A

 DETAILED ACCOUNT

 OF THE

 BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ

 BY THE

 AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL,

 STUTTERHEIM.

 TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

 BY

 MAJOR PINE COFFIN,

 ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH ARMY,

 Tout cela, prouve, qu'il y a beaucoup d'hommes, capables de faire
 manœuvrer, quinze a vingt mille hommes, et qu'il en est peu, qui
 puissent tirer tout le parti possible, d'une armée de quatre-vingt
 mille hommes.

 Note par un officier François.


 LONDON:

 PRINTED FOR T. GODDARD, MILITARY BOOKSELLER,
 NO. 1, PALL-MALL, CORNER OF THE HAYMARKET.

 1807.




 W. Marchant, Printer, 3, Greville-street, Holborn.




TO THE PUBLIC.


The fatal consequences that resulted from the battle of Austerlitz,
to the cause of Europe, and of humanity, render it an object of too
deep an interest with the statesman and the soldier to make an apology
requisite for introducing to the public, what may be considered as the
Austrian official account of that action. It is hardly probable, that,
under a government so constituted as that of Austria, a general officer
would have ventured to publish the particulars of an action, in which
he himself bore a conspicuous part, (at least with his name attached to
it,) unless he felt himself sanctioned by the _highest authority_ in so
doing.

However that may be, the work bears evident internal marks of
authenticity, while the events daily passing under our eyes, with such
dazzling, and unprecedented rapidity, give an additional interest to
the _cause_ which has been productive of such direful _effects_.

Scarcely have twelve months elapsed since this disastrous battle
was fought, and already have we seen new dynasties created, and the
proudest empires levelled in the dust.

We have seen one of the most powerful monarchies of Europe, whether it
be considered as to its military resources, or its well replenished
treasury; as to its well disciplined army, or the glorious recollection
of its past achievements: we have seen the armies of Prussia, which
were wont to be considered as the patterns of military excellence,
dissipated and annihilated, like chaff before the wind, by the
well-trained legions of the modern Alexander.

The present state of Europe affords ample scope to the reflections of
the statesman. For, though the soldier may account for the loss of a
battle, by reasoning on what was done, and what was left undone, the
subjugation of states is to be looked for in causes far remote from the
scene of action. These are times which not only require superiority
of intellect in those who govern, but the conviction on the part of
the _governed_, that they are not mere spectators of the fray; that
it is not a mere squabble for power; but that the happiness of each
individual, that the preservation of all he holds most dear, in short,
that the _liberties of his country_ are at stake, and depend upon the
issue of the contest.

Has this been, or _could it be_, the feeling of those nations of the
Continent we have seen overrun?

In the answer to this simple question, we may perhaps find the _real_
cause of all the disasters of the coalition, and subject of much
contemplation for ourselves. The cloud which has been long gathering
over Europe has begun to burst; we have seen the storm fall where least
expected, and bury whole empires, and their people, in one common ruin.
When the demon of destruction is abroad, let us not be unmindful of
ourselves. Are we better prepared than our neighbours? Have we more
skilful generals, or less intriguing politicians? I fear not. It is
then only to the people we can look in the day of trial; and I trust
there is yet enough left of the genuine spirit of the constitution, and
of the native valour of Britons, to make every man feel his country
is worth contending for. _The moment that ceases to be the case, our
independence as a nation is virtually gone_; and, though our empire
may drag on a precarious existence for a few years, it will fall,
inevitably fall, at no distant period.

I have been inadvertently led into a train of reflection, which some
persons may think not quite compatible with the character of a soldier.
Against this opinion, I beg leave to enter my protest. I have always
considered the superiority of the French troops over those of the
continent, as the result of their individual intelligence; arising in
a great degree from the habit of every Frenchman, to discuss whatever
topic comes under his notice; and it is quite unnecessary for me
to remark, that the powers of the mind only develope themselves in
proportion as they are called into action. Let us hear no more then
of soldiers being mere machines. The absurdity of the doctrine is too
palpable to need refutation.

I ought perhaps to assign some reason for having undertaken a labour,
to which I may appear so very unequal. It was to relieve my mind
from constantly dwelling on a subject of disappointment, which still
weighs but too heavily on my spirits; and which I hoped to alleviate,
though it cannot be removed by occupation. Personal vanity had no
share whatever in it, and if I have not concealed my name, it has been
because I hoped to disarm the severity of criticism by avowing it. Much
will not be expected from one, who embraced the profession of arms at a
very early period, and whose ambition, from a child, has been military
and not literary reputation. All that I can flatter myself with having
succeeded in, is, the rendering the sense of the author, in terms
plain and intelligible. For elegance of style, and flowing periods, the
public may look to a Hutchinson, but not to soldiers in general.

 JOHN PINE COFFIN.

P.S. It was my original intention to have annexed a good map to this
work, on which the reader might be enabled satisfactorily to follow
the operations with his eye;--but having in vain ransacked the shops
of London, without being able to procure a map of Moravia on a scale
sufficiently large to make it of any use; and, in fact, without finding
any that was better than Chauchards, which is woefully deficient, both
in the names of villages, and in geographical accuracy; I have been
induced to publish the Battle of Austerlitz without this advantage. My
principal motive for so doing has been the persuasion, that a bad map
could be of very little use; and that it would enhance the expense to
such a degree, as to place the work beyond the reach of many military
men; while others may be already in possession of as good, or better
information than I could furnish them with. To those, however, who do
not already possess a map of Moravia, I would recommend that published
by Covens and Mortier, at Amsterdam; not as the best possible map, but
as the least defective I have seen. But, I have great doubts whether
this is to be procured in England.




 TO THE
 AUSTRIAN ARMY.


_This account of what passed under my own observation at the Battle of
Austerlitz, and of the result of my researches on that memorable event,
I here dedicate to my brethren in arms. The desire of being read by
all the military men in Europe has induced me to write in a language
more generally known than that of Germany, and which there are few
among you who do not understand. Those who, like myself, have borne
a part in this disastrous day of the 2d December, will be enabled to
bear testimony to the truth of this narration. I have prided myself on
using the greatest impartiality; on having stifled all prepossession,
all passion, and every feeling, that could tend to lead my judgment
astray. It is to your approbation, my brother soldiers, that I look
forward, as the most delightful recompense of all my labours._




INTRODUCTION.


The imperfect accounts which have reached the public, as to the details
of the Battle of Austerlitz, are so contradictory to each other, and so
little satisfactory to military men, that it has been thought proper to
lay the following relation before them, in order to fix their ideas as
to this memorable epoch.

In all ages, as in all countries, nations and armies have been the
slaves of opinion. Hence it has ever been the policy of governments to
heighten, by those means best calculated to excite national enthusiasm,
the splendour of even the greatest victories; as well as to give a
specious colouring to those reverses of fortune, which are too public
to be passed over in silence.

The soldier, who here gives the relation of what he himself saw,
neither wishes to flatter a government, nor to gain the good opinion of
an army. His object will be, to detail, with truth, what he has either
seen or been able to discover from others; and, forgetting the part
he himself acted, he will speak with candour and impartiality of the
events that passed under his own observation, without the slightest
tincture of prejudice, or passion. Of these events, posterity must be
the judge.

Nothing will be found here, but the simple recital, without commentary,
naked, and devoid of art, of one of the most famous epochs of history.
To attempt to reason on the operations of wars that have passed in our
times would be giving too much scope to self-love, which always adopts
or rejects, as suits our own opinions.

It is not the strength of the respective armies opposed to each other
at the battle of Austerlitz, or the losses they sustained, which
particularly distinguishes it, from many of those which took place in
the first campaigns of the French Revolution, and the seven years war.

We have heretofore often seen 150,000 men in the field, and 30,000
slain. But it is the consequences of the action of the 2d of December,
1805; it is the epoch when it decided the fate of war; it is the
_moment_ in which it was fought, which makes it worthy of attention,
and which will assign it a marked place in history.

It was the wish to gain personal information that induced the author
to collect materials, which may become useful to a better pen: and he
avails himself of a leisure moment to offer them to such as have the
talent to make use of them.

In order that the past may serve to elucidate the future, it becomes
requisite to recur to the circumstances that led to this decisive day;
which proved how scrupulously accurate it is necessary to be, in making
the calculations and combinations, to which the existing circumstances
and the knowledge of human nature give rise.

The battles of Crems, and of Hollabrunn, are already well known.
This is not intended as a history of the late campaign, but merely
of a part of it, into which the account of those two affairs does
not enter. It was after they had taken place, that M. de Koutousoff
directed his retreat upon Brunn, and effected it from that moment,
without much annoyance from the enemy. This first Russian army had
orders carefully to avoid a serious engagement, and to hasten its
retreat, for the purpose of forming a junction with that under M. de
Buxhoevden, who was advancing rapidly to its support. M. de Koutousoff
executed a difficult retreat from the river Inn, upon Moravia, which
commenced on the 14th October, and lasted till the 18th November; and,
although very inferior to the enemy in point of numbers, this Russian
army effected its junction without much loss. The farther the grand
French army advanced, the more its combinations became multiplied,
and the more it was obliged to detach its force. The Russian general
had the advantage of being enabled to concentrate during his retreat,
which he also effected in good order: for this he was principally
indebted to Prince Bagration, who conducted the rear-guard with much
courage. The two Russian armies formed their junction at Wischau,
on the 18th of November; from which time they became one, under the
command of the General in Chief, Koutousoff. Its strength consisted of
104 Battalions, 20 of which were Austrians; and 159 squadrons, 54 of
which were Austrians, and 40 Cosacks. The Austrian corps was commanded
by Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein: his infantry was
composed of the 6th Battalion, recruited, armed, and organized about
a month before; M. de Kienmayer, with the remains of his corps, (very
much weakened by the movement of M. de Merveldt on Styria,) formed a
part of the corps under Prince John de Liechtenstein. The Archduke
Ferdinand, with the wreck of the army from Ulm, and some Battalions,
also newly raised, was in Bohemia, and thereby covered the right of the
combined army; which might at this time be computed at about 72,000
men. The corps under the Archduke Ferdinand was composed of from 18 to
20,000 men.

The grand French army, after passing the Danube, had advanced into
Moravia, being composed of the corps under Prince Murat, Marshals
Soult, Lannes, and Bernadotte. The last of these was then opposed to
the Archduke Ferdinand, and was advancing upon Iglau. Marshal Davoust,
after having followed M. de Merveldt into Styria, moved from Vienna
upon Presbourgh. The corps of Marmont marched upon Carinthia, and
then upon Styria; in the first instance, to open the communication
between the grand army and that of Italy; and afterwards, to oppose the
junction of the Archduke Charles with the army under M. de Koutousoff;
but the movements of this prince were so well calculated, and his force
so well concentrated, that he did not allow time for the French to
establish themselves at Gratz. Marshal Ney, after the passage of the
Inn, took his direction on the Tyrol, by Scharnitz.

At the time of the junction of the two Russian armies near Wischau,
they had only opposed to them, the corps of Prince Murat, part of which
formed the advanced guard, those of Marshals Soult and Lannes, the
imperial guards, under Marshal Bessiéres, and a corps of grenadiers,
drawn from these different troops, forming a reserve of 15,000 men,
under General Duroc. This army, when near Brunn, was composed of eight
divisions, each of which was about 7000 strong. The Russian army was so
much fatigued with the continual marches it had been making, whether to
fall back on the support, or the support to get forward in time, that
it was decided at Wischau to take up the position of Olmutz, to give
some days rest to the troops.

Opinions were at that time much divided. The Russian advanced posts had
no sort of information as to the position and force of the enemy; at
one time, even Prince Bagration was ignorant of the situation occupied
by the French advanced guard. The Austrians also, notwithstanding the
facility they ought to have possessed of procuring intelligence in the
country, had only _very vague data_ to act upon.

By _this_ information, however, it appeared, that the French forces
were collected only in small numbers near Brunn; and _some_ generals
of the combined army gave their opinion at Wischau, for _immediately_
resuming the offensive. It is possible, _this moment_ might have been
more fortunate than that which was afterwards chosen. The strength of
the coalesced army was, from the 19th of November, superior to that of
the enemy, who was yet uninformed that the junction of the two Russian
armies was effected, and therefore could not expect an offensive
movement,[1] such as a manœuvre on either of his flanks would have
been. The army was then too near him to admit of his receiving
reinforcements near Brunn. But this very diversity of opinion, perhaps
rendered the movement on Olmutz necessary, because those in command
did not possess that decision, which can only be the result of a
military eye.

The Austrian general Weyrother, had been sent into Galicia, for the
purpose of conducting the army of Buxhoevden through the hereditary
states. He was an officer of reputation, who did not want for talent,
and who had inspired the Russians with confidence. As soon as the
two armies became united, he filled the situation of Quarter-master
general. The court of Vienna had previously selected General Schmidt
for this important trust; but that officer, a man of superior merit,
and who, with a talent for the profoundest calculation, possessed that
tranquil wisdom, which gives reason and deliberation in counsel; after
having shewn himself, at Crems, to be worthy of the confidence that
was placed in him, lost his life there, and was thus snatched from the
hopes of his sovereign, and of his brother soldiers. His loss was the
more sensibly felt, and the more regretted, because his successor,
neither possessed his calmness, his prudence, or his firmness. The army
marched, the 21st of November, from Wischau, and arrived the next day
but one, in the position in front of Olmutz, whither we will follow it,
for the purpose of detailing the operations.


