[Cover Illustration]




                                 TRIAL
                                   OF
                        THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

                                 BEFORE

                           THE INTERNATIONAL
                           MILITARY TRIBUNAL

                           N U R E M B E R G
                    14 NOVEMBER 1945—1 OCTOBER 1946


                             [Illustration]


     P U B L I S H E D   A T   N U R E M B E R G ,   G E R M A N Y
                                1 9 4 7




        This volume is published in accordance with the
        direction of the International Military Tribunal by
        the Secretariat of the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction
        of the Allied Control Authority for Germany.




                               VOLUME XI



                       O F F I C I A L   T E X T

                              I N   T H E

                            ENGLISH LANGUAGE



                         P R O C E E D I N G S

                       8 April 1946-17 April 1946




                                 CONTENTS


          One Hundred and Second Day, Monday, 8 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                         1
                       Afternoon Session                      35

          One Hundred and Third Day, Tuesday, 9 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                        73
                       Afternoon Session                     107

          One Hundred and Fourth Day, Wednesday, 10 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       152
                       Afternoon Session                     190

          One Hundred and Fifth Day, Thursday, 11 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       224
                       Afternoon Session                     253

          One Hundred and Sixth Day, Friday, 12 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       289
                       Afternoon Session                     328

          One Hundred and Seventh Day, Saturday, 13 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       365

          One Hundred and Eighth Day, Monday, 15 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       396
                       Afternoon Session                     428

          One Hundred and Ninth Day, Tuesday, 16 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       460
                       Afternoon Session                     491

          One Hundred and Tenth Day, Wednesday, 17 April 1946,
                       Morning Session                       525
                       Afternoon Session                     568




                       ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND DAY
                          Monday, 8 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom):
I want to ask you some questions about the shooting of officers who
escaped from Sagan Camp. As I understand your evidence, very shortly
after the escape you had this interview with Hitler at which certainly
Himmler was present. That is right, isn’t it?

WILHELM KEITEL (Defendant): The day after the escape this conference
took place with the Führer and with Himmler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, you say that at that conference Hitler
said that the prisoners were not to be returned to the Wehrmacht but to
remain with the police. They were really your words. That is right,
isn’t it?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what you said. So that is what you say
took place. In your own mind you were satisfied when you left that
conference that these officers were going to be shot, were you not?

KEITEL: No, that I was not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you agree with this? You were
satisfied that there was a grave probability that these officers would
be shot?

KEITEL: As I rode home I had a subconscious concern about it. It was not
expressed at the conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you sent for General Von Graevenitz and
General Westhoff, did you not?

KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t know if you can remember, because
General Westhoff was a comparatively junior officer compared with
yourself, but he says that it was the first occasion on which you had
sent for him. Does your memory bear that out?

KEITEL: No, I did not call him. But he had been brought along to be
introduced to me. I did not know him. I had summoned only General Von
Graevenitz.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You had never met him before? Do you agree that
you had never met General Westhoff before, since he had come into that
job?

KEITEL: I had never seen him before.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what he said. Now you agree, as I
understand your evidence, that you were very excited and nervous?

KEITEL: Yes, I vented my disagreement and my excitement very strongly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you agree with General Westhoff that you
said something to this effect, “Gentlemen, this is a bad business” or
“This is a very serious matter” or something of that kind?

KEITEL: Yes, I said, “That is an enormously serious matter.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff said, in the next
sentence, what you said was, “This morning Göring reproached me in the
presence of Himmler for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It
was unheard of.”

KEITEL: That must be a mistake on Westhoff’s part. It was a day later.
We were then at Berchtesgaden and Generals Von Graevenitz and Westhoff
called on me the next morning. And it must also be a mistake that I
mentioned the name of the Reich Marshal Göring in this connection.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you were not very sure about that, were you,
as to whether or not Göring was present. You were not very sure, were
you?

KEITEL: I only became uncertain about it when in a preliminary
interrogation I was told that witnesses had stated that Göring was
present; thereupon I said it is not completely impossible but that I did
not recall it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, to put it quite right, when you were
interrogated, an American officer put exactly the sentence that I put to
you now. He put that sentence to you from General Westhoff’s statement.
Do you remember that he read what I have read to you now? “Gentlemen,
this is a bad business; this morning Göring reproached me in the
presence of Himmler for having let some more prisoners of war escape. It
was unheard of.” Do you remember the interrogator put that to you?
Didn’t he?

KEITEL: It was something like that at the preliminary interrogation, but
I said that I was not certain that Göring was present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I was going to put exactly what you said—and
you listen carefully, and if you have any disagreement, tell the
Tribunal. You said, “I request that you interrogate Jodl about the whole
incident and the attitude which I displayed during the whole conference
in the presence of Göring, of whose presence during that conference I am
not absolutely certain, but Himmler was there.” That was your view when
you were interrogated on the 10th of November, wasn’t it? You said,
“...during the whole conference in the presence of Göring, of whose
presence I am not absolutely certain....” That was your view on the 10th
of November?

KEITEL: There must have been some misinterpretation in the minutes,
which I never read. I expressed my uncertainty about the presence of
Göring and in the same connection put the request to interrogate General
Jodl about it, since, in my opinion, I was not sure that Göring was not
present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agree that you did ask that General Jodl
should be interrogated?

KEITEL: I made that proposal, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, what do you complain about as to the
next sentence? “...during the whole conference in the presence of
Göring, of whose presence during that conference I am not absolutely
certain....” Wasn’t that your view?

KEITEL: Yes, I was rather surprised at this interrogation and when I was
told that witnesses had confirmed that Göring had been present I was a
little uncertain in this matter and asked that General Jodl be
interrogated. In the meantime it became entirely clear to me that Göring
was not present and that I was right as I had at first said.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Had you discussed it with Göring while you were
both awaiting trial?

KEITEL: After my interrogations I had the occasion to speak with Reich
Marshal Göring and he told me, “But you must know that I was not there,”
and then I remembered fully.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, as you say, the Reich Marshal said to you
he had not been present at the interview. That is right, is it not?

KEITEL: General Jodl also confirmed to me Reich Marshal Göring was not
present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, did you tell General Von Graevenitz
and General Westhoff that Himmler had interfered and that he had
complained that he would have to provide another 60 to 70 thousand men
for the Landwache? Did you tell them that?

KEITEL: No, that is also a misinterpretation. I did not say that. It is
not correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said that Himmler had interfered.

KEITEL: I said only that Himmler had reported the fact of the escape and
I intended not to report it to Hitler on that day, since a number of
escapees had been returned to the camp. I did not intend to report to
the Führer on that day.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, whatever you said to General Von
Graevenitz, you agree that General Von Graevenitz protested and said,
“Escape is not a dishonorable offense. That is specially laid down in
the Convention.” Did he not say that?

KEITEL: Yes, it is true he said that. But I would like to add that the
statement of General Westhoff is a reminiscence which goes back over
several years.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, but you agree, as I understand your
evidence, that General Von Graevenitz did make a protest about the
action that was taken, is not that so?

KEITEL: Yes, he did so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then when he made the protest did you say
words to this effect? I am reading of course from General Westhoff’s
statement, “I do not care a damn. We discussed it in the Führer’s
presence, and it cannot be altered.” Did you say words to that effect?

KEITEL: No, it was not like that, but I do believe I said something
similar.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Similar?

KEITEL: But we are not concerned with...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Similar, to that effect?

KEITEL: I said something similar.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And after that did you say that your
organization, the Kriegsgefangenenwesen, were to publish a notice in the
prison camps where prisoners of war are held, telling all prisoners of
war what action had been taken in this case, in order that it would be
deterrent to other escapes?

Did you instruct these generals, your heads of the Prisoners of War
Organization, to publish a notice in the camps saying what action had
been taken in order to act as a deterrent?

KEITEL: I gave this due consideration while reading a report by the
British Government and I came to the conclusion that there must be some
confusion as to when I gave these instructions. I am sure I did not do
so at this conference. That was later, several days later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you will find it is stated in the
statement of General Westhoff that we put in, at the bottom of Page 3.
General Westhoff says:

    “The Field Marshal gave us detailed instructions to publish a
    list at the camps, giving the names of those shot as a warning.
    That was done. That was a direct order that we could not
    disobey.”

And in the statement which your counsel has put in, General Westhoff
says:

    “This must stop. We cannot allow this to happen again. The
    officers who have escaped will be shot. I must inform you that
    most of them are already dead and you will publish a notice in
    the prison camps where prisoners of war are held telling all
    prisoners of war what action has been taken in this case in
    order that it will be a deterrent to other escapes.”

KEITEL: May I make a statement to this?

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): The British Prosecutor is
referring to a document which I submitted in my document book. I assume
that is correct. And it is a document which the French Prosecution
wanted to submit and to which I objected, since it is a compilation of
interrogations which Colonel Williams prepared. I submitted this
document so as to furnish proof at the hearing of General Westhoff that
this document does not agree in 23 points with the testimony given by
him. He has given me the necessary information. But he will first be in
the witness box tomorrow. I therefore ask, if the British Prosecutor
appeals to the Witness Westhoff, to produce at least his statement which
he made under oath at the request of the American prosecutor Colonel
Williams. This affidavit up to now has not been produced, whereas all
other pieces of evidence from him contain only reports which have never
been submitted to Westhoff for his signature, or for his
acknowledgement, nor have been confirmed by his oath.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My point was to make quite clear that I was not
putting anything in from the first statement which was not contained in
the defendant’s document book. I thought that the complaint would be the
other way, that if I took our own evidence alone that then it would be
said that it is slightly different, for the difference is immaterial
from the documents submitted in the defendant’s document book. I have
carefully collated them both. There is practically no difference between
them but I thought it was only fair to put both sets of words.

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): The Tribunal thinks
the cross-examination is perfectly proper. Of course if Dr. Nelte does
call General Westhoff as a witness, he will be able to get from him any
corrections which General Westhoff thinks are necessary, which he makes
to the affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, what I want to know is: Did you give
orders to General Von Graevenitz and General Westhoff that it was to be
published in the camps as to what measures had been taken with regard to
these officers?

KEITEL: Yes, but several days later; not on the same day that these
officers were with me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How long later?

KEITEL: I believe 3 or 4 days later, but I can no longer tell you
exactly; in any event, not before I found out that shootings had taken
place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, 3 or 4 days later would be just when the
shootings were beginning, but what was published? What did you say was
to be published as to the measures that had been taken?

KEITEL: In the camp a warning was to be published. In my opinion, we
were not to mention shootings but only warn that those caught in flight
would not be returned to the camp. I cannot remember the exact wording.
It was traceable to an order which I had received from the Führer
resulting from a conference I had with him on the matter of shootings.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, is this a fair way to put your
recollection of the order: That it was probable, according to your
recollection, that those who attempted to escape would be handed over to
the SD and, certainly, that very severe measures would be taken? Is that
a fair way of putting your recollection of the order?

KEITEL: My recollection is that a warning, that is a threat, was to be
published to the effect that those who attempted to escape would not be
returned to the camp. That was the contents of this publication,
according to my recollection, which I then forwarded. I myself did not
word it. Besides, only the administration of the camp, or rather the
Luftwaffe were to be notified.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General Westhoff was not content with an
oral order and came back to you with a draft order in writing, did he
not?

KEITEL: I do not believe that he came to me. I believe he sent me this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, but when I said “came back to you,”
I was talking generally; you are quite right that he passed on for your
consideration a draft order in writing for you to approve; that is
right, isn’t it?

KEITEL: I do not believe that it was an order; but as far as I remember
it was just a memorandum, a note. However, I must add that I was first
reminded of this matter in the course of the interrogation by Colonel
Williams.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, what General Westhoff says, is:

    “Contrary to Feldmarschall Keitel’s order, I pretended that I
    had not understood properly. I worked the thing out on paper. I
    said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I want to have the word “shoot”
    included, so that Keitel can see it in writing. He may adopt a
    different attitude then.’”

Now, this is a bit later:

    “When I got the thing back, he had written the following in the
    margin: ‘I did not definitely say “shoot”; I said “hand over to
    the police or hand to the Gestapo.”’”

Then adds General Westhoff:

    “So, that was a partial climb down.”

Now, did you put a note on it: “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo.’” Did you?

KEITEL: I cannot remember the exact wording of the note—as little as
General Westhoff. But I did make a notation in the margin to the effect:
“I did not say ‘shoot’...”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the point that I’m putting to you,
Defendant? I want you to have it perfectly clear. Rightly or wrongly,
General Westhoff believed that you had inserted the word “shoot”; and
General Westhoff, to protect himself, put it back to you; and then you
say, “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said ‘hand over to the SD or
the Gestapo.’”

KEITEL: No, I did not say “shoot” either, but Colonel Williams said I
had written in the margin, “I did not say ‘shoot.’” That is on record in
the minutes of my interrogation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, what I want to know—and it is
perfectly clear—is, do you deny that that in substance represents what
you put in the document: “I did not definitely say ‘shoot’; I said,
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo’”? Did you put
words to that effect on the document?

KEITEL: It is probable that I wrote something similar to that for I
wanted to make clear what I had said to those two officers. What I said
was nothing new, but it was a clarification of what I had said.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next point that I want to direct your
attention to: Had you an officer on your staff called Oberst Von
Reurmont, on your PW staff, Kriegsgefangenenwesen?

KEITEL: No, he was never on my staff.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was his position in the OKW?

KEITEL: I believe there was a Colonel Reurmont. He was a department
chief and had nothing to do with the prisoner-of-war system; he was
department chief in the general Wehrmacht office.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In your office.

KEITEL: In the office, in the general Wehrmacht office under General
Reinecke, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that on 27 March, that is on a
Monday, there was a meeting, in which Colonel Von Reurmont took the
chair, attended by Gruppenführer Müller from the Gestapo, Gruppenführer
Nebe, and Colonel Wilde from the Air Ministry, from their PW inspector
of 17; do you know that?

KEITEL: No, I never heard anything about it. It has remained entirely
unknown to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that you had this
colonel in your office, a colonel from the Air Ministry, two extremely
important officials from the police, and they have a meeting to discuss
this matter 2 days after you had your first meeting, 1 day after you had
seen Von Graevenitz and Westhoff, and you did not know a word about it?

KEITEL: No, I knew nothing about this meeting. I cannot remember.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, most of us are very familiar with the
working of service departments. I do ask you in fairness to yourself to
consider this. Are you telling this Tribunal that no report was ever
made to you of that joint meeting between the representative of the OKW,
high police officials, and the Air Ministry? And it never came up to
you? Now, really think before you answer.

KEITEL: I cannot remember even with the best of my will. I was surprised
by the communication about this conference, and I can remember nothing
about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that—I put it in Colonel Welder’s
statement when I was cross-examining the Defendant Göring—he said that
at that conference it was announced that these officers were to be shot
and that many of them had been shot? Did no report come to you that
these officers were being shot and were to be shot?

KEITEL: No, not on the 27th. It was already discussed a while ago, when
I received the first report. At that time I knew nothing about it; on
that day, or even on the day following this conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You agreed, though, that you got to learn, as I
understand you, that they were being shot on the 29th; that would be a
Thursday?

KEITEL: I can no longer say what day, but I do remember that it was
later. I believe it was several days later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, let us, Defendant, make every point in
your favor. Let us take it that it was, say, Saturday the 31st, or even
Monday, the 2d of April. By Monday, the 2d of April—that is 9 days
after the escape—you knew then that these officers were being shot?

