

Under the heading “Horrible Lynching” the following item, taken from the
Southern Mississippi Sun of the 19th ult., appears in Niles’ Register
for December 14, 1839 (57: 256): “Crook and Carter who were confined in
the jail of Scott county for murder, have been taken by force from
prison by some of the citizens of that county and hung! It will be
recollected that they once made their escape from the jail and were
retaken.—They were brought to Rankin county two or three weeks since for
trial, but were remanded for want of some testimony. The people have
taken the law into their own hands, and executed them without a trial.”

The ordinary use of the term at this time was very well stated by Philip
Hone when he wrote in his diary on August 2, 1835: “A terrible system
prevails in some of the Southern and Western States, which consists
in ... beating, tarring and feathering, and in some cases hanging the
unhappy object of their vengeance, and this is generally called ‘Lynch’s
Law.’”[179]

Instances may be cited showing that the term continued to be used in
this way down to 1860. Niles’ Register for August 24, 1844 (66: 428) has
this paragraph: “Judge Lynch. Four men, Rea, Mitchell, White and Jones,
were tried and condemned before his honor, Chief Justice Lynch, on the
16th inst. at South Sulphur, Texas, for killing two men and one boy of
the Delaware tribe of friendly Indians. They were executed under said
sentence, the next day, in the presence of a large number of persons.”

In the year 1845 there were some lawless proceedings in Scott County,
Missouri. Niles’ Register for July 26, 1845 (68: 325) describes the
occurrence in the following way: “A party of men ... were charged with
burning the houses, stocks, etc. and doing other injuries to a man named
Lane. Some of his neighbors collected and caught several of the persons
charged, lynched them, and ordered them to leave the county, which they
did. A few days ago, they returned with a considerable party and avowed
their determination to drive out or be avenged on Lane and those who had
assisted to lynch and drive them away.”

The following item is taken from the St. Louis Reveille for October 2,
1845: “It is reported that the two men named Redman, brothers, with five
others, were recently arrested in the vicinity of Davenport, charged
with the murder of Colonel Davenport. Suspicion was strong as to their
guilt. We have heard rumors that Lynch law had been inflicted upon both
the Redmans since their arrest—that they both were hung.”[180]

Niles’ Register for January 17, 1846 (69: 320) gives the following:
“Lynching in Florida. A man by the name of Yeoman, accused of being a
noted slave stealer—having been discharged by Judge Warren, of Baker
County, Georgia, on a writ of _habeas corpus_ ... on his arrival at
Jefferson County, Florida, ninety citizens assembled and took a formal
vote, which stood 67 for and 23 against hanging him. He was executed
accordingly at 12 o’clock, on the 2d inst.”[181]

In 1855 several negroes were summarily executed by mobs in Tennessee.
The Liberator gives an account of these occurrences under the heading,
“Hanging Negroes in Tennessee by Judge Lynch’s Code.”[182]

In the Liberator, January 18, 1856 (p. 12), it is stated that “Judge
Thomas Clingman, of Carroll county, Missouri, was murdered, about the
middle of October, by one of his field slaves. The murderer was
instantly hung by Lynch law.”

The Liberator, May 2, 1856 (p. 72), contains this paragraph, taken from
the Western Herald: “Lynch Law in Virginia.—A man named William
Hornbeck, living in Lewis County, Virginia, for the alleged
ill-treatment of his family, was lynched by the young men in the
neighborhood, one night last week.—Stripped of his clothing, rode on a
rail, made to run through a briar patch, a stout paddle used to keep him
going, and a coat of tar and feathers applied.”

The Liberator, December 4, 1857 (p. 196) copies the following account of
the manner in which an abolitionist was lynched in Mississippi: “... A
crowd took him to the woods, told him to strip, carried to a hollow and
tied around a tree. He was then told what was their intention: to lynch
him until he told something. The lashing was commenced by two who used
straps fastened to sticks about 10 in. long....”

The same issue of the Liberator contains the following: “Lynch Law
Proceedings.—In Barton County, Southwestern Missouri, great excitement
has recently existed on account of the doings of a set of lawless
wretches called ‘Slickers,’ who pretended to be after a horse-thief, but
who ‘slicked’[183] or barbarously beat several men until their lives
were despaired of, and when women interfered, some were badly beaten and
others violated....”

The following paragraph appeared in the Liberator, December 31, 1860 (p.
211): “Lynch Law Again.—Two white men named Waters and a mulatto named
Wilson, at Mosely Hall, a village in North Carolina, were arrested a few
days ago for hurraing for Lincoln and the Abolitionists and severely
beating a citizen who remonstrated with them. They were immediately
tried by a jury, who ordered them to be whipped, and to have their heads
shaved. The verdict was carried out on the spot.”

The use of the word lynch in a story entitled “Jack Long; or lynch-law
and vengeance,” which appeared in the American Whig Review for February,
1845, purporting to be a true story of frontier life in Shelby County,
Texas, fully bears out the assertion that “to lynch” was generally
understood at that time to mean to whip or to maltreat. According to the
story a band of men calling themselves “Regulators,” led by a ruffian,
terrorized the county. Once they lynched, that is, lashed to a tree,
whipped and beat, Jack Long, leaving him for dead. He recovered and left
the county in obedience to their orders, but later came back and shot
all but two of the “Regulators.”

It should be said, however, that the instances of the application of
lynch-law which are given in Niles’ Register and the Liberator from 1830
to 1860 show an increase in the severity of the punishment administered.
As the slavery controversy went on and the breach widened between the
North and the South, it was but natural that such should be the case.
Many people in the South felt that no punishment was quite severe enough
for an abolitionist. Crimes committed by negroes were also treated with
greater severity. The following extract from a private letter, dated
Houston, Texas, August 23, 1860, to a friend in Hartford, Connecticut,
expresses a sentiment felt at that time in many sections of the South:
“Tell your abolition friends to go on and soon they will have the
pleasure of seeing the negro reduced to such a state of hopeless bondage
that they may well pity them. I solemnly declare that to-day the negro
is not as free as he was two or five years ago; and why? Simply because
his master has been goaded on to desperation by incendiary acts and
speeches. Now he fears the negro, and binds him down as you would a
savage animal. One year ago, all was peace and quietness here. The negro
was allowed to go out, to have dances and frolics; to-day one dare not
show his head after nine o’clock in the evening. Seven companies of
patrols are organized and guard the city each night, sixteen
horse-patrol scour the country around. Forty-eight vigilance men say
live, banish or die, as the proof may go to show. And so it is all over
the country. Men are hung every day by the decision of planters,
lawyers, judges and ministers. It is no hot impetuous act, but cool,
stern justice. It is the saving of wife and daughter, mother and sister
from the hand of desecration. It is the stopping of scenes that would
make the Druses and Turks blush for shame.”[184]

At the time this letter was written, and during the three years
preceding, there was a great deal of excitement in Texas. Vigilance
societies were in active operation against desperadoes and
abolitionists. In 1857 a vigilance committee in the “upper country,” as
it was then called, was “raking the country fore and aft and swinging
every horse-thief and murderer,” that could be found. A traveler saw
twelve bodies suspended from one tree and on another tree five.[185] In
the summer of 1860 there was an insurrection and conspiracy in Dallas,
Ellis, Tarrant and Denton counties, in northern Texas. The three
ringleaders, Sam, Cato, and Patrick, were hung by a vigilance committee
on July 24. Twenty-two insurrectionists in all were said to have been
hanged.[186] This condition of affairs must be taken into consideration
in connection with the statements made in the above letter and the fears
and prejudice therein expressed.

When drawing any conclusions from the instances recorded in the
newspapers as to the history of lynch-law during this period, there is
another fact to be kept in mind. During the later years the facilities
for obtaining news were greatly increased; the means of communication
between different parts of the country were very much improved and the
number of newspapers published had rapidly increased. There were no
doubt many cases of the administration of summary justice in the remote
districts during the thirties and the early forties which never came to
the notice of either the Liberator or Niles’ Register. There is,
however, abundant evidence to make the conclusion a safe one that
lynch-law was more and more resorted to during this period and that the
punishments administered under that name by vigilance committees and
mobs came to be more and more severe, death being frequently inflicted
during the later years.

The Parkville (Mo.) Democrat made the following statement in the year
1856: “Deeds of daring and outrages perpetrated by negroes, are
constantly becoming more frequent. We hope that the proper authorities
will see to it that all such cases are punished to the extent of the
law.”[187] The Liberator for May 2, 1856 (p. 72) contains an item which
reads in this way: “In Hancock County, La., Samuel L. Watson, a negro
overseer, whipped one of the negroes under him, and a few days after,
the negro caught him in a field and beat him with a club till he died.
The tragedy closed in the usual way, by the summary hanging of the negro
by the populace.” There are indications, therefore, that crime was on
the increase among the negroes at this time and that the whites had
cause for inflicting more rigorous punishment.

The following editorial appeared in the Liberator, December 19, 1856 (p.
204): “A record of the cases of ‘Lynch Law’ in the Southern States
reveals the startling fact, that within twenty years, over three hundred
white persons have been murdered upon the accusation—in most cases
unsupported by legal proof—of carrying among slave-holders arguments
addressed expressly to their own intellects and consciences, as to the
morality and expediency of slavery.” If this figure may be accepted as
reliable for the whites, it is within the truth to say that a
considerably larger number of negroes met with summary capital
punishment during the various insurrection excitements which occurred.

The summary execution of negroes did not, however, become a serious evil
previous to the Civil War. So long as the negroes were valuable as
slaves, it was a direct economic loss to the slave-holder if an
able-bodied slave were put to death. In general, it was only in cases of
real or supposed conspiracy against the whites, or in cases of
insurrection, that the negroes were killed in a summary manner. Such was
the case in Virginia at the time of the Nat Turner insurrection; such
was the case in Mississippi in 1835 when it was discovered that the
Murrell gang had laid plans for a general uprising among the slaves. A
similar condition of affairs existed in northern Texas in 1860, when it
was thought that strychnine had been distributed among the negroes and
they had been instructed to put it in the wells and in the food of their
masters.

Damages were sometimes claimed by owners for the loss of their slaves
through illegal procedure. A suit was instituted in the year 1857 in the
Jefferson Circuit Court of Kentucky against the city of Louisville for
the value of the slaves George, Bill, and Jack, the murderers of the
Joyce family. George and Bill had been hung by an infuriated mob, and
Jack had cut his own throat in jail, in order to escape the fate which
befell his companions. $1,500 each was claimed as damages by the owners
of the negroes. The Louisville Courier in commenting upon the case said
the suit would be of interest and importance, involving some delicate
principles of law.[188] In 1858 a vigilance committee was established in
Shelby County, Kentucky, whose method of procedure was described as
follows: “They order white men and free negroes who have been concerned
in evil deeds, to leave the county within three days. Any property
belonging to a white man is to be appraised by three disinterested
persons, and the price paid, after such person has been directed to
leave the county. Slaves who are vicious must be removed, also, from
Shelby county, by their masters.”[189] The property right in the slaves
was generally recognized in cases where they committed offenses against
a neighbor or a neighbor’s slaves. A common way of settling such matters
was for a number of the planters to meet together and decide upon the
amount of damages to be paid and what should constitute an equitable
settlement, without going through any formal legal procedure. In
Louisiana a tribunal formed in this way tried and gave sentence of death
upon two negroes for violating the person of a young white girl on
Christmas eve, 1856.[190]

An examination of the files of the Liberator shows that, during the ten
years 1830–1840, in cases where masters, overseers, or mistresses were
murdered by slaves, the law was allowed to take its course almost
without exception. The same is true in the case of rape committed upon
white women by negroes. The record stands, three slaves and one free
negro legally executed for rape and two slaves legally executed for
attempted rape. There are some instances reported of summary punishment,
not death, being administered to negroes for inducing white girls to run
away with them, or for living with white women.

There were also three instances of burning negroes at the stake during
this period. These cases have been described above: one was the burning
of two slaves near Mobile, Alabama, for murdering two children; another
was the burning of the free mulatto at St. Louis for killing an officer;
and the other was the burning of a slave in Arkansas for the murder of
his master.

For the ten years 1850–1860, the record is somewhat different. Out of
forty-six negroes put to death for the murder of owners or overseers,
twenty were legally executed and twenty-six were summarily executed. Of
the latter, one was a female slave who was taken from the constable and
hanged upon a tree for the crime of beating her mistress to death, and
another was a negro woman who was burned to death for poisoning her
master. Eight of the remaining twenty-four negroes were summarily
executed by being burned at the stake. For the crime of rape upon white
women, three negroes were legally executed, and for attempted rape two
were legally executed; while twelve negroes were more or less brutally
put to death by mobs for having committed the crime. Of the latter, four
were burned at the stake, three of whom had committed the double crime
of rape and murder. Some other instances of rape and of attempted rape
are reported, but no statement is made as to the manner or the nature of
the punishment inflicted.

It cannot be said, however, that these cases of the infliction of
capital punishment upon negroes without process of law were anything
more than sporadic and isolated cases. They were scarcely more than
local in their influence. The most important thing brought to light by
the above comparison of the two ten-year periods is the tendency, in the
later period, toward less reliance on legal procedure and toward greater
readiness on the part of the people to take matters into their own
hands. The newspapers in the fifties not only frequently excused summary
procedure but often openly advocated it. One instance only will be cited
and it is from a southern newspaper. In 1856, a Mr. Pearce, residing in
Morgan County, Georgia, attempted to give one of his negroes a flogging
for some misdemeanor. The negro picked up an ax and at one blow split
his master’s head open. He then fled. While he was still at large the
Madison Messenger printed the following: “Beyond doubt he will be
captured before many hours. If he is, although we admire submission to
the course pointed out by the law of the land, in this case so much of
the brute has been manifested, we should be glad to see our citizens
rise _en masse_, and avail themselves of Lynch law, and hang the rascal
without court or jury.”[191]

The preceding paragraphs have made it clear that negroes occasionally
suffered death under lynch-law previous to the Civil War. It was not
common, however, to characterize the summary hanging of negroes as
lynching. Such occurrences were neither common nor general enough to
give to the verb lynch its modern meaning, even though they had been
always designated as lynchings.

It was with reference to the lawless proceedings which took place in the
western and southwestern portions of the United States in the fifties
that the term lynch was first used in its modern sense. The vigilance
committees which were then common in that section of the country often
hung desperadoes and horse-thieves, and frequently when such persons
were thus executed they were said to have been lynched. A paragraph in
the Liberator, November 9, 1860 (p. 179), has the heading: “Four men
Lynched in Texas.” The paragraph contains a clipping from a Texas paper
describing the circumstances under which four men were found one morning
hung in the public square of a town in Navarro County, and refers to the
“many accounts of lynchings in Texas.”

Howitt’s Journal for February 12, 1848 (3: 109), contains an article
entitled “American Lynching—The Desperadoes of the South-West.” The
article is really a review of a book published under the title “The
Desperadoes of the South-West,” which, according to the reviewer, gives
a picture of the state of society in that section of the United States.
Quotations from the book are given in which the author outlines the way
the West was settled up and the difficulty of keeping prisoners until a
regular trial could be had, and the exasperating delays and
postponements brought about by pettifogging lawyers. The author
describes the operation of lynch-law at that time in the following
words:

  “Then, after all other means of redress have been exhausted, the
  honest, hard-working portion of the community organize themselves into
  a community of lynchers, elect a captain, appoint a committee, and, as
  they say, ‘take justice into their own hands.’... The company of
  lynchers once formed, they proceed to the execution of summary
  justice. It is easy to see what sad work they must make of it,
  rendered furious, as they have been, by multitudinous wrongs. And
  accordingly, they whip, bang, torture, burn, flay alive; and however
  they may begin, end at last by acting like a band of savages. What
  else could be expected of such men, however honest, however merciful,
  stung to ungovernable rage by so many injuries, and now placed as
  judges in their own case, in a position beyond responsibility? By and
  by, the more cunning rogues take shelter under their protection, and
  bawl out the loudest for justice. Then the fruit of ruin is ripe. Men
  accuse their enemies of the most appalling crimes, in order to glut
  feelings of private revenge. A hypocritical zeal for honesty becomes
  the cloak for rapine and murder. Vengeance supplants law, and brute
  force and fury trample down all show of order.... But the force is
  never wholly on one side only. The lynchers, or ‘regulators,’ as they
  are often called, soon find that their foes organize also; arm
  themselves, and prepare for systematic resistance, under the
  denomination of ‘moderators.’ Then commences a guerilla warfare as
  dark and deadly in its hate, as the old English contest between the
  Red and the White Roses. It is a war of utter extermination.”

Chambers’ Journal for February 17, 1855 (23: 101) contains an article
entitled “American Jottings. Eccentricities in criminal
jurisprudence—Lynch Law.” The following quotations are both illustrative
and instructive:

  “A respect for law and order is as conspicuous in general
  circumstances in the greater part of the United States as it is in
  England. This much may be said without prejudice to the fact, that
  very strange things occasionally come to pass, particularly in the
  south and west, in violation of the regular course of justice.... It
  is doubtless the perfunctoriness in the administration of justice
  which at times arouses the indignation of the public and causes them
  to have recourse to what is called Lynch Law, in which respect
  American society, in the more newly settled parts of the country, may
  be said to be at the stage of the rough populace of Edinburgh when
  they interrupted the ordinary course of justice, and laid violent
  hands on Captain Porteous. It is thus interesting to note how long it
  is before a people acquire the habit of implicit submission to the
  maxims of law—the time, of course, being proportioned according as the
  administrators of that law are in themselves unworthy of respect. The
  ancient venality of judges and juries in Scotland, now the theme of
  romance, would appear to be still matched on the banks of the
  Mississippi, and sometimes, as popular feeling inclines, it leads to
  similar results.... Objectionable and dangerous as lynching may be
  considered in the abstract there can be little doubt of its propriety
  practically in certain conditions of American society. When judges and
  courts are leagued with desperadoes, or when peculiar difficulties
  stand in the way of a prompt administration of justice, the public, in
  self-defense, feel impelled to interfere. At the settlement of
  California, and before society had time to establish regular
  tribunals, or to give due efficacy to the law, life and property would
  not have been safe for a moment, unless a Vigilance Committee had
  charged itself with the duty of lynching. Even when, in such newly
  opened territories, judges are appointed, only a small advance is made
  towards a vigorous legal administration. Of American judges it needs
  to be recollected that their position is often not such as to command
  respect. A judge of the supreme courts in England is a being aloof in
  every respect from the people, and he scrupulously abstains from
  interference personally in matters which might by possibility come
  before him in his judicial capacity. An American judge, on the other
  hand, is not dissevered from the ordinary action of society; and if he
  looks forward to a governorship, or some other high function, he
  requires to cultivate a certain popularity.”

In these extracts there is presented very clearly the character of the
illegal and summary proceedings to which the term lynch-law was
generally and commonly applied in the fifties. The quoted passages
likewise indicate the attitude of public sentiment at that time toward
such proceedings and the frequency of their occurrence. The tendency for
vigilance societies organized in the interests of law and order to pass
quickly into the control of the lawless and the vicious, or for
counter-organizations to be formed by the lawless element in the
population, is also given due prominence.

The Vigilance Committee movement in the West attained its highest state
of organization and effectiveness under the San Francisco Committees of
Vigilance of 1851 and of 1856. The discovery of gold in 1848 had brought
to California in a few years men from all parts of the world. National
characteristics came into conflict. Mexicans, Frenchmen, Irishmen, and
Americans were suddenly thrown together in a virgin territory. The
establishment of civil government and judicial tribunals could not keep
pace with the rapid increase in population. When such civil government
was begun, the control which the vicious and corrupt element in the
population was able to exercise over it rendered it ineffectual. It was
a time of social irresponsibility, and serious crimes were of common
occurrence. Out of five hundred and thirty-five homicides which occurred
in California during the year 1855, there were but seven legal
executions.[192] It was under these conditions and on the ground that
some such organization was necessary to bring about order and security,
that the two San Francisco Vigilance Committees were organized. “Each
hanged four men and banished about thirty. Each rescued two prisoners
from the county jail by means of surprise parties.... The crimes
committed by the victims of the first tribunal were against property and
life, while those of the second were strongly tinctured with political
immorality.... The reformation of 1851 was superficial and temporary;
that of 1856 radical and permanent.”[193] On the whole, though the
measures taken seem extreme, these committees accomplished their end
remarkably well, and it is to their credit that they promptly disbanded
when their time of usefulness had passed.

Committees of Vigilance were formed elsewhere than in the city of San
Francisco, however. Many places in California during the early history
of the State had similar committees, though outside of San Francisco
they were usually organized only temporarily to deal with particular
cases. Similar “Popular Tribunals” existed in Utah, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, Montana, Arizona, New Mexico, and Colorado during the
early period of their settlement. Bancroft says at the close of his
first volume on Popular Tribunals: “I have given in this volume many
examples of Popular Tribunals, but the half has not been told. It is
safe to say that thus far in the history of these Pacific States far
more has been done toward righting wrongs and administering justice
outside the pale of law than within it.”

Further evidence of the prevalence of lynch-law during the colonization
of the territory west of the Mississippi River is furnished by an
editorial in the New York Times of March 19, 1864, written under the
title “Judge Lynch.” The opening sentences are as follows: “Our
fellow-citizens in the far West, in the mineral territories bordering
upon the Rocky Mountains, and in those on the other side of the
mountains, are holding Lynch courts in extraordinary number, and
carrying out the decrees of that ferocious judge with unprecedented
energy. Our latest files from the distant regions of Idaho, Nevada,
Utah, &c., contain accounts of executions in numbers that we think were
never equalled even in the early days of California settlement, nor in
any part of the West.” Then follows a recital of various instances,
twenty or more robbers and murderers hung in Idaho Territory, four
murderers hung by a “Citizens Association” in the Territory of Nevada,
&c. It is stated that on Thursday of that week bills were passed in
Congress enabling Nevada and two other Territories to form constitutions
preparatory to their admission to the Union as States. As a condition to
their admission an irrevocable ordinance was provided prohibiting
slavery, and the writer of the editorial remarks, “we think lynching
might have been added.”

Lynch-law prevailed to a large extent, also, during the border troubles
attending the outbreak of the Civil War. Particularly was this the case
in Kansas where, along with the guerrilla warfare that went on for a
number of years, many instances of summary procedure occurred that may
be properly classified under lynch-law. A correspondent of the New York
Tribune in Lawrence, K. T., wrote on May 30, 1858: “There is a very
general disposition to pass over the helplessly useless forms of
Territorial law and corrupt Federal courts, and try these parties
(_i.e._, horse-thieves) by Lynch law.”[194]

The lynch-law procedure of the fifties that was most commonly mentioned
and described in the newspapers and periodicals was that that prevailed
in the western part of the United States. Bodies of citizens, organized
secretly or openly under the names of “vigilance committees,” “vigilance
societies,” “vigilantes,” “regulators,” “law-and-order men,” “Citizens’
Associations,” &c., punished with summary severity horse-thieves,
cattle-thieves, highway robbers, counterfeiters, burglars, and
swindlers, as well as murderers. Certain rude forms of trial were
generally observed, acquittals were rare but not entirely unknown, and
the punishment was usually death by hanging. The frequency with which
lynch-law was resorted to at this time is to be referred, both to the
lack of a well established civil government, and to a doubt on the part
of the people as to the adequacy of the ordinary legal machinery.

It was the use of the word lynching in connection with these summary
proceedings against white men of desperate character, the criminals of
the frontier region west of the Mississippi, during the period of
settlement, that first gave to it its modern meaning of putting to
death. After the Civil War, when the Southern States were being
reconstructed and the whites were threatened with negro domination,
summary practices were adopted against the negroes. The negro had ceased
to be valuable as property and was looked upon as a dangerous political
factor in the community; to take his life was thought to be the easiest
and quickest way to dispose of him. The adoption of this plan in many
parts of the South gave for the word lynching a new application. Since
the Reconstruction Period, then, to lynch has generally meant to put to
death. The infliction of any minor punishment without legal trial still
constitutes lynch-law, but the simple term “lynching” usually implies
capital punishment. It is in this sense that the term will be used
throughout the remainder of this investigation.




                               CHAPTER V
                       THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD


A civil war is worse in many respects than a foreign war. When the
members of a society are forced to settle any differences that they may
have and come together in order to resist the aggressions of a foreign
foe, the internal organization of the society is strengthened. A civil
war, on the contrary, shakes the very foundations of the social
structure. The antagonism of interests which brings on and attends a
civil war weakens every social bond and tends to disorganize the
society. Hence, a longer period of time is required for the effects of
internal dissension to be obliterated. The feelings engendered by such a
war are not easily overcome either by the victors or by the vanquished.
For men who have fought against each other on the battle-field, quietly
to lay aside their arms and at once enter into business and social
relations, requires an amount of magnanimity and forbearance that human
nature in general does not possess.

At the close of the Civil War in the United States, the South was in a
much weaker condition than the North. An attempt had been made to set up
a new and separate government, but the attempt had failed utterly. The
Union armies had overrun whole sections of the South and left the
country desolate. The Emancipation Proclamation had put an end to the
institution of negro slavery on which the whole organization of Southern
society had rested. Out of the ruins of the old must arise a new society
organized on an entirely different basis. It was inevitable that there
should be social disturbances and acts of violence while so great a
change was in progress.[195]

Before the passions of war had subsided, however, and an opportunity had
been given the Southerners to accommodate themselves to the new order of
things, new causes for irritation and animosity appeared. Politically,
the reconstruction policy adopted by the Federal Congress, by its lack
of wisdom and of efficient leadership, brought continued humiliation and
annoyance. Socially, there were two causes of vexation and exasperation
which the people were in no mood to bear. The class of individuals known
as “carpet-baggers,” by reason of their mercenary and malicious conduct,
aggravated the people beyond endurance. The second disturbing element
was the negroes.[196]

The history of the reconstruction period—the mistakes, the
misunderstandings, the hostility as between the whites of the North and
of the South; the criminal dishonesty and knavery of the “carpet-bag
governments”; the ignorance and lawlessness prevailing among the
negroes—all this may be read elsewhere. Without attempting to fix the
blame for the anomalous condition of affairs, it is sufficient here to
point out that the administration of civil law was only partially and
imperfectly re-established, and that for that reason, and for other
reasons, there was an unusual amount of disorder and violence prevailing
over the country. The proof of this is to be found not only in the daily
newspapers, but also in the records of the proceedings and debates in
Congress during the twelve years from 1865 to 1877, and especially in
the thirteen volumes embodying the report of the joint select committee
appointed by Congress to investigate affairs in the insurrectionary
States with reference to the Ku-Klux conspiracy.[197] It is to this
so-called Ku-Klux conspiracy that attention is here to be directed. The
mystery connected with the organization known as the Ku-Klux Klan and
the peculiar history and subsequent influence of the organization makes
it necessary to speak of it here in some detail.[198]

In May, 1866, a number of young men in the town of Pulaski, in Giles
County, Tennessee, formed a secret society for the purpose of diversion
and amusement to which they gave the name “Ku-Klux Klan.”[199] The
mystery connected with the name—mysterious because it was meaningless
and alliterative—gave it a peculiar potency. This was manifest not only
in the impression made by it on the general public, but likewise in the
weird influence that it had on the members of the Klan themselves. They
had adopted a mysterious name; thereupon the original plan was modified
so as to make everything connected with the order harmonize with the
name. Amusement was kept as the end in view, but the methods by which
they were to obtain it were those of secrecy and mystery. When the
report of the committee on rules and ritual came up for consideration,
the recommendations were modified to adapt them to the new idea. The
report as finally adopted provided for the following officers: a Grand
Cyclops or President, a Grand Magi or Vice-President, a Grand Turk or
Marshal, a Grand Exchequer or Treasurer, and two Lictors who were the
outer and inner guards of the “Den,” as the place of meeting was
designated.

The members bound themselves by oath to maintain profound and absolute
secrecy with reference to the order and everything pertaining to it.
This obligation prohibited those who assumed it from disclosing that
they were Ku Klux, or the name of any other member, and from soliciting
any one to become a member. Each member was required to provide himself
with the following outfit: A white mask, a tall cardboard hat so
constructed as to increase the wearer’s apparent height, a gown or robe
of sufficient length to cover the entire person. The matter of color and
material was left to the individual’s taste and fancy, and each selected
what in his judgment would be the most hideous and fantastic. Each
member carried also a small whistle with which, by means of a code of
signals agreed upon, they held communications with one another.

The “den” was at first in the law office of a member of the Pulaski bar,
where the suggestion for the formation of the Klan had been made. But
the room was small, and it was too near the business portion of the town
to be a suitable place for meeting. On the brow of a ridge that runs
along the western outskirts of the town there stood at that time the
ruins of an old residence that had been partially demolished by a
cyclone. Underneath the portion that remained standing was a large
cellar. No other houses stood near, and around these ruins were the
storm-torn, limbless trunks of trees which had once formed a magnificent
grove. This dreary, desolate and uncanny place was in every way most
suitable for a “den,” and the Klan appropriated it. When a meeting was
held one Lictor was stationed near the house and the other fifty yards
from it on the road leading into the town. These were dressed in the
fantastic regalia of the order and bore tremendous spears as the badge
of their office.

At the close of the war, when the young men of the South who had escaped
death on the battle-field returned to their homes, they passed through a
period of enforced inactivity. They could not engage at once in business
or professional pursuits. In the case of many, business habits were
broken up. Few had capital to enter mercantile or agricultural
enterprises. There was also a total lack of the amusements and social
diversions which prevail wherever society is in a normal condition. The
reaction, therefore, which followed the excitement of army scenes and
service was intense.

It is not strange, then, that this secret society with its mysterious
name and grotesque disguises should awaken profound curiosity in the
town of Pulaski. By means of subterfuges members were easily secured
without direct solicitation and the order rapidly increased in size. By
the time the eligible material in the town had been used up, the young
men from the country, whose curiosity had been inflamed by the newspaper
notices, began to come in and apply for admission to the Klan. Then
“dens” were established at various points in the country. Sometimes a
stranger from other parts of Tennessee, or from Mississippi, Alabama, or
Texas, visiting in a neighborhood where the order prevailed, would be
initiated and on his departure carry with him permission to establish a
“den” at home. In fact this was often done without such permission, and
thus the connecting link between these “dens” was very fragile. It was
only by a sort of tacit agreement that the Pulaski Klan was regarded as
the source of power and authority. This was the condition of affairs in
April, 1867. During the fall and winter of 1866, the growth of the Klan
had been rapid, and it had spread over a wide extent of territory. So
far there had appeared no need for a compact organization, rigid rules,
and close supervision. The leading members of the Klan were
contemplating nothing more serious than amusement. They enjoyed the
baffled curiosity and wild speculations of a mystified public even more
than the rude sport afforded by the ludicrous initiations.

About this time the combined operation of several causes led to the
transformation of the Ku-Klux Klan into a band of “regulators.” These
causes may be grouped under three heads: (1) The impressions made by the
order upon the minds of those who united with it; (2) The impressions
upon the public by its weird and mysterious methods; (3) The anomalous
and peculiar condition of affairs in the South at this time.

The prevalent idea seems to have been that the Klan contemplated some
great and important mission. When admitted to membership this
conclusion, in the case of many, was deepened rather than removed by
what they saw and heard. There was nothing in the ritual or the
obligation or in any part of the ceremony to favor such a conclusion;
but the impression still remained that this mysteriousness and secrecy,
the high-sounding titles of the officers, the grotesque dress of the
members, and the formidable obligation, all meant more than mere sport.
Each had his own speculations as to what was to be the character of the
serious work which the Klan had to do, but many were satisfied that
there was such work.

When the meetings first began to be held in the dilapidated house on the
hill passers-by were frequent. Most of them passed the grim and ghostly
sentinel by the roadside in silence, but always with a quickened step.
Occasionally one would stop and ask: “Who are you?” In awfully
sepulchral tones the invariable answer was: “A spirit from the other
world. I was killed at Chickamauga.” Such an answer, especially when
given to a superstitious negro, was extremely terrifying and if, in
addition, he heard the uproarious noises issuing from the “den” at the
moment of a candidate’s investiture with the “regal crown,” he had the
foundation for a most awe-inspiring story. There came from the country
similar stories. The belated laborer, passing after nightfall some
lonely and secluded spot, heard horrible noises and saw fearful sights.
These stories were repeated with such embellishments as the imagination
of the narrator suggested until the feeling of the negroes and of many
of the white people, at mention of the Ku-Klux, was one of awe and
terror.

In the country it was noticed that the nocturnal perambulations of the
colored population diminished or entirely ceased wherever the Ku-Klux
appeared. In many ways there was a noticeable improvement in the habits
of a large class which had hitherto been causing great annoyance. In
this way the Klan gradually realized that the most powerful devices ever
invented for controlling the ignorant and superstitious were in their
hands. Even the most highly cultured were unable wholly to resist the
weird and peculiar feeling which pervaded every community where the
Ku-Klux appeared. Circumstances made it evident that the measures and
methods employed for sport might be effectually used to subserve the
public welfare—to suppress lawlessness and protect property. The very
force of circumstances carried the Klan away from its original purpose,
so that in the summer of 1867 it was virtually a band of regulators,
honestly, but in an injudicious and dangerous way, trying to protect
property and preserve peace and order.

It was this conception of the mission of the Klan which led to its
reorganization on a plan corresponding to its increased size and new
purpose. Some abuses of what was by common consent the law of the Klan
and some other evils had already made their appearance. It was hoped
also that this danger could be effectually guarded against by
reorganization. With these objects in view the Grand Cyclops of the
Pulaski “den” sent out a request to all the “dens” of which he had
knowledge, to appoint delegates to meet in convention at Nashville,
Tennessee, early in the summer of 1867. At the time appointed this
convention was held and delegates were present from a number of States.

A plan of reorganization, previously prepared, was submitted to this
convention and adopted. The territory covered by the Klan was designated
as the “Invisible Empire.” This was subdivided into “realms” coterminous
with the boundaries of the States. The “realms” were divided into
“dominions,” corresponding to congressional districts, the “dominions”
into “provinces” coterminous with counties, and the “provinces” into
“dens.” The officers were the Grand Wizard of the Invisible Empire and
his ten Genii, the Grand Dragon of the Realm and his eight Hydras, the
Grand Titan of the Dominion and his six Furies, the Grand Cyclops of the
Den and his two Night Hawks, and other minor officers. The declaration
of principles and objects prescribed loyalty to the United States
government and opposition to lawlessness and violence of every kind. No
material change was made in the methods of the Klan’s operations. The
essential features of mystery, secrecy, and grotesqueness were retained,
but steps were taken with a view to deepening and intensifying the
impressions already made upon the public mind. Henceforth the Ku-Klux
courted publicity as assiduously as they had formerly seemed to shun it.
They appeared at different points at the same time and always when and
where they were least expected. Devices were multiplied to deceive
people in regard to their numbers and to play upon the fears of the
superstitious. On the night of July 4, 1867, public parades were made in
many towns in Tennessee.

For several years there existed in the South a spurious and perverted
form of the “Union League.” Against this organization the Ku-Klux
directed their efforts, and this has given color to the assertion that
the Ku-Klux Klan was a political organization having only political ends
in view. The “Union Leagues” in the South, or the “Loyal Leagues” as
they were sometimes called, were generally composed of the disorderly
element of the negro population and led by white men who were then
considered the basest and meanest of men, the “carpet-baggers” and
“scalawags.” The depredations committed by members of these
organizations and the general lawlessness then prevailing constitutes
the justification for the Ku-Klux Klan taking upon itself the duty of a
vigilance society. In justification of the devices which were used to
terrorize the negroes, it was held that it was not only better to deter
the negroes from theft and other lawlessness in this way than to put
them in the penitentiary, but it was the only way at this time by which
they could be controlled. The jails would not contain them; the courts
could not or would not try them.

At first the Klan seemed to exercise a wholesome influence, but the good
effect was short-lived. The order contained within itself sources of
weakness. The devices and disguises by which the Klan deceived outsiders
enabled all who were so disposed, even its own members, to practice
deception on the Klan itself. It placed in the hands of its own members
the facility to do deeds of violence for the gratification of personal
feeling and have them credited to the Klan. Many deeds of violence were
thus done by men who were Ku-Klux, but who, while acting under cover of
their connection with the Klan, were not under its orders. In addition
to this the very class which the Klan proposed to hold in check and awe
into good behavior soon became wholly unmanageable. Those who had
formerly committed depredations to be laid to the charge of the negroes,
after a brief interval of good behavior, assumed the guise of Ku-Klux
and returned to their old ways. Outrages were committed by masked men in
regions far remote from any Ku-Klux organizations. Secrecy was the
strength of the Ku-Klux Klan so long as it was conjoined with mystery,
but when the masks and disguises ceased to be mysterious, secrecy was
its greatest weakness.

Causes were at work also which led the Klan to adopt measures of greater
severity. It had come to pass that all the disorder done in the country
was charged upon the Ku-Klux because done under disguises which they had
invented and used. They felt that the charge of wrong was unfairly
brought against them, and, as is frequently the case, they were carried
beyond the limits of prudence and right by a hot zeal for
self-vindication against unjust aspersions. The mystery and secrecy that
had been courted by the Klan led to the Klan and its objects being
wholly misunderstood and misinterpreted. Many people were sure that the
Klan meant treason and revolution. A feeling of intense hostility
succeeded the first impressions of awe and terror which the Klan had
inspired. The negroes formed organizations of a military character the
avowed purpose of which was “to make war upon and exterminate the
Ku-Klux.” On several occasions the Klan was fired into. The effect of
such attacks was to provoke counter hostility from the Klan, and so
there was irritation and counter irritation till in some places the
state of things was little short of open warfare.