_March of the Combined Army into the Position of Olmutz._

It was on the 23d of November, the army arrived in this position, and
was posted in rear of the village of Ollschan. Its left rested on the
river March; its right extended to the heights in rear of Tobolau. In
this manner it lay upon its arms, in three lines; while the Austrian
corps, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, formed the reserve of
the army, on the heights in rear of Schnabelin, and was principally
intended to secure, in case of a check, the passage across the March.
With this view, several bridges were constructed across that river,
between Nimlau and Olmutz, to facilitate the operation. The ground
occupied by the army in this position, offered great advantages. It
was so commanding, throughout its whole extent, from the heights near
Nimlau, to the right of the position, as to discover nearly a league
in its front, all the enemy's movements in case of attack; while
the slope of the hills in its immediate front was so gentle, as to
resemble a glacis. In its rear, spacious ravines, only of sufficient
depth to conceal large columns of troops from the enemy, which might
unexpectedly be brought into action, facilitated the means, in this
_defensive_ position, of manœuvring _offensively_, under cover of
the heights. Along their summit, there were commanding points, which
mutually defended each other; and on which, the numerous artillery,
with which this army was provided, might be employed with great
success. A morass covered the right, and a part of the centre; the
Blata ran at the foot of these heights, on which heavy batteries might
have been constructed: this little stream, although insignificant in
itself, became an additional obstacle, under the fire of grape. To
sum up all, the ground offered the means of delaying the enemy, in
his attempt to overcome these obstacles, and to open out. The General
Bagration, with his advanced guard, was at Prosnitz. General Kienmayer,
with his, upon the left, at Kralitz, pushed on detachments upon
Klenowitz. The out-posts were at Predlitz. An Austrian partisan was
sent along the March, on Tobitschau, Kogetein, and Kremsir, to observe
that country. The French army had also sent a partisan, from Goeding on
Hradisch, and Kremsir; but the latter was repulsed, and the Austrian
detachments remained masters of the March. It will not escape the
observation of intelligent military men, that this was an advantage
which gave the allies the means of manœuvring by their left, while
their right (which would then have rested on the March) was secured;
and would have masked this movement, so as to give them, at least two
days march in advance. The good understanding, at that time subsisting
with Prussia, appears to have been such, as to have made it expedient
for the allied army, to think of establishing a communication with the
Archduke Charles. But, in determining on offensive movements, nothing
appears to have been thought of, but going straight forward.

M. de Koutousoff had also sent some Austrian partisans, on his right
flank, who marched upon Tribau and Zwittau, whither the Archduke
Ferdinand, who was at Czaslau, had sent some parties of light troops,
to keep up the chain of communication.

Prince Murat arrived, on the 18th of November, at Brunn. His advanced
guard, under general Sebastiani, pushed forward in the first instance,
to Rausnitz, and afterwards entered Wischau, after Prince Bagration had
evacuated it. The Emperor Napoleon, established himself, on the 20th
November, at Brunn, and placed his army in concentrated cantonments, in
the following manner:

The corps of guards, the grenadiers of the reserve, and the troops
under Marshal Lannes, in Brunn and its vicinity. The cavalry under
Prince Murat, on the right and left of the great road, between Brunn
and Posorsitz. Marshal Soult, at Austerlitz; and the three divisions,
of which his army was composed, were divided, between that place,
Butschowitz, Neuwieslitz, Stanitz, and the road to Hungary. At Gaja,
was a strong detachment, which kept open the communication with that
which observed the river March, in order to secure the right of the
army.[2]

The 25th November, the Grand Duke Constantine arrived at Olmutz, with
the corps of guards, of which he had the command. After a long and
forced march from St. Petersburgh, this fine body of men was in the
best order.

This corps was composed of ten battalions, and eighteen squadrons, the
whole amounting to 10,000 men; of whom, however, there were only 8,500
under arms. At this moment, the army, under M. de Koutousoff may be
computed to have amounted, in all, to above 80,000 men, as will be seen
hereafter, in detail.

A reinforcement of 10,000 men was still expected, under General Essen;
which, accordingly, arrived near Olmutz, at the moment when the allied
army commenced its offensive operations. The corps of Essen was at
Kremsir, the day of the battle of Austerlitz, and was of no kind of
use. The army under M. de Koutousoff, was certainly stronger than the
one opposed to it; but while the _latter_ was concentrated towards a
single point, and formed into masses, the _former_ diffused its force
as it advanced. It is not in numbers that the only, and, indeed, the
_principal_ strength of an army consists; but there are emergencies,
and occasions, in which it is absolutely necessary to profit by that
advantage; and the present was an instance of the kind. The allied army
was under the necessity of advancing, for the reasons hereafter to be
detailed. Had it commenced its movement from the day when the Grand
Duke Constantine arrived with his reinforcement, forming the reserve
of the centre. If, at this epoch, it had manœuvred with rapidity, and
calculation; if the reserve, under the Grand Duke, had been augmented
by the corps under General Essen; if less importance had been attached
to the resting an army, which, after some days inactivity, could no
longer be fatigued; there might, perhaps, have been found means,
without risking a battle, to oblige the French to abandon their
position, by turning one of its flanks; which, by giving this army some
uneasiness, as to its communications, would have induced it to move
upon Vienna, or Bohemia. The former step would have been attended with
danger. The corps of Bernadotte, which came from Iglau to reinforce the
army in front of Brunn, the evening before the battle of Austerlitz,
would not then have had time to make this movement, which was followed
by such fatal consequences to the allies.[3] It was only by means
such as these, had the allies acted with prudence and vigour, that
they could have hoped to make the French fall into their combinations:
combinations which should have been calmly conceived, and vigorously
executed. But the Quarter-master general, it has before been mentioned,
though an officer of great personal courage, had not that confidence
in himself which could enable him to give advice at the head-quarters,
where the greatest degree of wisdom was requisite. Without regarding
the difficulties thrown in his way, this officer, too easily, abandoned
his own opinions, to adopt those of other people.

The astonishing rapidity with which the unfortunate events, of this
disastrous war, succeeded each other; the excessive folly of Mack,
which was only to be surpassed by his disgrace; and in which originated
that succession of guilty errors, which astonished Europe, and
calumniated a brave army; that folly of never anticipating a check,
and of not establishing magazines in the rear, as a consequence of
that presumption. To these circumstances it was owing, that the army,
while in the position of Olmutz, was almost destitute of provisions.
It had only been there one day, before it was obliged to have recourse
to forced requisitions; a violent expedient, which, by the disorderly
manner in which it was executed, had much influence on the discipline
of the army, into which a spirit of licentiousness began to insinuate
itself from that day forwards. In the then state of politics, the
gaining time was, at that moment, nearly of equal importance with the
gaining a battle: and, the instant it was decided, not to manœuvre,
it became of the highest importance to be enabled to subsist in the
position of Olmutz, for the purpose of maintaining it. There still
remained countries, from whence it would have been possible to draw
provisions; but they were at a distance, and the convoys were obliged
to make a long circuit. To this it was necessary to apply a speedy
remedy. The officers of the commissariat received orders, incessantly
repeated, but never sufficiently urgent, to establish convoys of
provisions, with all possible dispatch, upon the different roads; but
_some_ of this department wanted both activity and inclination; their
systematic conception of things not allowing them to feel the extent of
the emergency; while _others_ experienced great embarrassment, from the
detention, by the Russians, of a great part of the horses belonging to
the country, which were employed in the transport of provisions, and
were, in consequence, at a loss for the means of conveyance. The bread
was plundered on the road, both by the detachments appointed for its
escort, and by a number of marauders who followed the army. The strict
discipline, that ought to have existed, was not vigourously maintained,
under the pretext, that the army was starving. Relaxation of discipline
is always succeeded by excesses; and the licentiousness, attendant upon
it, gives full latitude to the disaffected, and to all those who have
not courage to support the numerous privations attendant upon modern
warfare. It was thought impossible to subsist the army in the position
in front of Olmutz, and it was resolved to abandon it, for the purpose
of attacking the enemy.


_Offensive Movements of the Allied Army._

We have already seen the uncertainty in which M. de Koutousoff found
himself, as to the movements and force of the enemy, at the moment when
it was decided to resume the offensive. The accounts derived from the
people of the country were contradictory; and the out-posts gave no
information whatever. The first disposition made for the advance, was
not then founded upon an exact knowledge both of the position of the
enemy and the numbers to be contended with, but was solely adapted to
the nature of the ground, between Olmutz and Wischau. This disposition
was given to the generals, the 24th November. The 25th was the day on
which it was fixed to march; but it was necessary to take two days
provisions; and these provisions could not arrive till the day after.
When _that_ day came, some of the generals had not sufficiently
studied their dispositions; and thus, another day was lost. The enemy
profited by this time. The evening before the battle, as has been
already mentioned, Marshal Bernadotte, as well as part of the corps
of Marshal Davoust, reinforced the Emperor Napoleon. It was necessary
to recall the attention to these facts, on which we shall yet have
occasion still further to remark.

The 27th November, at eight o'clock in the morning, the army was put
in motion, in five columns, to approach nearer the advanced guard,
under Prince Bagration, who, on that day, made no movement whatever,
in order that the manœuvre might be concealed from the enemy. This was
done with a view to concentrating the troops, which, however, in the
end, were diffused afresh. The five roads, by which the army advanced,
were parallel to each other. The two right columns marched along the
foot of the mountains, to the right of the causeway, and were composed
of infantry only. That of the centre was on the great road to Prosnitz;
the fourth to the left of this, and very little distant from it; the
fifth, composed entirely of cavalry, was in sight of the fourth. In
front of this last, the country was entirely open.

Here follows the detail of the march.


RIGHT WING.

 The General of Infantry, Buxhoevden.


FIRST COLUMN.

 Lieutenant General Wimpfen.
 Major Generals Muller, Sclichow, and Strick.
 18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
 2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks.
 8,320 men. 250 horses.


SECOND COLUMN.

 Lieutenant General Langeron.
 Major Generals Kaminsky, Alsufieu.
 18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers.
 2-1/2 squadrons of Cosacks.
 11,420 men. 250 horses.


CENTRE.

 The General in Chief, Koutousoff.


THIRD COLUMN.

 Lieutenant General Przybyszewsky.
 Major Generals Orosow, Lieders, Lewis.
 24 battalions of Russians.
 2 companies of reserve artillery.
 13,800 men.


LEFT WING.

 The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince John de Liechtenstein.


FOURTH COLUMN.

 The Austrian Lieutenant General Kollowrath.
 The Russian Lieutenant Generals Essen and Miloradowich.
 The Russian Major Generals Szepelow and Repninsky.
 The Austrian Major Generals Carneville, Rottermund, and Jurezeck.
 32 battalions, of which 20 were Austrians.
 1 company of reserve artillery.
 5 companies of pioneers.
 30 squadrons of Russians, of which 8 were Cosacks.
 22,400 men. 3000 horses.


FIFTH COLUMN.

 The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince Hohenlohe.
 The Russian Lieutenant General Ouwarow.
 The Austrian Major Generals Stutterheim, Weber, and Caramelli.
 The Russian Major General Piritzky.
 70 squadrons, of which 40 were Austrian, but very weak.
 2 companies of light artillery.
 4600 horses.


THE RESERVE.

 The Grand Duke Constantine.
 Lieutenant Generals Kollagriwoff and Malutin.
 Major Generals Jankewitz and Depleradowich.
 10 battalions of guards, 4 companies.
 18 squadrons.
 8,500 men.


RECAPITULATION.

 1st and 2nd columns,   36 bat.   2 comp.    5 squad.  19,740
 3d            do.      24 ----   2 -----    --------  13,800
 4th and 5th   do.      32 ----   8 -----  100 ------  27,000
 Reserve                10 ----   4 -----   18 ------   8,500
 Advanced corps under
   Prince Bagration     12 ----     -----   40[4] ---  12,000
 General Kienmayer      -------     -----   14 ------   1,000
                       --------------------------------------
                       114 ----  16 -----  177 ---[5]  82,040

The first column assembled at Nebotin, and marched upon Trzebschein,
Blumenau, and Kobelnizeck, where it formed in two lines.

The second column assembled at Ollschan, and marched upon Studnitz,
Czechowitz, and Ottaslowitz, where it formed, with its right supported
by the left of the first column.

The third column assembled on the high road to Prosnitz, on which it
marched, and formed in line with the two right columns.

The fourth column[6] assembled at Nedwriss, and marched upon
Wrahowitz, and Dobrochow, where it formed, and established its
communication with the centre column.

The fifth column assembled at Schabelin, and marched upon Kralitz, and
Brzesowitz, where it formed in two lines.

This last column, not being covered by the out-posts on the left, had
an advanced guard of its own, commanded by General Stutterheim, which
communicated with the detachments observing the river March.

The army advanced with much precaution, because it was ignorant of
the enemy's movements. It had orders to refuse the left, and to allow
the right, which moved along the mountains, to gain ground, in order
to turn the enemy's left, in case of meeting with it. The corps under
the Grand Duke marched upon Prosnitz, (where the two emperors and the
head-quarters were established) and formed the reserve. After four
hours march, the army arrived on its different points of formation
without any obstacle.

