[Cover Illustration]




                                 TRIAL
                                   OF
                        THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

                                 BEFORE

                           THE INTERNATIONAL
                           MILITARY TRIBUNAL

                           N U R E M B E R G
                    14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946


                             [Illustration]


     P U B L I S H E D   A T   N U R E M B E R G ,   G E R M A N Y
                                1 9 4 7




        This volume is published in accordance with the
        direction of the International Military Tribunal by
        the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
        of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.




                               VOLUME XII



                       O F F I C I A L   T E X T

                              I N   T H E

                            ENGLISH LANGUAGE



                         P R O C E E D I N G S

                        18 April 1946—2 May 1946




                                CONTENTS


       One Hundred and Eleventh Day, Thursday, 18 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                              1
                    Afternoon Session                           33

       One Hundred and Twelfth Day, Tuesday, 23 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                             64
                    Afternoon Session                           97

       One Hundred and Thirteenth Day, Wednesday, 24 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                            136
                    Afternoon Session                          167

       One Hundred and Fourteenth Day, Thursday, 25 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                            196
                    Afternoon Session                          226

       One Hundred and Fifteenth Day, Friday, 26 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                            263
                    Afternoon Session                          292

       One Hundred and Sixteenth Day, Monday, 29 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                            317
                    Afternoon Session                          350

       One Hundred and Seventeenth Day, Tuesday, 30 April 1946,
                    Morning Session                            393
                    Afternoon Session                          429

       One Hundred and Eighteenth Day, Wednesday, 1 May 1946,
                    Morning Session                            460
                    Afternoon Session                          494

       One Hundred and Nineteenth Day, Thursday, 2 May 1946,
                    Morning Session                            527
                    Afternoon Session                          555




                      ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH DAY
                         Thursday, 18 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Dr. Seidl.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hans Frank): Mr. President,
Members of the Tribunal, on 9 April of this year, deviating from the
rule made by the Tribunal, I made the application that I should first be
allowed to present the documents, then call the witnesses, and then at
the end examine the defendant as a witness. I do not know whether the
Tribunal is already in possession of the document books. I have
ascertained that Volume I of the document book was translated by 8
April, Volume II and III on 11 April, and Volume IV and V a few days
later. At any rate, I have not yet received any document books myself,
for the reason that the office concerned has not yet received permission
to bind the books.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I thought I asked about this, not yesterday, but
the day before yesterday—yes; and you said you were perfectly ready to
go on.

DR. SEIDL: I had been told that the books had been translated, and I
naturally assumed that these books would also be bound. Yesterday I
discovered that this is not the case. At any rate, the fault is not
mine.

THE PRESIDENT: I was not suggesting that there was any fault on your
part.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): In
the first place, we did not have much to go over with Dr. Seidl. The
agreement was reached with him the night before last about 6 o’clock or
a little afterwards. Thereafter the materials were put into the process
of preparation, and there are 500 pages. They have just not been
completed, and it is not so that the people did not receive authority to
go ahead. They have not been able to complete their work and there will
be some delay.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you can go on with your witnesses. You have
the defendant himself to call and several other witnesses.

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And the documents will no doubt be ready by then. We are
rising this evening at half past four, and by the time that the Tribunal
reassembles, by Tuesday morning, no doubt all the documents will be
ready. As to your application, the Tribunal has considered the
application and sees no reason to depart from its ordinary rule that the
defendant should be called first; that is to say, if you intend to call
the defendant.

DR. SEIDL: Oh yes, I intend to examine the defendant; but in the
interests of accelerating the proceedings, I suggested that the other
witnesses should be heard first so that the examination of the defendant
might be as short as possible. It is possible that he can then answer a
number of questions merely by saying “yes” or “no.” Another reason why I
consider this procedure to be the most expedient is because a proper
examination of the defendant is only possible if I have the document
books at hand at the same time. That necessity does not apply to the
other witnesses. I should, therefore, beg the Tribunal to give me
permission so that I can first examine the witnesses who are already in
the witnesses’ room.

THE PRESIDENT: The documents are all, or nearly all, I imagine, in
German and can be put to the defendant in the course of his examination;
and the Tribunal think, as they have already said, that calling the
defendant first is in the interests of expedition; and they, therefore,
feel they must adhere to their rule.

DR. SEIDL: Very well. In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal,
I call the Defendant Dr. Hans Frank to the witness stand.

[_The Defendant Frank took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give your full name?

HANS FRANK (Defendant): Hans Frank.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I, swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down, please.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, when and where were you born?

FRANK: I was born on 23 May 1900 at Karlsruhe, in Baden.

DR. SEIDL: Will you please give the Tribunal a brief outline of your
education?

FRANK: In 1919 I finished my studies at the Gymnasium, and in 1926 I
passed the final state law examination, which completed my legal
training.

DR. SEIDL: And what profession did you follow after that?

FRANK: I had several legal posts. I worked as a lawyer; as a member of
the teaching staff of a technical college; and then I worked principally
as legal adviser to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist German
Workers Party.

DR. SEIDL: Since when have you been a member of the NSDAP?

FRANK: I joined the German Labor Party, which was the forerunner of the
National Socialist German Workers Party, in 1919, but did not join the
newly formed National Socialist Workers Party at the time. In 1923 I
joined the Movement in Munich as a member of the SA; and eventually, so
to speak, I joined the NSDAP for the first time in 1927.

DR. SEIDL: Were you ever a member of the SS?

FRANK: I have never been a member of the SS.

DR. SEIDL: That means you have never had a rank of an SS
Obergruppenführer or General of the SS?

FRANK: I never had the rank of an SS Obergruppenführer or SS General.

DR. SEIDL: Not even honorary?

FRANK: No, not even honorary.

DR. SEIDL: You were a member of the SA. What was the last position you
held in that?

FRANK: I was Obergruppenführer in the SA at the end, and this was an
honorary position.

DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold in the NSDAP during the various
periods, and what functions did you exercise?

FRANK: In 1929 I became the head of the legal department of the Supreme
Party Directorate of the NSDAP. In that capacity I was appointed
Reichsleiter of the NSDAP by Adolf Hitler in 1931. I held this position
until I was recalled in 1942. These are the principal offices I have
held in the Party.

DR. SEIDL: Until the seizure of power you concerned yourself mainly with
legal questions within the Party, did you not?

FRANK: I dealt with legal questions in the interest of Adolf Hitler and
the NSDAP and its members during the difficult years of struggle for the
victory of the Movement.

DR. SEIDL: What were your basic ideas regarding the concept of a state
controlled by a legal system?

FRANK: That idea, as far as I was concerned, was contained in Point 19
of the Party program, which speaks of German common law to be created.
In the interest of accelerating the proceedings, I do not wish to
present my ideas in detail. My first endeavor was to save the core of
the German system of justice: the independent judiciary.

My idea was that even in a highly developed Führer State, even under a
dictatorship, the danger to the community and to the legal rights of the
individual is at least lessened if judges who do not depend on the State
Leadership can still administer justice in the community. That means, to
my mind, that the question of a state ruled by law is to all intents and
purposes identical with the question of the existence of the independent
administration of law. Most of my struggles and discussions with Hitler,
Himmler, and Bormann during these years were more and more focused on
this particular subject. Only after the independent judiciary in the
National Socialist Reich had been definitely done away with did I give
up my work and my efforts as hopeless.

DR. SEIDL: You were also a member of the Reichstag?

FRANK: In 1930 I became a member of the Reichstag.

DR. SEIDL: What posts did you hold after 1933?

FRANK: First, I was Bavarian State Minister of Justice, and after the
ministries of justice in the various states were dissolved I became
Reich Minister without portfolio. In 1933 I became the President of the
Academy of German Law, which I had founded. I was the Reich Leader of
the National Socialist Jurists Association, which was later on given the
name of “Rechtswahrerbund.” In 1933 and 1934 I was Reich Commissioner
for Justice, and in 1939 I became Governor General of the Government
General in Kraków.

DR. SEIDL: What were the aims of the Academy of German Law of which you
were the founder?

FRANK: These aims are written down in the Reich Law regarding the
Academy of German Law. The main task, the central task, of that Academy
was to carry out Point 19 of the Party program to bring German Common
Law into line with our national culture.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Academy of German Law have definite functions, or
could it act only in an advisory capacity?

FRANK: The Academy of German Law was the meeting place of the most
prominent legal minds in Germany in the theoretical and practical
fields. Right from the beginning I attached no importance to the
question whether the members were members of the Party or not. Ninety
percent of the members of the Academy of German Law were not members of
the Party. Their task was to prepare laws, and they worked somewhat on
the lines of an advisory committee in a well-organized parliament. It
was also my idea that the advisory committees of the Academy should
replace the legal committees of the German Reichstag, which was
gradually fading into the background in the Reich.

In the main the Academy helped to frame only laws of an economic or
social nature, since owing to the development of the totalitarian regime
it became more and more impossible to co-operate in other spheres.

DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly, then the governmental
administration of law was solely in the hands of the Reich Minister of
Justice, and that was not you.

FRANK: No, I was not Reich Minister of Justice. The Reich Minister of
Justice, Dr. Gürtner, was, however, not competent for the entire field
of legislation but merely for those laws which came within the scope of
his ministry. Legislation in the Reich, in accordance with the Enabling
Act, was in the hands of the Führer and Reich Chancellor and the Reich
Government as a body. Consequently my name appears in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ at the bottom of one law only, and that is the law
regarding the Reintroduction of Compulsory Military Service. However, I
am proud that my name stands at the end of that law.

DR. SEIDL: You have stated earlier that during 1933 and 1934 you were
Bavarian Minister of Justice.

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: In that capacity did you have an opportunity of voicing your
opinion on the question of concentration camps, and what were the
circumstances?

FRANK: I learned that the Dachau concentration camp was being
established in connection with a report which came to me from the Senior
Public Prosecutor’s Office in Munich on the occasion of the killing of
the Munich attorney, Dr. Strauss. This Public Prosecutor’s Office
complained to me, after I had given them orders to investigate the
killing, that the SS had refused them admission to the Dachau
concentration camp. Thereupon I had Reich Governor, General Von Epp,
call a meeting where I produced the files regarding this killing and
pointed out the illegality of such an action on the part of the SS and
stated that so far representatives from the German Public Prosecutor’s
Office had always been able to investigate any death which evoked a
suspicion that a crime had been committed and that I had not become
aware so far of any departure from this principle in the Reich. After
that I continued protesting against this method to Dr. Gürtner, the
Reich Minister of Justice and at the same time Attorney General. I
pointed out that this meant the beginning of a development which
threatened the legal system in an alarming manner.

At Heinrich Himmler’s request Adolf Hitler intervened personally in this
matter, and he used his power to quash any legal proceedings. The
proceedings were ordered to be quashed. I handed in my resignation as
Minister of Justice, but it was not accepted.

DR. SEIDL: When did you become Governor General of the occupied Polish
territories, and where were you when you were informed of this
appointment?

FRANK: On 24 August 1939, as an officer in the reserve, I had to join my
regiment in Potsdam. I was busy training my company; and on 17
September, or it may have been 16, I was making my final preparations
before going to the front when a telephone call came from the Führer’s
special train ordering me to go to the Führer at once.

The following day I traveled to Upper Silesia where the Führer’s special
train was stationed at that time; and in a very short conversation,
which lasted less than ten minutes, he gave me the mission, as he put
it, to take over the functions of Civil Governor for the occupied Polish
territories.

At that time the whole of the conquered Polish territories was under the
administrative supreme command of a military commander, General Von
Rundstedt. Toward the end of September I was attached to General Von
Rundstedt’s staff as Chief of Administration, and my task was to do the
administrative work in the Military Government. In a short time,
however, it was found that this method did not work; and when the Polish
territories were divided into the part which was incorporated into the
German Reich and the part which then became the Government General, I
was appointed Governor General as from 26 October.

DR. SEIDL: You have mentioned the various positions which you held over
a number of years. I now ask you: Did you, in any of the positions you
held in the Party or the State, play any vital part in the political
events of the last 20 years?

FRANK: In my own sphere I did everything that could possibly be expected
of a man who believes in the greatness of his people and who is filled
with fanaticism for the greatness of his country, in order to bring
about the victory of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist movement.

I never participated in far-reaching political decisions, since I never
belonged to the circle of the closest associates of Adolf Hitler,
neither was I consulted by Adolf Hitler on general political questions,
nor did I ever take part in conferences about such problems. Proof of
this is that throughout the period from 1933 to 1945 I was received only
six times by Adolf Hitler personally, to report to him about my sphere
of activities.

DR. SEIDL: What share did you have in the legislation of the Reich?

FRANK: I have already told you that, and there is no need to give a
further answer.

DR. SEIDL: Did you, as a Reich Minister or in any other State or Party
post want this war, or did you desire a war in violation of treaties
entered into?

FRANK: War is not a thing one wants. War is terrible. We have lived
through it; we did not want the war. We wanted a great Germany and the
restoration of the freedom and welfare, the health and happiness of our
people. It was my dream, and probably the dream of every one of us, to
bring about a revision of the Versailles Treaty by peaceful means, which
was provided for in that very treaty. But as in the world of treaties,
between nations also, it is only the one who is strong who is listened
to; Germany had to become strong first before we could negotiate. This
is how I saw the development as a whole: the strengthening of the Reich,
reinstatement of its sovereignty in all spheres, and by these means to
free ourselves of the intolerable shackles which had been imposed upon
our people. I was happy, therefore, when Adolf Hitler, in a most
wonderful rise to power, unparalleled in the history of mankind,
succeeded by the end of 1938 in achieving most of these aims; and I was
equally unhappy when in 1939, to my dismay, I realized more and more
that Adolf Hitler appeared to be departing from that course and to be
following other methods.

THE PRESIDENT: This seems to have been covered by what the Defendant
Göring told us, by what the Defendant Ribbentrop told us.

DR. SEIDL: The witness has already completed his statement on this
point.

Witness, what was your share in the events of Poland after 1939?

FRANK: I bear the responsibility; and when, on 30 April 1945, Adolf
Hitler ended his life, I resolved to reveal that responsibility of mine
to the world as clearly as possible.

I did not destroy the 43 volumes of my diary, which report on all these
events and the share I had in them; but of my own accord I handed them
voluntarily to the officers of the American Army who arrested me.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you feel guilty of having committed crimes in
violation of international conventions or crimes against humanity?

THE PRESIDENT: That is a question that the Tribunal has got to decide.

DR. SEIDL: Then I shall drop the question.

Witness, what do you have to say regarding the accusations which have
been brought against you in the Indictment?

FRANK: To these accusations I can only say that I ask the Tribunal to
decide upon the degree of my guilt at the end of my case.

I myself, speaking from the very depths of my feelings and having lived
through the 5 months of this trial, want to say that now after I have
gained a full insight into all the horrible atrocities which have been
committed, I am possessed by a deep sense of guilt.

DR. SEIDL: What were your aims when you took over the post of Governor
General?

FRANK: I was not informed about anything. I heard about special action
commandos of the SS here during this trial. In connection with and
immediately following my appointment, special powers were given to
Himmler, and my competence in many essential matters was taken away from
me. A number of Reich offices governed directly in matters of economy,
social policy, currency policy, food policy, and therefore, all I could
do was to lay upon myself the task of seeing to it that amid the
conflagration of this war, some sort of an order should be built up
which would enable men to live. The work I did out there, therefore,
cannot be judged in the light of the moment, but must be judged in its
entirety, and we shall have to come to that later. My aim was to
safeguard justice, without doing harm to our war effort.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the police, and particularly the Security Police
and SD, come under your jurisdiction in the Government General?

FRANK: The Higher SS and Police Leaders were in principle subordinate to
the Reichsführer SS Himmler. The SS did not come under my command, and
any orders or instructions which I might have given would not have been
obeyed. Witness Bühler will cover this question in detail.

The general arrangement was that the Higher SS and Police Leader was
formally attached to my office, but in fact, and by reason of his
activities, he was purely an agent of the Reichsführer SS Himmler. This
state of affairs, even as early as November 1939, was the cause of my
first offer to resign which I made to Adolf Hitler. It was a state of
affairs which made things extremely difficult as time went by. In spite
of all my attempts to gain control of these matters, the drift
continued. An administration without a police executive is powerless and
there were many proofs of this. The police officers, so far as
discipline, organization, pay, and orders were concerned, came
exclusively under the German Reich police system and were in no way
connected with the administration of the Government General. The
officials of the SS and Police therefore did not consider that they were
attached to the Government General in matters concerning their duty,
neither was the police area called “Police Area, Government General.”
Moreover the Higher SS and Police Leader did not call himself “SS and
Police Leader in the Government General” but “Higher SS and Police
Leader East.” However, I do not propose to go into details at this
point.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the concentration camps in the Government
General come under you, and did you have anything to do with their
administration?

FRANK: Concentration camps were entirely a matter for the police and had
nothing to do with the administration. Members of the civil
administration were officially prohibited from entering the camps.

DR. SEIDL: Have you yourself ever been in a concentration camp?

FRANK: In 1935 I participated in a visit to the Dachau concentration
camp, which had been organized for the Gauleiters. That was the only
time that I have entered a concentration camp.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by a decree of the Führer, a State
Secretariat for Security in the Government General was created. The date
is 7 May 1942. What was the reason for creating that State Secretariat?

FRANK: The establishment of this State Secretariat was one of the many
attempts to solve the problem of the police in the Government General. I
was very happy about it at the time, because I thought now we had found
the way to solve the problem. I am certain it would have worked if
Himmler and Krüger had adhered to the principle of this decree, which
was co-operation and not working against each other. But before long it
transpired that this renewed attempt, too, was merely camouflage; and
the old conditions continued.

DR. SEIDL: On 3 June 1942, on the basis of this Führer decree, another
decree was issued regarding the transfer of official business to the
State Secretary for Security. Is that true?

FRANK: I assume so, if you have the document. I cannot remember the
details of course.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I shall ask the witness Bilfinger about this
point.

FRANK: But I should like to add something to that. Wherever the SS is
discussed here, the SS and the police are considered as forming one
body. It would not be right of me if I did not correct that wrong
conception. I have known during the course of these years so many
honest, clean, and upright soldiers among the SS, and especially among
the Waffen-SS and the police, that when judging here the problem of the
SS in regard to the criminal nature of their activities, one can draw
the same clear distinction as in the case of any of the other social
groups. The SS, as such, behaved no more criminally than any other
social groups would behave when taking part in political events. The
dreadful thing was that the responsible chief, and a number of other SS
men who unfortunately had been given considerable powers, were able to
abuse the loyal attitude which is so typical of the German soldier.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, another question. In the decree concerning the
creation of the State Secretariat for Security, it is ordered that the
State Secretary—which in this case was the Higher SS and Police
Leader—before making basic decisions, had to ask you for your approval.
Was that done?

FRANK: No, I was never called upon to give my approval and that was the
reason why before long this, my last, attempt proved to be a failure.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader and the SS
Obergruppenführer Krüger, in particular, obey orders which you had given
them?

FRANK: Please, would you repeat the question? It did not come through
too well. And please, Dr. Seidl, do not speak quite so loudly.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, who at the same
time was the State Secretary for Security, obey orders which you gave
him in your capacity as Governor General?

FRANK: Not even a single order. On the strength of this new decree I
repeatedly gave orders. These orders were supposedly communicated to
Heinrich Himmler; and as his agreement was necessary, these orders were
never carried out. Some special cases can be confirmed by the State
Secretary Bühler when he is here as a witness.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police,
before he carried out security police measures in the Government
General, ever obtain your approval?

FRANK: Not in a single case.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted a document, L-37, as Exhibit
Number USA-506. It is a letter from the Commander of the Security Police
and SD of the District Radom, addressed to the branch office at
Tomassov. This document contains the following:

    “On 28 June 1944 the Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the
    following order:

    “The security situation in the Government General has
    deteriorated so much during the recent months that the most
    radical means and the most severe measures must now be employed
    against these alien assassins and saboteurs. The Reichsführer SS
    in agreement with the Governor General, has given order that in
    every case of assassination or attempted assassination of
    Germans, not only the perpetrators shall be shot when caught,
    but that in addition, all their male relatives shall also be
    executed, and their female relatives above the age of sixteen
    put into a concentration camp.”

FRANK: As I have said that I was never called upon by the Reichsführer
SS Himmler to give my approval to such orders, your question has already
been answered. In this case, I was not called upon either.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you at least informed of such orders from the
Reichsführer SS Himmler or from the Higher SS and Police Leader East
before they were carried out?

FRANK: The reason why this was not done was always the same. I was told
that as Poles were living not only in the Government General but also in
those territories which had been incorporated into the Reich, the fight
against the Polish resistance movement had to be carried on by unified
control from a central office, and this central office was Heinrich
Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what jurisdiction did you have in the general
administration?

FRANK: I think it would accelerate the proceedings if the Witness Bühler
could testify to these details. If the Tribunal so desires I will of
course answer this question now. In the main I was concerned with the
setting up of the usual administrative departments, such as food,
culture, finance, science, _et cetera_.

DR. SEIDL: Were there representatives of the Polish and Ukrainian
population in the Government General?

FRANK: Yes. The representation of the Polish and Ukrainian population
was on a regional basis, and I united the heads of the bodies of
representatives from the various districts in the so-called subsidiary
committees. There was a Polish and an Ukrainian subsidiary committee.
Count Ronikier was the head of the Polish committee for a number of
years, and at the head of the Ukrainian committee was Professor
Kubiowicz. I made it obligatory for all my offices to contact these
subsidiary committees on all questions of a general nature, and this
they did. I myself was in constant contact with both of them. Complaints
were brought to me there and we had free discussions. My complaints and
memoranda to the Führer were mostly based on the reports from these
subsidiary committees.

A second form in which the population participated in the administration
of the Government General was by means of the lowest administrative
units, which throughout the Government General were in the hands of the
native population. Every ten to twenty villages had as their head a
so-called _Wojt_. This Polish word _Wojt_ is the same as the German word
“Vogt”—V-o-g-t. He was, so to speak, the lowest administrative unit.

A third form of participation by the population in the administration
was the employment of about 280,000 Poles and Ukrainians as government
officials or civil servants in the public services of the Government
General, including the postal and railway services.

DR. SEIDL: In what numerical proportion did the German civil servants
stand to the Polish and Ukrainian civil servants?

FRANK: The proportion varied. The number of German civil servants was
very small. There were times when, in the whole of the Government
General, the area of which is 150,000 square kilometers—that means half
the size of Italy—there were not more than 40,000 German civil
servants. That means to one German civil servant there were on the
average at least six non-German civil servants and employees.

DR. SEIDL: Which territories did you rule as Governor General?

FRANK: Poland, which had been jointly conquered by Germany and the
Soviet Union, was divided first of all between the Soviet Union and the
German Reich. Of the 380,000 square kilometers, which is the approximate
size of the Polish State, approximately 200,000 square kilometers went
to the Soviet Union and approximately 170,000 to 180,000 square
kilometers to the German Reich. Please do not ask me for exact figures;
that was roughly the proportion.

That part of Poland which was taken over into Soviet Russian territory
was immediately treated as an integral part of the Soviet Union. The
border signs in the east of the Government General were the usual Reich
border signs of the Soviet Union, as from 1939. That part which came to
Germany was divided thus: 90,000 square kilometers were left to the
Government General and the remainder was incorporated into the German
Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think there is any charge against the defendant
on the ground that the civil administration was bad. The charge is that
crimes were committed, and the details of the administration between the
Government General and the department in the Reich are not really in
question.

DR. SEIDL: The only reason, Mr. President, why I put that question was
to demonstrate the difficulties with which the administration had to
cope right from the beginning in this territory, for an area which
originally represented one economic unit was now split into three
different parts.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I am coming now to the next question. Did
you ever have hostages shot?

FRANK: My diary contains the facts. I myself have never had hostages
shot.

DR. SEIDL: Did you ever participate in the annihilation of Jews?

FRANK: I say “yes”; and the reason why I say “yes” is because, having
lived through the 5 months of this trial, and particularly after having
heard the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow
me to throw the responsibility solely on these minor people. I myself
have never installed an extermination camp for Jews, or promoted the
existence of such camps; but if Adolf Hitler personally has laid that
dreadful responsibility on his people, then it is mine too, for we have
fought against Jewry for years; and we have indulged in the most
horrible utterances—my own diary bears witness against me. Therefore,
it is no more than my duty to answer your question in this connection
with “yes.” A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany
will not have been erased.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what was your policy for the recruiting of laborers
for the Reich when you were Governor General?

FRANK: I beg your pardon?

DR. SEIDL: What policy did you pursue for the recruiting of labor for
the Reich in your capacity as Governor General?

FRANK: The policy is laid down in my decrees. No doubt they will be held
against me by the Prosecution, and I consider it will save time if I
answer that question later, with the permission of the Tribunal.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler give you any instructions as to how you
should carry out your administration as Governor General?

FRANK: During the first 10 minutes of the audience in his special train
Adolf Hitler instructed me to see to it that this territory, which had
been utterly devastated—all the bridges had been blown up; the railways
no longer functioned, and the population was in a complete turmoil—was
put into order somehow; and that I should see to it that this territory
should become a factor which would contribute to the improvement of the
terribly difficult economic and war situation of the German Reich.

DR. SEIDL: Did Adolf Hitler support you in your work as Governor
General?

FRANK: All my complaints, everything I reported to him, were
unfortunately dropped into the wastepaper basket by him. I did not send
in my resignation 14 times for nothing. It was not for nothing that I
tried to join my brave troops as an officer. In his heart he was always
opposed to lawyers, and that was one of the most serious shortcomings of
this outstandingly great man. He did not want to admit formal
responsibility, and that, unfortunately, applied to his policy too, as I
have found out now. Every lawyer to him was a disturbing element working
against his power. All I can say, therefore, is that, by supporting
Himmler’s and Bormann’s aims to the utmost, he permanently jeopardized
any attempt to find a form of government worthy of the German name.

DR. SEIDL: Which departments of the Reich gave instructions to you
regarding the administration of the Government General?

FRANK: In order to expedite the proceedings I should like to suggest
that the witness Bühler give the whole list.

DR. SEIDL: Did you ever loot art treasures?

FRANK: An accusation which is one that touches my private life, and
affects me most deeply, is that I am supposed to have enriched myself
with the art treasures of the country entrusted to me. I did not collect
pictures and I did not find time during the war to appropriate art
treasures. I took care to see that all the art treasures of the country
entrusted to me were officially registered, and had that official
register incorporated in a document which was widely distributed; and,
above all, I saw to it that those art treasures remained in the country
right to the very end. In spite of that, art treasures were removed from
the Government General. A part was taken away before my administration
was established. Experience shows that one cannot talk of responsibility
for an administration until some time after it has been functioning,
namely, when the administration has been built up from the bottom. So
that from the outbreak of the war, 1 September 1939, until this point,
which was about at the end of 1939, I am sure that art treasures were
stolen to an immeasurable extent either as war booty or under some other
pretext. During the registration of the art treasures, Adolf Hitler gave
the order that the Veit Stoss altar should be removed from St. Mary’s
Church in Kraków, and taken to the Reich. In September 1939 Mayor Liebel
came from Nuremberg to Kraków for that purpose with a group of SS men
and removed this altar. A third instance was the removal of the Dürer
etchings in Lvov by a special deputy before my administration was
established there. In 1944, shortly before the collapse, art treasures
were removed to the Reich for storage. In the Castle of Seichau, in
Silesia, there was a collection of art treasures which had been brought
there by Professor Kneisl for this purpose. One last group of art
treasures was handed over to the Americans by me personally.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you introduce ghettos, that is, Jewish quarters
in the Government General?

FRANK: I issued an instruction regarding the setting up of Jewish
quarters. I do not remember the date. As to the reasons and the
necessity for that, I shall have to answer the Prosecutor’s questions.

DR. SEIDL: Did you introduce badges to mark the Jews?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself introduce forced labor in the Government
General?

FRANK: Forced labor and compulsory labor service were introduced by me
in one of the first decrees; but it is quite clear from all the decrees
and their wording that I had in mind only a labor service within the
country for repairing the damage caused by the war, and for carrying out
work necessary for the country itself, as was of course done by the
labor service in the Reich.

DR. SEIDL: Did you, as was stated by the Prosecution, plunder libraries
in the Government General?

FRANK: I can answer that question plainly with “no.” The largest and
most valuable library which we found, the Jagellon University Library in
Kraków, which thank God was not destroyed, was transferred to a new
library building on my own personal orders; and the entire collection,
including the most ancient documents, was looked after with great care.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did you as Governor General close down the
universities in the Government General?

FRANK: The universities in the Government General were closed because of
the war when we arrived. The reopening of the universities was
prohibited by order of Adolf Hitler. I supplied the needs of the Polish
and Ukrainian population by introducing university courses of
instruction for Polish and Ukrainian students—which were actually on a
university level—in such a way that the Reich Authorities could not
criticize it. The fact that there was an urgent need for native
university-trained men, particularly doctors, technicians, lawyers,
teachers, _et cetera_, was the best guarantee that the Poles and
Ukrainians would be allowed to continue university teaching to the
extent which war conditions would allow.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Witness, we were last speaking of the universities. Did you
yourself, as Governor General, close the secondary schools?

FRANK: My suggestion to reopen the Gymnasiums and secondary schools was
rejected by Adolf Hitler. We helped to solve the problem by permitting
secondary school education in a large number of private schools.

DR. SEIDL: Now, a basic question. The Prosecution accuse you of having
plundered the country ruled by you as Governor General. What do you have
to say to that?

FRANK: Well, evidently by that accusation is meant everything that
happened in the economic sphere in that country as a result of the
arrangements between the German Reich and the Government General. First,
I would like to emphasize that the Government General had to start with
a balance sheet which revealed a frightful economic situation. The
country had approximately twelve million inhabitants. The area of the
Government General was the least fertile part of the former Poland.
Moreover, the boundary between the Soviet Union, as well as the boundary
between the German Reich, had been drawn in such a way that the most
essential elements, indispensable for economy, were left outside. The
frontiers between the Soviet Union and the German Reich were immediately
closed; and so, right from the start, we had to make something out of
nothing.

Galicia, the most important area in the Republic of Poland from the
viewpoint of food supplies, was given to the Soviet Union. The province
of Posen belonged to the German Reich. The coal and industrial areas of
Upper Silesia were within the German Reich. The frontier with Germany
was drawn in such a way that the iron works in Czestochowa remained with
the Government General, whereas the iron-ore basins which were 10
kilometers from Czestochowa were incorporated into the German Reich.

The town of Lodz, the textile center of Poland, came within the German
Reich. The city of Warsaw with a population of several millions became a
frontier town because the German border came as close as 15 kilometers
to Warsaw, and the result was that the entire agricultural hinterland
was no longer at the disposal of that city. A great many facts could be
mentioned, but that would probably take us too far. The first thing we
had to do was to set things going again somehow. During the first weeks
the population of Warsaw could only be fed with the aid of German
equipment for mass feeding. The German Reich at that time sent 600,000
tons of grain, as a loan of course, and that created a heavy debt for
me.

I started the financial economy with 20 million zlotys which had been
advanced to me by the Reich. We started with a completely impoverished
economy due to the devastation caused by the war, and by the first of
January 1944 the savings bank accounts of the native population had
reached the amount of 11,500 million zlotys, and we had succeeded by
then in improving the feeding of the population to a certain extent.
Furthermore, at that time the factories and industrial centers had been
reconstructed, to which reconstruction the Reich authorities had made
outstanding contributions; Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Speer
especially deserve great credit for the help given in reviving the
industry of the country. More than two million fully paid workers were
employed; the harvest had increased to 1.6 million tons in a year; the
yearly budget had increased from 20 million zlotys in the year 1939 to
1,700 million zlotys. All this is only a sketch which I submit here to
describe the general development.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in your capacity as Governor General did you
persecute churches and religion in the areas which you had under your
administration?

FRANK: I was in constant personal contact with the Archbishop, now
Cardinal, Sapieha in Kraków. He told me of all his sufferings and
worries, and they were not few. I myself had to rescue the Bishop of
Lublin from the hands of Herr Globocznik in order to save his life.

DR. SEIDL: You mean the SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?

FRANK: Yes, that is the one I mean.

But I may summarize the situation by quoting the letter which Archbishop
Sapieha sent to me in 1942, in which, to use his own words, he thanked
me for my tireless efforts to protect the life of the church. We
reconstructed seminaries for priests; and we investigated every case of
arrest of a priest, as far as that was humanly possible. The tragic
incident when two assistants of the Archbishop Sapieha were shot, which
has been mentioned here by the Prosecution, stirred my own emotions very
deeply. I cannot say any more. The churches were open; the seminaries
were educating priests; the priests were in no way prevented from
carrying out their functions. The monastery at Czestochowa was under my
personal protection. The Kraków monastery of the Camaldulians, which is
a religious order, was also under my personal protection. There were
large posters around the monastery indicating that these monasteries
were protected by me personally.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, when did you hear for the first time about the
concentration camp at Maidanek?

FRANK: I heard the name Maidanek for the first time in 1944 from foreign
reports. But for years there had been contradictory rumors about the
camp near Lublin, or in the Lublin District, if I may express myself in
such a general way. Governor Zörner once told me, I believe already in
1941, that the SS intended to build a large concentration camp near
Lublin and had applied for large quantities of building materials, _et
cetera_. At that time I instructed State Secretary Bühler to investigate
the matter immediately, and I was told, and I also received a report in
writing from Reichsführer SS Himmler, that he had to build a large camp
required by the Waffen-SS to manufacture clothes, footwear, and
underwear in large SS-owned workshops. This camp went under the name of
“SS Works,” or something similar.

Now, I have to say I was in a position to get information, whereas the
witnesses who have testified so far have said under oath that in the
circles around the Führer nothing was known about all these things. We
out there were more independent, and I heard quite a lot through enemy
broadcasts and enemy and neutral papers. In answer to my repeated
questions as to what happened to the Jews who were deported, I was
always told they were to be sent to the East, to be assembled, and put
to work there. But, the stench seemed to penetrate the walls, and
therefore I persisted in my investigations as to what was going on. Once
a report came to me that there was something going on near Belcec. I
went to Belcec the next day. Globocznik showed me an enormous ditch
which he was having made as a protective wall and on which many
thousands of workers, apparently Jews, were engaged. I spoke to some of
them, asked them where they came from, how long they had been there, and
he told me, that is, Globocznik, “They are working here now, and when
they are through—they come from the Reich, or somewhere from
France—they will be sent further east.” I did not make any further
inquiries in that same area.

The rumor, however, that the Jews were being killed in the manner which
is now known to the entire world would not be silenced. When I expressed
the wish to visit the SS workshop near Lublin, in order to get some idea
of the value of the work that was being done, I was told that special
permission from Heinrich Himmler was required.

I asked Heinrich Himmler for this special permission. He said that he
would urge me not to go to the camp. Again some time passed. On 7
February 1944 I succeeded in being received by Adolf Hitler
personally—I might add that throughout the war he received me three
times only. In the presence of Bormann I put the question to him: “My
Führer, rumors about the extermination of the Jews will not be silenced.
They are heard everywhere. No one is allowed in anywhere. Once I paid a
surprise visit to Auschwitz in order to see the camp, but I was told
that there was an epidemic in the camp and my car was diverted before I
got there. Tell me, My Führer, is there anything in it?” The Führer
said, “You can very well imagine that there are executions going on—of
insurgents. Apart from that I do not know anything. Why don’t you speak
to Heinrich Himmler about it?” And I said, “Well, Himmler made a speech
to us in Kraków and declared in front of all the people whom I had
officially called to the meeting that these rumors about the systematic
extermination of the Jews were false; the Jews were merely being brought
to the East.” Thereupon the Führer said, “Then you must believe that.”

When in 1944 I got the first details from the foreign press about the
things which were going on, my first question was to the SS
Obergruppenführer Koppe, who had replaced Krüger. “Now we know,” I said,
“you cannot deny that.” And he said that nothing was known to him about
these things, and that apparently it was a matter directly between
Heinrich Himmler and the camp authorities. “But,” I said, “already in
1941 I heard of such plans, and I spoke about them.” Then he said that
was my business and he could not worry about it.

The Maidanek Camp must have been run solely by the SS, in the way I have
mentioned, and apparently, in the same manner as stated by the witness
Hoess.

That is the only explanation that I can give.

DR. SEIDL: Therefore you did not know of the conditions in Treblinka,
Auschwitz, and other camps? Did Treblinka belong to Maidanek, or is that
a separate camp?

FRANK: I do not know; it seems to be a separate camp. Auschwitz was not
in the area of the Government General. I was never in Maidanek, nor in
Treblinka, nor in Auschwitz.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has presented under Number USA-275
the report of the SS Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the
Warsaw Ghetto. Before that action was initiated, did you know anything
about it and did you ever come across this report?

FRANK: I was surprised when the American Chief Prosecutor said in his
opening speech, while submitting a document here with pictures about the
destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, that that report had been made to me.
But that has been clarified in the meantime. The report was never made
for me, and was never sent to me in that form. And, thank Heaven, during
the last few days it has been made clear by several witnesses and
affidavits that this destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto was carried out
upon direct orders of Himmler, and over the head of all competent
authorities of the Government General. When in our meetings anybody
spoke about this Ghetto, it was always said that there had been a revolt
in the Warsaw Ghetto which we had had to quell with artillery; reports
that were made on it never seemed to me to be authentic.

DR. SEIDL: What measures did you take to see that the population in the
Government General was fed?

FRANK: An abundance of measures were taken to get agriculture going
again, to import machinery, to teach farmers improved farming methods,
to build up co-operative associations, to distribute seeds in the usual
way.

DR. SEIDL: The Witness Bühler will speak about that later.

FRANK: Moreover the Reich helped a great deal in that respect. The Reich
sent seeds to the value of many millions of marks, agricultural experts,
breeding cattle, machines, _et cetera_.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have told us what you did for the welfare of the
population of the Government General. The Prosecution, however, has
charged you with a number of statements which they found in your own
diary, and which seem to contradict that. How can you explain that
contradiction?

FRANK: One has to take the diary as a whole. You can not go through 43
volumes and pick out single sentences and separate them from their
context. I would like to say here that I do not want to argue or quibble
about individual phrases. It was a wild and stormy period filled with
terrible passions, and when a whole country is on fire and a life and
death struggle is going on, such words may easily be used.

DR. SEIDL: Witness...

FRANK: Some of the words are terrible. I myself must admit that I was
shocked at many of the words which I had used.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, under Number USA-297 the Prosecution has submitted a
document which deals with a conference which you apparently had in 1939
or 1940 with an office of the Chief of the Administration Ober-Ost. I
shall have the document handed to you and ask you to tell me whether the
report of that man, as it is contained in the document, agrees with what
you have said. It is on Page 1, at the bottom, the second paragraph.

FRANK: That is a shortened summary of a speech, which perhaps in an
address...

THE PRESIDENT: What is the PS number?

DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank, what is the number?

FRANK: 297, I believe.

DR. SEIDL: No, on the cover, please.

FRANK: On the cover it says 344. I will return the document to you.
Would you kindly ask me about individual phrases. It is impossible for
me to read all of its contents.

DR. SEIDL: The number is 297, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it is USA-297. It is EC-344, (16) and (17), is that
right?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here that during the first
conversation which the chief of the central department had with the
Reich Minister Dr. Frank on 3 October 1939 in Posen, the latter
explained the task which had been given him by the Führer and the
economic-political principles on which he intended to base his
administration of Poland. This could only be done by ruthless
exploitation of the country. Therefore, it would be necessary to recruit
manpower to be used in the Reich, and so on.

I have summarized it, Mr. President.

FRANK: I am sure that these utterances were not made in the way it is
put here.

DR. SEIDL: But you do not want to say that you have never spoken to that
man?

FRANK: I cannot remember it at all.

DR. SEIDL: Then, I come to the next question.

FRANK: Moreover, what actually happened seems to me to be more important
than what was said at the time.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that your actions as Governor General, and
undoubtedly also many excesses by the police and the SD, were due to the
guerrilla activities?

FRANK: Guerrilla activities? It can be said that it was the resistance
movement, which started from the very first day and was supported by our
enemies, which presented the most difficult problem I had to cope with
during all these years. For this resistance movement perpetually
supplied the police and the SS with pretexts and excuses for all those
measures which, from the viewpoint of an orderly administration, were
very regrettable. In fact, the resistance movement—I will not call it
guerrilla activity, because if a people has been conquered during a war
and organizes an active resistance movement, that is something
definitely to be respected—but the methods of the resistance movement
went far beyond the limits of an heroic revolt. German women and
children were slaughtered under the most atrocious circumstances. German
officials were shot; trains were derailed; dairies were destroyed; and
all measures taken to bring about the recovery of the country were
systematically undermined.

And it is against the background of these incidents, which occurred day
after day, incessantly, during practically the entire period of my
activity, that the events in that country must be considered. That is
all I have to say to that.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in the year 1944 a revolt broke out in Warsaw under
the leadership of General Bor. What part did the administration of the
Government General have, and what part did you have in putting down that
revolt?

FRANK: That revolt broke out, when the Soviet Russian Army had advanced
to within about 30 kilometers of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the
Vistula. It was a sort of combined operation; and, as it seems to me,
also a national Polish action, as the Poles at the last moment wanted to
carry out the liberation of their capital themselves and did not want to
owe it to the Soviet Russians. They probably were thinking of how, in
Paris, at the last moment the resistance movement, even before the
Allies had approached, had accomplished the liberation of the city.

The operation was a strictly military one. As Senior Commander of the
German troops used to quell the revolt, I believe, they appointed SS
General Von dem Bach-Zelewski. The civil administration, therefore, did
not have any part in the fighting. The part played by the civil
administration began only after the capitulation of General Bor, when
the most atrocious orders for vengeance came from the Reich.

A letter came to my desk one day in which Hitler demanded the
deportation of the entire population of Warsaw into German concentration
camps. It took a struggle of 3 weeks, from which I emerged victorious,
to avert that act of insanity and to succeed in having the fleeing
population of Warsaw, which had had no part in the revolt, distributed
throughout the Government General.

During that revolt, unfortunately, the city of Warsaw was very seriously
damaged. All that had taken years to rebuild was burned down in a few
weeks. However, State Secretary Bühler, in order to save time, will
probably be in a better position to give us more details.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you are also accused of having suppressed the
cultural life of the population of the Government General, especially as
regards the theater, broadcasting, films. What have you to say about
that?

FRANK: The Government General presented the same picture as every
occupied country. We do not have to look far from this courtroom to see
what cultural life is like in an occupied country.

We had broadcasting in the Polish language under German supervision. We
had a Polish press which was supervised by Germans, and we had a Polish
school system, that is, elementary schools and high schools, in which at
the end, 80,000 teachers taught in the service of the Government
General. As far as it was possible Polish theaters were reopened in the
large cities, and where German theaters were established we made sure
that there was also a Polish theater at the same time. After the
proclamation of the so-called total war in August 1944, the absurd
situation arose in which the German theater in Kraków was closed,
because all German theaters were closed at that time, whereas the Polish
theaters remained open.

I myself selected composers and virtuosos from a group of the most well
known musicians of Poland I found there in 1939 and founded the
Philharmonic Orchestra of the Government General. This was in being
until the end, and played an important part in the cultural life of
Poland. I established a Chopin Museum in Kraków, and from all over
Europe I collected relics of Chopin. I believe that is sufficient on
this point.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you deny, therefore, having taken any measures which
aimed at exterminating Polish and Ukrainian culture.

FRANK: Culture cannot be exterminated. Any measures taken with that
intention would be sheer nonsense.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that as far as it was in your power you did
everything to avoid epidemics and to improve the health of the
population?

FRANK: That State Secretary Bühler will be able to confirm in detail. I
can say that everything humanly possible was done.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution, under Number USSR-223, has
submitted an excerpt from the diary, which deals with the report about a
police conference of 30 May 1940, and we find here in Pages 33 to 38 the
following...

FRANK: [_Interposing._] Unless the Court orders it, it is not necessary
to read that.

DR. SEIDL: No, I only want to read one sentence, which refers to the
Kraków professors. Apparently, if the diary is correct, you said...

FRANK: [_Interposing._] May I say something about the Kraków professors
right away?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

FRANK: On 7 November 1939 I came to Kraków. On 5 November 1939 before my
arrival, the SS and the police, as I found out later, called the Kraków
professors to a meeting. They thereupon arrested the men, among them
dignified old professors, and took them to some concentration camp. I
believe it was Oranienburg. I found that report when I arrived and
against everything which may be found there in my diary, I want to
emphasize here under oath that I did not cease in my attempts to get
every one of the professors released whom I could reach, in March 1940.
That is all I have to say to this.

DR. SEIDL: The same police meeting of 30 May 1940 also dealt with the
so-called “AB Action,” that is, with the Extraordinary Pacification
Action. Before I put to you the question which is concerned with it, I
would like to read to you two entries in the diary. One is dated 16 May
1940, and here, after describing that extraordinary tension then
existing, you stated the following: That, first of all, an action for
pacification would have to be started, and then you said:

    “Any arbitrary actions must be avoided; in all cases the
    safeguarding of the authority of the Führer and of the Reich has
    to be kept in the foreground.”—I omit several sentences and
    quote the end—“The action is timed for 15 June.”

On 12 July a conference took place with the Ministerialrat Wille, who
was the chief of the Department of Justice, and there you said in your
own words:

    “Regarding the question as to what should happen to the
    political criminals who had been arrested during the AB Action,
    there is to be a conference with State Secretary Bühler,
    Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach and
    Ministerialrat Wille.”

End of quotation.

What actually happened during that AB Action?

FRANK: I cannot say any more or any less than what is contained in the
diary. The situation was extremely tense. Month after month attempted
assassinations increased. The encouragement and support given by the
rest of the world to the resistance movement to undermine all our
efforts to pacify the country had succeeded to an alarming degree, and
this led to this general pacification action, not only in the Government
General, but also in other areas, and which I believe was ordered by the
Führer himself.

My efforts were directed to limiting it as to extent and method, and in
this I was successful. Moreover I should like to point out that I also
made it clear that I intended to exercise the right of reprieve in each
individual case; for that purpose I wanted the police and SS verdicts of
death by shooting to be submitted to a reprieve committee which I had
formed in that connection. I believe that can be seen from the diary
also.

DR. SEIDL: Probably the witness Bühler knows something about it.

FRANK: Nevertheless, I would like to say that the method used at that
time was a tremendous mistake.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, have you at any time recognized the principle
introduced by the SD and SS of the liability of kin?

FRANK: No, on the contrary. When I received the first reports about it,
I complained in writing to Reich Minister Lammers about that peculiar
development of the law.

DR. SEIDL: The first SS and Police Leader East was Obergruppenführer
Krüger. When was this SS leader recalled and how did it come about?

FRANK: The relations between him and myself became quite impossible. He
wanted a peculiar kind of SS and police regime, and that state of
affairs could be solved only in one way—either he or I had to go. I
think that at the last moment, by the intervention of Kaltenbrunner, if
I remember correctly, and of Bach-Zelewski, this remarkable fellow was
removed.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution once mentioned that it was more a personal
struggle for power. But is it more correct to say that there were
differences of opinion on basic questions?

FRANK: Of course it was a struggle for power. I wanted to establish a
power in the sense of my memoranda to the Führer, and therefore I had to
fight the power of violence, and here personal viewpoints separated
altogether.

DR. SEIDL: The successor of SS Obergruppenführer Krüger was SS
Obergruppenführer Koppe. Was his basic attitude different?

FRANK: Yes. I had that impression; and I am thinking of him particularly
when I say that even in the SS there were many decent men who also had a
sense of what was right.

DR. SEIDL: Were there Polish and Ukrainian Police in the Government
General?

FRANK: Yes, there were 25,000 men of the Polish security, criminal, and
uniformed police, and about 5,000 men of the Ukrainian police. They also
were under the German police chief.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to one of the most important questions.
In 1942, in Berlin, Vienna, Heidelberg, and Munich, you made speeches
before large audiences. What was the purpose of these speeches, and what
were the consequences for you?

FRANK: The speeches can be read. It was the last effort that I made to
bring home to Hitler, by means of the tremendous response of the German
people, the truth that the rule of law was immortal. I stated at that
time that a Reich without law and without humanity could not last long,
and more in that vein. After I had been under police surveillance for
several days in Munich, I was relieved of all my Party offices. As this
was a matter of German domestic politics under the sovereignty of the
German Reich, I refrain from making any more statements about it here.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that after this you tendered your resignation?
And what was the answer?

FRANK: I was, so to speak, in a permanent state of resigning, and I
received the same answer: that for reasons connected with foreign policy
I could not be released.

DR. SEIDL: I originally intended to read to you from your diary a number
of quotations which the Prosecution has submitted; but in view of the
fact that the Prosecution may do that in the course of the
cross-examination, I forego it in order to save time. I have no more
questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to
ask any questions?

Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): Defendant, I should like to know what precisely was your
legal status and what exactly was the position you occupied in the
system of the fascist state. Please answer me: When were you promoted to
the post of Governor of occupied Poland? To whom were you directly
subordinated?

FRANK: The date is 26 October 1939. At least on that day the directive
concerning the Governor General became effective.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You will remember that by Hitler’s order of 12
October 1939 you were directly subordinated to Hitler, were you not?

FRANK: I did not get the first part. What was it, please?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember Hitler’s order concerning your
appointment as Governor General of Poland? This order was dated 12
October 1939.

FRANK: That was in no way effective, because the decree came into force
on 26 October 1939, and you can find it in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_.
Before that I was Chief of Administration with the military commander
Von Rundstedt. I have explained that already.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: By this order of Hitler you were directly
subordinated to him. Do you remember? Paragraph 3, Sub-paragraph 1, of
this order.

FRANK: The chiefs of administration in the occupied territories were all
immediately under the Führer. I may say in elucidation that Paragraph 3
states, “The Governor General is immediately subordinate to me.”

But Paragraph 9 of this decree states, “This decree becomes valid as
soon as I have withdrawn from the Commander-in-Chief of the Army the
task of carrying out the military administration.” And this withdrawal,
that is, the coming into force of this decree took place on 26 October.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I fully agree with you, and we have information
to that effect in the book which you evidently remember. It is Book 5.
You do remember this book of the Government General?

FRANK: It is of course in the decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, when this order came into force, to whom
were you directly subordinate?

FRANK: What shall I read here? There are several entries here. What is
your wish? To what do you wish me to answer?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It states that this order came into force on the
26 October. Well, when this order actually became valid, to whom were
you subordinated? Was there, or was there not, any further order issued
by Hitler?

FRANK: There is only one basic decree about the Governor General. That
is this one.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite correct. There were no further
instructions?

FRANK: Oh yes, there are some, for instance...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand that, but there was no other decree
determining the system of administration, was there?

FRANK: May I say that you can find it best on Page A-100 in your book,
and there you have the decree of the Führer verbatim.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Quite right.

FRANK: And it says also in Paragraph 9, “This decree shall come into
effect...” and so on, and that date was the 26th of October.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, that is quite correct. That means that
after 26 October you, as Governor General for occupied Poland, were
directly subordinate to Hitler?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then perhaps you may remember when, and by whom,
you were entrusted with the execution, in occupied Poland, of the Four
Year Plan?

FRANK: By Göring.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that you were Göring’s
plenipotentiary for the execution of the Four Year Plan in Poland, were
you not?

FRANK: The story of that mission is very briefly told. The activities of
several plenipotentiaries of the Four Year Plan in the Government
General were such that I was greatly concerned about it. Therefore, I
approached the Reich Marshal and asked him to appoint me trustee for the
Four Year Plan. That was later—in January...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it was in December.

FRANK: Yes, it was later, according to this decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This means that as from the beginning of
December 1939 you were Göring’s plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan?

FRANK: Göring’s? I was the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Now perhaps you can remember that in October
1939 the first decree regarding the organization of administration in
the Government General was promulgated?

FRANK: Yes. That is here, is it not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you recall Paragraph 3 of that decree.

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It says that “The sphere of action of the State
Secretary for Security will be determined by the Governor General in
agreement with the Reichsführer SS and”—this is the passage which
interests me—“the Chief of the German Police.”

Does that not coincide with Paragraph 3 insofar as from the first day of
your appointment as Governor General you undertook the control of the
Police and SS, and, consequently, the responsibility for their actions?

FRANK: No. I definitely answer that question with “no,” but I would like
to make an explanation....

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What interests me, Defendant; is how could that
be explained otherwise?

THE PRESIDENT: Let him make his explanation.

Defendant, you may make your explanation.

FRANK: I want to make a very short statement. There is an old legal
principle which says that nobody can transfer more rights to anybody
else than he has himself. What I have stated here was the ideal which I
had before me and how it should have been. Everybody has to admit that
it is natural and logical that the police should be subordinate to the
Chief of Administration. The Führer, who alone could have decided, did
not make that decree. I did not have the power nor the authority to put
into effect this decree which I had so carefully formulated.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then do I understand you to say that this
Paragraph 3 was an ideal which you strove to attain, but which you were
never able to attain?

FRANK: I beg your pardon, but I could not understand that question. A
little slower please, and may I have the translation into German a
little slower?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Shall I repeat the question?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked you a question; does this mean that the
statement can be interpreted as follows: Paragraph 3 of this decree was
an ideal which you persistently strove to attain, which you openly
professed, but which you were never able to attain? Would that be
correct?

FRANK: Which I could not attain; and that can be seen by the fact that
later it was found necessary to appoint a special State Secretary for
Security in a last effort to find a way out of the difficulty.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recall that in April 1942,
special negotiations took place between you and Himmler. Did these
negotiations take place in April 1942?

FRANK: Yes; certainly. I do not know on what you base your question. I
cannot tell you the date offhand, but it was always my endeavor...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: To confirm these facts, I can turn to your
diary. Perhaps you will recall that as a result of these negotiations an
understanding was reached between you and Himmler.

FRANK: Yes, an understanding was reached.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In order to refresh your memory on the subject I
shall ask that the corresponding volume of your diary be handed to you,
so that you may have the text before you.

FRANK: Yes, I am ready.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would refer you to Paragraph 2 of this
agreement. It states:

THE PRESIDENT: Where can we find this? Is it under the date 21 April
1942?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes; that is quite right; 21 April 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have got it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Document Number USSR-223. It has been
translated into English, and I shall hand it over immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have it now; we were only trying to find the
place.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is on Page 18 of the English text.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to recall the contents. It says:
“The Higher SS and Police Leader (the State Secretary) is directly
subordinate to the Governor General, and, if he is absent, then to his
Deputy.”

Does this not mean that Himmler, so to speak, agreed with your ideal in
the sense that the Police should be subordinate to you?

FRANK: Certainly. On that day I was satisfied; but a few days later the
whole thing was changed. I can only say that these efforts on my part
were continued, but unfortunately it was never possible to put them into
effect.

You will find here in Paragraph 3, if you care to go on, that the
Reichsführer SS, according to the expected decree by the Führer, could
give orders to the State Secretary. So, you see, Himmler here had
reserved the right to give orders to Krüger direct. And then comes the
matter of the agreement...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is true, but in that case I must ask you to
refer to another part of the document...

FRANK: May I say in this connection that this agreement was never put
into effect, but that this decree was published in the
_Reichsgesetzblatt_ in the form of a Führer decree. Unfortunately, I do
not know the date of that; but you can find the decree about the
regulation of security matters in the Government General, and that is
the only authoritative statement. Here, also, reference is made to the
“expected decree by the Führer,” and that agreement was just a draft of
what was to appear in the Führer decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I was just proceeding to that subject. You
agree that this decision was practically a verbatim decree of the
Führer?

FRANK: I cannot say that offhand. If you will be good enough to give me
the words of the Führer decree, I will be able to tell you about that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes.

[_Turning to the President._] Incidentally this decree appears in your
document book, Mr. President.

FRANK: I haven’t the document. It seems to me that the most essential
parts of that agreement have been taken and put into this decree, with a
few changes. However, the book has been taken away from me and I cannot
compare it.

THE PRESIDENT: The book will be submitted to you now.

[_The book was submitted to the defendant._]

FRANK: Very important changes have been made, unfortunately.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would request you to turn to Paragraph 3 of
Hitler’s decree, dated 7 May 1942. It is stated here that the State
Secretary for Security is directly subordinate to the Governor General.
And does this not confirm the fact that the police of the Government
General were, nevertheless, directly subordinate to you? That is
Paragraph 3 of the decree.

FRANK: I would like to say that that is not so. The police were not
subordinate to me, even by reason of that decree—only the State
Secretary for Security. It does not say here that the police are
subordinate to the Governor General, only the State Secretary for
Security is subordinate to him. If you read Paragraph 4, then you come
to the difficulties again. Adolf Hitler’s decree was drawn up in my
absence, of course. I was not consulted by Hitler, otherwise 1 would
have protested, but in any case it was found impracticable.

Paragraph 4 says that the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police
gave direct instructions to the State Secretary for Security in the
field of security and for the preservation of German nationality. If you
compare the original agreement with this, as contained in the diary, you
will find that in one of the most important fields the Führer had
changed his mind, that is, concerning the Commissioner for the
Preservation of German Nationality. This title embraces the Jewish
question and the question of colonization.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It appears to me, Defendant, that you have only
taken into consideration one aspect of this question, and that you have
given a rather one-sided interpretation of the excerpt quoted. May I
recall to your memory Paragraph 4 of this decree which, in Sub-paragraph
2, reads as follows:

“The State Secretary”—this means Krüger—“must receive the consent of
the Governor General before carrying out the directives of the
Reichsführer SS and the German Police.”

And now permit me to turn to Paragraph 5 of this self-same decree of
Hitler’s which states that “in cases of divergencies of opinion between
the Governor General and the Reichsführer of the SS and the German
Police, my decision is to be obtained through the Reich Minister and the
Head of the Reich Chancellery.” In this connection I would ask you, does
not this paragraph testify to the very considerable rights granted by
you to the leaders of the police and the SS in the Government General
and to your own responsibility for the activities of these
organizations?

FRANK: The wording of the decree testifies to it, but the actual
development was quite the contrary. I believe that we will come to that
in detail. I maintain therefore that this attempt to gain some influence
over the police and the SS also failed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then may I ask whose attempt it was? In this
case it is evidently an attempt by Hitler for he signed this decree.
Krüger was evidently more powerful than Hitler?

FRANK: That question is not quite clear to me. You mean that Krüger went
against the decree of the Führer? Of course he did, but that has nothing
to do with power. That was considered by Himmler as a tremendous
concession made to me. I want to refer to a memorandum of the summer of
1942, I think, shortly after the decree of the Führer came into force.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to ask you: Is it
possible that you...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell us, Defendant, who was the actual leader of
the National Socialist Party in the Government General?

FRANK: I hear nothing at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you...

FRANK: I hear nothing at all.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have the following question to put to you:
After 6 May 1940 in the Government General...

FRANK: 6 May?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, 6 May 1940, after the Nazi organization had
been completed in the Government General, who was appointed its leader?

FRANK: I was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Thus the leadership of the administration of the
National Socialist Party and of the Police was concentrated in your
hands. Therefore you are responsible for the administration, the Police,
and the political life of the Government General.

FRANK: Before I answer that question, I must protest when you say that I
had control of the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe that that is the only way one could
interpret the Führer’s orders and the other documents which I have put
to you.

FRANK: No doubt, if one disregards the actual facts and the realities of
the situation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then, let us pass on to another group of
questions. You heard of the existence of Maidanek only in 1944, isn’t
that so?

FRANK: In 1944 the name Maidanek was brought to my knowledge officially
for the first time by the Press Chief Gassner.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will now ask that you be shown a document
which was presented by your defense counsel, which was compiled by you,
and which is a report addressed to Hitler, dated June 1943. I will read
into the record one excerpt, and I wish to remind you that this is dated
19 June 1943:

    “As a proof of the mistrust shown to the German leadership, I
    enclose a characteristic excerpt from the report of the Chief of
    the Security Police and SD in the Government General...”

FRANK: Just a moment. The wrong passage has been shown me. I have the
passage here on Page 35 of the German text, and it is differently
worded.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Have you found the place now?

FRANK: Yes. But you started with a different sentence. The sentence here
starts “A considerable part of the Polish intelligentsia...”

THE PRESIDENT: Which page is it?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Page 35 of the German text, last paragraph.

FRANK: It starts here with the words “A considerable part...”

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: All right. Then I will continue:

    “As a proof of the degree of the mistrust shown to the German
    leadership I enclose”—these are your own words, this passage
    comes somewhat higher up in the quotation—“a characteristic
    excerpt from the report of the Chief of the Security Police and
    SD in the Government General for the period from 1 to 31 May
    1943, concerning the possibilities of propaganda resulting from
    Katyn.”

FRANK: That is not here. Would you be good enough to show me the
passage? Now, what you are presenting here is not in my text.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, it is there; it comes somewhat earlier in
your text.

FRANK: I think it has been omitted from my text.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I begin now at that part which you find lower
down at the bottom. Follow the text:

    “A large part of the Polish intelligentsia, however, as before,
    will not allow itself to be influenced by the news from Katyn
    and holds against the Germans alleged similar cruelties,
    especially in Auschwitz.”

I omit the next sentence and I continue:

    “Among that portion of the working classes which is not
    communistically inclined, this is scarcely denied; at the same
    time it is pointed out that the attitude of Germany towards the
    Poles is not any better.”

Please note the next sentence:

    “It is said that there are concentration camps at Auschwitz and
    Maidanek where likewise the mass murder of Poles is carried out
    systematically.”

How can one reconcile this part of your report which mentions Auschwitz
and Maidanek, where mass murder took place, with your statement that you
heard of Maidanek only at the end of 1944. Well, your report is dated
June 1943; you mentioned there both Maidanek and Auschwitz.

FRANK: With reference to Maidanek we were talking about the
extermination of Jews. The extermination of Jews in Maidanek became
known to me during the summer of 1944. Up to now the word “Maidanek” has
always been mentioned in connection with extermination of Jews.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently, we are to understand—I refer to
the text submitted to you—that in May 1943 you heard of the mass murder
of Poles in Maidanek, and in 1944 you heard of the mass murder of Jews?

FRANK: I beg your pardon? I heard about the extermination of the Jews at
Maidanek in 1944 from the official documents in the foreign press.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And you heard of the mass killings of the Poles
in 1943?

FRANK: That is contained in my memorandum, and I protest: these are the
facts as I put them before the Führer.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will ask that another document be shown to
you. Do you know this document, are you acquainted with it?

FRANK: It is a decree dated 2 October 1943. I assume that the wording
agrees with the text of the original decree.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, it is in full agreement with the original
text. In any case your defense counsel can follow the text and will be
able to verify it. I have to ask you one question. What do you think of
this law signed by you?

FRANK: Yes, it is here.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were President of the Reich Academy of Law.
From the standpoint of the most elementary standards of law, what do you
think of this law signed by you?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the number of it?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is Exhibit USSR-335, Mr. President.

FRANK: This is the general wording for a court-martial decree. It
provides that the proceedings should take place in the presence of a
judge, that a document should be drawn up, and that the proceedings
should be recorded in writing. Apart from that I had the power to give
pardons, so that every sentence had to be submitted to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to tell us how this court for
court-martial proceedings was composed, who the members of this court
were. Would you please pay attention to Paragraph 3, Point 1 of
Paragraph 3?

FRANK: The Security Police, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You were telling us of your hostile attitude to
the SD. Why then did you give the SD the right to exert oppression on
the Polish population?

FRANK: Because that was the only way in which I could exert any
influence on the sentences. If I had not published this decree, there
would have been no possibility of control; and the Police would simply
have acted at random.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You spoke of the right of reprieve which was
entrusted to you. Would you please note Paragraph 6 of this law. I
remind you that a verdict of a summary court-martial by the SD was to be
put into effect immediately according to the text. I remind you again
that there was only one possible verdict: “death.” How could you change
it if the condemned person was to be shot or hanged immediately after
the verdict?

FRANK: The sentence would nevertheless have to come before me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but a sentence had to be carried out
immediately.

FRANK: Those were the general instructions which I had issued in
connection with the power given me to grant reprieves, and the committee
which dealt with reprieves was constantly sitting. Files were sent in...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Since you have spoken of the right to reprieve,
I will put to you another question. Do you remember the AB Action?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Do you remember that this action signified the
execution of thousands of Polish intellectuals?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then what did it signify?

FRANK: It came within the framework of the general action of appeasement
and it was my plan to eliminate, by means of a properly regulated
procedure, arbitrary actions on the part of the Police. This was the
meaning of that action.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I do not understand very well what you mean. How
did you treat persons who were subject to the AB Action? What happened
to them?

FRANK: This meeting really only dealt with the question of arrests.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you what happened to them later?

FRANK: They were arrested and taken into protective custody.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And then?

FRANK: Then they were subjected to the proceedings which had been
established. At least, that is what I intended.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was this left to the Police exclusively?

FRANK: The Police were in charge.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, the Police took over the
extermination of these people after they had been arrested, is that so?

FRANK: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, then tell us, please, why you did not
exercise your power of reprieve while they were carrying out this
inhuman action?

FRANK: I did make use of it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will put before you your statement, dated 30
May 1940. You certainly remember this meeting with the Police on 30 May
1940, when you gave final instructions to the police before carrying out
this action?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated the following:

    “Any attempt on the part of the legal authorities to intervene
    in the AB Action, undertaken with the help of the Police, should
    be considered as treason to the State and to German interests.”

Do you remember this statement?

FRANK: I do not remember it, but you must take into account all the
circumstances which spread over several weeks. You must consider the
statement in its entirety and not seize upon one single sentence. This
concerns a development which went on for weeks and months, in the course
of which the reprieve committee was established by me for the first
time. That was my way of protesting against arbitrary actions and of
introducing legal justice in all these proceedings. That is a
development extending over many weeks, which you cannot, in my opinion,
summarize in one sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am speaking of words which in my opinion can
have only one meaning for a jurist. You wrote:

    “The reprieve committee which is part of my office is not
    concerned with these matters. The AB Action will be carried out
    exclusively by Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger and his
    organization. This is a purely internal action for quieting the
    country which is necessary and lies outside the scope of a
    normal legal trial.”

That is to say you renounced your right of pardon?

FRANK: At that particular moment; but if you follow the further
development of the AB Action during the following weeks you will see
that this never became effective. That was an intention, a bad
intention, which, thank God, I gave up in time. Perhaps my defense
counsel will be able to say a few words on the subject later.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One single question interests me. Did you
renounce your right of pardon while carrying out this operation or not?

FRANK: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, how can you account for your words,
this one sentence: “The reprieve committee is not concerned with these
matters.”?

How should we interpret these words?

FRANK: This is not a decree; it is not the final ruling on the matter.
It is a remark which was made on the spur of the moment and was then
negotiated on for days. But one must recognize the final stage of the
development, and not merely the various motives as they came up during
the development.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, I understand that very well, Defendant. But
I would like to ask you, was this statement made during a conference
with the Police and did you instruct the Police in that matter?

FRANK: Not during that meeting. I assume it came up in some other
connection. Here we discussed only this one action. After all, I also
had to talk to State Secretary Bühler.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well, all right. While discussing the AB Action
with the Police you stated that the results of this action would not
concern the reprieve committee which was subordinated to you, is that
right?

FRANK: That sentence is contained in the diary. It is not, however, the
final result, but rather an intermediate stage.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps I can recall to you another sentence, in
order that you may judge the results of this action. Perhaps you can
recall this part which I will put to you. You stated the following:

    “We need not bring these elements into German concentration
    camps, for in that case we would only have difficulties and an
    unnecessary correspondence with their families. We must simply
    liquidate matters in the country, and in the simplest way.”

What you mean is that this would simply be a question of liquidation in
the simplest form, is that not so?

FRANK: That is a terrible word. But, thank God, it did not take place in
this way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, but these persons were executed. What do
you mean by saying that this was not carried out? Obviously this was
carried out, for the persons were executed.

FRANK: When they were sentenced they were killed, if the right to pardon
them was not exercised.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And they were condemned without application of
the right of pardon?

FRANK: I do not believe so.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Unfortunately these people are no more, and
therefore obviously they were executed.

FRANK: Which people?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Those who were arrested under the AB Action. I
will remind you of another excerpt connected with this AB Action. If you
did not agree with the Police with regard to certain police actions it
would be difficult to explain the celebrations in connection with the
departure of Brigadeführer SS Streckenbach when he left for Berlin. Does
this not mean that you were at least on friendly terms with the Police?

FRANK: In connection with political relations many words of praise are
spoken which are not in keeping with the truth. You know that as well as
any other person.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I will allow myself to remind you of only one
passage of your speech addressed to the Brigadeführer Streckenbach, one
sentence only. You said:

    “What you, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and your people, have
    done in the Government General must not be forgotten; and you
    need not be ashamed of it.”

That testifies, does it not, to quite a different attitude toward
Streckenbach and his people?

FRANK: And it was not forgotten either.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to the
defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude the cross-examination?

MR. DODD: I have only one or two questions, if Your Honor pleases.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In the course of your examination I
understood you to say that you had never gathered to yourself any of the
art treasures of the Government General. By that I do not suppose you to
mean that you did not have them collected and registered; you did have
them collected and registered, isn’t that so?

FRANK: Art treasures in the Government General were officially collected
and registered. The book has been submitted here in Court.

MR. DODD: Yes. And you told the Tribunal that before you got there one
Dürer collection had already been seized—before you took over your
duties.

FRANK: May I ask you to understand that as follows:

These were the Dürers which were removed in Lvov before the civilian
administration was set up there. Herr Mühlmann went to Lvov at the time
and took them from the library. I had never been in Lvov before that.
These pictures were then taken directly to the Führer headquarters or to
Reich Marshal Göring, I am not sure which.

MR. DODD: They were collected for Göring, that is what I am driving at.
Is that not a fact?

FRANK: State Secretary Mühlmann, when I asked him, told me that he came
on orders of the Reich Marshal and that he had taken them away on orders
of the Reich Marshal.

MR. DODD: And were there not some other art objects that were collected
by the Reich Marshal, and also by the Defendant Rosenberg, at the time
you told the Tribunal you were too busy with war tasks to get involved
in that sort of thing?

FRANK: I know of nothing of that sort in the Government General. The
Einsatzstab Rosenberg had no jurisdiction in the Government General; and
apart from the collection of the composer Elsner and a Jewish library
from Lublin I had no official obligation to demand the return of any art
treasures from Rosenberg.

MR. DODD: But there were some art treasures in your possession when you
were captured by the American forces.

FRANK: Yes. They were not in my possession. I was safeguarding them but
not for myself. They were also not in my immediate safekeeping; rather I
had taken them along with me from burning Silesia. They could not be
safeguarded any other way. They were art treasures which are so widely
known that they are Numbers 1 to 10 in the list in the book—no one
could have appropriated them. You cannot steal a “Mona Lisa.”

MR. DODD: Well, I merely wanted to clear that up. I knew you had said on
interrogation there were some in your possession. I am not trying to
imply you were holding them for yourself, if you were not. However, I
think you have made that clear.

FRANK: I should like to remark in this connection, since I attach
particular importance to the point, that these art treasures with which
we are concerned could be safeguarded only in this way. Otherwise they
would have been lost.

MR. DODD: Very well. I have one other matter I would like to clear up
and I will not be long.

I understood you also to say this morning that you had struggled for
some time to effect the release of the Kraków professors who were seized
and sent to Oranienburg soon after the occupation of Poland. Now, of
course, you are probably familiar with what you said about it yourself
in your diary, are you?

FRANK: Yes, I said so this morning. Quite apart from what is said in the
diary, what I said this morning is the truth. You must never forget that
I had to speak among a circle of deadly enemies, people who reported
every word I said to the Führer and Himmler.

MR. DODD: Well, of course, you recall that you suggested that they
should have been retained in Poland, and liquidated or imprisoned there.

FRANK: Never—not even if you confront me with this statement. I never
did that. On the contrary, I received the professors from Kraków and
talked to them quietly. Of all that happened I regretted that most of
all.

MR. DODD: Perhaps you do not understand me. I am talking about what you
wrote in your own diary about these professors, and I shall be glad to
read it to you and make it available to you if you care to contest it.
You are not denying that you said they should either be returned for
liquidation in Poland, or imprisoned in Poland, are you? You do not deny
that?

FRANK: I have just told you that I did say all that merely to hoodwink
my enemies; in reality I liberated the professors. Nothing more happened
to them after that.

MR. DODD: All right.

Were you also talking for special purposes when you gave General Krüger,
the SS and Higher Police official, that fond farewell?

FRANK: The same applies also in this case. Permit me to say, sir, that I
admit without reservation what can be admitted; but I have also sworn to
add nothing. No one can admit any more than I have done by handing over
these diaries. What I am asking is that you do not ask me to add
anything to that.

MR. DODD: No, I am not asking you to add anything to it; rather, I was
trying to clear it up, because you’ve made a rather difficult situation,
perhaps, for yourself and for others. You see, if we cannot believe what
you wrote in your diary, I don’t know how you can ask us to believe what
you say here. You were writing those things yourself, and at the time
you wrote them I assume you didn’t expect that you would be confronted
with them.

THE PRESIDENT: Does he not mean that this was a record of a speech that
he has made?

MR. DODD: In his diary, yes. It is recorded in his diary.

THE PRESIDENT: When he said, “I did that to hoodwink my enemies”?

MR. DODD: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I presume that that particular record is a record of some
speech that he made.

MR. DODD: It is. It is entered in the diary.

FRANK: May I say something about that. It wasn’t that I put myself in a
difficult position; rather the changing course of the war made the
situation difficult for every administrative official.

MR. DODD: Finally, do you recall an entry in your diary in which you
stated that you had a long hour and a half talk with the Führer and that
you had...

FRANK: When was the last conference, please?

MR. DODD: Well, this entry is on Monday, the 17th of March 1941. It’s in
your diary.

FRANK: That was probably one of the very few conferences; whether I was
alone with him, I don’t know.

MR. DODD: ...in which you said you and the Führer had come to a complete
agreement and that he approved all the measures, including all the
decrees, especially also the entire organization of the country. Would
you stand by that today?

FRANK: No, but I might say the following: The Führer’s approval was
always very spontaneously given, but one always had to wait a long while
for it to be realized.

MR. DODD: Was that one of the times you complained to him, as you told
us this morning?

FRANK: I constantly complained. As you know, I offered to resign on 14
occasions.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know; but on this occasion did you make many complaints
and did you have the approval of the Führer, or did he turn down your
complaints on this occasion of the 17th of March, 1941?

FRANK: The Führer took a very simple way out at the time by saying,
“You’ll have to settle that with Himmler.”

MR. DODD: Well, that isn’t really an answer. You’ve entered in your
diary that you talked it out with him and that he approved everything,
and you make no mention in your diary of any disappointment over the
filing of a complaint. Surely, this wasn’t a speech that you were
recording in your diary; it seems to be a factual entry on your
conversations with the Führer. And my question is simply, do you now
admit that that was the situation, or are you saying that it was a false
entry?

FRANK: I beg your pardon, I didn’t say that I made false entries. I
never said that, and I’m not going to argue about words. I am merely
saying that you must judge the words according to the entire context. If
I emphasized in the presence of officials that the Führer received me
and agreed to my measures, then I did that to back up my own authority.
I couldn’t do that without the Führer’s agreement. What my thoughts
were, is not made clear from this. I should like to emphasize that I’m
not arguing about words and have not asked to do that.

MR. DODD: Very well, I don’t care to press it any further.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the first question put to you by the Soviet
Prosecutor was whether you were the chief of the NSDAP in the Government
General, and you answered “yes.” Did the Party have any decisive
influence in the Government General on political and administrative
life?

FRANK: No. The Party as an organization in that sphere was, of course,
only nominally under my jurisdiction, for all the Party officials were
appointed by Bormann without my being consulted. There is no special
Führer decree for the spheres of activity of the NSDAP in the occupied
territories, in which it says that these spheres of activity are
directly under Reichsleiter Bormann’s jurisdiction.

DR. SEIDL: Did your activity in that sphere of the NSDAP in the
territory of the Government General have anything at all to do with any
Security Police affairs?

FRANK: No, the Party was much too small to play any important part; it
had no state function.

DR. SEIDL: The next question: The Soviet Prosecution showed you Document
USSR-335. It is the Decree on Drumhead Courts-Martial of 1943. It states
in Paragraph 6: “Drumhead court-martial sentences are to be carried out
at once.” Is it correct if I say that no formal legal appeal against
these sentences was possible, but that a pardon was entirely admissible?

FRANK: Certainly; but, nevertheless, I must say that this decree is
impossible.

DR. SEIDL: What conditions in the Government General occasioned the
issuing of this decree of 2 October 1943? I am thinking in particular of
the security situation.

FRANK: Looking back from the more peaceful conditions of the present
time, I cannot think of any reason which might have made such a demand
possible; but if one recalls the events of war, and the universal
conflagration, it seems to have been a measure of desperation.

DR. SEIDL: I now come back to the AB Action. Is it true that in 1939 a
court-martial decree was issued providing for considerably greater legal
guarantees than that of 1943?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that people arrested in the AB Action were, on
the strength of this court-martial decree, sentenced or acquitted?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that all sentences of these courts were, as
you saw fit, to be passed on to the competent reprieve committee under
State Secretary Bühler?

FRANK: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: The prosecutor of the United States has laid it to your
charge that in Neuhaus, where you were arrested after the collapse of
the German Armed Forces, various art treasures were found, not in your
house, but in the office of the Governor General. Is it true that you
sent State Secretary Dr. Bühler with a letter to Reich Minister Dr.
Lammers, and that this letter contained a list of these art treasures?

FRANK: Yes, not only that, I at once called the attention of the head of
the Pinakothek in Munich to the fact that these pictures were there and
that they should at once be safeguarded against bombing. He also looked
at the pictures and then they were put in a bombproof cellar. I am glad
I did so, for who knows what might otherwise have happened to these
valuable objects.

DR. SEIDL: And now one last question. The Prosecution has submitted
Document 661-PS. This document also has a USSR exhibit number, which I
don’t know at the moment. This is a document which has been made to have
a bearing on the activities of the Academy for German Law, of which you
were president. The document has the heading “Legal Formation of
Germany’s Polish Policy on Racial-Political Lines”; the legal part
serves as a tect for the Committee on the Law of Nationalities in the
Academy for German Law. I’m having this document submitted to you.
Please, will you tell me whether you’ve ever had this document in your
hands before?

FRANK: From whom does it come?

DR. SEIDL: That is the extraordinary part; it has the Exhibit Number
USA-300.

FRANK: Does it state anywhere who drew it up or something of the sort?

DR. SEIDL: The document has no author; nor does it show on whose order
it was compiled.

FRANK: I can say merely that I’ve never seen the document; that I never
gave an order for it to be drawn up; so I can say really nothing about
it.

DR. SEIDL: It states here that it was found in the Ministry of Justice
in Kassel. Was there a Ministry of Justice in Kassel in 1940?

FRANK: A Ministry of Justice in Kassel?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

FRANK: That has not been in existence since 1866.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.

DR. SEIDL: In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall
call witness Dr. Bilfinger.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: This document which you produced as USSR-223, which are
extracts from Defendant Frank’s diary; are you offering that in
evidence? Apparently some entries from Frank’s diary have already been
offered in evidence; others have not. Are you wishing to offer this in
evidence?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been submitted in
evidence under two numbers; the first number is 2233-PS, which was
submitted by the American Prosecution, and the second is Exhibit
USSR-223, and was already submitted by us on 15 February, 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Have these entries which you have in this document
been submitted under USSR-223? You see, the PS number does not
necessarily mean that the documents have been offered in evidence. The
PS numbers were applied to documents before they were offered in
evidence; but the USSR-223 does imply that it has been offered in
evidence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This document has already been presented in
evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, what the Tribunal wants to know is
whether you wish to offer this USSR-223 in evidence, because unless it
was read before it hasn’t been offered in evidence, or it hasn’t gone
into the record.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We already read an excerpt on 15 February, and
it is, therefore, already read into the record.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I retire, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_The witness Bilfinger took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you stand up, please, and will you tell us your full
name?

RUDOLF BILFINGER (Witness): Rudolf Bilfinger.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, since when were you active in the Reich Security
Main Office (RSHA), and in what position?

BILFINGER: From the end of 1937 until the beginning of 1943 I was
government councillor in the RSHA, and later senior government
councillor and expert on legal questions, and legal questions in
connection with the police.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on two occasions and at different times
you were head of the “Administration and Law” department attached to the
commander of the Security Police and SD in Kraków?

BILFINGER: Yes. In the autumn of 1940 and in 1944 I was head of the
department “Administration and Law” attached to the commander of the
Security Police and SD in Kraków.

DR. SEIDL: What were the tasks you had to fulfil at different times in
the Government General—in broad outline.

BILFINGER: In 1940 I had the task of taking over from the Government
General a number of branches of the police administration and working in
that connection under the Higher SS and Police Leader.

DR. SEIDL: What was the legal position of the Higher SS and Police
Leader, and what was his relation to the Governor General? Did the
Higher SS and Police Leader receive his instructions concerning the
Security Police and the SD from the Governor General? Or did he receive
them direct from the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the Police, that is,
Himmler?

BILFINGER: The Higher SS and Police Leader from the very beginning
received his instructions direct from the Reichsführer SS, Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: Is it furthermore true that the commander of the Security
Police and of the SD in the Government General also received direct
orders and instructions from Amt IV, the Gestapo, and from Amt V, the
Criminal Police in the RSHA?

BILFINGER: Yes, the commander of the Security Police received many
orders direct from the various departments of the RSHA, particularly
from departments IV and V.

DR. SEIDL: Did the institution of the State Secretariat for Security,
which occurred in 1942, bring about a change in the legal position of
the Governor General with reference to measures of the Security Police
and the SD?

BILFINGER: The appointment of a State Secretary as such did not alter
the legal position of the Governor General or of the State Secretary.
New spheres of activity were merely added to the State Secretariat for
Security.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know of a decree of Reichsführer SS and Chief of the
German Police, Himmler, in the year 1939, and what were its contents?

BILFINGER: I knew of a decree, probably dated 1939, dealing with the
appointment of the Higher SS and Police Leader, which ruled that the
Higher SS and Police Leader would receive his instructions direct from
Himmler.

DR. SEIDL: The institution of the State Secretariat dated from 7 May
1942 and was based on a Führer decree. The application of this decree
called forth another decree dated 3 June 1942, which dealt with the
transfer of official business to the State Secretary for Security. Do
you know the contents of that decree?

BILFINGER: The essential contents of the decrees which you have
mentioned are known to me.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that on the basis of this decree the entire
Political Police and the Criminal Police, as had been the case before,
were again subordinated to the State Secretary for Security within the
framework of the Security Police?

BILFINGER: These two branches from the very beginning were under the
Higher SS and Police Leader, and later on under the State Secretary for
Security. To this extent the decree did not bring about a change, but
was merely a confirmation.

DR. SEIDL: Is it known to you that in Appendix B of that decree there
are 26 paragraphs in which all the branches of the Security Police are
transferred to the Higher SS and Police Chief as State Secretary for
Security?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in this decree, in Appendix B, Jewish
matters are also mentioned specifically?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that in Paragraph 21 of Appendix B it is ruled:

    “The special fields of the Security Police: Representation of
    the Government General at conferences and meetings, particularly
    with the central offices of the Reich, which deal with the
    above-mentioned special fields.”?

BILFINGER: I know that as far as the sense is concerned, such a ruling
was contained therein. Whether Paragraph 21 or another paragraph was
worded this way I don’t remember.

DR. SEIDL: Is it also true that on the basis of this decree the last
remains of the administrative police were removed from the
administration of the Government General and handed over to the State
Secretary for Security, who was directly under Himmler.

BILFINGER: That was the intention and the purpose of this decree. But,
contrary to the wording of that decree, only a few branches were taken
away from the administration; concerning the remainder a fight ensued
later. The result was, however, that all branches of the police
administration were taken away.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the administration of the Government General
have anything to do with the establishment and administration of
concentration camps?

BILFINGER: To the best of my knowledge, no.

DR. SEIDL: You were with the Chief of the Security Police and SD in
Kraków. When did you yourself hear of concentration camps at Maidanek,
Treblinka, and Lublin for the first time?

BILFINGER: May I correct you, I was attached to the Commander of
Security Police.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, the Commander of the Security Police.

BILFINGER: I heard of Maidanek for the first time when Lublin and
Maidanek were occupied by the Russians; and through propaganda I heard
for the first time what the name Maidanek meant, when the then Governor
General Frank ordered an investigation regarding events in Maidanek and
responsibility for these events.

DR. SEIDL: According to your own observation, generally speaking, what
were the relations like between the Governor General and the SS
Obergruppenführer Krüger, and what were the reasons for those relations?

BILFINGER: Relations between them were very bad from the beginning. The
reasons were partly questions of organization and of the use of the
Police, and partly essential differences of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: What do you mean by essential differences of opinion? Do you
mean different opinions regarding the treatment of the Polish
population?

BILFINGER: I can still recollect one example which concerned the
confirmation of police court-martial sentences by Governor General
Frank. In opposition to Krüger’s opinion, he either failed to confirm a
number of sentences or else mitigated them considerably. In this
connection I remember such differences of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: Were these sentences which were passed in connection with the
so-called AB Action?

BILFINGER: I know nothing of an AB Action.

DR. SEIDL: You came to the Government General later, did you?

BILFINGER: I came to the Government General in August 1940.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): May I put a few questions to
the witness?

Witness, the Prosecution states that the State Police was a circle of
persons formed in accordance with a common plan, and that membership in
it was voluntary. Since you had an especially high position in the RSHA,
I ask you to tell me briefly what you know about these questions?

BILFINGER: Of the members of the Secret State Police only a small part
were volunteers. The former officials, the officials of the former
political department of the headquarters of the Commissioner of the
Police, constituted the nucleus of the membership of the Secret State
Police. The various local police head offices were created from these
former political departments of the central police headquarters, and at
the same time practically all the officials from these former political
departments were taken over. In Berlin, for example, it was Department
I-A of the central police headquarters.

Apart from that, administrative officials were transferred from other
administrative authorities to the Secret State Police, or were detailed
to go here. As time went on people from other administrations and
offices were forced to transfer to the Secret State Police. Thus, for
instance, the entire frontier customs service was transferred to the
Secret State Police in 1944 by order of the Führer. At about the same
time the whole of the intelligence service was transferred.

In the course of the war numerous members of the Waffen-SS who were no
longer eligible for active military service were detailed to the Secret
State Police. In addition many people who originally had had nothing to
do with police work were drafted as emergency members to the Secret
State Police.

DR. MERKEL: If I summarize it by saying that the Secret State Police was
a Reich authority and that the German civil service law applied to its
employees, is that correct?

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: Was it possible for the officials to resign from the Secret
State Police easily?

BILFINGER: It was extremely difficult and, in fact, impossible to resign
from the Secret State Police. One could resign only in very special
circumstances.

DR. MERKEL: It has been stated here with reference to the composition of
the Secret State Police personnel that there was the following
proportion: executive officers about 20 percent; administrative
officials about 20 percent; and technical personnel approximately 60
percent. Are these figures about right?

BILFINGER: I have no general information about the composition of the
personnel; but for certain offices about which I knew more these figures
would probably apply.

DR. MERKEL: Under whose jurisdiction were the concentration camps in
Germany and in the occupied countries?

BILFINGER: The concentration camps were under the jurisdiction of the
Economic Administration Main Office under SS Gruppenführer Pohl.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Secret State Police have anything to do with the
administration of the concentration camps?

BILFINGER: No. It maybe that at the beginning certain concentration
camps here and there were administered directly by the Secret State
Police for a short period. That was probably the case in individual
instances. But in principle even at that time, and later on without
exception, the concentration camps were administered by the Economic
Administration Main Office.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all who gave orders for the liquidations
which took place in the concentration camps?

BILFINGER: No, I know nothing about that.

DR. MERKEL: Can you say anything about the grounds for protective
custody? On the strength of what legal rulings was protective custody
decreed after 1933?

BILFINGER: Protective custody was based on the Decree of the Reich
President for the Protection of the People and the State, of February
1933, in which a number of the basic rights of the Weimar Constitution
were rescinded.

DR. MERKEL: Was there later a decree by the Minister of the Interior
which dealt with protective custody, at the end of 1936 or the beginning
of 1937?

BILFINGER: Yes, at that time the Protective Custody Law was drawn up.
The legal basis as such remained in force. At that time power to decree
protective custody was confined to the Secret State Police. Before that
a number of other offices, rightly or wrongly, had decreed protective
custody. To prevent this, protective custody was then confined to the
Secret State Police.

DR. MERKEL: Is it correct that for some time you were in France. In what
capacity were you there?

BILFINGER: In the late summer and autumn of 1943 I was commander of the
Security Police in France, in Toulouse.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about an order from the RSHA, or from
the commander of the Sipo for France, or from individual district
commanders, to the effect that ill-treatment or torture was to be
applied when prisoners were interrogated?

BILFINGER: No, I do not know of such orders.

DR. MERKEL: Then how do you explain the ill-treatment and atrocities
which actually took place in connection with interrogations, proof of
which has been given by the Prosecution?

BILFINGER: It is possible that ill-treatment did occur; in a number of
cases this either took place in spite of its being forbidden, or else it
was committed by members of other German offices in France which did not
belong to the Security Police.

DR. MERKEL: Did you, while you were active in France, hear of any such
ill-treatment either officially or by hearsay?

BILFINGER: I never heard of any such ill-treatment at the hands of
members of the German police or the German Armed Forces. I heard only of
cases of ill-treatment carried out by groups consisting of Frenchmen who
were being employed by some German authority.

DR. MERKEL: Were there so-called Gestapo prisons in France?

BILFINGER: No, the Security Police in France did not have prisons of
their own. They handed over their prisoners to the detention camps of
the German Armed Forces.

DR. MERKEL: One last question: The Prosecution has given proof of a
large number of crimes against humanity and war crimes which were
committed with the participation of the Security Police. Can one say
that these crimes were perfectly obvious and were known to all members
of the Secret State Police, or were these crimes known only to a small
circle of persons who had been ordered directly to carry out the
measures concerned? Do you know anything about that?

BILFINGER: I didn’t quite understand the question from the beginning.
Were you referring to France or to the Security Police in general?

DR. MERKEL: I was referring to the Security Police in general.

BILFINGER: No ill-treatment or torture of any kind was permitted; and,
as far as I know, nothing of the kind did happen, still less was it
known generally or to a larger circle of persons. I knew nothing about
it.

DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine? Is there
nothing you wish to ask arising from Dr. Merkel’s cross-examination, Dr.
Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: I have only one more question to ask the witness.

Witness, in Paragraph 4 of the decree of 23 June 1942 the following
ruling is made, and I quote:

    “The SS and Police Leaders in the districts are directly
    subordinate to the governors of the districts, just as the State
    Secretary for Security is subordinate to the Governor General.”

Thus it does not say that the entire police organization is subordinate,
but only the police leaders.

Now I ask you whether orders which had been issued by the commanders of
the Security Police and the SD were forwarded to the governors or were
sent directly to the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD?

BILFINGER: These orders were always sent directly from the commander to
the district chiefs of the Security Police and the SD. The commander
could give no instructions to the governors.

DR. SEIDL: If I understand you correctly you mean that the Security
Police and the SD had their own official channels which had absolutely
nothing to do with the administrative construction of the Government
General.

BILFINGER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. SEIDL: With the permission of the Tribunal, I call as the next
witness the former Governor of Kraków, Dr. Kurt von Burgsdorff.

[_The witness Von Burgsdorff took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

KURT VON BURGSDORFF (Witness): Kurt von Burgsdorff.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

“I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Government General was divided into five
districts at the head of each of which there was a governor; is that
correct?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: From 1 December 1943 until the occupation of your district by
Soviet troops you were governor of the district Kraków?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. To use the correct official term, I was...

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Mr.
President, the defense counsel has put the question of the “occupation”
of this region by Soviet troops. I energetically protest against such
terminology and consider it a hostile move.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have just been told that perhaps a mistake
in the translation has crept in. All I intended to say was that, in the
course of the year 1944, the area of which this witness was governor was
occupied by the Soviet troops in the course of military action. I do not
know what the Soviet prosecutor is protesting against; it is at any rate
far from my intention to make any hostile statement here.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the point was, it was not an occupation; it was a
liberation by the Russian Army.

DR. SEIDL: Of course; I did not want to say any more than that the
German troops were driven out of this area by the Soviet troops.

Witness, will you please continue with your answer?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was entrusted with exercising the duties of a
governor—that is the correct official expression. Until a few months
ago I was still an officer of the Wehrmacht, and during my entire
activity in Kraków I remained an officer of the Wehrmacht.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations, what basically was
the attitude of the Governor General toward the Polish and Ukrainian
people?

VON BURGSDORFF: I want to emphasize that I can answer only for the year
1944. At that time the attitude of the Governor General was that he
wished to live in peace with the people.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that already in 1942 the Governor General had
given the governors the opportunity of setting up administrative
committees, comprised of Poles and Ukrainians, attached to the district
chiefs?

VON BURGSDORFF: There was a governmental decree to this effect. Whether
that was in 1942 or not I do not know.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself make use of the authorization contained
therein, and did you establish such administrative committees?

VON BURGSDORFF: In the district of Kraków I had such a committee
established at once for every district chief.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, according to your observations what was the food
situation like in the Government General, and particularly in your
district?

VON BURGSDORFF: It was not unsatisfactory; but I must add that the
reason for that was that, in addition to the rations, the Polish
population had an extensive black market.

DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the attitude of the
Governor General on the question of the mobilization of labor?

VON BURGSDORFF: He did not wish any workers sent outside the Government
General, because he was interested in retaining the necessary manpower
within the country.

DR. SEIDL: Was the Church persecuted by the Governor General in the
Government General; and what basically was the attitude of the Governor
General to this question, according to your observations?

VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can answer only for my district and for the year
1944. There was no persecution of the Church; on the contrary, the
relations with churches of all denominations were good in my district.
On my travels I always received the clergy, and I never heard any
complaint.

DR. SEIDL: Did you have any personal experience with the Governor
General with regard to this question?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. In the middle of January 1944 I was appointed
District Standortführer by the Governor General, who at the same time
was the Party Leader in the Government General; that is, I was appointed
to a Party office for the district of Kraków. I pointed out to him, as I
had pointed out to the Minister of the Interior, Himmler, before, that I
was a convinced church-going Christian. The Governor General replied
that he was in no way perturbed by that and that he knew of no provision
in the Party program which prohibited it.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations like
between the Governor General and the administration of the Government
General on the one side, and the Security Police and the SD on the other
side?

VON BURGSDORFF: Doubtlessly underneath they were bad, because the Police
always ended by doing only what it wanted and did not concern itself
with the administration. For that reason in the country districts also
there was real friction between the administration offices and the
Police.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that when you took office, or shortly after,
the Governor General issued several instructions referring to the
Police? I quote from the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, the entry of
4 January 1944:

    “The Governor General then gave some instructions to Dr. Von
    Burgsdorff with reference to his new activities. His task will
    be to inform himself, as a matter of principle, of all decisive
    factors in the district. Above all the Governor should direct
    his efforts to opposing energetically any encroachments by the
    Police.”

VON BURGSDORFF: Today I no longer remember that conversation of 4
January 1944, but it may have taken place. However, I do remember that
after I took office, at the end of November 1943, I went to see the
Governor General once more and told him that I had heard that the
relations with the Police were not good and were scarcely tolerable for
the administration. He replied that he was doing what he could in order,
as I might put it, to bring the Police to reason. It was on the basis of
this statement by the Governor General that I definitely decided to
remain in the Government General. I had, as is known, told the Reich
Minister of the Interior that I was unwilling to go there.

DR. SEIDL: In your capacity as Governor did you have any authority to
issue commands to the Security Police and the SD in your district?

VON BURGSDORFF: None whatsoever.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself ever see a police directive?

VON BURGSDORFF: Never. With the Police, orders are passed down
vertically, that is, directly from the Higher SS and Police Leader to
the SS and Police Leader respectively—and that is probably the usual
way—from the chief of the Security Police to the unit commander of the
Security Police.

DR. SEIDL: In your activity as Governor did you have anything to do with
the administration of concentration camps?

VON BURGSDORFF: Never.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know who administered the concentration camps?

VON BURGSDORFF: No, not from my own experience; but I have heard that
there was some central office in Berlin under the Reichsführer SS.

DR. SEIDL: When did you hear for the first time of the Maidanek
concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: From you, about a fortnight ago.

DR. SEIDL: You want to tell the Tribunal under oath...

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: ...that you, although you were Governor of Kraków in the
occupied Polish territory, did not learn about that until during your
captivity?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I am firmly convinced that I heard about this
concentration camp from you for the first time.

DR. SEIDL: When did you for the first time hear of the Treblinka
concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: Also from you on the same occasion.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Governor General is accused by the Prosecution
of issuing a summary court-martial decree in the year 1943. What at that
time was the security situation in the Government General?

VON BURGSDORFF: Again I can judge only for the year 1944. As the German
troops came back from the East, it became worse and worse, so that in my
district it became increasingly difficult to carry out any kind of
administration.

DR. SEIDL: According to your observations what was the economic
situation like in the agricultural and industrial sectors of your
district, and is the statement justified that, allowing for wartime
conditions, the administration of the Government General had done
everything to promote economy?

VON BURGSDORFF: Economy in my district was at full force in 1944 both in
industry and in agriculture. Some industries had been transferred from
the Reich to the Government General; and, as far as agriculture was
concerned, the administration imported large quantities of fertilizers
and seeds and the like. Horse breeding was also greatly promoted in my
district.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused of not having done
everything that was necessary with regard to public health and sanitary
conditions. What can you say about this point?

VON BURGSDORFF: I can say that in my district—again speaking of
1944—hospitals were improved and new ones installed. A great deal was
done, especially in the fighting of epidemics. Typhus, dysentery, and
typhoid were greatly reduced by inoculation.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Frank is also accused of having neglected
higher education. Do you know anything about the conditions in the
Government General in regard to this?

VON BURGSDORFF: When I came into the Government General there was no
longer any higher education at all. On the basis of other experiences I
suggested immediately that Polish universities be opened again. I
contacted the president of the main department for education, who told
me that the government was already entertaining such plans. In every one
of my monthly reports I pointed out the necessity for Polish
universities, because within a short time, or more correctly in a few
years’ time, there would be a shortage of technicians, doctors, and
veterinaries.

DR. SEIDL: Now, one last question. There was a so-called sphere of
activity of the NSDAP in the Government General; you were the District
Standortführer in the Government General?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what, according to your observations, were the
relations between the Governor General and the Head of the Party
Chancellery, Bormann?

VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can say without exaggeration that they were
extremely bad. As District Standortführer I combined this office with
that of District Governor and witnessed the last great struggle of the
Governor General against Bormann. The Governor General held the view,
and in this he was justified, that it was wrong to combine the Party
office with the government office. He was afraid there would be too much
interference not only by the Police but also by the Party, and he wanted
to prevent that. Bormann, on the other hand, wanted to establish the
predominance of the Party over the State in the Government General as
well. That led to the most serious conflict.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other Defense Counsel wish to ask any other
questions?

DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath):
Witness, you were at one time Under State Secretary in the Government of
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia? When was that?

VON BURGSDORFF: From the end of March 1939 until the middle of March
1942.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And to whom were you directly subordinate as Under
State Secretary? The State Secretary Frank or the Reich Protector?

VON BURGSDORFF: State Secretary Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: How did you come to know about the activities of
Von Neurath as Reich Protector?

VON BURGSDORFF: From conferences with him and personal conversations.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What kind of work did you have to do as Under
State Secretary?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was in charge of the administration proper.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were the Police and the various SS and police
offices subordinate to you?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: To whom were they subordinate?

VON BURGSDORFF: To State Secretary Frank.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was State Secretary Frank’s attitude to Von
Neurath?

VON BURGSDORFF: You mean officially?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Officially, yes, of course.

VON BURGSDORFF: Herr Von Neurath tried at first to get on with Herr
Frank; but the stronger Frank’s position became, the more impossible
that was. State Secretary Frank, later Minister Frank, had behind him
the entire power of the SS and the Police, and finally Hitler also.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: From whom did Frank get his orders directly?

VON BURGSDORFF: As far as I know, from Himmler; however, I saw that on
one or two or three occasions he received direct orders from Hitler.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And that happened mostly without Von Neurath being
consulted?

VON BURGSDORFF: That I cannot say, but I assume so.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was it possible for Frank to perform his political
functions independently within his sphere of activity, or did he have to
have the approval of Herr Von Neurath?

VON BURGSDORFF: Whether he was authorized or allowed to do so, I should
not like to decide, but at any rate he did so.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Were Herr Von Neurath and Herr Frank of the same
opinion concerning the policy towards the Czech people?

VON BURGSDORFF: I did not understand your question.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath agree with the policy toward
the Czech people pursued by Frank or his superior, Himmler?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Could he carry through his aims?

VON BURGSDORFF: He could not do anything, confronted as he was by
Himmler’s and Hitler’s immense power.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s own policy and
attitude?

VON BURGSDORFF: At the beginning I spoke very often about these things
to Herr Von Neurath. On the basis of the decree of 15 March he hoped and
believed he could get the Germans and Czechs in the Protectorate to live
together reasonably and peacefully.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But as Frank’s position became stronger, that
became more and more difficult?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that in the middle of November
1939 serious disturbances broke out among the students in Prague?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you also remember that on the day after these
incidents Herr Von Neurath and Frank flew to Berlin?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you remember that Frank returned from Berlin
alone on the same day?

VON BURGSDORFF: I believe I can recall that Frank returned on the same
day, but I do not know whether he returned alone.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You don’t know whether Herr Von Neurath returned
with him?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything else about the incidents
connected with the students’ disturbances and what the consequences
were?

VON BURGSDORFF: They resulted, as far as I remember, in the execution of
several students and in the closing of the universities.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether the universities were closed
on Himmler’s order?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the attitude of Herr
Von Neurath towards the Catholic and Protestant Churches?

VON BURGSDORFF: His attitude was always above reproach, and there were
no difficulties with the churches during the time that I was in the
Protectorate.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that Herr Von Neurath was in contact
with the Archbishop of Prague until the latter’s death?

VON BURGSDORFF: No, I don’t know anything about that.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything concerning whether, during
the term of office of Herr Von Neurath, with his approval or upon his
orders, art treasures of any kind, pictures, monuments, sculptures,
libraries, or the like, belonging either to the State or to private
owners, were confiscated and removed from the country?

VON BURGSDORFF: It is certain, absolutely certain, that he did not order
anything of the sort. Whether he consented in any way to this I do not
know, but I do not believe so. I remember one incident in the Malta
Palace, where some Reich office—I don’t remember today which it
was—removed art treasures. Herr Von Neurath immediately did everything
to make good this damage.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that the customs union which had been
ordered by Berlin from the very beginning between the Protectorate and
Germany was not established for a long time because of Herr Von
Neurath’s intervention?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes. I definitely know about that. However, in the
interest of the truth, I have to add that State Secretary Frank also was
against the customs union, because, like Herr Von Neurath, he believed
that the economy of the Protectorate would be damaged by the stronger
economy of Germany.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: While Von Neurath was Reich Protector, was there
any compulsory deportation of workers?

VON BURGSDORFF: I am convinced that that did not happen. Workers were
recruited, but in an entirely regular manner. That was the case while I
was in the Protectorate.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know whether Von Neurath made travel in or
out of the Protectorate dependent on official approval?

VON BURGSDORFF: Whether or not Von Neurath did that, I do not know.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about the closing of the
secondary schools?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about it?

VON BURGSDORFF: I remember that the closing of the secondary schools was
a necessary consequence of the closing of the universities. There were
too many secondary schools in the Protectorate. Not all of them were
closed by any means. On the other hand technical schools were greatly
expanded and new ones established. I cannot remember anything more exact
about it.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know anything about Von Neurath’s attitude
towards the Germanization of Czechoslovakia as intended by Himmler?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes, I remember the memorandum which Von Neurath sent to
Hitler about the whole affair. That memorandum was intended to defer
Himmler’s plans for forced Germanization. Von Neurath expressed the
view, which he had frequently mentioned to me, that in the interest of
peace in the Protectorate he did not advocate these attempts at
Germanization.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Tell us, please, when you first joined the National Socialist
Party?

VON BURGSDORFF: On 1 May 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you achieve office in any of its affiliated
organizations?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was an honorary SA Gruppenführer.

MR. DODD: Any other honors?

VON BURGSDORFF: Then for a few years, just as I had been during the
democratic regime, I was legal advisor to the administration of Saxony.

MR. DODD: Weren’t you also an Oberbannführer in the HJ, the
Hitler-Jugend?

VON BURGSDORFF: I once became Oberbannführer on the occasion of the
Reich Youth Leader’s visit to Prague. But that was purely a gesture of
courtesy, which had no consequences.

I should like to mention again, since you speak of Party offices, that,
as was said before, because of my post as Governor of Kraków I was
District Standortführer from the middle of January 1944 until the end,
that is the middle of January 1945.

MR. DODD: You also received the gold badge of the Hitler Youth, did you
not?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

MR. DODD: Weren’t you in some way associated with Reinhard Heydrich when
you were in Prague?

VON BURGSDORFF: I was with Heydrich until the middle of 1942. Then, as
is generally known, because of the course pursued by Heydrich, I left
the Protectorate, and at 55 years of age I went into the army.

MR. DODD: What position did you occupy with relation to Heydrich?

VON BURGSDORFF: The same as under Herr Von Neurath; I was Under State
Secretary.

MR. DODD: Let me put it to you this way: You told us that you never
heard of Maidanek, the concentration camp?

VON BURGSDORFF: Yes.

MR. DODD: And you never heard of Auschwitz?

VON BURGSDORFF: Of Auschwitz, yes.

MR. DODD: Had you heard of an installation known as Lublin?

VON BURGSDORFF: Of Lublin? Not of the concentration camp but of the city
of Lublin, of course.

MR. DODD: Did you know of a concentration camp by the name of Lublin?

VON BURGSDORFF: No.

MR. DODD: You did know, I assume, of many other concentration camps by
name?

VON BURGSDORFF: Only of German camps, yes—of Dachau and Buchenwald.

MR. DODD: That is all.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions?

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Who is your next witness?

DR. SEIDL: The next witness would be the former secretary of the
Governor General, Fräulein Kraffczyk. However, if I understood the
Tribunal correctly yesterday, this session will end at 1630 hours.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now until Tuesday morning.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 23 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                      ONE HUNDRED AND TWELFTH DAY
                         Tuesday, 23 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I shall dispense with the hearing of the
witness Struve, Chief of the Central Department for Agriculture and Food
in the Government General. With the permission of the Tribunal I am now
calling witness Dr. Joseph Bühler.

[_The witness Bühler took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

JOSEPH BÜHLER (Witness): Joseph Bühler.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long have you known Defendant Dr. Hans Frank;
and what were the positions in which you worked with him?

BÜHLER: I have known Herr Frank since 1 October 1930. I worked with him
in government spheres of service from the end of March 1933. I served
under him officially when he was Minister of Justice in Bavaria; later
when he was Reich Commissioner for Justice; and still later when he was
Minister. From the end of September 1939 Herr Frank employed me in an
official capacity in the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: In what capacity did you serve in the Government General at
the end?

BÜHLER: From about the second half of 1940 I was state secretary in the
government of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: Were you yourself a member of the Party?

BÜHLER: I have been a Party member since 1 April 1933.

DR. SEIDL: Did you exercise any functions in the Party or any of the
affiliated organizations of the Party, particularly in the SA or the SS?

BÜHLER: I never held an office in the Party. I was never a member of the
SA or the SS.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the time during which you were state secretary
to the chief of the government in the Government General. Will you
please tell me what the relations were between the Governor General on
the one side and the Higher SS and Police Leader on the other side?

BÜHLER: I might perhaps say in advance that my sphere of activity did
not touch upon police matters, matters relating to the Party, or
military matters in the Government General.

The relations of the Governor General to the Higher SS and Police
Leader, Obergruppenführer Krüger, who was allocated to him by the
Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police were, from the very
beginning, made difficult by essential differences of opinion. These
differences of opinion concerned the conception of the task and the
position of the Police in general in an orderly state system, as well as
the conception in particular of the position and tasks of the Police in
the Government General. The Governor General held the view that the
Police must be the servant and the organ of the executive of the state
and that accordingly he and the state authorities should give orders to
the Police and that this assignment of tasks involved a limitation of
the sphere of activity of the Police.

The Higher SS and Police Leader Krüger, on the other hand, held the view
that the Police in general had, of course, to fulfill tasks originating
with the executive of the state but that in fulfilling these tasks it
was not bound by the instructions of the administrative authorities,
that this was a matter of technical police questions, decisions about
which administrative authorities could not make and were not in a
position to make.

Regarding the power to give orders to the Police, it was Krüger’s view
that because of the effectiveness and unity of police activity in all
occupied territories, such power to issue orders had to rest with the
central authority in Berlin and that he and only he could issue orders.

As far as the duties of the Police were concerned, it was Krüger’s
opinion that the Governor General’s view regarding the limitation of
these duties as unfounded for the very reason that he, as Higher SS and
Police Leader, was simultaneously the deputy of the Reichsführer SS in
the latter’s capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of
German Nationality.

As far as the relation of the Police to the question of Polish policy
was concerned, it was Krüger’s view that, in connection with work in
non-German territory, police considerations would have to play a
predominant role and that with police methods everything could be
achieved and everything could be prevented. This overestimation of the
Police led, for instance, to the fact that, during later arguments
between the Police and the administration regarding their respective
spheres of work, matters concerning non-German groups were listed among
the competences of the Police.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that as early as 1939 Reichsführer SS Himmler
issued a restricted decree, according to which the handling of all
police matters was his own concern or the concern of his Higher SS and
Police Leader?

BÜHLER: That this was the case became clear to me from the actions taken
by the Police. I did not see a decree to this effect, but I can state
this much: The Police in the Government General acted exactly as in the
directives which I have described before.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, in 1942, by decree of the Führer, a State
Secretariat for Security was instituted. At whose instigation was this
instituted and what was the position taken by the Governor General in
that connection?

BÜHLER: This decree was preceded by a frightful campaign of hatred
against the person of the Governor General. The institution of the State
Secretariat for Security was considered by the Police a step, an
important step, in the fight for the removal of the Governor General.
The matters specified in that decree, or at least the majority of them,
were not being transferred to the Police now for the first time, but the
actual state of affairs was—the actual course of events had already
been—in conformity to the contents of this decree before it was issued.

DR. SEIDL: In the decree implementing this Führer decree and dated 3
June 1942 all the police spheres of activities which were to be
transferred to the State Secretary were given in two lists; in an
Appendix A, the tasks of the Regular Police; and in an Appendix B, the
tasks of the Security Police. Were these police matters at that time
transferred completely to the State Secretary and thus to the police
sector?

BÜHLER: The administration did not like giving up these matters; so
where the Police had not already got hold of them, they were given up
only with reluctance.

DR. SEIDL: You are thinking first of all of the spheres of the so-called
administrative police, health police, _et cetera_, are you not?

BÜHLER: Yes, that is to say, the police in charge of communications,
health, food, and such matters.

DR. SEIDL: If I have understood your statements correctly, you mean that
the entire police system, Security Police as well as SD and Regular
Police, was directed by the central office, either by Himmler himself or
by the Reich Security Main Office through the Higher SS and Police
Leader?

BÜHLER: In general according to my observations, it was possible for the
Security Police to receive orders direct from Berlin without their going
through Krüger.

DR. SEIDL: And now another question: Is it correct that resettlements
were carried out in the Government General, by Reichsführer SS Himmler
in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality?

BÜHLER: Resettlements, in the opinion of the Governor General, even if
carried out decently, always caused unrest among the population. We had
no use for that in the Government General. Also, these resettlements
always caused a falling off of agricultural production. For these
reasons, the Governor General and the Government of the Government
General did not, as a matter of principle, carry out resettlements
during the war. To the extent that such resettlements were carried out,
it was done exclusively by the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation
of German Nationality.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General, because of this
arbitrary resettlement policy, repeatedly had serious arguments with
Himmler, Krüger, and SS Gruppenführer Globocznik?

BÜHLER: That is correct. The intention of preventing such resettlements
always led to arguments and friction between the Higher SS and Police
Leader and the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: The Defendant Dr. Frank is accused by the Prosecution of the
seizure and confiscation of industrial and private property. What
basically was the attitude of the Governor General to such questions?

BÜHLER: The legal provisions in this sphere of the law originated with
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. Confiscation of private property
and possessions in the annexed Eastern territories and in the Government
General was subject to the same regulations.

The decree of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan provided for the
creation of a trust office—the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost—with its
central administration in Berlin. The Governor General did not want to
have the affairs of the Government General administered in Berlin, and
therefore he opposed the administration of property in the Government
General being entrusted to the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Without
interference by the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, he established his
own rules for confiscations in the Government General and his own trust
office. That trust office was headed by an experienced higher official
from the Ministry of Economy of Saxony.

DR. SEIDL: What happened to the factories and works which were situated
in the Government General and were formerly the property of the Polish
State?

BÜHLER: Factories, as far as they were included in the armament program,
were taken over by the military sector, that is to say, by the Inspector
for Armaments, who was subordinate to the OKW and later to Minister
Speer. Factories outside the armament sector, which had belonged to the
former Polish State, the Governor General tried to consolidate into a
stock company and to administer them separately as property of the
Government General. The chief shareholder in this company was the
Treasury of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: That is to say, these factories were administered entirely
separately by the Reich Treasury?

BÜHLER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted an extract from Frank’s diary in
evidence under Number USA-281 (Document Number 2233(d)-PS.) This is a
discussion of Jewish problems. In this connection Frank said, among
other things:

    “My attitude towards the Jews is based on the expectation that
    they will disappear; they must go away. I have started
    negotiations for deporting them to the East. This question will
    be discussed at a large meeting in Berlin in January, to which I
    shall send State Secretary Dr. Bühler. This conference is to
    take place at the Reich Security Main Office in the office of SS
    Obergruppenführer Heydrich. In any case Jewish emigration on a
    large scale will begin.”

I ask you now, did the Governor General send you to Berlin for that
conference; and if so, what was the subject of the conference?

BÜHLER: Yes, I was sent to the conference and the subject of the
conference was the Jewish problem. I might say in advance that from the
beginning Jewish questions in the Government General were considered as
coming under the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and Police Leader and
handled accordingly. The handling of Jewish matters by the state
administration was supervised and merely tolerated by the Police.

During the years 1940 and 1941 incredible numbers of people, mostly
Jews, were brought into the Government General in spite of the
objections and protests of the Governor General and his administration.
This completely unexpected, unprepared for, and undesired bringing in of
the Jewish population from other territories put the administration of
the Government General in an extremely difficult position.

Accommodating these masses, feeding them, and caring for their
health—combating epidemics for instance—almost, or rather, definitely
overtaxed the capacity of the territory. Particularly threatening was
the spread of typhus, not only in the ghettos but also among the Polish
population and the Germans in the Government General. It appeared as if
that epidemic would spread even to the Reich and to the Eastern Front.

At that moment Heydrich’s invitation to the Governor General was
received. The conference was originally supposed to take place in
November 1941, but it was frequently postponed and it may have taken
place in February 1942.

Because of the special problems of the Government General I had asked
Heydrich for a personal interview and he received me. On that occasion,
among many other things, I described in particular the catastrophic
conditions which had resulted from the arbitrary bringing of Jews into
the Government General. He replied that for this very reason he had
invited the Governor General to the conference. The Reichsführer SS, so
he said, had received an order from the Führer to round up all the Jews
of Europe and to settle them in the Northeast of Europe, in Russia. I
asked him whether this meant that the further arrival of Jews in the
Government General would cease, and whether the hundreds of thousands of
Jews who had been brought into the Government General without the
permission of the Governor General would be moved out again. Heydrich
promised me both these things. Heydrich said furthermore that the Führer
had given an order that Theresienstadt, a town in the Protectorate,
would become a reservation in which old and sick Jews, and weak Jews who
could not stand the strains of resettlement, were to be accommodated in
the future. This information left me definitely convinced that the
resettlement of the Jews, if not for the sake of the Jews, then for the
sake of the reputation and prestige of the German people, would be
carried out in a humane fashion. The removal of the Jews from the
Government General was subsequently carried out exclusively by the
Police.

I might add that Heydrich demanded, particularly for himself, his
office, and its branches, the exclusive and uninterrupted competence and
control in this matter.

DR. SEIDL: What concentration camps in the Government General did you
know about during your activity as State Secretary?

BÜHLER: The publications in the press during the summer of 1944 called
my attention to the Maidanek camp for the first time. I did not know
that this camp, not far from Lublin, was a concentration camp. It had
been installed as an economic establishment of the Reichsführer SS, in
1941 I think. Governor Zörner came to visit me at that time and he told
me that he had objected to the establishment of this camp when he talked
to Globocznik, as it would endanger the power supply of the city of
Lublin; and there were objections, too, on the part of the Police with
regard to the danger of epidemics. I informed the Governor General of
this and he in turn sent for Globocznik. Globocznik stated to the
Governor General that certain workshops for the needs of the Waffen-SS
at the front had been erected on that site by him. He mentioned
workshops for dressing furs but he also mentioned a timber yard which
was located there.

In these workshops for dressing furs, as I heard, fur articles from the
collection of furs were altered for use at the front. At any rate,
Globocznik stated that he had installed these workshops in compliance
with Himmler’s command.

The Governor General prohibited the erection of any further
installations until all questions were settled with the police in charge
of building and blueprints had been submitted to the state offices, in
other words until all rules had been complied with, which apply to the
construction of buildings. Globocznik never submitted these blueprints.
With regard to the events inside the camp, no concrete information ever
reached the outside. It surprised the Governor General just as much as
it surprised me when the world press released the news about Maidanek.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution has submitted a document, Number
437-PS, Exhibit USA-610, which is a memorandum from the Governor General
to the Führer, dated 19 June 1943. I think you yourself drafted that
memorandum. On Page 35 a report of the commander of the Security Police
is mentioned and quoted verbatim in part. This report of the Security
Police mentions also the name of Maidanek.

Did you at that time realize that this Maidanek was identical or
probably identical with that camp near Lublin?

BÜHLER: No. I assumed that, like Auschwitz, it was a camp outside the
territory of the Government General, because the Governor General had
repeatedly told the Police and the Higher SS and Police Leader that he
did not wish to have concentration camps in the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: Under whose jurisdiction was the administration of
concentration camps in the Government General?

BÜHLER: I don’t know because I did not know of the existence of the
camps. In August, on the occasion of a visit to the reception camp at
Pruszkow, I heard about the administration of concentration camps in
general. At that time I brought instructions from Himmler to the camp
commandant, according to which transport of the inhabitants of Warsaw
who had been removed from the city to concentration camps was to cease
forthwith.

DR. SEIDL: Was that after the uprising in Warsaw?

BÜHLER: It was during it; it must have been on or about 18 or 19 August
1944. The camp commandant, whose name I have forgotten, told me at the
time that he did not know about that order, and that he could receive
instructions only from the Chief of Concentration Camps.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know whether the Governor General himself ever sent a
Pole, a Ukrainian, or a Jew to a concentration camp?

BÜHLER: Nothing like that ever happened, when I was present.

DR. SEIDL: Is it true that a large number of Jewish workmen who were
working in the castle at Kraków were taken away by the Security Police
against the wishes of the Governor General and during his absence?

BÜHLER: This Jewish workers’ colony is known to me because I lived in
that castle. I also know that the Governor General always took care of
the maintenance of this colony. And the chief of the Chancellery of the
Government General, Ministerial Counsellor Keit, once told me that this
group of Jewish workers had been taken away by force by the Police
during the absence of the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the so-called AB Action, this extraordinary
pacification action. What were the circumstances which occasioned this
action?

BÜHLER: It may have been about the middle of May 1940 when one morning I
was called from the government building, where I performed my official
work, to visit the Governor General in the castle. I think I remember
that Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart had also been called. There we met the
Governor General together with some officials of the Police. The
Governor General stated that, in the opinion of the Police, an extreme
act of pacification was necessary. The security situation at that time,
as far as I remember, was this: Certain remnants of the Polish armed
forces were still roaming about in deserted forest regions, causing
unrest among the population, and probably giving military training to
young Poles. At that time, that is May 1940, the Polish people had
recovered from the shock which they had suffered at the sudden defeat in
1939; and they began openly, with little caution and without experience,
to start a resistance movement everywhere. This picture I remember
clearly because of the statement given by the Police on that or some
other occasion.

DR. SEIDL: May I interrupt you and quote from Frank’s diary, an entry of
16 May 1940. I quote:

    “The general war situation forces us to regard the security
    situation in the Government General very seriously. From a
    number of symptoms and actions one can draw the conclusion that
    a large organized wave of resistance among the Poles is present
    in the country awaiting the outbreak of greater and violent
    events. Thousands of Poles are reported to have been organized
    secretly and to have been armed, and are being incited to carry
    out acts of violence of all sorts.”

Then the Governor General quoted some recent examples, as, for instance,
an uprising in certain villages under the leadership of Major Huballa in
the district of Radom; the murder of families of German blood in
Józefów; the murder of the mayor of Grasienta, _et cetera_.

    “Illegal pamphlets, inciting to rebellion, are being distributed
    and even posted up everywhere; and there can therefore be no
    doubt that the security situation is extremely serious.”

Did the Governor General express himself in that manner at the time?

BÜHLER: When I took part in that meeting, the Governor General spoke
about the situation for some time, but the details I cannot recollect.

DR. SEIDL: What happened after that?

BÜHLER: I had only one impression. In the previous months the Governor
General had succeeded, by taking great pains, in imposing on the Police
a procedure for courts-martial which had to be observed in making
arrests and dealing with suspicious persons. Furthermore, the Police had
to concede that the Governor General could refer the sentences of a
summary court-martial to a reprieve commission and that the execution of
sentences could take place only after the sentences had been confirmed
by the Governor General. The statements of the Governor General during
this conference in the middle of May 1940 made me fear that the Police
might see in these statements the possibility for evading the
court-martial and reprieve procedure imposed on them. For that reason I
asked the Governor General for permission to speak after he had finished
his statement. The Governor General cut me short at first and stated
that he wanted to dictate something to the secretary in a hurry, which
the latter was then to dictate to a stenotypist at once and then put it
into its final version. Thereupon the Governor General dictated some
authorization, or order, or some such document; and with absolute
certainty I remember that after he had finished dictating, the secretary
and I think, quite definitely, Brigadeführer Streckenbach, the Commander
of the Regular Police, left the room. I am saying this in advance
because it explains the fact that everything that happened afterwards
has not been recorded in the minutes. The secretary was no longer
present in the room. I expressed my fears, saying that these
requirements laid down for court-martial procedure should be observed
under all circumstances. I am not claiming any particular merit in this
connection, because if I had not done it then this objection would have
been raised, I am convinced, by Reich Minister Seyss-Inquart, or the
Governor General himself would have realized the danger which his
statements might have caused in this respect. At any rate, in reply to
my objection, and without any debate, the Governor General stated at
once that arrests and shootings could take place only in accordance with
the court-martial procedure, and that sentences of the summary
courts-martial would have to be examined by the reprieve commission.

In the ensuing period these instructions were followed. I assume that it
is certain that the reprieve commission received all sentences
pronounced by these courts-martial and dealt with them.

DR. SEIDL: Another entry in Frank’s diary, 12 July 1940, leads one to
the conclusion that at first these leaders of the resistance movement
concerned were merely arrested. I quote a statement of the Governor
General:

    “Regarding the question what is to be done with the political
    criminals caught in connection with the AB Action, a discussion
    is to take place in the near future with State Secretary Dr.
    Bühler, Obergruppenführer Krüger, Brigadeführer Streckenbach,
    and Ministerial Counsellor Wille.”

Who was Ministerial Counsellor Wille, and what task did he have in that
connection?

BÜHLER: I might say in advance that there is a gap in my memory which
makes it impossible for me to say for certain when the Governor General
told Brigadeführer Streckenbach that in all cases he would have to
observe court-martial procedure and respect the reprieve commission. On
the other hand, I think I can remember for certain that at the time this
discussion took place between Krüger, Streckenbach, Wille, and me,
arrests only had taken place and no executions. Ministerial Counsellor
Wille was the head of the Department of Justice in the Government and
was the competent official for all matters concerning reprieves. The
Governor General wanted these matters dealt with by a legally trained,
experienced man.

During the conference with Krüger, Streckenbach, and Wille it had been
ruled that the persons who had been arrested up to that time were to be
subjected to court-martial procedure and that sentences had to be dealt
with by the reprieve commission. The Police were not exactly
enthusiastic about this. I remember that Krüger told me privately after
the conference that the Governor General was a jack-in-the-box with whom
one couldn’t work, and that in the future he would go his own way.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that this has been gone
into in too great detail.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, I am coming to the end of my questions.

Witness, during a Police meeting in 1940 on 30 May, the Defendant Dr.
Frank mentioned among other things the following: “The difficulties we
had had with the Kraków professors were terrible. If we had handled the
matter here, it would have taken a different course.” Who arrested these
professors, and to what extent was the Governor General concerned with
this matter?

BÜHLER: On 7 or 8 November 1939, when the Governor General arrived in
Kraków to begin his activities, all professors of the University of
Kraków were arrested by the Security Police without his knowledge and
taken away to concentration camps in the Reich. Among them were
acquaintances of the Governor General, with whom shortly before he had
had social and academic connections through the Academy for German Law.
The Governor General used his influence on Obergruppenführer Krüger
persistently and uninterruptedly until he achieved the release of the
majority of these professors from concentration camps.

This statement of his, which contradicts this, was made, in my opinion,
for the purpose of placating the Police, for the Police did not like
releasing these professors.

DR. SEIDL: What basically was the attitude of the Governor General
concerning mobilization of labor?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Government of the Government
General were always attempting to get as many Polish workers for the
Reich as possible. It was clear to us, however, that the employment of
force in recruiting workers might bring about temporary advantages but
that recruitment of workers in that way would not promise much success
in the long run. The Governor General gave me instructions, therefore,
to conduct extensive and intensive propaganda in favor of employment in
the Reich and to oppose all use of force in the recruitment of workers.

On the other hand the Governor General wanted to make his recruitment of
workers for the Reich successful by demanding decent treatment for
Polish workers in the Reich. He negotiated for many years with the Reich
Commissioner for the Allocation of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel, and
improvements were in fact achieved. The Governor General was especially
opposed to the identifying of Jews and Poles by distinguishing marks in
the Reich. I remember a letter from Reich Commissioner Sauckel in which
he informed the Governor General that he had made every effort to insure
the same treatment for Polish workers as for other foreign workers, but
that his efforts were no longer crowned by success whenever the
influence of the Reichsführer SS opposed them.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now come to another point. Under Number USA-275
the Prosecution has submitted Document 1061-PS, which is a report of
Brigadeführer Stroop on the destruction of the ghetto in Warsaw. Were
you, or the Governor General, informed beforehand about the measures
planned by the Security Police?

BÜHLER: I certainly was not. As to the Governor General, I do not know
that he was informed about any such plans.

DR. SEIDL: What did you learn afterwards about the events at the ghetto
in Warsaw in 1943?

BÜHLER: I heard what practically everybody heard—that an uprising had
broken out in the ghetto which had long been prepared; that the Jews had
used the building materials given them for the purpose of air-raid
protection to set up defense works; and that during the uprising violent
resistance was encountered by the German troops.

DR. SEIDL: I now come to the Warsaw uprising of 1944. To what extent did
the administration of the Government General participate in the quelling
of that revolt?

BÜHLER: As our comrades in Warsaw were encircled by the
insurrectionists, we asked the Governor General to apply to the Führer
for assistance to bring about a speedy quelling of the Warsaw revolt.
Apart from that the administration assisted in the welfare of the
population in connection with the evacuation in the battle zone of the
quarters that were to be destroyed. But the administration did not
exercise any authority here.

DR. SEIDL: On 4 November 1945 you made an affidavit. The affidavit bears
the number 2476-PS. I shall now read to you that affidavit, which is
very brief, and I shall ask you to tell me whether the contents are
correct. I quote:

    “In the course of the quelling of the Warsaw revolt in August
    1944, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw (a
    Polish estimate) were taken away to German concentration camps.
    As a result of a _démarche_ made by the Governor General, Dr.
    Frank, to the office of Reichsführer SS Himmler, the latter
    prohibited further deportations. The Governor General tried to
    secure the release of the 50,000 to 60,000 inhabitants of Warsaw
    who had already been taken to concentration camps in the Reich.
    The Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, Obergruppenführer
    Kaltenbrunner, refused this request, made in writing as well as
    orally on the occasion of a visit of mine to Berlin in September
    or October 1944, on the grounds that these inhabitants of Warsaw
    were being used in the secret manufacture of armaments in the
    Reich and that therefore a general release was out of the
    question. However, he would be willing to consider individual
    applications favorably. Individual applications for release from
    concentration camps were granted by Kaltenbrunner during the
    subsequent months.

    “Contrary to the Polish estimate, the number of persons taken
    from Warsaw to concentration camps in the Reich was estimated to
    be small by Kaltenbrunner. I myself reported to my office
    Kaltenbrunner’s statement regarding the number of internees, and
    after a renewed investigation I found that the above-mentioned
    figure of 50,000 to 60,000 was correct. These were the people
    who had been taken to concentration camps in Germany.”

I now ask you, are the contents of this affidavit, made before an
American officer, correct?

BÜHLER: I can supplement it.

THE PRESIDENT: Before he supplements it, is it in evidence? Has it yet
been put in evidence?

DR. SEIDL: It has the number 2476-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: That doesn’t prove it has been put in evidence. Has it
been put in evidence? Dr. Seidl, you know quite well what “put in
evidence” means. Has it been put in evidence? Has it got a USA exhibit
number?

DR. SEIDL: No, it has not a USA exhibit number.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you are offering it in evidence, are you?

DR. SEIDL: I don’t want to submit it formally in evidence; but I do want
to ask the witness about the contents of this affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: But it is a document, and if you are putting it to the
witness, you must put it in evidence and you must give it an exhibit
number. You cannot put documents to the witness and not put them in
evidence.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I submit this document as Document Number
Frank-1.

I now ask you, Witness, whether the contents of this affidavit are
correct, and, if so, whether you can supplement this affidavit.

BÜHLER: Yes, I should like to supplement it briefly. It is possible that
I went to see Kaltenbrunner twice about that question—not only
once—and after Kaltenbrunner had refused to release these people the
second time, on the strength of my experiences with the camp commandant
in Camp Pruszkow, I had the impression that it was not in
Kaltenbrunner’s power to order such a release. He didn’t talk to me
about that.

DR. SEIDL: But from his statements you had the impression that perhaps
he too did not have the power to release those people?

BÜHLER: During those conferences I had brought up questions about the
Polish policy, and from these conferences I had the impression that I
might gain Kaltenbrunner’s interest in a reasonable Polish policy and
win him over as an ally in negotiations with Himmler. At any rate,
talking to me, he condemned the methods of force used by Krüger. I
gathered from these statements that Kaltenbrunner did not want to see
methods of force employed against the Poles and that he would have
helped me if he could.

DR. SEIDL: The Soviet Prosecution has submitted a document bearing the
Exhibit Number USSR-128 (Document Number 3305-PS). It is a teleprinted
message from the intelligence office of the Higher SS and Police Leader
East addressed to the Governor General and signed by Dr. Fischer, then
Governor of Warsaw. Under Figure 2 it reads as follows:

    “Obergruppenführer Von dem Bach has been given the new task of
    pacifying Warsaw, that is to say, of laying Warsaw level with
    the ground during the war, except where military considerations
    of its value as a fortress are involved. Before the destruction,
    all raw materials, all textiles, and all furniture will be
    removed from Warsaw. The main task will fall to the civil
    administration.

    “I herewith inform you that this new Führer decree regarding the
    razing of Warsaw is of the greatest significance for the further
    new policy regarding the Poles.”

As far as you can recollect, how did the Governor General receive and
view that telegram? And to what extent was his basic attitude altered on
the strength of that message?

BÜHLER: This telegram referred to instructions which Obergruppenführer
Von dem Bach had received from the Reichsführer SS. The administration
in the Government General did not welcome the destruction of Warsaw. On
the contrary, I remember that, together with the Governor General, ways
which might be used to avoid the destruction of Warsaw were discussed.
Just what was really tried I cannot recollect. It may be that further
steps were not taken because of the impossibility of achieving anything.

DR. SEIDL: I now turn to another subject.

THE PRESIDENT: We might adjourn now for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Your Honors, before I continue the
interrogation of the witness Dr. Bühler, I should like to inform you
that I forego the interrogation of the witness Helene Kraffczyk; so this
witness will be the last one.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Defendant Dr. Frank has been accused by the
Prosecution of not having done everything within his power to ensure the
feeding of the population of the Government General. What can you say
about that?

BÜHLER: The decisive reason, the real cause, why the population in the
Government General could not be supplied as efficiently and as
satisfactorily as in Germany was the lack of co-operation on the part of
the Polish population in the measures taken by the Germans to bring
about a just and equal distribution of food quotas. This lack of
co-operation was caused by patriotic considerations, the aversion to
German domination, and the continuous, effective propaganda from the
outside. I do not believe that there was a single country in Europe
where so much was pillaged, stolen, and diverted to the black market,
where so much was destroyed and so much damage was done in order to
sabotage the food program, as in the Government General.

To give one example: All the dairy machinery, which had been provided
with great pains, and the chain of dairies, which had been organized
with difficulty, were destroyed again and again so that a more or less
comprehensive control of milk and fat supplies could not be carried out.
I estimate that the fat sold on the free market and the black market in
the Government General was several times the quantity of that controlled
and distributed officially.

Another decisive reason may be seen in the fact that the Government
General had been carved out of a hitherto self-contained governmental
and economic structure and that no consideration had been given
effecting a proper economic balance.

The large centers of consumption in the Government General, that is to
say, the cities such as Warsaw, Kraków, later Lvov, and also the
industrial area in the center of Poland, had previously received their
supplies to a very large extent directly from the country through the
standing market. In these areas of the Government General there was a
lack of granaries; a lack of refrigerators; there was no systematic
chain of dairies; and storehouses of all kinds were lacking—all
necessary for the directing or controlling of a supply economy by the
state.

The Government General had to construct all these things step by step,
and therefore the supplying of the population was proportionately
difficult. It was not intended to supply the population fully right
away; the supplies were to be improved gradually. I always saw to it
that the directives issued for combating the black market allowed
margins for the acquisition of foodstuffs and that the inhabitants of
the cities were given the opportunity of contacting the producers. In
1942 the rations were to have been increased; then an order came from
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan that rations were not to be
increased and that certain quotas of foodstuffs were to be allocated to
the Reich. Most of these foodstuffs were not taken out of the area, but
were consumed by the Armed Forces on the spot. The Governor General
fought continually against the authorities of the Four Year Plan, in
order to achieve an increase and an improvement in the food supplies for
the Polish population. That struggle was not without success. In many
cases it was possible to increase the rations considerably, especially
those of the workers in armament industries, and other privileged groups
of the working population.