KEITEL: I heard about it during these days, perhaps around the 31st,
through the Führer’s adjutancy when I again came to the Berghof for a
situation briefing. I was not told though, that all of these officers
had been shot; some of them had been shot while attempting to flee. I
was told that a little before the beginning of the conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were not all shot until the 13th of April,
which was nearly another fortnight. Were you told of the manner, in
which they got out of the cars to relieve themselves and were then shot
in the back of the head by someone with a revolver? Were you told of
that?

KEITEL: No, I found out only through the adjutant that a report had been
given to the Führer that shootings had followed the escape.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to one other point,
later on. You remember that my colleague, Mr. Eden, on behalf of the
British Government, made a statement in the House of Commons later on,
toward the end of June. Remember that?

KEITEL: Yes. I recall that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is it correct, as General Westhoff said,
that you had told your officers not to make contact with the Foreign
Office or the Gestapo, to leave this matter alone and not try and find
out anything about it? Is that right?

KEITEL: I told them that since the Wehrmacht was not concerned with the
means of searching for and catching the escapees, nor concerned with
what happened afterwards, the office for the prisoner-of-war matters
could not give any information on this subject as it did not deal with
the matter itself and did not know what had really happened. That is
what I said.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then the answer is, yes, that you did tell your
office to leave the matter alone and not to get in touch with the
Foreign Office or the police?

KEITEL: No, that is not quite right. The chief of the Amt Ausland was
connected with the Foreign Office. I only instructed that the officers
should not give any information about this case or any matters connected
with it, since they had not participated and knew only from hearsay what
had happened.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should have thought that my previous
question—you just repeated the effect of my previous question; I won’t
argue with you. I will come to the next point. You had an officer on
your staff named Admiral Bürckner, didn’t you?

KEITEL: Yes, he was chief of the Amt Ausland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was liaison between your office and the
Foreign Office?

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, did you give him orders to prepare an
answer to England, an answer to Mr. Eden’s statement?

KEITEL: It is possible that I told him that, even though he could not
receive any particulars from the offices of the Wehrmacht.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to read it again; I read the reply
a day or two ago. But eventually the reply was drawn up, I think, by the
Foreign Office in conjunction with Oberstleutnant Krafft of your office,
wasn’t it?

KEITEL: No, at that time...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Krafft...

KEITEL: I gave instructions that the answer was to be dealt with by the
RSHA but not by the prisoner-of-war department. I did not give any
instructions to Lieutenant Colonel Krafft.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But didn’t he go to Berchtesgaden to assist the
representative of the Foreign Office and Hitler in drawing up a reply?

KEITEL: I do not know. I did not speak with him nor did I see him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know that when they saw the reply, according
to General Westhoff, all your officers touched their heads and said,
“Mad.” You have seen that statement, haven’t you, “When we read this
note to England in the newspaper we were all absolutely taken aback; we
all clutched our heads—‘Mad’—we could do nothing about the affair.”
All your officers and you, yourself, knew the reply was an utter and
confounded lie. Wasn’t it a complete and utter lie? You all knew it.

KEITEL: They all knew it. I, too, learned of the reply; and it was clear
to me that it was not based on the truth.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that it comes to this, Defendant, doesn’t
it—that you will go as far as this: You were present at the meeting
with Hitler and Himmler. That is what you say. At that meeting Hitler
said that the prisoners who were caught by the police were to remain in
the hands of the police. You had a strong probability that these
prisoners would be shot and with that you used this incident as a
deterrent to try and prevent other prisoners of war escaping. All that
you admit, as I understand your answers this morning, don’t you?

KEITEL: Yes, I do admit; but I have not been interrogated on this matter
as to just what my position was with Hitler, and I have not testified as
to that, and that I did not give this warning, but that this warning was
an order of Hitler and was the cause for another severe collision
between Hitler and me when the first report of shootings reached me.
That is how it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I won’t go through the details again.

One other point: When did you learn of the use of cremation and the
sending of cremation urns to this camp?

KEITEL: This remained unknown to me and I do not recall ever having
heard of it. The matter was afterwards purely a concern of the
Luftwaffe, in which I was later involved, through my simple presence; I
do not know whether I ever heard or saw anything about this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you will agree with me, Defendant, that
anyone in the world who has had to deal with prisoner-of-war problems
would be horrified at the thought of bodies of shot officers being
cremated; it is simply asking for trouble, isn’t it, from the protecting
powers and everyone else, to put it at its lowest? You will agree with
that; I am sure you have had a good deal more to do with prisoners of
war than I. Don’t you agree it would horrify anyone who has to deal with
prisoners of war that bodies should be cremated—that the protecting
powers at once would be put on suspicion?

KEITEL: I am entirely of the same opinion that it is horrible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And if any service finds that its camps are
receiving 50 urns of ashes of cremated bodies of escaped prisoners of
war, that would be a most serious matter which would be taken to the
highest ranks of any service, isn’t that so?

KEITEL: Yes, even though I had nothing to do with the prisoner-of-war
camps of the Luftwaffe apart from having inspectional powers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I won’t ask you further about the Luftwaffe. Now
I think we can deal quite shortly with the question of the lynching of
Allied airmen.

[_Documents were handed to the defendant and also to the Tribunal._]

Now, Defendant, I would like to remind you that there was a report of a
conference on the 6th of June, Document 735-PS, which has been put in
against the Defendant Ribbentrop; it is a report of General Warlimont,
Exhibit GB-151, with regard to the criteria to be adopted for deciding
what were terror-fliers. You must remember the document, because you
yourself dealt on Friday with the note...

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...against legal procedure, which you already
dealt with.

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you said during your evidence—you remember
you told us why you did not want legal procedure: Because it was a
difficult problem for a court-martial to decide and also it meant a
3-month delay in reporting the death sentence to the protecting powers.

KEITEL: Yes, I did make those statements.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then you said that you had a discussion with
Göring, who said that lynching should be turned down. Do you remember
saying that on Friday.

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, that was not accurate, was it? Because I
want to just show you what did happen. That document which you annotated
was the 6th of June. And on the 14th of June...

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...it is Document D-774, which will be Exhibit
GB-307, initialed Warlimont—your office sent a draft letter to the
Foreign Office for the attention of Ritter, sending on this formulation
of what were terror-fliers. And if you look it over it says that it is
necessary to formulate, unambiguously, the concept of the facts which
are to constitute a criminal act. And then the draft letter, Document
D-775, Exhibit GB-308, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, for
the attention of Colonel Von Brauchitsch, which says that:

    “On the basis of the preliminary talks and in agreement with the
    Reich Foreign Minister and the head of the Security Police and
    SD”—the Defendant Kaltenbrunner—“the following facts are to be
    considered terroristic acts which are to be taken into
    consideration when publishing a case of lynch law or which
    justify the handing of enemy airmen from the Air Force Reception
    Camp of Oberursel to the SD for special treatment.”

And then you set out what was agreed and you say:

    “Please obtain the consent of the Reich Marshal to this
    formulation of the facts and, if necessary, give the Commandant
    of the Air Force Reception Camp of Oberursel verbal instructions
    to act accordingly.

    “It is further requested that you obtain the Reich Marshal’s
    consent also to the procedure intended for the handling of
    public announcements.”

And then if you look at Document D-776, Exhibit GB-309, that is a letter
from you to the Foreign Office, a draft letter for the attention of
Ritter, dated the 15th of June, to the same effect. You ask him to
confirm by the 18th. And then Document D-777, Exhibit GB-310, is a
similar draft letter to Göring, marked for the attention of Colonel Von
Brauchitsch and asking him to reply by the 18th. Then Document D-778,
Exhibit GB-311, records a telephone call from Ritter saying that the
Foreign Office will have to delay a couple of days in giving their view.
Document D-779, Exhibit GB-312, gives the first note from the Defendant
Göring. It says on 19 June:

    “The Reich Marshal has made the following notes with regard to
    the above letter:

    “The population’s reaction is, in any case, not in our hands;
    but, if possible, the population must be prevented from acting
    against other enemy fliers”—I ask you to note the word “other,”
    that is, enemy fliers that do not come within the category of
    enemy terror-fliers—“to whom the above state of affairs does
    not apply. In my opinion, a state of affairs as above can
    also”—and I ask you to note the word “also”—“at any time be
    tried by a court, as it is here a question of murders which the
    enemy has forbidden his fliers to commit.”

Then, in Document D-780, Exhibit GB-313, there is another copy of the
memorandum from the Foreign Office which I read in some detail when I
was presenting the case against the Defendant Ribbentrop; and it is
interspersed with comments of your officer, General Warlimont, in
general agreement with the memorandum. I do not want to go through that
again.

Then, in Document D-781, Exhibit GB-314, your office wanted to get quite
clear what the Defendant Göring meant, so you write to him again for the
attention of Von Brauchitsch:

    “It is unfortunately not possible to gather from your letter
    whether the Reich Marshal has concurred with the facts
    communicated to him, which in the publication of a case of lynch
    law are to be regarded as terroristic actions, and whether he is
    prepared to give the Commandant of the Air Force Reception Camp
    of Oberursel the verbal instructions to this effect.

    “It is again requested that the Reich Marshal be induced to give
    his consent and that this office be notified if possible, by the
    27 instant.”

Then, just passing along, Document D-782, Exhibit GB-315—it says that
the Foreign Minister will reply in a day or two; and in Document D-783
of the 26th, that will be Exhibit GB-316, comes the answer, a telephone
memorandum, a telephone call, adjutant’s office of the Reich Marshal,
Captain Bräuner:

    “The Reich Marshal agrees with the formulation of the concept of
    terror-fliers as stated and with the proposed procedure. He asks
    for information this very day about measures taken.”

So it is not right, is it, Defendant, that Defendant Göring disagreed
with the procedure? Here is a call from his adjutant’s office—and it is
noted by your office—saying that he agrees with the formulation of the
concept and with the proposed procedure. This must be right, must it
not?

KEITEL: Yes. I had never seen this document; but I understand, under the
applied measures, transfer to the Oberursel camp for Air Force prisoners
of war, not lynch law. Perhaps I may add something about the discussion
I had with the Reich Marshal...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear. I am not going through the
correspondence again. I pointed it out as we went along. Your letters
are saying both lynching and the measures to be taken for the
publication of lynching and the other procedure of segregating these
people in the hands of the SD, pending confirmation of suspicion of
terror-fliers. It is quite clear. I have taken you through nearly 10
letters in which it is stated implicitly that it is put to the Reich
Marshal on both these points, publication of lynching and segregation
from other prisoners of war. He is saying, “I agree with the proposed
procedure.”

KEITEL: May I add something?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, do.

KEITEL: I recall very distinctly my discussion with Reich Marshal Göring
at the Berghof. We waited for Hitler who was to give a speech to the
generals. This must have been at about the same time. In this discussion
two points were mentioned. Point one was the conception of the
desired—or how should I say—of the planned or the conceived lynch law.
The second question was that my influence with Hitler had not been
strong enough to definitely settle this matter. These two points I
talked over with Göring that day. We established that the entire method
discussed here should be the prerequisite for the free use of lynch law,
that we agreed that as soldiers we rejected it; and secondly, I asked
him most urgently to use his influence with Hitler again so that he
might desist from such measures. This discussion took place at the
Berghof in the anteroom of the hall where Hitler addressed the generals.
I remember this very distinctly.

I just looked over the correspondence which was exchanged all along. I
only recognize certain fragments. They deal with the deliberations on a
measure desired by Hitler which, thank goodness, never was adopted, as
corresponding orders were not issued.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at the next document, Document
D-784, Exhibit GB-317. That is a note from General Warlimont to you.
Paragraph 1 says that the Foreign Office has agreed; Ambassador Ritter
telephoned on the 29th that the Reich Foreign Minister has agreed to
this draft. Paragraph 2 says:

    “The Reich Marshal is in agreement with the formulation of the
    concept of ‘terror-flier’ as proposed by the OKW and with the
    method suggested.”

That is sent to you, and on it there is a penciled note, initialed by
Warlimont:

    “We must act at last. What else is necessary for this?”

Didn’t you act on it?

KEITEL: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, why...

KEITEL: As a matter of fact...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then why, if you did not act on it, were you
asking the Luftwaffe, 4 days later if they had given instructions to the
camp at Oberursel? Look at Document D-785, Exhibit GB-318.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it appears to be initialed by the
defendant—D-784.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My copy is initialed “W”, Warlimont.

THE PRESIDENT: D-784, on the copy I have, is initialed “K” at the top,
alongside Warlimont’s note.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, yes. I am sorry, My Lord. The fault is
entirely mine. My Lord is quite right.

[_Turning to the defendant._] So, before I pass from D-784, that was
submitted to you and initialed by you?

KEITEL: No, I only put my “K” on Document D-784 to show that I saw it. I
wrote nothing on it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But the document was submitted to you, and so
you did see that document? You knew that both the Foreign Office and
Göring were agreeing to this procedure being adopted?

KEITEL: I read it. I wrote “K” on it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And 4 days later, in D-785, your department is
asking Göring through Von Brauchitsch as to whether they have been
carried out:

    “Please report whether instructions have been given to the
    Commandant of the Air Force Reception Camp of Oberursel in the
    sense of the statements of the Supreme Command of the Armed
    Forces, Operational Staff, of 15 June, or when it is intended to
    do so.”

KEITEL: I have not seen this document before, but it seems to me to
confirm the accuracy of my viewpoint, that in these inquiries to the
Reich Marshal the transfer to Oberursel was the only point in question
and not whether he wanted lynch law, approved it, or whether he
considered it as right. That seems to be quite obvious from this
question. I do not know anything about the question itself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Please look at Document D-786, Exhibit GB-319.
You were going beyond that the next day. This is the 5th of July. It is
actually a report of the meeting on 4th July. It says that Hitler
decreed the following:

    “According to press reports, the Anglo-Americans intend in the
    future to attack from the air small places, too, which are of no
    importance militarily or to the war economy, as a retaliatory
    measure against the ‘V-1’. Should this news prove true, the
    Führer wishes it to be made known through the radio and the
    press that any enemy airman who takes part in such an attack and
    is shot down will not be entitled to be treated as a
    prisoner-of-war, but, as soon as he falls into German hands,
    will be treated as a murderer and killed. This measure is to
    apply to all attacks on small places which are not military
    targets, communications centers, armament targets, and the like,
    and therefore, are not of importance to the conduct of war.

    “At the moment nothing is to be ordered; the only thing to be
    done is to discuss such a measure with the Wi. Rü and the
    Foreign Office.”

So that, far from modifying the matter, you were increasing the severity
of the measures to be taken, that is to say, Hitler is increasing the
severity of the measures to be taken.

KEITEL: I do not remember this; but if that note was made at that time,
something like that must have been mentioned by him in this conference,
but I do not remember the incident.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I only want to put this point to you. You have
said twice, on Friday and again today, that no order of the Wehrmacht
had been issued. It would not need an order of the Wehrmacht to
encourage the population to lynch fliers who had crashed. All that would
be required to produce that result would be to hold off the police from
arresting people who murdered them, would it not? You would not need an
order of the Wehrmacht to encourage your population to murder fliers who
had crashed, would you?

KEITEL: No, there was only the Wehrmacht which exclusively had the right
to take a shot-down or landed airman into custody, and protect him
against lynching of the population, and prevent anything like that from
happening.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will agree with me that once an American or
British airman was handed over to the SD, his chance of survival would
not be—what—one in a million? He would be killed, would he not?