Information was received that the enemy had made no movement whatever,
and that his advanced guard at Wischau had neither been reinforced
or diminished. Preparations were in consequence made for its attack
the next morning, and Prince Bagration received orders to put it in
execution. The army was to follow, in the same order as before, the
route that should be opened for it by this general. On the 28th, at
day-break, Prince Bagration put his corps in motion, in three columns;
that of the centre remained on the causeway; the two others, on the
right and left, turned the town of Wischau; in which the enemy had
a regiment of hussars, and one of chasseurs. Two other regiments of
cavalry were posted in reserve, in rear of the town; while General
Sebastiani was at Huluboschan with a regiment of dragoons. As soon as
the Russians, with the cavalry under General Kienmayer (composed of the
hussars of Szechler and Hesse Hombourg) on their left, appeared before
Wischau, and on the heights of Brindlitz, the French cavalry, with the
exception of about 100 men, precipitately abandoned the town.

The Adjutant General Dolgorucky, took possession of the town with two
Battalions of Infantry, and made four officers and 100 men prisoners.
The Enemy's Cavalry received considerable reinforcements in retiring
upon Rausnitz, where was a strong Reserve. In the first instance, they
were pursued by four squadrons of Russian Hussars, and two of Cosacks;
but afterwards all the cavalry under Prince Bagration, reinforced by
that of the fourth column, under the command of Lieutenant General
Essen, (under whose orders were placed ten squadrons of Hulans, five
of Cuirassiers, five of Dragoons, and eight of Cosacks) passed through
Wischau, to support the attack of the advanced guard. To cover his
right during this movement, Prince Bagration had received orders
to send a regiment of chasseurs, and one of cavalry, to the right
of Drissitz by Bustomirz and Dietitz, upon Habrowan. This general
prosecuted his march as far as the heights of Rausnitz, where he took
up his position. The enemy was still master of this little town, and
began to cannonade; but the Russian artillery, which was more numerous,
soon silenced the fire. In the evening, two Russian Battalions took
possession of Rausnitz, in front of which were placed the out-posts.

M. de Kienmayer, who, with his cavalry, had supported the Russian
advanced guard on the left, took his direction upon Drasowitz, and
there established his communication with Prince Bagration.

The army, on the 28th, moved, as before, in five columns, and followed
up the movement of the advanced guard, in the following manner:

The first column, from Kobelnizeck, by Ratzlawitz, upon Lutsch, where
it took up its position, posting six Battalions of Infantry and
Chasseurs, in the wood between Nemajam and Pistomirtz.

The second column, from Ottaslowitz, by Dietitz, upon Nosalowitz, where
it formed in second line.

The third column, marched as before, along the causeway, to beyond
Noska: one brigade was posted in the first, and the two others in
second line.

The fourth column, from Dobrochow, by Krzizanowitz, and Brindlitz, upon
the heights of Noska, where two regiments[7] formed in first line; and
the two others in second line. The Austrian infantry attached to this
column was formed in two lines, on the left of the Russians.

The fifth column, from Brzesowitz, by Ewanowitz, upon Topolan: its
advanced guard marched upon Kutscherau, and communicated with that at
Drasowitz.

Upon these movements of the allies, the French quitted their
cantonments. By a signal made from Austerlitz, Marshal Soult collected
his corps there, which evacuated the villages it had before occupied.

The allies flattered themselves that the enemy would not risk the fate
of a battle in front of Brunn. After the 28th, this _hope_ became the
prevailing _opinion_ at head-quarters. Then, instead of hastening their
movements, they wished to manœuvre, at a period, when too much had been
risked, to enable them to avoid a decisive action; if, contrary to the
opinion of those who thought the French would not fight, they still
persisted in not retiring.

We have, hitherto, seen M. de Koutousoff advancing his right, and
refusing his left, with the view of turning the enemy's flank by the
mountains; for which purpose he had disposed the greater part of his
infantry on the right wing. At Wischau this disposition was changed.
He wished to manœuvre on the right of the enemy. A march to the left
was undertaken, which both lost time, and the ground that might have
been gained to the front. The 29th November, the combined army moved
from Lultsch, and the heights of Noska, upon those of Huluboschan and
Kutscherau. It was not till the 1st December that Marshals Bernadotte
and Davoust joined the Emperor Napoleon; and, on the 29th, M. de
Koutousoff might have been at Austerlitz. After having passed Wischau,
the allied army could no longer manœuvre with impunity. The time it
then lost, in making movements, which did not lead it directly towards
the enemy, while it discovered its intentions to the French army, gave
it also the means of receiving such reinforcements as were within
reach. A _short_ flank movement could not answer the end proposed;
while one that was _longer_, would have afforded the enemy an
opportunity of attacking on the march.

While the army was moving on the heights of Kutscherau, Prince
Bagration pushed on his advanced posts towards Posorsitz: General
Kienmayer marched upon Austerlitz, which the enemy had evacuated at
ten o'clock,[8] on the morning of the 29th; and General Stutterheim
arrived at Butschowitz, from whence he kept up the communication by
Stanitz, with a detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Scheither, who had
driven the enemy's detachments from Gaja. The French army concentrated
its forces, the same day, between Turas and Brunn: it occupied the
villages of Menitz, Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz, and Schlapanitz,
which covered its front, and placed its out-posts at Aujest, on the
heights of Girshikowitz, and near Krug. The 30th November, the combined
army, in consequence of its new plan, again marched to its left, in the
following manner:

The first column, from Kutscherau, by Lettonitz, upon Niemschan, which
was the appuy for the right; its left was at Hodiegitz, and it was
disposed in two lines.

The second column, by Lettonitz, to Hodiegitz, where it formed on the
left of the first column.

The third column, upon Malkowitz, by Butschowitz, and Krzizanowitz,
where it was posted in reserve, in rear of the first column.

The fourth column, by Schardiska, Tschertschein, Krzizanowitz, upon
Herspitz, where it formed in reserve to the second column.

The fifth column, by Neuwieslitz, followed the march of the third, and
was posted in the valley, in front of Marhoefen.

The Reserve, under the Archduke Constantine, marched to Butschowitz;
the advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, to Posorsitz; and pushed
on its out-posts upon the causeway, and upon Krug. M. de Kienmayer
remained at Austerlitz, and was reinforced by the brigade under General
Stutterheim. A little affair of out-posts took place that day; the
enemy was employed in reconnoitring, and a few cannon shots were
ineffectually exchanged. The head-quarters of M. de Koutousoff were at
Hodiegitz; those of the two Emperors at Krzizanowitz, near Austerlitz.

It is here necessary to remark, that during these offensive movements
the Archduke Ferdinand had received orders to advance also, to make
a diversion and occupy the enemy; and that this prince, quitting
Czaslau, after having driven the Bavarians, first from Steinsdorff
and afterwards from Deutschbrod, was advancing upon Iglau, where the
Bavarian general, De Wrede, had the command.

On the 1st December, there was a good deal of firing, the whole of
the morning, along the entire chain of out-posts. The enemy, from
day-break in the morning, was continually reconnoitring along the
heights in front of Pratzen and Krug. He also, for the like purpose,
pushed parties from his left to beyond the high road. M. de Kienmayer's
out-posts, on the left, were at Satchan: and he had a post near Menitz,
a village which the French abandoned. Five Battalions of frontier
troops, under Major-general Carneville, being a part of the Austrian
infantry, arrived in the evening to reinforce M. de Kienmayer.

The combined army, the left of which was commanded by General
Buxhoevden, and the centre by the general-in-chief, after having dined,
moved forwards, in five columns, in the following manner:

The first column, under Lieutenant-General Dochtorow, composed of
twenty-four Battalions of Russians, marched by its left on Herspitz,
Wachan, Klein-Hostieradeck, and took up a position in two lines, on the
heights where this village is situated. A regiment of Chasseurs was
posted at Aujest, a village between the foot of the mountain and the
lakes of Menitz.

The second column, commanded by Lieutenant-general Langeron, composed
of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched by Austerlitz, Krzenowitz,
and took up a position on the heights of Pratzen; also in two lines on
the right of the first column.

The third column, commanded by Lieutenant-General Przybyszewsky,
composed of eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched on the right of
Austerlitz, took its direction upon Pratzen, and its position on the
heights, to the right of this village.

The fourth column, commanded by the Austrian Lieutenant-general
Kollowrath, was composed of twelve Battalions of Russians, under
Lieutenant-general Miloradowitsch, and of fifteen of Austrians, who
were in the rear of this column. This latter marched by its right, near
Niemschan, intersected the high road from Austerlitz to Brunn, and took
post in two lines, in rear of the third column.

The fifth column, composed of cavalry, under the orders of
Lieutenant-general Prince John, of Liechtenstein, was composed of
eighty-two squadrons, marched by its left, and followed the direction
of the third column, behind which it took post under the heights.

The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, composed of
ten Battalions, and eighteen squadrons of guards, passed by Austerlitz,
and posted itself on the heights in front, with its left towards
Krzenowitz, and its right towards the high road from Austerlitz to
Brunn.

The advanced corps, under Prince Bagration, extended by its left beyond
Holubitz and Blasowitz, in order to facilitate the march of the third
and fourth columns upon their points of formation.

Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the columns arrived on the
heights, in front of Austerlitz and Krzenowitz, where his troops were
posted, marched by Pratzen, in front of Aujest, where he arrived at
nine o'clock at night: his corps was then composed of twenty-two
squadrons of Austrians, ten of Cosacks, and five Battalions of Croats.

The head-quarters were at Krzenowitz. The enemy did not interrupt
this movement, and even withdrew his out-posts as far as Tellnitz,
Sokolnitz and Schlapanitz. The second column having arrived late on
its point of formation, had no out-posts in its front. _During the
whole night there was no chain of out-posts established in front of the
position occupied by the combined army._

At one moment during the night, the enemy evacuated the village of
Tellnitz, in which out-posts were placed by a half squadron of Austrian
light cavalry of the regiment of O'Reilly: but two hours after, the
French returned in force, and posted a regiment of infantry in this
village, from the division of Legrand, forming a part of the right
of Marshal Soult. The out-posts on the left of the allies sent,
continually, patroles during the night, to their right, in order to
establish a communication with the Russian advanced posts, but could
never fall in with them.

This offensive movement had been made by the army in open day, and in
sight of the enemy, who, from the heights of Schlapanitz, and in front
of Kobelnitz, had been able to remark it at his ease. The position
occupied by the allies, at the moment when they crowned the heights
between Aujest, Pratzen, and Holubitz, was a strong one. The enemy, had
he been well observed, would have found it difficult to advance for
the purpose of attacking these heights;[9] The defiles of Tellnitz,
Sokolnitz, and Schlapanitz, which separated the two armies, offered
the means of delay; and the very elevated points of these heights
afforded strong means of defence. Here, as in the position, in front of
Olmutz, the army was posted on a curtain, behind which massive columns
might be posted, ready to act offensively. Its left was secured by
the lakes of Menitz and Aujest, while the right was refused. But the
taking advantage of this position was never thought of, any more than
the possibility of being _attacked_ on these heights, or of finding
the enemy on this side the defile. The French emperor took advantage,
in a masterly manner, of the faults that were committed. He kept his
troops concentrated in massive columns, ready to act according to
circumstances. Marshal Bernadotte (who had joined the Emperor Napoleon
the day on which the allies shewed themselves on the heights of
Pratzen), had been posted in the first instance to the left of the high
road. In the night the Emperor caused his corps to pass this road, and
posted it in rear of the village of Girschikowitz, which was occupied
in force. This corps, composed of the divisions of Rivaux and Drouet,
formed the centre of the French army. Prince Murat's cavalry was in
rear of Marshal Bernadotte, and on his left. Marshal Lannes formed
the left wing with the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli; this last
was connected with the left of Prince Murat. The right of the army,
commanded by Marshal Soult, was placed between Kobelnitz and Sokolnitz;
the division of Legrand forming the extreme right, was posted between
Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and occupied these villages with strong
detachments of Infantry. The division of Vandamme was on the left, and
the division of St. Hilaire in the centre of Marshal Soult's corps.

The reserve of the army, composed of ten Battalions of the imperial
guard, and of ten Battalions of General Oudinot's corps, the whole
commanded by General Duroc, was near Turas. The division of Friant,
belonging to the corps under Marshal Davoust, which had just arrived
from Presburg, was sent to the convent of Reygern, on the Schwartza,
to observe and keep the enemy in check, should he approach by the
route of Auspitz. The division of General Gudin (also arrived from
Presburg), with some dragoons belonging to Marshal Davoust's corps,
advanced from Nickolsbourg, on the right of the French army, to keep
in check the corps of M. de Merveldt, who had penetrated through
Hungary to Lundenbourg. This general had with him his own regiment of
Hulans, and the Emperor's hussars, much weakened by the losses they had
sustained during a difficult retreat; and six Battalions of infantry,
also very weak; the whole amounting to little more than 4,000 men. A
detachment of O'Reilly's light cavalry, and some Cossacks, were sent to
Gros-Niemschitz to observe that point.

We have now given the position of both armies, during the night
between the 1st and 2nd December, which immediately preceded this
ever-memorable day.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: _Note by a French officer._--A general, whose movements
are not so combined as to enable him to oppose another manœuvre to that
of his enemy, whatever it may be, is a general devoid of talent, and
ignorant of the art of war.