To sum up I should like to say that it was not easy for the population
of the Government General to get its daily food requirements. On the
other hand there were no famines and no hunger epidemics in the
Government General. A Polish and Ukrainian auxiliary committee, which
had delegations in all districts of the Government General, saw to the
supply of foodstuffs for those parts of the population which were in
greatest need. I used my influence to have this committee supplied with
the largest possible amount of foodstuffs, so that it should be able to
pursue its welfare work successfully, and it is known to me that that
committee took special care of the children of large cities.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what were the measures that the Governor General
took to safeguard art treasures in the areas under his administration?

BÜHLER: With a decree of 16 December 1939 the Reichsführer SS, in his
capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality, had already ordered, without informing the Governor
General, that all art treasures of the Government General were to be
confiscated and transported to the Reich. The Government General was
successful in preventing this transport to a great extent.

Then a man arrived in the Government General from the Delegate for the
Four Year Plan, State Secretary Mühlmann, who claimed to have plenary
authority from the Delegate for the Four Year Plan. I asked to see that
authorization. It was signed, not by Göring himself, but by somebody in
his circle, Gritzbach. He was entrusted with the task of safeguarding
the art treasures of the Government General in the interests of the
Reich. In order to bring this commissioner—provided as he was with
plenary authority from the Reich—into line with the Government General,
the Governor General entrusted to him, in addition, the task of
collecting together the art treasures of the Government General. He
collected these art treasures and also had catalogues printed; and I
know, from conferences which took place with the Governor General, that
the Governor always attached the greatest importance to having these art
treasures kept within the area of the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: The prosecution, under Number USA-378, that is Document
1709-PS, submitted a report about the investigation of the entire
activity of the Special Commissioner for the Collection and Safeguarding
of Art and Cultural Treasures in the Government General. On Page 6 of
that report it reads, and I quote:

    “Reason for investigation: Order of the State Secretary of the
    Government of the Government General of 30 June 1942 to
    investigate the entire activity of the Special Commissioner
    appointed for the collection and safeguarding of art and
    cultural treasures in the Government General, according to the
    decree of the Governor General of 16 December 1939.”

I ask you now what caused you in 1942 to give this order for
investigation, and did the report lead to serious charges?

BÜHLER: The investigation was found necessary because of the possibility
of a collision of duties, in the case of State Secretary Mühlmann,
between the order given by the Reich and the order given by the Governor
General. I had also heard that some museum pieces had not been properly
taken care of. The investigation showed that State Secretary Mühlmann
could not be blamed in any way.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has submitted another document, 3042-PS,
Exhibit USA-375. It is an affidavit by Dr. Mühlmann, and I quote:

    “I was the Special Commissioner of the Governor General of
    Poland, Hans Frank, for the safeguarding of art treasures in the
    Government General, from October 1939 to September 1943. Göring
    in his capacity as chairman of the Reich Defense Council had
    commissioned me with this duty.

    “I confirm that it was the official policy of the Governor
    General, Hans Frank, to take into safekeeping all important art
    treasures which belonged to Polish public institutions, private
    collections, and the Church. I confirm that the art treasures
    mentioned were actually confiscated; and it is clear to me that
    in case of a German victory they would not have remained in
    Poland, but would have been used to complement German art
    collections.”

I ask you now: Is it correct that the Governor General from the very
beginning considered all art treasures which had been safeguarded the
property of the Government General?

BÜHLER: Insofar as they were state property, yes; insofar as they were
private property, they were temporarily confiscated and safeguarded; but
the Governor General never thought of transferring them to the Reich. If
he had wanted to do that, he could have taken advantage of the war
situation itself in order to send these art treasures to Germany. But
where the witness obtained his information, as contained in the last
sentence of his affidavit, I do not know.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted a document, L-37, under Exhibit
Number USA-506. It is a letter of 19 July 1944 from the commander of the
Security Police and SD of the district of Radom, to the branch office of
Tomassov. There it says, among other things, and I quote:

    “The Higher SS and Police Leader East issued the following order
    on 28 June 1944:”

I skip a few sentences and then quote:

    “The Reichsführer SS, with the approval of the Governor General,
    has ordered that in all cases where assassinations of Germans or
    attempts at such assassinations have occurred, or where
    saboteurs have destroyed vital installations, not only the
    perpetrators are to be shot but also all their kinsmen are
    likewise to be executed and their female relatives above 16
    years of age are to be put into concentration camps.”

Is it known to you whether the Governor General ever spoke about this
question with the Reichsführer SS and whether he had given any such
approval?

BÜHLER: I know nothing about the issuing of an order of that kind. Once
during the second half of 1944, an order came through my hands relating
to the joint responsibility of kin, but I cannot say whether that
concerned the Reich or the Government General; it was a police order, I
should say. If it had had that formula, “with the approval of the
Government General,” I should have questioned the Governor General on
that point.

DR. SEIDL: Would such an approval have been consistent with the
fundamental attitude of the Governor General to this question as you
knew it?

BÜHLER: The fundamental attitude of the Governor General was on the
contrary opposed to all executions without trial and without legal
reasons.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that from 1940 on the Governor General
complained continually to the Führer about the measures taken by the
Police and the SD?

BÜHLER: Yes; I myself drew up at least half a dozen memoranda of about
the length of the one submitted, addressed to the Führer direct or to
him through the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. They contained repeated
complaints with regard to executions, encroachments in connection with
the recruiting of workers, the importation of inhabitants of other
regions without the permission of the Governor General, the food
situation, and happenings in general which were contrary to the
principles of an orderly administration.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution submitted one of these memoranda under the
number USA-610. This is a memorandum to the Führer of 19 June 1943. Is
this memorandum essentially different to any previous or later
memoranda; and what, basically, was the attitude of the Führer to such
complaints and proposals?

BÜHLER: This memorandum, which has been submitted, is somewhat different
from the previous ones. The previous memoranda contained direct
accusations with regard to these happenings and the encroachments by the
Police. When these memoranda remained unsuccessful, acting on the order
of the Governor General, I drew up the complaints contained in this
memorandum of June in the form of a political proposal. The grievances
listed there were not caused by the government of the Governor General;
rather they were complaints about interference by outside authorities.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find on 26 October 1943 a long report about
the 4 years of German construction work in the Government General which
was made by you yourself. On the basis of what documents did you compile
that report?

BÜHLER: I compiled that report on the basis of the material which the 13
main departments of the government had given me.

DR. SEIDL: Now a question of principle: What, basically, was the
attitude of the Governor General to the Polish and Ukrainian people, as
you know it from your 5 years’ activity, as the head of the government?

BÜHLER: The first principle of all was that of keeping peace in this
area and of increasing the usefulness of this area as far as possible by
improving its resources, economically speaking. In order to achieve
that, decent treatment of the population was necessary; freedom and
property must not be infringed upon. Those were the principles of policy
according to which, acting on the order of the Governor General, I
always carried out my functions as state secretary of the government.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General also tried within the
framework of wartime conditions to grant the population a certain
minimum of cultural development?

BÜHLER: That was the desire of the Governor General, but the realization
of this desire very frequently met with resistance on the part of the
Security Police, or the Propaganda Ministry of the Reich, or it was made
impossible by conditions themselves. But in principle the Governor
General did not wish to prohibit cultural activity among the Polish and
Ukrainian populations.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that he tried particularly to revive higher
education and that, evading the directives from the Reich, he instituted
so-called technical courses in colleges?

BÜHLER: Instruction was certainly given at the technical schools by
Polish professors in Warsaw and Lvov which corresponded approximately to
a university education. As a matter of principle, the Governor General
also wanted to open secondary schools and seminaries for priests, but
that always failed because of the objections of the Security Police. As
no agreement could be reached, and acting on the order of the Governor
General, in October 1941 on my own authority I promised the opening of
secondary schools and, I believe, of seminaries for priests with a
certain advisory autonomy for the Poles. Two days after this
announcement the Führer’s opinion was transmitted to me that I had no
authority to announce such measures.

DR. SEIDL: Dr. Frank’s diary often mentions the principle of unity of
administration and the fact that the Governor General was the deputy of
the Führer in this territory and the representative of the authority of
the Reich. Does this conception tally with the facts? What other
authorities of the Reich and the Party came into the administration of
the Government General?

BÜHLER: The authority of the Governor General was limited from the very
beginning in many important respects. Thus, for instance, before the
establishment of the Government General, the Reichsführer SS had been
invested with full power in the matter of the preservation of German
Nationality in all occupied territories. The Delegate for the Four Year
Plan had equal authority and power to issue decrees, in the Government
General. But many other offices as well, such as those for armaments,
post, railways, building, and other departments tried, and tried
successfully, to take over parts of the administration of the Government
General or to gain some influence over it. After the Governor General
had lost his offices as Reichsleiter in 1942, there was a special rush
in this direction. I might almost say that it became a kind of sport to
diminish the prestige of the King of Poland.

DR. SEIDL: Who appointed, dismissed, and paid the police officials in
the Government General and otherwise saw to their interests from the
point of view of the Civil Service?

BÜHLER: That was done exclusively by Himmler’s administrative office in
Berlin.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that even officials of the administration of
the Government General were arrested by Krüger and that it was not
possible for even the Governor General to effect their release? I remind
you of the case of Scipessi.

BÜHLER: Yes. I can confirm that from my own experience. Even from my own
circle people were arrested without my being notified. In one such case
I instructed the commander of the Security Police that the official was
to be released within a certain space of time. He was not released, and
I demanded the recall of the commander of the Security Police. The
result was that Himmler expressed his special confidence in this
commander of the Security Police and the recall was refused.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, how long was the Government General able to work at
all under normal conditions?

BÜHLER: I might almost say, never at any time. The first year was taken
up in repairing destruction caused by the war. There were destroyed
villages, destroyed cities, destroyed means of transport; bridges had
been blown up in very large numbers. After these destroyed objects had
been repaired, as far as it was possible under war conditions, the
Government General became again the deployment area for the war against
the East, against the Russians, and then the transit area to the front
and the line of communications area. It was the great repair shop for
the front.

DR. SEIDL: Another question: During the war Himmler presented to the
Reich Government the draft of a law concerning the treatment of
anti-social elements. What was the attitude of Dr. Frank towards this
draft?

BÜHLER: As far as I can remember...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal thinks that the matters which the
witness is going into are really matters of common knowledge. Everyone
knows about that. I think you might take the witness over this ground a
little bit faster than you are.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir. He has given the answer already.

Witness, during the war did the government of the Reich...

THE PRESIDENT: But I am speaking of the future, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Sir.

[_Turning to the witness._] During the war, Himmler submitted to the
Reich Government, the draft of a law concerning the treatment of
anti-social elements.

BÜHLER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: What was the attitude of the Governor General to this?

BÜHLER: The Governor General protested against this. At the conference
which I had with Heydrich in February 1942 the latter asked me as a
special request to ask the Governor General to retract his protect
against the law. The Governor General refused to do this.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has presented a chart which shows Dr. Frank
as having authority over the Reich Minister of Justice, Dr. Thierack.
Did such a situation ever exist?

BÜHLER: That must be an error; such a situation never existed.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, were the relations
between the Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler?

BÜHLER: The Governor General and the Reichsführer SS Himmler as
individuals were so different...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I thought we had been hearing all morning what
the relations were between the Governor General and the Reichsführer.

DR. SEIDL: Then I will not put that question.

Witness, the Soviet Prosecution, under Exhibit Number USSR-93, (Document
Number USSR-93), submitted an appendix to the report of the Polish
Government. The appendix is entitled “Cultural Life in Poland.” I have
shown it to you once before and would like you to tell me whether the
Governor General, or his government, ever actually issued such
directives?

BÜHLER: I do not remember ever having signed such directives or having
seen any such directives signed by the Governor General. This document
submitted to me, seems to me to be a fake or a forgery. That can be
recognized from the contents.

DR. SEIDL: In the diary we find a large number of entries referring to
the policies of the Governor General which seem to contradict what you
yourself said before as a witness. How can you explain these
contradictions?

BÜHLER: These statements by the Governor General, which have also been
called to my attention during previous interrogations, do not merely
seem to contradict what I said; they very clearly do contradict what I
had to say as a witness. As I myself heard such statements frequently, I
have tried to understand how he came to make such statements; and I can
only say that Frank perhaps took part more than was necessary in the
conferences and affairs of the government officials. There was scarcely
a conference in which he did not take part. Thus it happened that he had
to speak many times during one day, and I might say that in 99 out of
100 cases he spoke on the spur of the moment, without due reflection,
and I frequently witnessed how after making such grotesque statements he
would try in the next sentences, or at the next opportunity, to retract
them and straighten them out. I also witnessed how he rescinded
authority which he had delegated on the spur of the moment. I am sure
that if I could go through the diary for every one of these statements,
I would be able to give you a dozen—dozens of other statements to the
contrary.

DR. SEIDL: Frank’s diary includes...

BÜHLER: I should like to say the following: When the Governor General
was working with the members of his administration, he never made such
statements; at least I cannot remember any. Those statements were always
made when the Higher SS and Police Leader was sitting next to him, so
that I had the impression that he was not free at such moments.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank covers about 10,000 to
12,000 typewritten pages. Who kept this diary—he himself or somebody
else?

BÜHLER: According to my observations, the diary was kept by
stenographers. At first by one stenographer, Dr. Meidinger, later by two
stenographers, Nauk and Mohr. The procedure was that these stenographers
were in the room during conferences and took notes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that to a certain extent these stenographers
received reports from a third person as to what was said at a
conference?

BÜHLER: I often noticed that these stenographers did not take the
trouble to record everything literally, but merely wrote summaries of
the sense. I was also sometimes asked what this or that person, or what
the Governor General, had said or thought in some particular instance.

DR. SEIDL: Did the Governor General see these entries in the diary or
read them later?

BÜHLER: From what I know of the Governor General I do not believe that
he read them over.

THE PRESIDENT: How can this witness tell whether he read the notes
later?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness, Dr. Bühler, was the Governor
General’s closest collaborator.

THE PRESIDENT: If you wanted to put that sort of question, you should
have asked the Defendant Frank.

DR. SEIDL: A further question, Witness. According to your observations
what caused the Governor General not to destroy that diary, but to hand
it over when he was arrested?

BÜHLER: On 15 March for the last time I was...

THE PRESIDENT: That, again is a matter which rests in the mind of Dr.
Frank, not of this witness, why he did not destroy it.

DR. SEIDL: He has answered the question already, and I forego the answer
of the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, one last question. In 1942, after the
speeches made by Dr. Frank, he was deprived of all his Party offices.
What effect did that have on his position as Governor General?

BÜHLER: I have already referred to that. It weakened his authority
considerably, and the administration in the Government General became
increasingly difficult.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct, that the Governor General repeatedly, both in
writing and orally, tendered his resignation?

BÜHLER: Yes, written applications for resignation I often worded myself;
and I know that he also asked orally many times to be permitted to
resign, but that this was never approved.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions for the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, is it
correct that by far the largest number of the Polish workers who came to
Germany, came into the Reich before April 1942, that is, before Sauckel
came into office?

BÜHLER: I cannot make any definite statement about that, but I know that
the recruitment of labor produced smaller and smaller results and that
the main quotas were probably delivered during the first years.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the labor quotas which had been demanded from the
Governor General reduced by Sauckel in view of the fact that so many
Poles were already working in the Reich?

BÜHLER: I know of one such case; Sauckel’s deputy, President Struve,
talked to me about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it true that Himmler for his own purposes recruited
workers from the Polish area, without Sauckel’s knowledge and without
observing the conditions which Sauckel had laid down?

BÜHLER: I assume that that happened. Whenever I was told about roundups
of workers, I tried to clear matters up. The Police always said, “That
is the labor administration,” and the labor administration said, “That
is the Police.” But I know that once, on a visit to Warsaw, Himmler was
very annoyed at the loafers standing at the street corners; and I
consider it quite possible that these labor raids in Warsaw were carried
out arbitrarily by the Police without the participation of the labor
administration.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know Sauckel’s directives with regard to the
carrying out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: I have not seen them in detail, and I don’t remember them. I
know only that Sauckel stated, on the occasion of a visit in Kraków,
that he had not ordered the use of violence.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was that a speech of Sauckel’s?

BÜHLER: No, it was a conference.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you recall an address which Sauckel made in Kraków to
the various authorities?

BÜHLER: He spoke as a Party speaker.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he make any statements there about the treatment of
workers?

BÜHLER: These statements were made at a conference which preceded the
visit to the Governor General.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the nature of his remarks?

BÜHLER: My people had told him and his people that there had been
encroachments, and he answered that he had not ordered the use of
violence and denied that these events—the arrest of people in motion
picture houses or other places of assembly—had ever been ordered or
decreed by him.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know the structure of the labor administration in
the Government General?

BÜHLER: The Labor Department was part of my field of authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have any immediate influence on the carrying
out of labor recruitment?

BÜHLER: Not only did he have influence, but he also sent a deputy who
was not under my authority.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was it possible for that deputy to carry out the
recruitment of labor direct?

BÜHLER: If he wanted to, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: In what manner? Could he give any instructions, or direct
orders?

BÜHLER: The recruiting units set up by Sauckel were not under my
authority. I tried on several occasions to get these people within my
organization, but these attempts were always countered with the argument
that these recruiting units had to be used in all the occupied
territories and that they could not be attached to one particular area.

In other words, Sauckel’s deputy in the Government General, President
Struve, who was also in charge of the Labor Department, was on the one
hand dependent on Sauckel’s directives and did not need to pay attention
to me but was also on the other hand responsible to me to the extent
that he acted as president of the Labor Department.

DR. SERVATIUS: What branches handled forced recruitment whenever that
became necessary? Could the recruiting units do that?

BÜHLER: I do not know. The deputy always denied the fact of forced
recruitment.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions?
Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, I should like to define your official
position more accurately. As from 1940 and until the moment of the
liberation of Poland you were Frank’s chief deputy, were you not?

BÜHLER: From the end of September until November 1939 I served the
Governor General in a leading position on his labor staff. In November
1939 I became Chief of the Department of the Governor General; that was
the central administrative office of the Governor General, in Kraków.
During the second half of the year 1940 the designation of this function
was changed to “State Secretary of the Government,” and I was State
Secretary of the Government until I left Kraków on 18 January 1945.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Consequently you were the chief deputy of the
Defendant Hans Frank.

BÜHLER: My field of activity was definitely limited. I had to direct the
administrative matters. Neither the Police, nor the Party, nor the
Wehrmacht, nor the various Reich offices which were directly active in
the area of the Government General, were under my authority.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Frank was away, who was then his deputy?

BÜHLER: The deputy of the Governor General was Seyss-Inquart, Reich
Minister Seyss-Inquart.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after Seyss-Inquart left?

BÜHLER: After the departure of Seyss-Inquart there was a gap. I cannot
recall the month, but I think it was in 1941 that I was assigned as
deputy of the Governor General. But that appointment was approved only
with certain modifications. I was supposed to represent the Governor
General only when he was neither present in the area nor...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Answer me briefly. When Frank was away, did you
carry out his duties?

BÜHLER: I answer as my conscience dictates. Whenever Frank was not
present within the area, and could not be reached outside the area, then
I was supposed to represent him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I understand. That means that you took over when
he was away.

BÜHLER: Yes, whenever he could not be reached outside of the area
either.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes. That is precisely what I am asking
about.

I should like the witness to be shown the typed transcript of the report
on a conference of 25 January. Will you show him, first of all, the list
of those who were present. The Tribunal will find the passage that I
desire to quote...

THE PRESIDENT: What year? You said the 25th of January.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943, Mr. President. Your Honors will find it on
Page 7, Exhibit Number USSR-223, (Document Number USSR-223), Paragraph
6.

Witness, is that your signature among the list of those present?

BÜHLER: My signature, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means you were present at that conference.

BÜHLER: 1943, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall quote three sentences from the typed
transcript of the report. Please hand the original to the witness.

I quote three sentences from this document. It is Dr. Frank’s speech:

    “I should like to emphasize one thing. We must not be too
    soft-hearted when we hear that 17,000 have been shot. These
    persons who have been shot are also victims of the war.... Let
    us now remember that all of us who are meeting together here
    figure in Mr. Roosevelt’s list of war criminals. I have the
    honor of being Number 1. We have thus, so to speak, become
    accomplices in terms of world history”.

Your name is second on the list of those present at the conference. Do
you not consider that Frank must have had sufficient grounds to number
you among the most active of his accomplices in crime?

BÜHLER: About such statements of the Governor General I have already
said all that is necessary.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then you ascribe this to the Governor General’s
temperament?

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, that is not an answer to the question. The
question was, do you consider yourself to be one of those criminals?

BÜHLER: I do not consider myself a criminal.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you do not consider yourself a war criminal,
will you perhaps recollect who personally—I emphasize the word
“personally”—actively participated in one of Frank’s most cruel orders
with regard to the Polish population? I am talking about the decree of 2
October 1942. Were you not one of the participants?

BÜHLER: Which measures? Which decree? I should like to be shown it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am talking about the decree signed 2 October
and published 9 October 1943, Exhibit Number USSR 335, (Document Number
USSR-335), the decree about the creation of the so-called courts-martial
conducted by the Secret Police.

BÜHLER: The draft of this decree did not come from my office.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that you deny participation in
rendering that cruel decree effective?

BÜHLER: Yes, the decree comes from the Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The passage I should like to quote, Mr.
President, is on Page 35, of our document book, and in Paragraph 4 of
the English translation.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did you not, together with Dr. Weh, at a
time when even Frank was undecided about signing, succeed in persuading
him to do so and bring into force a decree of a frankly terrorist nature
to legalize tyranny by the Police?

I quote Page 142 of the minutes on the conference with State Secretary
Dr. Bühler (he evidently means you) and with Dr. Weh, concerning the
order issued by Dr. Weh for combating attacks on the German work of
reconstruction in the Government General:

    “After some brief statements by the State Secretary Dr. Bühler
    and Dr. Weh, the Governor General withdraws his objections and
    signs the drafted decree.”

Was it not you?

BÜHLER: I request the interpreter to repeat the question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you: Was it you who persuaded Frank
to sign that decree as quickly as possible?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does that mean that the entry is false?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case, how am I to understand you, if
this is “no” and the other is “no”?

BÜHLER: I can explain that to you exactly. The draft for this decree had
been submitted to the Governor General by SS Oberführer Bierkamp who had
recently been assigned to the Government General. The Governor
General...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please...

THE PRESIDENT: [Interposing] He is in the middle of his answer. You must
let the man answer. What were you saying? You were saying the draft had
been made by somebody?

BÜHLER: This draft had been submitted to the Governor General by
Bierkamp who had just recently come to the Government General. The
Governor General returned this draft and had it revised in the
legislative department. When it was presented to the Governor General,
the Governor General’s doubts were whether the legislative department
had revised it or not. I do not assume material responsibility for this
draft, and I did not have to.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You simply explained to Frank that the project
of the decree had been sufficiently worked over by the competent
technical department?

BÜHLER: Yes, by the legislative department.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And after that the Governor General signed the
decree?

BÜHLER: Obviously.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you not the person who, at the meeting of
23 October 1943, when a letter from Count Ronikier, a person evidently
known to you, was discussed, referred to the practical interpretation of
this cruel decree of 2 October and stated that the application of the
decree would in the future favor the camouflaging of the murder of
hostages by giving the shootings of hostages the semblance of a legal
sentence? Were you that person?

BÜHLER: I ask that the question be repeated. I understood only part of
it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Were you the person who, at the meeting of 23
October 1943, stated that the application of the decree of 2 October
would, in the future, favor the camouflaging of the shooting of
hostages, since it would give them the semblance of a legal sentence?

BÜHLER: It is not quite clear to me. May I repeat what I understood?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If you please.

BÜHLER: You want to ask me whether I was the one who, on the occasion of
a conference on the 23rd of October 1944...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: 1943.

BÜHLER: 1943—who, on the occasion of a conference on 23 October 1943
stated—stated what?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that the application of the decree of
2 October would help to camouflage the shooting of hostages.

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I wish to quote now, Your
Honors, is on Page 26 of the English translation of Exhibit Number
USSR-223, (Document Number 2233-PS), Paragraph 4. I shall now quote your
own words to you:

    “State Secretary Dr. Bühler considers it advisable that all
    those Poles who are to be shot should first be tried by regular
    court-martial proceedings. In the future one should also refrain
    from referring to such Poles as hostages, for the shooting of
    hostages is always a deplorable event and merely provides
    foreign countries with evidence against the German leadership in
    the Government General”.

BÜHLER: I said that, and thus I objected, and wanted to object, to the
shooting of hostages and to executions without court-martial
proceedings.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you consider that a court consisting of
high-ranking, police officials represents justice and is not a travesty
of the very idea of justice?

BÜHLER: To which court do you refer? I pleaded for courts-martial.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is the very court I am talking about, the
“Standgericht” or summary court-martial, composed of Gestapo officials
centralized in the Government General, according to the decree of 2
October.

BÜHLER: I can give you information about the reasons which may have led
to this stiffening of the summary court-martial order of 2 October, so
that you may understand how, psychologically, such a decree came about.

MR. COUNSELLOR. SMIRNOV: I am not interested in psychology. I am
interested in knowing if a court, composed of secret police officials
and considered to be a court, is not in fact sheer mockery of the very
idea of a court of justice?

BÜHLER: The summary courts-martial had to be appointed exactly in
accordance with the decree. I am not of the opinion that a summary
court-martial, simply because it is composed exclusively of police,
should not be considered a court. But I did not make these statements
which you have held against me now in reference to this decree of 2
October; rather I demanded, in general, sentences by courts-martial, and
termed the shooting of hostages a regrettable fact.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You are not giving me a direct answer to my
question. Perhaps you will remember Paragraph 3 of the decree which
stipulates how these courts were to be composed. Show the witness
Paragraphs 3 and 4. I am reading Paragraph 4 into the record:

    “The summary courts-martial of the Security Police are to be
    composed of one SS Führer of the office of the commander of the
    Security Police and the SD, and of two members of these
    organizations”.

Would a court of this composition not testify _a priori_ to the nature
of the sentence which the court would impose?

BÜHLER: Did you ask me?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, yes.

BÜHLER: Whether I consider a summary court-martial a court? I think, you
are asking me about things which have nothing to do with my field of
activity. I do not know what reasons were given for composing these
courts in this fashion. I cannot therefore say anything about it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will look at the signature to that
decree. It is signed by Frank, and it was you who persuaded Frank to
sign that decree.

BÜHLER: I thought that I had corrected that error before. I did not
persuade Herr Frank to sign that order. Rather, I told him that that
order had been worked out in the legislative department. As before, I
must now deny any responsibility for this order, because it did not
belong to my sphere of activity.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall pass on to another series of questions.
Do you recollect the following subparagraph of that decree, particularly
the report of Obergruppenführer Bierkamp at the conference of 27 October
1943 in Kraków?

BÜHLER: I cannot remember without notes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show him the passage which I wish to
quote. The passage I wish to quote, Your Honors, is on Page 26 of our
document, the last paragraph of the text. I quote the passage in
question:

    “Pursuant to the decree of even date, the Security Police have
    detained many people who since 10 October have committed
    criminal acts. They have been condemned to death and will be
    shot as an expiation for their crimes. Their names will be made
    known to the population by means of posters, and the population
    will be told that such and such people may expect a pardon,
    provided there are no further murders of Germans. For every
    murdered German, 10 Poles will be executed....”

Does it not testify to the fact that from the very first days of the
enforcing of Frank’s decree, it merely served to mask mass executions of
hostages?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then to what does it testify if, for each slain
German, 10 Poles entirely unconnected with the crime were to be executed
in accordance with these so-called “verdicts”?

BÜHLER: In my opinion it testifies that 10 Poles would be shot who had
committed crimes punishable by death, and who had been sentenced to
death.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: For each German killed?

BÜHLER: It is possible that these Poles were called hostages. That is
possible.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That means that the decree camouflaged the
system of taking hostages?

BÜHLER: No, it was rather that real shootings of hostages no longer
occurred. Real shootings of hostages occur when people who are not
criminals, who are innocent, are shot because of an act committed by
someone else.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this will be a convenient time to break off?

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has heard with the deepest regret of the
death of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court of the
United States of America. His loss will be most deeply felt in America,
where he had proved himself to be a great public servant. But it is
fitting that this Tribunal, upon which the representatives of the United
States sit, should express its sympathy with the American people in
their great loss.

After serving as Dean of the Law School of Columbia University he was
appointed Attorney General of the United States in 1923, and two years
later he became Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In 1941 he
became Chief Justice and discharged the duties of that high office with
great ability and in accordance with the highest traditions.

The Tribunal desires that I should express its sympathy in
acknowledgement of the great loss the American people have sustained.

Mr. Justice Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor of the United States, is a
member of the Supreme Court over which the Chief Justice presided, and
perhaps he would like to add a few words.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
May it please the Tribunal: It is not only because he was the head of
the judicial system of the United States that the news of the passing of
Chief Justice Stone brings sadness to every American heart in Nuremberg,
but because he was the personal friend of so many of us. He had a rare
capacity for personal friendship. No one was more kind to, and
thoughtful of, the younger men who from time to time came to Washington;
and they found in him a guide, philosopher, and friend.

Now, I know that not only do I feel the loss of a personal friend but
that the American representatives on the Tribunal, Mr. Biddle and Judge
Parker, feel the same way, and many of the younger men on the staff had
intimate contact with the Chief Justice which you might not expect if
you had not known Harlan Stone.

As Attorney General he took over the Department of Justice at one of its
most difficult periods and imparted to it the impress of his integrity,
an impress which stayed with it and was traditional in the department,
as we well know.

As a Justice of the Court he was a forward-looking man, open-minded,
always patient to hear the arguments of both sides and to arrive at his
decision with that complete disinterestedness and detachment which is
characteristic of the just judge. He presided with great fairness and
with kindness to his associates and to those who appeared before him.

It is the passing of a man who exemplified in public life those sturdy
qualities which we have come to associate with the New Englander.

The consolation of his friends lies in this: He died exactly as he would
have chosen to die, in full possession of his faculties and in the
discharge of his duties.

I express great appreciation that this Tribunal has seen fit to take
note of his passing and to allow us to record on behalf of the American
Bar our appreciation of his talents and character.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, before proceeding to a further
examination of the witness, I feel that I ought to make the following
statement:

During the examination of the witness by counsel for the defense Dr.
Seidl, the former stated that the document, which is an official
appendix to the report of the Government of the Polish Republic, was a
forgery. This document sets out the losses suffered by the Polish
Republic in objects of cultural value. The Soviet Prosecution does not
wish to enter into any controversies on the subject, but it does request
the Tribunal to note that this is an official appendix to the report of
the Government of the Polish Republic, and that it considers the
statement of the witness as libellous.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Did you say anything then?

BÜHLER: I was going to say that it was a document that contained a list
of art treasures.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the document, Colonel Smirnov, a document which
contains a list of art treasures?

BÜHLER: No, I do not mean that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. It is a list of losses in
cultural treasures. It is a list of libraries and of the losses suffered
by these libraries during the reign of the Germans in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: It is USSR-93, is it not, the document you are referring
to?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: It is an appendix to the Document Number
USSR-93, an official report by the Polish Government.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it deals with certain directives. That was the
evidence that was given this morning.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: No, Mr. President. This is a list of losses
sustained. It is an official appendix to the report of the Polish
Government. It contains no directives, but it does state the sum total
of the losses sustained by the public libraries in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Is there anything you want to say
about it?

BÜHLER: Yes. I do not think the description just given applies to the
document which I had in mind. The document which I question contains
directives regarding German cultural policy in the Government General.
It does not deal with art treasures or details of library property.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. What I took that you said this morning was that the
directives which you thought were referred to in the document did not
appear to have been made, or at any rate you had not heard of them, and
you thought they might be forgeries.

BÜHLER: I questioned the document.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the document.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: May I proceed to the next question?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You state that you personally, as well as the
administration of the Government General, had no close connection with
the activities of the Police. Have I understood you correctly?

BÜHLER: May I hear that question again, please?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You declare that neither you personally nor the
administration of the Government General were in any way closely
connected with the activities of the Police. Have I understood you
correctly?

BÜHLER: We had daily contact with the Police, but we had differences of
opinion. Moreover, the Police were not under my jurisdiction; the Chief
of Police was in no way under my orders.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In that case the Police did not come within your
competence?

BÜHLER: No, it was not one of my duties.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: How then can you explain that no one but you
carried out successful negotiations with the Police for the exploitation
of the property of Jews executed in the concentration camps? Do you
remember these negotiations?

BÜHLER: I did not quite understand you.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you: If you had no direct relations with
the Police, how can you explain the fact that you, and none other but
you, were the person who carried out successful negotiations with the
Police for the exploitation of property belonging to Jews murdered in
the concentration camps? Do you remember these negotiations with the
Police?

BÜHLER: I do not remember any such negotiations, and I could not have
conducted them. In any case the Administration was the department which,
by order of the Four Year Plan, had to effect the confiscation of Jewish
property.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, have I your permission to submit
a document handed to us by the American Prosecution, Document Number
2819-PS? It is a directive issued by the Administration of the Economic
Department of the Government General and addressed to the Governors of
Warsaw, Radom, Lublin, and Galicia. May I submit this document?

I quote the following from the text of this document:

    “Subject: Transfer of Jewish movable property from the SS to the
    Government.

    “I inform you herewith that, on 21 February 1944, in the
    presence of various departmental directors, an agreement was
    reached by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Higher SS and
    Police Leader, Obergruppenführer Koppe, that movable Jewish
    property, insofar as it is, or will be in the future, in
    storehouses, will be placed at the disposal of the Government by
    the SS. In execution of the agreement arrived at I have ordered
    that the taking over of the goods stored in the various SS
    depots shall take place in the shortest possible time. Goods
    deriving from confiscation and safeguarding have likewise been
    turned over to me by the commander of the Security Police and
    the Security Service. Please get in touch with the local SS and
    Police Leader in order to come to an understanding....”

Here I interrupt the quotation. After this, Witness, do you still insist
that you had no relations with the Police?

BÜHLER: I was in touch with the Police daily in my work, I do not want
to deny that for a moment; but I had no right to give orders to the
Police.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In any case the property of Jews murdered in the
concentration camps of Poland was, as a result of your negotiations,
transferred to warehouses in the Government General?

BÜHLER: That is not correct. The property mentioned was not that which
proceeded from Jews who were killed, but simply property which came from
Jews and which was removed by the Police after having been converted
through the administration department in the regular way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But could the Security Police or the SD be in
possession of property belonging to Jews who were not murdered?

BÜHLER: Why not? Right from the beginning the Police had taken over
Jewish problems, and therefore also came into possession of their
property in this manner.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But did the Auschwitz depot in Chopin Street
also keep the property of Jews who had not been murdered? Of Jews who
were still alive?

BÜHLER: The depots which have been mentioned here are not to be
interpreted as being concentration camps, but as depots where goods were
stored.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What other depots were there for storing the
movable property of Jews besides those in the concentration camps?

BÜHLER: I do not know what things looked like in concentration camps, as
I have never entered or seen one; but that the Police took possession of
movable Jewish property is something I was certainly told about by the
director of my trustee department.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask you this: In 1944 when the machines of
destruction were working at top speed at Auschwitz and Maidanek, what
depots or warehouses existed for the storage of Jewish movable property
besides those which stored the movable property of Jews executed in
concentration camps? Do you know of any other warehouses and where they
were located?

BÜHLER: The Jews were deprived of their property on the spot. I have
never assumed that Jewish property was to be found in concentration
camps. I did not know anything at all about these camps. Where the
Police took that movable property was not clear to me, but depots must
have existed.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would draw your attention to the date—21
February 1944. At that time were there any Jews still alive in Poland,
or were the Jewish ghettos already quite empty?

BÜHLER: The Jewish ghettos were empty, but there were still some Jews; I
know that because they were being used in one way or another in the
armament industry. Jewish property could not have been removed from the
territory, it must have been somewhere in the Government General, very
probably near the ghettos or wherever else the evacuation of Jews took
place. And this telegram, I repeat, does not concern stores which were
in concentration camps; they were everywhere. Every place had property
stored somewhere which originated from the resettlement of the Jews.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then the Jewish ghettos were already empty. In
that case, what happened to the Jews from Poland?

BÜHLER: When these Jewish ghettos were emptied, I assumed they were
resettled in the northeast of Europe. The chief of the RSHA had
definitely told me at the conference in February 1942 that this was the
intention.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: On the 21 February 1944 the front line ran
through the Government General. How and where could the Jews have been
transferred to the northeast?

BÜHLER: According to the conference this was to have taken place in
1942.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The document is dated 1944, 21 February 1944.

I pass on to the next question. Tell me, does not the fact that the
police chiefs attended all the conferences at the headquarters of the
Governor General and that the Governor General arranged for special
conferences to be held dealing exclusively with police matters indicate
that the very closest relations existed between the administration
department of the Governor General and the Gestapo?

BÜHLER: I have already mentioned at the beginning that the view of the
Governor General was that he should have jurisdiction over the Police.
This is the reason why the Governor General repeatedly called the Police
for discussions around the conference table. But that did not prevent
the Police from going their own way and using methods of their own.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But were no conferences held by the Governor
General for dealing directly and exclusively with police problems, and
with police problems only?

BÜHLER: Yes, from time to time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. Then will you tell me who took
Krüger’s place when he was removed from his post as Chief of Police?

BÜHLER: As far as I can remember Krüger was removed from his post in
Kraków in November 1943 and was replaced by Obergruppenführer Koppe.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: What were your personal relations with Koppe?

BÜHLER: The relationship with the Police under Krüger had always been
hostile, and whenever the administration department had any wish that
involved police jurisdiction, such wishes had always been frustrated by
Krüger; therefore, after Krüger had left Kraków I tried to establish a
comradely relationship with the new Higher SS and Police Leader, so that
in this manner I could influence the work of the Police and the methods
employed by them.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Could you answer briefly: What exactly were your
personal relations with Koppe? Were they good or bad?

BÜHLER: They were comradely.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to show you one document. You, Mr.
President, will find the passage on Page 38, Paragraph 2, of the English
translation. I am reading the passage into the record. It is a statement
made by Frank to Himmler at the conference with Himmler on the 12
February 1944:

    “Immediately after the exchange of greetings, Reichsführer SS
    Himmler entered into conversation with me and SS
    Obergruppenführer Koppe. The Reichsführer asked me right at the
    beginning how I was co-operating with the new Secretary of State
    for Security, SS Obergruppenführer Koppe. I expressed my deep
    satisfaction at the fact that between myself and SS
    Obergruppenführer Koppe, as well as between him and State
    Secretary Dr. Bühler, there existed extraordinarily good
    relations of friendly co-operation.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Does that statement by Frank correspond to the fact, Witness?

BÜHLER: At that time Koppe had been in the Government General only a few
weeks. This statement confirms just what I said here at the beginning,
namely, that after Krüger had been replaced by Koppe I tried through
comradely relations with Koppe to gain influence over the police powers
in the Government General. Thus there had been no friction up to that
time.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And between Koppe and Dr. Bühler, that is,
between Koppe and yourself, there existed the most comradely
collaboration; is that correct?

BÜHLER: I repeat, my relations with Koppe were comradely. Apart from
that, the problems with which we had to deal brought me into daily
contact with Koppe. For instance, there was this question of Jewish
property. One could not possibly have discussed such a question with
Krüger, as he held the view that all Jewish property belonged to the SS.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: When Koppe took over the post of Chief of
Police, was there any change with regard to the Polish population? Did
the police measures become less severe? Did they become less repressive
with Koppe’s arrival?

BÜHLER: I believe they were milder.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to follow the minutes of one
particular administrative conference of the 16 December 1943, held at
Kraków.

Please show the witness the original.

Incidentally, is that your signature on the list of those present? On
Page 154.

BÜHLER: Government meeting, 16 December 1943? Yes, I signed that; that
is right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, do you remember who Ohlenbusch was?

BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch was the President of the Department of Propaganda.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Was he in any way connected with the Police or
with the administration?

BÜHLER: Ohlenbusch participated in the government meetings, at which the
Police were also present as a rule.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he himself, in his own function, did he have
any connection with the Police or not?

BÜHLER: As a state official and head of a government department he did,
of course, have connections with the Police, official connections.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: But he was an official of the civilian
administration of your organization?

BÜHLER: Yes, of course. As far as his official position was concerned,
he was subordinate to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am reading into the record a short extract
from Page 176. Your Honors will find it on Page 33 of our document book,
Paragraph 3, Ohlenbusch’s speech:

    “It would be well to consider whether, for reasons of
    expediency, one should not, as far as possible, carry out
    executions on the spot where the attempt upon the life of a
    German took place. One ought, perhaps, also to consider whether
    special execution sites should not be created for this purpose,
    for it has been confirmed that the Polish population streamed to
    the execution grounds, which were accessible to all, in order to
    put the blood-soaked earth into containers and take them to the
    church.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Do you not consider this question a purely police question?

BÜHLER: It does not mention buckets of blood in my translation. It says
containers. I do not think that the blood could be carried away in
buckets.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We are talking here about containers into which
the blood-soaked soil was placed. Do you not consider that the question
of organizing secret execution grounds was purely a matter for the
Police?

BÜHLER: I am of the same opinion. For this reason this matter was by no
means approved of. But perhaps I may add that at the same time German
pedestrians in Kraków and Warsaw were being shot in the back daily,
without any reason, and that this affair was due to the excitement
which...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you about something else, Witness.
Do you not consider the fact that this question was discussed at the
initiative of Ohlenbusch as positive proof that even the petty officials
in the civilian administration interfered in police matters and were in
direct contact with the Police?

BÜHLER: No, I would not say so. This was not suggested as a police
measure. It arose from the threat under which all Germans lived at that
stage of the occupation.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This question of secret execution grounds—did
it arise on Ohlenbusch’s initiative? I trust you are not going to deny
this.

BÜHLER: What do you mean by this question?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did it arise on—was it provoked by the
initiative of Ohlenbusch? You are not going to deny it?

BÜHLER: I do not know whether this was discussed at all. In my opinion
there was not...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The typewritten report of that conference is
before you, and you were present at that conference.

BÜHLER: Yes, there are statements made by Ohlenbusch, if I am not
mistaken. Yes, it mentions “President Ohlenbusch” here. That is right.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I shall proceed to the next question. Did SS
Obergruppenführer Koppe not report on the subject at all during the
conference? I will quote a brief excerpt which Your Honors will find on
Page 34, Paragraph 2. It is on Page 180 of your document book.

    “...For the railway outrage 150 and for the two German
    officials, 50 Polish terrorists were executed either on the spot
    or in the immediate vicinity. It must be remembered that the
    shooting of 200 people affects at least 3,000 (nearest
    relatives)...” (Document Number 2288-PS.)

Do you not consider this as evidence that with the arrival of Koppe the
same savage measures of repression were used against the people of
Poland?

BÜHLER: Inasmuch as this mentions the shooting of 150 and 50 people this
obviously concerns the shooting of hostages, which never did have the
approval of the Governor General or my approval. If I have nevertheless
stated that in its entirety Koppe’s regime appeared milder to me, then I
must stand by that statement of mine.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Does this mean that the hostage system did not
meet either with your approval or with the approval of the Governor
General; is that correct?

BÜHLER: It did not have my approval, and I do not think it had the
approval of the Governor General.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please look at Page 185 of the document
in your possession. I begin with the quotation:

    “The Governor General expressed his gratitude and recognition to
    SS Obergruppenführer Koppe for his effective work and spoke of
    his satisfaction that an expert with such high qualifications
    should be at the head of the police organization in the
    Government General. He promised SS Obergruppenführer Koppe the
    active co-operation of all offices in the Government General and
    expressed his best wishes for the success of his work.”
    (Document Number 2233-PS.)

How are we to interpret this statement in the light of your previous
answer?

BÜHLER: This statement of the Governor General does not apply to these
50 and 150 people. It applies to the work in its entirety which was to
be done by Koppe in the Government General. And one of the principles
that was to be applied to that work—which I helped bring about—was
that shootings of hostages were to cease. It is quite possible that in
this case that principle had not yet been applied.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you please wait one minute. Just before
this you read Koppe’s report on the shooting of the hostages, Page 180.
And after that the Governor General expressed his approval. This means
that it was precisely this activity of Koppe’s that the Governor General
had approved?

BÜHLER: Well, this was not the only statement made by Koppe. The
statement of the Governor General was in reference to all the statements
made by Koppe, and not to detached portions.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Very well. In that case he also approved, among
other things, of this statement, that is to say, this report.

BÜHLER: But I know that the Governor General, together with me, was
exerting pressure on Koppe in order to stop the shooting of hostages.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you kindly inform me who, while Krüger was
still Chief of Police, issued instructions for the shooting of one male
inhabitant from each house which displayed a poster announcing a Polish
national holiday?

BÜHLER: That is unknown to me.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I ask to have the corresponding document
submitted to you. It is in the document book, on Page 1, Paragraph 7:

    “The Governor General received District Chief, Dr. Waechter, who
    reported on the appearance in some districts of inflammatory
    posters on the occasion of the 11 November (the Polish Day of
    Liberation). The Governor General ordered that from every house
    where a poster remains exhibited one male inhabitant is to be
    shot. This order is to be carried out by the Chief of Police.
    Dr. Waechter has taken 120 hostages in Kraków as a precautionary
    measure.”

Do you remember that? Who then introduced this criminal practice of
taking hostages?

BÜHLER: Are you trying to say that I was present during that conference?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to ask you about something else.

BÜHLER: Please, will you answer my question? Was I there or was I not?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am not obliged to answer your question. It is
you, Witness, who have to answer mine. It is I who am interrogating you,
not you who are examining me. Kindly answer the next question. You
resided in Kraków. Acting on Frank’s orders, Dr. Waechter, as a
precautionary measure, detained 120 hostages. Do you wish to say that
you knew nothing about this either?

BÜHLER: I know nothing about this measure; nor is it known to me that
hostages were shot.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question. Have I
understood you correctly—did you state today that there was no famine
in Poland?

BÜHLER: Yes, there was no famine in Poland.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I am asking you to be shown the speech of Dr.
Bühler, State Secretary—that obviously means you—at a meeting on the
31 May 1943, in Kraków. I begin the quotation:

    “...The Government of the Government General has for a long time
    been clear on the point that the scale of food rations allowed
    to non-Germans cannot be continued any longer without the
    population taking matters into its own hands or being driven to
    insurrection... The difficulties of the food situation, which
    naturally have a bad effect on the morale of the population, the
    enormous rise in prices, the exaggerated and narrow-minded
    salary and wage policy, have driven part of the Polish
    population to despair.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

Did you say that?

BÜHLER: I could follow the first part, but I could not find the last
sentence.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Would you kindly follow the text. In the text
you will find both the first part and the last sentence: “...have driven
part of the Polish population to despair.” Please study the text.

BÜHLER: Where does it say so, please? Would you show it to me?

[_The text was indicated to the witness._]

I made these statements, and...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Then I also have the following question to ask
you. Do you not think that your announcement in 1943 bears witness to
the fact that you have today testified falsely before the Tribunal?

BÜHLER: No; no. What I meant by my statement was that the population
would take things into its own hands. When for instance a worker
remained away from his place of work for 3 days to go in search of food,
this was considered by me to be a desperate step on the part of the
worker.

However, I said this morning that it was very difficult for the
population to obtain the necessary food supplies but that it was not
impossible, so that I did not notice famine at all in the Government
General.

And please may I ask you to consider that 80 percent of the population
of the Government General were country people, so that there could be no
famine on a large scale unless the countryside had been completely
despoiled, and that was not the case.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You stated that as a result of the food quotas
established in the Government General a revolt might arise, and you said
that the population was driven to despair by hunger. Is that not
evidence that a famine was raging in the country?

BÜHLER: By “revolt” I meant “unrest,” not an armed uprising. It is quite
clear that morale and the will to work did suffer by reason of the
insufficient rations. I stated this morning how it was that adequate
provisioning of the population could not be carried out. On the other
hand, however, there was such a widespread free market and black market
that even the worker, if he had sufficient time, could obtain food; and
if he did not have time, he took it. That was what I meant by the
workers taking things in their own hands.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please, answer this question. Were only such
educational possibilities left to the Poles as would—according to the
plan of Frank and Goebbels—merely emphasize the hopeless destiny of
their nation?

BÜHLER: Efforts to keep down the level of education of the Polish
population were noticeable. These tendencies originated from Himmler in
Berlin.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like you to answer: What was done with
the Polish universities?

BÜHLER: They were closed and they were not reopened. However, technical
courses were arranged in Warsaw and in Lvov in which these people
received university education; but, to be sure, these courses had to be
closed by demand of the Reich.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you will recollect under whose signature
the decree was issued to close the universities. Perhaps you will
recognize this signature? It is an official report.

BÜHLER: The decree regarding the appointment of university trustees was
signed by the Governor General in November 1940.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Will you please tell me whether technical
schools only were left in Poland?

BÜHLER: Not technical schools alone remained open; there were, for
instance, commercial schools, and the attendance there was very large.
Apart from that, there were craft schools and elementary schools, which
were set up on a large scale.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: In other words, only those schools were left
which trained artisans, and petty commercial clerks and tradesmen?

BÜHLER: Whether only petty or also more important traders attended them
I do not know. At any rate commercial schools were permitted.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I should like to know on whose initiative the
royal palace at Warsaw was destroyed?

BÜHLER: I do not know for certain. I heard once that it had been the
Führer’s wish that the castle in Warsaw, which was heavily damaged,
should be razed to the ground.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: And by whose personal order was this castle, the
royal castle of Warsaw destroyed?

BÜHLER: I do not know whether it was blown up; that I do not know.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes. It was destroyed. Who ordered it to be
destroyed, do you know?

BÜHLER: I do not know.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You do not know?

BÜHLER: No.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The quotation which I want to read to you is on
Page 1 of the translation of the document submitted by us to the
Tribunal. It is a very short quotation. I shall proceed to read it into
the record:

    “...The Führer discussed the general situation with the Governor
    General and he approved of the work of the Governor General in
    Poland, especially the pulling down of the palace at Warsaw and
    the intention not to reconstruct the city...”

Was it not true that the palace in Warsaw was destroyed by order of
Frank?

BÜHLER: It is not known to me that the castle was destroyed. As far as I
know there was at one time a project to pull it down, but the plan was
abandoned.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, please, was it not in your presence
that the Defendant Frank on 21 April 1940 issued an order to apply
police measures during the so-called recruitment of labor.

BÜHLER: I should have to see the minutes. I cannot remember it offhand.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The place which I should like to quote is on
Page 46 of the document, the last paragraph. I quote:

    “Discussion with State Secretary Dr. Bühler, SS
    Obergruppenführer Krüger, and Dr. Frauendorfer in the presence
    of Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart.

    “Subject of discussion is the deportation of workers, especially
    agricultural workers, to the Reich.

    “The Governor General stated that, as all methods in the way of
    appeals, _et cetera_, had been unsuccessful, one was now obliged
    to come to the conclusion that the Poles evaded this duty of
    work either out of malice, or with the intention of doing
    Germany indirect harm by not placing themselves at her disposal.
    He therefore asked Dr. Frauendorfer whether there were any
    measures left which had not yet been taken to win the Poles over
    voluntarily.

    “Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this question
    in the negative.

    “The Governor General stated emphatically that a final decision
    was now required of him. The question now was whether one would
    not have to resort to some form of coercive measure.”

Was that not an order to apply coercive measures when recruiting labor?

BÜHLER: I will not contradict the statement, as I have seen the minutes.
It is one of the utterances of the Governor General which, I believe,
were not altogether made voluntarily but which in no way altered the
course which I took on this question.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please answer the following question: Were you
present at a discussion with Sauckel on 18 August 1942, and was it in
your presence that Frank told Sauckel that he—as he put it—“joyfully”
informed him that he had shipped a fresh convoy of workers to the Reich
with the help of the Police.

BÜHLER: Together with my departmental heads who dealt with the
recruitment of workers I had a conference with Reich Commissioner
Sauckel before the visit to the Governor General took place. I cannot
now remember whether I was present when Reich Commissioner Sauckel
visited the Governor General. I ask to see the minutes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Please show the defendant, I mean the witness,
the passage.

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

I will now read into the record two short passages on Pages 918 and 920.
Doctor Frank says:

    “I am very glad that I can inform you officially that up to this
    date we have sent to Germany over 800,000 workers. Only a short
    time ago you asked for another 140,000. I am happy to inform you
    officially that, in accordance with our agreement of yesterday,
    60 percent of these newly requested workers will be sent by the
    end of October, and the other 40 percent will be dispatched to
    the Reich by the end of the year.”

Then I will ask you to pass on to Page 120. There is only one other
sentence I want to quote:

    “Besides the 140,000, you can count on a further number of
    workers from the Government General during the coming year, for
    we will use the Police to get them.”

Does that not imply the use of Draconian police methods in the so-called
recruiting of manpower?

BÜHLER: I do not recollect that I was present on that occasion, so I can
in no way confirm whether that was said in this way.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I have no more questions to put
to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Seidl._] Do you want to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I have a few more questions to ask the witness.

First of all, I should like to clarify a misunderstanding which seems to
have arisen. The question which I put to the witness in connection with
Document Number USSR-93 referred only to Appendix 1, which has the title
“Cultural Life in Poland.” That appendix deals with directives regarding
cultural policies which the administration of the Government General was
supposed to have issued, and the way I understood the witness was that
he only wanted to answer that particular question and not refer to the
other appendices, such as, for instance, those dealing with confiscated
art treasures.

Perhaps it would have been better if he had not used the word “forged.”
At any rate, he wanted to say that he did not know the directives in
question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, is it correct that by far the
greater number of Polish workers who were brought to the Reich were
volunteers?

BÜHLER: May I, first of all, say that I by no means wished to accuse the
Prosecution of committing a forgery. I merely wanted to point out that
possibly they were using a forged document. I did not want to accuse the
Prosecution itself of a forgery.

Now, regarding the question put by defense counsel, I want to say that
according to my observations by far the greater number of all the
workers from the Government General went to the Reich voluntarily.

DR. SEIDL: So as to assist your memory, I am going to read a short
quotation from the diary, which deals with the recruiting of workers.

On 4 March 1940 the Governor General addressed a meeting of the town
mayors of the Lublin district and stated the following regarding the
recruitment of workers:

    “He rejected the issue of a new decree, as demanded by Berlin,
    containing particular coercive measures and threats of
    punishment. Measures which attract attention abroad should be
    avoided. The forcible transport of people had every argument
    against it.”

Does that conception reflect the true views of the Governor General?

BÜHLER: I was not present during that conference, so I did not hear that
utterance by the Governor General, but it does tally with those
instructions and principles which the Governor General gave to me and
which I have always resolutely observed and carried out.

DR. SEIDL: Were you present during a conference on 14 January 1944—I
see you were there—it was a conference with the State Secretary Dr.
Bühler, Dr. Koppe, and several others. I quote from it:

    “The Governor General resolutely opposes the employment of
    Police for carrying out such measures. Such a task is not a
    matter for the Police.”

Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly opposed the use of
Police in connection with the recruiting of workers?

BÜHLER: That was not the only occasion. The deputy of Reich Commissioner
Sauckel was often attacked by him during public meetings when he talked
about raids for recruiting workers; but I must state that Sauckel’s
deputy always declared that it was not he who had given instructions for
these raids.

DR. SEIDL: The first quotation which the prosecutor submitted to you was
an entry dated 25 January 1943. He asked you whether you regarded
yourself as a war criminal. I shall now put to you another passage from
that conference, at which you yourself were present. I quote from Page 7
of that entry in the diary. The Governor General stated:

    “State Secretary Krüger, you know that orders of the
    Reichsführer SS can be carried out by you only after you have
    spoken with me. This was omitted in this instance. I express my
    regret that you have carried out an order from the Reichsführer
    without first informing me, in accordance with the orders of the
    Führer. According to that order, instructions of the
    Reichsführer SS may be carried out here in the Government
    General only after I have previously given my approval. I hope
    that this is the last time that that is overlooked; because I do
    not want to trouble the Führer about every single case of this
    kind.” (Document Number 2233-PS.)

I shall skip a sentence and continue to quote:

    “It is not possible for us to disregard Führer orders, and it is
    out of the question that in the sphere of police and security
    direct orders from the Reichsführer should be carried out over
    the head of the man who has been appointed here by the Führer;
    otherwise I should be completely superfluous.”

I now ask you, is it correct that there were very frequently such
disputes between the Governor General and the Higher SS Police Leader
Krüger, and that the Governor General terminated these disputes by
asking for co-operation, so that some sort of administration could
function in this territory?

BÜHLER: Yes, that is correct, such disputes were our daily bread.

DR. SEIDL: The Prosecution has also submitted to you another exhibit,
USSR-335 (Document Number USSR-335), the Court-Martial Decree, dated
October 1943. I now ask you what the security situation was like in the
Government General then, and would it have been at all possible at that
time to control the situation with normal criminal procedure?

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor Seidl, has that not already been dealt with very
fully in his examination in chief?

DR. SEIDL: I forego having this question answered again. Now one last
question, which refers to art treasures.

Is it correct that a portion of the art treasures which were found in
the region of Upper Silesia were taken to the last official residence of
the Governor General at Neuhaus to be safeguarded, and that the Governor
General gave you instructions to prepare a list of these articles and
send it to Reich Minister Lammers?

BÜHLER: The Governor General dictated a report to Reich Minister Lammers
about the transfer of 20 of the most outstanding art treasures from the
property of the Polish State. I was present when it was dictated and I
took that report personally to State Secretary Kritzinger in Berlin. It
was stated therein that these art treasures, so as to save them from the
Russians, had been taken from Seichau, or whatever the place is called,
to Schliersee. These art treasures were left unguarded in the official
residence of the Governor General.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. SEIDL: I have now completed the examination of witnesses, but as the
document books have not yet been bound, I would like to suggest that at
some later stage, perhaps after the case of Frick, I could submit these
document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, how many books are you presenting?

DR. SEIDL: A total of five volumes, but I myself have not received them
yet.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal approved the documents in five volumes?

DR. SEIDL: They are almost entirely documents which have already been
submitted by the Prosecution and an agreement has been reached with the
Prosecution regarding the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, we need not wait now for the document books.
The document books will be considered by the Tribunal when they are put
in and then, if you have anything in particular you want to say upon
them in explanation, you may do so.

DR. SEIDL: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: No doubt you will comment upon them in your final speech.
You say that they are mostly documents which have already been put in,
and therefore it would not be necessary to make any preliminary comment
upon them. You will be able to deal with them in your final speech.

DR. SEIDL: But I should have liked to quote a few passages during my
submission of evidence, since this is necessary to establish the
connection, and as it would be impossible to do all that during my final
speech; but I do not think that too much time will be lost through that.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Seidl, it would not be very useful to the
Tribunal for you to make a commentary upon the documents at a later
stage, when your witnesses have been finished and somebody else’s—some
other defendant’s—witnesses have been interpolated; therefore, the
Tribunal thinks it will be much better and much more convenient to the
Tribunal if you defer your comments on the documents until your final
speech.

Well, Dr. Seidl, as I understand, you have two books which are before us
now. Three is it?

DR. SEIDL: There is a total of five books. The other three do not appear
to have been bound.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but you say that most of the documents in them are
documents which are already in evidence.

DR. SEIDL: The diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank, which contains 42
volumes, has been submitted, but the Prosecution has used only those
parts which appeared favorable for them. In my opinion it is, therefore,
necessary that the connections should to some extent be re-established
during the submission of evidence. Also, there are other documents in
the document book which I believe should be read, at least in extract,
before this Tribunal, but I shall, of course, limit myself to the
absolutely necessary passages when I read the documents. I should like
to suggest to the Tribunal that the matter be handled as it was in the
case of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop, so that I submit the individual
documents to the Tribunal as exhibits. There are several speeches by the
Defendant Frank, there are decrees and legal regulations, there are two
affidavits, and I really think that somehow an opinion with regard to
them should be given during the submission of evidence; and, besides,
individual documents will have to be given exhibit numbers. Up to now
only one document has been submitted as evidence on behalf of the
Defendant Frank, and that is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Bühler;
but I have the intention of bringing a whole series of further documents
formally to the notice of the Tribunal and would like to postpone that
only because the Tribunal has not yet received the bound document books.

THE PRESIDENT: When will these other books be ready, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: I was told that they would be completed by this evening.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you will take in dealing with these
books?

DR. SEIDL: I think that two hours will be enough.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal would like you to deal with your
documents now, and insofar as they are documents which have already been
put in evidence, unless you wish to refer to other passages in them,
they think that you need only tell us what the documents are and put
them in evidence, unless it is very important to you to refer to any
particular document. So far as they are new documents, you will, no
doubt, offer them in evidence and make such short comments as you think
necessary. But the Tribunal hopes that you will be able to finish this
afternoon. With reference to the other books that you have, we
understand that you have all the documents in German yourself, and
therefore you can refer us to those documents now.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, upon the wish of the Prosecution and also, I
believe, of the Tribunal, I have reduced the original bulk of my
document books considerably. The first five document books, as I had had
them prepared, contained more than eight hundred pages. The new form is
considerably shorter; but I have not received the German text of the new
form, so that I am not in a position just now to give the number of
pages to the Tribunal or to co-ordinate my page numbers with the
numbered pages of the translations. If I may express a wish, it is that
we should first wait until the five document books in their new form are
available, because otherwise it is very likely that the numbering of the
pages would not correspond to the numbering of the individual documents
as exactly as might be desired.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks it best that you should begin now
with the first three volumes. We have them here.

DR. SEIDL: If the Tribunal has the first three volumes, then I will
begin. I begin with Volume I. The first document on Page 1 is the decree
of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, dated 12 October 1939, concerning
the administration of the occupied Polish territories. This decree
defines in detail the authority of the Governor General. In Paragraphs 5
and 6 some of the limitations to the authority of the Governor General
are included, which the witnesses Dr. Lammers and Dr. Bühler have
already pointed out. This document bears the number 2537-PS and it will
be Exhibit Frank-2.

I pass to Page 3 of the document book. This document is the decree of
the Führer concerning the establishment of a State Secretariat for
Security in the Government General, dated 7 May 1942. I quote Paragraph
2:

    “The State Secretary for Security serves at the same time as
    deputy of the Reichsführer SS in his capacity as Reich
    Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality.”

On Page 4 I quote Paragraph IV:

    “The Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police is
    authorized to give the State Secretary for Security direct
    instructions in the province of security and the preservation of
    German Nationality.”

This document will be Exhibit Frank-3 (Document Number Frank-3).

Following the decree of the Führer of 7 May 1942 comes the decree for
the transfer of authority to the State Secretary for Security, of 23
June 1942. I do not know whether that decree is already bound in that
volume. Apparently that decree, which was added later, has not yet been
translated.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?

DR. SEIDL: 23 June 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: We have one of 27 May 1942.

DR. SEIDL: That decree apparently has not yet been translated because it
was added afterwards, and I will put it in the document book later. It
will be Document Frank-4. In Paragraph 1 of that decree, we find, “The
jurisdictions of the administrative and creative branches of the Police
referred to in appendices A and B are now transferred to the State
Secretary for Security.” In Appendix 1 the spheres of authority of the
Order Police are mentioned under 15 headings—no, I must correct
that—26 headings; and in Appendix B the spheres of authority of the
Order Police come under 21 headings.

I pass now to Document Book I, Page 5. That is the decree of the Führer
concerning the appointment of officials and the termination of this
status as officials in the sphere of the Government General, of 20 May
1942. I quote from the figure 3, Paragraph 2:

    “The Governor General’s sphere of activity does not, in the
    sense of this decree, include officials belonging to the
    province of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police
    in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, or those belonging to the
    Customs Frontier Service.” (Document Number Frank-4(e).)

I pass to Page 6 of the document book, the decree of the Führer and
Reich Chancellor, for the Preservation of German Nationality, of 7
October 1939, which is already Exhibit USA-305 (Document Number 686-PS).

The next document is the letter from Reich Marshal Göring to the Chief
of the Security Police and the SD, of July 1941.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I suggest that an exhibit number be given as we
go along so that we can follow better, and later on have some track of
the exhibits as they go in. The last one and this one have not been
given any exhibit number.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): The
last one was Frank-5, was it not?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Frank-5 was the one of the 27th of May 1942.

MR. DODD: We did not know that; we did not get the number over the
speaker. I am sorry.

THE PRESIDENT: It may not have been stated but I took it down as that
myself. Will you take care to state each time, Dr. Seidl, what the
exhibit number is that you are giving. You are dealing now with the
letter of the 31st of July 1941.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. This letter has a USA number, namely, 509.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Wait a minute, perhaps I made a mistake. Yes,
Mr. Dodd, I think I made a mistake. The reason why Dr. Seidl did not
give a number was because it was already in evidence as USA-305. I made
a mistake. It was not Frank-5. He only got to Frank-4. The next one is
USA-509.

DR. SEIDL: 509 (Document Number 710-PS). I pass to Page 10 of the
document book. That is an order, a directive rather, of the High Command
of the Armed Forces concerning Case Barbarossa, USA-135 (Document Number
447-PS), and I quote Paragraph 2:

    “It is not intended to declare East Prussia and the Government
    General an operational area of the Army. On the other hand, on
    the basis of the unpublished Führer decrees of 19 and 21 October
    1939 the Commander-in-Chief of the Army is authorized to enact
    measures that are necessary for the execution of his military
    task and for the security of his troops.”

I pass to Page 11 of the document book, a directive for the execution of
the Führer decree concerning the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, of 27 March 1942. I quote Paragraph 4:

    “The Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor will
    have at his disposal for the performance of his tasks the
    authority delegated to me by the Führer to issue instructions to
    the highest Reich authorities, their subordinate offices, as
    well as to the offices of the Party and its formations and
    affiliated organizations; to the Reich Protector; to the
    Governor General; to the military commanders and the chiefs of
    the civil administrations.”

This document becomes Exhibit Number Frank-5 (Document Number Frank-5).

The next document is on Page 12—the decree by the Führer, concerning a
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, of 21 March 1942,
from which it can be seen that his authority to issue instructions
included the Government General. It becomes Exhibit Number Frank-6
(Document Number Frank-6).

The document on Page 13 of the document book deals also with the
authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor to
issue instructions. It is already Exhibit USA-206 (Document Number
3352-PS).

The document on Page 15 is a letter from Professor Dr. Kubiowicz,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Control Committee, to the Defendant Dr. Frank.
It already has the Exhibit Number USA-178 (Document Number 1526-PS); and
I will read only the first sentence from that document, in order to show
what the relation was between the Defendant Dr. Frank and the author of
that letter. I quote:

    “Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I
    should like to state the abuses and the painful incidents which
    create an especially difficult position for the Ukrainian
    population within the Government General.”

Then I pass on to Page 16 of the document book. That is an excerpt from
Exhibit USA-275 (Document Number 1061-PS), namely, the report of SS
Brigadeführer Stroop about the destruction of the Warsaw ghetto. I quote
the second paragraph of Section II, from which it can be seen that the
order came directly from the Reichsführer SS Himmler:

    “When the Reichsführer SS visited Warsaw in January 1943, he
    ordered the SS and Police Leader in the District of Warsaw to
    transfer to Lublin the armament factories and other enterprises
    of military importance which were installed within the ghetto,
    including the workers and the machines.”

The affidavit which the Prosecution submitted during the
cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner should then really
follow after Page 16 of the document book.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): As
far as I can gather, there has been some misunderstanding on this point.
Under the number mentioned by Dr. Seidl in his document book there is no
document referring to the Warsaw ghetto, but there is a document from
the Chief of Police and SS in Galicia relating to the solution of the
Jewish problem in Galicia. I should like this elucidated.

DR. SEIDL: The document on Page 16 is the report by the SS Brigadeführer
Stroop which has already been submitted as Exhibit USA-275. The report
by SS Führer Katzmann, which the Russian Prosecutor apparently means,
concerning the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia, is on Page 17
of the document book, that is, on the next page. Apparently the
insertion of Page 16 in the document book which was prepared for the
Russian Prosecution was overlooked.

After that report by Brigadeführer Stroop, Exhibit USA-275 should be
inserted as Page 16a, the affidavit by SS Brigadeführer Stroop which was
submitted during the cross-examination of the Defendant Dr.
Kaltenbrunner under Exhibit Number USA-804. That affidavit bears the
Document Number 3841-PS. I could not include that affidavit in the
document book because it was submitted by the Prosecution only after I
had sent the document book to be translated.

As Page 16b another document should be put in which was also submitted
during the cross-examination of Dr. Kaltenbrunner. That is the affidavit
by Karl Kaleske. That affidavit bears the Exhibit Number USA-803,
Document Number 3840-PS. That would be Page 16b of the document book.

Now I come to the report which the Soviet Prosecutor had in mind and
which deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia. It is
on Page 17 of the document book. That measure has the Exhibit Number
USA-277 and the Document Number L-18. I quote Pages 4 and 5, word for
word:

    “After it had been found in more and more cases that Jews had
    succeeded in making themselves indispensable to their employers
    by providing them with scarce goods, _et cetera_, it was
    considered necessary to introduce really Draconic measures.”

I pass to Paragraph 2 and quote:

    “As the administration was not in a position and showed itself
    too weak to master this chaos, the SS and Police Leader simply
    took over the whole question of the employment of Jewish labor.
    The Jewish labor agencies, which were staffed by hundreds of
    Jews, were dissolved. All employment certificates given by firms
    or administrative offices were declared invalid, and cards given
    Jews by the labor agencies were made valid again by being
    stamped by the police offices.”

I pass to Page 19 of the document book. That deals with the letter of
the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery to Reichsführer SS
and Chief of the German Police Himmler, of 17 April 1943. That document
is Number 2220-PS and Exhibit Number USA-175. I quote:

    “In our conference of 27 March of this year we had agreed to
    prepare written memoranda about conditions in the Government
    General on which to base our intended report to the Führer.

    “The material compiled for this purpose by SS Obergruppenführer
    Krüger has already been submitted to you directly. On the basis
    of this material I have had a report prepared which sums up the
    most important points contained therein, subdivides them
    clearly, and culminates in an explanation of the measures to be
    taken.

    “The report has been checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger
    and has his complete concurrence. I am submitting a part of it
    to you herewith.”—It is signed—“Dr. Lammers.”

I pass on to Page 20 of the document book and I quote:

    “Secret. Concerning conditions in the Government General...

    “The German administration in the Government General has to
    accomplish the following tasks: 1) To increase agricultural
    production for the purpose of securing food for the German
    people and seize as much of it as possible, to allot sufficient
    rations to the native population occupied with work essential to
    the war effort, and to remove the rest for the Armed Forces and
    the homeland.”

I leave out the following points and pass to the letter “B”, where
Krüger or his assistant criticized the measures of the Governor General.
I quote:

    “German administration in the Government General has failed
    grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a
    relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the
    delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and
    the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the
    labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally
    satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be
    made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until
    the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of
    bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and
    above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment
    of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational,
    economic, and political character which are indispensable if
    such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the
    situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every
    respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German
    administration can be explained in the first place by the system
    of the German administrative and governmental activity in the
    Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself,
    and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all
    questions decisive for conditions in the Government General.

    “I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government
    General.

    “From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor
    General to make a state organization out of the Government
    General which was to lead its own existence in complete
    independence of the Reich.”

Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:

    “3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in
    the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly
    administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation
    makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if
    necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other
    hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of
    satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties,
    especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation
    severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the
    population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The
    above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking.
    Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor
    General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual
    cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is
    already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing
    conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation
    during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and
    must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.

    “4) The relationship between racial Germans and the
    Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General.

    “The cases are numerous in which the German administration has
    permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government
    General to be put into the background in favor of the interests
    of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the
    latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled
    from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as
    settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be
    employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the
    expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far.
    Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was
    not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were
    allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians,
    badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government
    General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from
    territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of
    Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent
    vacations there, and so on.

    “The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the
    benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less
    friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of
    German Nationality had found the administration willing to
    co-operate and assist in the proper manner.”

I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:

    “The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General
    personally, and the material failure of the general German
    administration in the most various fields of decisive importance
    has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the
    native population, but has also brought about the result that
    the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly
    disunited throughout their history, have come together in a
    united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In
    a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which
    alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the
    Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in
    the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run.
    The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general
    administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the
    Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which
    made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich
    Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and
    the Police) to take over these tasks.”

Now I pass to Page 27 of the document book. That is the repeatedly
mentioned report by the Governor General to the Führer of 19 June 1943.
The document is Number 437-PS, Exhibit USA-610. Of this document the
Prosecution has so far quoted only Pages 10 and 11. These are the very
points in this memorandum which the Governor General most severely
criticized.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking now of the report which begins on Page
20?

DR. SEIDL: I am speaking of the report which begins on Page 27. I have
already finished the report which begins on Page 20.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what number did you give to that on Page 20?

DR. SEIDL: The report on Page 20 is an integral part of the letter which
begins on Page 19, and which already has the number USA-175.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see, yes.

DR. SEIDL: Now I come to the document on Page 27. That is a memorandum
which has already been mentioned by various witnesses and was submitted
under Exhibit Number USA-610 (Document Number 437-PS) by the
Prosecution. Of this report the Prosecution has only read Pages 10 and
11, which are Pages 36 and 37 of the document book, that is to say, only
those passages in the report which were condemned as excesses of the
Police, and against which excesses the Governor General complained to
the Führer.

I do not intend to read the whole memorandum; but I will pass on to Page
27 of the report, which is Page 53 of the document book, and I quote
under Section 2:

    “The almost complete discontinuation of the possibilities for
    participation in the cultural field has led, even among the
    lowest classes of the Polish people, to considerable discontent.
    The Polish middle and upper classes have a great need for
    self-expression. Experience shows that the possibility of
    cultural activity would at the same time mean a diversion from
    the political questions of the day. German propaganda frequently
    comes across the objection, on the part of the Poles, that the
    restriction of cultural activity enforced by the German
    authorities not only prevents a contrast being made with the
    Bolshevist lack of culture, but also shows that Polish cultural
    activity falls below the degree of culture allowed to Soviet
    citizens...

    “3. The closing of colleges, high schools, and secondary schools
    is on the same level. Its well-considered purpose is without
    doubt the lowering of the Polish educational standard. The
    realization of this goal appears, from the point of view of the
    necessities of war, not always beneficial to German interests.
    As the war goes on the German interest increases in the
    mobilization of able foreign replacements in the various fields
    of knowledge. But more important than that is the fact that the
    crippling of the school system and the severe hampering of
    cultural activities foster the growth of a Polish national body,
    led by the intelligentsia, to conspire against Germany. What was
    not possible during the course of Polish national history, what
    even the first years of German dominion could not bring about,
    namely, the achievement of national unity in a common purpose to
    hold together through thick and thin, now threatens to become a
    reality, slowly but surely, because of the German measures.
    German leadership cannot allow this process of unifying the
    individual classes of the Polish population to pass unheeded in
    the face of the growing power of resistance of the Poles. German
    leadership should promote class distinction by certain cultural
    concessions and should be able to play one class off against the
    other.

    “4. The recruiting of labor and the methods employed, even
    though often exercised under the unavoidable pressure of
    circumstances, have, with the aid of clever Bolshevist
    agitation, evoked a strong feeling of hatred among all classes.
    The workers thus obtained often come to work with firm resolve
    to engage in positive resistance, even active sabotage.
    Improvement of recruiting methods, together with the continued
    effort to arrest the abuses still practiced in the treatment of
    Polish workers in the Reich, and lastly, some provision, however
    meager it may be, for the families left behind, would cause a
    rise in morale, and the result would be an increased desire to
    work and increased production in the German interest.

    “5. When the German administration was set up at the beginning
    of the war the Polish element was removed from all important
    positions. The available German staff had always been inadequate
    in quantity and quality. Besides, during the past year, a
    considerable number of German personnel have had to be
    transferred to meet the replacement needs of the armed forces.
    Already an increased amount of non-German manpower has had to be
    obtained compulsorily. An essential change in the treatment of
    the Poles would enable the administration, while exercising all
    necessary precaution, to induce a greater number of Poles to
    collaborate. Without this the administration, in view of the
    present amount of personnel—not to speak of future
    transfers—cannot continue to function. The increased
    participation of Poles would further help to raise the morale
    itself.

    “Besides the positive changes set down in these proposals, a
    number of methods employed up till now in the treatment of Poles
    should be changed or even completely abandoned, at least for the
    duration of the fighting in Europe.

    “1) I have already shown in special reports that confiscation
    and evacuation of agricultural land have caused great and
    irreparable damage to agricultural production. Not less great is
    the damage to morale caused by such actions. Already the seizure
    of a great part of the large Polish estates has understandably
    embittered those affected by it, who naturally represent that
    strata of the population which is always anti-Bolshevist. But,
    because of their numerically small strength and their complete
    isolation from the mass of the people, their opposition does not
    count nearly as much as the attitude of the mass of the
    population which consists mainly of small farmers. The
    evacuation of Polish peasants from the defense zone, no doubt
    necessary for military-political reasons, has already had an
    unfavorable effect on the opinion and attitude of many farmers.
    At any rate, this evacuation was kept within certain territorial
    limits. It was carried out with careful preparation on the part
    of the governmental offices with a view to avoiding unnecessary
    hardship. The evacuation of Polish farmers from the Lublin
    district, held to be necessary by the Reich Commissioner for the
    Preservation of German Nationality, for the purpose of settling
    racial Germans there, was much more serious. Moreover—as I have
    already reported separately—the pace at which it was carried
    out and the methods adopted caused immeasurable bitterness among
    the populace. At short notice families were torn apart; those
    able to work were sent to the Reich, while old people and
    children were directed to evacuate Jewish ghettos. This happened
    in the middle of the winter of 1942-43 and resulted in
    considerable loss of life, especially among members of the last
    mentioned group. The dispossession meant the complete
    expropriation of the movable and immovable property of the
    farmers. The entire population succumbed to the belief that
    these deportations meant the beginning of a mass deportation of
    the Poles from the region of the Government General. The general
    impression was that the Poles would meet a fate similar to that
    of the Jews. The evacuation from the Lublin District was a
    welcome opportunity for communist agitation, with its own
    peculiar skill, to poison the feeling in the entire Government
    General, and even in the annexed Eastern territories, for a long
    time. Thus it came about that considerable portions of the
    population in the territories to be evacuated, but also in
    territories not affected, fled into the woods and considerably
    increased the strength of the guerrillas. The consequence was a
    tremendous deterioration of the security situation. These
    desperate people were incited by skillful agents to upset
    agricultural and industrial production according to a definite
    plan.

    “2) One has only to mention the crime of Katyn for it to become
    obvious that the safeguarding of personal security is an
    absolute condition for winning over the Polish population to the
    fight against Bolshevism. The lack of protection against
    seemingly arbitrary arrests and executions makes good copy for
    communist propaganda slogans. The shooting of women, children,
    and old men in public, which took place again and again without
    the knowledge and against the will of the government, must be
    prevented in all circumstances. Naturally this does not apply to
    the public executions of bandits and partisans. In cases of
    collective punishments, which nearly always hit innocent persons
    and are applied against people who are fundamentally politically
    indifferent, the unfavorable psychological effect cannot
    possibly be overestimated. Serious punitive measures and
    executions should be carried out only after a trial based at
    least upon the elementary conceptions of justice and accompanied
    by publication of the sentence. Even if the court procedure is
    carried on in the most simple, imperfect and improvised manner,
    it serves to avoid or to lessen the unfavorable effect of a
    punitive measure which the population considers purely
    arbitrary, and disarms Bolshevist agitation which claims that
    these German measures are only the prelude to future events.
    Moreover, collective punishment, which by its nature is directed
    primarily against the innocent, in the worst case against forced
    or desperate persons, is not exactly looked upon as a sign of
    strength of the ruling power, which the population expects to
    strike at the terrorists themselves and thereby liberate them
    from the insecurity which burdens them.”

I pass now to Page 37 of the report and quote under Section 3:

    “Besides the most important prerequisites mentioned in 1) and 2)
    to restore calm in the Government General, security of property
    among non-agricultural people must also be guaranteed, insofar
    as it is not counter to the urgent needs of war. Expropriation
    or confiscation without compensation in the industrial sector,
    in commerce and trade, and of other private property, should not
    take place in any case if the owner or the custodian has not
    committed an offense against the German authorities. If the
    taking over of industrial enterprises, commercial concerns, or
    real estate is necessary for reasons connected with the war, one
    should proceed in every case in such a way as to avoid hardship
    and under guarantee of appropriate compensation. Such a
    procedure would on the one hand further the initiative of Polish
    business men, and on the other hand avoid damage to the
    interests of German war economy.

    “4) In any attempt to influence the attitude of the Poles,
    importance must be attached to the influence of the Catholic
    Church which cannot be overestimated. I do not deny that the
    Catholic Church has always been on the side of the leading
    fighters for an independent national Poland. Numerous priests
    also made their influence felt in this direction even after the
    German occupation. Hundreds of arrests were carried out among
    them. A number of priests were taken to concentration camps and
    also shot. However, in order to win over the Polish population,
    the Church must be given at least a legal status even though it
    might not be possible to co-operate with it. It can without
    doubt be won over to reinforce the struggle of the Polish people
    against Bolshevism, especially today under the effect of the
    crime of Katyn, for the Church would always oppose a Bolshevist
    regime in the Vistula area, if only out of the instinct of
    self-preservation. To achieve that end, however, it is necessary
    to refrain in the future from all measures against its activity
    and its property, insofar as they do not run directly counter to
    war requirements.

    “Much harm has been done even quite recently by the closing of
    monasteries, charitable institutions, and church
    establishments.”

THE PRESIDENT: I had thought that your extracts were going to be brief.
But you have now read from Page 53 to Page 65.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, this document is the only one of this kind
which is available to me, and in view of the fact that the Prosecution
has quoted in full only those passages which the Defendant Dr. Frank
himself criticized most severely, I consider it my duty now to read a
number of passages, to quote them, in order to give the entire picture
correctly and to show what the Defendant Dr. Frank really intended to
achieve with this document. I shall only quote a few more lines and then
I will pass to another document.

THE PRESIDENT: I had hoped that one or two extracts from that document
would show what the Defendant Frank was putting forward—one or two
paragraphs.

DR. SEIDL: I will go on to the next document, Mr. President, that is on
Page 68, the affidavit by the witness Dr. Bühler, which I presented to
the witness today and which has been given the document number Frank-1;
Page 68 in the document book.

On Page 70 there appears Exhibit USA-473 (Document Number L-49). If I
remember correctly this document has already been read in full by the
Prosecution, and I would like to ask the Court only to take judicial
notice of that also in the defense of Dr. Frank.

On Page 72 of the document book is an affidavit of the former
Kreishauptmann, Dr. Albrecht. To be exact I have to state that this is
not really an affidavit in the true sense of the word. It is only a
letter which Kreishauptmann Dr. Albrecht sent to me through the General
Secretary of the Tribunal. I then returned the letter in order to have
it sworn to by the witness, but I have to say that until now that sworn
statement has not been returned, so that for the time being this exhibit
would only have the material value of a letter. Therefore I ask the
Tribunal to decide whether that document can be accepted by the Tribunal
as an exhibit in the form of a letter.

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal did consider that matter before when
your application was before it. They will accept the document for what
it is worth. If you get the document in affidavit form you will no doubt
put it in.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. That will be Document Number Frank-7. I forego the
quoting of the first points and proceed directly to Page 74 of the
document book and I quote under Section 4:

    “Dr. Frank’s fight against the exploitation and neglect of the
    Government General in favor of the Reich. Conflict with Berlin.

    “The first meeting with Dr. Frank occurred shortly after the
    establishment of the Government General in the autumn of 1939,
    in the Polish district capital Radom, where the 10 Kreis chiefs
    of this district had to report concerning the condition of the
    population in their administrative district and the problem of
    reconstructing, as quickly and effectively as possible, the
    general as well as the administrative and economic life. What
    struck one most was the keen awareness of Dr. Frank and his deep
    concern about the area entrusted to him. This found expression
    in the instructions not to consider or treat the Government
    General or allow it to be treated, as an object of exploitation
    or as a waste area, but rather to consider it as a center of
    public order and an area of concentration at the back of the
    fighting German front and at the gates of the German homeland,
    forming a link between the two. Therefore the loyal native
    inhabitants of this country should have claim to the full
    protection of the German administration as citizens of the
    Government General. To this end the constant efforts of all
    authorities and economic agencies would be demanded by him, also
    constant control through supervisors, which would be personally
    superintended by him in periodical inspection trips with the
    participation of the specialized central offices. In this way,
    for instance, the two districts which were administered by me
    were inspected by him personally three times in 4 years.

    “In face of the demands of the Berlin central authorities, who
    believed it possible to import more from the Government General
    into the Reich than the former could afford, Dr. Frank asserted
    vigorously the political independence of the Government General
    as an ‘adjunct of the Reich’ and his own independence as being
    directly subordinated only to the Supreme Head of the State, and
    not to the Reich Government. He also instructed us on no account
    to comply with demands which might come to us on the basis of
    personal relations with the authorities by whom we were sent, or
    with the ministries concerned; and if by so doing we came into
    conflict with our loyalty to the Reich, which was equally
    expected of us, to report to him about it. This firm attitude
    brought Dr. Frank the displeasure of the Berlin government
    circles, and the Government General was dubbed ‘Frankreich.’ A
    campaign of calumny was initiated in the Reich against him and
    against the entire administration of the Government General by
    systematically generalizing and exaggerating regrettable
    ineptitudes and human weaknesses of individuals, at the same
    time attempting to belittle the actual constructive
    achievements.”

I should like to ask the Tribunal merely to take official notice of
Section 5, also Section 6, and I will only quote from Section 7.

    “7) Dr. Frank as an opponent of acts of violence against the
    native population, especially as an opponent of the SS.

    “Besides the exploitation and the pauperization of the
    Government General, the accusation of the enslaving of the
    native population as well as deporting it to the Reich, and many
    atrocities of various kinds which have appeared in the newspaper
    reports on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, were interpreted as
    serious evidence against Dr. Frank. As far as atrocities are
    concerned, the guilt lies not with Dr. Frank but in some measure
    with the numerous non-German agitators and provocateurs who,
    with the growing pressure on the fighting German fronts,
    increased their underground activity; but more especially with
    the former State Secretary for Security in the Government
    General, SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, and his agencies. My
    observations in this respect are sketchy, because of the strict
    secrecy of these offices.

    “On the other hand, Dr. Frank went so far in meeting the Polish
    population that this was frequently objected to by his German
    compatriots. That he did the correct thing by his stand for the
    just interests of the Polish population is proved, for example,
    by the impressive fact that barely a year and a half after the
    defeat of the Polish people in a campaign of 18 days, the
    concentration of German army masses against Russia in the Polish
    area took place without any disturbance worth mentioning, and
    that the Eastern railroad was able, with Polish personnel, to
    move the troop transports up to the most forward unloading
    points without being delayed by acts of sabotage.”

I quote the last paragraph on Page 79:

    “This humane attitude of Dr. Frank, which earned him respect and
    sympathy among considerable groups of the native population,
    led, on the other hand, to bitter conflicts with the SS, in
    whose ranks Himmler’s statement, ‘They shall not love us, but
    fear us,’ was applied as the guiding principle of their thoughts
    and deeds.

    “At times it came to a complete break. I still recall quite
    clearly that during a government visit to the Carpathian areas
    in the summer of 1943 in the district center of Stanislav, when
    he took a walk alone with me and my wife in Zaremcze on the
    Prut, Dr. Frank complained most bitterly about the arbitrary
    acts of the SS, which quite frequently ran counter to the
    political line taken by him. At that time he called the SS the
    ‘Black Plague’; and when he noticed our astonishment at hearing
    such criticism coming from his lips, he pointed out that if, for
    example, my wife were to be wrongfully arrested one day or night
    by agencies of the Gestapo and disappear, never to be seen
    again, without having been given the opportunity of defense in a
    court trial, absolutely nothing could be done about it. Some
    time afterwards he made a speech to the students in Heidelberg,
    which attracted much attention and was loudly applauded, about
    the necessity for the re-establishment of a German
    constitutional state such as had always met the real needs of
    the German people. When he wanted to repeat this speech in
    Berlin, he is said to have been forbidden by the Führer and
    Reich Chancellor, at Himmler’s instigation, to make speeches for
    3 months, as reported to me by a reliable, but unfortunately
    forgotten, source. The struggle against the methods of violence
    used by the SS led to Dr. Frank’s having a nervous breakdown,
    and he had to take a fairly long sick leave. As far as I can
    remember this was in the winter of 1943-44.”

I ask the Court to take official notice of Section 8, and I pass on to
Page 84 of the document book. That is an affidavit by SS
Obergruppenführer Erich Von dem Bach-Zelewski, of 21 February 1946. This
affidavit becomes Document Frank-8.

THE PRESIDENT: Did this witness not give evidence?

DR. SEIDL: The witness was questioned here by the Prosecution, and I
made the motion at that time that either I be allowed to interrogate the
witness again or be granted the use of an affidavit. On 8 March 1946 the
Tribunal made the decision, if I remember correctly, that I could use an
affidavit from that witness but that the Prosecution would be free if
they desired to question the witness again.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SEIDL: I shall read the statements of the witness concerning this
matter, and I quote:

    “1) Owing to the infiltration of Russian partisan groups over
    the line of the river Bug into the Government General in 1943,
    Himmler declared the Government General to be a ‘guerrilla
    warfare territory.’ Thus it became my duty as Chief of
    Anti-Partisan Units to travel about the Government General to
    collect information and get experience, and to submit reports
    and suggestions for fighting the partisans.

    “In the general information Himmler gave me, he called the
    Governor General Dr. Frank a traitor to his country, who was
    conspiring with the Poles and whom he would expose to the Führer
    very shortly. I still remember two of the reproaches Himmler
    made against Frank:

    “a) At a lawyer’s meeting in the Old Reich territory Frank is
    said to have stated that ‘he preferred a bad constitutional
    state to the best conducted police state’; and

    “b) During a speech to a Polish delegation Frank had disavowed
    some of Himmler’s measures and had disparaged, in front of the
    Poles, those charged with carrying them out, by calling them
    ‘militant personalities.’

    “After having, on a circular tour, personally obtained
    information on the spot about the situation in the Government
    General, I visited the higher SS and Police Führer Krüger and
    the Governor General, Dr. Frank, in Kraków.

    “Krüger spoke very disapprovingly about Dr. Frank and blamed
    Frank’s faltering and unstable policy towards the Poles for
    conditions in the Government General. He called for harsher and
    more ruthless measures and said that he would not rest until the
    traitor Frank was overthrown. I had the impression, from
    Krüger’s statements, that personal motives also influenced his
    attitude, and that he himself would have liked to become
    Governor General.

    “After that I had a long discussion with Dr. Frank. I told him
    of my impressions; and he went into lengthy details about a new
    policy for Poland, which aimed at appeasing the Poles by means
    of concessions. In agreement with my personal impressions Dr.
    Frank considered the following factors responsible for the
    crisis in the Government General:

    “a) The ruthless resettlement action carried out now in the
    midst of war, especially the senseless and purposeless
    resettlement carried out by the SS and Police Führer Globocznik
    in Lublin.

    “b) The insufficient food quota allotted to the Governor
    General.

    “Dr. Frank called Krüger and Globocznik declared enemies of any
    conciliatory policy, and said it was absolutely essential that
    they should be recalled.

    “Being convinced that if Dr. Frank failed, he would be succeeded
    only by a more ruthless and uncompromising person, I promised
    him my support. Having been assured of strictest secrecy I told
    Frank I shared his opinion that Krüger and Globocznik would have
    to disappear. He, Dr. Frank, knew however that Himmler hated him
    and that he was urging Hitler to have him removed. With such a
    state of affairs any request on Frank’s part to have Krüger and
    Globocznik recalled would not only be rejected but would even
    strengthen their position with Himmler. Frank should give me a
    free hand, then I could promise him that both would be relieved
    of their posts within a short time. Dr. Frank agreed to that,
    and I then made use of the military mistakes that Krüger and
    Globocznik had committed in order to bring about their recall by
    Himmler.

    “3) The Warsaw revolt of 1944...”

THE PRESIDENT: I must point out to you that you said you were going to
be only 2 hours over five volumes. You have now been over an hour over
one volume, and you are reading practically everything in these
documents. It is not at all what the Tribunal has intended. You have
been told that you may make short comments showing how the documents are
connected with each other and how they are connected with all the
evidence. That is not what you are doing at all.

DR. SEIDL: In that case I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
Paragraph 3 of the affidavit by Von dem Bach-Zelewski.

Paragraph 3 deals with the Warsaw revolt in the year 1944 and the
question as to whether the Governor General had anything to do with the
crushing of that revolt.

Then I pass on to Page 92.

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, does the Indictment charge anything
in connection with the crushing of the Warsaw revolt in 1944?

DR. SEIDL: There is nothing in the Indictment itself about the part
played by the Governor General in the crushing of that revolt. The
Soviet Prosecution have, however, submitted a telegram which, while it
is not clear whether it was sent, nevertheless connects the Defendant
Dr. Frank in some way with the Warsaw revolt. But I shall not go into
details about that now.

I pass on to Page 92 of the document book.

This is an affidavit by the witness Wilhelm Ernst von Palezieux, in
whose case the Tribunal has approved an interrogatory. But I was told by
the Tribunal that in place of an interrogatory I could submit an
affidavit. I quote only the two main paragraphs as follows:

    “The art treasures stored in the castle in Kraków, from the
    spring of 1943, were under official and legal supervision there.
    When speaking to me Dr. Frank always referred to these art
    treasures as state property of thy Government General.
    Catalogues of the existing art treasures had already been made
    before I came to Poland. The list of the first selection had
    been printed in book form as a catalogue with descriptions and
    statements of origin, and had been ordered by the Governor
    General.”

THE PRESIDENT: Now you are reading the affidavit all over again. We do
not want that sort of...

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President. I assumed that in those cases where a witness
does not appear before the Tribunal in person, it is admissible that
either the interrogatory or the affidavit be read, because otherwise the
contents of his testimony would not become part of the record nor,
therefore, part of the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: That rule was in order that the defendants and their
counsel should have the document before them in German; that is the
reason for reading the documents through the earphones. The Tribunal
will adjourn now, but I want to tell you that you must shorten your
presentation of this documentary evidence. We have already been a good
deal more than an hour over one book and we have four more books to deal
with, and it does not do your case any good to read all these long
passages because we have some more weeks of the trial. It is only
necessary for you to give such connecting statements as make the
documents intelligible, and to correlate them with the oral evidence
that is being given.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 24 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH DAY
                        Wednesday, 24 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: I left off
yesterday at the last document of Volume I. It is the affidavit of the
witness Ernst von Palezieux, and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of it. The affidavit is given the document number Frank-9, and
that completes the first volume.

THE PRESIDENT: The first volume, what page?

DR. SEIDL: That was Page 92 of the first volume, Document Frank-9.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is the end of the first volume, isn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the end of the first volume. Volumes II, III,
and IV of the document book comprise extracts from the diary of the
Defendant Dr. Frank. I do not propose to number all these extracts
individually, but I ask the Tribunal to accept the whole diary as
Document Frank-10 (Document 2233-PS), and I propose to quote only a few
short extracts. For example Pages 1 to 27, Mr. President, are extracts
from the diary which have already been submitted by the Prosecution. I
have put the extracts submitted by the Prosecution into a more extensive
context, and by quoting the entire passages I have attempted to prove
that some of these extracts do not represent the true and essential
content of the diary. Those are Exhibits USA-173, on Page 1 of the
document book, USSR-223 on Page 3, USA-271 on Page 8, USA-611 on Page 11
of the document book. On Page 14 of the document book there appears to
be a misprint. The USA number is not 016 but 613.

THE PRESIDENT: It begins on Page 13 in my copy, doesn’t it?

DR. SEIDL: No, it is on Page 14. It is an entry dated 25 January 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the document that I have and which I think you are
referring to, is Document 2233 (aa)-PS, Exhibit USA-613. That is on Page
13. I don’t think it makes any difference.

DR. SEIDL: In that case it must be an error by the Translation
Department. At any rate I do not think it is important, I mean this
quotation.

I now turn to Page 20 of the document book, a quotation by the Soviet
Prosecution. On Page 22 there is a quotation by the Soviet Prosecution.
Page 24 of the document book contains quotations by the Prosecution of
both the United States and of the Soviet Union. Exhibit USA-295. Perhaps
I may point out that these extracts are only a few examples merely to
show that in a number of cases the impression obtained is different if
one reads either the entire speech or at least a portion of it.

I then turn to Page 32 of the document book, an entry dated 10 October
1939, in which the Defendant Dr. Frank gives instructions for
negotiations with the Reich Food Ministry regarding the delivery of
5,000 tons of grain per week—Page 32 of the document book.

On Page 34 there is an entry of 8 March 1940, and I quote the first
three lines. The Governor General states:

    “In close connection therewith is the actual governing of
    Poland. The Führer has ordered me to regard the Government
    General as the home of the Polish people. Accordingly, no
    Germanization policy of any kind is possible.”

I now pass on to Page 41 of the document book; an entry dated 19 January
1940. I quote the first five lines:

    “Dr. Walbaum (Chief of the Health Department): The state of
    health in the Government General is satisfactory. Much has
    already been accomplished in this field. In Warsaw alone 700,000
    typhus injections have been given. This is a huge total, even
    for German standards; it is actually a record.”

The next quotation is on Page 50 of the document book, an entry dated 19
February 1940:

    “The Governor General is further of the opinion that the need
    for official interpretation of Polish law may become greater. We
    should probably have to come to some form of Polish government
    or regency, and the head of the Polish legal system would then
    be competent for such a task.”

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid there seems to have been some slight
difference in the paging and therefore if you would give us carefully
and somewhat more slowly the actual date of the document we should be
able to find it perhaps for ourselves. The pages do not seem to
correspond.

DR. SEIDL: The last quotation which I read was dated 19 February 1940.

I now turn to a quotation; that is, an entry of 26 February 1940, and I
quote:

    “In this connection the Governor General expresses...”

This is on Page 51 in my book. The entry is of 26 February 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: Page 40 in ours.

    DR. SEIDL: “In this connection the Governor General expresses
    the wish of Field Marshal Göring that the German administration
    should be built up in such a way that the Polish mode of living
    as such is assured. It should not give the impression that
    Warsaw is a fallen city which is becoming germanized, but rather
    that Warsaw, according to the Führer’s will, is to be one of the
    cities which would continue to exist as a Polish community in
    the intended reduced Polish state.”

A further entry, dated 26 February 1940, deals with the question of
higher education. I quote:

    “The Governor General points out in this connection that the
    universities and high schools have been closed. However, in the
    long run it would be an impossible state of affairs, for
    instance, to discontinue medical education. The Polish system of
    technical schools should also be revived and with the
    participation of the city.”

The next quotation is on Page 56 of my document book. An entry of 1
March 1940.

    “The Governor General announces in this connection that the
    directive has now been issued to give free rein to Polish
    development as far as it is possible within the interests of the
    German Reich. The attitude now to be adopted is that the
    Government General is the home of the Polish people.”

A further entry deals with the question of workers in the Reich
territory. Page 60 of my document book, entry of 19 September 1940—I
beg your pardon, 12 September 1940. I quote:

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment. You mean the first of September, do you?

DR. SEIDL: 12 September—no, it should be 12 March; there is obviously a
misprint; 12 March 1940, Page 197 of the diary. I quote:

    “Governor General Dr. Frank emphasizes that one could actually
    collect an adequate number of workers by force following the
    methods of the slave trade, by using a sufficient number of
    police, and by procuring sufficient means of transportation; but
    that, for a number of reasons, however, the use of propaganda
    deserves preference under all circumstances.”

The next quotation is on Page 68 in my document book; an entry of 23
April 1940. I quote the last five lines. The Governor General states:

    “The Governor General is merely attempting to offer the Polish
    nation protection in an economic respect as well. He was almost
    inclined to think that one could achieve better results with
    Poles than with these autocratic trustees....”

I now turn to Page 71 of my document book, an entry dated 25 May 1940.
Here the Governor General gives an explanation to the President of the
Polish Court of Appeal, Bronschinski. I quote the last four lines:

    “We do not wish to carry on a war of extermination here against
    a people. The protection of the Polish people by the Reich in
    the German zone of interest gives you the possibility of
    continuing your development according to your national
    traditions.”

I turn to Page 77 of my document book, an entry from Volume III, July to
September, Page 692. I quote:

    “The Governor General then spoke of the food difficulties still
    existing in the Government General”—this was to Generaloberst
    von Küchler—“and asked the general to see to it that the
    provisioning and other requirements of new troops arriving
    should be as light a burden as possible on the food situation of
    the Government General. Above all, no confiscation whatsoever
    should take place.”

I turn to Pages 85 and 86; entries in Volume III, July to September
1940, Page 819 of the diary. This entry deals with the establishment of
the medical academy which was planned by the Governor General. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of this fact.

The next quotation is on Page 95 of the document book, an entry dated 9
October 1940, from the speech of the Governor General on the occasion of
the opening of the autumn trade fair at Radom. I quote Line 5.

    “It is clear that we...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the important things for us are the page in
the diary and the date. We seem to have the pages in the diary and the
dates, so if you will tell us them that will be of the greatest help to
us.

DR. SEIDL: The date is 9 October 1940; Pages 966-967 of the diary, I
quote Line 6:

    “It is clear that we do not wish to denationalize, nor shall we
    germanize.”

The next quotation...

THE PRESIDENT: The translation in our book of that sentence is:

    “It is clear that we neither want to denationalize nor
    degermanize.”

DR. SEIDL: That is apparently an error in the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: In which translation? In the one I have just read out?

DR. SEIDL: In the English translation. I shall now quote literally:

    “It is clear that we neither wish to denationalize nor shall we
    germanize.”

The other makes no sense.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what I read. Well, it is right in our book
anyhow.

DR. SEIDL: The Governor General wished to say that we did not want to
deprive the Poles of their national character and that we did not intend
to turn them into Germans.

I now turn to Page 101, to an entry dated 27 October 1940, Pages 1026 to
1027 of Volume IV of the diary. A conference with Reich Minister of
Labor Seldte. I quote, Line 7:

    “He, the Governor General, had complained to the Führer that the
    wages of Polish agricultural laborers had been reduced by 50
    percent. In addition, their wages had for the most part been
    used for purposes which were completely foreign to the idea of
    this exchange of workers.”

The next quotation is dated 29 November 1940. It is on Page 1085 in
Volume IV, of the year 1940. I quote:

    “Hofrat Watzke further states that Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s
    office was attempting to confiscate the so-called Polish Library
    in Paris, for inclusion in the Ahnenerbe in Berlin. The
    Department of Schools was of the opinion that the books of this
    Polish library belonged to the state library in Warsaw, as
    17,000 volumes were already in Warsaw.

    “The Governor General ordered that this Polish library should be
    transferred from Paris to Warsaw without delay.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the next entry, dated 6
and 7 June 1940, which refers to an economic conference. I shall not
read from the entry.

The next quotation is dated 25 February 1940. It deals with a conference
of the department chiefs, prefects, and town majors of the district of
Radom. I quote Page 12:

    “Thereupon the Governor General spoke, and made the following
    statements:”

It goes on from Page 13:

    “I shall, therefore, again summarize all the points.

    “1. The Government General comprises that part of the occupied
    Polish territory which is not an integral part of the German
    Reich...

    “2. This territory has primarily been designated by the Führer
    as the home of the Polish people. In Berlin the Führer, as well
    as Field Marshal Göring, emphasized to me again and again that
    this territory would not be subjected to Germanization. It is to
    be set aside as the national territory of the Polish people. In
    the name of the German people it is to be placed at the disposal
    of the Polish nation as their reservation.”

The speech of the Governor General ends two pages further. I quote the
last paragraph:

    “There is one thing I should like to tell you: The Führer has
    urged me to guarantee the self-administration of the Poles as
    far as possible. Under all circumstances they must be granted
    the right to choose the Wojts and the minor mayors and village
    magistrates from among the Poles, which would be to our interest
    as well.”

I now turn to the entry of 4 March 1940. From the volume of conferences,
February 1940 to November 1940, Page 8:

    “The Governor General submits for consideration the question of
    whether a slight pressure could not be exerted through proper
    use of the Compulsory Labor Order. He refuses to ask Berlin for
    the promulgation of a new decree defining special measures for
    the application of force and threats. Measures which might lead
    to unrest should be avoided. The shipping of people by force has
    nothing in its favor.”

The last quotation in my document book is on Page 143. It is an entry
dated 27 January 1941, Volume I, Page 115. A conference between State
Secretary Dr. Bühler and the Reich Finance Minister, Count Schwerin von
Krosigk. I quote the last paragraph:

    “It is due to the efforts of all personnel employed in the
    Government General that, after surmounting extraordinary and
    unusual difficulties, a general improvement in the economic
    situation can now be noted. The Government General, from the day
    of its birth, has most conscientiously met the demands of the
    Reich for strengthening the German war potential. It is,
    therefore, permissible to ask that in future the Reich should
    make no excessive demands on the Government General, so that a
    sound and planned economy may be maintained in the Government
    General, which, in turn, would prove of benefit to the Reich.”

That completes Volume II of the document book.

I now come to Volume III and I ask the Tribunal to refer to a quotation
on Page 17 in my document book. It is an entry following a government
meeting of 18 October 1941. I quote the eighth line from the bottom; it
is a statement of the Governor General:

    “I shall first of all state, when replying to these
    demands”—that means, the demands of the Reich—“that our
    strength has been exhausted and that we can no longer take any
    responsibility as regards the Führer. No instructions, orders,
    threats, _et cetera_, can induce me to answer anything but an
    emphatic ‘no’ to demands which, even under the stress of wartime
    conditions, are no longer tolerable. I will not permit a
    situation to arise such as you, Mr. Naumann, so expressly
    indicated, such as, for example, placing large areas at the
    disposal of the troops for maneuvers and thus completely
    disrupting the food supply which is already utterly
    insufficient.”

The next quotation is on Pages 36 and 37 of my document book. It is an
entry dated 16 January 1942, and the quotation to which I am referring
is on the next page—Pages 65 and 66 of the diary:

    “Later on a short discussion took place in the King’s Hall of
    the Castle.”

It took place with the chief of the Ukrainian committee. I quote:

    “The Governor General desires a larger employment of Ukrainians
    in the administrative offices of the Government General. In all
    offices in which Poles are employed there should also be
    Ukrainians in proportion to the number of their population. He
    asked Professor...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, if you will give us the page in your document
book now, that will be sufficient for the present, because they seem to
correspond.

DR. SEIDL: Very well. May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes.

DR. SEIDL: I then come to Page 38 in the document book. This entry deals
with a law drafted by Himmler, which has already been mentioned,
regarding the treatment of aliens in the community. I quote:

    “The Governor General orders the following letter to be sent to
    Landgerichtsrat Taschner:

    “‘Please inform Reich Minister Dr. Lammers of my opinion which
    follows with my signature certified by yourself: I am opposed to
    the law on the treatment of people foreign to the German
    community, and I request that an early date be set for a meeting
    of leading officials with regard to the draft so that it may be
    possible to set forth the principal legal viewpoints which today
    still emphatically contradict this proposal in its details. I
    shall personally attend this meeting. In my opinion it is
    entirely impossible to circumvent the regular courts and to
    transfer such far-reaching authority exclusively to police
    organizations. The intended court at the Reich Security Main
    Office cannot take the place of a regular court in the eyes of
    the people.’”

On Page 39 I quote the last paragraph but one:

    “For that reason I object to this draft in its present form,
    especially with regard to Paragraph 1 of the decree concerning
    the order of its execution.”

Page 40 is an entry dated 7 June 1942 which also deals with that
question of denationalization so emphatically denied by the Governor
General. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.
The next quotation is on Page 47 and deals with the acquisition of
Chopin’s posthumous works. I quote Paragraph 2:

    “President Dr. Watzke reports that it would be possible to
    procure in Paris the major part of Chopin’s posthumous wonks for
    the State Library in Kraków. The Governor General approves of
    the purchase of Chopin’s posthumous works through the government
    of the Government General.”

Page 50 deals with an entry in the diary which concerns the securing of
agricultural property. I quote Page 767 of the diary, Paragraph 2:

    “It is my aim to bring about agricultural reform in Galicia by
    every possible means, even during the war. I thus have kept the
    promises which I made a year ago in my proclamation to the
    population of this territory. Further progress of a beneficial
    nature can therefore result through the loyal co-operation of
    the population with the German authorities. The German
    administration in this area is willing, and has also been given
    orders to treat the population well. It will protect the loyal
    population of this area with the same decisive and fundamental
    firmness with which it will suppress any attempt at resistance
    against the order established by the Greater German Reich. For
    this purpose, for the protection of the individual farmer, I
    have issued an additional decree concerning the duties of the
    German administration for food and agriculture in Galicia.”

I turn to Page 55 of the document book. This concerns a speech, made by
the Governor General before the leaders of the Polish Delegation, and I
quote the last paragraph on Page 56, Line 6:

    “I hope that the new harvest will place us in a position to
    assist the Polish Aid Committee. In any event we will do
    whatever we can to check the crisis. It is also to our interest
    that the Polish population should enjoy their work and
    co-operate. We do not want to exterminate or annihilate
    anybody...”

Page 61 of the document book deals with a conference which the Governor
General held with the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of
Labor. I quote the last paragraph on Page 919 of the diary:

    “I would also like to take this opportunity of expressing to
    you, Party Comrade Sauckel, our willingness to do everything
    that is humanly possible. However, I should like to add one
    request: The treatment of Polish workers in the Reich is still
    subject to certain degrading restrictions.”

I turn to Page 62 and quote Line 10:

    “I can assure you, Party Comrade Sauckel, that it would be a
    tremendous help in recruiting workers, if at least part of the
    degrading restrictions against the Poles in the Reich could be
    abolished. I believe that could be effected.”

I now turn to Page 66 of the document book. This is the only entry in
the diary of the Defendant Dr. Frank which he has signed personally. It
is a memorandum on the development in the Government General after he
had been relieved of all his positions in the Party, and had repeatedly
stated that he was resigning and hoped that now at last his resignation
would be accepted.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this final survey, dated 1
September 1942. It consists of five pages: Pages 66 to 71.

The next quotation is on Page 75 and deals with the safeguarding of art
treasures. I quote the fifth line from the bottom. It is a statement
made by the Governor General:

    “The art treasures were carefully restored and cleaned, so that
    approximately 90 percent of all the art treasures of the former
    state of Poland in the territory of the Government General could
    be made safe. These art treasures are entirely the property of
    the Government General.”

I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 92 of this volume. It is an entry
dated 8 December 1942, which was made on the occasion of a meeting of
departmental chiefs and which deals with the supply situation.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of that entry. The same for
the entry on Page 93, in which the Governor General speaks of the
question of recruiting workers and most severely condemns all measures
of force.

The next entry, which appears important to me and which should be read
into the record, is on Page 108. It concerns a press conference, and I
ask the Tribunal to turn directly to Page 110. I quote the third
paragraph:

    “The Governor General sums up the result of the conference and
    states that, with the participation of the president of the
    department for propaganda and the press chief of the Government,
    all points will be comprised in a directive to be issued to all
    leading editors of the Polish papers. Instructions for the
    handling of matters concerning foreigners, in the press and in
    the cultural field, will be included in this directive. The
    conciliatory spirit of the Reich will serve as a model.”

I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 127 of the document book, a
conference of 26 May 1943, which deals with the question of food. I
quote the eighth line:

    “We must understand that the first problem is the feeding of the
    Polish population; but I would like to say, with complete
    authority, that whatever happens with the coming rationing
    period in the Government General, I shall, in any case, allot to
    the largest possible number of the population such food rations
    as we can justifiably afford in view of our commitments to the
    Reich. Nothing and nobody will divert me from this goal...”

Page 131 of the document book deals with a committee of the Governor
General for supplies for the non-German working population. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of these statements, and I now turn to
Page 141. This entry also deals with the food situation. I quote the
tenth line from the bottom:

    “After examining all possibilities I have now ordered that as
    from 1 September of this year, the food situation of the Polish
    population of this territory shall also be regulated on a
    generous scale. By 1 September of this year we shall introduce,
    for the population of this territory, the rations which are
    called the ‘Warthegau rations.’”

I ask permission to quote a few sentences from Page 142:

    “I should like to make a statement to you now. From the
    seriousness with which I utter these words, you can judge what I
    have in mind. I myself and the men of my Government are fully
    aware of the needs also of the Polish population in this
    district. We are not here to exterminate or annihilate it, or to
    torment these people beyond the measure of suffering laid upon
    them by fate. I hope that we shall come to a satisfactory
    arrangement in all matters that sometimes separate us. I
    personally have nothing against the Poles...”

I now turn to Page 148. It is a conference which deals with young
medical students. I quote Page 149, Paragraph 2, which is a statement by
the Governor General:

    “This first—we can safely call it Ministry of Health, even
    though this expression is not used—is something entirely new.
    This department for health will have to deal with important
    problems. For us, the physicians in this territory, there is
    above all a lack of...”

Mr. President, I have just discovered that an error may possibly have
occurred, since these statements on Page 672 were perhaps not made by
the Governor General himself but by the head of the Health Department. I
shall examine this question again and then submit the result to the
Tribunal in writing.

I now turn to Page 155 of the document book. This entry seems to me of a
vital nature. It is dated 14 July 1943 and deals with the establishment
of the State Secretariat for Security.

THE PRESIDENT: It is not in our book, apparently. We haven’t got a Page
155, and we haven’t got a date, I think, of the 14th of July.

DR. SEIDL: It is July 1943. It has probably been omitted. With the
approval of the Tribunal I shall read the sentences in question into the
record. There are only three sentences:

    “The Governor General points out the disastrous effect which the
    establishment of the State Secretariat for Security has had on
    the authority of the Governor General. He said that a new police
    and SS government had tried to establish itself in opposition to
    the Governor General which it had been possible to suppress only
    at the expense of a great deal of energy and at the very last
    moment.”

I then ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 166 of the document book. This
entry deals with general questions regarding the policy in Poland. I ask
the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.

Page 193 deals with the establishment of the Chopin Museum which was
created by the Governor General. I quote Page 1157 of the diary, which
is an extract from the Governor General’s speech:

    “Today I have inaugurated the Chopin Museum in Kraków. We have
    saved and brought to Kraków, under most difficult circumstances,
    the most valuable mementos of the greatest of Polish musicians.
    I merely wanted to say this in order to show you that I want to
    make a personal effort to put things in order in this country as
    far as possible.”

The last quotation is on Page 199 of Volume II of the document book. It
is an extract from a speech which Reichsführer SS Himmler made on the
occasion of the installation of the new Higher SS and Police Leader in
Kraków, before the members of the Government and the Higher SS and
Police Leaders. This is the speech which the Defendant Frank mentioned
when he was examined. I quote the eighth line from the bottom:

    “You are all very familiar with the situation: 16 million aliens
    and about 200,000 Germans live here; or if we include the
    members of the Police and Wehrmacht, perhaps 300,000. These 16
    million aliens, who were augmented in the past by a large number
    of Jews who have now emigrated or have been sent to the East,
    consist largely of Poles and to a lesser degree of Ukrainians.”

I turn to the last document of this volume, Page 200, an entry dated 14
December 1943. It concerns a speech which the Governor General made to
officers of the Air Force. I quote the second paragraph:

    “Therefore, everything should be done to keep the population
    quiet, peaceful, and in order. Nothing should be done to create
    unnecessary agitation among the population. I mention only one
    example here:

    “It would be wrong if now, during the war, we were to undertake
    the establishment of large German settlements among the
    peasantry in this territory. This attempt at colonizing, mostly
    through force, would lead to tremendous unrest among the native
    peasant population. This, in turn, from the point of view of
    production, would result in a tremendous loss to the harvest, in
    a curtailment of cultivation, and so on. It would also be wrong
    forcibly to deprive the population of its Church, or of any
    possibility for leading a simple cultural life.”

I turn to Page 201, and I quote the last paragraph:

    “We must take care of these territories and their population. I
    have found, to my pleasure and that of all of our colleagues,
    that this point of view has prevailed and that everything that
    was formerly said against the alleged friendship with the Poles
    or the weakness of this attitude, has dwindled to nothing in
    face of the facts.”

That completes Volume II of the document book—I beg your pardon, I
meant Volume III. Now I come to Volume IV of the document book.

Page 1 of the document book deals with a conversation which took place
on 25 January 1943 with the SS Obergruppenführer Krüger. I quote the
last paragraph:

    “The Governor General states that he had not been previously
    informed about the large-scale action to seize asocial elements
    and that this procedure was in opposition to the Führer’s decree
    of 7 May 1942, according to which the State Secretary for
    Security must obtain the approval of the Governor General before
    carrying out instructions by the Reichsführer SS and Chief of
    the German Police. State Secretary Krüger states that this
    concerned secret instructions which had to be carried out
    suddenly.”

I ask the Tribunal to take cognizance of the fact that this is merely an
example of many similar discussions and differences of opinion.

I now turn to Page 24 of the document book. This concerns a meeting of
the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee on 22 September 1943. I
hope that the pages tally again.

THE PRESIDENT: You said Page 24, didn’t you?

DR. SEIDL: Page 24, an entry of 22 September 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: It looks as though the paging is right. Our book is Page
24 at the top, so perhaps you will continue to quote the page for a
moment or two. We will see whether it goes on right.

DR. SEIDL: This concerns an entry dated 22 September 1943, a meeting of
the War Economy Staff and the Defense Committee. I quote only the first
lines:

    “In the course of the past few months, in the face of the most
    difficult and senseless struggles, I have had to insist on the
    principle that the Poles should, at last, be given a sufficient
    quantity of food. You all know the foolish attitude of
    considering the nations we have conquered as inferior to us, and
    that at a moment when the labor potential of these peoples
    represents one of the most important factors in our fight for
    victory. By my opposition to this absurdity, which has caused
    most grievous harm to the German people, I personally—and many
    men of my government and many of you—have incurred the charge
    of being friendly or soft towards the Poles.

    “For years now people have not hesitated to attack my government
    of this area with the foulest arguments of this kind, and behind
    my back have hindered the fulfillment of these tasks. Now it has
    been proved as clear as day that it is insane to want to
    reconstruct Europe and at the same time to persecute the
    European nations with such unparalleled chicanery.”

I now turn to Page 34 of the document book, an entry dated 20 April
1943, concerning a government meeting. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of the final words only of the Governor General’s speech
on Page 38 of the document book and Page 41 of the diary. Then I turn to
Page 39 of the document book, a meeting of 22 July 1943; I quote from
the second paragraph, the tenth line:

    “The question of the resettlement was altogether particularly
    difficult for us in this year. I can give you the good news that
    resettlement in general has been completely discontinued for the
    duration of the war. With regard to the transferring of
    industries, we have just started to work at full speed. As you
    know—I personally attach great importance to it—we have to
    satisfy this need of the Reich, and in the coming months we
    shall install great industrial concerns of international renown
    in the Government General.

    “However, with regard to this question we must consider the
    almost complete reconstruction of the Government General which
    has consequently been forced upon us. While, until now, we have
    always figured as a country supplying the Reich with labor, as
    an agricultural country, and the granary of Europe, we shall
    within a very short time become one of the most important
    industrial centers of Europe. I remind you of such names as
    Krupp, Heinkel, Henschel, whose industries will be moved into
    the Government General.”

I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 41 of the document book. It is
the statement which was made by the witness Doctor Bühler on 26 October
1943, in which he states that this report dealt with 4 years of
reconstruction in the Government General on the basis of reliable
information from the 13 chief departments. The statement includes Pages
42 to 69 of the document book. I do not propose to quote from this
statement, but I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.

I go straight on to Page 70 of the document book, which concerns a
government meeting dated 16 February 1944. I quote the last paragraph,
Page 4 of the document book.

    “As opposed to this, the fact must be established that the
    development, construction, and securing of that which today
    gives this territory its importance were possible only because
    it was necessary, in opposition to the ideas of the advocates of
    brute force—so completely untimely during a war—to bring the
    human and material resources of this area into the service of
    the German war effort in as constructive a manner as possible.”

The next quotation is Page 74; an entry dated 6 March 1944. I quote the
last paragraph on Page 75, Page 5 of the diary:

    “The Governor General does not, as a matter of principle, oppose
    the training of the younger generation for the priesthood
    because, if courses for doctors, _et cetera_, are arranged,
    similar opportunities must also be created in the field of
    religion.”

Page 77 deals with an order by the Governor General prohibiting the
evacuation of the population, or a part of it, which was in the fighting
zone near Lublin.

On Page 80 is an entry dated 12 April 1944. I quote the second
paragraph:

    “In this connection President Gerteis spoke of the treatment of
    the Poles in the Reich. This treatment, said to be worse than
    that of any other foreign workers, had led to the result that
    practically no Poles would volunteer any more for work in
    Germany.

    “There were 21 points on which the Polish workers in the Reich
    were more badly treated than any other foreign workers. The
    Governor General requested President Gerteis to acquaint him
    with these 21 points which he would certainly attempt to have
    abolished.”

I now ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 100 of the document book. It
concerns a conference on 6 June 1944 regarding a large-scale action
against the partisans in the Bilgoraje Forest. I quote Page 101, Page 4
of the diary:

    “The Governor General wants to be quite sure that protection is
    given to the harmless population, which is itself suffering
    under the partisan terror.”

Page 102 deals with the views of the Governor General on concentration
camps. It is an entry dated 6 June 1944. I quote the last paragraph:

    “The Governor General declared that he would never sign such a
    decree, since it meant sending the person concerned to a
    concentration camp. He stated that he had always protested with
    the utmost vigor against the system of concentration camps, for
    it was the greatest offense against the sense of justice. He had
    thought there would be no concentration camps for such matters,
    but they had apparently been silently put into operation. It
    could only be handled in such a manner that the persons
    condemned would be pardoned to jail or prison for a certain
    number of years. He pointed out that prison sentences, for
    instance, were imposed and examined by state institutions. He
    therefore requested that State Secretary Dr. Bühler should be
    informed that he, the Governor General, would not sign such
    decrees. He did not wish concentration camps to be officially
    sanctioned. He went on to say that there was no pardon which
    would commute a sentence into commitment to a concentration
    camp. The courts-martial are state legal organs of a special
    character and consist of police units; actually they should
    normally be staffed by members of the Wehrmacht.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, can you explain the translation of the words
at the bottom of Page 102 which are in English, “It only could be
handled in such a manner that the persons would be pardoned to jail or
prison for a certain number of years.” Can you explain that from the
point of view of meaning?

DR. SEIDL: The meaning of the words becomes clear from the statement
made by President Wille in the previous paragraph where, among others,
you will find the following statement. It is the tenth line from the
top.

    “The Reprieve Commission had asked the representative of the
    Chief of the Security Police, who was present at the session, in
    what form this pardon was to be effected. As far as he knew,
    remittance of a sentence had been allowed in one case only. In
    all other cases it was customary to couple Security Police
    measures with the remittance of a sentence. It was feared that
    otherwise these people might disappear.”

Now the Governor General was of the opinion that, for example, to
transmute a death sentence to a term in prison or penitentiary was
possible but that he would have to refuse direct commutation of a death
penalty into a suspended prison penalty if the Police in that event were
to impose security measures.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that it meant that pardon from a death sentence
might be made by a reprieve for a sentence in prison for a certain
number of years, but not by sending to a concentration camp, which would
be for an indefinite period and under police methods?

DR. SEIDL: Yes, that is the sense of it.

I now turn to Page 104 of the document book. This quotation also deals
with the general question of treatment of the population in the
Government General.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you have been very much longer than you said,
and the Tribunal thinks you might be able to cut down a great deal of
this. It is all very much on the same lines.

DR. SEIDL: Yes. In that case, I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 112 of
the document book, an entry dated 10 July 1944. This entry deals with
the official control of art treasures. I quote the second paragraph:

    “The Governor General instructs the expert Palezieux to have a
    complete index made of these art treasures.”

THE PRESIDENT: You have already told us and given us some evidence to
support the view that the Defendant Frank was preserving the art
treasures and was wishing them to be preserved in Poland, and it is not
necessary under those circumstances to go reading passages about it.

DR. SEIDL: Very well. Then I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
that entry; and if the Tribunal agrees, I shall merely give you the
pages of the documents in the document book which appear important to
me. That is page...

[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the
interpreting system._]

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if the Court is agreeable I should like to
give only the numbers of the pages of Volume IV of the document book
which seem particularly important to me. These are the Pages 115, 121,
123, 134, 139, 152, and 182. That concludes Volume IV of the document
book and I come to the last volume of the document book which will be
finished considerably faster.

Volume V deals exclusively with the accusations made by the Prosecution
of the United States against the Defendant Frank concerning his activity
as President of the Academy for German Law, as President of the National
Socialist Lawyers’ Association, and similar positions. Page 1 is a
document which has already been submitted by the Prosecution, 1391-PS.
It still has no USA number and will be Exhibit Number Frank-11. It is
the law regarding the Academy for German Law with the necessary statutes
and the tasks resulting therefrom.

I turn to page 25 of the document book. This quotation becomes Exhibit
Frank-12 (Document Number Frank-12). It deals with a sentence which has
been ascribed to the defendant: “Right is that which is good for the
people.” This quotation should prove only that the Defendant Dr. Frank
wanted to express nothing more than that which is implied in the Roman
sentence: _Salus publica suprema lex_ (The supreme law is the welfare of
the people). I ask the Court to take cognizance of this and turn to Page
26 of the document book, an excerpt from the magazine of the Academy for
German Law of 1938. That will be Exhibit Frank-13 (Document Number
Frank-13). This quotation also deals with the afore-mentioned sentence:
“Right is that which is good for the people.”

Page 30 is an excerpt from Exhibit USA-670 (Document Number 3459-PS) and
deals with the closing celebration of the “Congress of German Law 1939”
at Leipzig, where the Defendant Dr. Frank made the concluding speech
before 25,000 lawyers. I quote on Page 31, Line 10 from the bottom:

    “Only by applying legal security methods, by administering true
    justice, and by clearly following the legislative ideal of law
    can the national community continue to exist. This legal method
    which permanently ensures the fulfillment of the tasks of the
    community has been assigned to you, fellow guardians of the law,
    as your mission. Ancient Germanic principles have come down to
    us through the centuries.

    “1) No one shall be judged who has not had the opportunity to
    defend himself.

    “2) No one shall be deprived of the incontestable rights which
    he enjoys as a member of the national community, except by
    decision of the judge. Honor, liberty, life, the profits of
    labor are among those rights.

    “3) Regardless of the nature of the proceedings, the reasons for
    the indictment, or the law which is applied, everyone who is
    under indictment must be given the opportunity to have a defense
    counsel who can make legal statements for him; he must be given
    a legal and impartial hearing.”

I turn to Page 35 of the document book, which deals with a speech, an
address by the Defendant Dr. Frank, made at a meeting of the heads of
the departments of the National Socialist Lawyer’s Association on 19
November 1941. The speech—that is, the excerpt—becomes Exhibit Number
Frank-14 (Document Number Frank-14). I quote only a few sentences at the
top of Page 37.

    “Therefore, it is a very serious task which we have imposed upon
    ourselves and we must always bear in mind that it can be
    fulfilled only with courage and absolute readiness for
    self-sacrifice. I observe the developments with great attention.
    I watch every anti-juridical tendency. I know only too well from
    history—as you all do—of the attempts made to gain
    ever-increasing power in general directions because one has
    weapons with which one can shoot, and authority on the basis of
    which one can make people who have been arrested disappear. In
    the first place, I mean by this not only the attempts made by
    the SS, the SD, and by the police headquarters, but the attempts
    of many other offices of the State and the Reich to exclude
    themselves from general jurisdiction.”

I turn to—I would like to quote the last five lines on Page 41. Those
were the last words spoken during that session:

    “One cannot debase law to an article of merchandise; one cannot
    sell it; it exists or it does not exist. Law is not an exchange
    commodity. If justice is not supported, the State loses its
    moral foundation; it sinks into the abyss of darkness and
    horror.”

The next document is on Page 42. It is the first address which the
Defendant Dr. Frank made in Berlin at the university on 8 June 1942. It
will be Exhibit Number Frank-15 (Document Number Frank-15). I quote Page
44, second paragraph, seventh line:

    “On the other hand, however, a member of the community cannot be
    deprived of honor, liberty, life, and property; he cannot be
    expelled and condemned without first being able to defend
    himself against the charges brought against him. The Armed
    Forces serve us as a model in this respect. There everyone is a
    free, honored member of the community, with equal rights, until
    a judge—standing independently above him—has weighed and
    judged between indictment and defense.”

I then turn to Page 49 of the document book, the second of these four
long speeches. It was held in Vienna, and will become Exhibit Number
Frank-15.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already had Exhibit Frank-15 on Page 41.

DR. SEIDL: No, I beg your pardon, Mr. President; it will be Frank-16
(Document Number Frank-16). I quote only one sentence on Page 51.

    “I shall continue to repeat with all the strength of my
    conviction that it would be an evil thing if ideals advocating a
    police state were to be presented as distinct National Socialist
    ideals, while old Germanic ideals of law fell entirely into the
    background.”

Now I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 57 of the document book to the
speech made by the Defendant Dr. Frank at the University of Munich, on
20 July 1942. This will be Exhibit Frank-17 (Document Number Frank-17).
I quote on Page 58, Line 16:

    “It is, however, impossible to talk about a national community
    and still regard the servants of the law as excluded from this
    national community, and throw mud at them in the midst of the
    war. The Führer has transferred the tasks of the Reich Leader of
    the Reich Legal Office and that of the leader of the National
    Socialist Lawyers’ Association to me, and therefore it is my
    duty to state that it is detrimental to the German national
    community if in the ‘Black Corps’ lawyers are called
    ‘sewer-rats.’”

I ask the Tribunal to turn to Page 67 of the document book. That is the
speech which he made at Heidelberg on 21 July 1942. That will be Exhibit
Frank-18 (Document Number Frank-18). I ask the Tribunal to take official
notice of that speech. On Page 69 I quote only one sentence: “But never
must there be a police state, never. That I oppose.”

I now come to the last document which the Prosecution of the United
States has already submitted under Exhibit Number USA-607 (Document
Number 2233(x)-PS), an excerpt from the diary: “Concluding reflections
on the events of the last three months.”

In these reflections Dr. Frank once more definitely states his attitude
towards the concept of the legal state, and I ask the Tribunal to take
cognizance particularly of his basic assumptions on Pages 74 and 75 of
the document book. Here, Dr. Frank again formulated the prerequisites
which he considered necessary for the existence of any legal state. I
quote only a few lines from Page 74:

    “1) No fellow German can be convicted without regular court
    procedure, and only on the basis of a law in effect before the
    act was committed.

    “2) The proceedings must carry full guarantee that the accused
    will be interrogated on all matters pertaining to the
    indictment, and that he will be able to speak freely.

    “3) The accused must have the opportunity, at all stages of the
    trial, to avail himself of the services of defense counsel
    acquainted with the law.

    “4) The defense counsel must have complete freedom of action and
    independence in carrying out his office in order to strike an
    even balance between the State prosecutor and the defendant.

    “5) The judge or the court must make his or its decision quite
    independently—that is, the verdict must not be influenced by
    any irrelevant factors—in logical consideration of the subject
    matter and in just application of the purport of the law.

    “6) When the penalty imposed by the sentence has been paid, the
    act has been expiated.

    “7) Measures for protective custody and security custody may not
    be undertaken or carried out by police organs, nor may measures
    for the punishment of concentration camp inmates, except from
    this aspect, that is, after confirmation of the intended
    measures by regular, independent judges.

    “8) In the same manner, the administration of justice for fellow
    Germans must guarantee full safeguarding of individual interests
    in all relations pertaining to civil suits proper.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are there any passages in these documents
which express the opinion that the same principles ought to be applied
to others than fellow Germans?

DR. SEIDL: In this last quotation the Defendant Dr. Frank dealt
basically with questions of law without making any difference here
between Germans and people of foreign nationality. However, in his
capacity as Governor General he also fundamentally objected at all times
to the transfer of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews to concentration camps.
This can be seen from a whole series of entries in the diary.

With this I have come to the end of my evidence for Dr. Frank. There are
left only the answers to interrogatories by witnesses whose
interrogation before a commission has been approved by the Court. At a
later date I shall compile these interrogations in a small document book
and submit the translation thereof to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking of interrogatories where you have not
yet got the answers; is that right?

DR. SEIDL: These are interrogatories to which the answers have not yet
been received.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, as soon as you have received them you will
furnish them to the Prosecution and to the Tribunal?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker.

DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): In presenting
evidence for the Defendant Frick, I shall forego calling the defendant
himself as a witness. The questions which require an explanation deal
mainly with problems relating to formal authority and also with problems
which differentiate between formal authority and actual responsibility.
These are problems, part of which have already been elucidated by the
interrogation of Dr. Lammers and the rest of which will be cleared up by
the submission of documents. One special field, however, cannot be
entirely clarified by documents; and that is the question of the actual
distribution of authority within the sphere of the Police; but for that
special field I have named the witness Dr. Gisevius. He is the only
witness whose interrogation seems to be necessary for the presentation
of evidence in the case of Frick. Therefore, in the meantime, I have
dispensed with other witnesses.

I ask the Court to decide whether I should call the witness Dr. Gisevius
first or whether I should submit my documents first. If documents are to
be presented first, I believe that I could finish by the midday recess.

THE PRESIDENT: You can finish your documents before the adjournment, do
you mean?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. I believe so.

THE PRESIDENT: Until 1:00 o’clock?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you indifferent whether you call the witness first or
whether you present the documents first?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that perhaps it would be more
convenient to give the documents first. They hope that you will be able
to finish them reasonably quickly.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

Numbers 1, 2, and 3 of the document book (Documents Number 386-PS, L-79,
and 3726-PS) deal with evidence concerning the question of whether the
members of the Reich Cabinet knew about Hitler’s preparation for
aggressive war. I need not read the documents; they have already been
submitted, and they show that Hitler gave information of his plans for
aggression only to those of his assistants who had to know of these
plans for their own work, but did not inform Frick who, as Minister of
the Interior, was responsible for the internal policy.

Within the scope of the war preparation, Frick was made Plenipotentiary
for Reich Administration by the Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938,
which has already been submitted, Exhibit Number USA-36 (Document Number
2194-PS). This law does not indicate that this position had anything to
do with the known preparation of an aggressive war; it shows only the
participation of the Administration of the Interior in a general
preparation and organization in the event of a future war. I have
therefore included in the document book an excerpt from this law under
Number 4 of the document book, in order to correct an error. The
Defendant Frick himself stated in an affidavit on 14 November 1945, that
he had held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
from 21 May 1935. This is the date of the first Reich Defense Law, which
has already been submitted as Exhibit Number USA-24 (Document 2261-PS).
The first Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935, however, does not provide
for the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration; that is
contained only in the second law of 4 September 1938.