Matters continued to grow worse until it was imperatively necessary that
there should be interference on the part of the government. In
September, 1868, the legislature of Tennessee, in obedience to the call
of Governor Brownlow, assembled in extra session and passed a most
stringent anti-Ku-Klux statute. In some sections of the State a reign of
terror followed and the governor was compelled to send troops and
proclaim martial law in certain counties. In March, 1869, the Grand
Wizard of the Invisible Empire issued a proclamation to his subjects.
This proclamation recited the legislation directed against the Klan and
stated that the order had in large measure accomplished the objects of
its existence. At a time when the civil law afforded inadequate
protection to life and property, when robbery and lawlessness of every
description were unrebuked, when all the better elements of society were
in constant dread for the safety of their property, persons, and
families, the Klan had afforded protection and security to many
firesides and in many ways contributed to the public welfare. But
greatly to the regret of all good citizens, some members of the Klan had
violated positive orders; others, under the name and disguises of the
organization, had assumed to do acts of violence, for which the Klan was
held responsible. The Grand Wizard had been invested with the power to
determine questions of paramount importance to the interests of the
order. Therefore, in the exercise of that power, the Grand Wizard
declared that the organization that had been known as the Ku-Klux Klan
was dissolved and disbanded.

For several years after March, 1869, the papers reported and commented
on “Ku-Klux outrages” committed at various places.[200] The authors of
these outrages no doubt acted in the name of the Klan and under its
disguises, and it may be that in some cases they were men who had been
Ku-Klux, but it cannot be charged that they were acting by the authority
of the order. The report of the joint committee of Congress appointed to
investigate the “Ku-Klux conspiracy” records a great deal of lawlessness
and violence during the period 1866–71, a part of which may be justly
attributed to the Klan. The greater part of the outrageous conduct
attributed to the Klan belongs to a date subsequent to its disbandment,
and is chargeable merely to the influence of the operations of the Klan.
As one writer has put it, the birth of this order was an accident, its
growth a comedy, and its death a tragedy. Its existence can be explained
only when the anomalous condition of social and political affairs in the
South during the years immediately succeeding the war is taken into
account.

In this discussion of the conditions in the Southern States which
promoted recourse to lynch-law, it must not be forgotten that at the
same time the frontier type of lynch-law was in vogue in the West. The
tide of immigration toward that part of the United States, which had set
in early in the fifties, continued with increased vigor after the close
of the Civil War. While the establishment of Territorial government,
followed by admission to the Union and State government, was remarkably
expeditious in the West, yet there was constant occasion for recourse to
lynch-law against desperadoes and persons guilty of stealing live stock.
In other sections of the country, also, lynch-law was in operation.[201]
The following statistics, obtained from an examination of the files of
the New York Times for the three years, 1871–73, give some idea of the
distribution and character of lynchings at that time[202]:

  Kentucky: 2 negroes hung for rape, 1 white hung for rape, 1 negro hung
  for murder, 3 negroes shot by masked men, 1 negro “murdered” by
  Ku-Klux.

  Tennessee: 2 negroes hung for robbery and arson, 1 negro shot and hung
  for robbery and murder, 1 negro shot for attempted outrage, 1 negro
  hung and shot for murder, 1 white shot for murder of wife.

  Missouri: 5 horse thieves hung, 1 negro hung for outrage, 1 white hung
  for murder, 3 whites hung for murder and robbery, 3 whites shot for
  defending and being bondsmen of county officials accused of
  peculation.

  California: 2 whites hung for murder, 1 white hung and shot for
  murder, 1 Indian hung for murder, 1 Malay (steward of steamer) shot
  and thrown overboard near coast of California for ravishing sick girl,
  eleven years old.

  Montana: 2 whites hung for murder.

  Louisiana: 4 negroes hung for murder, 3 horse thieves hung.

  Virginia: 1 desperado, horse thief and murderer hung.

  Alabama: 1 white shot for murder.

  South Carolina: 2 whites shot for murder, 10 negroes shot and hung by
  Ku-Klux.

  Nevada: 1 desperado hung, 1 white hung for killing man in saloon row.

  Wisconsin; 1 white hung for murder.

  Indiana: 3 negroes hung for murder, 1 white hung for murder.

  Nebraska: 1 negro and 1 white man “killed” for robbery and shooting
  woman.

  Kansas: 2 whites hung for murder, 1 desperado and 1 horse thief
  “killed in jail.”

  Colorado: 2 whites hung for keeping gambling outfit.

  Michigan: 2 whites died from beating which they received for killing a
  man in a German-Irish riot on the streets.

  Ohio: 2 whites hung for murder.

  Maryland: 1 negro hung for arson.

  Total: 41 whites, 32 negroes, 1 Malay, 1 Indian.

The majority of those lynched in these three years, as given by the
Times, were forcibly taken from the custody of officers of the law. In
some instances, the jails were broken into, and the prisoners were taken
out and hanged or were killed in the jail; in other instances, the
prisoners were taken from the officers and put to death before they
could be taken to the jail. Some of the lynchings were carried on by
vigilance societies, others by mobs of masked persons or by “Ku-Kluxes.”
With two exceptions, nothing is said in the reports of these lynchings
about any attempts to take legal action against the lynchers. In the two
instances where attempts were made to prosecute the lynchers, it does
not appear that there was any measure of success.

It thus appears that lynch-law was in operation in nearly every part of
the United States during the years immediately following the close of
the Civil War, and that the ordinary penalty inflicted was death. It
was, however, the application of lynch-law under the anomalous
conditions in the South that rendered the reconstruction period a
distinctive period in the history of lynch-law. The reconstruction of
the Southern States has been rightly characterized as “one of the worst
periods of misgovernment and maladministration in the history of any
civilized community.”[203] The emancipation of the slaves and the
reconstruction policy carried out by the political leaders in Congress
not only brought about a changed relation between the two races, but
made negro domination a real evil and an imminent danger. The Southern
planters considered themselves justified in resorting to summary
measures as a means of protecting their property and their families.
Both the social and the political conditions in the South were such as
to give a distinctively new impulse to the lynching spirit.[204]

It is true that the extreme measures taken under Ku-Klux disguises never
received the approval of the mass of the Southern people, but, on the
other hand, few determined efforts were made by the civil authorities in
the Southern States to bring Ku-Klux offenders to justice. The outrage
upon freedmen, persons of Northern origin and Southerners accused of
favoring the reconstruction acts of Congress, were not stopped until
after Congress had passed the so-called “force bill” in 1871. By this
measure the jurisdiction of the Federal courts was extended to Ku-Klux
cases, and the President was authorized to suspend the writ of _habeas
corpus_ when necessary to preserve order. The Federal troops were not
entirely withdrawn from the South until 1877.

As a result of the doings of reconstruction times, habits of lawlessness
have been perpetuated at the South, the effect of which is still to be
seen. The disguises introduced by the Ku-Klux[205] have frequently given
security against identification at lynchings in recent years. The modern
“White Caps,” so well known in the central and eastern States as well as
in the South, though they are merely local and generally only temporary
organizations, use the same methods that were employed by the Ku-Klux.
The “White Caps” may be regarded as the successors of the Ku-Klux.




                               CHAPTER VI
                               LYNCHINGS


In recent years, particularly since about the year 1891, much has been
said and written upon the subject of lynching. Explanations and excuses
have been offered for the prevalence of the practice in the South and in
other parts of the country. Remedies and means for the suppression of
lynchings have been freely and widely discussed. Most of the literature,
however, shows a strong sectional or partisan spirit, and is, in
reality, but little more than the expression of personal opinion.
Scarcely any attempt has been made to present the general facts relating
to the practice of lynching for any considerable length of time. The
perusal of more than seventy-five magazine articles discussing recent
lynchings and dealing with different phases of the subject left upon the
writer’s mind no impression more distinct than this, that some facts of
a statistical nature were very much needed.

The first plan that suggested itself was to make a personal
investigation of the cases of lynching that have occurred in recent
years, to interview personally or to correspond with individuals
acquainted with the facts in such occurrences, and thus get some
reliable data. Such a plan, however, has by trial been found
impracticable. Mr. George C. Holt of New York had an examination made of
the index and files of the New York Daily Times for the first six months
of the year 1892, and a record made of all the instances of lynching
reported there. His experience can best be given in his own words. He
says:

“After obtaining a list of the cases reported in the Times, I drafted a
circular letter of inquiry asking for information in respect to the
name, age, residence, and occupation of the man lynched, the charge
against him, his possible guilt, the circumstances of the lynching, and
what steps, if any, were afterwards taken. In each reported case of
lynching I mailed three copies of the circular letter, with a stamped
envelope for reply, addressed one to the district attorney of the
county, one to the postmaster, and one to any clergyman of the city or
town where the lynching occurred.

“To the printed circulars sent out answers were received in relation to
16 out of the 30 cases of lynching. No answers were received in 14 of
the cases, although the envelopes bore the usual direction to the
postmaster to be returned if not delivered, and only one of them was
returned. Of the 16 cases in respect to which answers were received,
there were 3 cases in which 3 answers were returned, 5 in which 2 were
returned, and 8 in which one was returned. Most of the answers were
unsigned; many were very vague; a few declined to state the facts; and
several requested secrecy. The general impression derived from the
attempt to obtain information by the circular was that there was, in
many cases, a strong disinclination, for some cause, to give any
information.”[206]

In an attempt to verify some reports of lynchings in the years 1902 and
1903, the writer has met with a similar experience. A letter addressed
to the mayor of a town in Arkansas was returned with the following
penciled at the bottom of the sheet: “if you will give me some idea as
to your reasons for wanting this information I might give you some
information regarding same.” A letter addressed to the mayor of a town
in Georgia was returned with the following written at the bottom of the
sheet: “In answer to the above I will say that I don’t know anything
about it.” No name was signed in either case. These two replies,
together with Mr. Holt’s experience, are sufficient to indicate the
difficulties attendant upon the collection, by any such method, of data
in regard to lynchings covering any considerable period of time.

For more than twenty-two years the Chicago Tribune has published at the
close of each year an itemized summary of the disasters and crimes in
the United States for the year. An editorial in the Tribune for January
1, 1883, reads as follows: “Elsewhere in this issue will be found a
series of reviews of the happenings during 1882. A necrological table is
furnished, also a list of the more important crimes, casualties,
suicides, lynchings, and judicial executions for the last year. The
tables have been prepared with great care from the columns of _The
Tribune_, and furnish as complete a review of the unpleasant features of
the dead year as could possibly be obtained.”

This annual review published by the Tribune supplies the most available
and practically the only source for statistics of lynchings. The
following facts are given: the date of the lynching, the name of the
victim, his color and his nationality, the alleged crime for which he
was lynched, and the town and State where the lynching took place. Only
the names of those who have suffered death at the hands of mobs are
included. No account is taken of attempted lynchings or of persons to
whom mob violence was done but who recovered from their injuries.

In using this record as the basis of this investigation such means as
were available have been employed for purposes of correction and
verification. In every case where an error was apparent, or there was
any reason for doubt, the original report of the lynching has been
examined in some newspaper of the proper date, either the Chicago
Tribune, or the New York Times, or the New York Tribune. Only a very few
points have been left unsettled because of insufficient information. The
Cyclopedic Review of Current History gives confirmatory evidence for a
period covering the last twelve years. It, however, mentions only the
“notable crimes” and this evidence, therefore, applies to a
comparatively small number of cases.

For the last six months of the year 1902 a subscription to a newspaper
clipping agency was maintained as a further means of determining the
reliability and completeness of the Tribune record. The agency selected
was an old and well established one. Instructions were given the readers
to send full accounts of every lynching, together with a few editorial
comments from various parts of the country. Clippings on lynchings were
received from newspapers in every section of the United States. Out of
the fifty-three victims of lynching given in the summary published by
the Chicago Tribune for the six months, July-December, 1902, forty-six
were reported by the newspaper clipping agency and no errors of any
importance were shown. A few additional cases were mentioned in the
clippings, but they were mainly on the border line between murder and
lynching and could rightly be disregarded.

Undoubtedly there are errors and inaccuracies in particular cases in the
Tribune record.[207] Any one who has endeavored to sift the truth from
conflicting newspaper reports will readily appreciate the difficulty of
obtaining an accurate account of a lynching from such a source. For the
purpose of this investigation, however, only the most general facts are
required, and it is believed that in regard to these the reporter or the
newspaper correspondent is less likely to indulge his imaginative
powers. Furthermore, by reason of the popular excitement which usually
attends lynching-bees and the extraordinary methods of execution
oftentimes employed, it is fair to presume that but few lynchings escape
the reporter; the details of most lynchings exhibit so clearly the
journalistic idea of facts of contemporaneous human interest that the
publication of such news is not often intentionally omitted. There is
neither the motive nor the opportunity to keep lynchings from the
newspapers that there often is in the case of suicides and murders; not
only indeed is every such motive for secrecy absent, but there is
usually, more or less strongly expressed, a public sentiment approving
or excusing a lynching.

What the likelihood is of every lynching in the United States having
been reported to the Chicago Tribune during the last twenty-two years,
and whether the probability has been uniform throughout the period,
there is no means of determining. The annual review of disasters and
crimes has, however, been made a special feature throughout the period,
and this gives at least a presumption in favor of fullness and
completeness in the record. It is at any rate safe to say that the cases
of lynching actually reported probably afford a fair average basis of
cases for statistical investigation.

In view of these considerations, together with the corrections and
verifications that have been made, it is believed that the Tribune
record has reliability sufficient for its examination to lead to the
deduction of trustworthy and valuable conclusions.

On January 1, 1904, the Chicago Tribune published the following “table
of lynchings” covering the last nineteen years[208]:

                                1885 184
                                1886 138
                                1887 122
                                1888 142
                                1889 176
                                1890 127
                                1891 192
                                1892 235
                                1893 200
                                1894 190
                                1895 171
                                1896 131
                                1897 166
                                1898 127
                                1899 107
                                1900 115
                                1901 135
                                1902  96
                                1903 104

After carefully going over the lists of names, as published each year,
of the persons lynched during the last twenty-two years, the writer
obtained the following table which is based throughout on the number of
persons lynched. If only the number of lynchings were taken into account
the numbers given would be considerably smaller.[209]

                               NUMBER OF
                                PERSONS
                                LYNCHED

                                1882  114
                                1883  134
                                1884  211
                                1885  184
                                1886  138
                                1887  122
                                1888  142
                                1889  176
                                1890  128
                                1891  195
                                1892  235
                                1893  200
                                1894  197
                                1895  180
                                1896  131
                                1897  165
                                1898  127
                                1899  107
                                1900  115
                                1901  135
                                1902   97
                                1903  104
                                     ————
                               Total 3337

This table agrees with the Tribune table for the nineteen years with the
exception of the years 1890, 1891, 1894, 1895, 1897 and 1902. In some of
these cases the difference is due merely to an error which had been made
in footing up the lists. Some instances are given of a father and son
being lynched, or of five horse thieves, or of two negroes, and each of
these instances had been counted as one in making up the totals. In
other cases an error was found in the instance reported. In 1902, a
report of a negro having been lynched for murder in Alabama was found
later to be untrue and his name was dropped from the list.[210] Two
names have been added to the list for 1902 from information which the
writer obtained through the newspaper clipping agency and subsequent
correspondence.

In 1903 a record of persons lynched, kept by the writer from newspapers
other than the Chicago Tribune,[211] contained sixty-three out of the
one hundred and four reported by the Tribune, and corroborated the
Tribune record with reference to these sixty-three. In the writer’s
record seven lynchings were reported which did not appear in the Tribune
record. Letters of inquiry in regard to these resulted in only four
replies, one denying that the reported lynching had taken place, the
remaining three not stating definitely whether any lynching whatsoever
had taken place. No alteration, therefore, has been made in the Tribune
record for 1903.

[Illustration: I. NUMBER LYNCHED COMPARED WITH NUMBER LEGALLY EXECUTED
1882–1903]

[Illustration: II. NUMBER LYNCHED ACCORDING TO MONTHS IN DIFFERENT
SECTIONS OF THE U.S. 1882–1903]

Chart I has been prepared from the above table and shows at a glance the
relative prevalence of lynching during the twenty-two years,
1882–1903.[212] The solid line, representing the number of persons
lynched, begins at 114 in 1882, goes up to 211 in 1884, falls to 122 in
1887, rises again to 176 in 1889, falls again the following year to 128,
and then rises to 235 in the year 1892. From 1892 on the line shows a
general downward tendency.

The large number in 1884 was due to the work of vigilantes in Montana
and Colorado. According to the record, 40 horse thieves and cattle
thieves received summary justice in Montana during the year and the
lynching of seventeen cattle thieves was reported from Colorado. The
large number in 1892 was due to the lynching of negroes in the South.
These facts are shown in another form in Chart IV.

For purposes of comparison the broken line has been drawn on Chart I to
represent the number of persons legally executed during the twenty-two
years. The figures for legal executions have also been taken from the
Tribune record, but no further verification has been made of them than
merely to foot up the lists of names and verify the totals. The Tribune
record of legal executions is no doubt incomplete, but it is here given
for what it is worth. In a general way the broken line follows the solid
line with the exception of the year 1892 and the last five years. In the
review of the year 1881, the Tribune reported ninety-one legal
executions but gave no record of lynchings. To indicate the direction of
the broken line previous to 1882 a short line has been drawn at the left
of the chart.

On the whole, Chart I seems to indicate a relationship between legal
executions and lynchings. There is an indication that the upward
tendency in the broken line since 1887 may have contributed to the
downward tendency in the solid line since 1892—the punishment of crimes
by law may tend to make recourse to lynching less frequent. Another
factor is needed, however, to make this reasoning conclusive; some way
of measuring the amount of crime in the country during these several
years is requisite. For this purpose the writer took the number of
murders reported by the Tribune and plotted them on a trial chart in
connection with the number lynched and the number legally executed. The
result was so unsatisfactory and inconclusive, however, that any attempt
to make such a comparison was abandoned.[213]

In Chart II is shown the number of persons lynched according to months
throughout the twenty-two years, 1882–1903. Because of the difference in
the characteristics of lynchings in different sections of the United
States, and because of the differences in climate, the States have been
divided into three groups as follows: (1) The Southern Group, comprising
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri,
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; (2) The Western Group, comprising all
the other States and Territories west of the Mississippi River; (3) The
Eastern Group, comprising all the other States east of the Mississippi
River.

In the Southern Group the fewest are lynched in the months of January,
February, and November. The largest number are lynched in June, July,
and December. By dividing the twenty-two years into three periods and
drawing lines to show the monthly fluctuations for each of these
periods, it can be shown that these same tendencies are characteristic
of shorter periods of time, the tendency toward an increase in December
being less marked, however, in the period 1896–1903. Several
explanations suggest themselves. Perhaps the best explanation of the
fall in the line from the high point in June and July to a much lower
point in August is suggested by the fact that since most of the persons
lynched in the Southern Group are negroes and their time is largely
occupied with their camp-meetings and various religious exercises during
the month of August,—a custom which originated in the time of
slavery,[214]—they commit a smaller number of crimes against the whites
and thus there is less occasion for lynching during that month. During
the months of June and July, on the other hand, when there is work to be
done in tending the growing crops, disagreements and quarrels frequently
arise between the whites and the blacks, the latter often retaliating
upon the former by some offense against property or person, thus giving
greater occasion for lynching. The increase in December is possibly due
to indulgence in excesses and to the commission of a greater number of
offenses by the negroes in connection with their celebration of
Christmas. Idleness on the part of the negroes probably has much to do
with the whole matter. It has long been true that “the Devil finds work
for idle hands to do.”

In the Western Group there is comparatively little variation in the
number lynched in the different months. The drop in the line in the
months of February and November is probably explained by the fact that
those two months are the busy seasons of the year for the cattlemen. The
“fall round-up” takes place in November and the “spring round-up” about
February.

In the Eastern Group the line shows very little variation in the number
lynched in the different months. A slight increase in the month of June
is indicated.

Chart III shows the percentages lynched for various causes by months for
the entire period of twenty-two years and for the total number of
persons lynched in the United States during that time.

Before proceeding to an analysis of this chart a word of explanation is
necessary concerning the classification of causes that has been adopted.
The various causes assigned for the lynchings in the Tribune record have
been grouped into eight classes as follows: Murder, Rape, Assault, Minor
Offenses, Desperadism,[215] Theft, Arson, Unknown.

The class Murder includes murder, attempted murder, accessory to murder,
suspected murder, alleged murder, conspiracy to murder, complicity in
murder.

The class Rape includes rape, attempted rape, alleged rape.

The class Minor Offenses includes race prejudice, miscegenation, and
various minor offenses; such as (for whites) wife beating, cruelty,
kidnapping, saloon keeping, turning state’s evidence, refusing to turn
state’s evidence, being obnoxious, swindling, political prejudice,
seduction, giving information, frauds, informing, protecting a negro,
giving evidence, mob indignation, illicit distilling, disorderly
conduct, incest, elopement, revenue informer, disreputable character,
arrest of a minor, aiding escape of murderer, suspected of killing
cattle, prospective elopement; (for negroes) grave robbery, threatened
political exposures, slander, self-defense, wife beating, cutting
levees, kidnapping, voodooism, poisoning horses, writing insulting
letters, incendiary language, swindling, jilting a girl, colonizing
negroes, turning state’s evidence, political troubles, gambling,
quarreling, poisoning wells, throwing stones, unpopularity, making
threats, circulating scandals, being troublesome, bad reputation,
drunkenness, strike rioting, rioting, insults, supposed offense,
insulting women, fraud, criminal abortion, alleged stock poisoning,
enticing servant away, writing letter to white woman, asking white woman
in marriage, conspiracy, introducing smallpox, giving information,
conjuring, to prevent evidence, being disreputable, informing,
concealing a criminal, slapping a child, shooting at officer, passing
counterfeit money, felony, elopement with white girl, refusing to give
evidence, giving evidence, disobeying ferry regulations, running
quarantine, violation of contract, paying attention to white girl,
resisting assault, inflammatory language, resisting arrest, testifying
for one of his own race, keeping gambling-house, quarrel over profit
sharing, forcing white boy to commit crime, lawlessness.

The cause “race prejudice” is given, almost without exception, only in
the case of the lynching of negroes by whites and does not appear at all
in the earlier years of the period 1882–1903. The probable reason for
giving race prejudice as a cause for lynching is that no offense had
been committed which was considered worthy of mention as a cause. This
is borne out by the following instances. On February 22, 1898, a negro
by the name of F. B. Baker was lynched at Lake City, South Carolina, for
accepting the office of postmaster. In the Tribune record the cause is
given as “race prejudice.” On February 10, 1894, a negro named Collins
was lynched in Georgia for “enticing servant away.” One newspaper in
reporting this occurrence gave “race prejudice” as the cause. The
colored victims credited to “race prejudice” in 1902 by the Tribune were
lynched because they were supposed to have made some insulting remarks
about several white men. In December, 1903, Eli Hilson, colored, was
killed by “Whitecaps” in Lincoln County, Mississippi, because he refused
to leave the county in response to their warning. In the Tribune record
“race prejudice” is given as the cause for the lynching of Hilson. These
facts constitute the justification for placing “race prejudice” under
Minor Offenses.

The class Theft includes theft, larceny, burglary, robbery, suspected
robbery, safe breaking, cattle stealing, horse stealing, mule stealing.

The class Desperadism includes the action of desperado, outlaw, highway
robber, train wrecker, train robber.

The class Arson includes arson, incendiarism, barn burning.

The class Assault includes assault, murderous assault.

The class Unknown includes unknown offense, no offense, without cause,
mistaken identity, by accident, no cause given. There are in the lists
only a few cases of mistaken identity and only one by accident. They
have been put in this class merely because there was no other place to
put them.

Where more than one cause was given the following principles of
classification have been observed: rape and murder under Rape, robbery
and murder under Murder, arson and murder under Murder, assault and
robbery under Assault, robbery and arson under Arson.

Throughout this chapter, whenever any one of the above eight classes is
meant the word for the class will be begun with a capital letter. This
will avoid the danger of confusing the present use of the terms with
their ordinary and general use.

In an analysis of Chart III, it appears that smaller percentages of
persons are lynched for Murder in the summer months than in the winter
months, and that larger percentages are lynched for Rape in the summer
months than in the winter months, but that if Murder and Rape be taken
together larger percentages are lynched for those crimes in the summer
than in the winter. The percentage lynched for Assault shows little
variation throughout the year. The percentage lynched for Minor Offenses
is also fairly uniform throughout the year.

With regard to Desperadism a marked difference is shown between the
summer months and the winter months. Only about one per cent of the
lynchings in the summer are for Desperadism, there being none in the
month of April, while in January 6.4 per cent, in February 10.5 per
cent, in October 4.2 per cent, in November 4.5 per cent, and in December
11.2 per cent are for that cause. The percentage lynched for Theft is
relatively high in May, June, and July, but especially high in October.
Nearly 20 per cent of the lynchings in October are for Theft. There is a
relatively small percentage for Arson in the summer. The larger
percentage of lynchings for Arson are in March, September, October, and
November.

As to the influence of the seasons on crime, Mayo-Smith states that it
has been pretty well determined that crimes against the person are more
numerous in summer than in winter, and that crimes against property are
more numerous in winter than in summer.[216] Chart III shows conformity
to this law of crimes.[217] A larger percentage is lynched for Murder,
Rape, and Assault—crimes against the person—in summer than in winter. A
larger percentage is lynched for Desperadism, Theft, and Arson,—crimes
against property,—in winter than in summer.

[Illustration: III. PERCENTAGES LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES BY MONTHS
1882–1903]

[Illustration: IV. NUMBER OF WHITES, NEGROES AND OTHERS LYNCHED
ACCORDING TO YEARS 1882–1903]

Chart IV shows the relative number of whites, negroes, and other persons
lynched each year during the last twenty-two years. The largest number
of whites were lynched in the year 1884, the majority of them being in
the Western Group of States. Since that year there has been a general
but irregular decline in the lynching of whites. If the tops of the
columns representing the whites were joined together by a line, the line
would rise and fall with more or less regularity, suggesting the
conclusion that lynchings tend to recur in groups from year to year, or,
in other words, that the lynching mania spreads in successive waves over
the country. If the tops of the columns representing the negroes were
joined together by a line, the same tendency would be noticeable, but
the waves would appear less regular and less marked. The waves for the
whites and the negroes do not correspond at all from year to year, but
this perhaps can be explained by the fact that the lynching of negroes
is characteristic of the Southern States while the lynching of whites is
characteristic of the Western States. There is no psychic connection
between the lynching of a negro in the South and the lynching of a
murderer or cattle thief in the West.

For the lynching of negroes, 1892 and 1893 are the years in which the
largest number were lynched, the numbers being 156 and 155 respectively.
The chart shows a general increase in the lynching of negroes from 1882
to 1892, and a general decline from 1893 to 1903. In 1903, however,
nearly twice as many negroes were lynched as in 1882. The chart also
shows an increase in the proportion of negroes lynched to whites lynched
during the period 1882–1903.

The total number of negroes lynched during the twenty-two years is
2,060, an average of 93⁷⁄₁₁ per year. The total number of whites lynched
during the twenty-two years is 1,169, an average of 53³⁄₂₂ per year.

Chart IV also shows, under the title of Others, the comparatively small
number (108) of Indians, Mexicans, and foreigners that have been lynched
during the twenty-two years. In the years when the larger numbers were
lynched they were distributed as follows: in 1883, seven Mexicans, four
Indians, and one Chinaman; in 1884, six Mexicans, one Indian, one
Japanese, and one Swiss; in 1885, six Chinese and two Indians; in 1891,
eleven Italians (at New Orleans), two Indians, and two Chinese; in 1893,
five Italians, two Indians, two Mexicans, and one Bohemian; in 1895,
five Italians (at Walsenburg, Colorado), two Indians, and two Mexicans.
In all, forty-five Indians, twenty-eight Italians, twenty Mexicans,
twelve Chinese, one Japanese, one Swiss, and one Bohemian were lynched
during the period 1882–1903.

Chart V shows the number of females, both white and colored, lynched
each year during the twenty-two years. With the exception of the years
1882, 1883, 1887, and 1899 one or more were lynched each year. In the
year 1895, thirteen were lynched, eight colored and five white women.
The majority of the colored females were lynched in the five years
1891–95. In all, forty colored and twenty-three white females, or a
total of sixty-three females were lynched during the period 1882–1903.

The lower half of Chart V shows the causes for which the females were
lynched. Of the whites, nine were lynched for murder or complicity in
murder, one for being a disreputable character, one because of mob
indignation, one for race prejudice, one for miscegenation, one for
arson, two for theft, and seven for unknown reasons.

Of the colored, twenty were lynched for murder or complicity in murder,
two for alleged well poisoning, eight for race prejudice, five for
arson, one for theft, and four for unknown reasons.

[Illustration: V. NUMBER OF WOMEN (WHITES AND NEGROES) LYNCHED ACCORDING
TO YEARS 1882–1903]

[Illustration: PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES 1882–1903 WOMEN
(WHITES AND NEGROES)]

[Illustration: VI. PERCENTAGES LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES BY YEARS
1882–1903 WHITES AND OTHERS]

Chart V really supplements Chart IV. In Chart IV, the 3,337 persons who
have been lynched during the twenty-two years are classified according
to race only. In Chart V the number of females in Chart IV is shown and
also the causes for which they were lynched. In the further
investigation sex will be disregarded and the whites, Indians, Mexicans,
and foreigners will be grouped together under the head of Whites and
Others, this making a classification into negroes and those not negroes.

Chart VI shows the percentages lynched for various causes by years,
1882–1903, for Whites and Others. The percentages lynched for the
various causes vary greatly from year to year. The percentage lynched
for Murder varies from 24 per cent to 70 per cent. The percentage
lynched for Theft varies from 3.9 per cent to 46.5 per cent. In the
three years 1898–1900, and in the year 1903, none were lynched for
Theft. The percentage lynched for Rape varies from 1.8 per cent to 20
per cent, none being lynched for that cause in 1902. Rape is not
particularly important as a cause. The chief value of Chart VI is seen
by contrasting it with Chart VII.

Chart VII shows the percentages lynched for various causes by years,
1882–1903, for Negroes. The percentage lynched for Murder does not vary
greatly from year to year, the extreme variation being from 28.2 per
cent in the year 1882 to 53 per cent in the year 1898. Rape appears as
an important cause, the percentage varying from 22.6 per cent in the
year 1901 to 56.5 per cent in the year 1882. The chart indicates in a
general way a decrease in the importance of Rape as a cause for the
lynching of Negroes since 1882. Minor Offenses, on the contrary, have
increased in importance as a cause for the lynching of Negroes. In the
later years, also, a larger percentage has been for Assault.

Comparing Charts VI and VII it appears that there is greater uniformity
in the percentages lynched for the different causes from year to year in
the case of the Negroes than in the case of the Whites and Others. A
smaller percentage is lynched for Murder and a much larger percentage is
lynched for Rape in the case of the Negroes than in the case of the
Whites and Others. For the Negroes, Theft is largely larceny and
burglary while for the Whites and Others it is stealing live stock.
Desperadism figures to a very limited extent as a cause for lynching
Negroes. Assault figures to a very limited extent as a cause for
lynching Whites and Others.

Chart VIII shows the proportion lynched for various causes, 1882–1903,
for Whites and Others. This chart, like Chart VI, covers the total
number of Whites and Others that have been lynched during the period,
without reference to particular sections of the country. Murder with 628
stands highest, and Theft, with 264, second. Rape with 109 ranks third
as a cause, and Desperadism, with 93, fourth. Minor Offenses is credited
with 52, Arson with 31, and Assault with 11. The number lynched which
fall under the class Unknown is 89. Of the total number, 49.2 per cent
were lynched for Murder, 20.6 per cent for Theft, 8.5 per cent for Rape,
7.3 per cent for Desperadism, 4 per cent for Minor Offenses, 2.4 per
cent for Arson, .8 per cent for Assault, and 7 per cent is credited to
Unknown. Of those lynched for Theft, nearly 90 per cent were lynched for
the crime of stealing live stock.

[Illustration: VII PERCENTAGES LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES BY YEARS
1882–1903 NEGROES]

[Illustration: VIII. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES 1882–1903
WHITES AND OTHERS]

Chart IX shows the proportion lynched for various causes, 1882–1903, for
Negroes. This chart, like the preceding chart, covers the total number
of Negroes that have been lynched during the period, without reference
to particular sections of the country. By far the greater number of
Negroes have been lynched either for Murder or for Rape. Murder is
credited with 783 and Rape with 707. Minor Offenses with 208 ranks third
as a cause for the lynching of Negroes, and Arson, with 104, fourth.
Theft with 101 ranks fifth. Assault is credited with 47 and Desperadism
with 20. To the class Unknown 90 are credited. Of the total number, 38
per cent were lynched for Murder, 34.3 per cent for Rape, 10.1 per cent
for Minor Offenses, 5 per cent for Arson, 4.9 per cent for Theft, 2.3
per cent for Assault, .9 per cent for Desperadism, and 4.3 per cent is
credited to Unknown. Of the Negroes lynched for Theft only 14 per cent
were lynched for stealing live stock, the remaining 86 per cent being
lynched for causes that may be fairly classed under petty larceny.

By comparing Charts VIII and IX the characteristic differences in the
reasons assigned for the lynching of Negroes and for the lynching of
Whites and Others are readily seen. The larger number in each case is
under Murder, but further than that the order of the arrangement of the
causes does not agree. Rape which occupies second place in the chart for
the Negroes and is nearly equal to Murder, drops to third place on the
chart for the Whites and Others. Comparatively speaking, Theft,
particularly the stealing of live stock, and Desperadism are much more
important as causes for the lynching of Whites and Others than for the
lynching of Negroes. In the case of the Negroes, Rape, Minor Offenses,
and Arson are much more important as causes than in the case of the
Whites and Others. Assault is also more important as a cause for
lynching Negroes than for lynching Whites and Others.

Chart X shows the proportion lynched for various causes in the Southern
Group of States, 1882–1903, for Whites and Others. The majority of the
Whites and Others that have been lynched in this section of the country
have been lynched for Murder. The numbers lynched for the various causes
are as follows: Murder 321, Rape 69, Theft 63, Minor Offenses 42,
Desperadism 30, Arson 19, Assault 6, Unknown 50. The percentages lynched
for the various causes are as follows: Murder 53.5 per cent, Rape 11.5
per cent, Theft 10.5 per cent, Minor Offenses 7 per cent, Desperadism 5
per cent, Arson 3.2 per cent, Assault 1 per cent, Unknown 8.3 per cent.

Chart XI shows the proportion lynched for various causes in the Southern
Group of States, 1882–1903, for Negroes. As might be expected, the
causes arrange themselves in the same order as in Chart IX. The numbers
lynched for the various causes are as follows: Murder 753, Rape 675,
Minor Offenses 206, Arson 104, Theft 96, Assault 46, Desperadism 18,
Unknown 87. The percentages lynched for the various causes are as
follows: Murder 38 per cent, Rape 34 per cent, Minor Offenses 10.3 per
cent, Arson 5.2 per cent, Theft 4.8 per cent, Assault 2.3 per cent,
Desperadism .9 per cent, Unknown 4.3 per cent.

[Illustration: IX. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES 1882–1903
NEGROES]

[Illustration: X. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES IN SOUTHERN
STATES 1882–1903 WHITES AND OTHERS]

A comparison of Charts X and XI shows how greatly the lynching of
Negroes in the South predominates over the lynching of Whites and
Others. Against 600 Whites and Others lynched during the twenty-two
years, 1,985 Negroes were lynched. With regard to the causes assigned
for the lynchings a wide variation is observed. Only 38 per cent of the
Negroes, against 53.5 per cent of the Whites and Others, were lynched
for Murder. Rape stands next to Murder in order of importance in both
cases, but while 34 per cent of the Negroes were lynched for Rape, only
11.5 per cent of the Whites and Others were lynched for that cause.
Minor Offenses, Arson, Theft, and Assault appear as of much more
importance as causes for the lynching of Negroes than for the lynching
of Whites and Others.

Those who assume that the majority of the negroes lynched in the South
are lynched for the crime of rape against white women, and that the
lynching of negroes is therefore justifiable, will find very little
satisfaction in an examination of Chart XI. In the classification of the
cases the writer has put every case where both rape and murder were
assigned as the cause, under Rape. It is possible that if a careful
investigation were made of all the cases credited to Murder, it might be
found that the motive in some cases was rape but that the actual crime
committed was murder, and that it was for rape as well as for murder
that the negroes in such cases were lynched. The lynchers may have
considered themselves the avengers of the crime of rape as well as of
the crime of murder. The statistics, however, cannot be made to show
that more than thirty-four per cent of the negroes lynched in the South
during the last twenty-two years have been lynched for the crime of
rape, either attempted, alleged, or actually committed; and it is safe
to say that if rape were connected with the offense in any case, that
fact would ordinarily be stated in the report.

Chart XII shows the proportion lynched for various causes in the Western
Group of States, 1882–1903. This chart covers the total number of
persons lynched in that section of the country during the twenty-two
years, no distinction being made either as to race or nationality. The
numbers lynched for the various causes are as follows: Murder 279, Theft
199, Desperadism 64, Rape 34, Arson 12, Minor Offenses 9, Assault 4,
Unknown 31. The total number lynched for all causes is 632. The
percentages lynched for the various causes are as follows: Murder 44.1
per cent, Theft 31.5 per cent, Desperadism 10.1 per cent, Rape 5.4 per
cent, Arson 1.9 per cent, Minor Offenses 1.4 per cent, Assault .6 per
cent, Unknown 4.9 per cent. Lynchings for Theft and Desperadism are
particularly characteristic of the Western States. Of the 199 lynched
for Theft, 189 or 95 per cent were lynched for stealing live stock.