KEITEL: I did not know it then; I only heard it here. I did not know it
at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You will agree that that was in fact what
happened; when an airman was handed over to the SD, he would be killed,
would he not? That is what would happen?

KEITEL: I did not know that it was so, but in this...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not saying what you believe. Now we know
what would happen?

KEITEL: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have told us several times that you did not
know anything about the SD. In fact, at one time, you were a sort of a
court of appeal from the SD in France, were you not? You confirmed the
killings by the SD in France, did you not?

KEITEL: I do not recall that I should have made any regulation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: French Exhibit, Document Number RF-1244. I am
afraid that I do not have a German copy, but this is what it says:

    “Paris, 6 August 1942.

    “In the criminal proceedings against the French citizens:

    “(1) Jean Maréchal, born on 15 October 1912.

    “(2) Emmanuel Thépault, born on 4 June 1916.

    “Field Marshal Keitel, acting within the powers given to him on
    26 and 27 June 1942 by the Führer in his office as
    Commander-in-Chief of the Army, has refused to pardon these two
    men condemned to death and has ordered that the sentences should
    be executed within the scope of the general punishments.”

They were condemned by the Tribunal de la Feldkommandantur at Evreux,
and this was sent to the Commandant de la Police de Sûreté et du
SD—sent to the Commandant of the Police of the Sûreté and of the SD.
Does that not show that you were dealing with a confirmation of
sentences of death and passing on your confirmation to the SD?

KEITEL: This entire incident is an enigma to me. It happened in several
cases that the Führer, to whom I submitted all decisions which, as
Supreme Commander, he had to ratify—that I may have put the signature,
“By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Keitel.” By order—that
might have been possible, otherwise I know nothing about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, it does not look like that. Let me remind
you of the words, “Maréchal Keitel, dans le cadré des pouvoirs qui lui
ont été donnés les 26 et 27 Juin 1942.” That date. It is acting within
the powers given to you by the Führer. Had you not been given the
powers?

KEITEL: No, I did not have any such powers in that case. That is a
mistake. However, I may have put a signature, “By order of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Keitel, Field Marshal.”

THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I was going to pass on.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, isn’t Document D-775 relevant to that? The last
line of the first paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I am very grateful to you.

THE PRESIDENT: D-775. As I understand it, the defendant was saying that
he did not know what would necessarily happen to these prisoners if they
were handed over to the SD. Those are the last words of the first
paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Very good, My Lord.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The words are, “...the handing over of
airmen from the Air Force Reception Camp at Oberursel to the SD for
special treatment.”

We know, Defendant, that “special treatment” means death. Didn’t you
know, in 1944, what “special treatment” meant?

KEITEL: Yes, I know what “special treatment” meant. I do know that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, there is just one other point in the
document which my friend General Rudenko put to you—on Saturday, I
think it was, or Friday evening—Document EC-338. You remember General
Rudenko put this. This document is the report of Admiral Canaris about
treatment of prisoners of war, dealing with the position of the Soviet
Union as not being signatory to the Convention. You remember the point
that Admiral Canaris put to you, that although they were not
signatories, since the 18th century there had been established a
practice that war captivity was neither revenge nor punishment, but
solely protective custody. Do you remember the document? It was a report
from Canaris to you as of the 15th of September 1941, putting out the
position of prisoners of war of a country that had not signed the
Convention. You remember, you said you agreed with it but that you had
to put on this statement that it was nonsense from the point of view of
the present situation because it arose from a military concept of
chivalrous warfare, that this was the destruction of an ideology. You
said that you had to put that on, on Hitler’s instructions. Do you
remember?

KEITEL: I had submitted to him the procedure and I asked that he read
this, and upon that, I wrote out this note.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, there is a Paragraph 3-aa which I want
you to have in mind at the moment on the point I am dealing with now:

    “The screening of the civilians and politically undesirable
    prisoners of war, as well as the decision over their fate, is
    effected by the action detachments of the Security Police...”

Sicherheitspolizei—that is underlined in purple, that is, it is your
underlining, and opposite it is your pencilled note, “very efficient.”
That is, “action detachments of the Security Police, very efficient.”
Then it goes on, “...and the SD.” Then Admiral Canaris says, “...along
principles which are unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities.” And you have
put opposite “unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities”: “not at all.” Do
you remember doing that?

KEITEL: I cannot recall it at the present moment. I must have made this
remark in reference to the fact that this was unknown to the Wehrmacht.
I think that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see, it is perfectly clear. Admiral Canaris
says it is unknown to the Wehrmacht authorities, and you put opposite to
that, in your penciled notation, “not at all.” You could not have gotten
that from Hitler; that must have been your own point, was it not, if you
put in, in pencil, “not at all”? You must have thought that they were
known to the Wehrmacht.

KEITEL: Not at all.

[_The defendant read the document._]

I cannot clarify this statement. I put these remarks down in a hurry. I
cannot identify or define them, neither can I give any clear
explanation, because I do not know. However, I have the recollection
that I wanted to make, or did make, a note to the effect that it
remained unknown to the Wehrmacht and that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to take you quite shortly on
the last of my points, and then ask you one question about it. You have
said to the Tribunal, I should think probably at least 25 times, that
you were not interested in politics, that you simply took your orders as
to military preparations. I just want to ask you a little about that.

First of all, let us take the Austrian problem. I only want to put one
document to you there. You remember Defendant General Jodl’s account in
his diary about the pretended military movements which, according to
Defendant Jodl—I gather that you said that General Lahousen took a
different view—had an immediate effect in Austria? Do you remember
that? You must remember that.

KEITEL: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you suggested, did you not, these false
military movements?

KEITEL: No, I neither devised nor suggested them; but it was an
instruction of the Führer as he dismissed me that evening. I would not
have thought of that myself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have the document books that I gave you.
Just look at that. It is 113 of the German document book.

It is 131 of Your Lordship’s document book, the larger document book.

Now, this is your document of the 13th, Defendant.

KEITEL: Yes, I recall.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And it says, if you look at Paragraph 1, to take
no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe, no troop
movements or redeployments, to spread false but quite credible news
which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against
Austria. And it is through people in Austria and your customs personnel
and through agents that you sent out the news, and by a make-believe
wireless exchange and through maneuvers.

Now, you put that up to Hitler, and on the 14th Captain Eberhard gives
the information by phone that the Führer has given his approval on all
points. You were putting up what the false news and the false
preparations were to be in order to get a political effect in Austria,
were you not?

KEITEL: I made the proposal on the basis and instigation of instructions
which had been given to me on my return to Berlin.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I only want to deal quite shortly with
this, and I think I can, but I want to show the same point with regard
to Czechoslovakia.

Before you became Chief of the OKW you had been under Von Blomberg at
the Ministry of War. Had you seen Von Blomberg’s plan for the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, the directive dated 24 June 1937?

KEITEL: Yes, I knew that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have?

KEITEL: Yes. It was no directive for an invasion; it was the annual
preparatory work for mobilization. That is what it was and what I know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, Paragraph 2 reads:

    “The task of the German Wehrmacht is to prepare in such a way
    that the bulk of the whole strength can break into
    Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise, with the greatest force.”

I should have thought that was a preparation for an invasion. All I
want, at the moment, is to know this: You knew of that plan, Defendant,
did you not?

KEITEL: I believe, yes, that I read it at that time, but of course I do
not remember the details any more.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you told this Tribunal that the first that
you heard of the Führer’s plans against Czechoslovakia in 1938 was the
interview with the Führer that you had on 21 April 1938. It is very easy
to forget something, and I am not putting it to you that you are lying,
Defendant, on this point. But that is not accurate, is it? You had
correspondence with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop as early as the 4th of
March, 6 weeks before, on this point, had you not, about the liaisoning
with the Hungarian High Command? Isn’t that correct?

KEITEL: I cannot remember that; I have no idea.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at it. You see my point? You are
stating that you were not dealing with politics, but if you will look at
this document that I will give you in a moment—it is 2786-PS—you will
see that it is apparently a letter from the Defendant Von Ribbentrop to
you:

    “Most Honored General: Enclosed I forward to you the minutes of
    a conference with the local Hungarian Ambassador for your
    confidential cognizance. As you can judge from it, Mr. Sztojay
    suggested that possible war aims against Czechoslovakia be
    discussed between the German and Hungarian Armies. I have many
    doubts about such negotiations. In case we should discuss with
    Hungary possible war aims against Czechoslovakia, danger exists
    that other parties as well would be informed about this.

    “I would greatly appreciate it if you would notify me briefly
    whether any commitments were made here in any respect.”

And the Foreign Ministry encloses the minutes of his conversation with
the ambassador.

KEITEL: I remember this incident only so far as an invitation by General
Von Ratz was concerned. I did not know at all just what was to be
discussed. Von Blomberg had been invited by Von Ratz also, and in my
ignorance I questioned Hitler whether I should make such a visit. Hitler
agreed and told me that he considered it appropriate. However, an
operational General Staff meeting did not take place, it was just a
hunting visit with General Ritter von Ratz.

THE PRESIDENT: The Court will recess now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you very few questions on this
part of the case, Defendant. Do you remember you told the Tribunal that
on the 21st of April, when you saw Hitler, that he had either read to
you or handed you a copy of the minutes which appear there, taken by
Schmundt, about the basis of the “Fall Grün” against Czechoslovakia?

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, isn’t this really a matter of argument rather
than a matter for cross-examination? The witness says that insofar as
the part he took in all these matters, it was military. The case of the
Prosecution is that the part he took was political.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if I may say so, it is a very fair
comment and received with greatest respect. The difficulty is, when a
witness has said several times “it is political”—I mean, “it is only
military”. I wanted to bring out the points that show it is political
and I don’t want to cross anything which the Tribunal had in mind.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the Tribunal have all the documents before
them upon which they can judge, really, unless you have new documents.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there are not; and, My Lord, I will of
course, accede at once to what the Tribunal says. My Lord, I should like
to point out one document.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think the Tribunal does feel that the
cross-examination is apt to get a little bit too long and sometimes too
detailed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, I am sorry if that has
been done, but, My Lord, the witness was in examination-in-chief, I
think, 2 full days and in examination by the other defense counsel for
half a day, and so far the Prosecution have only spent just 4 hours. So
I hope Your Lordship won’t hold it too much against us. My Lord, the
only document which I should like to—I shall not pursue the point in
view of what Your Lordship has said—it is Page 31 of the document book.
I only wanted you to have this in mind, because Your Lordship will
remember that the witness said that the state of German preparations was
such that he himself and the other generals did not think that a
campaign against Czechoslovakia would succeed. Your Lordship will see
that on that day General Halder, then Chief of Staff, said that the
operation will definitely succeed and almost will be reached in the
second day. My Lord, I only want to pass on that and I think it is only
fair that the Tribunal should have that point in mind. I don’t think it
has been referred to before. I will leave that point, as Your Lordship
has indicated, and I will leave the other points on this part of the
case, which I intended to do. I only want to deal with a different point
entirely and then I shall finish.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, the document which I have now
passed to you is a document which gives the account of a conference
between Hitler and yourself on the 20th of October 1939 with regard to
the future shape of Polish relations, and I want you to look at
Paragraph 3, the second subparagraph. I want to put one interview to you
that arose out of that. That paragraph says:

    “The Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from forming a
    ruling class. The standard of living in the country is to remain
    low. We want only to draw labor forces from there.”

Now, do you remember General Lahousen giving evidence? He said that
Admiral Canaris had protested vehemently to you against, first of all,
the projected shooting and extermination measures that were being
directed particularly against the Polish intelligentsia, nobility, and
clergy, as well as elements that could be regarded as embodiments of the
national resistance movement. According to General Lahousen, Canaris
said:

    “Some day the world will make the Armed Forces, under whose eyes
    these events have occurred, also responsible for these events.”

Do you remember Admiral Canaris saying that to you or words to that
effect?

KEITEL: I know only what General Lahousen testified here in court. I do
not know anything about what Admiral Canaris said.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did Lahousen never give you any warning of any
kind as to the fact that the Armed Forces might be held responsible for
these actions that were being taken in Poland?

KEITEL: No. It was also my opinion that the Armed Forces would be made
responsible, if such actions were taken without their approval and
without their authorization. That was also the reason for the
conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was a point that did worry you very
much; didn’t it?

KEITEL: Yes, I was extremely worried and I had very serious discussions
about it, but not at that particular time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And wouldn’t it be fair to put it this way, that
if you had known at the time all that you know now, you would have
refused, even with all that you have told us, you would have refused to
have anything to do with actions that produced concentration camps, mass
murder, and misery to millions of people, or do you say that you still,
knowing all that you know now, would have gone on with these actions?

KEITEL: No; I am convinced that if the German Armed Forces and their
generals had known it, then they would have fought against these things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

MR. THOMAS J. DODD (Executive Trial Counsel for the United States): If
Your Honors please, I have just one question.

[_Turning to the defendant._] A few days ago, on the morning of the 3rd
of April, when you were on direct examination, we understood you to say
that you had the feeling that you must accept responsibility for orders
issued in your name, orders which you passed on, which were issued by
Hitler; and on Friday afternoon, when Sir David was examining you, we
understood you to say that as an old professional soldier you, of
course, understood the traditions and indeed the principles of that
profession that oblige a soldier not to carry out any order which he
recognizes to be criminal in character. Is that understanding on our
part correct?

KEITEL: Yes, I understood that.

MR. DODD: So that it is fair to say to you that under the obligations of
your oath as a professional soldier, you did acknowledge carrying out
criminal orders?

KEITEL: One can hardly put it that way. What should be said is that the
type of government we had at the time and the authority of the head of
state permitted such legislative power that the executive organs were
not conscious of carrying out illegal orders. Of course, I was also
aware of the fact that deeds were committed which were incompatible with
right and justice.

MR. DODD: I understand you to say you did, with knowledge, carry out and
pass on criminal or illegal orders. Is that a fair statement?

KEITEL: I did not have any inner conviction of becoming criminal in
doing so, since after all it was the head of the state who, as far as we
were concerned, held all the legislative power. Consequently I did not
consider that I was acting criminally.

MR. DODD: Well, I do not want to devote any more time to you except to
say this, to suggest to you that I think your answer is not responsive.

You told us that some of these orders were violations of the existing
international law. An order issued in that form and on that basis is a
criminal order, is an illegal order, is it not?

KEITEL: Yes, that is correct.

MR. DODD: Well, when you carried them out, you were carrying out
criminal orders in violation of one of the basic principles of your
professional soldier’s code, no matter by whom they were issued.

KEITEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, do you wish to re-examine?

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I do not propose to put any further questions
to the defendant regarding the actual facts involved in the case. It
appears to me that after his frank statements, the objective facts have
been clarified as much as is possible in this Trial.

Regarding the facts subjectively seen, it is necessary according to my
conception, particularly with reference to the last question which has
been asked by the American prosecutor, that certain supplementary
statements be obtained.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Once more, therefore, I am having the
Canaris document shown to you, USSR-356, from which General Rudenko has
presented to you your handwritten note and also the documents submitted
by the British Prosecutor, D-762, 764, 766, 765, and 770.