This second law has been submitted under Exhibit Number USA-36.
Following this erroneous statement which the Defendant Frick made
without having the two laws on hand, the Prosecution has also stated
that Frick held the position of Plenipotentiary for Reich Administration
from 21 May 1935, while actually he held it only from 4 September 1938,
that is, the date of the second law.

Numbers 5 and 6 of the document book have already been submitted by the
Prosecution. They also prove nothing except the participation of the
Defendant Frick in the establishment of civil administration with a view
to a possible future war. It is not necessary to read this either.

The Prosecution considers Hitler’s aggressive intentions to be so well
known and so obvious as to require no further proof. The Prosecution on
that assumption came to the conclusion that participation in the
National Socialist Government, in any field whatsoever, would in itself
imply the conscious support of aggressive war. In opposition to that I
have referred to evidence in documents from Number 7 to 10 inclusive of
the Frick document book (Documents Number 2288-PS, 2292-PS, 2289-PS, and
3729-PS) which have already been submitted by the Prosecution and which
show that Hitler in public, as well as in private conversations, from
the time he came into power followed a definite policy of declaring his
peaceful intentions—a policy, therefore, which for considered reasons,
declared to all that to keep peace was right.

I believe that these documents, which have already been submitted to the
Tribunal, must also be considered in order to decide whether or not
Hitler’s official policy, since his coming to power, indicated that he
had intentions of waging aggressive war. As evidence in that direction,
I should like to submit Number 11 and Number 12 of the document book,
which have not been presented until now, and which I will submit as
Documents Frick-1 and -2.

The first is a telegram of 8 March 1936 from Cardinal Archbishop Schulte
to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces at the time of the
occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. The second document is a solemn
declaration by the Austrian bishops occasioned by the annexation of
Austria in March 1938.

The first document states, and I quote:

    “Cardinal Archbishop Schulte has sent to General Von Blomberg,
    the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, a telegram in
    which, at the memorable hour when the Armed Forces of the Reich
    are re-entering the German Rhineland as the guardians of peace
    and order, he greets the soldiers of our nation with deep
    emotion mindful of the magnificent example of self-sacrificing
    love of fatherland, stern manly discipline, and upright fear of
    God, which our Army has always given to the world.”

I particularly selected these two documents because the Catholic Church
is not suspected of sanctioning aggressive wars, or of approving of
Hitler’s criminal intentions in any other way. These statements would
have been unthinkable if the accusations of the Prosecution were true,
namely, that the criminal aims of Hitler and particularly his aggressive
intentions had been known.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, the Tribunal would like to know what is
the source of this telegram from the Archbishop, Number Frick-11.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I took the telegram, Number Frick-11, from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 9 March 1936.

THE PRESIDENT: And the other one?

DR. PANNENBECKER: The other document is from the _Völkischer Beobachter_
of 28 March 1938.

Number 13 of the document book contains only one sentence, taken from a
speech made by Frick, from which it is evident that Frick shared the
same opinion. He states in this speech, and I quote:

    “The national revolution is the expression of the will to
    eliminate by legal means every form of external and internal
    foreign domination.”

THE PRESIDENT: You gave that the number 13, did you?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. That should be 3.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, that is what I wanted to say. I submit it as
Document Number Frick-3.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. PANNENBECKER: The Defendant Frick has been accused particularly of
working for the League for Germans Abroad. The Prosecution saw in this
activity a contribution by the Defendant Frick to the preparation of
aggressive wars. Frick’s actual attitude regarding the aims of the
League for Germans Abroad can be seen from Number 14, which will be
Document Number Frick-4. In a speech made by Frick, it states, and I
quote:

    “The VDA (League for Germans Abroad) has nothing to do with
    political aims or with frontier questions; it is, and is
    intended to be, nothing more than a rallying point for German
    cultural activities...the world over.”

In Number 15, which is Exhibit Frick-5...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, I perhaps ought to say that in the
index of this document book it looks as though the exhibit numbers were
the numbers of the documents in the order in which they are put in the
book, but that will not be so.

DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it will not be so.

THE PRESIDENT: That last document which you just put in as Exhibit
Number 4 is shown in the book to be Exhibit Number 14, which is a
mistake. It is Document Number 14, but not Exhibit Number 14.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Number 14 of the document book, Exhibit Number Frick-4
(Document Number Frick-4).

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Dealing with the same subject I have entered in Number
15, Exhibit Number Frick-5 (Document Number 3358-PS), a decree of the
Reich Minister of the Interior of 24 February 1933, which also deals
with the question of the work of the League for Germans Abroad. It
states, and I quote...

THE PRESIDENT: Has that not already been put in? I see it has a PS
number.

DR. PANNENBECKER: It has a PS number, but it was not then submitted as
evidence by the Prosecution. Therefore I quote:

    “The suffering and misery of the times, the lack of work and
    food within Germany, cannot divert attention from the fact that
    about 30 million Germans, living outside of the present
    contracted borders of the Reich, are an integral part of the
    entire German people; an integral part, which the Reich
    Government is not able to help economically but to which it
    considers itself under an obligation to offer cultural support
    through the organization primarily concerned with this task—the
    League of Germans Abroad.”

In the documents from Number 16 to 24 inclusive of the document book,
which I need not read in detail, I have placed together the legal
decrees which deal with the competence of the Reich Ministry of the
Interior as a central office for certain occupied territories. The tasks
of this central office, which had no authority to issue orders and no
executive authority in any occupied territories, have already been
described by the witness Dr. Lammers; and these tasks are specially
entered in Number 24 of the document book. I do not need to submit it in
evidence. It is an official publication of the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ and
has, in addition, already been submitted as 3082-PS. In accordance with
the fact that the central office had no authority to issue orders in the
occupied territories, there is in the diary of Dr. Frank a confirmation
that the Governor General alone had authority to issue orders for the
administration of his territory. I do not need to quote this passage as
it has already been submitted to the Tribunal.

Police authority in the occupied territories was transferred to
Reichsführer SS Himmler; but Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior had
nothing to do with this either, since that authority was vested
exclusively in Himmler in his capacity as Reichsführer SS. That can be
seen from Number 26 of the document book, which also already has been
submitted as Exhibit USA-319 (Document Number 1997-PS).

The Prosecution further considers the Defendant Frick responsible for
the crimes committed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia since
August 1943, on the grounds that Frick had been Reich Protector in
Bohemia and Moravia since August 1943. In this connection, I refer to
Numbers 28 and 29 of the document book (Documents Number 1366-PS and
3443-PS), from which it is evident that, at the time that Frick was
appointed, the former powers of the Reich Protector had been subdivided
between a so-called German State Minister in Bohemia and Moravia—who,
under the immediate supervision of the Führer and Reich Chancellor, had
to manage all government affairs—and the Reich Protector Frick who was
given some special powers and in principle had the right to grant
reprieves on sentences passed by the local courts.

Frick has also been accused of being responsible for the Political
Police, that is, the Secret State Police, and the concentration camps.
Until 1936 police matters were the affair of the individual states in
Germany; consequently in Prussia, Göring as Prussian Prime Minister, and
Prussian Minister of the Interior, built up the Political Police and
established the concentration camps. Frick, therefore, as Reich Minister
of the Interior, had no connection with these things.

In the spring of 1934 Frick also became Prussian Minister of the
Interior. Previously, however, Göring had by a special law taken the
affairs of the Political Police out of the jurisdiction of the office of
the Prussian Minister of the Interior and placed it under the immediate
supervision of the Prime Minister, an office which Göring retained for
himself.

The corresponding decrees have already been submitted by the Prosecution
as Documents Number 2104-PS, 2105-PS, and 2113-PS.

The same is evident from Document Number 30 in the document book, which
has also been submitted as Exhibit USA-233 (Document Number 2344-PS).

Thus, in the Political Police sphere, Frick, until 1936, had only a
general right of supervision, such as the Reich had over the individual
states. He had, however, no special right of command in individual
cases, only the authority to issue general directives; and in Numbers
31-33 of the document book I have entered a few of these directives
issued by Frick.

I quote Number 31, which will be Exhibit Frick-6 (Document Number
779-PS):

    “In order to correct the abuses resulting from the decree for
    protective custody, the Reich Minister of the Interior, in his
    directives of 12 April 1934 to the Land governments and
    Reichsstatthalter anent the promulgation and execution of
    decrees for protective custody, has determined that protective
    custody may be ordered only: (a) for the protection of the
    arrested person; (b) if the arrested person by his behavior, and
    especially by activities directed against the State, has
    directly endangered public security and order. Therefore,
    protective custody is not permissible when the above-mentioned
    cases do not apply, especially (a) for persons who merely
    exercise their public and civil rights; (b) for lawyers for
    representing the interests of their clients; (c) in the case of
    personal matters, as for instance, insults; (d) because of
    economic measures (questions of salary, dismissal of employees,
    and similar cases).

    “Furthermore, protective custody is not permissible as a
    countermeasure for punishable actions, for the courts are
    competent to deal with those cases.”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of that?

DR. PANNENBECKER: It is a document which the Prosecution has submitted
as 779-PS and which was taken from the files of the ministry. There is
no date on the document but it must have been in the spring of 1934, as
can be seen from the first sentence of the document. The _Völkischer
Beobachter_ mentions the same decree in its issue of 14 April 1934. I
have included that as Number 32 in the document book; it will be Exhibit
Frick-7 (Document Number Frick-7).

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, are you offering that as an exhibit or
has it already been put in evidence?

DR. PANNENBECKER: No, it has not, as yet, been submitted. I offer it as
Exhibit Number Frick-7.

THE PRESIDENT: I am told the date is April 12.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In the spring of 1934, yes, shortly after.

THE PRESIDENT: 12th of April, 1934.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

The _Völkischer Beobachter_ also mentions this decree in its issue of 14
April 1934. We are concerned with Document 32 of the document book,
which will be Exhibit Number Frick-7. I do not need to read it in
detail.

The same is evident from Number 33 of the book, which will be Exhibit
Number Frick-8 (Document Number I-302).

Number 34 of the book—which will be Exhibit Number Frick-9 (Document
Number 775-PS) shows that the Gestapo actually did not adhere to Frick’s
directives, and that Frick was powerless in that connection.
Nevertheless, the document appears important to me because it shows that
Frick tried repeatedly with great pains to counteract the abuses of the
Gestapo, which, however, with the support of Himmler, was stronger than
he—especially since Himmler enjoyed the direct confidence of the
Führer.

On 17 June 1936, the affairs of the Political Police came under the
jurisdiction of the Reich. Himmler was appointed Chief of the German
Police and, though formally attached to the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, he functioned, in fact, as an independent Police Ministry
under the immediate authority of Hitler; and, as a minister, he was
privileged to look after his affairs in the Reich Cabinet himself.

This can be seen from Document Number 35 of the document book—an
excerpt from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_ which has been submitted as
2073-PS. I do not believe that I have to give it an exhibit number; it
is an official announcement in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_.

In this connection the Prosecution has submitted Document 1723-PS as
Exhibit USA-206. I have entered an extract from this document as Number
36 in the document book in order to correct an error. The document is an
extract from a book written by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reich
Organization Leader. In that book Dr. Ley gives directives to the Party
offices regarding co-operation with the Gestapo, and at the end of the
extract Ley reprinted a decree by Frick which shows how Frick attempted
to counteract the arbitrary measures of the Gestapo.

However, in presenting evidence on the morning of 13 December 1945, the
Prosecution read the entire document as an order by Frick. I should
therefore like to correct that error.

Since Himmler and the chiefs of the Gestapo did not heed Frick’s general
directives, Frick tried, at least in individual cases, to alleviate
conditions in concentration camps; but generally he was not successful.
To quote an example, I have included—under Number 37 of the document
book—a letter by the former Reichstag Delegate Wulle, which he sent to
me of his own accord. This letter will be Exhibit Number Frick-10
(Document Number Frick-10). The letter states, and I quote:

    “He”—Frick—“as my former counsel told me, has at various times
    tried to persuade Hitler to release me; but without success as
    it was Himmler who made all decisions regarding concentration
    camps. However, I owe it to him that I have been treated in a
    comparatively decent manner at the Sachsenhausen Concentration
    Camp... He stood out from among the Nazi demagogues because of
    his impartiality and reserve; he was a man who by nature
    disapproved of any act of violence... Since the spring of 1925 I
    have been involved in a sharp struggle against Hitler and his
    party. I consider it even more to Frick’s credit that despite
    this antagonism and his comparatively powerless position with
    respect to Himmler, he tried in every way to help my wife and me
    during the bitter years of my imprisonment in the concentration
    camp...”

The Prosecution has asserted, on the basis of the statements made by the
witness Blaha before this Tribunal, that Frick knew of the conditions in
the Dachau concentration camp through having visited it in the first
half of the year 1944.

Therefore, with the permission of the Tribunal I submitted an
interrogatory to the witness Gillhuber, who accompanied Frick on all his
trips and...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a moment, Dr. Pannenbecker. The Tribunal considers
that it cannot entertain an affidavit upon oath from the Defendant
Frick, who is not going into the witness box to give evidence on oath,
unless he is offered as a witness, in which case he may be
cross-examined.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, but the last document was not an affidavit by
Frick, but by Gillhuber, a witness, who has received an interrogatory.
It is Number 40 of the document book. I am just informed that by an
oversight this exhibit has not been included in the book; I shall have
to submit it later.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, well! Tell us what it is.

DR. PANNENBECKER: It is an interrogatory of, and the answers by, the
witness Gillhuber. Gillhuber, for the personal protection of the
Defendant Frick, accompanied him on all his official travels. In
answering the interrogatory, he confirmed the fact that Frick had never
visited the camp. The interrogatory, with the answers, has still to be
submitted in translation. It is contained in my book.

THE PRESIDENT: You may read the interrogatory, unless the Prosecution
has any objection to its admissibility, or the terms of it, because the
interrogatory has already been provisionally allowed.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I read, then, from Number 40 of the Frick document
book, which becomes Exhibit Frick-11 (Document Number Frick-11), the
following:

    “Question: From when until when, and in what capacity, were you
    working for the Defendant Frick?

    “Answer: From the 18 March 1936 until the arrival of the Allied
    Troops on 29 or 30 April 1945, as an employee of the Reich
    Security Service, as guard and escort.

    “Question: Did you always accompany him on his travels for his
    personal protection?

    “Answer: From 1936 until January 1942 only intermittently, but
    from January 1942 as office chief, I accompanied him on all his
    trips and flights.

    “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick visited the
    concentration camp of Dachau during the first six months of
    1944?

    “Answer: To my knowledge, Frick did not visit the Dachau
    concentration camp.

    “Question: Would you have known it had that been the case, and
    why would you have known it?

    “Answer: I would have had to know it had that been the case. I
    was always close to him; and my employees would have reported it
    if he had left during my absence.

    “Question: Do you still have the log book of the trips you made,
    and can you produce it now?

    “Answer: From about 1941 log books were no longer kept. Instead
    of that, monthly reports of trips were sent to the Reich
    Security Service in Berlin. The copies which were kept in my
    office were, according to orders, burned with all the rest of
    the material in April 1945.

    “Question: Do you know whether the Defendant Frick ever visited
    the Dachau camp?

    “Answer: To my knowledge Frick never visited the Dachau Camp.

    “Moosburg, 23 March 1946”.—Signed—“Max
    Gillhuber”—Signed—“Leonard N. Dunkel, Lieutenant Colonel,
    Infantry.”

To comment on the question whether an official visitor to a
concentration camp could always get a correct picture of the actual
conditions existing there, I ask permission to read an unsolicited
letter which I received a few days ago from a Catholic priest, Bernard
Ketzlick. This letter which I have submitted as Supplement Frick
Number...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, the Prosecution makes objection to this
because it is a character of evidence that there is no way of testing. I
have a basket of such correspondence making charges against these
defendants, which I would not think the Tribunal would want to receive.
If the door is open to this kind of evidence, there is no end to it.

This witness has none of the sanctions, of course, that assure the
verity of testimony, and I think it is objectionable to go into letters
received from unknown persons.

DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say just one word on this subject? I received
the letter so late that I did not have an opportunity to ask the person
concerned to send me an affidavit. Of course, I am prepared to submit
such an affidavit later, if such an affidavit should have greater
probative value.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the letter cannot be admitted,
but an application can be made in the ordinary way for leave to put in
an affidavit or to call the witness.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes. Then, at a later date, I shall submit a written
request.

I shall not read Number 38 of the document book since it concerns a
statement made by Frick; and I refer, finally, to an excerpt from the
book _Inside Europe_ by John Gunther which will be submitted as Exhibit
Frick-12 (Document Number Frick-12). The excerpt is contained under
Number 39 in the document book I quote—it concerns a book which
appeared originally in the English language, and I therefore quote it in
English:

    “Born in the Palatinate in 1877, Frick studied law and became a
    Beamter, an official. He is a bureaucrat through and through.
    Hitler is not intimate with him, but he respects him. He became
    Minister of the Interior because he was the only important Nazi
    with civil service training. Precise, obedient, uninspired, he
    turned out to be a faithful executive; he has been called the
    ‘only honest Nazi?’”

As the last document, may I be permitted to refer to an extract from the
book _To the Bitter End_ by Gisevius. I believe I do not need to quote
these passages individually, since the witness himself will be
questioned. The extract will be Exhibit Number Frick-13 (Document Number
Frick-13).

There are still left two answers to interrogatories by the witnesses
Messersmith and Seger. I ask to be permitted to read these answers
later, as soon as the answers have been submitted to me.

That concludes the presentation of documents. I believe there would be
no purpose in calling the witnesses now.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Are you prepared to call your witness, Dr. Pannenbecker?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes, Mr. President, that is my request. I now ask
permission to call the witness Gisevius. He is the sole witness in
Frick’s case. I have especially selected witness Gisevius to clarify the
question of the state of the police authority in Germany, as he, from
the very beginning, has been on the side of the opposition and is best
qualified to give a picture of the state of that authority in Germany at
that time.

[_The witness Gisevius took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

HANS BERND GISEVIUS (Witness): Hans Bernd Gisevius.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, were you a member of the NSDAP or one of its
affiliated organizations?

GISEVIUS: No.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that you personally participated in the
events of 20 July 1944, and that you were also present in the OKW at
that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. PANNENBECKER: How did you get into the police service?

GISEVIUS: In July 1933 I passed the state examination in law. As a
descendant of an old family of civil servants I applied for a civil
service appointment in the Prussian administration. I belonged, at that
time, to the German National People’s Party and to the Stahlhelm, and by
the standards of that day I was considered politically reliable.
Consequently, at the first stage of my training as a civil servant I was
assigned to the Political Police, which meant my entry into the newly
created Secret State Police. In those days I was very glad to have been
assigned to the police service. I had already at that time heard that
abominations of all kinds were going on in Germany. I was inclined to
consider these as the final outburst of the situation, akin to civil
war, which we were experiencing at the end of 1932 and the beginning of
1933. So I hoped to contribute to the re-establishment of a proper
executive organization which would provide for law, decency, and order.
But this happiness was doomed to be short-lived.

I had scarcely been 2 days in this new police office, when I discovered
that incredible conditions existed there. These were not police who took
action against riots, murder, illegal detention, and robbery; these were
police who protected those guilty of such crimes. It was not the guilty
persons who were arrested, but rather those who asked the police for
help. These were not police who took action against the crime, but
police whose task seemed to be to hush it up or, even worse, to sponsor
it; for those SA and SS Kommandos who played at being police in private
were encouraged by this so-called Secret State Police and were given all
possible aid. The most terrible and, even for a newcomer, most obvious
thing was that a system of unlawful detention was gaining more and more
ground—a worse and more dreadful system than which could not be
conceived.

The offices of the new State Police were in a huge building which was,
however, not large enough to take all the prisoners. Special
concentration camps for the Gestapo were established, and their names
will go down in history as a mark of infamy. These were Oranienburg and
the Gestapo’s private prison in Papestrasse, Columbia House, or, as it
was cynically nicknamed, “Columbia Hall.”

I should like to make it quite clear that this was certainly rather
amateurish compared with what all of us experienced later. But so it
started, and I can only convey my personal impression by describing a
brief incident I remember. After only 2 days I asked one of my
colleagues, who was also a professional civil servant—he had been taken
over from the old Political Police into the new one, and he was one of
those officials who were forced into it—I asked him, “Tell me, am I in
a police office here or in a robber’s den?” The answer I received was,
“You are in a robber’s den and you can expect to see much more yet.”

DR. PANNENBECKER: Under whom was the Political Police at that time and
who was the superior authority?

GISEVIUS: The Political Police was under one Rudolf Diels. He, too, came
from the old Prussian Political Police. He was a professional civil
servant, and one might have expected him still to retain the ideas of
law and decency: but in a brutal and cynical way he set his mind on
making the new rulers forget his political past as a democrat and on
ingratiating himself with his superior, the Prussian Prime Minister and
Minister of the Interior, Göring. It was Diels who created the Gestapo
office; he suggested to Göring the issue of the first decree for making
that office independent. It was Diels who let the SA and the SS enter
that office; he legalized the actions of these civil Kommandos. But soon
it became evident to me that such a bourgeois renegade could not do so
much wrong quite by himself. Some very important person must have been
backing him; in fact, I very quickly saw also that somebody was taking a
daily interest in everything that happened in that office. Reports were
written; telephone inquiries were received. Diels went several times
daily to give reports, and it was the Prussian Minister of the Interior
Göring who considered this Secret State Police as his special preserve.

During those months nothing happened in this office which was not known
or ordered by Göring personally. I want to stress this, because in the
course of years the public formed a different idea of Göring because he
noticeably retired from his official functions. At that time, it was not
yet the Göring who finally suffocated, in his Karinhall. It was the
Göring who looked after everything personally and had not yet begun to
busy himself with the building of Karinhall or to don all sorts of
uniforms and decorations. It was Göring still in civilian clothes, who
was the real chief of an office, who inspired it, and who attached
importance to being the “iron” Göring.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I believe you can describe some points more
concisely. As to what you have just said, do you know this from your own
experience, or where did you learn of it?

GISEVIUS: I not only heard and saw it myself, but I also learned much
from a man who in those days was also a member of the Secret State
Police, and whose information will play an important part in the course
of my statements.

At that time a criminologist had been called into the Secret State
Police, probably the best known expert of the Prussian police,
Oberregierungsrat Nebe. Nebe was a National Socialist. He had been in
opposition to the former Prussian police and had joined the National
Socialist Party. He was a man who sincerely believed in the purity and
genuineness of the National Socialist aims. Thus I saw for myself how
this man found out on the spot what was actually going on and how he
inwardly recoiled.

I can also state here, as it is important, the reasons why Nebe became a
strong opponent, who went with the opposition up to 20 July and later
suffered death by hanging. At that time, in August 1933, Nebe was
ordered by the Defendant Göring to murder Gregor Strasser, formerly a
leading member of the National Socialist Party, by means of a car or
hunting accident. Nebe was so shocked at this order that he refused to
carry it out and made an inquiry at the Reich Chancellery. The answer
from the Reich Chancellery was that the Führer knew nothing of this
order. Thereupon Nebe was summoned to Göring, who reproached him most
bitterly for having made an inquiry. Nevertheless, when he finished
these reproaches he considered it advisable to promote him, because he
thought he would thereby silence him.

The second thing which happened at that time, and which is also very
important, was that the Defendant Göring gave the Political Police
so-called open warrants for murder. At that time there were not only
so-called amnesty laws which gave amnesty for infamous actions, but
there was also a special law according to which investigations, already
initiated by police authorities and by the public prosecutor, could be
quashed, on condition, however, that in these special cases the Reich
Chancellor, or Göring, personally signed the pertinent order. Göring
made use of this law by giving open warrants to the Chief of the
Gestapo, with which all that had to be done was to fill in the names of
those who were to be murdered. Nebe was so shocked by this that from
that moment on he felt it his duty to fight against the Gestapo. At our
request he remained with us there, and afterwards in the Criminal
Police, because we needed one man at least who could keep us informed
about police conditions in case our desire for a revolution should
materialize.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, what did you do yourself when you saw all
these things?

GISEVIUS: I, for my part, tried to contact those bourgeois circles which
through my connections were open to me. I went to various ministries: to
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, to State Secretary Grauert, and
several ministerial directors and counsellors. I went to the Reich
Ministry of the Interior, to the Ministry of Justice, to the Foreign
Office, and the Ministry of War. I spoke repeatedly to the Chief of the
Army High Command, Colonel General Von Hammerstein. Among all these
connections I formed at that time, there is one other who is
particularly important for my testimony.

At that time I met in the newly formed intelligence department of the
OKW a Major Oster. I gave him all the material which by then had already
accumulated. We started a collection—which we continued until 20
July—of all the documents we could get hold of; and Oster was the man
who from then on, in the Ministry of War never failed to warn every
officer he could contact officially or privately. In course of time, by
favor of Admiral Canaris, Oster became Chief of Staff of the
Intelligence. When he met his death by hanging he was a general. But I
consider it my duty to testify here, in view of all this man has
done—his unforgettable fight against the Gestapo and against all the
crimes which were committed against humanity and peace—that among the
inflation of German field marshals and generals there was one real
German general.

DR. PANNENBECKER: How did the work develop, according to your
observations in the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: At that time conditions in Germany were still such that people
kept their eyes open in the ministries. There was still an opposition in
the bourgeois ministries; there was still the Reich President Von
Hindenburg. Thus, at the end of October 1933 the Defendant Göring was
forced to dismiss Diels, the Chief of the State Police. At the same time
a commission of investigation was set up in order to re-organize that
institution thoroughly. According to the ministerial decree, Nebe and I
were members of that commission. But that commission never met, for the
Defendant Göring found ways and means to thwart this measure. He
appointed as Chief and successor of Diels a still worse Nazi named
Hinkler, who some time before had been acquitted in a trial because of
irresponsibility; and this Hinkler acted in such a way that before 30
days had passed he was dismissed. Then the Defendant Göring was able to
restore his Diels to the office.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything of the events which led to the
Prussian law of 30 November 1933, by which the functions of the Gestapo
were taken away from the office of the Minister of the Interior and
transferred to the office of the Prussian Prime Minister?

GISEVIUS: That was just the moment of which I am speaking. Göring
realized that it would not serve his purpose if other ministries were
too much concerned in his Secret State Police. Though he was Prussian
Minister of the Interior himself, he was disturbed by the fact that the
police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior could look
into the affairs of his private domain; and so he separated the Secret
State Police from the remaining police and placed it under his personal
direction, thereby excluding all other police authorities. From the
point of view of a proper police system this was nonsense, because you
cannot run a Political Police properly if you separate it from the
Criminal Police and the Order Police. But Göring knew why he did not
want any other police authority to look into the affairs of the Secret
State Police.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you remain in the police service
yourself?

GISEVIUS: On that day when Göring carried out his little—and I can’t
find another word for it—_coup d’état_ by assigning to himself a state
police of his own, this Secret State Police issued a warrant of arrest
against me. I had expected this and had gone into hiding. The next
morning I went to the Chief of the Police Department of the Prussian
Ministry of the Interior, Ministerial Director Daluege—who was a high
SS general—and said that it was really not quite in order to issue a
warrant of arrest against me.

A criminal commissioner of the Secret State Police came to arrest me in
the room of the Chief of the Prussian police. Daluege was kind enough to
allow me to escape through a back door to State Secretary Grauert.
Grauert intervened with Göring, and as always in cases of this kind,
Göring was very surprised and ordered a thorough investigation. That was
the usual way of saying that such incidents were to be pigeonholed.
After that I was no longer allowed to enter the Secret State Police, but
I was sent as an observer to the Reichstag Fire trial at Leipzig, which
was just drawing to an end. During these last days of November I was
able to get some insight into this obscure affair and having already
tried, together with Nebe, to investigate this crime, I was able to add
to my knowledge here.

I assume that I shall again be questioned about that point and,
therefore, shall now confine myself to the statement that, if necessary,
I am prepared to refresh Defendant Göring’s memory concerning his
complicity in and his joint knowledge of this first “brown” _coup
d’état_ and the murder of the accomplices.

DR. PANNENBECKER: On 1 May 1934 Frick became Prussian Minister of the
Interior. Did you get into touch with Frick himself or his ministries?

GISEVIUS: Yes. Immediately after the Reichstag Fire trial was over—that
is, at the end of 1933—I was dismissed from the police service and
transferred to a Landrat office in East Prussia. I complained, however,
to State Secretary Grauert about this obvious disciplinary punishment.
As he and Ministerial Director Daluege knew of my quarrel with the
Secret State Police, they got me into the Ministry of the Interior and
assigned to me the task of collecting all those reports which were still
being incorrectly addressed to the Ministry of the Interior and of
forwarding them to the Prussian Prime Minister who was in charge of the
Secret State Police and who dealt with these matters.

As soon as Göring found out about this he repeatedly protested against
my presence in the Ministry, but the Minister of the Interior was
adamant and I succeeded in keeping that post.

When Frick came I did not get in touch with him immediately as I was
only a subordinate official. I assume, however, that the Defendant Frick
knew about my activity and my views, because I was now encouraged to
continue collecting all those requests for help which were wrongly
addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, and a large number of these
reports I submitted through official channels to Daluege, Grauert, and
Frick. There was, however, the difficulty that Göring, in his capacity
of Prime Minister of Prussia, had prohibited Frick, as his Prussian
Minister of the Interior, to take cognizance of such reports. Frick was
supposed to forward them to the Gestapo without comment. I saw no reason
for not submitting them to Frick all the same, and as Frick was also
Reich Minister of the Interior—and in this capacity could give
directives to the Länder and, therefore, also to Göring—he took
cognizance of these reports in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and
allowed me to forward them to Göring with the request for a report.
Göring protested repeatedly, and I know this resulted in heated disputes
between him and Frick.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is anything known to you about the fact that at that
time the Reich Minister of the Interior issued certain directives to
restrict protective custody?

GISEVIUS: It is correct that at that time a number of such directives
were issued, and the fact that I say that a number of such directives
were issued already implies that generally they were not complied with
by subordinate authorities.

The Reich Minister of the Interior was a minister with no personal
executive power, and I will never forget the impression it made on me,
while training as a civil servant, that we officials in the Secret State
Police were instructed in principle not to answer any inquiries from the
Reich Ministry of the Interior. Naturally, at intervals the Reich
Minister of the Interior sent reminders, and the efficiency of a Gestapo
official was judged by the number of such reminders he could show his
chief, Diels, as proof that he did not pay any attention to such
matters.

DR. PANNENBECKER: On 30 June 1934 the so-called Röhm Putsch took place.
Can you give a short description of the conditions prevailing before
this Putsch?

GISEVIUS: First I have to say that there never was a Röhm Putsch. On 30
June there was only a Göring-Himmler Putsch.

I am in a position to give some information about that dark chapter,
because I dealt with and followed up this case in the Police Department
of the Ministry of the Interior, and because the radiograms sent during
these days by Göring and Himmler to the police authorities of the Reich
came into my hands. The last of these radiograms reads: “By order of
Göring all documents relating to 30 June shall be burned immediately.”

At that time I took the liberty of putting these papers into my safe,
and to this day I do not know whether or not they survived
Kaltenbrunner’s attempts to get them. I still hope to recover these
papers, and if I do, I can prove that throughout the whole 30 June not a
single shot was fired by the SA. The SA did not revolt. By this,
however, I do not wish to utter a single word of excuse for the leaders
of the SA. On 30 June not one of the SA leaders died who did not deserve
death a hundred times—but after a proper trial.

The situation on that 30 June was that of a civil war; on one side were
the SA headed by Röhm, and on the other side, Göring and Himmler. It had
been arranged for the SA, several days before 30 June, to be sent on
leave. The SA leaders had been purposely called by Hitler for a
conference at Wiessee that 30 June, and it is not usual for people who
intend to effect a _coup d’état_ to travel by sleeping car to a
conference. To their surprise they were seized at the station and at
once driven off to execution.

The so-called Munich Putsch took place as follows: The Munich SA did not
come into it at all, and at 1 hour’s driving distance from Munich the
alleged traitors, Röhm and Heines, fell into the sleep of death
completely ignorant of the fact that, according to Hitler and Göring, a
revolt had taken place in Munich the previous night.

I was able to observe the Putsch in Berlin very closely. It took place
without anything being known about it by the public and without any
participation by the SA. We in the police were unaware of it. It is
true, however, that 4 days before 30 June one of the alleged
ringleaders, SA Gruppenführer Karl Ernst of Berlin, came to Ministerial
Director Daluege looking very concerned and said that there were rumors
going round in Berlin that the SA were contemplating a Putsch. He asked
for an interview with Minister of the Interior Frick, so that he, Ernst,
could assure him that there was no such intention.

Daluege sent me with this message to the Defendant Frick, and I arranged
for this strange conversation where an SA leader assured the Minister of
the Interior that he did not intend to stage a Putsch.

Ernst then set out on a pleasure trip to Madeira. On 30 June he was
taken from the steamer and sent to Berlin for execution. I saw him
arrive at the Tempelhof airport. This struck me as particularly
interesting, because a few hours before I had read the official report
about his execution in the newspaper.

That, then, was the so-called SA and Röhm Putsch. And because I am not
to withhold anything, I must add that I was present when on 30 June the
Defendant Göring informed the press of the event. On this occasion the
Defendant Göring made the cold-blooded remark that he had for days been
waiting for a code word which he had arranged with Hitler. He had then
struck, of course with lightning speed, and had also extended the scope
of his mission. This extension of his mission caused the death of a
large number of innocent people. To mention only a few, there were
Generals Schleicher—who was killed together with his wife—and Von
Bredow, Ministerial Director Klausner, Edgar Jung, and many others.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you were in the Ministry of the Interior
yourself at that time. How did Frick hear about these measures, and was
he himself in any way involved in the quelling of this so-called Putsch?

GISEVIUS: I was present when, at about half past 9, Ministerial Director
Daluege came back quite pale after seeing Göring and having just been
told what had happened. Daluege and I went to Grauert and we drove to
the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to Frick. Frick rushed out of the
room—it may have been about 10 o’clock—in order to go to Göring to
find out what had happened in the meantime, only to be told that he, as
Police Minister of the Reich, should go home now and not worry about
further developments. In fact, Frick did go home, and during those 2
dramatic days he did not enter the ministry.

Once during this time Daluege drove over with me to see him. For the
rest, it was given to me, the youngest official of the Reich Ministry of
the Interior, to inform the Reich Minister of the Interior on that
bloody Saturday and Sunday of the atrocious things which in the meantime
had happened in Germany.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, you just told us of an instruction Frick had
received not to worry about these things. Who gave him this instruction?

GISEVIUS: As far as I know, Göring gave or conveyed to him an
instruction by Hitler. I do not know whether there was a written
instruction; neither do I know whether Frick had asked about it. I
should think that Frick, on that day, probably considered it would be
wise not to ask too many awkward questions.

DR. PANNENBECKER: After these things had been concluded, did Frick in
any way attempt to smooth matters over?

GISEVIUS: To answer this question correctly I have to say first that on
Saturday, 30 June, we at the Ministry of the Interior knew very little
about what had happened. On Sunday, 1 July, we learned much more, and
after these bloody days had passed, there is no doubt that Frick had on
the whole a clear idea of what had happened. Also, during these days he
made no secret of his indignation at the murders and unlawful arrests
which apparently had taken place. In order to stick to the truth I have
to answer your question by saying that the first reaction of the
Defendant Frick which I knew about was that Reich law in which the Reich
Ministers declared the events of June 30 to be lawful. This law had an
unprecedented psychological effect on the further developments in
Germany, and it has its place in the history of German terror. Apart
from this, many things happened in the Third Reich which a normal mortal
could not understand, but which were well understood in the circles of
ministers and state secretaries. And so, I have to admit that, after
that law, the Defendant Frick made a serious attempt to remedy at least
the most obvious abuses. Maybe he thought other ministers in the Reich
Cabinet should have spoken sooner. I am thinking now of Reich War
Minister Von Blomberg, two of whose generals were shot, and who, in
spite of that, signed this law. I intentionally mention Blomberg’s name,
and ask to be permitted to pause here to tell the Tribunal about an
incident which occurred this morning. I was in the room of the
defendants’ counsel and was speaking to Dr. Dix. Dr. Dix was interrupted
by Dr. Stahmer, counsel for Göring. I heard what Dr. Stahmer told Dr.
Dix...

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I ask whether a
personal conversation which I had with Dr. Dix has anything to do with
the taking of evidence?

GISEVIUS: I am not speaking...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, don’t go on with your evidence whilst the
objection is being made. Yes, Dr. Stahmer.

GISEVIUS: If you please. I didn’t understand...

DR. STAHMER: I do not know whether it is in order when giving evidence
to reveal a conversation which I had with Dr. Dix in the Defense
Counsel’s room.

GISEVIUS: May I say something to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly keep silent.

GISEVIUS: May I finish my statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Will you keep silent, sir.

DR. STAHMER: This morning in the room of the Defense Counsel, I had a
personal conversation with Dr. Dix concerning the Blomberg case. That
conversation was not intended to be heard by the witness. I do not know
the witness; I didn’t even see the witness, as far as I can remember,
and I don’t know whether this should come into the evidence by making
such a conversation public here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This incident has been reported to me, and I think
it is important that this Tribunal know the influence—the threats that
were made at this witness in this courthouse while waiting to testify
here, threats not only against him but against the Defendant Schacht.
Now, the affair was reported to me. I think it is important that this
Tribunal know it. I think it is important that it come out. I should
have attempted to bring it out on cross-examination if it had not been
told, and I think that the witness should be permitted. These other
parties have had great latitude here. This witness has been subjected to
threats, as I understand it, which were uttered in his presence, whether
they were intended for him or not, and I ask that this Tribunal allow
Dr. Gisevius, who is the one representative of democratic forces in
Germany, to take this stand to tell his story.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal would like to hear first of all
anything further you have to say upon the matter. They will then hear
what Dr. Dix has to say, if he wishes to say anything; and they will
then hear whether the witness himself wishes to say anything in answer.

DR. STAHMER: I have no qualms about telling the Court exactly what I
said. Last night I discussed the case with the Defendant Göring and told
him the witness Gisevius...

THE PRESIDENT: We don’t want to hear any communications which you had
with the Defendant Göring other than those you choose to make in support
of your objection to this evidence that has been given.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President; but I must say briefly that Göring told
me that it was of no interest to him if the witness Gisevius did
incriminate him, but that he did not want Blomberg, who died
recently—and I assumed it was only the question of Blomberg’s
marriage—he, Göring, did not want these facts concerning the marriage
of Blomberg to be discussed here in public. If that could not be
prevented, then of course Göring, in his turn—and it is only a question
of Schacht, because Schacht, as he had told me, wanted to speak about
these things—then he, Göring would not spare Schacht.

That is what I told Dr. Dix this morning, and I am sure Dr. Dix will
confirm that, and if I may add...

THE PRESIDENT: We will hear you in a moment, Dr. Dix.

DR. STAHMER: I said—and I was not referring to Schacht, to the witness,
or to Herr Pannenbecker—I said, for reasons of professional etiquette,
that I should like to inform Dr. Dix. That is what I said and what I
did. In any case I did not even know that the witness Gisevius was
present at that moment. At any rate, it was not intended for him.
Moreover, I was speaking to Dr. Dix aside.

THE PRESIDENT: So that I may understand what you are saying: You say you
had told Dr. Dix the substance of the conversation you had had with the
Defendant Göring, and said that Göring would withdraw his objection to
the facts being given if the Defendant Schacht wanted them to be given.
Is that right?

DR. STAHMER: No, I only said that Göring did not care what was said
about himself; he merely wanted the deceased Blomberg to be spared, and
he did not want things concerning Blomberg’s marriage to be discussed.
If Schacht did not prevent that—I was speaking only of Schacht—then
he, Göring, in his turn, would have no consideration for Schacht—would
no longer have any consideration for Schacht. That is what I told Dr.
Dix for reasons of personal etiquette.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait, wait, I can’t hear you. Yes.

DR. STAHMER: As I said, that is what I told Dr. Dix, and that finished
the conversation. And I made it quite clear to Dr. Dix that I told him
that only as one colleague to another.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is all you wish to say?

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

DR. DIX: I remember the facts, I believe, correctly and reliably, as
follows: This morning I was in the room of the Defense Counsel speaking
to the witness Dr. Gisevius. I believe my colleague, Professor Kraus,
was also taking part in the conversation. Then my colleague, Stahmer,
approached me and said he would like to speak to me. I replied that at
the moment I was having an important and urgent conversation with
Gisevius, and asked whether it could wait. Stahmer said “no,” and that
he must speak to me at once. I then took my colleague Stahmer aside,
probably five or six paces from the group with whom I had been speaking.
My colleague Stahmer told me the following—it is quite possible, I
don’t remember the actual words he used, that he started by saying that
he was telling me this for professional reasons, as one colleague to
another. If he says so now, I am sure that it is so. Anyhow I don’t
remember that any longer. He said to me, “Listen, Göring has an idea
that Gisevius will attack him as much as he can. If he attacks the dead
Blomberg, however, then Göring will disclose everything against
Schacht—and he knows lots of things about Schacht which may not be
pleasant for Schacht. He, Göring, had been very reticent in his
testimony; but if anything should be said against the dead Blomberg,
then he would have to reveal things against Schacht.”

That was what he meant—that he would bring things up against Schacht.
That was the conversation. I cannot say with absolute certainty whether
my colleague told me I should call Gisevius’ attention to it. If he says
he did not say so, then it is certainly true, and I believe him; but I
could only interpret that information to mean that I should notify
Gisevius of this development promised by Göring. I therefore
thought—and did not have the slightest doubt—that I was voicing
Göring’s intention, and that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer wished, and
that that was the purpose of the whole thing. What else could be the
reason for Dr. Stahmer’s telling me at that moment, immediately before
my discussion with Gisevius, even while I was in conversation with
Gisevius, that he could not wait, that I must break off my conversation?
Why should he inform me at that time, unless he meant that the mischief
hinted at and threatened by Göring might possibly be avoided—in other
words, that the witness Gisevius, on whom everything depended, should
think twice before making his statement? I did not have the slightest
doubt that what Stahmer meant by his words to me was that I should
convey them to Gisevius. As I said, even if Stahmer had not asked
me—and he was certainly speaking the truth when he said he did not ask
me to take action—I would have replied, if I had been questioned before
he made this statement, and that probably with an equally good
conscience, that he had asked me to pass it on to Gisevius. But I will
not maintain that he actually used those words. Anyway, it is absolutely
certain that this conversation did take place, and it was in the firm
belief that I was acting as Dr. Stahmer and Göring intended that I went
straight to Gisevius. He was standing only five or six steps away from
me, or even nearer. I think I understood him to say, when I addressed
him, that he had heard parts of it. I don’t know whether I understood
him correctly. I then informed him of the gist of this conversation.
That is what happened early this morning.

DR. STAHMER: May I say the following: It goes without saying, that I
neither asked Dr. Dix to pass it on to Gisevius, nor did I count upon
his doing so; but I surmised that Gisevius would be examined this
morning, and that Dr. Dix would question the witness concerning the
circumstances of Blomberg’s marriage. That is what I had been told
previously—namely, that Dr. Dix intended to put this question to the
witness. Therefore, I called Dr. Dix’s attention to it, assuming that he
would abstain from such a question concerning Blomberg’s marriage. That
was not intended for the witness in any way, and I know definitely that
I said to Dr. Dix that I was telling him this merely as one colleague to
another, and he thanked me for it. He said, “Thank you very much.” At
any rate, if he had said to me, “I am going to tell the witness,” I
would have said immediately, “For heaven’s sake; that is information
intended only for you personally.” Indeed, I am really surprised that
Dr. Dix has in this manner abused the confidence which I placed in him.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, we have heard the facts, and we do not think
we need hear anything more about it beyond considering the question as
to whether the witness is to go on with his evidence.

Witness, has the explanation which has been given by Dr. Stahmer and Dr.
Dix sufficiently covered the matters with which you were proposing to
deal with reference to Field Marshal Von Blomberg? Is there anything
further that you need say about it?

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I did not quite understand the
question.

Concerning Blomberg, at this point I did not want to say anything
further; I merely wanted, on the first occasion that Blomberg’s name
came up, to make it clear that the whole thing gave me the feeling that
I was under pressure. I was standing so near that I could not help
hearing what Dr. Stahmer said, and the manner in which Dr. Dix told me
about it—for I had heard at least half of it—could not be understood
in any other way than to mean that Dr. Dix in a very loyal manner was
instructing me, a witness for the Defendant Schacht, to be rather
reticent in my testimony on a point which I consider very important.
That point will come up later and has nothing whatsoever to do with the
marriage of Herr Von Blomberg. It has to do with the part which the
Defendant Göring played in it, and I know quite well why Göring does not
want me to speak about that affair. To my thinking, it is the most
corrupt thing Göring ever did, and Göring is just using the cloak of
chivalry by pretending that he wants to protect a dead man, whereas he
really wants to prevent me from testifying in full on an important
point—that is, the Fritsch crisis.

THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to Dr. Pannenbecker._] The Tribunal will hear
the evidence then, whatever evidence you wish the witness to give.

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. What I have to say in connection with the
Blomberg case is finished. I merely wanted to protest at the first
opportunity when the name was mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: Well then, counsel will continue his examination and you
will give such evidence as is relevant when you are examined or
cross-examined by Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, after the events of 30 June 1934, had the
position of the Gestapo become so strong that no measures against it had
any chance of succeeding?

GISEVIUS: I must answer this in the negative. The Secret State Police
doubtlessly gained in power after 30 June, but because of the many
excesses committed on 30 June, the opposition in the various ministries
against the Secret State Police had become so strong that through
collective action the majority of ministers could have used the events
of 30 June to eliminate the Secret State Police. I personally made
repeated efforts in that direction. With the knowledge of the Defendant
Frick I went to see the Minister of Justice Gürtner and begged him many
times to use the large number of illegal murders as a reason for action
against the Secret State Police. I personally went to Von Reichenau
also, who was Chief of the Armed Forces Offices at that time, and told
him the same thing. I know that my friend Oster brought the files
concerning this matter to the knowledge of Blomberg, and I wish to
testify here that, in spite of the excesses of the 30 of June, it would
have been quite possible at that time to return to law and order.

DR. PANNENBECKER: After that, what did the Reich Minister of the
Interior do—that is, what did Frick do to steer the Secret State Police
to a course of legality?

GISEVIUS: We started a struggle against the Secret State Police and
tried at least to prevent Himmler from getting into the Reich Ministry
of the Interior. Shortly before Göring had relinquished the Ministry of
the Interior to Frick, he had made Himmler Chief of the Secret State
Police in Prussia. Himmler, starting from that basis of power, had
attempted to assume police power in the other Länder of the Reich. Frick
tried to prevent that by taking the stand that he, as Reich Minister of
the Interior, had an equal voice in appointing police functionaries in
the Reich. At the same time, we tried to prevent an increase in the
numbers of the Secret State Police by systematically refusing all
requests by the Gestapo to increase its body of officials. Unfortunately
here also, as always, Himmler found ways and means to overcome this. He
went to the finance ministers of the individual states and told them
that he needed funds for the guard troops of the concentration camps,
for the so-called “Death’s-Head” units, and he drew up a scale whereby
five SS men were to guard one prisoner. With these funds Himmler
financed his Secret State Police, as, of course it rested with him how
many men he wanted to imprison.

In other ways too, we in the Reich Ministry of the Interior attempted by
all possible means to block the way of the Gestapo; but unfortunately,
the numerous requests we sent to the Gestapo remained unanswered. Again
it was Göring who forbade Himmler to answer and who protected Himmler
when he refused to give any information in reply to our inquiries.

Finally, a last effort was made during my term of office in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior. We tried to paralyze the Secret State Police
at least to some extent by introducing into protective custody the right
of supervision and complaint. If we could have achieved the right of
review of all cases of protective custody, we would also have been able
to get an insight into the individual actions of the Gestapo. A law was
formulated, and this law was first submitted to the Ministerial Council
of Prussia, the largest of the states. Again it was the Defendant Göring
who, by all available means, opposed the passing of such a law. A very
stormy cabinet meeting on the matter ended with my being asked to leave
the Ministry of the Interior.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I have shown you a memorandum...

THE PRESIDENT: This will be a convenient time to break off.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal wishes me to say that
it anticipates that you will put any questions which you think necessary
with reference to the alleged intimidation of the witness when you come
to cross-examine.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir; thank you.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to talk about the efforts which
were made by the Ministry of the Interior to stop the arbitrary methods
of the Gestapo, particularly with reference to the concentration camps.
I therefore ask you to look at a memorandum which originates from the
Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It is Document 775-PS,
which I submitted this morning as Exhibit Frick-9 when I presented the
evidence for Frick. It is Number 34 in the document book. Do you know
that memorandum?

GISEVIUS: No, I don’t. It appears that this memorandum was drawn up
after I had left the Ministry of the Interior. I assume this from the
fact that in this memorandum the Reich Minister of the Interior appears
to have already given up the fight, since he writes that as a matter of
principle it should be made clear who bears the responsibility, and, if
necessary, the responsibility for all the consequences must now—and I
quote—“be borne by the Reichsführer SS who, in fact, has already
claimed for himself the leadership of the Political Police in the
Reich.”

At the time when I was at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, we tried
particularly to prevent this from happening—namely, that Himmler should
take over the Political Police. This is evidently a memorandum written
about 6 months later when the terror had become still greater. The facts
which are quoted here are known to me.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you say anything about this? Does it not deal with
the Pünder case and the case of Esterwege, Oldenburg?

GISEVIUS: The Esterwege case can be told most briefly. It is one of
many.

So far as I can recollect, an SA or local group leader was arrested by
the Gestapo because he got excited about the conditions in the Papenburg
concentration camp. This was not the first time either. I don’t know why
the Defendant Frick picked on this particular case. Nevertheless, one
day Daluege showed me one of those customary handwritten slips sent by
Frick to Himmler. Frick had written to Himmler in the margin in large
green letters that an SA man or local group leader, or whatever he was,
had been arrested illegally, that this man must be released at once, and
that if Himmler did that sort of thing again he, Frick, would institute
criminal proceedings against Himmler for illegal detention.

I remember this story very well, because it was somewhat
peculiar—considering the police conditions which existed at the
time—that Himmler should be threatened by Frick with criminal
proceedings, and Daluege made some sneering remarks to me regarding
Frick’s action.

That is the one case.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date?

GISEVIUS: This must have happened in the spring of 1935, I should say in
March or April.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, do you know how Himmler reacted to that
threat of criminal proceedings?

GISEVIUS: Yes. There was a second case. That is this Pünder affair which
is mentioned here. He reacted similarly to both, and therefore it might
be better if I first relate the Pünder affair in this connection. It
concerned a Berlin attorney, who was a lawyer of high standing and legal
adviser to the Swedish Embassy. The widow of the Ministerial Director
Klausner, who had been murdered on 30 June, approached Pünder, as she
wanted to sue the life insurance companies for payment of her annuity.
But as Klausner had allegedly committed suicide on that day, no director
of any insurance company dared pay the money to the widow. Consequently,
the attorney had to sue. But the Nazis had made a law according to which
all such awkward cases—awkward for the Nazis—were not to be tried in
court: they were to be taken to a so-called Spruchkammer in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior. If I am not mistaken, this law was called “Law
for the Settlement of Civilian Claims.” They were never at a loss for
fine-sounding names and titles at that time. This law forced the
attorney to submit his claim to the court first. He was apprehensive. He
went to the Ministry of the Interior and told the State Secretary, “If I
comply with the law and sue, I shall be arrested.” The State Secretary
in the Ministry of the Interior forced him to sue. Thereupon the very
wise attorney went to the Ministry of Justice and told State Secretary
Freisler that he did not want to sue as he would certainly be arrested
by the Gestapo. The Secretary in the Ministry of Justice informed him
that he would have to send in a claim in any case, but that nothing
would happen as the courts had been instructed to pass such cases on
without comment to the Spruchkammer in the Ministry of the Interior.
Thereupon, the attorney sued and the Gestapo promptly arrested him for
slander because he had stated that the Ministerial Director Klausner had
not met his death by suicide. This was for us a classical example of
what we had come to in Germany as far as protective custody was
concerned.

I had taken the liberty of selecting this case from among hundreds, or I
should say thousands of similar cases and of suggesting to Frick that
this matter should be brought to the notice not only of Göring, but of
Hitler as well this time. Then I sat down and drafted a letter or a
report from Frick to Hitler, which also went to the Ministry of Justice.
There were more than five pages, and I discussed from every angle the
facts concerning Ministerial Director Klausner’s suicide, with the
assistance of the SS, and the ensuing lawsuit. This report to Hitler
concluded with Frick’s remark that the time had now come to have the
problem of protective custody settled by the Reich and by lawful means.

And now I answer your question regarding what happened. It roughly
coincided with Frick’s letter to Himmler regarding deprivation of
liberty. Himmler took these two letters to a meeting of Reichsleiter,
that is, the so-called ministers of the movement, and he put the
question to them, whether it was proper to allow one Reichsleiter,
namely Frick, to write such letters to another Reichsleiter, that is, to
Himmler. These worthy gentlemen answered this question in the negative
and reprimanded Frick. Then Himmler went to the meeting of the Prussian
cabinet where the protective custody law, which I mentioned, was being
discussed.

Perhaps I may draw your attention to the fact that at that time it was a
rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to attend a meeting of Prussian
ministers. There was a time in Germany—and it was quite a long
period—when Himmler was not the powerful man which he afterwards became
because the bourgeois ministers and the generals were cowards and gave
way to him. Thus, it was a rare thing for Himmler to be allowed to
attend a meeting of the Prussian Ministerial Council at all, and that
particular meeting ended by my being discharged from the Ministry of the
Interior.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, I should like to quote to you two sentences
from the memorandum which I have just shown to you—that is, 775-PS—and
ask you to tell me whether the facts are stated correctly. I quote:

    “In this connection, I draw your attention to the case of the
    attorney Pünder, who was taken into protective custody together
    with his colleagues, merely because, after making inquiry at the
    Reich Ministry of the Interior and at our ministry, he had filed
    a suit, which he was obliged to do under a Reich law.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. PANNENBECKER: And then the other sentence. I quote:

    “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at
    Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days
    because...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pannenbecker, where is that sentence which you have
just read?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In the Frick Document Book under Number 34, second
sentence.

THE PRESIDENT: Which page?

DR. PANNENBECKER: In my Document Book it is Page 80.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Paragraph 3 on Page 70?

DR. PANNENBECKER: No, Mr. President, I have just discovered that this
particular sentence in the document has not been translated. Perhaps I
may read one more sentence which apparently has been translated. It can
be found in Paragraph 3 of the same document.

    “I mention here only the case of a teacher and Kreisleiter at
    Esterwege who was kept in protective custody for 8 days because,
    as it turned out afterwards, he had sent a correct report to the
    head of his district concerning abuses by the SS.”

GISEVIUS: Yes, that corresponds to the facts.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, did you yourself have any support from Frick
for your personal protection?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At that time, of course, I was such a suspect in the eyes
of the Secret State Police that all sorts of evil designs were being
made against me. Frick gave an order, therefore, that I should be
protected in my home by the local police. A direct telephone from my
home to the police station was installed, and I had only to pick up the
receiver and someone at least would know in case I had surprise
visitors. Furthermore, the Gestapo used their usual methods against me
by accusing me of criminal acts. Apparently the files were taken to
Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, and Frick intervened, and it was soon
discovered that this concerned a namesake of mine! Frick said quite
openly on the telephone that these fellows—as he put it—had once more
lied to the Führer. This was the signal for the Gestapo, who were, of
course, listening in on this telephone conversation, that they could no
longer use these methods.

Then we advanced one step further through Heydrich. He was so kind as to
inform me by telephone that I probably had forgotten that he could
pursue his personal and political opponents to their very graves. I made
an official report of that threat to Frick, and Frick, either personally
or through Daluege, intervened with Heydrich, and there is no doubt that
he thereby rendered me a considerable service, for Heydrich never liked
it very much when his murderous intentions were talked about openly.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, would then, at least a minister of the Reich
have no cause for alarm about his own personal safety if he tried to
fight against the terror of the Gestapo and Himmler?

GISEVIUS: If you ask me that now, I must say that Schacht was the only
one who was put into a concentration camp. But it is true that we all
asked ourselves just how long it would take for a Reich Minister to be
sent to a concentration camp. As regards Frick, he told me
confidentially, as far back as 1934, that the Reich Governor of Bavaria
had given him reliable information, according to which he was to be
murdered while taking a holiday in the country, in Bavaria, and he asked
me whether I could find out any details. At that time I went with my
friend Nebe to Bavaria by car, and we made a secret investigation which,
at any rate, proved that such plans had been discussed. But, as I said,
Frick survived.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I have no further questions.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): May I ask you to decide
on the following question? I have called Gisevius. He is a witness
called by me, and this is, therefore, not a subsequent question which I
am putting, but I am examining him as my witness. I am of the opinion,
therefore, that it is right and expedient that I should now follow up
the examination by my colleague Pannenbecker, and that my other
colleagues who also want to put questions follow the two of us. I ask
the Tribunal to decide on this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you the only defendants’ counsel who asked for this
witness to be called on behalf of your client?

DR. DIX: I called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; but are you the only defendants’ counsel who
asked to call him?

DR. DIX: I believe, Sir, I am the only one who has called him.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may examine him next.

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, Dr. Pannenbecker has already mentioned the fact
that you have published a book entitled _To the Bitter End_. I have
submitted quotations from that book to the Tribunal as evidence, and
they have been accepted as documentary evidence by the Tribunal. For
this reason I now ask you: Are the contents of that book historically
true; did you write it only from memory, or is it based on notes which
you made at the time?

GISEVIUS: I can say here to the best of my knowledge, and with a good
conscience, that the contents of the book are historically true. In
Germany I always made personal notes as far as it was possible. I have
said here that my dead friend Oster had in the War Ministry a
considerable collection of documents to which I had access at all times.
In writing about any important matter in which I made reference to
friends in the opposition group, I never did so without having first
consulted them many times about it. And since 1938 I have been in
Switzerland, first as a visitor and later on for professional reasons,
and there I was able to continue my notes undisturbed. The volume which
has been submitted to the Tribunal was practically completed in 1941,
and in 1942 had already been shown to several friends of mine abroad.

THE PRESIDENT: If he says that the book is true, that is enough.

DR. DIX: Since when have you known the Defendant Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I have known the Defendant Schacht since the end of 1934.

DR. DIX: On what occasion and in what circumstances did you meet him?

GISEVIUS: I met him when I worked in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
and was collecting material against the Gestapo. I was consulted by
various parties, who either feared trouble with the Gestapo or who had
had trouble. Thus, one day Schacht, who was then Minister for Economy,
sent a man to me whom he trusted—it was his plenipotentiary Herbert
Göring—to ask me whether I would help Schacht. He, Schacht, had for
some time felt that he was being watched by Himmler and the Gestapo and
lately had had good reason to suspect that an informer, or at least a
microphone, had been installed in his own house. I was asked whether I
could help in this case. I agreed to do so and, with a microphone expert
from the Reich post administration, on the following morning I visited
Schacht’s ministerial residence. We went with the microphone expert from
room to room and—did not have to search very long. It had been done
very badly by the Gestapo. They had mounted the microphone all too
visibly and, moreover, had engaged a domestic servant to spy on Schacht.
She had a listening device attached to the house telephone installed in
her own bedroom, which was easy to discover, and so we were able to
unmask the whole thing. It was on that occasion that I first spoke to
Schacht.

DR. DIX: And what was the subject of your conversation? Did you at that
time already speak about political matters to him?

GISEVIUS: We spoke about the matters and the somewhat peculiar situation
which had brought us together. Schacht knew that I was very active in
opposing the Gestapo, and I, for my part, was aware that Schacht was
known for his utterances against the SS and the Gestapo on numberless
occasions. Many middle class people in Germany placed their hopes in him
as the only strong minister who could protect them if need be.
Particularly the industrialists and business men, who were very
important at the time, hoped for, and often found his support. So that
it was quite natural that immediately during the first conversation I
told him everything that was troubling me.

The main problem at that time was the removal of the Gestapo and the
removal of the Nazi regime. Therefore our conversation was highly
political, and Schacht listened to everything with an open mind, which
made it possible for me to tell him everything.

DR. DIX: And what did he say?

GISEVIUS: I told Schacht that we were inevitably drifting towards
radicalism, and that it was doubtful whether, the way things were going,
the end of the present course would not be inflation, and, that being
so, whether it would not be better if he himself were to bring about
that inflation. That would enable him to know beforehand the exact date
of such a crisis, and together with the generals and anti-radical
ministers make timely arrangements to meet the situation when it became
really serious. I said to him, “You should bring about that inflation;
you yourself will then be able to determine the course of events instead
of allowing others to take things out of your hands.” He replied, “You
see, that is the difference which separates us: You want the crash, and
I do not want it.”

DR. DIX: From that, one might draw the conclusion that at that time
Schacht still believed that the crash could be averted. What reasons did
he give for this view?

GISEVIUS: I think that at the time the word “crash” was too strong for
him. Schacht was thinking along the traditional lines of former
governments, but he saw that here and there a change had come
about—especially since Brüning’s time—by emergency laws and certain
dictatorial measures. But as far as I could see at the time, and during
all our subsequent conversations, uppermost in his mind was still the
idea of a Reich government which met and passed resolutions, where the
majority of ministers were bourgeois, and where at a given moment—which
might be sooner or later—one might steer a radically changed course.

DR. DIX: What was his attitude towards Hitler at that time?

GISEVIUS: It was quite clear to me that at that time he still thought
very highly of Hitler. I might almost say that at that time Hitler was
to him a man of irreproachable integrity.

THE PRESIDENT: What time are you speaking of?

GISEVIUS: I am now speaking of the time of my first meetings with
Schacht, at the end of 1934 and the beginning of 1935.

DR. DIX: What was your profession at that time? Where were you? Where
did you work?

GISEVIUS: I had succeeded in leaving the Reich Ministry of the Interior
in the meantime and had been transferred to the Reich Criminal Office,
which was in the process of being formed. When we realized that the
Gestapo were extending their power, we believed we could establish some
sort of police apparatus side by side with the Gestapo—that is, purely
criminal police. My friend Nebe had been made Chief of the Reich
Criminal Department to build up a police apparatus there which would
enable us to resist the Gestapo if need be. The Ministry of the Interior
gave me the task of organizing and sent me to this government office
about to be formed, to give advice for its establishment.

DR. DIX: We now slowly approach the year 1936—the year of the Olympic
Games. Did you have a special assignment there?

GISEVIUS: Yes. At the beginning of 1936 it was decided to make me Chief
of Staff of the police at the Central Police Department on the occasion
of the Olympic Games in Berlin. That was an entirely nonpolitical and
technical affair. Count Helldorf, who was then Commissioner of the
Police, thought that because of my connections with the Ministry of the
Interior and the Ministry of Justice this would be useful. But I was
quickly removed from this position. Heydrich discovered it and
intervened.

DR. DIX: Your book contains a letter from Heydrich, which I do not
propose to read in its entirety. It is addressed to Count Helldorf and
calls his attention to the fact that, during the time of your office at
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, you always put every possible
difficulty in the way of the Secret State Police, and that relations
with you had been extremely unpleasant. He continues:

    “I fear that his participation in the police preparations for
    the Olympic Games, even in this sphere, would not promote
    co-operation with the Secret State Police, and it should,
    therefore, be considered whether Gisevius should not be replaced
    by another suitable official. Heil Hitler. Yours, Heydrich.”

Is that the letter which affected your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the reason why I was also dismissed from that
job. I had to wait only a few more weeks and Himmler became the Chief of
Police in the Reich. And on the very day that Himmler became the Reich
Police Chief I was definitely removed from any kind of police service.

DR. DIX: And where did you go?

GISEVIUS: After my discharge from the police service I was sent to the
government in Münster, where I was assigned to the price control office.

DR. DIX: Could you, while in the price control office in Münster,
continue your political work in any way and make the necessary contacts?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had plenty of opportunity to make official journeys. I
made a thorough study not only of prices, but also of the political
situation, in the Rhineland and in Westphalia, and went to Berlin nearly
every week so as to keep in touch with my friends.

DR. DIX: Were you in touch with Schacht?

GISEVIUS: From that time on I met him very nearly every week.

DR. DIX: Did you, from Münster, make contacts with other persons in
prominent positions to further the work you were doing?

GISEVIUS: Yes. One of the reasons why I went to Münster was that the
president of the province, Freiherr Von Luening, was a man of the old
school—clean, correct, a professional civil servant, and politically a
man who upheld law and order. He, too, ended on the gallows after 20
July 1944. I also got into touch in Düsseldorf with Regierungspräsident
State Secretary Schmidt, and immediately upon my arrival in Münster I
did everything to get into touch with the commanding general there, Von
Kluge, who later became Field Marshal. In this I succeeded. There, too,
I tried at once to continue my old political discussions.

DR. DIX: We shall revert to General Kluge later on. I now ask you this:
At that time when you were working in Münster, did you perceive a change
in Schacht’s attitude towards the regime, and in his attitude towards
Hitler, as distinct from what you described to the Tribunal as existing
in 1934?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By a steady process Schacht withdrew himself further and
further from the Nazis. If I were asked to describe the phases, I would
say that in the beginning—that is to say, in 1935—he was of the
opinion that the Gestapo only was the main evil and that Hitler was the
man who was the statesman—or could at least become the statesman—and
that Göring was the conservative strong man whose services one ought to
use, and could use, to oppose the terror of the Gestapo and the State by
establishing orderly conditions. I contradicted Schacht vehemently
regarding his views about the Defendant Göring. I warned him. I told him
that in my opinion Göring was the worst of all, precisely because he was
hiding under the middle class, conservative cloak. I implored him not to
effect his economic policy with Göring, since this could only come to a
bad end.

Schacht—for whom much may be said, but not that he is a good
psychologist—denied this emphatically. Only then in the course of 1936
he began to realize more and more that Göring was not supporting him
against the Party, but that Göring supported the radical elements
against him, only then did Schacht’s attitude begin to change gradually,
and he came to regard not only Himmler but also Göring as a great
danger. For him Hitler was still the one man with whom one could create
policy, provided the majority of the cabinet could succeed in bringing
him over to the side of law and order.

DR. DIX: Are you now talking approximately of the time when Schacht was
handing over the foreign currency control to Göring?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was the moment when I warned him and, as I said, he
became apprehensive about Göring and realized that Göring was not
supporting him against the radical elements. That was the time I meant.

DR. DIX: By handing over the foreign currency control to Göring he
showed a negative, a yielding attitude. But now that he was gradually
changing his views, did he not have any positive ideas as to how to
bring about a change?

GISEVIUS: Yes. He was entirely taken up with the idea, like many other
people in Germany at that time—I might almost say the majority of the
people in Germany—the idea that everything depended on strengthening
the middle class influence in the cabinet, and above all, and as a
prerequisite, that the Reich Ministry of War, headed by Blomberg, should
be brought over to the side of the middle class ministers. Schacht had,
if you want to put it like that, the very constructive idea that one
must concentrate on the fight for Blomberg. That was precisely where I
agreed with him for it was the same battle which I, with my friend
Oster, had tried to fight in my small department, and in a far more
modest way.

DR. DIX: Had he already done anything to achieve that end at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: As a cue I mention the steps taken by Dreyse, the Vice
President of the Reichsbank.

GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all, he tried to establish close contact with
the competent expert in the Ministry of War, General Thomas, who later
on became Chief of the Army Economic Staff. Thomas was a man who, right
from the beginning, was skeptical about National Socialism, or even
opposed it. As by a miracle, he later on emerged from the concentration
camp alive.

Schacht at that time began to fight for Blomberg through Thomas. I took
part in that fight because Schacht used me as an intermediary through
Oster, and I was also informed about these connections through Herbert
Göring. Moreover, I learned about these things from many discussions
with Thomas. I can testify here that, even at that time, it was
extraordinarily difficult to establish connection between Schacht and
Blomberg, and I was naïve enough to tell Schacht repeatedly simply to
telephone Blomberg and ask him for an interview. Schacht replied that
Blomberg would certainly be evasive and that the only way was to prepare
the meeting via Oster and Thomas. This was done.

I know how much we expected from the many discussions Schacht had with
Blomberg. I was, of course, not present as a witness, but we discussed
these conferences in great detail at the time. I took notes and was very
pleased when I found that these recollections of mine tallied absolutely
with the recollections of Thomas, whose handwritten notes I have in my
possession. Thomas was repeatedly reprimanded by Blomberg and was told
not to bother him with these qualms on Schacht’s part. He was told that
Schacht was querulous, and that he, Thomas, should...

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into all this detail, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Yes, I believe, Your Lordship, that it will be necessary. This
change from a convinced follower of Hitler to a resolute opponent and
revolutionary, even a conspirator, is of course so complicated a
psychological process that I believe that I cannot spare the Tribunal
the details of that development. I shall certainly be economical with
nonessential matters, but I should be grateful if the witness could be
given a certain amount of freedom during this part of the testimony, as
he is the only witness I have on this subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks that you can give the essence
of the matter without giving it in this great detail. You must try, at
any rate, to give as little unnecessary detail as possible.

DR. DIX: I shall be glad to do that.

Well, then, Dr. Gisevius, you have heard the wish of the Tribunal and
you will no doubt bring out only the essential facts.

Is there any other essential fact in the affair of Blomberg via Thomas
that you wish to state, or can we conclude that chapter?

GISEVIUS: No, I shall now try to give a brief description of the other
channels which were tried. I do not know how much the Tribunal wishes to
hear about it, but I will say that Schacht tried to approach Baron Von
Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. As, however, he was very
difficult to approach, he sent his Reichsbank vice president, Dreyse, to
establish the contact. We also made one big attempt to approach Fritsch
and Blomberg through General Von Kluge.

DR. DIX: And, briefly, what was the object of that step? What were the
generals supposed to do—I mean these generals mentioned by you?

GISEVIUS: This step had as its object to make it clear to Blomberg that
things were taking a more and more extreme turn, that the economy of the
country had deteriorated, and that the Gestapo terror must be stopped by
all possible means.

DR. DIX: So that at the time there were only misgivings about the
economy and the terror which reigned—not about the danger of war, not
yet?

GISEVIUS: No, only the fear of extremism.

DR. DIX: We now turn to 1937. You know that was the year of Schacht’s
dismissal as Reich Minister of Economy. Did Schacht say anything to you
as to why he remained in office as President of the Reichsbank?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I witnessed in detail the struggle for his release as
Reich Minister of Economy. On the one side there was his attempt to be
released from the Ministry, and I think I am right in saying that this
was not so easy. Schacht told Lammers one day that if he did not receive
the official notification of his release by a certain date, he would
consider himself dismissed and inform the press accordingly. On that
occasion scores of people implored Schacht not to resign. Throughout
those years, whenever a man wanted to resign from his post, there was
always the question whether his successor might not steer an even more
radical course. Schacht was implored not to leave, lest radicalism
should gain the upper hand in the economic field also. I only mention
here the name of Ley, as head of the labor front. Schacht replied that
he could not bear the responsibility, but that he hoped he would be able
as President of the Reichsbank to keep one foot in, as he expressed it.
He imagined that he would be able to have a general view of the overall
economic situation and that through the Reichsbank he would be able to
conserve certain economic-political measures. I can testify that many
men, who later became members of the opposition, implored Schacht to
take that line and to keep at least one foot in.

DR. DIX: Was that decision of his not influenced by his attitude to, and
his judgment concerning some of the generals particularly Colonel
General Fritsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is quite right. One of the greatest disasters was
the fact that so many people in Germany imagined that Fritsch was a
strong man. I remember that not only high-ranking officers but also high
ministerial officials told me over and over again that there was no need
to worry: Fritsch was on the march; Fritsch was only waiting for the
right moment; Fritsch would one fine day bring about a revolt and end
the terror. General Von Kluge, for instance, told me this as a fact—and
he was a close friend of Fritsch. And so we all lived in the completely
mistaken belief—as I can now say—that one day the great revolt would
come of the Armed Forces against the SS. But instead of this, the exact
opposite occurred, namely, the bloodless revolt of the SS, the famous
Fritsch crisis, the result of which was that not only Fritsch was
relieved of his post but that the entire Armed Forces leadership was
beheaded, politically speaking, which meant that now all our hope...

DR. DIX: Forgive me if I interrupt you, but we shall come to the Fritsch
crisis later, which was in 1938...

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: I should like now to finish speaking about Schacht’s efforts
and actions in 1937 and to ask you—it is mentioned in your
book—whether some unsuccessful attempt to approach General Von Kluge
and a journey by Schacht to Münster did not play a part?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I thought that I was supposed to be brief about that.
Although Schacht made a great effort to get in touch with Fritsch, it
was not possible to arrange a conversation in Berlin. It was secretly
arranged that they should meet in Münster, as General Von Kluge was too
scared to meet Schacht publicly at the time. There was a lot of beating
about the bush, the net result was that the two gentlemen did not meet.
It was not possible to bring together a Reich minister and a commanding
general. It was all most depressing.

DR. DIX: Where were you at the time? What were you doing? Were you still
at Münster, or was there a change?

GISEVIUS: I was still in Münster at that time, but in the middle of 1937
Schacht wanted me to return to Berlin. The greater his disappointment,
the more he was inclined to take seriously my warnings against an
increasing radicalism and an SS revolt.

By the autumn of 1937 things in Germany had reached such a point that
everybody in the opposition group felt that evil plans were being made.
We thought at that time that there would be another day of blood like 30
June, and we were trying to protect ourselves. It was Schacht who got in
touch with Canaris through Oster and expressed the wish that I should be
brought back to Berlin in one way or another. At that time there was no
government office which would have given me a post. I had no other
choice but to take a long leave from the civil service, alleging that I
wanted to devote myself to economic studies. Schacht, in agreement with
Canaris and Oster, arranged for me to be given such a post in a Bremen
factory, but I was not allowed to show myself there, and so I came to
Berlin to place myself completely at the disposal of my friends for
future happenings.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we are now coming to January 1938 and the
Fritsch crisis. I do not think that it would be helpful to interrupt
that part of the witness’ testimony. If I may, I would suggest that Your
Lordship now adjourn the session, or else we would have to go on at
least another half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, we’ll adjourn now.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH DAY
                         Thursday, 25 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius! Yesterday we got as far as the year 1938. You had
returned to Berlin to a fictitious position which Schacht had arranged
for you and you were now in continuous contact with your political
confidants, Schacht, Oster, Canaris, and Nebe. You testified last that
within your circle, at that time, you all had the impression that a coup
was imminent.

Now, we really come to the so-called Fritsch crisis; in my opinion the
decisive, inner-political first step toward the war. Will you please
describe the entire course and the background of that crisis, especially
bearing in mind the fact that while that crisis was taking place the
march into Austria was made and always remembering, of course, Schacht’s
position and activities which are the main concern.

GISEVIUS: First, I shall describe the course of the crisis as such; and
it is correct that all my friends considered it the first decisive step
toward the war. I shall assemble the facts one by one. I consider it
advisable, in order not to confuse the picture, to leave Schacht out for
the time being, because the facts as such are extensive enough.
Furthermore, I will not indicate in the beginning the source of our
information or describe my own experiences; rather I shall wait until I
am questioned on those subjects.

On 12 January 1938 the German public was surprised by the report that
Field Marshal Von Blomberg, at that time Reich Minister for War, had
married. No details about his wife nor any photographs were published. A
few days later one single picture appeared, a photograph of the Marshal
and his new wife in front of the monkey cage at the Leipzig Zoo.
Malicious rumors about the past life of the Marshal’s wife began to
circulate in Berlin. A few days later there appeared on the desk of the
Police Commissioner in Berlin a thick file which contained the following
information: Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife had been a previously convicted
prostitute who had been registered as a prostitute in the files of seven
large German cities; she was in the Berlin criminal files. I myself have
seen the fingerprints and the pictures. She had also been sentenced by
the Berlin courts for distributing indecent pictures. The Commissioner
of the Police in Berlin was obliged to submit this file, by official
channels, to the Chief of the Police, Himmler.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, please; who was the Commissioner of the Police in
Berlin at that time?

GISEVIUS: The Commissioner of the Police in Berlin was Count Helldorf.
Count Helldorf realized that if that material were transmitted to the
Reichsführer SS it would place the Wehrmacht in a very embarrassing
position. Himmler would then have in his possession the material he
needed to ruin Blomberg’s reputation and career, and strike a blow at
the leadership of the Armed Forces. Helldorf took this file to the
closest collaborator of Marshal Blomberg, the then Chief of the Armed
Forces Department, Keitel, who at that time had just become related to
Marshal Blomberg through the marriage of their respective children.
Marshal Keitel, or Generaloberst Keitel as he was at that time, looked
through the file carefully and demanded that Police Commissioner
Helldorf should hush up the entire scandal and suppress the file.

DR. DIX: Perhaps you will tell the Tribunal the source of your
information.

GISEVIUS: I got my information from Count Helldorf, who described the
entire affair to me, and from Nebe, Oberregierungsrat of the police
headquarters in Berlin at that time, and later Reich Criminal Director.

Keitel refused to let Blomberg bear any of the consequences. He refused
to inform the Chief of the General Staff Beck, or the Chief of the Army
Generaloberst Von Fritsch. He sent Count Helldorf to Göring with the
file. Helldorf submitted the entire file to Defendant Göring. Göring
asserted he knew nothing about the various sections of the criminal
records and the previous sentences of Von Blomberg’s wife. Nevertheless
in that first conversation, and in later discussions, he admitted that
he already knew the following:

First, that Marshal Blomberg had already asked Göring several months ago
whether it was permissible to have an affair with a woman of low birth,
and shortly thereafter he had asked Göring whether he would help him to
obtain a dispensation to marry this lady “with a past” as he put it.
Later Blomberg came again and told Göring that this lady of his choice
unfortunately had another lover and he must ask Göring to help him,
Blomberg, to get rid of that lover.

DR. DIX: Excuse me. Göring told that to Helldorf and you learned it from
Helldorf?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what Göring said, and in the further course of
the investigation we learned of it from other sources too. Göring then
got rid of that lover by giving him foreign currency and sending him off
to South America. In spite of that, Göring did not inform Hitler of this
incident. He even went with Hitler, as a witness, to the wedding of
Marshal Blomberg on 12 January. I should like to point out here...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal would wish to know how you suggest
that these matters, which appear to be personal, are relevant to the
charges and in what way they affect the Defendant Schacht or the
Defendant Göring or the Defendant Frick?

DR. DIX: I am here only to serve the interests, the rightful interests,
of the Defendant Schacht. It is necessary to present that crisis in all
its horribleness in order to conceive what an effect, what a
revolutionary effect, it had on Schacht and his circle as far as the
regime was concerned, I have already said earlier that the Fritsch
crisis was the turning point in the transformation of Schacht from a
follower and, to a certain extent, an admirer of Hitler to a deadly
enemy who had designs on his life. The Tribunal cannot understand this
revulsion if the Tribunal does not receive the same impression as
Schacht had at that time. Indeed, I in no way desire to wash dirty linen
here unnecessarily. My decision to put these questions and to ask the
witness to describe the Fritsch crisis in full detail is only motivated
by the fact that the further development of Schacht, and of the Fritsch
crisis, or let us say, the Oster-Canaris circle to which Schacht
belonged, cannot be understood if one does not realize the monstrous
circumstances of that crisis. In the face of these facts, however
disagreeable, one must decide to bring these sometimes very personal
matters to the attention of the Tribunal. Unfortunately I cannot
dispense with it in my defense. It is the alpha and omega of my defense.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, it might be helpful at this
time to know our position in reference to this line of testimony, if it
is to be considered whether admissible or not now.

I should desire, if this incident were not brought out, to bring it out
upon cross-examination upon several aspects. One is that it shows the
background of the incident of yesterday, which I think is important in
appraising the truthfulness of testimony in this case.

Another thing is that it bears upon the conspiracy to seize power. There
were certain men in Germany that these conspirators had to get rid of.
Some of them they could kill safely. Some of them, as we see from the
Röhm Purge, when they went to killing they aroused some opposition. They
had to strike down by other means, and the means they used against
Fritsch and Blomberg show the conspiracy to seize power and to get rid
of the men who might stand in the way of aggressive warfare.

It will appear, I think, that Fritsch and Blomberg were among the
reliants of the German people in allowing these Nazis to get as far as
they did, believing that here at least were two men who would guard
their interests; and the method by which those men were stricken down
and removed from the scene we would consider an important part of the
conspiracy story, and I would ask to go into it on cross-examination.

That might perhaps be material to the Court in deciding whether it
should proceed now.

DR. DIX: May I add one more thing?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.

The Tribunal thinks, in view of what you have said and what Mr. Justice
Jackson has said, that your examination must continue and you will no
doubt try to confine it as much as you can to the political aspects of
the matter.

DR. DIX: Of course. But the personal matters are of such political
importance in this case that they cannot be omitted.

Well then, Dr. Gisevius, you understand the difficulties of the
situation. We want only to give evidence, and not to bring in anything
sensational as an end in itself. However, when it is necessary to speak
on such subjects in order to explain the development to the Tribunal, I
ask you to speak quite frankly.

GISEVIUS: I ask the Tribunal also to realize my difficulties. I myself
do not like speaking about these things.

I must add that Göring was the only head of the Investigation
Department. That was the institution which took overall telephone
control in the Third Reich. This Investigation Department was not
satisfied, as has been described here, with merely tapping telephone
conversations and decoding messages; but it had its own intelligence
service, all the way down to its own employees, for obtaining
information. It was, therefore, also quite possible to obtain
confidential information about Marshal Von Blomberg’s wife. When
Helldorf gave the file to Göring, Göring considered himself compelled to
give that file to Hitler. Hitler had a nervous breakdown and decided to
dismiss Marshal Blomberg immediately. Hitler’s first thought, as he told
the generals later at a public meeting, was to appoint Generaloberst Von
Fritsch as Blomberg’s successor. The moment he made his decision known,
Göring and Himmler reminded him that it could not be done as according
to a file of the year 1935 Fritsch was badly incriminated.

DR. DIX: Excuse me, Doctor. What is the source of your information
regarding this conversation between Hitler and the generals and also
Göring’s statement?

GISEVIUS: Several generals who took part in that meeting told me about
it, and I have said already that in the course of events, which I have
yet to describe, Hitler himself made many statements. We also had in our
possession until 20 July the original documents of the Supreme
Court-Martial which convened later.

The file of 1935, which was submitted to Hitler in January 1938,
referred to the fact that in 1934 the Gestapo conceived the idea of
prosecuting, among other enemies of the state, homosexuals as criminals.
In the search for evidence the Gestapo visited the penitentiaries and
asked convicted inmates, who had blackmailed homosexuals, for evidence
and for the names of homosexuals. One of the inmates reported a terrible
story, which was really so horrible that I will not repeat it here. It
will suffice to say that this prisoner believed the man in question had
been a certain Herr Von Fritsch or Frisch. The prisoner could not
remember the correct name. The Gestapo then turned over these files to
Hitler in 1935. Hitler was indignant about the contents. Talking to the
generals, he said he did not want to know about such a disgusting
affair. Hitler ordered the files to be burned immediately.

Now, in January 1938, Göring and Himmler reminded Hitler of these files;
and it was left to Heydrich’s cleverness to submit to Hitler again these
files, which had allegedly been burned in 1935 and which had been
completed, in the meantime, by extensive investigations. Hitler
believed, as he said to the generals at the time, that after having been
so disappointed in Blomberg, many nasty things could be expected from
Fritsch also. The Defendant Göring offered to bring the convict from the
prison to Hitler and the Reich Chancellery. At Karinhall, Göring had
previously threatened this convict with death if he did not abide by his
statements.

DR. DIX: How do you know that?

GISEVIUS: That was mentioned at the Supreme Court-Martial. Then Fritsch
was summoned to the Reich Chancellery and Hitler told him of the
accusations which had been made against him. Fritsch, a gentleman
through and through, had received a confidential warning from Hitler’s
adjutant; but it had been so vague that Fritsch came to the Reich
Chancellery extremely alarmed. He had no idea of what Hitler was
accusing him. Indignantly he denied the crime he had allegedly
committed. In the presence of Göring, he gave Hitler his word of honor
that all the accusations were false. But Hitler went to the nearest
door, opened it, and the convict entered, raised his arm, pointed to
Fritsch and said, “That is he.”

Fritsch was speechless. He was only able to ask that a judicial
investigation should be made. Hitler demanded his immediate resignation;
and on condition that Fritsch left in silence, he agreed to allow the
matter to rest where it was. Fritsch appealed to Beck, the Chief of the
General Staff. Chief of the General Staff Beck intervened with Hitler. A
hard struggle ensued for a judicial investigation of these terrible
accusations against Fritsch. That struggle lasted about a week. There
were dramatic disputes in the Reich Chancellery. At the end came the
famous 4 February when the generals, who until that day—that is to say,
10 days after the dismissal of Blomberg and the relief of Fritsch—were
completely unaware of the fact that both their superiors were no longer
in office, were ordered to come to Berlin. Hitler personally presented
the files to the generals in such a way that they also were completely
confused and said they were satisfied that the affair should be
investigated by the courts. At the same time Hitler surprised the
generals...

DR. DIX: You know of this only through the participants of that meeting?

GISEVIUS: From the participants of the meeting, yes.

At the same time Hitler surprised the generals with the announcement
that they had a new Commander-in-Chief, Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch.
Some of the generals had, in the meantime, been relieved of their posts;
and also on the evening previous to that announcement, a report appeared
in the newspapers according to which Hitler, under the pretense of
drawing together the reins of government, had dismissed the Foreign
Minister, Von Neurath, effected a change in the Ministry of Economics,
relieved a number of diplomats of their posts, and then, as an appendix
to that report, announced a change in the War Ministry and in the
leadership of the Army.

Then a new struggle arose, which lasted several weeks, regarding the
convening of the court-martial which should decide as to the
reinstatement of Generaloberst Von Fritsch. This was for all of us the
moment when we believed we would be able to prove before a German
supreme court the methods the Gestapo used to rid themselves of their
political adversaries. This was a unique opportunity of being able to
question witnesses under oath regarding the manner in which the entire
intrigue had been contrived. Therefore we set to work to prepare for our
parts in this trial.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by “we” in this case?

GISEVIUS: There was above all one man, who as an honest lawyer and judge
was himself a participator of this Supreme Court-Martial. This was the
Judge Advocate General at that time, and later Chief Judge of the Army,
Ministerial Director Dr. Sack. This man believed that he owed it to the
spirit of law to contribute in every possible way toward exposing these
matters. This he did, but he also paid with his life after 20 July.

In the course of this investigation the judges of this Supreme
Court-Martial questioned the Gestapo witnesses. They investigated the
records of the Gestapo; they made local investigations; and, with the
aid of the criminologist Nebe, it was not long before they discovered
definitely that the entire affair had concerned a double; it was not
Generaloberst Von Fritsch but a retired Captain Von Frisch who had been
pensioned long before.

In the course of that investigation the judges established another fact;
they were able to prove that the Gestapo had been in the residence of
this double Von Frisch as early as 15 January and had questioned his
housekeeper. May I compare the two dates once more. On 15 January the
Gestapo had proof that Fritsch was not guilty. On 24 January the
Defendant Göring brings the convict and witness for the prosecution into
the Reich Chancellery in order to incriminate Fritsch, the
Generaloberst. We believed that here indeed we were confronted with a
plot of incredible proportions, and we believed that now even the
skeptical general must see that it was not only in the lower ranks of
the Gestapo that there was scheming and contriving, invisible and
secret, without the knowledge of any of the ministers or of the Reich
Chancellery and which would compel any man of honor and justice to
intervene. This was the reason why we now formed into a larger group and
why we saw that we now no longer needed to collect material about the
Gestapo in secret. That, precisely, was the great difficulty we had had
to deal with. We heard a great deal; but if we had passed on that
evidence, we would in every case have exposed to the terror of the
Gestapo those men who had given us the evidence.

Now we could proceed legally, and so we started our efforts to persuade
Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch to submit the necessary evidence to the
Supreme Court-Martial.

DR. DIX: Whom do you mean by “we”?

GISEVIUS: At that time there was a group, among whom I must mention Dr.
Schacht, who was then extremely active and who went to Admiral Raeder,
to Brauchitsch, to Rundstedt, and to Gürtner, and tried to explain
everywhere that the great crisis had now arisen; that we now had to act;
that it was now the task of the generals to rid us of this regime of
terror.

But I must mention one more name in that connection. In 1936 Schacht had
already introduced me to Dr. Goerdeler. I had the honor of traveling the
same road with that brave man from then on until 20 July. And now I have
mentioned here for the first time, in this room where so many terrible
things are made known, the name of a German who was a brave and fearless
fighter for freedom, justice, and decency and who, I believe, will one
day be an example, and not only to Germany, to prove that one can also
do one’s duty faithfully until death, even under the terror of the
Gestapo.

This Dr. Goerdeler, who had always been a fearless and untiring fighter,
had in those days unequaled courage. Like Dr. Schacht he went from one
ministry to another, from one general to the next, and he also believed
that now the hour had come when we could achieve a united front of
decent people led by the generals. Brauchitsch did not refuse then. He
did not refuse to act at Goerdeler’s request. In fact he assured
Goerdeler of his co-operation in a revolt with almost religious fervor.

And as a witness I may mention that Brauchitsch also solemnly assured me
that he would now use this opportunity to fight against the Gestapo.
However, Brauchitsch made one condition, and that condition was accepted
by the generals as a whole. Brauchitsch said, “Hitler is still such a
popular man; we are afraid of the Hitler myth. We want to give to the
German people and to the world the final proof by means of the Supreme
Court-Martial and its verdict.” Therefore Brauchitsch postponed his
action until the day when the verdict of the Supreme Court-Martial
should be given.

The Supreme Court-Martial met. It began its session. The session was
suddenly interrupted under dramatic circumstances. I must add that
Hitler appointed the Defendant Göring as president of that Supreme
Court-Martial. And now the Supreme Court-Martial, under the chairmanship
of Göring, convened. I know from Nebe that Göring during the preceding
days had had consultations with Himmler and Heydrich. I know that
Heydrich said to Nebe, “this Supreme Court-Martial will be the end of my
career.”

DR. DIX: Did Nebe tell you that?

GISEVIUS: Yes, on the same day. The Supreme Court-Martial would be the
great danger for the Gestapo. And now the Supreme Court-Martial sat for
several hours and was adjourned under dramatic circumstances, for that
was the day chosen for the German armies to march into Austria. Even at
that time we knew without any doubt why the chairman of that
court-martial was so unusually interested in having the troops on that
day receive the order to march, not to a goal within but outside the
Reich. Not until one week later could the Supreme Court-Martial
reconvene, and then Hitler was triumphant. The generals had their first
“campaign of flowers” behind them, a plebiscite had been proclaimed, the
jubilation was great, and the confusion among the generals was still
greater. So that court-martial was dissolved. Fritsch’s innocence was
definitely established, but Brauchitsch said that as a result of the
changed psychological atmosphere created by the annexation of Austria,
he could no longer take the responsibility for a revolt.

That is roughly the story of how the War Ministry was practically
denuded of its leading men, and how the generals were thrown into
unequaled confusion. From that time on we took the steep downward path
to radicalism.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I may ask the Tribunal to be permitted to read in this
connection one sentence from a document which I will submit as Exhibit
Number Schacht-15. My document book is still in the process of
translation, but I hope that it will be here on the day of the hearing
of Schacht. There is only one sentence which is of interest in this
connection. It is from the biannual report of the General Staff...

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been submitted to the Prosecution and
to the Tribunal at all?

DR. DIX: The documents have been discussed with the Prosecution twice in
detail, once with regard to the question of translation, and then on the
question of their admissibility as evidence; and Mr. Dodd discussed them
in open court. I am firmly convinced that the Prosecution is thoroughly
acquainted with the document. It is only one sentence and I do not
believe that the Prosecution would object to the reading of this one
sentence, since otherwise the connection with the documentary evidence
might be obscured. I will introduce a document now and then, wherever it
seems practical. This is only one sentence from the biannual report of
the General Staff of the United States...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not know what this document is, Your Honor. I
should like to know because we may want to ask some questions about it.
I do not want to delay Dr. Dix, but I do not have a copy of it and I do
not know just what it is yet.

DR. DIX: I just wanted to shorten the proceedings; but as I see that
difficulties may arise, and that a long discussion may be needed, I will
omit it, and will present it later with my documentary evidence. It
would not serve my purpose otherwise.

[_Turning to the witness._] For the additional information of the Court,
perhaps you will describe the position of the chairman in German
court-martial proceedings; that the control of the examination is in his
hands—that, as a matter of fact, the entire case is in his hands.

GISEVIUS: Dr. Dix, I do not doubt that you could describe the authority
of such a chairman better and more clearly from the legal point of view.
I would, however, like to say the following:

I read the minutes of that session, for it is one of those documents
which we thought we would one day submit to the public. This, too, I
hope we will find again. From the minutes it can be seen that the
Defendant Göring, as president, determined the tenor of the entire
proceedings and of the questions.

He questioned the witnesses for the prosecution, and he took care that
no other questions were put which might have proved embarrassing. I must
say, from these voluminous minutes, that Göring knew how to cloak the
true facts by the manner in which he led the proceedings.

DR. DIX: In my introductory words at the beginning of the session, I
called the Fritsch crisis the first decisive inner-political step of the
war; and you, Doctor, have adopted that term. After concluding the
description of the Fritsch crisis, will you give the reason for the
views you adopted, and what the effect was upon your group in this
connection, especially upon Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I must point out again that until this Fritsch crisis it had
been difficult in the ranks of the German opposition to consider even
the possibility of war. That was due to the fact that in Germany the
opposition groups were so sure of the strength of the Army, and of the
leading men, that they believed it sufficed to have a man of honor, like
Fritsch, at the head of the German Army. It seemed inconceivable that
Fritsch would tolerate a sliding into terror or into war. Only a few
persons had pointed out that it was in the nature of every revolution
some day to go beyond the frontiers of a nation. We believed from
history that this theory should be pointed out as a danger threatening
the National Socialist revolution, and therefore we repeatedly warned
those who were convinced that they were faced with a revolution, not
only with a dictatorship, that one day those revolutionaries would
resort to war as a last recourse. As it became more evident in the
course of the Fritsch crisis that radicalism was predominant, a large
circle became aware that the danger of war could no longer be ignored.

DR. DIX: And did the Defendant Schacht also belong to that circle?

GISEVIUS: Yes. During those days of the Fritsch crisis, Schacht said, as
did many others: “That means war,” and that was also said plainly to the
then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Von Brauchitsch.

DR. DIX: Now the question arises why Schacht had previously financed the
rearmament program, at least in the beginning?

GISEVIUS: Schacht always told me that he had financed the rearmament
program for purposes of defense. Schacht was convinced for many years
that such a large nation in the center of Europe should at least have
means of defense. I may point out that at that time large groups of the
German people were possessed of the idea that there was a possible
danger of attack from the East. You must not forget the type of
propaganda with which the German people were inundated at that time, and
that the reasons given for this particular danger from the East were
based upon Polish aspirations concerning East Prussia.

DR. DIX: Did Schacht also discuss with you at that time the fact that
this rearmament was serving his political purposes, as through it he
might be able to start discussions on general disarmament again?

GISEVIUS: I beg your pardon. Unfortunately I forgot to emphasize this
point myself. Schacht was of the opinion that all means should be used
to bring about discussions on rearmament again. He had an idea that very
soon—I think he had held that opinion since 1935—the attention of
opponent countries should be drawn to German rearmament; and then
Hitler, because his rearmament was now known, would be forced to resume
discussions at the disarmament conference.

DR. DIX: Was that which you have just said the subject of your
conversation with Schacht at that time, or is that your judgment now?

GISEVIUS: No, I remember this conversation very well, because I thought
Hitler’s inclinations lay in other directions than in attending a
disarmament conference. I thought Hitler to be of an entirely different
mentality, and was somewhat surprised that Schacht considered it
possible that Hitler might harbor such thoughts.

DR. DIX: Did you have the impression from your conversations with
Schacht that he was informed in detail of the type, speed, and extent of
the rearmament?

GISEVIUS: I well remember how often Schacht asked me and friends of mine
whether we could not help him to get information about the extent of
rearmament by inquiring at the Reich War Ministry. I have already
described yesterday the efforts he made to get details through Oster and
Thomas.

DR. DIX: Could you tell the Tribunal whether Schacht made any attempt to
limit armament expenses, and thus limit the extent and speed of the
rearmament; and, if so, when he made these efforts?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge, he started to attempt this as early as 1936.
In the heated debates about Schacht’s resignation as Minister of
Economics in 1937, his efforts in this direction played a very important
part. I recall that practically every conversation was concerned with
that point.

DR. DIX: Now, it is said—and quite understandably also by the
Prosecution—that the reasons Schacht gave, even in official reports and
so on, for the necessity of these limitations were primarily of a
financial-technical nature, that is to say, he spoke as an anxious
economic leader and an anxious president of the Reichsbank and not as an
anxious patriot afraid that his country might be plunged into war.

Do you know of any discussions with Schacht, of which you can remember
anything, concerning the foregoing which might be useful to the
Tribunal?

GISEVIUS: In all these preliminary discussions there were dozens of
drafts of the communications Schacht wrote. They were discussed in
friendly circles. To mention but one example, Schacht repeatedly
discussed these drafts also with Goerdeler. It was always one question
that was concerned: What could one say, so that such a letter should not
be considered a provocation but would serve rather to draw the other
non-Party ministers, and particularly the War Minister Blomberg, to
Schacht’s side? That was just the difficulty, for how could such
ministers as Blomberg, Neurath, or Schwerin-Krosigk, who were much more
loyal to Hitler, be persuaded to join Schacht rather than to say that
Schacht had once again provoked Hitler and Göring with his notoriously
sharp tongue. All these letters can only be understood by their tactical
reasons which, as I have said, had been discussed in detail with the
leading men of the opposition.

DR. DIX: Now, after the Fritsch crisis, how did the political conspiracy
between you and your friends and Schacht take form?

GISEVIUS: I want to deal with that word “conspiracy.” While up to that
moment our activity could only be called more or less oppositional, now
a conspiracy did indeed begin; and there appeared in the foreground a
man who was later to play an important part as head of that conspiracy.
The Chief of the General Staff at that time, Generaloberst Beck,
believed that the time had come for a German general to give the alarm
both inside and outside the country. I believe it is important for the
Tribunal to know also the ultimate reason which prompted Beck to take
that step.

The Chief of the General Staff was present when Hitler, in May 1938,
made a speech to the generals at Jüterbog. That speech was intended to
reinstate Fritsch. A few words were said about Fritsch, but more was
said—and for the first time quite openly before a large group of German
generals—about Hitler’s intention to engulf Czechoslovakia in a war.
Beck heard that speech; and he was indignant that he, as Chief of the
General Staff, should hear of such an intention for the first time in
such an assembly without having been informed or consulted previously.
During that same meeting, Beck sent a letter to Brauchitsch asking him
for an immediate interview. Brauchitsch refused and deliberately kept
Beck waiting for several weeks. Beck became impatient and wrote a
comprehensive memorandum in which as Chief of the General Staff he
protested against the fact that the German people were being drawn into
war. At the end of that memorandum Beck announced his resignation, and
here I believe is the opportunity to say a word about this Chief of the
General Staff.

DR. DIX: One moment, Doctor. Will you tell us the source of your
knowledge of what Beck thought, and the negotiations between Beck and
Brauchitsch?

GISEVIUS: Beck confided in me, and during the latter years I worked in
very close collaboration with him, and I was by his side until the last
hour of his life on 20 July. I can testify here—and it is important for
the Tribunal to know this—that Beck struggled again and again with the
problem as to what a chief of the General Staff should do when he
realized that events were driving toward a war. Therefore I owe to his
memory, and to my oath here, not to conceal the fact that Beck took the
consequences of being the only German general to relinquish his post
voluntarily, in order to show that there is a limit beyond which even
generals in leading positions may not go; but at the sacrifice of their
position and their life, must resign and accept no further orders. Beck
was of the opinion that the General Staff was not only an organization
of war technicians; he saw in the German General Staff the conscience of
the German Army, and he trained his staff accordingly. He suffered
immensely during the later years of his life because men whom he had
trained in that spirit did not follow the dictates of their conscience.
I owe it to this man to say that he was a man of inflexible character.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think we might get on to what Beck actually
did.

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Honor, but...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it would be a convenient time to break off. What
I mean is, the witness said that Beck protested in a memorandum and
offered to resign, and that was some minutes ago, and since then he was
talking and had not told us what Beck actually did.

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will not sit in open session on Saturday
morning, but will be sitting in closed session.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] You were saying that Generaloberst
Beck carried out his decision to tender his resignation after the speech
at Jüterbog. What did he do then?

GISEVIUS: Hitler and Brauchitsch urgently pressed him to remain in
office, but Beck refused and insisted upon resigning. Thereupon Hitler
and Brauchitsch urged Beck at least not to make his resignation public,
and they asked him if he would not formally defer his resignation for a
few months. Beck, who had not yet gone the way of high treason, thought
that he should comply with this request. Later he most deeply regretted
this loyal attitude. The fact is that as early as the end of May or the
beginning of June his successor, General Halder, took over the office of
Chief of General Staff; and from that moment Beck was actually no longer
in charge.

DR. DIX: May I ask you once more, from what observations, and
conversations with whom, do you base the knowledge of these facts?

GISEVIUS: From constant discussions I had with Beck, Oster, Goerdeler,
Schacht, and an entire group of people at that time; later, the question
why Beck did not make his retirement public depressed him to such an
extent that it was a continual subject of discussions between him and me
up to the end.

DR. DIX: That was Beck’s resignation; but then the problem of the
possible resignation of Schacht was probably also brought up in
deliberations. To your knowledge, and from your observation, was the
question of the necessity or the opportuneness of Schacht’s resignation
discussed between Schacht and Beck?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was discussed in great detail.

It was Beck’s opinion that his resignation alone might not be
sufficiently effective. He approached Schacht therefore and asked him
whether he would not join him, Beck, and resign also. This subject was
discussed in great detail, on the one hand between Beck and Schacht
personally, and on the other between Oster and myself, who were the two
intermediaries. During these conferences, I must confess that I, too,
was of the opinion that Schacht should resign under all circumstances;
and I also advised him to that effect. It was Oster’s opinion, however,
that Schacht must definitely remain in office and he asked him to do so;
in order to influence the generals Schacht was needed as an official
with a ministerial title. In retrospect I must say here that my advice
to Schacht was wrong. The events which I have yet to describe have
proved how important it was to Oster and others that Schacht should
remain in office.

DR. DIX: That, of course, was a serious question for Schacht’s own
conscience. You have informed the Tribunal of your opinions and of
Oster’s opinions. Did Schacht discuss his scruples with you, and the
pros and cons of his deliberations in making his final decision?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I don’t object to the defendants trying their case
in their own way, but I do think we are passing beyond the limits of
profitable inquiry here. Schacht is present; he is the man who can tell
us about his conscience, and I know of no way that another witness can
do so, and I think it is not a question to which the answer would have
competent value, and I object respectfully.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better tell us what Schacht
did—not tell us—but get from the witness what Schacht did.

DR. DIX: If I may, I should like to make a brief remark. It is true, of
course, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, that Schacht knows his own reasons
best and can tell them to the Tribunal. On a question as difficult as
this, however, the justification of which is even subject to
argument—the Prosecution apparently is inclined to consider the train
of thought which led to Schacht’s decision to be unacceptable—it
appears to me, at least on the basis of our rules for evidence, that it
is relevant for the Tribunal to hear from an eye-and-ear witness what
the considerations were and whether they really were such at the time,
or whether Schacht, now in the defendants’ dock, is _ex post facto_,
devising some explanation, as every defendant is more or less suspected
of doing.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the witness can tell us what
Schacht said and what Schacht did, but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Certainly. Your Lordship, I only want him to tell us what
Schacht said to the witness at that time about his opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need any further discussion about it.
The witness has heard what I have said and you can ask him what Schacht
said, and what Schacht did; but not what Schacht thought.

DR. DIX: Very well then, what did Schacht say to you regarding the
reasons for his resignation?

GISEVIUS: Schacht told me at the time that after all we had experienced
the generals could not be relied upon ever really to revolt. For that
reason, as a politician, he considered it his duty to think of some
possibility other than a revolt for bringing about a change in
conditions in Germany. For that reason he evolved a plan which he
explained to me at the time. Schacht said to me, “I have got Hitler by
the throat.” He meant by that, as he explained to me in great detail,
that now the day was approaching where the debts which had been incurred
by the Reich Minister of Finance, and thus by the Reich Cabinet, would
have to be repaid to the Reichsbank. Schacht doubted whether the
Minister of Finance, Schwerin-Krosigk, would be prepared without further
ado to carry out the moral and legal obligation of repaying the credits
which had been extended.

Schacht thought that that was the moment in which he should come out
with his resignation, with a joint step by the Reichsbank Directorate;
and he hoped that, given that situation, the other ministers of the
Reich would join him, the majority of whom were still democratic at the
time.

That is what he meant when he said to me, “I have still one more arrow I
can shoot, and that is the moment when not even a Neurath, a Gürtner, a
Seldte can refuse to follow me.”

I answered Schacht at that time that I doubted whether there would ever
be such a meeting of the Cabinet. In my opinion, the steps which would
be taken to dispose of him would be much more brutal. Schacht did not
believe me, and above all he told me he would be certain of achieving
one thing; these matters would have to be discussed in the Cabinet, and
then he would cause a situation in Germany as alarming as the one which
existed in February 1938 at the time of the Fritsch crisis. He therefore
expected a radical reformation of the cabinet which would provide the
proper psychological atmosphere for the generals to intervene.

DR. DIX: You said at the beginning that Schacht had said or hinted that
he could not absolutely rely on the generals to bring about a revolt.
Which generals was he referring to, and what did he mean?

GISEVIUS: Schacht meant at the time the first revolutionary situation
which had arisen in Germany, during the months of May to September 1938,
when we drifted into the Czechoslovakia war crisis. Beck had assured us
at the time of his resignation—by us I mean Goerdeler, Schacht and
other politicians—that he would leave to us a successor who was more
energetic than himself, and who was firmly determined to precipitate a
revolt if Hitler should decide upon war. That man whom Beck trusted, and
to whom he introduced us, was General Halder. As a matter of fact, on
taking office, General Halder immediately took steps to start
discussions on the subject with Schacht, Goerdeler, Oster, and our
entire group. A few days after he took over his office he sent for Oster
and informed him that he considered that things were drifting toward
war, and that he would then undertake an overthrow of the Government. He
asked Oster what he, for his part, intended to do to bring civilians
into the plot.

DR. DIX: Who were the civilians in question, apart from Goerdeler and
Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Halder put that question to Oster, and under the circumstances
at that time, when we were still a very small circle, Oster replied that
to the best of his knowledge there were only two civilians with whom
Halder could have preliminary political conversations; one was
Goerdeler, the other, Schacht.

Halder refused to speak personally to a man as suspect as Goerdeler. He
gave as his reason the fact that it was too dangerous for him to receive
now a man whom he did not yet know, whereas he could find some official
reason for having a conference with Schacht. Halder asked Oster to act
as intermediary for such a conference with Schacht.

Oster approached Schacht through me. Schacht was willing. A meeting was
to be arranged at a third person’s place. I warned Schacht and said to
him, “Have Halder come to your house, so that you are quite sure of the
matter.”

Halder then visited Schacht personally at the end of July 1938 at his
residence; and he informed him that matters had reached a stage where
war was imminent and that he, Halder, would then bring about a revolt,
and he asked Schacht whether he was prepared to aid him politically in a
leading position.

That is what Schacht told me at the time, and Halder told it to Oster.

DR. DIX: And Oster told it to you?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I continually acted as an intermediary in these
discussions. Schacht replied, as he assured me directly after Halder’s
visit, that he was prepared to do anything if the generals were to
decide to remove Hitler.

The following morning, Halder sent for Oster. He told him of this
conversation, and he asked Oster whether police preparations had now
been made for this revolt. Oster suggested that Halder should talk to me
personally about these matters. I had a long talk in the darkness with
Halder about this revolt. I believe that it is important for me to state
here what Halder told me of his intentions at that time. First Halder
assured me that, in contrast to many other generals, he had no doubt
that Hitler wanted war. Halder described Hitler to me as being
bloodthirsty and referred to the blood bath of 30 June. However, Halder
told me that it was, unfortunately, terribly difficult to explain
Hitler’s real intentions to the generals, particularly to the junior
officers corps, because the saying which was influencing the officers
corps was ostensibly that it was all just a colossal bluff, that the
Army could be absolutely certain that Hitler did not want to start a
war, but rather that he was merely preparing a diplomatic maneuver of
blackmail on a large scale.

For that reason, Halder believed that it was absolutely necessary to
prove, even to the last captain, that Hitler was not bluffing at all but
had actually given the order for war. Halder therefore decided at the
time that for the sake of informing the German nation and the officers
he would even risk the outbreak of war. But even then Halder feared the
Hitler myth; and he therefore suggested to me that the day after the
outbreak of war Hitler should be killed by means of a bomb; and the
German people should be made to believe, as far as possible, that Hitler
had been killed by an enemy bombing attack on the Führer’s train. I
replied to Halder at the time that perhaps I was still too young, but I
could not understand why he did not want to tell the German people, at
least afterwards, what the generals had done.

Then for a few weeks there was no news from Halder. The press campaign
against Czechoslovakia assumed an ever more threatening character and we
felt that now it would be only a few days, or perhaps weeks, before war
would break out. At that very moment Schacht decided to visit Halder
again and to remind him of his promise. I thought it best that a witness
should be present during that conversation and therefore I accompanied
Schacht. It did not appear to me that Halder was any too pleased at the
presence of a witness. Halder once again declared his firm intention of
effecting a revolt; but again he wished to wait until the German nation
had received proof of Hitler’s warlike intentions by means of a definite
order for war. Schacht pointed out to Halder the tremendous danger of
such an experiment. He made it clear to Halder that a war could not be
started simply to destroy the Hitler legend in the eyes of the German
people.

In a detailed and very excited conversation Halder then declared that he
was prepared to start the revolt, not after the official outbreak of the
war, but at the very moment that Hitler gave the army the final order to
march.

We asked Halder whether he would then still be able to control the
situation or whether Hitler might not surprise him with some lightning
stroke. Halder replied literally, “No, he cannot deceive me. I have
designed my General Staff plans in such a way that I am bound to know it
48 hours in advance.” I think that is important, because during the
subsequent course of events the period of time between the order to
march and the actual march itself was considerably shortened.

Halder assured us that besides the preparations in Berlin he had an
armored division ready in Thuringia under the command of General Von
Höppner, which might possibly have to halt the Leibstandarte, which was
in Munich, on the march to Berlin.

Although Halder had told us all this, Schacht and I had a somewhat
bitter aftertaste of that conference. Halder had told Schacht that he,
Schacht, seemed to be urging him to effect this revolt prematurely; and
Schacht and I were of the opinion that Halder might abandon us at the
last moment. We informed Oster immediately of the bad impression we had
had, and we told Oster that something absolutely must be done to win
over another general in case Halder should not act at the last minute.
Oster agreed and these are the preliminary events which led to the later
General Field Marshal Von Witzleben first coming into our circle of
conspirators.

DR. DIX: Who won Von Witzleben over?

GISEVIUS: Schacht did.

DR. DIX: Who did?

GISEVIUS: Schacht won Witzleben over. Oster visited Witzleben and told
him everything that had happened. Thereupon Witzleben sent for me, and I
told him that in my opinion the police situation was such that he, as
commanding general of the Berlin Army Corps, could confidently risk a
revolt. Witzleben asked me the question which every general put to us at
that time: Whether a diplomatic incident in the East would really lead
to war or whether it was not true, as Hitler and Ribbentrop had
repeatedly told the generals in confidence, that there was a tacit
agreement with the Western Powers giving Germany a free hand in the
East. Witzleben said that if such an agreement really existed, then, of
course, he could not revolt. I told Witzleben that Schacht with his
excellent knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon mentality could no doubt give him
comprehensive information about that.

A meeting between Schacht and Witzleben was arranged. Witzleben brought
with him his divisional general, Von Brockdorff, who was to carry out
the revolt in detail. Witzleben, Brockdorff, and I drove together to
Schacht’s country house for a conference which lasted for hours. The
final result was that Witzleben was convinced by Schacht that the
Western Powers would under no circumstances allow Germany to move into
the Eastern territories and that now Hitler’s policy of surprise had
come to an end. Witzleben decided that he, on his part and independently
of Halder, would make all preparations which would be necessary if he
should have to act.

He issued me false papers and gave me a position at his district
headquarters so that there, under his personal protection, I could make
all the necessary police and political preparations. He delegated
General Von Brockdorff, and he and I visited all the points in Berlin
which Brockdorff was to occupy with his Potsdam Division. Frau Strünck
was at the wheel and traveling ostensibly as tourists we settled exactly
what had to be done.

DR. DIX: That is the witness Strünck. Please excuse me.

GISEVIUS: I believe I owe you a brief explanation as to why Witzleben’s
co-operation was absolutely necessary. It was not so easy to find a
general who had the actual authority to order his troops to march. For
instance, there were some generals in the provinces who could not give
their troops the order to march.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into the matter in such
detail as to why General Witzleben should be brought in?

DR. DIX: The reasons why Witzleben was needed are perhaps not essential
for our case. We can therefore drop this subject.

Will you please tell me, Dr. Gisevius, whether Schacht was kept
constantly informed of these military and police preparations which you
have described?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was kept informed about all these matters. We met in
the evening in the residence of Von Witzleben and I showed everything
that I had worked out in writing during the day. It was then discussed
in full detail.

DR. DIX: Apart from these military and police measures, which you have
mentioned, were there any political measures?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course. We had to decide carefully what the German
nation was to be told in such a case from the point of view of internal
politics, just as there were certain preparations which had to be made
regarding the external.

DR. DIX: What do you mean by external—foreign politics?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course, foreign politics.

DR. DIX: Why of course? Was the Foreign Office included or what is meant
by foreign politics in this case?

GISEVIUS: It is very difficult to give an explanation, because the
co-operation with foreign countries during the time of war, or
immediately before a war, is a matter which is very difficult to discuss
as we are touching upon a very controversial subject. If I am to talk
about it, then it is at least as important for me to state the reasons
which led these people to carry on such discussions with foreign
countries, as it is to give times and dates.

DR. DIX: I am sure that the Tribunal will permit you to do so. I think
that the Tribunal will permit that the motives...

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal thinks you are going into too great
detail over these matters. If the Tribunal is prepared to accept this
witness’ evidence as true, it shows that Schacht was negotiating with
him and General Witzleben at this time with a view to prevent the war. I
say, if the Tribunal accepts it; and that seems to be a matter you will
not prove with the details of these negotiations, which seem to me not
very important.

DR. DIX: Yes, but in my opinion the gravity and intensity of the
activities of these conspirators should be substantiated in detail. In
my opinion it is not sufficient that these plans...

THE PRESIDENT: But you have touched upon them since 10 o’clock this
morning.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now proceeding in connection with Schacht’s
point of view, as to whether a survey, a political survey of Schacht’s
part...

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that you said last night that you would be half
an hour longer. Do you remember saying that? Perhaps it was a
mistranslation.

DR. DIX: Oh no, that is quite a misunderstanding. I said that if I were
to touch upon the Fritsch crisis and complete it, it would take another
half hour—that is, the Fritsch crisis alone. Gentlemen of the Tribunal,
the position is this: We are now hearing the story of the political
opposition, in which Schacht played a leading role. If the Defendant
Göring and others had time for days to describe the entire course of
events from their point of view, I think that justice demands that those
men, represented in this courtroom by the Defendant Schacht, who fought
against that system under most dreadful conditions of terror, should
also be permitted to tell in detail the story of their opposition
movement.

I would, therefore, ask the Tribunal—and I am not in favor of the
superfluous—to give me permission to allow the witness to make a few
more remarks on the measures taken by the group of conspirators, Beck,
Schacht, Canaris, and others, which he has already touched upon. I beg
the Tribunal to realize that I consider it of the greatest importance;
and I assume, Your Lordship, that if it is not done now, the Prosecution
will take the matter up during cross-examination. Moreover, I believe
that as it is now being told in sequence, it will take less time than if
we were to wait for the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not propose to tell you how you are to
prove your case, but hopes that you will deal with it as shortly as
possible and without unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Please be sure of that.

Well then, Witness; you had mentioned foreign political measures, and
you were about to talk of the motives which caused some of you to enter
into relations with foreign countries for the support of your opposition
movement. Will you please continue with that?

GISEVIUS: I should like simply to confine myself to the statement that
from that time on there were very detailed and weighty discussions with
foreign countries in order to try everything possible to prevent the
outbreak of war or at least to shorten it or keep it from spreading.
However, as long as I am not in a position to speak of the motives of
such a delicate matter—in connection with which people like us would be
accused of high treason, in Germany, at least—as long as that is the
case, I shall not say more than the fact that these conversations took
place.

DR. DIX: I did not understand that the Tribunal would prevent you from
explaining your motives. You may state them therefore.

GISEVIUS: I owe it to my conscience and above all to those who
participated and are now dead, to state here that those matters which I
have described weighed very heavily upon their consciences. We knew that
we would be accused of conspiring with foreign countries.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, knows that these matters were
not conducted without danger; but we are not really here for the purpose
of considering people who have, unfortunately, lost their lives. We are
considering the case of the Defendant Schacht at the moment.

DR. DIX: I think the intention of the witness has been misunderstood. He
does not wish to speak about those men who lost their lives, and he does
not want to speak of the dangers; he wishes rather to speak of the
conflicts of conscience suffered by those who planned and undertook
those steps. I think that that privilege should be granted the witness
if he is to speak of this very delicate matter here in public. I would,
therefore, beg you to allow it; otherwise the witness will confine
himself to general indications which will not be sufficient for my
defense, and I assume that the Prosecution will ask about these things
in the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you try and get him to come to the point? We, of
course, can’t tell what he wants to talk about. We can only tell about
what he does talk about.

DR. DIX: Well, then, you will describe briefly the considerations which
swayed those who entered into those foreign relations, and also describe
the character of those relations.

GISEVIUS: Mr. President, it was not merely a question of conscience. I
was concerned with the fact that there are relatives still alive today
who might become the subject of unjust accusations; and that is why I
had to say, with reference to those conferences abroad which I shall
describe, that even our intimate circle of friends did not agree in all
respects as to what measures were to be permitted. One wanted to go
further, while another held back. I owe it to the memory of the dead
Admiral Canaris, for instance, to rectify many erroneous press
announcements and state that he refused to conspire with foreign
countries. I must guard against the possibility that anything I say now
might be applied to men whom I have mentioned earlier. That is why I
wanted to make this statement, and at the same time I wanted to say that
our friends who did these things rejected the accusation of high
treason, because we felt that we were morally obliged to take these
steps.

DR. DIX: Well then, what happened?

GISEVIUS: The following happened: Immediately after Hitler announced his
intention to invade Czechoslovakia, friends tried to keep the British
Government informed, from the first intention to the final decision. The
chain of attempts began with the journey of Goerdeler in the spring of
1938 to London, where he gave information concerning the existence of an
opposition group which was resolved to go to any lengths. In the name of
this group the British Government was continuously informed of what was
happening and that it was absolutely necessary to make it clear, to the
German people and to the generals, that every step across the Czech
border would constitute for the Western Powers a reason for war. When
the crisis neared its climax and when our preparations for a revolt had
been completed to the last detail, we took a step unusual in form and
substance. We informed the British Government that the pending
diplomatic negotiations would not, as Hitler asserted, deal with the
question of the Sudeten countries but that Hitler’s intention was to
invade the whole of Czechoslovakia and that, if the British Government
on its side were to remain firm, we could give the assurance that there
would be no war.

Those were, at the time, our attempts to obtain a certain amount of
assistance from abroad in our fight for the psychological preparation of
a revolt.

DR. DIX: We now come to September of 1938 and the crisis which led to
the Munich Conference. What were the activities of your group of
conspirators at that time?

GISEVIUS: The more the crisis moved towards the Munich conference, the
more we tried to convince Halder that he should start the revolt at
once. As Halder was somewhat uncertain, Witzleben prepared everything in
detail. I shall now describe only the last two dramatic days. On 27
September it was clear that Hitler wanted to go to the utmost extremity.
In order to make the German people war-minded he ordered a parade of the
Berlin army through Berlin. Witzleben had to execute the order. The
parade had entirely the opposite effect. The population, which assumed
that the troops were marching to war, showed their open displeasure. The
troops, instead of jubilation, saw clenched fists; and Hitler, who was
watching the parade from the window of the Reich Chancellery, had a fit
of rage. He stepped back from the window and said, “With such people I
cannot wage war.” Witzleben came home indignant and said that he would
have liked to have had the guns unlimbered in front of the Reich
Chancellery. On the next morning...

DR. DIX: One moment, Witzleben told you that he would have liked to have
had the guns unlimbered in front of the Chancellery?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: And what is the source of your knowledge regarding Hitler’s
remark when he stepped back from the balcony?

GISEVIUS: Several people from the Reich Chancellery told us that.

DR. DIX: Well then, go on.

GISEVIUS: The following morning—that was the 28th—we believed that the
opportunity had now come to carry out the revolt. That morning we also
learned that Hitler had rejected the final offer from the British Prime
Minister, Chamberlain, and had sent the intermediary, Wilson, back with
a refusal. Witzleben got that letter and took it to Halder. He believed
that proof of Hitler’s desire for war had now been produced, and Halder
agreed. Halder went to see Brauchitsch while Witzleben waited in
Halder’s room. After a few moments Halder came back and said that
Brauchitsch now had also realized that the moment for action had arrived
and that he merely wanted to go over to the Reich Chancellery to make
quite sure that Witzleben and Halder’s account was correct. Brauchitsch
went to the Reich Chancellery after Witzleben had told him over the
telephone that everything was prepared; and it was that noon hour of 28
September when suddenly, and contrary to expectations, Mussolini’s
intervention in the Reich Chancellery took place, and Hitler, impressed
by Mussolini’s step, agreed to go to Munich; so that actually at the
last moment the revolt was eliminated.

DR. DIX: You mean through Munich, don’t you?

GISEVIUS: Of course.

DR. DIX: And now the Munich conference was over. How did matters stand
in your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: We were extremely depressed. We were convinced that now Hitler
would soon go to the utmost lengths. We did not doubt that Munich was
the signal for a world war. Some of our friends wondered if we should
emigrate, and that was discussed with Goerdeler and Schacht. Goerdeler,
with this idea in mind, wrote a letter to a political friend in America
and asked particularly whether the opposition people should now
emigrate. Goerdeler said,

“Otherwise to be able to continue our political work at all in Germany
in the future there is only one other possibility, and that is to employ
the methods of Talleyrand.”

We decided to persevere, and then events followed in quick succession
from the Jewish pogroms to the conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: But before we come to Prague, Witness, you mentioned the Jewish
pogroms; and obviously you mean November 1938. Do you know or can you
recollect what Schacht’s reaction was to those events?

GISEVIUS: Schacht was indignant about the Jewish pogroms, and he said so
in a public speech before the personnel of the Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: I shall submit that speech later as documentary evidence. And
then how did things go on from there? We have come to the end of 1938.
Were there new political events on the horizon which had a stimulating
effect on your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: First of all, there was Schacht’s sudden dismissal from the
Reichsbank Directorate. Schacht’s desire for a consultation of the
Cabinet on this matter did not materialize and our hopes of bringing
about a cabinet crisis were vain. Thus our opposition group had no
connecting point and we had to wait and see what would happen after the
conquest of Prague.

DR. DIX: One moment; you mentioned Schacht’s dismissal from his position
as President of the Reichsbank. Can you tell us anything about this,
about the circumstances leading to it and the effect it had on Schacht,
and so on?

GISEVIUS: I saw how the various letters and memoranda of the Reichsbank
Directorate were drafted, and how they were progressively toned down,
and how Schacht was then dismissed. A few minutes after the letter of
dismissal arrived from Hitler, Schacht read it to me; and he was
indignant at the contents. He repeated to me the passage in which Hitler
praised him for his participation in the German rearmament program; and
Schacht said, “And now he wants me to undertake to go on working with
him openly, and uphold his war policy.”

DR. DIX: But then Schacht remained as a Minister without Portfolio. Was
the problem as to whether he should do so or whether he could act
differently ever discussed between you and Schacht at the time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, but as far as I know it was the same type of discussion
which took place whenever he was to resign. He talked to Lammers, and I
assume that Lammers gave him the customary reply.

DR. DIX: In other words, he thought he had to remain, that he was forced
to remain?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, you have made several attempts to speak about Prague, but
I interrupted you. Will you please describe the effects upon your group
of conspirators, as far as Schacht was concerned?

GISEVIUS: Since December our group had definite proof that Hitler would
attack Prague in March. This new action was cynically called the “March
whirlwind.” As it was quite openly discussed in Berlin circles, we hoped
that news of this action would also reach the British and French
Embassies. We were firmly convinced that this time results would not be
achieved by surprise; but Halder had already adopted a different view.
He thought that Hitler had been given free passage to Prague by the
Western Powers. He refused to have preliminary conferences and wanted to
wait and see whether this Prague action could be achieved without a
fight. And that is what happened.

DR. DIX: In which direction? You have already spoken about the steps
with the British and French Embassies.

GISEVIUS: No, there were no steps taken with regard to the British and
French Embassies.

DR. DIX: Do you want to say anything further about it? Have you anything
to add?

GISEVIUS: No, I have said that we did not take any steps.

DR. DIX: Now, then, Prague is over; and I believe that you and Schacht
went to Switzerland together on behalf of your group. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Not only together with Schacht but also with Goerdeler. We
were of the opinion that Schacht in Germany—excuse me—that Prague
would have incredible psychological effects in Germany. As far as
foreign countries were concerned, Prague was the signal that no peace
and no treaty could be kept with Hitler. Inside Germany unfortunately we
were forced to see that the generals and the people were now convinced
that this Hitler could do whatever he wished; nobody would stop him; he
was protected by Providence. This alarmed us. On one side we saw that
the Western Powers would no longer put up with these things; and on the
other side we saw that within Germany the illusion was growing that the
Western Powers would not go to war. We could see that a war could be
prevented only if the Western Powers would tell not only the Foreign
Minister, not only Hitler, but by every means of propaganda tell the
German nation that any further step towards the East would mean war. It
appeared to us that the only possibility was to warn the generals and to
get them to revolt, and that was the subject of the talks which Schacht,
Goerdeler, and I conducted in Switzerland, immediately after Prague.

DR. DIX: With whom?

GISEVIUS: We met a man who had excellent connections with the British
and French Governments. This man made very exact reports at least to the
French Government. I can testify to this because later after Paris was
conquered, I was able to find a copy of his report among Daladier’s
secret papers. We told this man very clearly that in autumn at the
latest, the fight for Danzig would start. We told him that, as good
Germans, we were without doubt of the opinion that Danzig was a German
city and that some day that point would have to be peacefully discussed;
but we also warned him against having conferences now regarding Danzig
alone because Hitler did not want only Danzig but the whole of Poland,
not the whole of Poland but the Ukraine, and that that was the reason
why the propaganda of foreign countries should make it abundantly clear
to Germany that the limit had now been reached and that the Western
Powers would intervene. We said that only then would a revolt be
possible for us.

DR. DIX: And did this man who had your confidence make a report in the
way you stipulated?

GISEVIUS: Yes, he did; and I must say that very soon public statements
on the part of the British, either on the radio or in the press or in
the House of Commons, began to remove these doubts among the German
generals and the German people. From that time on everything which could
be done was done by the British to alarm the German generals.

DR. DIX: Did not Schacht meet his friend Montagu Norman in Switzerland
at that time and talk with him in the same vein? Do you know? Were you
there?

GISEVIUS: Yes. We thought that the opportunity for Schacht to talk to a
close friend of the British Prime Minister, Chamberlain, should not be
allowed to pass; and Schacht had very detailed discussions with Montagu
Norman, so as to describe to him the psychological atmosphere in Germany
after Prague and to persuade him that the British Government should now
undertake the necessary clarifications.

DR. DIX: Was not your slogan in reports to foreign countries at the
time: “You must play off the Nazis against Germans”?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the tenor of all our discussions. We wanted it
made clear to the German people that the Western Powers were not against
Germany, but only against this Nazi policy of surprise and against the
Nazi methods of terror, within the country as well as without.

DR. DIX: And now, having come back from Switzerland, what happened next,
particularly with reference to Schacht?

GISEVIUS: We saw that things in Germany were rapidly drifting toward the
August crisis and that the generals could not be dissuaded from the view
that Hitler was only bluffing and that there would be another Munich or
another Prague. And now began all those desperate efforts which we made
in order to influence the leading generals, and particularly Keitel, to
prevent the decisive order being given to march against Poland.

DR. DIX: Let us come back to Schacht’s return from the Swiss journey in
spring of 1939. You know that Schacht left Germany then and made a
journey to India?

GISEVIUS: He went to India and hoped to stay there as long as possible
in order to go to China. But on the way Hitler’s order prohibiting him
from setting foot on Chinese soil reached him, and he had to return. As
far as I remember, he came back a few days before the outbreak of war.

DR. DIX: You said China; did Schacht have sympathies with
Chiang-Kai-Chek in spite of the pact with Japan?

GISEVIUS: Yes. He sympathized greatly with the Chinese Government, as
did our entire circle. We all had quite a number of good and dear
Chinese friends with whom we attempted to keep in touch in spite of the
Japanese pact.

DR. DIX: About when did Schacht come back from India?

GISEVIUS: I think it was the beginning of August; but I cannot...

DR. DIX: Now matters were rapidly heading toward war. Did Schacht,
before the outbreak of war, take any steps to prevent its outbreak?

GISEVIUS: He took a great number of steps, but they cannot be described
individually as that would create the impression that Schacht alone was
taking these steps. Actually the situation was such that a large group
of people were now in the struggle, and each one took those steps which
were most suited to him, and each one informed the group of what he had
done and what would be advisable for another to do. For that reason I am
afraid that it would present a completely erroneous picture if I were to
describe individually, and only with respect to Schacht, all those
desperate efforts made from August 1939 until the attack on Holland and
Belgium.

DR. DIX: The Tribunal has taken cognizance of the fact that Schacht was
not acting alone; but here we are dealing with Schacht’s case, and I
should like to ask you, therefore, to confine yourself to the
description of Schacht’s efforts.

GISEVIUS: In that case I must state first that Schacht knew of all these
other matters and was in a certain sense also an accomplice. Of Schacht
himself I can only say at this particular moment that he was co-author
of the Thomas memorandum addressed to General Keitel, or the two
memoranda, in which Schacht, together with our group, pointed out the
dangers of war to Keitel. Further, I can say that, through Thomas and
Canaris, Schacht took steps to intervene with Brauchitsch and Halder.
But I would like to emphasize expressly that all the steps taken by Beck
and Goerdeler were taken with the full knowledge of Schacht and also
with his participation. This was a very important undertaking.

DR. DIX: A collective action? Does not Schacht’s attempt at the very
last moment, at the end of August, to make representations to
Brauchitsch through Canaris at headquarters play a part in this?

GISEVIUS: Yes. After General Thomas had failed with both his memoranda
and after he had failed to persuade Keitel to receive Goerdeler or
Schacht, Schacht tried to approach Brauchitsch or Halder. For that
purpose Thomas paid frequent visits to General Halder, and it was
typical that during those critical days he could not get past the
anteroom of General Halder’s office, past General Von Stülpnagel. Halder
was not “at home,” and just said that he did not want to see Schacht.
Thereupon we took a further step on that dramatic 25 August, the day on
which Hitler had already once given the order to march. As soon as the
news reached us that Hitler had given Halder the order to march, Schacht
and I first got into touch with Thomas; and then, together with Thomas,
we went to Admiral Canaris so that both Thomas and Canaris should
accompany Schacht when he went unannounced to the headquarters in Zossen
in order to confront Brauchitsch and Halder with his presence. Schacht
intended to point out to Brauchitsch and Halder that, in accordance with
the existing constitution, the Reich Cabinet must be consulted before
waging war. Brauchitsch and Halder would be guilty of a breach of oath
if, without the knowledge of the competent political authorities, they
obeyed an order for war. That was roughly what Schacht intended to say
to explain his step. When Thomas and Schacht arrived at Bendlerstrasse,
Thomas went to Canaris. It was about 6 o’clock or...

DR. DIX: The OKW is situated in Bendlerstrasse. The Tribunal should know
that Bendlerstrasse meant the OKW or the OKH.

GISEVIUS: When we arrived at the OKW and were waiting at a corner of the
street, Canaris sent Oster to us. That was the moment when Hitler
between 6 and 7 o’clock suddenly ordered Halder to withdraw his order to
march. The Tribunal will no doubt remember that Hitler, influenced by
the renewed intervention of Mussolini, suddenly withdrew the order to
march which had already been given. Unfortunately, Canaris and Thomas
and all our friends were now under the impression that this withdrawal
of an order to march was an incredible loss of prestige for Hitler.
Oster thought that never before in the history of warfare had a supreme
commander withdrawn such a decisive order in the throes of a nervous
breakdown. And Canaris said to me, “Now the peace of Europe is saved for
50 years, because Hitler has now lost the respect of the generals.” And,
unfortunately, in the face of this psychological change, we all felt
that we could look forward to the following days in a quiet frame of
mind. So, when 3 days later, Hitler nevertheless gave the decisive order
to march, it came as a complete surprise for our group as well. Oster
called me to the OKW; Schacht accompanied me. We asked Canaris again
whether he could not arrange another meeting with Brauchitsch and
Halder, but Canaris said to me, “It is too late now.” He had tears in
his eyes and added, “That is the end of Germany.”

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, we now come to the war, and I think that perhaps
we had better deal with the war after lunch.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: Dr. Gisevius, before the noon recess we had just come to the
outbreak of the war, and so that your subsequent testimony may be
understood, I must ask you first in what capacity you served during the
war.

GISEVIUS: On the day of the outbreak of war I was called to Security
Intelligence by General Oster by means of a forged order. However, as it
was a regulation that all officers or other members of the intelligence
service had to be examined by the Gestapo, and as I would never have
received permission to be a member of the intelligence, they simply gave
me a forged mobilization order. Then I was at the disposal of Oster and
Canaris without doing any direct service.

DR. DIX: And after the outbreak of war what were the activities of your
group of conspirators, the members of which you have already mentioned?
Who took over the leadership, who participated, and what was done?

GISEVIUS: Immediately after the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck
was at the head of all oppositional movements which could exist in
Germany at all, with the exception of the Communists with whom we had no
contact at that time. We were of the opinion that only a general could
be the leader during war, and Beck stood so far above purely military
matters that he was the suitable man to unify all groups from the left
to the right. Beck chose Dr. Goerdeler as his closest collaborator.

DR. DIX: Consequently the only civilians who worked with this group of
conspirators were Schacht and Goerdeler as before?