Chart XIII shows the proportion lynched for various causes in the
Eastern Group of States, 1882–1903. The chart covers the total number of
persons, without distinction as to race or nationality, who have been
lynched in that section of the country during the twenty-two years. The
majority have been lynched for Murder and Rape. The numbers lynched for
the various causes are as follows: Murder 58, Rape 38, Theft 7, Minor
Offenses 3, Assault 2, Desperadism 1, Unknown 11. None were lynched for
Arson. The percentages lynched for the various causes are as follows:
Murder 48.3 per cent, Rape 31.7 per cent, Theft 5.8 per cent, Minor
Offenses 2.5 per cent, Assault 1.7 per cent, Desperadism .8 per cent,
Unknown 9.1 per cent.

[Illustration: XI. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES IN SOUTHERN
STATES 1882–1903 NEGROES]

[Illustration: XII. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES IN WESTERN
STATES 1882–1903]

Thus far in this investigation the question of the distribution of
lynchings has only entered to the extent of dividing the United States
into three sections, the Southern Group of States, the Western Group,
and the Eastern Group.[218] The following tables show the distribution
of lynchings by States on the basis of the number of persons lynched,
these persons being classified into Whites, Negroes and Others.

         NUMBER OF PERSONS LYNCHED IN SOUTHERN STATES, 1882–1903

                                         WHITES  NEGROES OTHERS   TOTAL

 Mississippi                                  39     294       1     334
 Texas                                       114     199      11     324
 Louisiana                                    34     232      19     285
 Georgia                                      28     241             269
 Alabama                                      46     198             244
 Arkansas                                     60     139       1     200
 Tennessee                                    49     150             199
 Kentucky                                     64     103             167
 Florida                                      19     115             134
 South Carolina                                8     109             117
 Missouri                                     49      42              91
 Virginia                                     21      70              91
 North Carolina                               15      48       1      64
 West Virginia                                19      27              46
 Maryland                                      2      18              20
                                             ———    ————     ———   —————
                  Total                      567    1985      33    2585

         NUMBER OF PERSONS LYNCHED IN WESTERN STATES, 1882–1903

                                         WHITES  NEGROES OTHERS   TOTAL

 Indian Territory (Oklahoma)                  73       7      15      95
 Montana                                      80       1       4      85
 Colorado                                     55       3       6      64
 Nebraska                                     52       2       2      56
 Kansas                                       34      17              51
 California                                   29              12      41
 Wyoming                                      37                      37
 Dakota (North and South)                     28       1       6      35
 New Mexico                                   30       1       3      34
 Arizona                                      25               3      28
 Washington                                   20               6      26
 Idaho                                        14               5      19
 Oregon                                       15       1       3      19
 Iowa                                         15               1      16
 Alaska                                        4               4       8
 Utah                                          4       1       2       7
 Minnesota                                     5               1       6
 Nevada                                        3               2       5
                                             ———      ——      ——     ———
                  Total                      523      34      75     632

         NUMBER OF PERSONS LYNCHED IN EASTERN STATES, 1882–1903

                                         WHITES  NEGROES OTHERS   TOTAL

 Indiana                                      41      11              52
 Ohio                                         10      11              21
 Illinois                                     11      10              21
 Michigan                                      7       1               8
 Pennsylvania                                  2       5               7
 Wisconsin                                     6                       6
 New York                                      1       1               2
 New Jersey                                            1               1
 Connecticut                                   1                       1
 Delaware                                              1               1
                                              ——      ——       —     ———
                  Total                       79      41             120

               TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS LYNCHED, 1882–1903

                                         WHITES  NEGROES OTHERS   TOTAL

 Southern                                    567    1985      33    2585
 Western                                     523      34      75     632
 Eastern                                      79      41             120
                                            ————    ————     ———    ————
                  Total                     1169    2060     108    3337

[Illustration: XIII. PROPORTION LYNCHED FOR VARIOUS CAUSES IN EASTERN
STATES 1882–1903]

Excluding the New England States there are no States in the Union in
which lynchings have not taken place during the last twenty-two years.
In forty-five of the States and Territories, as they are at present
organized, one or more persons have been lynched during this period. In
the Southern Group of States more than three times as many negroes as
whites have been lynched. In Texas the “Others” were Mexicans, with the
exception of one Indian; in Louisiana the “Others” were all Italians. In
the Western Group of States only about five per cent of the persons
lynched were negroes while nearly twelve per cent were “Others,” the
majority of whom were Indians, but there were also Chinamen, Mexicans,
Italians, a Japanese, a Swiss, and a Bohemian. In the Eastern Group of
States about thirty-four per cent of the persons lynched were negroes
and the rest were whites, there being no “Others.”

Only one lynching with one person lynched is credited to the New England
States. In July, 1886, in Litchfield County, Connecticut, Charles
Lockwood, a farm-hand, was found early one morning hanging from the limb
of a tree, evidently having been dead for several hours. According to
the New York Times,[219] public opinion was divided as to whether he had
been lynched or had committed suicide. The coroner’s verdict said that
it was a case of suicide. To a disinterested party, however, the
evidence appears very strong in favor of the former view. Lockwood had
brutally murdered “pretty Mattie Randell,” of Morris, Connecticut, and
escaped. Searching parties were organized and were scouring the country,
and feeling ran high in the community against him. Threats were
repeatedly made against his life. His body was found one morning
dangling from the limb of a tree. In the writer’s opinion, formed from
reading various newspaper accounts of the occurrence, the Chicago
Tribune rightly included Charles Lockwood in the list of persons lynched
in the year 1886.

For the purpose of studying the distribution of lynchings with a view to
determining what particular characteristics of the population, if any,
promote and foster the practice of lynching, it is the number of
lynchings that have occurred in specified districts which should be
considered rather than the number of persons who have been lynched in
those districts. Not infrequently several persons have been lynched at
one time and such cases would tend to vitiate any conclusions drawn from
an investigation made on the basis of the number of persons lynched. The
circumstances which surround lynchings do not vary in any respect
according to the number of victims at particular lynchings. The
following tables have therefore been prepared to show the distribution
of lynchings by States on the basis of the number of lynchings. In
making up these figures it was found necessary to establish some
standard length of time for a lynching. There were a number of cases
where persons were lynched on succeeding or subsequent days at or near
the same place, and the question arose as to whether there was one
lynching or more than one lynching in such cases. It would seem that
ordinarily, if one whole day intervened between the lynching of one
person and the lynching of another person, sufficient time had elapsed
for the excitement over the lynching of the first person to abate
somewhat and that the lynching of the second person in such a case could
not rightfully be considered a part of the preceding act of mob
violence. Using this as a criterion, all cases in which persons were
lynched on two succeeding days at or near the same place have been
classified as one lynching, but all cases in which at least a day
intervened in the lynching of two or more persons at or near the same
place have been classified as two or more lynchings.

      NUMBER OF LYNCHINGS BY YEARS IN SOUTHERN STATES, 1882–1903

 ═══════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══
            │’82│’83│’84│’85│’86│’87│’88│’89│’90│’91│’92│’93│’94│’95
 ───────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
 Mississippi│  3│ 10│ 10│ 12│ 12│ 10│ 10│ 22│ 11│ 20│ 11│ 12│ 14│ 13
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Georgia    │  3│  5│  5│  9│  6│  4│ 12│  9│ 17│ 11│ 13│ 11│ 16│ 14
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Texas      │ 10│ 13│ 15│ 20│ 14│  6│ 10│ 10│ 22│ 13│  8│  8│ 10│ 17
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Louisiana  │  5│  3│  5│  2│  6│  9│  7│  8│  8│ 14│ 18│ 12│ 11│  4
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Alabama    │  5│  4│  3│  4│  4│  4│  9│  6│  8│ 14│ 14│ 17│ 12│ 10
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Tennessee  │  2│  6│   │  9│  6│  4│  6│  5│  8│ 12│ 20│ 14│ 12│ 11
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Arkansas   │  2│  7│  6│  7│  3│  8│  2│  5│  6│ 10│ 20│  9│  6│  7
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Kentucky   │  6│  4│  6│  3│  5│  6│  6│  8│  5│  7│  9│ 11│ 16│ 12
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Florida    │  2│  1│  2│  3│  4│  3│  2│   │  3│  8│  7│  6│  7│  8
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 South      │  6│  3│  1│  1│  4│  2│  2│  5│  4│  1│  5│ 11│  5│  5
   Carolina │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Missouri   │  3│  2│  3│  6│  4│  1│  1│  7│  1│  1│  5│  4│  5│  4
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Virginia   │  2│  1│  5│  4│  2│  1│  3│  7│  3│  4│  5│  8│  5│  2
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 North      │   │  2│  3│  6│  2│  3│  6│  3│  2│  2│  5│  2│  1│  1
   Carolina │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 West       │  1│   │  2│  1│  3│  3│  2│  4│   │  2│  5│   │  2│
   Virginia │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Maryland   │   │   │  2│  3│  1│  2│   │  1│   │  1│  1│   │  1│  3
 ───────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
    Total   │ 50│ 61│ 68│ 90│ 76│ 66│ 78│100│ 98│120│146│125│123│111
 ═══════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══

 ═══════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═════
            │’96│’97│’98│’99│’00│’01│’02│’03│Total
 ───────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
 Mississippi│  6│ 15│ 12│ 11│ 15│ 11│  9│ 14│  263
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Georgia    │  8│ 13│ 12│ 17│ 14│ 13│  9│ 10│  231
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Texas      │  4│ 14│  3│  6│  2│  7│  5│  6│  223
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Louisiana  │ 21│ 10│  8│  9│  9│ 14│ 10│ 11│  204
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Alabama    │ 13│ 16│  8│  5│  8│ 12│  4│  2│  182
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Tennessee  │ 12│  5│  7│  2│  6│  9│  4│  4│  164
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Arkansas   │  4│ 10│ 10│  5│  6│  5│  6│ 10│  154
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Kentucky   │  6│  7│  5│  3│  1│  4│  8│  2│  140
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Florida    │  7│  6│  1│  4│  7│  5│  3│  6│   95
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 South      │  4│  6│  5│  1│  2│  5│  2│  5│   85
   Carolina │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Missouri   │  5│  3│  5│  3│  2│  4│  4│  3│   76
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Virginia   │   │  5│  4│  1│  5│  2│  4│   │   73
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 North      │  1│  2│  2│  2│  3│  1│  3│  1│   53
   Carolina │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 West       │  1│   │  1│  1│  2│  1│  2│  1│   34
   Virginia │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
            │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Maryland   │  1│  1│  2│   │  1│   │   │   │   20
 ───────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
    Total   │ 93│113│ 85│ 70│ 83│ 93│ 73│ 75│ 1997
 ═══════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═════
       NUMBER OF LYNCHINGS BY YEARS IN WESTERN STATES, 1882–1903

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══
             │’82│’83│’84│’85│’86│’87│’88│’89│’90│’91│’92│’93│’94│’95
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
 Indian      │   │  1│   │  3│  3│  2│  3│  4│   │  2│  1│  5│  6│  5
   Territory │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
   (Oklahoma)│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Kansas      │  2│  2│  2│  5│  5│  1│  3│  2│   │   │  3│  3│  3│  1
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Nebraska    │   │  2│  6│  1│  3│  4│  4│  6│  2│  2│   │   │  2│  3
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Colorado    │  6│  1│  3│  1│  3│   │  4│   │  2│  2│   │  1│  1│  2
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Montana     │   │  5│  9│  2│   │   │  3│  2│   │  3│  1│  1│   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 California  │   │  3│  2│  2│  1│  3│  3│  1│  2│  1│  4│  1│  1│  4
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 New Mexico  │  5│  2│  4│  3│   │  1│   │  2│  1│   │   │  4│   │  1
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Dakota      │  1│  1│  3│  2│   │   │  3│   │  1│  2│  1│  1│  1│  1
   (North &  │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
   South)    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Washington  │  2│  1│  2│  2│  1│   │   │  1│   │  3│  1│  1│  1│  1
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Arizona     │  4│  1│  1│  1│   │  2│  2│   │  1│   │  2│   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Wyoming     │  2│   │  1│   │   │   │  1│  3│   │  1│  4│   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Iowa        │   │  3│   │  2│   │  2│   │  1│   │   │   │  2│  2│
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Oregon      │   │   │  4│  3│   │  1│   │   │  2│   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Idaho       │  1│   │  1│  2│   │   │  1│   │   │   │  1│  1│   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Alaska      │   │  2│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Minnesota   │  2│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │  2│   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Utah        │   │  3│  2│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Nevada      │   │   │   │   │   │   │  1│   │  1│   │   │   │   │
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
    Total    │ 25│ 27│ 40│ 29│ 16│ 16│ 28│ 22│ 12│ 16│ 18│ 22│ 17│ 18
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═════
             │’96│’97│’98│’99│’00│’01│’02│’03│Total
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
 Indian      │  4│  1│  3│  1│   │  3│   │   │   47
   Territory │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
   (Oklahoma)│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Kansas      │   │   │  1│  3│  1│  2│  1│   │   40
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Nebraska    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   35
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Colorado    │  2│   │   │   │  3│   │  1│   │   32
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Montana     │   │   │  1│   │   │  2│   │  3│   32
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 California  │   │  1│   │   │   │  2│   │   │   31
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 New Mexico  │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   23
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Dakota      │   │  2│   │   │   │   │  1│   │   20
   (North &  │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
   South)    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Washington  │   │   │  1│   │   │   │   │  1│   18
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Arizona     │   │  2│   │   │   │   │   │  1│   17
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Wyoming     │   │   │  1│   │   │   │  1│  2│   16
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Iowa        │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   12
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Oregon      │   │   │   │   │   │   │  1│   │   11
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Idaho       │   │   │   │   │   │  1│   │   │    8
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Alaska      │   │  3│  1│   │   │   │   │   │    6
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Minnesota   │  1│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    5
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Utah        │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    5
             │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Nevada      │   │  2│   │   │   │   │   │  1│    5
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
    Total    │  7│ 11│  8│  4│  4│ 10│  5│  8│  363
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═════
       NUMBER OF LYNCHINGS BY YEARS IN EASTERN STATES, 1882–1903

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══
             │’82│’83│’84│’85│’86│’87│’88│’89│’90│’91│’92│’93│’94│’95
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
 Indiana     │  4│  3│  3│   │  5│  5│   │  2│  4│  3│   │  2│  2│
 Ohio        │  2│  1│  1│  3│  2│  1│   │   │   │  1│  4│   │  2│  2
 Illinois    │   │  1│   │  2│  1│   │  2│   │   │  1│  1│  2│  1│  1
 Michigan    │   │  2│   │   │   │   │  1│  1│   │  1│   │  1│   │
 Pennsylvania│  1│   │  1│   │   │   │  1│   │   │  2│   │   │  1│
 Wisconsin   │   │   │  1│   │   │   │  1│  1│   │  2│   │   │  1│
 New York    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │  1│   │   │
 Connecticut │   │   │   │   │  1│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Delaware    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 New Jersey  │   │   │   │   │  1│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
    Total    │  7│  7│  6│  5│ 10│  6│  5│  4│  4│ 10│  6│  5│  7│  3
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═════
             │’96│’97│’98│’99│’00│’01│’02│’03│Total
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
 Indiana     │  1│  1│  1│   │  2│  1│  1│   │   40
 Ohio        │   │  1│   │   │   │   │   │   │   20
 Illinois    │  1│  1│  1│   │   │   │  2│  3│   20
 Michigan    │   │   │   │   │   │   │  1│   │    7
 Pennsylvania│   │   │   │  1│   │   │   │   │    7
 Wisconsin   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    6
 New York    │  1│   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    2
 Connecticut │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    1
 Delaware    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │  1│    1
 New Jersey  │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │    1
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
    Total    │  3│  3│  2│  1│  2│  1│  4│  4│  105
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═════
             TOTAL NUMBER OF LYNCHINGS BY YEARS, 1882–1903

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══
             │’82│’83│’84│’85│’86│’87│’88│’89│’90│’91│’92│’93│’94│’95
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
 Southern    │ 50│ 61│ 68│ 90│ 76│ 66│ 78│100│ 98│120│146│125│123│111
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Western     │ 25│ 27│ 40│ 29│ 16│ 16│ 28│ 22│ 12│ 16│ 18│ 22│ 17│ 18
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Eastern     │  7│  7│  6│  5│ 10│  6│  5│  4│  4│ 10│  6│  5│  7│  3
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───
    Total    │ 82│ 95│114│124│102│ 88│101│126│114│146│170│152│147│132
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══

 ════════════╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═══╤═════
             │’96│’97│’98│’99│’00│’01│’02│’03│Total
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
 Southern    │ 93│113│ 85│ 70│ 83│ 93│ 73│ 75│ 1997
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Western     │  7│ 11│  8│  4│  4│ 10│  5│  8│  363
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 Eastern     │  3│  3│  2│  1│  2│  1│  4│  4│  105
   States    │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │   │
 ────────────┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼───┼─────
    Total    │103│127│ 95│ 75│ 89│104│ 82│ 87│ 2465
 ════════════╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═══╧═════

If much that has been said and written in recent years on the subject of
lynching is true; if the presence of the colored race, because of the
character of the crimes which negroes commit, is largely responsible for
the practice of lynching; if the immigration into this country of “the
scum of Europe” is also responsible for the practice; if lynching is, in
addition, a relic of barbarism and a sign of degeneracy in American
civilization,—then there ought to be some correlation between the
distribution of lynchings and the proportion of the white element to the
colored and the foreign elements in the population, and also between the
distribution of lynchings and the degree of illiteracy in the
population. With this idea in mind an attempt has been made to find out
whether any such correlations exist with reference to the lynchings that
have occurred during the last twenty-two years in the Southern Group of
States and in the three States of the Eastern Group in which lynchings
have been most numerous. In the following table the percentage which the
total number of lynchings bears to the total population of these several
States has been placed alongside the percentage of the negroes in the
population, the percentage of foreign born in the population, and the
percentage of illiterates in the population. In the same table also
there have been given the percentage of the persons lynched in these
several States who were whites, and the percentage of the persons
lynched who were negroes.

From this table there appears to be no distinct correlation between the
distribution of lynchings and the percentage of negroes in the
population. In a general way the percentage of lynchings to the
population is highest in the States where the negro element is largest,
but Virginia, North Carolina, and notably South Carolina, are
exceptions. So far as any correlation at all can be traced between the
percentage of lynchings and the percentage of foreign born, the latter
varies inversely to the former. The percentage of illiterates varies
from State to State in about the same way that the percentage of negroes
does; and hence there is the same general conclusion to be drawn with
reference to the correlation of lynchings to illiteracy as with
reference to the correlation of lynchings to the percentage of negroes,
namely, that there is no distinct correlation. When the percentage of
the persons lynched who were negroes is compared with the percentage of
negroes in the population, however, it is at once apparent that there is
a correlation between them. If plotted graphically the lines
representing the two percentages would rise and fall in almost perfect
uniformity, only Georgia and Tennessee presenting slight exceptions to
the general tendency.


 ═══════════╤══════════╤══════════╤══════════
            │ PER CENT │ PER CENT │ PER CENT
            │    OF    │OF WHITES │OF NEGROES
            │LYNCHINGS │    IN    │    IN
            │    TO    │POPULATION│POPULATION
            │POPULATION│          │
            │   1900   │          │
 ───────────┼──────────┼────┬─────┼────┬─────
            │          │1890│1900 │1890│1900
 ───────────┼──────────┼────┼─────┼────┼─────
 Mississippi│     .0169│42.2│ 41.3│57.6│ 58.5
 Georgia    │     .0104│53.2│ 53.3│46.7│ 46.7
 Texas      │     .0073│78.1│ 79.6│21.8│ 20.4
 Louisiana  │     .0147│49.9│ 52.8│50.0│ 47.1
 Alabama    │     .0099│55.1│ 54.7│44.8│ 45.2
 Tennessee  │     .0081│75.6│ 76.2│24.4│ 23.8
 Arkansas   │     .0117│72.6│ 72.0│27.4│ 28.0
 Kentucky   │     .0065│85.6│ 86.7│14.4│ 13.3
 Florida    │     .0179│57.5│ 56.3│42.5│ 43.7
 South      │     .0063│40.1│ 41.6│59.8│ 58.4
   Carolina │          │    │     │    │
 Missouri   │     .0024│94.4│ 94.8│ 5.6│  5.2
 Virginia   │     .0039│61.6│ 64.3│38.4│ 35.6
 North      │     .0027│65.2│ 66.7│34.7│ 33.0
   Carolina │          │    │     │    │
 West       │     .0035│95.7│ 95.5│ 4.3│  4.5
   Virginia │          │    │     │    │
 Maryland   │     .0016│79.3│ 80.2│20.7│ 19.8
 Indiana    │     .0015│97.9│ 97.7│ 2.1│  2.3
 Ohio       │     .0004│97.6│ 97.7│ 2.4│  2.3
 Illinois   │     .0004│98.5│ 98.2│ 1.5│  1.8
 ═══════════╧══════════╧════╧═════╧════╧═════

 ═══════════╤═══════╤═══════╤══════════╤══════════════
            │  PER  │  PER  │ PER CENT │ PER CENT OF
            │CENT OF│CENT OF│OF FOREIGN│ILLITERATES IN
            │LYNCHED│LYNCHED│ BORN IN  │  POPULATION
            │  WHO  │  WHO  │POPULATION│
            │ WERE  │ WERE  │          │
            │WHITES │NEGROES│          │
 ───────────┼───────┼───────┼────┬─────┼────┬─────────
            │       │       │1890│1900 │1800│1900[220]
 ───────────┼───────┼───────┼────┼─────┼────┼─────────
 Mississippi│  11.67│  88.02│ 0.6│  0.5│40.0│     32.0
 Georgia    │  10.40│  89.59│ 0.7│  0.6│39.8│     30.5
 Texas      │  35.18│  61.41│ 6.8│  5.9│19.7│     14.5
 Louisiana  │  11.92│  81.40│ 4.4│  3.8│45.8│     38.5
 Alabama    │  18.85│  81.14│ 1.0│  0.8│41.0│     34.0
 Tennessee  │  24.62│  75.37│ 1.1│  0.9│26.6│     20.7
 Arkansas   │   30.0│   69.5│ 1.3│  1.1│26.6│     20.4
 Kentucky   │  38.32│  61.67│ 3.2│  2.3│21.6│     16.5
 Florida    │  14.17│  85.82│ 5.9│  4.5│27.8│     21.9
 South      │   6.83│  93.16│ 0.5│  0.4│45.0│     35.9
   Carolina │       │       │    │     │    │
 Missouri   │  53.84│  46.15│ 8.8│  7.0│ 9.1│      6.4
 Virginia   │  23.07│  76.92│ 1.1│  1.0│30.2│     22.9
 North      │  23.43│   75.0│ 0.2│  0.2│35.7│     28.7
   Carolina │       │       │    │     │    │
 West       │  41.30│  58.69│ 2.5│  2.3│11.4│      2.5
   Virginia │       │       │    │     │    │
 Maryland   │   10.0│   90.0│ 9.0│  7.9│15.7│     11.1
 Indiana    │   78.8│   21.1│ 6.7│  5.6│ 6.3│      4.6
 Ohio       │   47.6│   52.3│12.5│ 11.0│ 5.2│      4.0
 Illinois   │   52.3│   47.6│22.0│ 20.1│ 5.2│      4.2
 ═══════════╧═══════╧═══════╧════╧═════╧════╧═════════

For the purpose of further investigating the subject of the distribution
of lynchings in relation to particular characteristics of the
population, the lynchings which have occurred during the last twenty-two
years in the Southern Group of States and in the three States of the
Eastern Group in which lynchings have been most numerous were classified
according to the counties in which they occurred in these several
States. On the basis of this classification a careful study was made of
the same characteristics of the population by counties as were
considered above with reference to the population by States. The
percentage of lynchings to the population in the several counties where
lynchings have taken place was compared with the percentage of negroes,
the percentage of foreign born, and the percentage of illiterates in
those several counties.[221] To facilitate comparison, trial charts were
drawn on which the percentages were plotted in graphic form, and the
results were carefully noted.

In the comparison of the percentage of lynchings with the percentage of
negroes in the population by counties no correlation can be clearly
distinguished. In many counties where the negroes constitute between
sixty per cent and eighty per cent of the population the percentage of
lynchings is high, but there are also numerous exceptions.

In the comparison of the percentage of lynchings with the percentage of
foreign born in the population by counties there appears to be no
distinguishable correlation. It is shown pretty conclusively, however,
that there is no tendency for the percentage of lynchings to increase
where the percentage of foreign born in the population is large.

In the comparison of the percentage of lynchings with the percentage of
illiterates in the population by counties there appears to be not the
slightest correlation.

The net result of this investigation into some characteristics of the
population in relation to the distribution of lynchings is negative
rather than positive. The proportion between the white and colored
elements in the population does not seem to affect the prevalence of
lynchings. It is only the proportion of whites lynched to negroes
lynched that seems to bear any relation to the proportion between the
white and colored elements in the population. The percentage of foreign
born in the population does not seem to influence the prevalence of
lynchings and there is not the slightest indication that the practice of
lynching is anything else than a thoroughly American practice. So far as
the percentage of illiterates in the population is an indication of the
degree of culture and civilization possessed by a community, it does not
appear that lynchings are confined to backward communities. The
deductions which may be drawn as a result of this investigation afford
no explanation why, for instance, a greater number of lynchings occurred
in Decatur County, Georgia, than in any other county in that State, or
why there were ten lynchings in Dallas County, Alabama, but only one
lynching in Lowndes, an adjoining county. It is probably true that the
distribution of lynchings is largely affected by entirely local
conditions, conditions which cannot be represented by statistics.[222]

In this chapter nothing has been said about the methods adopted for
lynching during the twenty-two-year period. In the record of lynchings
published by the Chicago Tribune no mention is made of the manner of
death which the victims suffered. It is probably true that most of the
lynchings were either by hanging or by shooting, or by both hanging and
shooting. Additional indignities and cruelties have not infrequently
been inflicted, however, and there have been a number of cases where the
victims have been burned alive. The following cases of lynching by
burning alive have come to the writer’s notice: in 1884, one in Texas;
in 1891, one in Texas, one in Louisiana; in 1892, one in Arkansas; in
1893, one in Texas; in 1894, one in Kentucky; in 1895, one in Texas; in
1897, one in North Carolina; in 1899, one in Georgia, one in
Mississippi, one in Kentucky; in 1901, one in Kansas; in 1902, three in
Mississippi, one in Arkansas, one in Texas, one in Colorado; in 1903,
one in Illinois, one in Delaware; in 1904, one in Mississippi, one in
Georgia, at each of which two persons were burned at the stake, in the
former instance one of them being a woman. In all these cases the
victims were negroes and they were believed to be either guilty of
several crimes or of a single atrocious crime. The majority were lynched
for the double crime of rape, or attempted rape, and murder.

If these cases of burning alive form a list that is at all complete,
there is ground for believing that as the practice of lynching continues
the punishments inflicted tend to increase in severity and the victims
are tortured more and more before death comes to their relief.

While the exact figures have been given in this investigation of
lynchings in recent years based on the Chicago Tribune record, it is to
be remembered that these figures are probably only approximations. It is
extremely doubtful whether exactly 3,337 persons have been lynched in
the United States during the last twenty-two years, or whether there
have been exactly 2,465 lynchings. It is probable, however, that these
approximations are as nearly correct and as reliable as any that we
shall ever get, and there seems to be no reason why they should not form
a sound basis for the statistical study attempted in this chapter.




                              CHAPTER VII
                    LYNCH-LAW AND ITS JUSTIFICATION


For more than a century the principle laid down by the legislature of
Virginia has been appealed to as a justification for recourse to
lynch-law. In Revolutionary times it was held that the immediate urgency
and imminent danger of the situation justified the summary and
extra-legal measures that were taken to suppress conspiracies against
American patriots. On the frontier it was urged that the imminence of
the danger warranted summary procedure against desperadoes and
marauders, at first merely whipping and banishment, later hanging and
summary execution. In the time of the anti-slavery agitation
circumstances had arisen under which measures, though not strictly
warranted by law, were held to be justifiable from the nature of the
offense. In the opinion of the slave-holder summary treatment in the
form of flogging, tarring and feathering, and banishing the abolitionist
was wholly justifiable. The doctrine that “when the law is inefficient
to take hold of a man the people should” was again and again referred to
in support of the summary punishment of the abolitionists.

Hidden away in Judge Lawless’s charge to the St. Louis grand jury is the
same principle.[223] If the lawless violence was the work of the “many,”
if it was committed by a representative number of the citizens while in
a state of frenzy and excitement, it must be considered beyond the reach
of human law. In 1839, W. E. Channing stated the principle in the
following words: “Undoubtedly there may be crimes, so unnatural, so
terrible to a community, that a people may be forgiven, if, deeming the
usual forms of justice too slow, they assume the perilous office of
inflicting speedy punishment.... There is, indeed, as I have intimated,
one case where popular commotion does comparatively little harm, I mean
that which is excited by some daring crime, which the laws sternly
forbid, and which sends an electric thrill of horror through a virtuous
community. In such a case, the public without law do the work of law,
and enforce those natural, eternal principles of right, on which all
legislation should rest.”[224]

Governor Lynch, of Mississippi, in his message to the State legislature
in 1836, used the following language with reference to the hanging of
the Vicksburg gamblers: “However we may regret the occasion, we are
constrained to admit that necessity will sometimes prompt a summary mode
of trial and punishment unknown to the law.”[225]

A few years later Captain Marryat wrote:

  “Englishmen express their surprise that in a moral community such a
  monstrosity as Lynch law should exist; but although the present
  system, which has been derived from the original Lynch law, cannot be
  too severely condemned, it must, in justice to the Americans, be
  considered that the original custom of Lynch law was forced upon them
  by circumstances.... In its origin the practice was no more blameable
  than were the laws established by the Pilgrim fathers on their first
  landing at Plymouth, or any law enacted amongst a community left to
  themselves, their own resources, and their own guidance and
  government. Lynch law, as at first constituted, was nothing more than
  punishment awarded to offenders by a community who had been injured,
  and who had no law to refer to, and could have no redress if they did
  not take the law into their own hands; the _present_ system of Lynch
  law is, on the contrary, an illegal exercise of the power of the
  majority in opposition to and defiance of the laws of the country, and
  the measure of justice administered and awarded by those laws.

  “It must be remembered that fifty years ago, there were but few white
  men to the westward of the Alleghany Mountains; that the States of
  Kentucky and Tennessee were at that time as scanty in population as
  even now are the districts of Ioway and Columbia; that by the
  institutions of the Union a district required a certain number of
  inhabitants before it could be acknowledged as even a district; and
  that previous to such acknowledgment, the people who had _squatted_ on
  the land had no claim to protection or law. It must also be borne in
  mind, that these distant territories offered an asylum to many who
  fled from the vengeance of the laws, men without principle, thieves,
  rogues, and vagabonds, who escaping there, would often interfere with
  the happiness and peace of some small yet well-conducted community,
  which had migrated and settled on these fertile regions. These
  communities had no appeal against personal violence, no protection
  from rapacity and injustice. They were not yet within the pale of the
  Union....

  “It was, therefore, to remedy the defect of there being no established
  law, that Lynch law, as it is termed, was applied to; without it, all
  security, all social happiness would have been in a state of abeyance.
  By degrees, all disturbers of the public peace, all offenders against
  justice met with their deserts; and it is a query, whether on its
  first institution, any law from the bench was more honestly and
  impartially administered than this very Lynch law, which has now had
  its name prostituted by the most barbarous excesses and contemptuous
  violation of all law whatever. The examples I am able to bring forward
  of Lynch law, in its primitive state, will all be found to have been
  based upon necessity, and a due regard to morals and to justice.”[226]

In 1843 the practice of employing lynch-law in frontier settlements was
justified in the following way: “Until the law ... is completely
established the Lynch tribunals assert a concurrent jurisdiction, so to
speak, with the ordinary courts; and this jurisdiction they preserve
until the population loses the habit of resorting thereto, and acquires
that of confiding in the protection afforded by the legal tribunals; a
change of habit which takes place, we believe, as soon as those
tribunals have power to protect. In a new and thinly peopled country
every man feels that he may at any time be called upon to act as his own
protector. A habit of self-reliance is thus generated which time alone
can convert into a habit of relying upon the law.”[227]

In a book descriptive of border life in Texas, which was published in
1852, the frontier type of lynch-law received the following
justification:

  “It is the stern primary law of self-preservation—this border custom
  of bringing criminals before the whole body of citizens for
  judgment—from which men sitting beside law-guarded hearths recoil in
  dismay, and hearing only its cruel side, stigmatize as the utterly
  unpardonable Lynch Law. Most true it is, that nothing but urgent and
  deplorable necessity will drive a just and merciful man to participate
  in its tribunals, but it is not less true that in frontier
  settlements, if the fear of its quick vengeance did not overawe the
  wicked, the innocent and peaceful would be in hourly danger of wrong
  and outrage....

  “The wild verdicts borderers sometimes enact, in the faith that they
  are just and needful, sound uncouthly to those fenced round with
  regular courts, and must seem dreadful to Christian men accustomed to
  the solemn decorum with which constituted courts deal out their legal
  awards of chains, lashes, and hangings; yet, seen close at hand, with
  a knowledge of the situation of the community, and of the life and
  deeds of the evil-doer, many of Judge Lynch’s verdicts will appear
  more just and necessary than half of the sentences of the regular
  courts....

  “Statute law is but the formal expression of what the larger community
  deems wisest and most just for the general welfare, the small, crude,
  remote settlement does the same for itself; only without writing down
  its enactments, and in the more summary way enforced by its peculiar
  situation. It has no prison houses in which to detain a criminal, no
  courts in which to try him, no funds wherewith to support him in long
  duress. If a crime is committed the accused has the whole community
  for judges and jury, and if he is found guilty by common suffrage they
  proceed to execute the verdict.”[228]

Another writer carries the vindication of the frontiersmen and pioneers
still further by attributing culpability to the United States government
for not providing remote settlements with legal tribunals, so that
recourse to lynch-law would have been unnecessary. He writes: “The
greater share of the sin and disgrace falls upon the government, which
leaves to its citizens a heavy and responsible office, that ought to be
guarded by all the solemnities and securities of law.”[229]

Such are the arguments and the lines of reasoning by which the operation
of lynch-law previous to the Civil War was generally justified.[230]
Vindication was urged on grounds of necessity or self-preservation and
the nature of the offense, and it was lynch-law as applied to whites
that was thus vindicated.

The anti-slavery agitation and the emancipation of the slaves brought to
the support of lynch-law procedure another factor—that of race
prejudice. The number of negroes lynched in recent years as compared
with the number of whites lynched has indicated so clearly the existence
of race prejudice that many writers have given to it the chief place
among the causes of lynchings. It is a mistake, however, to consider
this race prejudice as of recent origin in the United States.