According to statements made during the cross-examination your
explanation regarding responsibilities appears to require a
supplementary clarification. You have said that you passed on Hitler’s
orders in cognizance of their contents. And now I come back to Mr.
Dodd’s question and in light of the judgment to be passed on you, I must
ask you, for it is of the greatest importance, how was it possible and
how do you want to explain that these ruthless orders, in violation of
the law of war, could be carried out by you or how, as it says in the
note on the Canaris document, you could support them? You did have
objections. You told us so. This is a matter that can be explained only
by you, by yourself, since it is a personal affair and cannot be
clarified with the help of documents, as such. A number of times you
have told me, and now again you have emphasized it, that you desired to
help us find a thorough and truthful explanation for everything.

Thus, I am asking you how was it possible and how do you explain that
those orders and instructions were carried out and passed on by you and
how is it that no effective resistance was met with?

KEITEL: About this clearing up, I realize that many orders and also
notes which I wrote on documents that have been found and orders which I
passed on, must seem incomprehensible to third parties, to outsiders,
and particularly to foreigners.

To find an explanation for this, I must say that you had to know the
Führer, that you have to know in what atmosphere I worked in, day and
night, for years; you must not fail to consider just what the
circumstances were, under which these events occurred. I have often
testified here that I wanted to give expression to my scruples and
objections, and that I did so. The Führer would then advance arguments
which to him appeared decisive and he did so in his own, I must say,
forceful and convincing way, stating the military and political
necessities and making felt his concern for the welfare of his soldiers
and their safety, as well as his concern about the future of our people.
I must state that, because of that, but also because of the
ever-increasing emergency, militarily speaking, in which we found
ourselves, I convinced myself and often allowed myself to become
convinced of the necessity and the rightness of such measures. So I
would transmit the orders that were given, and promulgate them without
letting myself be deterred by any possible effects they might have.

Perhaps this may be considered as weakness and perhaps I shall be
accused of the same guilt. But at any rate, what I have told is the
truth. During the examination by Sir David I myself admitted and
acknowledged that I often had serious conflicts of conscience and that I
often found myself in a position where I myself in some way or another
was able to draw the consequences of these matters. But never did it
enter my mind to revolt against the head of the state and the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces or refuse him obedience. As far as I am
concerned, and as a soldier, loyalty is sacred to me. I may be accused
of having made mistakes, and also of having shown weakness towards the
Führer, Adolf Hitler, but never can it be said that I was cowardly,
dishonorable, or faithless.

This is what I had to say.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have reached the end of my examination. I
should like to ask you, if I may, only that the documents which have
been offered to the Tribunal in the course of this examination, bearing
the Numbers 1 and 2 in Document Book 2, named Documents Keitel-8 and
Keitel-9, be admitted in evidence without the necessity of my reading
any parts thereof. The Prosecution know the documents and they are
agreeable.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, there is one question I should like to ask
you. Are you suggesting that you ever put your protest or objections to
the orders of Hitler in writing?

KEITEL: Once I handed him a protest in writing, yes. That I know for
certain. In the other cases, and as far as I can recollect, the matters
were discussed verbally.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you keep a copy of that protest?

KEITEL: I have nothing left, Mr. President, not a single piece of paper.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you keep a copy of the protest? I did not ask you
whether you had a copy; I asked you whether you kept a copy. Did you
make a copy?

KEITEL: I had a draft as well as the handwritten document which I also
had given to him through the chief adjutant. I think I had the draft in
my personal files, but now I no longer have it and I do not know where
these files have gone. They could possibly have been in the hands of the
chief of the Armed Forces central office, who dealt with personal
matters in my office, or later on they may have got into the hands of
the chief adjutant of the Führer, General Schmundt, I do not know.
There, I think, the original of that document I sent at that time ought
to be available.

THE PRESIDENT: And what was the occasion of the protest?

KEITEL: It was made in connection with another crisis in our
relationship during which he had expressed his distrust, and in
connection with the current controversies on basic matters of the
conduct of the war.

THE PRESIDENT: But when?

KEITEL: I believe it was in 1940—1939-1940, in the winter of 1939-40.

THE PRESIDENT: And you cannot say more about it than that it was made on
basic matters?

KEITEL: I clearly asked for permission to resign on account of the
accusations made against me and for the reasons which I was quoting.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all. The defendant can return to his seat.

[_The defendant left the stand._]

DR. NELTE: May I ask permission to submit the two documents to the
Tribunal? I mentioned them before.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. Are you going to call in any more
witnesses?

DR. NELTE: I had asked the Tribunal to call to the stand the witness Dr.
Lammers.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. NELTE: Witness Dr. Lammers, please.

[_The witness Lammers took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name in full.

HANS HEINRICH LAMMERS (Witness): Hans Heinrich Lammers.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. NELTE: Witness, I principally wished to question you on the OKW, its
competencies, and the position held by the Defendant Field Marshal
Keitel as Chief of the OKW. We have talked about the matter during our
discussions, but since this will have been sufficiently clarified after
the statements made by Göring and the defendant and statements yet to be
made by other witnesses, and also to save time, I do not propose to ask
you in general or in detail on this subject. But I would like you, as
the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, to answer questions which others may
not know as well as you do—you, who had participated in some way or
other when certain decrees, and particularly that of the 4 February
1938, were drafted. May I ask you, therefore, to tell me, first of all,
what brought about the big reshuffle of 4 February 1938?

LAMMERS: The Führer informed me that the Minister of War, Von Blomberg,
was going to leave his position and that on that occasion he wanted to
make certain other changes of personnel in the German Government and
that in particular the Foreign Minister Von Neurath was going to retire
and that here, too, a change would take place and that, furthermore, in
the High Command of the Army, certain changes were about to be made.
Subsequently, the Führer gave me the order to draft a decree regarding
the leadership of the Wehrmacht. I was to participate in this in
collaboration with the Wehrmacht Department of the War Ministry. As a
guiding principle the Führer gave me the following instructions:

    “In the future I no longer want to have a Reich Minister for
    War; and in the future I no longer want a Commander-in-Chief of
    the Wehrmacht who stands between me as the Supreme Commander,
    and the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.”

Accordingly, the decree was drafted, in which, to start with, the High
Command of the Armed Forces became a military staff which was to be
under the direct orders of the Führer. The Führer desired that there
should be no independent authority here, which would stand between him
and the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.
Consequently, the then-appointed Chief of the OKW, General of Artillery
Keitel, had no direct power of command over the branches of the
Wehrmacht. Such power of command was out of the question if only for
reasons of authority.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this not been really covered by the Defendant Keitel
himself? No question in cross-examination has been put to him to
challenge any of his statements upon the organization of the OKW;
therefore, it seems to the Tribunal it is not necessary at all.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I already told that to the witness in my
introductory words, I asked the witness only to tell me what brought
about the reshuffle of 4 February 1938 and therefore he had to talk a
little about the decree of 4 February 1938. I shall try and make Dr.
Lammers’ examination as short as possible. I believe also that the
circumstances surrounding the Chief of the OKW have been fully
clarified, but it is, after all, a fundamental question. If a man of the
standing of Dr. Lammers can confirm it, it would probably increase the
value of the evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: If the Prosecution had put any questions in
cross-examination suggesting that there was any inaccuracy in the
evidence which the Defendant Keitel had given upon the subject, then, of
course, it would be open to you and it would be necessary for you to
call other evidence upon it; but, when the subject is not challenged in
any shape or form, it is not necessary to confirm it.

DR. NELTE: In that case, Mr. President, I need not ask the witness any
questions at all since the subject on which I was going to examine him
was the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW, his
position as a Minister, his functions as a so-called chairman of the
Reich Defense Council, and his functions as a member of the Three Man
College. In all these cases, no questions have been raised by the
Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Prosecution did raise the question as to
whether the Defendant Keitel took part in any political action and upon
that you may question him.

DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.

[_Turning to the witness._] Dr. Lammers, what can you say from your
personal knowledge, about the question as to whether the Defendant,
Field Marshal Keitel, had to occupy himself with political matters on
the strength of his position as Chief of the OKW, or did occupy himself
with them?

LAMMERS: As Chief of the OKW, he had, in reality, nothing at all to do
with political matters. The way I understand your question is that you
want me to say whether Herr Keitel, in his capacity as Minister of War,
did concern himself with political matters. I do not quite understand
your question.

DR. NELTE: This has nothing to do with his position as the Chief of the
OKW or Chief of Staff, nor has it anything to do with his functions in
the Ministry of War. What I want you to testify to is—do you know
whether the Defendant Keitel, during the time when he had held the
position of Chief of the OKW, dealt with political questions, that is to
say, primarily with foreign political questions?

LAMMERS: I cannot make any statement regarding the great political
issues, particularly foreign political affairs, as far as Herr Keitel is
concerned, since I, myself, had nothing to do with these questions.

DR. NELTE: All right, then. In that case I want to ask you a concrete
question: You know that Field Marshal Keitel was present at receptions
when President Hacha came, when there were meetings with other
statesmen. In some cases you were probably also present. Can you say
whether during such receptions, it was the function of Field Marshal
Keitel to take part in the political discussions or not?

LAMMERS: As far as I know, Herr Keitel often took part in such
discussions with foreign statesmen. I, myself, as a rule did not take
part. You have mentioned President Hacha. It was an exception that I was
there, for matters regarding the Protectorate were not regarded as
foreign political matters by us. I hardly ever was present at foreign
political discussions with competent men from abroad, at discussions of
a political nature, and I cannot say, therefore, to what extent Herr
Keitel did participate during such conferences. I assume though that he
was frequently present during such conferences.

DR. NELTE: In other words, you cannot answer that question on the
strength of your knowledge. In that case, I am asking you: In accordance
with the wishes of Hitler, the author of the decree of 4 February 1938,
with whom you have discussed its purposes, should the man who was to
take over the position of Chief of the OKW have any political functions?

LAMMERS: In my opinion he was not to have any political functions as
Chief of OKW, for he was immediately subordinate to the Führer.

DR. NELTE: Did it ever, at any time, become known to you, or did you
ever get the impression that Field Marshal Keitel was a political
general, in the sense that it was customary to call him a political
general?

LAMMERS: I never had that impression.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I have no further questions to ask the witness
since everything else he was to make statements on has already been
clarified.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal thinks that you may have
misunderstood what I said to you about whether you should ask any
questions about the Defendant Keitel as a member of the Reich Defense
Council. If this witness can give any evidence upon that point, you may
question him upon it.

DR. NELTE: Witness, in the Reich Defense Law of 1938, you, as Chief of
the Reich Chancellery, were appointed a permanent member of the Reich
Defense Council. Do you know if this Reich Defense Law, including the
Reich Defense Council, ever became effective?

LAMMERS: The Reich Defense Law was made but was never promulgated as
such. Therefore in my opinion, it has never become a law. The contents
of the Reich Defense Law were partially applied as, so to speak, secret
instructions of the Führer. The Reich Defense Law provided for a Reich
Defense Council. That Reich Defense Council, as such, as far as I know,
never convened. I, at any rate, have never received an invitation to
attend a meeting, and, in my recollection, I have never taken part in
any meeting of this Reich Defense Council.

Two meetings; however, were supposed to have taken place, as I have
heard, which have been called meetings of the Reich Defense Council. But
I believe that these meetings, because of the large number of people
attending them—I think there were 60 or 80—were meetings called by the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan in this capacity. I do remember having
partaken in such meetings. Apart from that, after the Reich Defense Law
had been formulated, I heard so little of it during the subsequent years
that I myself did not remember that I had been appointed a permanent
member of this Reich Defense Council. At any rate, in such meetings, if
they were meetings of the Reich Defense Council, in which I had
partaken, no matters directly concerned with the defense of the Reich
were discussed.

DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about the tasks which the Reich Defense
Council were supposed to have?

LAMMERS: I know no more about their tasks than was contained in the law,
which was not published; and as far as I can recall, these were only
general descriptions, very general, of the tasks to be performed, all
pertaining to the defense of the Reich.

DR. NELTE: It has been stated by the Prosecution here that the Reich
Defense Council was an instrument for the planning of aggressive war. At
any rate, an instrument for aggressions and for rearmament. Is there
anything you know as to whether the Reich Defense Council was directly
or indirectly involved in undertaking or carrying out such tasks?

LAMMERS: Nothing at all is known to me about that.

DR. NELTE: I should like to put now a few questions to you regarding the
Secret Cabinet Council of which, according to the law, you were supposed
to be a member. Defendant Keitel was to have been a member of the Secret
Cabinet Council, and it does, in fact, say so in that law. What can you
tell us about that law?

LAMMERS: When Von Neurath resigned as Foreign Minister, the Führer
wanted to give Von Neurath as much prominence as possible in the eyes of
the world, and he ordered me to draw up a decree regarding a Secret
Cabinet Council of which Herr Von Neurath was to be President, with the
title President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Other members were, as
far as I can recall, the Reich Foreign Minister; the Deputy of the
Führer, Reich Minister Hess; Field Marshal Keitel; and I, myself. I
think that is all.

But I gathered from statements made by the Führer that the creation of
this council was purely a formal matter which was to procure a special
position for Herr Von Neurath in the eyes of the public. I was convinced
that the Führer would never call a meeting of the Secret Cabinet
Council. In fact, the Secret Cabinet Council has never actually met, not
even for a constitutional meeting. It never received any task from the
Führer through me; it merely existed on paper.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, if it was a secret, how could it affect the
public?

LAMMERS: Through the promotion of the Reich Minister Von Neurath it was
to be shown to the public that there were no fundamental differences of
opinion between the Führer and the Reich Foreign Minister Von Neurath
justifying his resignation. It was to be demonstrated that all was well
between the Führer and Von Neurath; that in fact, because of his
valuable knowledge of foreign political matters, Herr Von Neurath had
been given, so to say, a higher position in the foreign political field
by being appointed President of the Secret Cabinet Council.

DR. NELTE: This, in other words, was a sort of camouflage for his
resignation?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I have another question. Field Marshal Keitel, as Chief of
the OKW, has been accused of having countersigned certain laws, and I am
now asking you what was the significance of the fact that the Chief of
the OKW countersigned the laws?

LAMMERS: Since he was exercising the authority, of the Minister for War,
he was obliged to countersign these laws. He assumed the responsibility,
_vis-à-vis_the Führer, that the Armed Forces, and everything connected
with the former Ministry of War were given proper consideration.

Keitel could only exercise his war ministerial authority by mandate of
the Führer, as specified in the decree, and as a result he was obliged
to ask the Führer whether he could countersign or not. His authority as
Minister for War was limited, in comparison, with that of any other
minister who simply applied his signature as an ordinary minister,
whereas Field Marshal Keitel could only exercise his war ministerial
authority by mandate of the Führer.

DR. NELTE: In other words, if I understand you correctly, you want to
say that Field Marshal Keitel was not a Minister?

LAMMERS: He was not a Minister as becomes clear from the decree which
expressly states that he only had the rank of a Minister.

DR. NELTE: Do you mean, in other words, that if he had been a Minister
that you would not have had to give him full ranking of a Minister? But
then, he was also a member of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of
the Reich. Did not that make him a minister?

LAMMERS: Nothing was altered in his position in the Reich Government
through that membership.

DR. NELTE: You mean no, don’t you?

LAMMERS: Yes, I mean no.

DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn until 1400.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                           _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the other defendants’ counsel who wish
to ask questions of this witness?

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): Witness, can
you recall what Hitler said in the Cabinet meeting, regarding his
political aims and the program of the new Government?