If the Russians had assumed the offensive at Wischau, it would have
been previous to the arrival of the corps under the Grand Duke
Constantine, which would have weakened their army by 10,000 chosen men.
The French army would not only have had Marshal Bernadotte with them,
who was then at Znaim, but also the corps of Marshal Davoust, whose
divisions were in echelons, on Nicolsburgh.

In fact, it was natural to suppose the combined army would not abandon
the capital of Moravia without a battle. It was well known that Brunn
was a fortified town, that there was much artillery, large magazines of
powder, and warlike stores of all kinds in it: its possession seemed to
merit an action, and it was expected. Although the arrival of General
Buxhoevden was not positively known, yet spies had reported it, and all
the information received as to the march of that army in Poland, and
the two Galicias, rendered it so probable, that all the calculations of
the French army were founded on the supposition of this junction.

The 19th November, Prince Charles had not passed Goritz; he therefore
could not enter into the most remote calculation relative to the war in
Moravia. The whole French army was collected, so that, if the Russian
army had wished to maintain the important point of Brunn, and to defend
the magazines in that place, it would two days after have been attacked
by Prince Murat, by the corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Davoust,
and by part of that under Marshal Mortier. The Russians would have had
10,000 chosen men less than at Austerlitz, and the French 30,000 men
more: and if it is asked, why, at Austerlitz, the French had not these
30,000 men more, it is, because the Emperor Napoleon, being informed
that the Russian army was retiring from Wischau, and falling back on
Olmutz, conjectured that the Russians were waiting for the third army
under Michelson, in order to resume the offensive; or meant to take up
a position under the guns of Olmutz, and so wait till Prince Charles
approached nearer to the theatre of operation.

Obliged to oppose both these armies; the emperor had detached Marshal
Davoust to Presbourgh, and Marshal Ney into Carinthia. The corps under
these two Marshals would have supported General Marmont, and have
had the corps of Marshal Mortier as their reserve; and above 90,000
men would have attacked Prince Charles, before he could approach the
Danube: and, _vice versa_, if the third Russian army, under Michelson,
and the combined army, under Olmutz, (which were calculated by their
junction to amount to 120,000 men) should resume the offensive; whether
they advanced by Kremsir, or direct upon Brunn, the calculation had
been made so as to be joined in a short time, by Marshal Bernadotte,
who had made two days march upon Iglau; by Marshal Davoust, one of
whose divisions was only two, and the other four marches distant;
and lastly, by Marshal Mortier, who would also have arrived in four
marches, and who, under this supposition, would have been replaced at
Vienna by one of the Generals, Marmont or Ney.

These were skilful dispositions; the object of which was, to oppose
equal force to the enemy, although in reality superior in numbers to
the French army.

When the Russians assumed the offensive, it was known that Michelson
had not joined them. The Emperor Napoleon was of course astonished, and
immediately saw how ill combined was the system of the allies. It was
not till after the battle of Austerlitz, and by reports from Galicia,
that it became known that Michelson had no army; that he was only the
Inspector of the two other corps; and that the Russians, after the
arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine, had nothing more to receive.

As soon as he learnt the offensive movement of the Russians, the
emperor recalled Marshal Bernadotte, the remainder of the corps of
Marshal Davoust and General Marmont. If he gave battle at Austerlitz,
without having been rejoined by the last divisions of Marshal Davoust,
and those of Marshal Mortier, it was because he saw so favourable an
opportunity, that he not only was persuaded he should gain the battle
without these reinforcements, but even had he 30,000 men less.

The allies then did well to wait the arrival of their reinforcements
before they resumed the offensive. They calculated rightly, in letting
the emperor be the first to make his movements, and must have conceived
the hope of afterwards gaining by it, when they should themselves come
to act upon their own plans.]

[Footnote 2: _Note by a French officer._--This disposition, of which
the Austrian officer makes mention, and which is accurate, shews that
the emperor had foreseen, that the enemy might manœuvre on the line of
operation from Olmutz, along the March; in this case, the Russian army
must pass at Shadish, whence it was farther distant than Marshal Soult,
who had some infantry at Gaja, and detachments of cavalry, observing
all the route, necessary to this movement.

Whenever the enemy's movement had been known, they would have been
allowed to advance. The corps of Marshals Mortier and Davoust, would
have been at Goeding, and the enemy would have had 30,000 men to
contend with more than at Austerlitz.

In all the enemy's manœuvres upon Vienna, he moved upon the wings of
the French army, which, by calling in all its detachments, concentrated
itself, and opposed its whole force to that of the enemy.

It is more particularly in discussing, what it was possible for the
enemy to have done, that we are convinced of the science, and deep
calculation shewn by the emperor, in a country so new, and so little
known. We see that all his dispositions, even those which appeared to
be the most trivial, and to have had no other object in view than the
subsistence of the troops, were the result of premeditated design, the
chances of which had been already calculated.]

[Footnote 3: _Note by a French Officer._--There is here the mistake
of a day. Marshal Bernadotte arrived _two_ days before the battle of
Austerlitz.]

[Footnote 4: 15 of these were Cosacks.]

[Footnote 5: _Note by a French officer._--It is evident that the author
here diminishes the real strength of the combined army, by one-_fifth_.]

[Footnote 6: _Note by the Austrian general._--The Austrian battalions,
of which this column was partly composed, were extremely weak, in
consequence of the new formation introduced by M. Mack, who, from three
battalions to each regiment, made five: and, as before stated, they
were new levies, with the exception of the regiment of Salzbourg, and
the frontier troops. This corps of infantry was composed as follows:

  2 bat. 1st reg. of Szeckler.
  2 do.  2d         do.
  1 do.  Brooder.
  6 do.  Salzbourg.
  1 do.  Auersperg.
  1 do.  Kaunitz.
  1 bat. reg. of Lindenau.
  1 ------------ Kerpen.
  1 ------------ Beaulieu.
  1 ------------ Wurtembourg.
  1 ------------ Reuss. Graitz.
  1 ------------ Czartorisky.
  1 ------------ Kaiser.
 --
 20
]

[Footnote 7: I am inclined to think the word, _regiment_ has here been,
inadvertently, substituted for _brigade_. Translator.]

[Footnote 8: _Note by a French officer._--The corps under Marshal Soult
had evacuated Austerlitz at three o'clock in the morning; and was
posted at seven o'clock in rear of Puntowitz and Schlapanitz. There
are some inaccuracies in the detail of the movements, and the partial
attacks; but the narrative is generally correct, and well told.]

[Footnote 9: _Note by a French officer._--There is no foundation for
the remark here made by the Austrian officer; since the Emperor, who
intended to act upon the centre of the enemy, had an interest in
remaining master of these defiles, that no obstacle might be opposed to
the bringing his army into action: it was with this view he occupied
the fine position of the Santon, situated in front of all the small
streams: besides, the Emperor had posts upon these rivulets two days
before; and the left of the French army was between the Santon and the
village of Girshikowitz, which was the rendezvous of almost the whole
cavalry; consequently, from that moment, it was no longer necessary to
pass the defiles in order to attack the heights.

This observation of the Austrian officer, only serves to mark more
strongly to every French officer, who was a witness of the affair, both
the prudence and military eye of their general. He made the Santon, the
point of appuy, for his left flank; not because it was a fine defensive
position; there were others in the rear equally good; but, _because
it was the key to all offensive operations_. If, on the contrary, the
French general had neglected the Santon, the whole of the left wing of
the French army would have been prevented from resuming the offensive,
unless they passed the defiles.

Eight days before the battle, the Emperor returning from Wischau,
ascended the Santon, notwithstanding the extreme cold; and said to the
officers about him: "Examine this position well; it will probably play
a conspicuous part before two months are over our heads."

The Emperor having always had it in view, during the campaign in
Moravia, not to allow his left to be turned, and to abandon his right;
that alone would have been a sufficient reason for resting his left
on a position not defensive, but offensive, such as was that of the
Santon. The fact is, the more we discuss the plan of the campaign,
the more we perceive the judgment and military eye of a master in the
science of war.]




BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ.


The disposition for the attack of the French army was delivered to
the general officers of the Austro-Russian army, soon after midnight,
on the morning of the 2nd December. But the imperfect knowledge that
was possessed of their position, although scarcely out of range of
the enemy's musketry, naturally made the suppositions upon which the
disposition of attack was founded also very indefinite. Some movements
had been remarked, the evening before, on the enemy's left, but it was
not known to be occasioned by the arrival of the corps under Marshal
Bernadotte.[10] It was supposed that the French army was weakening its
centre to reinforce its left. Several lines of smoke, which had also
been perceived the evening before, between Turas and the lakes in rear
of Sokolnitz, and Kobelnitz, and some others near Czernowitz, caused
the belief that the French army had made these lakes the point of
appuy for their right, and had placed a reserve in the rear. The left
of the combined army outflanked the right of the French army. It was
supposed, that by passing the defile of Sokolnitz, and of Kobelnitz,
their right would be turned, and that the attack might afterwards
be continued in the plain, between Schlapanitz and the wood of Turas,
thus avoiding the defiles of Schlapanitz and Bellowitz, which, it was
believed, covered the front of the enemy's position. The French army
was then to be attacked by its right flank, upon which it was intended
to move down large bodies of troops; this movement was to be executed
with celerity and vigour; the valley between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz
was to be passed with rapidity; the right of the allies (on which was
the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and the advanced corps
under Prince Bagration) was to cover this movement.--The first of these
generals on the plain between Krug and Schlapanitz, on each side of
the causeway; and the other by protecting the cavalry, and occupying
the heights situated between Dwaroschna and the Inn of Lesch, with his
artillery.[11] For this purpose, the five columns, composed as before,
received orders to advance in the following manner:

 1st. Column. Lieut.-general Dochtorow, with 24 Battalions of Russians,
 from the heights of Hostieradeck, by Aujest, upon Tellnitz. After
 having passed the village and defile, the column was to move forward
 to the right upon the lakes, till its head became parallel with that
 of the 2d column.

 2nd Column. Lieut.-general Langeron, with 18 Battalions of Russians,
 marching like the former column, by his left from the heights of
 Pratzen, was to force the valley between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and
 then dress by the 1st column.

 3rd Column. Lieut.-general Przybyszewsky, with 18 Battalions of
 Russians, was also to move by his left, from the heights to the right
 of Pratzen, close by the castle of Sokolnitz; from whence the heads
 of the three columns were to move forward, between Sokolnitz and the
 lakes situated behind it, as far as the lakes of Kobelnitz.

 4th Column. Lieut.-general Kollowrath, with 27 Battalions, 15 of
 which were Austrian, moving forward by his left, from the heights in
 rear of the 3d column, was to pass the same valley, and the lakes of
 Kobelnitz, and bring the head of his column parallel with that of the
 three former.

 The advanced corps under M. Kienmayer, was to protect, with its
 infantry, the movements of the 1st column, so that this last was, in
 fact, reinforced by five Austrian Battalions, and composed altogether
 of 29 Battalions. The heads of these four columns of infantry were to
 present a large front, and four Battalions of the 1st column were to
 occupy the wood of Turas. The remainder, and all the other columns,
 were then to move forward between this wood and Schlapanitz, and to
 attack the right of the enemy with strong bodies of infantry, while
 three Battalions of the fourth column should be occupied in carrying
 the village of Schlapanitz.

 5th Column. Lieut.-general Prince John de Liechtenstein, with 82
 squadrons, was first of all to move from the foot of the hill, in rear
 of the 3d column, between Blasowitz and Krug, to protect the formation
 and march of the columns on the right, and afterwards to advance upon
 the plain on the right and left of the causeway, between Krug and the
 Inn of Lesch, as was before mentioned.

 The advanced corps, under Lieutenant-general Prince Bagration,
 consisting of twelve Battalions and forty squadrons, was to maintain
 its position, and gain the heights between Dwaroschna, and the Inn of
 Lesch, in order to place strong batteries of cannon upon them.

 The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, consisting of
 ten Battalions and eighteen squadrons, was to move from the heights in
 front of Austerlitz to the rear of Blasowitz and Krug; he was to serve
 as a support to the cavalry of Prince John de Liechtenstein, and to
 the corps under Prince Bagration.

The fortune of this day was made to depend upon the rapidity of the
attack on our left, and on the driving back the enemy's right upon
_his_ left. It was imagined the battle would not be decisive if Prince
Bagration was not enabled to oppose an obstinate resistance to the
attacks the French might make upon him; and orders were given to the
cavalry, under Prince John de Liechtenstein, to attack the enemy in any
movement he might make, with a view to engaging this Russian general.

The cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon as the first
column should have passed the defile of Tellnitz, was destined to cover
the left of the column, and to march between Turas and the Schwarza;
observing well the convent of Reygern.

It was settled in the disposition, that in case the four columns were
fortunate enough to advance as far as the causeway between Lattein and
Bellowitz, and to drive the enemy back into the mountains, the Wood of
Turas was _still_ to remain occupied by the four Battalions destined
to this purpose, in order to preserve the facility of manœuvring round
it, and the means of retiring, if necessary, by Kobelnitz and Puntowitz
into the position of Pratzen; which retreat was, in case of the worst,
to be continued as far as the position of Hodiegitz, Niemtschen, and
Herspitz.