GISEVIUS: No, on the contrary; all the opposition groups, who had so far
had merely loose connections with each other, were now drawn together
under the pressure of war. This was especially so with the left
opposition movements, which had been greatly reduced in the early years
as all their leaders had been interned. These left groups especially now
came in with us. In this connection I shall merely mention Leuschner and
Dr. Karl Muehlendorf. However, I must also mention the Christian Trade
Unions, and Dr. Habermann, and Dr. Jacob Kaiser. Further I must mention
the Catholic circles, the leaders of the Confessional Church, and
individual political men such as Ambassador Von Hassell, State Secretary
Planck, Minister Popitz, and many, many others.

DR. DIX: What was the attitude of these left circles, especially
concerning the question of a revolt, the forceful removal of Hitler or
even an attempt on his life? Did they also consider the possibility of
an attempt at assassination, which later was actually suggested in your
group?

GISEVIUS: No, the left circles were very much under the impression that
the “stab in the back” legend had done much harm in Germany; and the
left circles thought that they ought not to expose themselves again to
the danger of having it said later that Hitler or the German Army had
not been defeated on the battlefield. The left-wing had long been of the
opinion that no matter how bitter an experience it might be for them, it
must now be proved absolutely to the German people that militarism was
committing suicide in Germany.

DR. DIX: I have already submitted to the Tribunal, a letter which you,
Doctor, smuggled to Switzerland for Schacht at about this time—the end
of 1939. It is a letter to the former president of the International
Bank at Basel, later president of the First National Bank of New York; a
man of influence, who probably had access to President Roosevelt.

In anticipation of the documentary evidence pertaining hereto I had
originally intended to read this letter to the Tribunal now. However, in
discussing the admissibility of evidence I informed the Tribunal of most
of the essential points, and as Mr. Justice Jackson could not yet have
the Schacht Document Book in hand, and as he remarked previously that he
did not like me to produce documentary evidence at this point, I will
not carry out my original intention to read this letter in its entirety.
I will come back to it when I present my documentary evidence. Just to
refresh the witness’ memory about this letter, I will give the
underlying reasons for it. Schacht suggested to President Fraser that
now the moment...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I make no objection to the use of the letter from
Schacht to Leon Fraser as one banker writing to another. If you want to
claim that Mr. Fraser was influential with President Roosevelt, I should
want you to prove it; but I have no objection to the letter.

DR. DIX: The letter is dated 14 January 1946. I will not read it in its
entirety, for there are six long pages. Its contents are...

THE PRESIDENT: What date was it?

DR. DIX: I had the wrong letter. The 16 October 1939. It will be Exhibit
Number 31 in my document book. He writes that now would be an excellent
time to give peace to the world with President Roosevelt—that would be
a victory, also a German victory...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the letter from Schacht?

DR. DIX: From Schacht to Fraser.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have proof for the letter?

DR. DIX: If the Tribunal prefers, Schacht can also deal with the letter.
In that case I will only ask the witness whether it is true that he
smuggled this letter into Switzerland.

[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question, Witness.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I took this letter to Switzerland and mailed it there.

DR. DIX: Very well. What did your group do to bring about peace, or
prevent the war from spreading? Did you undertake further activities in
foreign politics in that direction in your opposition group, that is,
your group of conspirators?

GISEVIUS: The main thing for us was with all possible means to prevent
the war from spreading. It could only spread toward Holland and Belgium
or Norway. We recognized clearly that if a step was taken in this
direction, the consequences, not only for Germany, but for the whole of
Europe would be tremendous. Therefore, we wanted to prevent war in the
West by all means.

Immediately after the Polish Campaign Hitler decided to move his troops
from the East to the West, and to launch the attack by violating the
neutrality of Holland and Belgium.

We believed that if we could succeed in preventing this attack in
November we would in the coming winter months gain enough time to
convince the individual generals, above all Brauchitsch and Halder and
the leaders of the army groups, that they must at least oppose the
expansion of the war.

Brauchitsch and Halder evaded the question and said it was now too late,
that the enemy would fight Germany to the end and destroy her. We did
not share this opinion. We believed a peace with honor was still
possible, and by honor I mean that we would of course eliminate the Nazi
hierarchy to the last man. In order to prove to the generals that the
foreign powers did not wish to destroy the German people, but wanted
only to protect themselves against the Nazi terror, we took all possible
steps abroad. The first attempt in that direction, or a small part of
that attempt, was the letter written by Schacht to Fraser, the object of
which was to point out that certain domestic political developments were
imminent and that if we could gain time, that is, if we could come
through the winter, we could perhaps persuade the generals to undertake
a revolt.

DR. DIX: Thank you. May I interrupt you for a moment? I would like to
call the attention of the Tribunal now to the fact that the witness is
referring to a passage, to a suggestion, contained in the letter. This
letter is in English. I have no German translation, and I must therefore
read this sentence in English. “My feeling is that the earlier
discussions be opened, the easier it will be to influence the
development of certain existing conditions.” The question is now...

Now, I would like to ask you: What did Dr. Schacht mean by the “certain
existing conditions” that were to be influenced? Did he mean your
efforts?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I must interpose an objection. I am not sure
whether you have misunderstood it. I think that what Schacht meant is
not a question to be addressed to this witness. I shall have no
objection to Dr. Schacht telling us what he meant by his cryptic
language, but I don’t think that this witness can interpret what Schacht
meant unless he has some information apart from anything that now
appears. I don’t want to be over technical about this, but it does seem
to me that this is the sort of question which should be reserved for Dr.
Schacht himself.

DR. DIX: Mr. Justice Jackson, of course, is right, but this witness said
that he smuggled the letter into Switzerland, and I assume that he
discussed the contents of the letter with Schacht and was therefore in a
position to explain the cryptic words.

THE PRESIDENT: He didn’t say this yet; he hasn’t said he ever saw the
letter except the outside of it. He hasn’t said he ever saw the letter.

DR. DIX: Will you please tell us whether you saw the letter and knew its
contents?

GISEVIUS: I am sorry that I did not so clearly at once, but I helped in
drafting the letter. I was there when the letter was drafted and
written.

DR. DIX: Then I believe Justice Jackson will withdraw his objection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

DR. DIX: Will you please answer my question; what is meant by those
cryptic words?

GISEVIUS: We wanted to suggest that we, in Germany, were interested in
forcing certain developments and that we now expected an encouraging
word from the other side. I do not, however, want any misunderstanding
to arise here. In this letter it also states very clearly that President
Roosevelt had in the meantime been disappointed many times by the German
side, so that we had to beg, to urge him to take such a step. It is a
fact that President Roosevelt had taken various steps for peace.

DR. DIX: Let us go on now. If I give you the cue “Vatican Action”?...

GISEVIUS: In addition to this attempt to enter into discussions with
America, we believed we should ask for a statement from the British
Government. Again it was our aim solely to...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the original of this letter still available or is this
only given from memory?

DR. DIX: The original copy, yes; that is, a copy signed by Schacht is
here. It was kept during the war in Switzerland and was brought back to
us from Switzerland by this witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, let us go on to the “Vatican Action.”

GISEVIUS: We tried in every possible way to prove to General Halder and
General Olbricht that their theory was wrong, that there could be no
longer a question of dealing with a decent German government. We
believed that we should now follow a particularly important and safe
road. The Holy Father made personal efforts in these matters, as the
British Government had, with justification, become uncertain whether
there really existed in Germany a trustworthy group of men with whom
talks could be undertaken. I remember that shortly afterwards the Venlo
incident took place when, with the excuse that there was a German
opposition group, officials of the English Secret Service were kidnapped
at the Dutch border. Therefore, we were anxious to prove that there was
a group here which was honestly trying to do its best and which, if the
occasion arose, would stand by its word under all circumstances. I
believe that we kept our word regarding the things we proposed to do,
while we said quite frankly that we could not bring about this revolt as
we had said previously we hoped to do.

These negotiations began in October—November 1939. They were only
concluded later in the spring, and if I am asked I will continue.

DR. DIX: Yes, please describe the conclusion.

GISEVIUS: I believe I must add first that, during November of 1939,
General Halder actually had intended a revolt, but that these intentions
for a revolt again came to naught because at the very last minute Hitler
called off the western offensive. Strengthened by the attitude of Halder
at that time, we believed that we should continue these discussions at
the Vatican. We reached what you might call a gentleman’s agreement, on
the grounds of which I believe that I am entitled to state that we could
give the generals unequivocal proof that in the event of the overthrow
of the Hitler regime, an agreement could be reached with a decent civil
German government.

DR. DIX: Did you read the documents yourself, Doctor?

GISEVIUS: These were oral discussions which were then written down in a
comprehensive report. This report was read by the Ambassador Von Hassell
and by Dr. Schacht before it was given to Halder by General Thomas.
Halder was so taken aback by the contents that he gave this
comprehensive report to Generaloberst Von Brauchitsch. Brauchitsch was
enraged and threatened to arrest the intermediary, General Thomas, and
thus this action which had every prospect of success, failed.

DR. DIX: Doctor, you have testified...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the last notes that I have got down in my
notebook are these: “That we knew that if Holland, Belgium, and the
other countries were attacked, it would have very grave consequences and
we therefore negotiated with Halder and Brauchitsch and they weren’t
prepared to help us to stop the war at that time. We wanted peace with
honor, eliminating politics. We took all possible steps.” Well, now,
since I took these notes down, I think we spent nearly 10 minutes in
details, which are utterly irrelevant, about further negotiations. If
they took all possible steps, what is the point of giving us these
details about it?

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, if a witness is called in a matter of such
importance, where he as well as the defendants’ counsel must always take
into account that people who are of a different opinion may say “these
are just generalities, we want facts and particulars,” then I cannot
forego having the witness testify at least in broad outline that, for
example, a detailed action had been undertaken through His Holiness in
the Vatican. If he merely says that the result of this action was a
comprehensive report, if with Halder and Brauchitsch the above
mentioned...

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with you that the one sentence about some
negotiations with the Vatican may have been properly given, but all the
rest of it were unnecessary details.

DR. DIX: Anyway we have already concluded this chapter, Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the witness._] You have already testified that the revolt
which was planned for November did not occur because the western
offensive did not take place. Therefore, we need not pursue this subject
any further. I would merely like to ask you at this point: Did your
group of conspirators remain inactive during the winter, and
particularly during the spring, or were further plans followed and acted
upon?

GISEVIUS: Constant attempts were made to influence all generals within
our reach. Besides Halder and Brauchitsch we tried to reach the generals
of the armored divisions in the West. I remember, for instance, there
was a discussion between Schacht and General Hoeppner.

DR. DIX: Hoeppner?

GISEVIUS: Hoeppner. We also tried to influence Field Marshal Rundstedt,
Bock, and Leeb. Here, too, General Thomas and Admiral Canaris were the
intermediaries.

DR. DIX: And how did the generals react?

GISEVIUS: When everything was ready, they would not start.

DR. DIX: Now, we come to the summer of 1941. Hitler is in Paris. The
aerial offensive against England is imminent. Tell us about your group
of conspirators and their activity during this period and the period
following.

GISEVIUS: After the fall of Paris, our group had no influence at all for
months. Hitler’s success deluded everyone, and it took much effort on
our part, through all channels available, to try at least to prevent the
bombardment of England. Here again the group made united efforts and we
tried, through General Thomas and Admiral Canaris and others, to prevent
this evil.

DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly, when you use the word “group”
you mean the group which was led by Beck, in which Schacht collaborated?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Now, at that time did Schacht have several talks, or one talk,
along the same line in Switzerland?

GISEVIUS: That was a little later. We have now come to the year 1941,
and on this trip to Switzerland Schacht tried to urge that a peace
conference should be held as soon as possible. We knew that Hitler was
thinking about the attack on Russia, and we believed that we should do
everything to avert at least this disaster. With this thought in mind
Schacht’s discussions in Switzerland were conducted. I myself took part
in arranging a dinner in Basel with the president of the B. I. Z., Mr.
McKittrick, an American, and I was present when Schacht tried to express
at least the opinion that everything possible must now be done to
initiate negotiations.

DR. DIX: In this connection I would respectfully like to remind the
Tribunal of the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_, of which I
presented the essential contents when we discussed the admissibility of
the document. It deals with a similar conversation between Schacht and
an American economist. That is the same trip which the witness is now
discussing. I will take the liberty of referring to this article later,
when presenting documentary evidences.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, the war continued. Do you have anything
to say about Russia; about the imminent war with Russia?

GISEVIUS: I can say only that Schacht knew of all the many attempts
which we undertook to avert this catastrophe.

DR. DIX: Now let us go further to the time of Stalingrad. What was done
by your group of conspirators after this critical period of the war?

GISEVIUS: When we did not succeed in persuading the victorious generals
to engineer a revolt, we then tried at least to win them over to one
when they had obviously come up against their great catastrophe. This
catastrophe, which found its first visible signs in Stalingrad, had been
predicted in all its details by Generaloberst Beck since December of
1942. We immediately made all preparations so that at the moment, which
could be forecast with almost mathematical exactitude, when the army of
Paulus, completely defeated, would have to capitulate, then at least a
military revolt could be organized. I myself was called back from
Switzerland and participated in all discussions and preparations. I can
only testify that this time a great many preparations were made. Contact
was also made with the field marshals in the East, with Witzleben in the
West but again, things turned out differently, for Field Marshal Paulus
capitulated instead of giving us the cue at which Kluge, according to
plan, was to start the revolt in the East.

DR. DIX: This was the time of the so-called Schlaberndorff attempt?

GISEVIUS: No, a little later.

DR. DIX: Now I shall interpose another question. Until now you have
always described the group led by Generaloberst Beck and supported by
Schacht, Goerdeler, _et cetera_, as a revolt movement, that is, a group
which wanted to overthrow the government. Did you not now more and more
aim at an assassination?

GISEVIUS: Yes, from the moment when the generals again deserted us, we
realized that a revolt was not to be hoped for, and from that moment on
we took all the steps we could to instigate an assassination.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the
German Armed Forces): Mr. President, I must object at this point to the
testimony of the witness. The witness, Dr. Gisevius, by his testimony
has incriminated the group which I represent. However, some of this
testimony is so general that it cannot be referred to as fact.
Furthermore, he has just testified that the field marshals in the East
had “deserted” the group of conspirators. These statements are opinions
which the witness is giving, but they are not facts, to which the
witness must limit his testimony, and therefore I ask—Mr. President, I
have not yet finished. I wanted to conclude with the request for a
resolution by the Court that the testimony given by the witness, where
he asserted that the generals had “deserted” the group of conspirators,
be stricken from the record.

DR. DIX: May I please reply briefly? I cannot agree with the opinion of
my esteemed colleague Dr. Laternser that the statement “the generals
deserted us” was not a statement of fact...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need to hear further argument upon it.
It certainly won’t be stricken from the record until we have had time to
consider it, and Dr. Laternser will have his opportunity of examining
this witness, and he can then elucidate any evidence he wants to.

DR. LATERNSER: But, Mr. President, if I make the motion for the reason
that the witness is giving testimony which is beyond his scope as a
witness, and that he is giving his opinion, then to that extent it is
inadmissible testimony which would have to be stricken from the record.

THE PRESIDENT: If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be
perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn’t make the evidence
inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have been misunderstood. I did not say,
and I am not basing my request to strike the testimony from the record
on the allegation that the witness made statements from hearsay; but I
say that it is not a statement of fact, but an opinion which the witness
is giving when he says that “the generals in the East deserted the group
of conspirators.”

DR. DIX: May I answer briefly to that? If I try to influence a group of
generals to organize a revolt and if they do not do so, that is a fact
and I can state this fact with the words, “They deserted us.” Naturally
I can also say, “They did not revolt,” but that is merely a matter of
expression. Both are facts and not an opinion. He is not appraising the
behavior of the generals in an ethical, military, or political sense, he
is merely pointing out, “They were not willing.”

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] If I recall correctly, you were
just about to tell us that now the policy of the conspirators’ group
changed from a revolt to an assassination. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Do you wish to state anything further?

GISEVIUS: You had asked me about the first step in this direction after
Generaloberst Beck had given up all hope of being able to win over
another general to a revolt. It was said at that time that there was now
nothing left for us but to free Germany, Europe, and the world from the
tyrant by a bomb attack. Immediately after this decision, preparations
were started. Oster spoke to Lahousen and Lahousen furnished the bombs
from his arsenal. The bombs were taken to the headquarters of Kluge at
Smolensk, and with every possible means we tried to bring about the
assassination, which was unsuccessful only because at a time when Hitler
was visiting the front, the bomb which had been put in his airplane did
not explode. This was in the spring of 1943.

DR. DIX: Now, an event took place in the Abwehr OKW, which as a result
of further developments, strongly affected Schacht’s further attitude
and also your remaining in Germany. Will you please describe that?

GISEVIUS: Gradually even Himmler could not fail to see what was
happening in the OKW, and at the urgent request of SS General
Schellenberg a thorough investigation of the Canaris group was now
started. A special commissioner was appointed and on the first day of
this investigation Oster was relieved of his post and a number of his
collaborators were arrested. A short time afterwards Canaris was also
dismissed from his post. I myself could no longer remain in Germany and
thus this group, which until now had in a certain sense been the
directorate of all the conspiracies, was eliminated.

DR. DIX: During that time, that is January 1943, Schacht was also
relieved of his position as Reich Minister without Portfolio. Did you
meet Schacht after that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes. By chance I was in Berlin on the day this letter of
dismissal arrived. It was an unusually sharp letter and I remember that
that night I was asked to the country house of Schacht, and as the
letter had simply stated that Schacht was to be dismissed, we wondered
whether he was also going to be arrested.

DR. DIX: I would like to remind the Tribunal that I read this letter
into the record when Lammers was examined and showed it to him. This
letter—I mean Schacht’s letter of dismissal signed by Lammers—has
already been read into the record and is probably contained in my
document book.

[_Turning to the witness._] You were in Switzerland at that time, but on
20 July you were in Berlin. How did that happen?

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the 20th of July 1944?

DR. DIX: Yes, the well-known day of the 20th of July. We are rapidly
approaching the end now.

GISEVIUS: A few months after the elimination of the Canaris-Oster circle
we formed a new group around General Olbricht. At that time Colonel
Count Von Stauffenberg also joined us. He replaced Oster in all
activities, and when after several months, and after many unsuccessful
attempts and discussions, the time finally arrived in July 1944, I
returned secretly to Berlin in order to participate in the events.

DR. DIX: But you had no direct connection with Schacht at this attempted
assassination?

GISEVIUS: No; I, personally, was in Berlin secretly and saw only
Goerdeler, Beck, and Stauffenberg; and it was agreed expressly at this
time that no other civilian except Goerdeler, Leuschner, and myself were
to be informed of the matter. We hoped thus to protect lives by not
burdening anyone unnecessarily with this knowledge.

DR. DIX: Now I come to my last question.

You know that Schacht had after all held high government positions under
the Hitler regime. You, Doctor, as is shown by your testimony today were
an arch enemy of the Hitler regime. Despite that you had, as can also be
seen from your testimony today, special confidence in Schacht. How do
you explain this fact which at first sight seems to be contradictory in
itself?

GISEVIUS: My answer can, of course, only express a personal opinion and
I will formulate it as briefly as possible. However, I would like to
emphasize that the problem of Schacht was confusing not only to me but
to my friends as well; Schacht was always a problem and a puzzle to us.
Perhaps it was due to the contradictory nature of this man that he kept
his position in the Hitler government for so long. He undoubtedly
entered the Hitler regime for patriotic reasons, and I would like to
testify here that the moment his disappointment became obvious he
decided for the same patriotic reasons to join the opposition. Despite
Schacht’s many contradictions and the puzzles he gave us to solve, my
friends and I were strongly attracted to Schacht because of his
exceptional personal courage and the fact that he was undoubtedly a man
of strong moral character, and he did not think only of Germany but also
of the ideals of humanity. That is why we went with him, why we
considered him one of us; and, if you ask me personally, I can say that
the doubts which I often had about him were completely dispelled during
the dramatic events of 1938 and 1939. At that time he really fought, and
I will never forget that. It is a pleasure for me to be able to testify
to this here.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, I am now through with the questioning of this
witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants counsel want to
ask questions of the witness?

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): Witness, yesterday you said that you
were a member of the Stahlhelm. When and for how long were you a member?

GISEVIUS: I entered the Stahlhelm in 1929, I believe, and left that
organization in 1933.

HERR BÖHM: You know the mentality of the members of the Stahlhelm. You
know that, almost without exception, they were people who had served in
the first World War, and I would like to ask you now whether the
internal and foreign political goals of the Stahlhelm were to be reached
by its members in a legal or in a revolutionary manner?

GISEVIUS: To my knowledge the Stahlhelm always favored the legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Was the fight of the Stahlhelm against the Treaty of
Versailles which every organization with national tendencies took up, to
be carried on by legal or revolutionary means, or means of force?

GISEVIUS: It is very hard for me to answer for the entire Stahlhelm, but
I can only say that I, and the members of the Stahlhelm organization
with whom I was acquainted, knew that the Stahlhelm wanted to take the
legal way.

HERR BÖHM: Is it correct to say that in the year 1932 and 1933 hundreds
of thousands, regardless of party and race, entered the Stahlhelm
organization?

GISEVIUS: That is correct. The more critical matters became in Germany,
the more people went to the right. I myself having experienced this
growth of the Stahlhelm as an official speaker at public meetings, from
1929 to 1933, I would describe it in this way: That those who did not
want to join the NSDAP and the SA, deliberately entered the Stahlhelm so
that within the German rightist movement there would be a counterbalance
against the rising “brown” tide. That was the underlying reason of our
recruitment for the Stahlhelm at that time.

HERR BÖHM: You know, of course, that in the year 1933 the Stahlhelm
organization as a whole was taken into the SA. Was it possible at that
time for the individual member of the Stahlhelm to say “no,” or to
protest against being taken over into the SA?

GISEVIUS: That was possible, of course, as everything was possible also
in the Third Reich.

HERR BÖHM: What would have been the possible consequences of such a
step?

GISEVIUS: The possible consequences would have been a violent discussion
with the regional Party leaders or SA leaders. At that time I was no
longer a member of the Stahlhelm and I can merely say that it
undoubtedly must have been very difficult for many people, particularly
those living in the country, to refuse being transferred to the SA.
After they had been betrayed by their leader, Minister Seldte, or as it
was said at that time “sold” to the SA, refusal to transfer to the SA
was naturally a sign of open distrust toward National Socialism.

HERR BÖHM: I gather from my correspondence with the former members of
the Stahlhelm, that these people who, as former members of the
Stahlhelm, were taken into the SA, remained a foreign body in it and
were in constant opposition to the NSDAP and the SA. Is that correct?

GISEVIUS: As I myself no longer belonged to that organization, I can
only say that I assume that those members of the Stahlhelm felt very
uneasy in their new surroundings.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know whether the members of the Stahlhelm, before 1934
and from 1934, participated in Crimes against Peace, against the Jews,
against the Church, and so forth?

GISEVIUS: No, I know nothing about that.

HERR BÖHM: Now I would also like to question you about the SA as far as
you are able to give information. Yesterday at least you expressed
yourself freely with regard to the SA leaders. I would like to ask you,
in replying to a question I shall now ask, to confine yourself to a
circle of SA members which lies between the simple SA man and the
Standartenführer or the Brigadeführer. Could you tell from the attitude
and activity of the ordinary SA man and that of the Standartenführer or
Brigadeführer—and I do not go beyond that limit because I well remember
the statements you made yesterday concerning the Gruppenführer or
Obergruppenführer—that these people intended to commit Crimes against
Peace?

GISEVIUS: It is, of course, very difficult to answer such a general
question. If you ask me about the majority of these SA men, I can only
say no.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, did you notice that SA men were arrested and that SA
men were also put into concentration camps?

GISEVIUS: I saw that many times. In 1933, 1934, and 1935, that was in
the years when it was my official duty to deal with these matters, many
SA men were arrested by the Gestapo, beaten to death, or at least
tortured, and put into concentration camps.

HERR BÖHM: Could a man, who was in the SA, or anyone outside for that
matter, judge the SA as a whole from the activity of its members, or
from individual cases, and gather that the SA intended to commit Crimes
against Peace?

GISEVIUS: No. When I consider what efforts even we in the High Command
of the Wehrmacht had to make to try and discover whether or not Hitler
was planning a war, I naturally cannot attribute to a simple SA man
knowledge of something which we ourselves did not know for certain.

HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution asserted that the SA incited the youth and
the German people to war. Did you observe anything of that nature? You
were a member of the Gestapo and such activities could not have escaped
your notice.

GISEVIUS: That is another extremely general question, and I do not know
to what extent certain songs, and other things, can be considered a
preparation for war. At any rate I cannot imagine that the mass of the
SA was of a different frame of mind than the mass of the German people
in the years up to 1938, and the general trend of opinion beyond a doubt
was that the mere thought of war was absolute madness.

HERR BÖHM: Was there anything that made you think that the SA intended
to commit Crimes against Peace, or that they had committed such crimes?

GISEVIUS: As far as the ordinary SA man is concerned, I must say “no”
again, and I say the same for the mass of the SA. I could not say to
what extent the higher leaders were involved in plotting all the
horrible things we have heard about here, but the majority undoubtedly
did not know of such things and were not trained for them.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, it cannot be denied that mistakes were made by a
number of SA men, and criminal acts were committed for which these
people certainly should be punished.

You know the SA and know what took place during the revolutionary period
and afterwards. Are you in a position to estimate or to give a
proportional figure as to what percentage of the numerous members of the
SA conducted themselves in a punishable manner? I call your attention to
the fact that up to, perhaps 1932 or 1933, the SA...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment, Dr. Böhm. The Tribunal doesn’t think that
is a proper question to put to a witness, what percentage of a group of
this sort, of hundreds of thousands of men, take a certain view.

HERR BÖHM: However the explanation of this question would be very
important for my case, Mr. President. Here is a witness who was outside
the SA, who as a member of the Gestapo was perhaps one of the few people
who could look into the activities of the SA, and actually did look into
them, and he will certainly be believed by the Tribunal. He knew fairly
well what criminal procedures were carried out and also—and that is
what I want to say—the number of members of the SA, and he is one of
the few who are in a position to testify on this matter. I believe that
if the witness is in a position to testify hereto, the testimony given
by him will be of great importance to the Tribunal also.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that not only this
witness, but other witnesses, are not in a position to give such
evidence, and the question is denied.

HERR BÖHM: Witness, do you know of cases in which SA members worked in
opposition to the SA?

GISEVIUS: I answered that question when I said that quite a number of SA
members were arrested by the Gestapo.

HERR BÖHM: Yes. Do you know what criminal proceedings were taken against
the members of the SA, and possibly how many?

GISEVIUS: Far too few, I am sorry to say, if you put it that way.

HERR BÖHM: Yes.

GISEVIUS: Unfortunately there were many who committed misdeeds in the SA
and who went scot-free. I am sorry that I must answer in this way.

HERR BÖHM: Certainly. And in what relation do they stand to the entire
SA?

GISEVIUS: Now we have come again to the question...

THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question over again.

HERR BÖHM: Do you know under what circumstances one could resign from
the SA?

GISEVIUS: In the same manner as one could resign from all organizations
of the Party. That was, of course, a brave decision to make.

HERR BÖHM: Thank you. I have no further question.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in replying to a question of my colleague Dr.
Dix, you told the Tribunal that after the defeat at Stalingrad a
military revolt was to be organized. You testified on this point that
discussions had already taken place, that preparations had been made,
and that the execution of the military revolt was prevented because the
field marshals in the East had deserted the group of conspirators.

I ask you now to give us more details on this question so that I can
understand why you came to the conclusion that the field marshals had
deserted the conspiracy group.

GISEVIUS: From the outbreak of the war Generaloberst Beck tried to
contact one field marshal after another. He wrote letters and he sent
messengers to them. I particularly remember the correspondence with
General Field Marshal Von Manstein, and I saw with my own eyes General
Von Manstein’s answer of the year 1942. To Beck’s strictly military
explanations that the war had been lost and why, Manstein could reply
only: A war is not lost until one considers it as lost.

Beck said that with an answer like that from a field marshal strategic
questions could certainly not be raised. Several months later another
attempt was made to win General Field Marshal Von Manstein. General Von
Tresckow, also a victim of the 20th of July, went to the headquarters of
Manstein. Oberstleutnant Count Von der Schulenburg also went to the
headquarters of Manstein, but we did not succeed in winning Herr Von
Manstein to our side.

At the time of Stalingrad we contacted Field Marshal Von Kluge, and he,
in his turn, contacted Manstein. This time discussions reached a point
when Kluge definitely assured us that he would win over Field Marshal
Von Manstein at a discussion definitely fixed to take place in the
Führer’s headquarters. Because of the importance of that day, a special
telephone line was laid by the General of the Signal Corps, Fellgiebel,
between the headquarters and General Olbricht at the OKW in Berlin. I
myself was present when this telephone conversation took place. Even
today I can still see that paper which said, in plain language, that
Manstein, contrary to his previous assurances, had allowed himself to be
persuaded by Hitler to remain in office. And even Kluge expressed
himself as satisfied at the time with very small military strategic
concessions. This was a bitter disappointment to us, and, therefore, I
would like to repeat again what Beck said at that time: “We were
deserted.”

DR. LATERNSER: What further preparations had been made in this special
connection?

GISEVIUS: We had made definite agreements with Field Marshal Von
Witzleben. Witzleben was the Commander-in-Chief in the West, and
therefore he was very important for starting or protecting a revolt in
the West. We had made further definite agreements with the Military
Governor of Belgium, Generaloberst Von Falkenhausen. In addition, as on
20 July 1944, we had assembled a certain contingent of armored troops in
the vicinity of Berlin. Furthermore, those commanders of the troops who
were to participate in the action had been assembled in the OKW.

DR. LATERNSER: All this happened after Stalingrad?

GISEVIUS: At the time of the Stalingrad revolt.

DR. LATERNSER: Please continue.

GISEVIUS: We had made all other political preparations which were
necessary. It is difficult for me to tell here the entire story of the
revolts against the Third Reich.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. What were the reasons why this intended military
revolt was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: What was that?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, what were the reasons why this revolt, which was
intended by the group of conspirators, was not carried through?

GISEVIUS: Contrary to all expectations, Field Marshal Paulus
capitulated. This, as is known, was the first wholesale capitulation of
generals; whereas we had expected that Paulus with his generals would
issue, before his capitulation, a proclamation to the German people and
to the East Front, in which the strategy of Hitler and the sacrifice of
the Stalingrad army would be branded in suitable words. When this cue
had been given, Kluge was to declare that in future he would take no
further military orders from Hitler. We hoped with this plan to
circumvent the problem of the military oath which kept troubling us more
and more; the field marshals one after the other were to refuse military
obedience to Hitler, whereupon Beck was to take over the supreme
military command in Berlin.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you just mentioned the military oath. Do you
know whether Blomberg and Generaloberst Beck opposed, or tried to
oppose, the pledge the Armed Forces took to Hitler?

GISEVIUS: I know only that Beck up to the last day of his life
considered the day he gave his pledge to Hitler as the blackest day of
his existence, and he gave me an exact description of how completely
taken unawares he had felt at the rendering of the oath. He told me that
he had been summoned to a military roll call; and that suddenly it was
announced that an oath of allegiance was to be given to the new head of
State; that unexpectedly a new form of oath was to be used. Beck could
never rid himself of the awful thought that at that time he perhaps
should not have given his oath. He told me that while he was on his way
home, he said to a comrade, “This is the blackest day of my life.”

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in your testimony, you also mentioned that
between the Polish campaign and the Western campaign, or with the
beginning of the Western campaign, a further military Putsch was to be
attempted, and that this Putsch failed because Halder and Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch shirked it. You used the term “shirked” previously in
your testimony. Now I ask you to tell me on the basis of what facts did
you arrive at this opinion that both these generals shirked...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I do not raise an objection that this is harmful to
us if we have plenty of time, but this evidence as to these Putsche, and
threatened Putsche, and rumored Putsche, was all admissible here in our
view only as bearing on the attitude of the Defendant Schacht. We are
not trying these generals for being in a Putsch or not being in a
Putsch. For all purposes it is just as well as they should not be in a
Putsch. I do not know what purposes this can have in doing it over
again. I call the Tribunal’s attention for the limited purpose for which
this historical matter was admitted, and suggest that it is serving no
purpose in this connection to review it.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the answer to that, Dr. Laternser?

DR. LATERNSER: Since the witness has talked about this matter and
testified that Halder as well as Brauchitsch shirked, and I cannot
establish whether the opinion expressed by this witness with “shirked”
is correct on the basis of the facts, I think I am obliged to clarify
this point. In a general sense I would like to add further that the
Prosecution is also justified in going into this point. I refer to the
contention of the French Prosecutor in which he stated that in the light
of all these circumstances it was beyond comprehension why Halder, as
well as the entire German nation, did not rise as one man against the
regime. Therefore, if I start from the viewpoint of the Prosecution,
then my question on this point, as I have just put it, is undoubtedly of
importance, and I, therefore, ask that this question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The charge against the High Command is that they were a
criminal organization within the meaning of the Charter; that is to say
that they planned an aggressive war, or that they committed War Crimes
or Crimes against Humanity in connection with an aggressive war. Well,
whether or not they took part, or were planning to take part in a Putsch
to stop the war does not seem very material to any of those questions.

DR. LATERNSER: I agree with you entirely on this point, Mr. President,
that it cannot actually be considered of special importance; but on the
other hand...

THE PRESIDENT: I did not say that it was not of special importance. I
say that it was not material to the relevancy. The Tribunal does not
think that any of these questions are relevant.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw my question. I have one final
question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, can you tell me the names of those
generals who participated on the 20th of July?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what has that got to do with any charge against the
High Command?

DR. LATERNSER: The General Staff is accused of having participated in a
conspiracy. The question...

THE PRESIDENT: We are not here to consider the honor of the High
Command. We are here to consider whether or not they are a criminal
organization within the meaning of the Charter, and that is the only
question with which we are going to deal as far as you are concerned.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the General Staff and the OKW are accused
of having participated in a conspiracy. If I prove, as I am trying to do
with this question, that on the contrary, instead of participating in a
conspiracy, part of the General Staff took part in an action against the
regime, then the answer to this question on this point indicates that
precisely the opposite was the case; and, for that reason, I ask that
the question be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think what the General Staff did in
July 1944, when the circumstances were entirely different to what they
were in September 1939, has any relevancy to the question whether they
took part, either before or in September 1939.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, if I put myself in the place of the
Prosecution, I must assume that the Prosecution assumes that the
conspiracy continued. It cannot be inferred, from testimony by the
Prosecution or from anything that has been submitted, that the
conspiracy was to have stopped at a certain period of time. So that the
answer to this question would be of importance, I believe of decisive
importance. I would like to supplement my statement, Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Laternser.

DR. LATERNSER: I would like to add that it is precisely for the members
of the group I represent that the period of time between 1938 and May
1940 is considered decisive.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the group changed; therefore, they might be
different in 1944?

DR. LATERNSER: I wish to add that a particularly large number of the
members of this group only joined it in the course of 1944 because of
their official positions, and I do consider this point important.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, my question was: Can you give me the names of
those generals who participated in the attempted assassination of the
20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Beck, General Field Marshal Von Witzleben,
General Olbricht, General Hoeppner.

DR. LATERNSER: One question: General Hoeppner was previously
commander-in-chief of an armored army?

GISEVIUS: I believe so; General Von Haase, and certainly a large number
of other generals whom I cannot enumerate offhand. Here I have mentioned
only the names of those who were at Bendlerstrasse that afternoon.

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness: Do you know whether Field Marshal
Rommel also participated on the 20th of July 1944?

GISEVIUS: I cannot answer by merely saying “yes,” for it is a fact that
Rommel, as well as Field Marshal Von Kluge, did participate. However, it
would give a wrong picture if Field Marshal Rommel were suddenly to
appear in the category of those who fought against Hitler. Herr Rommel,
as a typical Party general, sought to join us very late, and it gave us
a very painful impression when suddenly Herr Rommel in the face of his
own military catastrophe, proposed to us to have Hitler assassinated,
and then, if possible, Göring and Himmler as well. And, even then, he
did not want to join in at the first opportunity, but wanted to stay
somewhat in the background in order to allow us to profit by his
popularity later on. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to know
whether these gentlemen, when they joined our group, came as the fallen
might, as people who wished to save their pensions, or as people who,
from the beginning, stood for decency and honor.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you yourself ever speak to Field Marshal Rommel about
this?

GISEVIUS: No. I never considered it worth while to make his
acquaintance.

DR. LATERNSER: A further question: Did officers of the General Staff
participate in the 20th of July?

GISEVIUS: Yes, a great number.

DR. LATERNSER: About how many would you say?

GISEVIUS: I cannot give you the number, for at that time I was not
informed of how many of the General Staff Stauffenberg had on his side.
I do not doubt that Stauffenberg, Colonel Hansen, and several other
stout-hearted men had discovered a number of clean, courageous officers
among the General Staff, and that they could count on the support of
very many decent members of the General Staff, but whom they naturally
could not initiate into their plans beforehand.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that will be sufficient for this point. Another
question has occurred to me. You mentioned General Von Tresckow
previously. Did you know General Von Tresckow personally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know anything about the fact that, after he
learned that the commissar decree had been issued, General Von Tresckow
remonstrated with Rundstedt and that these remonstrances contributed to
the fact that the commissar decree was not passed on in General Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt’s sector?

GISEVIUS: Tresckow belonged to our group for many years. There was no
action which made us so ashamed as this one, and from the very start he
courageously called the attention of his superiors to the
inadmissibility of such terrible decrees. I remember how at that time we
learned of the famous commissar decree at first through hearsay, and we
immediately sent a courier to Tresckow to inform him simply of the
intention of such an outrage, and how after the decree had been
published, Tresckow, at a given signal, remonstrated with General Field
Marshal Von Rundstedt in the way you described.

THE PRESIDENT: You said a while ago that you were just going to ask your
last question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am sorry I could not keep to that. A
number of questions arose from the testimony of the witness, but this
was my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants’ counsel wish to
ask any questions of the witness?

[_There was no response._]

Then do the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I have a few questions
to put to you, Dr. Gisevius, and if you will answer them as nearly as
possible, “yes” or “no,” as you are capable of giving a truthful answer,
you will save a great deal of time.

The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is
it not a fact that within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you
at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your experiences in the conspiracy
that you have related here?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were later brought here, and after coming
here were interrogated by the Prosecution as well as by the counsel for
Frick and for Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, your attitude and viewpoint are, as I
understand you, those of a German who felt that loyalty to the German
people required continuous opposition to the Nazi regime. Is that a
correct statement of your position?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you had a very large experience in police
matters in Germany.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If your Putsche or other moves to obtain power in
Germany were successful, it was planned that you would be in charge of
the police in the reorganization, was it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Either as Minister of the Interior or as Police
Commissioner, whatever it might be called.

GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you represented the belief that it was not
necessary to govern Germany with concentration camps and with Gestapo
methods; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you found all of the ways of presenting your
viewpoint to the German people cut off by the Gestapo methods which were
used by the Nazi regime; is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So that there was no way open to you to obtain any
change in German policy except through revolt or assassination, or means
of that kind?

GISEVIUS: No. I am convinced that until 1937 or the beginning of 1938
the position could have been changed in Germany by a majority of votes
in the Reich Cabinet or through pressure by the Armed Forces.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you fix 1937 as the time when it ceased to be
possible by peaceful means to effect a change in Germany; is that
correct?

GISEVIUS: That is how I would judge it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was not until after 1937 that Schacht
joined your group; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as I said, the group was not formed until 1937, 1938; but
Schacht had already introduced me to Goerdeler in 1936, and Schacht and
Oster had known each other since 1936. And naturally Schacht had also
known a large number of other members of the group for a long time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But Schacht did not become convinced, as I
understand your statement to us, until after 1937—until the Putsch
affair—that he wouldn’t be able to handle Hitler in some peaceful way;
is that not correct?

GISEVIUS: In what manner? In a peaceful manner or...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In a peaceful manner.

GISEVIUS: Yes, until the end of 1937 Schacht believed that it ought to
be possible to remove Hitler legally.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But by the end of 1937, as you now say, the
possibility of a peaceful removal of Hitler had become impossible in
fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is what we thought.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; now, there was, as I understand your view in
going to the general—there was no power in Germany that could stop or
deal with the Gestapo, except the Army.

GISEVIUS: Yes. I would answer that question in the affirmative.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, in addition to the Gestapo, this Nazi
regime also had a private army in the SS, did they not? And, for a
period, in the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And if you were to combat successfully the Nazi
regime, you had to have manpower which only the Army had; is that right?

GISEVIUS: Yes, only people who could be found in the Army; but at the
same time we also attempted to influence certain people in the Police,
and we needed all the decent officials in the ministries, and the broad
masses of the people altogether.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the Wehrmacht was the source of power capable
of dealing with the SS and the Gestapo if the generals had been willing?

GISEVIUS: That was our conviction.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is the reason you kept seeking the help of
the generals and felt let down when they wouldn’t give you their
assistance finally?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when everybody connected
with your group knew that the war was lost.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was before these plots on Hitler’s life,
and it was apparent before the Schlaberndorff plot and before the July
20th plot, that the war was lost, was it not?

GISEVIUS: I should like to make it quite clear that there was no one in
our group who did not already know, even when the war started, that
Hitler would never win this war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it became very much more apparent as time went
on, not only that the war could not be won by Germany, but that Germany
was going to be physically destroyed as a result of the war; is that not
true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yet, under the system which the Nazi regime had
installed, you had no way of changing the course of events in Germany
except by assassination or a revolt; is that true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And so you resorted to those extreme measures,
knowing that Hitler could never make peace with the Allies; is that
true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in this was to save Germany the
last destroying blows, which unfortunately she received, from the point
of view of the Germans; is that not a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should like to say that actually since the beginning of the
war, we no longer thought only of Germany. I think that I may say that
we bore a heavy share of responsibility towards Germany and towards the
world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what you were endeavoring to do was to get
the war to an end, since you had not been able to stop its commencement,
were you not?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was impossible as long as Hitler was at
the head of the government and this group of men behind him?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there was another plot on Hitler’s life that
you haven’t mentioned. Was there not a bomb that was later found to have
been a communist bomb?

GISEVIUS: This happened on 9 November 1939, in the Bürgerbräukeller, in
Munich. It was a brave Communist who acted independently.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at none of these times when Hitler’s life was
endangered, by a strange coincidence, was Göring or Himmler ever
present; is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you attach any importance to that fact?

GISEVIUS: We sometimes regretted it. For instance, the attempt at
assassination would perhaps have succeeded, if Göring and Himmler had
been with Hitler on 17 July. But as the years went by, the members of
this clique separated to such an extent, and protected themselves so
much that they could hardly be found together anywhere. Göring, too, was
gradually so absorbed in his transactions and art collections at
Karinhall that he was hardly ever to be found at a serious conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the assassination of Hitler would have
accomplished nothing from your point of view if the Number 2 man had
stepped into Hitler’s place, would it?

GISEVIUS: That was a debatable problem for a long time, because
Brauchitsch, for instance, imagined that we could create a transitional
regime with Göring. Our group always refused to come together with that
man even for an hour.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you plan—if you were successful—to deal
with the other defendants here, with the exception of the Defendant
Schacht, all of whom, I understand, you regard as a part of the Nazi
government?

GISEVIUS: These gentlemen would have been behind lock and key in an
extremely short time, and I think they would not have had to wait long
for their sentences.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, does that apply to every man in this dock with
the exception of Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Yes, every man.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is, you recognized them, your group recognized
them all as parts and important parts of the Nazi regime—a Nazi
conspiracy. Is that a fact?

GISEVIUS: I should not like to commit myself to the words “Nazi
conspiracy.” We considered them the men responsible for all the
unspeakable misery which that government had brought to Germany and the
world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to ask you a few questions about the
Gestapo. You had testified generally in reference to the crimes which
were committed by that organization and I ask you to state whether that
included the torturing and burning to death of a large number of
persons?

GISEVIUS: The question does not seem to have come through correctly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you as to the crimes committed by the
Gestapo, and I am asking if it included the torturing and burning to
death of thousands of persons?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did it involve the unlawful detention of thousands
of innocent people?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The throwing of them into concentration camps where
they were tortured and beaten and killed?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo engage in wholesale confiscation of
property?

GISEVIUS: Yes, to a very large extent; they called it “property of
persons hostile to the State.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did it practice extortion against Jews and
against others?

GISEVIUS: In masses and by the million.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the Gestapo hinder and molest the public
officials, who were too prominent to be murdered, until they resigned or
were driven from office?

GISEVIUS: The Gestapo used every means, from murder to the extortion
which has just been described.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question arises here as to whether the
members of the Gestapo knew what the Gestapo was doing; and will you
please tell the Tribunal what the situation was as to the membership in
that organization and its knowledge of its program?

GISEVIUS: I have already stated at the beginning of my testimony that
from the first or second day every member of the Gestapo really could
not help seeing and knowing what took place in that institution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were some people who were taken into the
Gestapo at the beginning, who were transferred from other branches of
the civil service, were they not; who were in a sense involuntary
members of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes; these members were eliminated in the course of the first
year as being politically unreliable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the transfer took place at the time Göring set
up the Gestapo, did it not?

THE PRESIDENT: What did the witness mean by “eliminated”?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think eliminated from the Gestapo.

GISEVIUS: Gradually they were released from the service of the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after the purge of the 30th of June 1934, were
special pains taken to see that no one was permitted in the organization
who was not in sympathy with its program?

GISEVIUS: These attempts started after 1 April 1934, when Himmler and
Heydrich took over affairs. Actually, from that date, no official was
allowed into the Gestapo any longer unless Himmler and Heydrich
considered that he held the opinions which they desired. It may be that
during the first months some officials, who had not yet been screened by
the SS, may have got in. The Gestapo was, of course, a large
organization and it naturally took quite a time until the SS had
educated and trained their own criminal officials.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: However, did there come a time, and if so, will you
fix it as nearly as possible, after which every member of the Gestapo
must have known the criminal program of that organization?

GISEVIUS: For many years I have considered that question myself and
discussed it with Nebe and my friends. The reply entails very great
responsibility, and in the knowledge of that responsibility I would say
that from the beginning of 1935, at the latest, everyone must have known
what sort of organization he was joining and the type of orders he might
have to expect.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have testified as to the investigations which
you made when you were connected with the police administration and you
mentioned the Reichstag fire but you did not tell us what your findings
were when you investigated that. Will you please tell us?

GISEVIUS: To speak briefly and to begin with the facts, we ascertained
that Hitler in a general way had expressed a wish for a large-scale
propaganda campaign. Goebbels undertook to prepare the necessary
proposals and it was Goebbels who first thought of setting the Reichstag
on fire. Goebbels discussed this with the leader of the Berlin SA
Brigade, Karl Ernst, and he suggested in detail how it should be done.

A certain chemical, known to every maker of fireworks, was chosen. After
spraying it, it ignites after a certain time—hours or minutes. In order
to get inside the Reichstag, one had to go through the corridor leading
from the palace of the Reichstag President to the Reichstag itself. Ten
reliable SA men were provided, and then Göring was informed of all the
details of the plan, so that by chance he did not make an election
speech on that particular evening, but at such a late hour would still
be sitting at his desk in the Ministry of the Interior in Berlin.

Göring—and he gave assurances that he would do so—was to put the
police on wrong trails in the first confusion. From the very beginning
it was intended that the Communists should be accused of this crime, and
the 10 SA men who had to carry out the crime were instructed
accordingly.

That is, in a few words, the story of the events. To tell you how we got
hold of the details, I have only to add that one of these 10 who had to
spray the chemical was a notorious criminal. Six months later he was
dismissed from the SA, and when he did not receive the reward which he
had been promised he decided to tell what he knew to the Reich Court
sitting in Leipzig at the time. He was taken before an examining
magistrate who made a record of his statement, but the Gestapo heard of
it and the letter to the Reich Court was intercepted and destroyed. The
SA man, named Rail, who betrayed the plan, was murdered in a vile manner
with the knowledge of the Defendant Göring, by order of Gestapo chief
Diels. Through the finding of the body, we picked up the threads of the
whole story.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What happened to the 10 SA men who carried out the
Reichstag fire? Are any of them alive now?

GISEVIUS: As far as we are aware none of them are still alive. Most of
them were murdered on 30 June under the pretext of the Röhm revolt. Only
one, a certain Heini Gewaehr, was taken over by the police as a police
officer, and we tracked him down as well. He was killed in the war,
while a police officer on the Eastern Front.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you testified that you also investigated,
with the entire affair of Röhm, the murders that followed the Röhm
affair. Didn’t you so testify?

GISEVIUS: I cannot actually say that we carried out the investigation,
as we, of the Ministry of the Interior, had really been excluded from
the entire affair. However, matters were such that after 30 June, all
the appeals for help, and all the complaints of the people who were
affected reached us in the Ministry of the Interior; and during 30 June,
through the continual radio messages, incidental visits to Göring’s
palace, and the information received from Nebe, we discovered all the
details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, about how many people were killed in that
purge?

GISEVIUS: We have never been able to establish the number exactly, but I
estimate that no more than 150 to 200 persons lost their lives, which,
at that time, was an enormous figure.

I myself with Minister of Justice Gürtner checked the list of the number
of the dead which had been given him by Hitler and Göring, and we
ascertained that the list which contained the names of 77 dead, who had
allegedly been justly killed, was exceeded by nearly double that number
only by those names which we had received through the prosecuting
authorities, or through the appeals for help coming from relatives to
the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did you ascertain who selected the men who
were killed in that purge?

GISEVIUS: To begin with we ascertained that Himmler, Heydrich, and
Göring had compiled exact lists of those to be murdered; for I myself
heard in Göring’s palace—and it was confirmed by Daluege who was
present, and also by Nebe who was present from the very first
second—that not one of those who were killed was mentioned by name;
instead they just said: “Number so and so is now gone,” or, “Number so
and so is still missing,” and “It will soon be Number so and so’s turn.”

There is, however, no doubt that Heydrich and Himmler also had a special
list. On that special list there were several Catholics, Klausner, and
others. I cannot, for instance, say here under oath whether Schleicher
was murdered by order of Göring, or whether he was a man who was on
Heydrich’s and Himmler’s special list.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was the Defendant Frick fully informed as to
the facts which you knew about the illegal conduct of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I had to submit to him all the material that arrived
which was important, and I have already described that we reported all
these matters to the Secret State Police or to the Ministries of the
Interior of the Länder. Naturally I could submit only the most important
of these things to Frick personally. I estimate that I received several
hundred such complaints daily, but the most important had to be
submitted to Frick, because he had to sign them personally; for Göring
always complained as soon as he saw that such a young official signed
reports and appeals to the Ministry and to himself.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was Frick informed of your conclusions about
the Röhm purge?

GISEVIUS: Yes, because on the Sunday, while the murders were continuing,
I spoke to Frick about the murder of Strasser, Klausner, Schleicher and
the many other murders; and Frick was particularly disgusted at the
murder of Strasser, because he considered that an act of personal
revenge by Göring and Himmler. Likewise, Frick was extremely indignant
about the murders of Klausner, Bose, Edgar Jung, and the many other
innocent men who were murdered.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But when Frick signed the decree, along with
Hitler, declaring these murders legitimate and ordering no prosecutions
on account of those murders, Frick knew exactly what had happened from
you; is that the fact?

GISEVIUS: He knew it from me, and he had seen it for himself. The story
of the 30th of June was undoubtedly known to Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Frick ever talk with you about Himmler and
Heydrich as being bad and dangerous, cruel persons?

GISEVIUS: On that Sunday, the 1st of July, Frick said to me, “If Hitler
does not very soon do to the SS and Himmler what he has done to the SA
today, he will experience far worse things with the SS than he has
experienced now with the SA.”

I was greatly struck by that prediction at the time, and by the fact
that Frick should speak so openly to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But notwithstanding the estimate he made of those
men as dangerous persons, did he not thereafter appoint them both in his
Ministry of Interior?

GISEVIUS: Well, of course, they were actually appointed by Hitler.
However, I can only say that when I took leave of Frick, at the time I
left the Ministry of the Interior in May 1935, Frick told me literally
that the constant difficulties he had had because of me had taught him
from now on to take Party members only in his Ministry, and as far as
possible those who had the Golden Party Emblem. He said that it was
possible that in the course of events he might even be forced to allow
Himmler into his Ministry, but in no case would he accept the murderer
Heydrich. Those were the last words I exchanged with Frick.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both were put in charge of matters that were under
his legal control, were they not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, they became members of the Reich Ministry of the Interior
and Frick remained their superior.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say that those were the last words which you
exchanged with the Defendant Frick?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was in 1935 and I have not met him or talked to him
since.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, after 1934 Frick was the Minister in charge of
the running and controlling of concentration camps, was he not, Dr.
Gisevius?

GISEVIUS: In my opinion the Reich Minister of the Interior was
responsible from the beginning for all police matters in the Reich and
therefore also for the concentration camps, and I do not believe that
one can say he had that responsibility only since 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I am willing to accept your amendment to my
question. I ask that you be shown Document Number 3751-PS of the United
States, which has not yet been offered in evidence.

[_The document was submitted to the witness._]

Now, this purports to be a communication from Dr. Gürtner, the Minister
of Justice, to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior. That
would be from your friend Dr. Gürtner to Frick, would it not?

GISEVIUS: I believe I heard you say “friend.” During the time he acted
as Minister, Gürtner did not conduct himself in such a way that I could
consider him my friend.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well then, tell us about Gürtner. Tell us about
Gürtner’s position in this situation because we have a communication
here apparently from him.

GISEVIUS: Gürtner?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

GISEVIUS: At that time Gürtner without doubt made many attempts to
expose the cruelty in the camps and to initiate criminal proceedings. In
individual cases Gürtner did make many attempts; but after the 30th of
June he signed that law which legalized all those dreadful things, and
also in other respects Gürtner never acted consistently with his views.
But this document which you submit to me was just such an attempt by
Gürtner and the many decent officials in the Ministry of Justice to
bring the question of the Gestapo terror to discussion. As far as I
recollect this is one of those letters which we discussed unofficially
beforehand in order to provoke an answer, so to say.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I now desire to read some parts of this into the
record. It becomes Exhibit USA-828. I will offer it as such.

Will you kindly follow the German text and see if I correctly quote:

    “My dear Reich Minister!

    “Enclosed you will find a copy of a report of the Inspector of
    the Secret State Police, dated 28 March 1935.

    “This report gives me an occasion to state my fundamental
    attitude towards the question of corporal punishment for
    internees. The numerous instances of ill-treatment which have
    come to the knowledge of the authorities of justice point to
    three different reasons for such ill-treatment of prisoners:

    “1. Beating as a disciplinary punishment in concentration camps.

    “2. Ill-treatment, mostly of political internees, in order to
    make them talk.

    “3. Ill-treatment of internees arising out of sheer wantonness
    or for sadistic motives.”

I think I will not take the Tribunal’s time to read his comment on
Number 1 or Number 2. About Number 3, you will find in the German text:

    “The experience of the first revolutionary years has shown that
    the persons who are charged to administer the beatings generally
    lose all sense of the purpose and meaning of their action after
    a short time, and permit themselves to be governed by personal
    feelings of revenge, or sadistic tendencies. Thus members of the
    guard detail of the former concentration camp at Bredow, near
    Stettin, completely stripped a prostitute who had an argument
    with one of them and beat her with whips and cowhides in such a
    fashion that the woman 2 months later still showed two open and
    infected wounds.”

I shall not go into the dimensions; they are not important.

    “In the concentration camp at Kemna near Wuppertal, prisoners
    were locked up in a narrow clothing locker and were then
    tortured by blowing in cigarette smoke, upsetting the locker,
    _et cetera_. In some cases the prisoners were first given salt
    herring to eat, in order to produce an especially strong and
    torturing thirst.

    “In the Hohnstein Concentration Camp in Saxony, prisoners had to
    stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for this
    purpose, until the drops of water, which fell down at even
    intervals, caused seriously infected wounds on their scalps.

    “In a concentration camp in Hamburg four prisoners were lashed
    in the form of a cross to a grating for days, once without
    interruption for 3 days and nights, once for 5 days and nights
    and fed so meagerly with dry bread that they almost died of
    hunger.

    “These few examples show a degree of cruelty which is such an
    insult to every German feeling, that it is impossible to
    consider any extenuating circumstances.

    “In conclusion, I should like to present my opinion about these
    three points to you, my dear Herr Reich Minister, in your
    capacity as departmental minister competent for the
    establishment of protective custody, and the camps for
    protective custody.”

And he goes on to make certain recommendations for action by the
Minister. I do not know whether the Tribunal cares to have more of this
read.

Was any improvement in conditions noted after the receipt of that
communication by Frick?

GISEVIUS: The letter was received just at the time I left the Ministry
of the Interior. I should like to say only one thing concerning this
letter: What is described therein is really only a fraction of what we
knew. I helped prepare this letter in that I spoke to the officials
concerned in the Ministry of Justice. The Minister of Justice could
bring up only those matters which had by chance become known legally
through some criminal record. But there can be no doubt that this
communication was merely a motive, and the cause of a very bold letter
from Heydrich to Göring, dated 28 March 1935, in which he disputed the
right of the Minister of Justice to prosecute cases of ill-treatment.
The letter, therefore does not add anything new to my descriptions, and
no doubt all have been convinced that these conditions, which started at
that time, never ceased but became worse as time went on.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came a time when Heydrich was
assassinated in Prague, was there not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, some very brave Czechs were able to do what we
unfortunately could not achieve. That will always be to their glory.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I suppose the Czechs expected, and did you
expect that the assassination of Heydrich would result in some
improvement in this condition?

GISEVIUS: We doubted—we, Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and the others of the
group—whether it was possible at all for an even worse man to be found
to succeed such a monster as Heydrich, and to that extent we really did
think that the Gestapo terror would now subside, and that perhaps we
would return to a certain amount of honesty and integrity, or that at
least the cruelties might be lessened.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then came Kaltenbrunner. Did you notice any
improvement after the appointment of Kaltenbrunner? Tell us about that.

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner came and things became worse from day to day.
More and more we learned that perhaps the impulsive actions of a
murderer like Heydrich were not so bad as the cold, legal logic of a
lawyer who took over the administration of such a dangerous instrument
as the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Can you tell us whether Kaltenbrunner took an even
more sadistic attitude than Himmler and Schellenberg had done? Were you
informed about that?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I know that Heydrich, in a certain sense, really had
something akin to a bad conscience when he committed his crimes. At any
rate, he did not like it when those things were discussed openly in
Gestapo circles. Nebe, who as Chief of the Criminal Police had the same
rank as the Chief of the Gestapo, Müller, always told me that Heydrich
took care to conceal his crimes.

With the entry of Kaltenbrunner into that organization, this practice
ceased. All those things were now openly discussed among the department
chiefs of the Gestapo. By now the war had started, of course. These
gentlemen lunched together, and Nebe often came to me from such
luncheons so completely exhausted that he had a nervous breakdown. On
two occasions Nebe had to be sent on long sick leave because he simply
could not stand the open cynicism with which mass murder, and the
technique of mass murder, were discussed.

I remind you only of the gruesome chapter of the installation of the
first gas chambers, which was discussed in detail in this circle, as
were the experiments as to how one could remove the Jews most quickly
and most thoroughly. These were the most horrible descriptions I have
ever heard in my life. It is, of course, so much worse when you hear
them first-hand from someone who is still under the direct impression of
such discussions—and who because of this is almost at the point of
physical and mental collapse, than when you hear of them now from
documents. Nebe became so ill that actually as early as 20 July he
suffered from a persecution mania and was a mere human wreck after
everything he had gone through.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it the custom to have daily dinner conferences
of the chiefs of the Main Security Office, those who happened to be in
town?

GISEVIUS: Daily conferences; everything was discussed at luncheon. This
was of particular importance to us, because we heard details of the
methods used by the Gestapo in the fight against our group.

To prove what I say, I can state here that, for instance, the order
issued for the arrest of Goerdeler on 17 July was decided upon during
such a luncheon conference, and Nebe warned us at once. That is the
reason why Goerdeler was able to escape, at least for some time, and why
we were able to know to what extent the Gestapo were aware of our plot.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who were the regular attendants at those
luncheon conferences?

GISEVIUS: Kaltenbrunner presided. Then there were Gestapo Müller,
Schellenberg, Ohlendorf, and Nebe.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you know whether, at those meetings, the new
kinds of torture and the technique of killing by gas, and other measures
in the concentration camps, were discussed?

GISEVIUS: Yes. That was discussed in great detail, and sometimes I
received the description only a few minutes later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what is the situation with reference to the
information of the Foreign Office about the conduct of the Gestapo? Will
you tell us what was done to inform the Foreign Office from time to time
of the crimes that the Gestapo were committing?

GISEVIUS: The Foreign Office, particularly during the earlier years, was
continually kept informed, as nearly every day some foreigner was half
beaten to death or robbed, and then the diplomatic missions would come
with their complaints, and these complaints were sent to the Ministry of
the Interior by the Foreign Office. These went through my office and
sometimes I had four or five such notes a day from the Foreign Office
regarding excesses by the Gestapo; and I can testify that in the course
of years there were no crimes by the Gestapo which were not set forth in
these notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make certain reports to the Foreign Office
which were so dispatched that you are reasonably certain they would
reach Neurath?

GISEVIUS: Ribbentrop was not yet the Foreign Minister at that time...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, Neurath.

GISEVIUS: I very often discussed these matters personally with the
officials of the Foreign Office, because they were of a particularly
difficult nature, and because the officials of the Foreign Office were
very indignant, I asked them repeatedly to put these matters before the
Minister through the official channels. In addition, I gave as much
material as I could to one of the closest collaborators of the Foreign
Minister at that time, the Chief of Protocol, “Minister” Von
Bülow-Schwante; and according to the information I received from
Bülow-Schwante, he very often submitted that material to Neurath.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, were certain of the collaborators close
collaborators of Von Papen? Was Von Papen subject to action by the
Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: To start with, the entire group around Von Papen was
continuously under surveillance by the Gestapo because in the earlier
years there was an impression among great masses of people that Von
Papen was a special advocate for decency and right. A large group
collected around Von Papen and that, of course, was most carefully
watched by the Gestapo. As the complaints, which Von Papen received by
the score, were carefully compiled in his office, and as no doubt Von
Papen quite often took these papers either to Göring or to the
Hindenburg palace, the closest collaborators of Von Papen were
especially suspected by the Gestapo. So it was that on 30 June 1934
Oberregierungsrat Von Bose, the closest collaborator of Von Papen, was
shot dead in the doorway of Von Papen’s office. The two other colleagues
of Von Papen were imprisoned, and the man who wrote Von Papen’s radio
speeches, Edgar Jung, was arrested weeks before the 30th of June; and on
the morning of 1 July, he was found murdered in a ditch along the
highway near Oranienburg.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did Von Papen continue in office after that?

GISEVIUS: I have never heard that he resigned; and I know that very soon
after the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered, he was sent to
Vienna as Hitler’s ambassador.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he ever make any protests that you know of?

GISEVIUS: I personally heard of none at the time, although, we were
naturally extremely eager to hear which minister would protest. However,
no letter from Papen arrived at the Ministry of the Interior.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were some of his collaborators murdered after the
Anschluss in Austria?

GISEVIUS: On the day of the Anschluss, when the SS entered Austria, Von
Papen’s closest collaborator, Legation Counsellor Freiherr von Ketteler,
was kidnapped by the Gestapo. We searched for him for weeks, until 3 or
4 weeks later his body was washed up on the banks of the Danube.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After that did Papen continue to serve as a part of
the Hitler Government and accept further offices from Hitler’s hands?

GISEVIUS: He was no longer a member of the Government at the time.
Immediately after the march into Austria Von Papen was disposed of by
being made envoy. However, it was not long before he continued his
activities as Ambassador at Ankara.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does the Tribunal desire to rise at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: You would like a little more time, wouldn’t you, with
this witness?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It will take a little more time, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 26 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH DAY
                          Friday, 26 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal:

Dr. Gisevius, yesterday you made some reference to Herbert Göring in
saying that Schacht had sent word to you about the Gestapo microphones
in Schacht’s house. Will you tell us who Herbert Göring was in relation
to the defendant?

GISEVIUS: Herbert Göring was a cousin of the Defendant Göring. I had
known him for many years. Herbert, as well as his brothers and sisters,
warned me already years ago about the disaster which would overtake
Germany if at any time a man like their cousin Hermann Göring should get
a position of even the smallest responsibility. They acquainted me with
the many characteristics of the defendant which all of us had come to
know in the meantime, starting with his vanity, and continuing with his
love of ostentation, his lack of responsibility, his lack of scruples,
even to the extent of walking over the dead. In this way I already had
some idea what to expect of the defendant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, during the period when you were making these
investigations and having these early conversations with Schacht, and up
until about 1937, you, as I understand it, were very critical of Schacht
because he had helped the Nazis to power and continued to support them.
Is that true?

GISEVIUS: I did not understand how an intelligent man, and one who was
as capable in economics as he was, could enter into such a close
relationship with Hitler. I was all the more bewildered because, on the
other hand, this man Schacht, from the very first day and in a thousand
small ways resisted the Nazis, and the German public took pleasure in
many sharp and humorous remarks which he made about the Nazis. Great was
my bewilderment, until I actually met the man Schacht. And then...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period Schacht did have great influence
with the German people, did he not, particularly with German people of
responsibility and power?

GISEVIUS: He had great influence to the extent that many Germans hoped
to find a proponent of decency and justice in him, since they heard that
he undertook many steps in that direction. I remember his activity in
the Ministry of Economics, where officials who were not Party members...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we have covered that, and I am anxious to
get along with this, if I may interrupt you.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During this period you reported to Dr. Schacht
fully concerning your findings about the criminal activities of the
Gestapo, did you not?

GISEVIUS: Yes; from time to time I spoke more frankly, and it is obvious
that I...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he took the position, as I understand you, that
Hitler and Göring did not know about these things.

GISEVIUS: Yes. He was of the opinion that Hitler did not know anything
about such terrible things, and that Göring knew at most only a part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he stood by Göring until 1937, when Göring
pushed him out of the economics office, did he not?

GISEVIUS: I believe that was at the end of 1936. I may be wrong. I
believe it would be more correct to say that he looked for support from
Göring and hoped that Göring would protect him from the Party and the
Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, Schacht did not heed warnings about
Göring until late 1936 or 1937?

GISEVIUS: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And during this period there would be no doubt,
would there, that Schacht was the dominant economic figure in the
rearmament program until he was superseded by Göring with the Four Year
Plan?

GISEVIUS: I do not know whether everything went through like that
exactly. He was, of course, as Minister of Economics, the leading man in
German economy, not only for rearmament but for all questions of German
economy; rearmament was just one of them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now Schacht believed, and as I understand it, you
too believed during all this period that under German constitutional law
no war could be declared except by authority of the Reich Cabinet. Is
that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, from the point of view of the
German Constitution, the war was illegal, by German law, as declared and
carried out by Hitler, in your view.

GISEVIUS: According to our firm conviction, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think we found out yesterday the position you
were to have if there was a successful overthrow of the Hitler regime.
Schacht was under consideration for Chancellor, was he not, if that
movement was successful?

GISEVIUS: No. It is only correct as to the first offer that Halder made
in August of 1938, or perhaps July 1938, when he visited Schacht for the
first time. At that time, according to the information which I received,
Halder asked Schacht whether, in the case of an overthrow, he would be
ready to take over a position like that. Schacht replied that he would
be ready for anything if the generals would eliminate the Nazi regime
and Hitler.

As early as the year 1939 individual opponents formed a group, and at
the last, when Beck was the acknowledged head of all conspirators from
the left to the right wing, Goerdeler emerged in the foreground together
with Beck as the leading candidate for the position of Reich Chancellor,
so that after that time we need speak only of Goerdeler in that regard.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to ask you some questions about the
Defendant Keitel. Of course, we have heard that Hitler was the actual
head of the state, but I want to ask you whether Keitel occupied a
position of real leadership and power in the Reich.

GISEVIUS: Keitel occupied one of the most influential positions in the
Third Reich. I would like to say at this point that I was a very close
friend of four of the closest collaborators of Keitel. One was the Chief
of the Ordnance Office in the OKW, the murdered General Olbricht; the
second was the Chief of the Counterintelligence Service, Admiral
Canaris, who was also murdered; the third was the Chief of the Army
Legal Department, Ministerial Director Sack—he was also murdered—and
finally there was the chief of the armament economy department, General
Thomas, who escaped being murdered as though by a miracle. A close
friendship, I might say, bound me to these men, and thus from these men
I found out exactly what tremendous influence Keitel had over the OKW
and in all Army matters, and thereby what influence he wielded in
representing the Army in the eyes of the German people.

It may be that Keitel did not influence Hitler to a great extent. But I
must testify here to the fact that Keitel influenced the OKW and the
Army all the more. Keitel decided which documents were to be transmitted
to Hitler. It was not possible for Admiral Canaris or one of the other
gentlemen I mentioned to submit an urgent report to Hitler of his own
accord. Keitel took it over, and what he did not like he did not
transmit, or he gave these men the official order to abstain from making
such a report. Also, Keitel repeatedly threatened these men, telling
them that they were to limit themselves exclusively to their own
specialized sectors, and that he would not protect them with respect to
any political utterance which was critical of the Party and the Gestapo,
of the persecution of the Jews, the murders in Russia, or the
anti-Church campaign, and, as he said later, he would not hesitate to
dismiss these gentlemen from the Wehrmacht and turn them over to the
Gestapo. I have read the notes in regard to this which Admiral Canaris
made in his diary. I have read the notes of General Oster in regard to
this from the conferences of commanders in the OKW. I have talked with
the Chief Judge of the Army, Dr. Sack, about this, and it is my strong
wish to testify here that Field Marshal Keitel, who should have
protected his officers, repeatedly threatened them with the Gestapo. He
put these men under pressure, and these gentlemen considered that a
special insult.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whether Keitel could control Hitler
or not, he did have a very large control of the entire OKW underneath
him. Is that not true?

GISEVIUS: Did you say Hitler? No, Keitel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whether Keitel could control Hitler or not he did
control and command the entire OKW underneath him?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In other words, whatever Hitler’s own inclinations
may have been, these men in this dock formed a ring around him which
kept out information from your group as to what was going on unless they
wanted Hitler to hear it, isn’t that a fact?

GISEVIUS: Yes. I believe that I should cite two more examples which I
consider especially significant. First of all, every means was tried to
persuade Keitel to warn Hitler, before the invasion of Belgium and
Holland, and to tell him, that is Hitler, that the information which had
been submitted by Keitel regarding the alleged violation of neutrality
by the Dutch and Belgians was wrong. The counterintelligence was to
produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and Belgians.
Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I ask that
this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which
were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong. That is one example
when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he should have transmitted.
The second was that Keitel was asked by Canaris and Thomas to submit to
Hitler the details of the murders in Poland and Russia. Admiral Canaris
and his friends were anxious to prevent even the beginning of these mass
murders and to inform Keitel while the first preparations by the Gestapo
were being made for these infamous actions. We received the documents,
through Nebe and others. Keitel was informed as to this in detail, and
here again he did not resist at the beginning; and he who did not stop
the Gestapo at the beginning can not be surprised if in the end a
millionfold injustice was the upshot.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, I think you put your question, “Did
not these men in the dock form a ring which prevented you getting to
Hitler,” and the question was answered rather as though it applied only
to Keitel. If you intended to put it with reference to all defendants, I
think it ought to be cleared up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think that is true.

[_Turning to the witness._] Each of the defendants who held ministerial
positions of any kind controlled the reports which should go to Hitler
from that particular ministry, did he not?

GISEVIUS: As far as this general question is concerned, I must reply
cautiously, for, first of all, it was a close clan which put a cordon of
silence around Hitler. A man like Von Papen or Von Neurath cannot be
included in this group, for it was obvious that Von Papen and Von
Neurath, and perhaps one or the other of the defendants, did not have
the possibility, or much later no longer had the possibility, of having
regular access to Hitler, for besides Von Neurath, Hitler already had
his Ribbentrop for a long time. Thus I can only say that a certain
group, which is surely well known, composed the close circle of which I
am speaking.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like you to identify those of the
defendants who had access to Hitler and those who were able to prevent
access to Hitler by their subordinates. That would apply, would it not,
to Göring, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frick, and to
Schacht—during the period until he broke with them, as you have
testified—and to Dönitz, Raeder, Sauckel, and Speer?

GISEVIUS: You mentioned a few too many and some are missing. Take the
Defendant Jodl, for instance. I would like to call your attention to the
strange influence which this defendant had and the position he had with
regard to controlling access to Hitler. I believe my testimony shows
that Schacht, on the other hand, did not control access to Hitler, but
that he could only be glad about each open and decent report which got
through to Hitler from his and other ministries. As far as the defendant
Frick is concerned, I do not believe that he was necessarily in a
position to control access to Hitler. I believe the problem of Frick
centers in the matter of responsibility.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Should I have included Funk in the group that had
access to Hitler?

GISEVIUS: Funk, without a doubt, had access to Hitler for a long time,
and for his part Funk had of course the responsibility to see that
affairs in the Ministry of Economics and in the Reichsbank were
conducted in the way Hitler desired. Without a doubt Funk put his
surpassingly expert knowledge at the service of Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you prepare or participate in preparing reports
which were sent to Keitel as to the criminal activities of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did others participate with you in the preparation
of those reports?

GISEVIUS: Yes, it was the work of a group. We gathered reports about
plans and preparations of the Gestapo, and we gathered material about
the first infamous acts, so that some courageous men at the front,
officers of the General Staff and of the Army, went to the scene,
prepared reports, made photographs, and this material came then to both
Canaris and Oster. Then the problem arose: how can we bring this
material to Keitel? It was generally known that officers, even highly
placed officers like Canaris and Thomas, were forbidden to report on
political matters. The difficulty was, therefore, not to have Canaris
and the others come under the suspicion that they were dealing with
politics; we employed the roundabout method of preparing so-called
counterintelligence agents’ reports from foreign countries or from
occupied countries; and with the pretext that different agents from all
countries were here reporting about these outrages, or that agents
traveling through or in foreign countries had found such infamous
photographs we then submitted these reports to Field Marshal Keitel.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, did Canaris and Oster participate in
submitting those reports to Keitel?

GISEVIUS: Yes. Without Canaris and Oster the working out and the
gathering of this material would have been inconceivable.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And what positions did Canaris and Oster hold with
reference to Keitel at this time when these reports were being
submitted?

GISEVIUS: Canaris was the senior officer of the OKW. Formally he even
had to represent Keitel when Keitel was absent. Keitel was only
concerned that someone else should take his place at such times, usually
his Party general, Reinecke; and Oster, as the representative, Chief of
Staff for Canaris, was also in close association with Canaris. Keitel
could not have wished for closer contact with reality and truth than
through this connection with the Chief of his Wehrmacht
Counterintelligence Service.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So these reports which were sent to Keitel came
from the highest men in his own organization under himself?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, what did they report to Keitel? Let me ask you
if they reported to him that there was a systematic program of murder of
the insane going on.

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. On these subjects, too, records were completed in
detail including the despairing reports of the directors of the lunatic
asylums. I recall this exactly because here, too, we had great
difficulties in giving a reason for these reports, and we actually put
them through as reports of foreign doctors who had heard of these things
with indignation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he report to him the persecution and murder of
the Jews and the program of extermination of the Jews that was being
carried out?

GISEVIUS: From the first Jewish pogroms in 1938 on Keitel was minutely
informed of each new action against the Jews, particularly about the
establishment of the first gas chamber, or rather, the establishment of
the first mass graves in the East, up to the erection of the murder
factories later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did these reports mention the atrocities that were
committed in Poland against the Poles?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed, here I would say again that the atrocities in
Poland, too, started with isolated murders which were so horrible that
we were still able to report on single cases, and could add the names of
the responsible SS leaders. Here, too, Keitel was spared nothing of the
terrible truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that condition of informing Keitel also
prevail as to the atrocities against nationals in other occupied
countries?

GISEVIUS: Yes. First of all I must of course mention the atrocities in
Russia, because I must emphasize that Keitel now certainly, on the basis
of the Polish atrocities, had been warned sufficiently as to what was at
hand in Russia. And I remember how the preparation of these orders, such
as the order for the shooting of commissars and the Night and Fog
Decree, was continued for weeks in the OKW, so that, as soon as the
preparation of these orders was begun, we begged Canaris and Oster to
present a petition to Keitel. But I would like to add that I do not
doubt that other courageous men also presented a petition to Keitel in
this connection. Since I belonged to a certain group, the impression
might be created that only in this group were there persons who were
interested in these problems, and I would be withholding vital
information if I did not add that even in the High Command of the OKW
and in the General Staff there were excellent men who did everything to
reach Keitel through their separate channels, and that there were also
brave men in many ministries who tried to reach every officer whom they
saw in order to plead with him to order a stop to this injustice.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel mention the forced
enslavement of millions of foreign workers and their deportation or
importation into Germany?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those enslaved laborers are the displaced
persons, largely, of this day—that are plaguing Germany today, are they
not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed. In this connection I would also like to say that
in our reports it was already mentioned just what responsibility the
Wehrmacht would have to bear if these ill-treated people should be free
some day. We had an idea of what was to come, and those who made the
reports at that time can understand what has now taken place.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did the reports to Keitel report the persecution of
the churches in the occupied countries?

GISEVIUS: Yes, they did. I would like to cite as a special example how
we even once sent leading churchmen to Norway in the guise of agents.
They established contact with Bishop Bergraf, and brought back very
detailed reports of what Bishop Bergraf thought about the persecution of
the churches in Norway and other countries. I can still see this report
before me because Keitel also wrote one of his well-known National
Socialist Party phrases on this document.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, these reports consisted both of information
furnished by Canaris and Oster and of the reports coming in from the
field under this plan?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want to ask you a few questions about the SA and
the SS organizations. In your book, which you have been asked about, I
think you have characterized the SA as a private army of the Nazi
organization. Is that a correct characterization?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: During the early part of the struggle for power the
SA constituted a private army for carrying out the orders of the Nazi
Party, did it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They took in a good many people in the SA, and it
got pretty large, and there came a time when there was some danger it
would get away from them; wasn’t there?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the murder of Röhm and his associates was a
struggle for power, was it not, between Göring and Himmler and the Nazi
crowd associated with them on one hand and Röhm and his associates on
the other?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After the murder of Röhm, this SA organization,
which was very big at the time, rather lost importance, didn’t it?

GISEVIUS: Yes, completely.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the SS, which was a smaller and more compact
organization, came in to take its place as a private army, didn’t it?

GISEVIUS: Yes, as the decisive private army.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s go back to the SA during the period
before the struggle for power resulting in the Röhm purge. What part did
the SA play in the battle for power, the seizure of power?

GISEVIUS: As is said in the song, “It cleared the streets for the Brown
Battalions,” and without a doubt the SA played a dominant role in the
so-called seizure of power. Without the SA Hitler would undoubtedly
never have come to power.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let’s take up their methods. Perhaps I can
shorten this by quoting from your book. I think you say that:

    “Whoever had not entirely made up his mind, had it made up for
    him unequivocally by the SA. Their methods were primitive,
    therefore all the more effective. For instance, one learned the
    new Hitler salute very quickly when, on the sidewalks, beside
    every marching SA column—and where were there no parades in
    those days—a few stalwart SA men went along giving pedestrians
    a crack on the head right and left if they failed to perform the
    correct gesture at least three steps ahead of the SA flag. And
    these Storm Troopers acted the same way in all things.”

Is that a correct account of their activities and influence?

GISEVIUS: I hope so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you know so, don’t you?

GISEVIUS: Yes, yes, of course, for it is my own description, I cannot
criticize it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but you saw these things yourself, did you
not? You were in Germany at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You see, it is very difficult for us, with all the
documents we have, Doctor, to get the picture of the day to day events,
and you were there and we were not.

Now, let me make another question:

    “The chronicle of that private army is colorful and stirring. It
    teemed with beer hall brawls, street fights, knifings,
    shootings, and fist fights, altogether a mad rough and tumble
    affair, where naturally there was no question of crises of
    leadership or of mutinies. In this brotherhood of the wild men
    of German nationalism there was undoubtedly much idealism, but
    at the same time the SA was the repository for political
    derelicts. The failures of all classes found refuge there. The
    discontents, the disinherited, the desperados streamed to it
    wholesale. The core, the paid permanent group, and particularly
    the leaders, were recruited, as time went on, more and more from
    the riffraff of a period of political and social decay.”

Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA at that time?

GISEVIUS: Yes, quite.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I call your attention to another question:

    “The SA organized huge raids. The SA searched houses. The SA
    confiscated property. The SA cross-examined people. The SA put
    people in jail. In short, the SA appointed themselves permanent
    auxiliary police and paid no attention to any of the principles
    of the so-called system period (Weimar Republic). The worst
    problem for the helpless authorities was that the SA never
    returned its booty at all. Woe unto anyone who gets into their
    clutches!

    “From this time dated the ‘Bunker,’ those dreaded private
    prisons of which every SA Storm Troop had to have at least one.
    ‘Taking away’ became the right of the SA. The efficiency of a
    Standartenführer was measured by the number of arrests he had
    made, and the good reputation of an SA man was based on the
    effectiveness with which he ‘educated’”—in quotation marks, the
    quotation marks being yours—“‘educated’ his prisoners. Brawls
    could no longer be staged in the fight for power, yet the
    ‘fight’ went on, only the blows were now struck in the full
    enjoyment of power.”

Is that a correct statement of your observations of the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also used the term “Bunker,” and it is
a slightly technical term with which some of us are not familiar. Will
you tell the Tribunal what this Bunker system of the SA was?

GISEVIUS: Bunkers were those cellars or other dungeons with thick walls
in which the poor prisoners were locked up, where they were then beaten
and in a large measure beaten to death. They were these private jails in
which, during the first months, the leaders of the leftist parties and
of the trade unions were systematically rendered harmless, which
explains the phenomenon that the leftist groups did not act again for so
long a time, for there, at the outset and most thoroughly, the entire
leadership was done away with.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also use the expression “‘taking away’ became
the inalienable right of the SA,” and “taking away” is in quotation
marks. Will you tell us about this “taking away,” what it means?

GISEVIUS: That was the arbitrary arrest, whereby the relatives often for
periods of weeks or months did not know where the poor victims had
disappeared to, and could be glad if they ever returned home.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think you also make this observation in your
book:

    “Every excess, pardoned as ‘overzealousness in the cause of the
    National Socialist Revolution,’ was a demonstration of official
    sanction and necessarily drew in its wake a new excess. It was
    the bestiality tolerated during the first months that later
    encouraged the sadistic murderers in the concentration camps.
    The growth in brutality and insensibility of the general public,
    which toward the end of the revolution extended far beyond the
    domain of the Gestapo, was the unavoidable consequence of this
    first irresponsible attempt to give free rein to the Brown
    Shirts for their acts of violence.”

Does that, too, represent your observation of the SA?

GISEVIUS: Yes—not of the SA alone but also of general conditions in
Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, will you tell us about—as I understand you,
after the Röhm Purge the SA was rather abandoned as the private army,
and a more reliable and smaller and more compact private army was
created under Himmler.

GISEVIUS: A guard which had been established by Himmler long before this
time now actually came into action. I do not doubt that Himmler and his
closest circle for years had worked toward this very objective so that
one day, with their Schutztruppe (protective guard), they could
establish the terror system in Germany. But until 30 June the SS had
been a part of the SA, and Göring—excuse me, Röhm was also the chief of
the SS. The road for Himmler to police chief in Germany, to police chief
of evil, was only open after Röhm had been eliminated with his much
larger SA. But the will to power of the SS and all the confused and
unscrupulous ideas connected therewith must be assumed to have existed
in the leadership of the SS already for many years previous to that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this SS organization selected its members with
great care, did it not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Will you tell us something about the qualifications
for membership? What was necessary?

GISEVIUS: The members had to be so-called Nordic types. Actually I
always considered these questionnaires as a good subject for a humorous
paper, and for that reason I am not in a position today to give you
exact particulars, except that, if I am not mistaken, the distinguishing
characteristics of men and women went so far as underarm perspiration. I
recall that Heydrich and Himmler, in selecting SS men who were to do
police duty, decided only after a picture had been submitted to them of
the future victim who would be charged with carrying out their evil
commands. I know that, for example, Nebe repeatedly saved officials in
the criminal police force (Kripo) from being transferred to the ranks of
the Gestapo by having poor photographs taken of these people so that, as
far as possible, they did not look Nordic. In that case, of course, they
were turned down immediately. But it would be going too far afield to
relate more about these dismal things in this courtroom.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, was the membership of the SS recruited only
from what we may call fanatical Nazis, reliable Nazis?

GISEVIUS: I believe we have to make a distinction. In the first years of
the SS, many decent German people, especially farmers and people in the
country, felt drawn to the SS, because they believed Himmler’s assurance
that the SS was to bring order to Germany and to be a counterbalance to
the SA terror. In that way, to my knowledge, some people in the years
before 1933, and even in 1933 and 1934, entered the SS, because they
hoped that here would be a nucleus standing for order and right, and I
believe it is my duty to point out the tragedy of these people. Each and
every case should be examined before deciding whether, later on, a
member was guilty or whether he remained decent.

But from a certain period of time on—I believe I specified yesterday
1935—no one could have any doubts as to the real SS objectives. From
then on—here I would like to take up your own expression—fanatical
National Socialists, that is, “super” National Socialists, entered the
SS.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And from 1935 on, was it, in your judgment as one
who was on the ground, necessarily so, that the persons who entered it
knew what its actual activities were?

GISEVIUS: Yes; what he was entering into and what orders he had to
expect.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Tribunal wishes me to ask you in reference to
yesterday’s incident if you have anything to add. I know nothing further
on that incident, in reference to the threat made. Is there anything
that you wish to add about that incident in order to make it clear to
the Tribunal, anything that has not been told about it?

GISEVIUS: I would like to make clear that Dr. Dix did not merely inform
me about a discussion he had with Dr. Stahmer. That morning I arrived in
the room of the attorneys, and I do not wish to state further
particulars, but the atmosphere there was not exactly cordial to begin
with. Then I went up to Dr. Dix to report something else. Dr. Stahmer
approached, obviously very excited, and asked Dr. Dix for an immediate
interview. Dr. Dix refused on the ground that he was talking to me. Dr.
Stahmer said in a loud voice that he must speak to Dr. Dix immediately
and urgently. Dr. Dix took only two steps aside and the conversation
that followed was carried on by Dr. Stahmer in such a loud voice, that I
was bound to hear most of it. I did hear it and said to attorney Dr.
Kraus who was standing nearby, “Just listen how Dr. Stahmer is carrying
on.” Dr. Dix then came over to me, very excited, and after all this
fuss, in response to my questions as to what precisely was the demand of
the Defendant Göring, he told me what I had half heard anyway. I would
like to underline that if I had had the opportunity to tell the story
first in my own way, I would have emphasized that I was under the
impression that Dr. Stahmer had merely transmitted a statement, or
rather what I would call a threat, by the Defendant Göring.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in this Nazi regime, after Hitler came to
power, will you state whether there was, as far as you could see, a
systematic practice of the Nazi ministers and Nazi officials enriching
themselves by reasons of their confiscation of property of Jews and
others?

GISEVIUS: Yes. This became more cynical from year to year and we kept
lists as to which of the civil ministers and, above all, which of the
generals and field marshals participated in this system. We planned to
inquire of all the generals and ministers at a later date whether these
donations had been put into a bank account or whether they had possibly
used this money for their own personal interests.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And will you state to the Tribunal which of the
defendants were engaged in self-enrichment in the manner that you have
indicated?

GISEVIUS: I am sorry I am only able to give a negative reply since we
repeatedly inquired from the Defendant Schacht...

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps this will be a good time to adjourn for 10
minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Gisevius, I have just a few more questions
which I would like to put to you in reference to the war and the
resistance movement of which you were a part.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, there is just one question I should
like to ask the witness. You said that you kept lists of the ministers
and generals who participated in this system of spoils. What was your
source of information?

GISEVIUS: We had information from the various ministries, from
antechambers of ministries, and from the Finance Ministry. But I did not
finish the answer before. I said that I could answer the question as to
which of the defendants had enriched himself only in the negative.

Concerning the Defendant Schacht, I wanted to continue saying that I
personally did not look into these lists, and that I took part only in
the questioning of the Defendant Schacht and that he personally had not
enriched himself. I did not intend to say in any sense, therefore, that
all the defendants, especially Defendants Von Papen or Von Neurath, to
name only these two, had enriched themselves. I do not know. I wanted to
say only that about Schacht we know, or rather I know, that he did not
take part in that system.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, in addition to a system of spoils from
confiscated property, there were also open gifts from Hitler to the
generals and ministers, were there not, of large sums of property and
money?

GISEVIUS: Yes. These were the famous donations with which, especially in
the years after the outbreak of the war, the top generals were
systematically corrupted.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did that hold true with reference to many of
the ministers?

GISEVIUS: I do not doubt it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as I understood your testimony, whatever
doubts you may have had before 1938 when the affair Fritsch occurred,
that event or series of events convinced even Schacht that Hitler was
bent on aggressive warfare.

GISEVIUS: After the Fritsch crisis Schacht was convinced that now
radicalism and the course toward war could no longer be stopped.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was never any doubt in the minds of all of
you men who were in the resistance movement, was there, that the attack
on Poland of September 1939 was aggression on Hitler’s part?

GISEVIUS: No, no, there could be no doubt about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that diplomatic means of righting whatever
wrongs Germany felt she suffered in reference to the Corridor and Danzig
had not been exhausted?

GISEVIUS: I can only point to the existing documents. There was no will
for peace.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, in the German resistance movement, as I
understand you, there was agreement that you wanted to obtain various
modifications of the Treaty of Versailles, and you also wanted various
economic betterments for Germany, just as other people wanted them. That
was always agreed upon, was it not?

GISEVIUS: We were all agreed that a calm and a reasonable balance could
be achieved again in Europe only when certain modifications of the
Versailles Treaty were carried through by means of peaceful
negotiations.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your difference from the Nazi group was chiefly, in
reference to that matter, one of method.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the very beginning, as I understand you, it
was the position of your group that a war would result disastrously for
Germany as well as for the rest of the world.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that the necessary modifications, given a
little patience, could be brought about by peaceful means.

GISEVIUS: Absolutely.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, it was in the light of that difference of
opinion, I suppose, that your resistance movement against the regime in
power in Germany carried out these proposals for Putsche and
assassinations which you have described.

GISEVIUS: Yes, but I would like to add that we were not only thinking of
the great dangers outside, but we also realized what dangers lay in such
a system of terror. From the very beginning there was a group of people
in Germany who still did not even think of the possibility of war, and
nevertheless protested against injustice, the deprivation of liberty,
and the fight against religion.

In the beginning, therefore, it was not a fight against war, but if I
may say so, it was a fight for human rights. From the very first moment
on, among all classes of people, in all professional circles, and in all
age groups, there were people who were ready to fight, to suffer, and to
die for that idea.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question may arise here as to what your
motives and what your purposes in this resistance movement were with
reference to the German people, and I shall ask you to state to the
Tribunal your overall purpose in resisting the Government in power in
your country.

GISEVIUS: I should like to say that death has reaped such a rich harvest
among the members of the resistance movement, that it is only for that
reason I can sit here, and that otherwise more worthy and able men could
give this answer. Having said this, I feel that I can answer that,
whether Jew or Christian, there were people in Germany who believed in
the freedom of religion, in justice, and human dignity, not only for
Germany but also, in their profound responsibility as Germans, for the
higher concept of Europe and the world.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There was a group which composed this resistance,
as I understand it.

GISEVIUS: It was not only just a group, but many individuals had to
carry the secret of their resistance silently to their death rather than
confide it to the Gestapo records; and only a very few persons have
enjoyed the distinction of being referred to now as a group.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Most of the men who were associated with you in
this movement are dead?

GISEVIUS: Almost all of them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add to clarify
your position to the Tribunal, Dr. Gisevius?

GISEVIUS: Excuse me, I did not understand you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Is there anything you would like to add in order
that the Tribunal may understand your position in this, your feeling,
your very strong feeling in this matter, to understand and appraise your
own relation to this situation?

GISEVIUS: I do not like to talk of myself, but I want to thank you, Mr.
Prosecutor, for giving me an opportunity to testify emphatically on
behalf of the dead and the living.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have concluded the examination.

MAJOR GENERAL G. A. ALEXANDROV (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.):
Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Was not the understanding arrived at with Counsel for the
Prosecution that the witness for the Defendant Frick should only be
cross-examined by one prosecutor?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Mr. President, I have an agreement with the prosecutors
to the effect that the examination of the Defendant Schacht and his
witnesses will be carried out by the American Prosecution, but that, in
the presence of additional questions during cross-examination, the
prosecutor from the Soviet Prosecution could also join in the
examination. In view of the fact that the Soviet Prosecution has several
additional questions to ask the witness Gisevius, which are of great
importance to the case, I ask permission to address these questions to
the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: What are the questions which you say are of particular
importance to the Soviet Union? I do not mean the individual questions
but the general nature of them.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Questions in connection with the part played by the
Defendant Frick in the preparation for war, questions connected with the
attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards the Hitler regime, as well as
a number of other important questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn in order to consider whether
the Prosecution ought to be allowed to cross-examine this witness in
addition to the cross-examination which has already taken place.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has before it two documents which were
presented to it by the Chief Prosecutors upon the subject of
cross-examination. In the first of these documents it was provided that
the following procedure for the cross-examination of the Defendants
Keitel, Kaltenbrunner, Frank, Frick, Streicher, and Funk was agreed; and
that with reference to Frick the American Prosecution was to conduct the
cross-examination of the defendant and his witness. The document was
presented because of the Tribunal’s express desire that too much time
should not be taken up by the cross-examination by more than one
prosecutor.

In addition to that document there was another document, which was only
a tentative agreement, and with reference to the Defendant Schacht it
provided that the American delegation should conduct the principal
cross-examination and the Soviet and the French delegations should
consider whether either would wish to follow.

In view of those two documents, the first of which suggests that the
Prosecution have agreed to only one cross-examination of the witnesses
of the Defendant Frick, and the second of which tentatively suggests
that, in addition to the American Prosecution, the Soviet and the French
might wish to cross-examine, the Tribunal propose to allow the
additional cross-examination in the present instance, and they are loath
to lay down any hard and fast rule concerning cross-examination. They
hope, however, that in the present instance, after the full
cross-examination by the Prosecutor of the United States, the Soviet
Prosecutor will make his cross-examination as short as possible. For the
future, the Tribunal hopes that the prosecutors may be able to agree
among themselves that in the case of witnesses one cross-examination
only will be sufficient, and that in any event the additional
cross-examination will be made as brief as possible.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Witness, in order to save time, I beg you to answer my
questions as briefly as possible.

Tell me, what part did the German Ministry of the Interior and the
Defendant Frick personally play in the preparation for the second World
War?

GISEVIUS: This question is very difficult for me to answer. I left the
Ministry of the Interior as early as May 1935, and I actually cannot say
any more about conditions after that time than any other German, that
is, that the Ministry of the Interior was part of the German government
machine and doubtlessly there, as in all other ministries, those
preparations for war were made which administrations have to make in
such cases.

DR. PANNENBECKER: May I say something? The witness has just stated that
he could not say any more in answering that question than any other
German could. I believe that, under these circumstances, the witness is
not the right person to make any factual statements.

THE PRESIDENT: He has just said so himself. That is exactly what he
said. I don’t see any reason for any intervention. The witness said so.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I only meant that he could not even function as a
witness concerning these facts.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: For perfectly obvious reasons I am deprived of all
possibility to put these questions to any German, but I am perfectly
satisfied with the answers of the witness Gisevius.

[_Turning to the witness._] Do you know anything about the so-called
“Three Man College”? It consisted of the Plenipotentiary for the
Administration of the Reich, of the Plenipotentiary for Economy, and of
a representative of the OKW. This Three Man College was entrusted with
the preparation of all fundamental questions pertaining to the war.

GISEVIUS: I personally cannot give any information on that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the activities of the
Ministry of the Interior in territories occupied by the Germans?

GISEVIUS: As far as I know, the Ministry of the Interior sent important
officials into the military administration, but it is not clear to me
whether these officials, from that moment on, were subordinate to the
Ministry of the Interior or the OKW.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Have you any special knowledge as to whether the
machinery of the Reich Commission in the occupied territories of the
Soviet Union was recruited from the Ministry of the Interior or at least
with considerable help from this ministry?

GISEVIUS: I should assume so, yes. It holds good as far as help is
concerned, because the ministry for the occupied Russian territories
could take its officials only from the personnel department of the
Ministry of the Interior.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know of the visits paid by the Defendant
Frick to the concentration camps?

GISEVIUS: At the time when I was in the Ministry of the Interior I did
not hear anything about that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: And after that?

GISEVIUS: After that I did not hear anything about it either.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Could a situation arise in which the Defendant Frick,
although Minister of the Interior, would not be informed regarding the
system of concentration camps established in Germany and of the violence
and lawlessness practiced in the camps?

GISEVIUS: I believe that I have already yesterday given exhaustive
information as to the fact that we were informed about everything.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In this particular case I am interested in the
Defendant Frick. What do you know about him in this connection?

GISEVIUS: I have said yesterday that the Reich Ministry of the Interior
received numberless calls for help from all over the country, and
yesterday we even saw a letter from the Ministry of Justice. Also I have
referred...

THE PRESIDENT: This subject was fully covered yesterday.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall pass on to the next question.

[_Turning to the witness._] Are you acquainted with the secret law
issued in Germany in 1940 concerning the killing of sick persons and the
old?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Frick towards
the promulgation and enforcing of this law?

GISEVIUS: I assume that he, as Minister of the Interior, signed it.

THE PRESIDENT: The law, if there was a law, was after 1935, was it not?
What is the law that you are putting? If it was in 1935, then this
witness was not in the Ministry of the Interior.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am speaking of the law which was promulgated in 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: He would not know anything about it any more than anybody
else.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I am satisfied with the answer which I have received
from the witness. Will you now allow me to proceed to questions
concerning the Defendant Schacht?

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were in close relations with
the Defendant Schacht for a considerable period of time; have I
understood you correctly?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Thus you were sufficiently acquainted with the state
and political activities of the Defendant Schacht?

GISEVIUS: I believe so, yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, what do you know about the part played by the
Defendant Schacht in Hitler’s seizure of power?

GISEVIUS: That was just the time when I did not yet know Schacht, and
about which I cannot give any information.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about it?

GISEVIUS: I knew only that he entered the Cabinet and that without doubt
he assisted Hitler in the preliminary political negotiations.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Do you know anything about the meeting engineered by
Schacht between Hitler and the big industrialists, in February 1933?

GISEVIUS: No.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: As a result of this meeting a fund was created by the
industrialists with a view to guaranteeing the success of the Nazi Party
at the elections. What do you know about this meeting?

GISEVIUS: I know nothing about this meeting. In my book I wrote that to
my knowledge the largest amount for the election campaign in 1932 was
given by Thyssen at that time and Grauert, a member of the Rhein-Hessian
iron and steel industry group.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the part played by the Defendant Schacht on
this occasion?

GISEVIUS: At that time I did not see Schacht in the Ruhr district, and I
also do not know whether he was there at that time. I emphasize again
that I did not know him at all.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I know that. But in your book entitled _Until the
Bitter End_, published in 1946, and in your replies to preliminary
interrogations by defendant’s counsel Dix, you favorably described the
Defendant Schacht; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: I did not understand the last words.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I repeat that you favorably described the Defendant
Schacht; is that correct?

GISEVIUS: Yes, yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: You state that as from 1936, the Defendant Schacht was
in opposition to Hitlerite regime, and that he expressed these opinions
in a fairly open manner; is that true?

GISEVIUS: No, I state expressly that beginning with 1936 his suspicions
were aroused, but that he only became an opponent of Hitler during the
Fritsch crisis.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In which year do you place this crisis?

GISEVIUS: End of 1937 and beginning of 1938. The Fritsch crisis was at
the beginning of 1938.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell us, under the then existing regime in Germany,
could a situation arise where Hitler would not be informed as to these
opposite views of Schacht which, according to you, existed at the end of
1937?

GISEVIUS: You mean that Hitler was not informed after 1938?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I asked you, could it be possible, under the then
existing regime in Germany, that Hitler was not informed as to this
antagonistic attitude on the part of Schacht?

GISEVIUS: Hitler knew very well that Schacht was very critical towards
the system and that he frequently expressed disapproval. He often
received letters from Schacht and of course heard a great deal, too. But
he did not know how far that opposition went.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then how could Schacht remain in the Government of the
Reich, as Minister without Portfolio and personal adviser to Hitler,
right up to January 1943, if Hitler, as you say, was fully aware of his
critical attitude towards his, Hitler’s, policy?

GISEVIUS: Hitler always took care to let prominent individuals disappear
quietly or put them in the shade so that foreign propaganda could not
take advantage of these facts. The Schacht case is not the only one in
which Hitler tried to camouflage an open crisis.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Were you acquainted with a letter from Hitler of 19
January 1939, addressed to Schacht, who at that time was being relieved
of his post as President of the Reichsbank? I should like to remind you
of the contents of that letter in which Hitler writes to Schacht as
follows:

    “I avail myself on the occasion of your release from the post of
    President of the Board of Directors of the Reichsbank to thank
    you most warmly, most sincerely for the services you have
    repeatedly rendered while in that position, to Germany and to me
    personally, during long and arduous years. Above all else, your
    name will be connected forever with the first period of national
    rearmament. I am happy that you will now be able, as
    Reichsminister, to proceed to the solution of new tasks...”

THE PRESIDENT: This was all gone over yesterday by the witness.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Please forgive me, but I have a question to put to the
witness in connection with this letter.

[_Turning to the witness._] It would appear, from the contents of this
letter, that in January 1939—and I stress the date, Witness—Hitler
expressed his appreciation of Schacht’s activities rather differently
from the manner in which you worded your evidence. How do you reconcile
this divergence of opinion with your assertion that the Defendant
Schacht was already in direct opposition to Hitler’s regime towards the
end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938?

GISEVIUS: I should like to answer that I am not accustomed to consider
any written or oral proclamation by Hitler as truthful. That man always
said only that which seemed opportune to him at the moment to deceive
the world or Germany. In this particular case Hitler intended to avoid
the impression that Schacht’s resignation would cause a difficult
economic crisis. But I am only saying now what Hitler could have had in
his mind. Yesterday I described with what indignation Schacht received
that letter. He considered it derision and debasement.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then I shall refer to another document, to a letter
from Schacht himself addressed to Hitler. This is a memorandum of 7
January 1939, in which Schacht wrote to Hitler:

    “From the very beginning the Reichsbank has realized that the
    fruits of a successful foreign policy can only be obtained if
    this policy is founded on the rebirth of the Wehrmacht. It
    therefore took upon itself, to a very large extent, the
    financing of the armament program, despite the monetary and
    political difficulties involved. The justification of this
    consisted in the necessity, which far outweighed all other
    arguments, of manufacturing arms immediately, _ex nihilo_, often
    even under disguise, in order to ensure a foreign policy which
    would command respect.”

Do you also consider this document as an expression of Schacht’s
attitude?

GISEVIUS: As far as I have understood, you refer to a letter from the
year 1935, is that correct?

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I refer to a letter of 7 January 1939.

GISEVIUS: Please pardon me. Then I can say only what I said yesterday:
that all these letters were very carefully written so that they could
not be considered a provocation, and the factual contents of the letter
made illusory lest Hitler should simply say, “This is a personal attack
on me.” I said yesterday that the problem was to convince the other
conservative ministers, who were not so much against Hitler, about the
actual situation and neutralize any opposition.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What was the attitude of the Defendant Schacht towards
the Anschluss?

GISEVIUS: The Anschluss happened right in the middle of the Fritsch
crisis, or probably at the dramatic climax, and that is why we were
firmly convinced that this was a particularly malevolent case of
camouflage, and in that sense we were indignant. We had no doubt that
the German Army was to be diverted outwards...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, wait a minute. You were asked if you knew what
the attitude of Schacht was to the Anschluss question at that time. You
are not answering that question. Do you or do you not know?

GISEVIUS: I cannot give a definite answer about that, because all of us
saw clearly that the problem of Austria had to be solved in a legal way.
There were differences of opinion with regard to this question in our
group. Most of us hoped that the independence of Austria could be
preserved. Especially from the German point of view, it was desirable
that another independent German State should exist, if at any later time
there should be a League of Nations or diplomatic negotiations. However,
I cannot state under oath whether Schacht personally was of that opinion
or whether he was for an outright annexation. He was certainly against
the method.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I shall quote an excerpt from a speech made by Schacht
in Vienna, in March 1938:

    “Thank God, these matters could not, in the end, hinder the
    forward march of the great German people, for Adolf Hitler has
    created a community of German will and thought, he supported it
    with the reborn strength of the Wehrmacht, and thereby gave an
    outward form to this spiritual union of Germany and Austria.”

Do you qualify these statements of Schacht’s also as expressions of his
opposition to the Hitler regime?

GISEVIUS: I would have to be able to read the speech in its entirety. I
personally would not have said it, but I do not know whether pure
judgment on my part here serves any purpose. Would it not be better to
ask Schacht what he meant?

THE PRESIDENT: The speech can be put to Schacht when he goes into the
witness box, if he does.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Tell me, Witness, you are currently residing in
Switzerland? In which town?

GISEVIUS: I live near Geneva in a village called Commugny.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: How long have you lived in Switzerland?

GISEVIUS: Since the first of October 1940.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Did you know about Schacht’s arrival in Switzerland in
1943?

GISEVIUS: No. He did not come to Switzerland in 1943.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In 1942?

GISEVIUS: He did not come to Switzerland in 1942 either.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: Then Schacht was not in Switzerland either in 1942 or
1943?

GISEVIUS: That is correct.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: In all the time that you yourself lived in Switzerland,
did you ever meet the Defendant Schacht or not?

GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly. I was in Berlin at least every 4 weeks or 8
weeks and until 1943...

GEN. ALEXANDROV: No. I am asking you about Schacht’s visit to
Switzerland.

GISEVIUS: During the war there was only one visit to Switzerland by
Schacht—in 1941, on the occasion of his wedding trip, and then I saw
him.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: That was in 1941?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: On 14 January 1946, an article was published in the
newspaper _Basler Nachrichten_, entitled “What Schacht Thinks.” Do you
know anything about that article?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: What do you know about that article?

GISEVIUS: Not more than I read in the paper about it. I have tried to
find out who that American was with whom Schacht had the conversation.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: The details do not interest me.

One last question: Did you know anything about a conference held at
Hitler’s house in Berchtesgaden, in the summer of 1944, when the
advisability of killing imported foreign workers was discussed, in the
case of further successful advances by the Allied Forces? Did you hear
anything about that conference?

GISEVIUS: No, at that time I could not go to Germany any more, because
there were proceedings against me, and I heard nothing about that.

GEN. ALEXANDROV: I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Then do you wish to re-examine, or does any other member
of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions of the witness?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, yesterday during the cross-examination the
American prosecutor submitted to you a letter of 14 May 1935 by the
Reich Minister of Justice to the Reich and Prussian Minister of the
Interior. In that letter there is an enclosure which mentions a copy of
a letter by an inspector of the Secret State Police. Witness, did I
understand you correctly to say that you personally assisted in writing
that letter?

GISEVIUS: We had cross-connections between the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of Justice, and at times it was desirable, if a letter
of a severe nature came from another ministry, for me to present it to
my minister. And I do not doubt that Frick was also glad when he
received a sharp letter, so that he could submit a matter in a general
way and before the Cabinet. Thus I remember that the sending of that
letter was discussed in advance with several gentlemen of the Ministry
of Justice and with myself.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do I understand you correctly then that the letter was
a joint effort of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the
Interior to do something against the Gestapo terror?

GISEVIUS: As for myself, I can certainly say “yes.” I was at that time a
member of the Ministry of the Interior. Of course I did not speak to my
chief about that point.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In that letter we find on Page 5 of the German text
the following sentence—I quote:

    “In the concentration camp at Hohnstein in Saxony, inmates had
    to stand under a dripping apparatus especially constructed for
    that purpose, until the drops of water, falling at regular
    intervals, produced serious infected injuries on the scalp.”

Do you know that the guards of that camp were heavily punished for that?

GISEVIUS: No, and if that happened it was an astounding exception.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Witness, then I have one more question. That is in
connection with the statement which you just made, that there was an
atmosphere of hostility toward you in the room of the attorneys due to
the incident which has been mentioned. A number of colleagues are deeply
shocked by that statement of yours, and these colleagues were glad that
you described conditions in Germany so openly. Could you tell me whether
that statement you made applies to all of the Defense Counsel?

GISEVIUS: I am grateful to you that you give me the opportunity to
correct an apparent misstatement, or a misunderstanding which was
created by my statement. I meant a different incident which occurred as
I entered the counsel room, about which I do not want to speak any
further here. I wish to emphasize that I realize the difficult task of
the Defense Counsel, and that I want to apologize if in any way the
impression was created or might be created that I had reproached the
great majority of the Defense Counsel in the carrying out of their
difficult task.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I thank you. I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Gisevius, I want to ask you some questions to try and
get clear what your various positions were and where you were at various
times.

As I understand it, in 1933 you were a civil servant, is that right?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And then you became a member of the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: The first position I held as a qualified civil servant was in
the service of the Political Police. In Germany one is a civil servant
even in the training stage. Therefore I have to say that I received my
first real position as an official in August of 1933 when I entered the
Gestapo.

THE PRESIDENT: And when did you leave that position?

GISEVIUS: The end of December 1933.

THE PRESIDENT: And to what position did you go?

GISEVIUS: Then I entered the Ministry of the Interior; that is to say,
the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. In the course of the year 1934 I
also entered the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and in May of 1935 I
was dismissed from the Ministry of the Interior.

Then I came into the newly created, or to-be-created, Reich Criminal
Office, which, at its beginning, was the Police Presidium in Berlin. On
the date when Himmler was appointed Reich Chief of Police, on 17 June
1936, I was finally dismissed from the police service.

I was then transferred to the Government office in Münster, worked there
in price control supervision, and, in the middle of 1937, I took an
unpaid vacation, ostensibly to make studies in economics. That vacation
was canceled by the Ministry of the Interior at the beginning of 1939,
and I was attached to the Government office in Potsdam near Berlin.
There I had to do with road building...

THE PRESIDENT: In the middle of 1937 you took unpaid service and studied
in economics, I think you said, or an unpaid vacation.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You still remained a member of the civil service then,
did you?

GISEVIUS: Yes; until the 20th of July I was continuously in the civil
service.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, in the beginning of 1939 you were posted to the
Ministry of the Interior and attached to Potsdam?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on; after that?

GISEVIUS: When war broke out the difficulty arose that I had no
mobilization order and, on the other hand, my friends wanted to have me
in the OKW. From the date of the outbreak of the war until 1 October
1940 I had only a forged mobilization order, and every day I expected to
be found out. At which time I would have had to take the consequences.

After the fall of Paris I stated to Canaris and Oster that I would have
to ask them now to release me from that somewhat complicated situation.
At that time the position of Canaris, temporarily, was so strong that he
placed me in an intelligence position with the Consulate General in
Zürich. There I received the title of a Vice Consul with the Consulate
General in Zürich, and I stayed there as a counterintelligence man,
without belonging to the Abwehr formally, until 20 July.

After 20 July I was dismissed from all posts, and I do not know whether
I was not even deprived of citizenship. I have found out nothing about
that.

THE PRESIDENT: Between the time you went to Zürich and 20 July, were you
returning to Germany from time to time?

GISEVIUS: During that time I was mainly in Germany, and only from time
to time Oster and Canaris sent me to Switzerland as a courier, on travel
orders. Schacht was still quite helpful to me at that time in getting me
a Swiss visa, through the Swiss Legation.

THE PRESIDENT: During the time that you were in the Gestapo, from August
to December 1933, what was your actual job or function?

GISEVIUS: When I received my first civil service position I was only in
training, and I was attached to the then Chief of the Executive
Department, Oberregierungsrat Nebe, for training. After the warrant for
arrest was issued, at the end of October 1933, I was sent to Leipzig as
a reporter for the Reichstag Fire trial.

THE PRESIDENT: You spoke yesterday very often of a man whose name I am
not clear about, Nebe, I believe it was.

GISEVIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What was his position?

GISEVIUS: Nebe was a well-known criminologist at the Berlin Police
headquarters before 1933. As a National Socialist he was called into the
Gestapo in July 1933 and until the beginning of 1934; he was promoted
there to Oberregierungsrat. Then we were successful, with the aid of the
Defendant Frick, in having him transferred for some time to the Ministry
of the Interior. And then he became the founder and Chief of the Reich
Office of Criminology. On the day of the appointment of Himmler as Chief
of Police of the Reich he was put into the new Reich Security Main
Office. In the course of time he was taken over into the SS; he became
an SS Gruppenführer, SS General, and, until 20 July, he was one of the
closest subordinates of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner was Chief of the Gestapo as well as the Criminal Police
and the Information Service. So that thereby Nebe became a subordinate
of Kaltenbrunner and received continuously official orders from him,
just like the Gestapo Chief Müller.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you wish to ask any questions, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, perhaps we had better do that after the adjournment
at a quarter past 2.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1415 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: The Soviet Prosecutor put a question to you in connection with
the annexation of Austria. While answering the question you were
interrupted. You had just said, I quote “But the form...” Would you
please complete your answer now?

GISEVIUS: What I wanted to say was that Schacht was undoubtedly opposed
to the Anschluss in this form.

DR. DIX: Then I have one last question, which concerns the so-called
incident of yesterday. I discussed this incident with you yesterday and
explained the situation as regards my colleague Dr. Stahmer. I also gave
you permission to make use of this explanation at any time.

I now request you to give this explanation to the Tribunal.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I interpose an objection. I think that is a
most irregular way to inform the Tribunal, if there is anything the
Tribunal should be informed about, that Dr. Dix should tell the witness
what the witness should tell the Tribunal.

Now, I have no objection to the witness’ relating to the Tribunal
anything that he knows from his own knowledge. I do object to the
witness’ being asked to relate what Dr. Dix has told him he may tell the
Tribunal. I think that is a most irregular way of clarifying it.

DR. DIX: That is not the case. I made a remark about Dr. Stahmer to Dr.
Gisevius. That is a matter between the witness and myself; I consider it
important that this remark of mine be related and testified to by the
witness. It is an incident which he observed, and I prefer that the
witness should confirm the fact that I explained this to him. I cannot
see anything irregular about this procedure, and I ask for a decision by
the Tribunal. Otherwise I should make the explanation myself, but I
consider it better for the witness to say what I told him immediately
after that incident.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you may properly put the
question to the witness.

DR. DIX: I have already put the question, and you may answer it at this
time.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not quite sure now what your question was, but the
Tribunal thinks that you may put the question. Was there anything in
connection with the incident which the witness has not already told us,
which he wishes to say?

DR. DIX: Yes. The question relates to a conversation between the witness
and myself.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what did I tell you yesterday?

GISEVIUS: You told me immediately that, in your opinion, your colleague
Dr. Stahmer did not wish to put undue pressure upon me but that this
undue pressure came rather from the Defendant Göring.

DR. DIX: I have no further questions.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were you, during the war...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, are you attempting to re-examine?

DR. SEIDL: I wanted to put a single question...

THE PRESIDENT: I was not thinking of the time which you would take up,
but the question of whether you ought to be allowed to put any question.
Yes, go on, Dr. Seidl.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, during the war were you at any time active in the
intelligence service of a foreign power?

GISEVIUS: At no time.

DR. SEIDL: It is also not correct...

THE PRESIDENT: That is not a question which you ought to put to this
witness in re-examination.

DR. SEIDL: But, Mr. President, it is a question affecting the
credibility of this witness. If it should turn out that this witness,
who is or was a citizen of the German Reich, had been active in the
intelligence service of a foreign power, that fact would have an
important bearing on the credibility of the witness.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to be heard on that. In the first
place, I do not think that this witness should be subjected to any
attacks. In the second place, I respectfully submit that it does not
militate against the credibility of the witness that he should have
opposed this kind of an organization. I think that the attack upon the
credibility of this witness, if there were one to be made—he is sworn
on behalf of the defendants and is not the Prosecution’s witness—the
attack is not timely, is not a proper attack, and the substance of it
does not go to credibility.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow you to put the question.

DR. SEIDL: Please answer my question and remember your oath.

GISEVIUS: Mr. Attorney, it is not at all necessary for you to remind me
of my oath. I have said that I was never in the intelligence service of
a foreign power. I was in the service of a good, clean German cause.

DR. SEIDL: During the war did you receive funds from any power at war
with Germany?

GISEVIUS: No.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know what the three letters OSS mean?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: What do they stand for?

GISEVIUS: They stand for an American intelligence service.

DR. SEIDL: You had nothing to do with that organization?

GISEVIUS: I had friendly and political contacts with several members of
this organization.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I hope the defendants’ counsel will remember that they
have all had a free opportunity to cross-examine this witness already
and have not...

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): The person of Herr
Von Papen was not mentioned until the cross-examination by the American
prosecutor. Therefore I could not ask questions before.

Witness, you replied in the negative to a question put by the American
chief prosecutor yesterday as to whether the Defendant Von Papen at any
time protested. Of course, you modified this by pointing out that some
written communication by Von Papen had not been addressed to the
Ministry of the Interior.

In order to clarify this problem, I should like to know whether this
assertion of yours refers only to the Ministry of the Interior. On Page
133 of your book you pointed out that one of the Defendant Von Papen’s
main activities as Vice Chancellor consisted in handing in protests and
that he addressed these protests above all to Hindenburg and Göring.

GISEVIUS: I again emphasized the latter point yesterday or today. I have
no official knowledge of any protest made by Von Papen to the competent
police minister after 30 June 1934. I can say only that it would greatly
have strengthened the position of the ministry of police if a protest of
that nature, describing in detail the murder of Von Papen’s closest
co-workers, had reached the Ministry of the Interior. In that case, it
is unlikely that this rumor about the suicide or rather the suspicious
death of Von Bose and Jung would have reached the public.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you not think that it is understandable, especially
considering the position held by Frick, the comparatively insignificant
and uninfluential position held by Frick, that one should make such
protests to higher authorities if it is possible to do so?

GISEVIUS: At the very moment when the ministers took the position that
they could apply only to higher authorities, that is, the dictator
himself, they, of their own accord, shattered the constitutional
competency of the individual ministries and the Cabinet.

It would have meant a great deal if Herr Von Papen at that time had used
the prescribed channels.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In agreement with your book, you do not dispute the fact
that Von Papen made many protests to these higher authorities in respect
to other questions as well?

GISEVIUS: No; he did protest frequently.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yesterday, within the scope of your general statements
you gave an unfavorable characterization of the Defendant Von Papen.
This character sketch coincides with the one you gave in your book. In
your book you pay special attention to certain details and draw your
conclusions from them.

Since the Defendant Von Papen only occupies a comparatively small amount
of space in your book and you probably had nothing to do with him in
your official capacity, you must have had to base your statements on
second-hand information. Since all these statements, as far as they
refer to Von Papen, are incorrect, I refer to them briefly.

First, you proceed from the assumption that, in spite of the events of
30 June, Von Papen did not resign.

On the contrary, it is historically significant that Papen did send in
his resignation after the suppression of his Marburg speech, that
negotiations about this resignation were pending between Hitler and
Hindenburg, and that Hitler accepted Papen’s resignation immediately
after the latter’s release on 3 July, when it was again tendered, but
did not intend to make it public until a later date, in spite of Papen’s
request to the contrary.

Is it possible, Witness, that you were not correctly informed of this
internal event?

GISEVIUS: It is perfectly possible for me not to have known of internal
events. I should like, however, to stress the fact that a minister or
vice chancellor is under an obligation to give a certain amount of
publicity to his opinion and to his decisions; and I can say only that,
whatever Papen may have said to Hitler in private, he contrived with
consummate skill to conceal from the German people the fact that he
intended to resign—or had already resigned; and that is the point.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Are you aware that this same Defendant Von Papen had had
a very bad experience a few weeks earlier, when the press was forbidden
to publish his speech at Marburg, which contained a frank statement of
his opinions, and warning was given that persons found circulating it
would be punished?

GISEVIUS: I am aware of it because we were appalled that a Vice
Chancellor of the German Reich allowed himself to be silenced in such a
way. I believe that the 30th of June would not have involved such a
heavy death-roll for the middle classes if Vice Chancellor Von Papen had
given a manly “no”—a definite “no” at the proper time.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Your answer makes no reference to the point which I
raised before, that Von Papen had actually resigned because the
publication of his Marburg speech had been prohibited.

Secondly, you make the assumption that Von Papen took part in the
Cabinet session of 3 July, in which the law was passed that the measures
involved by 30 June were legal as emergency measures for the protection
of the State. Is it known to you that Von Papen did not participate in
this session, that he had just been released and went into the
Chancellery while the session was in progress, that Hitler asked him to
go from the session-room into the adjoining room, that Von Papen again
tendered his resignation, which Hitler accepted, and that he left the
Chancellery immediately afterwards, without participating in the session
at all?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether it is possible for the witness to
follow your questions, but they are so long and contain so many
statements of fact that it is very difficult for anybody else to follow
them; it is very difficult for the Tribunal.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The gist of my question was that Von Papen did not attend
the Cabinet session on 3 July. My question to the witness...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, why do you not ask the witness whether he
knows whether he did participate or not? If that is the question you
want to ask why do you not ask it?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: My question is simply an attempt to find out whether the
assertion to the contrary which appears in his book can also be
explained by an error in information obtained from a third party.

GISEVIUS: It can be explained by false information, which, through the
silence of Herr Von Papen, became known to the public and by which I
myself was misled.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thirdly, you go on with the statement that Von Papen,
although he went to see Hindenburg afterwards, did not make a
sufficiently strong protest against the measures taken. Is it known to
you that Von Papen did everything in his power to reach Hindenburg but
was kept away from him and he did not reach Hindenburg’s estate at
Neudeck until after the 30th of June, after Hindenburg’s death? Can the
assertion to the contrary contained in your book be traced back to an
error in information?

GISEVIUS: Yes, if you tell me that even in his capacity of Vice
Chancellor of the Reich he did not have access to the President of the
Reich and still remained in office, in spite of the fact that there were
foreign journalists, the foreign diplomatic corps, and even a large
number of Germans who heard of this attitude of a German vice
chancellor.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: But, Witness, you are forgetting that he was a retired
vice chancellor and had already been out of office for several weeks.

Fourthly, you start with the premise that Von Papen attended the
Reichstag session at which the measures taken on 30 June were justified.
Do you know that Von Papen did not attend that session in spite of
Hitler’s summons to him to do so? Is it possible that you could have
been informed incorrectly on that point, too?

GISEVIUS: I believe you have already asked me that.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this is not the Cabinet session; this is the
Reichstag session.

GISEVIUS: Yes, then I must be misinformed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._]

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the Defense has had
every opportunity to interrogate this witness. After the witness was
examined by the Prosecution, after his cross-examination, the Defense
makes again an application to cross-examine the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, at any rate, that it is perfectly
able to manage its own proceedings without any interruptions of this
sort. We can deal with Dr. Laternser when he makes his application to
cross-examine.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to say that
we would like to shorten the duration of the proceedings as much as
possible, and the Prosecution would like the Defense to consider that
the same way.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have several further questions to put to
the witness, arising from his cross-examination; I assume that the
Tribunal have no objection to my questioning him.

THE PRESIDENT: No, if they arise out of the cross-examination of him.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, yesterday, in answer to a question of the
American prosecutor, you expressed the opinion that a Putsch against the
then existing regime would have been possible only with the co-operation
of the generals but that the many discussions which took place did not
achieve this co-operation. I should like to ask you, Witness, to which
generals you spoke personally about the existing plans for a Putsch on
the part of your group?

THE PRESIDENT: You are not concerned with every general in the German
Army; you are only concerned with those who are charged with being a
criminal group.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Your question must be addressed to them, or with
reference to them.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. Then I ask the Court’s permission to
describe to the witness the OKW and General Staff circle so that he can
answer my question.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can put to him, I think, whether he had contact
with any members of the General Staff who are charged with being a
criminal group. You know who the generals are.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I should like to make a few preliminary remarks to
the witness and then put the question. Witness...

THE PRESIDENT: Now, what is the question you want to put?

DR. LATERNSER: So that the witness can answer the question within the
limits prescribed by the Tribunal, I should like to give the witness a
brief explanation as to the circle of persons actually belonging to this
group and then ask him with which of these persons he talked personally
in order to win them over for the Putsch intended by his groups.
Otherwise...

THE PRESIDENT: If you do it shortly.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the group General Staff and OKW is held to
include the holders of certain appointments from February 1938 to May
1945. These appointments are as follows: The Commanders-in-Chief of the
various branches of the Armed Forces...

THE PRESIDENT: You are not going through the whole lot, are you, 130 of
them?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the list is really quite short and
otherwise I cannot restrict my question as desired by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know what you mean. What I said was, are you
proposing to go through the whole 130 generals or officers?

DR. LATERNSER: No, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

DR. LATERNSER: The group includes those holding certain appointments;
briefly, all those who were commanders-in-chief during the period
February 1938 to May 1945. Now, I ask you, with which generals of this
group did you personally discuss the subject of Putsch plans, in order
to obtain their co-operation in a Putsch, if such were made?

GISEVIUS: You mean commanders-in-chief of groups?

DR. LATERNSER: Of armies, of army groups, branches of the Wehrmacht, and
General Staff chiefs of the Wehrmacht branches.

GISEVIUS: I have already mentioned Halder and Brauchitsch.

DR. LATERNSER: One question, Witness; did you discuss with Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch an intended Putsch against the regime or only against
the Gestapo?

GISEVIUS: I discussed both with him; and in both cases he answered in
the affirmative and acted in the negative.

I spoke to Halder and Witzleben. I knew Kluge well from the old times. I
do not know at what period he entered the category to which you refer.
At any rate my connection with Kluge was never broken off. I may have
talked to other individuals falling within this category.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but to discuss Putsch plans with a high-ranking
military leader is an event of some importance; if you had had a
discussion of this kind with a field marshal you would surely remember
it.

GISEVIUS: It was not such an important event as all that, Mr. Attorney.
Field marshals were not such important people in the Third Reich.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the fact that these generals were spoken
to and refused to join a Putsch is not a crime within the meaning of the
Charter.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, yesterday I explained that this point is
very important because it would exclude the assumption of a conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid, Dr. Laternser, it is no good answering me
that a point is very important. What I asked you was, how is it relevant
to show that these generals discussed a revolt against the regime? That,
I am putting to you, is not a crime within the meaning of the Charter.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, but this circumstance would exclude the assumption
of the conspiracy alleged by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: But does it preclude the possibility of a conspiracy to
make aggressive war? It has nothing to do with it.

DR. LATERNSER: I did not quite understand that.

THE PRESIDENT: The question of a revolt against the regime in Germany
is, it seems to me, not necessarily connected with the conspiracy to
carry out aggressive war; therefore, anything which has to do with a
revolt against the regime in Germany is not relevant to the question
which you have to deal with.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the conspiracy is assumed precisely in
connection with the wars of aggression; and if the high military leaders
turned against the regime to such an extent that they discussed and even
attempted a Putsch, there would be no question of conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal think the proper way of
putting the question, which they understand you want to put, is to ask
which of the generals were prepared to join in a revolt. You may put
that question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in order to decide how far the circle as a
whole was willing to take part I must ask the witness how many of them
he spoke to and how many of those declared themselves ready to act with
him.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you might put that to him—how many. Ask him how
many.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, that was the question I asked at the
beginning.

THE PRESIDENT: I said you may put it.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, with how many generals of this
group did you discuss the matter?

GISEVIUS: In the course of years it may have been a dozen or several
dozen, but I should like to say that it was the task of Generaloberst
Beck and Oster or Canaris to talk to these gentlemen rather than mine.
As regards names, I cannot give you much of the information you want; on
the other hand I can shorten your question by saying that,
unfortunately, very few of the leading generals in the appointments
referred to by the Prosecution ever seriously declared their intention
of helping to overthrow the system.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, that is exactly what I want to know. You spoke
to Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch, Halder, and Witzleben?

GISEVIUS: And Olbricht.

DR. LATERNSER: He did not belong to this group. You did speak to these
three, then?

GISEVIUS: Also to Kluge.

DR. LATERNSER: Regarding the intended Putsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes, of course.

DR. LATERNSER: And of these four that you mentioned did Field Marshal
Von Witzleben agree?

GISEVIUS: They all agreed to begin with. Witzleben was the only one who
stuck to his word.

DR. LATERNSER: Then he did participate in this Putsch?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did I understand you correctly when you said yesterday
that the Putsch of 20 July originated mainly with the Wehrmacht, that
is, with the generals and the officers of the General Staff, and that
they intended to keep down as far as possible the number of those taking
part?

GISEVIUS: No, I did not make such an exact statement as that. Under a
terror regime, only the military circles are in a position to carry out
a Putsch; to this extent it is true to say that these few generals who
participated were the mainstay of the Putsch. But on 20 July the main
weight lay with the wide front of the civilians who for years had fought
for the generals and were invariably disappointed by the generals. For
this reason alone, because the generals had repeatedly broken their
word, we decided this time that on 20 July we would wait until the
generals had really taken action, in order not to raise the hopes or
burden the conscience of many civilians all to no purpose. That is what
I meant by limitation.

DR. LATERNSER: Then the only Putsch which was actually attempted was
effected by generals and General Staff officers?

GISEVIUS: And civilians.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And the head of this group was, as you testified,
Generaloberst Beck?

GISEVIUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: And he also belonged to the group indicated under the
name General Staff and OKW. Now, I have a further question: Do you know
of relations between these military leaders and the Minister of Finance
Popitz, who also had designs for a Putsch and is even said to have
negotiated with Himmler for the purpose of doing away with Hitler; and
do you know anything about that?

GISEVIUS: Yes, that is true. Popitz made great efforts to incite the
generals to make a Putsch and to assassinate him. I regret that I did
not mention his name at the right time. He too was one of those who,
from 1938 or 1939 on, did their best to overthrow the regime.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you discuss that with Minister Popitz?

GISEVIUS: Yes, repeatedly.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he tell you anything about the identity of the high
military leaders he had contacted for this purpose?

GISEVIUS: Popitz was in contact with Beck in particular. He is certain
to have been in contact with Witzleben; he was in touch with Halder and
Brauchitsch. The list of his disappointments is no shorter than the list
of disappointments which all the rest of us had.

DR. LATERNSER: Did he himself call it a disappointment?

GISEVIUS: Yes, he was bitterly disappointed. This bitter, everlasting
disappointment was our one topic of conversation, and that was the
difficulty confronting the civilians, Mr. Attorney.

DR. LATERNSER: There were no other possible ways of doing away with
Hitler?

GISEVIUS: No. Since, through the fault of the generals, there was no
other means of power, constitutional or otherwise, left in Germany, and
the generals, who were the only armed power of the nation, took their
orders from Hitler, it was impossible to organize opposition through any
other circles. I may remind you that after 1938 every attempt made by
the Leftists to organize a strike was punishable in the same way as
mutiny in time of war, and I remind you of the hundreds of death
sentences imposed on civilians under the war laws.

DR. LATERNSER: Now, a different subject. When...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that this matter has been fully
covered and is really not relevant. You have already cross-examined this
witness at some length before this, and the Tribunal does not wish to
hear any further evidence on this subject in any further
cross-examination.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have just finished.

Witness, as regards the Fritsch crisis, when did you...

THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had concluded?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I am afraid I was misunderstood. I have
concluded those questions referring to an intended Putsch and I should
like to pass on to another point now and put a question on the Fritsch
crisis.

THE PRESIDENT: What question?

DR. LATERNSER: As regards the Fritsch crisis I should like to ask the
witness when he learned of the exact state of affairs and whether he
transmitted his knowledge to high military leaders or caused that
knowledge to be transmitted to them.

THE PRESIDENT: But the Fritsch crisis has nothing to do with the charges
against the High Command. The charges against the High Command are
crimes under the Charter, and the Fritsch crisis has nothing whatever to
do with that.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I will withdraw that question.

Witness, today in cross-examination...

THE PRESIDENT: What are you going to put to him now?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I should like to ask the witness now about
some points which he made in reply to the American chief prosecutor’s
questions. I believe that some clarification is necessary here.

THE PRESIDENT: The principle is not whether you think the clarification
is necessary, but whether the Tribunal thinks it; and, therefore, the
Tribunal wishes to know what points you wish to put to him.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed. In the course of his testimony today the
witness mentioned the fact that he had in his possession documentary
evidence of murders in Poland and Russia. I wanted to ask him who had
prepared these reports and in particular whether he is acquainted with a
very thorough and scientifically prepared report made by Blaskowitz,
commander in Poland, and intended for transmission to his superiors.
That would be an extremely important point. Generaloberst Blaskowitz is
a member of the group which I represent. From the facts to be shown, it
is clear that the members of this group have always taken a stand
against cruelty, if such cases were reported to them through official
channels. I must therefore establish whether these reports, the object
of which was to prevent atrocities, are to be ascribed to the
co-operation of generals belonging to the indicted group.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It seems to me, if I may suggest, Your Honors, that
counsel is under the apprehension that he has here to deal with
individual generals. We are dealing only with the group. If what counsel
says about General Blaskowitz is true, that is a defense for him, and I
am right to say that General Blaskowitz did defy this Nazi conspiracy.
And if that fact is ever verified, he certainly should not be subject to
penalties for the acts which he stood up against.

It seems to me that we are going into individual defenses here under a
misapprehension that this is the occasion to try each and every one of
the generals. We made no charge against them that they either did or did
not have a Putsch or a Fritsch affair. The Fritsch affair is only
referred to here as fixing the time when the Defendant Schacht became
convinced that aggressive warfare was the purpose of the Nazi regime.
The Putsch is only introduced because in his defense Schacht says he
tried to induce a Putsch. It enters not at all into the case against the
General Staff. And most of the General Staff who took any part in the
Putsch were hanged and I cannot see how it could be any defense to those
who remained and are under trial that a Putsch was or was not conducted.
It seems that we are off the main track.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I would like to define my position with
regard to this point. Unless I am permitted to ask questions about the
attitude of the members of this group and in respect to such an
important point, from which it is clear that they combated atrocities,
it is impossible for me to make clear to the Tribunal the attitude
typical of the high military leaders. It is absolutely necessary for me
to follow up such points, especially since I have no other evidence
material at my disposal; for I cannot consider a group criminal
unless—for instance—the majority of its members actually committed
crimes. I must be in a position to ask in this case what position
Generaloberst Blaskowitz took in regard to the murders which took place
in Poland.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn to consider the matter.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, the Tribunal considers that the questions
that you have been putting, if relevant at all, are only extremely
remotely relevant, and they cannot allow the cross-examination to
continue for any length of time, or the time of the Tribunal would be
wasted further. They think, and they rule, that you may put the question
which they understand you desire to put in this form: The witness has
spoken of reports which were received by the group of which he has
spoken about atrocities in the East, and they think you may ask him who
submitted those reports.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, I should like you to answer this question: With
whom did these reports of murders in Poland and Russia originate?

GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during
the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information
received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far
as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster.
But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by
someone else somewhere.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst
Blaskowitz submitted?

GISEVIUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended...

THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not
tend to show that the group was either innocent or criminal.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude
of the group was.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not
evidence as to the criminality of the whole group.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about
the aim of the report.

THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was
contained in that report is not admissible.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.

Dr. Pannenbecker, that concludes your case, does it?

DR. PANNENBECKER: The case of the Defendant Frick is hereby concluded,
except for the answers to the interrogatories which I have not yet
received.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Counsel for the Defendant Streicher, Dr. Marx, go
on.

DR. HANNS MARX (Counsel for Defendant Streicher): With the permission of
the Tribunal, Mr. President, I now call the Defendant Julius Streicher
to the witness box.

[_The Defendant Streicher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

JULIUS STREICHER (Defendant): Julius Streicher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Witness, would you give the Tribunal first a short description
of your career?

STREICHER: I should like to ask the Tribunal to let me make a brief
statement in respect to my defense. Firstly...

THE PRESIDENT: You really ought to answer the questions that are put to
you.

STREICHER: My Lord, my defense counsel cannot say what I must say now. I
should like to ask permission—in short, my defense counsel has not
conducted and was not in a position to conduct my defense in the way I
wanted; and I should like to state this to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you understand that the Tribunal does not wish
to have its time taken up with unnecessary matters. It has no objection
to your stating what is material or to your reading it if necessary. It
hopes that you will be as brief as possible.

STREICHER: I mention only facts, four facts.

Firstly, the Charter created for this International Military Tribunal
guarantees the defendant the right to an unhampered and just defense.

Secondly, before the Trial began the defendants received a list
containing the names of the attorneys from whom the defendant could
choose his counsel. Since the Munich attorney whom I had selected for my
defense could no longer be put at my disposal, I asked the Military
Tribunal to put the Nuremberg attorney Dr. Marx at my disposal. That was
done.

Thirdly, when I met my counsel for the first time, I told him he must
expect, as my counsel, to be attacked before the public. Shortly
afterwards, an attack was made by a Communist newspaper published in the
Russian zone of Berlin. The International Tribunal was compelled to make
a public statement repudiating the attack of that newspaper and assuring
my counsel of the express protection of the Military Tribunal.

Fourthly, although the statement made by the International Military
Tribunal left no doubt as to the fact that the Tribunal wished to see
the defense of the defendants unhampered, a renewed attack occurred,
this time by radio. The announcer said, “There are camouflaged Nazis and
anti-Semites among the defendants’ counsel.” That these terroristic
attacks were made with the intention of intimidating the defendants’
counsel is clear. These terror attacks might have contributed to the
fact—that is my impression—that my own counsel had refused to submit
to the Tribunal a large number of pieces of evidence which I considered
important.

Fifthly, I wish to state that I have not been afforded the possibility
of making an unhampered and just defense before this International
Military Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: You can rest assured that the Tribunal will see that
everything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, bears upon the case or
is relevant to your case or is in any way material in your case will be
presented and that you will be given the fairest opportunity of making
your defense.

STREICHER: I thank you. From my life...

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President; may I ask briefly to be permitted to
state my position. May it please the Court, when I was asked to take
over Herr Streicher’s defense, I naturally had grave misgivings. I
have...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I do not think it is necessary, really, for you
to make any personal explanation at this stage. It is very possible that
the defendant may have different ideas about his own defense. I think we
had better let him go on with his defense.

DR. MARX: Nevertheless, I should like to ask permission, Mr. President,
just to mention the following point: As attorney and as defense counsel
of a defendant I have to reserve for myself the right to decide how I
shall conduct the defense. If the client is of the opinion that certain
documents or books are relevant, and the attorney is of the opinion that
they are not, then that is a difference of opinion between the counsel
and his client.

If Herr Streicher is of the opinion that I am incapable or not in a
position to conduct his defense, then he should ask for another defense
counsel. I am aware that at this stage of the proceedings it would be
very difficult for me to follow the matter to its logical conclusion and
ask to be relieved of this task of defense. I am not terrorized by any
journalist, but for a counsel to lose the confidence of his own client
is quite another matter; and for that reason I feel bound to ask the
Court to decide whether in these circumstances I am to continue to
defend my client.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks, Dr. Marx, that the explanation and
the statement which you have just made is in accordance with the
traditions of the legal profession and they think therefore that the
case ought to proceed and that you should proceed with the case. Now,
Defendant, will you go on?

STREICHER: About my life: I was born on 12 February 1885 in a small
village in Bavaria Swabia. I was the youngest of nine children. My
father was an elementary school teacher. I too became a teacher at an
elementary school. In 1909, after I had taught for several years in my
native district, I was called to the municipal school in Nuremberg. Here
I had the opportunity of contact with the families of the working-class
children in the suburbs and of observing social contrasts. This
experience led to my decision in 1911 to go into politics. I became a
member of the Democratic Party. As a young democratic speaker, I spoke
at the Reichstag election in 1912. The car put at my disposal was paid
for by the banking firm of Kohn. I stress this point because at that
time I had occasion to associate a good deal with Jews, even in the
Democratic Party. I must therefore have been fated to become later on a
writer and speaker on racial politics.

The World War came and I, too, went into the army as a lance corporal in
an infantry regiment. Then I became an officer in a machine-gun unit. I
returned home with both Iron Crosses, with the Bavarian Order, and the
rare Austrian Cross of Merit attached to the Ribbon for Gallantry. When
I had returned home, I had no desire to go into politics again. I
intended only to stay in private life and devote myself to my
profession. Then I saw the blood-red posters of revolution in Germany
and for the first time I joined the raging masses of that time. At a
meeting, when the speaker had finished, I asked to be heard as an
unknown person. An inner voice sent me onto the platform and I spoke. I
joined in the debate and I spoke on recent happenings in Germany. In the
November revolution of 1918 the Jews and their friends had seized the
political power in Germany. Jews were in the Reich Cabinet and in all
the provincial governments. In my native Bavaria the Minister President
was a Polish Jew called Eisner-Kosmanowsky. The reaction among the
middle classes in Germany manifested itself in the form of an
organization known as Schutz und Trutzbund (Society for Protective and
Offensive Action). Local branches of this organization were formed in
all the large cities in Germany; and fate willed that after I had again
spoken at a gathering, a man came up to me and asked me to come to the
Kulturverein (Cultural Society) in the Golden Hall and hear what they
had to say there.

In this way, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I became involved in what brings
me here today. Destiny made of me what international propaganda thought
it had made. I was called a bloodhound—a blood czar of Franconia; my
honor was attacked, a criminal was paid 300 marks to swear in this very
hall that he had seen me, as an officer in France during the war, rape a
Madame Duquesne, a teacher’s wife in Atis, near Peronne. It was 2 years
before someone betrayed him and the truth came out.

Gentlemen, the receipt for 300 marks was produced here in this court.
With 300 marks they tried to deprive me of my honor.

I mention this case only because my case is a special case; and if it is
to be judged with justice, then I must be allowed to make such a remark
in passing. In this connection, I may say that it is no coincidence that
the first question asked me by the Soviet Russian officer who
interrogated me was whether I was a sex criminal.

Gentlemen, I told you how I was fated to be drawn into the Schutz und
Trutzbund. I told you what conditions were like in Germany at the time,
and it was therefore quite a natural development that I no longer
visited the centers of revolution to join in debate. I felt myself
impelled to call meetings of my own and so I spoke for perhaps 15 years
almost every Friday before about 5,000 to 6,000 people. I admit quite
frankly that I went on making speeches over a period of 20 years in the
largest cities of Germany, sometimes at meetings on sport fields and on
public squares, to audiences of 150,000 to 200,000 people. I did that
for 20 years, and I state here that I was not paid by the Party. The
Prosecution will never succeed, not even through a public appeal, in
getting anybody into this room who could testify that I had ever been
paid. I still had a small salary which continued after I was relieved of
my position in 1924. Nonetheless, I remained the one and only unpaid
Gauleiter in the Movement. It goes without saying that my writing
supported myself and my assistants later on.

And so, Gentlemen, in the year 1921—I return now to that period—I went
to Munich. I was curious because someone had said to me, “You must hear
Adolf Hitler some time.” And now destiny again takes a hand. This
tragedy can only be grasped by those whose vision is not limited to the
material, but who can perceive those higher vibrations which even today
have not had their full outcome.

I went to the Munich Bürgerbräukeller. Adolf Hitler was speaking there.
I had only heard his name. I had never seen the man before. And there I
sat, an unknown among unknowns. I saw this man shortly before midnight,
after he had spoken for 3 hours, drenched in perspiration, radiant. My
neighbor said he thought he saw a halo around his head; and I,
Gentlemen, experienced something which transcended the commonplace. When
he finished his speech, an inner voice bade me get up. I went to the
platform. When Adolf Hitler came down, I approached him and told him my
name.

The Prosecution has submitted a document to the Tribunal which recalls
that moment. Adolf Hitler wrote in his book, _Mein Kampf_, that it must
have cost me a great effort to hand over to him the movement which I had
created in Nuremberg.

I mention this because the Prosecution thought that these things in
Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_, should be submitted and used against me.
Yes, I am proud of it; I forced myself to hand over to Hitler the
movement which I had created in Franconia. This Franconian movement gave
the movement which Adolf Hitler had created in Munich and southern
Bavaria a bridge to northern Germany. That was my doing.

In 1923 I took part in the first National Socialist revolution or,
rather, attempted revolution. It will go down in history as the Hitler
Putsch. Adolf Hitler had asked me to come to Munich for it. I went to
Munich and took part in the meeting in which Adolf Hitler came to a
solemn agreement with representatives of the middle classes to go to
northern Germany and put an end to the chaos.

I marched with them up to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I was arrested and,
like Adolf Hitler, Rudolf Hess, and others, was taken to Landsberg on
the Lech. After a few months I was put up as candidate for the Bavarian
Parliament by the Völkischer Block and was elected in the year 1924.

In 1925 after the Movement had been permitted again and Adolf Hitler had
been released from jail, I was made Gauleiter of Franconia. In 1933 I
became a deputy to the Reichstag. In 1933 or 1934 the honorary title of
SA Gruppenführer was bestowed on me.

In February 1940 I was given leave of absence. I lived for 5 years,
until the end of the war, on my estate. At the end of April I went to
southern Bavaria, to the Tyrol. I wanted to commit suicide. Then
something happened which I do not care to relate. But I can say one
thing: I said to friends, “I have proclaimed my views to the world for
20 years. I do not want to end my life by suicide. I will go my way
whatever happens as a fanatic in the cause of truth until the very end,
a fanatic in the cause of truth.”

I might mention here that I deliberately gave my fighting paper, _Der
Stürmer_, the subtitle, _A Weekly for the Fight for Truth_. I was quite
conscious that I could not be in possession of the entire truth, but I
also know that 80 or 90 percent of what I proclaim with conviction was
the truth.

DR. MARX: Witness, why were you dismissed from the teaching profession?
Did you ever commit any punishable or immoral act?

STREICHER: Actually I have answered this question already. Everybody
knows that I could not have been active publicly in this profession if I
had committed a crime. That is not true. I was dismissed from my
profession because the majority of the parties in the Bavarian
Parliament in the fall of 1923, after the Hitler Putsch, demanded my
dismissal. That, Gentlemen, was my crime of indecent behavior.

DR. MARX: You know that two charges are made against you. First, you are
accused that you were a party to the conspiracy which had the aim of
launching a war, or wars, of aggression generally, of breaking treaties
and by so doing, or even at an earlier stage, of committing Crimes
against Humanity.

Secondly, you are accused of Crimes against Humanity as such. I should
like to ask various questions on the first point now. Did you ever have
discussions with Adolf Hitler or other leading men of the State or the
Party at which the question of a war of aggression was discussed?

STREICHER: I can answer that with “no” right away, but I should like to
be permitted to make a short statement.

In 1921, as I have already said, I went to Munich; and before the public
on the platform I handed over my movement to the Führer. I also wrote
him a letter in this connection later. No other conference took place
with Adolf Hitler or any other person. I returned to Nuremberg and went
on making speeches. When the Party program was proclaimed I was not
present. That announcement, too, was made in public; the conspiracy was
so public that political opponents could make attempts at terrorization.

To sum up: At none of the secret meetings was any oath taken or anything
agreed upon which the public could not have known. The program stood; it
had been submitted to the Police; on the basis of the law governing
organizations the Party, like other parties, was entered in the register
of organizations. So that at that time there was no conspiracy.

DR. MARX: Witness, one of the most important points of the Party program
was the demand, “Freedom from Versailles.” What were your ideas as to
the possibility of some day getting rid of the Versailles Treaty?

STREICHER: I think I can state that very shortly. I believe the Tribunal
has known this for some time. Of course you will sometimes find one
traitor in a people—like the one who was sitting here today; and you
will also find unlimited numbers of decent people. And after the last
war these decent people themselves took up the slogan, “Freedom from
Versailles.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I think I must object to
this sort of procedure. This witness has no right to call another
witness a traitor. He has not been asked any question to which that is a
response, and I ask that the Tribunal admonish him in no uncertain terms
and that he confine himself to answering the questions here and that we
may have an orderly proceeding.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will observe that injunction.

STREICHER: I ask the Tribunal to excuse me. It was a slip of the tongue.

THE PRESIDENT: The observation that you apparently made I did not catch
myself, but it was made with reference to a witness who has just given
evidence here and you had no right at all to call him a traitor or to
make any comment upon his evidence.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, you will please refrain from making such
remarks. Adolf Hitler always spoke on the anniversary days of the Party
about a sworn fellowship. What do you say about that?

STREICHER: Sworn fellowship—that meant that he, Hitler, was of the
conviction that his old supporters were one with him in thought, in
heart, and in political loyalty—a sworn fellowship sharing the same
views and united in their hearts.

DR. MARX: Would not that mean that a conspiracy existed?

STREICHER: Then he would have said we were a fellowship of conspirators.

DR. MARX: Was there any kind of close relationship between you and the
other defendants which could be termed a conspiracy, and were you better
acquainted or did you have especially close relations with any one of
these defendants?

STREICHER: Inasmuch as they were old members of the Party we were one
community of people with the same convictions. We met at Gauleiter
meetings; or when one of us spoke in the other’s Gaustadt, we saw one
another. But I had the honor of getting to know the Reich Ministers and
the gentlemen from the Army only here. A political group therefore—an
active group—certainly did not exist.

DR. MARX: In the early days of the Party what solution was foreseen for
the Jewish problem?

STREICHER: Well, in the early days of the Party, the solution of the
Jewish problem was never mentioned just as the question of solving the
problem of the Versailles Treaty was never mentioned. You must remember
the state of chaos that existed at that time in Germany. An Adolf Hitler
who said to his members in 1933, “I shall start to promote a war,” would
have been dubbed a fool. We had no arms in Germany. Our army of 100,000
men had only a few big guns left. The possibility of making or of
prophesying war was out of the question, and to speak of a Jewish
problem at a time when, I might say, the public made distinctions with
respect to Jews only on the basis of religion, or to speak of the
solution of this problem, would have been absurd. Before 1933,
therefore, the solution of the Jewish problem was not a topic of
discussion. I never heard Adolf Hitler mention it; and there is no one
here of whom I could say I ever heard him say one word about it.

DR. MARX: It is assumed that you had particularly close relations with
Adolf Hitler and that you had considerable influence on his decisions. I
should like to ask you to describe your relations with Adolf Hitler and
to clarify them.

STREICHER: Anyone who had occasion to make Adolf Hitler’s acquaintance
knows that I am correct in saying that those who imagined they could
pave a way to his personal friendship were entirely mistaken. Adolf
Hitler was a little eccentric in every respect and I believe I can say
that friendship between him and other men did not exist—a friendship
that might have been described as intimate friendship. It was not easy
to approach Adolf Hitler; and any one who wanted to approach him could
do so only by performing some manly deed.

If you ask me now—I know what you mean by that question—I may say that
before 1923 Adolf Hitler did not trust me. Although I had handed over my
movement to him unreservedly, he sent Göring—who later became Marshal
of the Reich—some time later to Nuremberg. Göring was then a young SA
leader—I think he was an SA leader—and he came to investigate matters
and to determine whether I or those who denounced me were in the right.
I do not mean this as an accusation, but merely as a statement of fact.
Soon after that he sent a second and then a third person—in short, he
did not trust me before 1923.

Then came Munich and the Putsch. After midnight, when most of them had
left him, I appeared before him and told him that the public must be
told now when the next great day would come. He looked at me intently
and said, “Will you do it?” I said, “I will do it.”

Maybe the Prosecution has the document before it. Then, after midnight,
he wrote on a piece of paper, “Streicher will be responsible for the
entire organization.” That was to be for the following day, 11 November;
and on 11 November I publicly conducted the propaganda, until an hour
before the march to the Feldherrnhalle. Then I returned and everything
was in readiness. Our banner—which was to become a banner of
blood—flew in front. I joined the second group and we marched into the
city towards the Feldherrnhalle. When I saw rifle after rifle ranged
before the Feldherrnhalle and knew that now there would be shooting, I
marched up 10 paces in front of the banner and marched straight up to
the rifles. Then came the massacre, and we were arrested.

I have almost finished.

At Landsberg—and this is the important part—Hitler declared to me and
to the men who were in prison with him, that he would never forget this
action of mine. Thus, because I took part in the march to the
Feldherrnhalle and marched at the head of the procession, Adolf Hitler
may have felt himself drawn to me more than to the others.

That was the friendship born of the deed.

DR. MARX: Have you finished?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Were you consulted by Adolf Hitler on important matters?

STREICHER: I saw Adolf Hitler only at Gauleiter conferences; when he
came to Nuremberg for meetings we had meals together, along with five,
ten, or more people. I recall having been alone with him only once in
the Brown House at Munich, after the completion of the Brown House; and
our conversation was not a political one. All the conversations which I
had with Adolf Hitler, whether in Nuremberg, Munich, or elsewhere, took
place in the presence of Party circle members.

DR. MARX: Now I come to 1933. On 1 April 1933 a boycott day was decreed
throughout the entire German Reich against the Jewish population. What
can you tell us about that and what part did you play in it?

STREICHER: A few days before 1 April I was summoned to the Brown House
in Munich. Adolf Hitler explained to me something that I already knew,
namely, that a tremendous propaganda campaign against the new Germany
was being carried on by the foreign press. Although he himself had only
just become Chancellor, although Hindenburg was still at the head of the
Reich, although Parliament existed, a tremendous campaign of hate
against Germany had begun in the foreign press.

The Führer told me that even the Reich flag, the emblem of sovereignty,
was being subjected to insults abroad and that we would have to tell
world Jewry, “Thus far and no farther.” We would have to show them that
we would not tolerate it any longer.

Then he told me that a boycott day was to be fixed for 1 April and that
I was to organize it. Perhaps it would not be irrelevant to point out
the following facts: Adolf Hitler thought that it might be a good thing
to use my name in connection with this boycott day; that was not done in
the end. So I undertook the organization of the boycott and issued a
directive, which I believe is in the hands of the Court. There is no
need for me to say much about it. I gave instructions that no attempts
should be made on the lives of Jews, that one or more guards should be
posted in front of all Jewish premises—that is to say, in front of
every Jewish store—and that these guards should be responsible for
seeing that no damage was done to property. In short, I organized the
proceedings in a way which was perhaps not expected of me; and perhaps
not expected by many members of the Party. I frankly admit that.

One thing is certain; except for minor incidents the boycott day passed
off perfectly. I believe that there is not even one Jew who can
contradict this. The boycott day was a disciplined proceeding and was
not “anti” in the sense of an attack on something. It has a purely
defensive connotation.

DR. MARX: Was a committee formed at the time consisting of prominent,
that is, leading members of the Party and did that committee ever
appear?

STREICHER: As to the committee, it was like the Secret Cabinet Council
in Berlin, which never met. In fact, I believe that all the members of
the Cabinet did not even see each other or get to know each other.

DR. MARX: The committee members?

STREICHER: The boycott committee, that was put in the newspapers in
Berlin by Goebbels. That was a newspaper story. I spoke to Goebbels on
the telephone once. He asked how things were going in Munich, where I
was. I said that everything was going perfectly. Thus no conference ever
took place; it was only done for effect, to make it appear a much bigger
thing than it was.

DR. MARX: Witness, you made a mistake a few minutes ago, speaking of the
Munich affair in 1923. You meant 9 November—or did you not—9 November
1923, and what did you say?

STREICHER: I do not remember.

DR. MARX: It should be 9 November 1923?

STREICHER: 9 November 1923.

DR. MARX: Yes. The so-called “Racial Law” was promulgated at the Reich
Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935. Were you consulted about the planning
and preparation of the draft of that law; and did you have any part in
it, especially in its preparation?

STREICHER: Yes, I believe I had a part in it insofar as for years I have
written that any further mixture of German blood with Jewish blood must
be avoided. I have written such articles again and again; and in my
articles I have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the Jews should
serve as an example to every race, for they created a racial law for
themselves—the law of Moses, which says, “If you come into a foreign
land you shall not take unto yourself foreign women.” And that,
Gentlemen, is of tremendous importance in judging the Nuremberg Laws.
These laws of the Jews were taken as a model for these laws. When, after
centuries, the Jewish lawgiver Ezra discovered that notwithstanding many
Jews had married non-Jewish women, these marriages were dissolved. That
was the beginning of Jewry which, because it introduced these racial
laws, has survived throughout the centuries, while all other races and
civilizations have perished.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, this is rather too much of a digression. I
asked you whether you took part in planning and working out the draft of
the law, or whether you yourself were not taken by surprise when these
laws were promulgated.

STREICHER: I was quite honest in saying that I believe I have
contributed indirectly to the making of these laws.

DR. MARX: But you were not consulted on the law itself?

STREICHER: No. I will make a statement, as follows:

At the Reich Party Day in Nuremberg in 1935, we were summoned to the
hall without knowing what was going to happen—at least I myself had no
knowledge of it—and the racial laws were proclaimed. It was only then
that I heard of these laws; and I think that with the exception of Herr
Hess, _et cetera_, this is true of most of the gentlemen in the dock who
attended that Reich Party Day. The first we heard of these decrees was
at the Reich Party Day. I did not collaborate directly. I may say
frankly that I regarded it as a slight when I was not consulted in the
making of these laws.

DR. MARX: It was thought that your assistance was not necessary?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Were you of the opinion that the 1935 legislation represented
the final solution of the Jewish question by the State?

STREICHER: With reservations, yes. I was convinced that if the Party
program was carried out, the Jewish question would be solved. The Jews
became German citizens in 1848. Their rights as citizens were taken from
them by these laws. Sexual intercourse was prohibited. For me, this
represented the solution of the Jewish problem in Germany. But I
believed that another international solution would still be found, and
that some day discussions would take place between the various states
with regard to the demands made by Zionism. These demands aimed at a
Jewish state.

DR. MARX: What can you tell us about the demonstrations against the
Jewish population during the night of 9 to 10 November 1938, and what
part did you play in it?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, if you are going into that, it is now 5
o’clock; and I think we had better adjourn now until Monday morning.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 29 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH DAY
                          Monday, 29 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

DR. MARX: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: Before continuing
with questions to the Defendant Streicher, may I ask permission to make
a statement?

On Friday afternoon, Herr Streicher referred to a case, namely, that
press event which concerned me and my professional attitude. I thereupon
took the opportunity to refer to this case in my statement as well, and
I pointed out that at that time I had had to ask for the protection of
the Tribunal against this damaging attack on my work and that this
protection was given me very graciously. On that occasion and in that
extemporary explanation I used the expression “newspaper writer.” I used
it exclusively with reference to the particular journalist who had
written the article in question in that Berlin newspaper regarding my
person and my activity as a lawyer.

By no means did I express, or mean to express, a reference to the press
in general. It was far from my intention in any way to attack the press,
the group of press experts, and particularly not the members of the
world press who are active here; nor did I wish to injure their
professional honor.

The reason for this statement of mine is a statement made on the radio,
according to which I, the attorney Marx, had attacked and disparaged the
press in general. I am, of course, aware of the significance of the
press. I know precisely what the press has to contribute and I should be
the last person to fail to recognize fully the extremely difficult work
and the responsible task of the press. May I, therefore, quite publicly
before this Tribunal ask that this statement be accepted; and may I ask
the gentlemen of the press to receive my statement in the spirit in
which it is made, namely, that this was merely a special comment on that
particular gentleman and not in any way on the entire press. That is
what I wanted to say.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the Tribunal understood your statement the
other day in the sense in which you have now explained it.

DR. MARX: Yes. With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall then
continue with my examination.

Witness, what aims did you pursue with your speeches and your articles
in _Der Stürmer_?

STREICHER: The speeches and articles which I wrote were meant to inform
the public on a question which appeared to me one of the most important
questions. I did not intend to agitate or inflame but to enlighten.

DR. MARX: Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the
Party came into power, were there any other publications in Germany
which treated the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way?

STREICHER: Anti-Semitic publications have existed in Germany for
centuries. A book I had, written by Dr. Martin Luther, was, for
instance, confiscated. Dr. Martin Luther would very probably sit in my
place in the defendants’ dock today, if this book had been taken into
consideration by the Prosecution. In the book _The Jews and Their Lies_,
Dr. Martin Luther writes that the Jews are a serpent’s brood and one
should burn down their synagogues and destroy them...

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is not my question, I am asking you to
answer my question in accordance with the way I put it. Please answer
now with “yes” or “no,” whether there were...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I should like to interpose an objection to this
method of answering unresponsively and with speeches here. We are
utterly unable in this procedure to make objections when answers are not
responsive to questions. We have already got into this case, through
Streicher’s volunteered speeches, an attack on the United States which
will take considerable evidence to answer if we are to answer it. It
seems to me very improper that a witness should do anything but make a
responsive answer to a question, so that we may keep these proceedings
from getting into issues that have nothing to do with them. It will not
help this Tribunal, in deciding Streicher’s guilt or innocence, to go
into questions which he has raised here against us—matters that are
perfectly capable of explanation, if we take time to do it.

It seems to me that this witness should be admonished, and admonished so
that he will understand it, if that is possible, that he is to answer
questions and stop, so that we can know and object in time to orations
on irrelevant subjects.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, will you try, when you put the questions to the
witness, to stop him if he is not answering the questions you put to
him?

DR. MARX: Yes, Mr. President. I was just in the process...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant Streicher, you understand, you have heard what
has been said and you will understand that the Tribunal cannot put up
with your long speeches which are not answers to questions which we put
to you.

DR. MARX: I will now repeat the question and I want you to answer the
question first with “yes” or “no” and then to add a brief explanation
regarding the question.

Apart from your weekly journal, and particularly after the Party came
into power, were there other publications in Germany which dealt with
the Jewish question in an anti-Semitic way?

STREICHER: Yes, even before the coming to power there were in every Gau
weekly journals that were anti-Semitic and one daily paper called the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ in Munich. Apart from that, there were a number
of periodicals which were not working directly for the Party. There was
also anti-Semitic literature. After the seizure of power, the daily
press was co-ordinated, and now the Party found itself in control of
some 3,000 daily papers, numerous weekly journals, and all type of
periodicals; and orders were given by the Führer that every newspaper
should provide enlightening articles on the Jewish question. The
anti-Semitic enlightenment was, therefore, after the seizure of power,
carried out on a very large scale in the daily press as well as in the
weekly journals, periodicals, and books. Consequently, _Der Stürmer_ did
not stand alone in its enlightening activity. But I want to state quite
openly that I make the claim of having treated the question in the most
popular way.

DR. MARX: Were the directives necessary for this issued by a central
office, say, for instance, by the National Socialist press service?

STREICHER: Yes. The Propaganda Ministry in Berlin had a National
Socialist press service. In this service, in every issue, there were a
number of enlightening articles on the Jewish question. During the war
the Führer personally gave the order that the press, far more than
previously, should publish enlightening articles on the Jewish question.

DR. MARX: The Prosecution accuse you of having contributed indirectly to
mass murders by incitation, and according to the minutes of 10 January
1946, the following charge has been made against you: No government in
the world could have undertaken a policy of mass extermination, as it
was done here, without having behind it a nation which agreed to it; and
you are supposed to have brought that about. What have you to say to
this?

STREICHER: To that I have the following to say: Incitation means to
bring a person into condition of excitement which causes him to perform
an irresponsible act. Did the contents of _Der Stürmer_ incite, this is
the question? Briefly stated, the question must be answered, “What did
_Der Stürmer_ write?” Several volumes of _Der Stürmer_ are available
here, but one would have to look at all the issues of 20 years in order
to answer that question exhaustively. During those 20 years I published
enlightening articles dealing with the race, dealing with what the Jews
themselves write in the Old Testament, in their history, what they write
in the Talmud. I printed excerpts from Jewish historical works, works
for instance, written by a Professor Dr. Graetz and by a Jewish scholar,
Gutnot.

In _Der Stürmer_ no editorial appeared written by me or written by
anyone of my main co-workers in which I did not include quotations from
the ancient history of the Jews, from the Old Testament or from Jewish
historical works of recent times.

It is important, and I must emphasize that I pointed out in all
articles, that prominent Jews, leading authors themselves, admitted that
which during 20 years as author and public speaker I publicly
proclaimed.

Allow me to add that it is my conviction that the contents of _Der
Stürmer_ as such were not incitation. During the whole 20 years I never
wrote in this connection, “Burn Jewish houses down; beat them to death.”
Never once did such an incitement appear in _Der Stürmer_.

Now comes the question: Is there any proof to be furnished that any deed
was done from the time _Der Stürmer_ first appeared, a deed of which one
can say that it was the result of an incitement? As a deed due to an
incitement I might mention a pogrom. That is a spontaneous deed when
sections of the people suddenly rise up and kill other people. During
the 20 years no pogrom took place in Germany, during the 20 years, as
far as I know, no Jew was killed. No murder took place, of which one
could have said, “This is the result of an incitement which was caused
by anti-Semitic authors or public speakers.”

Gentlemen, we are in Nuremberg. In the past there was a saying that
nowhere were the Jews in Germany so safe and so unmolested as in
Nuremberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, is not this becoming a rather lengthy speech?

DR. MARX: Streicher, you have explained this now sufficiently, so that
one can form an opinion—you mean, “I have not incited in such a way
that any spontaneous action carried out against the Jews by any group of
people or by the masses resulted”?

STREICHER: May I make a remark in this connection? Here we are concerned
with the most serious, the most decisive accusation raised against me by
the Prosecution, and here I ask the Tribunal to permit me to defend
myself against it objectively. Is it not of tremendous significance if I
can establish that in Nuremberg, of all places, no murder took place, no
single murder and no pogrom either? That is a fact.

THE PRESIDENT: You have already said it. I have just written down,
before I intervened, saying that no Jews have been killed not only in
Nuremberg but anywhere else as a result of your incitement.

DR. MARX: Witness, we shall make reference to these demonstrations of 9
and 10 November 1938 later.

STREICHER: Yes, but may I continue? The Indictment accuses me of having
indirectly contributed by incitation to mass murders, and I ask to be
allowed to make a statement on this: Something has been ascertained
today about which I myself did not know. I learned of the will left
behind by the Führer, and I assume that a few moments before his death
the Führer told the world the truth in that will. In it he says that
mass killings were carried out by his order; that the mass killings were
a reprisal.

Thus it is demonstrated that I, myself, cannot have been a participant
in the incredible events which occurred here.

DR. MARX: Finished?

STREICHER: Yes. You said that the Indictment accuses me in saying that
these mass killings could never have taken place if behind the
Government and behind the leaders of the State there had not been an
informed people.

Gentlemen, first of all, the question, “Did the German people really
know what was happening during the years of the war?” We know today...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is a matter of argument and not a matter
upon which you can give evidence. You can say what you knew.

STREICHER: I was a part of that nation during the war. During the war I
lived alone in the country. For 5 years I never left my farm. I was
watched by the Gestapo. From 1939 on I have been forbidden by the Führer
to speak.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we will certainly come to that later. I have
interrogated you now on this question, and I will proceed with my
questions. The other will come later.

STREICHER: But I wish to state that I had no opportunity—that is why I
said this—to learn what was actually going on.

I first heard of the mass murders and mass killings at Mondorf when I
was in prison. But I am stating here that if I had been told that 2 or 3
million people had been killed, then I would not have believed it. I
would not have believed that it was technically possible to kill so many
people; and on the basis of the entire attitude and psychology of the
Führer, as I knew it, I would not have believed that mass killings, to
the extent to which they have taken place, could have taken place.
Finished.

DR. MARX: The Prosecution also raise the charge against you that it was
the task of the educators of the nation to educate the people to murder
and to poison them with hatred, that you had devoted yourself
particularly to these tasks. What do you want to answer to this charge?

STREICHER: That is an allegation. We educated no murderers. The contents
of the articles which I wrote could not have educated murderers. No
murders took place, and that is proof that we did not educate murderers.
What happened during the war—well, I certainly did not educate the
Führer. The Führer issued the order on his own initiative.

DR. MARX: I now continue. The Prosecution further assert that the
Himmler-Kaltenbrunner groups and other SS leaders would have had no one
to carry out their orders to kill, if you had not made that propaganda
and if you had not conducted the education of the German people along
these lines. Will you make a statement on that?

STREICHER: I do not believe that the National Socialists mentioned read
_Der Stürmer_ every week. I do not believe that those who received the
order from the Führer to carry out killings or to pass on the order to
kill, were led to do this by my periodical. Hitler’s book, _Mein Kampf_,
existed, and the content of that book was the authority, the spiritual
authority; nor do I believe that the persons mentioned read that book
and carried out the order on the strength of it. Based on my knowledge
of what went on in the Movement, I am convinced that if the Führer gave
an order everyone acted upon it; and I state here quite openly that
maybe fate has been kind to me. If the Führer had ordered me to do such
things, I would not have been able to kill; but perhaps today I would
face some indictment which it has not been possible to lodge against me.
Perhaps because fate has taken a hand in this. But the conditions were
thus, that the Führer had such a power of hypnotic suggestion that the
entire people believed in him; his way was so unusual that, if one knows
this fact, one can understand why everyone who received an order acted.
And thus I want to reject as untrue and incorrect what was here thought
fit to assert against me.

DR. MARX: What do you know about the general attitude of Adolf Hitler to
the Jewish question? And when did Hitler first become hostile to the
Jews, according to your knowledge?

STREICHER: Even before Adolf Hitler became publicly known at all I had
occupied myself journalistically with anti-Semitic articles. However, on
the strength of his book, _Mein Kampf_, I first learned about the
historic connections of the Jewish problem. Adolf Hitler wrote his book
in the prison in Landsberg. Anyone who knows this book will know that
Hitler many years back, either by study of anti-Semitic literature or
through other experiences, must have developed this knowledge in himself
in order then to be able to write that book in prison in so short a
time. In other words, in his book Adolf Hitler stated to the world
public that he was anti-Semitic and that he knew the Jewish problem
through and through. He himself often said to me personally...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, the book _Mein Kampf_ is in evidence, and it
speaks for itself.

STREICHER: I will now answer your question, not with reference to the
book. You asked me whether Adolf Hitler had discussed the Jewish problem
with me. The answer is “yes.” Adolf Hitler always discussed the Jewish
problem in connection with Bolshevism. It is perhaps of importance in
answering that question to ask whether Adolf Hitler wanted a war with
Russia. Did he know long in advance that a war would come, or not? When
he was with us Adolf Hitler spoke of Stalin as a man whom he honored as
a man of action, but that he was actually surrounded by Jewish leaders,
and that Bolshevism...

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is going too far again. The question
which I put was quite exact, and I am asking you not to go so far
afield. You have heard the Tribunal object to it, and in the interest of
not delaying the proceedings you must not go into so many details. You
must not make speeches.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I believe that some time ago Mr. Justice
Jackson remarked, quite justly, quite reasonably, that the Defendant
Streicher became so intoxicated by his own speeches that he did not
answer the questions put to him or the charges made against him. I
therefore invite the attention of the Tribunal to this fact and suggest
that the defendant abstain from making lengthy speeches and merely give
brief replies to the charges brought against him.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you go on, Dr. Marx, and try to keep the witness to
an answer to the questions which you have no doubt prepared.

DR. MARX: Very well, Mr. President.

STREICHER: May I, please, as a defendant, say a few words, here? The
question was...

THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] No, you may not. You will answer the
questions, please.

DR. MARX: Next question. Is there reason for the assumption that Hitler,
when he decided to have the Jews in Europe killed in masses, was subject
to any influence, or what is to be considered the motive for that
dreadful decision?

STREICHER: The Führer could not be influenced. As I know the Führer, if
somebody had gone to him and said that Jews should be killed, then he
would have turned him down. And if, during the war, somebody had gone to
him and said, “I have learned that you are giving the order that mass
killings are to be carried out,” then he would have turned that man down
too. I therefore answer your question by saying that the Führer could
not be influenced.

DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that the decision in this
matter was made entirely on his own initiative.

STREICHER: I have already said that that becomes clear from his will.

DR. MARX: In August 1938 the main synagogue in Nuremberg was demolished.
Was this done on your orders?

STREICHER: Yes. In my Gau there were approximately 15 synagogues, in
Nuremberg one main synagogue, a somewhat smaller one, and I think
several other prayer rooms. The main synagogue stood in the outskirts of
the medieval Reichsstadt. Even before 1933, during the so-called period
of struggle, when we still had the other government, I stated publicly
during a meeting that it was a disgrace that there should be placed in
the Old City such an oriental monstrosity of a building. After the
seizure of power I told the Lord Mayor that he should have the synagogue
torn down, and at the same time the planetarium. I might point out that
after the World War, in the middle of the park grounds laid out for the
recreation of the citizens, a planetarium had been built, an ugly brick
building. I gave the order to tear down that building and said that the
main synagogue, too, should be razed. If it had been my intention to
deprive the Jews of their synagogue as a church or if I had wanted to
give a general signal, then I would have given the order, after the
seizure of power, that every synagogue in my Gau should be torn down.
Then I would likewise have had all the synagogues in Nuremberg torn
down. But it is a fact that in the spring of 1938 only the main
synagogue was torn down; the synagogue in the Essenweinstrasse, in the
new city, remained untouched. That the order was then given in November
of that year to set fire to the synagogues, that is no fault of mine.

DR. MARX: In other words, you want to say that you did not order the
tearing down of this building for anti-Semitic reasons but because it
did not conform to the architectural style of the city?

STREICHER: For reasons of city architecture. I wanted to submit a
picture to the Tribunal on this, but I have not received any.

DR. MARX: Yes, we have a picture.

STREICHER: But you cannot see the synagogue in it. I do not know whether
the Tribunal want to see the picture. The picture actually shows only
the old houses, but the front of the synagogue facing the
Hans-Sachs-Platz is not visible. I do not know whether I may submit the
picture to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, the photograph can be put in. Let us see
the photograph.

DR. MARX: In that case, I will submit it to the Tribunal as evidence and
I am asking you to accept it accordingly.

THE PRESIDENT: What will it be, exhibit what?

DR. MARX: I cannot say at the moment, Mr. President. I shall take the
liberty of stating the number later and for the moment I confine myself
to submitting it. I could not present it any earlier because I had not
come into possession of this picture. It was only in the last days...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.

DR. MARX: In your measure in connection with the main synagogue did you
rely on any statements of art experts?

STREICHER: I had frequent opportunities to discuss the subject with
architects. Every architect said that there must have been a city
council which had no feeling whatsoever for city architecture, that it
was impossible to explain it.

These statements were not in any way directed against the synagogue as a
Jewish church, but rather against such a building in this part of the
city. Strangers, too, whom I guided—for on Party rally days I used to
accompany British and American people across the Hans-Sachs-Platz—and I
remember only one case where when I said “Do you not notice anything?”
that the person did not. But all other strangers said “How could that
building get there in the midst of these medieval buildings?” I could
also have submitted a book, written in 1877, which is in the prison
library, where a Professor Berneis, who was famous, wrote at that time
to the author, Uhde, in Switzerland, that he had now seen the Sachs
Platz...

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, that is enough now. In other words, you have
indicated that you believed you could rely on the judgment of architects
who seemed to you to be authorities?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: At the time when the synagogue was demolished, did you make a
speech?

STREICHER: Yes, but I want to point out that the Prosecution have
submitted an article, a report from the _Tageszeitung_, that was written
by a simple young man. I want to state that this article does not
contain a true representation of the statements which I made.

DR. MARX: I now come to the demonstrations on the night of 9 to 10
November 1938. What can you say concerning those demonstrations and what
role did you play in that connection? Were those demonstrations
initiated by the population?

STREICHER: Every year the Gauleiter and SA and SS leaders met the Führer
in Munich on the occasion of the historic day of 9 November. We sat down
to dinner in the old Town Hall, and it was customary for the Führer to
make a short speech after the dinner. On 9 November 1938, I did not feel
very well. I participated in the dinner and then I left; I drove back to
Nuremberg and went to bed. Toward midnight I was awakened. My chauffeur
told me that the SA leader Von Obernitz wanted to talk to the Gauleiter.
I received him and he said the following: “Gauleiter, you had left
already when the Minister of Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels, took the floor
and said”—I can now repeat it only approximately—“said, ‘Legation
Counsellor Vom Rath has been murdered in Paris. That is now the second
murder abroad of a prominent National Socialist. This murder is not the
murder by the Jew, Grünspan; this is rather the execution of a deed
which has been desired by all Jewry. Something should now be done.’” I
do not know now whether Goebbels said the Führer had ordered it; I
remember only that Von Obernitz told me that Goebbels had stated the
synagogues were to be set on fire; and I cannot now remember exactly,
but I think he told me that the windows of Jewish business houses were
to be smashed and that houses were to be demolished.

Then I said to Obernitz—for I was surprised—“Obernitz, I think it is
wrong that synagogues be set on fire, and at this moment I think it is
wrong that Jewish business houses be demolished; I think these
demonstrations are wrong. If people are let loose during the night,
deeds can be perpetrated for which one cannot be responsible.” I said to
Obernitz that I considered the setting on fire of synagogues
particularly wrong because abroad and even among the German people the
opinion might arise that National Socialism had now started the fight
against religion. Obernitz replied, “I have the order.” I said,
“Obernitz, I will not assume any responsibility here.” Obernitz left and
the action took place. What I have said under oath here I have
previously stated in several interrogations; and my chauffeur will
confirm it, for he was witness to this night’s conversation, and shortly
afterwards when he went to bed told his wife what he had heard up there
in my bedroom.

DR. MARX: Have you finished?

STREICHER: Yes, but you asked another question...

DR. MARX: Yes, whether it was a spontaneous act of force initiated by
the masses of the people?

STREICHER: Yes. In the National Socialist press there appeared after
this action an article to the same effect, which stated that a
spontaneous demonstration of the people had revenged the murder of Herr
Vom Rath. It had therefore been deliberately ordered from Berlin that
there should be a public statement to the effect that the demonstration
of 1938 was spontaneous. That this was not the case I was also able to
learn in Nuremberg; and it is remarkable that the indignation at what
had happened during those demonstrations expressed itself even here in
Nuremberg, even among the Party members.

The Prosecution have submitted an article which is a report on a speech
which I made on 10 November; and that is a remarkable piece of evidence
of the fact that the people were against this action. I was forced,
because of the atmosphere which prevailed in Nuremberg, to make a public
speech and say that one should not have so much sympathy for the Jews.
Such was the affair of November 1938.

Perhaps it might also be important for you to ask me how I, of all
people, happened to oppose the idea of these demonstrations.

DR. MARX: I thought you had explained that already. Very well. Who gave
the order then for the burning down of the synagogue still standing on
Essenweinstrasse?

STREICHER: I do not know who gave the order; I believe it was SA leader
Von Obernitz. I do not know the details.

DR. MARX: A further question: Did you yourself express publicly your
disapproval of these brutalities?

STREICHER: Yes. In a small circle of leading Party members I said what I
have always said, what I have always said publicly: I stated that this
was wrong. I talked to lawyers during a meeting—I do not know whether
my defense counsel himself was there—I believe it was as early as
November 1938 that I stated, to the Nuremberg lawyers at a meeting, that
what had happened here during that action, was wrong; that it was wrong
as regards the people and as regards foreign countries. I said then that
anyone who knew the Jewish question as I knew it would understand why I
considered that demonstration a mistake. I do not know whether this was
reported to the Führer at that time, but after November 1938 I was never
again called to the Hotel Deutscher Hof when the Führer came to
Nuremberg. Whether this was the reason I do not know, but at any rate I
did criticize these demonstrations publicly.

DR. MARX: It is assumed by the Prosecution that in 1938 a more severe
treatment of the Jews was introduced. Is that true, and what is the
explanation?

STREICHER: Yes. In 1938 the Jewish question entered a new phase; that is
shown, indeed, by the demonstration. I myself can only say in this
connection that there was no preliminary conference on this subject. I
assume that the Führer, impulsive as he was and acting on the spur of
the moment, got around probably only on 9 November to saying to Dr.
Goebbels, “Tell the organizations that the synagogues must be burned
down.” As I said, I myself did not attend such a meeting; and I do not
know what happened to bring about this acceleration.

DR. MARX: On 12 November 1938 the decree was published according to
which the Jews were to be eliminated from the economic life of the
country. Was there a connection between the orders for the
demonstrations of 9 November and that further decree of 12 November
1938, and would that decree be due to the same reason?

STREICHER: Well, here I can say only that I am convinced that there was
a connection. The order, rather the decrees, which were to have such an
extensive effect in the economic field, came from Berlin. We did not
have any conference. I do not remember any Gauleiter meetings in which
that was discussed. I do not know of any. That happened just as
everything happened; we were not previously informed.

DR. MARX: How was it that not you, but the Codefendant Rosenberg, was
given the task of attending to this matter?

STREICHER: Rosenberg was the spiritual trustee of the Movement, but he
was not given this particular task nor the task of the demonstration nor
that of economic matters.

DR. MARX: No, we are talking of different points. Rosenberg was the one
given the task by the Leaders of the State of taking care, as it was
called, of racial-political and other enlightenment tasks; and you were
not. How can that be explained? How can it be explained that you were
not chosen?

STREICHER: Rosenberg, as he himself said, had met the Führer very early
and was anyway, because of his knowledge, intellectually suited to take
over this task. I devoted myself more to popular enlightenment.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, he has told us that he wasn’t given the task.
Unless he had some communication with Rosenberg he can’t tell us
anything more about it except that he wasn’t given the task. All the
rest is mere comment and argument.

DR. MARX: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I now put the next question to you: Was an
order issued during the year 1939 forbidding you to make speeches?

STREICHER: Yes. In the autumn of 1939 my enemies went so far that the
Führer, without my being asked beforehand, issued a written order
through Party Member Hess forbidding me to make speeches. The threat of
immediate arrest was made should I act against this order.

DR. MARX: Is it also correct that in 1938 an effort was evidently made
to stop further publication of _Der Stürmer_, I mean in government
circles?

STREICHER: Such intentions existed quite often, and also at that time.
Perhaps I might refer to two other documents in this connection in order
to save time.

The Prosecution have submitted copies of a letter from Himmler and
Baldur von Schirach. Here I can give quite a simple explanation right
now. At that time, in 1939, there were intentions of prohibiting _Der
Stürmer_. Bormann had even issued some such order. Then the Chief Editor
of _Der Stürmer_ wrote to prominent members of the Party, asking them to
state their opinion about _Der Stürmer_. And thereupon letters were also
received from Himmler and Von Schirach. Altogether, I think about 15
letters were received from prominent members of the Movement; they were
merely kind replies to an inquiry.

DR. MARX: That is sufficient. Is it true that at the outbreak of the war
you were not made Armed Forces District Commissioner
(Wehrkreis-Kommissar) in your own Gau?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: How can that be explained?

STREICHER: Well, maybe that is not so important; that is how conditions
were at the time. There were certain personal feelings, _et cetera_; it
is of no significance. At any rate, I did not become Armed Forces
District Commissioner.

DR. MARX: The Prosecution have stated that after 1 September 1939 the
persecution of the Jews increased more and more. What was that due to?

STREICHER: That question only the Führer could answer; I cannot.

DR. MARX: But do you not think this had something to do with the
outbreak of war?

STREICHER: The Führer always said so in public, yes.

DR. MARX: A proceeding was instituted against you before the Supreme
Party Court. How did that happen? What was the development and the
result of that trial?

STREICHER: I am grateful that I have an opportunity to state quite
briefly before the International Military Tribunal something which I
have had to keep silent about up to now because of a Führer order. I
myself had instituted proceedings against myself before the Supreme
Party Court in order to defend myself against people who were denouncing
me. I was being accused...

THE PRESIDENT: Is the defendant talking about some order which Hitler
gave that he was not to be allowed to speak or is he talking about
something else?

You remember, Dr. Marx, that certain allegations were struck out of the
record. If he is talking about those, it seems to me that we have got
nothing whatever to do with it. Am I right in recollecting that
something was struck out of the record?

DR. MARX: Yes it was, Mr. President, but only certain things from the
Göring report were struck out, only the one passage which concerned the
affair with the three young persons; but everything else was retained by
the Prosecution. The Defense, therefore, must be able to take a stand in
regard to these points, if the Prosecution do not say that they are
dropping the entire Göring report; and in that connection this
proceeding before the Supreme Party Court also plays a part. He can make
a brief statement about it.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

DR. MARX: Witness, be brief.

STREICHER: Yes. It is important then that I instituted proceedings
against myself; about 10 points were involved which had been raised
against me, among them a matter referring to some shares. An affidavit
exists from the Göring report which states that I had been found guilty.
May I state here that the trial was never completed and no sentence was
passed.

That is the answer to the question which you have put to me.

DR. MARX: The matter referring to shares, does that have something to do
with the shares of the Mars works?

STREICHER: We will come to it later. It was not the main point.

DR. MARX: And then you were ordered to remain permanently at the
Pleikershof? Were you under the guard of the Gestapo there, and was
there also a check-up as far as visitors were concerned?

STREICHER: It is not correct that I was ordered to stay at the
Pleikershof. What is true is that I retired voluntarily with the
intention of never again being active in the Movement. It is correct
that the Gestapo watched me, and every visitor was called to the police
station and interrogated as to his conversations he had had. That is a
fact.

DR. MARX: During your stay at the Pleikershof did you have any
connections or correspondence with any leading personalities of the
Party or State?

STREICHER: No. As far as prominent persons of the Movement and of the
State are concerned, I had no correspondence whatsoever with them; that
is why the Prosecution could hardly find any letters. I never stated in
letters my opinion on the Jewish problem or on other matters. I shall
have to state then, in order to answer your question exactly, that I had
no correspondence with prominent persons of the Party and the State.

DR. MARX: After the outbreak of the war, were you informed of or
consulted in any way on any measures intended against the Jews?

STREICHER: No.

DR. MARX: What were your relations to Himmler? Did you know him at all
closely? Did you ever speak to him about measures against the Jews or
did he talk about intended mass executions of the Jews?

STREICHER: I knew Himmler just as I knew the SA leaders, or other SS
leaders. I knew him from common meetings, Gauleiter conferences, _et
cetera_. I did not have a single political discussion with Himmler,
except in society when he may have touched on this or that, in the
presence of others. The last time I saw Himmler was in Nuremberg when he
spoke to the officers in their mess. When that was I cannot say exactly
but I think it was shortly before the war. I never had a talk with him
on the Jewish question. He himself was, of course, well informed on this
question. He had an organ of his own called the _Schwarze Korps_. And
what his inner attitude toward me was is something that I did not
discover until my stay on the farm. There were denunciations against me
which reached him. It was stated that I was being too humane with the
French prisoners. Shortly after that I received a letter in which he
reproached me and made serious representations against me. I gave no
answer at all. Without having made any previous inquiries with me as to
whether these denunciations were true, he made a serious charge against
me; and I state quite openly that it was actually my feeling at the time
that I might possibly lose my liberty through arrest. These were my
relations with Himmler.

DR. MARX: That is enough.

During this Trial you have heard mentioned the names of a great number
of Higher SS and Police Leaders who played a leading part in the Jewish
persecutions, as for instance, Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf, and so on.
Were there any connections between you and one of these Higher SS and
Police Leaders?

STREICHER: I heard the names you have mentioned for the first time
during an interrogation here. I did not know these men; they may well
have seen me, but there was never a discussion involving me and the
senior SS or SA leaders. Furthermore, I never was in any of Himmler’s
offices in Berlin, or any Ministry in Berlin. Thus, no conference ever
took place.

DR. MARX: The Prosecution have drawn the conclusion from numerous
articles in _Der Stürmer_, that as early as 1942 and 1943 you must have
had knowledge of the mass executions of Jews which had taken place.

What statement can you make on this, and when, and in what way, did you
hear of the mass executions of Jews which took place in the East?

STREICHER: I had subscribed to the Jewish weekly that appeared in
Switzerland. Sometimes in that weekly there were intimations that
something was not quite in order; and I think it was at the end of 1943
or 1944—I believe 1944—that an article appeared in the Jewish weekly,
in which it said that in the East—I think it was said in Poland—Jews
were disappearing in masses. I then made reference to this in an article
which perhaps will be presented to me later. But I state quite frankly
that the Jewish weekly in Switzerland did not represent for me an
authoritative source, that I did not believe everything in it. This
article did not quote figures; it did not talk about mass executions,
but only about disappearances.

DR. MARX: Have you finished?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Did you make proposals in _Der Stürmer_ for the solution of
the Jewish question, during the war?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: And in what sense?

STREICHER: As I said yesterday, I represented the point of view that the
Jewish question could be solved only internationally, since there were
Jews in all countries. For that reason we published articles in my
weekly journal referring to the Zionist demand for the creation of a
Jewish state, such as had also been provided for or indicated in the
Balfour Declaration. There were therefore two possibilities for a
solution, a preliminary solution within the countries through
appropriate laws; and then the creation of a Jewish state.

During the war, I think it was in 1941 or 1942, we had written another
article—we were subject to the Berlin censorship—and the censorship
office sent back the proof submitted with the remark that the article
must not be published in which we had proposed Madagascar as the place
for the establishment of a Jewish state. The political relations with
France were given as the reason why that article should not be
published.

DR. MARX: If you had expected that question to be solved by mass
executions, would you then too have written this article?

STREICHER: At that time, at any rate, it would still have been
nonsensical to publish it.

DR. MARX: Did it not make you uneasy to deal with the Jewish question in
a biased way, in a way which left completely out of sight those
qualities of the Jews which can be described as great?

STREICHER: I did not understand this question fully, perhaps I did not
hear it correctly.

DR. MARX: You can be accused of treating, in a biased way, only those
qualities of the Jews that appear disadvantageous to you, whereas the
other qualities of the Jewish people you ignored. What is your
explanation?

STREICHER: I think that this question is really superfluous here. It is
perfectly natural that I, as an anti-Semitic person and as I saw the
Jewish question, was in no way interested in that. Perhaps I did not see
the good traits which you or some others see in the Jews. That is
possible. But at any rate I was not interested in investigating as to
what particular good qualities might be recognized here.

DR. MARX: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: This would seem a good time to break off.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. MARX: Did you visit concentration camps?

STREICHER: Yes. I visited the Dachau Concentration Camp.

DR. MARX: When was that?

STREICHER: I believe the first time was when all the Gauleiter were
called together. I believe 1935, I do not know definitely, 1934 or 1935,
I do not know.

DR. MARX: At what intervals did you then visit this camp? It is said
that you were in Dachau every 4 weeks.

STREICHER: Altogether I was at Dachau four times.

DR. MARX: It is asserted that after each of your visits in Dachau, Jews
disappeared there.

STREICHER: I do not know whether Jews disappeared.

DR. MARX: What caused you to visit the Dachau Camp repeatedly?

STREICHER: I went to the Dachau Camp to visit Social Democratic and
Communist functionaries from my Gau who were in prison there to have
them introduced to me. I picked out—I do not know how many hundreds of
them there were—but every time I was in Dachau I picked out 10 or 20 of
those of whom it had been ascertained by the Police that they had no
criminal record; I had them picked out from among the inmates, and at
Christmas every year I had them brought in buses to Nuremberg to the
Hotel Deutscher Hof, where I brought them together with their wives and
children and had dinner with them.

I should like to ask the Tribunal, for the benefit of the Nuremberg
public, to permit me to make a very short statement as to why I took
these Communists out. Party proceedings were initiated against me
because I did this. There were rumors which were not true. May I make a
very short statement as to why I did it?

DR. MARX: I should like to ask the Tribunal to approve this, Mr.
President, so that the reasons why the defendant did this may be
ascertained.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, as long as it is brief.

DR. MARX: Be brief.

STREICHER: When I walked through the streets of Nuremberg children
approached me and said, “My father is in Dachau.” Women came to me and
asked to get their husbands back. I knew many of these officials from
the time when I spoke at revolutionary meetings, and I could vouch for
these people. I know of only one case where I was wrong in the selection
of those people. All the others behaved impeccably. They kept the word
which they had given me. Thus, perhaps my Party comrades, who sit here
in the dock, see now that I did not want to harm my country but that I
wanted to do, and did do, something humanely good.

DR. MARX: Now I come to the picture books which appeared in _Der
Stürmer_ publishing house. You know that two picture books were
published, one with the title, _Trust No Fox in the Field_, and the
other one with the title, _The Poisonous Toadstool_. Do you assume
responsibility for these picture books?

STREICHER: Yes. May I say, by way of summary, that I assume
responsibility for everything which was written by my assistants or
which came into my publishing house.

DR. MARX: Who was the author of these picture books?

STREICHER: The book _Trust No Fox in the Field_ and _No Jew Under His
Oath_ was done and illustrated by a young woman artist, and she also
wrote the text. The title which appears on the picture book is from Dr.
Martin Luther.

The second picture book was done by the Editor-in-Chief of _Der
Stürmer_, who was a former schoolteacher. Two criminal cases in
Nuremberg, which were tried here in this courtroom, as far as I know,
were the occasion for my publishing these two books. There was a
manufacturer, Louis Schloss, a Jew, who with young Nuremberg girls some
of them still innocent, had...

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, we do not want to hear that now. My question
was only as to who was the author of these picture books and whether you
assumed the responsibility for them?

STREICHER: It is important for the Tribunal, in fact, right for them to
know how it came about that all of a sudden two picture books for young
people appeared in my publishing house. I am making this statement
absolutely objectively. I am speaking here of legal cases. There are
gentlemen here, who are witnesses, who were here in this court and were
present during the proceedings. Only thus can one understand why these
books were published. They were the answer to deeds that had occurred.

DR. MARX: Yes, but we are concerned here only with the accusation made
against you, that thereby you exerted an influence on the minds of young
people which was not beneficial and which could be considered designed
to have a poisonous effect.

STREICHER: And I should like to prove by my statement that we wanted to
protect youth because things had, in fact, occurred.

DR. MARX: Yes, but young persons could hardly understand the Schloss
case, or any such case, could they?

STREICHER: It was a matter of public discussion in Nuremberg and beyond
that all over Germany.

DR. MARX: As far as I am concerned, this question is answered, Mr.
President.

STREICHER: But not for me as defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: You told us that the books were published to answer
things which had occurred here. That is sufficient.

DR. MARX: Witness, another serious accusation made by the Prosecution
against you is that a special issue concerning ritual murders was
published in the publishing house of _Der Stürmer_ and appeared in one
number of _Der Stürmer_. How did this special issue come about and what
was the cause for it? Were you the author of that special issue?

STREICHER: No.

DR. MARX: Who was the author?

STREICHER: My collaborator, the Editor-in-Chief at that time, Karl Holz,
who is now dead. But I assume the responsibility.

DR. MARX: Is it not true that even during the twenties you dealt with
that question in _Der Stürmer_?

STREICHER: Yes, and in public speeches.

DR. MARX: Yes, in public speeches. Why did you now in 1935 stir up again
this doubtlessly very grave matter?

STREICHER: I should like to ask my counsel to express no judgment as to
what I have written; to question me, but not to express judgment. The
Prosecution are going to do that.

You have asked me how this issue came about. I will explain very
briefly...

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. I have to protest against the fact
that Herr Streicher here, in the course of his interrogation by me,
thinks he can criticize the manner in which I put my questions.
Therefore, I ask the Court to give a decision on this, since otherwise I
am not in a position to ask my questions at all.

THE PRESIDENT: You have already stated your position and the Tribunal
has given you full support in your position. Will you please continue?

And let me tell you this, Defendant, that if you are insolent either to
your counsel or to the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not be able to
continue the hearing of your case at this moment. You will kindly treat
your counsel and the Tribunal with due courtesy.

STREICHER: May I ask to say something about this?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Answer the question, please.

DR. MARX: I will go on now with my questioning.

The Prosecution accuse you, in connection with this ritual murder
affair, of having treated the matter without documentary proof, by
referring to a story from the Middle Ages. What, in brief, was your
source?

STREICHER: The sources were given in that issue. Nothing was written
without the sources being given at the same time. There was reference
made to a book written in Greek by a former Rabbi who had been converted
to Christianity. There was reference made to a publication of a high
clergymen of Milan, a book which has appeared in Germany for the last 50
years. Not even under the democratic government did Jews raise
objections to that book. That ritual murder issue refers to court files
which are located in Rome, it refers to files which are in Court. There
are pictures in it which show that in 23 cases the Church itself has
dealt with this question. The Church has canonized 23 non-Jews killed by
ritual murder. Pictures of sculptures, that is, of stone monuments were
shown as illustrations; everywhere the source was pointed out; even a
case in England was mentioned, and one in Kiev, Russia. But in this
connection I should like to say, as I said to a Jewish officer here,
that we never wanted to assert that all Jewry was ready now to commit
ritual murders. But it is a fact that within Jewry there exists a sect
which engaged in these murders, and has done so up until the present. I
have asked my counsel to submit to the Court a file from Pisek in
Czechoslovakia, very recent proceedings. A court of appeal has confirmed
a case of ritual murder. Thus, in conclusion I must say...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I object to this statement, Your Honor. After his
counsel has refused to submit it, he insists on stating here the
contents of a court record. Now this is not an orderly way to make
charges against the Jewish people. Streicher says he is asking counsel
to submit. His counsel apparently has refused, whereupon he starts to
give evidence of what he knows, in any case, is a resumé of the matters
which his counsel has declined to submit here. It seems to me that,
having appointed counsel to conduct his case, he has shown repeatedly
that he is not willing to conduct his case in an orderly manner and he
ought to be returned to his cell and any further statements that he
wishes to make to this Court transmitted through his counsel in writing.
This is entirely unfair and in contempt of Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, I think you had better continue.

DR. MARX: I should like to say that that closes this affair. The
essential thing is whether one can say that he treated the case without
documentary proof. The Defense is not interested in the affair at all;
and, according to my recollection, I even suggested to one of the
gentlemen of the Prosecution that this affair perhaps be left out
altogether, because it is really so gruesome and so horrible that it is
better not to treat it. But the defendant only wanted to say that it was
only on the basis of various pieces of evidence that he dealt with the
case, and I believe that is sufficient; that should close the matter.

Now, Herr Streicher, you fall again and again into the mistake of going
too far in your explanations and of discussing things which can be
considered propaganda on your part. I should like to ask you now for the
last time to stick to the questions and leave out everything else. It is
in your own interest. You are accused of having carried on various
activities in your Gau, which were Crimes Against Humanity, of having
mistreated people who lived in your Gau. Thus you are accused of having
sought out a political prisoner, a certain Steinruck, in his cell and of
having beaten him. Is that correct?

STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Was Steinruck a Jew?

STREICHER: No.

DR. MARX: For what reason did you do that?

STREICHER: Steinruck, in a public place, in the presence of many
witnesses, had made derogatory statements about the Führer, libelous
statements. He was at police headquarters. I had spoken to the Police
President about it and told him that I should like to look at that
Steinruck once. I went with my adjutant—the Göring report says that a
Party member, Holz, was there too, but that is not correct—I went with
my adjutant to police headquarters. The same Police President, who later
denounced me to Reich Marshal Göring, took me to Steinruck’s cell. We
went into the cell; I stated here that I had come with the intention of
talking to him, talking to him reasonably. We talked to him. But he
behaved so cowardly that it became necessary at the moment that he be
chastised. I do not mind stating here that I am sorry about that case,
that I regret it as a slip.

DR. MARX: Then it is asserted that in August 1938 you beat up an editor,
Burger. Is that correct?

STREICHER: No, that is not correct. If I had beaten him up, then I would
say so here. But I believe that my adjutant and somebody else had an
argument with him.

DR. MARX: What about the incident in the Künstlerhaus in Munich?

STREICHER: I went to Munich to the Inn Künstlerstätte, or something like
that. I was received by the manager. Then a young man came up to me,
drunk and quarrelsome, and shouted at me. The manager protested and
ordered him out of the place. But the drunken young fellow came back
again and again and then my chauffeur grabbed him and my son helped.
They took him into a room and beat him up and then the proprietor of the
inn thanked me for having rid him of the drunkard.

And now I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to state very
briefly my position on one case which I believe the Prosecution also
have dropped, where I was accused of sadistic tendencies...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you know perfectly well that that incident has
been stricken from the record and is not, therefore, mentioned against
you, so that it is quite unnecessary to go into it. The Tribunal cannot
hear you on it.

DR. MARX: Witness, from the so-called Göring report I should like to
submit to you some points which have been presented by the Prosecution.

You know that after the action of November 1938, in the district of
Franconia, Aryanization of Jewish property was undertaken to the utmost
extent. Would you like to make a statement about that?

STREICHER: Here in the Göring report is a reference to a statement of
the deceased Party member, Holz. In that statement it is pointed out
that Holz came to see me after that action, that he made a report about
the action and likewise declared the action to be wrong; he said
furthermore that now that this had happened, he considered it necessary
to go further and Aryanize the property. The Göring report states that I
then told Holz that could not be done and that I opposed it. Then it
states further that Holz said to me that he still thought it would be
right if one were to do it. We could then get out of it the means for
the establishment of a Gau school. Holz also states that I said
something like: “Well, Holz, if you believe you can do it, then go ahead
and do it.”

I want to state here that what Party member Holz said is true. I was
opposed at first; and then, acting on a sudden impulse, which I cannot
understand today, I said, “Well, if you can do it, then go ahead and do
it.” I want to state that at that time when I said it, I did not believe
at all that it was to be done or would be done; but it was done. The
Reich Marshal, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, later stated his
position on it in Berlin, sharply rejecting it. Only at that time did I
find out exactly how Holz accomplished this Aryanization. I had a talk
with him, got into a serious dispute; and our friendly relations were
broken off at that time. Holz volunteered in an armored unit, went to
the front, and resigned as deputy. I returned from Berlin to Nuremberg,
and later there appeared in Nuremberg a Police Inspector sent by the
Reich Marshal in his capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan. He
reported to me and asked me if I would agree to an investigation of the
whole matter, and I stated that I would welcome the investigation. Then
the investigation took place. The Aryanization was repealed, and it was
established that Holz personally had not gotten any material advantage
from it. Aryanization was then taken over by the State, repealed, and
taken over.

I state frankly that in that affair I am at least guilty of negligence.

DR. MARX: Did you know that the amounts paid in the Aryanization of
houses or real estate represented only about 20 percent, or even less,
of the actual value?

STREICHER: Holz had not come to see me for weeks. He had carried on the
Aryanization in the Labor Front Office with the expert there. Not until
later, in Berlin during the meeting which the Reich Marshal held, did I
learn of the real facts; and thus the dispute and the break between Holz
and me came about, because I had to disapprove the manner in which the
Aryanization had been handled.

DR. MARX: You are further accused of having had shares in the Mars Works
at Nuremberg acquired at an extraordinarily low price, for purposes of
enriching yourself and, in the course of this acquisition, of having
exerted an undue pressure on the owner of the shares?

STREICHER: It says in the Göring report, literally, that I had
instructed and in another place that I had given the order that the Mars
shares be acquired for me. I state here that I neither instructed nor
ordered anyone to acquire the Mars shares. The whole thing was like
this. The director of my publishing house, who had power of attorney
because I, personally, never in all the years bothered with financial or
business matters, could do what he wanted. One day he came to see me
with my adjutant. I do not recollect now whether the adjutant or the
director of my publishing house was the one who spoke first. I was told
the following: An attorney had called and said that the Mars shares were
being offered for sale at an advantageous price. The director of my
publishing house asked me whether I agreed. I stated that never in my
life had I owned any shares, that I had never bothered about financial
matters in my publishing house. If he thought that the stock should be
bought, then he could do it. The shares were bought. It was the most
serious breach of confidence ever committed against me by any Party
comrade or employee. After a short time it turned out; that is, I was
informed how these shares had been acquired. I found out that the owner
had been threatened. When I found out under what conditions this stock
purchase had been made, I gave the order at once to return the stock. In
the Göring report it is noted that this return took place. Among the
confiscated files of my publishing house there is an official statement
about this affair which shows that these shares were returned.

In this connection perhaps I may be permitted to say that my publishing
house was located until the end of the war in a rented house. At the
time of the Aryanization I was approached with the plan that an
Aryanized house be acquired for my publishing firm. I refused that. I
state here in conclusion that I have in my possession no Jewish
property.

When those demonstrations occurred in 1938, jewels had been brought into
the Gau house. These pieces of jewelry were turned over to the police. A
man who was bearer of the honorary Party emblem was convicted and
sentenced to 6 years penal servitude because he had given his sweetheart
a ring and another piece of jewelry dating from that time. But I may add
one thing: The guilt of this bearer of the Party emblem rests perhaps
with those who gave the order: “Go into the Jewish houses.” That man, as
far as I knew him, had always been personally decent. Because of that
order, he got into a position in which he committed a crime.

I have finished what I wanted to say.

DR. MARX: Is it not true the allegations, made by the chief of the
publishing firm Fink before the Party Court and also even before that,
at a police interrogation, were different, in the main points, from your
present statements?

STREICHER: The whole thing was that Fink, the publishing house manager,
was called to police headquarters and interrogated. The police Chief was
interested in the hearing since for many years he had been a friend of
mine and of my family. Fink returned from the interrogation completely
upset. He paced up and down in front of me and shouted, “I was
threatened, I have made statements which are not true. I am blackguard.
I am a criminal.” A witness of that incident was my chauffeur. I calmed
him down and told him, “I was called in for a hearing once, too. I was
even imprisoned once. I will give you opportunity...”

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to go into such detail in this matter?

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Perhaps this is necessary, because
in this very report reference is made to the testimony of Fink; and an
attempt is made to prove with this that the explanation made by the
Defendant Streicher is wrong, that he gave the order to purchase this
stock, possibly under pressure, and that he approved of it, whereas he
counters that he knew neither that these shares were to be bought at
such a low price nor that blackmail was to be used.

If this is taken for granted, then, of course, we can close the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what he has already said. He has said that quite
clearly, has he not? I was only suggesting that it was not necessary to
go into such detail in the matter.

DR. MARX: Witness, it may be of some importance to state what the
development of _Der Stürmer_ has been since 1933, as far as circulation
is concerned. Give us a short statement on the circulation of _Der
Stürmer_, and then I shall put another question to you.

STREICHER: _Der Stürmer_ appeared in 1923 in octavo format, and in the
beginning it had a circulation of 2,000 to 3,000 copies. In the course
of time the circulation increased to 10,000. At that time _Der Stürmer_
circulated—until 1933 really—only in Nuremberg, in my Gau, perhaps
also in Southern Bavaria. The publisher was a bookseller and he worked
first with one man, then with two. This is proof that the circulation
was really small.

In 1933—but I say this with certain reservations because it may be that
the publisher did not always tell me the correct circulation figures and
I had no written contract with him—I say with reservations, that in
1933 the circulation was 25,000 copies.

In 1935 the publisher died; and at that time it was, I believe, 40,000.
Then an expert took over the publishing house and organized it to cover
all of Germany. The circulation increased then to 100,000, and went up
as high as 600,000. It fluctuated, decreased, and then dropped during
the war; I cannot say exactly but I believe it was about 150,000 to
200,000.

DR. MARX: You said that that new man organized the circulation to cover
all of Germany. Was the Party machinery utilized in this, and were not
industries and other offices—the German Labor Front, for
instance—utilized in order to increase the circulation forcibly?

STREICHER: Well, the attitude of the Party was made manifest in a
letter, which was sent to all Gaue, signed by Bormann. There it was
expressly pointed out that _Der Stürmer_ was not a Party organ and had
nothing to do with the Party. Thereupon several Gauleiter saw this an
occasion for ordering that _Der Stürmer_ should not appear in their Gaue
any more. Now it is clear that within the organizations there were Party
members who, because of idealism or for other reasons, worked to
increase the distribution of _Der Stürmer_. However, I myself, neither
in writing nor orally, ever issued any order to any Party organization
to support _Der Stürmer_.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher, even, before 1933 you came in contact with the
courts on various occasions, both because of your articles and because
of your attitude as evidenced in _Der Stürmer_. Would you give us a
short statement as to how often that occurred and what consequences it
had for you?

STREICHER: How often? I cannot answer that exactly now, but it was very
often. I was frequently given a court summons. You ask me about the
consequences. I was many times in prison, but I can say proudly that in
the sentences it repeatedly stated “an incorruptible fanatic for the
truth.”

That was the consequence of my activity as a speaker and writer, but
perhaps it is important to add the following: I never was arraigned
because of criminal charges, but only because of my anti-Semitic
activity, and the charge was brought by an organization of citizens of
the Jewish faith. The chairman filed charges repeatedly when we made a
slip in speaking and thus exposed ourselves to prosecution on the basis
of the laws and regulations existing at that time. But perhaps I may
also point out here that the Jewish Justizrat, Dr. Süssheim, the
Prosecuting Attorney, stated before the court here in this courtroom,
“Your Honors, he is our inexorable enemy, but he is a fanatic for the
truth. He is convinced of what he does; he is honest about it.”

THE PRESIDENT: What years were they that you were repeatedly in jail?

STREICHER: That was, of course, before 1933. The first time I went to
Landsberg, to prison, because I had taken part in the Hitler Putsch.
Then I was sentenced to three and a half months in prison in Nuremberg,
where I am now. Then I got three months...

THE PRESIDENT: You needn’t bother with the details.

STREICHER: That is to say, before 1933 I was repeatedly given prison
sentences or fined.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, the Göring report also mentions the fact that
the Defendant Streicher was personally interested in various Jewish
plants, allegedly in order to get some capital out of them. However, I
am of the opinion that it is not essential to deal with these points.
The same applies to the fact that the house on Lake of Constance was
sold, and to whom. I do not know whether the defendant should make any
statements about this here. In my opinion there is no cause to ask him
any questions concerning that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you could leave that and see whether it is taken
up in cross-examination. If it is, then you may re-examine him.

DR. MARX: Yes, certainly.

Mr. President, this concludes my questions to the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any members of defendants’ counsel wish to ask
questions of the defendant?

[_There was no response._]

The Prosecution?

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the
United Kingdom): If the Tribunal pleases.

When you handed over your Party to Hitler in 1922, did you know his
policy and what was to become the policy of the Nazi Party?

STREICHER: The policy? First I should like to say, “no.” At that time
one could not speak of things which could not exist even as thoughts.
The policy then was to create a new faith for the German people, that
is, a faith which would deny the chaos and disorder and which would
bring about a return to order.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that, within a short course of
time, you knew the policy, the policy according to the Party program and
according to _Mein Kampf_?

STREICHER: I did not need a Party program. I admit frankly that I never
read it in its entirety. At that time programs were not important, but
mass meetings...

THE PRESIDENT: That’s not an answer to the question. The question was
whether, a short time after 1922, you knew the policy as indicated in
the Party program and in _Mein Kampf_.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You knew, did you not, that the policy included
the Anschluss with Austria? Can you answer that “yes” or “no”?

STREICHER: No. There was never any talk about Austria. I do not remember
that the Führer ever spoke about the fact that Austria should be
annexed.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only want you to answer my question. My
question was: Did you know that the Führer’s policy was the annexation
of Austria to Germany? I understand your answer to be “no.” Is that
correct?

STREICHER: That he intended it? No, that I did not know.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that he intended to take over
Czechoslovakia or at least the Sudetenland?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you know that from the beginning in _Mein
Kampf_ his ultimate objective was Lebensraum?

STREICHER: What I read in _Mein Kampf_ is marked in red. The book has
been confiscated. I only read that. I read only what concerns the Jewish
question; I did not read anything else. However, that we had the
objective of acquiring Lebensraum for our people, that goes without
saying. I personally also had set myself the objective of contributing
in some way to providing a future for the surplus children.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. May I take it that during the years
1922 and 1923, as editor and owner of _Der Stürmer_, and as a Gauleiter
from 1925, you did everything you could to put the Nazi Party into
power?

STREICHER: Yes; that is to be taken as a matter of course.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And after 1933 did you continuously support and
issue propaganda on behalf of the Nazi Party’s policy?

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Not only in respect to the Jewish question, but
to the foreign policy as well?

STREICHER: No, that is not correct. In _Der Stürmer_ there is not a
single article to be found which dealt with foreign policy. I devoted
myself exclusively...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is quite enough. I am not going to occupy
very much time with this matter. But I would ask you to look at Document
Number D-802.

My Lord, this is a new exhibit.

THE PRESIDENT: Which will be what?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Exhibit Number GB-327.

My Lord, I am sorry, but the document seems to be missing for the
moment. Perhaps I might read the extract.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Let me just read to you an extract from an
article which you wrote in _Der Stürmer_ of March 1938, immediately
after the Anschluss with Austria. I want you to tell me whether or not
you are advocating the Nazi policy in regard to Austria.

    “Our Lord is making provision that the power of the Jews may not
    extend to heaven itself. What was only a dream up to a few days
    ago has now become reality. The brother nation of Austria has
    returned home to the Reich.”

And then, a few lines farther down:

    “We are entering into glorious times, a Greater Germany without
    Jews.”

Do you say that you are not there issuing propaganda on behalf of the
Nazi policy?

STREICHER: I did not indulge in propaganda politics, for Austria was
already annexed. I just welcomed the fact. I did not need to make any
more propaganda about it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Perhaps you’ll tell me what you mean
by the “Greater Germany” that you are approaching. What Greater Germany
are you approaching in March 1938, a Germany greater than it was after
the Anschluss with Austria?

STREICHER: A Greater Germany, a living area in which all Germans,
German-speaking people, people of German blood, can live together.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand that you are advocating
Lebensraum, greater space, not yet owned by Germany?

STREICHER: Not at first, no. At first it was merely a question of
Austria and Germany. The Austrians are Germans and, therefore, belong to
a Greater Germany.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t argue with you. I will just ask you
once more, what do you mean by the “Greater Germany” that you are
approaching in March of 1938?

STREICHER: I have already explained, a Germany where all those can live
and work together who speak German and have German blood.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Document Number D-818, which
will become Exhibit Number GB-328. Perhaps I can carry on. In November
of 1938, after Munich, did you yourself personally send a telegram to
Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten-German Party?

STREICHER: If it says so here, then it is true. I do not recall it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me refresh your recollection as to what you
said, “Without your courageous preparatory work the great task would not
have succeeded.”

Are you there advocating and issuing propaganda in support of the policy
of the Nazi Government?

STREICHER: I have to ask you again, would you please repeat your
question?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am asking you whether or not that telegram,
which you sent to Konrad Henlein and reprinted in your newspaper under a
picture of that gentleman—I am asking you whether or not that was
propaganda in support of the Nazi policy, Nazi foreign policy?

STREICHER: I have to say the same to this as I said before. That was a
telegram of greeting, of thanks. I did not have to make propaganda any
more because the Munich Agreement had already taken place.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put it to you and I’ll leave it. I’ll put it
to you that throughout the years from 1933 until 1944 or 1945 you were
in fact doing everything you could to support the policy of the
Government, both domestically and in regard to its foreign affairs.

STREICHER: As far as possible within my field of activity, yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I want to turn now to the question of the Jews.
May I remind you of the speech that you made on 1 April 1933, that is to
say, the day of the boycott.

My Lord, this will be found in the original document book, Document
Number M-33. It was not actually put in before. It now becomes Exhibit
Number GB-329. It is in the document book on Page 15, in the original
document book which the Tribunal have.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I give you the document book. If you
want to see the original, you may do so in every case. [_The document
book was submitted to the defendant._]

    “For 14 years we have been crying to the German nation, ‘German
    people, learn to recognize your true enemy,’ and 14 years ago
    the German Philistines listened and then declared that we
    preached religious hatred. Today German people have awakened;
    even all over the world there is talk of the eternal Jews. Never
    since the beginning of the world and the creation of man has
    there been a nation which dared to fight against the nation of
    blood-suckers and extortioners who, for a thousand years, have
    spread all over the world.”

And then I go down to the last line of the next paragraph:

    “It was left to our Movement to expose the eternal Jew as a mass
    murderer.”

Is it right that for 14 years you had been repeating in Germany, “German
people, learn to recognize your true enemy”?

STREICHER: I state first of all that what you have given me here has
nothing to do with that. You have given me an article...

THE PRESIDENT: You are asked a question. You are asked whether it is
true that for 14 years you had been repeating, to Germany, “Learn to
recognize your true enemy.” Is that true?

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And in doing so, is it true that you had been
preaching religious hatred?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at...

STREICHER: May I be permitted to make a statement concerning this
answer? In my weekly, _Der Stürmer_, I repeatedly stated that for me the
Jews are not a religious group but a race, a people.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you think to call them “blood-suckers,”
“a nation of blood-suckers and extortioners”—do you think that’s
preaching hatred?

STREICHER: I beg your pardon. I have not understood you?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may call them a race or a nation, whichever
you like, now; but you were saying, on 1 April 1933, that they were a
“nation of blood-suckers and extortioners.” Do you call that preaching
hatred?

STREICHER: That is a statement, the expression of a conviction which can
be proved on the basis of historical facts.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Understand me. I did not ask you whether it was
a fact or not. I am asking whether you called it preaching hatred. Your
answer is “yes” or “no.”

STREICHER: No, it is not preaching hatred; it is just a statement of
facts.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look two pages further on in that last
document, M-33, and do you see the fourth paragraph from the end of the
extract? That is Page 17 of the document book: “As long as I stand at
the head of the struggle, this struggle will be conducted so honestly
that the eternal Jew will derive no joy from it.”

STREICHER: That I wrote; that was right.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And you were, were you not, one of those who
did stand and continue to stand at the head of that struggle?

STREICHER: Did I stand at the head? I am too modest a man for that. But
I do claim to have declared my conviction and my knowledge clearly and
unmistakably.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Why did you say that so long as you were at the
head of it, the Jew would derive no joy from it?

STREICHER: Because I considered myself a man whom destiny had placed in
a position to enlighten people on the Jewish question.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And “enlightenment”—is that another word for
persecution? Do you mean by “enlightenment,” “persecution”?

STREICHER: I did not understand that.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word
“persecution”? Is that why the Jew was to have no joy from it, from your
enlightenment?

STREICHER: I ask to have the question repeated.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I can show it to you and we will repeat the
question as loud as you want it. Do you mean by “enlightenment” the word
“persecution”? Do you hear that?

STREICHER: I hear “enlightenment” and “production.” I mean by
“enlightenment” telling another person something which he does not yet
know.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We won’t go on with that. You know, do you not,
that starting with the boycott which you led yourself in 1933, the Jews
thereafter were, during the course of the years, deprived of the right
to vote, deprived of holding any public office, excluded from the
professions; demonstrations were conducted against them in 1938, they
were fined a billion marks after that, they were forced to wear a yellow
star, they had their own separate seats to sit on, and they had their
houses and their businesses taken away from them. Do you call that
“enlightenment”?

STREICHER: That has nothing to do with what I wrote, nothing to do with
it. I did not issue the orders. I did not make the laws. I was not asked
when laws were prepared. I had nothing to do with these laws and orders.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But as those laws and orders were passed you
were applauding them, and you were going on abusing the Jews and asking
for more and more orders to be passed; isn’t that a fact?

STREICHER: I ask to have put to me which law I applauded.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you told the Tribunal yesterday, did you
not, that you were responsible, you thought, for the Nuremberg Decrees,
which you had been advocating for years before they came into force;
isn’t that a fact?

STREICHER: The Nuremberg Decrees? I did not make them. I was not asked
beforehand, and I did not sign them either. But I state here that these
laws are the same laws which the Jewish people have as their own. It is
the greatest and most important act of legislation which a modern nation
has at any time made for its protection.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is the time to break off.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
My Lord, I wonder if the Tribunal would be good enough to consider
setting aside a half hour some time for the discussion of the documents
of the Defendant Von Schirach. We are ready to clear up outstanding
points at any time that is suitable to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want
to ask you a few questions as to the part you played in the various
actions against the Jews between 1933 and 1939.

Will you look at Document M-6, which is at Page 20 in the document book
that you have before you, Page 22 in the document book that the Tribunal
have in English. It is Page 20 in the German document book; M-6, which
is already Exhibit Number GB-170.

Now, I just want to refer to what you said about the Nuremberg Decrees.
You told us this morning that you thought when they had been passed that
that was already the final solution of the Jewish question. Will you
look at the paragraph beginning in the center of the page, “However, to
those who believe...”:

    “However, to those who believe that the Jewish question has been
    finally solved and the matter thus settled for Germany by the
    Nuremberg Decrees, be it said that the battle continues—world
    Jewry itself is seeing to that anyhow—and we shall only get
    through this battle victoriously if every member of the German
    people knows that his very existence is at stake. The work of
    enlightenment carried on by the Party seems to me to be more
    necessary than ever today, even though many Party members seem
    to think that these matters are no longer real or urgent.”

STREICHER: Yes, I wrote that.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “the battle
continues,” if you have already solved the Jewish problem by the
issuance of the Nuremberg Decrees?

STREICHER: I have already stated today that the solution of the Jewish
problem was regarded by me as having to be solved, first of all, within
the country and then in conjunction with other nations. Thus “the battle
continues” means that in the International Anti-Semitic Union, which I
had formed and which had representatives from all countries in it, the
question was discussed as to what could be done from an international
point of view to terminate the Jewish problem.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Are we, therefore, to take it that everything
that you said and wrote after 1936 was in connection with an
international problem and had nothing to do with the Jews in Germany as
such?

STREICHER: Yes, mainly international, of course.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just refer you to half way through the
next paragraph, “_Der Stürmer’s_ 15 years’ work of enlightenment has
already led an army of those who know, millions strong, to National
Socialism.” Is that so?

STREICHER: That is correct.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, you were telling the Tribunal this
morning that up to 1933, and indeed afterwards, you said the circulation
of your paper was only very small. Is it true, in fact, that your 15
years’ work had led an army, millions strong, to National Socialism?

STREICHER: I have said today that the moment the press was politically
co-ordinated, 3,000 daily newspapers were committed to the purpose of
enlightenment about the Jewish problem. There were 3,000 daily papers in
addition to _Der Stürmer_.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I don’t think you need go on. Let me
just finish reading through that paragraph:

    “The continued work of _Der Stürmer_ will help to insure that
    down to the last man every German will, with heart and hand,
    join the ranks of those whose aim it is to crush the head of the
    serpent Pan-Judah.”

Wait one moment, let me ask my question. There is nothing there about an
international problem. You are addressing yourself to the German people,
are you not?

STREICHER: In that article? Yes. And if that article was read abroad,
then also to countries abroad, but as to the remark about crushing the
serpent’s head, that is a biblical expression.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you now let us discuss for a moment the
breaking up of the synagogue in Nuremberg, which you have told about, on
the 10th of August of 1938. Will you look at Page 41 of the book that
you have in front of you, Page 42 of the English document book that the
Tribunal has.

Now we have heard your explanation of that breaking up of the synagogue.
The _Fränkische Tageszeitung_ at the 11th of August states this, “In
Nuremberg the synagogue is being demolished. Julius Streicher himself
inaugurated this work by a speech lasting more than an hour and a half.”
Were you talking to the inhabitants of Nuremberg upon the architectural
value of their city for an hour and a half on the 10th of August 1938?

STREICHER: I no longer know in detail what I said, but I refer to what
you have remarked and what you find important. There was a branch of the
Propaganda Ministry in Nuremberg. The young Regierungsrat had press
conferences with the editors every day, and at that time he told the
editors during a press conference that Streicher would speak and that
the synagogue was being demolished and that this was to be kept secret.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I asked you, were you talking for that hour and
a half on the architectural beauties of Nuremberg and not against the
Jews? Is that what you are telling us?

STREICHER: That, too, of course.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At the press conference to which you
referred—you no doubt have seen the document; it is Page 40 of the
Tribunal’s document book—do you remember that it was arranged that the
show should be staged in a big way, the show of pulling down the
synagogue? What was the object of arranging the demonstration to
demolish that synagogue in such a big way?

STREICHER: I was merely the speaker. What you are intimating here, that
was done by the representative of the Ministry of Propaganda; but I
would not object to it if you decided to assume, let me put it like
that, that I would naturally have been in favor of making a big show if
I had been asked.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me just ask you now a word about the
demonstrations which followed that in November of that year—My Lord, I
refer to Page 43 of the document book; 42 of the German—as I understand
it, you tell us that you disapproved of those demonstrations that took
place and they took place without your knowledge or previous knowledge.
Is that correct, “yes” or “no”?

STREICHER: Yes, it is correct.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I just want to remind you of what you said on
the following day, the 10th of November. This is an account of what
happened:

    “In Nuremberg and Fürth there were demonstrations by the crowd
    against the Jewish gang of murderers. These lasted until the
    early hours of the morning.”

I now pass to the end of that paragraph:

    “After midnight the excitement of the public had reached its
    peak and a large crowd marched to the synagogues in Nuremberg
    and Fürth and burned those two Jewish buildings where the murder
    of Germans had been preached.”

This is now what you say—it is on Page 44 of the document book, My
Lord:

    “From the cradle on, the Jew is not taught as we are: ‘Thou
    shalt love thy neighbor as thyself’ or ‘If you are smitten on
    the left cheek offer then your right one.’ No. He is told ‘With
    the non-Jew you can do whatever you like.’ He is even taught
    that the slaughtering of a non-Jew is an act pleasing to God.
    For 20 years we have been writing about this in _Der Stürmer_.
    For 20 years we have been preaching it throughout the world, and
    we have made millions recognize the truth.”

Does that sound as though you had disapproved of the demonstrations that
had taken place the night before?

STREICHER: First of all I must state that the report, part of which you
read, appeared in a daily paper. Thus I am not to be held responsible
for this. If someone wrote that part of the populace rose up against the
gang of murderers then that is in keeping with the order from the
Ministry of Propaganda in Berlin; outwardly that action was described as
a spontaneous demonstration of the populace...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That does not answer my question. Does that
passage that I have read sound as though you had disapproved of the
demonstrations that had taken place the night before? Does it or does it
not?

STREICHER: I was against that demonstration.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just let me read on:

    “But we know that we have in our midst people who take pity on
    the Jews, people who are not worthy of living in this town, who
    are not worthy of belonging to this people, of whom you are a
    proud part.”

Why should it have been necessary for people to have had pity on the
Jews, if you were not—you and the Nazi Party—persecuting them?

STREICHER: I have already pointed out today that I was forced, after
this demonstration had taken place, to make a public comment and say
that one should not have so much pity. I wanted to prove thereby that
this was not a spontaneous action by the people; in other words, the
matter does not speak against me; it speaks for me. The people, as I
myself, were opposed to the demonstration and I found that I had cause
to—should I say—get public opinion to the point where one might
possibly not regard that action as something too severe.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, why, if you were opposed to it and if the
people were opposed to it, should it have been your duty to try and
convert them so that they should be in favor of that kind of thing? Why
were you opposed to it and why should you try to turn them against the
Jew?

STREICHER: I do not understand what you mean.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I understand you to say that you were opposed
to these demonstrations and that the people also were opposed to the
demonstrations; that, therefore, it was your duty to try to stir them up
and make them in favor of the demonstrations after they had happened.
Why should it have been your duty to do that?

STREICHER: Today one can perhaps say that this or that was my duty, but
one must consider what those times were—the confusion that
existed—that to make a quick decision, as one might have to in this
courtroom, was quite impossible. What happened has happened. I was
against it and the public too. What was written about it otherwise was
done so for tactical reasons.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Were you in favor of the
Aryanization of Jewish houses and businesses? Were you in favor of that
or did you disapprove of that issue?

STREICHER: I have answered that question today in great detail, in
connection with a statement of Party comrade Holz. I have stated and I
repeat that my deputy came to me...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Just stop for a moment, I don’t want a speech.
I asked you a question which you could answer “yes” or “no.” Did you
approve or disapprove of the system of Aryanization of Jewish businesses
and houses?

STREICHER: One cannot answer that quickly with “yes” or “no.” I have
made it clear today, and you must allow me to explain it so that there
is not any misunderstanding. My Party comrade...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to allow you to repeat it. I
will go on if you are not prepared to answer that question. The Tribunal
have heard it and I pass on.

STREICHER: I certainly want to answer it. After my Party comrades...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant...

STREICHER: After the Party comrades came...

THE PRESIDENT: You have refused to answer the question properly, a
question to which you can give either an affirmative or a negative
answer. Did you approve or did you not approve? You can give an answer
to that and then you can give any explanation afterwards.

STREICHER: I personally was not for Aryanization. When Holz repeated
that, giving as a reason that the houses had been pretty badly damaged,
_et cetera_, that we might get material for a Gau (district) building, I
said “All right, if you can do it, go ahead.” I already stated today
that this was carelessness on my part.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There were in fact a very great number of
Jewish businesses and houses Aryanized in Nuremberg and Franconia, were
there not?

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you just look at a new exhibit, Document
Number D-835, which becomes Exhibit GB-330. That is a list—it is an
original document—it is a list of Jewish property in Nuremberg and
Fürth which was Aryanized. Have you seen that list or anything like it
before?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you can take it from me, that that list
contains the addresses of some 800 properties in Nuremberg and Fürth
which have been taken from the Jews and handed over to Aryans. Would you
agree that that would be at least 800 houses in your city here that were
Aryanized?

STREICHER: I do not know about it in detail; but I must establish
something: I do not know—is that the official document? I have already
stated today that my Party comrade Holz started Aryanizing. That was
rescinded by Berlin. Then came the Aryanization carried out by the
State. I could not have had any influence here, either, so that this was
none of my business. This Aryanization, the expropriation of Jewish
property, was ordered by Berlin.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you mentioned this morning that you were a
subscriber to a weekly newspaper called the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_; is that correct?

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: When did you start subscribing to that
newspaper?

STREICHER: What did you say?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: At what date did you start subscribing to that
newspaper?

STREICHER: I do not know.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, I have no doubt you can tell the Tribunal
approximately. Have you always, since 1933, been a subscriber of that
newspaper?

STREICHER: Well, I do not think I could have read every issue, since I
traveled a great deal.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You were, as I think it is stated in this
application of your wife to give evidence, a regular reader of it, were
you not?

STREICHER: My friends, the editors, and I used to share in the reading
of this paper.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May I take it that between yourself and your
editors—I don’t say every copy was read—but it was regularly read from
1933 onwards; is that fair?

STREICHER: You cannot say “read regularly.”

LT. COL, GRIFFITH-JONES: A large number of the copies that you
subscribed for, which came weekly to you, were they read by yourself or
by your editors?

STREICHER: Certainly.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want to turn to something else for a
moment. I want to make myself perfectly clear to you.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, I should like to draw the attention of the
Tribunal to the fact that the document which has just been presented,
“Confiscated Property and Real Estate,” has the heading “Aryanization
Department for Real Estate, Nuremberg.” That cannot mean anything except
that this document comes from the official department which was later
set up for the confiscation of such real estate. But by no means can
this be a document to prove that we are concerned here with the real
estate Aryanized by Holz, subsequent to 9 November.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I accept that that may be so.

DR. MARX: I should like to ask, therefore, that the appropriate
correction be made.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If I was mistaken in saying that those
properties had been Aryanized, I would be right then, would I not, in
saying that that list of properties was prepared by the Aryanization
Department in Nuremberg for the purpose of Aryanizing them in the
future? Would that be a fair statement to make?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I won’t pursue that matter any further.

I want to make myself quite clear to you in what I am suggesting. I am
suggesting that from 1939 onwards you set out to incite the German
people to murder and to accept the fact of the murder of the Jewish
race. Do you understand that?

STREICHER: That is not true.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No doubt you will say it isn’t true. I just
wanted you to be quite clear on what my suggestion is going to be.

I want you to look now at a bundle, which will be given to you, of
extracts from _Der Stürmer_. You can see the originals which are in
Court if you desire to do so, but it will save time if we use the
document books there.

Now, will you look at Page 3-A. For convenience, the pages in this
bundle are all marked “A” to distinguish them from the numbers in the
original document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in evidence?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: None of them are in evidence at the moment.
Perhaps the most convenient way would be for me to put the actual
documents in evidence together at the end, unless the Tribunal or the
defendant desire to see any copies of them. I will give them numbers as
I go along.

Will you look at Page 3-A of that bundle, Document Number D-809, which
becomes Exhibit Number GB-331:

    “The Jewish problem is not yet solved, nor will it be solved
    when one day the last Jew will have left Germany. Only when
    world Jewry has been annihilated, will it have been solved.”

Is that what you were working for when you say you were working for the
international solution to this problem, an annihilation of world Jewry?

STREICHER: If that is how you understand “annihilation.” That was
written by my chief editor at the time. He says that the Jewish problem
will not yet be solved when the last Jew will have left Germany. And
when he suddenly says that only when world Jewry has been annihilated
will it be solved, then he certainly may have meant that the power of
world Jewry should be annihilated. But my Party comrade Holz did not
think of mass killing or the possibility of mass killing.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The German word used there is “vernichtet,” is
it not? Look at your copy. “Vernichtet” that means “to annihilate.”

STREICHER: Today, when you look back, you could interpret it like that,
but not at that time.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, we won’t waste time because we have
quite a number to look through. Will you look on to the next page. That
was in January you were writing that. In April 1939, Document D-810,
Exhibit GB-332, I refer only to the last two lines. This is an article
again by your editor: “Then perhaps their graves will proclaim that this
murderous and criminal people has, after all, met its deserved fate.”

What do you mean by “graves” there? Do you mean excluding them from the
business of the world?

STREICHER: This is the first time that I have seen this article. That is
the statement of opinion of a man who was probably looking ahead and
making a play on words; but as far as I knew him, and as far as we
discussed the Jewish problem, there was no question of mass
extermination; we did not even think of it. Maybe it was his wish—I do
not know—but anyway, that is the way it happened to be written.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Just turn over, will you now, to May
1939, Document Number D-811, Exhibit Number GB-333. I quote the last six
lines: “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia.”

This, of course, was before the Russian invasion.

    “There must be a punitive expedition against the Jews in Russia,
    a punitive expedition which will provide the same fate for them
    that every murderer and criminal must expect, death sentence and
    execution. The Jews in Russia must be killed. They must be
    utterly exterminated. Then the world will see that the end of
    the Jews is also the end of Bolshevism.”

STREICHER: Who wrote that article?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is published in your _Stürmer_. We can find
out, if necessary. It is not written by you, but it is published in your
_Der Stürmer_; and you have told the Tribunal that you accept
responsibility for everything that was written in that newspaper.

STREICHER: All right, I assume responsibility; but I want to state that,
here too, this is the private opinion of a man who in May 1939 could not
have thought that _ex nihilo_—for we had no soldiers—a “March to
Russia” could be started. This is a theoretic and very strongly-worded
expression of opinion of that anti-Semitic person.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: All I ask you about that is: Is that not
advocating the murder of Jews, that article; if it is not, what is it
advocating?

STREICHER: The whole article would have to be read so that I could tell
what motives existed for writing something like that. I therefore ask
you to make public the whole article. Then one can form a proper
judgment.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we’ll go on. We won’t waste time unless
you really want to see the whole article.

My Lord, if I perhaps might be allowed to put these documents in
evidence. As Your Lordship will see, this bundle is a bundle of extracts
from _Der Stürmer_.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, I would
like to make the following statements: A number of extracts from _Der
Stürmer_ have been mentioned here which have been put before me for the
first time. Some of them are articles which have not been written by the
defendant personally. Some are signed by Hiemer, and some by Holz, who
was particularly radical in his manner of writing, and passages are
being quoted which are perhaps taken out of context.

I must ask, therefore, that I be afforded the opportunity of going over
these extracts together with the Defendant Streicher. Otherwise, he
might come to the conclusion that his defense is being made too
difficult for him and that it is being made impossible for him to
prepare himself appropriately.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you will have an opportunity of checking up on
these various extracts, and then you will be able to introduce, if
necessary, any passages which explain the extracts. That is a matter
which has been explained to defendants’ counsel over and over again.

Colonel Griffith-Jones, are there not certain of these extracts which
are written or signed by the defendant?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, with Your Lordship’s permission I will
refer to some of them, but so that I should not have to refer to all of
them, I was going to suggest that perhaps I might put them in and, if it
is necessary, let the Tribunal know afterwards the numbers of them to
save time.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I put the whole bundle in evidence and will not
refer to all of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you can give us the exhibit numbers later.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is suitable to the convenience of the
Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, the Tribunal will see by looking at
this bundle, from the first page—which I think is 3-A—to Page 25-A,
that there are various extracts which have been written either by
yourself or by members of your staff between January 1939 and January
1941.

Do I understand you to say now, to have said in your evidence, that you
never knew that Jews were being exterminated in thousands and millions
in the Eastern territories? Did you never know that?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: As I understood your evidence about the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ this morning you said this, as I have
written it down:

    “Sometimes that journal contained hints that everything was not
    in order. Later in 1943 an article appeared stating that masses
    of Jews were disappearing but the article did not quote any
    figures and did not mention anything about murders.”

Are you really saying that those copies of the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_, which you and your editors were reading, contained nothing
except for a hint of disappearance with no mention of figures or murder?
Is that what you are telling this Tribunal?

STREICHER: Yes, I stick to that, certainly.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I want you, if you will, to take this
bundle and keep it in front of you. It is a bundle of extracts from the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ from July 1941 until the end of the war.
The Tribunal will be able to see what a fanatic for the truth really
tells.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

My Lord, this bundle, for convenience again, is marked “B.”

[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the first page? That is
an article on the 11th of July 1941. “Some 40,000 Jews died in Poland
during the last years. The hospitals are overfull.”

Now, you need not turn over for the moment, Defendant. We will turn the
pages soon enough.

Did you happen to read that sentence in the issue of the 11th of July
1941?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 3, 3-B? In November 1941:
“Very bad news comes from the Ukraine. Thousands of Jewish dead are
being mourned, among whom are many of the Galician Jews who were
expelled from Hungary.”

Did you read that?

STREICHER: That might be possible. It says “thousands,” thousands are
being mourned. That is no proof that millions were killed. There are no
details as to how they came to their end.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If that is the explanation you want us to
accept we will leave it.

Just go on again to the next page, will you? The 12th of December 1941,
a month later:

    “According to news which has arrived from several sources,
    thousands of Jews—one even speaks of many thousands—are said
    to have been executed in Odessa”—and so on.—“Similar reports
    reach us from Kiev and other Russian cities.”

Did you read that?

STREICHER: I do not know; and if I had read it then it would not change
a thing. That is no proof.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you have told the Tribunal, you know, that
there was nothing except hints of disappearance. Doesn’t it show that
you were not telling the truth when you read these extracts?

STREICHER: In that case may I say the following? When the war started we
no longer received the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. During the later
years one could only get the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ through the
Police. We got that paper, toward the end, into Germany by smuggling. On
one occasion we asked the Police to provide us with foreign newspapers
and this weekly, and we were told that it was not possible. But we
nevertheless got it. What I mean to say by this is that I did not read
every one of those issues. The issues which I did read were confiscated
on my farm. Whatever is underlined has been read by me or it was read by
my editor in chief. I cannot, therefore, guarantee that I read every
article.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I appreciate that and that is why we have
quite a number of them. You see, we have an extract for practically
every week or month over the course of 3 years.

I would just like you to turn to Page 30-A of the “A” bundle. I just
want you to see what you were writing after having heard, or after
having read, or anyway after those copies of the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_ had been published. This is a leading article by yourself.

    “If the danger of the reproduction of that curse of God in the
    Jewish blood is finally to come to an end, then there is only
    one way open—the extermination of that people whose father is
    the devil.”

And is the word that you use for extermination there “Ausrottung,”
rooting out, extirpation?

STREICHER: First of all, I would like to ask whether this issue is known
to my defense counsel, and if the translation is correct?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It does not matter. He has copies of all this
and he will be able to protect your interests. We are now just testing
the truth of the evidence that you have given.

Can you tell me, is that “extermination”? Does that mean murder of Jews?
What else can it mean?

STREICHER: It depends on the whole context. In that case I want you to
read the whole article.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, if there is anything in the rest of the
article which can be helpful to you, your counsel will have an
opportunity to see the article and be able to put it before the
Tribunal. I can assure you that the remainder of your articles, as a
general rule, do not assist your case.

STREICHER: When that article appeared, mass killing had already taken
place a long time ago.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Well now, we will not go through
this at any length.

If you will look at your “B” bundle, your bundle of extracts from the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_...

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should draw his attention to the date on Page
30-A.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged to Your Lordship.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The 25th of December 1941.

If you will glance at “B” bundle you will see a number of extracts going
from Page A to Page 21. Now, I would like you to glance at Page 24 of
that “B” bundle.

STREICHER: Page 24?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes, Page 24. This is an article which appeared
in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ on the 27th of November 1942. I just
wondered whether you read this:

    “At the Zionist Congress of Switzerland the representative of
    the ‘Jewish Agency’ in Geneva... gave a report on European
    Jewry.... The number of victims goes into millions. If the
    present conditions continue and the German program is carried
    out, it is to be reckoned that, instead of 6 or 7 million Jews
    in Europe only 2 million will still be left.”

Then there are the three last lines of the extract:

    “The Jews who were there had mostly been deported to the
    notorious unknown destination further to the East. At the end of
    this winter the number of victims will be 4 million.”

Is that what you call a hint of disappearance of Jews from the East?

STREICHER: I cannot recollect that I have ever read that but I do want
to say that if I had read it I would not have believed it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, let us just turn to the “A” bundle
again and look at the article that you wrote on the 17th of December
1942. It is Page 34-A. This is an article which is initialed “STR” so I
presume it was written by you.

“The London newspaper, _The Times_, of the 16th of September 1942
published a...”

STREICHER: I have not got it yet.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Page 34-A.

STREICHER: Just a minute.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Find it for him. It is headed: “Eye for Eye,
Tooth for Tooth.”

    “The London newspaper, _The Times_, of 16 September 1942
    published a resolution which had been unanimously passed by the
    Board of Deputies of British Jews. This resolution expresses the
    grief and horror of the Anglo-Jewish Community at the
    unspeakable atrocities committed by Germany and her allies and
    vassals against the Jews of Europe which had only one aim, to
    exterminate the whole Jewish population of Europe in cold
    blood.”

Now, you must have read of that in _The Times_ because you say so.

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:

    “Strange how the Jews of the Anglo-Jewish Community suddenly
    begin to prick up their ears. When the second World War began
    the Führer of the German nation warned the Jewish warmongers
    against plunging the world into a blood bath again. Since then
    the German Führer has warned and prophesied again and again that
    the second World War, instigated by world Jewry, must
    necessarily lead to the destruction of Jewry. In his last speech
    too, the Führer again referred to his prophecies.”

Did you write that?

STREICHER: Yes, this is merely a quotation. It refers to a forecast from
the Führer, of which nobody could possibly tell what it really meant.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.

If you had not even read that or the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, did
you ever hear of the declaration of the United Nations which was made on
the 17th of December 1942?

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Do you remember hearing of that? You appear to have been reading _The
Times_; you appear to have been reading some copies of the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. Maybe you heard of this declaration which
was published in London, Washington, and Moscow at the same time with
the assent and support of all Allied nations and dominions. I will just
read it to you and see if you remember it:

    “The attention of the Belgian, Czechoslovak, Luxembourg,
    Netherlands, Norwegian, Polish, Soviet, United Kingdom, United
    States, and Yugoslav Governments and also the French National
    Committee has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that
    the German authorities, not content with denying to persons of
    Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous
    rule has been extended the most elementary human rights, are now
    carrying into effect Hitler’s often repeated intention to
    exterminate the Jewish people in Europe.

    “From all the occupied countries Jews are being transported in
    conditions of appalling horror and brutality to Eastern Europe.
    In Poland, which has been made the principal Nazi
    slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the German invaders
    are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly
    skilled workers required for war industries. None of those taken
    away are ever heard of again. The able-bodied are slowly worked
    to death in labor camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure
    and starvation, or are deliberately massacred in mass
    executions.

    “The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in
    many hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women, and
    children.

    “The above-mentioned Governments and the French National
    Committee condemn, in the strongest possible terms, this bestial
    policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such
    events can only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving
    peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny. They
    reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those
    responsible for the crimes shall not escape retribution, and to
    press on with the necessary practical measures to this end.”

Did you never hear of this declaration?

STREICHER: I do not know, but if I should have heard of it, then I would
have to say the following:

After the seizure of power the foreign press published so many atrocity
stories, which turned out to be rumors, that I would have had no reason
to believe anything like this; nor is there any mention here that
millions of Jews were killed.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, you see, it isn’t altogether
uncorroborated. You say you had no reason to believe it; but your
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, which you were subscribing to, was saying
exactly the same thing.

Would you look at Page 26-B of the “B” bundle? That is the declaration
of the United Nations of the 17th of December. Just see what the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ says on the 18th. And there I quote the
second paragraph:

    “At that time the Polish Government in London gave the number of
    Jews executed as 700,000. The Berlin radio hereupon declared
    that these reports were untrue, but admitted that in Poland
    ‘Jews’ had had to be executed because they carried out acts of
    sabotage.”

Then the last paragraph quoted:

    “‘Up to the end of September 1942,’ writes the _Daily
    Telegraph_, ‘2 million Jews have lost their lives in Germany and
    in the countries occupied by the Axis, and it is to be feared
    that the number of victims will be doubled by the end of this
    year.’”

Did you happen to read that article?

STREICHER: I cannot remember having read it, but I would not have
believed it if I had.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You see, there is another article in that same
paper on the 23rd of December, in the same terms; another on the 30th of
December; and another on the 8th of January. Look at what it says on the
8th of January:

    “The Polish Government in London has issued a new declaration
    which states that all the information received agrees that a
    third of the 3 million odd Jews have lost their lives.”

Did you read that?

STREICHER: I do not know, but I have to repeat, I would not have
believed it.

LT. COL GRIFFITH-JONES: Well now, just let’s see just what you were
writing on the 28th of January. Look at 35-A of your own bundle; 35-A.
Now just see what your Chief Editor, the witness you are going to call,
I understand, Hiemer—see what he has got to say first of all:

    “But the ghetto too, which has today been re-established in
    nearly all European countries, is only an interim solution, for
    mankind once awakened will not merely solve the ghetto question
    but the Jewish question in its totality. A time will come when
    the present demands, of the Jews will be fulfilled. The ghetto
    will have disappeared—and with it Jewry.”

What is he referring to, if he isn’t referring to the mass killing,
murder, of the Jewish race?

STREICHER: That was a statement of his opinion, his conviction. That
conviction must be understood in the same way as something which a
Jewish author wrote in his book in America. Erich Kauffmann wrote that
German men capable of fathering children should be sterilized, and in
that manner the German people should be exterminated. It was at the same
time that Hiemer wrote his article, and I want to say that the very
severe tone in _Der Stürmer_ at that time was due to that book from
America.

The interrogating officers know—and so does my counsel—that I have
repeatedly pointed out that I wanted that book to be produced. It was in
the _Völkischer Beobachter_.

If in America an author called Erich Kauffmann can publicly demand that
all men in Germany capable of fathering children should be sterilized,
for the purpose of exterminating the German people, then I say, eye for
eye and tooth for tooth. This is a theoretical literary matter.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. I am sure we have heard your
explanation. Let’s see what you have to say about your own article on
the same date. I quote from the middle of the next paragraph:

    “But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is
    beginning in its retrospective considerations to understand that
    the destiny of Jewry is finding its fulfillment at the hands of
    German National Socialism.”

What did you mean by that? Perhaps I should have quoted a little
earlier, going back to the beginning:

    “When, with the outbreak of the second World War, world Jewry
    again began to manifest themselves as warmongers, Adolf Hitler
    announced to the world from the platform of the German Reichstag
    that the World War conjured up by world Jewry would result in
    the self-destruction of Jewry. This prophecy was the first big
    warning. It was met with derision from the Jews, as were all the
    subsequent warnings.”

And then you go on to say:

“But now, in the fourth year of this war, world Jewry is beginning in
its retrospective considerations to understand that the destiny of Jewry
is finding its fulfillment at the hands of German National Socialism.”

What did you mean by that?

STREICHER: Pardon me?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: What do you mean by saying “World Jewry is
finding its fulfillment at the hands of National Socialism”? How did you
mean that National Socialism was finding the fulfillment of Jewry’s
destiny?

STREICHER: National Socialism could not fulfill the fate, that is to
say, find the solution, since the Führer intervened with the hand of
destiny. That was not a solution.

During an interrogation I pointed out that I who personally wanted a
total solution, was, right from the beginning, against trying to solve
the Jewish problem by means of pogroms. If I said that the destiny of
Jewry was to be fulfilled by National Socialism, then I wanted to say
that through National Socialism the world would gain the knowledge and
the realization that the Jewish problem must be solved internationally.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let’s just go on.

    “That which the Führer of the German people announced to the
    world as a prophecy at the beginning of this second World War is
    now being fulfilled with unrelenting inevitability. World Jewry,
    which wanted to reap big dividends from the blood of the warring
    nations, is rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation.”

And again you use the word “Ausrottung.”

Does that mean just as it sounds, as though the fulfillment that you
were aiming at was warning the world about Jewry? What do you mean by
it? “Rushing with gigantic steps toward its extirpation”—Ausrottung.
What did you mean by it?

STREICHER: This is a warning. The Führer made a prophecy; nobody could
interpret that prophecy properly. The prophecy was not quoted only in
this article, but in 10 others. Again and again we referred to these
prophecies, the first of which had been made in 1929. Today we know what
the Führer wanted to say; at that time we did not. And I confess quite
openly that with this quotation we wanted to warn world Jewry: “Against
their threat, this threat.”

So as to defend myself I might mention in this connection that the
author, Dr. Emil Ludwig Kohn, who had left Germany and emigrated to
France, had written in the paper _Le Fanal_, in 1934, “Hitler does not
want war, but he is being forced into it. Britain has the last word.”
Thus...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We are not discussing war now. We are
discussing the extermination, the mass murder of Jews, by the National
Socialists. That is what we are discussing. Let me read on:

    “When Adolf Hitler stepped before the German people 20 years ago
    to submit to them the National Socialist demands which pointed
    the way into the future, he also made the promise which was to
    have the gravest repercussions; that of freeing the world from
    its Jewish tormentors. How wonderful it is to know that this
    great man and leader is following up this promise with practical
    action. It will be the greatest deed in the history of mankind.”

Do you say that you are not putting forward propaganda for the policy of
mass extermination which the Nazi Government had set out to do?

STREICHER: We too had freedom of the press like democratic countries.
Every author knew of the forecast, which perhaps later on turned out to
be a fact, and could write about it. That is what I did.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well.

STREICHER: But for my defense, Mr. Prosecutor, I want to be allowed to
say that wars too can be mass murder, with their bombs, _et cetera_. And
if it is proved that someone says that we are forcing Hitler into war,
then I can certainly say that a man who knows that Hitler is being
forced into war is a mass murderer.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal I am going
to interrupt you again because we are not discussing whether or not
Hitler was forced into war. We will leave that now.

Just let us go on and see if you are really speaking the truth in saying
that while you are writing these articles you are not perfectly well
aware of what was happening in the Eastern territories.

We got as far as January 1943. I would like you to just look at one or
two more of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and see if you remember
reading any of these. Will you look at Page 30-B the 26th of February,
in your “B” bundle?

    “Exchange reports from the Polish Government circles in London
    that Warsaw, Lvov, Lodz and other cities have been ‘liquidated,’
    and that nobody from the ghettos remained alive. The last
    investigations have ascertained that only about 650,000 Jews
    remain out of 2,800,000.”

Listen to me. Did you read that? Do you remember it?

STREICHER: I do not know. For months, perhaps half a year, we did not
get an issue, but if I had read it, I would not have believed that
either.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did you believe Hitler? If you will turn over
the page to 31-B, did you believe Hitler? According to the last two
lines quoted in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of the 5th of March
1943: “Hitler, in his proclamation of 24 February, again proclaimed the
extermination of the Jews in Europe as his goal.”

Did you believe your own beloved Führer when he was saying the same
things as the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, the United Nations, and _The
Times_ newspaper in London?

STREICHER: No, I declare that whoever got to know the Führer’s deepest
emotions and his soul, as I have personally, and then later had to learn
from his testament that he, in full possession of his faculties,
consciously gave the order for mass extermination, is confronted with a
riddle. I state here...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We really don’t want another long speech about
the Führer. Just turn over the page and look at what is being said on
the 26th of March:

    “The report of the Polish Government on the measures against the
    Jewish population is published in full in the English press. A
    passage reads, ‘In the town of Vilna 50,000 Jews were murdered,
    in Rovno 14,000; in Lvov half of the total Jewish population.’

    “Many details are also given about the use of poison gas, as at
    Chelm, of electricity in Belzec, of the deportations from
    Warsaw, the surrounding of blocks of houses, and of the attacks
    with machine guns.”

Did you read that one?

STREICHER: I do not know. However, that shootings must have occurred, of
course, where Jews committed sabotage, _et cetera_, is self-evident.
During a war that is considered as a matter of course. However, the
figures which are quoted here were just simply not believable.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes. I understand you to say that now, but what
I do not understand is what you meant when you said this morning that
the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ made no mention of murders and gave no
figures. You didn’t say that the figures were unbelievable; you told
this Tribunal, on your oath, that the newspaper contained nothing except
the hints of disappearance, with no mention of figures. What did you
mean by that?

STREICHER: I have said the truth under oath, but it is possible that one
might not remember everything. During an interrogation some time back I
stated, based on memory, that an issue must exist which mentions the
disappearance of Jews, and so on. It is in the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_, and I thought I said that it was in 1943 and it is true.
If one article after the other is put before me—well, even if I had
seen it, how can I remember it? But that I, under oath, should have
deliberately told you an untruth, that is, at any rate, not so.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will deal with the article you mention in
1943 in one moment; but just before we do that, just see if you believe
your own staff. Turn, will you, to 38-A, M-139. Now, on the 6th of May
it so happens just after those last three extracts from the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ we have looked at, within 2 or 3 months, 1
or 2 months afterwards your newspaper is publishing this article. It is
headed “Children of the Devil.”

    “_Der Stürmer_ paid a visit to the ghettos in the East. _Der
    Stürmer_ sent its photographic reporter to various ghettos in
    the East; a member of _Der Stürmer’s_ staff is well acquainted
    with the Jews. Nothing can surprise him easily. But what our
    contributor saw in these ghettos was a unique experience for
    him. He wrote, ‘What my eyes and my Leica camera saw here
    convinced me that the Jews are not human beings but children of
    the devil and the spawn of crime.... It is hard to see how it
    was possible that this scum of humanity was for centuries looked
    upon as God’s chosen people by the non-Jews. ... This satanic
    race really has no right to exist.’”

Now, you have heard of what was happening in the ghettos in the East
during 1942 and 1943? Are you really telling this Tribunal that your
photographer went with his camera to those ghettos and found out nothing
about the mass murder of Jews?

STREICHER: Yes, otherwise he would have reported to us about it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Warsaw ghetto, you remember, exterminated,
wiped out in April 1943. Your photographer must have been around just
about that time, if you were writing this on the 6th of May, if he had
just returned. Did you think he could have been there looking at ghettos
for _Der Stürmer_, for Julius Streicher, the Jew-baiter, and have
discovered nothing of what was happening in the ghetto in Warsaw and
elsewhere?

STREICHER: I can only remember that immediately after the end of the
Polish campaign a Viennese reporter went over there, made films and made
reports, in 1942. I would like to ask—is there a name, a signature
there, to show by whom it was written? One thing I know is that the
ghetto was destroyed; I read it in a summary, an illustrated report
which I think originated in the Ministry of Propaganda. But as to the
destruction of the ghetto during an uprising—well, I consider that
legal; from my point of view it was right. But mass murders in the
ghetto in Warsaw are something I never heard of.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just let’s look at the article to which
you referred a moment ago. Will you look at 44-A of the document book?

My Lord, this is the same as was included at Page 53 in the original
document book; it was Document Number 1965-PS, Exhibit Number GB-176,
but there is slightly more of the extract quoted at Page 44-A.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I just want you to examine for the
last time whether or not you are speaking the truth in telling the
Tribunal that you did not know what was happening. You quote in that
article from the Swiss newspaper, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, of
the 27th August 1943—you will see that date, My Lord, in the middle of
the first paragraph—I start now from that line in the middle:

    “The Swiss Jewish newspaper goes on to say, ‘The Jews of Europe,
    with the exception of those in England and of insignificant
    Jewish communities in the few neutral countries, have
    disappeared, so to speak. The Jewish reservoir of the East that
    was able to counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West
    no longer exists.’”

That is the end of your quotation from the newspaper, and you go on to
say:

    “This is not a Jewish lie; it is really true that the Jews have,
    ‘so to speak,’ disappeared from Europe and that the ‘Jewish
    reservoir of the East’ from which the Jewish pestilence spread
    for centuries among the European nations has ceased to exist. If
    the Swiss newspaper wishes to affirm that the Jews did not
    expect this kind of development when they plunged the nations
    into the second World War, this is to be believed; but already
    at the beginning of the war the Führer of the German Nation
    prophesied the events that have taken place. He said that the
    second World War would swallow those who had conjured it.”

Now, are you really saying that when that article was written you did
not know how to interpret the word “disappearance,” the disappearance of
the Jews from the East? Are you really telling the Tribunal that?

STREICHER: Yes, the word “disappear” after all does not mean
extermination _en masse_. This deals with a quotation from the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ and is a repeated quotation of what the
Führer had prophesied.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, now, would you look at the article from
which you quote there, which you will find at Page 36-B; and I would
like you to follow it, and we will read the two together. Now, the
particular paragraph which I want to read in the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_ is that quotation which I have just read to you and you
will find the same quotation.

My Lord, it starts at the end of the eighth but last line, “The Jews
were” or rather “The Jews of Europe...” Have you got them in front of
you, Defendant?

STREICHER: I shall listen to you.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It would be better, I think, if you followed
it. I want to help you as much as possible. Page 44-A and 36-B. I will
read slowly first of all from your _Stürmer_ again:

    “The Jews of Europe, with the exception of those in England and
    of insignificant Jewish communities in the few neutral
    countries, have, so to speak, disappeared...”

and you will see that you then go on in the quotation and say:

    “...the Jewish reservoir of the East which was able to
    counterbalance the force of assimilation in the West no longer
    exists.”

Now, would you look at the original article:

    “The Jews of Europe”—this is 36-B—“the Jews of Europe, with
    the exception of those in England and of insignificant Jewish
    communities in the few neutral countries, have, so to speak,
    disappeared.”

Now—there you go on, “The Jewish reservoir of the East”—the original
goes on—“three million dead, the same number outlawed; many thousands,
all over the world, mentally and physically broken.”

Are you telling this Tribunal now that on the 27th of August, or when
you read that article of the 27th of August, you didn’t know that Jews
were being murdered in the East and that you had not read of those
things in the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_?

STREICHER: Whether I had read it or not, I would not have believed it,
that 3 million Jews had been killed. That is something I would not have
believed, and that is why I left it out, at any rate. Anyhow, the German
censorship would not have allowed the spreading of something which is
not credible.

THE PRESIDENT: You didn’t read the last part of the line, did you?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: [_Repeating._] “...were mentally and physically
broken. That is the result of the new order.” I am very much obliged to
you.

[_Turning to the defendant._] “That is the result,” you say, “of the
‘new order’ in Europe...”

You say you didn’t believe it. Is that what you say now, that you must
have read it—must you not?

STREICHER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But you just didn’t believe it; is that right?

STREICHER: No, I did not believe it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Even if you didn’t believe it, when you were
reading this newspaper more or less regularly, when your cameraman had
been to the ghettos in the East, did you think it right to go on, week
after week, in your newspaper crying for the extermination, murder, of
the Jews?

STREICHER: That is not correct. It is not true that murder was demanded
week after week. And I repeat again, the sharpening of our tone was the
answer to the voice from America that called for our mass murder in
Germany—eye for eye, tooth for tooth. If a Jew, Erich Kauffmann,
demands mass murders in Germany, then perhaps I, as an author, can say
that the Jews too should be exterminated. That is a literary matter. But
the mass murders had taken place a long time before without our having
known about them; and I state here that if I had known what had in fact
happened in the East, then I would not have used these quotations at
all.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But, Defendant, you must have known then, must
you not, after reading that article, after sending your cameraman, after
the United Nations published their declaration, after Hitler’s
prophecies had been made again and again in his proclamations, after you
said his prophecy had been fulfilled? You really say you didn’t know?

STREICHER: The cameraman is at your disposal. He is in Vienna, and I ask
to have him brought here. And I state that this cameraman reported
nothing, and could not have reported anything, about mass murders.

THE PRESIDENT: I think we might adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. MARX: Mr. President, with the permission of the Tribunal, and in the
interest of clarification of the facts, I should like to point out the
following: The Prosecutor, Sir Griffith-Jones, has mentioned a document,
Page 38-A from _Der Stürmer_ of 6 May 1943. That seems to be an error,
because we are dealing here with _Der Stürmer_ of 6 March 1943.

That date is of the greatest importance because if the photographer of
_Der Stürmer_ published a report of 6 March in _Der Stürmer_, then he
must have been at the ghetto in Warsaw before 6 March 1943.
Presumably...

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say 6 March? The document I have before me has
6 May.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There has been a mistake, I am afraid, in the
German that Dr. Marx has. I have the original before me, which is 6 May
1943.

DR. MARX: Excuse me. At the present moment I cannot recall when the
destruction of the ghetto of Warsaw took place. That was Document
1061-PS.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I cannot remember for the moment the number of
the document, but the date was, I think from memory, from the 1st to the
23rd of April.

DR. MARX: Then, of course, my remark is without foundation. Please
excuse me.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now we had just dealt with the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_ issue for 27 August, the copy that you quoted from. I just
refer you to one more copy of that newspaper. Would you look at Page
37-B, which is an issue of 10 September 1943:

    “Statistics presented by the Convening Committee showed that 5
    millions out of the 8.5 million Jews of Europe had died or been
    deported ... About 3 million Jews had lost their lives through
    forced labor and deportation.”

Did you read that one?

STREICHER: I do not know, and again I would not have believed it. To
this day I do not believe that 5 million were killed. I consider it
technically impossible that that could have happened. I do not believe
it. I have not received proof of that up until now.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is quite clear that there were plenty of
figures for you, quoted in this _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ over the
period that we are discussing. Plenty of figures, it now turns out,
doesn’t it?

STREICHER: Pardon?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: We will go on. Now, I just want to put one or
two further articles of your own to you. You remember what I am
suggesting, that you are inciting the German people to murder. We know
now that at least you had read one article in the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_ where murder is mentioned. I just want to see what you go
on to publish in your own paper after that date.

Would you look at Page 47-A. This is an article by yourself on 6 January
1944. This is after you had been living on your estate for some time.

    “After the National Socialist uprising in Germany, a development
    began in Europe, too, from which one can expect that it will
    free this continent for all time of the Jewish disintegrator and
    exploiter of nations; and, over and above this, that the German
    example will, after a victorious termination of the second World
    War, bring about the destruction of the Jewish world tormentor
    on the other continents as well.”

What example was the German nation setting to the other nations of the
world? What example do you mean there?

STREICHER: This article corroborates what I have been saying all along.
I spoke of an international solution of the Jewish question. I was
convinced that if Germany had won this war or had been victorious over
Bolshevism, then the world would have agreed that an understanding
should be reached with the other nations for an international solution
of the Jewish question. If I wrote here about destruction, it is not to
be understood as destruction by mass killing; as I have said, that is an
expression; I have to point out that I do not believe that Erich
Kauffmann really wanted to kill the German people by sterilization, but
he wrote it, and we sometimes wrote in the same manner, echoing the
sounds that we heard in the other camp.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You have not yet told us what is this
international solution that you are advocating by talking about
extermination; if it is not murder, what is it? What is the solution?

STREICHER: I have already said that I founded the Anti-Semitic Union,
and through this Anti-Semitic Union we wanted to create movements among
the nations which should, above and beyond governments, act in such a
way that an international possibility would be created, such as has been
represented today here in this Trial—thus, I conceived it, to form an
international congress center which would solve the Jewish question by
the creation of a Jewish state and thereby destroy the power of the Jews
within the nations.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That is your answer—that you were advocating a
Jewish state? Is that all that this comes to? Is it simply that you were
advocating a Jewish national home? Is that what you have been talking
about in all these extracts that we have read? Is that the solution
which you are advocating?

STREICHER: Well, I do not know what you want with that question. Of
course, that is the solution.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Let us just go on now. Turn to Page
48-A now, will you? This is 24 January 1944, “Whoever does what a Jew
does is a scoundrel, a criminal, and he who repeats and wishes to copy
him deserves the same fate—annihilation, death.”

Are you still advocating a national Jewish home?

STREICHER: Yes, that has nothing to do with the big political plan. If
you take every statement by a writer, every statement from a daily
newspaper, as an example, and want to prove a political aim by it, then
you miss the point. You have to distinguish between a newspaper article
and a great political aim.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, let us just turn now to the next
page, 2 March 1944, “Eternal night must come over the born criminal race
of Jews so that eternal day may bless awakening non-Jewish mankind.”

Were they going to have eternal night in their national Jewish state? Is
that what you wanted?

STREICHER: That is an anti-Semitic play of words. Again it has nothing
to do with the great political aim.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It may be an anti-Semitic play of words, but
the only meaning it can have is murder. Is that not true?

STREICHER: No.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you turn to the next page, 25 May 1944;
and I remind you that these are all after you must have read of the
murder in _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I quote the second paragraph:

    “How can we overcome this danger and restore humanity to health?
    Just as the individual human being is able to defend himself
    against contagious diseases only if he proclaims war against the
    cause of the disease, the germ, so the world can be restored to
    health only when the most terrible germ of all times, the Jew,
    has been removed. It is of no avail to battle against the
    outward symptoms of the world disease without rendering the
    morbific agents innocuous. The disease will break out again
    sooner or later. The cause and the carrier of the disease, the
    germ, will see to that. But if the nations are to be restored to
    health and are to remain healthy in the future, then the germ of
    the Jewish world plague must be destroyed, root and branch.”

Is that what you mean? Are you saying there when you say “must be
destroyed root and branch”—did you mean to say “ought to be given a
Jewish national state”?

STREICHER: Yes, it is a far cry from such a statement in an article to
the act, or to the will, to commit mass murder.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Turn over to the 10th of August. “When it loses
this struggle, Judaism will be ruined, then the Jew will be
extinguished. Then will Judaism be annihilated down to the last man.”

Are we to read from these words: Provide the Jews with a Jewish national
state?

STREICHER: That is a vision of the future. I would like to call it an
expression of a prophetic vision. But it is not incitement to kill 5
million Jews. That is an opinion, a matter, of belief, of conviction.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is the prophetic vision of what you wanted,
is it not—of what you have been advocating now for the last 4
years—the beginning of the war? Isn’t that what it is?

STREICHER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot tell you today what I may have been
thinking years ago at a certain moment when writing an article. But
still I admit that when I saw lying before me on the table declarations
from the Jewish front, many declarations saying, “the German nation has
to be destroyed; bomb the cities, do not spare women, children, or old
men”—if one has declarations like these in front of one, it is possible
that things will come from one’s pen such as I have often written.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You know, do you not, now, even if you do not
believe the full figures, that millions of Jews have been murdered since
the beginning of the war? Do you know that? You have heard the evidence,
have you not?

STREICHER: I believe it...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know whether you had heard
that evidence. You can answer “yes” or “no,” and I presume it will be
“yes.”

STREICHER: Yes, I have to say, evidence for me is only the testament of
the Führer. There he states that the mass executions took place upon his
orders. That I believe. Now I believe it.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think that it would have been possible
to carry out the extermination of 6 million Jews in 1921? Do you think
the German people would have stood for it? Do you think it would have
been possible under any regime in 1921 to have carried out the murder of
6 million men, women, and children of the Jewish race?

STREICHER: Whether that would have been possible with the knowledge of
the people—no, it would not have been possible. The prosecutor himself
has said here that since 1937 the Party had full control over the
people. Now even if the people had known this, according to the opinion
of the Prosecution, they could not have done anything against that
dictatorship because of that control. But the people did not know it.
That is my belief, my conviction, and my knowledge.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Was it possible to exterminate people in that
way only after some 20 years of incitement and propaganda by you and
other Nazis? Is that what made that possible?

STREICHER: I deny that the population was incited. It was enlightened,
and sometimes a harsh word may have been directed against the other side
as an answer. It was enlightenment, not incitement. And if we want to
keep our place before history I have to state again and again that the
German people did not want any killings, whether individually or _en
masse_.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not going to let you go into another
history about the German people. I am going to remind you of what you
have said...

STREICHER: Adolf Hitler...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am going to remind you of what you said
yesterday. I read from the transcript: You speak of a Jewish question at
the time—that is 1923—“I would like to say that the public
distinguished Jews only by their religion; to speak about a Jewish
problem then would have been nonsense.”

Was that because there was no Jewish problem then, and that the Jewish
problem had only been created by you and the Nazi regime?

STREICHER: It was my aim, and I reached that goal in part: If the laws
which in the future should make impossible sexual intercourse between
different races, that is to say if that should become law—then it would
make the public realize that to be a Jew is not a point of religion but
of people and race. I helped to create that basis. But mass killings
were not the result of the enlightenment, or as the Prosecution say,
incitement. Mass killings were the last acts of will of a great man of
history who was probably desperate because he saw that he would not win.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have no further questions. Perhaps I might be
allowed to just sort out the exhibits and then mention to the Tribunal
their numbers. If the Tribunal would agree, those that I have put in
evidence, which are the other parts of the bundle other than I have
actually quoted from—perhaps I could put them all in as one number and
hand the exhibits in to the clerk, if that would be the convenient
course.

THE PRESIDENT: I think so, yes. If they are in one bundle and you are
going to give one number to a number of documents, it had better be in
one bundle, had it not?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you want to re-examine?

DR. MARX: I do not consider it necessary any more.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to the dock. Dr. Marx, will
you continue the defendant’s case?

DR. MARX: I call now, with the permission of the Court, the witness
Fritz Herrwerth.

[_The witness Herrwerth took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

FRITZ HERRWERTH (Witness): Fritz Herrwerth.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

You may sit down.