Race prejudice between the whites and the negroes in this country began
with the landing of the first ship-load of slaves in Virginia. In
describing the condition of the negroes in the colony of Virginia,
George W. Williams says: “It was not a mitigating circumstance that the
white servants of the colony who came into natural contact with the
Negroes were ‘disorderly persons,’ or convicts sent to Virginia by an
order of the King of England. It was fixed by public sentiment and law
that there should be no relation between the races. The first
prohibition was made September 17, 1630. Hugh Davis, a white servant,
was publicly flogged ‘before an assembly of Negroes and others,’ for
defiling himself with a Negro. It was also required that he should
confess as much on the following Sabbath.... All intercourse was cut off
between the races. Intermarrying of whites and blacks was prohibited by
severe laws. And the most common civilities and amenities were frowned
down when intended for a Negro. The plantation was as religious as the
Church, and the Church was as secular as the plantation. The ‘white
Christians’ hated the Negro, and the Church bestowed upon him a most
bountiful amount of neglect.”[231]

The importation of negroes from Africa into this country brought a
stream of racial heredity from the torrid zone to mingle with a similar
stream which had its origin and development in the north temperate zone.
When these two streams met, the chief characteristics of the former
were: civilization of a very low level; no letters or art or science,
language in the agglutinative state; industries confined to a very
elementary agriculture, fishing, a little hunting, and some simple
handicrafts; no religion except that which explains all natural
phenomena by reference to spirits, mostly ill-disposed towards man;
physical and psychic characteristics substantially uniform, only trained
observers being able to detect differences here and there. The stream
from the north temperate zone, on the contrary, was characterized by an
hereditary endowment delicately adjusted to the highest civilization
recorded in history. A difference and contrast better adapted to
bringing about racial antagonism can scarcely be conceived.[232]

On both physical and psychic grounds there is reason for an antagonistic
feeling between the white race and the black race. Physically there is
great diversity between the racial types of the two races. The color of
the negro’s skin, his kinky hair, and his general physiognomy,
especially his flat nose and protruding lips with receding (actual or
apparent) forehead,—all are widely diverse from the white man’s standard
of beauty and symmetry. Measured by the Caucasian ideal the features of
the negro are coarse and animal-like. To most white persons, also, the
odor arising from an assemblage of negroes is extremely disagreeable,
and some negroes say that they find the odor of white persons similarly
distasteful.[233] With reference to the psychic characteristics of the
two races, their intellectual and moral traits, there is even greater
diversity. In their religion, and essential manners, customs, and habits
of thought, the differences are so great as to constitute almost
opposite extremes. There is a total lack of anything like a community of
interest between the two races. Members of the white race and of the
black race do not find satisfaction in intermarriage and mingling
together around the hearthstone. The whites and the blacks never have
associated and do not to-day associate together in public and in private
as one people.[234]

When two races, occupying the same territory and living side by side,
differ so widely in their physical features, in their interests and in
their attainments, as do the white and colored races in this country, it
is most natural and indeed almost inevitable that prejudice should arise
between them. The institution of slavery has no doubt created a caste
feeling on the part of the master race, and yet this is but the
strengthening and deepening of a natural race antipathy, the causes for
which are evident. Slavery merely intensified a feeling that was due to
other causes. It is an error to say that slavery has been the cause of
all the prejudice against the negro.[235] It is true that the black race
long wore the chain of slavery and was regarded as an inferior race, and
this was true in the United States as well as elsewhere; but the reason
for the antagonistic feeling lies deeper than that fact.[236]

An indication of the existence of racial prejudice during the period of
slavery is found in a report adopted at the “Second Annual Convention of
the People of Color” which met at Philadelphia in June, 1832. This
convention, composed of free negroes, adopted a resolution in which the
following passage occurs: “The recent occurrences at the South have
swelled the tide of prejudice until it has almost revolutionized public
sentiment, which has given birth to severe legislative enactments in
some of the States, and almost ruined our interests and prospects in
others, in which, in the opinion of your Committee, our situation is
more precarious than it has been at any other period since the
Declaration of Independence. The events of the past year have been more
fruitful in persecution, and have presented more inducements than any
other period of the history of our country, for the men of color to fly
from the graves of their fathers, and seek new homes in a land where the
roaring billows of prejudice are less injurious to their rights and
privileges.”[237]

To this view of the matter there is an apparent objection. It would seem
that if race prejudice existed during the time of slavery, it should
have manifested itself in the form of summary treatment of the negroes
more frequently than it did. In general, however, there was no occasion
for its manifestation. So long as the blacks were valuable as slaves and
accepted their inferior position without protest, no one wanted to get
rid of them or put them to death. The fact that slaves were property,
and in that capacity were amenable to the laws, made recourse to
unlawful procedure against them both unwise and unnecessary. It was only
in cases of insurrection among the slaves, or when some especially
brutal and barbarous crime was committed by a negro, that summary
measures were adopted prior to the Civil War. At such times negroes were
killed without mercy, sometimes they were tortured and their bodies
mutilated while still alive, and occasionally they were burned to death.
But these were extraordinary occasions; ordinarily the law was allowed
to take its course.[238]

A careful study of the relations which existed between the two races
from 1619 to 1860 will reveal the presence of more or less racial
antipathy. The institution of slavery, however, acted as a check to the
manifestation of this antagonistic feeling as regards the manner of
procedure for the punishment of negroes accused of serious offenses.
“Slavery was, in its way, a thoroughgoing school; the negro race was
educated in the cotton-fields and cabins of the South. In the Old South
there was very little negro crime and no negro idleness. The negro
worked under direction; he was taught how to work; he cheerfully
accepted his work, and he was the soul of fidelity, as the history of
the war proved.”[239] Restraints were placed around him; he received
protection and guardianship; and, above all, he received an industrial
training which gave him some degree of control over his own impulses and
actions. He was looked upon and governed as a child, and he was punished
as a child when he committed a breach of the peace or some serious
offense against person or property. The legal procedure for the
punishment of negroes, based upon the property right in slaves, was in
perfect accord with the order of society that had been established
during two hundred years or more of slavery.

When the institution of slavery was attacked in the early thirties and
during the years of controversy which followed, and still more when it
was finally overthrown in the sixties, race prejudice began to manifest
itself in the manner of treatment accorded negro criminals. By the
emancipation of the slaves in 1863, under the existing conditions,
absolutely no restriction was left upon its manifestation, for the
property right in the negro had been swept away and the great mass of
the negroes, finding all the old restraints suddenly removed, naturally
mistook liberty for license and committed many excesses. Large numbers
of negroes ceased to work. “The worst instincts of the negro came to the
front; the percentage of criminals among negroes increased to an
alarming extent; many were guilty of crimes of violence of the most
heinous and repulsive kind.”[240] The result of emancipation had not
been fully anticipated and no adequate legal provision was made for the
control of the freedmen. The foundation had been removed from the old
legal system and no new system was established in the place of the old
one which to any degree could cope with the condition of affairs.

Further, not only did the emancipation of the slaves leave no
restriction upon the manifestation of race prejudice in the form of
summary procedure against negro criminals, but the sudden elevation of
the negroes to political equality with the whites directly encouraged
its display. “Two hundred years or more of slavery educated both the
white and the black to a fixed order of society, in which the negro was
the servant and the white man the master. In one generation, through as
devastating a war as any country ever experienced, slavery was
abolished, the vast property interests in the slave destroyed, the
structure of society reversed, the master put at the bottom and the
slave at the top.”[241] In the light of subsequent history a greater
mistake could scarcely have been made than that of giving the elective
franchise to the newly emancipated slave. He was far from being a fully
developed man capable of exercising the duties of citizenship in a
democratic government, but in the legal institutions which were
established in the South during the period of Reconstruction it was
assumed that he was entitled to an equal share in the government with
his former master. A legal system was established which had no basis in
the order of society then existing. The result was enmity and bitterness
between whites and blacks at a time when there should have been sympathy
and forbearance, and summary and illegal measures were adopted by the
whites to prevent negro domination.

Any one who would deal intelligently with the questions presenting
themselves in the South to-day must recognize the existence of a racial
prejudice. In some respects it is an unreasoning prejudice, a prejudice
in the extreme sense of the word, but there is also a real and
substantial basis for such racial antipathy, and it is a feeling which
is not likely to disappear for generations to come. It must be taken
into account in the consideration of all remedies proposed for existing
evils in the South. It is something that cannot be removed by
legislative enactments; neither can it be destroyed by constant crying
out against it. While it does not justify the lynching of negroes, it
does furnish a standpoint from which justification is easy, and it is a
fact which makes the prevention of such lynchings extremely difficult,
particularly where brutal crimes are committed upon whites by negroes.

The commonest justification for lynching negroes in recent years, the
plausibility of which rests very largely on race prejudice, is the crime
of rape as directed against white women. According to Tillinghast this
crime has come into existence since the Civil War, and its perpetrators
are overcome in many cases by primitive passions which master the
criminal’s whole being, a great fear being present also which impels to
murder.[242] Strictly speaking, this crime has not come into existence
since the Civil War. It is not a new crime to the negro. It has merely
increased and become more common along with the general increase in
criminality manifest in the negro race since emancipation.[243]

In colonial times laws were in force in a number of the colonies
providing for the punishment of rape committed by negroes on white
women, and there were numerous instances of the perpetration of this
crime.[244]

In the year 1705 the Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania enacted
that “WHEREAS some Difficulties have arisen within this Province, about
the Manner of Trial and Punishment of _Negroes_ committing Murder,
Manslaughter, Buggery, Burglary, Rapes, Attempts of Rapes ... it shall
and may be lawful for two justices of the Peace of this Province, who
shall be particularly commissionated by the Governor for that Service,
within the respective Counties thereof, and Six of the most substantial
Freeholders of the Neighbourhood to hear, examine, try and determine ...
and shall be punished by Death. And for an Attempt of Rape or Ravishment
on any white Woman or Maid, and for robbing, stealing, or fraudulently
taking and carrying away any Goods, living or dead, above the Value of
_Five Pounds_, every _Negroe_, upon Conviction of any of said Crimes,
shall be whipped Thirty-nine Lashes, and branded on the Forehead with
the Letter R or T, and exported out of this Province by the Master or
Owner, within Six Months after Conviction, never to return into the
same, upon Pain of Death, and shall be kept in Prison till Exportation
at their Masters or Owners or their own Charge.”[245]

By an act passed December 10, 1712, the colony of New York provided that
“all and every Negro Indian or other Slave, who ... shall murder or
otherwise kill ... or conspire or attempt the Death of any of Her
Majesty’s liege people, not being Slaves, or shall commit or attempt any
rape on any of said Subjects, or shall wilfully burn any dwelling-house,
barn, etc. ... or shall wilfully mutilate, mayhem or dismember any of
the said Subjects not being Slaves as aforesaid, or shall wilfully
murder any Negro, Indian or Mallatto Slave within this Colony, and shall
thereof be convicted before three or more of Her Majesty’s Justices of
the Peace ... in Conjunction with five of the principal ffreeholders of
the County wherein such fact shall be committed, ... or before any Court
of Oyer and Terminer or General Gaole Delivery ... shall suffer the
pains of Death in such manner and with such circumstances as the
aggravation or enormity of their Crimes in the Judgment of the Justices
of those Courts aforesaid, or as in the judgment of Seven of the said
Justices and ffreeholders they shall merit and require.”[246]

By an act passed March 11, 1713–14, the General Assembly of the Province
of New Jersey made the above enactment the law of New Jersey, and added
the provision that “if any Negro, Indian or Mulatto Slave shall attempt
to ravish any white Woman or Maid ... any two Justices of the Peace are
hereby authorized to inflict such corporal Punishment, not extending to
Life or Limb, upon such Slave or Slaves so offending, as to the said
Justices shall seem meet.”

In 1721 Delaware passed “An Act for the Trial of Negroes” the provisions
of which were similar to those of the law of Pennsylvania enacted in
1705. Two justices of the peace, “particularly commissionated by the
Governor for that service within the respective counties thereof,” and
six of the most substantial freeholders of the neighborhood, were to
hear, examine, try and determine offenses committed by negro or mulatto
slaves, and it was provided that “if any Negro or Mulatto slave ...
shall attempt to commit a rape on a white woman or maid, they shall be
tried in manner aforesaid, and shall be punished by standing four hours
in the pillory at the Court-House on some court day, with both ears
nailed to the pillory, and before he be taken down from the same shall
have both his ears cut off close to his head.”[247]

By an act of June 8, 1751, it became the law of Maryland “that if any
slave or slaves shall at any time consult, advise, conspire or attempt
to raise any insurrection within this province, or to murder or poison
any person or persons whatsoever, or to commit a rape upon any white
woman, or to burn any house or houses, and be thereof convict by
confession or verdict ... shall suffer death, as in cases of felony,
without benefit of clergy.”[248]

In North Carolina, in 1758, the Assembly resolved to try “a plan which
would save the lives of the slaves and still act as a deterrent from
further crimes.” It was enacted “that except for rape or murder no male
slave who had committed a crime which was ordinarily punished by death
should suffer death for the first offence; but that on due conviction
such an offender should be castrated, the sheriff to be allowed for the
operation twenty shillings to be paid by the public. The court must fix
the value of the slave before the execution of this sentence, so that if
it should be the cause of his death there might be no dispute as to the
value to be paid his master. Three pounds were allowed by the public for
the curing of the slave’s wounds. For the second offence death might be
the penalty.”[249]

Foregoing further quotation and reference, the statement may be made
that in the colonial period, when laws were enacted for the trial and
punishment of offenses committed by negroes upon whites, rape was
usually one of the offenses for which capital punishment was provided,
and considerable discretion was generally allowed the judicial
authorities as to the manner in which the penalty should be inflicted,
the methods of hanging and burning alive both being employed.

In Massachusetts, in the year 1676, Basto, a negro slave, was sentenced
to be hanged for rape on the daughter of his master.[250]

In New Jersey, in the year 1731, “a negro slave called Harry, ravished
Annatye Pryers, but, apparently without exercising much force; sentenced
to receive forty-one lashes and to be branded on the right shoulder with
the letter ‘B.’”[251]

In Maryland, in 1739, “two slaves of Anne Arundel were executed, one for
burglary, the other for rape on a white woman; and the body of the
second, who had been a notorious offender, was hung in chains at some
distance from the gallows.”[252]

In Somerset County, New Jersey, in the year 1744, a young negro was
burnt alive for ravishing a white child about nine years old.[253]

The punishment of burning alive, which was sometimes applied to negroes
by the courts during the colonial period, was, however, usually
inflicted for other offenses than rape, such as murder or conspiracy to
murder (particularly by the use of poison), insurrection, and
arson.[254] But this punishment was never applied to negroes during the
colonial period except by judicial decree. Indeed, with the possible
exception of the slave insurrection in South Carolina in 1740,[255]
there are no instances recorded in colonial history where slaves were
publicly executed without trial.[256] Both by law and by public
sentiment slaves were recognized as chattels, and when they were
executed for crimes for the commission of which the owners could in no
way be held responsible, such owners were entitled to indemnification
and could enter suit at law for damages. It was customary for the courts
when passing sentence of death upon a slave to fix the valuation of the
slave, and this sum was then paid to the owner.

There is evidence to show that this crime directed against white women
continued to be perpetrated down to the time of the Civil War. The Salem
(Mass.) Gazette for October 5, 1813, contained this item: “At the late
term of the Supreme Judicial Court, holden at Northampton, Peter Pyner,
a black man, was convicted of a Rape, committed on the body of a _white
female_. The circumstances of the case were of a very distressing
nature, and the evidence of his guilt clear beyond a question. Sentence
of Death was pronounced by his Honor Chief Justice Parsons, in a solemn
and affecting manner.”

The Richmond Enquirer of December 14, 1813, gives an account of the
killing of a negro slave by a white woman in defense of her virtue.[257]

The following passages are taken from Niles’ Register in the years 1821
and 1822. “_A Monster._ A negro fellow, armed with a gun, seized upon a
respectable married lady, near Cartersville, Va., and attempted to
commit a rape on her. After a long contest, she succeeded in getting out
of his clutches, when he fired at her, but missed his aim. About an hour
afterwards, he in like manner attacked another married lady—not
succeeding, after a desperate struggle, he attempted to kill her with a
knife, but she wrested it from him, and getting released, ran away, when
he fired at her and lodged many shot in the back of her neck and
head—and yet, thus wounded, she escaped. The fellow declared his
intention of thus serving all the white women he could meet with. A
reward is offered for his apprehension.”[258]

“_A negro_, near Winchester, in Virginia, lately assailed two young
ladies, tied them to trees and compelled them to endure his loathsome
caresses; but was happily frustrated as to his ultimate design.”[259]

“_Trial of Ned._ A negro fellow so named, was tried and condemned at
Norfolk on the 19th inst. for the crime of committing a rape on the
person of a respectable white woman. He was found guilty, and the
decision of the court was received with a burst of applause.”[260]

“These remarks were chiefly induced by reflecting on the late conspiracy
at Charleston, and certain shocking enormities committed near Norfolk
and in North Carolina on the persons of white women, for which the
perpetrators were put to death, the relation of which is too disgusting
for our pages. Thirty-five have been hung and others remain for
execution at Charleston, and many were sentenced to transportation, &c.
yet it appears that the trials are not yet over. The plot seems to have
been well devised, its operation was extensive, and its intent
terrific.... When the plan was nearly ripe, the conspiracy was made
known, and a large number of the supposed principals were
arrested—twenty-two of whom were executed in one day!... The system of
slavery involves in itself a state of dreadful severity, for it is
sustained only by force—and about 60 years ago, thirteen blacks were
burnt alive in the then colony of New York for insurrectionary
movements.”[261]

The following item appeared in Niles’ Register for July 16, 1831 (40:
345): “A young lady, in Duplin County, North Carolina, about fourteen
years old, while proceeding to pay a visit to a neighbor between eleven
and twelve o’clock, noon, was violated and murdered close to the road,
after an apparently severe struggle, the ground at the place being much
trodden. The _Infernal_, after accomplishing his first purpose, cut her
throat! No clue had been discovered by which to trace the villain.”

Niles’ Register for August 24, 1833 (44: 423) contained the following:
“A free negro calling himself James Warfield, has been committed to the
jail of Harford county, Maryland, charged with the commission of a rape
upon a little girl aged nine years, the daughter of Mr. William Adams, a
respectable resident of that county.”

Such evidence shows that the crime of rape directed against white women
was not unknown prior to 1860.[262] As regards other crimes frequently
committed by negroes during the period of slavery, apparently it formed
a rather small proportion. It was far from being a crime that was more
frequently committed than any other, and yet it was one for the
perpetration of which the negroes showed a marked propensity whenever an
opportunity presented itself. Under the institution of slavery, however,
such opportunities were few. From the nature of slavery, the negro
seldom had an opportunity to ravish a white woman. The strong, burly
negro who was considered dangerous and likely to commit violence was
ordinarily put at hard labor in the fields and kept under strict
surveillance. Also, the discipline to which the negro was subjected when
a slave gave him a mastery over himself which it has been extremely
difficult for him to obtain by his own efforts. Habits of obedience and
industry, however inculcated, go very far toward restraining criminal
impulses. The good effects of the discipline of the slave régime were
particularly manifest during the progress of the Civil War, when the
Southern planters were obliged to leave their families with no other
protectors than the slaves, and these slaves discharged their trust with
uniform faithfulness and loyalty.

From the colonial period to the beginning of the anti-slavery agitation
in the early thirties, the law was regularly allowed to take its course
in dealing with negro criminals. Very little inclination was shown on
the part of the people to inflict punishment otherwise than as was then
provided by law. With regard to the crime of rape two instances may be
cited where summary measures were employed.

Niles’ Register for November 15, 1823 (25: 176) contained this item:
“_Negro Frank_ was lately tried at Frederick, Maryland, for having
defloured a young white female. That the fact had taken place, and as
stated, in the most brutal manner, was admitted; but Frank was acquitted
for the want of sufficient proof of his person. Some of the people,
however, thought he was guilty—and, after his release, he was beaten so
severely, as almost to deprive him of life.”

The following item appeared in Niles’ Register for March 10, 1832 (42:
22): “A negro fellow lately committed a horrid outrage on the body of a
girl twelve or thirteen years old, the daughter of a respectable
gentleman in Dinwiddie county, Virginia, who was almost killed by his
brutality. The ravisher was caught by the father, and instantly punished
with 150 lashes, of which it was believed that he would die—if not he
would be brought to trial.”

That there was an increasing disposition to resort to summary methods
for the punishment of negroes during the period 1830–1860 has been shown
in the evidence cited in Chapter IV; but so far as the infliction of
summary capital punishment was concerned, that did not become a serious
evil until the time of the Reconstruction of the Southern States.
Comparatively few negroes were lynched until after the close of the War.
It may be said, therefore, that while race prejudice and the crime of
rape against white women both existed as causes for the summary
treatment of negroes prior to the Civil War, both were held in check by
the institution of slavery.

It thus appears that throughout the period of slavery there was a
greater reliance on legal procedure for the treatment of negroes accused
of heinous offenses than has been manifest since that time; and not only
did the institution of slavery directly bring about this greater
reliance on legal procedure, by the suppression of the strongest
incentives toward adopting summary and illegal procedure, but it made
possible the enactment of special laws providing for a more expeditious
trial and execution of sentence in the case of negro offenders.

In the year 1740, South Carolina made the following provision for the
trial of slaves:

  “And _whereas_, natural justice forbids that any person, of what
  condition soever, should be condemned unheard, and the order of civil
  government requires that for the due and equal administration of
  justice, some convenient method and form of trial should be
  established; _Be it therefore enacted_ by the authority aforesaid,
  That all crimes and offences which shall be committed by slaves in
  this Province, and for which capital punishment shall or lawfully may
  be inflicted, shall be heard, examined, tried, adjudged and finally
  determined by any two justices assigned to keep the peace, and any
  number of freeholders not less than three or more than five, in the
  county where the offences shall be committed, and who lives in the
  parts adjacent, and can be most conveniently assembled; either of
  which justices, on complaint made or information received of any such
  offence committed by a slave, shall commit the offender to the safe
  custody of the constable of the parish where such offence shall be
  committed, and shall without delay, by warrant under his hand and
  seal, call to his assistance and request any one of the nearest
  justices of the peace to associate with him, and shall, by the same
  warrant, summon such a number of the neighboring freeholders as
  aforesaid, to assemble and meet together with the said justices, at a
  certain day and place, not exceeding three days after the apprehending
  of such slave or slaves[263]; and the justices and freeholders being
  so assembled, shall cause the slave accused or charged, to be brought
  before them, and shall hear the accusation which shall be brought
  against such slave, and his or her defence, and shall proceed to the
  examination of witnesses and other evidences, and finally to hear and
  determine the matter brought before them, in the most summary and
  expeditious manner; and in case the offender shall be convicted of any
  crime for which by law the offender ought to suffer death, the said
  justices shall give judgment, and award and cause execution of their
  sentence to be done, by inflicting such manner of death and at such
  time, as the said justices, by and with the consent of the
  freeholders, shall direct, and which they shall judge will be most
  effectual to deter others from offending in the like manner.

  “_And be it further enacted_ by the authority aforesaid, That if any
  crime or offence not capital, shall be committed by any slave, such
  slave shall be proceeded against and tried for such offence in the
  manner hereinbefore directed, by any one justice of the peace and any
  two freeholders of the country where the offence shall be committed,
  and can be most conveniently assembled; and the said justice and
  freeholders shall be assembled, summoned and called together, and
  shall proceed upon the trial of any slave who shall commit any offence
  not capital, in like manner as is hereinbefore directed for trying of
  causes capital. And in case any slave shall be convicted before them
  of any offence not capital, the said one justice, by and with the
  consent of the said freeholders, shall give judgment for the
  inflicting any corporal punishment, not extending to the taking away
  life or member, as he and they in their discretion shall think fit,
  and shall award and cause execution to be done accordingly. _Provided
  always_, that if the said one justice and two freeholders, upon
  examination of any slave charged or accused before them for an offence
  not capital, shall find the same to be a greater offence, and may
  deserve death, they shall, with all convenient speed, summons and
  request the assistance of another justice and one or more freeholders,
  not exceeding three, which said justice and freeholders newly
  assembled, shall join with the justice and freeholders first
  assembled, and shall proceed in the trial, and unto final judgment and
  execution, if the case shall so require, in manner as is hereinbefore
  directed for the trial of capital offences.

  “_And be it further enacted_ by the authority aforesaid, That two
  justices and one freeholder, or one justice and two freeholders, of
  the said two justices and three freeholders, shall make a quorum, and
  the conviction or acquittal of any slave or slaves by such a quorum of
  them shall be final in all capital cases; but on the trial of slaves
  for offences not capital, it shall and may be sufficient if before
  sentence or judgment shall be given for inflicting a corporal
  punishment, not extending to life or member, that one justice and any
  one of the freeholders shall agree that the slave accused is guilty of
  the offence with which he shall be charged....

  “And _whereas_, slaves may be harbored and encouraged to commit
  offences, and concealed and received by free negroes, and such free
  negroes may escape the punishment due to their crimes, for want of
  sufficient and legal evidence against them; _Be it therefore further
  enacted_ by the authority aforesaid, That the evidence of any free
  Indian or slave, without oath, shall in like manner be allowed and
  admitted in all cases against any free negroes, Indians (free Indians
  in amity with this government, only excepted,) mulattoe or mustizoe;
  and all crimes and offences committed by free negroes, Indians,
  (except as before excepted,) mulattoes or mustizoes, shall be
  proceeded in, heard, tried, adjudged and determined by the justices
  and freeholders appointed by this Act for the trial of slaves, in like
  manner, order and form, as is hereby directed and appointed for the
  proceedings and trial of crimes and offences committed by slaves; any
  law, statute, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.”[264]

Few of the other colonies made such careful and comprehensive provision
for expediting the trial of slaves, whether accused of minor or of
capital offenses. A number of the other colonies, however, made similar
provision for the prompt trial of slaves and followed the same general
principles in their legislation affecting the punishment of offenses
committed by slaves.[265] Indeed, it was generally true throughout the
period of slavery that a special form of trial was provided in the case
of slaves accused of serious offenses, and that special penalties were
imposed upon such offenders. It is to be noted in the South Carolina Act
of 1740 that free negroes were given the same form of trial as the
slaves, and that the whole purport and spirit of the statute was merely
that justice might be done.

So long as the negro race was in bondage to the white race, then, not
only were the inciting causes of negro lynching largely held in check,
but such provisions were made for the trial and punishment of miscreant
slaves that resort to lynching was wholly without justification. Even
after the anti-slavery agitation had begun in the early thirties and
summary measures were occasionally taken against negro offenders,
justification was claimed on the ground of the incendiary publications
and utterances of the abolitionists rather than the specific crimes
committed by the blacks. The fact that during the period of slavery, in
the case of the raping of white women, as well as of other crimes, the
law was generally allowed to take its course, goes far toward refuting
the argument that lynching is necessary to repress crime among the
negroes in the South to-day.

History has shown it to be a fundamental mistake to assume that illegal
and summary procedure against a particular offense will deter from that
offense. As one writer has very forcibly said, if an argument based on
this assumption were put into plain language, it would read: “Let past
crime be met with present crime in order that future crime may be
prevented.”[266] All revengeful dealing with crime has increased crime
rather than lessened it. The only deterrent from crime that men have
found is the prompt and certain and solemn punishment by law, sustained
and supported by a confident, unyielding body of public opinion.[267]

The attempt to justify the lynching of negroes on the plea that lynching
for rape committed upon white women is necessary to repress that crime
is without support in any respect. Frederick Douglass lessened the force
of this plea very considerably when he pointed out that there have been
three distinct excuses offered for the persecution of negroes in the
United States. First, it was because of insurrections; then, it was the
fear of negro domination and supremacy; then, when neither of these was
any longer defensible as an excuse, the crime of assault upon white
women was put forward to justify their persecution.[268] The fact that
not more than thirty-four per cent of the negroes lynched in the last
twenty-two years have been lynched for that crime likewise vitiates such
a plea of justification. The facts as known indicate that lynching for
that crime, instead of having a repressive influence, has directly
stimulated its perpetration. Assaults on white women have occurred again
and again immediately following a lynching for such crime, and they have
so occurred in the same neighborhood where the lynching took place.[269]
It has been publicly stated that in one instance a negro who had
witnessed a lynching for this crime actually committed an assault on his
way home.[270]

The lynching of negroes in recent years can be justified on no other
ground than that the law as formulated and administered has proved
inadequate to deal with the situation—that there has been governmental
inefficiency. Not that guilty negroes frequently escape conviction in
the Southern courts, or that they fail to receive punishment to the full
extent of the law, but rather that the law and its administration seem
utterly unsuited to the function of dealing with negro criminals. A
judicial system adapted to a highly civilized and cultured race is not
equally applicable to a race of inferior civilization, and the failure
to realize this fact and act upon it, by making special provision for
the control of the negro population in the Southern States since slavery
was abolished, is a fundamental reason for the disrepute into which
legal procedure has fallen as regards negroes accused of offenses
against the whites.[271]

The mistakes of Reconstruction times are not yet blotted out in the
South. Abstractions still control where racial characteristics,
circumstances, and conditions should be the determining factors. Ever
since the Civil War the Southern people have been blindly groping after
some system other than slavery whereby two races of widely different
interests and attainments can live together in peace and harmony under a
republican form of government, and at the same time a vast number of
Northern people have been misinterpreting their motives and watching
every move with a critical and suspicious eye, ready at any moment to
shout across Mason and Dixon’s line that the negroes must have their
rights under the Constitution of the United States and the amendments
thereto.[272] Under such conditions it has been practically impossible
for the South to find a satisfactory solution of its problem, and herein
lies all the justification that can be found for the use of summary
measures in dealing with the increasing criminality which has manifested
itself in the younger generations of the colored race.

In the last analysis lynch-law in this country is without any
justification whatsoever. In a government founded on the idea that
ultimate power and authority shall rest with the people, and in which
sufficient facility has been given to the expression of the collective
will of the people so that the acts of the government, the formulation
of the law, and the administration of justice, ought adequately to
represent this collective will, there is no tenable ground on which to
vindicate the practice of punishing criminals other than by the
regularly constituted courts and the officers of the law. But if
circumstances and conditions be taken into consideration and the history
of the practice carefully noted, it is possible to see how justification
has come about through the different points of view that have been
taken. From the standpoint of the frontiersmen and pioneers summary
procedure in certain cases was wholly justifiable. From the standpoint
of the Southerners during the period of Reconstruction summary procedure
was likewise wholly justifiable. To men living in a community where a
particularly brutal and barbarous crime is committed upon a white person
by a negro, the prompt lynching of the negro, even with some torture and
cruelty, seems entirely defensible. Thus, while we cannot justify the
practice of lynching on any ground whatever, yet the fact remains that
it has been repeatedly justified in one way or another.




                              CHAPTER VIII
                                REMEDIES


In the consideration of remedies for lynching it is to the type of
lynch-law procedure which prevails in well settled communities that
attention is to be directed. The type of lynch-law procedure which is
characteristic of a frontier society naturally ceases to exist with the
disappearance of that unorganized form of society. The changed social
conditions incident to an increasing density of the population in a
frontier region, and the establishment of a regular and adequate
judiciary, remove every cause for the existence of the frontier type of
lynch-law. The rapid colonization of the western section of the United
States has thus made that phase of the lynching question no longer a
serious matter. But how to put an end to the practice of lynching in
older communities possessing well established civil regulations is a
problem for which the people of the United States have not yet found a
satisfactory solution.

As has been pointed out in the preceding chapter, there has been a
strong popular sentiment in the United States, even down to the present
day, excusing and apologizing for lynch-law procedure. On the other
hand, however, there has not been wanting at the same time a spirit of
denunciation and disapprobation[273]; although it was not until the
early nineties, when public attention was directed to the subject by
reason of the occurrence of a number of flagrant cases of lynching, that
determined efforts were put forth to check the practice. Previous to
that time such discussion as there was of the subject brought no
effective restraint to bear on the continuance of the practice, either
because of the intensely partizan character of the discussion as between
the North and the South, or because, while the practice in general was
denounced, particular instances of lynching were excused.[274] The
newspapers and magazines took comparatively little notice of lynchings
until after the year 1890. The newspapers printed accounts of such
occurrences, but the editorial protests were few, and the magazine
literature is almost barren on the subject.

On March 14, 1891, the eleven Italians who were accused of complicity in
the murder of the chief of police of New Orleans were summarily put to
death by a mob. On May 30, 1891, Tump Hampton, colored, was burned at
the stake in the parish of St. Tammany, Louisiana. On January 31, 1893,
a negro by the name of Henry Smith was publicly burned at the stake with
extreme torture at Paris, Texas.[275] Excursion trains were run for the
occasion and there were many women and children in the throng which
watched the sufferings of the victim. These and other instances of a
similar character, together with the increased number of lynchings in
the years 1891, 1892, 1893 (See charts I and IV), focused the attention
of the world upon the American practice of lynching. Italy demanded from
the United States an indemnity for the lynching of the Italians at New
Orleans. Foreign newspapers and periodicals united in heaping abusive
censure upon the United States. Repeated and insistent demands were
made, in America as well as in Europe, that lynchers be brought to
justice and be punished as other murderers are punished.

An effort was also made at this time to so organize foreign public
opinion that it would be directly effective in putting an end to the
practice of lynching. Miss Ida B. Wells, colored, who was editor of the
Free Speech published at Memphis, Tennessee, and whose paper was
suppressed because she so fiercely denounced the lynching of some
colored young men and arraigned the authorities for failing to punish
the lynchers,[276] gave a series of lectures in England in 1893–94, and
started a crusade against lynching by organizing anti-lynching
societies, enrolling as members several men of international
prominence.[277] These bodies proposed to send a committee to this
country “to collect statistics and quietly to investigate the subject of
lynchings in the United States.” The South rose _en masse_ against such
a visit and the governors of the Southern States with one or two
exceptions vehemently denounced the whole project. The statement of
Governor O’Ferrall of Virginia, himself an anti-lynching man, is typical
of the Southern sentiment. “Things have come to a pretty pass in this
country,” he said in the New York World, “when we are to have a lot of
English moralists sticking their noses into our internal affairs. It is
the quintessence of brass and impudence.”[278] The English committee
never came to this country, and Miss Wells at length recognized the
futility of further work in England and returned home. She has since
organized anti-lynching societies in various parts of the North,[279]
and more recently, as chairman of the Anti-lynching Bureau of the
National Afro-American Council, has to all appearance been working
principally among her own people, urging them to take steps to prevent
lynching.[280]

Out of all this discussion, agitation, and censure there came proposals
for various remedies for lynching. Various reasons were assigned for the
prevalence of the practice and consequently there was little agreement
in the measures which were proposed for its prevention or suppression,
but most of the proposed measures were of the nature of new or
additional laws directed specifically against lynching or mob violence.