If the attack made by the left proved successful, then Prince Bagration
was to move against the enemy's left, and to establish a communication
with the four columns of infantry; after which it was intended to
unite the army in front of the village of Lattein, between Lesch and
Nennowitz. The defiles of Schalapanitz, Bellowitz and Kritschen, being
thus cleared, the cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein was to
pass them with rapidity, in order to support the infantry; and, in
case of success, to pursue the enemy between Brunn and Czernowitz.

The general-in-chief, Koutousoff, was in the centre with the fourth
column.

The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, commanded the left of the army,
and marched with the first column.

Having thus given the plan of attack, concerted by the allies, we
are now about to see the manner in which it was deranged, and how it
happened that the faults in the conception were not compensated for by
the success of the execution.

At seven o'clock in the morning the combined army was put in motion,
and quitted the heights of Pratzen to advance upon its given points.
Each of the four columns of infantry was perfectly in view of the
enemy, who could not but perceive that the direction of their march
caused considerable intervals between them, in proportion as the
heads of the columns approached the valleys of Tellnitz, Sokolnitz and
Kobelnitz. The action began on the left wing of the allies. The corps
of General Kienmayer, posted in front of Aujest, as before mentioned,
was nearest the enemy, and destined to force the defile of Tellnitz,
to open the route for the first column, which had a great circuit to
make after having passed this defile, in order to arrive at the point
which would bring it in a line with the second column; this made
it necessary to carry the village of Tellnitz as soon as possible.
Between Aujest and Tellnitz is a considerable plain, on which some
squadrons of hussars were advanced, between seven and eight o'clock, to
reconnoitre the enemy. On a hill, in front of the village, were posted
several companies of infantry, who defended its approach, while some
detachments of cavalry were on the right, having the lake of Menitz as
their appuy.

M. de Kienmayer ordered a detachment of cavalry to advance against
their right, and a Battalion[12] of the first regiment of Szeckler
infantry to attack the hill on which the French infantry was posted.
The latter was reinforced, and a fire of musketry commenced, which
became pretty warm. The French defended themselves with obstinacy; and
the Austrians, who had been supported by another Battalion, attacked
with spirit. The hussars of Hesse Hombourg, on the right, under Major
General Nostitz, and those of Szeckler on the left, under Major General
Prince Maurice Liechtenstein, took post on the flanks of this infantry,
to check the enemy's cavalry, (which was perceived on the farther side
of the defile of Tellnitz) should it attempt to pass for the purpose of
attacking these Austrian Battalions. The Hussars suffered severely from
the enemy's sharp shooters, who took advantage of the ground, which all
round the village was covered with vineyards, and full of ditches; but
they could not succeed in keeping off the cavalry. The second Battalion
of the regiment of Szeckler infantry had arrived to reinforce the
first, which was attacking the hill, and which had lost more than half
its strength. Twice the Austrians were repulsed; and twice they again
advanced to the foot of the hill, which it was necessary to carry, in
order to arrive at the village. At length General Stutterheim succeeded
in getting possession of it with these two Battalions.

The enemy's third regiment of the line, and two Battalions of sharp
shooters, were in possession of Tellnitz and the vineyards round
the village. These troops defended their post with valour. M. de
Kienmayer ordered General Carneville to advance with the remainder of
his infantry (consisting of three other Battalions) to the support of
the two which were on the hill, and were fighting with great courage.
A destructive fire of musketry ensued. The village was situated in
a natural entrenchment, the vineyards being surrounded by a deep
ditch, of which the French kept possession: however, the Austrians
succeeded at one time in penetrating as far as the village; but were
again repulsed, and had some difficulty in maintaining possession of
the hill they had before carried. The regiment of Szeckler infantry
fought with the greatest obstinacy; above two-thirds of them being
killed or wounded. This action had already lasted above an hour, and
yet the head of the first column, with which was M. de Buxhoevden, had
not yet made its appearance. The French had more troops belonging to
Legrand's division on the farther side of the defile; and the Austrians
engaged in so unequal a contest (since they were without support),
continued to make fresh efforts, which they momentarily expected would
become useless. At length, M. de Buxhoevden, with the first column,
appeared from Aujest, and sent a Battalion of the seventh regiment of
light infantry to support the Austrians, and a brigade of Russians
to form the reserve. Two Austrian Battalions, with this Battalion of
light infantry, which charged the enemy with impetuosity, attacked the
village, gained possession of it, and were followed by the remainder.
The French, on the approach of such superior numbers, evacuated the
defile, and drew up on the farther side in order of battle. M. de
Buxhoevden, before he moved forward, waited to see the head of the
second column (which was not advancing) appear in the plain, between
the foot of the hills and Sokolnitz.

Towards nine o'clock the enemy received a reinforcement of 4,000 men
from the corps under General Davoust. These troops arrived from the
convent of Reygern; the French then taking advantage of a thick fog
which suddenly darkened the whole valley, again got possession of the
village, and even penetrated as far as the hill beyond it. At this
moment General Nostitz made a rapid charge, with two squadrons of the
hussars of Hesse Hombourg, for the purpose of checking them.

The Russian light infantry, and an Austrian Battalion, which had been
posted in Tellnitz, had fallen back in disorder: the Russian regiment
of New Ingermannland ought to have supported them; but retreated in
a manner, which, combined with the fog, threw a part of the column
into confusion. The charge made by the hussars had checked the French
infantry, some hundreds of whom were made prisoners. The fog having
dispersed, the troops again moved forwards, and the enemy abandoned
the village. The first column made a deployment in several lines upon
the hill, and Tellnitz was retaken. A cannonade took place; and as
soon as the French entirely withdrew from this point, the defile was
passed, without opposition, by the brigades of cavalry under Prince
Maurice Liechtenstein and General Stutterheim, who drew up in order
of battle on the farther side. Tellnitz and the defile were occupied
by some Battalions provided with artillery. The enemy then entirely
abandoned the plain between Tellnitz and Turas; but he was not followed
up, because the communication with the second column was not yet
established. The Austrian cavalry consequently avoided the snare laid
for it, by the retreat of the right of the French army. During this
action, near Tellnitz, the second and third column had quitted the
heights of Pratzen, and had approached towards Sokolnitz, which was
occupied by two Battalions from the division of Legrand. These two
Battalions opposed some resistance to the Russian light infantry as
they advanced at the head of these columns. The French had placed some
cannon on a hill between Sokolnitz and Kobelnitz; (the latter village
was occupied by the enemy's reserve) a pretty heavy cannonade was
opened upon Sokolnitz, which destroyed the village. These two Russian
columns, without concerning themselves as to the fourth column,
without any direct communication with it, and without being deterred
by the offensive movements of the enemy, thought of nothing but the
first disposition, and continued their movements upon Sokolnitz; which
village they took possession of without much resistance, after a long
and useless cannonade. General Muller, of the Russian light infantry,
was wounded and afterwards taken prisoner beyond Sokolnitz. In passing
this village, the two columns crossed upon each other, and some
confusion ensued.

We must now, for an instant, leave this point, in order to see what
was passing in the centre, and on the right of the allies, while the
capture of the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz was going forward.
The Emperor of the French, who had not failed to remark the want of
concert and consistency in the movements of the Austro-Russian army,
and who saw that by the circuitous route the left was obliged to take,
it became more distant from the centre, in proportion as it advanced,
immediately put in motion the massive columns which he had kept
together, with a view of marching against the centre, and by that means
cutting off the wing, which still imprudently continued to advance,
for the purpose of turning the French army in a position which it did
not occupy. The Reserve of the French army, composed of ten Battalions
of the Imperial guard, and of ten Battalions of General Oudinot's
grenadiers, (who recovered from his wound, now resumed his command)
remained upon the heights between Schlapanitz and Kobelnitz. This
Reserve did not fire a shot during the whole battle. Marshal Soult,
with the two divisions of St. Hilaire, and Vandamme (posted during the
night, as we have already seen, in the valley of Kobelnitz), traversed
this village and that of Puntowitz, to make an attack upon the heights
and the village of Pratzen. At the same time Marshal Bernadotte, after
having crossed, by means of a bad and narrow bridge, (only a few
musket shots distant from his enemy) the rivulet at the village of
Girschikowitz, with the division of Rivaud on his left, and that of
Drouet on his right, took his direction upon the heights of Blasowitz.
The cavalry under Prince Murat formed in several lines on the left of
Marshal Bernadotte, and marched between Girschikowitz and Krug. Marshal
Lannes having on his right the division of Caffarelli, and on his left
that of General Suchet, moved forward to the left of Prince Murat, on
each side of the causeway. From that time the centre and right of the
allies became engaged in all quarters. The Grand Duke Constantine was
destined with the corps of guards to form the Reserve of the right, and
quitted the heights in front of Austerlitz, at the appointed hour,
to occupy those of Blasowitz and Krug. He was hardly arrived on this
point before he found himself in _first line_, and engaged with the
sharp shooters of Rivaud's division, and Prince Murat's light cavalry,
commanded by General Kellermann. The Grand Duke hastened to occupy the
village of Blasowitz with the light infantry Battalion of the guards.
At the same instant Prince John de Liechtenstein arrived with his
cavalry. According to the original disposition, this Prince was to post
himself on the left of Prince Bagration, to preserve the command of
the plain in front of Schlapanitz. This column of cavalry, which had
been posted in rear of the third column, and which was to move by its
right flank, upon its point of attack, was impeded in its march by the
columns of infantry, which crossed upon it as they were advancing, to
descend from the heights. Prince Liechtenstein had hastened to send,
during the march, 10 squadrons, under Lieut.-general Uwarrow, to the
left of Prince Bagration, to secure that general's left flank, which
was opposed to a part of Prince Murat's cavalry. After the regiment
of Elisabethgrod hussars had formed in order of battle, under General
Uwarrow, the Grand Duke Constantino's regiment of Hulans became the
head of the column of cavalry. Prince John de Liechtenstein, when he
arrived on the Grand Duke's left, found the enemy in presence of the
Russian guards; it was the cavalry under General Kellermann, supported
by the infantry of Marshal Bernadotte's left, and of Marshal Lannes'
right. Prince John de Liechtenstein immediately determined on forming
his cavalry in order of battle, to charge the enemy. The Grand Duke's
regiment was the first that deployed; but, carried away by the ardour
of the brave General[13] Essen, who commanded them; the Hulans did not
await the formation of the rest of the line, and, without support,
rushed forward to attack the enemy's light cavalry, which, retiring
through the intervals of the infantry, was pursued with but too much
impetuosity through the Battalions. The Hulans wanted to attack the
French cavalry that was in second line, but, in consequence of the fire
they had sustained, they reached it in disorder, and were received by
it with determination. The division of Caffarelli formed a line on
their right, and that of Rivaud on their left, and the Hulans, being
thus placed between two fires, lost above 400 men; Lieut.-general
Essen, who led them, was severely wounded, and died in consequence. The
Grand Duke's regiment, which had made this brilliant charge, attacked
too soon, with too much impetuosity, and became the victim of its own
ill-placed courage. It was put completely to the route, and in this
state it reached, by its right, the corps under Prince Bagration, in
rear of which it again formed. This last general had now moved forward
from the post of Posorsitz, to oppose the left of Marshal Lannes, which
rested on Kovalowitz; Prince Bagration had caused the villages of Krug
and Holubitz to be occupied by General Ulanius, with three Battalions
of light infantry.

We now come to the centre of the allied army, where the fate of this
day was decided. It was too weak to resist the enemy's attacks.
Abandoned by the third column, and all the left of the army, while
the division on the right flank was not sufficiently powerful to
divide the French forces; the centre saw itself attacked, or menaced
with attack, by _four_ divisions, to which it could only oppose 27
very weak Battalions, without any hope of reinforcement. Those Russian
regiments which had made their retreat from Braunau, formed a part
of this number, and were scarcely composed of 400 men each. Without
exaggeration, we may here calculate, that 12,000 men were attacked by
24,000, and while the French army was not, in fact, so numerous as
that of the allies, by a more happy arrangement of their force, which
was more concentrated and better directed, the enemy's strength was
_doubled_ on that point, which was of the greatest importance. The
centre of the allies was perfectly insulated, which, in consequence of
the distance the several columns (the 2d and 3d excepted) were from
each other, was the case, nearly, on _all_ points.

The Emperor of Russia, with the Commander in chief, arrived at the head
of the fourth column, at the moment when it was to advance. In order
to give time to the columns on the left to gain ground, Lieut.-general
Kollowrath, who commanded the fourth column, received orders not to
move till towards eight o'clock. The action, therefore, near Tellnitz,
had already begun, and the left was in motion, when the centre formed,
and broke into platoons from the left. The Russian infantry, under
Lieut.-general Miloradowich, was at the head of the column. Two of his
battalions, of the regiments of Novogrod and Apscherousky, commanded by
Lieut.-colonel Monachtin, with some Austrian dragoons of the Archduke
John's regiment, formed the advanced guard of the column, and marched
only a small distance in its front.

It was now near nine o'clock, and the third column had just quitted the
heights of Pratzen to march, in conformity to the disposition, upon
Sokolnitz: the fourth column had just arrived on the ground occupied,
during the night, by General Przibischewsky, when a massive column of
French infantry was suddenly descried in a bottom, in front of Pratzen.
As soon as the enemy's columns were perceived, they were put in motion,
at the moment when the Russian advanced guard approached the village.
This massive column of the enemy was composed as follows: the right
columns of the division of Vandamme; those on the left, of the division
of St. Hilaire. Nevertheless, the advanced guard of the 4th column lost
no time in occupying the village of Pratzen, and got possession of a
small bridge beyond it before the enemy's sharp shooters. Having passed
this bridge, it posted a Battalion upon a hill to the left, in front of
the village, (which was not yet left by the rear of the third column)
while the other Battalion of the advanced guard occupied the village
itself.