DR. MARX: How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?

HERRWERTH: Since the Party Rally in 1934.

DR. MARX: When did you enter his service and in what capacity?

HERRWERTH: I was employed on 15 October 1934, in Nuremberg, not in the
personal service of Herr Streicher himself, but in the municipal motor
pool. However, I worked for the then Gauleiter Streicher.

DR. MARX: When did you leave that service?

HERRWERTH: In August 1943.

DR. MARX: For what reason?

HERRWERTH: It was a personal dispute, and mainly due to my fault.

DR. MARX: Did you have any other tasks to carry out for Herr Streicher?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: And which?

HERRWERTH: Well, whatever came up. I also did agricultural work at the
end.

DR. MARX: Thus you were very often with Streicher?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: And therefore you knew about the most important incidents
during that period?

HERRWERTH: Yes. I do not know, however, what you call important
incidents. There were things that I do not know about, that is, at least
I assume that.

DR. MARX: I will ask you later in detail.

HERRWERTH: Yes, if you please.

DR. MARX: The Defendant Streicher is accused of having caused acts of
violence against the Jews and of having participated in these acts. Do
you know of any such case?

HERRWERTH: Not a single one.

DR. MARX: Will you please wait until the end of my question, and then I
shall say “end of question.” On 9 November 1938, did you drive Streicher
back to Nuremberg from Munich, and when? End of question.

HERRWERTH: It was on 9 November, yes. I do not know the time exactly. At
that time Streicher left Munich a bit earlier, and it may have been
about—I do not know for sure—9 o’clock perhaps.

DR. MARX: Did Streicher know already during that ride back that
something was to be done that night against the Jewish population?

HERRWERTH: No, he knew nothing about that.

DR. MARX: Then, during the night of 9 November, did you witness a
conversation between Streicher and the SA Leader, Von Obernitz?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: Where did that conversation take place?

HERRWERTH: In order to answer that question, I have to explain a little
further. When Herr Streicher went to bed, I was usually with him or the
house superintendent. On that evening Herr Streicher went to bed earlier
than usual. I do not know the reason. And that concluded my work for the
day. I went from Herr Streicher to the Casino of the Gauleitung. That
was in the cellar of the Gauleitung building on Schlageterstrasse. I
played cards there. And then the former SA Obergruppenführer, Von
Obernitz, came and called me, as was customary, by the name of Fritz and
told me he had to speak to Herr Streicher very urgently; and I answered
him that Herr Streicher had already gone to bed. Then he said, “Then I
must rouse him,” and he told me he would assume the responsibility; it
was an important affair. Herr Von Obernitz went to Herr Streicher’s
apartment in my car. Herr Streicher’s bedroom is above my apartment. I
had the keys and of course I could get in at any time.

On the way to the apartment at night I noticed that many SA men were in
the streets. I asked Herr Von Obernitz the reason for that. He told me
that that night something was going to happen; the Jewish homes were to
be destroyed. He did not say anything further to me.

I accompanied Herr Von Obernitz all the way to the bed of Herr
Streicher. Herr Von Obernitz then reported to Streicher about what was
happening that night. I cannot recall the details very well any more,
but I believe that he said that that night the Jewish homes were to be
destroyed. Herr Streicher was, if I may say so, surprised. He had not
known anything about it. He said literally to Herr Von Obernitz, and I
remember that very clearly, “That is wrong. One does not solve the
Jewish question that way. Do what you have been ordered. I shall have no
part in it. If anything should occur so that you need me, then you may
come for me.” I can also mention that thereupon Herr Von Obernitz said
that Hitler had declared that the SA should be allowed to have a fling
as retribution for what had occurred in Paris in connection with Herr
Vorn Rath. Streicher stayed in bed and did not go out during that night.

DR. MARX: Did Herr Von Obernitz mention anything about the fact that the
synagogues were to be set on fire?

HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes. But, as far as I remember, Herr Streicher
refused to do that, too, because the synagogue, as far as I know, was
burned down by the regular fire department, and upon orders from Herr
Von Obernitz.

DR. MARX: How do you know that?

HERRWERTH: I was there.

DR. MARX: Did you watch it?

HERRWERTH: Yes. I was at the synagogue during the night.

DR. MARX: And how could one assume that the regular fire department
started the fire?

HERRWERTH: How that could be assumed I do not know, but I saw it. The
regular fire department started the fire.

DR. MARX: Were you there in time to see how the fire was started or did
you arrive when the building was already on fire?

HERRWERTH: The building was not yet on fire, but the fire department was
there already.

DR. MARX: Is that right?

HERRWERTH: I can say nothing else.

DR. MARX: Did Herr Streicher at that time mention anything about the
fact that he was afraid of a new wave of excitement on the part of the
world press if the synagogue was burned? Did he say that that is why he
refused to do it?

HERRWERTH: I believe so, yes, but I could not say definitely; but, if I
remember correctly, they spoke about that.

DR. MARX: Did Obernitz say from whom he had received the order?

HERRWERTH: He only repeated what Hitler had said—the SA should be
allowed to have a fling.

DR. MARX: Is it correct that you, Witness, told your wife during the
same night about that conversation between Obernitz and Streicher?

HERRWERTH: I believe I did not speak about the conversation; but when I
walked down from the second floor to the ground floor through my
apartment, I told my wife that I would probably be a little late because
that night that action was going to be started; I told her briefly what
was happening but nothing about the conversation.

DR. MARX: Then, later you were at the Pleikershof when Streicher had
been forced to retire there or had retired?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: Do you remember an incident where the future Frau Streicher
spoke about the incidents at Magdeburg which had occurred there the same
night?

HERRWERTH: No, I know nothing of that.

DR. MARX: Did you not tell the then Frau Merkel that she should not talk
about these incidents because Streicher always got very excited about
them?

HERRWERTH: I can recall that Herr Streicher once said that he had been
right in his opinion, for, not long after that night he received
information—I do not know through whom—that, for instance, the glass
for the window panes had to be bought from Holland again. Herr Streicher
said then that that was the first confirmation of the correctness of the
opinion he had expressed at that time.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, just one moment.

Sir David, would it be convenient to you and the counsel for the
Defendant Von Schirach if we discussed the question about the documents
at 0930 tomorrow morning?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I will find out. Yes, counsel for Von
Schirach says that he thinks it is all right.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, 0930 tomorrow morning.

DR. MARX: What observations did you make during your stay at Pleikershof
about the attitude of Streicher with regard to the Jewish question? What
was that about the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_?

HERRWERTH: Well, what do you want to know about the _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_? Herr Streicher received it.

DR. MARX: Did he receive it regularly?

HERRWERTH: Yes, I believe I can say that quite certainly. I always saw
large bundles of newspapers of the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. They
came continuously.

DR. MARX: Herr Streicher said that during the first years of the war he
had great difficulty in getting that paper and the Police did not
release it easily.

HERRWERTH: Yes, that can very well be. For I do not know, after all, of
what year they were. I just saw them and it is difficult for me to tell
now of what date these papers were.

DR. MARX: Yes, you said there were always large bundles of them.

HERRWERTH: Yes, on and off, but there were other newspapers too. Swiss
newspapers were there, the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, and so on.
There were always so many newspapers lying about and among them I saw
here and there the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_. I mean to say that it
would not be possible for me to say how many there were.

DR. MARX: All right. Did Streicher speak at times about his knowledge of
happenings in the East or of happenings in concentration camps in the
East?

HERRWERTH: Well. Herr Streicher did not know anything at all about it.
Thus he could not say anything about it. At least that is my conviction.

DR. MARX: Did you, then, ever speak to him about it?

HERRWERTH: Not that I know of; I did not know anything about it myself.

DR. MARX: Did you ever receive knowledge of a letter in which Streicher
was reproached by Reichsführer SS Himmler because he treated the French
prisoners too well? Did you understand me?

HERRWERTH: Yes, I understood, but I have to think about it. I know quite
well that Herr Streicher once mentioned something about the treatment of
prisoners. I know that the Frenchmen were treated very well, but whether
the cause for that was a letter from Himmler I do not know.

DR. MARX: No, no. The cause for the good treatment, you mean?

HERRWERTH: No, the cause for Herr Streicher’s speaking about it. Herr
Streicher spoke about reproaches against the good treatment of the
Frenchmen; but I do not know whether the fact that he spoke about it was
due to a letter from Himmler. But I do not believe that there was a
single Frenchman who could complain in any way about the treatment.

DR. MARX: You were no longer present when the Frenchmen left?

HERRWERTH: No.

DR. MARX: Do you know about an incident when the publisher Fink came
into the garden of Streicher’s home and admitted having lied to the
police in an affair concerning shares?

HERRWERTH: The question must be put in detail, Mr. Attorney, for I do
not know all about it, only part of it. I know that the then Director
Fink stood in tears before Streicher, that he wailed, that he accused
himself, saying that he was a rascal and a traitor. But why, I do not
know. For Herr Streicher then walked farther into the garden with him,
and I only saw that Herr Fink wept, and again heard how he accused
himself.

DR. MARX: Do you know that Streicher at certain intervals brought people
from the SPD and the KPD (Social Democratic Party and Communist Party)
from the Dachau Concentration Camp?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: How many do you suppose there were?

HERRWERTH: I do not know. It was every year around Christmas time. I
estimate that there were about 100 to 150 men every year. They came from
Dachau. Herr Streicher had dinner prepared for them in a separate room,
in the Hotel Deutscher Hof, and I believe that used to be the family
reunion—that is to say, the prisoners rejoined the members of their
family. Streicher also saw to it that released prisoners found work, and
he intervened personally for them.

DR. MARX: Did he also get work for one or another of these released
persons?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: What do you know about that?

HERRWERTH: I remember that three men, I believe, came into the Mars
motorcycle factory. Herr Streicher at that time told the plenipotentiary
of the German Labor Front to find positions for these people, as far as
I remember.

DR. MARX: What was the attitude of Streicher when he found out that
members of the Party had acquired cars and villas of Jewish property at
very low prices?

HERRWERTH: I can still remember when Herr Streicher returned from
Berlin. I do not know how much Herr Streicher knew at that time about
these purchases; but at any rate, when Herr Streicher returned from
Berlin where Herr Göring had expressed his views about these low-priced
purchases of buildings, Herr Streicher, just arrived at the Nuremberg
railroad station, said—and I heard it myself—that these purchases had
to be nullified at once.

Besides, I know only about one case where a Party member had to do with
the purchase of a house. I do not know whether there were more of them.

DR. MARX: Do you know whether Streicher was under surveillance by the
Gestapo while on his farm and that there was a prohibition against
visiting him there?

HERRWERTH: In answering the first question, I cannot say for sure that
Criminal Police agents were there. I cannot affirm categorically that
Herr Streicher was once under observation, but it could be safely
assumed. I know of a woman who even stated that she had been
photographed in the forest when she came from the railroad station to
the farm. And what was the second question?

DR. MARX: Whether people were prohibited from visiting him.

HERRWERTH: Yes. I met various members of the Party within the city and
whomever I asked said to me, “Impossible to get out there, impossible to
get out there.” And if I asked who had issued the prohibition, then no
one would talk about it; but as one heard it here and there, this
prohibition was said to have been issued by the Deputy of the Führer,
Herr Hess.

DR. MARX: Do you know anything about the fact that Streicher, when he
found out that acts of violence against Jews or other political
adversaries were intended, stopped them immediately?

HERRWERTH: Yes. At least, on the basis of his statements. He always said
that that was wrong.

DR. MARX: Do you know of any case where he took measures against
somebody who had been a party to such acts of violence? If you do not
know it, say you do not know.

HERRWERTH: Very well, at this moment I cannot recall any case.

DR. MARX: Do you know anything about that affair concerning the Mars
Works shares? What do you know about it?

HERRWERTH: Yes. I know about that case through statements made by
Streicher at that time. I was not a witness to these events myself, but
Herr Streicher once related to me what had happened. Shall I describe it
briefly?

DR. MARX: Yes, but very condensed, please.

HERRWERTH: Streicher was in a Turkish bath at the time when the Director
Fink and his adjutant, König, came and offered to sell the shares to
Herr Streicher. Herr Streicher said, “What kind of shares are they?” The
answer was, “They are shares of the Mars Works.” He said, “How many?”
The answer was “100,000 marks’ worth.” Then Streicher said, “What do the
shares cost?” He was told “5,000 marks.” Herr Streicher asked, “Why are
these shares so cheap?” Finally Herr Fink said, I believe, “Because they
are Jewish shares.”

Whoever knows Herr Streicher as I do, knows that Herr Streicher has
never taken anything from a Jew. He protested very emphatically against
the fact that such an offer had been made to him at all.

That seemed to settle the matter for the time being, and then suddenly
the then Gauleiter Herr Streicher had the thought that with that money
he could possibly construct the third Gau building. He mentioned that to
the gentlemen as they left, and they decided to buy the shares. Herr
Streicher forbade them to use Party money. Then both did not know what
to do. Herr Streicher said he would advance these 5,000 marks.

That settled the case, but I had another experience later. It was about
one and a half years after that trial that Streicher had had in Munich,
when he was dismissed. At that time the wife of NSKK Obergruppenführer
Zühlen came to me and asked whether I already knew that the criminal
police was again in Nuremberg concerning the Streicher case. I said “no”
to Frau Zühlen and added, “If they want to find out something why do
they not come out to the farm to Herr Streicher himself? He will give
them all the necessary information.”

After about 2 to 3 weeks, I met the Director of _Der Stürmer_, Fischer,
successor to Herr Fink. He told me—but I would like to mention first
that the shares, together with the 5,000 marks, were confiscated from
Herr Streicher. The then Director Fischer told me that on that same day
he had received a phone call from the trustee association, and that the
trustee association had reported to Director Fischer that they had
transferred to the account of _Der Stürmer_ the 5,000 marks which
Streicher at that time had advanced for the purchase of the shares.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you not think he is going into rather too
much detail about this?

DR. MARX: Yes.

HERRWERTH: Yes, I will make it shorter.

The man from the trustee association said that the 5,000 marks were
released because the innocence of Streicher had been proved in this
matter.

DR. MARX: You witnessed the Supreme Party Court session at that time?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: What did Herr Fink say at that time? Did he not accuse himself
again of having made false statements?

HERRWERTH: I was not present when Herr Fink was questioned.

DR. MARX: Very well. Then I would like to ask you, were you present when
the incident in Munich occurred at the Künstlerhaus Inn—with the man
who accosted Streicher?

HERRWERTH: Yes.

DR. MARX: Can you give us a description of how that incident occurred?

HERRWERTH: Well, Herr Streicher left the inn after dinner. I cannot
remember the exact words any more, but I am going to try to describe it
as well as possible. Herr Streicher left the inn, and as he went out
that man approached Herr Streicher in a—may I say—improper manner.
Streicher continued on his way and was silent at first. He asked the
people around him, myself also, whether we knew that man. Nobody knew
him.

Then Herr Streicher sent his son, Lothar, back into the room again to
speak to the man and to ask him what the reason was for such behavior.
Lothar Streicher came out and said that the man had behaved in just the
same manner again.

DR. MARX: Will you please be more brief? You should only tell us how
that incident occurred and what caused you and also Herr Streicher to
use violence against the man.

HERRWERTH: You mean his behavior?

DR. MARX: Yes. What happened then?

HERRWERTH: Herr Streicher asked the landlord for a room, and in that
room Streicher spoke to the man personally. There again the man made
offensive remarks, and then it came to blows, first with Lothar
Streicher. Now, as it happened, he was a strong man, and of course all
of us helped to get him down.

DR. MARX: All right.

I am through with the questioning of this witness, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions?
Do any of the Prosecution Counsel wish to cross-examine? Then the
witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. MARX: Then I should like to call the witness Wurzbacher, if he is
available. Is he not? I do not know which one of the witnesses is still
in the witness room. Is there anyone? Wurzbacher? Hiemer?

MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Frau Streicher is available.

THE PRESIDENT: Is not the witness Wurzbacher here?

MARSHAL: I will see, Sir. He was not here a while ago. He was not called
for.

THE PRESIDENT: What other witnesses have you got, Dr. Marx?

DR. MARX: The wife of the defendant could be called as a witness now.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let her be called then.

MARSHAL: The witness Strobel is available now.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx wants to call Frau Streicher.

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. If it is rather difficult to call
Frau Streicher, then the witness...

[_The witness Frau Streicher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?

FRAU ADELE STREICHER (Witness): Adele Streicher, born Tappe.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Your maiden name is Tappe and you were born in Magdeburg?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Were you a member of the NSDAP or of the Frauenschaft?

FRAU STREICHER: No.

DR. MARX: When did you become Herr Streicher’s secretary and for how
long were you in that job?

FRAU STREICHER: On 7 June 1940, I became Julius Streicher’s secretary
and I remained in that job until the end of the war.

DR. MARX: And during that period, you were continuously on his farm?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I was always with him.

DR. MARX: Were you also in charge of all the correspondence for Herr
Streicher?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: What did that correspondence mainly consist of?

FRAU STREICHER: Mainly letters to his sons and to relatives.

DR. MARX: What were Streicher’s activities during that period of 5
years?

FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher did mainly physical work; that is,
agriculture and gardening, and from time to time he wrote articles for
_Der Stürmer_.

DR. MARX: During these 5 years did he leave the farm at all or was he
ever absent from the farm for any length of time?

FRAU STREICHER: During the first few years of his stay there Julius
Streicher did not leave the farm at all; later, once in a while, he
would pay a visit in the neighborhood. His longest absence did not
comprise an entire day and never a single night.

DR. MARX: Did you know that it was prohibited for prominent Party
members to visit Herr Streicher?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes, there was such a prohibition.

DR. MARX: How did you know that?

FRAU STREICHER: From conversations. Then, too, I myself remember, when
Dr. Goebbels visited the farm, that Julius Streicher said to him,
“Doctor, you dare to come here? Do you not know that it is prohibited by
the Party chiefs to visit me?”

DR. MARX: When did the visits of Dr. Ley and Dr. Goebbels occur?

FRAU STREICHER: Dr. Ley came to the farm on 7 May 1944. The visit of Dr.
Goebbels occurred on 4 June 1944.

DR. MARX: Would you please describe the character of these visits and
what was the subject of the conversations?

FRAU STREICHER: Both visits were of a rather unofficial character. Dr.
Ley wanted mainly to know how Julius Streicher was doing, personally. No
political questions were raised. Ley said only, “Streicher, the Führer
is waiting for you.”

DR. MARX: And what did Streicher say to that?

FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher answered that he had become accustomed
to his solitude, that he was happy as a farmer, and that Ley should tell
the Führer that he, Streicher, wanted nothing more. At the visit of Dr.
Goebbels the subject of the conversation dealt mainly with Julius
Streicher’s dismissal from his office as Gauleiter, and Dr. Goebbels was
of the opinion that Julius Streicher should return into the circle of
old Party members; but he gave him the same answer, “Tell the Führer I
wish for nothing.”

DR. MARX: Were you always present during these conversations?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: Was not the Jewish question a subject of these conversations?

FRAU STREICHER: No, they never spoke about the Jewish question.

DR. MARX: Did they not speak about the happenings in the Eastern
territories, or in the concentration camps?

FRAU STREICHER: No, that never came up any more.

DR. MARX: Did not Streicher speak to you about the articles he intended
to write for _Der Stürmer_, and did he not also speak about what he
considered to be the solution of the Jewish problem?

FRAU STREICHER: From all conversations with Julius Streicher I could see
with certainty that he never thought of the solution of the Jewish
question in terms of violence, but hoped for the emigration of Jews from
Europe and their settlement in territories outside Europe.

DR. MARX: Was Herr Streicher in correspondence with leading
personalities of the Party or of the State?

FRAU STREICHER: No, neither personally nor by correspondence was there
any such connection.

DR. MARX: I will now mention several names, of whom I want you to tell
me whether they had any connection with him: Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann,
or other leading men of the Police or the SS or the Gestapo.

FRAU STREICHER: No, I know nothing of any of these men. With the
exception of one letter from Herr Himmler there was never any mail.

DR. MARX: What was the reason for that letter?

FRAU STREICHER: In that letter Herr Himmler complained about the fact
that the French prisoners of war who were employed on our Pleikershof
farm were treated too well.

DR. MARX: How was the treatment of the prisoners of war and the foreign
civilian workers on the farm?

FRAU STREICHER: On the Pleikershof eight French prisoners of war, one
Polish girl, and one Slovene girl were employed. They were all treated
very well and very humanely. Each service for which Julius Streicher
asked, each piece of work for which he asked personally, was especially
rewarded with tobacco, pastry, fruit, or even money. Such cordial
relations developed with some of the Frenchmen during the years that
they were there that they assured us, with tears in their eyes at their
departure, that they would visit Julius Streicher after the war with
their families.

DR. MARX: Did Streicher not finally receive credible information about
these mass executions in the East?

FRAU STREICHER: I believe he found out about it through Swiss newspapers
in 1944. We were never informed about it officially.

DR. MARX: But it is asserted that he already had knowledge before that.

FRAU STREICHER: No.

DR. MARX: You do not know anything about it?

FRAU STREICHER: I only know about the Swiss newspapers.

DR. MARX: Very well. You once brought up the subject, in a conversation,
that in Magdeburg, from the 9 to 10 November 1938, you witnessed the
demonstration against the Jews and that you were revolted by it. Is that
true?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes, I spoke about it and said that I was shocked at
this action. Julius Streicher got very excited during that conversation
and said, “Such nonsense occurred in Nuremberg also. That is not
anti-Semitism; that is just great stupidity.”

DR. MARX: Is it correct that Herr Streicher was hardly interested in the
financial affairs of the publishing firm and left these things to the
manager?

FRAU STREICHER: Julius Streicher never bothered about financial affairs
at all, neither in the house nor in the firm. Again and again the
gentlemen of the firm were disappointed when they wanted to report about
annual balances or the like and Julius Streicher would tell them, “Do
not worry me with your business matters. There are other things besides
that are more important than money.”

DR. MARX: How did he take care of the household expenses, then?

FRAU STREICHER: I received 1,000 marks every month from the firm. That
provided for the household, presents, and so on.

DR. MARX: Do you know that he is supposed to have acquired shares
through illegal pressure against a Jewish banker?

FRAU STREICHER: That is completely out of the question. I consider it
quite impossible that Julius Streicher acquired shares that way. I
believe that he does not even know what a share looks like.

DR. MARX: Did he not tell you anything about it?

FRAU STREICHER: I only heard that he never received shares.

DR. MARX: How did it come about that you and the defendant were married
as late as April 1945?

Did you understand the question?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes. Julius Streicher wanted to take part in the
fighting in Nuremberg. I wanted to accompany him, so he married me
before we left. We wanted to die together.

DR. MARX: Then you left the Pleikershof with him, and where did you go
from there?

FRAU STREICHER: First we wanted to go to Nuremberg, and that was refused
for fear of difficulties with the authorities. So we drove in the
direction of Munich. In Munich we were told to continue in the direction
of Passau. From Passau they sent us to Berchtesgaden; from Berchtesgaden
they sent us to Kitzbühel.

DR. MARX: How did it happen that the original intention to die together
was not followed up? What caused him to change his mind?

FRAU STREICHER: The cause for that was a conversation with three young
soldiers.

DR. MARX: And what was that? I will be through right away, Mr.
President.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should go into that, Dr. Marx.

DR. MARX: Well, then. I will forego the question. Only one more
question: Is it correct that Streicher gave the managers of his
publishing firm a written power of attorney which meant that they could
dispose of the money as they saw fit?

FRAU STREICHER: Yes, Julius Streicher gave the power of attorney to
whoever happened to be the manager of the firm, and thereby gave him his
full confidence without any restrictions.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?

Does the Prosecution wish to ask any questions?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire, and the Court will adjourn
until 0930 tomorrow morning.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 30 April 1946 at 0930 hours._]




                    ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTEENTH DAY
                         Tuesday, 30 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, were you going to deal with these questions?

MR. DODD: Yes, Mr. President, I am prepared to do so. Shall I proceed to
take up those documents about which we have some difficulty?

THE PRESIDENT: If you will, yes.

MR. DODD: Altogether, there are some 118 documents submitted on behalf
of the Defendant Von Schirach. As a result of our conversations we have
agreed on all but—I believe the number is twelve.

The first group, Numbers 30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 109, 124, and 133, are
all excerpts from a book entitled, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, written
by a man named Stanley McClatchie. They are excerpts referring to the
Hitler Youth organization, and we do object to them on the ground that
they are all irrelevant and immaterial here. They describe Hitler Youth
meetings at homes and Hitler health programs and Hitler athletic
competitions and Hitler Youth Land Service and that sort of thing. There
are general descriptions by Mr. McClatchie of some activities of the
Hitler Youth organization. They are all, I say, from that same
book—none of them written by the defendant himself. They were published
in 1937.

Then, Document Number 118 (a) is a letter. It is unsigned, except that
it is typewritten. It is by Colin Ross and his wife and it appears to be
a suicide note setting forth the reasons why Ross and his wife intended
to commit suicide. We have been unable to determine its probative value
and do not see any probative value in it, insofar as the issues
concerning this defendant are concerned. He apparently was acquainted
with the Defendant Von Schirach and that is the claim, I assume, of
counsel for Von Schirach, that it sheds some light of some kind on Von
Schirach’s attitude. But it is not clear to us.

The third document is Number 121. This is a quotation from the United
States Army newspaper, _The Stars and Stripes_, issue of the 21st of
February 1946. It is about the training of young people in Yugoslavia at
the present time. With respect to this we also say that we believe it to
be immaterial here and not relevant and not bearing on the issues
concerning this defendant as charged in the Indictment.

Those three—the first group and the two, 118 and 121, are the only
documents concerning which we have any controversy.

THE PRESIDENT: Eleven.

MR. DODD: I am sorry. I said twelve.

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Von Schirach): Mr. President,
the first group of documents to which the Prosecution has objected are
from a book by an American, McClatchie.

This American, as he himself writes in the book, is of Scottish descent,
and in the year 1936—that was the year of the Olympic Games—visited
Germany; he was able to see for himself the conditions in Germany and
the development of the German people during the first years of the
Hitler regime, and here he describes the impressions he received.

Normally, I would not attach any special value to this book, if it were
not for the fact that the preface shows that the book was written on
suggestion of the Defendant Baldur von Schirach.

The defendant, as he will explain in the course of his own examination,
began very early to build up a pleasant and friendly relationship
especially with the United States, and this book by McClatchie is one of
the many means which the Defendant Von Schirach used for that purpose.
The author himself admits in the preface of his book that he obtained a
large part of the material for the book from the Defendant Von Schirach.
This fact lends to the book an importance, with respect to its relevancy
for the purposes of this Trial in the defense of Von Schirach, entirely
different from what it would have been had it been written quite
independently of Von Schirach. That is, we have to evaluate the
statements and descriptions in this book more or less as though they
were statements of the Defendant Von Schirach himself. This is the main
reason why I have submitted the book with the request that I be
permitted to quote in evidence some short passages, particularly those
referring to the Youth Leadership. The rest of the book, which is also
interesting but has no direct connection with the Youth Leadership of
the Defendant Von Schirach, have not mentioned; I refer only to a few
short extracts which shed light exclusively on the activity and the aims
of the Defendant Von Schirach; and, besides, they are intended to show
you, Gentlemen, what impression even a foreigner gained of this
activity, although naturally he had come to Germany with a certain
prejudice which had to be overcome by his personal impressions.

That, Mr. President, is what I wanted to say to the first group, which
the prosecutor listed individually from Numbers 30 to 133.

The second group consists of Number 118(a) of the Document Book
Schirach, and that is a letter of farewell which the explorer, Dr. Colin
Ross, left behind.

If the prosecutor objects that the letter bears no signature, the fact,
in my opinion, is not particularly important. What we have submitted is
the original copy of that last letter, and this original copy was found
among the papers of Dr. Colin Ross.

Now, the Prosecution ask: What has that farewell letter by Dr. Colin
Ross to do with the charges against Schirach? I ask the Tribunal to
recall that the name of Dr. Colin Ross has been mentioned here
repeatedly. He is the explorer—I believe an American by birth but I am
not certain at the moment. He is the man who for many years was not only
a close friend of Schirach’s but one whom the Defendant Von Schirach
used again and again in order to prevent the outbreak of a war with the
United States, and later, to terminate the war and to bring about peace
with the United States. When the evidence is presented, these points
will be clarified in detail, I believe. I now submit the last letter of
Dr. Colin Ross...

THE PRESIDENT: When was it dated?

DR. SAUTER: One moment please. The date is 30 April 1945. I consider the
letter—it is only one page long—important for the reason that in it a
man, at a moment before he committed suicide with his wife because he
was desperate about the future of Germany, at this moment—in the face
of death, he again confirmed the fact that he, together with the
Defendant Von Schirach, continuously endeavored to maintain peace
particularly with the United States. I believe, Gentlemen, that such a
man...

THE PRESIDENT: Where was he at the time when, as I understand you to
say, he committed suicide?

DR. SAUTER: The Defendant Von Schirach...

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, the man who wrote the letter.

DR. SAUTER: One moment, please. The Defendant Von Schirach had a small
house in Upper Bavaria in Urfeld on the Walchensee, and in that house
Colin Ross lived at the time with his wife, and it was here in
Schirach’s house that he committed suicide.

The letter is only one page, and it would not cause any considerable
delay in the proceedings if it were read.

Then, Gentlemen, the third group to which the Prosecution objects again
consists of one number only—a comparatively short article from _The
Stars and Stripes_, Number 121. That edition of which I shall submit the
original in evidence is of 21 February 1946, that is, of this year. It
explains in detail how the education of youth in Yugoslavia has now been
reorganized by Marshal Tito, and the Defendant Von Schirach attaches
particular value to this document because it proves that in Yugoslavia a
definitely military education of youth has been decided upon this very
year. The Defendant Von Schirach therefore desires to make a comparison
between the kind of education which he promoted and the Yugoslav
education of youth which has been adopted only this year, and which goes
very much further than the program of the Defendant Von Schirach did at
any time.

That is all.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I make just one or two short observations?
I realize that ordinarily the Tribunal does not want to hear from
counsel twice, but there are two matters I feel I should clear up.

First of all, this book, _Look, the Heart of Europe_, which may have
been written by this man McClatchie, who, counsel says, is an American
of Scotch ancestry—I think it is important that the Tribunal know that
it was published in Germany. I am sure that counsel did not mean to
imply that it was an American publication because, other than having
been written by this man, it was published over here after he attended
the Olympic Games in 1936.

THE PRESIDENT: And in the German language, I suppose?

MR. DODD: Yes, and the German title was _Sieh: Das Herz Europas_. Then
with respect to the Colin Ross note. I think it is important to observe
that no one knows whether Ross committed suicide or not—at least
insofar as the Allied countries are concerned. His body has never been
found and only this note which counsel says was found among his effects.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, may I make another remark concerning the
first group? This book by McClatchie was published by a German
publisher. The efforts of the Defendant Von Schirach made the
publication possible. That again speaks for the fact that Von Schirach
in furthering the publication had a certain purpose in view. That
purpose was to bring about enlightenment between America and Germany and
to smooth over the difficulties which he was afraid could one day lead
to war. The book by McClatchie appeared not only in German, but also in
the English language, and it was sold in large numbers in England and in
the United States. Of course, it also appeared in German and the German
language edition was sold in Germany.

That, I believe, is all I wish to say at this point.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you tell the Tribunal what these other documents
are that Mr. Dodd has not objected to? Because we understand that there
are 160 documents which he has not objected to. What are they all about,
and how long are they?

DR. SAUTER: They are short. I have submitted only one Document Book.
That is, I have limited myself to the absolute necessities, Gentlemen.

THE PRESIDENT: Of how many pages?

DR. SAUTER: Altogether, 134 pages. Of course, some cover only one-half
or one-third of a page, since the majority are relatively short
quotations. It was necessary for me to submit these excerpts, because I
can produce evidence of the activities of the Defendant Von Schirach as
Reich Youth Leader only by showing the Tribunal just what the Defendant
Von Schirach told the youth of the German nation, what his teachings
were, what his directives to his subordinate leaders were. And in order
to do so, I must submit, as I believe the Prosecution realizes, a short
report covering the entire period during which Von Schirach was Reich
Youth Leader, so as to show that the opinions and theories of the
Defendant Von Schirach during the last year of his activity as Reich
Youth Leader were exactly the same as those during his first year. He is
one of the few men within the Party who did not, in the course of the
years, allow themselves to become violent, he did not go to extremes as
did most of the others; and that is what I want to show by these
comparatively short excerpts.

I believe that is all at the moment.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you have the supplementary applications for
witnesses, have you not?

DR. SAUTER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You’d better deal with those, had you not?

DR. SAUTER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, one of them, I understand, is a person who made an
affidavit which has been used by the Prosecution.

DR. SAUTER: I believe that is the witness Uiberreither.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I think it is the other one, is it not? Who are the
two?

DR. SAUTER: One is, I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: Marsalek.

DR. SAUTER: No, not Marsalek, but Uiberreither. Marsalek, Mr.
President,...

THE PRESIDENT: I have your application before me for Marsalek. You do
not want Marsalek?

DR. SAUTER: No, that must be an error.

THE PRESIDENT: Dated the 15th of April 1946. Anyhow, you do not want
him?

DR. SAUTER: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you only want one, do you?

DR. SAUTER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And that is Uiberreither?

DR. SAUTER: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution any objection to him?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, we have not, Your Honor. That affidavit I
believe, was introduced by us in connection with the Kaltenbrunner case,
an affidavit by Uiberreither.

THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No objection.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Dr. Sauter. We will consider your
application in respect of documents and the witness. We will consider
your application, and we will now proceed with the case of Streicher.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal, I should like to make a
motion to the case of Streicher. I desire to move that Streicher’s
testimony found on Pages 8495, and 8496 of April 26th be expunged from
the Record, and on Page 8549 of yesterday’s testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, do you wish to say anything about that?

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. Unfortunately, I did not completely
understand the motions made by the Chief Prosecutor, Mr. Justice
Jackson, because at that moment I was busy with something else. As far
as I understood, he dealt with the deletion.

THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you what the motion was. The motion was that
passages on Pages 8494, 8495, and 8496, and on Page 8549 be expunged
from the record.

DR. MARX: I understand. I would like to say, from the point of view of
the Defense, that I agree that these passages be expunged from the
record, because I am of the opinion that they are in no way relevant for
the defense of the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: The passages to which Mr. Justice Jackson has drawn our
attention are, in the opinion of the Tribunal, highly improper
statements made by the Defendant Streicher. They are, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, entirely irrelevant, and they have been admitted by
counsel for the Defendant Streicher to be entirely irrelevant, and they
will, therefore, be expunged from the record.

And now, Dr. Marx.

DR. MARX: May I now, with the permission of the Tribunal, continue with
the examination of witnesses? I now call the witness Friedrich Strobel
to the stand.

[_The witness Strobel took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.

FRIEDRICH STROBEL (Witness): Friedrich Strobel.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Witness, on 3 December 1938 were you at a meeting of the
Jurists’ association (Rechtswahrerbund) in Nuremberg?

STROBEL: Yes.

DR. MARX: During that meeting the Defendant Streicher is supposed to
have spoken; is that correct?

STROBEL: Yes.

DR. MARX: Would you please tell us what the Defendant Streicher stated
on that occasion concerning the demonstrations of 9 November 1938?

STROBEL: He said, “I should not have carried out this action in this
way. In such a manner it is impossible to fight a power like World
Jewry.” Then he added, “What has been done cannot be undone,” and some
more phrases of that kind.

DR. MARX: Is it correct that at that time you were surprised that
Streicher in public objected against that action, which had been ordered
by the highest authorities?

STROBEL: Yes. Streicher frequently spoke against measures and directives
of the Government when he was of a different opinion, as on this
occasion. I had the impression that apparently he had been passed over;
for in his speech there was a certain malicious undertone to the effect
that the matter was having unfavorable aftereffects. I wondered at the
time whether Streicher really had a lucid interval and realized how
harmful that anti-Jewish action was, or whether merely his vanity was
wounded, or whether he felt that a too quick and radical an
extermination of the Jews would put an end also to his own importance.

DR. MARX: Witness, these are opinions which you are stating and not
facts; I did not ask you about that.

STROBEL: Well, that was my impression.

DR. MARX: All right, I ask you now: On 9 and 10 November 1938 were you
present in Nuremberg?

STROBEL: Yes, I believe so. I do not remember exactly, but I believe it
was on the night of 8 to 9 November 1938 that that action was carried
out. It was on 7 November that Herr Vom Rath was shot, and on the 8th he
died, and the night after these things occurred.

THE PRESIDENT: We needn’t argue about whether it was the 8th or the 9th.
It doesn’t matter, does it?

DR. MARX: The question which I want to put to you now is: After that
night during which the demonstrations against the Jewish population took
place, what observations did you make on the following morning and
later, about the attitude of the population in Nuremberg toward these
demonstrations?

STROBEL: I was informed about that action by the personnel in my office.
Thereupon I walked into the city and looked around in the streets.
People were standing in front of the damaged stores. I had the
impression that the vast majority of the population was benumbed and
speechless. People shook their heads, looked at each other, muttered
something, and then walked away. But, generally, I had the impression
that people could not speak aloud, and later I heard that those who had
objected to these things were treated rather badly, when they were
overheard by informers.

DR. MARX: But the general impression was, was it not, that the
population definitely disapproved of that action, and that general
indignation was recognizable though not loudly expressed?

STROBEL: Yes. The Russian radio at the time hit the nail on the head by
saying, “Let it be said to the credit of the German people that they had
no part in the events and that they were sleeping.”

In fact most people heard of the events of the night only on the
following morning.

THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the Defendant Streicher?

DR. MARX: Well, the Defendant Streicher has been accused of openly
approving this action in his speech on 10 November. The Defendant
Streicher also maintains in his defense that it was an action ordered by
the top authorities and not a spontaneous demonstration of the people.

THE PRESIDENT: The fact that a number of people in Nuremberg, or even
the whole of the people of Nuremberg, disapproved of it wouldn’t show
that Streicher disapproved of it.

DR. MARX: Yes, but he maintains that there could have been no question
of an incitement, since the action had been ordered and directed from
the top, whereas, in the case of an incitement, the action would have
been started by the people themselves. That was his conclusion.

STROBEL: May I state my opinion about that? The action was definitely
not started by the people themselves, because even the majority of the
SA men who took part in it did so against their will. It was an order
from above; it was an organized affair. The assertion of Dr. Goebbels
that the German people had risen spontaneously was an intentional
incrimination of the German people.

DR. MARX: I have no more questions to ask of this witness, Mr.
President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask him
any questions?

[_There was no response._]

Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

[_There was no response._]

Then the witness can retire.

DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness
Ernst Hiemer.

MARSHAL: There is no witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Is he not there?

MARSHAL: We have no witness there.

THE PRESIDENT: He says, Dr. Marx, that he is not there, and that there
are no witnesses there.

DR. MARX: Excuse me, Mr. President. The witness Hiemer is in the prison
here, and I talked to him personally.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, did you inform the prison authorities yesterday
that you were going to call him?

DR. MARX: I spoke to the Marshal on Monday and asked that Hiemer be
brought up on Tuesday, as far as I can recall. There must be a
misunderstanding.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, have you got any other witnesses besides Hiemer?

DR. MARX: Yes, the witness Wurzbacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is he? Where is Wurzbacher?

DR. MARX: Wurzbacher is also here in prison.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, while he is being brought, can you take up the time
in dealing with your documents?

DR. MARX: Yes. We can do that.

MARSHAL: They will be here in about 5 minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on, Dr. Marx.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, before coming to the question of the documents,
I should like to point out the following: During the session yesterday
afternoon the Prosecution submitted several documents which were new to
me, and I have not yet had an opportunity of stating my position with
regard to them. Nor have I yet had a chance of speaking to the Defendant
Streicher about them. From the point of view of the Defense, I consider
it necessary to explain my position with regard to these very important
documents; and I believe that I must now examine all the articles of
_Der Stürmer_ to see whether Streicher used in some way or other the
various pieces of information from the _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_; for
his defense is, “I did not believe what I read there.” If he did not use
these items of information in any of his articles, then his answer is,
to a certain extent, corroborated. Therefore I have to review the
matter...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. In one particular article it was
demonstrated yesterday in cross-examination, as I understood it, that he
had used an article from the Jewish paper.

DR. MARX: Yes. I know that article. It is one of 4 November 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Marx, what exactly are you applying for now?
What is your motion?

DR. MARX: My motion is that the Tribunal permit me to supplement my
document book so as to be able to state my position with regard to
yesterday’s presentation of documents by the Prosecution by submitting
counter documents of my own. My presentation of documents would be
incomplete if I had no chance of replying to these new documents
submitted by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Marx; the Tribunal grants your motion provided
you make it in the ordinary way, in writing, referring to any passages
which you contend throw light on the passages which have been put in by
the Prosecution.

DR. MARX: Yes. May I now begin to discuss the individual documents?
Document Number Streicher-1 shows that the newspaper _Der Stürmer_,
according to the decision of the Führer, was not an official Party organ
and was not even entitled to carry the state insignia while all other
press organs displayed the insignia conspicuously. That is evidence that
the paper _Der Stürmer_ was a private publication of the Defendant
Streicher.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, you are going to offer these documents in
evidence and give them exhibit numbers, are you not?

DR. MARX: I consider these documents as submitted; I have discussed the
subject with the Prosecution, and the Prosecution had no objections.

THE PRESIDENT: You see, there is a written transcript being taken down,
and unless you offer each document in evidence and say that will be
exhibit number so-and-so, it does not get into the transcript. If you
like you can do it in a group and say, “I offer in evidence such and
such documents as Exhibits 1 to 100,” or whatever number you wish.

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The book I have before me does contain certain exhibit
numbers; for instance, Page 1 to 4 appears to be Exhibit Number
Streicher-1 and Page 5 is Exhibit Number Streicher-5; Page 6 is Exhibit
Number Streicher-6; Page 7 is Exhibit Number Streicher-7.

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that Page 4 is Exhibit Number Streicher-1; is
it?

DR. MARX: The pagination made here is completely different from the one
I made and consequently it is now arranged altogether differently.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, let us get on. You only have to tell us what
documents you are offering in evidence and under what exhibit numbers.
Dr. Marx, you can do it later if you want to.

DR. MARX: I further submit Exhibit Number Streicher-5, an excerpt from
an editorial of _Der Stürmer_ of July 1938. Number 28. This article,
which was not written by the Defendant Streicher but by Karl Holz, is
worded in very sharp language and says that vengeance will break loose
one day and all Jewry will be exterminated. But the salient point
here—the article seems to have been provoked by a letter which was sent
from Nuremberg to New York, and which stated that Germany in the case of
war, would be destroyed from the air. And so this article also falls
under the claim which the defendant made yesterday, namely that his
sharp language was always caused by some preceding action from another
side. That is Document Number Streicher-5 and I ask permission to submit
it as an exhibit under that number.

Then I submit as Document Number Streicher-6, an excerpt from Number 40
of _Der Stürmer_ of October 1938. I think I can dispense with comment on
it because my argument can be seen from the document itself; or is it
necessary to speak about it?

THE PRESIDENT: No, you need not speak about them; just put them in.

DR. MARX: I submit as Document Number Streicher-7, an excerpt from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 25 February 1942, in answer to Document M-31
of the trial brief against the defendant.

Then I submit Document Number Streicher-8, an excerpt from the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ of 8 February 1939, Page 2.

Then as Document Number Streicher-9, an excerpt from the political
testament of Adolf Hitler, dated 29 April 1945.

As Document Number Streicher-10, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, February
1935, Number 8, Page 4.

As Document Number Streicher-11, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of
September 1935, Number 38.

I am giving the next page the Document Number Streicher-12. That is an
excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of September 1935, Number 38, Page 9.

Document Number Streicher-13 is an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_, of
January 1938. Number 1.

Document Number Streicher-14, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of May 1938,
Number 20.

As Document Number Streicher-15, an excerpt from _Der Stürmer_ of 5
November 1943, Number 45.

As Document Number Streicher-16, of the Defense, a document submitted by
the Prosecution under number 759-PS.

As Document Number Streicher-17, speeches made by Himmler in April 1943,
on 4 October 1943, and 23 September 1943 at Posen and Kharkov.

As Document Number Streicher-18, a photostat of the special issue of
_Der Stürmer_ of May 1939, Number 20.

I ask to have these documents admitted. I have limited myself to the
utmost.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are the witnesses ready yet? Perhaps we might as well
adjourn for 10 minutes now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

[_The witness Ernst Hiemer took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.

ERNST HIEMER (Witness): Ernst Hiemer.

DR. MARX: May I just interrupt for a minute, Mr. President. First of all
I would like to state that I am by no means holding the Marshal
responsible for the mistake. The matter was as follows: The mistake in
requesting the witness...

THE PRESIDENT: It is quite all right, Dr. Marx.

DR. MARX: I consider it my duty to state here that the Marshal is not
responsible for the mistake about the bringing in of the witness. One of
my assistants spoke yesterday with a gentleman...

THE PRESIDENT: We quite understand, Dr. Marx.

DR. MARX: Then, Mr. President, I should like to submit Documents Number
Streicher 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 up to 18. I do not know whether it is clear
now. The numbers are 1 and 5, and from 6 through 18. Lacking are 2, 3,
and 4, which were dropped. All other exhibit numbers are contained
therein, Numbers 1 and from 5 through 18.

THE PRESIDENT: You include 19, don’t you?

DR. MARX: No, Numbers 19 and 20 are not necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I beg your pardon. I think I must have been wrong. I
have taken down 19, but you haven’t got 19, have you?

DR. MARX: Number 18 is my last one, Your Honor, and I ask to have that
included in the record.

THE PRESIDENT: And now you are going to go on with the witnesses?

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name.

ERNST HIEMER: Ernst Hiemer.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Since when have you known Herr Streicher, how did you get into
contact with him, and what position did you have on _Der Stürmer_?

HIEMER: At the end of 1934 I was introduced to the then Gauleiter Julius
Streicher in the Deutscher Hof in Nuremberg. Streicher gave me the
assignment of working for his public health journal, _Die Deutsche
Volksgesundheit_. In 1935 I also wrote reports for _Der Stürmer_.
Streicher then had me transferred to the editorial staff of _Der
Stürmer_.

Eventually, under Streicher’s direction and the direction of other staff
members of _Der Stürmer_, I did editorial work as a co-editor. The
responsible editor of _Der Stürmer_ was Karl Holz, Streicher’s deputy,
but the leading spirit of the paper was Streicher himself. In the year
1938 instructions came from Berlin to the effect that Holz was permitted
to contribute to _Der Stürmer_, but in his capacity as state
official—he was the Deputy Gauleiter—he was no longer to be mentioned
in the editions of _Der Stürmer_. Thereupon, on instruction from
Streicher, my name was entered in _Der Stürmer_ as responsible editor.
The overall direction of the paper and all authority connected therewith
remained in Streicher’s hands, and Streicher retained this position
until the collapse.

DR. MARX: What was the main idea of _Der Stürmer’s_ policy? What was the
Leitmotiv?

HIEMER: Streicher wanted by means of _Der Stürmer_, in the simplest and
most popular language, to convey to every man and every woman of the
German nation knowledge about the Jews. Streicher wanted the entire
German people to realize that the Jew was a stranger among them.

DR. MARX: Herr Hiemer, I do not want to know that. I want you to tell me
whether Herr Streicher, let us say, wished to advocate emigration or
whether he followed a different train of thought. Long expositions on
the Jewish problem are not required.

HIEMER: Streicher was of the opinion that in Germany the Jewish question
should be solved by emigration. He repeatedly criticized the leadership
of the Reich because the emigration of Jews was not being carried
through in the manner desired by Streicher. When the war came, Streicher
asserted that the Jewish problem would no longer have had any
significance for a Germany at war if in accordance with his idea it had
been solved by complete emigration of the Jews during the preceding time
of peace.

DR. MARX: Is it correct that the Palestine and Madagascar problem was
discussed in the journal?

HIEMER: Yes. Streicher stated his opinion in word as well as in writing,
that Palestine and Madagascar would be suitable localities for absorbing
the Jews living in Germany. However, he did not follow up this thought,
since not Germany but only England and France could dispose of Palestine
and Madagascar.

DR. MARX: What do you think about the influence exerted by Streicher and
_Der Stürmer_ since 1933? Is it not true that since 1933 its influence
among the German people was much in decline?

HIEMER: Yes, that is correct. In many circles it was known that the
influence of Streicher and of his paper on the movement did decrease.
After 1933 Streicher had many conflicts with other Party leaders, and he
made many enemies. Particularly from the year 1937, Streicher was pushed
more and more into the background. Within the Party the Institute for
the Study of the Jewish Problem, under the leadership of Rosenberg,
dealt with the theory of the Jewish problem, and actual authority over
the Jews belonged, as is well known, exclusively to Himmler.

When finally in the year 1940 Streicher was relieved of his post as
Gauleiter, he was completely isolated. From then on he lived on his farm
and worked there as a farmer; he wrote articles only for _Der Stürmer_.

DR. MARX: What was the circulation of _Der Stürmer_ from 1933? Can you
give us figures? Of course, only after the date when you joined the
paper.

HIEMER: This question of the circulation could, of course, be answered
best by the publication manager, who was concerned with it. However, I
remember approximate figures. _Der Stürmer_ was in 1933 a very small
paper; but by the year 1935 its circulation increased to about 800,000.
After that, however, there was a sharp decline.

Of course, during the war _Der Stürmer_ had a smaller circulation. I
cannot give you any exact figures and during the last months the
circulation of the paper was, of course, extremely small. On the
average, I might say that _Der Stürmer_ had a circulation of perhaps
half a million. Of course, there were special issues which had a much
larger circulation.

As I said, only the publisher could authenticate these figures.

DR. MARX: What can be the reason for the increase in the year 1935?

HIEMER: It is very difficult for me to answer that question.

DR. MARX: Wasn’t it because Party authorities—because subscriptions
were made compulsory in factories and other places?

HIEMER: You are putting questions to me which really only a publisher
can answer. I myself cannot answer the question with assurance, and
therefore must remain silent; my testimony would not be reliable.

DR. MARX: Of course, if you don’t know, you are free to say, “My
knowledge on this point is not sufficient.” Did Herr Streicher know of
the happenings in the East, especially in the concentration camps, and
what did he personally tell you about these things?

HIEMER: Streicher himself never told me that he knew about the
happenings in the concentration camps. On the contrary, Streicher said
he learned of these things only in 1944 through the Swiss press.
Streicher received the Swiss newspapers regularly, in particular the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ of Switzerland, and in 1944 this journal
published rather detailed descriptions about what was going on in the
concentration camps.

Streicher at first refused to credit these reports in the Swiss press
and called them premeditated lies. He declared that these reports were
being printed merely for the purpose of undermining the prestige of the
German people abroad. It is true Streicher soon changed his opinion. He
began to doubt that his opinion was right and finally he believed that
the occurrences in concentration camps, as pictured in the Swiss press,
did after all correspond to the facts. Streicher said that Himmler was
the only man who could have authorized such crimes.

DR. MARX: You said that Streicher soon changed his opinion. What does
that mean?

HIEMER: In the beginning he had decidedly said that these reports could
not be true. Then he became uncertain and said that perhaps they might
be true. I had the impression that either the detailed manner of the
reports in the Swiss press had convinced Streicher that these things had
actually occurred or that Streicher, from one source or another, either
through personal contact or through letters, had received knowledge that
these happenings were actually taking place in the concentration camps.
To that I ascribe his change of view.

DR. MARX: And when was that, approximately?

HIEMER: I cannot give you the exact date, but I believe it was in the
middle of 1944.

DR. MARX: What attitude did he take when he was finally convinced? Did
he express satisfaction at the fact that so many people had been killed?

HIEMER: No. Streicher definitely deprecated what was done in the
concentration camps. It did happen that Streicher, in anger—if he had
been especially upset by political events—often or at times, asserted
that Jews, as an enemy of the German people, should be exterminated.
However, Streicher talked in that way only in the first phase of
excitement. When he was calmed, he always opposed the extermination of
the Jews.

DR. MARX: But repeatedly in articles of _Der Stürmer_ there is talk of
the extermination of the Jews?

HIEMER: Yes. It is a fact that in reports of _Der Stürmer_ the
extermination of Jewry is spoken about. However, on the other hand,
Streicher again and again opposed the murder of the Jews, and I am quite
convinced that Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ had nothing whatever to do
with the happenings in concentration camps. I do not believe it.

For it is known now that these crimes in the concentration camps were
committed on the instructions of individual leading men; that is, on
official orders, and it is my firm conviction that neither Streicher nor
_Der Stürmer_ had anything to do with them.

DR. MARX: How were the articles which you wrote prepared? Did you
receive directives for the articles from Streicher and then merely edit
them, or were you the real author?

HIEMER: Streicher was the founder and the publisher of _Der Stürmer_.
But he was in fact also the chief editor, and all his colleagues, no
matter whether it was his deputy, Holz, or others—all of them had to
submit their articles to Streicher before they were printed. Streicher
then ordered changes if the need arose; he also gave the editors
assignments for articles, that is, he told them with what arguments
these articles were to be drawn up; and Streicher knew of all the
articles which appeared in _Der Stürmer_. In fact, he was the
responsible head, the editor of _Der Stürmer_. All others were his
assistants. He himself was, as he often said with pride, one and the
same with _Der Stürmer_. “Streicher and _Der Stürmer_ are one and the
same.” That was his maxim.

DR. MARX: That, of course, he admits; he says that he assumes the
responsibility.

What can you tell us about the so-called pornographic library?

HIEMER: _Der Stürmer_ was in possession of a large archive. This archive
consisted of many thousands of German and foreign-language books,
documents, edicts, and so forth. These books were either put at the
disposal of the _Stürmer_ archive by friends of _Der Stürmer_, or they
came from Jewish apartments. The police put books which were found in
Jewish houses at the disposal of Rosenberg’s Institute for the Study of
the Jewish problem for research purposes. Whatever remained in the
Jewish dwellings in Nuremberg was turned over to the _Stürmer_ archive.
Among these books there were also numerous which dealt with sexual
knowledge, books by Magnus Hirschfeld, Bloch, and some which were simply
pornographic. These, then, consisted both of books which had been sent
in by friends of the _Stürmer_, and books which had been found in Jewish
dwellings.

These books were kept in a special section of the _Stürmer_ archive
under lock and key, and the public did not have access to them. This
literature was no personal pornographic library of Streicher, but formed
a part of _Der Stürmer’s_ archive. Streicher never read these books.
They were to be reviewed after the war in the course of the
reconstruction. All those which were not of direct Jewish origin were to
be removed, but as I said, Streicher did not read these books.

DR. MARX: Where were these books kept? Were they in the publishing
house, or how is it that a part...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Marx, there is no charge here with respect to this
particular sort of books.

DR. MARX: This is my last question. I just wanted to clarify this
matter, since it played an important part in the public mind. I have no
further questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any questions from the other Defense
Counsel?

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): I have one question
only.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did Rosenberg have any connections with the
editorial staff of _Der Stürmer_?

HIEMER: To my knowledge, his connections were almost non-existent. I
knew personally only Dr. Ballensiefen, who worked with Rosenberg. I also
knew Dr. Pohl personally, but no relations existed between the _Der
Stürmer_ and the Institute for the Study of the Jewish Problem for the
purposes of co-operation.

DR. THOMA: Did Ballensiefen and Pohl have connections with _Der
Stürmer_?

HIEMER: Pohl had personal connections with me. He was a student of
Hebrew and had made translations of the Talmud; he had also published
the _Talmudgeist_. Through that I got to know him. Ballensiefen also had
no personal connection with _Der Stürmer_.

DR. THOMA: Does this mean that Pohl did have personal connections...

HIEMER: Only with me, not with _Der Stürmer_.

DR. THOMA: ...or was he sent by Rosenberg in this matter?

HIEMER: No.

DR. THOMA: I have no further questions, Your Honor.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I have only one matter to ask you about. Do I
understand you to say that by the middle of 1944 Streicher had become
convinced that the reports in the Swiss newspaper, _Israelitisches
Wochenblatt_, were true?

HIEMER: I did not understand you. Will you please repeat the question?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do I understand you to say that by the middle
of 1944 Streicher had become convinced of the truth of the reports he
was reading in the Swiss newspaper about concentration camps?

HIEMER: Yes, I had the impression that Streicher in the middle of
1944...

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted an answer “yes” or “no.” That is
quite sufficient.

Let me just read to you three lines of an article which was published in
_Der Stürmer_ on the 14th of September 1944.

HIEMER: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES:

    “Bolshevism cannot be vanquished; it must be destroyed. The same
    is true of Judaism; it cannot be vanquished, disarmed, or
    rendered powerless; it must be exterminated.”

That is Page 2.

Then the word that you use or is cited for exterminated is ausgerottet,
which I understand means completely wiped out. Why was that article
appearing in _Der Stürmer_ in September 1944, when it was known by the
owner of _Der Stürmer_ what was going on in concentration camps in the
East? What was the purpose of that article?

HIEMER: I personally did not write this article. I believe that
Streicher wrote it, therefore I myself am not able to judge the
intention of the article. But I do maintain that Streicher made
statements opposing the murders in the concentration camps, and that he
did not want the murder of Jewry.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I will leave that.

My Lord, in the interest of time I do not propose to cross-examine this
witness any further. Perhaps I might be allowed to draw the Tribunal’s
attention to those articles contained in your bundle, which are articles
actually written by this witness. There are about seven of them. Page
3A, 35A, 38A, 40A, 49A, 50A and 51A, that is, covering a period from
January 1939 up to August 1944.

And, My Lord, the other matter that I would draw the Tribunal’s
attention to was that this witness was the author of the disgusting
children’s book which I presented to the Tribunal in putting the
individual case against Streicher.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any further cross-examination?

[_There was no response._]

Dr. Marx, do you wish to re-examine? You heard what counsel said about
the various articles written by this witness. You wish to re-examine or
not? Have you any questions you wish to ask the witness?

DR. MARX: Yes, please.

Herr Hiemer, perhaps you did not quite understand the question a moment
ago. Please tell us again just when Herr Streicher received knowledge,
and when he told you that he was convinced of or believed in these mass
murders.

HIEMER: It is my opinion and conviction that it was in the middle of
1944.

DR. MARX: But there had been statements to that effect in the
_Israelitisches Wochenblatt_ for a number of years prior to that date.

HIEMER: Yes; at that time Streicher did not believe these things. His
change of view took place only in the year 1944 and I remember it was
not before the middle of the year.

DR. MARX: I have no further questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. MARX: With the permission of the Tribunal I would like to call the
witness Philipp Wurzbacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The witness Wurzbacher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

PHILIPP WURZBACHER (Witness): Philipp Wurzbacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

You may sit down.

DR. MARX: Witness, you were an SA Leader in Nuremberg?

WURZBACHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: From when?

WURZBACHER: From 1928.

DR. MARX: And what position did you have?

WURZBACHER: At that time I was an SA Standartenführer and had risen from
the lowest ranks.

DR. MARX: Witness, please speak more slowly and pause as frequently as
possible, as your testimony has to be interpreted into several
languages.

How long have you known the Defendant Streicher?

WURZBACHER: I have known him from meetings, since 1923; personally, from
the time of my activity as an SA Leader in the year 1928.

DR. MARX: Were you regularly present at the meetings at which Streicher
spoke?

WURZBACHER: I cannot say that I was present regularly, but I attended
very frequently.

DR. MARX: Did Streicher in his speeches advocate the use of violence
against the Jewish population, or did he predict it?

WURZBACHER: At no meeting did I hear suggestions that violence should be
used against the Jewish population. Nor did I ever hear Streicher
suggest or announce that he had any such intentions in mind.

DR. MARX: Did an act of violence against the Jewish population,
originating from and carried out by the people themselves, take place in
Nuremberg or the Gau Franconia at any time in the period from 1920 to
1933?

WURZBACHER: No, I cannot remember any incident of that type.

DR. MARX: Did the SA undertake any such action or was anything like that
ordered?

WURZBACHER: The SA never undertook anything like that at that time. On
the contrary, the SA had instructions, unequivocal instructions, to
refrain from such acts of violence. Severe punishment would have
resulted for anyone who did anything like that, or for an SA Leader who
gave such orders. Besides, as I have already emphasized, there was never
any suggestion or any order to that effect.

DR. MARX: What do you say to the events on the night of the 9 to 10
November 1938?

WURZBACHER: I was not in Nuremberg during the events from the 9 to 10
November 1938. At that time I was in Bad Ems on account of chronic
laryngitis. I can only say what I know from stories which I heard
afterwards.

DR. MARX: Did you talk with Obergruppenführer Obernitz?

WURZBACHER: Yes.

DR. MARX: About these events?

WURZBACHER: Yes, I talked with SA Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz in a
brief conversation, when I reported my return. We spoke only a few
words, since Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz was called away so that in
the course of the conversation I could not return to the subject. I
remember that Obergruppenführer Von Obernitz declared at the time that
as far as he was concerned the matter had been put in order. That was
the sense of what he said.

DR. MARX: Was there within the SA a uniform opinion, or were there, even
in the circles of the SA, men who disapproved of these incredible
occurrences?

WURZBACHER: Opinions were, as far as I could determine upon my return—I
believe it was on 23 or 24 November—very much divided. A part of the SA
was in favor, the other opposed what had happened, but at all events,
the majority in general considered it to be wrong and condemned what had
been done.

DR. MARX: Was there an increase, I mean, an increase of brutality in
these circles after 1933 on account of the growing numbers of the SA?

WURZBACHER: It goes without saying that after the accession to power,
when many doubtful elements joined, the situation was completely
different from what it had been before. Up to that time, as a
responsible Leader, one knew almost every member individually, but now
with the tremendous influx of new men, a general survey of the new
situation had first to be made. But I believe I may say that an increase
of brutality did not occur. Perhaps some undesirable elements which, in
the name of the SA, did this or that, had slipped in but in general I
cannot say that an overall increase of brutality took place.

DR. MARX: Did you conclude that _Der Stürmer_ exerted an influence in
the SA with the result that an anti-Semitic tendency made itself felt
among the men under your command? Did you not read a different
publication, _Der SA Mann_?

WURZBACHER: _Der Stürmer_ had a very divided reception, I might say,
especially among the people in Nuremberg and in particular in the SA.
There were large numbers in the SA who, if they did not exactly reject
_Der Stürmer_, were in fact not interested because of the tedious
repetitions contained in it, and for this reason the paper was of no
importance to them. Moreover, it was natural that members of the SA read
their own paper, _Der SA Mann_, first.

DR. MARX: When you attended a meeting in which Streicher spoke, what
impression did you gain of the objectives which he pursued in his speech
with regard to the solution of the Jewish problem?

WURZBACHER: The objectives which were stated by Streicher were, I should
say, unequivocal and clear. He pursued the policy that the strong
elements of the Jewish people which occupied positions in the German
economy and above all in public life and public offices should be
removed and that necessarily, expulsion or emigration should be
considered.

DR. MARX: Did you participate in the boycott on 1 April 1933 in any way?

WURZBACHER: Yes, I participated in the boycott. At that time I had
instructions from my Gruppenführer to see to it that this boycott should
be kept within the limits of order and propriety, and that in this way
the success of the boycott would be assured. I instructed the
Sturmführer under my command to assign to each department store a guard
of two SA men who were to see to it that nothing happened and everything
took its course in an orderly and unobjectionable fashion.

DR. MARX: Were there not instructions from Streicher also?

WURZBACHER: Yes. The instructions which I received from my Gruppenführer
had been issued by Gauleiter Streicher.

DR. MARX: Were attacks on Jews not to be prevented by all means?

WURZBACHER: That was so not only in this one case, but in all cases. It
was repeatedly pointed out that we were to refrain from attacks or
unauthorized acts of violence or other hostile acts against the Jewish
people or Jewish individuals, especially in Nuremberg, and that it was
strictly prohibited...

DR. MARX: What was Streicher’s reaction when he heard that nevertheless
such acts of violence had been perpetrated by individuals?

WURZBACHER: I can cite one example in which violence was used. I believe
it was a small scuffle, at any rate, something had happened, but I do
not recall the details of the case. In any event, he called us very
sharply to account, and we SA leaders were severely reprimanded and
rebuked.

DR. MARX: And what did he say? Did he make a general statement?

WURZBACHER: If I may give the essence of it, he said that he would not
tolerate that human beings be beaten or molested in any way in his Gau,
and for the SA leaders he had rather drastic expressions such as
ruffians or similar names—I do not recall them exactly.

DR. MARX: But he was called the Bloody Czar of Franconia. How is that to
be explained?

WURZBACHER: Perhaps it was his manner, the way he behaved at times.
Sometimes he could be very harsh and outspoken. At any rate I can only
say that during my activity I did not experience anything or hear
anything suggesting that he was a “bloody czar.”

DR. MARX: Do you know what his attitude was toward concentration camps?
Did he visit Dachau? If so, how often, and what did he do about it?

WURZBACHER: I cannot give you any information on that point. I know just
one thing and that is that he said repeatedly that people who had been
taken to Dachau should be freed as soon as possible if there was no
criminal or other charge against them. I also know of several cases of
release very soon after the arrest of the people or their removal to a
concentration camp. For example the teacher Matt, who was an old
adversary of his in the Town Hall of Nuremberg, was released after a
very short time—I believe three or four months. Another man, a certain
Defender, who had been active primarily in labor unions, was also
released after a very short period of time. If I remember correctly, it
was about the year 1935 or perhaps the beginning of 1936—I do not know
exactly—when the last inmates left the camp at Dachau and were greeted
with music upon their return.

DR. MARX: Was it not held against him that he freed so many members of
the left-wing parties from Dachau?

WURZBACHER: It was said here and there by members of the SA that the
Gauleiter’s action could hardly be justified, that he took too light a
view of these things and so on, but we also pointed out that after all
the Gauleiter bore the responsibility and that he ought to know just
what he had to do in this or that case.

DR. MARX: Do you know that Himmler told Streicher of his displeasure at
these releases and said that disciplinary action would be taken against
him if he continued with them? If you know nothing about this matter,
please say: “No.”

WURZBACHER: No.

DR. MARX: Then I have concluded my questioning of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the Defense Counsel wish to ask
questions?

Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Does that conclude your case, Dr. Marx?

DR. MARX: Yes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Then we go on with Dr. Schacht’s case next.

DR. DIX: I begin my presentation of evidence with the calling of Dr.
Schacht as a witness, and I ask Your Lordship to permit Dr. Schacht to
enter the witness box.

[_The Defendant Schacht took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

HJALMAR SCHACHT (Defendant): Hjalmar Schacht.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

You may sit down.

DR. DIX: Please tell the Tribunal briefly about your descent?

SCHACHT: The families of both my parents have lived for centuries in
Schleswig-Holstein, which until 1864 belonged to Denmark. My parents
were both born as Danish citizens. After the annexation by Germany my
father emigrated to the United States, where three of his older brothers
had already emigrated, and he became an American citizen. My two
brothers, who were older than I, were born there. Later my mother’s
health prompted my father’s return to Germany.

I was educated in Hamburg. I studied at universities in Germany and in
Paris, and after receiving my doctor’s degree I was active for 2 years
in economic organizations. Then I began my banking career, and for 13
years I was at the Dresdner Bank, one of the large so-called “D” banks.
I then took over the management of a bank of my own, which was later
merged with one of the “D” banks, and in 1923 I abandoned my private
career and went into public service as Commissioner for German Currency
(Reichswährungskommissar). Soon afterwards I became President of the
Reichsbank, and I held that office until 1930, when I resigned.

DR. DIX: Why did you resign as President of the Reichsbank at that time?

SCHACHT: In two essential points there were differences of opinion
between the Government and me; one was the internal finance policy of
the Government. With the terrible catastrophe of the lost war and the
Dictate of Versailles behind us, it was necessary in my opinion to use
thrifty and modest methods in German politics. The democratic and
socialist governments of that period could not see that point, but
carried on an irresponsible financial policy, especially by incurring
debts which in particular were contracted to a very large extent abroad.
It was quite clear that Germany, already heavily burdened with
reparation payments, was under no circumstances in a position to build
up as much foreign currency as was necessary for the payment of these
debts. We were not even able to pay the reparations from our own
economy.

Therefore I objected to the contraction of these debts in which the
various governments of that period indulged, and to which they also
encouraged communities and private companies. I objected to this
financial policy and continually, abroad and at home, warned against
such a policy of incurring foreign debts. The foreign bankers did not
listen nor did the German Government. It was during that period that if
in Berlin one passed the Adlon Hotel, Unter Den Linden, one could not be
sure that a financial agent would not emerge and ask whether one did not
need a loan.

Later I was strongly opposed by these same people, when Germany was
forced to discontinue making payments of her debts. But I wish to state
here that I have always and on every occasion been against such a policy
of debts. That was the one reason. The other reason was in the field of
foreign policy. I had not only contributed my part toward the creation
of the Young Plan but in 1929 I also assisted in the setting up of the
Young Committee; the so-called Young Plan had resulted in a number of
improvements for Germany, which the German Government was now
sacrificing step by step during the subsequent negotiations at The
Hague. Thus the financial and economic condition of the nation again
deteriorated. I revolted against this, and for both these reasons I
resigned my office as Reichsbankpräsident in protest, in March 1930.

DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in this connection, may I call your
attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-6 of my Document Book. If the
Tribunal agrees, I should like, in order to shorten the presentation of
documents during the examination of the witness, to call your attention
to those documents which have a direct connection with the questions
with which the witness is dealing. I believe that this arrangement will
be agreeable to the Tribunal since it will shorten the presentation of
documents. It is Document Number Schacht-6, on Page 12 of the German
copy of my document book and on Page 8 of the English copy, Your
Lordship, Exhibit Number Schacht-6. That is a record of the statements
made by Dr. Schacht during the session of the subcommittee for monetary
and credit matters on 21 October 1926. I believe it is not necessary for
me to read these statements. They refer to the foreign debts which Dr.
Schacht has just mentioned, and contain the same thoughts which Dr.
Schacht has just expressed before the Tribunal, and are proof that these
thoughts are not views _ex post facto_. Therefore, without reading it, I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the whole of this document.

I shall return to my examination.

[_Turning to the witness._] You had resigned your office as President of
the Reichsbank. What did you do then?

SCHACHT: I went to the small estate which I owned in the country and
lived there as a private citizen. Then in 1930 I made a trip to the
United States. I departed shortly or immediately after the Reichstag
elections of September 1930 and went to New York via London. There I
lectured for about two months on questions which were presented to me by
American friends.

DR. DIX: When did you first get in touch with the National Socialist
ideology, with the Party, and with Hitler personally, and when, in
particular, did you read the Party program and Hitler’s _Mein Kampf_?

SCHACHT: With the exception of a single occasion I have never in my life
concerned myself with Party politics. Even at the age of 26 I was
offered a sure electoral district in the Reichstag, which I did not
accept, since I have never been interested in Party politics. My
interest always lay in the field of economics and financial policy but,
of course, for public affairs I always had a general interest, arising
from a concern for the future of my country and my people.

Therefore, in 1919, I participated in the foundation of the Democratic
Party.

May I say a few words here about my background and spiritual upbringing?
My father, throughout his life, adhered to democratic ideals. He was a
Freemason. He was a cosmopolitan. I had, and I still have, numerous
relatives on my mother’s side in Denmark and on my father’s side in the
United States, and to this day I am on friendly terms with them. I grew
up among these ideas and I have never departed from these basic
conceptions of Freemasonry and democracy and humanitarian and
cosmopolitan ideals. Later I always remained in very close contact with
foreign countries. I traveled much, and with the exception of Ireland
and Finland there is no country in Europe which I have not visited. I
know Asia down to India, Ceylon, and Burma. I went to North America
frequently, and just before the Second World War broke out I intended to
travel to South America.

I want to emphasize this in order to show that I was never interested in
Party politics. Nevertheless, when in the elections of September 1930
Hitler’s party suddenly and surprisingly obtained 108 seats, I began to
take an interest in the phenomenon; and on board ship going to the
United States I read _Mein Kampf_ and, of course, also the Party
program. When I arrived on the other side the first question was what
was my opinion about Hitler and the Party, because naturally everyone
was talking about this event in Germany. In my first publication at that
time—it was an interview—I uttered an unequivocal warning and said,
“If you people abroad do not change your policy towards Germany, then
you will soon have very many more adherents of Hitler in Germany than
there are now.” Throughout that period of 2 months I spoke about 50
times in public meetings, and I always met with understanding in the
question of reparations, the mistakes of the Versailles Treaty, and the
economic difficulties of Germany, and I returned with the impression
that the whole American attitude, the attitude of the American people
toward us, was indeed rather friendly. Not on my initiative but by
coincidence, I got in touch with the adherents of the National Socialist
Party. A friend of mine, a bank director, invited me at the beginning of
December 1930 to dine with him at his house and to meet Hermann Göring
there. I did so and gained no really definite impression from Göring’s
statements and conduct. He was in every respect reserved, modest, and
well-mannered, and he invited me to his house in order to meet Hitler.
At the beginning of January my wife and I dined with Göring and his wife
one evening at their home, and on that occasion, Fritz Thyssen was also
invited. It had been planned that Hitler should come also and talk with
us. I say again now that Göring’s apartment was extremely modestly and
simply styled. We had a plain pea soup and bacon and particularly
Göring’s first wife made an excellent impression. After supper Hitler
appeared, and the ensuing conversation was conducted in such a way that,
let us say, 5 percent of it was contributed by us, and 95 percent by
Hitler. What he said concerned national questions, in which he agreed
absolutely with us. No extravagant demands were stated, but on the other
hand the national necessities of Germany were definitely emphasized. In
social questions Hitler expressed a number of good ideas; he was
especially intent on avoiding class struggle and on eliminating strikes,
lock-outs, and wage disputes by decisive intervention of the State in
labor relations and the direction of economic affairs. There was no
demand for abolishing private enterprise, but merely for influence in
its conduct. It seemed to us these ideas were quite reasonable and
acceptable. Aside from that, he revealed practically no knowledge in the
field of economy and financial policy, though on that evening he did not
claim to know anything about these subjects. He merely asked that we as
representatives of economy should have understanding for his ideas and
give him factual advice. That was the purpose of that evening.

DR. DIX: I shall refer to this first conversation with Adolf Hitler
later, but I should like to return now to the question I have put before
concerning your attitude to the Party program and the ideology developed
in the book, _Mein Kampf_. I am stressing this because, as you have
heard, the gentlemen of the Prosecution are of the opinion that certain
parts of the Party program as such and also parts of the book, _Mein
Kampf_, are of a criminal character, and that their criminal character
was recognizable immediately upon their publication. Therefore I should
like to ask you to explain in detail your attitude at the time, and
possibly also your attitude today, toward the Party program and the
ideology of National Socialism as it appears in the book _Mein Kampf_.

SCHACHT: From the proceedings in this Court so far I have not gained the
impression that the opinion of the Prosecution concerning the criminal
character of the Party program is a uniform one. I am unable to see in
the Party program as such any sign of criminal intentions.

Federation of all Germans, which always plays a great role, is always
claimed only on the basis of the right for self-determination. A
position for Germany in foreign politics is demanded as constituting
equality of the German nation with the other nations; that this involved
the abolition of the discriminations which were imposed upon the German
people by the Versailles Treaty is quite clear.

Land and soil was demanded for the nutrition of our people and the
settlement of our excess population. I cannot see any crime in that,
because after land and soil was expressly added in brackets the word
“colonies.” I have always considered that as a demand for colonies,
which I myself supported a long time before National Socialism came into
existence. Rather strange and, in my opinion, going somewhat beyond the
limits were the points concerning the exclusion of Jews from civil
rights, but on the other hand it was reassuring that the Jews were to be
under the protection of the Aliens’ Law, that is, subject to the same
laws which applied to foreigners in Germany. I would have wished and
always demanded that this legal protection should under all
circumstances be given to the Jews. Unfortunately they were not given
that protection. For the rest it was emphasized that all citizens should
have equal rights and duties.

Promotion of popular education was stressed as being beneficial, and
also gymnastics and sports were demanded for the improvement of public
health. The fight against deliberate political lies was demanded, which
Goebbels afterwards conducted very energetically. And, above all, demand
was made for the freedom of all religious denominations and for the
principle of positive Christianity.

That is, in essence, the content of the National Socialist Party
program, and I cannot see anything criminal in it. It would, indeed,
have been quite peculiar if, had this been a criminal Party program, the
world had maintained continuous political and cultural contact with
Germany for two decades, and with the National Socialists for one
decade.

As far as the book, _Mein Kampf_, is concerned, my judgment has always
been the same from the very beginning as it is today. It is a book
written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who was
strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated
man, which to me Hitler has always been. In the book _Mein Kampf_ and in
part also in the Party program there was one point which worried me a
great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all
economic problems. The Party program contained a few slogans, such as
“Community interests come before private interests,” and so on, and then
the “breaking up of subjection to financial interests” and similar
phrases which could not possibly signify anything sensible. The same
held true for _Mein Kampf_, which is of no interest from the point of
view of economic policy and consequently had no interest for me.

On the other hand, as regards foreign policy _Mein Kampf_ contained, in
my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it always toyed with the idea
that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought
to be extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a
National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then it was for the very simple
reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the
book made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British
Government. Therefore, to me, believing that I knew British policy very
well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these
theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It
was clear to me that every territorial change on European territory
attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be
approved by the other nations.

Besides that, _Mein Kampf_ had a number of very silly and verbose
statements but, on the other hand, it had many a reasonable idea, too; I
want to point out that I liked two things especially: first, that anyone
who differs with the government in political matters is obliged to state
his opinion to the government; and secondly, that, though the democratic
or rather parliamentary government ought to be replaced by a Führer
government, nevertheless the Führer could only remain if he was sure of
the approval of the entire people, in other words, that a Führer also
depended on plebiscites of a democratic nature.

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you have now described the impression which you
gained from your first conversation with Adolf Hitler, as well as from a
study of the Party program and _Mein Kampf_. Did you believe that you
would be able to work with Adolf Hitler and what practical conclusions
did you derive from that first conversation with Hitler?

SCHACHT: To work with Adolf Hitler was out of the question for me
personally, since I was a private citizen and not interested in Party
politics and consequently after that conversation I did nothing at all
to create for myself any personal relations with the Hitler circles. I
simply went back to my farm and I continued to live there as a private
citizen. So personally, for myself I did not draw any conclusions but I
drew another conclusion. I have already said that naturally I had the
future of my country at heart. After that conversation I repeatedly
emphasized to Reich Chancellor Brüning and implored him when forming and
heading the Cabinet to include the National Socialists in it, because I
believed that only in this way the tremendous impetus, the tremendous
propagandistic fervor which I had noticed in Hitler, could be caught and
harnessed—by putting the National Socialists to practical government
work. One should not leave them in the opposition where they could only
become more dangerous, but one should take them into the government and
see what they could achieve and whether they would not acquire polish
within the government. That was the suggestion and the very urgent
request I made to Brüning, and I might say that according to my
impression Hitler would at that time have been quite ready to do that.
Brüning could under no circumstances be won over to such a policy and in
consequence was later crushed.

DR. DIX: Let us stop for a moment and deal with the Party. The
Indictment states that you were a Party member. Now, Göring has already
said that Hitler conferred the Golden Party Emblem only as a sort of
decoration. Do you have anything new to add to that statement made by
Göring?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether it has been mentioned here; the Golden
Party Emblem was in January 1937 given to all Ministers and also to all
military personalities in the Cabinet. The latter could not become Party
members at all; therefore the award of the Party emblem did not entail
membership. As to the rest I think Göring has testified from the witness
stand. I might mention one more thing. If I had been a Party member,
then doubtlessly when I was ousted from my position as Minister without
Portfolio in January 1943, the Party Court would have gone into action,
since a case of insubordination to Hitler would have been evident. I was
never before the Party Court and even when on the occasion of my
dismissal the return of the Golden Party Emblem was demanded from me, I
was not told that I was being dismissed from the Party, since I was not
in the Party. I was only told “return the Golden Emblem of the Party
which was conferred upon you,” and I promptly complied.

I believe I could not add anything else to the statements already made.

DR. DIX: Then the Indictment is wrong in this point?

SCHACHT: Yes; in this point it is absolutely wrong.

DR. DIX: Why did you not become a Party member?

SCHACHT: Excuse me, but I was opposed to quite a number of points of the
National Socialist ideology. I do not believe that it would have been
compatible with my entirely democratic attitude to change over to a
different Party program, and one which, not in its wording but through
its execution by the Party had certainly not—in the course of
time—gained any more favor with me.

DR. DIX: Therefore, you did not become a Party member for reasons of
principle?

SCHACHT: Yes, for reasons of principle.

DR. DIX: Now, a biography of you was published by one Dr. Reuther in
1937. There, also, it is correctly stated that you were not a Party
member; but the biographer gives different, more tactical reasons for
your refusing to join the Party; and he mentions the possibility of
being more influential from outside the Party and so on. Maybe it is
advisable, since the biography has been referred to in the course of the
proceedings, that you shortly state your views on this point?

SCHACHT: I believe that at the time Hitler had the impression that I
could be useful to him outside of the Party and it may be that Dr.
Reuther got knowledge of this. But I would rather not be made
responsible for the writings of Dr. Reuther, and in particular I should
like to object to the fact that the Prosecutor who presented the brief
against me described this book by Dr. Reuther as an official
publication. Of course this book is the private work of a journalist for
whom I have respect but who certainly states his own opinions and ideas.

DR. DIX: Did you speak in public on behalf of Hitler before the July
elections in 1932?

SCHACHT: Before the July elections of 1932, which brought that
tremendous success for Hitler, I was never active either publicly or
privately on behalf of Hitler, except once, perhaps, or twice—I
remember now, it happened once—Hitler sent a Party member to me who had
plans on economic, financial, or currency policies; Hitler may have told
him that he should consult me as to whether or not these plans could be
put into practice. I might tell the story briefly: It was Gauleiter
Röwer of Oldenburg. In Oldenburg the Nazis had already come to power
before 1932 and he was the Minister President there. He wanted to
introduce an Oldenburg currency of its own, a consequence of which would
have been that Saxony would have introduced its own Saxon currency,
Württemberg would have introduced its own currency, and Baden would have
had its own currency, and so on. I ridiculed the whole thing at the time
and sent a telegram to Hitler, saying that the economic needs of the
German Reich could not be cured by such miracles. If I disregard this
case, which might have constituted some sort of private connection, then
I may say that neither privately nor publicly, neither in speeches nor
in writing, have I at all been concerned with Hitler or his Party and in
no way have I recommended the Party.

DR. DIX: Did you vote National Socialist in July 1932?

SCHACHT: No, I would not think of it.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution now lists a number of points by which it wants
to prove that you were an adherent of the National Socialist ideology. I
am going to name them one by one, and I ask you to state your view on
each of them. First, that you were an opponent of the Treaty of
Versailles. Would you like to say something about that?

SCHACHT: It surprised me indeed to hear that reproach from an American
Prosecutor. The lieutenant who spoke is perhaps too young to have
experienced it himself, but he should know it from his education; at any
rate, for all of us who have lived through that time, it was one of the
outstanding events that the Treaty of Versailles was rejected by the
United States, and, if I am not wrong, rejected with the resounding
approval of the entire American people.

The reasons prompting that action were also my reasons for rejecting the
Treaty: it stood in contradiction to the Fourteen Points of Wilson,
which had been solemnly agreed upon, and in the field of economics it
contained absurdities which certainly could not work out to the
advantage of world economy. But I certainly would not accuse the
American people of having been adherents of the Nazi ideology, because
they rejected the Treaty.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution also assert that you had already been for a
long time a German National Socialist, not merely a German patriot, but
a German nationalist and expansionist. Would you like to state your
position in that respect?

SCHACHT: You, yourself, by emphasizing the word “patriot” have
recognized that one must be clear on just what a nationalist is. I have
always been proud to belong to a nation which for more than a thousand
years has been one of the leading civilized nations of the world. I was
proud to belong to a nation which has given to the world men like
Luther, Kant, Goethe, Beethoven, to mention only a few. I have always
interpreted nationalism as the desire of a nation to be an example to
other nations, and to maintain a leading position in the field of
spiritual and cultural achievement through high moral standards and
intellectual attainment.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If it please the Tribunal, it seems to me that we
are getting very far from the relevant charges in this case, and
particularly if they are going to be preceded by a statement of the
Prosecution’s position.

We have no charge against Dr. Schacht because he opposed the Treaty of
Versailles; we concede it was the right of any German citizen to do that
by any means short of war. Nor do we object to his being a patriotic
German by any means short of war. The only purpose has been to find out
what his attitude in those matters was in connection with the charge
that he prepared and precipitated war.

To deal with philosophical matters separately from the war charge seems
to me entirely irrelevant, and I assure the Tribunal we have no purpose
in charging that it is a crime to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. Many
Americans did that. It is no crime to be a German patriot. The crime is
the one defined in the Indictment, and it seems to me we are a long way
off from that here, and wasting time.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you say to that, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: I was eager and glad to hear what Justice Jackson just said,
but I must quote from Wallenstein, “Before dinner we heard another
version.” There was no doubt—and once, because I thought I had
misunderstood, I even asked again—that the criminal character of the
Party program, the criminal character of the contents of _Mein
Kampf_—reproachable in itself and, to say the least, indicative of
crimes committed later—the willful opposition to the Treaty of
Versailles—and further the accusation of having been an expansionist
and nationalist, all these things have repeatedly in the course of the
proceedings here been held against Dr. Schacht in order to strengthen
the foundation of the charges made against him.

If Mr. Justice Jackson now with gratifying frankness states, “We do not
at all blame Schacht for opposing the Treaty of Versailles; we do not
assert that he was more than a patriot, that is to say, a nationalist in
the sense described before, and we do not maintain either that these our
statements are circumstantial evidence for his later co-operation, his
financial co-operation, in the rearmament program, which in turn is
proof indicative of his intent to assist in waging a war of
aggression”—if that is now stated unequivocally by the Prosecution,
then we can dispense with a great many questions which I intended to put
in the course of my examination of the witness; I would then gladly
leave the whole subject of Schacht’s expansionism and nationalism. We
have not yet mentioned expansionism; Mr. Justice Jackson has not
mentioned it either. I do not believe, however, that the Prosecution
will withdraw the accusation of expansionism, that is the expansion of
German living space in Europe. I am not sure of this but we shall
certainly hear about it. As I said, if these accusations which have been
made are withdrawn, then I can dispense with these questions and my
client need not answer them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Of course, I made no such statement as Dr. Dix has
assumed. My statement was clearly made in the opening and clearly is
now, that he had a perfect right to be against the Treaty of Versailles
and to be a German nationalist and to follow those aims by all means
short of war. I do not want to have put in my mouth the very extensive
statements made by Dr. Dix.

My statement was made clear in the opening, and these matters as to the
Versailles Treaty and nationalism and Lebensraum, as political and
philosophical matters, are not for the Court to determine. We are not
going to ask you to say whether the Treaty of Versailles was a just
document or not. It was a document. They had a right to do what they
could to get away from it by all means short of war.

The charge against Dr. Schacht is that he prepared, knowingly, to
accomplish those things by means of aggressive warfare. That is the nub
of the case against him.

DR. DIX: Then on this point there is...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think the case for the Prosecution has been
clear from the outset, that all these matters are only relied upon when
they were entered into with the intention of making war.

DR. DIX: Very true. I need not put these questions if the Prosecution no
longer uses these accusations as circumstantial evidence for his intent
to wage a war of aggression, but Mr. Justice Jackson has not yet made a
statement to that effect. But there seems to be no doubt—and I do not
believe that I misunderstood the Prosecution—that in order to prove Dr.
Schacht’s intention to wage a war of aggression, the Prosecution did
refer to Schacht’s opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, to his
nationalism and expansionism that is, extension of Lebensraum. We do not
want to make academic or theoretical statements about the ideas of
Lebensraum and nationalism, but as long as these ideas, which the
Prosecution concedes he is justified in holding, as long as these
characteristics are considered to be in part proof of his intent, my
client must have the opportunity of telling the Tribunal just what he
meant by Lebensraum if he ever spoke of it, which I do not yet know. But
I think, nevertheless, that there is still a matter not quite clear
between Mr. Justice Jackson and me, and that I do not quite agree either
with what was said by Your Lordship...

THE PRESIDENT: What you were asking him about was his views on
nationalism. That is what you were asking him about, his views upon
nationalism, and that seems to be a waste of time.

DR. DIX: I put to him that he was accused of being a nationalist and an
expansionist, and that the Prosecution therefrom drew the conclusion
that he planned an aggressive war by financing armament; now he has to
show, of course, that...

THE PRESIDENT: What Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out is that the
Prosecution have never said that he simply held the views of a
nationalist and of an expansionist, but that he held those views and
intended to go to war in order to enforce them.

DR. DIX: Yes, Your Lordship, but it is held that these opinions were
proof—one proof among others—that he had the intention of waging
aggressive war; that they therefore constitute what we jurists should
call circumstantial evidence for his intent, to wage war, and as long as
this argument—it is no longer a charge maintained by Justice Jackson
but it is an argument of the Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue about it. He agrees that he did hold
these views. Therefore it is quite unnecessary to go into the fact. The
Prosecution say he held the views; he agrees that he held the views. The
only question is whether he held them with the innocent intention of
achieving them by peaceful methods, or whether he had the alleged
criminal intention of achieving them by war.

DR. DIX: I only wish to say one more thing to that. Expansionism has not
yet been discussed. Should Dr. Schacht have had expansionist tendencies,
then Mr. Justice Jackson certainly would not say that he has no
objection. Therefore...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think that you may ask him questions about the
expansionists, his ideas of what expansionists were, what he meant by
expansion, but for the rest it seems to me you are simply proving
exactly the same as the Prosecution have proved.

DR. DIX: I fully agree. Dr. Schacht, were you...

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

                [_A recess was taken until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: I believe, Dr. Schacht, that both of us will have to speak a
little more slowly and pause between question and answer.

Now, please reply to the accusation by the Prosecution that you were an
expansionist. Please define your position.

SCHACHT: Never in my life have I demanded even a foot of space that did
not belong to Germany, nor would I ever entertain such an idea.

I am of the opinion that neither is it national to try to dominate and
govern foreign peoples, nor is appropriation of foreign territory a
politically just action.

These are two questions with which we are much concerned at present.

I might perhaps add, in order to clarify my position, just what I
understand by nationalism, and just why I was against each and every
form of expansionism. Just one sentence will suffice, a sentence from a
speech which I made in August of 1935. On that occasion I said, and I
quote:

    “We want to express the belief that self-respect requires
    respect for others, and the upholding of our national
    individuality must not mean disparagement of the individuality
    of others; by respecting the acts of others we respect our own
    action; and a battle of economic competition can be won in the
    end only through example and achievement and not through methods
    of violence or craft.”

DR. DIX: According to the opinion of the Prosecution, in the year 1936
you made a public threat of war, on which occasion you are alleged to
have said that the spirit of Versailles was instrumental in keeping
alive war mania. I am referring to Document EC-415, a document to which
the Prosecution has referred.

SCHACHT: I never understood, in the course of this proceeding, how there
could be a threat of war in this quotation. The quotation concludes with
the words—and I must quote in English because I just have the English
words before me:

    “The spirit of Versailles is perpetuated in the fury of war, and
    there will not be a true peace, progress, or reconstruction
    until the world desists from this spirit. The German people will
    not tire of pronouncing this warning.”

The conclusion says that the German people will not tire of pronouncing
this warning. It seems to be a matter of course that hereby expression
is given to the fact that I am warning others from persisting in war
mania. I am not warning ourselves, but the entire world, to avoid
perpetuating the spirit of Versailles.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution further accuses you in this connection that you
publicly approved the idea of Lebensraum, for the German people. In this
special connection reference was made to the speech you made at
Frankfurt on 9 December 1936, in which you said: “Germany has too
limited Lebensraum for her population.”

SCHACHT: This speech of 9 December 1936 was a speech which was solely
concerned with a restoration of the colonial rights of Germany. I have
never demanded any Lebensraum for Germany other than colonial space. And
in this instance, again, I am surprised that just the American
Prosecutor should accuse me on my efforts in this direction, because in
the Fourteen Points of Wilson, which regrettably were not adhered to
later on, the colonial interests of the Germans are taken into
consideration. In consequence, I said, again and again: “If you want
peace in Europe, give Germany an economic outlet into which Germany can
develop and from which she can satisfy her needs. Otherwise Germany will
be a center of unrest and a problem for Europe.”

I would like to quote one sentence only from the speech I made:

    “Peace in Europe, together with the peace of the entire world,
    is dependent upon whether or not the densely populated areas of
    Central Europe will have the means of existence.”

I emphasized this viewpoint again and again, but at no time did I
connect these views with the idea of an armed conflict.

I would like to quote another sentence from this same speech:

    “I did not mention this consideration as to the parts of Germany
    which were separated from her”—and I am speaking of the losses
    suffered by Germany—“in order that we might draw the conclusion
    of warlike intentions; my entire position and my work are
    marshaled to the objective of bringing about peace in Europe
    through peaceful and sensible considerations and measures.”

THE PRESIDENT: Will you please give me the PS numbers and the exhibit
numbers of those two speeches?

DR. DIX: I cannot at this moment, Your Lordship, I am sorry, but I will
try to get them and submit them in writing. The last is the speech at
Frankfurt, and the others...

THE PRESIDENT: That is quite all right. You will let us know in writing,
will you?

DR. DIX: Yes, indeed.

SCHACHT: Perhaps if it is permitted I might refer to two other sentences
from my article which was published in _Foreign Affairs_, the well-known
American magazine, in the year 1937. I have the German translation
before me, which says, in the introduction, and I quote:

    “I am making these introductory remarks in order to clarify the
    situation. The colonial problem today, as in the past, is for
    Germany not a question of imperialism or militarism, but still
    surely and simply a question of economic existence.”

Perhaps I might refer to the point that very influential Americans were
in constant accord with this view. I have a statement made by the
collaborator of President Wilson, Colonel House, who made the well-known
distinction between the “haves” and “have nots,” and who was especially
influential in advocating consideration for German colonial interests.
Perhaps I can dispense with the quotation.

DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to point to the document
submitted by the Prosecution, Document L-111, Exhibit USA-630. This
document is concerned with the conversation which you had with the
American Ambassador Davies, and in which you are accused of having
indirectly threatened a breach of peace.

SCHACHT: I have already set forth just now that I constantly said that
Europe cannot have peaceful development if there are no means of
livelihood for the completely overpopulated Central Europe, and I
believe conditions at present show how absolutely right I was—just what
an impossibility it is to feed these masses of people within Europe. And
beyond that I had a keen interest in diverting Hitler’s quite misguided
ideas from Eastern Europe and therefore was constantly at pains to
direct his attention to the colonial problem so that I could turn his
thought from the mad ideas of expansionism in the East. I recall that in
1932, shortly before he assumed office, I had a conversation with him in
which for the first time I approached him on these facts and
particularly told him what utter nonsense it would be to think of an
expansion in the East.

Then, constantly, in the subsequent years, again and again, I spoke
about the colonial problem, until at the last in the summer of 1936 I
had the possibility of pursuing my ideas and Hitler gave me the mission,
which I had suggested to him, of going to Paris to discuss with the
French Government the possibility of a satisfactory solution of the
question of colonies for Germany. This actually happened in the summer
of 1936. And for the satisfaction of myself and all other friends of
peace, I might say that the Government of Léon Blum, which was in office
at the time, showed gratifying appreciation of this solution for
Europe’s food and economic problems, and for their part stated that they
were ready to deal with the colonial problem with the aim of perhaps
returning one or two colonies to Germany. Léon Blum then undertook, in
agreement with me, to inform the British Government about these
conversations in order to secure their consent or to bring up a
discussion of this problem within the British Government. That actually
did take place, but the British Government hesitated for months before
they finally could decide on any position in this matter and so the
discussion dragged on up to the initial months of the Spanish civil war
and was eclipsed and supplanted by the problems of the Spanish civil
war, so that a continuation of the discussion on this colonial problem
never came about.

At that time, in January of 1937, when the American Ambassador to
Moscow, Ambassador Joseph Davies, visited me at Berlin, I was rather
irritated by the slowness with which the British Government was meeting
these suggestions, and consequently I came forth with a request for
understanding and support and told Ambassador Davies about this whole
matter. I tried constantly and repeatedly to gain the understanding
support of representatives of the American Government. I tried again and
again to advise these gentlemen about domestic conditions and
developments within Germany, to tell them as much as was possible and
compatible with German interests and to keep them informed. That applies
to Ambassador Davies, Ambassador Dodd, Ambassador Bullitt when he was in
Berlin, and so on.

This conversation with Ambassador Davies is referred to in the document
which the Prosecution has submitted, Document L-111, and which is taken
from the book which Ambassador Davies wrote about his mission in Moscow,
and we will perhaps come back to this book later.

As the gist of my conversation with Davies I would like to quote just
one sentence again, which I must again quote in English, since I have
only the English book at my disposal.

    “Schacht earnestly urged that some such feasible plan could be
    developed if discussions could be opened; and that, if
    successful, would relieve the European war menace, relieve
    peoples of enormous expenditures for armaments, restore free
    flow of international commerce, give outlet to thrift and
    natural abilities of his countrymen and change their present
    desperation into future hope.”

DR. DIX: In this connection the affidavit of Fuller plays an important
part, that is Exhibit USA-629, and Document EC-450. According to this
affidavit, you allegedly declared to Fuller that if Germany could not
get colonies through negotiations she would take them. Please define
your position as to this statement.

SCHACHT: In a German drama an intriguer is being instructed by a tyrant
to bring a man of honor to ruin, and he says in reply, “Just give me one
word said by this man, and I will hang him thereby.” I believe, My Lord
Justices, that in this courtroom there is not a single person who at one
time or another in his life has not said a rather unfortunate word. And
how much easier is it when he is speaking in a foreign language of which
he is not completely master.

Mr. Fuller is known to me as a respectable business man, and this
discussion which he has here reproduced is indubitably done according to
the best of his knowledge. He himself rightly says that even had he
tried to put down the exact words he could not guarantee that each and
every word has been said. But if I did say these words, then it seems
only that I said we Germans must have colonies and we shall have them.
Whether I said, “We shall take them,” or “We shall get them,” that, of
course, it is impossible for me to say with certainty today after a
period of 10 years.

The representative of the Prosecution also thought the expression, “We
will take them,” a little colorless in effect and therefore I believe he
just added a trifle, for he said twice in his presentation of the
charges that I had said, “We will take these colonies by force,” and on
a second occasion he even said, “We will take these colonies by force of
arms.” But “force” or “force of arms” are not mentioned in the whole of
Fuller’s affidavit. And if I had used that word or even used it only by
implication, Mr. Fuller would have had to say with reason: “So you want
to take colonies by force; how do you expect to do that?” It would have
been utter nonsense to assert that Germany would ever have been able to
take overseas colonies by force. She lacked—and always will
lack—domination of the seas, which is necessary for this.

Fuller did not take exception to my manner of expression and in his
conversation he immediately continued—and I quote:

    “You mentioned a little while ago that necessary raw materials
    could not be obtained, owing to German lack of foreign exchange.
    Would stabilization help you?”

Therefore, rather than to become excited about the fact that I wanted to
take colonies by force—something which I never said and which is
contrary to my views, as I have already stated—he immediately goes on
to foreign exchange and to stabilization.

DR. DIX: The prosecutor asserts further that you were interested in the
conquest of neighboring territory in Europe.

SCHACHT: This matter is not quite so harmless as the previous mistake of
the Prosecution. In a previous interrogation, I was accused as follows,
and the prosecutor, in presenting his charges here, referred to the
fact—I quote the prosecutor:

    “On 16 April, on the occasion of the Paris conference on
    reparation payments, Schacht said, ‘Germany in general can pay
    only if the Corridor and Upper Silesia are returned to
    Germany.’”

This is the interrogation of 24 August 1945. According to the verbatim
record of the interrogation, I answered:

    “It may be that I said such a thing.”

Of course, as far as the wording of a statement, which I had made 10 to
15 years before, I did not recall it. But I did remember that in
connection with the Corridor and Upper Silesia I had made a remark, and
since I had to assume that if the Prosecution submitted this record to
me it would be an accurate stenographic record, for that reason I did
not dispute this remark which I had allegedly made and said that it
might be that I said something to that effect. The Prosecution takes a
“maybe” and out of that reconstructed the following sentence:

    “This quotation was read to Schacht, and he said it was
    correct.”

This assertion by the Prosecution is therefore wrong. I said, “It may be
that I said something to that effect,” but I did not say that this
statement that was submitted to me was correct.

Then, fortunately, in my imprisonment here, I succeeded in getting hold
of my book, a book which I wrote about the termination of reparation
payments, which was published in 1931 and in which I luckily put down
the text of my statement about the matter we are dealing with now. I
have the exact text, and I would like to say that this book has been
submitted in evidence, and from this text appears what I said verbatim:

    “Regarding the problem of German food and food supplies, it is
    especially important that import of foodstuffs has been
    decreased”—I beg your pardon—“that import will be
    decreased.”—I am sorry again. I cannot read this—“that the
    import of foodstuffs will be decreased and partially made up
    through home production. Therefore, we cannot let the fact be
    overlooked that important agricultural surplus territories in
    the eastern part of Germany have been lost by cession and that a
    large territory which was almost exclusively agrarian has been
    separated from the Reich. Therefore the economic welfare of this
    territory, East Prussia, is decreasing steadily and the Reich
    Government must support and subsidize it. Constantly, therefore,
    suitable measures should be taken to eliminate these injurious
    conditions, which are hindering considerably Germany’s ability
    to pay.”

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, this is from our document book, Document
Schacht-16, German Page 38, English Page 44.

SCHACHT: This quotation absolutely does not agree with the statement
submitted to me in the interrogation, and in no way can we draw the
conclusion in consequence that I was in favor of a return of these
areas. What I demanded was that the separation of these areas be taken
into consideration when Germany’s ability to pay and the payments were
determined. When the prosecutor in his speech added: “I would like to
point out that this is the same area over which the war started in
September 1939,” I believe it is an insinuation which characterizes the
prosecutor, rather than me, against whom it was intended.

DR. DIX: As part of the circumstantial evidence, that is, the indirect
evidence for the will to aggression, with which you are charged, the
Prosecution includes your wish—your alleged wish—for the Anschluss of
Austria. Will you please take your position as to this accusation?

SCHACHT: From 1919 I considered the Anschluss of Austria inevitable and,
in the national sense, that is, spiritually and culturally, it was
welcome. But that economically the Anschluss of Austria would not be for
Germany so much an aggrandizement as a liability. I always knew. But the
wish of the Austrian people to belong, to be incorporated into
Germany—I took that wish as my own and said that if here there are six
and a half million people who spontaneously in 1919 and later in
innumerable demonstrations expressed their wish of being incorporated
into the brotherhood of Greater Germany, that was an event to which no
German could be opposed, but in the interest of Austria must hail with
gladness. In that sense I always favored and respected the wish of
Austria to belong to the Reich and wanted it carried through as soon as
external political conditions permitted it.

DR. DIX: My attention has just been called to the fact that you are
still speaking too fast and that the interpretation is lagging behind a
little bit. Will you please speak a little more slowly.

What was your opinion as to the incorporation of the Sudetenland into
Germany?

SCHACHT: Concerning the incorporation of the Sudetenland, I never
thought of any such thing. Of course, Czechoslovakia was a European
problem, and it was regrettable that in that state, which had five and a
half million Czechs, two and a half million Slovaks and about three and
a half million Germans, the German element had no means of expression.
But just because the Czechoslovakian problem was not a purely
German-Czech but also a Slovak-Czech problem, I sought a solution of
this problem in such a way and wished it to be in such a way that
Czechoslovakia should constitute a federated state, similar perhaps to
Switzerland, divided into three different, culturally separate, but
politically unified areas, which would be a guarantee for the unity of a
German-Czech-Slovak state.

DR. DIX: What was your opinion and attitude to the problem of war; by
that I mean, as far as philosophical, ideological, and practical
considerations are concerned?

SCHACHT: I always considered war as one of the most devastating things
to which mankind is exposed and on basic principles throughout my entire
life I was a pacifist.

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, during your meditative and thoughtful life you
have certainly considered the fundamental and profound differences
between legitimate and ethically based soldiership and militarism in its
various degenerate forms. What did you mean by the latter and what was
your attitude toward it, that is, militarism?

SCHACHT: Of course I saw the necessity of a country’s defense in case of
war or threats, and I stood for that theory. In that sense I was always
in favor of a Wehrmacht, but the profession of a soldier I consider to
be full of deprivations and characterized by willingness and readiness
to sacrifice, not because perhaps during a war the soldier has to give
up his life—that is the duty of every citizen of military age—but
because his whole aim and aspiration must be directed to the end that
never must the craft which he has learned be exercised. A soldier, a
career officer, who is not intrinsically a pacifist, has really in my
opinion missed his calling. Consequently, I was always an opponent of
every military digression and excess. I was always against militarism,
but I consider that soldiership conscious of its responsibility is the
highest calling which a citizen can pursue.

DR. DIX: Now, George Messersmith, as you know, the Consul General of the
United States at Berlin at one time, says in one of his various
affidavits produced by the Prosecution that you had told him, and
repeatedly told him, about Nazi intents of aggression. Will you please
state your position in that regard?

SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to remark that of course I never
made a statement of that sort, neither to Mr. George Messersmith nor to
anyone else. As far as these three affidavits of Mr. Messersmith, which
were submitted by the Prosecution, are concerned, I would like to make a
further statement.

Mr. Messersmith asserts that he had frequent contact and numerous
private conversations with me, and I would like to state here now that,
according to my exact memory, I saw Mr. George Messersmith perhaps two
or three times in my entire life. Mr. George Messersmith represents
himself as having had numerous contacts and many private conversations
with me, and he asserts further that his official capacity brought him
in contact with me as President of the Reichsbank and as Minister of
Economics.

I do not recall once having received Mr. Messersmith in my office. Mr.
George Messersmith takes these two or three discussions and proceeds to
characterize me. He calls me cynical, ambitious, egotistic, vain,
two-faced. I am, unfortunately, not in a position to give an equally
comprehensive picture of the character of Mr. Messersmith. But I must
definitely dispute his trustworthiness.

And as a first reason for this I should like to quote a general remark
by Mr. Messersmith. In his affidavit of 30 August 1945, Document
2385-PS, Mr. George Messersmith says, and I quote: “When the Nazi Party
took over Germany, it represented only a small part of the German
population.”

Contrary to that, I say that before the Nazi Party took over Germany it
occupied about forty percent of all Reichstag seats. That percentage Mr.
Messersmith calls a small part of the German population. If diplomatic
reports are everywhere as reliable as in this instance, it is small
wonder that nations do not understand each other.

I would still like to correct a specific remark by Mr. Messersmith. Mr.
Messersmith asserts, as I have quoted just a minute ago, that his duty
brought him in contact with me as Minister of Economics. In his
affidavit of 28 August, 1760-PS, Mr. Messersmith says, and I quote:
“During the wave of terrorist activity in May and June of 1934, I had
already assumed my duties as American Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna.” In
August of 1934 I became Minister of Economics, whereas, on the other
hand, Mr. Messersmith, already in May of 1934, assumed his official
duties in Vienna; but this does not prevent Mr. Messersmith from
asserting that his official duties brought him in frequent contact with
me as Minister of Economics. I believe this will suffice to gauge the
capacity of Mr. Messersmith’s memory correctly.

DR. DIX: In a similar connection, the Prosecution repeatedly referred to
the diary of the former ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Dodd, which was
published on the basis of his private notes by his children after his
death. This document has the Document Number EC-461. The Prosecution
quotes from this diary repeatedly to prove that Mr. Dodd, too,
considered you a warmonger. I know, of course, that you were a friend of
Mr. Dodd’s, a fact which is shown in his diary. Can you tell me how the
two facts can be reconciled?

SCHACHT: First of all, I might say that Ambassador Dodd was one of the
most undefiled personalities I have met, an upright character, a man of
unflinching fidelity to his convictions. He was a professor of history,
undoubtedly a good historian. He had studied at German universities. I
believe that he would turn in his grave if he could know that the notes
which he put down casually in his diary were put together by his two
children without commentary and printed without investigation.

Mr. Dodd, I am sorry to say, had one characteristic which made dealing
with him a little difficult. I think the reason for this lay in his
steadfastness of conviction, which from the first often made him appear
averse to outside influence. He found it rather hard to make himself
understood easily and fluently, and he was even less in a position to
view opinions of others in the right light. Many things that were told
him he misunderstood and saw in a wrong light.

On Page 176 in his diary, in the lower part, there is one sentence I
would like to quote to illustrate the point I am trying to make. Here he
says: “I talked fifteen minutes with Phipps”—the British Ambassador at
that time—“about the accumulated evidence of Germany’s intense war
activities.” This statement dates from the autumn of 1934 and I believe
no one is able to say that in the autumn of 1934 there was any talk of a
war activity on the part of Germany. Mr. Dodd uses the expression “war”
undoubtedly in the place of “armament”; he says “Krieg” instead of
“Aufrüstung.” In that sense, I believe he misunderstood the words.

And, as further evidence for the difficulty which one had in making the
Ambassador understand, I might say that the Foreign Office asked him
once to bring a secretary who would take notes of discussions with
representatives of the Foreign Office, so that misunderstandings could
be avoided.

I believe, therefore, that all these statements by Mr. Dodd are apt to
be misunderstood. As for myself I can only say what I have already said
about Mr. Messersmith, that of course I never talked about war
intentions.

DR. DIX: Now, in this diary it says that he was favorably disposed
towards you. Do you have any proof for this friendly attitude to you?

SCHACHT: May I perhaps refer to the correspondence with Henderson...

DR. DIX: Yes, we can deal with that later.

SCHACHT: Then I shall just confine myself to your question. Dodd was
entirely friendly to me, and I respected him deeply. I saw a sign of his
friendship in that shortly before his departure from Berlin in December
of 1937 he visited me at my home, and this incident is also dealt with
in his diary, and I would like to quote just one sentence: “I went to
Dr. Schacht’s house in Dahlem. I wished especially to see Schacht, whose
life is said to be in danger.”

In other words, Mr. Dodd had heard of an imminent attack on my life on
the part of National Socialists, and considered it important enough and
a reason for coming to my home personally in order to warn me.

A second piece of evidence of his friendship towards me can be seen from
the final visit he paid me just a few days before returning to America.
At that time he again called on me and told me urgently that I should go
to America with him, or as soon after him as possible, that I should
change my residence to America, and that I would find a pleasant welcome
there. I believe he would never have said that to me had he not felt a
certain degree of friendship for me.

DR. DIX: These are express services of friendship, and it can hardly be
assumed that the deceased Ambassador would have done you these good
services if he had considered you a warmonger and friend of the Nazis,
and especially—and I would like to say this to the High Tribunal—if
one remembers that Mr. Dodd was one of the few accredited diplomats in
Berlin who very obviously had no sympathy of any sort for the regime in
power, in fact he was wholly and fully opposed to it.

I intentionally say “the few diplomats” and, Dr. Schacht, I would like
you to define your opinion on what I am saying. You will remember that
those diplomats who kept aloof from Hitler’s regime politically and
socially, such as the Dutch Minister, the magnificent grand seigneur
Limburg-Stirum, or the Minister from Finland, the true-hearted and great
Social Democrat, Wuolijoki, that most of these diplomats were recalled
by their Governments. How is it that an opponent of the Nazis like Dodd
did such open services of friendship to someone whom he considered a
friend of the Nazis? Do you agree with my opinion?

SCHACHT: Yes. I am entirely of the same opinion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly object to going into this kind of
sermonizing back and forth between the box and the bar. It seems to me
that the witness has been allowed to say everything that Mr. Dodd has
ever written and to put in his mind what he thinks Dodd meant. He has
allowed him to go to great lengths characterizing all American
representatives, but it seems to me that this is utterly off the track
and improper for this witness to give a characterization of him in
comparison with other ambassadors and other diplomatic representatives.

There is no request here for information about facts. I reiterate, we
are not accusing Dr. Schacht here because of his opinions. We are
accusing him because of very specific facts which there seems great
reluctance to get to and deal with.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you should go on, Dr. Dix, and pass from this
part of it, pass on from these documents.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I might mention very briefly that it is entirely far
from me or from Dr. Schacht to feel impelled to express here our
opinions on political or diplomatic personalities, but, on the other
hand, if the Prosecution produces affidavits or diaries of these
diplomats and uses these documents as pieces of evidence against the
defendant in this proceeding, the defendant...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you would put questions and
put them shortly, it would be much better, and we should get on much
faster.

DR. DIX: Yes. In general I have put brief questions, Your Lordship. I
only said this now, because I would like to follow the procedure
approved, I believe, by the High Tribunal, of dealing with part of the
evidence at this stage; and so I would like to bring up the reliability
of Dodd’s Diary. That is Document Schacht-43 in my document book; German
text, Page 194; English text, Page 202. Here we are concerned with the
correspondence between the publisher of Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile
Henderson, which deals with several misstatements in the diary. I will
dispense with the rather long letter by Sir Nevile Henderson—there are
five folio pages—and will cite just a few sentences.

On Page 196 of the German text, Sir Nevile Henderson writes:

    “Take, for instance, the first statement attributed to me about
    Neurath. It is entirely impossible, that I, in front of
    Hitler...”

and so on and so forth.

Then on the same page, in the middle of the page, next paragraph:

    “And it is the same with the general discussion. It is quite
    inconceivable that I should have spoken, as there recorded,
    about Bismarck and the annexation of Czechoslovakia and other
    countries.”

And on the same page, a little further down, next to the last paragraph,
it says:

    “Nor could I possibly have said that ‘Germany must dominate the
    Danube-Balkan zone.’”

And on the next page, second paragraph:

    “The remark attributed to me that England and Germany ‘must
    control the world’ is pure balderdash and hardly fits in with
    the preceding sentence about the United States.”

Now, there are other similar passages on this and the following page,
but I do not believe it necessary for me to quote them. I request the
High Tribunal to take official notice of this document in its entirety,
and I would like to submit it as such.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Dr. Schacht, a little while ago you
mentioned a warning on the part of Ambassador Dodd with regard to a
danger which was threatening you. Was it an attack on your life?

SCHACHT: At that time—and I only heard about this in January after Mr.
Dodd told me—I was informed that the SS was planning an attack on my
person. The intent was, as the technical expression then had it, “to
remove” me. Something like that must have been in the air; otherwise, a
foreign ambassador and the circles close to me would not have known
about it.

DR. DIX: Just a little while ago you set forth how your policy rejected
the use of arms in bringing about equality of German rights and means of
livelihood. Did you try to do anything in a practical way to further
your policy of peaceful agreement with foreign countries, for example,
when you were President of the bank?

SCHACHT: My entire work as President of the Reichsbank was primarily
based on the principle of working with the banks in foreign countries as
harmoniously as possible, of pursuing a policy of mutual assistance and
support.

Secondly, I tried to enter into personal, friendly relations with the
directors of all these banks in the hope of meeting understanding for
German problems, and thus of contributing to a solution by way of
co-operation and mutual solution of these difficult problems which had
arisen in Central Europe. The word “co-operation” (Zusammenarbeit) was
the leitmotif of our circle.

DR. DIX: To turn from the directors of the banks, what about your
foreign creditors?

SCHACHT: As I already said a little while ago, from the start I was in
disfavor with all the money makers, those people who had profited from
German loans in foreign countries for I was against Germany’s being
involved in debts abroad, and I took my stand very firmly on this point.

Then later, after the misfortune which I had always predicted actually
did come to pass, after the financial crash in the year 1931, these
self-same financiers and money men blamed me for the fact that the
interest on their money was no longer being transferred to them.
Therefore in those circles I did not gain any friends, but among serious
bankers and large banking institutions which were interested in constant
and regulated business with Germany, I believe I made no enemies,
because all measures which I later had to take in order to protect the
German currency and to maintain Germany’s foreign trade, all these
measures I always discussed jointly with the representatives of foreign
creditors. Approximately every six months we met, and I always gave them
a detailed account of German conditions. They were permitted to look
into the books of the Reichsbank. They could examine and interrogate the
officials of the Reichsbank and they always confirmed that I told them
everything in the most frank and open manner. So that I may say that I
worked in a fair and friendly way also with these men.

DR. DIX: And how did your policy of peaceful agreement affect foreign
trade, export, credit, and so forth?

SCHACHT: I believe that after the happenings that have now taken place
it is today even clearer than before that Germany cannot and could not
live without foreign trade, and that the maintenance of export trade
must be the basis for the future existence of the German nation.
Consequently, I did everything in order to maintain German foreign
trade. I can cite a few specific examples to supplement the general
principles. I tried, for example, to do business with China in order
that we might export to China. I was ready to give China credit and did.
I hailed the fact that the Soviet Union kept up an extensive flow of
trade with us, and I always advocated expanding and stabilizing this
foreign trade in the case of Russia as well as China. About the ability
and readiness to pay and the promptness of payment of the opposite
parties I never had any doubts.

THE PRESIDENT: He is going into unnecessary detail in support of the
allegation that he tried to maintain export trade. We do not surely need
details.

DR. DIX: As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, this exposition is of
great significance and relevance. It shows Schacht contrary and in
opposition to the policy carried out by Hitler. Hitler was hostile to
the Soviet Union and this hostility is counterbalanced by open
friendliness on the part of and in the person of the Minister of
Economics. If I want to prove that Schacht was pioneer of a policy of
understanding between nations, even in phases where Hitler carried on a
peaceful battle, so to speak, with another country, such as the war of
propaganda against the Soviet Union, then, in my opinion, this point is
very important for Schacht’s fundamental attitude—on one side war and
on the other understanding. This is of absolute relevance.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has made the allegation. It is for the
Prosecution to dispute it in cross-examination and if they do, then the
details might become material in re-examination.

DR. DIX: I believe the question has been answered, and now I shall turn
to an entirely new phase of questioning.

Since it is typical of his desire for understanding and his direct basic
opposition to the policy of Hitler, I would like to refer to Document
Number Schacht-34, which is an affidavit, of Schniewind, the banker and
Swedish Consul General at Munich. This is Exhibit 34, Page 114, of the
English translation, and I would like to quote a short paragraph on Page
112 of the German text, which confirms Dr. Schacht’s remarks.
Schniewind, who was a high official in the Ministry of Economics, says
here:

    “My department dealt with the Reich guarantees for deliveries to
    Russia, and thus I was in position to know that Schacht
    considered Hitler wrong in fighting Russia. Through much effort,
    he obtained Hitler’s permission to send extensive supplies,
    especially machines to Russia. Frequently I gained the
    impression that Herr Schacht favored these deliveries because,
    while instrumental in giving employment, they did not benefit
    rearmament. Herr Schacht on several public occasions pointed out
    with satisfaction that trade shipments to Russia were proceeding
    promptly and smoothly.”

There are just a few more minutes before the customary recess, Your
Honor, and before we take our recess, I ask that I be permitted to reply
shortly to Your Lordship’s remarks of a few minutes ago. The defendant
must conduct what is, to a certain degree, a very difficult defense. The
Prosecution very simply argued: “You helped to finance rearmament and
this rearmament in the final analysis ended in war and not only a war
but a war of aggression; therefore, you as a defendant are either a
conspirator or an accomplice, and that is a war crime.”

As far as this argument is concerned, it must in my opinion be open to
the defendant, first—and we shall deal with that later—to point out
that rearmament as such by no means constitutes a desire for aggressive
war; and secondly, to show that his acts actually indicate the exact
opposite, namely, his desire for concord and peace; and for these
fundamental reasons, I do beg the Tribunal not to cut me short in this
evidence but rather to give me the time to carry it through in detail.
This explains my desire to set forth Schacht’s policy toward the Soviet
Union, a policy in which he was in direct opposition to Hitler, to bring
it forth in its entirety, and also my wish to show that he worked for
agreement on all levels—with directors of banks and credit
furnishers—that is, he advocated a policy of give and take rather than
one of unilateral terrorizing and strife.

Gentlemen of the Bench, it is chiefly on a psychological plane on which
I have to conduct the defense; that is a very sensitive and delicate
field, and I again ask that my task may not be made more difficult.
Then, when the witnesses are called, I for my part will most likely
dispense with every witness except one, and I beg that you show me some
consideration. Does Your Lordship consider it time for a recess?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Dix. I thought that the Tribunal has
shown you every consideration, and we will now certainly have a recess.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, what was your attitude toward the Leadership
Principle? Did you not realize the danger of giving a blank check, the
danger of losing your own capacity of responsibility? You have heard
that Sir David considers the Leadership Principle in itself to be
criminal.

SCHACHT: As to whether the Leadership Principle is criminal or not,
opinions throughout history have been much divided. If we look back
through Roman history we see that from time to time in dire periods of
distress a leader was selected to whom everyone else was subordinate.
And if I read _Failure of a Mission_ by Henderson there, too, I find
sentences in which he says:

    “People in England sometimes forget and fail to realize that
    even dictators can be, up to a point, necessary for a period and
    even extremely beneficial for a nation.”

Another passage from the same book says:

    “Dictatorships are not always evil.”

In other words, it depends on just what is attributed to a Führer, how
much confidence one has in a Führer, and for how long a time. Of course,
it is a sheer impossibility for someone to assume the leadership of a
country without giving the nation from time to time an opportunity of
saying whether it still wants to keep him as Führer or not. The election
of Hitler as Führer was in itself no political mistake; in my opinion
one could have introduced quite a number of precautionary limitations
with a view to averting the danger you have mentioned. I regret to say
that that was not done, and that was a great mistake. But perhaps one
was entitled to rely on the fact that from time to time a referendum, a
plebiscite, a new expression of the will of the people would take place
by which the Führer could have been corrected, because a leader who
cannot be corrected becomes a menace. I recognized that danger very
well, I was afraid of it, and I attempted to meet it. May I say one more
thing? Limitless Party propaganda attempted to introduce the idea of a
Führer as a lasting principle into politics. That of course is utter
nonsense, and I took the opportunity—I always took such opportunity
whenever it was possible—of expressing my dissenting opinions publicly.
I took the opportunity in an address to the Academy of German Law, of
which not only Nazis but lawyers of all groups were members, and in that
speech I lectured about the Leadership Principle in economics. And I
expressed myself ironically and satirically, as unfortunately is my
wont, and said that it was not necessary to have a leader in every
stocking factory, that in fact, this principle was not a principle at
all, but an exceptional rule which had to be handled very carefully.

DR. DIX: I know that, because I was present on the occasion of that
address. What did you think about the ideology of the master race
(Herrenvolk)?

SCHACHT: I have always considered it a very unhappy precedent to speak
of a “chosen people,” or of “God’s own country,” or of things like that.
As a convinced adherent to the Christian faith I believe in Christian
charity, which bids me extend love to all men without regard to race or
faith. I would like to mention also that the silly talk about the master
race, which some Party leaders made their own, was held up to constant
ridicule by the German public. That was not surprising, because most of
the leaders of the Hitler Party were not exactly ideal types of the
Nordic race. And in that connection, when these things were discussed
among the German population, little Goebbels was referred to as “Der
Schrumpfgermane”—the shrivelled Teuton.

Only one thing—I have to say this to be just—did most of the leaders
of the Party have in common with the old Teutons—and that was drinking;
excessive drinking was a main part of the Nazi ideology.

DR. DIX: What did you think of the so-called National Socialist
Weltanschauung?

SCHACHT: Weltanschauung in my opinion is a summation of all those moral
principles which enable me to acquire a clear judgment on all aspects of
life. Therefore it is a matter of course that a Weltanschauung cannot
take root in the tangible world, but must rise above it; it is something
metaphysical, that is to say, it is based on faith, on religion. A
Weltanschauung which is not rooted in religion is in my opinion no
Weltanschauung at all. Consequently I reject the National Socialist
Weltanschauung which was not rooted in religion.

DR. DIX: In the trial brief against you it is expressly stated that
there are no charges against you with regard to the Jewish question.
Nevertheless I am putting to you a few questions on this topic, because
the trial brief by its very words takes from you what in the Jewish
question it conceded you; that is to say, the trial brief accuses you
repeatedly of Nazi ideology, in which strict observance of anti-Semitism
is integral.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I simply cannot be bound by silence after this
flagrant misstatement of our position made in conjunction with this
witness’ testimony. It is not true that we make no charges against Dr.
Schacht with reference to the Jews. What is true is that we say that he
was not in complete sympathy with that aspect of the Nazi program which
involved a wholesale extermination of the Jews, and he was for that
reason attacked from time to time. It is further conceded that he gave
aid and comfort to individual Jews, but we do charge that he believed
the Jews of Germany should be stripped of their rights as citizens, and
that he aided and participated in their persecution. And I do not like
to have our position misstated and then be met with a claim of estoppel
by silence.

DR. DIX: I have to thank you, Mr. Justice Jackson, for your clarifying
statement, and it is now all the more necessary that I put in questions
to Dr. Schacht, but at this moment I want to point out...

THE PRESIDENT: Please put it then.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, it is not only a question, but it is a problem,
and I should like to ask the Prosecution to clarify it now, because it
still needs clarification even after the statement of Mr. Justice
Jackson. If the Tribunal do not think that this is the opportune time I
can bring it up later. I believe, however, that it would be right to
bring it up how.

As I see it, there is a contradiction in the Indictment, and I would
like it clarified, so that we shall not be at cross-purposes in our
final speeches.

I can put it quite briefly. It is the question of whether Dr. Schacht is
accused also of Crimes against Humanity, that is, not only the crime of
conspiracy concerning the war of aggression, but also the typical crimes
against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of the
Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were
presented, are at variance. I wanted to take the liberty of pointing out
the contradictory passages and to ask the Prosecution to be kind enough
to state conclusively at some future occasion whether Schacht is accused
also on Count Three and Four of the Indictment. In presenting the
charges the Prosecution stated, and that indicates that the Prosecution
will limit itself to Counts One and Two:

    “Our evidence against the Defendant Schacht is limited to the
    planning and preparation of aggressive war and his participation
    in the conspiracy for aggressive war.”

Similar statements are on Page 3 of the trial brief. Also, in Appendix A
of the Indictment the charges against Schacht are limited to Counts One
and Two. However, on Page 1 of the Indictment we find the following:

    “...accuse as guilty...of Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and
    Crimes against Humanity, and of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to
    commit those Crimes....”

And then all the defendants are listed, including the Defendant Hjalmar
Schacht.

On Page 17 of the German text of the Indictment we read:

    “On the basis of the facts previously stated, the
    defendants”—that is, all the defendants—“are guilty.”

That is, all the defendants are guilty of Counts One, Two, Three, Four.
It also states, on Page 18 of the Indictment:

    “All defendants committed, from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945,
    War Crimes in Germany and in countries and territories occupied
    by German troops after 1 September 1939 and in Austria,
    Czechoslovakia, Italy, and on the high seas.”

On Page 46 it reads:

    “During several years before the 8th of May 1945, all defendants
    committed Crimes against Humanity in Germany”

—and so forth.

Therefore, some parts of the oral presentation and of the Indictment
show that the Prosecution limits its charges against Schacht to Counts
One and Two, but other passages express beyond doubt that he is also
accused of Crimes against Humanity.

I think it would be helpful—it need not be done immediately, but I
wanted as a precaution to express it now—if at the proper time the
Prosecution would state to what extent the charges apply to Schacht.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Your Honor, it will take only one moment to answer
that, and I think the cross-examination—the examination should not
proceed under any misapprehension.

At all times, and in all documents that I am aware of, the Defendant
Schacht has been accused of being guilty of Count One.

Count One, as the statement of the offense, states:

    “The Common Plan or Conspiracy embraced the commission of Crimes
    against Peace in that the defendants planned, prepared, and
    initiated wars of aggression... In the development and course of
    the Common Plan it came to embrace the commission of War Crimes,
    in that it contemplated, and the defendants determined upon, and
    carried out ruthless war...”

And that included also Crimes against Humanity.

Our contention is that, while the Defendant Schacht himself was not in
the field perpetrating these individual atrocities, he is answerable for
every offense committed by any of the defendants or their
co-conspirators up to the time that he openly broke with this outfit
with which he became associated.

That is our contention and Dr. Dix should conduct his examination on the
assumption that every charge is a charge against Schacht up to the time
that he openly, and on record so that somebody knew it, became separated
from the company with which he chose to travel.

DR. DIX: It is probably my fault, but I still cannot see clearly. First,
I do not know what date the Prosecution means when it admits that
Schacht openly broke with the regime. I must, during my examination...

THE PRESIDENT: I think you must make up your own mind as to what time it
was, the time at which he openly broke.

Are you not able to hear?

DR. DIX: I have to make up my mind now?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think you had better go on with the evidence.

DR. DIX: All right. I can refer to the subject again later.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, please do not make any
statements of principle concerning the Jewish question, but tell the
Tribunal, and give a few examples, of what your attitude was on the
Jewish question.

SCHACHT: The Jewish question came up quite early, when, in 1933, a New
York banker, the late James Meier, announced his intention to visit me.
I went to Hitler at that time and told him, “Mr. James Meier, one of the
most respected New York bankers and a great benefactor of his old home
country, Germany, will come to visit me, and I intend to give a dinner
in his honor. I assume that you have no objection.” He immediately said,
in a very definite and pronounced manner, “Herr Schacht, you can do
everything.” I assumed that he gave me absolute freedom to keep in
contact with my Jewish friends, which I did. The dinner actually took
place.

I only mention this because it was the first time the Jewish question
was brought up between us. At every occasion I took a definite position
on the Jewish question—and wherever possible, publicly—I have always
looked for that opportunity.

I will give only two examples of that.

There was a branch of the Reichsbank in Amswalde in the Province of
Brandenburg. The name of the manager of that branch office was one day
posted up in one of the public _Stürmer_ boxes in his town, and termed a
traitor to the people because his wife had bought 50 pfennings worth of
ribbon or the like in a Jewish store. I at once approached the competent
official at Amswalde and demanded the immediate removal of the placard
and an immediate correction to the effect that the man was no traitor to
the people. That was refused; whereupon, without asking anyone, I closed
the Reichsbank branch at Amswalde. It took a number of weeks until, in
the end, the Oberpräsident, who was of course also a Nazi boss, came to
me and asked me to reopen the branch office. I told him, “As soon as
they repudiate that affair publicly I shall reopen the branch office at
Amswalde.” It took only a few days before the Oberpräsident and
Gauleiter of Brandenburg, Grube, had the announcement made public in the
Amswalde newspaper, in large print, and so I reopened the branch office
in Amswalde. That is one example.

The second example has been mentioned briefly; I just want to sum it up
once more because its effect was penetrating.

On the occasion of a Christmas celebration for the office messengers of
the Reichsbank I referred to the pogrom of 9 November 1938, and I told
the boys, in the presence of many—parents, Party leaders, and Party
members—that I hoped they had nothing to do with these things, which
should make every decent German blush with shame. But if they did they
should leave the Reichsbank at once, because in an institution such as
the Reichsbank, which was built up on good faith, there was no place for
people who did not respect the property and life of others.

DR. DIX: May I interrupt you, Dr. Schacht, and point out to the Tribunal
that in Document Number Schacht-34, which has been submitted and is an
affidavit of Dr. Schniewind, on Page 118 of the German text and on Page
126 of the English text the same incident which Dr. Schacht has just
related is mentioned. May I quote quite briefly:

    “It is known that at the Christmas celebration of the Reichsbank
    in December of 1938 he”—that is Schacht—“said the following in
    his address to the young office boys:

    “‘A few weeks ago things occurred in our fatherland which are a
    disgrace to civilization and which must turn every decent
    German’s face red with shame. I only hope that none of you
    office boys participated in them, because for such an individual
    there is no place in the Reichsbank.’”

[_Turning to the defendant._] Excuse me. Please continue. You wanted to
add something?

SCHACHT: When in August of 1934 I took over the Reich Ministry of
Economics, of course I first put the question to Hitler: “How are the
Jews in our national economy to be treated?” Hitler told me then,
literally, “The Jews can be active in domestic economy in the same way
as before.”

That was the directive that Hitler had promised to me, and during all
the time when I was in charge of the Ministry of Economics I acted
accordingly.

However, I have to add that every few weeks there was a quarrel on some
Jewish question with some Gauleiter or other Party official. Also, I
could not protect Jews against physical mistreatment and the like,
because that came under the competence of the Public Prosecutor and not
mine; but in the economic field I helped all Jews who approached me to
obtain their rights, and in every individual case, I prevailed upon
Hitler and succeeded against the Gauleiters and Party officials,
sometimes even threatening to resign.

I believe that it is notable that the pogrom of November 1938 could only
have taken place after I had resigned from my office. Had I still been
in office, then that pogrom doubtlessly would not have occurred.

DR. DIX: The witness Gisevius has already testified that in the course
of developments from 1933 on, fundamental changes took place in your
judgment of Adolf Hitler. I ask you now, because this is a very decisive
question, to give the Tribunal a detailed description of your real
attitude and your judgment of Adolf Hitler in the course of the
years—as exhaustively, but also as briefly, as possible.

SCHACHT: In former statements which I have made here, I have spoken of
Hitler as a semi-educated man. I still maintain that. He did not have
sufficient school education, but he read an enormous amount later, and
acquired a wide knowledge. He juggled with that knowledge in a masterly
manner in all debates, discussions, and speeches.

No doubt he was a man of genius in certain respects. He had sudden ideas
of which nobody else had thought and which were at times useful in
solving great difficulties, sometimes with astounding simplicity,
sometimes, however, with equally astounding brutality.

He was a mass psychologist of really diabolical genius. While I myself
and several others—for instance, General Von Witzleben told me so
once—while we were never captivated in personal conversations, still he
had a very peculiar influence on other people, and particularly he was
able—in spite of his screeching and occasionally breaking voice—to
stir up the utmost overwhelming enthusiasm of large masses in a filled
auditorium.

I believe that originally he was not filled only with evil desires;
originally, no doubt, he believed he was aiming at good, but gradually
he himself fell victim to the same spell which he exercised over the
masses; because whoever ventures to seduce the masses is finally led and
seduced by them, and so this reciprocal relation between leader and
those led, in my opinion, contributed to ensnaring him in the evil ways
of mass instincts, which every political leader should avoid.

One more thing was to be admired in Hitler. He was a man of unbending
energy, of a will power which overcame all obstacles, and in my estimate
only those two characteristics—mass psychology and his energy and will
power—explain that Hitler was able to rally up to 40 percent, and later
almost 50 percent, of the German people behind him.

What else shall I say?

DR. DIX: Well, I was mainly concerned with bringing up the subject of
your own change of opinion. You have said that the break in your
attitude toward Hitler was caused by the Fritsch incident. You are the
best witness who can give us an explanation not of Hitler’s but of your
own development and your changing attitude towards Hitler.