Early in the year 1894 a number of the citizens of Louisiana petitioned
the legislature of that State to enact stringent laws against lynching,
but the legislature adjourned without fulfilling the request. A number
of governors at about this time, in messages to the State legislatures,
called attention to the subject and recommended immediate legislation.
Governor Hogg of Texas made the matter of lynching the subject of a
special message, denouncing the practice and strongly urging the
enactment of laws to prevent it. Governor O’Ferrall, in a message to the
legislature of Virginia, recommended that the county in which a lynching
occurs should be required to pay to the State treasury a sum not
exceeding ten thousand dollars for the benefit of the public school
fund. Recommendations of a similar character were subsequently made by
the governors of Maryland and Georgia. Governor Atkinson of Georgia made
the unique recommendation that if an officer in charge of a prisoner is
not required to protect his charge at the hazard of his own life, he
should be required to unshackle the prisoner, arm him, and give him an
opportunity to defend himself. On the assumption that the law’s delay or
slowness is the principal cause for lynching, the governors of a number
of States offered suggestions for a more expeditious judicial procedure.
Of the many measures proposed, however, and of the numerous
recommendations that special legislation be enacted against lynching,
comparatively few have received from the various legislatures sufficient
consideration to lead to the enactment of laws on the subject.[281]

The legislature of Georgia, in the year 1893, passed an act which
authorized “any officer, charged with the duty of preserving the peace
and executing the lawful warrants” of the State, who should have
“knowledge of any violence attempted to be perpetrated upon any
citizen ... by mob violence and without authority of law,” to summon a
posse of citizens, who must respond or be punished for a misdemeanor,
whose duty it should be to use every means in their power, even to the
extent of taking human life, to prevent such violence. It was made a
misdemeanor for said officer to fail to call together a posse in such an
emergency, and citizens who responded were authorized to carry weapons
in the performance of their duties. Any person engaged in “mobbing or
lynching any citizen ... without due process of law” should be arrested
and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one
nor longer than twenty years; and if death resulted from such mob
violence the person causing said death should be subject to indictment
and trial for the offense of murder.[282]

The legislature of North Carolina in the year 1893 passed an act which
provided that every person who should conspire to break or enter, or who
should engage in breaking or entering, any jail or place of confinement
of prisoners for the purpose of killing or injuring any person confined
therein would be guilty of a felony and be punishable by a fine of not
less than five hundred dollars and by imprisonment for not less than two
nor more than fifteen years. It was made the duty of the prosecuting
officer of the judicial district in which such a crime had been
committed to take immediate proceedings against the guilty parties, and
jurisdiction of the offense was conferred upon the superior court of any
county adjoining that in which the violence was committed. It was also
made a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, one or both, at
the discretion of the court, for a witness wilfully to fail to comply
with the process served on him, or, after being sworn, to refuse to
answer questions pertinent to the matter being investigated; nor was any
person to be excused from testifying on the ground that his evidence
might tend to criminate himself, for when he should be thus examined as
a witness for the State he became altogether pardoned of any and all
participation in the crime concerning which he was required to testify.
The entire cost incurred in the prosecution was to be paid by the county
in which the crime was committed, and in case the commissioners of the
county failed to provide a sufficient guard for a jail in response to
the request of the sheriff, and the jail should be entered and a
prisoner killed, the county became responsible in damages to be
recovered by the personal representatives of the prisoner killed.[283]

In the year 1895 the General Assembly of Georgia enacted additional
legislation on the subject of lynching by passing an act which made
penal the offense of hindering, obstructing, or interfering with
sheriffs or their deputies or constables in the execution of any order
or sentence of court after trial in criminal cases, and requiring
sheriffs and constables to present to the grand jury any and all persons
so interfering. Penalties were provided for the offense and for failure
to comply with the provisions of the act, power being given the governor
to suspend a derelict sheriff or constable and to declare his office
vacant.[284]

In the constitution which South Carolina adopted in 1895, it was
provided that “in case of any prisoner lawfully in the charge, custody
or control of any officer, State, County or municipal, being seized and
taken from said officer through his negligence, permission or
connivance, by a mob or other unlawful assemblage of persons, and at
their hands suffering bodily violence or death,” the said officer should
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon true bill found should be
deposed from office pending trial, and upon conviction should forfeit
his office, and, unless pardoned by the governor, should be ineligible
to hold any office of trust or profit within the State. It was made the
duty of the prosecuting attorney within whose circuit or county the
offense might be committed to forthwith institute a prosecution against
said officer, who should be tried in such county in the same circuit,
other than the one in which the offense was committed, as the
attorney-general might elect. The fees and mileage of all material
witnesses both for the State and the defense were to be paid by the
State treasurer. It was also provided that “in all cases of lynching
when death ensues, the county where such lynching takes place shall,
without regard to the conduct of the officers, be liable in exemplary
damages of not less than $2,000 to the legal representatives of the
person lynched,” and that “any county against which a judgment has been
obtained for damages in any case of lynching shall have the right to
recover the amount of said judgment from the parties engaged in said
lynching in any court of competent jurisdiction.”[285]

In 1896 Ohio entered the list of States that have adopted anti-lynching
laws. This Ohio act gave to lynching its first legal definition. A
_lynching_ and a _mob_ are defined as follows: “That any collection of
individuals, assembled for any unlawful purpose, intending to do damage
or injury to any one or pretending to exercise correctional power over
other persons by violence, and without authority of law, shall for the
purpose of this act be regarded as a ‘mob,’ and any act of violence
exercised by them upon the body of any person, shall constitute a
‘lynching.’” Under this act any person who is taken from the hands of
the officers of justice in any county by a mob, and is assaulted by the
same with whips, clubs, missiles, or in any other manner, may recover
damages from the county to the amount of one thousand dollars; any
person assaulted by a mob and suffering lynching at their hands may
recover from the county in which the assault is made five hundred
dollars, or, if the injury is serious, one thousand dollars, or, if it
result in permanent disability to earn a livelihood by manual labor,
five thousand dollars; and the legal representative of any person
suffering death by lynching at the hands of a mob may recover from the
county in which such lynching occurs the sum of five thousand dollars,
provision being made for the disposition of the recovery in such
instances. Any person suffering death or injury at the hands of a mob
engaged in an attempt to lynch another person is to be deemed within the
provisions of the act, he or his legal representatives having the same
right of action thereunder as one purposely injured or killed by such
mob. An order to the commissioners of a county against which such
recovery may be made, to include the same with costs of action in the
next succeeding tax levy of said county, forms a part of the judgment in
every such case. The county, however, has a right of action to recover
the amount of any judgment against it, including costs, against any of
the parties composing such mob, and any person present with hostile
intent at such lynching is to be deemed a member of the mob and is
liable to such action. In case a mob shall carry a prisoner into another
county, or shall come from another county to commit violence on a
prisoner brought from such county for safe keeping, the county in which
the lynching was committed may recover the amount of the judgment and
costs against the county from which the mob came, unless there was
contributory negligence on the part of the officials of said county in
failing to protect the prisoner or disperse said mob. It is also
provided that nothing in the act shall be held to relieve any person
concerned in such lynching from prosecution for homicide or assault for
engaging therein.[286]

By an act of April 25, 1898, it is further provided in the law of Ohio
that whoever shall break into or attempt to break into a jail or any
prison, or to attack an officer, with intent to seize a prisoner for the
purpose of lynching, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall be
confined in the penitentiary for not more than ten years nor less than
one year.[287]

In 1897, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas enacted laws directed against
lynching. By the Tennessee act it was made a felony punishable by from
three to twenty-one years’ imprisonment, and by full judgment of infamy
and disqualification, for two or more persons to form or remain in any
conspiracy or combination, under any name, or upon any pretext
whatsoever, to take human life, or engage in any act reasonably
calculated to cause the loss of life; or to inflict corporal punishment
or injury; or to burn or otherwise destroy property or to feloniously
take the same. It was likewise made a felony punishable in like manner
for any person either directly or indirectly to procure or encourage any
one to become or remain a member of any such unlawful conspiracy or
combination; or for any person either directly or indirectly to aid,
abet, or encourage any person to engage or remain in such conspiracies
or combinations, or to aid or abet in the accomplishment of any purpose
or end of such conspiracies or combinations. Any person guilty of any of
these offenses was declared to be incompetent to sit or serve on any
grand or traverse jury, and it was made the duty of the court to
carefully exclude all such persons from the juries, both grand and
petit. It was provided that indictments framed under the act were not to
be held insufficient by reason of the general nature of the charges
preferred, or for embracing more than one of said offenses in the same
indictment, and the act was to “take effect from and after its passage,
the public welfare demanding it.”[288]

By the Kentucky “Act to prevent lynching, &c.,” which was amended by the
omission of three sections and thus re-enacted in 1902, it was provided
that if any two or more persons should confederate or band themselves
together for the purpose of intimidating, alarming, disturbing, or
injuring any persons, or to rescue any person or persons charged with a
public offense from any officer with the view of inflicting any kind of
punishment on them, or with the view of preventing their lawful
prosecution for any such offense or to do any felonious act, they, or
either of them, should be deemed guilty of felony, and upon conviction
should be confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than
five years. If any two or more persons should confederate or band
together and go forth for the purpose of molesting, injuring, or
destroying any property, real or personal, of another person, persons or
corporation, whether the same be injured, molested or damaged or not,
they should be guilty of a felony punishable by a like penalty; and if
any injury should result to the person or property of any person or
persons, by reason of any such unlawful acts, any one participating in,
or aiding or abetting, such unlawful acts should be guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction should be confined in the State penitentiary not
less than one nor more than fifteen years, unless death should result,
in which case the penalty for such offense should be that prescribed by
law for murder. It was made no mitigation of the offense for any one
upon his trial, that he may have acted through heat or passion, or that
he may have acted without malice, and the judge trying the case should
so instruct the jury in writing. It was provided, also, that any officer
or person having the custody of a prisoner should have the power and it
should be his duty to summon to his aid as many of the able-bodied male
citizens of his county as might be necessary to protect such prisoner,
any person who should fail or refuse to respond to such summons being
liable to a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five
hundred dollars; and when any officer in charge of a jail had reasonable
grounds to believe that said jail would be attacked by a mob or persons
confederated or banded together for the purpose of inflicting violence
upon any inmate of said jail, he was authorized, in his discretion, to
arm said threatened inmates, with a view to their own protection.
Authority was given the governor to offer a reward for the apprehension
and conviction of any offender of this law in any sum not exceeding five
hundred dollars, and also to employ detectives, in his discretion, not
exceeding two at any one time, provided the cost thereof should not
exceed three thousand dollars in any one year. The judge of the county
court of any county in which this law should be violated was also given
power to offer a reward not exceeding two hundred dollars, or supplement
the governor’s reward, for the arrest and conviction of any person
violating the act. It was also provided that any person who should send,
circulate, exhibit or put up any threatening notice or letter, should
upon conviction thereof be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail not
less than three nor more than twelve months. In any prosecution under
the act it should be no exemption for a witness that his testimony might
incriminate himself; but no such testimony should be used against him in
any prosecution except for perjury, and he should be discharged from all
liability for any violation of the act so necessarily disclosed in his
testimony.[289]

By the Texas law, which was enacted at a special session of the
legislature, it was provided that whenever two or more persons should
combine together for the purpose of mob violence, and in pursuance of
said combination should “unlawfully and wilfully take the life of any
reasonable creature in being by such violence,” such person should be
deemed guilty of murder by mob violence, and upon conviction thereof
should be punished by death or confinement in the penitentiary for life,
or according to the degree of murder, to be found by the jury. It was
made the duty of the district judges to give this law specially in
charge to the grand jury at the beginning of each term of court, and
prosecution for murder under the act might be commenced and carried on
in any county of the judicial district in which the offense should be
committed, except the county of the offense. It was also provided that
if any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, chief of police, city marshal
or other officer in the State should permit or suffer any person in his
custody charged with crime to be killed by one or more persons, or
should permit or suffer any such person to be taken from his custody and
killed by one or more persons, he should be deemed guilty of official
misconduct, and be removed from office, proceedings for removal to be
conducted by the attorney-general in accordance with the provisions of
the act, such cases taking precedence in all courts of all other cases.
Pending trial such officer should be temporarily suspended from his
office and should judgment be rendered against him he should not
thereafter be elected or appointed to that office. The final section of
the act reads as follows: “The fact that there is no adequate law in
this State for the suppression of mob violence, creates an emergency and
an imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule requiring
all bills to be read on three several days be suspended, and that this
act take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so
enacted.”[290]

In 1899 an act dealing with the subject of lynching and violence by mobs
was passed by the legislature of Indiana. In this act a _mob_ and a
_lynching_ are defined as follows: “Any collection of individuals
assembled for any unlawful purpose intending to injure any person by
violence and without authority of law shall, for the purpose of this
act, be regarded as a ‘mob,’ and any act of violence exercised by such
mob upon the body of any person shall constitute the crime of
‘lynching,’ when such act or acts of violence result in death.” It is
provided that any person who actively participates in or actively aids
or abets such lynching, upon conviction thereof, shall suffer death or
be imprisoned during life, in the discretion of the jury, and any person
who, being a member of any such mob and present at any such lynching,
shall not actively participate in the lynching, shall be guilty of
abetting such lynching, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned
not less than two nor more than twenty-one years. Every person who
shall, after the commission of the crime of lynching, harbor, conceal or
assist any member of such mob, with the intent that he shall escape
detention, arrest, capture, or punishment, shall be deemed an accessory
after the fact, and upon conviction thereof shall be imprisoned not more
than twenty-one years nor less than two years. Provision is made for the
manner in which prosecutions shall be instituted under the act, and in
case any persons shall come together in any county for the purpose of
proceeding to another county, with the view of lynching any person, or
in case any person or persons shall purchase or procure any rope,
weapon, or other instrument in one county for the purpose of being used
in lynching any person in another county, such crime of lynching, if
committed, shall constitute a continuous offense from the time of its
original inception, and the courts of any county in which such overt act
has been committed shall have jurisdiction over the person of any member
of the mob committing such overt act. Power is given the sheriff to call
bystanders and others to his assistance and arm them for the protection
of a prisoner, it being a misdemeanor for such persons to refuse
assistance, punishable by a fine in any sum not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, and imprisonment in the
county jail for a period not exceeding six months. If at any time a
sheriff has reason to believe that a prisoner in his custody is in
danger of being lynched, and that he, with his deputies and assistants,
is not able to protect the life of such prisoner, it shall be his duty
at once to notify the governor of such facts; whereupon, the governor
shall be authorized to furnish such militia as shall be necessary to
preserve order and defend such prisoner.[291]

In 1901 the Indiana act received the following important amendment: “If
any person shall be taken from the hands of a sheriff or his deputy
having such person in custody, and shall be lynched, it shall be
conclusive evidence of failure on the part of such sheriff to do his
duty, and his office shall thereby and thereat immediately be vacated,
and the coroner shall immediately succeed to and perform the duties of
sheriff until the successor of such sheriff shall have been duly
appointed, pursuant to existing law providing for the filling vacancies
in such office, and such sheriff shall not thereafter be eligible to
either election or reappointment to the office of sheriff: _Provided,
however_, That such former sheriff may, within ten days after such
lynching occurs, file with the governor his petition for reinstatement
to the office of sheriff, and shall give ten days’ notice of the filing
of such petition to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which such
lynching occurred and also to the attorney general. If the governor,
upon hearing the evidence and argument, if any, presented, shall find
that such sheriff has done all in his power to protect the life of such
prisoner and performed the duties required of him by existing laws
respecting the protection of prisoners, then such governor may reinstate
such sheriff in office....”[292]

In 1899 the legislature of Michigan enacted a law against lynching
modelled on the Ohio act of 1896, but in 1903 this law was
repealed.[293]

In the constitution which was adopted by Alabama in 1901 this provision
was made in regard to the responsibility of sheriffs: “Whenever any
prisoner is taken from jail or from the custody of the sheriff or his
deputy, and put to death, or suffers grievous bodily harm, owing to the
neglect, connivance, cowardice or other grave fault of the sheriff, such
sheriff may be impeached under Section 174 of this Constitution. If the
sheriff be impeached and thereupon convicted, he shall not be eligible
to hold any office in this State during the time for which he had been
elected to serve as sheriff.”[294]

In response to a general and a special message from the governor of West
Virginia calling attention to the fact that within a year several
persons had been “brutally murdered at the hands of riotous and lawless
mobs,” the legislature of that State adopted a joint resolution on
February 3, 1903, condemning “such riotous and lawless acts” and
empowering the governor, by and with the aid and advice of the
attorney-general, to investigate and place on foot such means as in his
judgment were necessary to bring the guilty parties to justice.[295]

Prompted by the flagrant case of lynching which occurred at Pittsburg,
Kansas, on December 25, 1902,[296] the legislature of Kansas early in
1903 authorized county commissioners to offer and pay a reward in any
sum not exceeding five hundred dollars for the discovery, arrest, and
conviction of the perpetrator or perpetrators of the “murder or lynching
of a human being committed in their county,”[297] and also enacted a
statute against lynching modelled on the Indiana act of 1899 and the
amendment of 1901.[298]

From this review of the legislation that has been enacted against
lynching it appears that an application of the following remedies has
been sought: first, an increase of the power of sheriffs and of their
responsibility for the proper discharge of the duties of their office;
second, heavier penalties for sheriffs and other officers who fail to
protect from mob violence any person lawfully in their custody; third,
heavier penalties for citizens who break into jails, or attack officers,
or hinder or obstruct legal procedure; fourth, adequate provision in the
law for the discovery, prosecution, and punishment of lynchers; fifth,
fixing responsibility upon a community by making the county in which a
lynching occurs liable for damages,[299] and giving a right of recovery
to the legal representatives of the person lynched.

Direct and definite information as to the effectiveness of these
measures in particular instances is somewhat meager, but the few cases
that have arisen in the courts afford a basis for argument.[300]

On January 6, 1897, Lawrence Brown, colored, was lynched in Orangeburg
County, South Carolina, for suspected arson. Isaac Brown, administrator
of the estate of Lawrence Brown, deceased, entered suit against
Orangeburg County in the common pleas circuit court of that county for
the recovery of damages under Section 6, Article 6, of the constitution,
and the act to prevent lynching which was passed in 1896.[301] Judgment
was rendered for the defendant, the presiding judge directing the jury
to find a verdict in his favor, on the ground that the provision in the
constitution and the act of the legislature conferred upon the plaintiff
no right to recover damages against the defendant, as the person lynched
was not a prisoner. An appeal from this decision was taken to the
supreme court where the judgment of the lower court was reversed and the
case was remanded for trial. The supreme court, construing the
constitutional provision broadly and in connection with the act of the
legislature, ruled that the judge had been in error in his directions to
the jury, that the correct construction of the constitutional provision
made a county liable for damages when the person lynched was not in the
custody of the law as a prisoner. While the court declared a
consideration of the question of the power of the legislature to pass
such an act, independently of the constitutional provision, to be
unnecessary in the case in hand, an opinion in regard to the matter was
expressed in the following words: “It has been held that statutes making
a community liable for damages in cases of lynchings, and giving a right
of recovery to the legal representatives of the person lynched, are
valid, on the ground that the main purpose is to impose a penalty on the
community, which is given to the legal representatives, not because they
have been damaged, but because the legislature sees fit thus to dispose
of the penalty. Such statutes are salutary, as their effect is to render
protection to human life, and make communities law-abiding.”[302]

At the January term of the supreme court of Ohio in the year 1900 a
decision was rendered on the constitutionality of the “Act for the
Suppression of Mob Violence” which was passed April 10, 1896.[303] Two
cases were before the court. Benjamin F. Church, as the administrator of
Charles W. Mitchell, deceased, filed a petition against the board of
commissioners of Champaign County to recover five thousand dollars for
the lynching of said Mitchell, at Urbana, in said county.[304] Defendant
demurred to the petition and the demurrer was sustained by the court of
common pleas and the petition dismissed. The circuit court reversed the
judgment of the court of common pleas and the case then came before the
supreme court. In the other case, J. W. Caldwell brought action, under
the same statute, against the board of commissioners of Cuyahoga County,
to recover the sum of one thousand dollars for an injury which he
alleged that he had received at the hands of a mob in that county. A
demurrer to the petition, on the ground that the petition did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause for action and that said act was
unconstitutional, was sustained by the court of common pleas, and the
judgment of the court of common pleas was affirmed by the circuit court.
Both cases came up to the supreme court on petitions in error to reverse
the respective judgments of the circuit court.

In the opinion delivered on April 10, 1900, the supreme court fully
discussed and upheld the principle involved in the act, affirming the
judgment of the circuit court in Commissioners _v._ Church,
administrator of Mitchell, and reversing the judgment of the circuit
court and the judgment of the court of common pleas in Caldwell _v._
Commissioners. Church recovered from Champaign County five thousand
dollars with interest and costs for the lynching of Mitchell, and
Caldwell’s action was sustained for the recovery of one thousand dollars
for injuries received at the hands of a mob in Cuyahoga County.[305] The
court in its opinion stated specifically that the act was
constitutional; that the recovery authorized by said act was penal in
its nature, and it was within the legislative power to provide therefor;
that such legislation was not an exercise of judicial power, nor was it
a violation of the right of trial by jury[306]; that such recovery, and
the tax levy authorized and required by said act, were within the
general powers of the legislature.[307]

One case has arisen under the Indiana act as amended in 1901. On
November 20, 1902, James Dillard, a negro who had committed the crime of
rape, was taken from the custody of John S. Dudley, the sheriff of
Sullivan County, Indiana, and “lynched by hanging until dead.” Dudley
had been elected sheriff at the general election held in November, 1900,
and William P. Maxwell had been elected coroner of Sullivan County. At
the general election held in November, 1902, each had been elected as
his own successor. On the day following the lynching of Dillard,
Governor Durbin notified Maxwell that the office of sheriff of Sullivan
County was vacant, and that he, as coroner, under the law succeeded to
the duties of the office. Maxwell thereupon demanded of Dudley the
possession of the office. This Dudley refused to give, and within ten
days after the lynching occurred, as provided for in the statute, filed
with the governor a petition for reinstatement in the office. After
hearing the petition and the evidence in support of it, Governor Durbin
denied the petition and refused to reinstate him. Governor Durbin then
notified the board of commissioners of Sullivan County of the vacancy in
the office of sheriff and suggested that the board appoint a successor
to Dudley. The board of commissioners took no action, however, and
Maxwell brought suit under a _quo warranto_ statute, to oust Dudley from
the office. In the circuit court of Sullivan County a judgment for the
defendant was rendered, and on an appeal to the supreme court of Indiana
the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The issues in the case
were purely questions of law, it being held that Maxwell did not have
ground for action under the _quo warranto_ statute, and the supreme
court expressed no opinion on the constitutionality of the amendatory
act of 1901.[308]

Thus, the outcome of this case was, in effect, to nullify the operation
of the statute which removes a sheriff from office when he allows a
prisoner to be taken from his custody and lynched. The fact that Dudley
continued to exercise the duties of his office after the lynching
occurred, and successfully refused to vacate the office in response to
the demands of the coroner, indicates that public sentiment in the
community did not support the execution of the provisions of the law.
Newspaper reports of the case intimate, however, that politics entered
into the question to some extent.

Perhaps the present situation with reference to remedial legislation on
the subject of lynching can be summed up in these few words:
Comparatively few States have enacted laws defining and punishing
lynching, or have enacted any statutes the specific purpose of which is
to prevent lynching. Where such statutes exist very few attempts have
been made to enforce them, and the validity of some is still in doubt.
From the supreme court decisions in South Carolina and Ohio it would
seem that the courts are likely to uphold statutes giving recovery of
damages from counties in cases of lynching. The constitutionality of
statutes fixing upon sheriffs the penalty of removal from office for
failure to protect prisoners is open to considerable doubt, however, and
no such measure has yet been enforced. In both South Carolina and
Alabama provision has been made in the body of the constitution for the
removal of a sheriff from office under such circumstances, but neglect,
connivance, or other grave fault must be proved against the sheriff.

As to the effect that this remedial legislation has had on the practice
of lynching, opinions may differ, but it is difficult to point out in
what way these laws have brought about a decrease in the number of
lynchings.[309] It is true that not nearly so many lynchings occurred in
the years 1901, 1902, 1903, as occurred in the years 1891, 1892, 1893,
but it is also true that a marked decline in the number of lynchings per
year began several years before the greater number of the anti-lynching
laws were enacted. It is likewise true that the number of lynchings per
year, in States other than those possessing anti-lynching statutes has
declined in recent years. The truth would seem to be, therefore, if it
be assumed that the number of crimes or offenses which occasion
lynchings has been fairly uniform from year to year, that the same
causes which led to the enactment of the laws also brought about the
decline in the number of lynchings, namely, public discussion and
condemnation of the practice of lynching, a stronger public sentiment
against it, a deeper realization of the seriousness of the lynching
problem in the United States.

That the measures adopted in South Carolina for the prevention of
lynching, even though upheld and strongly indorsed by the supreme court,
have not been altogether effective becomes apparent from a special
message sent to the General Assembly of South Carolina, on January 20,
1904. Governor Heyward wrote as follows: “In my annual message to your
honorable body reference was made to lawlessness in our State, the
frequent occurrence of lynchings being dealt with particularly. You, the
lawmakers, had not been assembled here a week when another evidence of
this lawless spirit is given in the lynching at Reevesville. The
Governor is popularly credited with the power to prevent or punish these
outrages against the State. In reality he is practically powerless. When
the crime has been committed his hands are practically tied. The meager
rewards he has been empowered to offer out of his contingent fund have
proved ineffectual, and this is as far as he is permitted to go. In the
meantime the spirit of lawlessness is unchecked.

“Any band of men may feel secure in taking the life of a fellow-being on
almost any pretext. This deplorable condition ought to be remedied. To
compel the proper respect for the majesty of the law I recommend the
enactment of special legislation in reference to lynching, that the
great responsibility of officials directly charged with enforcing the
law be brought home to them, and that more effectual measures be taken
for the apprehension of persons who take the law in their own hands. In
lieu of some such legislation, I suggest that the Governor be provided
with an adequate fund for the purpose of suppressing lynching.”[310]

On March 7, 1904, Richard Dixon, a negro, was taken from the jail and
lynched at Springfield, Ohio. This occurred in Clark County which
adjoins Champaign County on the south. In at least two other instances
lynchings would have taken place in Ohio, since the decision of the
supreme court which established the validity of the law holding counties
liable in damages, had it not been for the vigilance and prompt action
of the sheriffs. The possibility of an increase in the rate of taxation
does not seem as yet to have had any restraining influence on the
actions of people in Ohio when occasion has arisen for a lynching.

It is only within the last three or four years that determined efforts
have been put forth to arrest and punish persons who have participated
in lynchings, but these efforts have not been confined to the States
which have special laws against lynching. Lynchers may be punished
through statutory provisions defining homicide, manslaughter, murder,
conspiracy, riot, malicious mischief, assault, and the like.

In November, 1903, eleven persons were indicted in St. Clair County,
Illinois, for participating in the lynching of a negro school teacher
the preceding June.[311]

More than twenty persons were indicted in Vermilion County, Illinois,
for participation in the lynching of a negro at Danville on July 25,
1903, and verdicts of guilty of engaging in an attack on the county jail
were found against eleven men and one woman, the penalty being an
indeterminate sentence in the penitentiary.[312]

In January, 1903, twenty-eight white citizens of Attala County,
Mississippi, were indicted for the lynching of two negroes.[313]

In Alabama, in 1902, some men were given a term in the penitentiary for
lynching a negro, they being “the first like offenders,” according to
Governor Jelks, “to serve the state since the great war. No man had
heretofore gone to the penitentiary for lynching a negro.”[314]

On June 4, 1903, Samuel Mitchell, white, who led the mob that lynched
Thomas Gilyard, a negro, at Joplin, Missouri, on April 15, preceding,
was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, and two
other men were still to be tried for their part in the burning of negro
houses following the lynching.[315]

In California nineteen indictments were returned against persons who
engaged in the lynching of four men and a boy on May 31, 1901, at
Lookout, in Modoc County, and it was said that the State’s attorney
worked up the case against great opposition.[316]

There were several persons under indictment in Wyoming in February,
1904, for connection with a lynching which occurred in Big Horn County
on July 19, 1903.[317]

No convictions of persons participating in lynchings in either
Tennessee, Kentucky, or Texas have been brought about under the
anti-lynching laws which were enacted by those States in 1897.[318] The
case of the State _vs._ Hughes, charged with participating in a
lynching, came up in DeKalb County, Tennessee, in July, 1902, but it was
found impossible to get a jury to try the case. The court exhausted a
venire of three hundred and fifty, and “found every man in the lot
disqualified—probably having themselves aided in the affair.”[319] On
November 13, 1902, John Davis, colored, was lynched in Marshall County,
Tennessee. Two men, W. P. Hopwood and W. H. L. Johnson, were later
arrested on the charge of participating in the lynching. On January 7,
1903, thirty masked men appeared at the jail where the prisoners were
confined, obtained the keys to the jail, and released the
prisoners.[320]

The measures adopted by Georgia and North Carolina for the suppression
of lynchings have likewise remained inoperative. Numerous lynchings have
taken place in both of these States since 1893, but no lyncher has yet
suffered any of the penalties prescribed by law. A resident of North
Carolina recently made this statement with reference to the punishment
of lynchers in his State: “Judges have charged juries against the crime,
and Governor Aycock—risking his political fortunes for his
convictions—recently offered a reward of $400 each for the conviction of
a party of seventy-five who lynched a negro near Salisbury. But never
yet has the law punished a North Carolina lyncher.”[321]

In general it may be said that the laws proposed far outnumber the laws
enacted against lynching, and that wherever such laws have been enacted
their enforcement has not as yet been such as to warrant any great
reliance on their effectiveness to prevent lynching. It can scarcely be
said that the remedy for lynching lies at present in the direction of
additional State legislation specifically directed against it.

By many it is thought that a federal law on the subject would be most
effective in the suppression of lynchings, and several bills have been
introduced in Congress with this end in view.[322] On January 13, 1902,
Mr. Crumpacker of Indiana introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives for the punishment of persons taking part in the
lynching of aliens. The bill was designed to cover cases similar to the
lynching of the Italians at New Orleans, and jurisdiction over such
offenses was given to the federal courts, persons who had taken part in
lynchings being disqualified from serving as jurors.[323]

Others would have Congress enact a law making all who lynch, whether the
victims be citizens or aliens, and all who instigate, aid, abet, or
shield lynchers, guilty of a crime against the United States. In support
of such a law it is urged that a lyncher could be as easily discovered
and punished as a moonshiner, or a counterfeiter, or a mail robber; that
if the object of our constitution is to insure domestic tranquility,
promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, it ought to include the power to punish
those who defy the government established by the constitution and take
life without due process of law; and that if it was worth while to amend
the constitution to prevent the denial of the electoral franchise, it is
also worth while to amend the constitution to prevent and punish the
denial of justice.[324]

A further ground for bringing lynching within the jurisdiction of
federal courts and federal law is the fact that the lynching of an alien
may involve the United States in international complications, although
the federal government can take no action in the premises. Diplomatic
intercourse was actually broken off between Italy and the United States
during the controversy over the matter of an indemnity for the lynching
of Italian citizens at New Orleans in 1891.[325] In a number of other
instances foreign countries have successfully demanded indemnities from
the United States through the Department of State for injuries done
their citizens by mob violence. The following table gives the sums of
money that have been paid to foreign countries since 1880 in the
settlement of such claims.

              INDEMNITIES PAID FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS.[326]

  YEAR WHEN   COUNTRY TO    LOCALITY WHERE INJURIES  AMOUNT OF INDEMNITY
    PAID      WHICH PAID        WERE INFLICTED
    1887     China         Wyoming                           $147,748.74
    1888     China         Pacific Coast                      276,619.75
    1892     Italy         Louisiana                           24,330.90
    1896     Italy         Colorado                            10,000.00
    1896     Great Britain Louisiana                            1,000.00
    1896     Great Britain Nebraska                             1,800.00
    1897     Italy         Louisiana                            6,000.00
    1898     Mexico        California                           2,000.00
    1901     Mexico        Texas                                2,000.00
    1901     Italy         Louisiana                            4,000.00
    1903     Italy         Mississippi                          5,000.00
                                                        —————-——————————
                        Total                           $480,499.39[327]

With the exception of the payment to China in 1887, “in consideration of
the losses unhappily sustained by certain Chinese subjects by mob
violence at Rock Springs, in the Territory of Wyoming, September 2,
1885,” these indemnities have been paid “out of humane consideration,
without reference to the question of liability therefor.” While they
have thus not been paid in discharge of an express obligation recognized
by the United States, there has been a moral obligation recognized and
the federal government has felt it to be incumbent upon itself to
redress grievances of this nature.[328]

It is a peculiar situation when the United States can thus be called
upon to pay indemnities for lynchings and yet cannot take steps in the
several States to prevent their occurrence and cannot in any way hold
the State governments responsible. That this defect in the federal
constitution should be remedied seems, from this standpoint, wholly
desirable. It is very doubtful, however, whether such an object could be
accomplished at the present time, and still more doubtful whether a
federal law could be enacted and enforced against lynching at the
present time, without reviving the sectionalism and many of the evils of
the Reconstruction Period. When Senator Gallinger of New Hampshire
offered a resolution in the 57th Congress that the Committee on the
Judiciary be directed to make an inquiry into the subject of lynchings
and to report whether there be any remedy for the evil, his reference to
a recent lynching in a Southern State was instantly resented by the
senators from that State, and the course which the debate took upon the
resolution made it apparent at once that an attempt to make such an
investigation would be an unwise step. The matter was dropped by Senator
Gallinger’s making the request that the resolution lie on the table
subject to his call.[329]

Of the numerous proposals that have been made for reform in the system
of legal procedure in the United States, as a remedy for lynching, none
is more noteworthy or fundamental than that put forward by Justice
Brewer of the United States Supreme Court. He argues that men are afraid
of the law’s delays and the uncertainty of its results; that if all were
sure that the guilty ones would be promptly tried and punished, the
inducement to lynch would be largely taken away. He suggests, therefore,
the taking away of the right of appeal in criminal cases as one means of
checking lynching.[330]

While the law’s delays in criminal cases are probably not so great as
they are popularly believed to be, the popular impression being due to
over-emphasis of flagrant cases,[331] still the fact that such an
impression is a prevalent one makes it extremely easy for a community to
countenance the summary and illegal punishment of the perpetrator of a
crime which has been particularly shocking to the community, a crime for
which many persons in the community really feel that no punishment can
be quite adequate. A case in point is that of the lynching of George
White, colored, at Wilmington, Delaware, on June 22, 1903. A refusal by
the judges to grant an immediate trial on the ground that the accused
could not then have a fair and impartial trial because of the excited
state of public feeling, was publicly urged as a reason for the people
taking the law into their own hands and “upholding the majesty of the
law.” The outcome was that White was burned at the stake and those who
participated in the lynching were allowed to go free, the coroner’s jury
returning a verdict that the deceased came to his death at the hands of
persons unknown.

It is in this way that the popular idea that the law’s delays are so
great as frequently to defeat the ends of justice, whether it have much
or little basis in fact,[332] contributes to the continuance of the
practice of lynching. If to abolish the right of appeal in criminal
cases, or to limit it to a considerable extent, will further the ends of
justice, as there seems to be good reason for believing that it will,
such a step will have a tendency to check lynching by making void one of
the excuses most frequently urged in extenuation of the practice.
Lynching is a phenomenon in American society too deeply rooted to be
destroyed by merely taking away the right of appeal in criminal cases,
but that a measure will render less plausible a prominent excuse for its
existence and continuance makes such a measure worthy of serious
consideration.

The governors of several States have recently asked that they be given
more power, and that more resources be placed at their command, in order
that they may take the initiative both in preventing lynchings and in
punishing lynchers. Something may be accomplished by granting their
requests. During the fourteen years immediately preceding Governor
O’Ferrall’s inauguration there were sixty-two lynchings within the
bounds of the State of Virginia, but during the four years of his
administration there were but three, and in neither case was the chief
executive in a position either to prevent the crime or punish the
offenders.[333] The most hopeful sign at the present time is the stand
which the governors and minor officers in a number of States, in the
South as well as in the North, have taken against lynching.[334]
Governor Vardaman, of Mississippi, in his recent rather sensational
rescue of a negro murderer from a mob,[335] has at least demonstrated
the possibility of preventing lynchings and enforcing the law. Governor
Jelks, of Alabama, and Governor Durbin, of Indiana, have not only been
outspoken in their denunciation of lynchings but have taken active
measures to prevent them. A number of sheriffs in various States have
within the last two years prevented lynchings by courageously facing
mobs and making it clear that they would defend their prisoners at the
hazard of their own lives.[336]

So long, however, as coroner’s juries empanelled to inquire into the
death of victims of lynching continue to render the verdict that “the
deceased came to his death at the hands of persons unknown to the jury,”
and so long as it is true that the coroner’s verdict commonly marks the
end of all legal procedure with reference to the occurrence, it is not
to be expected that sheriffs and jailers will hazard their lives in the
protection of prisoners.[337] Prisoners are taken from officers of the
law and lynched, not because the officers are cowards, but because they
are in sympathy with the sentiment in the community which demands
immediate punishment. The public sentiment revealed in the following
citations is not found in isolated instances, but is typical, although
equal frankness of statement cannot always be secured.

A verdict rendered by a coroner’s jury in Wayne County, North Carolina,
in August, 1902, over the body of a negro rapist, read as follows: “We
the undersigned, empanelled as a jury to inquire into the cause of the
death of Tom Jones, find that he came to his death by gun shot wounds,
inflicted by parties unknown to jury, obviously by an outraged public
acting in defense of their homes, wives, daughters and children. In view
of the enormity of the crime committed by said Tom Jones, alias Frank
Hill, we think they would have been recreant to their duty as good
citizens had they acted otherwise.”[338]

In December, 1899, Richard Coleman, a negro ravisher and murderer, was
burned at the stake at Maysville, Kentucky. In response to a letter from
the governor of the State, asking for particulars, a Maysville lawyer
wrote as follows: “The whole thing took place in broad daylight and in
the presence of thousands. The parties to it are known, Mr. Lashbrook
(husband of Coleman’s victim) himself being the leader, but it will be
fruitless to attempt any prosecution of them. The people of this
community are as good as the people of any other community in the State,
or, for that matter, elsewhere, and they are shocked, and, I may say,
well-nigh paralyzed by this gruesome happening in their midst, but I am
satisfied they will not take kindly to any attempt to hold the parties
to the transaction to any responsibilities therefor.”[339]

The only ultimate remedy for lynching is a strong public sentiment
against it. It is necessary, in the United States particularly, to
depend very largely upon public sentiment for the enforcement of law,
and until there is a sentiment, in every community where a lynching
occurs, which will demand the punishment of those who take part in such
lynching, it can scarcely be expected that sheriffs will risk their
lives to protect prisoners, or that prosecuting attorneys, judges, and
juries will co-operate to secure the conviction of lynchers and to make
them feel the full penalty of the law. A member of the Maryland Bar
writing in 1900 said that less than a dozen lynchers had ever been tried
for their crime, and only one or two had been punished. The present
writer has been able to obtain no information which would warrant the
statement that as many as twenty-five persons have been convicted of a
crime and punished for participating in the lynching of over three
thousand persons in the last twenty-two years.[340]

From the greater number of indictments that have been secured against
lynchers during the last two years it would seem that the practice of
lynching is receiving stronger public condemnation now than formerly,
but it must be remembered that the creation of a public sentiment on any
subject is a slow process, particularly with reference to lynching.
Lynching as a crime against society is not yet distinguished from
lynching as the justifiable infliction of a deserved punishment by
private citizens. Furthermore, it is difficult to create a public
sentiment against lynching because of the racial antipathy which
aggravates the evil in certain sections of the United States. Time will
be required for the effectual application of a remedy for lynching. Any
anti-lynching measures that may be adopted must be considered as
palliatives rather than as remedies.

No single statute can be enacted which will put an end to the practice
of lynching; nor is it likely that any single measure can be adopted
which will effectually suppress lynching. Every measure which will tend
to invalidate the excuses offered for the adoption of lynch-law
procedure, every measure which will tend to prevent the commission of
crimes provoking resort to lynch-law procedure, every measure which will
tend to strengthen and maintain a popular reliance on legal procedure,
every measure which will in any way tend to create a strong,
uncompromising public sentiment against lynching, all of these must be
adopted if the practice of lynching is to be made a thing of the past in
the United States.




                               CHAPTER IX
                            SOME CONCLUSIONS


The question naturally arises, what is the peculiarity about American
society which fosters and tolerates lynching? Why is lynching a
peculiarly American institution? It has been suggested that the
explanation lies along racial lines. Some have said that the
Scotch-Irish are responsible for the introduction into this country of
the practice of illegally punishing public offenders. Others say that it
is race prejudice, a result of the coming together of many races in one
country, and particularly that it is the racial antagonism between the
white race and the negro race, which explains the matter. Looking at the
history of the practice in the United States from colonial times down to
the present day, one can scarcely regard such an explanation as either
adequate or conclusive. The real explanation lies along a somewhat
different line, and it can be pointed out best by drawing some contrasts
between the administration of the law in the United States and its
administration in the older countries of Europe.

The American people are not any more disposed toward lawlessness—they
are not less law-abiding—than European peoples; it is rather that they
maintain a wholly different attitude toward the law. Social and
political conditions are different, and the law, instead of being
something in itself to reverence and respect, is little more than a
device for securing freedom. The value of laws as rules of conduct is
not minimized but there is no sense of sanctity pertaining to them. To
outwit, avoid, defy, or forget the laws is not a serious offense so long
as an appeal can be made to the individual sense of justice in support
of such courses of action.

In Europe, where the statutes have grown up from tradition and ancient
custom, the law is regarded as a more sacred institution; in a very real
sense it is the product of a superior authority. Law in its
institutional sense is as much a predetermined factor in daily affairs
as is one of the laws of nature. Social and political conditions are
fixed. Politics do not enter into the enforcement of law. Civilization
is distributed in a more nearly equal measure and the law is enforced
with equal vigor over the whole country.[341] The judicial and
administrative officers are persons socially and politically distinct
from the masses, and their individuality is so completely subordinated
to their representative capacity that the law thus comes to have a
majesty and dignity which can be given it in no other way.

In the United States, on the contrary, the body of the law lacks the
support of long tradition and ancient practice. The early immigrants
brought with them the European conception of law, but in the midst of
new conditions, with no strong government to enforce it with an
impartial and an iron hand, along with the growth of the democratic
spirit, a new _esprit des lois_, as Montesquieu would call it, has been
developed. Where the people, either directly or through their
representatives, make the laws and then elect the officers who are to
enforce them, it is inevitable that the legal machinery will prove
powerless to control popular excitements. Politics also enter very
largely into the whole question. In remote districts, too, the people
seldom have occasion to meet any other officers of the law than their
own neighbors and friends whom they have elected to minor civil offices.
It is for this reason that the execution of the law varies so greatly in
different parts of the United States, being either vigorous or lax, in
accordance with the moral sentiment of the community.