General Koutousoff, whom this movement of the enemy had taken by
surprize (thinking himself the assailant, and seeing himself attacked
in the midst of his combinations and his movements), felt all the
importance of maintaining the heights of Pratzen, against which the
French were moving; they commanded every thing, and were the only
security to the rear of the third column, which continued to advance
and expose itself with the greatest imprudence, forgetting the enemy
and every thing but the original disposition. It was the summit of the
heights of Pratzen which decided the fate of the day. It had been the
key to the position the allied army had just quitted; and, from the
confused situation of the different columns their fate depended upon
whoever was master of this height. As soon as the Commander-in-chief,
who was at the head of the column, was informed by his advanced guard
that the enemy was so near him, he gave orders for shewing him a front,
and for occupying the height; at the same time he sent for some cavalry
from the column under Prince John de Liechtenstein, who sent him four
Russian regiments. The French directed the march of their two masses
of infantry with great coolness, and at a slow pace. A third column
of the enemy now made its appearance on the right of Pratzen, and
threatened to pass through the interval, between the fourth column, and
the cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein. This French column was
a part of the corps under Marshal Bernadotte. Upon this the Russian
infantry, belonging to the fourth column, marched to the right of
Pratzen, and sent a reinforcement to the Battalions of the advanced
guard, which were already posted on the hill to be maintained; but this
advanced guard, being attacked by superior numbers, abandoned it, after
a very short resistance.

The action then became very warm, and it was attempted to regain the
ground that had been lost by the advanced guard. The Russians made an
attack; opened their fire at too great a distance, and without much
effect, while the French columns continued to advance without firing a
shot; but when at the distance of about a hundred paces, they opened
a fire of musketry which became general, and very destructive. The
enemy opened out his masses by degrees, formed in several lines, and
marched rapidly towards the height, resting his left on the church of
the village, and his right on the most elevated point of the heights.
Having reached them, he formed in an angular direction, for the purpose
of opposing the rear of the third column. This was composed of the
Brigade under General Kamensky, which had separated from the column,
and shewed a front upon the height, menacing the right flank of Marshal
Soult's corps.

It was still necessary to dislodge the enemy from the heights, of which
he had obtained possession, and to prevent his establishing himself on
them.

The Emperor of Russia, who, during this sanguinary conflict, had
remained with his infantry of the fourth column, and who, incessantly,
exposed his own person in trying to remedy the confusion, ordered his
Battalions to advance, and try to take the enemy in flank. General
Kollowrath received orders to check the enemy on the left, and, for
that purpose, caused the Austrian Brigades, under the Generals
Jurczeck and Rottermund, to advance against the heights, on which
the French continued to gain ground, and extend themselves, more and
more, while they followed up the Russian Battalions that had been
thrown forward. The first Austrian Battalions made their attack on
the enemy with coolness and intrepidity, although they were entirely
composed of new levies. They fell upon a French regiment which had
been the first to advance on the crest of the hill, and which was
nearly surrounded. The French received the Austrians with firmness,
and defended themselves with valour, notwithstanding which they were
forced to retreat; but, receiving a reinforcement, they quickly
regained the ground which they had lost. Two Russian regiments,
belonging to the second column, the grenadiers of Fanagorisky, and
the musketteers of Rhiasky, who were left in Reserve upon the height
which the column had occupied during the night, were ordered, by the
General-in-chief, to reinforce the Brigade under General Kamensky. The
troops commanded by this General fought very bravely during the whole
of this unfortunate battle. They came to the support of the Austrian
Brigades; and this reinforcement seemed likely to re-establish the
balance of power in the attack of the crest of the hill; upon which the
French generals manœuvred their troops with that ability which is the
result of a military eye, and of experience, taking advantage of the
inequalities of ground to cover their troops from fire, and to conceal
their movements. There was no other chance of turning the fate of the
day but a general and desperate attack at the point of the bayonet.
The Austrian Brigades, with that under General Kamensky, charged the
enemy; the Russians shouting, according to their usual custom; but
the French received them with steadiness, and a well-supported fire,
which made a dreadful carnage in the compact ranks of the Russians.
General Miloradovich, on his side, advanced upon the right; but the
Generals Berg and Repninsky being wounded, their troops had lost that
confidence in themselves, without which nothing is to be done in war.
The ardour of this attack soon evaporated. The superior numbers of
the enemy, and his steadiness, soon changed it to a slow uncertain
pace, accompanied by an ill-directed fire of musketry. Nevertheless,
the example of some of their officers had at one moment the effect
of inducing the left wing again to advance with intrepidity; and,
for an instant, the right wing of the French began to give way. The
regiment of Saltzbourg, and the Battalion of Auersperg, fought with
much courage.[14] Kamensky's Brigade always distinguished itself.
The Austrian General, Jurczeck, was severely wounded. The enemy, well
aware of the importance of this post, now in turn attacked the allies,
who were without any support whatever, and absolutely abandoned by the
left of the army. The fourth column now lost the heights of Pratzen,
beyond the possibility of recovery, together with the greatest part of
its artillery, which was entangled in the deep clay that prevails in
that part of the country. The greatest possible efforts were made to
repair the confusion incident to such a retreat. Meanwhile, the enemy
had advanced his artillery, and vigourously plied it in cannonading
the allies during their retreat, which put the finishing stroke to
the disorder they were in. The Austrian part of this column had one
general, six superior officers, nineteen subalterns, and 1886 soldiers
killed and wounded; five officers and 470 soldiers taken prisoners.
This action, upon the heights of Pratzen, lasted about two hours; after
which the fate of the battle was decided. The fourth column marched
upon Waschan, and repaired (as pointed out in the disposition) to the
position of Hodiegitz and Herspitz, where it collected its Battalions.
The enemy, being once in possession of the heights, did not disturb
this retreat, and remained near Pratzen, waiting, probably, the event
of the movements on the left of the allies. After the unfortunate
attack that was made by the Hulans, Lieutenant-general Prince John de
Liechtenstein, with his cavalry, covered the country between Blasowitz
and Pratzen. The Austrian General, Caramelli, made a charge with the
Cuirassiers of the regiment of Lorraine upon the enemy's infantry,
which coming out of Girschikowitz took advantage of the vineyards
between that village and Pratzen, to take the Russians in flank. This
attack, in which General Caramelli had his horse shot under him,
had the effect of checking the French for a moment. The Major who
commanded the regiment, a Count d'Auersperg, was killed. Prince John de
Liechtenstein also caused an attack to be made on the French infantry,
by the regiment of Nassau, at which time the fourth column had already
lost the heights of Pratzen, and was put to the route. Prince John de
Liechtenstein flew to its assistance to cover the Retreat with the
remains of the cavalry. This general tried to rally some Austrian
Battalions, which, like the Russian infantry, were retreating in
disorder, and was successful in his efforts. His horse was killed under
him by a grape-shot. The cavalry continued to occupy the bottom of the
heights of Pratzen, between that village and Krzenowitz, till it was
night.

While the action took this turn on the heights of Pratzen, and the
cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein attempted to make head,
both to the right and left, against the enemy's infantry, and a part
of Prince Murat's cavalry, in order to check, or at least retard, the
success of the French. The Grand Duke, Constantine, also found himself
engaged in an obstinate contest. The village of Blasowitz, which he
had caused to be occupied, as we have before seen, was attacked, and
carried by the corps under Marshal Bernadotte. The Grand Duke wishing
to check the enemy's progress, left the commanding heights on which he
was posted, and advanced in line upon the enemy's columns. A sharp fire
of musketry ensued. The French sharp-shooters, who covered the columns,
disputed their ground; but were at length driven in by a charge with
the bayonet, which was ordered by the Grand Duke. A sharp cannonade,
attended with much execution, then took place on this point. The
grape-shot made a dreadful carnage; but, at the moment when the Prince
approached the enemy, (who had by this time deployed into line) the
cavalry of the guards, commanded by Marshal Bessiéres, which had been
posted in the intervals of the infantry, made a charge on the Russian
line, which, being without support, was in consequence driven back,
after a brave resistance.

The Grand Duke's regiment of horse-guards, in order to disengage the
infantry, made a charge on the enemy's flank, where it checked and
routed their cavalry, and afterwards attacked the French infantry,
which had advanced to support the cavalry. It was on this occasion that
the regiment of horse-guards captured a French eagle belonging to a
Battalion of the fourth regiment. The corps of guards being obliged
to retire, succeeded, after considerable loss, in rallying and forming
its Battalions on the heights which it had originally quitted; from
whence it continued its movement upon Austerlitz, marching towards
Krzenowitz. The enemy's cavalry again returned to the charge, but was
checked by the horse-guards, and some squadrons of hussars belonging
to the guards, who attacked the French with the greatest impetuosity
at the very moment when they were about to charge the infantry during
its retreat. The horse-guards valiantly attacked, and were closely
engaged with the French horse grenadier guards, who, under the command
of General Rapp, had arrived to reinforce the enemy's cavalry. From
that moment the Russian guards effected their retreat upon Austerlitz,
without farther molestation from the French, who remained on the
heights in front of Blasowitz. Prince Repnin, a colonel of the
horse-guards, was wounded and made prisoner, with some officers of the
same corps. The Russian guards suffered severely, but had few taken
prisoners.

While these things were passing on the left, Prince Bagration, it
has been already stated, had advanced in front of Posorsitz, and had
tried to occupy the heights of Dwaroschna. Lieutenant-general Uwarrow,
with the cavalry under his command, was upon that Prince's left, near
Holubitz; which village, as well as that of Krug, had been occupied
in the manner before described; but Marshal Lannes arriving with his
troops in column on Prince Bagration's left, and on the right of the
cavalry under General Uwarrow, put a stop to the march of the right
of the allies. In order to cover the left of the French army, and to
secure its retreat in case of disaster, Marshal Lannes had posted
eighteen pieces of cannon, protected by the twenty-seventh regiment
of infantry, upon the commanding height, situated between Lesch and
Kowalowitz, to the left of the causeway leading to Brunn: it was the
same height that was to have been occupied by Prince Bagration. This
general was under the necessity of reinforcing his left (on which a
heavy cannonade was opened), and of sending almost the whole of his
cavalry to General Uwarrow, who, in consequence, had about thirty
squadrons under his orders. The enemy succeeded, notwithstanding, in
driving back General Ulanius from the villages of Krug and Holubitz,
and continued to advance in column; their march being protected by a
part of the cavalry under Prince Murat. This gave occasion to some
fine charges on the part of both the Russian and French cavalry.
General Ulanius, who commanded the cavalry with the greatest degree of
intelligence and bravery, succeeded by his efforts in checking the
rapid progress which the enemy would otherwise have made on the right
of the allies. Prince Bagration, after having long maintained himself
at Posorsitz, retired upon the heights of Rausnitz, at the moment when
the Russian guards were quitting the heights in rear of Blasowitz;
and, in the evening, received orders to march to Austerlitz. The high
road to Wischau was in consequence left entirely uncovered, on which
the chief part of the baggage of the army was afterwards captured by
the enemy. Lieutenant-general Uwarrow, with the cavalry, protected
this retreat; and Prince Bagration took post in rear of Austerlitz,
at six o'clock in the evening, while the cavalry under Prince John de
Liechtenstein still continued to occupy the heights in front of that
place.

It now becomes necessary to revert to what was passing at Tellnitz
and Sokolnitz. The first, second, and third columns, were left in
the act of marching upon the points of attack fixed in the primary
disposition, without thinking of the enemy's movements, and without
having discrimination enough to give that direction to their columns,
which the nature of the ground and the position of the enemy ought
to have pointed out, at the very first glance. These three columns
were composed of fifty-five Battalions (without including the Brigade
under General Kamensky, which had not followed them), and were only
opposed to the division under Legrand, not above five or six thousand
strong, and to four thousand of the corps under Marshal Davoust.[15]
Had the left of the allied army observed the enemy's movements
during the battle, and reflected upon his intentions; had it taken
advantage of the ground, and seized the means which it presented for
again concentrating itself, in order to execute a bold manœuvre by the
height on which the chapel above Aujest is situated, and which extends
quite to Pratzen. Had this been done, the battle might yet have been
prolonged, and at least have given a chance that the event of this
day would have been less decisive. The offensive movement on the part
of the French disconcerted the attack of the allies; and, from that
moment, all concert ceased.

The second and third columns were left in Sokolnitz, through which the
head of the latter had passed. It was also stated, that the two columns
had become entangled during a thick fog that took place, and they were
thrown into confusion, in this village, where they mutually embarrassed
each other. At this time that part of the French which had been engaged
in front of Tellnitz retired upon Sokolnitz; General Legrand having
ordered that village to be turned by General Franceschi. When this
took place, the centre of the allies had already been penetrated; and
the French were in possession of the heights of Pratzen. The Russians
who were in Sokolnitz, and those who had passed through it, when they
saw themselves surrounded, immediately surrendered. Lieutenant-general
Przibischewsky, who had the command of the third column, was made
prisoner in the valley of Sokolnitz, together with 6,000 men, being a
part of both columns, which likewise lost the whole of their artillery.