SCHACHT: Excuse me. I think there is a basic error here. It appears from
this as if I had been a convinced adherent of Hitler at some time. I was
never that. On the contrary, out of concern for my people and my
country, after Hitler gained power, I endeavored with all my strength to
direct that power into an orderly channel, and to keep it within bounds.
Therefore, there was no question of a break with Hitler. A break could
only be spoken of had I been closely connected with him before. At heart
I was never closely connected with Hitler, but to all appearances I
worked in the Cabinet and I did so because he was after all in power,
and I considered it my duty to put myself at the disposal of my people
and my country for their good.

DR. DIX: All right, but at what time, by what conditions, by what
realization were you influenced to begin that activity which the witness
Gisevius has described?

SCHACHT: My serious criticism of Hitler’s doings started already at the
time of the so-called Röhm Putsch on 30 June 1934. I should like to
point out first that these things occurred quite unexpectedly and took
me by surprise, because I had not at all anticipated them. At that time
I had told Hitler, “How could you have these people just simply killed
off? Under all circumstances there should have been at least a summary
trial of some sort.” Hitler swallowed these remarks and merely mumbled
something about “revolutionary necessity,” but he did not really
contradict me.

Then in the course of the second half of the year 1934 and the first
half of the year 1935 I noticed that I had been under a misconception
when I believed that Hitler did not approve of what might be considered
revolutionary and disorderly Party excesses, and that he was really
willing to restore a respectable atmosphere. Hitler did nothing to put a
stop to the excesses of individual Party members or Party groups. Very
likely the idea which recently—or I believe today—was mentioned by a
witness was always in his mind: let the SA have its fling for once. That
is to say, for the masses of the Party he sanctioned, as a means of
recreation, so to speak, behavior which is absolutely incompatible with
good order in the State. In the course of the following months my
suspicions were confirmed and increased, and then for the first time, in
May 1935, I took occasion to bring these matters up with him quite
openly. I do not know if you want me to discuss these things now, but I
am ready to tell about them.

DR. DIX: I consider it important that the Tribunal should hear from you
how your original attitude towards Hitler, which you have just
described, changed, and you became a conspirator against him.

SCHACHT: Well, the decisive change in my attitude came about by reason
of the Fritsch incident, at the very moment when I had to
recognize—and, of course, that did not come with lightning speed, but
in the course of weeks and months it crystallized—that Hitler aimed at
war, or at least was not prepared to do everything to avoid a war. At
that moment I told myself that this was a tremendous danger which was
raising its head, and that violence could be crushed only by violence.

Any opportunity of political propaganda within the German people was of
course out of the question. There was no freedom of assembly. There was
no freedom of speech. There was no freedom of writing. There was no
possibility of discussing things even in a small group. From beginning
to end one was spied upon, and every word which was said among more than
two persons was spoken at the peril of one’s life. There was only one
possibility in the face of that terror, which was beyond democratic
reform and which barred every national criticism. That was to meet this
situation with violence.

Then I came to the conclusion that in the face of Hitler’s terror only a
_coup d’état_, a Putsch, and finally an attempt at assassination was
possible.

DR. DIX: And is Gisevius right in saying that the _peripeteia_, the
decisive turning point in your attitude resulted from your impressions
and experiences in the so-called Fritsch crisis?

SCHACHT: Aside from the inherent falsehood which appeared in all actions
and measures of the Party men, the Fritsch crisis provided the absolute
assurance that a basic change was occurring in the conduct of political
affairs, for within about 10 days Blomberg was removed, Fritsch was
removed, Neurath was removed, and Hitler not only appointed so
unsuitable a person as Ribbentrop to be Foreign Minister, but also in
his speech in the Reichstag soon afterwards announced that from now on
rearmament had to be increased even more. Consequently the Fritsch
crisis was the decisive turning point in my attitude, and from then on I
knew that every further peaceful attempt at controlling the torrent
would fail and that only violent means could meet it.

DR. DIX: For an estimate of the Fritsch crisis may I quote now from the
document which I already wanted to produce on the occasion of the
interrogation of Gisevius but could not because the document was not
then available to the Prosecution. The same view about the Fritsch
crisis which Gisevius and now Dr. Schacht have put here was also
expressed abroad by an intelligent officer with political foresight. May
I point to Exhibit Number 15 of my document book (Document Number
Schacht-15)? That is Page 41 of the English text, and 35 of the German
text. It is a biennial report of the Chief of Staff of the United States
Army to the Secretary of War for the period of 1 July 1943 to 30 June
1945. I quote one sentence from it:

    “The history of the German High Command from 1938 on is one of
    constant conflict of personalities, in which military judgment
    was increasingly subordinated to Hitler’s personal dictates. The
    first clash occurred in 1938 and resulted in the removal of Von
    Blomberg, Von Fritsch, and Beck and of the last effective
    conservative influence on German foreign policy.”

So here also that turning point has been clearly understood. And in
summary I would like to ask this question of Dr. Schacht.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Were you only disappointed by Hitler, or
did you consider yourself deceived by Hitler at that time? Will you
answer that?

SCHACHT: The answer is that I have never felt disappointed by Hitler,
because I had not expected more of him than my appraisal of his
personality allowed me. But I certainly consider myself deceived,
swindled, and cheated by him to the highest degree, because whatever he
had previously promised to the German people and thereby to me, he did
not keep afterwards.

He promised equal rights for all citizens, but his adherents, regardless
of their capabilities, enjoyed privileges before all other citizens. He
promised to put the Jews under the same protection which foreigners
enjoyed, yet he deprived them of every legal protection. He had promised
to fight against political lies, but together with his Minister Goebbels
he cultivated nothing but political lies and political fraud. He
promised the German people to maintain the principles of positive
Christianity yet he tolerated and sponsored measures by which
institutions of the Church were abused, reviled, and damaged. Also, in
the foreign political field he always spoke against a war on two
fronts—and then later undertook it himself. He despised and disregarded
all laws of the Weimar Republic, to which he had taken the oath when he
became Chancellor. He mobilized the Gestapo against personal liberty. He
gagged and bound all free exchange of ideas and information. He pardoned
criminals and enlisted them in his service. He did everything to break
his promises. He lied to and deceived the world, Germany, and me.

DR. DIX: Let us return to the period of the seizure of power. In
November 1932, you stated publicly that Hitler would become Reich
Chancellor. What caused you to make that statement?

SCHACHT: That statement was caused by the fact that Hitler in the July
elections of 1932 obtained 40 percent of all seats in the Reichstag for
his Party. That is an election result which, if I am informed correctly,
had never occurred since 1871, when the Reichstag was founded; and to
me, as a democrat and a follower of democratic parliamentary government,
it was quite inevitable that that man was now to be entrusted with
forming a cabinet. I do not know of any alternative at the time. There
was only one other possibility, one alternative, and that was a military
rule. But the Cabinet of Von Papen already had had some special
presidential authority and still could not maintain itself in the face
of the Reichstag; and when Herr Schleicher attempted to establish a
military regime without the participation of the Nazis, he failed after
just a few weeks, because he found himself confronted with the
alternative either of starting a civil war or of resigning.

Hindenburg and at first Schleicher as well—although at the last moment
he acted differently—were always of the opinion that the Armed Forces
could not face a civil war, and Hindenburg was certainly not ready to
tolerate a civil war. But very unwillingly he saw himself forced by
necessity to put the reins of government into the hands of the man who,
thanks to his own propaganda and the incapability of all preceding
governments, thanks also to the inconsiderate policy of the foreign
countries toward Germany, had won the majority of German votes.

DR. DIX: You know that the Prosecution accuses you of having assisted
Hitler and the Nazi regime to power. I therefore want to ask you now
whether between the July elections 1932, and the day when Hitler became
Chancellor—that is the 30th of January, 1933—you spoke publicly for
Hitler.

SCHACHT: I want to state first that Hitler’s power was an accomplished
fact in July 1932, when he secured 230 Reichstag seats. Everything else
that followed must be viewed as a consequence of that Reichstag
election. During that entire period—with the exception of the one
interview you mentioned, in which I said that according to democratic
principles Hitler must become Reich Chancellor—I can say that I did not
write or publicly speak a single word for Hitler.

DR. DIX: Did you, during the time when the reorganization of the Reich
Cabinet was discussed, speak to Hindenburg on behalf of Hitler’s
Chancellorship?

SCHACHT: I have never in consultations with any of the competent
gentlemen, be it Hindenburg, Meissner, or anyone else, contributed
towards exerting any influence in favor of Hitler, nor did I participate
in any way in the nomination of Hitler to be Reich Chancellor.

DR. DIX: The prosecutor accuses you in that connection of putting the
prestige of your name at the disposal of Hitler in November 1932, and he
refers to a statement made by Goebbels in the latter’s book, _From the
Kaiserhof to the Reich Chancellery_. What can you say about that?

SCHACHT: I would never have expected that this apostle of truth,
Goebbels, would once more be mobilized against me here, but it is not my
fault if Herr Goebbels made a mistake.

DR. DIX: The prosecutor also states that you provided the funds for
Hitler in the Reichstag elections of 5 March; that is said to have
happened in an industrial meeting on which there is an affidavit by the
industrialist Von Schnitzler, Document Number EC-439, Exhibit USA-618.
What do you have to say about that? It is our Number 3 of our document
book, Page 11 of the English copy.

SCHACHT: In February of 1933, at the time when Hitler was already Reich
Chancellor and the elections of 5 March were to furnish a basis for the
shape of the new government, Hitler asked me whether, at the occasion of
a meeting which Göring was to call and which would have the purpose of
raising funds for the elections, I would be good enough to take the role
of his banker. I had no reason for refusing to do that. The meeting took
place on 26 February.

And now the prosecutor has made it appear that during that meeting I had
solicited election funds. The Prosecution themselves, however, have
presented a document, D-203, which apparently is meant to be a record of
the election speech made by Hitler on that evening...

DR. DIX: May I interrupt you and point out to the Tribunal that it is
our Exhibit Number Schacht-2, on Page 9 of the English text. Excuse me.
Please, will you kindly go on.

SCHACHT: D-203. That document closes with the following sentence:

    “Göring then passed very cleverly to the necessity that other
    circles not taking part in this political battle should at least
    make the financial sacrifices required.”

Therefore from that report which was submitted by the Prosecution, it
can be seen very clearly that not I but Göring pleaded for funds. I only
administered these funds later, and, in the affidavit by Schnitzler,
Document EC-439, Page 11, the Prosecution have carefully left out these
decisive passages which do not accuse, but exonerate me. I quote the two
sentences, therefore, as follows—I am sorry, I have to quote in English
because I have only the English text in front of me:

    “At the meeting Dr. Schacht proposed raising an election fund of
    as far as I remember three million Reichsmarks. The fund was to
    be distributed between the two ‘allies’ according to their
    relative strength at the time. Dr. Stein suggested that the
    Deutsche Volkspartei should be included, which suggestion, if I
    remember rightly, was accepted. The amounts which the individual
    firms were to contribute were not discussed.”

It can be seen from this that the election fund was not collected only
for the Nazi Party, but for the Nazi Party and the national group which
was its ally and to which, for instance, also Herr Von Papen and
Hugenberg belonged, and which during that very meeting was extended to
comprise a third group, the German People’s Party. It was, therefore, a
collective fund for those parties who went into the election campaign
together, and not just a Nazi fund.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution have mentioned those laws which were decreed
after the seizure of power, and which introduced and then established
the totalitarian rule of the Nazis and of Hitler. We have to consider
the question of your personal responsibility as a later member of the
cabinet and I must discuss these laws with you in detail; for the
present I just want to remind you of them generally: First, the Enabling
Act; then the law about the prohibition of parties and the establishment
of one Party; the law about the unity of Party and State; the law
decreeing the expropriation of the SPD and the trade unions; the law
about civil service associations; the law about the legal limitation of
professions for Jews; the law instituting the Peoples’ Court; the law
legalizing the murders of 30 June 1934; and the law about the merger of
the offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President in the
person of Hitler. How do you, as a member of the Cabinet, define your
personal responsibility with respect to these laws?

SCHACHT: When all these laws were issued I was not a Cabinet member. I
had no vote in the Cabinet. I had a vote in the Cabinet only after 1
August 1934, at which time the last disastrous law, the merger of the
offices of Reich Chancellor and Reich President was decreed. I did not
participate in the discussions preceding this law, nor did I vote on it.
I had absolutely no part in any of these laws.

DR. DIX: I do not know whether I mentioned it, but I want to protect you
against a misunderstanding. This does not apply to the merger of the
offices of the Reich President in the person of Hitler, after
Hindenburg’s death?

SCHACHT: Of course, I did not take part in that either.

DR. DIX: And why not?

SCHACHT: Because I was not then in the Cabinet. I received my official
nomination as Minister on 3 or 4 August. I did not take part in the
deliberations on that law. I did not vote for it, and did not sign it.

DR. DIX: But in the Indictment it is stated that you were a member of
the Reichstag. Then as a member of the Reichstag you would have voted
for these laws, inasmuch as, actually, after 1933 only unanimous votes
were cast in the Reichstag?

SCHACHT: Yes. Unfortunately, there is much in the trial brief which is
not correct. During my entire life I was never a member of the
Reichstag. One look into the _Reichstag Handbook_ could have enlightened
the Prosecution that also during that time I was not a member of the
Reichstag.

I had nothing to do with all these laws either as member of the Cabinet
or of the Reichstag, because I had been neither during that time.

DR. DIX: Did Adolf Hitler actually take an oath to the Weimar
Constitution?

SCHACHT: Of course Hitler took an oath to the Weimar Constitution when
he became Reich Chancellor, to Reich President Von Hindenburg. In taking
that oath he swore not only to respect the constitution but also to
observe and fulfill all laws unless they were lawfully changed.

DR. DIX: Was the Weimar Constitution ever formally repealed?

SCHACHT: No, the Weimar Constitution has never been repealed.

DR. DIX: In your view was the Leadership Principle established anywhere
legally or constitutionally?

SCHACHT: The Leadership Principle was not established by a single law,
and the subsequent attempt to reduce the responsibility of the
individual ministers—and that affects me, too—by saying that it had
become prescriptive law, is not correct. The responsibility of the
ministers continued to exist, my own also, and was kept down only by the
terror and the violent threats of Hitler.

DR. DIX: The questions whether the Enabling Act referred to the Führer
or to the Cabinet; whether the first Cabinet after 1933 was a National
Socialist one or a combination of the parties of the right; and the
question of the development of Hitler into an autocratic dictator, all
these I have already put to the witness Lammers. I do not wish to repeat
them, but do you have to add anything new to what Lammers has testified?

SCHACHT: I made only two notes. In Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 23 March
1933 he said, “It is the sincere desire of the National
Government...”—not the National Socialist, as it is always referred to
later, but the National Government.

And the second point: In the proclamation to the Wehrmacht which Defense
Minister Von Blomberg issued on 1 February 1933 this sentence occurs:

    “I assume this office with the firm determination to maintain
    the Reichswehr, in accordance with the testament of my
    predecessors, as a power factor of the State, above Party
    politics.”

This and other factors already mentioned convinced me that the Cabinet
would be a national coalition cabinet, whereas Hitler, by his rule of
terror and violence, formed a pure Nazi dictatorship out of it.

DR. DIX: The quotation mentioned by Schacht is in our document book,
Document Number Schacht-4, Page 14 of the English text. Now, when you
became Minister of Economics...

THE PRESIDENT: It is 5 o’clock; the Tribunal will adjourn.

DR. DIX: Mr. President, may I ask a question? Do we continue tomorrow,
because tomorrow is the first of May, and there is some uncertainty
whether there will be a session tomorrow or not?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal will go on tomorrow.

       [_The Tribunal adjourned until 1 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTEENTH DAY
                          Wednesday, 1 May 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Before we go on with the case of the Defendant Schacht,
the Tribunal wishes to announce its decision on the applications by Dr.
Sauter on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach: The first application to
which any objection was taken related to the group of documents Numbers
30, 31, 45, 68, 73, 101, 124, and 133. That application with respect to
that group of documents is denied.

The next matter was an application in respect of Number 118(a). That
application is granted and the document is to be translated.

The next was Number 121 and in that case the application is denied. As
regard to witnesses, Dr. Sauter withdrew his application for the witness
Marsalek.

In connection with the other applications, the Tribunal grants the
application that Uiberreither should be called as a witness.

That is all.

DR. DIX: Yesterday, much to my regret, I neglected after an answer given
by Dr. Schacht to my question as to whether he was disappointed by
Hitler or whether he considered himself deceived by him, to read a
passage from a document which deals with the same point. I am referring
to a document which has been submitted to the High Tribunal and which
has been quoted several times—Exhibit Schacht-34, Page 114 of the
English text of the document book. This passage may be found on Page 124
of the English document book and reads as follows:

    “Dr. Schacht, even in the years 1935-36, as may have been seen
    from numerous statements, had fallen into the role of a man, who
    in good faith had put his strength and ability at Hitler’s
    disposal but who now felt himself betrayed.

    “Of the many statements made by Schacht, I quote only one which
    Schacht made at the occasion of a supper with my wife and myself
    in the summer of 1938. When Dr. Schacht made his appearance, it
    was evident that he was in a state of inner excitement and
    during the supper, he suddenly gave vent to his feelings, when,
    in deep agitation he almost shouted at my wife, ‘My dear lady,
    we have fallen into the hands of criminals—how could I ever
    have suspected that?’”

This is the affidavit made out by Schniewind.

Yesterday I mentioned three documents: namely, a speech made by Schacht
on “Geography and Statistics” at Frankfurt-am-Main on 9 December 1936,
then an article Schacht had written on the colonial problem and a speech
given at Königsberg by Schacht.

I wish to submit these documents: The speech on “Geography and
Statistics” at Frankfurt is the Document Schacht-19, Page 48, English
Page 54. The theme on the colonial question is Exhibit Schacht-21,
German version Page 53 and English version Page 59. The speech at
Königsberg is Exhibit Schacht-25 of my document book, German version on
Page 44 and English version Page 73.

Dr. Schacht, we stopped in the middle of 1934, shortly before you
entered the Ministry of Economics, and when you became Minister of
Economics, you were familiar with the happenings of 30 June 1934 and
their legalization by the Cabinet. Did you not have any misgivings to
enter the Cabinet or what reasons prompted you to put aside these
misgivings?

SCHACHT: As far as my personal composure and comfort would have been
concerned, it would have been very simple not to assume office and to
resign. Of course, I asked myself what help that would be for the future
development of German politics if I did refuse office. We were already
at a stage in which any public and open opposition and criticism against
the Hitler regime had been made impossible. Meetings could not be held,
societies could not be established, every press statement was subject to
censorship, and all political opposition, without which no government
can thrive, had been prevented by Hitler through his policy of terror.
There was only one possible way to exercise criticism and even form an
opposition which could prevent bad and faulty measures being taken by
the Government. And this opposition could solely be formed in the
Government itself. Thus convinced, I entered the Government and I hoped
in the course of the years to find a certain amount of support and
backing among the German people. There was still a large mass of
spiritual leaders, professors, scientists, and teachers, whom I did not
expect simply to acquiesce to a regime of coercion. There were also many
industrialists, leaders of economy, who I did not assume would bow to a
policy of coercion incompatible with free economy. I expected a certain
support from all these circles, support which would make it possible for
me to have a moderating, controlling influence in the Government.
Therefore, I entered Hitler’s Cabinet, not with enthusiastic assent, but
because it was necessary to keep on working for the German people and
exercise a moderating influence within the Government.

DR. DIX: In the course of time was no opposition ever developed within
the Party?

SCHACHT: In answering that question, I would like to say that within the
Party, of course, the decent elements were by far in majority; the
greater part of the population had joined the Party because of a healthy
instinct and with good intentions driven by the need in which the German
nation found itself.

I would like to say about the SS, for instance, that in the beginning
numbers of decent people joined the SS because Himmler gave the SS the
appearance of fighting for a life of ideals. I would like to call your
attention to a book written by an SS man which appeared at that time
under the significant title, _Schafft anständige Kerle_ (_Let’s Make
Decent Men_).

But, in the course of time, Hitler knew how to gather around him all bad
elements, within the Party and its organization, and to chain tightly
all those elements to himself, because he understood how to exploit
shrewdly any mistake, slip-up, or misdemeanor on their part. Yesterday I
talked about drunkenness as a constituent part of Nazi ideology; I did
not do that with the purpose of degrading anyone personally. I did it
for another quite definite reason.

In the course of further developments, I observed that even many Party
members who had fallen into this net of Hitler and who occupied more or
less leading positions, gradually became afraid because of the
consequences of the injustices and the evil deeds to which they were
instigated by the regime. I had the definite feeling that these people
resorted to alcohol and various narcotics in order to flee from their
own conscience, and that it was only this flight from their own
conscience that permitted them to act the way they did. Otherwise, there
would be no explanation for the large number of suicides that took place
at the end of the Nazi regime.

DR. DIX: You know that you are accused of being a participant in a
conspiracy which had as its object an illegal violation of the peace.
Did you at any time have secret discussions, or secret orders, or secret
directives, which worked toward this objective?

SCHACHT: I may say that I myself never received any order or fulfilled
any wish which might have been contrary to the conception of right.
Never did Hitler request anything from me which he knew I would surely
not carry out because it did not agree with my moral point of view. But
neither did I ever notice or observe that one of my fellow ministers or
one of the other leading men who did not belong to Hitler’s inner
circle—of course, I could not control that circle—or anyone else whom
I met in official contacts, showed in any way that there was an intent
to commit a war crime; on the contrary, we were always very glad when
Hitler came off with one of his big speeches in which he assured, not
only the entire world, but above all the German people that he was
thinking of nothing except peace and peaceful work. The fact that Hitler
deceived the world and the German people, and many of his co-workers, is
one of the things that I mentioned yesterday.

DR. DIX: Did you at any time—of course, I mean outside of your normal
oath of office—take any oath or bind yourself in any other way to the
Party or another National Socialist organization?

SCHACHT: Not a single oath and not a single obligation beyond my oath of
office to the head of the State.

DR. DIX: Did you have close private relations with leading National
Socialists, for example, with Hitler or Göring?

SCHACHT: I assume you mean a close friendly or social contact?

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: I never had relations of that sort with Hitler. He repeatedly
urged me in the first years to come to the luncheons at the Reich
Chancellery where he was lunching with closer friends. I tried to do
that twice. I attended twice at various intervals, and I must say that
not only the level of the discussion at the luncheon and the abject
humility shown to Hitler repulsed me but I also did not like the whole
crowd, and I never went back again.

I never called on Hitler personally in a private matter. Of course,
naturally, I attended the large public functions which all the
ministers, the Diplomatic Corps and high officials, _et cetera_,
attended, but I never had any intimate, social, or other close contact
with him. That applies to the other gentlemen as well.

As a matter of course, in the first months of our acquaintance we
visited each other on occasion, but all so-called social gatherings
which still took place in the first period had a more or less official
character. Close private relations simply did not exist.

DR. DIX: And does this answer apply to all the other leading National
Socialists as well?

SCHACHT: All of them.

DR. DIX: When, for instance, did you speak for the last time with the
following persons? Let us start first with Bormann.

SCHACHT: I gather from the use of the word “first” that you are going to
mention others also.

DR. DIX: Yes, Himmler, Hess, Ley, and Ribbentrop.

SCHACHT: In that case I would like to make a few preliminary remarks: At
the close of the French campaign, when Hitler returned triumphant and
victorious from Paris, all of us—the ministers and the Reichsleiter and
the other dignitaries of the Party as I assume, and state secretaries,
and so forth—received an invitation from the Reich Chancellery to be
present at the Anhalter Railway Station to greet Hitler on his arrival.
Since I was in Berlin at the time, it was impossible for me to refuse
this invitation. It was 1940, the conflict between Hitler and myself had
been going on for some time, and it would have been a veritable affront
if I had stayed at home. Consequently, I went to the station and saw a
very large number of Party dignitaries, ministers and so forth, but, of
course, I do not remember any more just who all these people were.

DR. DIX: I beg your pardon for interrupting you. I have a rather poor
memory for films and especially for newsreels, but I believe that that
reception was shown in a newsreel and I believe that you were just about
the only civilian who was present among those people.

SCHACHT: I personally did not see that film, but my friends told me
about it. They mentioned especially that among all the gold braid, I was
the only civilian in street clothes there. Of course, it could be
ascertained from the film who was present at the time.

I mentioned this reception, for it might be possible that I said “Good
morning” to many people and inquired about their health and so forth,
and I also recall that I arrived at the station with the Codefendant
Rosenberg in the same car, because there were always two people to a
car. I did not attend the reception which followed at the Reich
Chancellery. Rosenberg did go but I said, “No, I would rather not go. I
am going home.”

DR. DIX: Then, I may assume that you probably saw the leading men, Hess,
Ley, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Frick, Frank, Schirach, Speer, Sauckel,
Seyss-Inquart, Kaltenbrunner, _et cetera_, then for the last time?

SCHACHT: It is possible that all these gentlemen were there, but I did
not speak at length with any of them except Hitler himself.

DR. DIX: Did you speak with Hitler at that time?

SCHACHT: Hitler addressed me, and that was one of the strangest scenes
of my life. We were all standing in line and Hitler passed everyone by
rather quickly. When he saw me, he came up to me with a triumphant smile
and extended his hand in a cordial manner, something which I had not
seen from him for a long time, and he said to me, “Now, Herr Schacht,
what do you have to say now?” Then, of course, he expected me to
congratulate him or express my admiration or a similar sentiment, and to
admit that my prognostication about the war and about the disaster of
the war was wrong, for he knew my attitude about the war quite exactly.
It was extremely hard for me to avoid such an answer and I searched my
mind for something else to say, finally replying: “I can only say to
you, ‘God protect you.’” That was the only significant conversation
which I had that day. I believed the best way to have kept my distance
was through just such a completely neutral and inconsequential remark.

DR. DIX: Well...

SCHACHT: But perhaps you would like me to refer to the individual
gentlemen, and I can tell you with this exception just when I spoke to
these gentlemen for the last time.

DR. DIX: Himmler?

SCHACHT: Himmler, I would judge that perhaps I talked to him last in
1936.

DR. DIX: Hess?

SCHACHT: Hess—of course I am not referring to the conversations here in
the prison. I had not spoken with Hess for years before the beginning of
the war.

DR. DIX: Ley?

SCHACHT: Ley, I had not seen him since the beginning of the war.

DR. DIX: Ribbentrop?

SCHACHT: I saw Ribbentrop last after my being thrown out of the
Reichsbank, because I had to talk with him about the imminent journey to
India, and that must have been, I would judge, February 1939. I have not
talked with him since.

DR. DIX: Rosenberg?

SCHACHT: Rosenberg, always aside from this reception of Hitler’s,
perhaps not since 1936.

DR. DIX: Frick?

SCHACHT: I perhaps saw Frick last in the year 1938.

DR. DIX: Schirach?

SCHACHT: I did not even know Schirach.

DR. DIX: Speer?

SCHACHT: I talked with Speer for the last time—and I can tell you this
exactly—when I went to the World Exposition in Paris in the year 1937.

DR. DIX: Of course, you are always referring to the time before you were
taken prisoner?

SCHACHT: Yes, of course, naturally here I have...

DR. DIX: Sauckel?

SCHACHT: Not since the beginning of the war.

DR. DIX: Seyss-Inquart?

SCHACHT: Seyss-Inquart, I would judge that I spoke to him for the last
time in 1936, when I visited a colleague in the National Bank in
Austria.

DR. DIX: Kaltenbrunner?

SCHACHT: I saw Kaltenbrunner for the first time here at the prison.

DR. DIX: We will refer to Hitler later. Frank is still missing.

SCHACHT: I saw Frank last perhaps 1937 or 1938.

DR. DIX: Most likely at the occasion of the speech you mentioned
yesterday?

SCHACHT: Yes, possibly also afterwards at an official reception, but I
do not believe that I saw him after 1938.

DR. DIX: Now, how about the leading men of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, for
instance?

SCHACHT: I never had any contact with Keitel. I perhaps saw him at some
social gathering, but never after 1938.

DR. DIX: Jodl?

SCHACHT: I made Herr Jodl’s acquaintance here in the prison.

DR. DIX: Dönitz?

SCHACHT: I met Dönitz for the first time here in the prison.

DR. DIX: Raeder?

SCHACHT: Herr Raeder, I believe I have known him for quite some time. In
the beginning we exchanged occasional visits within the family, visits
of a semiofficial character but always on a friendly basis; however, I
believe that I have also not seen him or talked to him since 1938.

DR. DIX: Brauchitsch?

SCHACHT: I have not talked with Brauchitsch since 1939, or since 1938,
since the Fritsch affair.

DR. DIX: How about Halder?

SCHACHT: As you know, I saw Halder in connection with the Putsch in the
fall of 1938 but not after that.

DR. DIX: How often did you see Hitler after your dismissal as President
of the Reichsbank?

SCHACHT: After my dismissal as President of the Reichsbank?

DR. DIX: Since January 1939.

SCHACHT: I saw him once more in January 1939 because I had to discuss my
future activity, _et cetera_, with him. And on that occasion he asked
me—he knew that I had long wished to take an extensive journey—that I
might avail myself of this opportunity to take this journey now, so
there would not be so much talk about my leaving the Reichsbank. Then we
agreed on the trip to India. On that occasion I also saw Göring for the
last time. And then—after my return in August, I did not see him
again—then the war came, during the course of which I saw him twice.

Shall I tell you about those two occasions?

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: I saw him once in February 1940. At that time various American
magazines and periodicals had requested me to write articles on
Germany’s interpretation of the situation, her desires, and her position
in general. I had the inclination to do this, but because we were at
war, I naturally could not do so without first informing the Foreign
Minister. The Foreign Minister advised me that he had nothing against my
writing an article for an American periodical, but that before sending
off this article, he wanted to have the article submitted for
censorship. Of course that did not appeal to me—I had not even thought
of that—and, consequently, I did not write this article.

However, there were further inquiries from America and I said to myself,
“It is not sufficient for me to talk with the Foreign Minister, I must
go to Hitler in this matter.” So, with that aim, I called on Hitler, who
received me very soon after my request, and I told him at that time,
among other things, just what my experience with Herr Von Ribbentrop had
been, and I further told him that I thought it might be quite expedient
to write these articles; and that it seemed vital to me to have
constantly someone in America, who by means of the press, _et cetera_,
could enlighten public opinion as to Germany and her interests.

Hitler was favorably impressed with this suggestion of mine and said to
me, “I shall discuss this matter with the Foreign Minister.”
Consequently, this entire matter came to naught.

Then, later, through the good offices of my Codefendant, Funk, who
probably had a discussion at that time with Ribbentrop about this
matter, I tried to get at least an answer from Ribbentrop. This answer,
given to Funk, was to the effect that it was still too early for a step
of that sort. And that was my visit in 1940. Then I saw Hitler again in
February of 1941...

DR. DIX: Pardon my interruption. So that we can avoid all
misunderstandings, if Hitler had given you permission that you could
have gone to America, just what would your activities have been? Tell us
very briefly. I want no misunderstanding.

SCHACHT: First of all, I had not proposed going myself; I rather made a
general suggestion. But, naturally, I would have been very glad to go to
America for I saw a possibility...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think it is material to know what
he would have done if something had happened which did not happen.

DR. DIX: I just wanted to preclude any misunderstanding. I said that
misunderstandings—Well let us drop the subject.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Then, let us go on to your second visit.

SCHACHT: In 1941, in February, I called on Hitler once more because of a
private affair. The year before my wife had died and now I intended to
remarry. As Minister without Portfolio, which I still was, I naturally
had to inform the Reich Chancellor and head of the State of my intention
and I called on him for that reason. There was no political discussion
on this occasion. As I was going to the door, he asked me, “At one time
you had the intention, or you advised me, that someone should go to
America. It is probably too late for that, now.” I replied immediately,
“Of course, it is too late for that now.” And that was the only remark
of a political nature made. The conversation dealt mainly with my
marriage, and since then I did not see Hitler any more.

DR. DIX: And now your relations with Göring?

SCHACHT: I did not see Göring either since 1939.

DR. DIX: Now, I am turning to a point which has been repeatedly stressed
by the Prosecution, that is, the propaganda value of your participation
at Party rallies, and I would like to remind you of what Mr. Justice
Jackson has already mentioned in his opening statement. I am translating
from the English because I have no German text:

    “Does anyone believe that Hjalmar Schacht, seated in the first
    row at the Nazi Party Rally of 1935 and wearing the Party
    emblem, was only included in the film for the purpose of making
    an artistic effect? This great thinker, in lending his name to
    this threadbare undertaking, gave it respectability in the eyes
    of every hesitating German.”

Will you please state your opinion on this?

SCHACHT: First of all, I would like to make a few minor corrections. In
1935 I did not have a Party emblem. Secondly, Germans who were
hesitating were no longer of any importance in 1935, for Hitler’s
domination had been firmly established by 1935. There were only those
people who were turning away from Hitler but none who were still coming
to him. And then, I must really consider it as a compliment that I am
called a figure of importance, a great thinker, and so forth; but I
believe that the reasons for my being and working in the Hitler Cabinet
have been set forth by me in sufficient detail, so that I need not go
into that any more.

The fact that in the first years especially I could not very well absent
myself from the Party rallies is understandable, I believe, for they
were Hitler’s principal display of show and ostentation for the outside
world, and not only did his ministers participate in the Party rallies
but also a great many other representative guests.

May I add just a few more words?

I stayed away from the later Party rallies. For example, the Party Rally
of 1935 mentioned by the Chief Prosecutor. That was the Party rally—and
this is why I happen to remember it—at which the Nuremberg Laws against
the Jews were proclaimed, and at the time I was not even in Nuremberg.

I attended the Party Rally in 1933 and in 1934. I am not certain whether
I attended it in 1936 or 1937. I rather believe that I attended in 1936.
I was decidedly missing at the later rallies and the last visit that I
made at the Party Rally, which I have just mentioned, I attended only on
“Wehrmacht Day.”

DR. DIX: At these Party Rallies were the prominent foreigners—you
already mentioned that. Was the Diplomatic Corps represented by the
chiefs of the diplomatic missions?

SCHACHT: I believe that with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador, in
the course of years all other leading diplomats attended the Party
Rally, and I must say, in large numbers, with great ostentation and
seated in the first rows.

DR. DIX: How did you explain that? The Diplomatic Corps only really
takes part in functions of State and this was a purely Party matter? How
was this participation explained?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think this is objectionable. If it please the
Tribunal, I am in a position to object, because I am not embarrassed by
it, if there is any embarrassment, but for this witness to explain the
conduct of the ambassadors of other countries seems utterly beyond
probative value. His opinion of what the ambassadors were doing, why
they attended a Party rally which he was lending his name to, doesn’t
seem to me has any probative value. The fact that they attended I don’t
object to, but it seems to me that for him to probe, unless he has some
fact—and I want to make clear I don’t object to any facts that this
witness knows, and I haven’t objected to most of his opinions which we
have been getting at great length. But I think for him to characterize
the action of foreign representatives is going beyond the pale of
relevant and material evidence.

SCHACHT: May I make just one remark in reply?

THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better pass on, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: Yes, of course. However, I would ask to be given the permission
to answer Mr. Justice Jackson briefly, not because I want to be
stubborn, but I believe that if I answer now I can avoid later
discussions and can save time thereby. I did not ask the defendant for
his opinion. Of course Mr. Justice Jackson is right in saying that he is
not here to give opinions about the customs of the Diplomatic Corps; but
I asked him about a fact: How this participation on the part of the
Diplomatic Corps, which is significant, was explained at that time. I
consider this relevant, as will be seen more than once in the course of
my questioning, and that is why I am saying it now, that throughout his
and his political friends’ oppositional activities, it is of prime
importance to know who gave them moral, spiritual, or any other support,
and who did not support them. And thereby, of course, the outward
demeanor of the official representatives of foreign countries during the
whole period is of tremendous importance, with regard to the capacity of
this opposition group to act. One can support such a group; one can be
neutral to it, or one can also combat it from abroad. That is the only
reason why I put my question, and I deem myself obligated to consider
this angle of the problem also in the future.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson’s objection
was to the fact that the diplomatic representatives were there but to
comment upon the reasons why they were there. If all you want to prove
is the fact that they were there, then I don’t think Mr. Justice Jackson
was objecting to that. What the defendant was going on to give, was his
opinion of why the diplomatic representatives were there.

DR. DIX: I believe I do not need to make a further reply. He has already
said that he does not wish to give an explanation, but if Your Lordship
will permit me, I shall continue.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Around that time, you certainly came into
contact with prominent foreigners both officially and privately. What
position did they take towards the trend of events at the time the
National Socialists consolidated their power? And how did their attitude
influence your own attitude and activity?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May it please the Tribunal! I dislike to interrupt
with objections, but I can’t see how it exonerates or aids this
defendant, that prominent foreigners may have been deceived by a regime
for which he was furnishing the window dressings with his own name and
prestige. Undoubtedly there were foreigners, I am willing to stipulate
there were foreigners, like Dahlerus, who were deceived by this set-up
of which he was a prominent and slightly respectable part. But it does
seem to me that if we are going to go into the attitude of foreigners
who are not indicted here or accused that we approach endless questions.

I see no relevance in this sort of testimony.

The question is here, as I have tried to point out to Dr. Dix, the sole
thing that is charged against this defendant is that he participated in
the conspiracy to put this nation into war and to carry out the War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity incidental to it.

Now, I can’t see how the attitude of foreigners either exonerates or
helps the Court to decide that question. If it does, of course I don’t
object to it, but I can’t see the importance of it at this stage.

DR. DIX: I do believe that Mr. Justice Jackson...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Dix, what exactly was the question
that you were asking at that moment? What had it reference to?

DR. DIX: I asked the witness what the attitude was that was taken by
prominent foreigners with whom he came into contact at that time,
officially and privately during the period that the regime consolidated
its power. Did they reject the regime, or were they sympathetic to it?
In other words, just how far did these foreigners influence him and his
thinking? And may I...

THE PRESIDENT: I think you know, Dr. Dix, that to ask one witness what
the attitude of other people is is a very much too general form of
question. Attitude—what does the word mean? It is far too general, and
I do not understand exactly what you are trying to prove.

DR. DIX: I will make the question more precise.

How, Dr. Schacht, through your exchange of thoughts with foreigners, was
your personal attitude influenced? How was your attitude and your
activity influenced through the attitude of these foreigners?

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That is something which Dr. Schacht can
testify to alone, because it is of an intimate nature and personal to
Schacht. Your Lordship, I want quite openly to state the point to be
proved which seems very relevant to the Defense and on which this
question is based. I do not wish to conceal anything.

I, the Defense, maintain that this oppositional group—about which
Gisevius has already spoken, and of which Schacht was a prominent
member—that this group not only received no support from abroad, but
that foreigners rendered the opposition more difficult. That is not a
criticism that is leveled towards foreign governments.

There is no doubt that the representatives of these countries took that
attitude in good faith and with a sense of duty in the service of their
countries. But it was of decisive value for the attitude of these men of
this oppositional group what position the foreign countries took to this
regime; whether they respected or whether they supported it by
precedence given its representatives, socially, as far as possible, or,
through caution and reserve, showed their disinclination to it, thereby
strengthening this oppositional group.

This evidence is of the utmost importance to me in the carrying on of
the defense. I have stated it quite openly, and, as much as I can, I
will fight for this piece of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal has considered the argument which
you have presented to it and they think that the investigation of these
facts is a waste of time and is irrelevant. They will, therefore, ask
you to go on with the further examination of the defendant.

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, you supported the rearmament through financing by
the Reichsbank. Why did you do that?

SCHACHT: I considered that Germany absolutely had to have political
equality with other nations, and I am of the same opinion today; and in
order to reach this state, it was necessary that either the general
disarmament which had been promised by the Allied powers would come into
effect, or that if equal rights were to be obtained Germany would have
to rearm on a corresponding scale.

DR. DIX: Was this financial help by the Reichsbank your work alone or
was that decreed through the Directorate of the Reichsbank?

SCHACHT: In the Reichsbank, the Leadership Principle was never applied;
I rejected the Leadership Principle for the Reichsbank. The Reichsbank
was governed by a group of men all of whom had an equal power to vote
and if there was a “tie,” the vote of the chairman was the decisive
vote, and beyond that the chairman had no rights in this board.

DR. DIX: You are familiar with the affidavit of the former Reichsbank
Director Puhl. Did—I put the question taking into consideration the
contents of this affidavit with which the Tribunal is acquainted—Puhl
also participate in giving financial help from the Reichsbank for
rearmament?

SCHACHT: Herr Puhl participated in all decisions which were made by the
Reichsbank Directorate on this question and not once did he oppose the
decision reached.

DR. DIX: It is known to you that the Reichsbank’s method of financing
consisted in the discounting of the so-called mefo bills. The
Prosecution have discussed this fact in detail and the afore-mentioned
affidavit signed by Puhl says that this method made it possible to keep
the extent of rearmament secret. Is that correct?

SCHACHT: We cannot even talk about keeping the armament a secret. I call
your attention to some excerpts from documents presented and submitted
by the Prosecution themselves as exhibits. I quote first of all from the
affidavit by George Messersmith, dated 30 August 1945, Document Number
2385-PS, where it says on Page 3, Line 19: “Immediately after the Nazis
came into power they started a vast rearmament program.” And on Page 8
it says: “The huge German armament program which was never a secret....”

Thus, Mr. George Messersmith, who was in Berlin at the time, knew about
these matters and I am sure, informed his colleagues also.

I continue quoting from Document Number EC-461. It is the diary of
Ambassador Dodd, where it says, under 19 September 1934, and I quote in
English for I just have the English text before me:

    “When Schacht declared that the Germans are not arming so
    intensively, I said: Last January and February Germany bought
    from American aircraft people one million dollars worth of
    high-class war flying machinery and paid in gold.”

This is from a conversation between Dodd and myself which took place in
September 1934 and he points out that already in January and February
1934 war aircraft...

[_The proceedings were interrupted by technical difficulties in the
lighting system._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how long you expect to be
with your examination-in-chief of the defendant. You have already been
nearly a whole day, and the Tribunal think, in view of the directions in
the Charter, that the examination of the defendant ought to finish
certainly in a day.

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, there are two things I do not like to do, to
make prophecies which do not come true and to make a promise I cannot
keep.

May I answer the question by saying that I consider it quite impossible
for me to finish today. I am fully aware of the rules of the Charter,
but on the other hand I am asking you to consider that the Prosecution
have tried to prove the accusations against Schacht by numerous pieces
of evidence, directly and indirectly relevant facts, and that it is my
duty to deal with these individual pieces of evidence offered by the
Prosecution.

Please apply strict measures to my questions and if the Tribunal should
be of the opinion that there is something irrelevant, then I shall
certainly adhere to their ruling. However, I do think that I have not
only the right, but also the duty to put any questions which are
necessary to refute the evidence submitted by the Prosecution.

I shall, therefore, certainly not be able to finish today. I think—I
should be extremely grateful if you would not make me prophesy, it may
go faster and tomorrow I may finish in the course of the day but it may
even take the whole day—I cannot say for certain. In any case, I shall
make every effort to put only relevant questions. If the Tribunal should
be of the opinion that something is not relevant, I ask to be told so
after I have explained my standpoint.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better get on at once then, Dr. Dix, and
we’ll tell you when we think your questions are too long or too
irrelevant.

DR. DIX: Now, Dr. Schacht, we were considering the mefo bills, did you
consider them as a suitable means of keeping the rearmament secret? Have
you anything else to say to that question?

SCHACHT: The mefo bills as such, as far as rearmament was concerned, had
of course no connection with the question of secrecy, for the mefo bills
were used to pay every supplier. And there were, of course, hundreds and
thousands of small and big suppliers all over the country.

Apart from that, before they could be taken to the Reichsbank, the mefo
bills circulated among the public for at least 3 months and the
suppliers who required cash used the mefo bills to discount them in
their banks or to have advances made on the strength of them, so that
all banks participated in this system.

But I should like to add also that all the mefo bills, which were taken
up by the Reichsbank, were listed on the bill account of the Reichsbank.
Furthermore, I should like to say that the keeping secret of State
expenditure—and armament expenditures were State expenditure—was not a
matter for the President of the Reichsbank but an affair concerning the
Reich Minister of Finance. If the Reich Minister of Finance did not
publish the guarantees which he had accepted for the mefo bills, then
that was his affair and not mine. I am not responsible for that. The
responsibility for that lies with the Reich Minister of Finance.

DR. DIX: The next question, Your Lordship, might arouse doubts as to its
relevancy. I personally consider it irrelevant for the verdict in this
Trial. However, it has been mentioned by the Prosecution, and for that
reason alone I think it is my duty to give Dr. Schacht an opportunity to
reply and to justify himself.

The Prosecution have represented the view that the financing by means of
mefo bills, from the point of view of a solid financial procedure, was
also very hazardous. One might adopt the view that that may have been
the case or not to make this verdict...

THE PRESIDENT: Ask the question, Dr. Dix, ask the question.

DR. DIX: You have heard what I have in mind.

SCHACHT: It goes without saying that in normal times and under normal
economic conditions such means as mefo bills would not have been
resorted to. But if there is an emergency, then it has always been
customary, and it has always been a policy recommended by all experts,
that the issuing bank should furnish cheap money and credits so that the
economic system can, in turn, continue to function.

Mefo bills, of course, were a thoroughly risky operation, but they were
absolutely not risky if they were connected with a reasonable financial
procedure and to prove this I would say that if Herr Hitler, after 1937,
had used the accruing funds to pay back the mefo bills, as had been
intended—the money was available—then this system would have come to
its end just as smoothly as I had put it in operation. But Herr Hitler
preferred simply to refuse to pay the bills back, and instead to invest
the money in further armament. I could not foresee that someone would
break his word in such a matter too, a purely business matter.

DR. DIX: But, if the Reich had met the bills and had paid, then means
would no doubt have partly been lacking for further rearmaments and the
taking up of the bills would therefore have curtailed armament. Is that
a correct conclusion?

SCHACHT: That, of course, was the very purpose of my wanting to
terminate the procedure. I said if the mefo bills were not met, it would
obviously show ill-will; then there would be further rearming, and that
cannot be.

DR. DIX: Earlier you briefly dealt with the question of keeping armament
secret in another connection. Have you anything to add to that?

SCHACHT: I think in a general manner it must be realized that State
expenditures do not come under the jurisdiction of the President of the
Reichsbank, and that the expenses and receipts of the State are under
the control of the Reich Minister of Finance, and consequently the
responsibility lies in his hands and it is his duty to publish the
figures. Every bill which the Reichsbank had in its possession was made
known every week.

DR. DIX: Is that what you have to add to your answer to the basic
question of allegedly keeping the armament program secret?

SCHACHT: Yes.

DR. DIX: You have also already explained on the side why you
fundamentally were in favor of rearmament. Have you anything to add to
that?

SCHACHT: Yes. A few very important remarks are, of course, to be made on
that and since this question concerns the chief accusation against me, I
may perhaps deal with it in greater detail.

I considered an unarmed Germany in the center of Europe, surrounded by
armed nations, as a menace to peace. I want to say that these states
were not only armed but that they were, to a very large part, continuing
to arm and arming anew. Especially two states which had not existed
before, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were beginning to arm, and England,
for example, was continuing to rearm, specifically with reference to her
naval rearmament in 1935, _et cetera_.

I should like to say quite briefly that I myself was of the opinion that
a country which was not armed could not defend itself, and that
consequently it would have no voice in the concert of nations. The
British Prime Minister Baldwin once said, in 1935:

    “A country which is not willing to take necessary precautionary
    measures for its own defense will never have power in this
    world, neither moral power nor material power.”

I considered the inequality of status between the countries surrounding
Germany and Germany as a permanent moral and material danger to Germany.

I further want to point out—and this is not meant to be criticism, but
merely a statement of fact—that Germany, after the Treaty of
Versailles, was in a state of extreme disorganization and confusion.
Conditions in Europe were such that, for example, a latent conflict and
controversy existed between Russia and Finland and between Russia and
Poland which had considerable parts of Russian territory. There was
Russia’s latent conflict with Romania which had Bessarabia, and then
Romania had a conflict with Bulgaria about the Dobruja and one with
Hungary about Siebenbürgen. There were conflicts between Serbia and
Hungary, and between Hungary and nearly all her neighbors and between
Bulgaria and Greece. In short all of Eastern Europe was in a continuous
state of mutual suspicion and conflict of interests.

In addition, there was the fact that in a number of countries there were
most serious internal conflicts. I remind you of the conflict between
the Czechs and the Slovaks. I remind you of the civil war conditions in
Spain. All that will make it possible to understand that I considered it
absolutely essential that in the event of the outbreak of any
conflagration in this devil’s punch bowl, it was an absolute necessity
for Germany to protect at least her neutral attitude. That could not
possibly be done with that small army of 100,000 men. For that an
adequate army had to be created.

Here in prison I accidentally came across an edition of the _Daily
Mail_, dated April 1937, where the conditions in Europe were described,
and I beg you to allow me to quote one single sentence. I shall have to
quote it in English. It does not represent the views of the _Daily
Mail_; it only describes conditions in Europe.

I quote:

    “All observers are agreed that there is continual peril of an
    explosion and that the crazy frontiers of the peace treaties
    cannot be indefinitely maintained. Here, too, rigorous
    non-interference should be the King of the British chariot. What
    vital interests have we in Austria or in Czechoslovakia, or in
    Romania, or in Lithuania or Poland?”

This merely describes the seething state of Europe at that time, and in
this overheated boiling pot which was always on the point of exploding,
there was Germany, unarmed. I considered that a most serious danger to
my country.

Now, I shall probably be asked whether I considered Germany threatened
in any way. No, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I did not consider Germany
threatened directly with an attack, nor was I of the opinion that Russia
was likely to attack Germany. However, for example, we had experienced
the invasion of the Ruhr in 1923 and these past events and the actual
situation made it imperative for me to demand equality for Germany and
to support a policy that would attempt to achieve this.

I assume that we shall deal with the reasons for the carrying out of the
rearmament and with the reaction of foreign countries, _et cetera_.

DR. DIX: What did you know at the time about Germany’s efforts to cause
the other nations to disarm? Did that have anything to do with your
decisions?

SCHACHT: Let me tell you the following:

Fundamentally, I was not in favor of rearmament. I only wanted equality
for Germany. That German equality could be brought about either by means
of disarmament on the part of the other nations or by our own
rearmament. I would have preferred, in fact I desired disarmament on the
part of the others, which anyway had been promised to us. Consequently I
most zealously tried all along for years to prevent a rearmament, if
general disarmament could be brought about.

The disarmament on the part of the others did not take place, although
the Disarmament Committee of the League of Nations had repeatedly
declared that Germany had met her obligations regarding disarmament.

To all of us who were members of the so-called National Government at
the time, and to all Germans who participated in political life, it was
a considerable relief that during the first years Hitler, again and
again, strove for and suggested general disarmament. Afterwards, of
course, it is easy to say that that was a false pretense and a lie on
Hitler’s part, but that false pretense and that lie would have blown up
quite quickly if the countries abroad had shown the slightest
inclination to take up these suggestions.

I remember quite well what was told Foreign Minister Eden of Great
Britain when he visited Germany at the beginning of 1934, because I was
present at the social festivities. Quite concrete proposals concerning
Germany’s obligations in all disarmament questions, in case disarmament
on the part of the others was begun and carried out, were made to him.
It was promised to Eden that all so-called half-military units, like the
SS, the SA, and the Hitler Youth, would be deprived of their military
character if only the general disarmament could be accelerated by those
means.

I could produce a number of quotations regarding these offers to disarm,
but since it is the wish of the President not to delay the proceedings,
I can forego that. They are all well-known statements made by statesmen
and ministers, ambassadors, and such, all of which have the same tenor,
namely, that it was absolutely essential that the promise made by the
Allies should be kept; in other words, that disarmament should be
carried out.

DR. DIX: Excuse me if I interrupt you, but we can do it more quickly and
more simply by asking the Tribunal to take judicial notice of Exhibit
Number Schacht-12, which I have been granted, without my reading it,
Page 31 of the English translation of my document book. These are
pertinent remarks and speeches made by Lord Cecil and others, by the
Belgian Foreign Minister, _et cetera_. There is no need to read them;
they can be presented. I just hear that they have been presented, and I
can refer to them.

Pardon me, please. Continue.

SCHACHT: Well, in that case I am finished with my statement. Hitler made
still further offers but the other countries did not take up a single
one of these offers, and thus, unfortunately, only one alternative
remained, and that was rearmament. That rearmament carried out by Hitler
was financed with my assistance, and I assume responsibility for
everything I have done in that connection.

DR. DIX: Do I understand you correctly? Can one draw the conclusion from
your statement that there were other reasons for your assistance in the
rearmament program, that you had the tactical consideration that, by
putting German rearmament up for discussion, the debate on disarmament
amongst the other governments might be started again? This debate, so to
say, had died down?

SCHACHT: If I may, I will illustrate it briefly by means of an example:

Two parties have a contract with each other. One party does not live up
to that contract, and the other party has no way of making him fulfill
his obligations. Thus the other party can do nothing except, in turn,
not adhere to the contract. That is what Germany did. That is what I
supported. Now, of course, I must say that I had expected a type of
reaction which in such a case must always be expected from the partner
to a contract, namely, that he would say, “Well, if you do not keep up
the contract either, then we shall have to discuss this contract again.”

I must say—and I can quite safely use the word—it was a disappointment
to me that Germany’s rearmament was not in any way replied to by any
actions from the Allies. This so-called breach of contract on Germany’s
part against the Versailles Treaty was taken quite calmly. A note of
protest was all; nothing in the least was done, apart from that, to
bring up again the question of disarmament in which I was interested.

Not only was Germany allowed to go on rearming but the Naval Agreement
with Great Britain did, in fact, give Germany the legal right to rearm
contrary to the Versailles Treaty. Military missions were sent to
Germany to look at this rearmament, and German military displays were
visited and everything else was done, but nothing at all was done to
stop Germany’s rearmament.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If the Tribunal please, I cannot see the point of
all this detail. We have conceded that rearmament here, except as it was
involved with aggressive purposes, is immaterial. As I said in the
opening, the United States does not care to try here the issues of
European politics, nor are they submitted to this Tribunal for decision.

The sole question here is the Indictment, charging arming with the
purpose of aggression.

I do not want to interfere with the defendant giving any facts that bear
on his aggressive intentions, but the details of negotiations, of
European politics and charges and countercharges between governments, it
seems to me, lies way back of any inquiry that we could possibly make,
and the details of this matter seem to me not helpful to the solution of
the issues here, and I think was ruled out by the Tribunal in the case
of Göring, if I am not mistaken.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Dix, it all seems to be a matter of argument,
and argument isn’t really the subject of evidence.

DR. DIX: I do not believe so, Your Lordship. What Mr. Justice Jackson
said is quite correct. Schacht is accused of having assisted in bringing
about an aggressive war, but this assistance of his is supposed to have
consisted in the financing which he carried out.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Dix, and do try to make it as short as
possible.

DR. DIX: I think you had come to the end of that question anyway.

May I refer in this connection to one of the motives for Dr. Schacht’s
assistance in rearmament. It was his hope to renew the debate on
disarmament. May I draw your attention to Exhibit Number Schacht-36,
Page 141 of the German text, and Page 149 of the English text? It is an
affidavit from Dr. Schacht’s son-in-law, Dr. Von Scherpenberg. On Page 2
of that affidavit you will find the following brief paragraph which I
propose to read; in fact, I can confine myself to one sentence:

    “He”—that is to say, Schacht—“considered rearmament within
    certain limits to be the only means for the re-establishing of
    the disturbed equilibrium and the only means of inducing the
    other European powers to participate in a limitation of
    armaments which, in opposition to the Versailles Treaty, they
    had sought to avoid.”

That is a statement of Scherpenberg regarding conversations which
Schacht had had at that time. It is, therefore, not an _ex post facto_
opinion; it is the report of a conversation which he, Scherpenberg, had
with his father-in-law Schacht at that time. That is just an additional
remark I wanted to make.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You have spoken about the rearmament on
the part of the other states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland,
but can you tell us whether at the time you knew of or heard any exact
details regarding the state of armament of those two states?

SCHACHT: I know only that it was known about Russia that in 1935 she
announced that her peacetime army should be increased to 960,000 men.

Then I knew that in Czechoslovakia, for instance, the installation of
airdromes was one of the leading tasks of rearmament. We knew that Great
Britain’s Navy was to be stepped up.

DR. DIX: Did you later on completely abandon your idea of general
disarmament?

SCHACHT: To the contrary, I used every opportunity, in particular during
conversations with men from abroad, to say that the aim should always be
disarmament, that, of course, rearmament would always mean an economic
burden for us, which we considered a most unpleasant state of affairs.

I remember a conversation which I had with the American Ambassador
Davies. His report of this conversation is incorporated in an exhibit
that has been submitted to the Tribunal. It is an entry in a diary which
is repeated in his book, _Mission to Moscow_, and it is dated as early
as 20 June 1937, Berlin. He is writing about the fact that among other
things he and I had talked about disarmament problems, and I need only
quote one sentence. I do not have the number of the document, Your
Lordship, but it has been submitted to the Tribunal.

DR. DIX: It is Exhibit Schacht-18, German Page 43, English Page 49.

SCHACHT: Since I have only the English text, I shall read from it.

Davies writes:

    “When I outlined the President’s (Roosevelt) suggestion of
    limitation of armament to defensive weapons only, such as a man
    could carry on his shoulder, he (means Schacht) almost jumped
    out of his seat with enthusiasm.”

It becomes clear, therefore, from Ambassador Davies’ remark that I was
most enthusiastic about this renewed attempt and the possibility of an
imminent step towards disarmament as proposed by President Roosevelt.

In this same book, Davies reports a few days later on 26 June 1937 about
the conversation he had with me, in a letter addressed to the President
of the United States. I quote only one very brief paragraph—in English
again:

    “I then stated to him (that is, Schacht) that the President in
    conversation with me had analyzed the European situation and had
    considered that a solution might be found in an agreement among
    the European nations to a reduction of armaments to a purely
    defensive military basis and this through the elimination of
    aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment, and the limitation of
    armaments to such weapons only as a man could carry on his back,
    with an agreement among the nations for adequate policing of the
    plan by a neutral state. Schacht literally jumped at the idea.
    He said: ‘That’s absolutely the solution.’ He said that in its
    simplicity it had the earmarks of great genius. His enthusiasm
    was extraordinary.”

DR. DIX: To what extent did you want rearmament?

SCHACHT: Not beyond equality with every single one of our neighbor
states.

DR. DIX: And did Hitler talk to you of far-reaching intentions, or did
you hear of any?

SCHACHT: At no time did he tell them to me, nor did I hear from anyone
else, whether he had made remarks about further intentions.

DR. DIX: Were you informed about the extent, the type and speed of
rearmament?

SCHACHT: No, I was never told about that.

DR. DIX: Had you set yourself a limit regarding this financing or were
you prepared to advance any amount of money?

SCHACHT: I was certainly, by no means, ready to advance any unlimited
amount of money, particularly as these were not contributions; they were
credits which had to be repaid. The limits for these credits were
twofold. One was that the Reichsbank was independent of the State
finance administration, and the supreme authority of the State as far as
the granting of the credits was concerned. The Board of Directors of the
Reichsbank could pass a resolution that credits were to be given, or
were not to be given, or that credits were to be stopped, if they
considered it right, and as I was perfectly certain of the policy of the
Board of Directors of the Reichsbank—all of these gentlemen agreed with
me perfectly on financial and banking policy—this was the first
possibility of applying a brake, if I considered it necessary.

The second safeguard—limit was contained in the agreement which the
Minister of Finance, the Government, and of course Hitler had made—the
mefo bills, of which these credits consisted, were to be paid back when
they expired. They were repayable after 5 years, and I have already said
that if the repayments had been made, funds for rearmament would
naturally have had to decrease. Therein lay the second possibility of
limiting the rearmament.

DR. DIX: Will you please give now to the Tribunal the figures which you
were dealing with at the time?

SCHACHT: We went up to...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We have no desire to enter into controversy about
the figures of financing rearmament. It seems that the detail of dollars
and cents or Reichsmarks is unimportant to this, and terribly involved.
We aren’t trying whether it cost too much or too little; the purpose of
this rearmament is the only question we have in mind. I don’t see that
the statistics of cost have anything to do with it.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we would like to know what figures the accused
and you are talking about.

DR. DIX: The amounts that Schacht as President of the Reichsbank was
ready to grant for the rearmament program; that, no doubt, is relevant,
because if those amounts remained within such limits as might possibly
be considered adequate for defensive rearmaments in case of emergency,
then, of course, the extent of that financial assistance is a very
important piece of evidence regarding the intentions which Schacht was
pursuing at the time. That is the very thing that, in the case of
Schacht, Mr. Justice Jackson considers relevant, namely, whether he
helped prepare for an aggressive war. If he were considering only the
possibility of a defensive war in his financing and placed only sums at
the disposal of the rearmament program which would never have allowed an
aggressive war, then that would refute the accusation raised by the
Prosecution against the defendant, and I think that the relevance of
that question cannot be doubted.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that if the Defendant Schacht placed at
the disposal of the Reich, say, 100 millions, or whatever the figure is,
it would be defensive, and if he placed 150 millions, it would be not
defensive, or what? Is it simply the amount?

DR. DIX: No, I want to say that if, as will be proved, he only wanted to
give 9 and later on gave hesitatingly and unwillingly 12 millions for
the purpose, then that contribution can never have been aimed at an
aggressive war.

THE PRESIDENT: It is simply the amount?

DR. DIX: Yes, only the size of the amount.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that can be stated very shortly, but as for details
of finance...

DR. DIX: I am also of the opinion that we have talked about it too long.
I was only going to ask, “What amount did you give?” and then the
objection was raised, and thus the discussion was drawn out. May I put
the question?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well, then, what amount did you
intend to grant?

SCHACHT: Naturally as little as possible; however, what I contributed is
what is decisive. I placed at their disposal—to give one figure and to
be very brief—until 31 March 1938, credits amounting to a total of
12,000,000,000 Reichsmark. I have discussed that with one of the
interrogators of the British Prosecution, who asked me about the
subject, and I replied that that was about one-third of the amount which
was spent on rearmament. After that, without the Reichsbank, beginning
with 1 April 1938, the figure stated in that budget year for rearmament
was 11,000,000,000, and in the subsequent year, 20,500,000,000, and of
that not a pfennig came from the Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: That was after your resignation, was it not?

SCHACHT: That was after I had stopped credits.

For the record I should like to say that I think I made a mistake
before. I said millions instead of milliards, but I think it is obvious
what I meant. I wanted only to correct it.

DR. DIX: Now, then, Dr. Schacht, the Prosecution have stated that on 19
February 1935 the Ministry of Finance received authority to borrow
unlimited amounts of money if Hitler ordered them to do so.

SCHACHT: Here, again, the prosecutor did not see things in the proper
light. The President of the Reichsbank is not responsible for the
actions of the Reich Minister of Finance. I think the President of the
Federal Reserve Bank in New York can hardly be held responsible for the
things done by the Secretary of the Treasury in Washington.

DR. DIX: You have also been accused that the debt of the Reich increased
three times during the time while you were President of the Reichsbank.

SCHACHT: I might just as well be accused of being responsible for the
fact that the birth rate in Germany rose sharply during the time I was
President of the Reichsbank. I want to emphasize the fact that I had
nothing to do with either.

DR. DIX: You were not responsible for the same reason.

SCHACHT: No, of course I am not responsible for that.

DR. DIX: And presumably the same applies to the point made by the
Prosecution that you allegedly drafted a new finance program in 1938?

SCHACHT: On the contrary, I refused to do anything else for the
financing of rearmament; the finance program was drafted by a state
secretary in the Reich Finance Ministry, and it looked like it.

DR. DIX: One of your economic policies, during the time you were
Minister of Economy, and which you have been accused of as being a
preparation for war, was the so-called “New Plan” (Neue Plan). What was
that?

SCHACHT: May I first of all say that the New Plan had nothing at all to
do with rearmament. Germany, after the Treaty of Versailles, had fallen
into a state of distress, economically speaking and especially export...

DR. DIX: Your Lordship, if the Tribunal is of the opinion that the New
Plan has nothing to do with the rearmament and preparations for war—I
think the Prosecution are of the opposite opinion—then, of course, the
question is irrelevant, and I will drop it. I am only putting it because
the New Plan has been used in the argumentation of the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: If you say, and the defendant has just said that the New
Plan had nothing to do with rearmament, I think you might leave it for
cross-examination and you can raise it again in re-examination if it is
cross-examined.

DR. DIX [_Turning to the defendant_]: In that case I shall not ask you
about the barter agreements, either. I shall leave it to the Prosecution
to bring it out during the cross-examination. I cannot see what it has
to do with the preparation for war.

Now, you have already stated that you strove to remove the Versailles
Treaty by means of peaceful negotiations, or at least, to modify it. In
the opinion which you held at that time did any such means for a
peaceful modification of the Versailles Treaty still exist?

SCHACHT: In my opinion, there were no means other than peaceful ones.
The desire to modify the Versailles Treaty by means of a new war was a
crime.

DR. DIX: Well. But now you are being accused that the alleged
preparations for war, which really were a countermeasure to the general
rearmament although not a preparation for an aggressive war, were
nevertheless a rearmament, and as such, were an infringement of the
Treaty of Versailles. I assume that you, at the time, decided to help
finance that rearmament only after giving the problem due legal and
moral considerations. What, exactly, were these considerations?

SCHACHT: I think I have already answered that question in detail. I need
add nothing else.

DR. DIX: Very well. Insofar as you know, was this attitude of yours, the
attitude of a pacifist and of someone who was definitely opposed to the
extension of living space in Europe, known abroad?

SCHACHT: As long as I have been President of the Reichsbank, that is to
say from March 1933—and I am, of course, only talking about the Hitler
regime—my friends and acquaintances abroad were fully informed about my
attitude and views. I had a great many friends and acquaintances abroad,
not only because of my profession but also outside of that and
particularly in Basel, Switzerland, where we had our monthly meeting at
the International Bank, with all the presidents of the issuing banks of
all the great and certain neutral countries, and I always took occasion
at all these meetings to describe quite clearly the situation in Germany
to these gentlemen.

Perhaps I may at this point refer to the so-called conducting of foreign
conferences or conversations. If one is not allowed to talk to
foreigners any more, then one cannot, of course, reach an understanding
with them. Those silly admonitions, that one had to avoid contact with
foreigners, seem entirely uncalled for to me, and if the witness
Gisevius deemed it necessary the other day to protect his dead comrades,
who were my comrades too, from being accused of committing high treason,
then I should like to say that I consider it quite unnecessary. Never at
any time did any member of our group betray any German interests. To the
contrary, he fought for the interests of Germany, and to prove that, I
should like to give you a good example:

After we had occupied Paris, the files of the Quai d’Orsay were
confiscated and were carefully screened by officials from the German
Foreign Office. I need not assure you that they were primarily looking
for proof whether there were not any so-called defeatists circles in
Germany which had unmasked themselves somewhere abroad. All the files of
the Quai d’Orsay referring to my person and, of course, there were
records of many discussions which I had had with Frenchmen, were
examined by the Foreign Office officials at that time, without my
knowing it.

One day—I think it probably happened in the course of 1941—I received
a letter from a German professor who had participated in this search
carried out by the Foreign Office. I shall mention the name so that, if
necessary, he can testify. He is a Professor of Finance and National
Economy, Professor Stückenbeck of Erlangen, and he wrote me that at this
investigation...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal cannot see any point in this, so far as this
Trial is concerned. In any event, if the defendant says that he did not,
in any way, give away the interests of Germany, surely that is
sufficient. We do not need all the details about it. What it has got to
do with this Trial, I do not know.

DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, that that was not the point of the
statement. What he wants to say is that reliable men abroad knew him and
were acquainted with the fact that he was certainly a man of peace and
not a man who prepared aggressive wars, and that applies even to the
period of rearmament.

THE PRESIDENT: But he said that 5 minutes ago.

DR. DIX: I do not think the question of Professor Stückenbeck is so
important, but it certainly seems pertinent to me what Ambassador Davies
said about his conversation with the then Foreign Commissar of the
Soviet Republic, Litvinov. This is contained in Exhibit Schacht-18 of my
document book. It is Page 43 of the German text, and Page 49 of the
English text. May I read one paragraph, and then ask Dr. Schacht briefly
whether that statement of Ambassador Davies corresponds to his
recollection? It is Davies’ report, an extract from his book _Mission to
Moscow_. A report is there to the Secretary of State in the United
States. The passage is on Pages 108 and 109.

    “Pursuant to an appointment made, I called upon Commissar for
    Foreign Affairs Litvinov to present my respects before departure
    for the United States.

    “I then stated that the European situation in its elementals
    looked simple and that it was difficult to understand why the
    statesmanship of Europe could not provide that England, France,
    Germany, Italy, and Russia should agree to preserve the
    territorial integrity of Europe and through trade agreements
    provide Germany with raw materials, thereby giving the assurance
    that she could live, which would relieve the peoples of Europe
    and the world of these terrific burdens of armament and of the
    fear of catastrophic war. The prompt rejoinder was: ‘Do you
    think Hitler would ever agree to anything like that?’ I said
    that I did not know, but that it was my opinion that there was a
    very substantial body of influential and responsible men in
    Germany that such an idea would appeal to. Litvinov replied that
    he thought that might be so; that Schacht was of that type; he
    did not think they could prevail against Hitler and the
    political and military forces dominant in Germany.”

And now I ask you, do you remember that conversation with Davies?

SCHACHT: I think there must be a mistake. I did not speak to Davies
about this, I spoke to Litvinov. This is a report of Davies to the
Secretary of State, about which I did not know.

DR. DIX: Yes, you are perfectly right.

It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Prosecution that your knowledge
of Hitler’s intentions of war resulted also from your being
Plenipotentiary for War Economy and a member of the Reich Defense
Counsel. Göring has made a detailed statement on it. Have you anything
new to add to Göring’s statement?

SCHACHT: I think the witness Lammers has also talked about it. I should
like merely to confirm that the first Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 was
nothing other than the legalization of a committee which existed before
1933, made up of ministerial officials who were supposed to deal with
economic measures as well as administrative measures, which might have
to be taken in the event of a threat of war against Germany.

DR. DIX: How often did you have a meeting especially with the Minister
of War and the Plenipotentiary for Administration?

SCHACHT: This famous triumvirate, this Three Man College described by
one of the prosecutors as the cornerstone of war policy, never met at
all, and it is no wonder that we lost the war, if that was the
cornerstone.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution have also referred to the report of the
Ministry of War regarding the task of the Reich Defense Counsel of 1934.
It is Document Number EC-128, Exhibit Number USA-623. Have you anything
in particular to add to that?

SCHACHT: Yes, I should like to have permission to quote one very brief
paragraph. I see there are only two sentences. This report contains the
following statement:

Referring to the experiences of World War I, that is 1914 to 1918, and I
quote—I shall have to do it in English since I have only the English, I
quote:

    “At that time we were able to extend our bases for raw materials
    and production toward the West: Longwy, Briey, Tourcoing,
    Roubaix, Antwerp (textiles), and toward the East, Lodz, and
    Southeast (ore mines in Serbia and Turkey, mineral oils in
    Romania). Today we have to reckon with the possibility of being
    thrown back in our own country and even of being deprived
    thereby of most valuable industrial and raw material in the West
    and in the East.”

I think that if anyone wanting to prepare an aggressive war had
calculated in September 1934 that one would have to protect oneself
against the possibility of such a situation arising, that this is the
best proof that there can be no question of an aggressive war at all.

DR. DIX: In that connection, under the heading of “peaceful efforts,”
can you perhaps also tell the Tribunal what your peaceful efforts were,
to have the reparations clauses of the Versailles Treaty modified or
even abolished?

SCHACHT: From the very first moment, after the reparations were
determined in 1921 or so, I fought against this nonsense with the
argument that the carrying out of those reparations would throw the
entire world into economic chaos. One cannot, during one generation, pay
120,000,000,000 Reichsmark or about 2,000,000,000 Reichsmark yearly, as
at that time...

DR. DIX: We would like to make it brief. Will you please talk only about
your peaceful efforts and not about national economy?

SCHACHT: All right, I will not talk about national economy.

I fought against it and, as time went by, I did succeed in convincing
the people of almost all the countries that this was sheer nonsense.
Therefore in July of 1932, if I am not mistaken, the then Reich
Chancellor Papen was in a position to affix his signature to an
agreement at Lausanne, which reduced reparations, _de jure_, to a
pending sum of 3,000,000,000, and which, _de facto_, canceled
reparations altogether.

DR. DIX: Did you then continue your definitely peaceful efforts in other
fields? You have already touched upon the negotiations in Paris
regarding the colonial question. I wonder if you have anything to add to
that in this connection?

SCHACHT: I do not remember at the moment how far I had gone at the time,
but I think I reported on the negotiations in detail, so I need not
repeat.

DR. DIX: George Messersmith, the often-mentioned former Consul General
of the United States in Berlin, states in his affidavit Document Number
EC-451, Exhibit Number USA-626, to which the Prosecution have referred,
that he is of the opinion that the National Socialist regime could not
have been in a position to stay in power and build up its war machine if
it had not been for your activity. At the end of the case for the
Prosecution, the Prosecution present that thesis of Messersmith.
Therefore I should like you to make a statement on this subject.

SCHACHT: I do not know whether that completely unsubstantiated private
opinion of Mr. Messersmith has any value as evidence. Nevertheless, I
should like to contradict it by means of a few figures. I had stated
earlier that until 31 March 1938, the Reichsbank had given
12,000,000,000; that is to say, during the first fiscal year, about
2,250,000,000, and during the subsequent 3 years, 3,250,000,000 per
annum. During those years—the Codefendant Keitel was asked about that
when he was examined here—the armament expenditures, as Keitel said,
amounted to the following:

In the fiscal year 1935-1936—5,000,000,000.

In the fiscal year 1936-1937—7,000,000,000.

In the following fiscal year—9,000,000,000.

And at that stage the assistance from the Reichsbank ceased. In spite of
that, during the following year and without any assistance from the
Reichsbank, the expenditure for armament increased to 11,000,000,000,
and in the following year it climbed to 20,500,000,000.

It appears, therefore, that even without the financial genius of Herr
Schacht, they managed to raise the funds. Just how they did so is
another question.

DR. DIX: I duly put these figures to the Defendant Keitel. I do not
think that the Tribunal had the document at the time. It is now
available and has the Exhibit Number Schacht-7. It is Page 15 of the
German text and Page 21 of the English text. Herr Keitel could, of
course, only refer to the first column, that is to say, total
expenditure; but there is a second and a third column, in this account,
and these two are calculations made by Schacht, calculations regarding
what was raised with the help and without the help of the Reichsbank.

I do not intend to go through it in detail now. I should merely like to
have your permission to ask Dr. Schacht whether the figures calculated
by him, in Columns 2 and 3 of the document, were calculated correctly.

SCHACHT: I have these figures in the document before me. The figures are
absolutely correct and again I want to declare that they show that,
during the first year after the Reichsbank had discontinued its
assistance, no less than 5,125,000,000 more were spent without the
assistance of the Reichsbank, that is to say, a total of 11,000,000,000.

DR. DIX: Up to now you have stated to the Tribunal that you were active
against a dangerous and extensive rearmament and you showed that by
tying up the money bag. Did you oppose excessive rearmament in any other
way, for instance, by giving lectures and such?

SCHACHT: Many times I spoke not only before economists and professors
who were my main auditors, but I often spoke upon invitation of the
Minister of War and the head of the Army Academy before high-ranking
officers. In all these lectures I continually referred to the financial
and economic limitations to which German rearmament was subject and I
warned against excessive rearmament.

DR. DIX: When did you first gather the impression that the extent of
German rearmament was excessive and exaggerated?

SCHACHT: It is very difficult to give you a date. Beginning in 1935, I
made continuous attempts to slow down the speed of rearmament. On one
occasion Hitler had said—just a moment, I have it here—that until the
spring of 1936 the same speed would have to be maintained. I adhered to
that as much as possible, although, beginning with the second half of
1935, I continuously applied the brake. But after 1935 I told myself
that, since the Führer himself had said it, after the spring of 1936 the
same speed would no longer be necessary. This can be seen from Document
1301-PS in which these statements of mine are quoted, statements which I
communicated to the so-called “small Ministerial Council” (kleiner
Ministerrat). Göring contradicted me during that meeting, but I of
course maintain the things which I said at the time.

After that I constantly tried to make the Minister of War do something
to slow down the speed of rearmament, if only in the interest of general
economy, since I wanted to see the economic system working for the
export trade. Proof for the fact of just how much I urged the Minister
of War is contained in my letter dated 24 December 1935, which I wrote
him when I saw the period desired by Hitler coming to an end, and when I
was already applying the brake. It has also been presented by the
Prosecution as Document Number EC-293. In the English version of the
document it is on Page 25.

I beg to be allowed to quote very briefly—all my quotations are very
brief—from that document. I wrote a letter to the Reich Minister of
War, and I quote:

    “I gather from your letter dated 29 November”—and then come the
    reference numbers—“that increased demands by the Armed Forces
    for copper and lead are to be expected, which will amount to
    practically double the present consumption. These are only
    current demands, whereas the equally urgent provisions for the
    future are not contained in the figures. You are expecting me to
    obtain the necessary foreign currency for these demands, and to
    that I respectfully reply that under the existing circumstances
    I see no possibility of doing so.”

In other words, Blomberg is asking that I should buy raw materials with
foreign currency, and I am stating quite clearly that I do not see any
possibility of doing so.

The document goes on to say—and this is the sentence regarding the
limit up to 1 April. I quote:

    “In all the conferences held with the Führer and Reich
    Chancellor up to now, as well as with the leading military
    departments, I have expressed my conviction that it would be
    possible to supply the necessary foreign currencies and raw
    materials for the existing degree of rearmament until 1 April
    1936. Despite the fact that, due to our cultural and agrarian
    policies which are being repudiated all over the world, this has
    been made extremely difficult for me and continues to be
    difficult, I still hope that my original plan may be carried
    out.”

That is to say, that I thought this proposed program could be carried
out up to 1 April, but not over and beyond that.

DR. DIX: It is a fact that Minister of Transportation, Dorpmüller, was
trying to raise credits for railway purposes. What was your attitude as
President of the Reichsbank towards this?

SCHACHT: During a conference between the Führer, Dorpmüller, and myself,
at which the Führer strongly supported Dorpmüller’s demands, I turned
that credit down straightway, and he did not get it.

DR. DIX: The meeting of 27 May 1936 of the so-called “small Ministerial
Council,” presided over by Göring, has been discussed here. The
Prosecution contend that intentions of aggressive war became apparent
from that meeting. Did you have any knowledge of that meeting?

SCHACHT: What was the date, please?

DR. DIX: 27 May 1936.

SCHACHT: No. I was present during that conference and I see nothing in
the entire document pointing to an aggressive war. I have studied the
document very carefully.

DR. DIX: It has furthermore been stated against you what is contained in
the report of Ambassador Bullitt, Document Number L-151, Exhibit USA-70,
dated 23 November 1937. You have heard, of course, that the Prosecution
are also drawing the conclusion from that report that there were
aggressive intentions on Hitler’s part. Will you please make a statement
about that?

SCHACHT: I see nothing in the entire report to the effect that Hitler
was about to start an aggressive war. I was simply talking about
Hitler’s intentions to bring about an Anschluss of Austria, if possible,
and to give the Sudeten Germans autonomy if possible. Neither of those
two actions would be aggressive war, and apart from that, Mr. Bullitt
says the following with reference to me in his report about this
conversation. I quote: “Schacht then went on to speak of the absolute
necessity for doing something to produce peace in Europe....”

DR. DIX: The memorandum of this conversation is also contained in my
document book as Exhibit Number Schacht-22. It is on Page 64 of the
English text and Page 57 of the German text.

We shall now have to deal in greater detail with your alleged knowledge
of Hitler’s intentions to start war. First of all, speaking generally,
did Hitler ever, as far as you know...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I asked Dr. Dix if he would object if
the Tribunal would allow me, since he is passing to a new point, to
mention the question of the Raeder documents. I had a discussion with
Dr. Siemers. There are still some outstanding points, and we should be
grateful if the Tribunal would hear us this afternoon, if possible,
because the translating division is waiting for the Raeder documents to
get on with their translations.

THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not more than a half hour, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: If the translation department are waiting, perhaps we had
better do it at 2 o’clock.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: If it is only going to take a half hour. It isn’t likely,
I suppose, to take more than that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think it will take more than that.

THE PRESIDENT: We will do that at 2 o’clock, and now we will adjourn.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, the Tribunal should
have in front of them a statement of our objections to certain of the
documents, arranged in six groups. Attached to that sheet they will find
an English summary of the documents, presenting shortly the contents of
each one of them. My Lord, with regard to the first group, might I make
two erasures from our objection to Number 19, which has been allowed in
the case of Schacht, and if I understand Dr. Siemers correctly he
doesn’t press for Number 76.

Now, My Lord, the others in that group:

Number 9 is a series of quotations from Lersner’s book on _Versailles_.

Number 10, the quotation from a book by the German left-wing publicist,
Thomas Mann.

Number 17 is the _Failure of a Mission_, by Nevile Henderson.

Number 45 is a quotation from a book of Mr. Churchill’s.

Number 47 is the report on a complaint to Lord Halifax about an article
in _News Chronicle_ criticizing Hitler.

My Lord, Number 66 is rather different. If the Tribunal would be good
enough to look at it, it is a report by a German lawyer, Dr. Mosier I
think his name should be, who is an authority on international law,
dealing with the Norway action. Dr. Siemers has been, of course,
absolutely frank with me and he said that it would be convenient to him
to have this, which is really a legal argument, embodied in his document
book. Of course, that is not really the purpose of these document books;
but, of course, it is a matter for the Tribunal, and we felt we had to
draw attention to it.

Then, My Lord, Number 76 comes out.

Numbers 93 to 96 are quotations from Soviet newspapers.

Number 101 is a quotation from Havas, the French News Agency.

Numbers 102 to 107 are minor orders relating to the Low Countries which,
the Prosecution submit, have no evidential value.

Then in the second group, there are a number of documents which, the
Prosecution submit, are not relevant to any of the issues in the case.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn’t deal with Number 109, did you?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, it is on the second line.
That is another legal argument, the effect of the war on the legal
position of Iceland, which is a quotation from the _British Journal of
Information in Public Law and International La_w.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the second group, the Prosecution
submit, is irrelevant.

Number 22 is a Belgian decree of 1937 dealing with the possible
evacuation of the civil population in time of war.

Number 39 is a French document of the Middle East.

Numbers 63 and 64 are two speeches, one by Mr. Emery and another by Mr.
Churchill, dealing with the position in Greece at the end of 1940, some
two months after the beginning of the Italian campaign against Greece.

Number 71 is an undated directive with regard to the study of routes in
Belgium, which doesn’t seem to us to have any evidential importance.

Number 76 comes out as the _Altmark_.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 76 came out?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, that is the _Altmark_. It is the
same one that is in Number 71. I am sorry, My Lord, it should have been
marked out.

Number 99 is the minutes of the ninth meeting of the combined Cabinet
Council on the 27th of April 1940, and it deals with a suggestion of M.
Reynaud with regard to the Swedish ore mines. As it was long after the
Norway campaign and it was never, of course, acted upon in Norway, it
seems to us to have no relevance for this Trial.

Numbers 102 to 107 I have dealt with under one. They have certain very
small unimportant memoranda relating to the Low Countries.

Number 112 is a French document in which Paul Reynaud quotes a statement
from Mr. Churchill that he will fight on to the end, which again doesn’t
seem of much importance in 1946.

Now, My Lord, the next group are documents which were rejected by the
Tribunal when applied for by the Defendant Ribbentrop. The first two
deal with British rearmament and the others with the Balkans and Greece.
The Tribunal will probably remember the group which they did reject in
the Ribbentrop application; and the fourth group are other documents of
the same series as those rejected by the Tribunal in the case of the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The fifth group are really objectionable on
the _tu quoque_ basis. I think they are entirely French documents which
deal with proposals in a very tentative stage and which were arranged,
but never followed out, with regard to the destruction of oil fields or
the blocking of the Danube in the Middle East. My Lord, they are
documents dated in the spring of 1940 and, as I say, they deal with the
most tentative stages and were never put into operation. The plans were
never in operation.

The sixth group are documents dealing with Norway, which were captured
after the occupation of France. As I understand Dr. Siemers’ argument,
it is not suggested that these documents were within the knowledge of
the defendants at the time that they carried out the aggression against
Norway; but it is stated that they had other information. Of course, as
to their own information, we have not made any objection at all; and
that these documents might be argued to be corroborative of their
agents’ reports. Actually, as is shown by Document Number 83, to which
we make no objection, they also deal with tentative proposals which were
not put into effect and were not proceeded with; but in the submission
of the Prosecution, the important matter must be what was within the
knowledge of the defendants before the 9th of April 1940; and it is
irrelevant to go into a large number of other documents which are only
arguably consistent with the information which the defendants stated
they had.

My Lord, I tried to deal with them very shortly because I made a promise
to the Tribunal on the time, but I hope that I have indicated very
clearly what our objections were.

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Your Honors, it is
extremely difficult to define my position with reference to so many
documents, especially since I know that these documents have not yet
been translated and that the contents, in the main, are therefore not
known to those concerned. Therefore, I might point out that there is a
certain danger in treating documents in this way. In part they are basic
elements of my defense.

Therefore, I should like to state now that in dealing with these
documents I shall be compelled, in order to give the reasons for the
relevancy of this evidence, to point out those passages which I shall
not need to read separately into the record, for as soon as the document
book is ready they will be known to the Tribunal and can be read there.

I shall follow the order as outlined by Sir David. First of all, the
first group, Document Numbers 9 and 10. The note submitted by Sir David
to the Tribunal points out that the submission of these documents
conflicts with the ruling given by the Tribunal on 29 March. In reply I
should like to point out that this opinion of the Prosecution is an
error. The ruling of the Tribunal said that no documents might be
submitted concerning the injustice of the Versailles Treaty and the
pressure arising from it. These documents do not concern the injustice
and the pressure; rather they serve to give a few examples of the
subjective attitude of a man like Noske, who was a Social Democrat and
certainly did not want to conduct any wars of aggression. A few other
statements in Numbers 9 and 10 show the thought of the Government and
the ruling class at that time in regard to defensive measures and the
fear that in case of an attack on the part of Poland, for instance, the
German Armed Forces might be too weak. These are facts pure and simple;
and I give you my express assurance that I shall not quote any sentences
which might introduce a polemic. Moreover, I need this mainly as a basis
for my final pleading.

Number 17 is a very brief excerpt from the book by Henderson, _Failure
of a Mission_, written in 1940. I believe there are no objections to my
quoting about 15 lines, if I wish to use them in my final pleading in
order to show that Henderson, who knew Germany well, still believed in
1940 that he had to recognize certain positive good points in the regime
at that time; and I believe that the conclusion is justified that one
cannot expect that a German military commander should be more sceptical
than the British Ambassador at that time.

Then we turn to Document Number 45. It is true this document is taken
from a book by Churchill; but it deals with a fact which I should like
to prove, the fact that already many years before World War I there
existed a British Committee for Defense. In the table of contents which
Sir David has submitted, the word “Reichsverteidigungsausschuss” is
used, and I therefore conclude that this is a mistake on the part of the
Prosecution who took it to mean a German Reich Defense Committee; that
is not correct. This document shows how it came about that the
Prosecution wrongly overestimated the importance of the German Reich
Defense Committee, as the Prosecution naturally compared it with the
British Committee for Defense, which went very much further in its
activities.

Number 47 is evidence to show that when the German Embassy pointed out
that an extremely scathing article on Hitler had appeared in the paper
_News Chronicle_, Lord Halifax pointed out in reply that it was not
possible for him to exert any influence on the newspaper. I should
merely like to compare this with the fact that the Prosecution made it
appear as though Raeder had had something to do with the regrettable
article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_: “Churchill sank the _Athenia_.”
Raeder was no more connected with that article than Lord Halifax with
the article in the _News Chronicle_ and was unfortunately even more
powerless, as far as this article was concerned, than the British
Government.

Number 66 deals with the opinion given by Dr. Mosier, a specialist on
international law, an opinion on the Norway action in very compressed
form, as the Tribunal will surely admit. The Tribunal will also concede
that in my defense of the Norway action I must speak at length about the
underlying principles of international law. The underlying principles of
international law are not an altogether simple matter. I have nothing
against presenting this myself in all necessary detail. I was merely
guided by the thought that the Tribunal have asked again and again that
we save time. I believe that we can save considerable time if this
statement of opinion is granted me, so that I shall not have to cite
numerous excerpts and authors in detail in order to show the exact legal
justification. I could then perhaps deal with the legal questions in
half an hour, whereas without this statement of opinion it is utterly
impossible for me to treat such a problem in half an hour. If the
Prosecution do not object to more time being taken up, then I do not
object if the document is denied me. I will merely have to take the
consequences.

Number 76 has meanwhile been crossed out, that is, it is granted me by
the Prosecution.

Numbers 93 to 96 are excerpts on statements of the official Moscow
papers, _Isvestia_ and _Pravda_. These statements prove that, at least
at that time, Soviet opinion regarding the legality of the German action
in Norway coincided with the German opinion of that time. If the
Tribunal think that these very brief quotations should not be admitted
as documents, I would not be too insistent, since at this point in the
proceedings I shall in any case be compelled to discuss it. The Tribunal
will remember that at that time Germany and Russia were friends, and
Soviet opinion on a purely legal problem should, at any rate, be
considered as having a certain significance.

Then, Number 101; I beg your pardon, Sir David, but if I am not mistaken
Dr. Braun said an hour and a half ago that Number 101 is to be rejected.
Very well, then, Numbers 101 to 107. The action against Norway, as I
have already said, involved a problem of international law. It involves
the problem of whether one country may violate the neutrality of another
country when it can be proved that another belligerent nation likewise
intends to violate the neutrality of the afore-mentioned neutral state.
When presenting my evidence I shall show that Grossadmiral Raeder, in
the autumn of 1939, received all sorts of reports to the effect that the
Allies were planning to take under their own protection the territorial
waters of Norway, that is, to land in Norway, in order to have Norwegian
bases. When I deal with the Norway documents, I shall return to this
point. I should like to say at this point that it is necessary to
explain and to prove that the legal attitude taken by the Allies to the
question of the possible violation of the neutrality of a country was in
the years 1939 and 1940 entirely the same as the attitude of the
Defendant Raeder in the case of Norway at the same time.

Therefore it is necessary not only to deal with Norway; but also to show
that this was a basic conception, which can readily be proved by
reference to parallel cases on the strength of these documents. These
parallel cases deal in the first place with the plans of the Allies with
respect to the Balkans, and secondly with the plans of the Allies with
respect to the Caucasian oil fields.

Your Honors, it is by no means my intention, as Sir David has suggested,
to use these documents from the _tu quoque_ point of view, from the
point of view that the defendant has done something, which the Allies
have also done or wanted to do. I am concerned only with a judgment of
the Defendant Raeder’s actions from the legal point of view. One can
understand such actions only when the entire matter is brought to light.

It is my opinion—and in addition to this I should like to refer to the
statement of Dr. Mosier’s opinion, Exhibit Raeder-66—that this cannot
be made the subject of an accusation.

We are concerned, Your Honors, with the right of self-preservation as
recognized in principle by international law. In this connection I
should like...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we don’t want to go into these matters in
great detail, you know, at this stage. If you state what your reasons
are in support and state them shortly, we shall be able to consider the
matter.

DR. SIEMERS: I am very sorry that I have to go into these details, but
if through the objection of the Prosecution the principles...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail. I have
said that the Tribunal do not wish to hear you in detail.

DR. SIEMERS: I merely ask that the Tribunal take into consideration the
fact that this concerns the principle of international law laid down by
Kellogg himself in 1928, namely, the right of self-preservation, or “the
right of self-defense.” For that reason 1 should like to adduce these
documents showing that just as the Allies acted quite correctly
according to this principle, so also did the Defendant Raeder.

Document Number 22 is next. I have given various statements of principle
which apply to a large number of the remaining documents, so that I can
refer to the statements I have already made. These statements also apply
to Documents Numbers 22 and 39.

As far as Documents Numbers 63 and 64 are concerned, I should like to
point out that these documents deal with Greece; and not only these two,
but also a later group of perhaps 10 or 12 documents, with which I
should like to deal very briefly.

As far as Greece is concerned, the situation is as follows:

I must admit that I was more than surprised that the Prosecution
objected to these documents, about 14 in all. In Document Number C-12,
Exhibit Number GB-226, the Prosecution accuse Raeder of having decreed
on 30 December 1939; and I quote, “Greek merchantmen in the prohibited
area declared by the United States and England are to be treated as
enemy ships.” The accusation would be justified, if Greece had not
behaved in such a manner that Raeder had to resort to this order.

If the documents concerning Greece which show that Greece did not
strictly keep to her neutrality are struck out, then I cannot bring any
counterevidence. I do not believe that it is the intention of the
Prosecution to restrict my presentation of evidence in this way.

These are all documents which date back to this time and which show that
Greece put her merchantmen at the disposal of England who was at war
with Germany. Therefore they could be treated as enemy ships.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like to say that I should have told the
Tribunal I would make no objection to Documents Numbers 53 and 54,
because they do deal with the chartering of Greek steamers by the
British Government.

THE PRESIDENT: But you made no objection to them; you didn’t object to
Numbers 53 or 54.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to make clear that I don’t object to
them.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no objection on the paper. What you are dealing
with, Dr. Siemers, is 63 and 64, not 53 and 54?

Oh, I beg your pardon, I see it further on. Yes, I see; will you please
strike that out.

DR. SIEMERS: There is no objection to Numbers 53 and 54?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, no objection. My Lord, my friend was dealing
with the Greek fleet.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; I beg your pardon, I misheard.

DR. SIEMERS: The same things, as I have already stated regarding
Documents Numbers 101 to 107, apply also to Document Number 71.

Number 99 belongs really to Group 6, to the Norwegian documents; and I
should like to refer to these collectively and then refer again later to
Number 99. All these documents concern Norway, that is, the planning by
the Allies with respect to Norway. These documents deal positively with
the planning of the landing in Narvik, the landing in Stavanger, the
landing in Bergen, and the absolute necessity of having Norwegian bases.
The documents mention that Germany should not be allowed to continue
getting ore supplies from Sweden. They also deal in some measure with
Finland. There are likewise documents which support the same plan after
the Finnish-Russian war had already been concluded.

I should like to quote from these documents to prove their relevancy.
Since the Tribunal has told me that I cannot do that, I ask that these
brief references be considered sufficient. The facts contained in these
documents agree, point for point, with those reports which Grossadmiral
Raeder received from September 1939 until March 1940 from the
Intelligence Service of the German Wehrmacht headed by Admiral Canaris.
These plans agree with the information which Raeder received during the
same 6 months through the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän
Schreiber, and with the information which he received in a letter from
Admiral Carls at the end of September 1939.

The information from these three sources caused the Defendant Raeder to
point out the great danger involved were Norway to fall into the hands
of the Allies, which would mean that Germany had lost the war. It is,
therefore, a purely strategic consideration. The occupation of Norway
did not, as contended by the British Prosecution, have anything to do
with the prestige or desire for conquest but was concerned solely with
these positive pieces of information.

I must therefore prove, first of all, that the Defendant Raeder did
receive this information and, secondly, that these reports were
objective.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, you are dealing with Document Number 99, are
you not?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, 99, and all of Group 6.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know what you mean by Group 6; 99 is in Group B.

DR. SIEMERS: The group under the letter “F,” which Sir David called
Group 6, the last on the page.

THE PRESIDENT: The objection of the Prosecution to that document was
that it was a document of the 27th of April 1940, at a time after
Germany had invaded Norway. You haven’t said anything about that.

DR. SIEMERS: I wanted to avoid dealing with each document singly,
because I believe that these can be treated generally. However, in this
specific case...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t want you to deal with each document separately. I
thought you were dealing with Document Number 99. If you can deal with
them in groups, by all means do so. However, you are taking up a great
deal of the Tribunal’s time.

DR. SIEMERS: This Document Number 99 is the Minutes of the Ninth Meeting
of the Supreme Council, that is, the military operational staff of
England and France, on 27 April. The heading shows beyond doubt that it
was after the occupation of Norway. However, that is only a formal
objection. The contents of the document show that at this session the
participants discussed the happenings during the period before the
occupation, and the most important leaders of the Allies took part in
this meeting. Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir
Alexander Cadogan, _et cetera_ and, on the French side Reynaud,
Daladier, Gamelin, and Darlan were present; and these gentlemen
discussed the previous plans which, I admit, had misfired because of the
German occupation of Norway. But they did discuss about how necessary it
was that the iron-ore deposits in Sweden should fall into the hands of
the Allies and what was to be done now to prevent Germany’s getting this
ore and how the destruction of these iron-ore deposits could be brought
about. I believe, therefore, that though this happened at a later date,
the train of thought I have presented is of significance.

Then we turn to Document Number 100. This deals with the session of the
French War Committee of 9 April 1940, which concerns the same problem:
what the Allies had planned and what could be planned now that the
report had just come in about the action on the part of Germany.

Documents Numbers 102 to 107 have already been dealt with. For Document
Number 110 the same statements apply as for Documents 101 to 107.

Document Number 112 is a document which shows that Churchill, as early
as May 1940, expected active intervention on the part of America. I
wanted to present this in connection with the accusation raised against
the Defendant Raeder, that in the spring of 1941 he was instrumental in
bringing about a war against the United States by way of Japan. For me
this document is not nearly so important as those basic documents which
I have referred to at greater length. Therefore, I leave this completely
to the discretion of the Prosecution or the Tribunal.

The next group consists of documents which were turned down in the case
of Ribbentrop. I should like to point out that I did not have the
opportunity in the Ribbentrop case to define my position as to the
justification and relevancy of these documents. Therefore I consider it
insufficient simply to state that these documents were refused in the
case of Ribbentrop, that the charges against Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: We have already carefully considered the arguments and
have decided those documents were inadmissible.

DR. SIEMERS: I believed that the decision applied only to the Ribbentrop
case, since no other point of view was discussed during those
proceedings, namely, that of the charges raised against Raeder in which
connection it is expressly said in Document C-152 that Raeder brought
about the occupation of the whole of Greece. That is an accusation that
was not made against Ribbentrop but only against Raeder. How can I
refute this accusation if these documents are denied me?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal know the documents and know the
charges against Raeder, and they don’t desire to hear any further
argument on it. They will consider the matter.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg the pardon of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances
I am compelled to see whether all these documents were covered in
Ribbentrop’s case. My notes, as I told the Prosecution this morning, do
not agree with the statements of the Prosecution. Perhaps after the
session, if I am unable to do so at the moment, I might point out
whether or not the documents are identical.

It is really a fact that in Ribbentrop’s case these documents were not
presented in their entirety and that the Tribunal therefore does not
know them in their entirety. Whether Dr. Horn had marked exactly the
same passages as I wish to use, I am not able to say as far as each
individual document is concerned. I know only that in the large majority
of cases Dr. Horn did not present the entire document because he was
presenting it only from the point of view of the Ribbentrop case.

THE PRESIDENT: Presumably you have submitted your extracts to the
Prosecution. The Prosecution tell us that those extracts are the same
ones that were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, we have only a list of those documents
so far. We haven’t seen the extracts.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Prosecution
conferred._]

My Lord, I am sorry. I spoke too quickly. We have seen the extracts in
German and we haven’t had them translated. We have done the best we
could in German.

THE PRESIDENT: 24 and 25, at any rate, are both speeches in English.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, some of them are. I am sorry, My
Lord; these are. Your Lordship is quite right.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, as I understand it, Dr. Siemers says that
these are not the same passages of evidence, or suggested evidence, as
were rejected in Ribbentrop’s case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did not do the actual checking
myself, but Major Barrington, who checked the Ribbentrop documents, went
through these and compared the two, and he gave me that which forms the
basis of our note. That is the position. I can’t tell Your Lordship that
I have actually checked these myself.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers is telling us that that is untrue?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As I understood Dr. Siemers, he was saying that
he didn’t know whether they were the same extracts...

DR. SIEMERS: May I just make one remark in connection with that, please?
I am not quite certain that I can say in each specific case which
extracts were contained in the Ribbentrop case, but they are not the
same. I know for certain that they are not the same because in order to
relieve the work of the Translation Division I compared the numbers and
in the few cases in which they were the same I told the Translation
Division that these documents were identical so that they would not be
translated a second time. But I am sorry to say that a large number of
the documents were not the same, as they were asked for by Dr. Horn and
Ribbentrop from a completely different point of view.

I might also point out that the numbers under Group D which are
enumerated here as Ribbentrop Documents Numbers 29, 51, 56, 57, 60, 61,
62, although I made every effort to find them, could not be found in the
Ribbentrop Document Book. And the list does not show which numbers they
should be in the Ribbentrop Document Book.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is not suggested. What is said is
that they are in the same series which deals with the same subject—that
is, the question of Greece and the Balkans—as those documents which the
Tribunal ruled out in the case of Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Siemers, I think the best course would be for
you to go through these documents this afternoon under the heading “C”
and find out whether they are the same ones rejected in Ribbentrop’s
case; and if they are not, indicate exactly in what they differ from the
documents rejected in Ribbentrop’s case, so as to show they have some
relevance to your case; and we shall expect to have that by 5 o’clock.

Now will you go on with the others?

DR. SIEMERS: May I perhaps make one remark about what Sir David said
regarding group “D”? They were not objected to because they have already
been mentioned in Ribbentrop’s case; but only because they deal with the
same subject matter, that is true. The same subject matter, namely,
Greece, is dealt with; and I can only reply that the Prosecution have
charged the Defendant Raeder in Document C-152 with having aimed at, and
brought about, the occupation of the whole of Greece. The facts
concerning this statement of three lines I can present only if I am
allowed some documents referring to Greece and only if these are not
refused on the grounds that the documents concerning Greece were turned
down quite generally in Ribbentrop’s case.

Now, I come to group “E” which begins with Document 26. The same
statements apply which I have already set forth in regard to Documents
Numbers 101 to 107. The attacks planned by the Allies on the oil regions
in neutral Romania and in the neutral Caucasus—as I should like to
remark in parenthesis—have already been dealt with in these
proceedings. The Tribunal will remember that I asked Göring during his
examination about entries in Jodl’s diary pertaining to this question
and he has given information about the reports received by Germany, on
Pages 6031 and 6033 of the transcript of 18 March (Volume IX, Pages
402-404). This testimony too concerns only the subjective side, that is,
what was known by Germany. I must prove that the objective side, the
fact that this had actually been planned, agrees exactly with the
subjective side, that is, with these reports. These documents, Numbers
26, 30 to 32, 36, 37, 39, 40 to 44, are to prove that. Then comes Number
99 which has already been dealt with, which seems to be here in
duplicate; Number 101, and Number 110 which also seem to be duplicates.

I turn now to Group 6, which is supposed to be irrelevant, dealing with
the attack on Norway. I have already, on principle, set forth my reasons
and I beg the Tribunal not to deny me these documents under any
circumstances. If I am not granted these documents, I shall simply not
be in a position to present evidence in a reasonable manner without
telling everything myself. I can present proof in regard to a question
of such importance only if documents are granted me just as they are
granted the Prosecution. But if all the documents, practically all the
documents concerning this question are refused, then I do not know how I
am to treat such a question. And I believe that the Tribunal will wish
to assist me in this matter.

I am requesting this especially for the following reasons: When I gave
my reasons for wanting to present this particular evidence, I asked that
those files of the British Admiralty be brought in, which dealt with the
preparations and planning regarding Scandinavia, that is, Norway. Sir
David did not object at that time but said he would have to consult the
British Admiralty. The Tribunal decided accordingly and granted my
application. In the meantime the British Admiralty has answered, and I
assume that Sir David will agree to my reading the answer which has been
put at my disposal. This answer is as follows—it concerns, if I may say
that in advance...

THE PRESIDENT: We have had the answer, I think, have we not? We have had
the answer and transmitted it to you.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much. From this reply it can be seen that
the files will not be submitted, that I cannot get the necessary
approval. It can also be seen that certain facts which will be important
for my presentation of evidence will be admitted by the British
Admiralty; but in reality I am not in a position to prove anything by
means of documents. Since I am unable to make use of this evidence, I
ask at least to be allowed the other means of presenting evidence, that
is, the documents contained in the German White Books. These are
documents recognized as being correct. In all cases they are facsimiles.
They can be carefully examined and I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we are dealing with your application for
particular documents. We are not dealing with any general argument or
general criticism that you have to make. We are only hearing you in
answer to certain objections on behalf of the British Prosecution.

DR: SIEMERS: Your Honor, unless I am very much mistaken—in which case
you will pleas correct me—Sir David, with a few exceptions, defined his
position regarding these documents under “F”—this is a large number,
from 59 to 91 with some omissions—as a whole and not his position
regarding each individual document. But I have to say the same thing to
practically each document and asked only that I be granted those
documents as a whole, for I cannot make headway without these
documents...

THE PRESIDENT: You were not referring to these documents. You were
referring to the fact that the British Admiralty was not prepared to
disclose its files to you. It has nothing to do with these documents at
all.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe I have been misunderstood, Your Honors. I have
already stated very clearly why I need these documents for my
presentation of evidence regarding the Norway action. Beyond that I said
merely that if these documents are not granted me, then I cannot present
any evidence. I am deprived of it. I asked the Tribunal merely to take
into consideration the fact that the documents from London, which I had
originally counted on, are not at my disposal. And I do not know why
this request, which I am submitting to the Tribunal and which is only in
explanation of my previous statements, is being taken amiss by the
Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?

DR. SIEMERS: I have now finished, Your Honors. It is not at all my
intention to read all these documents or to spend too much time on them.
I believe that if I am granted these documents, the presentation of
evidence will be much easier, for these are groups of documents which
show the chronological development of certain plans; and if I have the
5th, 6th or 7th document, then I need not read each one. But if I am
granted just one document, I will be put in an extremely difficult
position and will have to speak in greater detail than I would if I
could simply refer to these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider it.

Now, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Now, we come to the whole
question of your alleged knowledge of the direct war objectives of
Hitler. You have already mentioned in a general way that Hitler never
spoke about war to you. Have you anything to add to this?

SCHACHT: No.

DR. DIX: You also touched upon the question of the sincerity of his
peaceful assurances and his disarmament proposals. Have you anything to
add to that?

SCHACHT: No, at the beginning I believed that.

DR. DIX: And did the various members of the Cabinet ever speak to you
about warlike intentions?

SCHACHT: Never did I hear anything from any of my fellow colleagues in
the Reich Cabinet which could lead me to believe that anyone had the
intention of going to war or would welcome it if Germany were to start a
war.

DR. DIX: Now, we turn to your own attitude towards the war. You already
indicated your general attitude when you spoke about your philosophy as
a pacifist. I believe, therefore, that it is more expedient if I read
from my document book the opinion of a third person, one who knows you
very well, the former member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Huelse. It
is the Schacht Document 37-C, Page 160 of the German text, and 168 of
the English text. It is an affidavit. And there, beginning with
Paragraph 2, Huelse says:

    “I recall several chance talks with Dr. Schacht during the years
    1935 to 1939 about war and rearmament. In these talks he always
    expressed his aversion to any war and any warlike conduct. He
    held the firm opinion that even to the conqueror war brings only
    disadvantages and that a new European war would, on the whole,
    be a crime against culture and humanity. He hoped for a long
    period of peace for Germany, as she needed it more than other
    countries in order to improve and stabilize her unstable
    economic situation.

    “To my knowledge, until the beginning of 1938, Dr. Schacht at
    meetings of the Reichsbank Board of Directors and in private
    conversations on the subject of armament always spoke only of
    defense measures. I believe I can recall that he told me in the
    middle of 1938 that Hitler’s provocative action against Austria
    and the Sudeten country was worse than thoughtless from the
    military point of view.

    “He said that Germany had undertaken only a defensive armament,
    which would prove absolutely inadequate as a defense in case of
    attack by one of the big powers, a possibility with which Hitler
    had to reckon. He said that he had never heard that the
    Wehrmacht was in any way designed or armed for an aggressive
    war.

    “When the war did break out and spread more and more, he said
    repeatedly that he had greatly erred in his judgment of Hitler’s
    personality; he had hoped for a long time that Hitler would
    develop into a real statesman who, after the experience of the
    World War I, would avoid any war.”

You have already touched upon the question of an annexation of Austria
and given your general opinion. I ask you now to make a concrete
statement about the Anschluss after it had actually taken place and
especially about the manner in which this Anschluss was carried out.

SCHACHT: That this Anschluss would come at some time we Germans all
knew. As for the various political negotiations which took place between
Hitler, Schuschnigg and others, I naturally was as little informed as
were the other Cabinet Ministers, with the probable exception of Göring
and Ribbentrop and perhaps one or two more. The actual Anschluss in
March was a complete surprise to us, not the fact but the date. A great
surprise and we, at any rate my acquaintances and I myself, were
completely surprised.

DR. DIX: How did you judge the manner, the nature and development of
this Anschluss?

SCHACHT: I believe that much can be said about the manner. What we heard
subsequently and what I have learned in these proceedings is certainly
not very gratifying, but I believe that it would have had very little
practical influence on the Anschluss itself and the course of events.
The whole thing was more of a demonstration to the outside world,
similar perhaps to the marching into the Rhineland; but it had no great
effect in my opinion on the course of the negotiations. I am speaking
now of the marching in of the troops. This march was more or less a
festive reception.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution have pointed out that in March 1938 you
regulated the relation of the schilling to the mark for the event of a
possible Anschluss, and by this the Prosecution obviously want to prove
that you had previous knowledge of this action. Will you tell us your
position as to this?

SCHACHT: The fact to which the Prosecution refer is a communication from
a Lieutenant Colonel Wiedemann. March 11, at about 3 o’clock in the
afternoon—I believe I remember that but I cannot say whether it was by
telephone or in person—someone, it may have been Lieutenant Colonel
Wiedemann, inquired of me how the purchasing power for the troops in
Austria was to be regulated if German troops should march into Austria,
purely as a matter of currency policy, and whether it was necessary to
have any regulation prescribed. I told him that of course everything had
to be paid for, everything that the troops might buy there, and that the
rate of exchange; if they paid in schillings and not in marks, would be
1 mark to 2 schillings. That was the rate which obtained at the time,
which remained fairly steady and was the recognized ratio of the
schilling to the mark. The fact that in the afternoon of the 11th I was
approached about this matter is the best proof that I had no previous
knowledge of these matters.

DR. DIX: The Prosecution further consider it an accusation against you
that in your speech to the Austrian National Bank after the marching in
of the troops, you used decidedly National Socialist phraseology and
thus welcomed the Anschluss.

Perhaps we can use this opportunity to save time and reply to the
accusation made repeatedly by the Prosecution that in speeches,
petitions, _et cetera_, you sometimes thought fit to adopt a tone, of
which it could perhaps be said that it exuded National Socialist ideas.
That has been used as circumstantial evidence against you. Will you
please define your position to those arguments and give your reasons for
this attitude of yours?

SCHACHT: If I did so in the first years, I did so only in order to
remind Party circles and the people of the original program of the
National Socialist Party, to which the actual attitude of the Party
members and functionaries stood in direct contrast. I always tried to
show that the principles which I upheld in many political matters agreed
completely with the principles of the National Socialist program as they
were stated in the Party program, namely, equal rights for all, the
dignity of the individual, esteem for the church, and so forth.

In the later years I also repeatedly used National Socialist
phraseology, because from the time of my speech at Königsberg, the
contrast between my views and Hitler’s views regarding the Party was
entirely clear. And gradually within the Party I got the reputation of
being an enemy of the Party, a man whose views were contrary to those of
the Party. From that moment on not only the possibility of my
co-operation, but also my very existence was endangered; and in such
moments, when I saw my activity, my freedom, and my life seriously
threatened by the Party I utilized these moments to show by means of an
emphatically National Socialist phraseology that I was working entirely
within the framework of the traditional policies and that my activity
was in agreement with these policies—in order to protect myself against
these attacks.

DR. DIX: In other words, recalling the testimony of the witness Gisevius
about a remark of Goerdeler’s, you used Talleyrand methods in this case?

SCHACHT: I am not entirely familiar with Talleyrand’s methods, but at
any rate I did camouflage myself.

DR. DIX: In this connection I should like to read a passage from the
affidavit of Schniewind which has been quoted repeatedly. It is Schacht
Number 34. I have often indicated this page. It is Page 118 of the
German, Page 126 of the English text. Schniewind says:

    “If Schacht on the other hand occasionally made statements, oral
    or written, which could be construed as signifying that he went
    a long way in identifying himself with the Hitler regime, these
    statements were naturally known to us; but what Schacht thought
    in reality was known to almost every official in the Reichsbank
    and in the Reich Ministry of Economics, above all, of course, to
    his closest colleagues.

    “On many occasions we asked Dr. Schacht if he had not gone too
    far in these statements. He always replied that he was under
    such heavy fire from the Party and the SS that he could
    camouflage himself only with strong slogans and sly statements.”

I might explain that Schniewind was a high official in the Reich
Ministry of Economics, and worked directly under Schacht and with him.

The Prosecution have also referred to an affidavit by Tilly to the
effect that you admitted that you thought Hitler capable of aggressive
intentions. Will you make a statement about that?

SCHACHT: That affidavit of the British Major Tilly is entirely correct.
I told Major Tilly during the preliminary interrogation that in 1938,
during the events of the Fritsch affair and afterwards, I had become
convinced that Hitler at any rate would not avoid a war at all costs and
that possibly he even sought to bring about a war. Looking back I
pondered over a number of statements by Hitler and asked myself the
reason why Hitler, in the course of the years, had reached the point
where he might not avoid a war. And I told Major Tilly that the only
reason which I could think of was that looking back I had the impression
that Hitler had fallen into the role which necessarily falls to each and
every dictator who does not want to relinquish his power in time,
namely, that of having to supply his people with some sort of victor’s
glory—that that was probably the development of Hitler’s thought.

DR. DIX: That is the same explanation as given by Prince Metternich
about Napoleon?

You have already remarked parenthetically that you first became
suspicious during the Fritsch affair. The witness Gisevius has described
the Fritsch affair to the Tribunal in detail. We do not wish to repeat
anything. Therefore, I am asking you only to state in regard to the
Fritsch affair anything you might have to say to supplement or to amend
Gisevius’ testimony. If that is to take a long time—which I cannot
judge—then I might suggest to the Tribunal that we have the recess now,
if the Tribunal so desires.

SCHACHT: I have just a brief remark to make.

DR. DIX: A brief remark. Then answer the question briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if he can do it briefly, we had better have it now.

SCHACHT: It is just a single remark that I should like to add. The
account given by Gisevius of the development of the Fritsch affair is,
according to my knowledge and my own experience, completely correct in
every detail. I have nothing to add to that. I can only confirm it. On
the other hand, I should like to refer to a speech of Hitler’s on 20
February 1938 in the Reichstag which contains a remark which even at
that time aroused my attention. He said—and I quote this speech from
Die Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, of which all copies were available
here:

    “The changes in the Reich Cabinet and in the military
    administration on 4 February”—that is, changes which were made
    following the Fritsch and Blomberg affair—“were for the purpose
    of achieving within the shortest time that intensification of
    our military means of power, which the general conditions of the
    present time indicate as advisable.”

This remark also confirmed my opinion that the change from a peaceful to
a military policy on Hitler’s part was becoming obvious; I did not wish
to omit reference to this remark which completes the account given by
Gisevius.

DR. DIX: This is Exhibit Number Schacht-28 of our document book, Page 81
of the English text, Page 74 of the German text. There this passage is
quoted.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Several meetings have been
discussed here during which Hitler is said to have spoken directly or
indirectly about his war intentions. Did you participate in any such
meetings?

SCHACHT: No, not in a single one.

DR. DIX: You disagreed, as you have stated, with Hitler and the Party on
many issues. Did you express this disagreement or did you conform to
Hitler’s instructions at all times? Can you in particular make
statements about your critical attitude, for instance, to the Jewish
question, the Church question, the Gestapo question, the Free Mason
question, _et cetera_?

SCHACHT: I might say in advance that Hitler never gave me any order or
any instructions which would have been in opposition to my inner views
and that I also never did anything which was in opposition to my inner
convictions. From the very beginning I did not conceal my convictions
concerning all these questions which you have mentioned, not only when
speaking to my circle of friends and to larger Party circles, but also
in addressing the public, and even when speaking to Hitler personally. I
have already stated here that as early as the Party purge of 30 June
1934 I called Hitler’s attention to the fact that his actions were
illegal.

I refer, furthermore, to a document of which unfortunately only half has
been presented by the Prosecution. It is a written report which I
personally submitted to Hitler on 3 May 1935. I remember the date very
well because it happened during a trial run of the Lloyd Steamer
_Scharnhorst_, at which both Hitler and I were present.

On that day I handed him two inter-related memoranda which together
formed a unit. In the one half I made it clear that I wanted to stop the
unrestrained and constant collections of money by various Party
organizations because it seemed to me that the money ought not to be
used for Party purposes, particularly Party installations, Party
buildings, and the like, but that we urgently needed this money for
State expenses which had to be paid and which of course included the
rearmament question as well.

The second half of this report dealt with cultural questions. The
Defense and I have tried for months to get this second half of the
document from the Prosecution, since they had submitted the first half
of the document here as evidence. It has not been possible to obtain
that second half. I must therefore confine myself to communicating the
contents.

I want to say in advance that, of course, I could only bring forward
such charges in regard to the mistaken cultural and legal policy of the
Party and of Hitler when reasons originating in my own department gave
me the excuse to submit these things to Hitler. I stated that very
serious harm was being done to my foreign trade policy by the arbitrary
and inhuman cultural and legal policy which was being carried out by
Hitler. I pointed in particular to the hostile attitude towards the
churches and the illegal treatment of the Jews and, furthermore, to the
absolute illegality and despotism of the whole Gestapo regime. I
remember in that connection that I referred to the British Habeas Corpus
Act, which for centuries protected the rights of the individual; and I
stated word for word that I considered this Gestapo despotism to be
something which would make us despised by the whole world.

Hitler read both parts of this memorandum while still on board the
_Scharnhorst_. As soon as he had read it he called me and tried to calm
me down by making statements similar to those which he had already made
to me in July 1934, when he told me these were still the transitional
symptoms of a revolutionary development and that as time went on this
would be set right again and disappear.

The events of July 1934 had taught me a lesson, however, and
consequently I was not satisfied with this explanation. A few weeks
afterwards, on 18 August 1935, I used the occasion of my visit to the
Eastern Fair Königsberg to mention these very things in the speech which
I had to make there; and here I gave clear expression to the same
objections which I had made to Hitler aboard the _Scharnhorst_ at the
beginning of May.

I did not talk only about the Church question, the Jewish question, and
the question of despotism; I talked also about the Free Masons; and I
shall quote just a few sentences from that speech (Exhibit Number
Schacht-25), with the permission of the Tribunal. They are very short. I
am speaking about people, and I now quote...

DR. DIX: Just one moment. I want to tell the Tribunal that this is the
Königsberg speech, which I submitted to the Tribunal this morning as a
document.

SCHACHT: I am talking about people and I now quote:

    “...people who under cover of darkness heroically smear window
    panes, who brand as a traitor every German who trades in a
    Jewish store, who declare every former Free Mason to be a
    scoundrel, and who in the fight against priests and ministers
    who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves distinguish
    between religion and misuse of the pulpit.”

End of quotation, and then another sentence. I quote:

    “In accordance with the present legislation and in accordance
    with the various declarations made by the Führer’s Deputy, the
    Reich Minister of the Interior, and the Reich Minister for
    Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (not to mention the Ministry
    of Economics), Jewish businesses are permitted to carry on their
    business activities as heretofore.”

End of quotation, and then, in the last sentences, I quote:

    “No one in Germany is without rights. According to Point 4 of
    the National Socialist Party program the Jew can be neither a
    citizen nor a fellow German. But Point 5 of the Party program
    provides legislation for him too; that means, he must not be
    subjected to arbitrary action but to the law.”

I assumed the same attitude on every other further occasion that offered
itself.

DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht; did the regime tolerate this speech?

SCHACHT: It is a good thing that you remind me of that; because in the
course of the Gisevius testimony the same question was discussed with
reference to the Marburg speech of Herr Von Papen. Since up to then my
speeches were not subject to censorship—of course I would not have
allowed that—this speech was broadcast by mistake, so to speak, over
the Deutschlandsender. In that way the speech was brought to the notice
of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, and at once he issued an order
prohibiting the publication of the speech in the newspapers. As a
result, although the speech was broadcast by the Deutschlandsender it
did not appear in any newspaper. But as, fortunately, the Reichsbank had
its own printing press which was of course not subject to censorship, I
had the speech printed in the Reichsbank printing press; and 250,000
copies of it were distributed to the 400 branches of the Reichsbank
throughout the country, and in that manner it became known to the entire
population.

DR. DIX: You were going to continue, were you not?

SCHACHT: I wanted to go on and say that on every future opportunity
which I could find I always returned to these points. I should like to
touch upon only two more things in this connection.

This morning I referred to these things in connection with the letter
written by me on 24 December 1935 to the Reich Minister of War, which is
Document Number EC-293. I should merely like to add and point out the
words, which I shall now quote:

    “The economic and legal policy for the treatment of the Jews,
    the anti-Church activities of certain Party organizations, and
    the legal despotism associated with the Gestapo are detrimental
    to our armament program...”

The same attitude can also be seen from the minutes of the so-called
“small Ministerial Council” for 12 May 1936, which have been submitted
in evidence by the Prosecution. It says in these minutes, and I quote:
“Dr. Schacht emphasized openly again and again that a cultural and legal
policy must be pursued which does not interfere with economy.”

I want to remark in this connection that, of course, as Minister of
Economics I always linked my arguments with the work of the departments
under the Minister of Economics. And, as a last example, one of many
others which I cannot mention today, there is the speech on the occasion
of a celebration for the apprentices at the Berlin Chamber of Artisans
on 11 May 1937 which is Exhibit Number Schacht-30. On that occasion I
said the following, and I quote:

    “No community and, above all, no state can flourish which is not
    based on legality, order, and discipline.”

And a second sentence, I quote:

    “For that reason you must not only respect the right and the
    law, but you must also act against injustice and unlawful
    actions everywhere, wherever you find them.”

And because I made known my attitude not only to a close circle but also
to a wider public by using every opportunity to voice my views
frankly—because of this, a few weeks ago in this court, the Chief of
the RSHA, Department III, Security Service, the witness Ohlendorf, in
reply to a question, described me as an enemy of the Party, at least
since the year 1937-1938. I believe that the Chief of the Security
Service, the inland department, should know since he had the task of
combating political opponents inside Germany.

DR. DIX: May I point out that the statements made during the meeting of
the small Ministerial Council on 12 May 1936 are contained in my
document book, Exhibit Schacht-20, Page 57 of the English text, Page 51
of the German text and Schacht’s speech to the Chamber of Industry and
Commerce on 12 May 1937...

SCHACHT: [_Interrupting._] You mean Chamber of Artisans.

DR. DIX: I shall refer to that later when I have the proper document;
and I now continue.

We have talked about your participation at the Party rallies, and I
should merely like to ask you in addition: Did you participate in any
other Party functions?

SCHACHT: I do not remember that I ever participated in any other
functions of the Party.

DR. DIX: The Indictment charges you, in substance, with using your
personal influence and your close connections with the Führer for the
aims as set forth. Did you, as far as you know and can judge from your
experience, have any influence on the Führer?

SCHACHT: Unfortunately, I never had any influence on the Führer’s
actions and decisions. I had influence only insofar as he did not dare
to interfere with me in my special financial and economic policies. But
this lack of influence of all members of Hitler’s entourage has already
been mentioned by various witnesses and so much has been said about it
that I think I need not take up the Tribunal’s time with any further
statements on that subject.

DR. DIX: What you have just said applies in the main to the question of
the influence of the Reich Cabinet, the last meetings of the Reich
Cabinet, and so forth. Various witnesses have made statements on that
subject. Have you anything new to add?

SCHACHT: I can merely add that on the whole the Reich Cabinet did not
have the slightest influence on Hitler, and that from November 1937
on—this has been stated repeatedly—there were no more meetings or
consultations of the Cabinet. The Reich Cabinet was an uncorrelated
group of politically powerless departmental ministers without the proper
professional qualifications.

DR. DIX: I should like to add that the number of the speech to the
Chamber of Artisans is Exhibit Number 30, Page 89 of the English text
and Page 82 of the German text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] What was the situation regarding
rearmament? Whose will was decisive and authoritative as regards the
extent of rearmament?

SCHACHT: I am without any basis for judgment as far as that is
concerned. But I have no doubt that Hitler’s will, here too, was the
sole decisive and authoritative factor.

DR. DIX: That is to say, you had no influence other than that of the
credit-giver?

SCHACHT: Within my Ministry, insofar as I administered this Ministry, I
did nothing for which I would not assume responsibility myself.

DR. DIX: Did you speak to prominent foreigners about your lack of
influence on Hitler?

SCHACHT: In this connection I recall a conversation with Ambassador
Bullitt in November 1937. This conversation with Ambassador Bullitt has
already been mentioned in some other connection, and Ambassador
Bullitt’s memorandum has been presented in evidence to the Tribunal by
the Prosecution. I merely refer to the sentence which refers to me, and
I quote:

    “He”—that is to say Schacht—“prefaced his remarks by saying
    that he himself today was ‘completely without influence on that
    man’”—meaning Hitler. “He seemed to regard himself as
    politically dead and to have small respect for ‘that man.’”

That was said in November 1937. But if I am permitted to add to this, I
want to point out that my foreign friends were kept constantly informed
about my position and my entire activity as regards the directing of
public affairs in Germany, as I have already mentioned once before. This
will be seen on later occasions when various instances are mentioned.

DR. DIX: This morning I submitted Exhibit Number Schacht-22, Page 64 of
the English text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] And now a few special questions regarding
your position as Minister of Economics. You have already made statements
regarding the obtaining of foreign raw materials, that is, you have
quoted appropriate passages. Could these not be substituted by home
products in your opinion?

SCHACHT: A portion of such raw materials could certainly be replaced by
home products. We had learned in the meantime how to produce a large
number of new materials which we did not know about before...

DR. DIX: Please be brief.

SCHACHT: ...to produce them synthetically. But a considerable part could
not be replaced in that way and could be obtained only through foreign
trade.

DR. DIX: And what was your attitude towards the question of
self-sufficiency?

SCHACHT: As far as self-sufficiency was concerned I believe that, if at
a reasonable cost, without undue expenditure, which would have meant a
waste of German public funds and German manpower, certain synthetic
materials could be produced in Germany, then one should do so, but that
apart from this the maintenance of foreign trade was an absolute
necessity for economic reasons, and that it was even more necessary for
reasons of international cultural relations so that nations might live
together. I always regarded the isolation of nations as a great
misfortune, just as I have always regarded commerce as the best means of
bringing about international understanding.

DR. DIX: Who was the exponent in the Reich Cabinet of the
self-sufficiency principle?

SCHACHT: As far as I know, the whole idea of self-sufficiency, which was
then formulated in the Four Year Plan, originated with Hitler alone;
after Göring was commissioned with the direction of the Four Year Plan,
then Göring too, of course, represented that line of thought.

DR. DIX: Did you express your contradictory views to Göring and Hitler?

SCHACHT: I think it is clear from the record that I did so at every
opportunity.

DR. DIX: One incidental question: You will remember that Göring
exclaimed, “I should like to know where the ‘No men’ are.”

I want to ask you now, do you claim this honorary title of “No man” for
yourself? I remind you particularly of your letter of November 1942.

SCHACHT: On every occasion when I was no longer in a position to do what
my inner conviction demanded, I said, “No.” I was not content to be
silent in the face of the many misdeeds committed by the Party. In every
case I expressed my disapproval of these things, personally, officially,
and publicly. I said “No” to all those things. I blocked credits. I
opposed an excessive rearmament. I talked against the war and I took
steps to prevent the war. I do not know to whom else this honorary title
of “No man” might apply if not to me.

DR. DIX: Did you not swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler?

SCHACHT: I did not swear an oath of allegiance to a certain Herr Hitler.
I swore allegiance to Adolf Hitler as the head of the State of the
German people, just as I did not swear allegiance to the Kaiser or to
President Ebert or to President Hindenburg, except in their capacity as
head of the State; in the same way I did not swear an oath to Adolf
Hitler. The oath of allegiance which I did swear to the head of the
German State does not apply to the person of the head of the State; it
applies to what he represents, the German nation. Perhaps I might add
something in this connection. I would never keep an oath of allegiance
to a perjurer and Hitler has turned out to be a hundredfold perjurer.

DR. DIX: Göring has made extremely detailed explanations regarding the
Four Year Plan, its origin, its preparation, technical opposition by
you, and the consequences you took because of this opposition. Therefore
we can be brief and deal only with new material, if you have something
new to say. Have you anything to add to Göring’s statements or do you
disagree on points which you remember or about views held?

SCHACHT: I gather from Göring’s statements that he has described
conditions perfectly correctly and I myself have nothing at all to add
unless you have something special in mind.

DR. DIX: According to your impressions and the experience you had, when
did Hitler realize that you were an obstacle in the way of a speedy and
extensive rearmament? Did he acknowledge your economic arguments? Was he
satisfied with your policy or not?

SCHACHT: At that time, in 1936, when the Four Year Plan was introduced
in September I could not tell what Hitler’s inner attitude to me was in
regard to these questions of economic policy. I might say that it was
clear that after my speech at Königsberg in August 1935 he mistrusted
me. But his attitude to my activities in the field of economic policy
was something which I was not yet sure of in 1936. The fact that I had
not in any way participated in the preparation of the Four Year Plan but
heard about it quite by surprise during the Party Rally and that, quite
unexpectedly, Hermann Göring and not the Minister of Economics was
appointed head of the Four Year Plan, as I heard for the first time at
the Party Rally in September 1936—these facts naturally made it clear
to me that Hitler, as far as economic policy with reference to the
entire rearmament program was concerned, did not have that degree of
confidence in me which he thought necessary. Subsequently, here in this
prison, my fellow Defendant Speer showed me a memorandum which he
received from Hitler on the occasion of his taking over the post of
Minister and which, curiously enough, deals in great detail with the
Four Year Plan and my activities, and is dated August 1936. In August
1936 Hitler himself dictated this memorandum which has been shown to me
in prison by my fellow Defendant Speer, and I assume that if I read a
number of brief quotations from it with the permission of...

DR. DIX: I just want to give an explanation to the Tribunal. We received
the original of this memorandum about three weeks ago from the Camp
Commander of the Camp Dustbin through the kind mediation of the
Prosecution. We then handed it in for translation so that we might
submit it now. But the translation has not yet been completed. I shall
submit the entire memorandum under a new exhibit number when I receive
it.

THE PRESIDENT: Has any application been made in respect to it?

DR. DIX: No application has been made as yet. I wanted...

THE PRESIDENT: Which memorandum? Who drew it up?

DR. DIX: It is a Hitler memorandum of the year 1936, of which there
exist three copies; and one of them was in the Camp Dustbin. This copy
arrived here a fortnight or three weeks ago after we had discussed our
document books with the Prosecution. I intended to submit the
translation of the Hitler memorandum today and at the same time to ask
that this be admitted in evidence, but unfortunately I am not in a
position to do so because the translation is not yet ready. My
colleague, Professor Kraus, was in fact told that it has been mislaid.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, let the defendant go on, and you can submit the
document in evidence and a translation afterwards.

DR. DIX: Very well. The defendant has a copy and he will quote the most
important, very brief passages.

SCHACHT: I shall quote very brief passages. Hitler says in this
memorandum, among other things, and I quote:

    “It is, above all, not the task of State economic institutions
    to rack their brains about methods of production. This does not
    concern the Ministry of Economics at all.”

The Ministry of Economics was under me, and this is therefore a reproach
for me.

A further quotation:

    “It is furthermore essential that German iron production be
    increased to the utmost. The objection that we are not in a
    position to produce the same cheap raw iron from German ore,
    which has only 26 percent of iron content, as from the 45
    percent Swedish ores, is unimportant... The objection that in
    this case all the German smelting works would have to be
    reconstructed is also irrelevant; and, in any case, this is none
    of the business of the Ministry of Economics.”

As is apparent from the statement, I had explained that from 26 percent
ore one could produce steel only at costs twice or three times those at
which one could produce steel from 45 percent ore. And I explained
further that, in order to use 26 percent ore, one would have to have
completely different plants from those using 45 percent ore. Herr Hitler
states that this is none of the business of the Ministry of Economics,
and that, of course, means Herr Schacht.

There is one last, very brief quotation. I quote:

    “I want to emphasize in this connection that in these tasks I
    see the only possible economic mobilization and not in the
    curbing of the armament industry...”

That statement, too, is directed, of course, against my policy.

DR. DIX: We have now reached the stage of tension of technical
differences between you and Göring, the tension between you and Hitler
regarding your functions as Minister of Economics. What were your
thoughts at the time about resigning from your office as Minister of
Economics? Was it possible for you to resign? Please do not repeat
anything that Lammers and other witnesses have already told us about the
impossibility of resigning. Please talk only about your own special case
and what you yourself did.

SCHACHT: First of all, I tried to continue my own economic policy, in
spite of the fact that Göring as head of the Four Year Plan tried, of
course, as time went on to take over as many of the tasks concerned with
economic policy as possible. But the very moment Göring encroached on my
rights as Minister of Economics I used it as an opportunity to force my
release from the Ministry of Economics. That was at the beginning of
August 1937.

At the time I told Hitler very briefly the reason, namely, that if I was
to assume responsibility for economic policy, then I would also have to
be in command. But if I was not in command, then I did not wish to
assume responsibility. The fight for my resignation, fought by me at
times with very drastic measures, lasted approximately two and a half
months until eventually Hitler had to decide to grant me the desired
release in order to prevent the conflict from becoming known to the
public more than it already was.

DR. DIX: When you say “drastic measures” do you mean your so-called
sit-down strike?

In this connection I want to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number
Schacht-40 of my document book, an affidavit from another former
colleague of Dr. Schacht in the Reich Ministry of Economics,
Kammerdirektor Dr. Asmus. On Page 180 of the English version of this
long affidavit there is a brief passage. I quote:

    “When this was found to be unsuccessful”—it means his
    fight—“and when developments continued along the course which
    he considered wrong, he”—Schacht—“in the autumn of 1937, long
    before the beginning of the war, acted as an upright man and
    applied for release from his office as Reich Minister of
    Economics and thereby from his co-responsibility.

    “He was obviously not able to resign his office in the normal
    way, because for reasons of prestige the Party required the use
    of his name. Therefore, in the autumn of 1937, he simply
    remained away from the Ministry of Economics for several weeks.
    He started this sit-down strike, as it was humorously called in
    the Ministry, and went in his official capacity only to the
    Reichsbank...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to trouble the Tribunal with all
this detail? There is no dispute that he did resign, and the only thing
that he has got to explain is why he continued to be a Minister. The
Prosecution have given evidence about his resignation and about the
conflict between him and the Defendant Göring. What is the good of going
into all the detail of it, as to this sit-down strike and that sort of
thing? That doesn’t interest the Tribunal.