LAMMERS: Hitler delivered a very long speech, in the course of which the
individual ministers also had a chance to speak. One of the details I
remember particularly is that the Führer talked, first of all, about the
removal of unemployment, something which would definitely have to be
achieved. Secondly, he spoke about the fact that an economic revival of
Germany would have to be provided for. And thirdly, he talked in detail
about the fact that a revision of the Versailles Treaty would have to be
effected, and that we would have to try to put an end to the defamation
of Germany which was contained in the Versailles Treaty, and that one
would have to strive to achieve equality of rights for the German Reich
within the circle of nations.

All these statements of Hitler’s were then written down in a special
Government declaration. I also recollect that in that Government
declaration the protection of positive Christianity was mentioned in
particular. I cannot recall the special details. But these, I am
convinced, are the main points concerned.

Nothing was discussed which would have required special secrecy. And
what was discussed was, in the main, contained in the Government
declaration which was published in the press.

DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler say anything at all, during this Cabinet meeting,
about the fact that he was going to alter the system of government and
that he wanted to govern dictatorially?

LAMMERS: Herr Hitler expressed his opinion to the effect that the
present parliamentary system, prevailing up to that time in Germany, had
been a failure.

THE PRESIDENT: You are speaking about a meeting. What was the date of
the meeting you are referring to?

LAMMERS: It was the first Cabinet meeting which the Defense Counsel
inquired about. It took place on 30 January 1933, on the day after the
seizure of power. The Führer stated that the present governmental system
had been a failure. Furthermore he said that the result of that failure
had been that the Reich President was obliged, in a state of emergency,
according to Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, to govern by means
of emergency decrees, and that the only possibility was to create a
stable Reich Government, a government which would be in power for many
years. And further, how one could create such a government would be
something which would have to be agreed upon first with the Reich
President and the Reichstag.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler say, during this Cabinet meeting, that he
wanted to concede to the NSDAP a specially favored position of power?

LAMMERS: He said that the NSDAP, as the strongest party, would naturally
have to have due influence in the German Government. He said nothing to
the effect that he wanted to put an end to the other parties that still
existed and were still represented in the Cabinet, the German
Nationalists and the Stahlhelm group.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler explain his foreign political aims during
this first meeting and did he say, in particular, that Germany would
definitely have to be freed from the shackles of the Versailles Treaty
and would again have to take the place befitting her in the community of
nations?

LAMMERS: I answered that question already in the affirmative before.
Those were the foreign political aims, the complete revision of the
Versailles Treaty.

DR. SEIDL: Did Hitler also mention at the time that for the achievement
of these foreign political aims one would have to run the risk of
another war, possibly even of a preventive war?

LAMMERS: As far as I know and as far as I remember, no mention was made
of war, certainly not of a preventive war or an aggressive war.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did Hitler, in the period following, in Cabinet
sessions or during any other meetings of all or numerous ministers,
present a comprehensive plan for the achievement of his foreign
political aims?

LAMMERS: No, I knew of no comprehensive plan except the general points I
have mentioned. Neither during that meeting nor during later meetings
did Hitler elaborate a general plan. In my opinion, he never did discuss
and describe in detail any comprehensive plans of a long-term character
at all.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, what caused Hitler a) to appoint Hess Deputy to the
Führer of the NSDAP and b) to make him a Reich minister?

LAMMERS: He appointed Hess Deputy to the Führer, I believe, because he,
as Chancellor of the Reich, no longer wanted to attend to the business
of the Party and had to have a responsible man for the technical
leadership of the Party.

He appointed Hess Reich Minister in order to create a link between Party
and State; to have a man in the Cabinet who was in a position to
represent the wishes and views of the Party in the Cabinet. Perhaps he
was thereby hoping to create a united front between Party and State,
something which became a law later on.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were the leading generals, a) before and b) after
seizure of power, in contact with the Reich directorate and the
Political Leadership Corps of the Party?

LAMMERS: Before the seizure of power, as far as I know, contact between
the Party and the generals did not exist as such. There could only have
been cases of personal contact between individual members of the Party
and individual generals.

After the seizure of power I had the opportunity of being present when
the Führer, at the beginning of February 1933, had the high-ranking
generals, the commanders-in-chief, introduced to him, and I had the
impression that the Führer did not know most of these men, for they were
all introduced to him—I stood nearby—and it was my impression that he
had known only a few of these men previously.

After the seizure of power, of course, the relations between the Party
leaders and the high-ranking generals became closer—after the Party had
gained a strong position in the State. But what I would like to say is
that relations, general relations, between the Party, that is to say
between the Reich directorate of the Party and the Political Leadership
Corps of the Party on the one side, and the high-ranking generals and
perhaps also the generals with lower rank, on the other side—that these
relations never went beyond the purely formal, beyond so-called social
relations which were based on duty requirements at chance meetings, on
festive occasions and public demonstrations, _et cetera_. I feel that
the general relations between the Reich Directorate and the Political
Leadership Corps of the Party on the one side, and the generals on the
other, were in no instance any closer than that.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did the character of these relations change after
Hitler became the Head of the State and Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces?

LAMMERS: As far as the high-ranking generals are concerned, I am of the
opinion that in principle nothing changed, for the high-ranking generals
regarded the Führer not as the leader of the Party but as the Head of
the State, and they considered him the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. Consequently, they did not believe that they had to establish
any particularly close relations with the Party.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, did joint meetings and conferences take place for
the discussion of political aims between the Reich Government, the Reich
Directorate of the Party, and the high-ranking generals?

LAMMERS: Such joint meetings or conferences are out of the question.
They never took place. That would also have been impossible because of
the large number of people involved.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, were members of the Reich Government, the Reich
Directorate of the Party and the high-ranking generals in a position to
present their views to Hitler with regard to important questions
involving the welfare of the nation, particularly on questions which
concerned war or peace?

LAMMERS: Jointly, these three groups, if I may say so, naturally could
not voice an opinion at all, for they had no connection with each other
in any way. But neither could any of these groups—the Reich Directorate
of the Party, the Reich Government, and the generals—voice its opinion,
in the first place because they were not informed at all about the
Führer’s political and economic aims. What attitude could they take?
They were simply taken by surprise by the actual execution, by the
accomplished facts, and any subsequent voicing of an opinion would have
meant a “stab in the back” of the Führer’s policy.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, then a general political plan on Hitler’s part—in
which these most important groups were active participants—did not
exist at all, and therefore there could be no talk of a conspiracy?

LAMMERS: I know of no such general plan, but I can assure you of one
thing, that the large majority, the large majority of ministers never
knew anything of any such general plan. Just how far the Führer informed
individual persons of such plan, I do not know. I was not present on
such occasions. The Führer may have discussed some sort of plans with
one person or another, perhaps with a member of the Party of the Reich
Directorate or the generals; but just what was discussed on such
occasions I do not know. And of course I cannot say whether in such
cases these gentlemen agreed or disagreed with the Führer. I also do not
know whether shortly before the execution of any large-scale political
plans, such as for instance the march into Czechoslovakia or something
like that, whether, shortly before, they could still advise the Führer
as to whether they agreed or were opposed, or whether they merely
received an order which they had to execute.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, if I understand you correctly, then you obviously
want to say that all decisions of any magnitude were made by Hitler
alone?

LAMMERS: The large-scale political decisions were certainly made by him
alone, at most with some few persons being consulted and participating,
but never with the Reich Government participating, for the Reich
Government—if I may go into detail about this—it was when we left the
League of Nations that Hitler for the last time informed the Reich
Government before taking an action. Then followed as a large, important
action, the march into the Rhineland.

The Cabinet was informed that we were going to withdraw from the League
of Nations; it was still informed beforehand.

No one was informed of the march into the Rhineland; the Führer informed
the Reich Cabinet only after the march had taken place. On the occasions
of the march into Austria, the march into the Sudetenland, the march
into Prague, the outbreak of the Polish war, the beginning of the other
campaigns against Norway, France, Russia, and so forth, the Reich
Government were consulted by the Führer neither beforehand, nor were
they informed subsequently; and consequently there were certain
ill-feelings among all the ministers because they were in no instance
informed in advance of these large-scale plans which had certain
implications for the non-military departments as well, and because the
Reich Government did not learn until later of the accomplished facts.

Thus, to this extent I can say that all these decisions were made by the
Führer alone; and to what extent he consulted persons individually I do
not know. However, on the whole, the large majority of the ministers
were not informed of all these actions; they just had general
information such as any newspaper reader and any radio listener has; or
they, as I for instance, sometimes heard of such a matter a few hours
before, when it was made known to the press. There was no questioning of
the Führer or any information from him beforehand.

DR. SEIDL: Please tell me now just how it actually came about, that the
entire governmental power was thus transferred to the Führer?

LAMMERS: That transfer was accomplished, I might say, by way of a
gradually developing state customary law.

DR. SEIDL: Slowly, please.

LAMMERS: First of all, the Führer and the Reich Government had been
given, by the well-known Enabling Act of the Reichstag, the power to
alter the Constitution. The Reich Government made use of this power in
their actual legislation and, of course, use was also made of it by way
of passive endurance and by creating a state customary law as was
actually recognized in all countries. Thus in the course of the first
years, and also during the later years, it came about quite naturally by
way of a state customary law, that the Führer acted more independently
than would actually have been possible according to the Weimar
Constitution. From the beginning important political questions were all
removed by the Führer from the jurisdiction of the Cabinet.

Even in 1933 and 1934, when Hindenburg was still alive, the Führer did
not wish general political questions to be raised in the Cabinet by any
minister. I repeatedly had to have various ministers informed that they
were to refrain from bringing up questions which did not directly affect
their department for discussion in the Cabinet.

For instance, I had to pass on such information to those gentlemen who
wanted to discuss church policy. I had been forbidden to put any general
political questions on the agenda of a Cabinet meeting. If, in spite of
that, a minister raised a political question during a meeting of the
Cabinet, then the Führer generally interposed and silenced the minister
concerned, or referred him to a private discussion. Things developed in
this way in the course of time.

After Von Hindenburg’s death, when the Führer became the Head of State,
such debates in the Cabinet were stopped altogether. Nothing of this
sort could be debated any more. The ministers were not allowed to feel
that they were political ministers. I had to inform various gentlemen
repeatedly, by order of the Führer, that they were requested to refrain
from voicing their opinions in regard to such questions during Cabinet
meetings.

Then came the time, which I have already described, during which the
larger-scale actions took place and there were no more Cabinet meetings.
In this connection the Führer acted alone, and all declarations which
were made on behalf of the Reich Government were made by him alone,
acting on his own and without previous consultation with the Cabinet. I
must admit that the Cabinet very often complained about that but could
not prevail against the Führer.

Thus gradually the governmental power—if I interpret “Regierung”
according to the conception of “government” laid down in Anglo-Saxon
law—then after 1936 there was no longer any complete Reich Government
at all consisting of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Ministers, that
is, a collective, unified body. The Führer was the Reich Government, and
this power had slipped into his hands—and one will naturally say that
it should not have slipped into his hands. All I can say to this, is
that it may have been wrong, it may have been stupid, but it was not a
crime. It was a political development such as has happened repeatedly in
history. I might recall the fact that in ancient Rome, where the senate
had the power and that there...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal really does not want to hear a history of
ancient Rome.

LAMMERS: Very well.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you have described the development of the transfer
of governmental powers into Hitler’s hands...

LAMMERS: Yes, but not completely.

DR. SEIDL: In that case, please continue with your account. But all
descriptions...

THE PRESIDENT: We have had quite enough. We quite understand that he is
saying that Hitler took over all powers and would not listen to any
debate at all. It is perfectly clear that he said so.

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

Witness, will you please tell me one more thing about the last question
in this connection? Please tell me whether you as Reich Minister and
Chief of the Reich Chancellery considered legal the development you have
just described.

LAMMERS: I regarded this development, in the first place, from the point
of view of constitutional law. I have discussed these questions
repeatedly with Hitler, and I consider this development perfectly legal
and, if it is desired, I can explain my reasons in detail.

In particular, I considered this development legal in view of the
well-known Enabling Act and later laws which gave the Reich Government
plenipotentiary powers and because of which the Reich Government, in
turn, were in a position to delegate some of these powers to the Führer
and to transfer this power. In that manner that which the Reich
Government, as soon...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal is not really interested in
whether or not it was legal. What the Tribunal is interested in is
whether crimes against other nations were committed. We certainly do not
want to hear this in such great detail.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the main point of the Indictment is Count One of the
Indictment; and that is concerned with the Conspiracy charged by the
Indictment.

THE PRESIDENT: The main point in the Indictment is not whether it was in
accordance with German law that Hitler should take over the powers of
his Government. There was no such point made in the Indictment.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, I now turn to some questions which concern the
Defendant Dr. Frank. Since when have you known Dr. Frank? What were his
activities up to the outbreak of the war?

LAMMERS: I became acquainted with Herr Frank in the course of the year
1932. If I understand you rightly, you want to hear about his activities
only from the outbreak of the war?

DR. SEIDL: Up to the outbreak of the war.

LAMMERS: He was Chief of the Legal Division of the Party, then Chief of
the National Socialist Lawyers’ Association (Juristenbund) which later
on became the so-called Lawyers’ League (Rechtswahrerbund). Then he
became a member of the Reichstag, and at the time of the seizure of
power in 1933, he became Minister of Justice in Bavaria. At the same
time he became Reich Commissioner for Legal Reforms.

Later on—and I do not remember the exact year—he became Reich Minister
without Portfolio; and he was the President of the Academy of German
Law. He finally became Governor General.

THE PRESIDENT: We have had the Defendant Frank’s posts proved to us
already, I should think, probably more than once. We do not require them
from Dr. Lammers.

DR. SEIDL: I can put another question to the witness.

Witness, what was the relationship between Frank and Hitler?

LAMMERS: The relationship between the two was, at the beginning, I
should like to say, good and proper, but not particularly close. At any
rate, during the whole time he did not belong to those who could be
called the closest advisers of the Führer.

DR. SEIDL: What was Frank’s attitude towards the “Police State” and the
question of concentration camps?

LAMMERS: Frank repeatedly made speeches in public in which he stood up
for the constitutional state, for right and law, by attacking the
“Police State” and in which—although not in very strong terms—he
always took a stand against internment in concentration camps, because
such internment was without a legal basis. These speeches made by Frank
were frequently the cause of severe disapproval on the part of Hitler,
so that in the end the Führer instructed me to forbid his making
speeches and he was forbidden to publish the printed version of these
speeches. Finally, Frank’s activity in standing up for the
constitutional state resulted in his being removed from his office as
the Reich Chief of the Legal Division of the Party.

DR. SEIDL: Was he not dismissed from his position as President of the
Academy of German Law for these reasons?

LAMMERS: Yes, that happened at the same time—and also from his position
as Chief of the Lawyers’ League.

DR. SEIDL: Another question: Did Dr. Frank as Governor General have
considerable power, or was it not rather the case that his power in many
respects was greatly infringed upon?

LAMMERS: One can certainly say that in many respects his power was
infringed upon.

There are a number of reasons—first of all, as is self-evident, the
Armed Forces. But they bothered him least of all, for in the occupied
territories, the Reich commissioners were never members of the High
Command of the Armed Forces. That was always separate.

Then Göring, as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, had comprehensive
powers to issue orders to both the Party and the State in all occupied
territories, therefore also in the Government General, and thus could
give orders to the Governor General and could, when it was necessary in
the interests of the whole, countermand and annul the latter’s decrees.