The relics of the second column retreated in disorder upon Aujest, and
what continued embodied fell back upon the first column. This latter,
informed, when too late, of the attack made by the French upon the
centre, intended to move to its support; but took a wrong direction to
be capable of making a diversion in its favour. The Austrian cavalry,
which had been left beyond Tellnitz, retired through that village,
which was now evacuated, leaving some Battalions of infantry, with a
few cavalry on the hill fronting it, as a corps of observation, and to
secure the march of M. de Buxhoevden, who was retiring upon Aujest, by
the same route he had advanced. To protect the flank of the Russian
infantry, the Szeckler hussars under Prince Maurice Liechtenstein,
and O'Reilly's light cavalry, with two regiments of Cossacks, under
General Stutterheim, were advanced upon the plain, between the foot
of the mountains and the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz; General
Nostitz, with the hussars of Hesse Homburg, marched with the column.
The French, after their success in the centre, had already brought
forward their reserve, consisting of 20 Battalions, and had extended
along the crest of the heights that were occupied in the morning by the
allies, from Pratzen to the chapel above Aujest, but, _as yet_, they
were not in force, and had no cannon above that village.[16]

If the first column of the allies, reinforced by some Battalions
from the second, and at that time consisting of above 30 Battalions,
had moved in full force upon these heights, and had attacked them;
if, instead of passing through a defile, (the height above which was
occupied by the enemy,) it had made a charge on the flank of the
French, it is possible that a diversion might have been effected
in favour of the centre; and a defeat in Aujest (which was to be
anticipated) would at least have been avoided. In marching upon the
height above Aujest, the left of the allies might, at least, give a
chance in favour of the battle; while the left, being no longer liable
to be put in confusion, would not have lost so many men. Even supposing
it not to have succeeded in maintaining the height, still it had always
a retreat open upon Scharoditz.

As soon as the column arrived in Aujest, the French rushed like a
torrent down upon the village, in which a sharp fire of musketry at
first took place, but which was of short duration, before they gained
possession of the village. It was the division of Vandamme, which had
formed the extreme right, on the heights of Pratzen, and which, in
proportion as the French crowned that height, had gradually moved upon
the chapel, above Aujest. The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, with a
few Battalions, succeeded in passing through the village, and rejoined
the army near Austerlitz; some confusion took place, and 4,000 men were
taken prisoners in or about Aujest: they also lost their artillery.
Many of the fugitives betook themselves to the lake, which was frozen
over, but not sufficiently so to prevent many from perishing in it.
The enemy, who in the mean time had received his artillery, vigorously
plied the fugitives with it, who afterwards passed through Satschan,
and in the evening succeeded in regaining the rear-guard of the army,
on the heights of Neuhof. After the French had occupied Aujest, the
centre and rear of the first column, which was so very strong, fell
back under the orders of Lieut.-general Dochtorow, upon the plain
between Tellnitz and the lake. This infantry was collected, but not
in good order. Lieut.-general Dochtorow succeeded for a moment in
re-establishing order, after which he considered only how to effect
his retreat. This was very difficult in the execution, and could only
be effected across a very narrow dike between the lakes, on which it
was not possible to march more than two men in front. There was also
reason to apprehend that the French passing by Aujest and Satschan,
round the lake, would thus cut off the dike, the only retreat now left
to the Russians, which would have made it impossible to save this last
wreck of the left wing of the allied army. Lieut.-general Kienmayer,
with the hussars of Hesse Hombourg, was sent over in advance, for
the purpose of securing this retreat, and posted himself upon the
heights between Satschan and Ottnitz, in order to observe this point.
Meanwhile, the Austrian cavalry continued to support General Dochtorow,
and for that purpose advanced into the plain, between Aujest and
Sokolnitz. The generals who commanded O'Reilly's light cavalry and the
Szeckler hussars, advanced to the attack of two French regiments of
dragoons, who approached from Sokolnitz, but seeing that the Russian
infantry was supported, the latter marched by their left, upon the
height near Aujest, and posted themselves at the head of the division
of Vandamme. The conclusion of this battle was very remarkable, since
the French troops of the right wing were turning their backs upon
Austerlitz to attack the remains of the left of the allies; to do
which, the French were now quitting the same heights, whence the allies
had marched in the morning, to attack them. When the first column had
advanced, the lake was the point of appuy to the right of the French;
at _this_ moment it was the appuy to their _left_, while the Russians
had their right upon it.

It was now about two o'clock in the afternoon; the action was decided
and finished along the rest of the line, when the division of Vandamme
advanced to complete it. In rear of Tellnitz, between that village and
Menitz, was a hill of considerable elevation, the right of which was
on the lake. To this hill the Russian infantry retired, still under
the protection of the Austrian cavalry, which was every instant mowed
down by discharges of grape-shot. The village of Tellnitz, which has
already been described as surrounded by ditches, presented the means of
defence, which were taken advantage of; and to give time to the rest
of the column to file off, a regiment of Russian infantry, under Major
General Lewis, was posted behind these ditches, where it was attacked,
but defended itself with resolution. From that time, General Dochtorow
continued his retreat. The cavalry occupied the hill that has been
mentioned, in order to save a great part of this column, which was
again in the greatest possible confusion. The French got possession
of Tellnitz (in which a great many Russian stragglers were taken
prisoners), and bringing the light artillery of the guards down to the
edge of the lake, for the purpose of driving the Austrian cavalry from
their post on the hill, they opened a fire on the flank of O'Reilly's
light cavalry, and destroyed a great part of it. Yet nothing could
prevent this brave regiment from continuing to cover the retreat of the
Russians with the greatest intrepidity.

Colonel Degenfeldt posted his light artillery, which commanded that of
the French, with so much judgment as to damp the ardour of their fire.
The Colonel of the Szeckler hussars was desperately wounded in the head
with a grape-shot.

The Russian infantry, fatigued and exhausted, retired very slowly,
and the cavalry had a long time to support their post; at length,
however, this famous dike, the only remaining retreat to the wreck of
the first column of the allies, and which had justly been the subject
of so much uneasiness, was happily passed; still, however, the French
(who occupied the hill, before in possession of the cavalry, as soon
as they quitted it) continued to fire on them, with their artillery,
till they were completely out of reach. Having passed the dike, the two
Austrian Generals, who protected General Dochtorow's retreat, halted
on the heights in front of Neuhoff, and tried to restore order in the
Russian Battalions, which yet formed a corps of at least 8,000 men.
It was then about four o'clock, and already began to grow dark. The
retreat was then continued by Boschowitz; the troops marched the whole
night, under a heavy fall of rain, which completed the destruction
of the roads; the remaining artillery sunk in the sloughs, and were
abandoned. The Austrian cavalry formed the rear guard, without being
pursued by the French, who halted on the dike. The regiment of O'Reilly
brought off its artillery.

The French army took up the position occupied by the allied army the
preceding night; the latter, after the greatest exertion on the part
of the two Emperors to remedy the general confusion on the field of
battle, retired in the evening completely behind Austerlitz, into the
position of Hodiegitz. But the very considerable loss it had sustained
in killed and wounded, and the number of those who were prisoners,
or missing; more especially of the first, second, third, and fourth
columns, made this army, on its arrival in rear of Austerlitz, in a
very feeble state; at least, as far as regards its disposeable force.
The Austrian cavalry, commanded by General Prince Hohenlohe, (who was
sent to replace Prince John de Liechtenstein that same night, on the
latter being charged with a mission to the Emperor Napoleon:) this
cavalry, alone, had some detachments in front of Austerlitz, and
formed the rear guard of the army. Thus closed this ever-memorable day.

Should any errors of detail have crept into the foregoing narrative,
those military men who have been engaged in actual service will know
how to make allowances for them; they will know, from experience,
how difficult it is to procure exact information, as to the minute
particulars of a great battle. Two persons rarely see the same object
in a similar point of view. But, as to the general arrangement, the
plans, and the principal movements, their execution, and their result,
my pen has been strictly guided by the love of truth, an accurate
knowledge of what was done, and the utmost impartiality.

It will not have escaped the observation of the experienced soldier,
that it is principally to the following causes that the loss of
this battle is to be attributed. To the want of correctness in the
information possessed by the allies, as to the enemy's army; to the
bad plan of attack, supposing the enemy to have been entrenched in
a position which he did not occupy; to the movements executed the
day before the attack, and in sight of the enemy, in order to gain
the right flank of the French; to the great interval between the
columns when they quitted the heights of Pratzen; and to their want
of communication with each other. To these causes may be attributed
the first misfortunes of the Austro-Russian army. But, in spite of
these capital errors, it would still have been possible to restore the
fortune of the day, in favour of the allies, if the second and third
columns had thought less of the primary disposition, and attended
more to the enemy, who, by the boldness of his manœuvre, completely
overthrew the basis on which the plan of attack was founded: or, if
the first column (which possessed the means of doing so), instead of
retiring by Aujest, as before mentioned, had marched to the assistance
of the two former, and, together with them (or at least with what
remained of them) had moved upon the heights, of which the French
had as yet but a precarious possession, so long as the left of the
allies was unbroken, and their extreme right, which made only feeble
demonstrations, continued at Posorsitz.

No computation has been made in this work, as to the loss of the two
armies, at the battle of Austerlitz. It is impossible for any one,
though actually bearing a part in the action, to calculate with any
degree of accuracy the number of killed and wounded on each side.

The carnage made on the 2nd December was very great. The few Austrian
troops there yet remained were not collected on one point; but, as
we have seen, conducted themselves every where with constancy and
animation. The sixth Battalions of the regiments of Wurtemberg and
Reuss-Graitz were the only corps that were in confusion at the time
when the fourth column was defeated. The Russians, at the commencement,
fought with intrepidity, and the guards and Hulans distinguished
themselves for their courage. The French infantry manœuvred with
coolness and precision, fought with courage, and executed its bold
movements with admirable concert. After having made some efforts,
without effect, the Russian Battalions began to waver; confusion and,
finally, complete defeat were the consequences of the imprudent conduct
of the second and third columns.

The fourth column of the allies abandoned a _part_ of its artillery.
The first, second, and third columns, lost the _whole_ of theirs, with
the exception of General Kienmayer's corps, which saved its cannon.
The guns were entangled in the sloughs, as before mentioned, and the
Russian horses, which are more calculated for speed than for draft,
could not drag them out of the deep clay, into which they had sunk. The
number of the Russian prisoners may be computed at 15,000 men; while
their killed and wounded must have been very considerable; in addition
to which, as always happens on such occasions, they had a great number
of soldiers missing.

The loss of the French army must also, necessarily, have been very
considerable. The fire, at the commencement of the action, was too
warmly kept up, not to have done great execution; still, however, the
French force was by no means diminished in the same proportion as
that of the allies. The Generals who were killed, wounded, and taken
prisoners are already well known.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 10: _Note by a French officer._--Marshal Bernadotte was never
seen till the day of the battle. _Two_ days before he had rested on his
arms behind Brunn, and the following day he took post in the rear of
the army, near Lattein. The French generals object in this disposition
was, not only to avoid fatiguing this corps as much as possible, but
also, not to pass the defile of Bellowitz; for not intending to risk an
action, unless the enemy committed great errors, he had determined on
retiring another day's march to the rear, if the enemy manœuvred with
skill. It was not his wish to engage a general action with a superior
army, if it were well posted. The victory might have been doubtful, and
above all, too destructive.

It was, therefore, that the divisions repassed the defiles, each day in
proportion as the enemy's plans became apparent, and the faults he was
about to commit became more probable. Besides, if instead of turning
the right of the French army, (which was what the French general rather
wished) the Russians had brought on an affair among the mountains, by
turning the left. The position of the head-quarters, behind Kritchen,
(which was always occupied by the French) was the point, from whence,
by a wheel to the left, it was the most easy to move diagonally in rear
of the Santon, upon the little hills towards the left.

The movement that may have been seen on our left, was nothing else
than the posting the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli to support
the Santon, because it was apprehended the enemy might, in the course
of the day, attempt to get possession of that height, which was the
key to the emperor's projects. He would not allow the enemy to occupy
positions too near to Girshikowitz and Puntowitz, which might have
prevented the army from forming. For the attack, which had been planned
by the emperor, particularly depended on the rapidity with which the
centre should march on the heights of Pratzen.]

[Footnote 11: _Note by a French officer._--This plan was faulty in
every point of view. Supposing the emperor not to have attacked the
heights of Pratzen, merely keeping possession of the Santon, and the
village of Girshikowitz, he would have made an effort in the centre,
when the enemy attacked him, and the left of the enemy, once arrived at
the wood of Turas, was by that divided from his centre.

All this serves to prove, that many men are capable of manœuvring 15 or
20,000 men, but very few know how to derive all the possible advantage
from an army of 80,000.]