In a monarchy or a highly centralized form of government, the law is
made for the people and enforced against them by officials who are in no
sense responsible to them.

In a democracy with a republican form of government, like the United
States, such is not the case. The people consider themselves a law unto
themselves. They make the laws; therefore they can unmake them. Since
they say what a judge can do, they entertain the idea that they may do
this thing themselves. To execute a criminal deserving of death is to
act merely in their sovereign capacity, temporarily dispensing with
their agents, the legal administrators of the law. While not always
expressed in language so unmistakable in meaning, yet this is the spirit
exhibited, the vague and perhaps unconscious attitude toward the law,
which seems particularly to pervade the United States.

The tendency toward public disorder has existed in this country from its
earliest settlement, and as the line of the frontier has slowly moved
westward there has always been a region on the border where the forces
of law were unorganized. There has thus been a constant opportunity for
a plea of necessity in certain cases for resorting to the popular
execution of justice. In recent years the customary explanations of
lynchings attribute them to mob rule, emotional insanity of the crowd,
race prejudice, contempt for the “niggers,” intense community feeling,
vivid hatred of crime, _lex talionis_ and the like. It is often asserted
that lynchings occur because the courts are slow, uncertain, and unduly
sympathetic with the rights of the accused, because corrupt jurymen,
shrewd lawyers, the technicalities of the law or the undue sympathies of
the pardoning powers frequently prolong and save a guilty person’s life.
While it is true on psychological grounds that punishment to be
effective must be prompt and certain, and while such explanations have
validity in particular cases, the fundamental explanation lies deeper.
It is to be found in the peculiar and distinctively American attitude
toward those institutions connoted by the term “the law.”[342] There is
a readiness on the part of the people in the United States to take the
law into their own hands which is not found in other countries, and the
consequent immunity from punishment which is generally accorded to
lynchers renders an American mob exceedingly open to the suggestion of
lynching.

It is on such grounds that the existence of lynching as a peculiarly
American institution is to be explained. Such are the conditions and
such has been the conception of the law which has fostered a public
sentiment in the United States excusing and apologizing for lynchings.
The writer of a book published in London in 1837 was not far wrong when
he wrote: “The Lynch law, is not, properly speaking, an opposition to
the established laws of the country, or, is at least, not contemplated
as such by its adherents; but rather as a supplement to them,—a species
of _common_ law, which is as old as the country.”[343]

To the same effect is this “Scotch View of Lynch law” which was
occasioned by the lynching of the Italians at New Orleans in 1891. After
reviewing the facts and circumstances connected with that lynching, the
following comments were made: “This is crude and it is primitive. It is
to be deplored and condemned. But it is not without a foundation of
reason and justice. The people have committed the administration of
justice to a certain machinery; so long as that machinery works without
flagrant injustice, it will be left to do the work; but when it utterly
breaks down, or goes in the teeth of what is right according to the
rough-and-ready ideas of the Americans, the people will resume the
function of dealing out punishment direct. The ultimate sanction is
brought in. That is the American method. The Briton, when he thinks the
ordinary tribunals have failed, writes to the _Times_, or gets up a
monster petition to the Home Secretary, or asks a question of the Houses
of Parliament.”[344]

In certain sections of the United States this readiness on the part of
the people to take the law into their own hands receives constant
support and encouragement from the racial antipathy which exists between
the whites and the negroes. It cannot be said that the lynching of
negroes is due to “race prejudice” alone, but it is true that the
antagonistic feeling between the two races aggravates the tendency to
lynch, when offenses are committed against white persons by negroes.
Other racial contrasts in the population have likewise promoted the
adoption of extra-legal methods of punishment. From colonial times down
to the present day the contemptuous attitude of the whites toward the
Indians has undoubtedly been a potent factor in the not infrequent
failure to observe due process of law in the treatment of Indians. In
the summary treatment of Italians, Mexicans, Chinese, and other aliens,
differences in racial characteristics have also played an important
part. In very many cases of lynching a racial antipathy has acted as the
most prominent contributory cause, and it is this fact that has induced
many writers to find in “race prejudice” the ultimate explanation of
lynching as an American institution.

The lynching of negroes is now so distinctively an American practice
largely because of the racial contrast in the population which is
peculiar to this country. Nowhere else in the temperate zone does a
colored race of tropical origin come into contact in such numbers with a
highly civilized race of European stock. The “native question” of
tropical regions has here been transplanted, as it were, to the
temperate zone.[345] Furthermore, the difficulties arising from ethnic
contact within the tropics have been intensified rather than lessened by
this change of environment. There are the same fundamental differences
in racial characteristics and in racial heredity, but these become
accentuated and seem even more adverse in a climate where the struggle
for existence is of necessity much more vigorous and exacting. In
addition, there has developed between the white race and the colored
race in the United States an intolerant, inconsiderate spirit directly
promoted by an unwise and short-sighted political policy. A great many
years will doubtless be required for the effacement of the unfortunate
results of past errors, involving as it does a very general
understanding and recognition of the ethnic and “societal” factors which
enter vitally into the “race question.” Only in so far as this comes
about, however, will it be possible to establish a new order of society
with an appropriate legal system in the place of that which formerly
existed on the basis of the institution of slavery.

The assumption made by many writers that more negroes are lynched for
the crime of rape against white women than for any other crime is
without foundation in fact. Statistics show that not more than
thirty-four per cent of the negroes summarily put to death during the
last twenty-two years have been lynched for that crime, either alleged,
attempted, or actually committed. Lynching for that crime, however,
leads to lynching for other crimes and also furnishes a ground for an
appeal to public sentiment to condone the practice of lynching.

Since the negroes were made free American citizens a large class of the
younger generation has become utterly shiftless and worthless, many of
them being vicious and dangerous individuals in a community. Professor
DuBois, than whom there is probably no man better qualified to make a
careful and conservative estimate, says that at least nine per cent of
the county black population in the Black Belt are thoroughly lewd and
vicious.[346] Lynching has been resorted to by the whites not merely to
wreak vengeance, but to terrorize and restrain this lawless element in
the negro population. Among the Southern people the conviction is
general that terror is the only restraining influence that can be
brought to bear upon vicious negroes. The negroes fear nothing so much
as force, and should they once get the notion that there is a reasonable
hope of escape from punishment, the whites in many parts of the South
would be at their mercy.[347] There is no evidence, however, to show
that the punishment of negroes by mob violence tends to decrease
lawlessness among the negroes, or even tends to restrain the vicious
element from committing offenses against the whites. On the contrary,
lawlessness seems to beget lawlessness and the publicity given to
revolting crimes by lynching the perpetrators of them seems really to
incite others to commit similar crimes, or at least suggests to others
like crimes when opportunity offers.

The frightful tortures and the burnings which have taken place in the
last few years in connection with the lynching of negroes is partly to
be accounted for by the fact that lynchings are now carried on by a
lower class of whites than formerly.[348] The power of suggestion as an
incentive to crime is also evident in this barbarous conduct of lynching
mobs. The publicity given in the newspapers, particularly the
sensational ones, to the details of such tragic scenes has undoubtedly
been largely responsible for the frequency of their recurrence.[349] The
relations between the younger generations of the two races are, besides,
much less cordial and amicable than were those which existed between the
generations immediately preceding; there is less of a mutual
understanding. The relation of master and slave has been destroyed and
no new relation has yet been firmly established in its place. In the
process of adjustment to a new order of things there has been constant
friction between the two races, and when an offense has been committed
upon a white person by a negro, particularly if an assault has been made
upon the person of a white woman or child, the exasperation of the
whites has known scarcely any bounds.

While the decrease in the number of lynchings per year since the early
nineties affords some hope for the future with reference to the
suppression of lynchings, still the number of burnings and the number of
cases in which the victims are subjected to extreme torture indicate
that too much reliance cannot be placed upon any apparent decline in the
tendency to lynch. The fact also that lynchings frequently occur in
communities where such summary and illegal procedure had not previously
been permitted forebodes more lynchings in the future. The seriousness
of the situation with reference to the practice of lynching in the
United States is not yet fully realized. There is no little ground for
apprehension in the fact that it is becoming common for cries of “Lynch
him,” “Hang him,” “Get a rope and string him up,” &c., to be heard, even
on the streets of New York City, whenever a crowd gathers in response to
a feeling of popular excitement and indignation over the perpetration of
some atrocious crime.

In the course of this investigation into the history of lynching it has
become evident that there is usually more or less public approval, or
supposed favorable public sentiment, behind a lynching. Indeed, it is
not too much to say that popular justification is the _sine qua non_ of
lynching. It is this fact that distinguishes lynching, on the one hand,
from assassination and murder, and, on the other hand, from insurrection
and open warfare. A lynching may be defined as an illegal and summary
execution at the hands of a mob, or a number of persons, who have in
some degree the public opinion of the community behind them. When the
term first came into use it meant the infliction of corporal punishment,
particularly whipping. The term is now used exclusively to signify the
infliction of the death penalty in a summary fashion, usually by
hanging. But whatever the penalty imposed or the manner of its
imposition, the sentiment frequently expressed in a community where a
lynching has occurred is to the effect that the victim or victims got no
more than was deserved.

It further appears from this investigation that no one cause or crime
can be assigned for lynching. Lynchings take place for various causes.
At one time there may be a lack of ordinary tribunals of justice, at
another time there may be doubt as to the efficiency of the legal
machinery. Lynchings may take place because the offense is outside the
law but is deemed serious enough to merit severe punishment. They may
occur because of the barbarity and fiendish nature of the crime
committed. They may occur for one reason or for another; the only factor
that is always present is a disorganized state of society or a condition
of popular excitement and resentment when reliance on ordinary legal
procedure is at a minimum.

Of the legal remedies for lynching which have been proposed, few have
been enacted into laws, and where such measures have been placed upon
the statute-books they have not as yet been so effectively administered
as to inspire confidence in them as an ultimate means of suppressing the
practice. The problem of finding a remedy for lynching is really a
problem of increasing and maintaining a popular reliance on the
formulation and the administration of the law. Every measure which will
in any way promote such a reliance, either by invalidating the excuses
offered in justification of the practice or by developing a strong
public sentiment against it, deserves serious consideration, and every
such measure, unless likely to be productive of other evils possibly
greater, should be immediately adopted and put into operation.

The existence of the practice of lynching in the United States is a
national disgrace and should be so considered by every citizen no matter
in what part of the country his home may be. This, however, does not
justify citizens of the Northern section in violently attacking citizens
of the Southern section every time that a lynching occurs in that
section, or _vice versa_. Each section and indeed each community must
hold itself responsible for the prevention of lynchings. Neither
European philanthropists nor the Northern press or pulpit can do very
much toward preventing such occurrences in the South. It is a question
with which the South alone can properly deal and it is a problem which
the intelligent men of the South are best able to solve. The efforts of
the Southern Education Board and the General Education Board to educate
both the whites and the blacks and lift them to a higher plane of living
will do much toward preventing lynchings. The work done by such schools
as the Hampton Institute and the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial
Institute, and the principles advocated by such men as Booker T.
Washington, also lead in the same direction.

It has been well suggested that the Northern papers and the Southern
papers should exchange texts—the Northern press should preach against
negro crime, the Southern press should preach against lawlessness and
race prejudice. That this has been done in a few instances gives hope
for the future.

To the extent that the colored race increases its industrial efficiency
and becomes economically strong in the South will there be a decrease in
negro lawlessness and viciousness, and likewise will it merit respect
and confidence on the part of the white race. More than anything else
the colored race needs wise and able leaders at the present time. The
false notions and ideals of the Reconstruction Period have now been
largely eradicated. The race is in a position to make substantial and
material progress, if under able leadership, and such progress will tend
to eliminate the conditions which foster lynching in the South.

If the United States had a monarchical form of government the most
practicable means for the suppression of lynchings would consist merely
in the publication of an edict by the monarch for the better enforcement
of the law. Most lynching mobs could be easily dispersed were the
officers of the law resolute and determined men intent upon protecting
their prisoners and letting the law take its course; if they were
responsible only to their superior officers and not more or less
directly responsible to the people, and if they were not in sympathy
with the mob to a greater or less degree. Our system of government,
however, is in form representative and popular, and all our traditions
are against a highly centralized form of government. In the United
States it is therefore necessary to depend very largely upon public
sentiment for a strict enforcement of the law. Lynch-law will not cease
to exist in this country until there is a strong and uncompromising
public sentiment against it in every community, a public sentiment
which, with a full recognition of the ethnic and “societal” factors
involved in the “race question,” and of the necessity for a legal system
consistent with these factors instead of one based on abstract
principles concerning the rights of all men, will invariably condemn
lynchings because they are a crime against society, if for no other
reason, and will under no circumstances countenance them because they
may be the administration of deserved and well-merited punishments.




                       LIST OF PERIODICALS CITED


 American Journal of Social Science.
 American Law Review.
 American Whig Review.
 Annals of the American Academy of Science.
 Annual Reports of the American Historical Association.
 Atlantic Monthly.
 Boston Chronicle.
 Boston Daily Advertiser.
 Boston Evening Post.
 Boston Evening Transcript.
 Boston Gazette.
 Boston News-Letter.
 British and Foreign Review.
 Brooklyn Standard Union.
 Chambers’ Journal.
 Chattanooga Times.
 Chicago Tribune.
 Congressional Record.
 Cyclopedic Review of Current History.
 Denver Republican.
 Essex Gazette.
 Fortnightly Review.
 Forum.
 Green Bag.
 Harper’s Magazine.
 Harvard Law Review.
 Houston Post.
 Howitt’s Journal.
 Independent.
 International Monthly.
 Johns Hopkins Historical Studies.
 Journal of Proceedings of American Social Science Association.
 Leisure Hour.
 Leslie’s Weekly.
 Liberator.
 Literary Digest.
 London Gazette.
 London Gazetteer.
 Massachusetts Spy.
 Modern Philology.
 Nation.
 New England Gazette.
 New England Magazine.
 New York Commercial Advertiser.
 New York Evening Post.
 New York Evening Sun.
 New York Evening Telegraph.
 New York Gazette.
 New York Times.
 New York Tribune.
 New York World.
 Niles’ Register.
 North American Review.
 Notes and Queries.
 Our Day.
 Outlook.
 Publications of the American Economic Association.
 Publications of the Southern Historical Association.
 Public Opinion.
 Raleigh News-Observer.
 Review of Reviews.
 Richmond Planet.
 Salem Gazette.
 Saturday Review.
 Southern Literary Messenger.
 Spectator.
 Washington Times.
 Yale Review.

Citations are made also to statutes, historical records, colonial
archives, encyclopedias, dictionaries, etc. Full references are given in
the foot-notes. For authors quoted see index.




                                 INDEX


 Abolitionism, 91, 107, 121.

 Abolitionists, 105, 106, 113, 120, 122.

 Act of indemnity, 29, 72, 73.

 Agreement to take extra-legal measures, 49, 73, 83.

 Alabama, burning alive, 108, 126;
   lynch-law adopted, 151, 179, 183, 188;
   responsibility of sheriffs, 244;
   punishment of lynchers, 255, 263.

 Alaska, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Aliens, lynching of, 171, 181.

 Anti-slavery agitation, 198.

 Arizona, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Arkansas, burning alive, 109, 126, 191;
   lynch-law adopted, 179, 183, 188.

 Arnold, S. G., 66.

 Atkinson, Governor, 231.

 Austria-Hungary, mob violence, 4.

 Aycock, Governor, 256.


 Bancroft, H. H., 132, 198.

 Bassett, John S., 48, 211.

 Beard, J. M., 139.

 Birkbeck, Morris, 77.

 Blanchard, Governor, 262.

 Blane, W. N., 38, 78.

 Boag, Rev. John, 10.

 Bohemian lynched, 172, 181.

 Boies, Henry M., 164.

 Brackett, J. R., 212.

 Brande, 5, 8.

 Brewer, Justice, on right of appeal, 260–262.

 Bristed, C. A., 16.

 Brown, W. G., 140.

 Brown, William Wells, 202.

 Brown _v._ Orangeburg Co., 246 ff.

 Bryce, James, 140.

 Burning alive, 108, 109, 126, 127, 191, 274, 275;
   as legal punishment, 212 ff.


 Cabell, Julia Mayo, 23, 33, 75.

 California, vigilance committee movement, 132 ff.;
   lynch-law adopted, 151, 180, 184;
   punishment of lynchers, 255.

 Canada, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

 Carpet-baggers, 138.

 Castration, form of punishment, 211.

 Cattle thieves, 163 (see horse thieves).

 Causes of lynchings, classification of, 166 ff.;
   conclusion in regard to, 276.

 Cazneau, Jane M., 197.

 Channing, W. E., 194.

 China, secret societies in, 4.

 Chinese lynched, 172, 181.

 Civil War, social disruption at close of, 137 ff.

 Club law, 38.

 Colonies, punishment of rape in, 208 ff.

 Colorado, lynch-law adopted, 152, 163, 180, 184;
   burning alive, 191.

 Colored element in population, influence on lynching, 186 ff.

 Commissioners _v._ Church, 248 ff.

 Connecticut, tarring and feathering, 63;
   perpetrators of outrage
 fined, 115;
   lynching of Charles Lockwood, 180, 181, 185.

 Corporal punishment (see whipping, tar and feathers, riding on rail).

 County liable for damages, 246 ff.

 Cowper justice, 8.

 Craig, John, 10.

 Criminality among negroes, 274.

 Crockett, David, 196.


 Damages, suits for, 114, 115, 125.

 Defensor, 105.

 Delaware, burning alive, 180, 185, 191, 261.

 Desjardins, Arthur, 24.

 Desperadism, 166.

 Desperadoes, 128 ff., 150.

 Dewees, F. P., 150.

 Douglass, Frederick, 223.

 Doyle, A. Conan, 140.

 Drake family of South Carolina, tradition in, 17 ff.

 Draper, Lyman C., 26, 34, 73.

 Drayton, John, 61, 69.

 Drewry, W. S., 92 ff., 165.

 DuBois, W. E. B., 274.

 Durbin, Governor, 263.


 England, practice of lynching does not exist, 3, 7, 9.

 Emancipation proclamation, 137.


 Fallows, Samuel, 10.

 Farmer, John S., 10.

 Faux, W., 38, 76.

 Featherston, H. C., 15, 23, 30.

 Featherstonhaugh, G. W., 36.

 Federal anti-lynching law proposed, 257.

 Fiske, John, 212.

 Flogging (see whipping).

 Florida, lynch-law adopted, 119, 179, 183, 188.

 Ford, Paul Leicester, 60.

 Foreign element in population, effect on lynching, 186 ff.

 France, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

 Franchise given to negroes, effect of, 205 ff.

 Frontier conditions, lynch-law under, 1, 78 ff., 129 ff., 150, 194 ff.


 Gag law, 37.

 Galway story, 13 ff.

 Gamblers, lynch-law adopted against, 98, 99, 108.

 Garner, J. W., 138.

 Garrison, W. L., 91, 96.

 Georgia, lynch-law adopted, 92, 168, 179, 183, 185;
   burning alive, 191;
   anti-lynching laws, 231 ff., 233;
   punishment of lynchers, 256.

 Germany, practice of lynching does not exist, 3.

 Gregg, Alexander, 20, 51 ff.

 Grose, 7.

 Grund, F. J., 114, 271.

 Guinea Coast, secret societies of, 4.


 Hakluyt, 61.

 Halifax law, 8.

 Hall, Judge James, 39, 81.

 Hanna, C. A., 42.

 Hardiman, 15.

 Hawkes, Arthur, 202.

 Hening, 30, 32, 73, 76, 211.

 Henry, William Wirt, 32.

 Hershey, O. F., 270.

 Heyward, Governor, 252.

 Hittell, John S., 132.

 Hoffman, F. L., 153.

 Hogg, Governor, 230.

 Holt, George C., 155, 265.

 Hone, Philip, 117.

 Horse thieves, 3, 122, 128, 134, 163.

 Howe, Henry, 25, 26, 33.


 Idaho, lynch-law adopted, 180,184.

 Illinois, lynch-law adopted, 44, 45, 78, 180, 185, 188;
   compact entered into by Regulators, 83;
   mob violence, 110, 115;
   burning alive, 191;
   punishment of lynchers, 254.

 Illiteracy, study of with reference to the distribution of lynchings,
    186 ff.

 Immigration, effect on practice of lynching, 186 ff.

 Indemnities paid by United States, 259.

 Indemnification of William Preston and others, 29;
   William Campbell and others, 72;
   Thomas Nelson, Jr., 73.

 Indiana, lynch-law adopted, 38, 77, 152, 180, 185, 188;
   anti-lynching laws, 241 ff.;
   Maxwell _v._ Dudley, 250.

 Indians lynched, 172. Cf. 41 ff., 44. 45.

 Indian Territory, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Informers tarred and feathered, 62 ff.

 Ingle, Edward, 75.

 Ingraham, J. H., 101, 227.

 Iowa, lynch-law adopted, 86 ff., 180, 184.

 Italians lynched, 172, 181, 228.


 Jacksonian period, 106 ff.

 Jameson, R. G., 61.

 Jamieson, John, 8.

 Japanese lynched, 172, 181.

 Jeddart justice, 8.

 Jelks, Governor, 263.

 Johnson, Joseph, 22, 56, 61.

 Johnson, William, 26.

 Judge Lynch, code of his honor, 82, 83, 102, 133.


 Kansas, lynch-law adopted, 134, 152, 180, 184, 245;
   burning alive, 191;
   anti-lynching law, 245.

 Keller, Albert G., 272.

 Kemble, Fanny, 201.

 Kentucky, lynch-law adopted, 38, 78, 88, 151, 179, 183, 188;
   damages for slaves illegally executed, 125;
   burning alive, 191, 264;
   anti-lynching law, 238 ff.;
   punishment of lynchers, 255, 264.

 Ku-Klux Klan 6, 139 ff.


 Lashing (see whipping).

 Latrobe, C. J., 83.

 Lawless, Judge, 109, 193.

 LeBon, Gustave, 275.

 Lee, Henry, 26.

 Legal executions compared with lynchings, 163.

 Legal remedies, efficacy of, 245, 251 ff, 277.

 LeRoy, James A., 202.

 Lester, J. C., 139.

 Levell, W. H., 274.

 Linch, 16.

 Linch’s Law, 39, 81.

 Lincoln, Abraham, on effects of mob law, 110 ff.

 Linn, W. A., 103.

 Lossing, Benson J., 24.

 Louisiana, lynch-law adopted, 117, 151, 179, 183, 188;
   slaves sentenced to death by planters, 126;
   burning alive, 191, 228.

 Lovejoy, Rev. E. P., 110, 115.

 Loyal League, 146.

 Lydford law, 7.

 Lyell, Sir Charles, 119.

 Lynch, dictionary definitions of, 9 ff.;
   etymology of, 16 ff.;
   use of word, 116.

 Lynch, Charles, 11, 23 ff.

 Lynch, John, 23, 35, 75.

 Lynch, James Fitzstephen, 13.

 Lynch, William, 73, 75.

 Lynchers, punishment of, 114 ff., 152, 254 ff., 265.

 Lynch’s Creek, South Carolina, 19 ff.

 Lynch Creek, North Carolina, 17.

 Lynching, practice peculiar to United States, 1 ff., 267 ff.;
   social conditions affecting, 2, 5, 277;
   similar to regulating, 46;
   definition of, 11, 135, 136, 186, 241, 276;
   manner of death by, 151, 152, 191;
   how justified in South, 224–226, 272, 273.

 Lynchings, reports of in newspapers, 159;
   distribution of by States, 182;
   distribution of by counties, 189.

 Lynch-law, meaning of term, 9 ff., 40, 136;
   frontier type, 82 ff., 85 ff., 89, 90, 129 ff., 150, 194 ff.;
   type found in well settled communities, 2, 112 ff.

 Lynch’s law, earliest use of expression, 36;
   original signification of term, 39, 40;
   used for first time in Liberator, 97;
   used for first time in Niles’ Register, 98.


 Malay lynched, 152.

 Marryat, F., 114, 194 ff.

 Martin, Colonel William, 34.

 Martin, F. X., 20, 48.

 Martineau, Harriet, 104, 114.

 Maryland, lynch-law adopted, 152, 179, 183, 188.

 Massachusetts, lynch-law adopted, 102, 103;
   tarring and feathering, 61 ff., 64, 65, 67 ff.

 Matthews, Albert, 19, 21, 32, 36, 59.

 Maxwell _v._ Dudley, 250.

 Mayo-Smith, Richmond, 170.

 McConnel, J. L., 84, 85.

 McCord, D. J., 213, 219, 221.

 McCrady, Edward, 20, 61, 69.

 Mexicans lynched, 172, 181.

 Michigan, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185;
   anti-lynching law, 244.

 Mississippi, lynch-law adopted, 99 ff., 117, 120, 168, 179, 183, 188;
   suits for damages, 115;
   burning alive, 191;
   punishment of lynchers, 254.

 Missouri, lynch-law adopted, 98, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 151, 179,
    183, 188;
   burning alive, 108, 109, 126;
   punishment of lynchers, 255.

 Mob law, 37.

 Mobocracy, 101.

 Mobs, 20, 69, 97, 101;
   definition, 241.

 Mob violence, 66, 68, 91, 103 ff., 110, 115, 259;
   damages for, 66.

 Molly Maguires, 150.

 Montana, lynch-law adopted, 151, 163, 180, 184.

 Montgomery, Cora, 197.

 Moore, Frank, 60, 61, 69, 70, 71.

 Moore, Nina, 64.

 Mormons, 103.

 Murray, C. A., 36, 198.

 Murrell conspiracy, 100.


 Nebraska, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 184.

 Negroes, lynching of, previous to Civil War, 124, 126 ff.;
   in recent years, 151, 152, 170 ff., 181;
   how justified, 223 ff.

 Nevada, lynch-law adopted, 151, 180, 184.

 New Hampshire, lynch-law adopted, 44.

 New Jersey, tarring and feathering, 70, 180, 185.

 New Mexico, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 New York, tarring and feathering, 63, 70;
   lynch-law adopted, 180, 185.

 New Zealand, tarring and feathering, 61.

 Noble, J., 212.

 North Carolina, Regulators, 20 ff., 48;
   lynch-law adopted, 91, 120, 179, 183, 188, 264;
   burning alive, 191;
   anti-lynching law, 232;
   punishment of lynchers, 256, 257.

 North Dakota, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Nuttall, 10.


 O’Ferall, Governor, 229, 231, 262.

 Ohio, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185, 188, 248;
   anti-lynching laws, 235 ff.;
   Commissioners _v._ Church, 248 ff.

 Olmsted, F. L., 128.

 O’Neall, J. B., 20, 21, 53, 55.

 Oregon, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.


 Page, Thomas Nelson, 140, 207, 224.

 Page, Thomas Walker, 23 ff.

 Page, Walter H., 223.

 Pell, Edward Leigh, 159, 231.

 Pennsylvania, Rangers at Paxtang, 41;
   tarring and feathering, 64;
   lynch-law adopted, 22, 97, 98, 180, 185.

 Perfectionists, 103.

 Phillips, Edward, 7.

 Popular tribunals, 133.

 Public sentiment as remedy, 265 ff., 279.


 Race prejudice, 168, 198 ff., 272.

 Ramsay, David, 55.

 Rangers, 41, 45, 82.

 Rape, 126, 127, 166, 169, 170, 177, 207 ff., 213 ff., 273.

 Ratzel, F., 4, 201.

 Reconstruction period characterized, 153.

 Regulate, earliest use in connection with extra-legal punishment, 48.

 Regulating, 20, 38, 39, 46, 48, 51, 59, 80.

 Regulators, 6, 20 ff., 33, 38, 42, 48 ff., 79 ff., 88, 121, 130, 143.

 Remedies tried, 245, 251 ff.

 Revolutionary War, social conditions during, 60.

 Rhode Island, tarring and feathering, 63;
   mob violence, 66.

 Riding on rail, 92, 103, 113, 120 (see whipping, tar and feathers).

 Riots, 38, 69, 91, 97.

 Roads, Jr., S., 69.

 Roberts, William, 3.

 Royce, Josiah, 132.

 Russia, lynch-law procedure, 3.


 San Francisco vigilance committees, 132.

 Schaper, Wm. A., 21.

 Schenck, David, 36.

 Schofilites, 22, 56.

 Scotland, summary procedure, 7, 9.

 Scotch-Irish blamed for introduction of lynch-law, 42, 43.

 Sewall, Samuel, 201.

 Shaler, N. S., 270.

 Shepherd, Samuel, 211.

 Sidis, Boris, 275.

 Simms, W. G., 26.

 Slick, use of word, 98, 120.

 Sloane, W. M., 71.

 Smith, W. H., 45.

 Sons of Liberty, 59, 154.

 South Carolina, Regulators, 19, 21, 51 ff.;
   tarring and feathering, 69, 71;
   lynch-law adopted, 151, 168, 179, 183, 188;
   provision for trial of slaves, 218 ff.;
   anti-lynching law, 233 ff.;
   Brown _v._ Orangeburg Co., 246 ff.

 South Dakota, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Squire Birch, 33, 81.

 Stamp Act, 59.

 Stearns, Charles, 139.

 Stedman, C., 26.

 Stone, Alfred Holt, 191.

 Summers, L. P., 36.

 Sumner, W. G., 60, 107.

 Swiss lynched, 172, 181.


 Tar and feathers, 60 ff., 92, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 120.

 Tarleton, Banastre, 26.

 Tea merchants, subjects for tar and feathers, 66.

 Tennessee, lynch-law adopted, 35, 114, 115, 119, 151, 179, 183, 188;
   Ku-Klux Klan, 139, 145, 148;
   anti-lynching law, 237;
   punishment of lynchers, 255, 256.

 Texas, lynch-law adopted, 118, 121, 122, 128, 179, 183, 188;
   burning alive, 191, 228;
   anti-lynching law, 240, 241;
   punishment of lynchers, 255.

 Tillinghast, J. A., 200.

 Tories, 24 ff., 60, 72.

 Turner, Nat., 92 ff.


 Union League, 146.

 Upton, George P., 160.

 Utah, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.


 Vardaman, Governor, 263.

 Vehmic courts, 5 ff.

 Verdicts of coroner’s juries, 263.

 Vicksburg gamblers, 99, 108, 194.

 Vigilance organizations, 6, 122, 125, 128, 130 ff.

 Virginia, lynch-law adopted, 23 ff., 32, 39, 76, 92, 119, 151, 179,
    183, 188;
   acts to indemnify, 29, 72, 73;
   tarring and feathering, 71;
   agreement of 1780, 73;
   slave insurrection led by Nat Turner, 92 ff.


 Washington, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184.

 Washington, Booker T., 278.

 Wells, Ida B., 229.

 West Virginia, lynch-law adopted, 102, 179, 183, 188;
   joint resolution condemning lynching, 244.

 Westcott, 7.

 Wheeler, John H., 17 ff., 50.

 Whipping, 27, 28, 32, 35, 47, 76, 77, 92, 98, 99, 102, 113, 114, 115,
    116, 120, 217–218.

 White Caps, 154, 168.

 Willcox, Walter F., 207.

 Williams, George W., 199, 203.

 Williamson, Hugh, 20, 48, 50.

 Wilson, D. L., 139.

 Wilson, Woodrow, 107.

 Wirt, William, 26, 32, 71.

 Wisconsin, lynch-law adopted, 152, 180, 185.

 Wister, Owen, 197.

 Women, lynching of, 172, 173.

 Wright, Carroll D., 268.

 Wyoming, lynch-law adopted, 180, 184;
   punishment of lynchers, 255.

-----

Footnote 1:

  Compare statement by William Roberts in _Fortnightly Review_, January,
  1892 (57: 92).

Footnote 2:

  The _Times_, Washington, D. C., Dec. 14, 1902.

Footnote 3:

  The _Standard Union_, Brooklyn, N. Y., Nov. 14, 1902.

Footnote 4:

  The _New York Evening Telegraph_, Oct. 8, 1902.

Footnote 5:

  See F. Ratzel: “History of Mankind” (trans. by A. J. Butler), I, 125,
  281, 282; II, 131; III, 507.

Footnote 6:

  See “Fehmic courts,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th edition.

Footnote 7:

  Edward Phillips: “The New World of Words, or a General English
  Dictionary” (1678, 4th edition).

Footnote 8:

  Grose’s “Provincial Glossary” (London, 1811), p. 163.

Footnote 9:

  See “Lynch Law,” International Cyclopædia (1893).

Footnote 10:

  See Century Dictionary under “Law.”

Footnote 11:

  John Jamieson: “Etymological Dictionary of the Scottish Language”
  (1879).

Footnote 12:

  An American edition, bound under the title, “Brande’s Encyclopædia,”
  was published in 1843.

Footnote 13:

  The English Dictionary, edited by Rev. John Boag and published at
  Glasgow in 1848, gives for the verb lynch, “To inflict punishment
  without the forms of law, as by a mob.” The definitions given for the
  words “lynched” and “lynching” are also very similar to the ones given
  by Webster. It is fair to presume that Boag consulted Webster and
  followed his authority, although he did not mark the term as an
  American word. John Craig’s Dictionary of the English Language
  (London, 1849) gives “lynch, _v. a._ To punish summarily without
  judicial investigation, as by a mob.—An American word.” The London
  edition of Nuttall’s Dictionary (published about 1863) gives “Lynch,
  _v. a._ To inflict pain, or punish without the forms of law, as by an
  American mob.” The dictionaries published in Great Britain previous to
  1848 do not contain the verb lynch.

Footnote 14:

  The edition of 1901 has the same. The Century Dictionary is the only
  recent authoritative work that states unequivocally that lynch-law was
  originally the kind of law administered by Charles Lynch of Virginia.

Footnote 15:

  See Hardiman’s History of Galway (Dublin, 1820), p. 70. Also,
  _Spectator_ (London), April 13, 1889 (62: 511). The story can be
  traced back as far as the year 1674. See Miscellany of the Irish
  Archæological Society (1846), I, 44–80. (M.)

Footnote 16:

  The _Green Bag_, March, 1900 (12: 150).

Footnote 17:

  See “lynch law,” The American Cyclopædia (edition of 1875). See also,
  Notes & Queries, 2d Series, Oct. 23, 1858 (6: 338), where reference is
  made to _London Gazette_, 6–9 February, 1687–8, No. 2319.

Footnote 18:

  That he succeeded in making himself thoroughly unpopular with every
  one is shown in the Calendars of State Papers, Colonial Series,
  America & West Indies, 1685–1688, and 1688–1692. (M.)

Footnote 19:

  See “lynch law,” Encyclopædia Britannica (9th edition); also, under
  “to lynch,” Bartlett’s Dictionary of Americanisms (4th edition, 1877).

  C. A. Bristed, in an essay on The English Language in America
  (Cambridge Essays, 1855, p. 60) says: “_Linch_, in several of the
  northern-county dialects, means to beat, or maltreat. Lynch Law, then,
  would be simply equivalent to _club-law_; and the change of a letter
  may be easily accounted for by the fact that the name of Lynch is as
  common in some parts of America as in Ireland.”

Footnote 20:

  No such verb as _linch_ or _linge_ is found in Bosworth’s Dictionary
  of the Anglo-Saxon Language, or in Stratmann’s Middle-English
  Dictionary. Murray’s Oxford Dictionary (1903) gives the verb _linch_
  as a variant of _linge_, a word “of obscure origin.”

Footnote 21:

  See “lynch,” Skeat’s Etymological Dictionary.

Footnote 22:

  Although Bristed ingeniously traces lynch-law back to the verb
  _linch_, he remarks, in passing, that “if there ever was a phrase
  deemed particularly Trans-atlantic in origin, it is that of Lynch Law
  for summary and informal justice.”

Footnote 23:

  See p. 10, note 1.

Footnote 24:

  “Reminiscences and Memoirs of North Carolina” (1884), p. 172.

Footnote 25:

  “History of North Carolina” (1851), p. 274.

Footnote 26:

  See article by Albert Matthews in the _Nation_, Dec. 4, 1902 (75:
  439).

Footnote 27:

  Alexander Gregg: “History of the Old Cheraws” (1867), p. 120. F. X.
  Martin: “History of North Carolina” (1829), II, 228, 233. Hugh
  Williamson: “History of North Carolina” (1812), II, 128, 131.

Footnote 28:

  J. B. O’Neall: “Annals of Newberry” (1859), p. 76. It is not stated by
  O’Neall at what time these gentlemen instituted this practice in South
  Carolina. From the evidence that Gregg gives, it apparently took place
  in the summer of 1767. See the following chapter, p. 53.

Footnote 29:

  See article by Edward McCrady, in the _Nation_, Jan. 15, 1903 (76:
  52). This article as originally written was published in full in the
  _Sunday News_, Charleston, S. C., Jan. 11, 1903. In a letter published
  in the _Nation_, March 19, 1903 (76: 225), Mr. George S. Wills cites
  an example of the use of the word lynch in connection with this creek,
  which is found in a journal kept by the Rev. William H. Wills, a
  Methodist minister of North Carolina, who traveled in his sulky from
  Tarboro, North Carolina, to Alabama, in the early summer of 1837.
  After describing a narrow escape from drowning in an attempt to cross
  Lynch’s Creek while it was swollen, the Rev. Mr. Wills writes in his
  journal: “Probably I shall never forget Lynches Creek; for it had well
  nigh Lynch^d me.”—See “Publications of the Southern Historical
  Association,” November, 1902 (6:479). This example, however, shows no
  original connection between the term lynch-law and Lynch’s Creek,
  South Carolina. As will appear in the following pages, by the year
  1837 the word lynch had come to be widely used to indicate summary
  punishment. Evidently the writer in this case merely noticed the
  similarity between the name of the creek and the word which had
  recently come into use, and so made this play upon words, using the
  word lynch in a somewhat figurative sense.