Thirdly, Frank’s powers as Governor General were considerably limited
through the police, since Himmler as Chief of the German Police had
direct police powers which he was, to be sure, to co-operate with those
of the Governor General but which he did not always do. The Governor
General suffered a further loss of power through the fact that Himmler
was Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality and as
such could undertake resettlements and did do so without consulting
Governor General Frank in any way.

Then, there were certain infringements in favor of the Plenipotentiary
for the Allocation of Labor, but in my opinion the infringement of power
in this field was very slight, for Gauleiter Sauckel always, where
possible, came to an agreement with the local offices beforehand.

Finally there were powers reserved for Reich Minister Speer in the field
of armament and technology. There were still other powers reserved for
the postal service, the railroads, _et cetera_. But in the main, these
are the gaps, as you call them, Dr. Seidl, in Frank’s power.

DR. SEIDL: What, according to your observations, was Frank’s basic
attitude towards the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, and what was the
policy he tried to carry through?

LAMMERS: In my opinion Frank always tried to pursue a policy of
moderation and to create an atmosphere of friendship towards Germany in
Poland. To be sure, he very often was unable to achieve his aim,
especially because of the fact that the powers of the police and
Himmler’s powers were too great in the field of resettlement, so that
his measures and his intentions suffered set-backs. He found it
difficult to achieve his aims.

DR. SEIDL: Did Dr. Frank occupy himself with Germanization aims or did
he rather, whenever he could, oppose the policy of resettlement pursued
by Himmler as Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German
Nationality?

LAMMERS: I should not have thought that Frank would be so foolish as to
have germanizing intentions or to want to make Germans of Poles. He
probably tried to win the people of German origin in Poland for the
cause of Germanism. He had many difficulties with regard to the
resettlements, since he was not consulted beforehand and since, by way
of resettlement, people were simply shoved into the Government General.
In that respect he and I agreed entirely. I have repeatedly told the
Führer that these mass resettlements could not take place, all at once,
without the agreement of the Governor General, and that the Governor
General could not govern if he did not know about these resettlement
measures in advance and if he could not even exert an influence in
connection with these measures.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you stated earlier that the entire Security Police
and the SD in the Government General were directly under Himmler or the
Higher SS and Police Chief. Did Governor General Frank not try to
protest against the policy of force employed by these two men and to
relieve the situation?

LAMMERS: On this point he addressed repeated complaints to me, so that I
might take them to the Führer, which, however, I could do only in part.
In one point, however, we did want to help him. In the Government
General there had been established a Secretariat of State for the
security system. This was under Krüger, then Higher SS and Police Chief.
This, however, functioned for only 4 to 6 weeks and then differences of
opinion in this field broke out once more. The State Secretary for
Security, Krüger, stated, “I receive my orders from Himmler.” If the
Governor General complained about that, then Himmler said, “These are
all unimportant matters. I certainly must be able to rule on them
directly.” The Governor General said, “But for me they are not
unimportant; even those things are important to me.”

The channels of command and the co-operation with the Governor General
were not being observed, and it is therefore perfectly understandable
that Herr Frank had a very difficult position with respect to the police
system.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General repeatedly, both
orally and in writing, declared his intention of resigning and the
reasons for it?

LAMMERS: He repeatedly offered his resignation, because of these sharp
conflicts which he had, with Himmler in particular, and because Hitler
usually decided that he was in the wrong and Himmler in the right. Many
statements of his intention or desire to resign were brought to me, some
of which I was not even allowed to submit to the Führer. But I informed
the Führer of the Governor General’s intentions of resigning and the
Führer several times refused Frank’s offer to resign.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that Reichsführer SS Himmler was working towards
having Frank removed?

LAMMERS: Reichsführer Himmler personally was indubitably an opponent of
Frank’s. There is cause for me to assume from various disapproving
statements made by Himmler with regard to Frank that Himmler would have
liked it very much if Frank had been removed from his position; and
Reichsleiter Bormann who also was not very well disposed to Frank’s
personality, would have liked it also.

DR. SEIDL: Who in the Government General had jurisdiction over the
concentration camps and was the competent official as far as their
establishment and administration were concerned?

LAMMERS: The concentration camps were under Himmler, and organs and
departments under Himmler’s control were responsible for the
administration and organization. There was an economic department, I
believe, attached to the SS, which was responsible for administration;
but concentration camps as such were under Himmler’s jurisdiction.

DR. SEIDL: Who was responsible for all questions connected with the
so-called Jewish policy in the Government General?

LAMMERS: In occupied territories the Jewish policy, I might say, in its
larger implications was handled by Himmler, who directed it. But, of
course, the Governor General was also concerned with matters in the
field of Jewish policy or with measures against the Jews, for instance,
the combating of spotted fever, and, I think, the marking by means of a
visible sign. All personal measures were proposed to the Governor
General by the Police. But the main policy in Jewish questions, as I
learned afterwards, was handled entirely alone by Himmler, who had been
given these powers by the Führer.

DR. SEIDL: Is it true that the Governor General, as early as 1940,
continuously raised complaints regarding the activities of the Higher SS
and Police Chief Krüger?

LAMMERS: I can confirm that. That happened several times. In particular
these complaints were made because the SS and Police courts were
assuming powers in the Government General which they did not actually
have. Consequently, they deprived the Governor General, the only
authority competent in this respect, of the administration of justice.
There were also shootings of hostages. He repeatedly complained about
that. I want to state that all complaints were addressed to me—there
were no complaints to me but they were merely always directed to me—so
that I could submit them to the Führer.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Governor General continuously made
objections about the extensive claim made by the Reich on the Government
General, particularly in reference to grain deliveries?

LAMMERS: He had often raised objections but the demands which were put
to him were even increased. He did, for the most part, fulfill them,
which must have been extremely hard for him.

DR. SEIDL: Do you know that the Governor General protested against the
removal of art treasures by Himmler’s organization?

LAMMERS: Yes; I have only a very faint recollection of that. It is
possible that he also complained about the removal of art treasures, but
I cannot remember any details in that connection.

DR. SEIDL: And now the last question. Is it true that the Governor
General, in many documents, from as early as 1940 on, made proposals to
the Führer regarding the improvement of living conditions of the
population in the Government General and that the Führer only very much
later acknowledged that the high policy which had been advocated by
Frank from the very beginning was correct?

LAMMERS: Herr Frank had often objected to a policy of exploitation and
pronounced himself in favor of a policy of reconstruction, in cultural
matters as well. He had suggested, for instance, that Polish advisory
committees be assigned to the authorities under the Governor General and
to the district chiefs, and so forth; that was refused. He spoke in
favor of the creation of high schools, theological seminaries, and
similar cultural aims, all of which were rejected.

On one occasion he had submitted a long memorandum. This referred to a
Polish organization which called itself “The Plough and the Sword.” It
had offered to co-operate with the Germans, and Frank submitted detailed
proposals in a long memorandum, saying that these Poles could be won
over to co-operate only if they were met on proper terms. All these
suggestions, coming from Frank, were turned down by Hitler. It is not
correct for you to say, Dr. Seidl, that it was not until the last moment
that the Führer agreed to these suggestions; all I can say is that they
were all turned down without exception.

DR. SEIDL: I have no further questions.

DR. ALFRED THOMA (Counsel for Defendant Rosenberg): By a decree of 17
July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg was appointed Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. Would you please tell the Tribunal very
briefly by means of what decrees his authority in the East was limited?

LAMMERS: I can do that very briefly by repeating what I said before. The
same limitations which applied to the Governor General also apply to
him—these limitations which I have just listed; but I have to add one
thing more to that.

The position of Reich Minister Rosenberg was made particularly difficult
through the fact that the difference of opinion which existed between
him and Minister Goebbels in the field of propaganda was especially
detrimental for him. For in the Führer’s opinion Rosenberg was to decide
on the Eastern policy and Goebbels was to decide on the propaganda, and
these two things could not always be co-ordinated. There were strong
differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Goebbels which could be
settled only after lengthy negotiations. But the practical success was
always slight, because the difference of opinion, which had scarcely
been settled, arose again without delay in the next few weeks. There was
also another limitation which is different from the case of the
Government General, that is, that Rosenberg had two Reich commissioners
for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Reich Commissioner Lohse and Reich
Commissioner Koch.

DR. THOMA: I am coming to that later.

Can you remember that before the 17 July 1941 decree there had been a
conference with the Führer, on the day before, on 16 July 1941, during
which, right from the beginning, Rosenberg complained that his ministry
was to have no police powers and that all police powers were to be
transferred to Himmler?

LAMMERS: Herr Rosenberg was, of course, not quite in agreement with the
vesting of police powers in Himmler. He did object to that but without
success. Police matters in other occupied territories had been ruled
upon in the same way as in this case. The Führer would not depart from
his views.

DR. THOMA: In the general instructions to the Reich commissioners there
is a passage where it says that the Higher SS and Police Chief is
directly subordinate to the Reich commissioner himself. Did this mean
that the Police Chief could also give orders to the Reich commissioner
in technical matters?

LAMMERS: Normally, no; Himmler had reserved technical instructions for
himself. The SS and Police Chief was instructed to get in touch with the
Reich commissioner and, of course, to take into consideration the
latter’s political instructions, but not the technical ones.

DR. THOMA: Not the technical ones? Please tell the Tribunal, but also
quite briefly, what Rosenberg’s political concepts were, from the
beginning until the end, with reference to the treatment of the Eastern
peoples.

LAMMERS: In my opinion he always wanted to pursue a moderate policy.
Beyond a doubt he was opposed to a policy of extermination and a policy
of deportation, as was often preached. He made efforts to create order
in the field of agriculture by means of his agrarian policy, likewise to
create order in the field of education, church matters, universities,
schools, and so forth. But he had little success, since one of the two
Reich commissioners, namely Koch, in the Ukraine, opposed Rosenberg’s
measures, or rather simply disregarded Rosenberg’s orders in respect to
these matters.

DR. THOMA: I am thinking about the large political conceptions. Did he
ever mention to you that he had the idea of leading the Eastern peoples
to a certain autonomy and of allowing them such an autonomy?

LAMMERS: Yes, I can answer that in the affirmative.

DR. THOMA: Did he also mention to you that he intended that sovereign
right should be extended to the Occupied Eastern Territories?

LAMMERS: Whether he said it in just that form, that I cannot recollect.
At any rate he was in favor of establishing a certain independence for
the Eastern peoples.

DR. THOMA: That is to say autonomy. And was it for this reason that he
was so deeply interested in tending to the cultural life of these
Eastern peoples?

LAMMERS: Yes. He was particularly interested in that. I know that
because he also took an interest in the school system, the church, and
the universities.

DR. THOMA: Was that possibly the cause of the conflict which he
especially had with Reich Commissioner Koch?

LAMMERS: That and many other things. Koch was above all a strong
opponent of the agrarian policy. That agrarian policy which Rosenberg
considered especially favorable in the interest of his aims was
sabotaged by Koch.

DR. THOMA: Can you mention any other fields in which Koch made
difficulties for the Minister for the Eastern Territories?

LAMMERS: I cannot at the moment recollect any.

DR. THOMA: Do you know that there was a final row between the two when
you were given the order, in collaboration with Bormann, to conduct
negotiations between the two, and that Rosenberg refused and demanded
that the matter be brought before the Führer?

LAMMERS: The differences of opinion between Rosenberg and Koch were very
numerous. They filled volumes and volumes of records. The Führer had
given the order that Bormann and I should investigate these matters.
Many weeks of investigation ensued; and after the investigation I must
say there was never a decision made by the Führer. The Führer always
postponed making a decision on these matters. On one occasion—perhaps
that is the case which you, Dr. Thoma, are thinking of—the differences
of opinion were again particularly sharp. The Führer then sent for
Rosenberg and Koch, and instead of settling these differences of
opinion, again no agreement was reached. Instead of a real decision, the
compromise was made that these two gentlemen should meet once every
month and co-operate. That was naturally, in the first place, an
unbearable situation for Rosenberg, that he, as the minister in charge,
should in every instance have to come to an agreement with the Reich
commissioner subordinate to him; in the second place, it could hardly be
carried out in practice. Firstly, the two gentlemen met no more than
once or twice at most, and then when they did meet no agreement could be
reached, and in the long run the Führer thought that Koch was in the
right.

DR. THOMA: How could it be seen that Koch was considered right?

LAMMERS: Because the Führer reached no decision in regard to the
complaints made by Rosenberg which, in my opinion, were justified. Thus
the things accomplished by Koch remained.

DR. THOMA: Defendant Rosenberg says that the result was that Hitler gave
him the order to confine himself in the administration of the Eastern
territories to the most basic lines. Is that right?

LAMMERS: That was approximately the Führer’s order. Both had agreed to
come to a mutual understanding on the matter about which the Führer had
misgivings.

DR. THOMA: What form did Rosenberg’s relationship to the Führer take and
when was Rosenberg’s last report to the Führer?

LAMMERS: As far as I know, Rosenberg visited the Führer at the end of
1943 for the last time; and even before that he had always had
considerable difficulties in getting to see the Führer. He was not very
often successful.

DR. THOMA: Did this tense situation have the result that Rosenberg
offered his resignation in the autumn of 1940?

LAMMERS: Yes, it was not actually an application for resignation, since
the Führer had prohibited such applications, but he did say that if he
could no longer conduct affairs to the Führer’s satisfaction, he would
like to be removed from office, thus, in the end, it amounted to an
application for resignation.

DR. THOMA: Can you tell the Tribunal to what extent Rosenberg had
influence and popularity among the population in the Occupied Eastern
Territories? Is it correct, particularly, that a number of church
leaders in the Occupied Eastern Territories sent telegrams of thanks to
him because of his tolerant attitude and because he allowed them to
practice their religion freely?

LAMMERS: I know of that only superficially, from personal statements
made to me by Rosenberg. He may have once told me something like that.

DR. THOMA: I have another question. It has repeatedly come to light
during this Trial that Hitler’s military entourage considered him a
military genius. What was the situation in the administrative sphere?
Hitler was above all the supreme legislator, the supreme chief of
Government and Head of State. Did his administrative entourage encourage
him in the belief that all his decisions were correct and that he was
doing something extraordinary, or who did strengthen him in this belief?

LAMMERS: In this sphere, too, the Führer had an extraordinarily quick
power of perception and almost always a correct evaluation of affairs.
He was in a position to make frequent use of the large-scale policy
which he alone had to determine for legislation and administration. It
was then the task of the gentlemen who were to carry this out; above
all, the ministers—I, too, to a certain extent—to shape into an
appropriate form those suggestions and basic thoughts which he had
formulated. If any objections did arise in this connection, the Führer
was for the most part willing to listen to them, as long as they did not
touch the principle of the matter; he was thus ready to listen to
questions of severity, mitigation, or greater stringency, if necessary,
or to questions of formulation and construction, but not if a basic
tendency was being attacked. Then one had great difficulties with him.

DR. THOMA: And as far as individual problems were concerned, did he
personally make the pertinent decisions about everything, or was he
hampered in any way by his purpose, by certain aims which he had in
mind?

LAMMERS: Very little was reported to him. Normally, in the last years I
made official reports every 6 or 8 weeks; in other words six or eight
times a year or perhaps, at the most, 10 times. On these occasions,
problems could not be discussed. Generally speaking, the Führer left the
administration to his ministers...

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard it over and over again about Hitler.

DR. THOMA: I have only one more question. Did you know anything
regarding the fact that Hitler had decided to solve the Jewish question
by the final solution, that is, by the annihilation of the Jews?