DR. DIX: He did not remain a Minister at that time. He resigned as
Minister.

THE PRESIDENT: I thought he had remained a Minister until 1943.

DR. DIX: Minister without Portfolio, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t say Minister with Portfolio, I said Minister.

DR. DIX: Yes, but there is a difference, but I shall come to that later.
I understood you to mean an active Minister, but I shall not go into
that now. It was a misunderstanding. Anyway, I have already finished
that. I was merely trying to show how difficult it was to resign.

[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the manner in which you
were released. Have you anything to add to the statements made by
Lammers in this connection or not?

SCHACHT: I think we should inform the Tribunal of one matter about which
I also learned here in prison from my fellow Defendant Speer. He
overheard the argument between Hitler and myself on the occasion of that
decisive conference in which I managed to push through my resignation.

If the Tribunal allow, I shall read it very briefly. There are two or
three sentences. Herr Speer informed me of the following: “I was on the
terrace of Berghof on the Obersalzberg, and I was waiting to submit my
building plans. In the summer of 1937 when Schacht came to the
Berghof...”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: [_Interposing._] Speer is present in the room. For
one defendant to testify as to a conversation with another defendant is
a very convenient way of getting testimony without access to
cross-examination, but it seems to me that it is a highly objectionable
method. I object to this on the ground that it has no probative value to
testify to a conversation of this character when the Defendant Speer is
in the courtroom and can be sworn and can give his testimony. He sits
here and is available.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the subject of the conversation?

DR. DIX: The subject of this conversation is a matter which concerns the
Defendant Schacht. It is a statement of Hitler regarding Schacht; it is
not a matter which concerns the Defendant Speer. Therefore I consider it
expedient for him, since it is a matter which concerns Schacht, to be
able to make a statement about it. I would, of course, consider it more
appropriate that he should not read something which Speer has written to
him, but that he should give his own account of what happened between
Hitler and Schacht and merely say, “I heard that from Speer.” That
appears to be better than...

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Dr. Dix, you may give that.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Will you please not read, then,
but tell of this incident and say you got it from Speer?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is even more objectionable to me than to have
a written statement from Speer. If we are to have Speer’s testimony, it
at least should be Speer’s and not a repetition of a conversation
between the two defendants. If Speer has made a written statement, it
can be submitted to us in the ordinary course.

This is the second document that we have not had the privilege of seeing
before it has been used here; and it seems to me that if this is a
document signed by Speer—which I don’t understand it to be—if it is,
that is one thing. We can then see it and perhaps it can be used. If it
is a conversation, I should prefer Speer’s version.

DR. DIX: May I add something? The question of procedure is not of basic
importance for me here. In that case it can be discussed when Speer is
examined. However, I do not know whether Speer is going to be called;
probably he will be. Actually it would be better for us to hear it now,
but I leave it to the Tribunal to decide. It is not a question of great
importance to me.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will allow the evidence.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the defendant._] Well then, without reading,
please describe the incident.

SCHACHT: The gentlemen on the terrace, among them Speer, heard this
discussion, which was conducted in very loud tones. At the end of the
discussion Hitler came out on the terrace and...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. [_There was a brief pause in the
proceedings._] Very well, Dr. Dix, go on.

SCHACHT: Hitler came out on the terrace after this conference and said
to those present, among them Speer, that he had had a very serious
argument with Schacht, that he could not work with Schacht, and that
Schacht was upsetting his financial plans.

DR. DIX: Well then, after you had left your position as Minister of
Economics you were still left authority as Reichsbank President. Were
you approached by Hitler or the Minister of Finance in your capacity as
President of the Reichsbank and asked for credit?

SCHACHT: After the Reichsbank had discontinued giving credits, on 31
March 1938, the Reich Minister of Finance of course received more urgent
demands for money and toward the end of that year he found himself in
the awkward situation of not being able to pay even the salaries of the
civil servants from the treasury. He came to me and asked me to grant
him a special credit. According to its charter and laws the Reichsbank
was entitled and to a certain extent obliged, but actually only
entitled, to advance to the Reich up to 400 million marks per annum. The
Reich Minister of Finance had received these 400 million marks and he
was asking, over and above that, for further credits; the Reichsbank
refused to give him these credits. The Reich Minister of Finance had to
go to the private banks and all the large banks together gave him a
credit of a few hundred million marks. However, the Reichsbank did not
participate in this credit.

DR. DIX: If you as President of the Reichsbank turned down those
credits, then it seems there was nothing for it but to print more notes.
Did Hitler or anyone else suggest to you that the note printing presses
should be set in motion?

SCHACHT: After the events of November 1938 I paid one more visit to
London, in December, to attend a conference regarding the financing of
the Jewish emigration from Germany in an orderly manner—a thing which I
myself had suggested. On that occasion I also talked with Prime Minister
Chamberlain. On 2 January 1939 I arrived at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden
to report to Hitler about these matters. On that occasion we, of course,
also got to talk about the financial needs of the Reich. I still refused
to give credit to the Reich, and pointed out the very difficult
financial situation which called for, or should have called for, a
reduction of State expenditure and thus of armament expenditure.

In particular, I pointed out that at the beginning of December the first
instalment of the so-called Jewish fine—which had been imposed on the
Jews after the murder of Herr Vorn Rath in Paris and which had been
collected to the extent of 250 million marks at the beginning of
December—that this first instalment of 250 million marks had not been
received entirely in the form of cash, but that the Reich Minister of
Finance had had to agree to accept a considerable part of it “in kind,”
as the English say, because it was not possible to make liquid the cash
necessary for this payment. Hitler replied: “But we can circulate notes
on the basis of these goods. I have looked into the question of our
future financial policy very carefully and when I get back to Berlin in
a few days I shall discuss my plans with you and the Minister of
Finance.”

I saw at once that it was Hitler’s intention to resort to the printing
of notes to meet this expenditure with or without the necessary cover,
but at any rate against certain securities. The danger of inflation was
now definitely imminent. And since I realized at once that this was the
point where I and the Reichsbank had to say “stop,” I replied to him,
“Very well, in that case I will get the Reichsbank to submit a
memorandum to you, setting out the attitude of the Reichsbank to this
problem and which can be used at the joint meeting with the Finance
Minister.”

After that I went back to Berlin and informed my colleagues in the
Reichsbank Directorate. We saw, to our personal satisfaction, that here
was an opportunity for us to divorce ourselves definitely from that type
of policy.

The memorandum dated 7 January which the Reichsbank Directorate then
submitted to Hitler has, I think, also been submitted as evidence by the
Prosecution.

In order to explain the statements which the Reichsbank Directorate made
to Hitler in this decisive moment regarding further State expenditure
and especially armament expenditure, I ask permission to read only two
very brief sentences from this memorandum. It says, and I quote:

    “Unrestrained public expenditure constitutes a definite threat
    to our currency. The unlimited growth of government expenditure
    defies any attempts to draw up a regulated budget. It brings
    State finances to the verge of ruin despite a tremendous
    increase in taxes, and it undermines the currency and the
    issuing bank.”

Then there is another sentence, and I quote:

    “...if during the two great foreign political actions in Austria
    and the Sudetenland an increase in public expenditure was
    necessary, the fact that after the termination of these two
    foreign political actions a reduction of expenditure is not
    noticeable and that everything seems rather to indicate that a
    further increase of expenditure is planned, makes it now our
    absolute duty to point out what the consequences will be for our
    currency.

    “The undersigned Directors of the Reichsbank are sufficiently
    conscious of the fact that in their co-operation they have
    gladly devoted all their energy to the great aims that have been
    set, but that a halt must now be called.”

DR. DIX: This memorandum has already been submitted by the Prosecution
under the Document Number EC-369, but it is being submitted again as
Exhibit Schacht-24 in our document book, Page 70 of the English text,
and Page 63 of the German text.

I shall have to put various questions to Dr. Schacht on that memorandum,
but I think that perhaps there is not time now and that I should do so
tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT: If you must, Dr. Dix; but do you think that is very
important? At any rate, you had better do it tomorrow, if you are going
to do it at all.

DR. DIX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, can you inform us whether those extracts are
the same as the extracts which were refused in the case of the Defendant
Ribbentrop?

DR. SIEMERS: I have made a comparison, and I can hand it to the Tribunal
in writing. Some documents are the same, some do not tally, and some are
missing. I have done that in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

The Tribunal will adjourn.

       [_The Tribunal adjourned until 2 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                     ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH DAY
                          Thursday, 2 May 1946


                           _Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know exactly what
your letter means, which they received from you, relating to the
following documents which the letter says have been withdrawn. What I
want to know is, does it mean that they are not to be translated? Let me
read you the numbers: 18, 19, 48, 53, 76, 80, 81, 82, 86, and 101. Now,
does your letter mean that those documents are not to be translated?

DR. SIEMERS: No, Your Lordship; that means that the British Delegation
informed me yesterday morning that the objections against those
documents on the part of the British Delegation are withdrawn.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

DR. SIEMERS: I had written the letter on 30 April, in the afternoon,
after I had had a conversation with Sir David. The following morning I
was informed...

THE PRESIDENT: We won’t bother with that. You say that their objections
no longer exist. If they agree to that, well and good.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, apparently there seems to have been
some misunderstanding about three of them, Numbers 80, 101, and 76. The
others were not objected to.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on 76 there seemed to be some
misunderstanding between Dr. Siemers and myself. I understood that he
did not want to persist in the legal report on the _Altmark_ incident,
and I think Dr. Siemers thought that I wasn’t persisting. However, I
thought Dr. Siemers was withdrawing that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, then, are you still objecting to that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am still objecting to it if it is not
withdrawn, My Lord. However, the other ones in the list Your Lordship
mentioned—that is Numbers 18, 19, 48, 53, 81, 82, and 86—there is no
objection to.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Concerning Document 76, I agree with Sir David. Number 76
can be struck out, as far as I am concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. That’s all I wanted to know.

DR. SIEMERS: Number 80 about which I have spoken in detail with the
British Delegation...

THE PRESIDENT: You need not tell me about it.

DR. SIEMERS: I assumed there would be no objection. I would like to ask
that it be admitted in any case.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that is right. In order that the Translation
Division should get on as soon as possible, the Tribunal has decided
upon these documents and the only questions upon which the Tribunal has
decided is that they shall be translated. The question of their
admissibility will be decided after they have been translated, and I
will take them in the categories of objection which are set out in Sir
David’s memorandum.

In Category A, the first category, Number 66 will be allowed. Number 76
as Dr. Siemers has now said, goes out. Numbers 101 to 106 will be
allowed, the rest are disallowed in A. In B the following documents will
be allowed: Numbers 39, 63, 64, 99, and 100. And, of course, Numbers 102
to 107, which are allowed under A. The rest will not be allowed.

Category C: The following will be allowed: Numbers 38, 50, 55, and 58.
The remainder are not allowed.

Category D: The following will be allowed: Numbers 29, 56, 57, 60, and
62.

Category E: The following will be allowed: Numbers 31, 32, 36, 37, 39,
41, and of course 99 and 101 which have already been allowed.

In the last category, Category F, the Tribunal has very great doubts as
to the relevance of any of the documents in that category, but it will
have them all translated with the exception of Document 73.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I wonder whether the Tribunal would
allow me to mention the document numbers of the additional extracts from
_Der Stürmer_ which were put in cross-examination of Streicher. I had
the numbers ready to present at a convenient time.

THE PRESIDENT: The exhibit numbers?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean read them?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: With the permission of the Tribunal, I have
proposed to hand in that schedule, which is in effect a catalogue or
index to the two bundles which the Tribunal had—Bundle A and Bundle
B—and I proposed then putting this schedule in as an exhibit itself,
which will become GB-450, (Document Number D-833), and if the Tribunal
agrees, that would save reading any numbers out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: There is another request I would make. The
original of the newspaper, _Israelitisches Wochenblatt_, was put in, or
has been put in. Those volumes I have borrowed from a library, and I was
going to ask the Tribunal’s permission to have the extracts photographed
and to substitute with the Tribunal’s Secretariat the photostats, and
then take back the originals so that they might be returned.

THE PRESIDENT: There seems no objection to that.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.

THE PRESIDENT: You have no objection to that, Dr. Marx?

DR. MARX: No, Mr. President, I have no objection to that. I reserve the
right to submit some counter documents if it should be necessary. But
the presentation of these documents is in accordance with what Colonel
Griffith-Jones stated in the course of the proceedings—if they are
submitted...

THE PRESIDENT: You have a copy of this document here, this exhibit.

DR. MARX: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you whether you had any objection to the
original of the Jewish newspaper being returned...

DR. MARX: No.

THE PRESIDENT: ...after it is photographed.

DR. MARX: No, I have no objection to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am very much obliged.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, I believe you still had to supplement your answer
to a question I put to you yesterday. I put to you the point that
different memoranda, letters, _et cetera_ from you to Hitler were full
of National Socialist phraseology. I said you dealt with letters and
memoranda from the date of the seizure of power until later when you
went into opposition. The Prosecution, however, specifically in the oral
presentation of the charges, as I remember it, referred to at least one
letter which you addressed to Hitler before the seizure of power in
November 1932, and there is in the files another letter of similar
contents of August 1932. I think you should state your position with
respect to these two letters, supplementing your answer to my question.

DR. SCHACHT: I explained to you yesterday already that up to the
decisive election of July 1932, I had in no way intervened in the
development of the National Socialist movement, but remained completely
aloof from it. After that movement achieved its overpowering success in
July 1932, of which I spoke yesterday, I foresaw very clearly the
development which would now result. According to the principles of the
democratic political concept there was only one possibility, namely,
that the leader of that overwhelmingly large party would now have to
form a new government. I rejected from the first the other theoretical
possibility of a military government and a possibly resulting civil war,
as being impossible and incompatible with my principles.

Therefore, after I had recognized these facts I endeavored in everything
to gain influence over Hitler and his movement, and the two letters
which you have just mentioned were written in that spirit.

DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Austria?

SCHACHT: I never knew anything about plans against Austria. Nor did I
know in detail the plans Hitler had for Austria. I only knew—like the
majority of all Germans—that he was in favor of an Anschluss of Austria
with Germany.

DR. DIX: What did you know about his plans against Czechoslovakia?

SCHACHT: I knew nothing of his plans against Czechoslovakia until about
the time of the Munich Conference.

DR. DIX: Did you, after the Munich Conference, that is to say, after the
peaceful, so far peaceful settlement of the Sudeten question, hear a
remark of Hitler’s about Munich which was of importance in your later
personal attitude toward Hitler? Will you tell the Tribunal the remark
which you heard?

SCHACHT: May I say first that, according to my knowledge of conditions
at that time, Hitler was conceded in Munich more than he had ever
expected. According to my information—and I expressed this also in the
conversation with Ambassador Bullitt at that time—it was Hitler’s
purpose to gain autonomy for the Germans in Czechoslovakia. In Munich
the Allies presented him with the transfer of the Sudeten-German
territories on a silver platter. I assumed, of course, that now Hitler’s
ambition would be more than satisfied and I can only say that I was
surprised and shocked when a few days after Munich I saw Hitler. I had
no further conversation with him at that time, but I met him with his
entourage, mostly SS men, and from the conversation between him and the
SS men I could only catch the remark: “That fellow has spoiled my entry
into Prague.” That is to say made it impossible.

Apparently he was not satisfied with the great success which he had
achieved in foreign politics, but I mentioned when I spoke about it
yesterday the fact that I assumed from that remark that he lacked the
glory and a glamorous staging.

DR. DIX: And what were your feelings in regard to your whole political
attitude towards Hitler after Munich?

SCHACHT: In spite of the foreign political success I regretted very
deeply, and so did my close friends, that by this intervention on the
part of the Allied Powers, our attempt to remove the Hitler regime was
ruined for a long time to come—we did not know at that time of course
what would happen in the future—but, naturally, at that moment we had
to resign ourselves to it.

DR. DIX: What did you know about Hitler’s plans against Memel?

SCHACHT: I knew nothing at all and never heard anything about it. As far
as I know, I learned of the annexation of Memel by Germany on my trip to
India, which I had already started at that time.

DR. DIX: And since you were in India at that time, you, of course, heard
nothing either about the negotiations, _et cetera_, which preceded the
attack on Poland?

SCHACHT: I had no knowledge about that and therefore I also knew nothing
of the May meeting of 1939 which has been discussed several times. In
the beginning of March I left Berlin and then stayed for some time in
Switzerland; at the end of March I set out for India via Genoa, and so I
learned nothing at all about the Hacha affair, that is the establishment
of the protectorate in Czechoslovakia, nor of Memel, nor of Poland,
since I did not return from the trip to India until the beginning of
August.

DR. DIX: The invasions of Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark have
been taken up here. Did you approve of these measures and actions?

SCHACHT: Under no circumstances.

DR. DIX: Were you ever able to express that disapproval anywhere and
how?

SCHACHT: Before the invasion of Belgium I was visited on the order of
the Chief of the General Staff, Halder, by the Quartermaster General,
the then Colonel, later General Wagner who after the collapse committed
suicide. He informed me of the intended invasion of Belgium. I was
shocked and I replied at that time, “If you want to commit that insanity
too, then you are beyond help.”

THE PRESIDENT: What time?

SCHACHT: Before the march into Belgium. Exactly when it was I could not
say. It may have been already in November 1939. It may have been in
April 1940. I no longer know exactly when it was.

DR. DIX: Even though you did not approve of that action, Germany was
after all engaged in a life and death struggle. Did not that cause you
to put your active co-operation at her disposal, since you were still
Minister without Portfolio, though you no longer held a special office?

SCHACHT: I did not do that.

DR. DIX: Did anyone ask you to do that?

SCHACHT: The visit, which I have just mentioned, of Quartermaster
General Wagner, upon order of the Chief of General Staff Halder, was
intended to persuade me to act in Germany’s interest during the expected
occupation of Belgium. I was to supervise and direct currency, finance,
and banking matters in Belgium. I flatly refused that. Later I was
approached again by the then Military Governor of Belgium, General Von
Falkenhausen, for advice concerning the Belgian financial
administration. I again refused to give advice and did not make any
statements or participate in any way.

DR. DIX: When did you for the first time...

SCHACHT: I could perhaps relate another instance when I was approached.
One day, shortly after America was drawn into the war, I received a
request from the newspaper published by Goebbels, that, on account of my
knowledge of American conditions, I should write an article for _Das
Reich_, to assure the German people that the war potential of the United
States should not be overestimated. I refused to write that article for
the reason that precisely because I knew American conditions very well,
my statement could only amount to the exact opposite. And so I refused
in this instance also.

DR. DIX: When did you hear for the first time of the meeting which we
call here simply the Hossbach meeting, or the meeting concerning the
Hossbach protocol?

SCHACHT: To my great surprise, I was informed of that meeting on 20
October 1945, here in my cell, and I was extremely astonished that
during all previous interrogations I had never been asked about this
record, because it can be seen clearly from it that the Reich Government
was not to be informed of Hitler’s intentions for war and therefore
could not know anything about them.

DR. DIX: Did you take part in similar conferences which were preparatory
to attacks, for instance the meeting of November 1940 in which the
attack on Russia was discussed? I do not wish to be misunderstood—the
Speer document which you spoke of yesterday discusses an attack which
according to Hitler was threatened by Russia. I am speaking now of
discussions in which the subject was an attack on Russia.

SCHACHT: The fear of an attack from Russia dates back to the fall of
1936 and therefore has as yet nothing to do with the war. I never took
part in any conference which indicated intentions of war, consequently
not in the conference on the intended attack on Russia, and I never
heard anything about it.

DR. DIX: Does that also apply to the meeting of May 1941?

SCHACHT: At the moment, I do not know which meeting that is, but I did
not in any way take part in any meeting in May 1941, as during the
entire period when I was Minister without Portfolio, I never took part
in any official conference.

DR. DIX: Then you also did not get any information about the conferences
which the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka had in Berlin?

SCHACHT: I did not have the slightest knowledge of the Matsuoka
conference except what may perhaps have been said on the radio or in the
press.

DR. DIX: Mention has been made in some way that you at one time had made
available 200,000 marks for Nazi propaganda purposes in Austria. Is
there any truth in this?

SCHACHT: I have not the slightest knowledge of that.

DR. DIX: Now we come to your dismissal as President of the Reichsbank.
As you have heard, the Prosecution asserts that you finally brought
about your own dismissal in order to evade the financial responsibility.
I ask you to reply to that accusation and to tell the Tribunal briefly
but exhaustively the reasons and the tactical deliberations leading to
your dismissal and that of your assistants. They appear here in the
memorandum of the Reichsbank Directorate which has been under
consideration several times.

SCHACHT: I should like to divide the question into two parts: The first
question is whether I tried to rid myself of my office as President of
the Reichsbank. My answer to that question is a most emphatic “yes.”
Since the middle of 1938, we in the Reichsbank always considered that if
there were no change in policy, we in no event wanted to continue in
office, because—and that brings me to the second part of the
question—we did not want to assume the responsibility which we were
then expected to bear.

For everything which we did previously and for a defensive rearmament in
order to achieve equal rights for Germany in international politics, we
gladly assumed responsibility, and we assume it before history and this
Tribunal. But the responsibility for continuing rearmament which
possibly in itself constituted a serious potential danger of war or
which would ever aim at war intentionally—that responsibility none of
us wanted to assume. Consequently, when it became clear that Hitler was
working toward a further increase in rearmament—and I spoke about that
yesterday in connection with the conversation of 2 January 1939—when we
became aware of that we wrote the memorandum which was openly quoted and
is in the hands of this Tribunal as an exhibit. It indicates clearly
that we opposed every further increase of state expenditure and would
not assume responsibility for it. From that, Hitler gathered that he
would in no event be able to use the Reichsbank with its present
Directorate and President for any future financial purposes. Therefore,
there remained only one alternative; to change the Directorate, because
without the Reichsbank he could not go on. And he had to take a second
step; he had to change the Reichsbank Law. That is to say, an end had to
be put to the independence of the Reichsbank from government decrees. At
first he did that in a secret law—we had such things—of 19 or 20
January 1939. That law was published only about 6 months later. That law
abolished the independence of the Reichsbank and the President of the
Reichsbank became a mere cashier for the credit demands of the Reich,
that is to say, of Hitler.

The Reichsbank Directorate did not want to continue along this line of
development. Therefore, on 20 January the President of the Reichsbank,
the Vice President, and the main financial expert, Reichsbank Director
Huelse, were dismissed; three other members of the Directorate of the
Reichsbank, Geheimrat Vocke, Director Erhard, and Director Blessing
pressed insistently for their resignation from the Reichsbank until it
was also granted. Two other members of the Reichsbank Directorate,
Director Puhl, whose name has been mentioned here already, and an eighth
director, Director Poetschmann, remained in the Directorate even under
the new conditions. They were both Party members, the only ones in the
Directorate, and therefore they could not easily withdraw.

DR. DIX: That is one accusation which is made by the Prosecution
concerning your reasons for writing the memorandum, that is to say, to
evade the financial responsibility. The second accusation is that not a
word of this memorandum expressly mentions limitation of armaments, but
that it essentially treats only matters of currency, technical questions
of finance, and economic considerations; and that it was therefore the
Dr. Schacht who in his capacity of Bank Director was concerned about the
currency, rather than the opponent of rearmament, who made himself heard
by this memorandum.

It is necessary that as co-author of the memorandum—as its main
author—you state your position with regard to this incriminating
interpretation of the memorandum.

SCHACHT: Even at an earlier time I said here that every objection which
I made and had to make to Hitler—and that applies not only to myself
but to all ministers—could only be made with arguments arising out of
the particular department administered.

Had I said to Hitler, “I shall not give you any more money because you
intend to wage war,” I should not have the pleasure of conducting this
animated conversation here with you. I could then have consulted a
priest, and it would have been a very one-sided affair because I would
have lain silently in my tomb, and the priest would have delivered a
monologue.

DR. DIX: This memorandum is certainly very important, and therefore we
have to pause here for a moment. In summarizing—and please check me—I
believe I can express your views in this way: This memorandum at the end
contained demands such as further means of raising funds by increase of
taxation or else by making use of the stock market—both impossible.
Taxation could not be increased any more. The stock market had just
unsuccessfully attempted a loan.

If these actually impossible demands had been granted, the Reichsbank
would have created guarantees that no further funds would be used for
one or another form of rearmament. This success was not to be expected;
rather you could expect your dismissal. Did my brief but comprehensive
summary of this matter express your views correctly?

SCHACHT: That entire letter was composed in such a way that there were
only two possible answers to it; either an alteration of financial
policy—and that meant a stop to rearmament, which would have amounted
to a complete change of Hitler’s policy—or else the dismissal of the
Reichsbank President; and that happened. We expected it because at that
time I no longer believed that Hitler would change his policy so
completely.

DR. DIX: Therefore, the Prosecution are right in saying that your
mission ended with your dismissal.

SCHACHT: Hitler certainly confirmed that himself and in the letter of
dismissal to me said it expressly. We heard from the testimony of Herr
Lammers in this Court that Hitler with his own hand wrote that addition
into the letter, that my name would remain connected with the first
stage of rearmament. The second stage of rearmament I rejected and
Hitler understood that very clearly, because when he received that
letter from the Reichsbank he said to those who were present: “This is
mutiny.”

DR. DIX: How do you know that?

SCHACHT: The witness Vocke who will, I hope, appear in this Court will
testify to that.

DR. DIX: Furthermore, the Prosecution asserted that your exit from the
political stage could not be attributed to your policy of opposition to
a war but to disputes with Hermann Göring over power and rank. As such,
that accusation seems to me to have been refuted already by statements
which Göring and Lammers have made up to now. We do not wish to
recapitulate. I merely want to ask you whether you have anything to add
to the statements made on this subject by Göring and Lammers, or whether
you disagree with them.

SCHACHT: In his oral presentation the prosecutor said that throughout
the entire material which he had studied he could not find one piece of
evidence for my opposition to a policy of war. I can only say in this
respect: If someone on account of his shortsightedness does not see a
tree on a level plain, there is surely no proof that the tree is not
there.

DR. DIX: You have heard from the Prosecution that you are accused of
having remained a member of the Cabinet as a Reich Minister without
Portfolio. That was also the cause for misunderstanding yesterday. I
merely wanted to express yesterday that you had resigned as an active
minister and head of a department, that you resigned as Minister of
Economy and His Lordship correctly pointed out, that of course you
remained a Minister without Portfolio, that is without a special sphere
of activity until January 1943. Of that you are accused by the
Prosecution. What caused you to remain Reich Minister without Portfolio?
Why did you do that? Did you have any particular financial reasons?
Excuse my mentioning that, but the trial brief, on Page 5, charges you
with that motive.

SCHACHT: I have already repeatedly explained here that my release from
office as Minister of Economy encountered very great difficulties, and
you have also submitted several affidavits confirming the fact.

Hitler did not, under any circumstances, want it to be known that a
break or even so much as a difference of opinion had occurred between
one of his assistants and himself. When he finally approved my release,
he attached the condition that nominally I should remain Minister
without Portfolio.

As regards the second accusation, it is as unworthy as it is wrong.
There was a law in Germany that if a person held two public offices he
could be paid only for one. Since I was in addition President of the
Reichsbank I continuously received my income from the Reichsbank, at
first my salary and later my pension; therefore as a minister I drew no
salary whatever.

DR. DIX: Did you then, during the entire period of your position as
Reich Minister without Portfolio, have any other function to fulfill in
that capacity? Did you take any part in important decisions of the
Cabinet, did you participate in discussions—in brief, was the Minister
without Portfolio just a fancy dress major or was the position one of
substance?

SCHACHT: I have already emphasized again and again in this Court—and I
can only repeat it again—that after I left the Reichsbank I had not a
single official discussion; I did not take part in a single ministerial
or official conference and that, unfortunately, it was not possible for
me to bring up any subject for discussion; for I had no factual basis or
pretext for such a possibility, for the very reason that I had no
particular field to administer. I believe that I was the only Minister
without Portfolio—there were also a few others—who was not active in
any way at all. As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart was undoubtedly Minister
without Portfolio; he had his administration in Holland. Frank was
Minister without Portfolio and had his administration in Poland.
Schirach—I do not know whether he was Minister without Portfolio; I
think it has been mentioned once, but I do not know if it is correct—he
had his Austrian administration in Vienna. I had nothing further to do
with the state administration or in any other way with the State or the
Party.

DR. DIX: What about the ordinary course of affairs? Were there perhaps
any circulars sent out by Lammers on which you acted?

SCHACHT: On the whole—and I think it is understandable after what I
have stated here—I watched carefully for every possibility of
intervening again in some way but I remember and state with absolute
certainty, that during the entire time until the collapse I received all
in all three official memoranda. The numerous invitations to state
funerals and similar social state functions really need not be mentioned
here as official communications. I did not participate in these
occasions either. However, these three instances are interesting. The
first time it was a letter from Hitler—pardon, from Himmler—a circular
or request or a bill proposed by Himmler who intended to transfer court
jurisdiction over the so-called asocial elements of the population to
the police, or rather the Gestapo, that is to say, a basic principle of
the administration of justice to separate the functions of prosecution
and judge...

DR. DIX: Well, that is known, Dr. Schacht. You can assume that is known.

SCHACHT: In regard to this question I immediately assented in the copy
of a letter which Reich Minister Frank had sent me in which he took a
stand against this basic violation of legal principles, and the bill was
not made law. It would indeed have been extremely regrettable, because I
am firmly convinced that I myself was a definite anti-social element in
Himmler’s sense.

The second instance was a letter concerning some discussions about state
property in Yugoslavia, after we had occupied Yugoslavia. I answered
that since I had not taken part in the preliminary discussions on the
draft of the law I should not be counted upon to assist in this matter.

Finally, the third incident—and this is the most important—occurred in
November 1942. Apparently by mistake there came into circulation the
draft for a law of the Reich Minister for Air, which contained the
suggestion of taking 15 and 16 year old students away from the high
school to enlist them for military service in the anti-aircraft defense,
the so-called Flakdienst. I answered this letter because it was a
welcome opportunity for me to state for once my opinion on the military
situation in a long detailed reply which I sent to Göring.

DR. DIX: On the third of November?

SCHACHT: It is a letter of 30 November, which on the second of December
I believe was given personally by my secretary to the adjutant of Göring
in a closed envelope, with the request that he himself open it.

DR. DIX: One moment, Dr. Schacht.

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] That letter has already been submitted
under Document Number 3700-PS by the Prosecution, but it is also in our
document book under Exhibit Number 23; Page 66 of the English text and
Page 59 of the German text. If we were not so pressed for time, it would
have been especially gratifying for me to read this letter here in full.
It is a very fine letter. However, I want to take time into
consideration and I merely ask you, Dr. Schacht, to state briefly your
opinion of its content.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will read the letter. It isn’t necessary for
you to read it now, is it?

DR. DIX: Very well. Well, then, would he speak quite briefly about the
letter before the recess or do you not wish to say anything further?

SCHACHT: Yes. I would like to say in this connection, if it is
permitted, that to my knowledge this letter has already been read here
by the American Chief Prosecutor, that is...

DR. DIX: Read?

SCHACHT: Or mentioned, or at least the most important points were read.
I believe it is sufficient if you submit the letter to the Court in
evidence.

DR. DIX: Yes, that has been done.

Now, that constituted your entire activity as Reich Minister without
Portfolio?

SCHACHT: Yes, that was the end of it.

DR. DIX: Therefore if one wanted to define your position in one word,
one would say, just a kind of retired major (Charaktermajor).

SCHACHT: I don’t know what a “Charaktermajor” is, at any rate, I was
never a major, but I have always had character.

DR. DIX: But, Dr. Schacht, that is a historical remark about authority
conferred by Kaiser Wilhelm, the First as German Emperor on Bismarck.

THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. DIX: Dr. Schacht, we spoke of the letter, dated 30 November 1942, to
Göring. Did that letter have any consequences?

SCHACHT: Yes, the letter had very considerable consequences. It had the
result that on 22 January I did at last receive my long hoped-for
release from my position of a nominal Minister without Portfolio. The
reason given for it, however, was less pleasant. I believe the letter is
already in the files of the Tribunal. It is a letter attached to the
official document of release from Lammers.

DR. DIX: Yes, very well. We put a question on that subject during
Lammers’ hearing.

SCHACHT: Yes. But I should only like to refer to the statement which
says: “...in view of your entire conduct in the present fateful struggle
of the German nation...”—so that was my whole attitude.

DR. DIX: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, it is Number 26 of the document
book. It is on Page 76 of the English text and on Page 69 of the German
text.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.

SCHACHT: It was, therefore, my entire attitude during this war which led
to my dismissal, and the letter of dismissal also contained the
statement that I would be dismissed for the time being. According to
Lammers’ statement, as we have heard, this expression “for the time
being” was included in the letter, also on the Führer’s initiative. I
was very clearly aware of this wording when I received the letter.

Two days later I was removed from the Prussian State Council, of which I
was a member—a body, incidentally, which had not met for at least 8
years. At any rate, I was not at the meetings. Perhaps it was 6 years, I
do not know. The text of that decision was communicated to me by the
chairman of that State Council, Hermann Göring, and because of its
almost amusing contents, I still recollect it very clearly. It stated:

    “My answer to your defeatist letter undermining the power of
    resistance of the German people is that I remove you from the
    Prussian State Council.”

I say it was amusing because a sealed letter written by me to Göring
could not possibly shake the power of resistance of the German people. A
further result was that Party Leader Bormann demanded from me the return
of the Golden Party Badge and I did that at once. After that I was
particularly closely watched by the Gestapo. I gave up my residence in
Berlin immediately, within 24 hours, and for the whole day the Gestapo
spies followed me all over Berlin both on foot and by car. Then I
quietly retired to my estate in the country.

DR. DIX: Now, since the trial brief has mentioned material and pecuniary
reasons for the decisions which you made, it appears to me justified and
necessary to ask what was the position regarding your property and your
income after 1933? In your reply please take into consideration that it
is striking that in 1942 there was an increase in your income.

SCHACHT: A few months ago, apparently with the approval of the Military
Government, there appeared in the press a list of donations which the
Party leaders and ministers in Germany received and, in that connection,
of their income and their property. I was also listed, not under
“donations,” but it was stated that in 1942 I had an unusually high
income. This list is incorrect, since it is a gross figure which is
mentioned and it does not take into consideration the fact that the war
profit tax was later deducted from it. When the list was compiled the
tax was not yet determined, so that about 80 percent must be deducted
from the sum which is given there. The income is then no longer striking
in any way. In regard to my property, the list shows that over a period
of 10 years it has hardly changed, and I want to emphasize here
particularly that in the last 20 years my property remained
approximately the same and did not increase.

DR. DIX: If I remember rightly you reduced your own salary as President
of the Reichsbank at a certain time on your own initiative?

SCHACHT: When, on Hitler’s suggestion, President Hindenburg in March of
1933 appointed me again to the position of President of the Reichsbank,
Hitler left it to me to fix my own income. At that time, I voluntarily
reduced my income to less than 25 percent of my former income from the
Reichsbank.

DR. DIX: Did you ever receive presents or donations from Hitler, either
in money or in valuables?

SCHACHT: As I have just mentioned, I have never received any kind of
donations from Hitler, and I think he would hardly have risked offering
me one. I did, indeed, receive one present from Hitler, on the occasion
of my 60th birthday. He gave me a picture which certainly had the value
of about 20,000 marks. It was an oil painting by a German painter
Spitzweg; and would have been worth approximately 200,000 marks if it
had been genuine. As soon as the picture was brought into my room I
recognized it as a forgery, but I succeeded about 3 months later in
tracing the original. I started proceedings on the subject of the
genuineness of the picture, and the forgery was established before a
court.

THE PRESIDENT: It is not appropriate for the Tribunal to listen to this.

DR. DIX: Did Hitler ever bestow on you the right to wear a uniform or
give you any kind of decoration or military rank?

SCHACHT: If the Tribunal will permit me I would like to say that I
returned the forgery and it was never replaced; so that I have received
no presents from Hitler.

Hitler offered me a uniform. He said I could have any uniform I desired
but I only raised my hands in refusal and did not accept any, not even
the uniform of an official, because I did not wish to have a uniform.

DR. DIX: Now, another subject: Did you know anything about the
concentration camps?

SCHACHT: Already in the year 1933, when Göring established concentration
camps, I heard several times that political opponents and other disliked
or inconvenient persons were taken away to a concentration camp. That
these people were deprived of their liberty perturbed me very much at
the time, of course, and I continuously demanded, as far as I was in a
position to do so during conversations, that the arrest and removal to
concentration camps should be followed by a clarification before the law
with a defense and so on, and suitable legal proceedings. At that early
time the Reich Minister of the Interior Frick also protested
energetically along the same lines. Subsequently this type of
imprisonment, _et cetera_, became less known in public, and in
consequence I assumed that things were slowly abating. Only much
later—let us say the second half of 1934 and 1935...

DR. DIX: When you met Gisevius, you mean?

SCHACHT: Yes, when I met Gisevius—I heard on repeated occasions that
not only were people still being deprived of their liberty, but that
sometimes they were being ill-treated, that beatings, _et cetera_, took
place. I have already said before this Tribunal that as a result, as
early as May 1935, I personally took the opportunity of drawing Hitler’s
attention to these conditions and that I told him at the time that such
a system was causing the whole world to despise us and must cease. I
have mentioned that I repeatedly took a stand against all these things
publicly, whenever there was a possibility of doing so.

But I never heard anything of the serious ill-treatment and
outrages—murder and the like—which started later. Probably because,
firstly, these conditions did not begin until after the war, after the
outbreak of war, and because already from 1939 onwards I led a very
retired life. I heard of these things and of the dreadful form in which
they happened only here in prison. However, I did hear, as early as 1938
and after, of the deportation of Jews; but because individual cases were
brought to my notice I could only ascertain that there were deportations
to Theresienstadt, where allegedly there was an assembly camp for Jews,
where Jews were accommodated until a later date when the Jewish problem
was to be dealt with again. Any physical ill-treatment, not to speak of
killing or the like, never came to my knowledge.

DR. DIX: Did you ever take a look at a concentration camp?

SCHACHT: I had an opportunity of acquainting myself with several
concentration camps when, on 23 July 1944, I myself was dragged into a
concentration camp. Before that date I did not visit a single
concentration camp at any time, but afterwards I got to know not only
the ordinary concentration camps but also the extermination camp in
Flossenbürg.

DR. DIX: Did you not, while in Flossenbürg, receive a visit from a
“comrade-in-ideas”—if I may say so?

SCHACHT: I know of this matter only from a letter which this gentleman
sent to you or to this Tribunal, I believe, and in which he describes
that visit. I can only, on my own observation...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it is improper to give the contents of a
letter from a person unidentified. I have said to this Tribunal before
that these letters which come from unidentified persons—if he is
identified, it has not been done in evidence—come to all of us. I am
sure members of the Tribunal get a great many of them. If that is
evidence, then the Prosecution should reopen its case, because I have
baskets of them.

I think it is highly improper to take communications and put them in
evidence directly and it is even more improper to relate all of them by
oral testimony when the document is not produced. I think this kind of
evidence has no probative value and I object to it.

DR. DIX: May I be permitted to say that I would never do anything
improper nor have I done it. I do not intend in any way to submit this
very harmless jocular letter to the Tribunal as evidence. But this
letter, which reached me through quite regular channels, informed Dr.
Schacht and myself that there existed a plan to murder him in
Flossenbürg. That is why I also questioned the witness Kaltenbrunner on
this matter. The only reason why I am asking Dr. Schacht is that I
expect him to inform the Tribunal that according to this information
there was in fact at that time an order to murder him. This fact, not
the letter, is not without some significance, because if a regime wants
to kill a man then that is at least proof of the fact that it is not
particularly well-disposed toward him. That is the only reason why I
asked that this letter be submitted, and it is, of course, also at Mr.
Justice Jackson’s disposal. It is really quite an amusing letter,
written by a simple man.

But I would never have considered submitting this letter as a document
in evidence. If the Tribunal have objections to hearing the matter, a
matter which was also discussed when Kaltenbrunner was examined, then I
shall willingly omit it. I am quite astonished that the matter should be
given so much significance.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that the letter isn’t being
offered in evidence, and therefore you ought not to refer to it. Well,
then, don’t refer to it.

DR. DIX: All right, we shall leave it.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, at last you were released. What
did you do then?

SCHACHT: After that time I did nothing more apart from continuing my
efforts towards the removal of Hitler. That was my only political
activity. For the rest, I was living on my estate.

DR. DIX: Did you not go on a journey in the spring of 1939?

SCHACHT: Excuse me, you are speaking of the time after the dismissal as
President of the Reichsbank, I thought you meant minister. I was just
talking of 1943.

DR. DIX: No. No.

SCHACHT: You are going back to the year 1939. After the dismissal in
January 1939 I already mentioned that Hitler suggested to me that I
should go on an extensive journey abroad and at the time I went to India
by way of Switzerland, where I again saw my friends.

DR. DIX: Were you in any way politically active in India?

SCHACHT: In India I merely traveled as a tourist. I was not politically
active but, of course, I visited several governors and I spent 3 days as
the Viceroy’s guest in his house in Simla.

DR. DIX: Did you not have political connections with Chinese statesmen
in Rangoon?

SCHACHT: When I was in Burma, after leaving India, I received a visit in
Rangoon from a Chinese friend who had visited me before in Berlin on
occasion and who had been commissioned by his government to talk to me
about the Situation of China.

DR. DIX: That is Chiang Kai-Shek’s China?

SCHACHT: Chiang Kai-Shek’s China which was already at war with Japan at
the time. The other China did not then exist and this gentleman asked me
upon the request of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese Cabinet...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I can’t see the slightest relevancy to this. In the
first place, we heard it once and secondly, after we had heard it it has
no relevancy to the case. We have no charge against him that he did
anything in China and we will stipulate that he was as pure as snow all
the time he was in China. We haven’t a thing to do with that and it is
taking time here that just gets us nowhere and is keeping us away from
the real charge in the case.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal quite understands that you say it is
irrelevant. Why do you say it is relevant?

DR. DIX: I regret that Mr. Justice Jackson and I understand each other
too little. The matter is relevant in the following connection: In this
testimony and also in an affidavit which has been read...

THE PRESIDENT: I think we heard three times that the Defendant Schacht
went to India. Three times in his evidence he dealt with the fact that
he went to India and China. How is it relevant?

DR. DIX: I am not speaking of the journey to India. It had to be
mentioned only briefly to explain the connection of time. I put a
question, referring to Schacht’s negotiations in Rangoon with the envoy
from Chiang Kai-Shek—with the Chinese—and at that point Mr. Justice
Jackson raised his objection. But the fact that Schacht maintained
friendly connections with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Government and gave support
to it, that fact is relevant, and for the same reason for which I
attached importance to the fact that it became clear here that in regard
to the Union of Soviet Republics also Schacht pursued a pro-Soviet line
in his economic policy during the years when Hitler was conducting a
political campaign against Russia. Here we have a second instance, where
he is demanding relations which were contrary to the principles of
Hitler’s policy; that is relations with Chiang Kai-Shek, and so against
Hitler’s ally, Japan. It is in this connection that the negotiations
with the Chinese are of significance. They will take only a moment’s
time at most. They were merely to be mentioned in passing.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that if you consider his relations
with China of any importance, it can be stated in one sentence.

DR. DIX: I am of the same opinion.

SCHACHT: I will sum it up in one sentence. In a written memorandum I
advised Chiang Kai-Shek’s government to continue holding out against
Japan, giving as reason that the economic resources of China would last
longer than the economic resources of Japan; and I advised Chiang
Kai-Shek to rely primarily on the United States of America in his
foreign policy.

DR. DIX: Then upon your return from India, that is, in August 1939, you
found a situation which must have appeared quite tense to someone who
was just coming back. Did you not then attempt to contact the Cabinet or
Hitler in order to discuss this situation?

SCHACHT: Of course, I found a very tense situation in the question of
Poland and I used my return as an occasion for writing a letter to
Hitler, a letter to Göring, and a letter to Ribbentrop; that is to say,
the three leading men, in order to inform them that I had come back from
India, leaving it to their discretion and expecting that at least one of
them would ask me for an account of my experiences; and then, I should
have had an opportunity of talking to the leading men once again. To my
very great surprise, I did not get an answer from Hitler at all; I
received no reply from Göring; and Herr Von Ribbentrop answered me that
he had taken note of my letter. There was therefore no other way for me
but to make my own inquiries regarding the real state of affairs on
Poland, and when things became critical I took the well-known step,
which has already been described here by Herr Gisevius; namely the
attempt to gain access to the Führer’s headquarters.

DR. DIX: We need not repeat that. The only question which I still want
to ask you is what were you going to tell the generals, particularly
General Von Brauchitsch, at that last moment?

SCHACHT: That he still had a chance to avert a war. I knew perfectly
well that bare economic and general political statements would of course
accomplish nothing with Von Brauchitsch because he would then certainly
have referred to Hitler’s leadership. Therefore I wanted to say to him
something of quite a different nature and, in my opinion, that is of the
most decisive significance. I was going to remind him that he had sworn
an oath of allegiance to the Weimar Constitution. I wanted to remind him
that the Enabling Act did not delegate power to Hitler but to the Reich
Cabinet and I wanted to remind him that in the Weimar Constitution there
was and still is a clause, which has never been annulled and according
to which, war cannot be declared without previous approval by the
Reichstag. I was convinced that Brauchitsch would have referred me to
his oath sworn to Hitler and I would have told him: “I also have sworn
this oath. You have sworn no oath other than your military one, perhaps,
but this oath does not in any way invalidate the oath sworn to the
Weimar Constitution; on the contrary, the oath to the Weimar
Constitution is the one that is valid. It is your duty, therefore, to
see to it that this entire question of war or no war be brought before
the Cabinet and discussed there, and when the Reich Cabinet has made a
decision, the matter will go before the Reichstag.” If these two steps
had been taken, then I am firmly convinced that there would have been no
war.

DR. DIX: You never reached Brauchitsch. We do not want to repeat the
description of that whole affair or of your attempts at the
Bendlerstrasse and so on. Have you anything to add to Gisevius’
testimony or do you wish to change anything in it?

SCHACHT: I can only confirm that Gisevius’ statement is correct in every
single point and I myself merely want to add that Canaris mentioned
among many reasons which then kept us from making the visit, that
Brauchitsch would probably have us arrested immediately if we said
anything to him against the war or if we wanted to prevent him from
fulfilling his oath of allegiance to Hitler. But the main reason why the
visit did not come about was quite correctly stated by Gisevius.
Moreover it is also mentioned by General Thomas in his affidavit which
we shall later submit. The main reason was: the war was canceled. And so
I went to Munich on a business matter and to my surprise while in
Munich, war was declared on Poland; the country was invaded.

DR. DIX: You mentioned the Reichstag a short time ago. A meeting of the
Reichstag did in fact take place, though not before the war or before
the declaration of war, but immediately thereafter. At the time you were
still a Minister without Portfolio.

Normally you would have had to sit on the minister’s bench during that
meeting.

Did you take part in that meeting?

SCHACHT: I did not participate in that meeting at all and I would like
to add at once that during the entire war, I was present at only one
meeting of the Reichstag. I could not avoid it, considering the matters
which I already mentioned here yesterday. It was after Hitler’s return
from Paris. I had to participate in this meeting of the Reichstag, which
followed the reception at the station because, as I said, it would
otherwise have been too obvious an affront. It was the meeting during
which political matters were not dealt with at all, but at which the
field marshal’s rank was granted by the dozen.

DR. DIX: Now, this last effort which has just been mentioned to stop the
outbreak of war through Canaris brings us to the particular chapter of
your attempts at a coup to overthrow Hitler and his government. We want
to make it a rule, if possible, not to repeat what the witness Gisevius
has already stated but only to supplement or correct or state what you
know from your own memory. Before I touch upon that chapter, however,
may I ask you whether you know from information you received or from
other indications, that your oppositional attitude and that of your
similarly minded friends, and your oppositional aims, were known in
authoritative circles abroad?

SCHACHT: I do not wish to repeat anything; I merely want to point out
that I have already stated repeatedly here that I continually discussed
the situation in Germany—thus also my own position—with my friends
abroad—not only with Americans, Englishmen, and Frenchmen but also with
neutrals—and I would like to add one more thing; foreign broadcasting
stations did not tire at all of speaking constantly about Schacht’s
opposition to Hitler. My friends and family received a shock whenever
information on this subject transpired in Germany.

DR. DIX: When did your attempts to overthrow the Hitler government
begin?

SCHACHT: As early as 1937 I tried to determine which groups in Germany
one might rely upon in an attempt to remove the Hitler regime.
Unfortunately in the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, I got to know that all
those circles in which I had placed my hope were failing, namely the
scientists, the educated middle class, and the leaders of economy.

I need only mention that the scientists permitted themselves to listen
to the most nonsensical National Socialist lectures without opposing
them in the least. I call attention to the fact that when the economic
leaders saw that I was no longer a figure in economy, they disappeared
from my anteroom and thronged into that of Göring. In a word, one could
not rely upon these circles. Consequently, one could depend only on the
generals, on the military, because according to my conception at the
time, one could certainly count on an armed resistance even by the SS
bodyguard.

Therefore, as has been stated here—and I do not want to pursue it
further—I tried at first to contact such generals as Kluge, for
instance, merely in order to ascertain whether among the military there
were people with whom one could speak openly. And this first occasion
led me to a great many generals whom I contacted in the course of time.

DR. DIX: That was then in the year 1937; now we come to 1938, still
limiting ourselves by what Gisevius has already said, merely touching on
it briefly and confirming it. By the way, were you in any way directly
or indirectly involved in the negotiations at Godesberg or Munich?

SCHACHT: In no way.

DR. DIX: Now we continue with your political work, aiming at a revolt.
Is Gisevius’ account of the year 1938 correct or is there something to
be added to it?

SCHACHT: Gisevius’ statement is complete and reliable.

DR. DIX: That also applies to the attempt at a _coup d’état_ in the late
summer of 1938?

SCHACHT: Yes.

DR. DIX: Then came the war. Did you fold your arms after war broke out?

SCHACHT: No; throughout the entire war I pleaded with every general whom
I could contact. I used the same arguments which I have just mentioned
in connection with the prospective interview with Brauchitsch;
therefore, it was not merely theory, but I actually spoke to all these
generals.

DR. DIX: Was not a visit to General Hoeppner significant in this
connection?

SCHACHT: In 1941 I tried not only to get in touch with General Hoeppner
but in a whole series of conversations I attempted to make him take
action. Hoeppner was perfectly willing and prepared and later he too,
unfortunately, lost his life as a consequence of 20 July 1944.

In the year 1942—and this has not been mentioned here up to now,
because Gisevius did not participate—I tried again to mobilize General
Von Witzleben to renewed activity. I went on a special journey to
Frankfurt-on-the-Main, where he had his headquarters at that time, and
Von Witzleben proved as ever to be completely resolved to act, but he
told me that, of course, he could only do so if he again received a
command at the front. Then I...

DR. DIX: At that time Frau Strünck, who knew of these matters, was in
Frankfurt?

SCHACHT: She knew of these things and can confirm them.

DR. DIX: Perhaps I may tell the Tribunal at this point that Frau Strünck
was granted me as a witness and she was here. In order to save time,
however, I have decided to dispense with this witness since she could
make only cumulative statements on what Gisevius has already said and I
do not think it is necessary. Schacht himself has just stated the only
piece of information which she could have added, namely this trip, this
special journey to Frankfurt to Von Witzleben. On the strength of
experience the Tribunal will itself know that in the course of a
revolutionary movement, stretching over years such as this, many
journeys are made and in respect to this particular journey it is not
important to submit special evidence. In order to save time, therefore,
I have decided to dispense with the testimony of Frau Strünck. Excuse
me, I merely wanted to say this now. Then there is the next...

SCHACHT: May I perhaps say one more thing? I of course always
participated in the conversations—mentioned by Gisevius here—with the
other generals, that is the group of Beck, Fromm, Olbricht, _et cetera_.
These things did not come about for some time on account of the
negotiations abroad for which the generals were always waiting. I think
that enough has been said here about this topic and I need not make
further report on it. I come then to one last point, which does not
become apparent from Gisevius’ statement but about which an affidavit
from Colonel Gronau will be submitted here. I can mention it quite
briefly in order to save time. Naturally, together with the group of
Beck, Goerdeler, my friend Strünck, Gisevius, and others I was
completely informed of, and initiated into, the affair of 20 July.
However, and I think it was mutual, we told each other whenever possible
only those things which the other absolutely had to know, in order not
to embarrass the other man, should he at any time be submitted to the
tortures of the Gestapo. For that reason, apart from being in touch with
Beck, Goerdeler, Gisevius, and Strünck, _et cetera_, I had another
connection with the generals who were at the head of this revolt and
that was the General of Artillery Lindemann, one of the main
participants in the coup, who unfortunately also lost his life later.

DR. DIX: Perhaps it would be proper—and also more intelligible in
connection with your participation in 20 July—if I read a brief part of
Colonel Gronau’s affidavit which refers to Lindemann.

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] It is Exhibit Number 39 of our document
book, Page 168 of the German text and Page 176 of the English text. I
shall omit the first part of the affidavit, but I ask the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of it; essentially it contains only matters on
which evidence has already been given. I shall read only the part that
deals with 20 July. It begins on Page 178 of the English text and on
Page 170 of the German text, and I start with Question 5:

    “Question 5) You brought Schacht and General Lindemann together.
    When was that?

    “Answer 5) In the fall of 1943, for the first time in years, I
    again saw General Lindemann, my former school and regiment
    comrade. While discussing politics I told him that I knew
    Schacht well, and General Lindemann asked to be introduced to
    him, whereupon I established the connection.

    “Question 6) What did Lindemann expect from Schacht, and what
    was Schacht’s attitude toward him?

    “Answer 6) The taking up of political relations with foreign
    countries following a successful attempt at revolt. He promised
    his future co-operation. At the beginning of 1944 Lindemann made
    severe reproaches that the generals”—that should read “he
    severely reproached Lindemann”; it is incorrectly copied
    here—“because the generals were hesitating so long. The attempt
    at revolt would have to be made prior to the landing of the
    Allies.”

    “Question 7) Was Lindemann involved in the attempted
    assassination of 20 July 1944?

    “Answer 7) Yes, he was one of the main figures.

    “Question 8) Did he inform Schacht of the details of this plan?

    “Answer 8) Nothing about the manner in which the attempt was to
    be carried out; he did inform him, however, of what was to
    happen thereafter.

    “Question 9) Did Schacht approve the plan?

    “Answer 9) Yes.

    “Question 10) Did Schacht put himself at the disposal of the
    military in the event of a successful attempt?

    “Answer 10) Yes.

    “Question 11) Were you arrested after 20 July 1944?

    “Answer 11) Yes.

    “Question 12) How were you able to survive your imprisonment?

    “Answer 12) By stoically denying complicity.”

Now, we have left the years 1941 and 1942 and to explain the Putsch in
logical sequence we reached the year 1944, something that could not be
avoided, but we must now go back again to the year 1941. You have
already mentioned, in passing, the efforts made abroad. In 1941 you were
in Switzerland. Did you make any efforts in that direction there?

SCHACHT: Every time I went abroad I talked at length to my foreign
friends and again and again looked for some way by which one might
shorten the war and begin negotiations.

DR. DIX: In this connection, the Fraser letter is of importance. I think
the Fraser letter and the way it was smuggled into Switzerland has been
sufficiently discussed by the witness Gisevius. I have on two occasions
stated the contents briefly, once when the translation was discussed and
again during the discussion on the admissibility of the letter as
evidence before the Court. I do not think I need do it here nor that I
need read it. I should merely like to submit it. It is Exhibit 31, on
Page 84 of the German and Page 91 of the English text. And—I say this
now, we shall discuss it later—the same applies to the article which
appeared this year in the _Basler Nachrichten_ and which deals with a
conversation which an American had with Schacht recently. I shall not
read that either since I have already stated the main points of its
contents. I submit it as Exhibit Number 32, Page 90 of the German text
and Page 99 of the English text. I might point out that this article has
already been the subject of certain accusations made during the
cross-examination of Gisevius by the representative of the Soviet
Prosecution.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like to raise one objection in regard to Document
32; this is an article about Dr. Schacht and his ideas by an unknown
writer describing his conversations with an unknown economist. The
article in question was published in the _Basler Nachrichten_ on 14
January 1946, that is, when the present Trial was already well under
way, and I cannot consider that this article can be presented in
evidence with regard to Schacht’s case.

DR. DIX: I might—may I, before the Tribunal decides, say something very
briefly?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. DIX: The article has already been admitted as evidence. We have
discussed it, and the Tribunal approved the article as evidence. The
Tribunal can, of course, revoke that decision. I think, for me it
would...

THE PRESIDENT: I think the Tribunal has always made it clear that the
allowance of these documents is a provisional allowance and that when
the document is actually offered in evidence, they will then decide the
relevancy or its admissibility, rather, and its relevancy.

DR. DIX: That is quite beyond doubt. I merely wanted to point out that
we have already discussed the question once before. Of course, the
Tribunal can today reject the document. I shall...

THE PRESIDENT: The allowance is provisional. It is not a question of the
Tribunal’s reversing its previous decision. The previous decision was
merely provisional, and the question of admissibility now comes up for
decision.

DR. DIX: It is quite clear to me, Your Lordship. I am merely surprised
at the objection raised by the Soviet Prosecution, inasmuch as the
representative of the Soviet Delegation himself referred to that article
in his observations during the cross-examination of the witness
Gisevius. It is true, he did not submit it to the Tribunal, but he
referred to it in his observations to the witness Gisevius. However, if
the Tribunal has the slightest objections to allowing the article as
documentary evidence, then I shall ask permission to leave it. I will
then—and I think I may—ask the witness Schacht whether it is true that
in 1941 he had a conversation with an American who was a professor of
national economy, a conversation which dealt with the possibility of
peace. I leave it to the Tribunal. For me, it is no—I thought it would
be simpler, if I submitted the article.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, as you have raised the objection to this
document, what have you to say about the point that Dr. Dix makes that
you used the document yourself in cross-examination?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, we did not use this document in the
cross-examination of the witness Gisevius. An explanatory question was
asked in order to reach a decision on this point and I particularly
emphasize...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you say that again? I did not understand you.

GEN. RUDENKO: I say, that we did not use this document during the
cross-examination of the witness Gisevius, but we did ask an explanatory
question in order that when the document was presented by Dr. Dix, we
could object to it as being of no probative value. I especially...

THE PRESIDENT: But did you not put the contents of the document to
Gisevius? I do not remember. What I want to know is did you not put the
contents of the document?

GEN. RUDENKO: No, no, we did not submit the contents, and we did not
discuss the substance of the document. We merely asked a question—did
the witness Gisevius know about the article in the _Basler Nachrichten_
of 14 January 1946? That was the question, and the witness answered that
it was known to him.

DR. DIX: May I say one more thing? It appears to me that the Soviet
Delegation does not desire to have the article submitted as evidence. I
therefore withdraw it as evidence. And since I have no due reasons to
the contrary, no factual reason to the contrary, 1 can certainly fulfill
this wish of the Soviet Delegation. I would like the Tribunal to
consider the matter as settled.

May I now put my question?

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you had conversations in
Switzerland?

SCHACHT: Yes.

DR. DIX: What was the subject of these conversations, in broad outlines,
and with whom did you have them?

SCHACHT: This article, which has just been discussed...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First, Your Honor, may I interpose an objection?
The reason I did not join in the Soviet objection to this document was
that I want to know who this economist is. I want to check this thing.
There are very peculiar circumstances about this document, and I object
to his retelling a conversation with an unknown economist. All I ask is
that he identify time and place and person with whom he had his
conversation, so that we can do a little verifying of this effort to get
something before the Tribunal that did not appear until 1946.

DR. DIX: The question is now being given a significance which its
comparative triviality really does not merit. I shall, therefore,
dispense with this question too. Please do not now refer to the
conversation with the professor, and I shall leave it to the Prosecution
to put the question which Mr. Justice Jackson has just mentioned during
cross-examination.

Well, your conversations in Switzerland, then, excepting that with the
unknown professor.

SCHACHT: Yes, I tried again and again to shorten the war and to bring
about some form of mediation which I always sought for particularly
through the good offices of the American President. That is all that I
can say here. I do not think I need go into details.

DR. DIX: Very well. Did you in your letters to Ribbentrop and
Göring—you have already mentioned Hitler—or besides, did you, during
the war, state your views about the policy of the war in writing at any
time? First of all, as far as Hitler was concerned.

SCHACHT: I mentioned my discussion with Hitler in February 1940. In the
summer of 1941 I wrote a detailed letter to Hitler, and the witness
Lammers has admitted its existence. I do not think he was asked about
the contents of this letter here, or he was not allowed to talk about
it. If I may come back to it; in that letter, I pointed out somewhat as
follows—I shall use direct language—“You are at present at the height
of your success.”—This was after the first Russian victories.—“The
enemy believes that you are stronger than you really are. The alliance
with Italy is rather a doubtful one, since Mussolini will one day fall
and then Italy will drop out. Whether Japan can still come to your aid
at all is questionable in view of Japan’s weakness in the face of
America. I assume that the Japanese will not be so foolish as to wage
war against America. The output of steel, for instance, in spite of
approximately similar population figures, amounts to one-tenth of the
American production. I do not think, therefore, that Japan will enter
into the war. I now recommend you at all events to reverse foreign
policy completely and to attempt with every means to conclude a peace.”

DR. DIX: Did you state your views to Ribbentrop during the war?

SCHACHT: I do not know when it was. On one occasion Herr Von Ribbentrop
conveyed to me through his State Secretary, Herr Von Weizsäcker, the
reproachful message that I should not indulge in defeatist remarks. That
may have been in 1940 or in 1941, during one of those 2 years. I asked
where I had made defeatist remarks and it appeared that I had talked to
my colleague Funk and had given him extensive reasons why Germany could
never win this war. I held this conviction unchangeable at all times
before and during the war, even after the fall of France. I answered
Ribbentrop through his State Secretary that I, as Minister without
Portfolio, considered it my duty to state my opinion to a ministerial
colleague in its true conception, and in this written reply I maintained
the view that Germany’s economic power was not sufficient to wage this
war. This letter, that is, a copy of this letter was sent both to
Minister Funk and to Minister Ribbentrop through his State Secretary.

DR. DIX: I think, Your Lordship, this would be a suitable moment...

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: I spoke before of 20 July. Do you recall a statement made by
Hitler about you in connection with 20 July?

SCHACHT: Codefendant Minister Speer was present and told me about it. It
was on 22 July 1944 when Hitler issued the order to his circle for my
arrest. At that time he made derogatory remarks about me and stated that
he had been greatly hindered in his rearmament program by my negative
activities, and that it would have been better if he had had me shot
before the war.

DR. DIX: To conclude I come to a few general collective questions.
Voices were heard within the country, and also abroad—and even the
Prosecution, although recognizing your intellectual capacities and the
services you rendered, appears to consider it also—that it was
incomprehensible that a man as clever as you did not recognize the true
nature, the real intentions of Hitler in time. I would like you to state
your position with regard to that accusation.

SCHACHT: I should like very much to have known the gentlemen who are now
judging me, at a time when it might have been of use. These are the
people who always know afterwards what ought to have been done before. I
can only state that first of all, from 1920 until the seizure of power
by Hitler, I tried to influence the nation and foreign countries in a
way which would have prevented the rise and seizure of power by a
Hitler. I warned the country to be thrifty but I was not heeded. I
repeatedly warned the foreign nations to develop an economic policy
which would enable Germany to live. I was not heeded, although as it now
appears, I was considered a clever and foresighted man. Hitler came to
power because my advice was not followed. The German people were reduced
to great economic need and neither...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President. For 2 days now we have been listening to
lengthy explanations on the part of the Defendant Schacht, and I rather
think that the explanations which have just been given by the Defendant
Schacht are not definite answers to questions concerned with the
Indictment brought against him, but mere speeches. I consider that they
will only prolong the Trial.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal is, I think, fully apprised with
the case on behalf of Defendant Schacht. They don’t want to stop him
putting forward his defense fully, but they would be glad if you could
make it as short as possible and if he could make it as short as
possible.

DR. DIX: My Lord, I am certain that I shall be through by the recess,
and perhaps even before the recess; but I beg you to bear in mind that
the defendant is accused of having assisted in the seizure of power. The
question arises, how was it that...

THE PRESIDENT: I wasn’t ruling that this evidence was inadmissible. I
was only asking you to get on with it as quickly as you could.

DR. DIX: Very well. Dr. Schacht, please continue and try to comply with
the suggestions of the representative of the Soviet Prosecution as far
as possible.

SCHACHT: As briefly as possible. I will not go into detail; I will
merely state that due to the collapse of 1918 and the unsatisfactory
conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany was faced with a severe
depression. The democratic parties, which had a firm hold on the regime
at that time, were not able to improve the situation; and the other
nations did not know what policy to take towards Germany. I do not
reproach any one; I merely state facts. Consequently, in this state of
depression, Hitler received a larger majority in the Reichstag than had
ever been the case since the formation of the Reich.

Now, I ask the people who, although silent at the time, can tell me now
what I should have done; I ask them what they would have done. I have
stated that I was against a military regime, that I wanted to avoid a
civil war, and that, in keeping with democratic principles, I saw only
the one possibility: To allow the man to lead the government once he had
come to power. I said further that from the moment I realized this I
tried to participate in the government, not with the intention of
supporting this man in his extremist ideas, but to act as a brake and,
if possible, to direct his policies back into normal channels.

DR. DIX: Then there came a time later when you recognized the dangers,
when you yourself suffered under the unbearable conditions of terror and
of suppressed opinion, so that perhaps this question is pertinent and
admissible: Why did you not emigrate?

SCHACHT: Had it been only a question of my personal fate, nothing would
have been simpler, especially since, as we have heard before, I would
have been offered that opportunity and it would have been made easy for
me. It was not merely a question of my own welfare; but as I had devoted
myself to the public interest since 1923, it was the question of the
existence of my people, of my country. I know of no instance in history
where emigrants were of help to their own nation. Of course, I speak of
those emigrants who leave of their own free will, not those that have
been expelled. It was not the case in 1792, at the time of the French
Revolution; it was not the case in 1917, during the Russian Revolution;
and it was not the case at the time of the National Socialist revolution
which we witnessed. To sit in a safe harbor abroad and to write articles
which no one reads in the home country...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, we don’t want a historical lecture, do we?

DR. DIX: I believe we can stop here. He merely wanted to state why he
did not emigrate. [_Turning to the defendant._] You have been
understood.

SCHACHT: Thank you.

DR. DIX: In the course of these proceedings, either in a letter or in a
poem—I do not know which at the moment—there was some mention of your
thoughts on the possibility of dying a martyr’s death; whether it would
have served the cause of peace and the German nation, if you had done
more than you did; if you had sacrificed your life...

SCHACHT: I think that you are referring to a quotation from one of my
notes, which a representative of the American Prosecution read here, in
which I spoke of the silence of death.

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: If I had sacrificed myself, it would not have been of the
slightest use because the circumstances of my sacrifice would never have
become known. Either I would have disappeared in some prison or I would
have died there, and no one would have known whether I was alive or not;
or I would have been the victim of a planned accident, and it would not
have been possible to become a martyr. Martyrs can be effective only if
their martyrdom becomes known to the public.

DR. DIX: May I ask for the attention of the Tribunal for a moment?
Yesterday I was denied a question concerning the social attitude of the
diplomatic corps and its influence on men like Schacht, for instance.
The question which I want to put now is not the same question; otherwise
I would not put it. But it has nevertheless...

THE PRESIDENT: The objection that I made was to the use of the word
“attitude,” because I don’t see how witnesses can give evidence about
the attitude of a corps. I said I think especially that the fact that
the diplomatic corps were present at the Party rally might be given in
evidence, but I said that the word “attitude” was far too general. What
is it you want to put now?

DR. DIX: Yesterday, the question which I framed in the following manner
was denied: “How was Schacht influenced by the collective attitude of
the diplomatic corps?” That question was denied, and that concludes the
matter. Now, I should like first to clarify the matter because I do not
want to create the impression of smuggling into the proceedings a
question which may raise the same objections. On the one hand, it is
essential for my line of defense to show that people from abroad with
judgment, who were above being suspected of wanting to prepare for an
aggressive war, had the same attitude toward the regime as Schacht had.
On the other hand, it is one of the strong points of my defense to show
that the work of these people in their opposition was not only not
supported by foreign countries but was actually made more difficult.
That is the _thema probandum_ that is important for me, and on this
theme—but please, Herr Schacht, do not answer before I have received
the permission of the Tribunal—this theme...

THE PRESIDENT: State exactly what the question is.

DR. DIX: Yes, I will put the question now. According to my notes I
intended to refer to the tokens of honor, which the Nazi regime received
from abroad, and to the representatives and numerous state visits paying
honor to the regime, which have already been mentioned here. I wanted to
ask the defendant what influence these frequent marks of great honor had
on the work and aims of this group of conspirators. However, since that
question is very similar to the one that has been rejected—and I prefer
to make my objections myself rather than to have them made to me—I
wanted to submit the question to the Tribunal first and make sure that
it is admissible.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the question being: “What effect did the
recognition of the Nazi regime from abroad have upon the group of
conspirators with whom the Defendant Schacht was in contact?” That is
the question, is it not? Well, that question, as the Tribunal thinks,
you may put.

DR. DIX: It is admissible if “Anerkennung” is translated correctly as
“honor”—honor, not recognition in the sense of recognition of a
government in diplomatic official language, but honor, respect. It is a
difficulty of translation and I do not want a misunderstanding—may I
put to him, first, the individual official visits which I have noted, so
that he can answer the question? May I do that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you may; actual visits?

DR. DIX: Yes. The list will not be complete.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I remind you that in 1935, the delegate of
the Labor Party, Alan Hartwood...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that you ought to put the question in
the general way in which I put it to you, and not go into details of
each visit or the details of each number of visits.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If Your Honor pleases, I want to object to it as
generalities, because it already appears that the United States did not
participate in this and I tried to keep the European politics out of
this case, and this is the entering wedge. Now, I don’t want to get into
this sort of thing. I think it is entirely irrelevant that some
foreigner, deceived by the appearance which the Defendant Schacht was
assisting in putting up, didn’t start a war earlier. This thing is
entirely irrelevant. The United States has desired to keep this sort of
thing out of this case because it is endless if we go into it. It seems
to me, if Herr Schacht wants to put the responsibility for his conduct
on some foreigner, that foreigner should be named. He has already said
that the United States representatives, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Dodd,
had no part in it because they were always against them. Now, it gets
into a situation here which seems to me impossible before this Tribunal,
and I cannot understand how it constitutes any defense for mitigation
for Schacht to show that the foreign powers maintained intercourse with
Germany even at a period of its degeneration.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is relevant but should
be put without detail.

DR. DIX: I will put the question without detail, and I would like to say
that I cannot, of course, speak of myself and America in the same
breath; but I, too, am trying to avoid foreign politics. However, my
question does not concern foreign politics.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Here is the one question: What influence
did the honors which were showered upon the Nazi regime by foreign
countries, in a manner well known to you, have on the work of your group
of conspirators?

SCHACHT: Throughout the years from 1935, up to and including 1938,
numerous statesmen from almost all other nations came to Berlin to visit
Hitler, including some crowned heads. From America, for instance, there
was Under Secretary of State Phillips.

DR. DIX: Do not mention any names.

SCHACHT: I said that only because names were expressly mentioned here.
It is not limited to Europe. I do not intend to make any political
explanations, I merely say that there were so many visitors, which meant
not only recognition but respect for Hitler, that this man appeared a
very great man in the eyes of the German people. I still remember that
in 1925, I believe, the King of Afghanistan, Amanullah, appeared in
Berlin. He was the first foreigner to visit the Social Democratic
Government, and there was a celebration because at last a great man from
another country had visited us. In the case of Hitler, starting with
1935 there was one visitor after another; and Hitler went from one
foreign political success to another, which made it extremely difficult
to enlighten the German people and made it impossible to work for that
enlightenment within the German nation.

DR. DIX: And now, two final questions.

You have heard the speech by the British Attorney General Shawcross, who
said that there should have been a point where the servants of Hitler
refused to follow him. We want to accept that point of view, and I ask
you: Do you believe that you yourself acted in accord with that
postulate of the leader of the British Delegation?

SCHACHT: I not only accept it, but I fully approve of it. From the very
moment when I recognized what a harmful individual Hitler was, what a
threat to world peace, I broke with him, not only secretly, but publicly
and personally.

DR. DIX: So you consider that when you realized the truth you did
everything humanly possible to try and save humanity from the disaster
of this war and bring it to an end, once it had started.

SCHACHT: I know of no one in Germany who would have done more in that
respect than I did. I warned against excessive armament. I impeded, and
if you like, sabotaged effective armament through my economic policy. I
resigned from the Ministry of Economics against the will of Hitler; I
publicly protested to Hitler against all the abuses of the Party; I
continuously warned people abroad and gave them information; I attempted
to influence the policy of other nations with respect to the colonial
question in order to achieve a more peaceful atmosphere. Credits for
continued armaments...

THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard this more than once, you know.

DR. DIX: Yes.

SCHACHT: May I be permitted one sentence: I blocked Hitler’s credits and
I finally tried to remove him.

DR. DIX: Gentlemen, I am now at the end of my presentation of evidence
for Schacht’s case, and I have only one request. During the last few
days, I have received a large number of letters and also affidavits from
well-known people who know Schacht. I will examine them; and if I should
decide that any of the affidavits are relevant, I will get in touch with
the Prosecution and discuss with them whether they have any objection to
having them translated, so that we can perhaps submit them to the
Tribunal—not to have them read, but merely to have them put in
evidence. May I request that I be granted this right.

At the end of my entire presentation, I will briefly submit my
documents; this has been only partially done.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have only a few questions to put to Dr. Schacht.

How long have you known Herr Von Neurath, Dr. Schacht?

SCHACHT: I cannot state the exact year, but at any rate for a very long
time; for many, many years.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: For some time, for about 4 years, you were both
colleagues as ministers in the government. During that time, did you
have any contact with him other than in purely official capacity?

SCHACHT: Unfortunately not enough, but of course I saw him from time to
time. I would have liked to have seen him more often.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But from conversations with him, or from what you
heard about him, you certainly formed an opinion about his political
views.

SCHACHT: I was well acquainted with his views.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And what was the trend of his political thought?

SCHACHT: I had the impression that basically Von Neurath believed in a
conservative policy, but was open to conviction where progressive
measures were concerned. He was above all in favor of peaceful
international co-operation.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you consider it possible, or do you have any
reason to believe, that under certain circumstances he would also resort
to belligerent methods or that he would even consider them, if the
peaceful understanding which he desired was quite impossible?

SCHACHT: According to my understanding of Neurath, I think that he was
entirely averse to any aggressive policy.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: You witnessed the various...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly put the earphones on,
the Tribunal thinks these questions are not questions which can properly
be put because of their general nature.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you have the impression that in everything
that he achieved, particularly in the occupation of the Rhineland, Herr
Von Neurath...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, this is not a proper question to put to
a witness, “Did you have an impression about him?” You can ask him what
he said and what he did; what did Von Neurath do and what did he say?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes; then I will not put this question. I have
only one last question.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You know that on the 4th of February 1938
Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister. What did you and your
immediate circle say to the resignation of Von Neurath from foreign
politics? What impression did it make upon you?

SCHACHT: I believe I have already said in the course of the
interrogation that I considered Von Neurath’s resignation a very bad
sign, for it meant departing from the previous policy of understanding
in foreign politics.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions?

Does the Prosecution desire to cross-examine?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I think it might save time, Your Honor, if we could
take our recess at this time. It is a little early, I know, but it takes
some time to arrange our material.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, according to the transcript of the
testimony at Page 8698 (Volume XII, Page 460), you said that in 1938 you
told a certain lady while you were dining: “My dear lady, we have fallen
into the hands of criminals. How could I ever have suspected that!” You
recall that testimony?

SCHACHT: It was not I who gave that testimony; it came from an affidavit
submitted here by my Defense Counsel, but it is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am sure you want to help the Tribunal by telling
us who those criminals were.

SCHACHT: Hitler and his confederates.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you were there; you know who the co-operators
were. I am asking you to name all that you put in that category of
criminals with Hitler. Hitler, you know, is dead.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, it is very difficult for me to answer that
question fully because I do not know who was in that close conspiracy
with Hitler. The Defendant Göring has told us here that he considered
himself one of that group. There were Himmler and Bormann, but I do not
know who else there was in the small circle of men who were trusted by
Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You have only named three men. Let me put it this
way: You named four men criminals, three of whom are dead and one of
them you say admitted...

SCHACHT: I can add one more, if you will permit me. I assume that the
Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was also always acquainted with Hitler’s
plans. I must assume that; I cannot prove it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom else did you include when you were talking to
the lady?

SCHACHT: On that evening I did not mention any names.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But whom did you have in mind? You surely were not
making charges against your own people, who were in charge of your own
government, without having definite names in mind.

SCHACHT: I have taken the liberty of mentioning the names to you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Are those all?

SCHACHT: I do not know, but I assume that there were more. I would add
without hesitation, Heydrich. But I cannot know with whom...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Heydrich is a dead man.

SCHACHT: I regret that these people are dead, I would have liked to see
them die some other way; but...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, are those the only people that you included?

SCHACHT: I have no proof of the fact that there was anyone else in this
conspiracy about whom I could say that there is proof that he was a
conspirator.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, at the time the Nazis seized
power you had a world-wide acquaintance and very great standing as a
leading banker in Germany and in the world, did you not?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether that is so, but if that is your opinion I
do not wish to contradict you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, at first you would admit that? Wouldn’t you?

SCHACHT: I do not contradict.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And yet as we understand it, you made public
appearances in Germany before the German people in support of the Nazi
regime, alongside of characters such as Streicher and Bormann.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, I have taken the liberty of explaining here that
until July 1932 I did not in any way come forward publicly for Hitler or
the Party and that, on the contrary, in America for instance, I warned
the people against Hitler. At that time I—the name Bormann was, of
course, unknown to me at the time; and Streicher’s paper, _Der Stürmer_,
was just as revolting to me before that time as afterwards. I did not
think that I had anything in common with Herr Streicher.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I didn’t either, but that is why I wondered
about your appearing with him publicly before the German people after
1933 when the Nazi regime was consolidating its power. You did that,
didn’t you?

SCHACHT: What did I do, Mr. Justice?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I spoke of your appearances, publicly, before the
German people with Streicher and Bormann in support of the Nazi program
after the seizure of power.

SCHACHT: I do not think so. I was never seen publicly with Herr
Streicher or with Mr. Bormann—certainly not at that time. It is quite
possible that he attended the same Party rallies as I, or that I sat
next to him; but, at any rate, in 1933 I was never seen publicly either
with Streicher or with Bormann.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask to have you shown the photograph from the
Hoffmann collection, marked Number 10. You have no difficulty
recognizing yourself in that, do you?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the right sits Bormann?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And next to him the Minister of Labor?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And on the other side of you is Hitler?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And beyond him, Streicher?

SCHACHT: I do not recognize him; I do not know whether it is Streicher,
but perhaps it is.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I will offer the photograph in evidence. And
perhaps the identification will be sufficient.

And also Frick is in that picture?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This becomes Exhibit Number USA-829.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will ask to have you shown...

THE PRESIDENT: Justice Jackson, what is the date of that photograph?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no date given on the photographs. Perhaps
the defendant can tell us.

SCHACHT: Mr. Justice, you said that in 1933 I had permitted myself to be
seen publicly with Streicher and Bormann as a representative of the
National Socialist Party; and I should like to know, therefore, where
this picture was taken and when. I cannot identify it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you about after 1933. Schacht, do you deny
this is a photograph...

SCHACHT: No, no. By no means, I am merely asking when it was taken. I do
not think this refers to 1933 or 1934.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When was it, if you want to tell us?

SCHACHT: I do not know; I cannot tell you.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will show you another photograph—two
photographs, Numbers 3 and 4. Number 3 shows you marching with Dr.
Robert Ley among others.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Number 4 shows you entering the hall, marching, and
giving the Nazi salute.

SCHACHT: Yes, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Ley the man who suppressed the labor unions of
Germany?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And those are correct photographs, are they not?

SCHACHT: Certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer them in evidence under Exhibit Number
USA-829.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I will show you photographs marked Numbers
1 and 2 and 6—and 7. Now let us look at Number 1. Do you recall where
that was taken?

SCHACHT: Yes—one moment, if it is the number I have here—yes, just a
minute.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Where was it taken?

SCHACHT: I think Number 1 is a picture from the Reich Chancellery, if I
am not mistaken.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Among the persons appearing in Number 1 is Frick?

SCHACHT: Gürtner, Goebbels, Popitz, Schacht, Papen, Göring, and others,
and Hitler in the middle.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Neurath, do you recognize?

SCHACHT: Neurath. Yes; I think he is immediately on Hitler’s right, in
the background.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Goebbels?

SCHACHT: Yes, I said Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You identify Funk as present in the picture, at the
extreme right, only a part of his body showing.

SCHACHT: Who is that?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Funk, the Defendant Funk.

SCHACHT: No, that is Göring.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Back of Göring and back of Neurath.

SCHACHT: I beg your pardon. Perhaps I have a different picture. I beg
your pardon. That is Number 2. On Number 2 I see from left to right:
Popitz, Rust, Göring, Neurath, Hitler, Blomberg, Schacht, Gürtner,
Krosigk, Eltz von Rübenach, and then at the very back on the right,
Funk.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let us take Number 7. Who do you identify as
your company in that photograph?

SCHACHT: On the extreme left, my late wife; then the Vice President of
the Reichsbank, Dreyse, Hitler, and myself. There is an adjutant of
Hitler, and the heavy-set man on the right—I do not know who he is.

This is a photograph taken when the foundation of the new Reichsbank
building was laid in 1934. Directly behind me, on the right, is
Blomberg.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Number 6?

SCHACHT: One moment. That is the picture where I am walking alongside
Hitler, is that right? That is Hitler’s entrance in my company, on the
occasion when the foundation of the new Reichsbank building was laid.
Behind me, or rather behind Hitler, you can see Geheimrat Vocke, who is
to appear as a witness here tomorrow, and several other gentlemen from
the directorate of the Reichsbank.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I offer the remaining photographs, 1, 6, and 7 in
evidence under the same number.

So that it would appear, Dr. Schacht, that a good deal of your present
company was the company that started off with you in 1933 and 1934?

SCHACHT: Is that a question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, is that not true?

SCHACHT: No. If you had photographed me with my other acquaintances just
as often, the number would be 10 times as great.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You testified—and I refer to Page 8650 of the
record (Volume XII, Page 424)—that there were reasons of principle why
you did not become a Party member and that Party membership would not be
compatible with your principles?

SCHACHT: That is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also testified—I refer to Page 8692 of the
record (Volume XII, Page 455)—that from 1932 to the 30th of January
1933—I am quoting you, “I have not written or spoken a single word
publicly for Hitler.”

SCHACHT: I think that is right, if you emphasize “publicly.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You must emphasize “publicly”?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I want yet to ask you about the next thing. You
also said:

    “I have never helped in any way to exert influence in favor of
    Hitler through discussions with any of the competent gentlemen:
    Hindenburg, Meissner, _et cetera_; and I did not participate in
    any way in the appointment of Hitler to Reich Chancellor.”

Is that correct?

SCHACHT: That is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, are there any words that we have to emphasize
in that in order to understand it correctly?

SCHACHT: No, in reference to Hitler’s becoming Chancellor, please note I
said, “competent men.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I don’t just know what you mean by that, but
I’ll give you a chance to explain.

SCHACHT: Yes. When I say “competent,” I mean those people who could
decide as to who was to be Chancellor. Of course, I did say that Hitler
would be Chancellor and must become Chancellor, and I expressed those
convictions in private circles.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that in public?

SCHACHT: No, I said that only in a circle of my friends, business
acquaintances, and such like.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to quote you a statement by Von Papen:

    “When I was Chancellor of Germany, in 1932, Schacht came to see
    me in July or August while I was at home. He said, ‘here’s a
    very intelligent man.’—It was in the presence of my wife and I
    have never forgotten it.—He said, ‘Give him your position. Give
    it to Hitler. He is the only man who can save Germany.’”

Did you say that or didn’t you?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said that he was the only man who could
save Germany, but I did tell him that Hitler would and must become
Chancellor. But that was in August or July of 1932, after the July
elections; and it has nothing to do with Hitler’s nomination, which did
not take place until after the Schleicher Cabinet, about which I have
been examined here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, I just asked you if you had not
testified that you had nothing to do with his coming to the
Chancellorship and you said...

SCHACHT: That is the truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and it is here said that you asked Von Papen to
give the place to him and...

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...and do you contend—and I want you to say
anything you want to about this—do you contend that that was not aiding
Hitler to the Chancellorship?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether it was aiding Hitler. In the course of my
examination here, I have been asked whether I had exerted any influence
in connection with Hitler’s election or his nomination for the
Chancellorship in January 1933. I have given the names of Hindenburg,
Meissner, and so forth, that is to say, Hindenburg’s circle. Since the
beginning of November 1932, Papen was no longer Chancellor and thus he
had no influence upon these matters at all. I did not talk to Papen at
all during those weeks. On the contrary, after the elections of 1932, I
said that it was inevitable that a man who had obtained so many votes in
the Reichstag must take over the political lead.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let me get you correctly. When you saw Hitler
was going to win you joined him?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll just make it clear what you do mean. You
did not assist him until he had already accumulated more votes than any
other Party in the Reichstag?

SCHACHT: I did not join Hitler when I saw that he would win, but when I
had discovered that he had won.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, well, I’ll accept the amendment.

You have referred to your letter to Hitler on the 29th of August 1932...

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...in which you advised him not to put forward any
detailed economic program?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You told him there was no such program on which 14
millions could agree?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that economic policy is not a factor for
building up a party?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you added that, “You can always count on me as
your reliable assistant”; did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then that was after he had won?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And then on the 12th of...

SCHACHT: November.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, I just want to refer to that document as
EC-456, Exhibit Number USA-773. Now, then, on the 12th of November 1932,
you wrote a letter to him, in which you said, among other things, “I
have no doubt that the present development of things can only lead to
your becoming Chancellor.”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “It seems as if our attempt to collect a number of
signatures from business circles for this purpose is not altogether in
vain...”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were collecting signatures for this purpose?

SCHACHT: Not I, but I participated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were assisting.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that was Document Number EC-456.

Now, as of November 1932, a document was prepared for a large number of
industrialists to sign, urging the selection of Hitler as Chancellor, in
substance, was there not?

SCHACHT: I no longer remember the document, but I assume that that is
the document.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And men like Schacht, Schröder, and Krupp, and a
great number of industrialists signed that document, did they not?

SCHACHT: That is possible, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was sent to Von Hindenburg?

SCHACHT: I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the purpose of it was to aid Hitler in
obtaining the Chancellorship?

SCHACHT: That is possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It is addressed to the Reich President, is it not?
Document Number 3901-PS, Exhibit Number USA-837.

SCHACHT: I have not seen it; but it is probably correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you do not deny that that occurred?

SCHACHT: I assume that it is correct. I have not seen it, but I do not
doubt it at all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, in November of 1932 you communicated to
Hitler the result of your money-raising campaign, did you not?

SCHACHT: I do not know anything about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I’ll remind you from your own interrogation.
Well, I’ll remind you first, of your testimony, in which you say that it
appears that you did not plead for funds but that Göring pleaded for
funds; and I ask if you did not, on the 9th of October 1945, give these
answers to these questions as to events of February 1933?

SCHACHT: Events of what?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Events of February 1933.

SCHACHT: Yes, thank you very much.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Going back to 1933. This is the question:

    “Prior to the time that Hitler appointed you as President of the
    Reichsbank, do you recall a meeting in the home of Göring?

    “Answer: ‘Yes. That was a financial meeting. I have been
    interrogated about that several times already.’

    “Question: ‘Tell me about it.’

    “Answer: ‘Yes, I will. Hitler had to go to the elections on 5
    March, if you will remember, and for these elections he wanted
    money for the campaign. He asked me to procure the money and I
    did. Göring called these men together and I made a speech—not a
    speech, for Hitler made the speech—then I asked them to write
    down the amounts and to subscribe for the elections, which they
    did. They subscribed a total of 3 millions and they allocated
    the sum among themselves.’

    “Question: ‘Who were the people who made up that subscription
    list?’

    “Answer: ‘I think that all of them were bankers and
    industrialists. They represented the chemical industry, iron
    industry, textile industry, all of them.’

    “Question: ‘Representatives of all the industries?’

    “Answer: ‘All of them; all of the big industries.’

    “Question: ‘Do you recall any of their names?’

    “Answer: ‘Oh certainly; Krupp was there—the old gentleman,
    Gustav. He arose from his seat and thanked Hitler and was very
    enthusiastic about him at the time. And then there was
    Schnitzler—I think it was he—and Vögler for the United Steel
    Works.’”

Did you give that testimony?

SCHACHT: Certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, at that meeting you have referred to Document
Number D-203, which is a record of the meeting—at that meeting Göring
said this in substance, did he not?

    “The sacrifices which are required would be so much easier for
    industry to bear if it knew that the election of 5 March would
    surely be the last one for the next 10 years, probably even for
    the next 100 years.”

You heard that, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now yesterday or the day before you were
interrogated about your support and about the tribute that Goebbels paid
to you; and you said to the Court, “It is not my fault if Goebbels made
a mistake.” Do you recall that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I ask you, if testifying about Dr. Goebbels you
did not say this to the interrogator of the United States, on the 17th
day of October 1945, Exhibit Number USA-616 (Document Number 3729-PS)?

    “Question: ‘When did you become interested in becoming a
    co-worker of Hitler?’

    “Answer: ‘I should say in the years of 1931, 1932.’

    “Question: ‘And that was when you saw that he had a mass
    movement that was likely to take power?’

    “Answer: ‘Quite right; it was growing continually.’

    “Question: ‘And did you publicly record your support for Hitler
    in those years?’

    “Answer: ‘I think I made a statement in December 1930 once at
    the Bavarian People’s Party, upon coming back from America. I
    said that there was a choice for any future Government, either
    to hold against 25 percent socialists, or against 20 percent
    National Socialists.’

    “Question: ‘But what I mean—to make it very brief indeed—did
    you lend the prestige of your name to help Hitler come to
    power?’

    “Answer: ‘I stated publicly that I expected Hitler to come into
    power for the first time that I remember in November 1932.’

    “Question: ‘And you know, or perhaps you don’t, that Goebbels in
    his diary, records with great affection...’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘...the help that you gave him at that time?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes, I know that.’

    “Question: ‘November 1932?’

    “Answer: ‘You say the book is called _From the Kaiserhof to the
    Reich Chancellery_?’

    “Question: ‘That’s right; you have read that?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘And you don’t deny that Goebbels was right?’

    “Answer: ‘I think his impression was that he was correct at that
    time.’”

Did you give that testimony?

SCHACHT: Yes. I never doubted that Goebbels was under this impression; I
merely said that he was mistaken.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then you didn’t—Well, I won’t bother. Now, you
made some extensive quotations from Ambassador Dodd yesterday, the day
before. Did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And let’s have this understood: Ambassador Dodd was
consistently and at all times opposed to the entire Nazi outfit, wasn’t
he?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you got no encouragement from him to be in this
outfit?

SCHACHT: Oh, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified, as I understood you, that
Ambassador Dodd invited you to go to the United States of America and
you say—I am quoting from Page 8670 of the record (Volume XII, Page
439):

    “At that time, 1937, he called on me and urged me to go with
    him, or follow him as soon as possible, and change my residence
    to America. He said that I would find a very pleasant welcome in
    America. I believe he never would have said that to me if he had
    not had a friendly feeling towards me.”

You said that to the Tribunal?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I think you intended to convey to the Tribunal
the impression that Ambassador Dodd had great confidence in you and
great friendship for you?

SCHACHT: I had that impression.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you read his entire diary, or did you confine
yourself to reading extracts?

SCHACHT: Yes. I also know of the passage where he said, “You would make
a very bad American,” or something like that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, yes, you didn’t mention that to the Tribunal.

SCHACHT: I think that would be better for the Prosecution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we are not disappointing you then.

Are you not familiar with his entry under the date of December 21, 1937,
where he speaks of the luncheon at which you were present?

    “Schacht spoke of the defeat of Germany in 1918 as wholly due to
    Woodrow Wilson’s bringing America into the World War. But I said
    Wilson’s Fourteen Points were the one great promise of
    international peace and co-operation, and every country on both
    sides had helped to defeat his purpose. Don’t you think Wilson,
    50 years from now, will be regarded as one of the greatest
    presidents the United States has ever had? He evaded an answer
    but turned his attention to the Japanese-Chinese war and opposed
    Germany’s alliance to Japan. Then he showed the true German
    attitude, quoting, ‘If the United States would stop the Japanese
    War and leave Germany to have her way in Europe, we would have
    world peace.’”

SCHACHT: What is the question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you make those statements?

SCHACHT: I do not know whether I said it, but even today it seems an
extremely reasonable statement. I am of the opinion that it was correct
with one exception, I believe...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, now let’s get this straight. As I understand
you correctly, you can have peace, world peace, if Germany was left to
have her way in Europe?

SCHACHT: Yes. May I say that there were various opinions about the path
Germany was to take; mine was a peaceful one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he goes on:

    “I did not comment, and others also failed to make remarks.
    Schacht meant what the Army Chiefs of 1914 meant when they
    invaded Belgium, expecting to conquer France in 6 weeks, namely;
    domination and annexation of neighboring little countries,
    especially north and east.”

SCHACHT: Am I to reply?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you say that?

SCHACHT: No, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was that what Dodd said about your conversation?

SCHACHT: But I did not say that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you?

SCHACHT: No, may I...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What was the impression?

SCHACHT: No, may I answer please?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I ask you this question: What is the impression
received over the course of his acquaintance with you by a man whom you
describe as being a decent fellow and a friend of yours?

SCHACHT: May I answer that I have already stated that Mr. Dodd was the
victim of many misconceptions. In this case, too, he does not say that I
said it; he says, “Schacht meant.” That was his opinion which he
attributed to me. I never said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I so understood it; but it was the estimate of a
friendly observer, I take it from you.

SCHACHT: A friendly observer who continually misunderstood; Ambassador
Henderson has proved that in his book.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He may have misunderstood Henderson; but there is
never any doubt that he understood the Nazi danger from the beginning,
is there?

SCHACHT: Yes; but he misunderstood my attitude.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, when you went and asked first the Foreign
Minister and then Hitler to go to the United States, or have some one go
to the United States, you testified, on Page 8708 of the record (Volume
XII, Page 467) that you told Hitler this:

    “It seems vital to me that there should be someone constantly in
    America who could clarify German interests publicly, in the
    press, _et cetera_.”

Did you say that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, is that what you actually said to Hitler?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I call your attention to your own letter,
Document Number 3700-PS to the Reich Marshal.

    “In the beginning of 1940 I proposed to the Führer that I should
    go to the United States in order to attempt to slow down
    America’s assistance to England in the matter of armaments and,
    if possible, to prevent America becoming involved more deeply in
    the war.”

I ask you, which of those is true?

SCHACHT: Both of them.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Both? Then you did not reveal to the Tribunal
yesterday, when you reported the conversation, all that you had
pretended that you would do in the United States, did you?

SCHACHT: No, certainly not. I wanted, for instance, to try to persuade
the President to intervene for peace. That, too, I did not mention here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also testified yesterday that you were
never told about the extent, the type, and the speed of rearmament. Do
you recall that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But although you had no such information, you said
it was too much?

SCHACHT: I had the feeling that one ought to go slowly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let me remind you of certain statements made
by General Von Blomberg concerning 1937.

    “Answer: ‘At that time, the organization of the planned
    Wehrmacht was about complete.’

    “Question: ‘When? 1937?’

    “Answer: ‘I believe it was 1937.’

    “Question: ‘Was that a plan that had been discussed with Doctor
    Schacht in connection with the financing, as to how big the
    Wehrmacht would be?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes. Schacht knew the plan for the formation of the
    Wehrmacht very well, since we informed him every year about the
    creation of new formations for which we had been expending
    money. I remember that, in the year 1937 we discussed what the
    Wehrmacht would need for current expenses after a large amount
    had been spent for creating it.’

    “Question: ‘That means that you gave Schacht a clear statement
    of how much money each year went into the creation of new units,
    new installations, and so forth, and how much you were using for
    the operating expenses of the Wehrmacht?’

    “Answer: ‘Exactly right.’

    “Question: ‘When you say that by 1937 the plan had been
    fulfilled, do you mean in the main?’

    “Answer: ‘In the main.’”

Another question. I skip two or three irrelevant ones.

    “When you say that Schacht was familiar with those figures, how
    were they brought to his attention?

    “Answer: ‘The demands for the money needed were handed to
    Schacht in writing.’

    “Question: ‘That means that in connection with the money which
    Schacht was raising for the rearmament program, he was informed
    of how many divisions and how many tanks and so forth would be
    procured through these means?’

    “Answer: ‘I don’t think we put down the amount of money we would
    need for every tank and so forth, but we would put down how much
    every branch of the Wehrmacht, like the Navy or Air Force,
    needed, and then we would state how much was required for
    activating and how much for operating.’

    “Question: ‘That is, Doctor Schacht could see each year how much
    of an increase there would be in the size of the Armed Forces as
    a result of the money he was procuring?’

    “Answer: ‘That is certain.’”

I ask whether you deny the statements made by Von Blomberg as I have put
them to you?

SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately, I must say that I know nothing about this.
A member of the Reichsbank Directorate, Geheimrat Vocke, will testify
tomorrow; and I ask that you put this matter to him so that the question
will be clarified. The question was not one of informing me, but of
informing the Reichsbank Directorate. Everything that I knew the
Reichsbank Directorate naturally also knew.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Dr. Schacht, I don’t care whether you know or
didn’t know as far as the Prosecution’s case is concerned. What I am
asking you these questions for is to know how far we can rely on your
testimony.

SCHACHT: Yes, I understand.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So there will be no misunderstanding about that.
And you deny that Von Blomberg was telling the truth when he says, when
he reported to you in writing, those facts?

SCHACHT: Yes, unfortunately I must deny it. Evidently he does not
remember.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you testified yesterday or the day before,
that the so-called New Plan had nothing to do with the armament program,
did you not?

SCHACHT: Nothing in particular with armament.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Oh, nothing in particular.

SCHACHT: No. I mean of course—the Tribunal was expressly asked whether
I was to speak about the New Plan here or not, and the Tribunal decided
that it was to be brought up at your cross-examination. I am prepared to
inform you now about the New Plan before you...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, Dr. Schacht, you have no objection to
answering my questions, have you?

SCHACHT: Certainly not.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am referring to the answer which you gave—the
one which you were not allowed to give—find the Page 8732 of this
record (Volume XII, Pages 484 and 485):

    “Question: ‘Some of your economic policies during the time you
    were Minister of Economics, which have been accused as being in
    preparation for war, were the so-called New Plan. What was
    that?’”

And your answer:

    “May I state first of all that the New Plan had nothing at all
    to do with rearmament.”

And then you went into an explanation of the New Plan which the Court
did not receive, and I am asking you only this question: Did you not
say, in your speech on the Miracle of Finance on the 29th day of
November 1938, this—after quoting a great number of figures: “These
figures show how much the New Plan contributed to the execution of the
armament program as well as to the securing of our food.”

Did you say that or didn’t you?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is Document Number EC-611, Exhibit Number
USA-622.

Now, I understood you to say in your testimony that you really didn’t
have anything to do socially with Hitler or with the other Nazis and
that you refused their invitation to lunch at the Reich Chancellery; and
one of the chief reasons was that those present showed such abject
humility to Hitler. Did you say that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I want to read to you from your speech,
Document Number EC-501, your inaugural speech on the occasion of the
Führer’s birthday. This was a public speech, by the way, wasn’t it?

SCHACHT: I do not know. I do not remember.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You made a speech on the Führer’s birthday on the
21st of April 1937, carried in the newspapers?

SCHACHT: Maybe.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “We are meeting together here to remember
    with respect and love the man to whom the German people
    entrusted the control of its destiny more than 4 years ago.”

And then, after some other remarks, you say,

    “With the limitless passion of a glowing heart and the
    infallible instinct of a born statesman, Adolf Hitler, in a
    struggle which he led for 14 years with calm logic, has won for
    himself the soul of the German people.”

Was that a part of your published and public speech?

SCHACHT: I assume that you have quoted it quite correctly. I do not
believe that anyone, on the occasion of the birthday celebration of the
head of a state, could say anything very different. Mr. Justice, may I
make one request. You have completely passed over the New Plan, while
the Tribunal has pointed out that it was to be discussed here in
cross-examination. If you are not going to refer to the New Plan, may I
ask that the New Plan be discussed again in re-examination by my
attorney.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not ask you what the New Plan was; I asked
whether your statement that it had nothing to do with armaments was true
or not. But if your solicitor wants to ask about it, it is open to
ruling by the Tribunal. You quoted today Hitler’s letter of the 19th of
January 1939, in which you were dismissed from the presidency of the
Reichsbank; and you did not quote the concluding sentence, as I recall
it, which reads, “I am happy to be able to avail myself of your services
for the solution of new tasks in your position as Reich Minister.” That
is a correct quotation, is it not?

SCHACHT: I refer to the testimony by the witness Gisevius, who has
already said that outwardly Hitler would never indicate that there was
dissension between himself and his collaborators but that he always
attempted to give a false impression to the world. After January 1939
Hitler never asked for my opinion or my co-operation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you asked by anyone else?

SCHACHT: No. I cited this morning the occasions when I was asked for
assistance. That was in connection with Belgium, and in connection with
the periodical, _Das Reich_. I think that was all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you performed no functions whatever in
reference to Belgium?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I quote your letter of the 17th of October
1940 to the Reich Minister of Economics, Document EC-504, USA-830. At
that time you had ceased to be President of the Reichsbank, had you not?

SCHACHT: Yes. I was only a minister without portfolio.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “So that the German banks in the occupied
    western territories need not work side-by-side, or rather
    against each other, you had assigned the Deutsche Bank the task
    of clearing the way for closer economic co-operation with
    Holland; and you entrusted the Dresdner Bank with the same task
    for Belgium.”

And you go on to describe that situation and say:

    “In order to remove this difficulty, you, Herr Reich Minister,
    have agreed that the undersigned comply with the requests of
    both banking houses for a decisive expression of opinion in this
    question. I have subsequently discussed the situation with both
    banks and it was confirmed in the course of the conversation
    that at present there is no tendency on the part of Dutch or
    Belgian financial institutions to enter into general ties with
    the German business men.”

Do you recall?

SCHACHT: Yes, I remember it, now that you have read it to me. May I make
a statement, or what was your question?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I just wondered if you remembered that.

SCHACHT: Yes, and I ask permission to make a statement. It concerns...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: If you think it needs explaining...

SCHACHT: I would think so; but I leave that to the Tribunal. If I may
speak: It concerns a rivalry between two large banks. Both these large
banks approached me—as a former banker and President of the
Reichsbank—to decide the matter, and I did. I really do not see what
that has to do with the official participation in the Belgian
administration.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the purpose of your intervention was to avoid
misunderstanding in the occupied countries between the banking interests
of the occupied countries and the German banks, was it not?

SCHACHT: Certainly, they were to work together peacefully.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. Although you have said to the Tribunal that
you were entirely opposed to the Germans being in there at all?

SCHACHT: Of course. But now that they were there I tried to keep peace.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You also were approached by Krupp von Bohlen about
raising a fund known as the “Hitler spending fund,” were you not?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never were?

SCHACHT: Never.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is most unfortunate—that your name
should be connected with...

SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received such a letter?

SCHACHT: Yes, I know the letter, but I was not assigned the task of
raising that fund.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you assisted in raising it, didn’t you?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you contribute to it?

SCHACHT: I personally, certainly not. I do not know what you are
accusing me of.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I thought you knew about the letter from Von
Bohlen.

SCHACHT: Yes, but I ask you of what are you accusing me? Please tell me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you raise any money or help to organize a loan
with Krupp von Bohlen in May of 1933—the Hitler spending fund?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How did you answer Krupp von Bohlen’s letter asking
you to do so?

SCHACHT: Would you please remind me of what Herr Von Krupp wrote to me
at the time?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Have you the letter of the 29th of May?

SCHACHT: Yes, one moment, please, I have nearly finished. May I reply
now? From this...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: First of all, did you receive such a letter?

SCHACHT: Yes, of course.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right. Tell us what happened.

SCHACHT: In that letter Herr Von Krupp informed me that industry and
other economic circles, such as agriculture, _et cetera_, intended to
organize a joint Hitler fund in order to combine in one collection the
unrestrained Party collections which were making the entire country
insecure. He informed me of this, and also of the fact that a board of
trustees was to be appointed for this Hitler fund. I want to say that I
never joined the board of trustees and was not a member of it. He
further informed me that the representatives of the banks, Dr. Fischer
and Dr. Mosier, would contact me and inform me about these things. That
is all that the letter says.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That I offer as Exhibit Number USA-831, (Document
Number D-151).

[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you look at the following letter of
the 30th of May 1933, which says they had the opportunity of mentioning
it to you?

SCHACHT: One moment, please. I do not think the letter is in my document
book. No, it is not here.

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you to read the letter of the 29th of May
first; one of the 29th of May and one of the 30th. The 29th of May has
not been translated.

SCHACHT: I see. Just a minute. I read.

This letter never reached me. It has been crossed out and apparently it
was not sent, because Krupp and I had a personal conversation to which
Krupp refers in the letter of the following day, 30 May; the letter
begins, “As Dr. Köttgen and I had the opportunity of mentioning to you
yesterday...” That apparently was a personal conversation.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, and you had also said:

    “You were kind enough to promise me to obtain from Messrs. Otto
    Christian Fischer and Dr. Mosier...full particulars, and
    especially information on how far banks which are public
    corporations can participate in this task.”

SCHACHT: No, Mr. Justice Jackson, it does not say that in the letter.
Please, will you be good enough to read the letter of 29 May? Where does
it say that I spoke to Dr. Fischer or would speak to Dr. Mosier?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny receiving the letter of the 29th?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never received it?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Do you deny having a conversation with Krupp von
Bohlen-Halbach, the substance of which is set forth in that letter?

SCHACHT: No—One moment. Please, let me answer quietly. I do not wish to
be accused of anything without replying.

I did not receive that letter on 29 May, nor did I receive it later.
Instead, there was a personal conversation. The subject of that
conversation is contained in the letter of 30 May, which we read before
and which I received. You have just asserted that I had promised Krupp
von Bohlen to speak to Dr. Fischer and Dr. Mosier. The letter makes no
mention of that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Does it not say so in the memorandum which you say
was replaced by a conversation? That is what I am trying to ask you.

SCHACHT: At any rate, I did not promise to talk to the gentlemen.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Anything more you want to say?

SCHACHT: No. That is enough.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, yesterday, I think it was, you testified that
you had made public statements against the terror policy of the regime;
and in evidence you quoted from your Königsberg speech.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Unfortunately, Dr. Schacht, you stopped just at the
point where I got interested in it.

SCHACHT: Yes, that is generally the case.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: After you had stated that there are people who ran
Germany—let me quote the part you quoted, because it is important in
connection...

SCHACHT: Quote the whole thing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. This is what you quoted:

    “Those are the people who heroically smear window panes in the
    middle of the night; who brand every German who trades in a
    Jewish store as a traitor; who condemn every former Freemason as
    a scoundrel, and who, in the just fight against priests and
    ministers who talk politics from the pulpit, cannot themselves
    distinguish between religion and misuse of the pulpit. The goal
    at which these people aim is generally correct and good.”

That is what you quoted?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now let us go on:

    “The goal at which these people aim is generally correct and
    good. There is no place in the Third Reich for secret societies,
    regardless of how harmless they are. The priests and ministers
    should take care of souls, and not meddle in politics. The Jews
    must realize that their influence is gone for all time.”

That was also a part of that speech, was it not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you pointed out in that speech that on the
Jewish problem, as you called it, legislation is being prepared and must
be awaited?

SCHACHT: Yes, I had hoped so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You assured them so, did you not?

SCHACHT: I beg your pardon? Yes, that was the intention as I gathered
from my conversation with Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew that the laws on the Jewish subject
were on their way?

SCHACHT: Not the laws which were passed later. I always urged Hitler to
give legal protection to the Jews. I wanted to see this law enacted, and
I assumed that it would be done; but instead the Racial Laws of
September or November, yes, November, 1935, were passed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have quoted from Exhibit Number USA-832, which is
Document EC-433, and you say the laws you were forecasting and promising
were laws for the protection of the Jews?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that later.

You gave your reasons, which you said were reasons of principle, to the
Tribunal for not becoming a Party member?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR: JUSTICE JACKSON: Yesterday in Court, do you recall that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now isn’t it a fact that you have told the United
States Prosecution Staff that you asked Hitler whether to join the
Party, and that to your great relief Hitler told you not to?

SCHACHT: Yes. Before I co-operated with him I wanted to find out whether
he demanded that I should become a member of the Party. I was most
relieved when he said I need not.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So you remained out of the Party with Hitler’s
consent and approval?

SCHACHT: Yes, of course. I think that is just another reason which will
prove that I have never been a member of the Party.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But you did not mention that to the Tribunal when
you were giving your reasons for setting out, that Hitler had given
permission?

SCHACHT: No, I thought the Tribunal would believe me anyway.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you received the Party golden swastika, you
stated that it was the greatest honor that could be conferred by the
Third Reich, did you not?

SCHACHT: I did, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And while you didn’t wear it in your daily life,
you did wear it on official occasions, you stated, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes. It was very convenient on railroad journeys, when ordering
a car, _et cetera_.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From 1933 to 1942 you contributed a thousand
Reichsmark a year to the Nazi Party?

SCHACHT: No. Yes, I beg your pardon; from 1937 to 1942.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Didn’t you say on interrogation that it was from
1933 to 1942?

SCHACHT: No, that is an error. From 1937, after I had received the
swastika. Evidently that is a misunderstanding. After I had received it
I said to myself, “It would be fitting—give the people a thousand marks
a year, and have done with it.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: For upwards of ten years, not quite ten years, you
accepted and held office of one kind or another under this regime, did
you not?

SCHACHT: From 17 March 1933 to 21 January 1943.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And as I understand you, that during this time, at
least a part of the time, Hitler deceived you, and all the time you
deceived Hitler.

SCHACHT: No, oh no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I have misunderstood you?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now...

SCHACHT: I believe that in the first years, at least, I did not deceive
Hitler.

I not only believe so, I know it. I only started to deceive him in 1938.
Until then, I always told him my honest opinion. I did not cheat him at
all; on the contrary...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What becomes, then, of your explanation that you
entered his government in order to put brakes on his program? Did you
tell him that?

SCHACHT: Oh, no. I should hardly have done that or he would never have
admitted me into the government. But I did not deceive him about it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he know your purpose in joining his government
was to defeat his program by sabotage?

SCHACHT: I did not say that I wanted to defeat his program. I said that
I wanted to direct it into orderly channels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, you have said that you wanted to put brakes
on it. You used that expression.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which meant slow down? Didn’t it?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he wanted to speed it up, isn’t that right?

SCHACHT: Yes, perhaps.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never allowed him to know that you had entered
his government for the purpose of slowing down his rearmament program,
did you?

SCHACHT: It was not necessary to tell him what I was thinking. I did not
deceive him. I made no false statements, but I would hardly tell him
what I actually thought and wanted. He did not tell me his innermost
thoughts either, and you do not tell them to your political opponents
either. I never deceived Hitler except after 1938.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I daresay. I am not asking you about a political
opponent. I am asking you about the man in whose government you entered
and became a part.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You don’t tell your opponents; but is it customary
in Germany that members of the government enter for the purpose of
defeating the head of the government’s program?

SCHACHT: I have already told you that the word defeat is incorrect. I
did not intend to defeat him. I intended to slow him down; and that is
indeed the custom, for that is how every coalition government is
constructed. If you enter into a coalition government, you must discuss
certain matters with your neighboring parties and come to an agreement
about them, and you must use your influence to check certain projects of
the other party. That is not a deception; it is an attempt at a
compromise solution.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You claim you entered as a coalition?

SCHACHT: Yes. I explained that in a distinct and comprehensive manner.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You used the word yourself today, in describing
your activities, as sabotaging his rearmament program, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes, I did so, shall we say, after 1936. But he noticed it.
That was not a deception.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You take some part of the responsibility, I take
it, for the loss of the war by Germany.

SCHACHT: That is a very strange question. Please, forgive me if I say
that I assume no responsibility. Since I am not responsible for the fact
that the war started I cannot assume any responsibility for the fact
that it was lost. I did not want war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when did your doubts about Hitler as a man, his
integrity, first arise?

SCHACHT: I have explained that in such detail during the examination
that I do not think I need repeat it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did that occur—I’ll put it in the terms of your
interrogation, since your interrogation is a little clearer.

    “In 1934”—so your interrogation runs—“he killed many people
    without having any legal justification or had them killed; and a
    few days after, in the Reichstag, he said he was the highest
    judge in Germany. He was certainly not, and for the first time I
    was shaken by his conception. It seemed to me absolutely immoral
    and inhuman.”

Is that correct?

SCHACHT: I said that here yesterday or the day before; exactly the same
thing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I want to fix these dates, Dr. Schacht. You
see, your purpose in this trial and mine aren’t exactly the same.

SCHACHT: No, no, I know that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also received full information about the
operation of the Gestapo from Gisevius in 1934 or 1935, as he testified,
did you not?

SCHACHT: No, he did not say that. He said that he knew about these
matters. He did not tell me everything, but I admitted earlier
today—this morning—that he did inform me of certain things, and from
that I drew my conclusions. At the beginning of May 1935 I had already
discussed this matter with Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were informed about the Gestapo terrorism,
Reichstag Fire...

SCHACHT: The Reichstag Fire?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: ...the falsity of the purge claim...

SCHACHT: One moment, please. May I take them in order? I was not told
about the Reichstag Fire until years later by the late Count Helldorf,
who has been mentioned by Gisevius.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean Gisevius never told you about that?

SCHACHT: I think I heard it from Helldorf. I may have heard it from
Gisevius, but I think it was Helldorf. At any rate, it was after 1935
that I heard about it. Until then, I did not think it was possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never doubted Gisevius’ word when he told you
in 1934 or 1935 as he testified, did you?

SCHACHT: One moment. He told me this either in 1934 or 1935, but not
1934 and 1935, and if he did tell me—well if Gisevius said so, I assume
that it is true.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It was then that you knew about the persecution of
the churches and the destruction of the labor unions, wasn’t it?

SCHACHT: The destruction of the labor unions took place as early as May
1933.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You knew all about that, didn’t you?

SCHACHT: I did not know everything, only what was generally known. I
knew exactly what every other German knew about it and what the labor
unions themselves knew.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As a matter of fact, that was one of the reasons
for the contributions by yourself and other industrialists to the Nazi
Party, wasn’t it?

SCHACHT: Oh, no: oh, no. There was never any question of that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You mean that meetings of industrialists were held,
and as important a thing to industry as the destruction of the labor
unions was never mentioned in your conferences?

SCHACHT: I know nothing about it. Will you please remind me of something
definite.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Confiscation of the properties; the putting of
labor union leaders into concentration camps.

SCHACHT: I heard about that—one moment. I do not know exactly who was
put into the concentration camps. I was informed about the confiscation
of property because that was publicly announced; but, if I understand
you correctly, I do not know what the meetings of industrialists had to
do with it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also knew very early about the persecution
of the Jews, didn’t you?

SCHACHT: I explained yesterday exactly what I knew about the persecution
of the Jews, how I acted in connection with the persecution of the Jews,
and I state that as long as I was a minister I did everything to prevent
these things.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I understood your generality, and I am trying to
get at a little more detail about it, Dr. Schacht. Did you not testify
as follows, on your interrogation on the 17th of October 1945:

    “The National Socialists, as I understood from the program,
    intended to have a smaller percentage of Jews in the
    governmental and cultural positions of Germany, with which I
    agreed.”

SCHACHT: Yes.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, you had read _Mein
    Kampf_, had you not?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘And you knew the views of Hitler on the Jewish
    question. Did you not?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’”

You so testified, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Question: ‘Well, now, during your time as
    Reich Minister, statutes were passed, were they not, prohibiting
    all Jewish lawyers, for example, from practicing in the courts?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes, that is what I said.’

    “Question: ‘Did you agree with that?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’”

Did you say that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you did agree with excluding...

SCHACHT: Yes, I always agreed with that principle.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. And you also agreed with the principle of
excluding all Jews from civil service positions, did you not?

SCHACHT: No. I want to emphasize in this connection...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well...

SCHACHT: May I finish?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

SCHACHT: With regard to the principle of the dominating Jewish influence
in government, legal, and cultural questions I have always said that I
did not consider this influence to be of advantage either to the German
people and Germany, which was a Christian state and based on Christian
conceptions, or to the Jews, since it increased the animosity against
them. For these reasons I was always in favor of limiting Jewish
participation in those fields, not actually according to the population,
but nevertheless limiting them to a certain percentage.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, let’s go on with the interrogation. The
interrogations are always so much briefer than the answers made in court
where the press is present, if I may say so.

Did you not give these answers:

    “Question: ‘Now, with respect to civil service. There was this
    Aryan clause that was put in. Did you agree with that
    legislation?’

    “Answer: ‘With the same limitation.’

    “Question: ‘Now, did you ever express yourself in the Cabinet or
    elsewhere to the point that you wanted these restrictions put
    in, restrictions you have been talking about?’

    “Answer: ‘I don’t think so; useless to do it.’

    “Question: ‘You say “useless to do it?”’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘I thought you said at one time or another that the
    reason you stayed in is because you thought you might have some
    influence on policy.’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘You didn’t consider this as important enough a
    matter to take a position on it?’

    “Answer: ‘Not an important enough matter to risk a break.’”

SCHACHT: To break, that is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, you were asked this:

    “You certainly signed a law with respect to the prohibition of
    Jews receiving licenses to deal in foreign currencies.”

Do you remember that?

SCHACHT: Yes.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Yes, maybe.’

    “Question: ‘You were in favor of that?’

    “Answer: ‘I don’t remember the details of that question.’

    “Question: ‘Well, it is not a matter of details. The question is
    a matter of discrimination.’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’”

You said that?

SCHACHT: Yes, certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of that legislation, or were you
not?

SCHACHT: Is that the question now, or from the interrogation?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am asking you now.

SCHACHT: Yes. I agreed to it. Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were in favor of it. Well, you were not when
you were interrogated.

SCHACHT: You can see how difficult it is.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The question then was, you were in favor of it, and
you said:

    “‘I wasn’t in favor, but I had to sign it.’

    “Question: ‘Well, you were the only one who signed it. You were
    the Reich Minister of Economics?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘And, obviously, it was a bill which was put in by
    your Ministry, was it not?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’”

Is that correct?

SCHACHT: Yes, I assume so. You see, in these matters it was a question
of degrees. I have just explained the principles of my policy. The
extent to which these individual laws went is a question of politics.
Today, you can say what you like about it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you also favored the law, and signed the law,
prohibiting all Jews from being admitted to examinations for public
economic advisors, for co-operatives, for example.

SCHACHT: Yes, possibly. I do not remember but probably it is right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you also approved a law imposing the death
penalty on German subjects who transferred German property abroad, or
left German property abroad.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And of course you knew that that affected, chiefly
and most seriously, the Jews who were moving abroad.

SCHACHT: I hope that the Jews did not cheat any more than the
Christians.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, the death penalty on German subjects for
transferring German property abroad was your idea of a just law?

SCHACHT: I do not understand. My idea?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes.

SCHACHT: It was an idea of the Minister of Finance, and I signed it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, the question was then asked you after these
were recited:

    “Well, now, was there a matter of conscience involved, or was
    there not?”

And you answered:

    “To some extent, yes, but not important enough to risk a break.”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the question:

    “Yes. In other words, you had quite another objective which was
    more important?”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Well what was that objective, Dr. Schacht?” I am
still reading. It saves time.

SCHACHT: Oh, pardon me.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Answer: ‘Well, the objective was to stay
    in power and to help carry this through in an ordinary and
    reasonable way.’

    “Question: ‘That is to say, the restoration of the German
    economy?’

    “Answer: ‘Quite.’

    “Question: ‘And the completion of the armament program?’

    “Answer: ‘The completion of the international equality, the
    political equality of Germany.’

    “Question: ‘By means of armament, as you yourself have said?’

    “Answer: ‘Also by means of armament.’”

SCHACHT: All correct, and I stand by that today.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes. So the armament question was so important that
you didn’t want to risk any break about the Jews.

SCHACHT: Not the armament question, but the equality of Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, now, I just asked you “by means of armament,
as you yourself have said.”

SCHACHT: And I say, also by means of armament. That is one of the means.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is the only one that was used ultimately,
wasn’t it?

SCHACHT: No, it was not. There were other ones.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: We will get to that in time.

Now, isn’t it a fact that you also approved the law dismissing all
Jewish officials and notaries public?

SCHACHT: That is possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you wrote to Blomberg on the 24th of December
1935 giving your motives, did you not, saying this:

    “The economic and illegal treatment of the Jews, the anti-Church
    movement of certain Party organizations, and the lawlessness
    which centers in the Gestapo are a detriment to our rearmament
    task which could be considerably lessened through the
    application of more respectable methods, without abandoning the
    goals in the least.” (Exhibit Number Schacht-13).

You wrote that, did you not?

SCHACHT: Yes. I quoted it myself yesterday.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, as to the rearmament program, you participated
in that from three separate offices, did you not?

SCHACHT: I do not know which offices you mean, but please go ahead.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will help you to list them. In the first place,
you were Plenipotentiary for War.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That was the secret office at first.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were President of the Reichsbank. That was the
financial office.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were Minister of Economics, in which
position you had control with the minister for the general economic
situation.

SCHACHT: Yes. This word “control” is such a general term that I cannot
confirm your statement without question, but I was Minister of
Economics.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, let us take up first this position of
Plenipotentiary for War. You have testified that this position was
created for two purposes: (a) Preparation for war; (b) Control of the
economy in event of war.

Is that correct?

SCHACHT: That means preliminary planning in case war should come, and
the direction of economy when war had broken out. In other words, a
preparatory period and a later period in the event of war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, you were asked about your functions and gave
these answers, did you not, “As the Chief of Staff provides for
mobilization from a military point of view... so you were concerned with
it from the economic point of view.”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You answered, “certainly.” And your position as
Plenipotentiary for War was of equal rank with the War Ministry, was it
not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And, as you told us, those charged with
responsibility in event of war were: First, the Minister of War and the
Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht; and, secondly, on an equal
footing, Dr. Schacht, as Plenipotentiary for Economics. Is that correct?

SCHACHT: I assume so, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And in January of 1937 you wrote this, did you not?

    “I am entrusted with the preparation of the war economy
    according to the principle that our economic war organization
    must be so organized in time of peace that the war economy can
    be directly converted in case of emergency from this peacetime
    organization and need not be created at the outbreak of war.”

SCHACHT: I assume that that is correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And who was your Deputy in that office? Wohlthat?

SCHACHT: I think Wohlthat.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, those being your functions as Plenipotentiary
for the War Economy, let’s turn to your functions as President of the
Reichsbank.

You said that the carrying out of the armament program was the principal
task of the German policy in 1935, did you not?

SCHACHT: Undoubtedly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: There is no doubt that you voluntarily assumed the
responsibility for finding financial and economic means for doing that
thing.

SCHACHT: No doubt.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were the financial and economic
administrator in charge of developing the armament industry of Germany.

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not?

SCHACHT: No, in no way.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I may have misunderstood you.

    “Question: ‘Now, in connection with this development’”—I am
    referring to your interrogation of the 16th of October 1945,
    Exhibit USA-636 (Document Number 3728-PS), Page 44—“‘Now in
    connection with this development of the armament industry, you
    charged yourself as the financial and economic administrator of
    it.’

    “Nodding your head.”

SCHACHT: I beg your pardon?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Nodding your head.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “You charged yourself”—I will ask the whole
question so you will get it.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “Now, in connection with this development of the
armament industry, you charged yourself as the financial and economic
administrator of it.”

The record says that you nodded your head. The next question was:

    “And in that connection you took various steps. Would you be
    good enough to describe for us the larger steps which you took
    with reference to this goal of rearmament, first, internally,
    and, second, with respect to foreign nations?

    “Answer: ‘Internally, I tried to collect all money available for
    financing the mefo bills. Externally, I tried to maintain
    foreign commerce as much as possible.’”

Did you make those answers, and are they correct?

SCHACHT: I am sure that you are correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And your purpose in maintaining foreign trade was
to obtain enough foreign exchange to permit the imports of raw
materials, not manufactured, which were required for the rearmament
program. Is that not correct?

SCHACHT: That is the question that is put to me. Now comes the answer.
Please, will you read the answer?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What is your answer now?

SCHACHT: My answer today is that that was not the only aim.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Not the only aim?

SCHACHT: Right.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was the primary aim, was it not?

SCHACHT: No, not at all.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All right, what was the other aim?

SCHACHT: To keep Germany alive, to assure employment for Germany, to
obtain sufficient food for Germany.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Which was your dominant aim?

SCHACHT: The food supply in Germany and work for the export industry.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, I should like to go over one or two of these
documents with you as to your aim. I refer to Document 1168-PS of May 3,
1935.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Title, “Financing of Armament,” Exhibit Number
USA-37.

    “The following comments are based on the assumption that the
    completion of the armament program in regard to speed and extent
    is the task of German policy and that accordingly everything
    else must be subordinated to this aim, insofar as this main goal
    is not endangered, by neglecting other questions.”

Did you write that?

SCHACHT: Not only did I write it, but I handed it to Hitler personally.
It is one of twin documents, one of which has already been submitted in
evidence and discussed in detail by the Prosecution. I did not receive
the second document.

When my defense counsel examined me I stated here that I was intent on
stopping the Party collections and Party moneys, which were extracted
everywhere from the German people, because it was extremely difficult
for me to get the money to finance the armament program and the mefo
bills.

I could only get that point across to Hitler if I told him that of
course this was being done in the interests of armament. If I had told
him that this was done...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, but...

SCHACHT: No, please let me finish. If I had told him that this was done
for the building of theaters, or something similar, it would have made
no impression on him. However, if I said it must be done because
otherwise we could not arm, that was a point which influenced Hitler and
that is why I said it. I admitted that and explained it during the
examination by my attorney.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you didn’t call that misleading him?

SCHACHT: I would not call it “misleading”; I would call it “leading.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But leading without telling him the true motives
which actuated you, at least.

SCHACHT: I think you can be much more successful in leading a person if
you do not tell him the truth than if you do tell him the truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am very glad to have that frank statement of your
philosophy, Dr. Schacht. I am greatly indebted to you. Well, you devised
all kinds of plans, one for the control of foreign exchange, blocked
foreign accounts; and mefo bills was one of the principal ones of your
devices for financing was it not?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, I don’t care about the details of mefo bills,
but I would like to ask you this. Isn’t it correct, as you testified in
the inquiry of the 16th of October 1945—Exhibit Number USA-636—as
follows:

    “Question: ‘Actually, as a matter of fact, let me ask you this.
    At the time when you started the mefo bills, for example, there
    were no ready means available for financing the rearmament?’

    “Answer: ‘Quite.’

    “Question: ‘That is to say, through normal budget finance
    methods?’

    “Answer: ‘Not enough.’

    “Question: ‘Also, you were limited at that time by the statute
    of the Reichsbank which did not permit you to give anything near
    the sufficient credit which was required by the armament
    program.’

    “Answer: ‘Quite.’

    “Question: ‘And you found a way?’

    “Answer: ‘Yes.’

    “Question: ‘And the way you found was by creating a device in
    effect which enabled the Reichsbank to lend, by a subterfuge, to
    the Government what it normally or legally could not do?’

    “Answer: ‘Right.’”

Is that true?

SCHACHT: That was my answer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The following questions were then asked:

    “I understand that basically what was built up in Germany in the
    way of an armament industry, a domestic economy that was sound,
    and a Wehrmacht, the efforts that you put in from 1934 to the
    spring of 1938, when mefo financing stopped, were responsible in
    large part for the success of the whole program.

    “Answer: ‘I don’t know whether they were responsible for it, but
    I helped a great deal to achieve that.’”

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you were asked as follows, on the 17th of
October 1945:

    “In other words, in effect you are not taking the position that
    you are not largely responsible for the rearming of the German
    Army?

    “Answer: ‘Oh no, I never did that.’

    “Question: ‘You have always been proud of that fact, I take it.’

    “Answer: ‘I wouldn’t say proud, but satisfied.’”

Is that still your position?

SCHACHT: In reply to that I should like to say: The question of mefo
bills was quite certainly a system of finance which normally would never
have been attempted. I made a detailed statement on this subject when I
was questioned by my attorney. On the other hand, however, I can say
that this question was examined by all legal experts in the Reichsbank
and by means of this subterfuge, as you put it, a way was found which
was legally possible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I didn’t put it that way; you said so.

SCHACHT: No, no. I mean the sentence you have just quoted as being my
answer. I beg your pardon. The matter was investigated from a legal
viewpoint, and we assured ourselves that it could be done in this way.
Moreover, I am still satisfied today that I contributed to the
rearmament, but I wish that Hitler had made different use of it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on your 60th birthday Minister of War
Blomberg said that, “Without your help, my dear Mr. Schacht, there could
have been no rearmament,” did he not?

SCHACHT: Yes, those are the sort of pleasantries which one exchanges on
such occasions. But there is quite a bit of truth in it. I have never
denied it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is the way it looks to me.

Now, when you finally made some suggestion that the armament should stop
or slow up, as I understand, you made that suggestion without knowing
what the armament was.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The only thing you were judging by was financial
conditions, was it not?

SCHACHT: Oh, no.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, what was it?

SCHACHT: I did, of course, have a general impression of these matters
because General Thomas always discussed them with me. However, I do not
remember that General Von Blomberg gave me detailed information about
what he thought. Of course, I was informed in a general way regarding
the progress made by the armament program, and that is why I said “more
slowly.” My opinion was strengthened because of the general conditions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well now, let’s see what reasons you gave in
Document Number EC-286. That is Exhibit Number USA-833:

    “I am therefore of the opinion that we should promote our export
    with all resources by a temporary”—and I emphasize the word
    “temporary”—“decrease of armament.”

SCHACHT: Decrease?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Decrease, yes, temporary.

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I emphasize “temporary,” and you emphasize
“decrease.”

SCHACHT: Oh no, no; I agree with you.

    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: “And that further, with reference to the
    Four Year Plan, we should solve only those problems which appear
    most pressing. Among these I include the oil-fuel program, the
    buna program, and the program of developing ore resources,
    insofar as this development does not of itself require large
    amounts of raw materials which must be withheld from export.

    “On the other hand, all other measures of the Four Year Plan
    should be postponed for the time being. I am convinced that by
    such a policy our export could be increased so greatly that
    there would be a certain improvement in our exhausted stocks,
    and that the resumption of the strengthened armament would again
    be possible in the not too distant future, from the point of
    view of raw materials. I am unable to judge to what extent a
    temporary postponement of armament would have military
    advantages. However, I presume that such a pause in armament
    would not only have advantages for the training of officers and
    men, which has yet to be done, but that this pause would also
    afford an opportunity to survey the technical results of
    previous armament and to perfect the technical aspect of
    armament.”

Now that you addressed to Göring, did you not?

SCHACHT: That is perfectly possible. I cannot remember the letter, but
it looks quite like one of mine.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; and you were correctly giving to Göring your
true views; were you not?

SCHACHT: No; I believe that this was merely a tactical letter. I think
that I was mainly trying to limit armament. If I had told him that we
wanted to stop arming, Göring would probably have denounced me to the
Führer accordingly. Therefore I told him, “Let’s stop for the time
being”—temporary. I also emphasize “temporary.” It was a tactical
measure to convince Göring that for the time being it should be
temporary.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then, with your fellow officers in the Government
you were also using tactical statements which did not represent your
true views?

SCHACHT: That was absolutely necessary.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did it cease to be necessary, Dr. Schacht?

SCHACHT: Cease?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes; when did it cease to be necessary?

SCHACHT: I think it more important to ask when it commenced; when it
started.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well?

SCHACHT: During the first years I did not do it, of course, but later on
I did to a considerable extent. I could say always; it never stopped.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Has it stopped now?

SCHACHT: I have no more colleagues, and here before this Tribunal I have
nothing to tell but the truth.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, on the 24th of September, 1935—December—you
wrote EC-293, which is Exhibit Number USA-834, and used this language,
did you not:

    “If there is now a demand for greater armament, it is, of
    course, not my intention to deny or change my attitude, which is
    in favor of the greatest possible armament and which I have
    expressed for years both before and since the seizure of power;
    but it is my duty to point out the economic limitations of this
    policy.”

SCHACHT: That is very good.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that is true?

SCHACHT: Certainly.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there came in the Four Year Plan in 1936?

SCHACHT: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You did not like the appointment of Göring to that
position?

SCHACHT: I thought he was unsuited and, of course, it made an opening
for a policy which was opposed to mine. I knew perfectly well that this
was the start of exaggerated armament, whereas I was in favor of
restricted rearmament.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Why do you say that Göring’s appointment meant
exaggeration of armament? Can you point to anything that Göring has said
in favor of rearmament that is any more extreme than the things you have
said?

SCHACHT: Oh yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, will you do it?

SCHACHT: Yes, I think if you read the record of the so-called “small
Ministerial Council,” of the year 1936, and in particular 1938, which
you yourself introduced, you will see at once that here the necessity of
increased armament was emphasized. For instance, those of November or
October 1936, I think.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it was also emphasized in your documents, was
it not, throughout?

SCHACHT: No.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You say that your statements of that sort were
merely tactical.

SCHACHT: No, I beg your pardon. I said arm within the limits of what is
economically possible and reasonable. Göring, if I may say it again,
wanted to go beyond those limits.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is exactly the point I want to make. Your
difference with Göring over rearmament was entirely a question of what
the economy of Germany would stand, was it not?

SCHACHT: No. I said that the most important thing was that Germany
should live and have foreign trade, and within those limits we could
arm. However, it is out of the question that Germany should arm for the
sake of arming, and thus ruin her economy.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well that’s the difference between you and Göring;
it was over what the economy would stand, was it not?

SCHACHT: No, it was a question of the extent of rearmament. The point
is, Mr. Justice Jackson, that German economy paid the price for Göring’s
action. The only question is, was it reasonable or unreasonable? If I
may state it pointedly, I would say that I considered Göring’s economic
policy to be unreasonable and a burden to the German nation; while I
considered it most important that rearmament should not be extended and
that the German nation should have a normal, peacetime standard.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

       [_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                           TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this
volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 12_, by Various.]