Footnote 30:

  See article by Albert Matthews in the _Nation_, Jan. 29, 1903 (76:
  91). In a monograph by William A. Schaper, on “Sectionalism and
  Representation in South Carolina,” the statement is made, in reference
  to the Regulators of 1768, that “the settlers agreed to rely on lynch
  law, which received its name at this time.”—Annual Report of the
  American Historical Association (1900), I, 337. The author of this
  statement that lynch-law received its name at this time was, however,
  unable to cite facts to support it. (M.)

Footnote 31:

  “History of the Old Cheraws” (1867), p. 128.

Footnote 32:

  J. B. O’Neall: “Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South
  Carolina” (1859), I, p. x.

Footnote 33:

  “Traditions and Reminiscences,” pp. 44–45.

Footnote 34:

  Ibid., p. 544.

Footnote 35:

  Vol. 48, p. 402.

Footnote 36:

  One such story will be found in the following chapter on p. 73. For an
  account of the Lynch family in Virginia, see Mrs. Julia Mayo Cabell:
  “Sketches and Recollections of Lynchburg” (1858), pp. 9–23. The chief
  available sources of information for the facts and events pertaining
  to the life of Charles Lynch are an article by Thomas Walker Page in
  the _Atlantic Monthly_, December, 1901 (88: 731), and one by Howell
  Colton Featherston in the _Green Bag_, March, 1900 (12: 150). Both of
  these articles have been largely drawn upon in the following pages.

Footnote 37:

  A writer (“Claverhouse”) in the _New York Evening Post_ for June 2,
  1864, says: “In America, the term ‘Lynch law’ was first used in
  Piedmont, on the western frontier of Virginia. There was no court
  within the district, and all controversies were referred to the
  arbitrament of prominent citizens. Among these was a man by the name
  of Lynch, whose decisions were so impartial that he was known as Judge
  Lynch, and the system was called ‘Lynch law,’ and adopted in our
  pioneer settlements as an inexpensive and speedy method of obtaining
  justice.”

Footnote 38:

  Edited by Benson J. Lossing, published in 1882.

Footnote 39:

  See article by Arthur Desjardins, _Revue des Deux Mondes_, May, 1891.

Footnote 40:

  Charles Lynch was born in 1736, at Chestnut Hill, his father’s estate,
  upon a part of which the city of Lynchburg now stands. His father was
  a “redemptioner” who came to Virginia from Ireland about 1725. The
  young adventurer subsequently married the daughter of the planter to
  whom the captain of the ship that brought him over had sold him, took
  up a large tract of land lying between the James and the Staunton
  rivers, and became a tobacco planter on a large scale. At his death
  the home on the James fell to his eldest son, John, and Charles took
  the part of the family lands that lay nearer the frontier. The mother,
  Sarah Lynch, then a widow, had joined the sect of the Quakers at the
  Cedar Creek meeting on April 16, 1750, and it is in the records of
  this congregation of Quakers that the following item appears: “14 of
  Dec., 1754. Charles Lynch and Anne Terrill published for the first
  Time their Intentions of Marriage.” The young couple established their
  home on the Staunton, in what is now the southwestern part of Campbell
  County.

  For years Charles followed his mother’s teachings and was an active
  member of the Society of Friends; for some time he was “Clerk of the
  monthly meetings.” Later, however, the exigencies of the times caused
  him to forego some of his scruples and accept public office. In 1767
  he became “unsatisfactory” to the peace-loving Quakers and he was
  “disowned for taking solemn oaths, contrary to the order and
  discipline of Friends.” It was in this year, 1767, that he was elected
  to the Virginia House of Burgesses, where he held a seat till the
  colony became an independent State. He was prominent in the earliest
  organization of Bedford County, formed from Lunenburg County in 1753
  (Henry Howe: “Historical Collections of Virginia” (1845), p. 188;
  Hening’s Statutes at Large, VI, 381), and was a member of the Virginia
  convention of 1776, which, by sending instructions to the delegates
  from Virginia in the Continental Congress, exercised a decisive
  influence on the movement for independence. He had been made a justice
  of the peace under a commission from Governor Dunmore in 1774, and
  when the county court was reorganized, according to the ordinance of
  the Convention, passed on the 3d of July, 1776, he retained the
  position.

  At the beginning of the Revolutionary War his Quaker principles seemed
  still to influence his actions to an extent sufficient to keep him out
  of active military service. His loyalty was well known, however. Mr.
  Page says: “He did not enlist in the army, partly because of his
  Quaker principles, but chiefly because his presence was imperatively
  necessary at home. He had to rouse the spirit of his constituents to
  support the action he had advocated in the convention. He had to raise
  and equip troops for the army. He had, as it were, to mobilize the
  forces of his country, and attend to all the duties of a commissary
  department. In addition, he had to make some provision in the event of
  an attack from hostile Indians.” In 1778 the court of Bedford
  recommended him to the Governor for the office of Colonel of Militia
  in that county. He accepted the commission and organized a regiment,
  but the call to the front did not come till two years later when the
  war was shifted to the south and Lord Cornwallis was sent to
  co-operate with General Philips and Benedict Arnold in the invasion of
  Virginia.

  The records of the court of Bedford County, the minutes of various
  Quaker meetings, the journals of the Virginia House of Burgesses and
  of the first Constitutional Convention, taken together with family
  documents and traditions, show Charles Lynch to have been a thoroughly
  capable and highly respected man, a leader among the men in his
  community. Before the close of the war he made a record for himself as
  an officer in the army. At the battle of Guilford Court House, March
  15, 1781, a battalion of riflemen under his command behaved with much
  gallantry and aided in bringing considerable credit to the Virginia
  militia. [Henry Howe: “Historical Collections of Virginia” (1845), p.
  212. W. G. Simms: “Life of Nathanael Greene” (1859), p. 186. Henry
  Lee: “Memoirs of the War” (1812), I, 341, 345. William Johnson:
  “Sketches of Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene” (1822), II,
  3. Banastre Tarleton: “History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781”
  (1787), p. 272. C. Stedman: “History of the American War” (1794), II,
  338.]

  He lived for a number of years after peace had been declared with
  England, and voted for the new constitution. In the family
  burying-ground on his homestead plantation a tombstone bears the
  simple inscription:

  “In memory of Colonel Charles Lynch, a zealous and active patriot.
  Died, October 29, 1796; aged 60 years.”

  Many anecdotes are still in circulation among the old inhabitants of
  his neighborhood illustrative of his habits and character. The chorus
  of a once popular patriotic song runs as follows:

                      “Hurrah for Colonel Lynch,
                      Captain Bob and Callaway!
                      They never turned a Tory loose
                      Until he shouted ‘Liberty’!”

  Another version of this refrain runs this way:

                      “Hurrah for Captain Bob,
                      Colonels Lynch and Callaway!
                      Who never let a Tory off
                      Until he cried out ‘Liberty!’”

Footnote 41:

  Mr. Page makes no mention of any trouble with desperadoes. Referring
  to the Tories in Bedford County, he says: “Numerous records of the
  county courts, taken together with other sources of information, show
  that here, as in many other western counties, there was a strong and
  influential party opposed to the struggle for independence. For the
  most part they were quiet, thrifty men, far different from the
  ruffians and desperadoes that prejudice has since represented them to
  be.” That there were cliques of depredators and that much lawlessness
  prevailed in Virginia and the Carolinas at about this time is
  undoubtedly true, however. William Wirt, in his “Sketches of the Life
  and Character of Patrick Henry” (p. 217), cites the case of Josiah
  Philips who, at the head of a band of banditti, spread terror in the
  counties of Norfolk and Princess Anne, and was made an outlaw by an
  act of the legislature of Virginia, by which act it became lawful for
  any person to kill him whenever opportunity offered. Lyman C. Draper
  presents the record of a great deal of lawlessness and depredation in
  his “King’s Mountain and its Heroes.” See pp. 241, 331, 332, 336, 340
  note, 343 note, 384, 448–449.

Footnote 42:

  It is to be understood that these statements are based on tradition
  and not on contemporary evidence.

Footnote 43:

  Mr. Page remarks that the fine was not so heavy as it seems, for in
  that year the prices fixed by the court were: rum and brandy per
  gallon, £40, corn and oats per gallon, £2 8s., dinner at an
  “ordinary,” £4 10s., &c.

Footnote 44:

  Hening’s Statutes at Large, XI, 134–135.

Footnote 45:

  Quoted from the article by Mr. Page. No evidence is cited in support
  of the statement that the proceedings in Bedford were imitated in
  other parts of the State and came to be known by the name of Lynch’s
  Law.

Footnote 46:

  See article by Mr. Featherston. A drawing of this tree “from a sketch
  from nature” may be found in the _Green Bag_, December, 1892 (4: 561).

Footnote 47:

  Mr. Featherston states that Charles Lynch was often called “Judge
  Lynch” by his neighbors. He seems to have been more commonly known as
  “Colonel Lynch.”

Footnote 48:

  “The infliction of capital punishment was extremely rare. There were
  only three instances of it, and these for most heinous offenses,
  between the organization of the county (Bedford) and the Revolution.
  The first case was on May 24, 1756, when the court assembled ‘to hear
  and determine all Treasons, Petit Treasons, Murders, and other
  Offenses committed or done by Hampton and Sambo belonging to John
  Payne of Goochland, Gent.’ ‘The said Hampton and Sambo were set to the
  Bar under Custody of Charles Talbot (then sheriff) to whose Custody
  they were before committed on Suspicion of their being Guilty of the
  felonious Prepairing and Administering Poysonous Medicines to Ann
  Payne, and being Arraigned of the Premises pleaded Not Guilty and for
  their Trial put themselves upon the Court. Whereupon divers Witnesses
  were charged and they heared in their Defence. On Consideration
  thereof it is the Opinion of the Court that the said Hampton is guilty
  in the Manner and Form as in the Indictment. Therefore it is
  considered that the said Hampton be hanged by the Neck till he be
  dead, and that he be afterwards cut in Quarters, and his Quarters hung
  up at the Cross Roads. And it is the Opinion of the Court that the
  said Sambo is guilty of a Misdemeanor. Therefore it is considered that
  the said Sambo be burnt in the Hand, and that he also receive
  thirty-one Lashes on his bare Back at the Whipping Post. Memo: That
  the said Hampton is adjudged at forty-five Pound which is ordered to
  be certified to the Assembly (that his owner may be remunerated
  according to law).’ That it was a convincing proof of his guilt, and
  not race prejudice, that led the court to impose this savage
  punishment is evident from the fact that in the same year a negro was
  tried for murder, another for poisoning, and a third for arson, and
  all were cleared.”—Quoted from the article by Mr. Page.

Footnote 49:

  This evidence has been presented by the present writer in a
  communication to the _Nation_. See issue of May 21, 1903 (76: 415).

Footnote 50:

  William Wirt: “Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry”
  (1818), p. 372. Mr. Matthews, in his article in the _Nation_, Dec. 4,
  1902 (75: 439), remarks that it is uncertain whether the note was
  written by Roane or Wirt. In William Wirt Henry’s “Life of Patrick
  Henry,” Vol. II, p. 482, the “MS. Letter of Judge Roane to Mr. Wirt”
  is given, but the note is not included. The note was undoubtedly
  written by Wirt.

Footnote 51:

  An act for dividing the county of Bedford into two distinct counties,
  the new county to be known by the name of Campbell, was passed by the
  General Assembly in 1782.—Hening’s Statutes at Large, X, 447; Journal
  of the House of Delegates, Jan. 5, 1782, p. 73. Howe says that
  Campbell County was formed from Bedford in 1784, and named in honor of
  General William Campbell, a distinguished officer of the American
  Revolution.—“Historical Collections of Virginia.” p. 210.

Footnote 52:

  Published at Charleston, South Carolina, in 1845. See p. 212 for the
  quotation. See Mrs. Julia Mayo Cabell: “Sketches and Recollections of
  Lynchburg” (1858), pp. 9–10, for a similar account of the connection
  of Colonel Charles Lynch with the origin of “the celebrated code
  called ‘Lynch Law.’” This account is taken from the _St. Louis
  Republican_, but neither the author’s name nor the date of its
  publication is given.

Footnote 53:

  Henry Howe: “The Great West” (Cincinnati, 1852), p. 183.

Footnote 54:

  The writer is indebted to Mr. Matthews for the suggestion that Howe’s
  allusion to “Squire Birch” points to Judge James Hall’s “Letters from
  the West” as one such source. See Chapter III. p. 81.

Footnote 55:

  There are two errors here. Lynchburg was not named for him but for his
  brother, John Lynch, and the plan was started later than “some seventy
  or eighty years ago.” Mr. Matthews disagrees with the writer in saying
  that this account is entirely independent of what Wirt had written on
  the subject. It seems to the writer, however, that these two
  inaccuracies indicate that Martin was drawing wholly from his own
  sources of information. He was, apparently, merely writing down what
  was considered a matter of common knowledge among the older men in
  that section of the country, many of whom were emigrants from
  Virginia.

Footnote 56:

  “Publications of the Southern Historical Association,” November, 1900,
  (4: 463).

Footnote 57:

  Charles Augustus Murray, in his “Travels in North America during the
  years 1834, 1835, and 1836” (2 vol., N. Y., 1839), gives a traditional
  account of the origin of the term “lynch-law,” such a one as might be
  given around a camp-fire. He also describes the operation of lynch-law
  at that time in the Mississippi Valley. See Vol II, p. 79. G. W.
  Featherstonhaugh, in his “Excursion through the Slave States” (N. Y.,
  1844), gives “An account of the first Judge Lynch, and the state of
  Legal Practice in his Court,” pp. 89–90. He speaks of a certain Judge
  Lynch in Arkansas and of “a famous Virginia ancestor of his.” He says
  that “this ancestor, the first Judge Lynch, was a miller and a justice
  of the peace in the back woods,” and then gives a traditional account
  of his methods of inflicting punishment. See also David Schenck:
  “North Carolina, 1780–81” (1889), pp. 309–310. L. P. Summers: “History
  of Southwest Virginia and Washington County” (1903), p. 243.

Footnote 58:

  Mr. Matthews holds a somewhat different view. See article, “The Term
  Lynch Law,” _Modern Philology_, Vol. II, No. 2, October, 1904. This
  article should be consulted by any one desiring to investigate this
  matter further.

Footnote 59:

  In the _Salem Gazette_, July 17, 1812, p. 3, the rise and domination
  of mobs in a community was characterized as “Mob Law.” (M.)

Footnote 60:

  Jan. 9, 1819 (15: 384). (M.)

Footnote 61:

  July 24, 1819 (16: 368). (M.)

Footnote 62:

  June 1, 1822 (22: 224). (M.)

Footnote 63:

  “Memorable Days in America” (1823), p. 304.

Footnote 64:

  Ibid., p. 318.

Footnote 65:

  Vol. 26, p. 326.

Footnote 66:

  “An Excursion through the United States and Canada,” pp. 233–236. (M.)
  An extended extract is given in the following chapter on p. 79.

Footnote 67:

  pp. 291, 292. A more extended extract is given in the following
  chapter on p. 81.

Footnote 68:

  C. A. Hanna: “The Scotch-Irish” (1902), p. 60.

Footnote 69:

  C. A. Hanna: “The Scotch-Irish” (1902), p. 60.

Footnote 70:

  New Hampshire Provincial Papers, VI, 262–266. (M.)

Footnote 71:

  W. H. Smith: “The St. Clair Papers” (1882), II, 351, 374, 376,
  396–397. (M.)

Footnote 72:

  New Jersey Archives (1897), XIX, 225–226. (M.)

Footnote 73:

  New Jersey Archives (1897), XIX, 326–327. _New York Gazette_, December
  31, 1753. (M.) This is the earliest use of the word regulate in
  connection with illegal punishment for corrective purposes that has
  come to the writer’s notice.

Footnote 74:

  See monograph on “The Regulators of North Carolina,” by Professor John
  S. Bassett of Trinity College, N. C., for a full and complete account
  of this organization. It was published in the Annual Report of the
  American Historical Association for 1894.

Footnote 75:

  F. X. Martin: “History of North Carolina” (1829), II, 218–219. H.
  Williamson: “History of North Carolina” (1812), II, 130–131, 261.

Footnote 76:

  H. Williamson: “History of North Carolina” (1812), II, 262–263. J. H.
  Wheeler: “History of North Carolina” (1851), II, 306.

Footnote 77:

  H. Williamson: “History of North Carolina” (1812), II, 270–271.

Footnote 78:

  See Alexander Gregg: “History of the Old Cheraws” (1867), Ch. VII.
  This chapter contains quotations from original sources on the
  Regulation movement in South Carolina, and has, therefore,
  considerable value.

Footnote 79:

  See Gregg’s “History of The Old Cheraws,” p. 134.

Footnote 80:

  See Gregg’s “History of The Old Cheraws,” p. 134.

Footnote 81:

  J. B. O’Neall: “The Annals of Newberry” (1859), pp. 75–76.

Footnote 82:

  See Gregg’s “History of the Old Cheraws,” p. 136. This is the earliest
  use of the word Regulator in connection with the disturbances in the
  Carolinas known to the present writer.

Footnote 83:

  On April 18, a Circuit Court Act was passed, but afterwards failed to
  become a law.

Footnote 84:

  See Gregg’s “History of The Old Cheraws,” p. 138.

Footnote 85:

  See Gregg’s “History of The Old Cheraws,” p. 139.

Footnote 86:

  David Ramsay: “History of the Revolution in South Carolina” (1785), I,
  63–64. According to this author these events took place “about the
  year 1770.” O’Neall says (Annals of Newberry, p. 75): “The Regulators
  and Scofelites, in 1764, met in battle array,” &c. Johnson says
  (Traditions and Reminiscences, p. 92): “In 1769 great commotions arose
  in the upper parts of the State, between what were called ‘Regulators’
  and ‘Schofilites.’” In reality, the crisis in the strife between the
  Regulators and Schofilites occurred in March, 1769. This is shown by
  the following extract, dated Charlestown, (South Carolina), April 6,
  which appeared in the _Boston Chronicle_ of May 11–15, 1769 (No. 92,
  II, 155): “The prudent conduct of government, in ordering Joseph
  Coffill, who had assumed the title of Colonel, and some extraordinary
  powers, and with his party had committed divers excesses, to disperse,
  has had the happy effect of once more restoring peace and good order
  amongst the inhabitants of the western settlements, who, exasperated
  by the tyrannical conduct of this man, has assembled in a large body
  towards the close of last month, in order to compel him to shew what
  powers he was invested with, and if they had found that he was not
  cloathed with authority, to have brought him to justice, at all
  events. Both parties were incamped within musket shot of each other,
  on Saludy river, when the orders to Coffill arrived, and thus a great
  deal of bloodshed was prevented. The Colonels Richardson, Thompson,
  and M’Girt, gentlemen of great reputation, and highly esteemed by the
  whole body of honest back settlers, we are told, exerted themselves
  upon this occasion, with great spirit, discretion, and success.”

Footnote 87:

  Joseph Johnson: “Traditions and Reminiscences” (1851), p. 45.

Footnote 88:

  Ibid.

Footnote 89:

  See Gregg’s “History of the Old Cheraws,” pp. 151–152.

Footnote 90:

  This is likewise Gregg’s view of the matter.

Footnote 91:

  In the year 1765 and for several succeeding years the “Sons of
  Liberty” were particularly active in stirring up resistance to the
  acts of the British government, which were considered oppressive. The
  “Sons of Liberty,” elsewhere as well as in Boston, seem to have been
  regularly organized and to have held secret meetings at which
  resolutions were adopted and definite plans of action were determined
  upon for either driving away or punishing certain “Stamp Masters,”
  “infamous importers,” and “informers.” Warning notices were frequently
  posted and published, signed by “P. P., Clerk,” “M. Y., Secretary,”
  &c. Hanging and burning in effigy, flagellation, tarring and
  feathering, and ducking, were the punitive measures generally
  threatened and not infrequently carried into effect.—These statements
  are based on a collection of notes on “Sons of Liberty” which were
  loaned to the writer by Mr. Albert Matthews.

Footnote 92:

  For an exposition of the condition of society, its state of
  dissolution and lack of organization, during the Revolutionary period
  and subsequent to that period, see W. G. Sumner: “Alexander Hamilton”
  (1890). On page 13 this statement is made: “The Union was from the
  start at war with the turbulent, anarchistic elements which the
  Revolution had set loose.”

Footnote 93:

  A correspondent of the _New England Gazette_ in 1776 asked “whether it
  would be featherable for a man to be detected with one of them
  (pardons from the king) in his pocket.”—Frank Moore: “Diary of the
  Revolution (1875), p. 226. Paul Leicester Ford, when writing his
  historical novel “Janice Meredith,” treated tarring and feathering as
  an ordinary incident of Revolutionary times. See Chapters XVII,
  XXXVIII.

Footnote 94:

  John Drayton: “Memoirs of the American Revolution” (1821), I, 273.
  Frank Moore: “Diary of the Revolution” (1875), p. 44. Joseph Johnson:
  “Traditions and Reminiscences” (1851), p. 70. Edward McCrady: “South
  Carolina in the Revolution 1775–1780” (1901), p. 24. The date on which
  the tarring and feathering of Thomas Ditson of the town of Billerica
  took place was March 9, not March 8, as given by the above writers.
  For an explanation of the discrepancy in the date and for a
  description of the occurrence, see _Boston Gazette_, March 13, 1775
  (No. 1039, p. 3); March 20, 1775 (No. 1040, p. 3).

Footnote 95:

  Joseph Johnson: “Traditions and Reminiscences” (1851), p. 71. “The
  punishment of banishment, preceded by the more dreadful operation of
  tarring and feathering,” was put in execution by a “judicial
  Association” in the early days of a settlement on the Bay of Islands,
  New Zealand. See R. G. Jameson: “New Zealand, South Australia, and New
  South Wales” (London, 1842), pp. 190–191.

  The _Yankee_, June 4, 1813, p. 4, cited one of the laws of the naval
  code established during the reign of Richard I as the “Origin of
  Tarring and Feathering.” By this law any one lawfully convicted of
  stealing should have his head shorn, and boiling pitch poured upon his
  head, and feathers or down strewed upon the same, whereby he might be
  known until the next landing place was reached, where he was to be
  left.—See Hakluyt’s “Voyages,” II, 21.

Footnote 96:

  The writer is indebted to Mr. Albert Matthews for the facts which are
  here presented in regard to the practice of tarring and feathering
  previous to the year 1775.

Footnote 97:

  _Salem Gazette_, Sept. 6–13, 1768 (No. 7, p. 27). _Boston Evening
  Post_, Sept. 12, 1768 (No. 1720, p. 3). “Diaries of B. Lynde & B.
  Lynde, Jr.” (1880), p. 192.

Footnote 98:

  _Boston Evening Post_, Sept. 19, 1768 (No. 1721, p. 3).

Footnote 99:

  _Essex Gazette_, Sept. 20–27, 1768 (No. 9, p. 37).

Footnote 100:

  _Boston Evening-Post_, June 19, 1769 (No. 1760, p. 3).

Footnote 101:

  _Boston Gazette_, Sept. 25, 1769 (No. 755, p. 3).

Footnote 102:

  _Boston Gazette_, Oct. 16, 1769 (No. 758, p. 2).

Footnote 103:

  No. 140, II, 351.

Footnote 104:

  _Boston Gazette_, Jan. 1, 1770 (No. 769, p. 1); June 11, 1770 (No.
  792, p. 2); July 2, 1770 (No. 795, p. 2); August 20, 1770 (No. 802, p.
  1); _Boston-Gazette_ Supplement July 30, 1770 (No. 799, p. 2); Aug. 6,
  1770 (No. 800, p. 2); _Boston News-Letter_, June 21, 1770 (No. 3480,
  p. 3); _Essex Gazette_, June 19–26, 1770, II, p. 191; June 26–July 3,
  1770, II, p. 195; Aug. 7–14, 1770, III, p. 11; _London Gazetteer_,
  Nov. 17, 1770 (No. 13016, p. 2); “The Letters of James Murray,
  Loyalist,” edited by Nina Moore Tiffany (1901), pp. 165, 175–178.

Footnote 105:

  _Boston Gazette_, Nov. 1, 1773 (No. 969, pp. 1, 3). See also _Boston
  News-Letter_, Jan. 27, 1774 (No. 3669, p. 2).

Footnote 106:

  _Boston Gazette_, Nov. 15, 1773 (No. 971, p. 3).

Footnote 107:

  _Boston News-Letter_, Jan. 27, 1774 (No. 3669, p. 2); Feb. 3, 1774
  (No. 3670, p. 2); _Massachusetts Spy_, Jan. 27, 1774 (No. 156, p. 3).

Footnote 108:

  _Boston Gazette_, Jan, 31. 1774 (No. 982, p. 3); _Massachusetts Spy_,
  Feb. 3, 1774 (No. 157, p. 2).

  On January 17 a handbill signed in the same way had been distributed,
  giving notice that any “TEA CONSIGNEES” who should come to reside
  again in Boston would be given “such a Reception as such vile Ingrates
  deserve.”—_Boston Gazette_, Jan. 17, 1774 (No. 980, p. 3); _Boston
  Evening Transcript_, Feb. 27, 1903, p. 14.

Footnote 109:

  No. 976, p. 3.

Footnote 110:

  _Boston News-Letter_, Nov. 18, 1773 (No. 3659, p. 2).

Footnote 111:

  “History of Rhode Island” (1878), II, 308–309.

Footnote 112:

  No. 761, p. 3.

Footnote 113:

  _Boston News-Letter_, Jan. 27, 1774 (No. 3669, p. 2); _Massachusetts
  Spy_, Jan. 27, 1774 (No. 156, p. 2); _Essex Gazette_, Jan. 25–Feb. 1,
  1774 (No. 288, VI, p. 107); March 1–8, 1774 (No. 293, VI, p. 127);
  _Boston Gazette_, Feb. 28, 1774 (No. 986, p. 2); March 14, 1774 (No.
  988, p. 1). For a brief account of the whole affair see S. Roads, Jr.:
  “History and Traditions of Marblehead” (1880), pp. 91–94.

Footnote 114:

  For an account of the doings of mobs in Massachusetts see Frank Moore:
  “Diary of the American Revolution” (1875), pp. 37–42.

Footnote 115:

  John Drayton: “Memoirs of the American Revolution” (1821), I, 273–274.
  Frank Moore: “Diary of the Revolution” (1875), pp. 90–91. Edward
  McCrady: “South Carolina in the Revolution, 1775–1780” (1901), p. 24.

Footnote 116:

  John Drayton: “Memoirs of the American Revolution” (1821), II, 17.

Footnote 117:

  Frank Moore: “Diary of the Revolution” (1875), p. 138.

Footnote 118:

  Ibid., p. 178.

Footnote 119:

  Frank Moore: “Diary of the Revolution” (1875), p. 359.

Footnote 120:

  W. M. Sloane: “The French War and the Revolution” (1893), p. 239.

Footnote 121:

  “Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry” (1818), pp.
  232–233.

Footnote 122:

  Hening’s “Statutes at Large,” X, 195.

  For an account of the measures taken which were not strictly warranted
  by law, see L. C. Draper: “King’s Mountain and its Heroes” (1881), pp.
  384–387.

  “An act to indemnify Thomas Nelson, Junior, esquire, late governor of
  this commonwealth, and to legalize certain acts of his
  administration,” was passed in 1781.—Hening’s “Statutes at Large,” X,
  478.

Footnote 123:

  _Southern Literary Messenger_, II, 389 (May, 1836).

  This reference comes to the present writer through Mr. J. P. Lamberton
  of Philadelphia, Mr. Edward Ingle, the author of “Southern Sidelights”
  (See pp. 191–193), and Mr. Albert Matthews.

Footnote 124:

  The name of one of the younger sons of John Lynch, the founder of
  Lynchburg, was William, and Mrs. Cabell says that he was a “Colonel in
  the late war.” This William Lynch, however, married in early life and
  made his home in the city of Lynchburg. See Mrs. Julia Mayo Cabell:
  “Sketches and Recollections of Lynchburg” (1858), p. 20.

  A writer in _Harper’s Magazine_ for May, 1859 (p. 794) refers to a
  “Mr. Lynch” who “was for many years the senior and presiding Justice
  of the County Court of Pittsylvania.” This writer also says that
  Lynchburg was named for this Mr. Lynch, and that his advanced age
  prevented him from taking the field during the War of Independence.
  This, however, is an account from memory of a story heard when a mere
  boy from an old man, and, as there are inaccuracies in several
  particulars, it cannot be regarded as reliable.

Footnote 125:

  Hening’s “Statutes at Large,” XI, 373.

Footnote 126:

  “Memorable Days in America” (London, 1823), pp. 304, 305.

Footnote 127:

  See pp. 96–98 for this extract. (M.)

Footnote 128:

  W. N. Blane: “An Excursion through the United States and Canada,
  1822–1823” (London, 1824), pp. 233–236.

Footnote 129:

  See pp. 291–292 for this extract. The letters which compose Judge
  Hall’s book were mostly printed in _The Port Folio_ between 1821 and
  1825, but the letter in which he speaks of lynch-law first appeared in
  the printed volume of 1828. (M.)

Footnote 130:

  This expression is used in the Illinois agreement of 1820 (see below),
  and that document, if genuine, furnishes the earliest instance of its
  use known to the present writer.

Footnote 131:

  This statement is made on the authority of McConnel (see below), but
  compare C. J. Latrobe: “Ramble in America,” (N. Y., 1836, 2d ed.),
  Let. VII, I, 96.

Footnote 132:

  J. L. McConnel: “Western Characters or Types of Border Life in the
  Western States” (1853), pp. 244–245. (M.) This extract is copied
  verbatim, the names of the twelve men being omitted by McConnel. Of
  the genuineness of the document McConnel says: “I am not sure that I
  can vouch for its authenticity, but all who are familiar with the
  history of those times, will recognise, in its peculiarities, the
  characteristics of the people who then inhabited this country. The
  affectation of legal form in such a document as this would be rather
  amusing, were it not quite too significant; at all events, it is
  entirely ‘in keeping’ with the constitution of a race who had some
  regard for law and its vindication, even in their most high-handed
  acts. The technical phraseology, used so strangely, is easily
  traceable to the little ‘Justice’s Form Book,’ which was then almost
  the only law document in the country; and though the words are rather
  awkwardly combined, they no doubt gave solemnity to the act in the
  eyes of its sturdy signers.”

Footnote 133:

  J. L. McConnel: “Western Characters,” &c., p. 176.

Footnote 134:

  _Niles’ Register_, July 19, 1834 (46: 352).

Footnote 135:

  The _Liberator_, Nov. 5, 1831 (1: 180).

  The publication of this paper was begun in Boston in 1831, by William
  Lloyd Garrison, the enthusiastic agitator of the anti-slavery cause.
  His efforts to make his lists of “Southern Atrocities” as large as
  possible render his paper a valuable source of information on the
  subject of lynch-law, particularly lynch-law as applied to negroes
  prior to the Civil War.

Footnote 136:

  _Liberator_, Oct. 29, 1831 (1: 174).

Footnote 137:

  Ibid., Oct. 1, 1831 (1: 157).

Footnote 138:

  Ibid., Dec. 3, 1831 (1: 194).

Footnote 139:

  For the fullest and, on the whole, most trustworthy account of this
  insurrection, see W. S. Drewry: “Slave Insurrections in Virginia”
  (1900). This book has been very largely drawn upon for what is here
  said on the subject.

  See also, _Liberator_, Oct. 1, 1831 (1: 159); Dec 10, 1831 (1: 198);
  Dec. 17, 1831 (1: 202); Dec. 24, 1831 (1: 206).

  See also, _Niles’ Register_, Aug. 27, 1831 (40: 455); Sept. 3, 1831
  (41: 4); Sept. 10, 1831 (41: 19); Sept. 17, 1831 (41: 35); Jan. 7,
  1832 (41: 350).

Footnote 140:

  See p. 84 in Drewry’s book.

Footnote 141:

  The slavery question was the subject of prolonged debate at the next
  session of the Virginia House of Delegates. See _Niles’ Register_,
  Jan. 28, 1832 (41: 393).

  In a speech made during the course of this debate, William H. Broadnax
  said: “I have certainly heard, if incorrectly, the gentleman from
  Southampton will put me right, that of the large cargo of emigrants
  lately transported from that county to Liberia, all of whom
  _professed_ to be _willing_ to go, were rendered so by some such
  severe ministrations as these I have described. A lynch club—a
  committee of vigilance—could easily exercise a kind of inquisitorial
  _surveillance_ over any neighborhood, and convert any desired number,
  I have no doubt, at any time, into a willingness to be removed.” See
  W. L. Garrison: “Thoughts on African Colonization” (1832), p. 74. This
  reference comes to the present writer through Mr. W. P. Garrison and
  Mr. Albert Matthews.

Footnote 142:

  See _Niles’ Register_ for the year 1834.

Footnote 143:

  _Liberator_, Oct. 18, 1834 (4: 168).

  The _New England Magazine_, November, 1834 (7: 409), gives some
  comments on the times under the heading “The March of Anarchy.”

Footnote 144:

  _Liberator_, Sept. 27, 1834 (4: 153).

Footnote 145:

  Conditions were apparently much like those which existed recently in
  Memphis, Tennessee, when a Committee of Public Safety was organized
  and a crusade started against gambling. See _New York Times_, July 14,
  1904; July 17, 1904.

Footnote 146:

  See _Niles’ Register_, July 25, 1835 (48: 363); Aug. 1, 1835 (48:
  381). Also _Liberator_, Aug. 8,1835 (5: 126–7).

Footnote 147:

  For a brief account of the conspiracy led by Murrell, see _Niles’
  Register_, Aug. 8, 1835 (48: 403–4). A complete account may be found
  in the _American Whig Review_, November, 1850 (12: 494); March, 1851
  (13: 213).

Footnote 148:

  See _Liberator_, Aug. 8, 1835 (5: 126–7).

Footnote 149:

  The “South-West,” II, p. 185–7. In Mississippi, at this time, eleven
  crimes were punishable by death.

Footnote 150:

  See _Liberator_, Aug. 1, 1835 (5: 123).

Footnote 151:

  _Boston Advertiser_, Sept. 12, p. 2.

Footnote 152:

  Similar punishments have been inflicted upon Mormons. Joseph Smith,
  Jr., and Sidney Rigdon were tarred and feathered on the night of March
  25, 1832.—See W. A. Linn: “The Story of the Mormons” (1902), pp.
  133–137.

Footnote 153:

  Issue of Aug. 22, 1835 (48: 439).

Footnote 154:

  Issue of Sept. 5, 1835 (49: 1).

Footnote 155:

  See also Harriet Martineau “Society in America” (1837), I, 120, 121,
  122.

Footnote 156:

  _Niles’ Register_, Oct. 3, 1835 (49: 65).

  For a caustic satire on the “proceedings of Judge Lynch,” see “The
  Enemies of the Constitution Discovered,” &c., by Defensor (N. Y.,
  1835), pp 48–52.

Footnote 157:

  _Liberator_, Nov. 21, 1835 (5: 188).

Footnote 158:

  See _Liberator_, June 8, 1838 (8: 89), for an editorial from the
  _Philadelphia Daily Focus_.

Footnote 159:

  _Liberator_, April 16, 1836 (6: 63).

Footnote 160:

  _Leisure Hour_, Nov. 24, 1877, p. 750.

Footnote 161:

  This was Garrison’s view of the matter. See _Liberator_, Aug. 10, 1838
  (8: 127).

Footnote 162:

  Woodrow Wilson: “Division and Reunion” (Edition of 1898), pp. 115,
  117.

Footnote 163:

  W. G. Sumner: “Andrew Jackson” (1882), pp. 364–365; pp. 428–429, in
  edition of 1899 in American Statesmen series.

Footnote 164:

  _Liberator_, July 4, 1835 (5: 108).

Footnote 165:

  See _Niles’ Register_, June 4, 1836 (50: 234).

  Also _Liberator_, May 14, 1836 (6: 79), and May 21, 1836 (6: 83).

  A negro slave was burned to death in a similar way in Arkansas in
  November, 1836, for murdering his master and several negroes. See
  extract from the _Arkansas Gazette_ in _Niles’ Register_, Dec. 31,
  1836 (51: 275).

Footnote 166:

  _Liberator_, June 25, 1836 (6: 102).

Footnote 167:

  “Abraham Lincoln, Works,” I, pp. 9–10.

Footnote 168:

  F. J. Grund: “The Americans in their moral, social, and political
  relations” (London, 1837), I, 323. (M.)

Footnote 169:

  “Diary in America” (1839), III, 232–233.

Footnote 170:

  Harriet Martineau: “Retrospect of Western Travel” (1838), I, 236–237.
  Marryat: “Diary in America” (1839), II, 201. _Liberator_, Aug. 24,
  1838 (8: 135), &c.

Footnote 171:

  See Chapter II.

Footnote 172:

  _Liberator_, Oct. 27, 1837 (7: 174).

Footnote 173:

  _Niles’ Register_, June 15, 1839 (56: 256).

Footnote 174:

  _Liberator_, Sept. 14, 1838 (8: 146).

Footnote 175:

  _Liberator_, March 16, 1838 (8: 44).

Footnote 176:

  _Liberator_, Feb. 9, 1838 (8: 24).

Footnote 177:

  This is not wholly in accord with the opinion expressed by Mr. Albert
  Matthews in the _Nation_, Dec. 4, 1902 (75: 441), but in a private
  letter to the writer Mr. Matthews has accepted this modification.