LAMMERS: Yes, I know a great deal about that. The final solution of the
Jewish question became known to me for the first time in 1942. That is
when I heard that the Führer supposedly, through Göring, had given an
order to the SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich to achieve a solution of the
Jewish question. I did not know the exact contents of that order and
consequently, since this did not come within my jurisdiction, at the
beginning I took a negative attitude, but then as I wanted to know
something I, of course, had to contact Himmler. I asked him what was
really meant by the idea of the final solution of the Jewish question.
Himmler replied that he had received the order from the Führer to bring
about the final solution of the Jewish problem—or rather Heydrich and
his successor had that order—and that the main point of the order was
that the Jews were to be evacuated from Germany. With that statement I
was satisfied for the time and waited for further developments, since I
assumed that I would now in some way—I really had no jurisdiction
here—I would obtain some information from Heydrich or his successor,
Kaltenbrunner.

Since nothing did come I wanted to inform myself about this, and back in
1942 I announced a report to the Führer, whereupon the Führer told me
that it was true that he had given Himmler the order for evacuation but
that he did not want any further discussion about this Jewish question
during the war. In the meantime or shortly afterwards—this was already
at the beginning of 1943—the RSHA sent out invitations to attend a
meeting on the subject, “Final Solution of the Jewish Question.” I had
previously sent out an order to my officials that I was not defining my
attitude to this matter, since I wanted to present it to the Führer. I
merely ordered that, if invitations to a meeting were sent out, one of
my officials should attend as a so-called “listening post.”

A meeting actually did take place afterwards to discuss this question,
but without results. Minutes were taken and the various departments were
supposed to express their attitude. When I received these minutes I
found that they contained nothing vital. For a second time I forbade
taking a definite attitude. I myself refused to take a stand and I
remember it very well indeed, because I received a letter which, first
of all, was signed by some unimportant man who, as far as I was
concerned, had no right to sign. He asked me why I had not yet taken a
stand. Secondly, the tone of the inquiry was very unfriendly; he said
that everybody had expressed an opinion except me. I ordered that the
reply be made that I refused to define my views since I wished to
discuss the matter with the Führer first.

In the meantime I once more turned to Herr Himmler. He was of the
opinion that it was necessary to discuss this question since a number of
problems would have to be solved, particularly since the intention of
achieving a final solution of the Jewish question would probably extend
to persons of mixed blood, first grade, and would also extend to the
so-called “privileged” marriages, that is to say, marriages where only
one party was Aryan whereas the other party was Jewish. The Führer
stated once more that he did not wish to have a report on it but that he
had no objections to consultation on these problems. That some
evacuations had taken place in the meantime had become known to me. At
that time, at any rate, not the slightest thing was known about the
killing of Jews; if crass individual cases came up, I always addressed
myself to Himmler and he was always very willing to settle these
individual cases.

Finally, however, in 1943, rumors cropped up that Jews were being
killed. I had no jurisdiction in this field; it was merely that I
occasionally received complaints and on the basis of these complaints I
investigated the rumors. But, as far as I could tell, at any rate, these
rumors always proved to be only rumors. Every one said he had heard it
from somebody else and nobody wanted to make a definite statement. I am,
in fact, of the opinion that these rumors were based mostly on foreign
broadcasts and that the people just did not want to say from where they
had the information.

That caused me once more to undertake an investigation of this matter.
First of all, since I, for my part, could not initiate investigations of
matters under Himmler’s jurisdiction, I addressed myself to Himmler once
again. Himmler denied any legal killings and told me, with reference to
the order from the Führer, that it was his duty to evacuate the Jews and
that during such evacuations, which also involved old and sick people,
of course there were cases of death, there were accidents, there were
attacks by enemy aircraft. He added too, that there were revolts, which
of course he had to suppress severely and with bloodshed, as a warning.
For the rest, he said that these people were being accommodated in camps
in the East. He brought out a lot of pictures and albums and showed me
the work that was being done in these camps by the Jews and how they
worked for the war needs, the shoemakers shops, tailors shops, and so
forth. He told me:

    “This is the order of the Führer; if you believe that you have
    to take action against it then tell the Führer and tell me the
    names of the people who have made these reports to you.”

Of course, I could not tell him the names, first of all because they did
not want to be named, and secondly, they only knew these things from
hearsay, so as I said, I could not have given him any definite material
at all.

Nevertheless, I once again reported this matter to the Führer, and on
this occasion he gave me exactly the same reply which I had been given
by Himmler. He said, “I shall later on decide where these Jews will be
taken and in the meantime they are being cared for there.”

Then he said the same thing Himmler had said, which gave me the
impression that Himmler had told the Führer that Lammers would come and
probably report to him something about this.

But that final solution of the Jewish problem was nevertheless in my
portfolio and I was determined to bring it up once again with the
Führer. I succeeded in doing so on the occasion of some particularly
crass cases in connection with this question, cases which were such that
the Führer let me talk to him about it. By way of example I should
mention the entire case.

If a Jew was married to a German woman then he was considered
“privileged,” that is to say, he was not evacuated. But if the wife had
died...

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please...

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I myself should like to ask the witness to
speak more briefly. But I ask that this particular question be admitted.
In my opinion the witness is trying to describe how this entire final
solution of the Jewish problem was carried out in secret and with
deception being practiced on Hitler’s entire entourage, and that is why
I ask that the witness be allowed to finish his statement since this is
a very decisive point in the discussion.

[_Turning to the witness._] But, Witness, please be quite brief. I am
now putting this question to you: Did Himmler ever tell you that the
final solution of the Jewish problem would take place through the
extermination of the Jews?

LAMMERS: That was never mentioned. He talked only about evacuation.

DR. THOMA: He talked only about evacuation?

LAMMERS: Yes, only about evacuation.

DR. THOMA: When did you hear that these 5 million Jews had been
exterminated?

LAMMERS: I heard of that here a while ago.

DR. THOMA: In other words the matter was completely secret and only very
few persons knew of it?

LAMMERS: I assume that Himmler arranged it so that no one learned
anything about it and that he formed his Commandos in such a way that
nobody knew anything about them. Of course, there must be a large number
of people who must have known something about it.

DR. THOMA: Can you tell me what people must have known something about
it, apart from those who actually carried out these exterminations? Who,
apart from those people, must have known something about it?

LAMMERS: Well, to start with, Himmler must have passed his order on to
other people; and there must have been certain leading officials, and
these leading officials must, of course, have had other leading
officials subordinate to them who took charge of the Kommandos and who
kept everything completely secret.

DR. THOMA: No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. OTTO PANNENBECKER (Counsel for Defendant Frick): Witness, you have
already talked about a number of questions which are also of importance
for the defense of Defendant Frick, since he was a member of the Reich
Cabinet. Can you tell me on the strength of what position, or what
position it was, that you are enabled to give these answers? I repeat,
can you tell me what your position was within the Reich Cabinet which
enables you to answer these questions?

LAMMERS: You mean my own?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

LAMMERS: I was State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery and I was the
intermediary between the Führer and the Reich ministers, with two
exceptions: the Führer either had direct communication with these
gentlemen or the men in question had a way prescribed to approach the
Führer other than through me. There were a number of things which did
not go through my hands, but which the ministers submitted to the Führer
directly. These were all matters of high policy, particularly of high
foreign policy. Only in 1937, on the occasion of certain changes in the
Cabinet, did I receive the title “Reich Minister,” but my tasks did not
change. In particular, I also had no departments.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me when the very last meeting of the
Reich Cabinet took place?

LAMMERS: The Reich Cabinet met for the last time in November 1937. To be
sure, in 1938, at the beginning of February, there was one more
so-called “information conference” of the ministers, during which the
Führer announced the change which had been made in the Cabinet involving
Herr Von Blomberg and Herr Von Neurath. The last Cabinet meeting in
which actual consultation took place, namely in regard to the draft of a
penal code, took place in November 1937.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me something about any attempts after
that date to get the ministers together?

LAMMERS: After that date I continuously attempted to effect a
concentration of the Reich Cabinet, a reactivation, I might say. This
was continuously refused by the Führer. I had even prepared a draft, a
draft for a decree according to which ministers should at least come
together to consult with each other once or twice a month under the
chairmanship of Reich Marshal Göring, or, if he were prevented from
attending, with me as acting chairman. The ministers were to come
together and hear informal reports. That was turned down by the Führer.
Nevertheless, the ministers had an urgent desire to meet. My next
suggestion was that I invite the ministers once or twice a month to a
social evening, a beer party, so that we could get together and talk. To
that the Führer replied, “Herr Lammers, this is not your concern; it is
my concern. The next time I go to Berlin, I will do that.”

THE PRESIDENT: What are all these details about beer drinking? If they
did not meet and he applied to the Führer, asking them to meet, and they
never did, that is sufficient. What is the good of going into detail?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct, therefore, to say that the Reich
Ministers had to work on their own in their departments, in their
special field of activity, and that a Reich Cabinet as such, which
decided questions of policy and was informed and held discussions, did
not exist any more at all?

LAMMERS: Actually the ministers were no more than the highest
administrative chiefs of their departments. They could no longer act in
the Cabinet of the Reich Government as political ministers. I tried to
describe that earlier. No more meetings took place; conferences were
even forbidden. So, how could it have been possible for them to exchange
views?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about Hitler’s statement
considering the Reich Cabinet as a defeatist club, which he did not want
to see anymore?

LAMMERS: In connection with my attempts to reactivate the Reich Cabinet
through certain meetings, the Führer told me that this would have to be
stopped since an atmosphere might arise which he would not like. He did
not use the words “defeatist club” in my presence, but Reichsleiter
Bormann told me that he said, “The ministers are not to meet; that might
become a defeatist club.”

DR. PANNENBECKER: It has been discussed here frequently that a Reich
Minister on his own could not resign. Do you know anything about Frick
making an attempt to resign his post as Reich Minister?

LAMMERS: In spite of this prohibition by the Führer, Frick repeatedly
stated his wish to be relieved of his office if he no longer enjoyed the
Führer’s full confidence and if the Führer would not receive him any
more. He told me that frequently; but I cannot recall a written
application for resignation. Frick’s wishes to resign were always passed
on to the Führer by me although the Führer always rejected such
communications very bluntly.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In August 1943 Frick left his post as Reich Minister
of the Interior. Do you know any details of what he himself said in that
connection?

LAMMERS: At that time Herr Frick himself told me, “I am happy to leave
my post as Minister of the Interior, but please see to it that the
Führer does not make me Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, as he
intends to do. I do not want that office. I want to retire.” And I told
that to the Führer.

The Führer ordered Frick to come to headquarters. Before Frick went in
to see the Führer alone, he told me that he did not, under any
circumstances, want to accept the position of Reich Protector, but when
he came back from the Führer he had, nevertheless, changed his mind and
had accepted the office. If I am right this must have been in August
1943.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Frick’s position as Plenipotentiary General for Reich
Administration is also one of the points against him in the accusation.
Do you know anything about the appointment of that office?

LAMMERS: As Reich Plenipotentiary for Administration he had the task of
co-ordinating other ministries. The following were co-ordinated: the
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry for
Education, the Ministry for Churches, and the National Office for
Regional Planning. He co-ordinated them under his administration and
represented them, so to speak, in the Ministerial Council for Defense of
the Reich, which came into being in 1939 with the outbreak of the war.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you tell me on the basis of what regulations Frick
was appointed Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration? There
are two Reich defense laws, one of 1935 and one of 1938.

LAMMERS: The Defense Law of 1935 I can no longer remember. The draft of
the Reich Defense Law of 1938, which was not published, allots to the
Plenipotentiary General for Reich Administration a great number of tasks
which, however, were never passed on to him. He had merely the task of
co-ordinating the various departments, which I have just mentioned. At
any rate he never exercised actual powers as Plenipotentiary General for
the Reich Administration to the extent to which they were allotted him
in the Reich Defense Law.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In this connection one also talks of the powers of a
so-called Three Man College. This consisted of Plenipotentiary General
for Reich Administration Frick, Plenipotentiary General for Economy
Schacht—later Funk—and the Chief of the OKW. Can you tell me what
powers these three exercised?

LAMMERS: The expression Three Man College is first of all quite false;
it is not a concept in constitutional law but merely a term of
convenience, a term used by officials. These three people, the
Plenipotentiary General for Administration, the Plenipotentiary General
for Economy, and the Chief of the OKW, each had the power to issue
decrees, but they were obliged to have the consent of the other
two—that is, with the agreement of the others, anyone could give orders
in his field. A meeting of this committee, this so-called Three Man
College, never took place. The decrees issued by it are very few,
insignificant, and quite unimportant. For instance, I can remember that
this committee ruled on the question of reducing the numbers of judges
in the disciplinary chambers; that is in civil service matters. A second
task in this sphere—in all, there were six to eight decrees at the
most, but altogether quite unimportant.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In addition there was later on the Ministerial Council
for Defense of the Reich. Can you compare these two groups, those three
and the Ministerial Council for Defense of the Reich?

LAMMERS: Do you mean the Three Man College for the Ministerial Council?

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

LAMMERS: First of all, after the Ministerial Council for Defense of the
Reich was established, it was my principle to stalemate this Three Man
College if possible, since it was not at all necessary. The Ministerial
Council for Defense of the Reich had the task of issuing decrees with
legal effect but it actually had nothing to do with the Defense of the
Reich. Military matters were never discussed in this Ministerial Council
for Defense of the Reich, nor did it deal with foreign policy or
propaganda. In the main it issued decrees which had the effect of laws.
Meetings took place only until December 1939, and after that the members
communicated with each other by writing for the purpose of issuing
decrees. Political debates never took place.

DR. PANNENBECKER: A Central Office was founded in the Ministry of the
Interior for the occupied territories. This Central Office has been
cited by the Prosecution as evidence of the fact that Frick had
considerable administrative powers, and hence responsibility for the
occupied territories. Are you able to say anything about that?

LAMMERS: The Central Office had, in the main, two tasks. One was the
obtaining of civil servants, the other was assisting in the issuing of
laws and decrees in occupied territories. Such an office was necessary
because the occupied territories required personnel and because the
Reich commissioners in the occupied territories were directly under the
Führer’s command. Written communications went in part through me. If
personnel was to be provided for within this framework, then I would
have had to do it. But I had no instrument for it. I had only a staff of
12 senior officials and I had no organization in the country; I had no
executive officials in those countries. Therefore the Minister of the
Interior was brought in, since he had the whole civil service apparatus
at his disposal.

DR. PANNENBECKER: You just said that the Central Office gave some
assistance in issuing decrees for the occupied territories. Was it
possible for the Central Office to issue a decree for, let us say,
Norway?

LAMMERS: For what?

DR. PANNENBECKER: To issue a decree for some occupied territory, for
instance Norway.

LAMMERS: No, not of itself—at the most after the Reich commissioner had
agreed.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Was it at all customary for the Central Office at any
time to issue a decree for a certain occupied territory?

LAMMERS: To my knowledge that has never happened. I do not know of a
single case where the Central Office issued a decree.

DR. PANNENBECKER: A decree by the Reich Minister of the Interior has
been cited which ruled on the question of citizenship, also with
reference to occupied territories.

LAMMERS: Yes, about German citizenship probably.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Yes.

LAMMERS: Yes, but that was certainly an internal German matter.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Central Office have any right to issue
instructions either to the German Plenipotentiary in the occupied
territory, say the Reich Commissioner for Norway...