[Footnote 12: Many misfortunes of the allies appear to have originated
in attacking with small corps where they had the power of attacking
in force. It is obvious, that if _one_ Battalion is inadequate to the
service on which it is sent, it will not only suffer severely in the
attempt, but that very attempt will apprize the enemy of the intention,
and enable him to reinforce. Whereas, by at once attacking with
numbers, all opposition is borne down, and the defence, from not being
protracted, is generally less destructive to the assailants: wherever
the French make an attack, it is in force; and _therefore_ they usually
succeed; with the additional advantage, that they are enabled _by
those very numbers_ to maintain themselves in what they have acquired.
_Translator._]

[Footnote 13: Either there were two generals of this name in the
Russian army, or there must be some mistake; since, in a former
part of this work, General Stutterheim says, "The corps under Essen
was at Kremsir on the day of the battle, and was of no sort of
use."--_Translator._]

[Footnote 14: _Note by a French Officer._--It is very true, that the
Austrians fought well, as asserted by the Austrian officer; as also
that the regiment of Salzbourg particularly distinguished itself, and
lost a great number of men by the bayonet.]

[Footnote 15: _Note by a French officer._--General Legrand had only one
of his brigades with him; the other, commanded by General Levasseur,
was posted in reserve, in front of the rivulet, and of the village
of Hobesnitz, from whence it marched on the flank and rear of the
enemy, when he attempted to retake the heights of Pratzen; it was this
unforeseen movement which greatly contributed to the defeat of that
column. Levasseur's brigade fought during the remainder of the day, in
conjunction with the divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme.]

[Footnote 16: _Note by a French officer._--The first column had no
longer the means of resuming the offensive. The reserve, composed of
20 Battalions of grenadiers, had reached the heights in rear of the
divisions St. Hilaire and Vandamme. (The Emperor, with the cavalry
belonging to the guards, was already descending from the chapel of St.
Anthony.) The rear of the column was exposed to Marshal Davoust and
General Legrand. Marshal Bernadotte, _alone_, had 18 Battalions, not
one half of which had burnt priming, and the remainder had been but
little engaged.

The French would have gained the victory with 25,000 men less than
they had, which is a subject of reflection for military men, and
sufficiently shows the influence which the being well commanded has
over the operations, of war.]




The 3d and 4th of December.


The Austro-Russian army had experienced so many difficulties in
regard to its subsistence, on the line of operations it had followed
previous to these offensive movements, that it was abandoned, during
the retreat, in order to direct its march upon Hungary. The allies
quitted the position of Hodiegitz at 12 o'clock at night, and marched
upon Czeitsch, where they arrived on the morning of the third of
December. The column under General Dochtorow arrived at Niskowitz, on
the road to[17]Hungary, where it found General Kienmayer then forming
the rear-guard of the allies. This Russian column continued its
march, for the purpose of rejoining the army at Czeitsch; but lost a
considerable number of men during the night, who had straggled and lost
themselves in the woods and villages. The Austrian cavalry, which had
protected the retreat of these wrecks of the left wing of the combined
army, and which was a part of the corps under M. de Kienmayer, halted
at Niskowitz. Lieut.-General Prince Bagration was a league in rear
of this Austrian corps, occupying the heights of Urschutz. Between
Niskowitz and Urschutz is a large wood, under cover of which, the
French had it in their power to surround and cut off the corps under
M. de Kienmayer, which was thus too much pushed forward. He therefore
remained in this position no longer than was necessary to give time
to the stragglers of the army, and to some baggage to fall back upon
Urschutz, and to obtain some knowledge of the enemy's movements. As
soon as the French, who had entered Austerlitz in the morning, began
to advance, General Kienmayer fell back upon General Bagration, and
in front of Saruschitz formed the support of that Prince's corps. A
detachment of O'Reilly's light cavalry, and some Cosacks, were sent
to Stanitz, to watch that road. The corps under M. de Merveldt had
received orders to retire from Lunenbourg, in the direction of Goeding,
to observe the country on the left, and principally the two roads of
Auspitz and Nicolsbourg.

On the third of December, the French army advanced in the following
manner: The cavalry, under Prince Murat, which had pushed forward
detachments upon Rausnitz and Wischau (on the evening of the same
day on which the battle was fought) pursued that route, and made
immense booty: it advanced beyond Prosnitz, and then sent out strong
detachments upon Kremsir.

Marshal Lannes at first took the same road, and then moved by his
right, to gain the right of the allies by Butschowitz and Stanitz.
Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, the imperial guards, and the grenadiers
of the reserve, were posted on the route towards Hungary, as soon as
the Emperor Napoleon had received information of the direction taken by
the allied army; they advanced, however, but slowly; probably with a
view to give time to the extreme right of their army to gain ground on
the left of the allies.

Marshal Davoust marched upon the left flank of the Austro-Russian
army, by the route of Nicolsbourg, (in which was the division of
Gudin,) and by that of Auspitz, in which was the remainder of that
corps; these two roads unite within half a league of Goeding.

Prince Bagration had placed some out-posts in the wood of Urschutz.
The French, about two o'clock in the afternoon, began to reconnoitre
it, obtained possession of the wood, and established themselves on the
skirts of it. A trifling affair ensued, which lasted about two hours,
and which terminated by General Bagration maintaining his post, which,
however, he evacuated that evening, retiring towards Czeitsch; General
Kienmayer posted himself in his front, upon the heights of Nasedlowitz,
pushing forward his out-posts in the direction of Urschutz.

The 4th of December the allied army crossed the river March, and
arrived at Hollitsch, much diminished in numbers, and with very few
effectives, compared with the army to which it was opposed. The Emperor
Alexander took up his quarters in the castle of Hollitsch, while the
Emperor of Germany remained at Czeitsch, to be ready for the interview
which was about to take place with the Emperor Napoleon.

An armistice had been agreed on, to take place at day-break on the
4th December. Prince John de Liechtenstein had returned from the
head-quarters of the French the evening before with this intelligence.
But their advanced guard, probably from not having received timely
orders on this subject, advanced to attack the fore-posts of M. de
Kienmayer's corps, which remained upon the heights of Nasedlowitz.
Prince Bagration then retired quite behind Czeitsch. However, this
misunderstanding, and the firing consequent upon it, were soon put a
stop to. A suspension of arms took place, and the space of about a
league and a half was left between the out-posts of the two armies.
That of the French had advanced, and taken up its position in several
lines, between Damborschutz, and Saruschutz, in front of Urschutz.

It was then that the famous interview, which gave peace to the two
empires, took place between the Emperor Francis II. and Napoleon;
it passed at a little distance from the village of Nasedlowitz,
near a mill, by the side of the high-road, and in the open air. The
conversation of these two sovereigns lasted some time, when the
Emperor of Germany returned to Czeitsch, which he reached in the
evening, and immediately set about informing his ally of the result
of the interview.--For this purpose, an Austrian general was to be
sent immediately to Hollitsch; and General Savary, aid-de-camp to the
Emperor Napoleon, was named by his sovereign, in the first instance
to attend the Emperor Francis II. and afterwards to accompany the
general that should be sent to Hollitsch. In case his Majesty, the
Emperor of all the Russias, should consent to the conditions of the
armistice, General Savary was empowered to countermand the march of
Marshal Davoust's corps, and was afterwards to accompany the Austrian
general, to acquaint the corps of M. de Merveldt with the suspension of
arms. General Stutterheim, who was with the rear-guard of the corps,
near which the interview took place, was charged by his sovereign
with this commission. It was twelve o'clock at night before these two
generals reached Hollitsch, where they had the happiness of obtaining
immediate access to the presence of the Emperor Alexander, who received
them with kindness, and threw no obstacle in the way of the armistice.
Upon this they again departed immediately to find out the corps under
M. de Merveldt, and to countermand that under Marshal Davoust: the
former they fell in with at two o'clock in the morning, retiring upon
Goeding. M. de Merveldt, we have already seen, was charged with the
protection of the left flank of the Russian army; but the whole force
under his orders did not exceed 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, which
made it impossible for him to impede the march of the right of the
French army. The two generals succeeded in falling in with Marshal
Davoust at Josephsdorf, at about four o'clock in the morning. General
Gudin's advanced guard was at Neudorf. According to the agreement
between the Emperor Francis II. and Napoleon, all the troops remained
in the exact situation in which they were found upon the cessation of
hostilities being made known to them. The following day Prince John
de Liechtenstein returned to Austerlitz (which was the head-quarter of
the Emperor Napoleon) for the purpose of negociating the boundary to
be observed by the respective armies during the continuation of the
armistice which preceded the peace concluded between Austria and France.

On the 4th December, the very day on which the armistice took place,
the Archduke Ferdinand, who could not be made acquainted with it, and
who had received orders to advance and observe the Bavarians that
remained at Iglau, after the departure of Marshal Bernadotte: on this
day, that prince attacked General Wrede (to keep him in check) with
some troops, the remnant of his corps; with which he succeeded in
driving him from Iglau.

The Archduke Charles, obliged to retreat in consequence of the unheard
of catastrophe that happened to the German army, arrived in Hungary,
with his army quite entire, after having at Caldiero incapacitated the
French army of Italy from doing him any mischief.

It appears, then, that wherever their generals allowed the Austrian
troops to fight, they fought well; and it would be a very rash, and a
very false opinion, to impute the misfortunes of the war of 1805 to
them. In that, as well as in all former instances, the Austrian army
distinguished itself by its courage, its devotion to the cause, its
constancy in supporting unheard of privations, and by its implicit
obedience. It was at Ulm that these brave troops, victims to the
conduct of M. Mack, were subjected to that heart-breaking fate which
was the destruction of the German army. But, at Ulm, many regiments
that had not fired a single shot were obliged to surrender, in
consequence of the operations pursued, and in pursuance of orders given
by that M. Mack, who talked of _burying himself in the ruins of Ulm;
who always talked of death, yet feared to die_.


THE END.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: _Note by a French officer._--It is too ridiculous to
suppose that the Russian army, without artillery, without baggage, and
without provisions, would have preferred a retreat by its flank (which
exposed it to the danger of being surrounded by the French army) to
that upon Olmutz: but, in the course of this day, it lost its line of
operation, which was the high road to Olmutz, and nothing remained
for it but to move upon Goeding; and it did not gain much by that;
for, had it not been for the too great clemency of the Emperor, and
the armistice, which was concluded, the remains of the Russian army
would have been entirely destroyed; as may be perceived from what
the Austrian officer lets fall a little farther on.--The loss of a
battle is no proof of want of talent in a general: but the loss of his
artillery and baggage, of his line of operations, and his retreat, are
positive evidence that he is ignorant of the art of war.

An army, so commanded, never could make head against a French army in
so great and difficult a warfare. The emperor took advantage of the
faults committed by the enemy, who would have committed yet greater
errors had the emperor retired behind Brunn: the latter would have
been in greater force; and had already planned new combinations, in
the course of which, the general who possessed most experience, and
the greatest genius for the art of war, must naturally have taken his
adversary at a disadvantage.]




TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY.


T. Goddard takes this opportunity of returning thanks to his numerous
Military Friends for the liberal encouragement he has already
experienced, and begs leave to assure them, that such attention shall
be paid to their future favours as will, he trusts, ensure to him a
continuance of that patronage and preference he has already met with.

He has also the honour to inform them, they can at any time be
immediately supplied with every Publication connected with the finance,
interior management, economy, and discipline of the army. Printed
Review, Inspection, and Monthly Returns for Cavalry and Infantry;
Returns of Arms, Clothing, and Appointments; Attestations, Furloughs,
Discharges, Regimental and Orderly Books, Paymasters Account Books,
and Stationary of every description, for home or foreign service.
Regulations, Instructions, &c.

General and Staff Officers supplied with Boxes of Stationary, fitted up
in the most convenient and portable manner, with every article allowed
by the King's Regulations.

       *       *       *       *       *

New and correct forms of Staff Contingent Accounts, with all the
required Certificates printed.

       *       *       *       *       *

The following publications are particularly recommended:

       *       *       *       *       *

The AIDE-DE-CAMP, or STAFF OFFICER'S ASSISTANT, containing correct
statements of the pay, allowances, and contingencies granted to every
officer when employed on the staff in Great Britain.

       *       *       *       *       *

INSTRUCTIONS for OFFICERS EMPLOYED ON, or EMBARKING FOR FOREIGN
SERVICE; containing his Majesty's Regulations, together with forms
and complete directions for stating and certifying claims for losses
of personal baggage, camp equipage, chargers, and bat horses, whether
lost, or shot for the glanders. Necessaries of Non-commissioned
Officers and Private Soldiers, Regimental Clothing and Appointments,
&c. &c. &c. To which are added all the new Regulations relative to the
Increased Pay, Allowances, and Passage Money of Men and Officers, both
at Home and on Embarking for Foreign Stations, with a variety of other
necessary information.

       *       *       *       *       *

A CHART, shewing the comparative Rank of every Officer in the Army,
Navy, Marines, Ordnance, Artillery, Engineers, Medical Department,
Militia, Volunteers, &c. &c. &c. &c.

       *       *       *       *       *

An OFFICER'S LAST LEGACY to his Wife and Family; being a complete
Collection of the Rules, Orders, Regulations, and Instructions,
relative to the Pension and Allowances granted by Government to the
Widows and Orphans of Officers dying in his Majesty's Service, whether
belonging to the _Army_, _Navy_, _Artillery_, or _Marines_.

Together with correct Tables of the Pensions, as increased from the
25th of June, 1806; as also of the King's Bounty to the Widows and
Relations of Officers Killed in Action or Dying of their Wounds, and
Forms of the Applications, Affidavits, and Certificates, necessary for
obtaining the same, &c. &c. &c.




Marchant, Printer, 3, Greville-Street, Holborn.

[Transcriber's Note: Original spelling, including probable inconsistencies,
has been retained.]