Footnote 178:

  See _Liberator_, Dec. 19, 1835 (5: 204).

Footnote 179:

  Philip Hone: “Diary 1828–1851” (1889), I, 150. (M.)

Footnote 180:

  See _Niles’ Register_, Oct. 25, 1845 (69: 115).

Footnote 181:

  Sir Charles Lyell, who was in Macon, Georgia, a short time after this
  occurred, gives an account of it in his book, “A Second Visit to the
  United States of America” (1850), II, 31–32.

Footnote 182:

  _Liberator_, Oct. 19, 1855 (25: 168).

Footnote 183:

  During the period 1830–1860 the word “slick” was occasionally used at
  places in the Mississippi Valley, in the same sense as “lynch.” See
  _Liberator_, Oct. 3, 1835 (5: 157), and compare _Niles’ Register_,
  Oct. 5, 1833 (45: 87).

Footnote 184:

  _Liberator_, Sept. 14, 1860 (30: 146).

Footnote 185:

  See _Liberator_, Oct. 2, 1857 (27: 160).

Footnote 186:

  See _Liberator_, Aug. 24, 1860 (30: 160).

Footnote 187:

  See _Liberator_, Jan. 18, 1856 (26: 12).

Footnote 188:

  _Liberator_, Oct. 16, 1857 (27: 167).

Footnote 189:

  _Liberator_, Sept. 24, 1858 (28: 155).

Footnote 190:

  _Liberator_, April 3, 1857 (27: 56).

Footnote 191:

  See _Liberator_, Dec. 19, 1856 (26: 204). It is possibly to this case
  that F. L. Olmsted refers in “A Journey in the Back Country” (N. Y.,
  1860), pp. 442–443. He says a negro killed his master “a few months
  since in Georgia or Alabama”; and “was roasted, at a slow fire, on the
  spot of the murder, in the presence of many thousand slaves, driven to
  the ground from all the adjoining counties.”

Footnote 192:

  See H. H Bancroft: “Popular Tribunals” (1887), I, 749. In his two
  volumes on “Popular Tribunals” this author presents very forcibly the
  arguments and the conditions urged in justification of the acts of
  these “Tribunals.” He also exhibits the methods and inner workings of
  these organizations. In “Literary Industries” (1890), pp. 655–663, he
  tells how he obtained his knowledge of what went on behind the scenes.

  For a somewhat different view of the Vigilance Committee movement in
  California, see Josiah Royce: “California” (1886), Chapters IV and V.

  See also, John S. Hittell: “History of the City of San Francisco.”

Footnote 193:

  Quoted from Bancroft: “Popular Tribunals” (1887), II, 666.

Footnote 194:

  _New York Tribune_, June 7, 1858, p. 3.

Footnote 195:

  In a message written by Governor Clarke of Mississippi in 1865, this
  passage occurs: “The terrible contest through which the country has
  just passed has aroused in every section the fiercest passions of the
  human heart. Lawlessness seems to have culminated in the assassination
  of Mr. Lincoln.”—Quoted in J. W. Garner’s “Reconstruction in
  Mississippi” (1901), p. 59. The message is printed in the _New York
  Times_ of June 11, 1865.

Footnote 196:

  See “Report on the Condition of the South,” No. 261 of Reports of
  Committees of House of Representatives for 2d Sess., 43d Cong.,
  1874–75.

  See, also, article on “The Southern Question” by Charles Gayarré in
  _North American Review_, November and December, 1877 (125: 472).

  For a comprehensive view, briefly stated, of the great social changes
  begun in the South during the reconstruction period, see editorial
  “The Way Out,” in _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 197:

  See Reports of Committees of House of Representatives for 2d Sess.,
  42d Cong., 1871–72.

Footnote 198:

  The best apparently reliable source for information as to the
  character and purpose of this organization is a little book entitled
  “The Ku-Klux Klan,” written by J. C. Lester and D. L. Wilson, and
  published at Nashville, Tennessee, in 1884. See also, article “The
  Ku-Klux Klan,” signed D. L. Wilson, published in the _Century
  Magazine_, July, 1884 (6: 398).

  A less valuable but an interesting book is “K. K. K. Sketches,” by J.
  M. Beard, published at Philadelphia in 1877.

  Many writers make incidental reference to the Ku-Klux Klan; for
  example, Charles Stearns: “The Black Man of the South and the Rebels”
  (1872), Chap. 39; James Bryce: “The American Commonwealth,” II, 479.

  An account of “The Ku-Klux Movement” is given in W. G. Brown’s “Lower
  South in American History” (1902).

  Some of the characteristic, possibly exaggerated, features of the
  “Ku-Klux Movement” have been presented in fiction. See, for example,
  A. Conan Doyle: “Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, The Five Orange Pips”
  (1902), p. 104; Thomas Nelson Page: “Red Rock, a chronicle of
  Reconstruction” (1898).

Footnote 199:

  The committee appointed to select a name reported among others the
  name “Kukloi,” from the Greek word _kuklos_, meaning a band or circle.
  At mention of this some one cried out: “Call it ‘Ku Klux.’” The word
  “Klan” at once suggested itself, and was added to complete the
  alliteration. It has been said that the society was named in imitation
  of the click heard in cocking the rifle, but this seems to be without
  foundation in fact.

Footnote 200:

  See, for example, _Nation_, March 23, 1871 (12: 192); _New York
  Times_, Feb. 15, 1871; _New York Times_, Aug. 26, 1873; _New York
  Tribune_, July 31, 1878.

Footnote 201:

  For a list of the “Molly Maguire” outrages in the mining region of
  Pennsylvania, and for an exposition of the origin, growth, and
  character of that organization, see F. P. Dewees: “The Molly Maguires”
  (1877).

Footnote 202:

  No claim for completeness is made in regard to these statistics.
  Particularly in the case of lynchings in the West they are doubtless
  incomplete.

Footnote 203:

  _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 204:

  Compare the opinion expressed in the _Nation_, Sept. 7, 1876 (23: 145)
  on the subject of “intimidation” at the South. In the year 1879, a
  “Negro exodus from the Southern States” took place, which, on account
  of its size and character, attracted considerable attention. Numerous
  reasons were assigned as the cause. See F. L. Hoffman: “Race Traits
  and Tendencies of the American Negro.”—Publications of the American
  Economic Association, August, 1896 (11: 1); _Nation_, April 10, 1879
  (28: 239, 242); Report and Testimony of the Select Committee of the U.
  S. Senate to investigate the causes of the removal of the negroes from
  the Southern States to the Northern States, 2d Sess., 46th Cong.
  (Washington, 1880).

Footnote 205:

  It is of interest to note that the Sons of Liberty of the period
  1765–1775 seem to have had a regular organization and that in their
  use of disguises and in their methods they were not wholly unlike the
  Ku-Klux.

Footnote 206:

  “Lynching and Mobs,” _American Journal of Social Science_, No. 32, p.
  67 (November, 1894).

Footnote 207:

  Edward Leigh Pell, writing on “Prevention of Lynch-law Epidemics,” in
  the _Review of Reviews_, March, 1898 (17: 321), questions the accuracy
  of the _Tribune_ figures for Alabama, Florida, and Virginia in the
  year 1897. It is to be noted, however, that he refers to lynchings and
  seems to have regarded number of lynchings as synonymous with number
  of persons lynched.

Footnote 208:

  In a recent article, entitled “The Facts about Lynching,” written by
  George P. Upton, who for a number of years has been associate-editor
  of the _Tribune_, a similar table may be found. [See the
  _Independent_, Sept. 29, 1904 (57: 719)]. In this table, however,
  there are numerous inaccuracies, and the fact that Mr. Upton does not
  discriminate between number of lynchings and number of persons lynched
  detracts materially from the value of all of his statistical summaries
  on the subject.

Footnote 209:

  Compare p. 182.

Footnote 210:

  The negro had escaped from the mob and gone to a neighboring county
  where he gave himself up to the authorities for protection. Later,
  according to a letter received by the writer from the mayor of the
  town where he sought protection, he was taken back by the sheriff and
  brought before a justice for a preliminary hearing. The evidence was
  considered insufficient to bind him over to the grand jury and he was
  released.

Footnote 211:

  Principally New York City and New Haven, Conn., papers.

Footnote 212:

  To be strictly accurate the number of lynchings should be taken rather
  than the number of persons lynched, but for the purpose of comparison
  from year to year the latter may be considered sufficiently exact. See
  p. 185.

Footnote 213:

  Henry M. Boies has shown from the _Tribune_ record of murders that
  there has been, within the last twenty years, “an alarming increase of
  homicides, accompanied by a proportionate decrease of executions by
  law and lynching.”—“Science of Penology” (1901), p. 120.

Footnote 214:

  See W. S. Drewry: “Slave Insurrections in Virginia” (1900), pp. 22–25.

Footnote 215:

  The liberty has been taken of coining this word to designate the cause
  for lynching the class of individuals known as desperadoes. No other
  word seems to express the idea so clearly. The word “brigandage” is
  too narrow in meaning and too nearly obsolete; the word “outlawry” is
  not sufficiently inclusive and is generally used only in its technical
  sense.

Footnote 216:

  “Statistics and Sociology” (1900), p. 271.

Footnote 217:

  This may be taken as an indication of the trustworthiness of the
  _Tribune_ record of lynchings as a basis for statistical
  investigation.

Footnote 218:

  See p. 164.

Footnote 219:

  See the daily issues from July 23 to July 27, 1886.

Footnote 220:

  These figures are taken from the Twelfth Census, where the term
  “illiterates” is used to designate all persons ten years of age and
  over who can neither read nor write, or who can read but cannot write.

Footnote 221:

  The figures given by the Twelfth Census were used. The figures of the
  Eleventh Census would be more nearly typical for the period under
  consideration than those of the Twelfth Census, but a difficulty was
  met with in an attempt to use them, owing to the fact that new
  counties have been formed since 1890. It was found that counties in
  which lynchings have occurred did not appear at all in the Eleventh
  Census, and that for the sake of completeness it was necessary to use
  the Twelfth Census.

Footnote 222:

  Alfred Holt Stone, In a paper read before the American Economic
  Association in December, 1901, attributed the amicable relations
  existing between the whites and the negroes in the Yazoo-Mississippi
  delta to the absence of a white laboring class, particularly of field
  laborers. In his opinion one of the gravest causes of trouble between
  the two races is contact on a common industrial plane.—“Publications
  of the American Economic Association,” February, 1902 (3d Ser., Vol.
  III, No. 1, p. 235).

Footnote 223:

  See p. 109.

Footnote 224:

  _Liberator_, April 19, 1839 (9: 63).

Footnote 225:

  _Liberator_, April 30, 1836 (6: 72).

Footnote 226:

  “Diary in America” (1839), III, 226–230.

  For a description of the beginnings of legal procedure in isolated
  settlements on the frontier, see “Narrative of the Life of David
  Crockett,” written by himself (1843), pp. 132–135. (M.)

Footnote 227:

  _British and Foreign Review_, 14: 29 (1843).

Footnote 228:

  Cora Montgomery (Jane M. Cazneau): “Eagle Pass; or Life on the Border”
  (1852), pp. 153, 164–167.

  Compare the justification of the frontier type of lynch-law given by
  Owen Wister in his recent novel, “The Virginian.” After describing the
  lynching of some Wyoming cattle-thieves, and emphasizing the fact that
  “many an act that man does is right or wrong according to the time and
  place which form, so to speak, its context,” the author puts into the
  mouth of “Judge Henry” these words: “They (the ordinary citizens) are
  where the law comes from, you see. For they chose the delegates who
  made the Constitution that provided for the courts. There’s your
  machinery. These are the hands into which ordinary citizens have put
  the law. So you see, at best, when they lynch they only take back what
  they once gave.... We are in a very bad way, and we are trying to make
  that way a little better until civilization can reach us. At present
  we lie beyond its pale. The courts, or rather the juries, into whose
  hands we have put the law, are not dealing the law. They are withered
  hands, or rather they are imitation hands made for show, with no life
  in them, no grip. They cannot hold a cattle-thief. And so when your
  ordinary citizen sees this, and sees that he has placed justice in a
  dead hand, he must take justice back into his own hands where it was
  once at the beginning of all things. Call this primitive, if you will,
  but so far from being a _defiance_ of the law, it is an _assertion_ of
  it—the fundamental assertion of self-governing men, upon whom our
  whole social fabric is based.”—pp. 435–436.

Footnote 229:

  C. A. Murray: “Travels in America” (1839), II, 81.

Footnote 230:

  Bancroft’s justification of popular tribunals and vigilance societies
  has been referred to above. See Chapter IV, p. 133.

Footnote 231:

  “History of the Negro Race in America” (1883), I, 121, 131.

Footnote 232:

  See J. A. Tillinghast: “The Negro in Africa and America”—Publications
  of the American Economic Association, May, 1902 (3d Ser., Vol. III,
  No. 2). This monograph presents an admirable historical perspective of
  the native characteristics and of the acquirements of the colored race
  in America.

Footnote 233:

  Fanny Kemble, writing in 1838–39, attributed the “personal
  offensiveness” of negroes to dirt and habits of uncleanliness,
  asserting that the negroes had no respect for their personal
  appearance, and that this lack of respect was due to slavery. In her
  journal, these words are found: “The stench in an Irish, Scotch,
  Italian, or French hovel are quite as intolerable as any I ever found
  in any of our negro houses.” In another connection, however, when
  describing a certain negro named Isaac, she refers particularly to his
  strong physical resemblance to a monkey, and says that she is much
  comforted by the fact that this individual “_speaks_.” See “Journal of
  a Residence on a Georgian Plantation” (1863), pp. 23–24, 219.

  In describing “The Negro in General,” Ratzel writes: “The specific,
  but hardly definable negro smell is certainly possessed by all, in
  varying degrees. Falkenstein refers it to the somewhat more oily
  composition of the sweat, which with uncleanly habits easily develops
  rancid acids.”—“History of Mankind” (Trans. from 2d German ed. by A.
  J. Butler, 1897), II, 315; see also II, 266, 301.

  A practising physician in the city of New Haven, Conn., has assured
  the writer that the peculiar odor is again apparent very soon after a
  negro patient has been given a bath and a change of clothing.

Footnote 234:

  Compare statements made in “An Apology for the Short Shrift”—_Saturday
  Review_, May 28, 1898 (85: 717).

  The following passage is found in “The Selling of Joseph,” by
  Chief-Justice Samuel Sewall, printed in Boston, June 12, 1700, the
  first printed protest against slaveholding in Massachusetts: “and
  there is such a disparity in their Conditions, Colour & Hair, that
  they can never embody with us, and grow up in orderly Families, to the
  Peopling of the Land: but still remain in our Body Politick as a kind
  of extravasat Blood.”—See “Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
  Society” for October, 1863 (Vol. 1863–64, p. 161).

Footnote 235:

  William Wells Brown makes this statement in his book, “The Negro in
  the Rebellion,” pp. 361–362.

Footnote 236:

  Compare the manifestation of race prejudice in South Africa, in
  Australia, and in the Philippines. See article “The Negro Problem in
  South Africa,” by Arthur Hawkes, _Review of Reviews_, September, 1903
  (28: 325), and the editorial comments on pp. 264–265 of the same
  issue. See also, article “Race Prejudice in the Philippines,” by James
  A. Le Roy, _Atlantic Monthly_, July, 1902 (90: 100).

Footnote 237:

  George W. Williams: “History of the Negro Race in America” (1883), II,
  72.

Footnote 238:

  Evidence for this statement has been presented above. See Chapter IV.

Footnote 239:

  _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 240:

  _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 241:

  _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 242:

  See p. 200 of monograph “The Negro in Africa and America,” referred to
  above. That this crime is of recent origin is either stated or assumed
  by almost every writer who discusses the lynching of negroes. See, for
  example, article by Thomas Nelson Page in _The North American Review_,
  January, 1904 (178: 33).

Footnote 243:

  From a study of the prison statistics furnished by the United States
  census, Professor Walter F. Willcox came to the positive conclusion
  that “a large and increasing amount of negro crime is manifested all
  over the country.”—See an address on “Negro Criminality,” delivered
  before the American Social Science Association, on Sept. 6,
  1899—“Journal of Proceedings,” No. 37, p. 97.

  A like opinion is expressed by many writers. See, for example,
  _Forum_, October, 1898 (16: 167); _Outlook_, Oct. 31, 1903 (75: 493);
  _Outlook_, Dec. 26, 1903 (75: 984).

Footnote 244:

  For a number of references on the subject of rape and its punishment,
  and also on the subject of burning alive as a legal punishment for
  crime, during the colonial period, the writer is indebted to Mr.
  Albert Matthews.

Footnote 245:

  “Acts of Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania” (1775), pp. 45–46.

  On May 5, 1722, it became the law of Pennsylvania that importers of
  servants who have been convicted of rape must pay a duty and enter
  security for good behavior for one year.—Statutes at Large of
  Pennsylvania, III, 264.

Footnote 246:

  Colonial Laws of New York, I, 765–766.

  Compare law of Aug. 8, 1688, in the Island of Barbadoes, which
  provided that two justices and three freeholders were to “give
  sentence of Death upon” negroes, for murder, rape, burning houses,
  &c.—Acts of Assembly Passed in the Island of Barbadoes, From 1648, to
  1718 (1721), pp. 140–141.

Footnote 247:

  Laws of the State of Delaware (1797), I, 102–105.

  By an act passed in January, 1797, thirty-nine lashes well laid on
  were added to the punishment for an attempted rape on a white woman or
  maid.—Laws of the State of Delaware (1797), II, 1321–1324.

Footnote 248:

  Laws of Maryland (1799), Chapter XIV.

Footnote 249:

  See John S. Bassett: “Slavery and Servitude in the Colony of North
  Carolina”—Johns Hopkins Historical Studies (1896), XIV, 199. In
  Virginia the punishment of castration was so frequently inflicted upon
  slaves by the county courts that the Assembly deemed it necessary to
  enact that “it shall not be lawful for any county or corporation
  court, to order and direct castration of any slave, except such slave
  shall be convicted of an attempt to ravish a white woman, in which
  case they may inflict such punishment.”—See Hening: “Virginia Statutes
  at Large,” VI, 3; VIII, 358; Samuel Sheperd: “Virginia Statutes at
  Large” (New Series, 1835), I, 125.

Footnote 250:

  “Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of the Massachusetts
  Bay” (J. Noble, 1901), p. 74.

  The following passage is taken from the _Boston Chronicle_, Sept.
  26–Oct. 3, 1768 (No. 42, I, 383): “We hear that a negro fellow was
  tried at the Assizes held lately at Worcester, for a rape, and found
  guilty, and received sentence of death.—A white man was also tried and
  found guilty of the same crime, and sentenced to sit on the gallows.”

Footnote 251:

  See “Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society” (1874), 2d
  Series, III, 178.

Footnote 252:

  See J. R. Brackett: “The Negro in Maryland” (1889), p. 131.

Footnote 253:

  _Pennsylvania Gazette_, Dec. 14, 1744 (N. J. _Archives_, XII, 244).

Footnote 254:

  The basis for these statements is a collection of notes on legal
  burning alive made by Mr. Albert Matthews. Compare John Fiske: “Old
  Virginia and her Neighbours” (1897), II, 265.

Footnote 255:

  Section LVI of “An Act for the better Ordering and Governing Negroes
  and other Slaves in this Province,” dated the 10th day of May, 1740,
  reads as follows: “And _whereas_, several negroes did lately rise in
  rebellion, and did commit many barbarous murders at Stono and other
  parts adjacent thereto; and _whereas_, in suppressing the said rebels,
  several of them were killed and others taken alive and executed; and
  as the exigence and danger the inhabitants at that time were in and
  exposed to, would not admit of the formality of a legal trial of such
  rebellious negroes, but for their own security, the said inhabitants
  were obliged to put such negroes to immediate death; to prevent,
  therefore, any person or persons being questioned for any matter or
  thing done in the suppression or execution of the said rebellious
  negroes, as also any litigious suit, action, or prosecution that may
  be brought, sued or prosecuted or commenced against such person or
  persons for or concerning the same; _Be it enacted_ by the authority
  aforesaid, That all and every act, matter and thing, had, done,
  committed and executed, in and about the suppressing and putting all
  and every the said negro and negroes to death, is and are hereby
  declared lawful, to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as fully and
  amply as if such rebellious negroes had undergone a formal trial and
  condemnation, notwithstanding any want of form or omission whatever in
  the trial of such negroes; and any law, usage or custom to the
  contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.”—“Statutes at Large of
  South Carolina” (edited by D. J. McCord, 1840), VII, 416–417.

Footnote 256:

  Instances are recorded where Indians who had committed the crime of
  rape on white females were legally dealt with. See “Records of the
  Colony of the Massachusetts Bay in New England,” II, 23; “New Haven
  Colonial Records” (Hoadly, 1858), p. 543; “Rhode Island Colonial
  Records,” II, 420, 427, 428; “Records of the Court of Assistants of
  the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay” (J. Noble, 1901), pp. 21–22;
  “Plymouth Colony Records,” VI, 98.

Footnote 257:

  _Niles’ Register_, Dec. 25, 1813 (5: 279).

Footnote 258:

  _Niles’ Register_, Aug. 25, 1821 (20: 415–416).

Footnote 259:

  _Niles’ Register_, June 8, 1822 (22: 238).

Footnote 260:

  _Niles’ Register_, July 13, 1822 (22: 320).

Footnote 261:

  _Niles’ Register_, Sept, 14, 1822 (23: 18). It was in the year 1741
  that the thirteen blacks were burned at the stake in New York by
  judicial decree.

Footnote 262:

  Additional evidence has been given above in another connection. See
  Chapter IV.

Footnote 263:

  By an act passed the 11th day of May, 1754, power was given the
  justice to postpone the trial to such time as he thought proper, owing
  to the frequent difficulty of procuring the justice and the
  freeholders and the witnesses to attend the trial within the three
  days.—“Statutes at Large of S. C.” (edited by D. J. McCord, 1840),
  VII, 426–427.

Footnote 264:

  “Statutes at Large of South Carolina” (edited by D. J. McCord, 1840),
  VII, 400–402. It was also provided by this act, which was passed the
  10th day of May, 1740, that an oath for the faithful discharge of duty
  be taken by the freeholders when they assembled with the justices for
  the trial of prisoners, that the evidence of slaves, without oath, be
  admitted against slaves, that for certain offenses certain penalties
  be imposed, that compensation be allowed the owners of slaves
  executed, that masters and other persons be compelled to give
  evidence, that the constables execute or punish slaves according to
  the judgments rendered, &c., &c.

Footnote 265:

  The laws of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware have been
  cited above.

Footnote 266:

  “Negro Outrage no Excuse for Lynching”—_Forum_, November, 1893 (16:
  300).

Footnote 267:

  Walter H. Page: “The Last Hold of the Southern Bully”—_Forum_,
  November, 1893 (16: 303).

Footnote 268:

  “Lynching of Black People because they are Black”—_Our Day_, 13: 298
  (1894).

Footnote 269:

  The following passage is taken from an editorial in the _Houston_
  (Texas) _Post_ of October 23, 1902: “From the same telegraph pole from
  which the two negroes were hanged at Hempstead on Tuesday, a rapist
  was hanged less than two months ago. The circumstances of the first
  execution were fully known to the victims of the second mob. This
  teaches very plainly that lynching does not deter.”

Footnote 270:

  See “The Epidemic of Savagery,” _Outlook_, Sept. 7, 1901 (69: 9);
  also, “The Lynching of Negroes,” by Thomas Nelson Page, _North
  American Review_, January, 1904 (178: 33).

Footnote 271:

  Compare the conclusion arrived at by a Georgia lawyer in an article in
  the _Forum_, October, 1893 (16: 176).

Footnote 272:

  Even such a discriminating and estimable journal as the _Nation_ still
  makes use of every possible occasion to preach the rights of man in
  general and of the negro in particular, utterly ignoring the question
  of capability and responsibility.

Footnote 273:

  See, for example, J. H. Ingraham: “The South-West” (1835), II,
  185–189.

Footnote 274:

  See, for example, _Southern Literary Messenger_, March, 1839 (5: 219).

Footnote 275:

  See _Public Opinion_, Feb. 11, 1893 (14: 448).

Footnote 276:

  See _Our Day_, May, 1893 (11: 333).

Footnote 277:

  See Haydn’s “Dictionary of Dates” (1898), p. 681. Also, “The
  Cyclopedic Review of Current History” (1894), p. 647.

Footnote 278:

  The _New York World_ secured “interviews” with nineteen governors on
  the subject of the proposed visit of the committee. See _American Law
  Review_, November-December, 1894 (28: 904).

Footnote 279:

  See _Literary Digest_, July 14, 1894.

Footnote 280:

  See _Independent_, May 16, 1901 (53: 1133).

Footnote 281:

  See article by Edward Leigh Pell on “Prevention of Lynch-law
  Epidemics,” _Review of Reviews_, March, 1898 (17: 321).

Footnote 282:

  See Georgia Code, 1895, Sections 356–359.

Footnote 283:

  Public Laws of North Carolina, 1893, ch. 461.

Footnote 284:

  Georgia Laws, 1895, Part I, Title 7, No. 209.

Footnote 285:

  Constitution of South Carolina, Section 6, Article 6. This article of
  the constitution with additional provisions necessary to make its
  operation effective was passed by the legislature in 1896 as “An Act
  to Prevent Lynching.” See Acts of South Carolina, 1896, p. 213.

Footnote 286:

  92 Ohio Laws 136. In this the original act the amount of damages that
  could be recovered was fixed at a certain sum; for assault, “the sum
  of $1000,” for suffering lynching “the sum of $500,” &c. In thus
  fixing the amount of damages it was said that the legislature had
  assumed judicial power and had thus rendered the act unconstitutional.
  To remedy this defect, the legislature on April 21, 1898, amended the
  act so that the amount of damages that might be recovered should be,
  for assault “any sum not exceeding $1000,” for suffering lynching “any
  sum not exceeding $500,” &c. See 93 Ohio Laws 161. Being Sections
  4426–4 to 4426–14 of the Revised Statutes.

Footnote 287:

  93 Ohio Laws 411. Being Section 6908 of Title I, Part Fourth, Revised
  Statutes, Crimes and Offenses.

Footnote 288:

  Acts of Tennessee, 1897, Chapter 52. This act was approved March 24,
  1897.

Footnote 289:

  Laws of Kentucky, 1897, Chapter 20. For the amendment and re-enactment
  of this law see Laws of Kentucky, 1902, Chapter 25. In the above
  résumé of the law nothing has been included from the sections which
  were repealed in 1902.

Footnote 290:

  Laws of Texas, 1897, Chapter 13. This act was approved June 19, 1897.

Footnote 291:

  Acts of Indiana, 1899, Chapter 218. Being Sections 2065a–2065d, 2065f
  of the Revised Statutes (1901).

  By an act approved Feb. 24, 1899, boards of county commissioners in
  Indiana are authorized to pay five hundred dollars reward for the
  arrest and conviction of a murderer or lyncher.—Acts of 1899, Chapter
  100.

Footnote 292:

  Acts of Indiana, 1901, Chapter 140. Being Section 2065e of the Revised
  Statutes (1901).

Footnote 293:

  Public Acts of Michigan, 1899, No. 252. Repealed by Public Acts of
  Michigan, 1903, No. 26.

Footnote 294:

  Constitution of Alabama, Section 138.

Footnote 295:

  Acts of West Virginia, 1903, p. 305; Joint Resolution, No. 12, adopted
  Feb. 3, 1903.

Footnote 296:

  See newspapers of the date Dec. 26, 1902, and subsequent dates.

Footnote 297:

  Laws of Kansas, 1903, Chapter 407. This act was approved March 10,
  1903.

Footnote 298:

  Laws of Kansas, 1903, Chapter 221. This act was approved March 11,
  1903.

Footnote 299:

  As early as the year 1796, this measure was suggested as a means of
  preventing the administration of popular justice by extra-legal
  methods. In that year Governor St. Clair, in a report to the Secretary
  of State concerning “Official Proceedings in the Illinois Country,”
  after describing an affair in which some Indians were summarily put to
  death, the circumstances of which he characterized as “not only not
  blameable but laudable,” continued in these words: “I am sorry
  however, to add that, had the affair been ever so criminal in its
  nature, it would have been, I believe, impossible to have brought the
  actors to punishment. The difficulties that have occurred in cases of
  that nature in various parts of the United States, as well as in this
  Territory, and the stain it fixes on the national character, has often
  led me to consider whether justice could not be secured to the Indians
  by adding some sanction to the law beyond what is usual between the
  citizens, and it has occurred to me that, were a pretty heavy
  pecuniary fine to be set upon the murder of an Indian, and a
  proportional one for lesser injuries, to be levied upon the counties
  where the offense was committed if the offenders were not brought to
  justice, it would probably have the effect, for it is often seen that
  the minds of men little tinctured with justice or humanity, have a
  pretty strong sympathy with their pockets, and I believe it to be a
  subject within the province of the general legislature.”—The St. Clair
  Papers (1882), Vol. II, p. 397.

Footnote 300:

  For the purpose of obtaining accurate and complete information on the
  subject of anti-lynching laws the writer asked the following questions
  of thirty-three attorneys-general in the United States, inclosing in
  each letter a self-addressed and stamped envelope for reply:

  1. What anti-lynching laws have been enacted in your State since 1890?
  (Please give citation to statutes.) If there are no anti-lynching laws
  in your State, mention any attempts that have been made to enact such
  laws.

  2. Have any cases been tried under any of such laws or any attempts
  been made to that effect, and what has been the record and the outcome
  in each case?

  3. Are such laws effective in any respect?

  Twenty-four replies were received to the thirty-three letters sent,
  and upon examination a fact became evident which is probably rather
  more than a coincidence—the nine unanswered letters were the ones
  which were sent to the attorneys-general of the States, with one
  exception, in which the greater number of lynchings have occurred. The
  exception is scarcely worth noting, however, because it was a reply
  which was very tardy and very non-committal.

Footnote 301:

  See p. 234.

Footnote 302:

  Brown _v._ Orangeburg Co., 55 S. C. 45; 32 S. E. 764. The decision of
  the Supreme Court was rendered on April 20, 1899.

Footnote 303:

  See p. 235.

Footnote 304:

  Mitchell was a negro and was lynched on June 4, 1897, for the crime of
  rape.

Footnote 305:

  Caldwell lost again in the common pleas and circuit courts, and went
  no further.—Deputy Clerk of Cuyahoga County in letter to the writer.

Footnote 306:

  See note, p. 236. The supreme court by this decision upheld the act in
  its original form.

Footnote 307:

  62 O. S. 318.

Footnote 308:

  68 N. E. 899.

Footnote 309:

  See p. 185. Compare Chart I.

Footnote 310:

  _New York Times_, Jan. 21, 1904. Governor Sayers of Texas made similar
  statements in his annual message to the legislature of Texas on Jan.
  16, 1903.

Footnote 311:

  _New York Times_, Nov. 3, 1903.

Footnote 312:

  _New York Times_, Sept. 7, 1903.

Footnote 313:

  _Richmond_ (Va.) _Planet_, Feb. 14, 1903.

Footnote 314:

  Governor’s message to the legislature, Jan. 14, 1903.

Footnote 315:

  _New York Evening Sun_, June 5, 1903.

Footnote 316:

  After a trial which lasted three months, the first man tried was
  acquitted.—_Denver_ (Colo.) _Republican_, Feb. 28, 1902.

Footnote 317:

  Attorney-general of Wyoming in letter to the writer.

Footnote 318:

  A woman whose husband was hanged by a mob has recently filed suit
  against twenty-six “prominent citizens” of Fleming County, Kentucky,
  for $50,000 damages, claiming that they were members of the mob which
  lynched her husband.—_New York Times_, July 14, 1904.

Footnote 319:

  _Chattanooga_ (Tenn.) _Times_, July 27, 1902. It will be remembered
  that by the Tennessee act any person guilty of direct or indirect
  participation in a lynching was declared to be incompetent to serve on
  a jury, and that the court was to carefully exclude all such persons
  from both grand and petit juries. See p. 237.

Footnote 320:

  Despatch from Lewisburg, Tennessee, in _New York Commercial
  Advertiser_, Jan. 8, 1903.

  In October, 1903, a grand jury in Moore County, Tennessee, indicted
  twenty-two members of a lynching mob.—See _Outlook_, Oct. 24, 1903
  (75: 427).

Footnote 321:

  _Atlantic Monthly_, February, 1904 (93: 155).

Footnote 322:

  See bills introduced during 57th Congress, 1st Session: Senate Bill
  1117; House bills 21, 4572.

Footnote 323:

  _Congressional Record_, 57th Congress, 1st Session, p. 636.

Footnote 324:

  See _Green Bag_, September, 1900 (12: 466).

Footnote 325:

  _New York Tribune_, April 15, 1892.

Footnote 326:

  Some of these indemnities cover loss of property and bodily injuries
  as well as loss of life.

Footnote 327:

  See, in addition to _New York Tribune_, April 15, 1892, United States
  Statutes at Large, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess., Ch. 253; 50th Cong., 1st
  Sess., Ch. 1210; 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 373; 55th Cong., 1st
  Sess., Ch. 9; 55th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 571; 56th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch.
  831; 57th Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 1006.

Footnote 328:

  _American Law Review_, September-October, 1900 (34: 709).

Footnote 329:

  See _Congressional Record_, 57th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 5902–5905,
  5956, 6214.

Footnote 330:

  _Leslie’s Weekly_, Aug. 20, 1903; _Independent_, Oct. 29, 1903 (55:
  2547).

Footnote 331:

  See _Harvard Law Review_, March, 1904 (17: 317).

Footnote 332:

  On the work of the courts in the State of New York, see “Report of the
  Commission on Law’s Delays,” January, 1904.

Footnote 333:

  _Review of Reviews_, March, 1898 (17: 321).

Footnote 334:

  Governor Newton C. Blanchard, at his inauguration on May 16, 1904, at
  Baton Rouge, Louisiana, stated his position with reference to
  lynchings in unmistakable language. “Lynchings,” he said, “will not be
  permitted under any circumstances, if it be possible for the military
  at the command of the Governor to get there in time to prevent them.
  And if they occur before the intervention of the Executive can be made
  effective, inquiry and investigation will be made and prosecution
  instigated. Sheriffs will be held to the strictest accountability
  possible under the law for the safety from mob violence of persons in
  their custody.... The courts are adequate to the prompt vindication of
  the law and the punishment of crime.”—_Outlook_, May 28, 1904 (77:
  197).

Footnote 335:

  Governor Vardaman ordered out two companies of militia and went
  himself to the scene of the trouble in a special train, bringing the
  negro away in his private car, at a cost to the State, it was said, of
  $250,000. See _New York Times_, Feb. 29, 1904.

Footnote 336:

  Vigilance and prompt action on the part of the officers of the law,
  together with the presence of the militia, probably prevented the
  lynching of the three negroes who assaulted Mrs. Biddle at Burlington,
  New Jersey, on July 5, 1904.—See _New York Times_, July 16, 1904.

Footnote 337:

  Governor Jelks, of Alabama, in his message of Jan. 14, 1903, said in
  reference to the lynching in Pike County of a negro who was taken away
  from a constable: “His offense was probably swearing contrary to one
  of his white neighbors in a justice trial on a proof of character.
  This was a cold-blooded murder and without excuse at all.... The
  murderers go about. None of them will be hanged as they should be.”

Footnote 338:

  The _News-Observer_, Raleigh, North Carolina, Aug. 27, 1902.

Footnote 339:

  _American Law Review_, March—April, 1900 (34: 238).

Footnote 340:

  For a discussion of the problem of punishing lynchers and for some
  statistics with reference to the punishment of persons who
  participated in lynchings during the first six months of the year
  1892, see paper by George C. Holt, on “Lynching and Mobs,” _American
  Journal of Social Science_, No. 32, p. 67 (November, 1894).

Footnote 341:

  Carroll D. Wright: “Outline of Practical Sociology” (1899), p. 357.

Footnote 342:

  This view of the matter is ably set forth in the _Green Bag_ for
  September, 1900 (12: 466), by O. F. Hershey of the Maryland Bar.

  The same idea is expressed in a different way in an article on
  “American Quality,” by N. S. Shaler. See _International Monthly_,
  July, 1901.

Footnote 343:

  Francis J. Grund: “The Americans in their moral, social, and political
  relations” (London, 1837), I, 323. (M.)

Footnote 344:

  Quoted from the _Journal of Jurisprudence_ (Edinborough). See
  _American Law Review_, May—June, 1891 (25: 461).

Footnote 345:

  For a comprehensive discussion of the “native question,” see “A
  Sociological View of the ‘Native Question,’” by Albert G. Keller,
  _Yale Review_, November, 1903.

Footnote 346:

  W. E. B. DuBois: “The Souls of Black Folk” (1903), p. 143.

Footnote 347:

  William Hayne Levell: “On Lynching in the South.”—_Outlook_ Nov. 16,
  1901 (69: 731).

Footnote 348:

  “Lynching and the Franchise Rights of the Negro,” Annals of the
  American Academy of Science, May, 1900 (15: 493).

Footnote 349:

  On the suggestibility of crowds, see Gustave LeBon: “The Crowd. A
  Study of the Popular Mind” (2d ed., 1897).

  See also Boris Sidis: “The Psychology of Suggestion” (1898), Part III.

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                          TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


 1. Silently corrected obvious typographical errors and variations in
      spelling.
 2. Retained archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings as printed.
 3. Re-indexed footnotes using numbers and collected together at the end
      of the last chapter.
 4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.