LAMMERS: No, they had no such right at all.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Or did they have a right to issue instructions to
lower offices—German offices—or to the occupied territories
themselves?

LAMMERS: No, they did not have the right to give instructions.

DR. PANNENBECKER: The Prosecution have further stated that the Central
Office also had the right to issue instructions in those territories for
which it had not been specifically appointed. Is there any legal
provision or any practical case where the Central Office interfered with
jurisdiction in the occupied territories?

LAMMERS: No case is known to me.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it then correct to say that the chiefs of the civil
administration in the occupied territories were always directly
subordinate to Hitler as the Führer, no matter what their official
designation was?

LAMMERS: In the occupied territories the Reich commissioners of the
so-called chiefs of the civil administration were directly subordinate
to the Führer.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did Frick, as Minister of the Interior, have the power
to issue orders for the occupied territories insofar as the German
Police was active in the occupied territories?

LAMMERS: No, the police authority in occupied territories was vested
solely in Himmler who was to act in agreement with the Reich
commissioners. The Minister of the Interior had nothing at all to do
with the police in occupied territories.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Must it not be concluded from that that this matter
came within the competency of the Reich Minister of the Interior insofar
as Himmler was subordinate to the Reich Ministry of the Interior?

LAMMERS: There would have been at most a power to issue orders for
Germany but not for the occupied territories, and to what extent this
power existed for Germany herself is also problematic.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I shall come to that later in detail. Can you tell me
what powers the Minister of the Interior had in the police field during
that time when the police were still under the jurisdiction of the
provinces of Prussia, _et cetera_, that is, from 1933 to 1936?

LAMMERS: Well, his powers were in any case very limited, but I cannot
tell you the details.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did the Reich have the right of supervision?

LAMMERS: Yes, the old right, as it was formerly—the Reich had only the
ultimate supervision.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Of course, you know that later on, through a decree,
Himmler was appointed Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police in
the Ministry of the Interior, do you not? Do you know who created that
designation, “Reichsführer SS” and so forth?

LAMMERS: Yes, I had something to do with it at the time. The proposal of
such a title originated apparently with Himmler. I objected to this
title from the very beginning for two reasons. Two entirely different
matters were being lumped together: the Reichsführer SS, which is a
Party affiliation, and the Police, which is a State concern. On the one
side was the Reichsführer SS who has the rank of a Reichsleiter in the
Party, which is equivalent to that of a Reich minister; on the other
side the Chief of Police, who has the position of a State Secretary in
the Ministry of the Interior and who is subordinate to the Minister of
the Interior. But Himmler insisted on this designation, and the Führer
considered that he was right.

My objections to this designation proved to be correct in practice, for
the Minister of the Interior’s right to issue instructions to the Police
now became extremely problematic, since Reichsführer Himmler, as far as
the police officers were concerned, was, at the same time the SS Führer
and could give them orders in his capacity as Reichsführer SS, and the
Ministry of the Interior could not interfere. It was also a practice of
his that he usually made the other police officials SS leaders. One
therefore could never know exactly in what capacity the person concerned
was acting, whether he was acting as member of the SS, or as a member of
the Police. And the question of authority in the Ministry of Interior
afterwards became almost devoid of meaning, because Himmler dropped the
last words of the designation, “Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior,” and completely separated himself from the
Ministry of the Interior as far as having an office in the building and
the mode of procedure were concerned, and no longer felt himself in a
subordinate position.

When Minister Frick lodged a complaint about this with me, which I was
supposed to take to the Führer, the Führer told me, “Tell Herr Frick
that he should not restrict Himmler as Chief of the German Police too
much; with him the Police is in good hands. He should allow him as much
free rein as possible!”

Thus for all practical purposes, though not by a special decree, the
Minister of the Interior’s authority to give orders was very sharply
limited, if not even suspended.

DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that Himmler, on his own,
arbitrarily exercised jurisdiction over police organizations without
bothering about what Frick wanted. But then there was still another
channel for commands issued to the police, orders given by Hitler
himself. Did he give them to Frick as the competent minister, or did he
give them to Himmler?

LAMMERS: Normally the Führer gave these instructions to Himmler. If he
gave instructions to me which concerned police matters then I generally
passed them on through the Minister of the Interior, or at least I
informed him about them.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about whether concentration camps
were included in the budget of the Reich or whether they were in the
budget of the SS?

LAMMERS: As far as I know—but I cannot say this for certain—the funds
for concentration camps did not appear in the budget of the Reich. It
was rather this way: The Reich Minister of Finance paid a yearly lump
sum to the Party through the Reich Treasurer, who had to distribute it
to the various Party organizations. The Reichsführer SS received a lump
sum from the SS with which he probably financed this matter. I also
cannot recollect that I ever saw any part of the Reich budget in which
the concentration camps were mentioned.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything about the fact that Himmler
opposed the Minister of the Interior’s right to interfere in this field,
giving as his reason the fact that the funds for concentration camps had
been provided for?

LAMMERS: No, I do not know anything about that.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I now have some questions referring to another field.
Do you know anything about Hitler’s efforts to kill incurably insane
persons painlessly?

LAMMERS: Yes, this idea occurred to Hitler in the autumn of 1939 for the
first time. On that occasion the State Secretary in the Ministry of the
Interior, Dr. Conti, received the order to investigate this question. He
was told to discuss the legal aspect of the matter with me. I spoke
against the execution of any such program. But since the Führer insisted
on it I suggested that this matter should be given all legal guarantees
and be ruled upon by a law. I also had an appropriate draft for a law
worked out; thereupon State Secretary Conti was relieved of this task,
and in 1940 it was given over to Reichsleiter Bouhler. Reichsleiter
Bouhler reported to the Führer, but I was not present. Then he came to
see me. I showed him my draft of the law and stated the objections I had
to the matter and he left again. Then I presented the drafted law to the
Führer; he did not approve of it, but he did not reject it altogether.
Later, however, ignoring me, he gave Reichsleiter Bouhler and the
medical attendant, Professor Dr. Brandt, then attached to him, plenary
authority to kill incurably insane people. I had nothing to do with the
drafting of this plenary power. As far as I was concerned, the matter
was settled, as the Führer did not want me and had given the work to
others to do.

DR. PANNENBECKER: You have just said that the Führer gave the task to
State Secretary Dr. Conti in the Ministry of the Interior. Did that
order from Hitler pass to Conti through Frick?

LAMMERS: I do not know. State Secretary Conti was called by telephone by
the adjutant’s office of the Führer or by Reichsleiter Bormann; and
whether that went through Frick or not, I do not know.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Do you know anything at all about whether Frick
himself participated in these measures in some form or other?

LAMMERS: No, nothing about that is known to me.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Then I have a last group of questions, referring to
the Protectorate in Bohemia and Moravia. When, in August 1943, Frick was
appointed Protector for Bohemia and Moravia did the formal authority of
the Reich Protector remain the same as before?

LAMMERS: No. These powers were deliberately altered and in such a way
that the Reich Protector from then on was to become a more or less
decorative figure. The political direction of the Protectorate was to be
transferred to State Minister Frank. The Reich Protector was merely the
German representative in the Protectorate with very little actual power.
He co-operated in forming the government in the Protectorate.
Furthermore he had the limited, rather small right of nominating civil
servants, which in the main applied to the medium and lower grade of
civil servants; and then he had the right of granting pardons. And in
general the State Minister for Bohemia and Moravia, Frank, was obliged
to keep the Reich Protector informed. In the main these were the rights
of the Reich Protector. Apart from that it was Hitler’s wish that the
Reich Protector did not spend too much time in the Protectorate. In fact
I have had to pass this information on to him several times.

DR. PANNENBECKER: You said that the Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia during Frick’s time was the head of the German administration.
Was State Minister Frank under Frick?

LAMMERS: Yes, he was subordinate but the relation was rather that of the
head of the State to the head of the Government; State Minister Frank
had the political control.

DR. PANNENBECKER: But is it not right to say that Minister Frank was
directly subordinate to the Führer?

LAMMERS: I do not believe that that was the situation. I do not remember
the decree. He was not directly under him—I cannot say that for certain
now. At any rate the Führer received only Frank and not the Reich
Protector for political discussions.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I do not have the decree with me. I shall have to
clear that up later.

Do you know anything about the fact that Frick expressly demanded this
division of authority and that, to start with, he had refused to accept
the position of a Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia; and that this
division of authority did not take place until he said that he could not
assume outer responsibility for something which was not his inner
responsibility?

LAMMERS: I have already mentioned the fact that Minister Frick refused
to accept this position, and when this decree appeared, in which the
rights of the Protector were laid down—a decree which was not
published—Dr. Frick quite rightly had misgivings, thinking, “As far as
the outside world is concerned, I shall have responsibilities which are
not known at all.” So we published a notice in the press. In that it
stated that the new Reich Protector would have only such and such
rights, as I previously listed here, such as the nomination of civil
servants, the right to pardon and the right to co-operate in the forming
of a government in the Protectorate. Thus it was stated to the outside
world that Frick no longer had the full responsibility which former
Reich Protectors had perhaps had.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Did you know anything about the fact that the reason
for this division of responsibility in the Protectorate was that Hitler
did not think that Frick would be hard enough to handle matters there?

LAMMERS: That was obviously the reason, yes.

DR. PANNENBECKER: In that case I have no further questions.

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendant Funk): As a supplement to the
statements already made by the witness, I have still a few questions.

Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk beginning with the year 1933 was the
Press Chief of the Reich Government. That is known to you?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: You yourself were at that time already in your office, were
you not?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Did the Defendant Funk in this capacity as Press Chief of
the Reich Government exercise any influence on decisions made by the
Reich Cabinet or on the contents of bills of the Reich Cabinet?

LAMMERS: That question must be answered in the negative. At the most, he
may have had an influence from the journalistic point of view, that is,
for an attractive title for a law, or some sort of popular wording, or
something like that. But he did not vote on the contents of the laws. In
his position as Press Chief, he was first Ministerial Director and then
State Secretary; he had nothing to say about the contents.

DR. SAUTER: Then why was he, as Press Chief of the Reich Government,
invited at all to attend the meetings of the Reich Cabinet at that time?

LAMMERS: Well, because of the reporting to the press afterwards.

DR. SAUTER: That is to say, only to inform the press of the discussions
and decisions of the Reich Cabinet? And he had no influence whatsoever
on decisions or not on the bills either?

LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.

DR. SAUTER: But without having any influence on decisions or the
authority to propose laws.

LAMMERS: Yes, that is right.

DR. SAUTER: In this capacity as Press Chief of the Reich Government, the
Defendant Funk had, as you know, to give reports regularly on press
matters to the then Reich Chancellor, Hitler. Do you know when these
regular reports made by the Press Chief of the Reich Government to
Hitler ceased?

LAMMERS: At the latest they ceased 1 year later. These were joint
conferences. Funk and I, at the beginning, had as many as three to four
meetings a week with the Führer, and this lasted through the summer of
1933. During the winter the meetings became fewer, then became more
frequent again, and ceased altogether in 1934, after Von Hindenburg’s
death.

DR. SAUTER: Who made these press reports to Hitler after that?

LAMMERS: The Press Chief Dr. Dietrich.

DR. SAUTER: Excluding Dr. Funk?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Funk later on became President of
the Reichsbank. Do you know anything about who had to decide about
credits given, or to be given, to the Reich by the Reichsbank?

LAMMERS: That decision was the Führer’s. The way it happened in practice
was that the Minister of Finance submitted the application for a credit.
That was done in duplicate. One letter with the appropriate order was
directed to the Reich Minister of Finance, and the second letter with
such an order was addressed to the President of the Reichsbank.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, these technical details do not really interest
us. We are only interested in this: Did Dr. Funk, as President of the
Reichsbank have any influence on the question of whether and to what
extent the German Reich could claim credit from the Reichsbank? Only
this interests us.

LAMMERS: I can answer that only by citing technical details. All I
received were those two documents from the Finance Minister. It was
entirely a matter of having them signed. They were signed in one second
by the Führer and then they were sent back. I never had an order to
negotiate with Herr Funk or with Herr Schacht or with the Minister of
Finance. It was entirely a matter of having them signed, nothing else.

DR. SAUTER: So that according to your knowledge these instructions came
from Hitler and not from the Reichsbank president?

LAMMERS: The instructions were signed by the Führer.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already mentioned once the so-called
Committee of Three or Three Man College, which was formed in the later
years. Regarding this Committee of Three the Prosecution maintain that
Funk was also a member of this committee, and that this committee
represented, so to speak, the highest court as far as the legislation of
the Reich Government during the war was concerned.

LAMMERS: One cannot say that at all. I have already stated that these
three men, each acting independently, had the right to issue decrees
with the consent of the two others, and that there were very few and
quite insignificant decrees.

DR. SAUTER: You mean decrees of little importance, decrees for his
department?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Furthermore, Dr. Lammers, the Defendant Göring stated during
his examination that the powers which Dr. Funk had as Plenipotentiary
for Economy—I think in 1938—were transferred for the most part to the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan, that consequently Dr. Funk’s powers,
generally speaking, existed only on paper. I should be very interested
in knowing whether these powers of the Plenipotentiary for Economy were
transferred to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, in other words,
Göring, formally, as well as in fact.

LAMMERS: That was based on a decree of the Führer and a special order
issued by the Führer.

DR. SAUTER: When was that, approximately?

LAMMERS: The Four Year Plan was set up in 1936, and it was extended in
1940 for another 4 years. These special powers which Herr Funk later
surrendered to the Four Year Plan were based on an agreement between
Reich Marshal Göring and Minister Funk, an arrangement which, as far as
I know, had the Führer’s approval.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, you have already told the Tribunal that since
1938, I think, no more meetings of the Cabinet took place and that in
the end Hitler even prohibited informal discussions among ministers. Can
you tell us anything as to whether and, if so, how often the Defendant
Dr. Funk had an opportunity, during the 7 years he was Minister, to talk
to Hitler, to report to him, and so forth?

LAMMERS: Well, during the first years, as I have said, he reported
frequently as Press Chief.

DR. SAUTER: And later as Minister of Economics?

LAMMERS: Later, as Minister of Economics, he very rarely came to the
Führer. At many conferences he was not consulted, even at conferences in
which he ought to have been consulted. Quite often he complained to me
about that. I tried in every way to do my best to include him in such
conferences, but I did not always succeed.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, I have noticed that minutes have been read here
in which it is clearly said, and I think by you, that the Defendant Funk
as Minister for Economics has asked you that he be permitted to
participate in this or that important conference, and that you had
expressly stated in that record that the Führer had refused that, or
that the Führer had prohibited it. May I show you an example? I remember
a meeting of 4 January 1944, Document 1292-PS, concerning questions of
labor employment. In those minutes it says—once more said by you—that
Funk’s request to be able to participate had been refused. Can you
remember such cases and can you give us the reasons?

LAMMERS: Yes, I can remember such cases, but I do not know whether they
were mentioned in the minutes. Probably I informed Herr Funk that I had
made the greatest effort to have him participate in these conferences;
the Führer, however, had refused.

DR. SAUTER: The reason?

LAMMERS: Frequently the Führer made objections; those were various
reasons in the case of Funk. He was sceptical about him and did not want
him there.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, in April of 1941 you are supposed to have informed
the Defendant Dr. Funk that Rosenberg had received an order from Hitler
for a uniform treatment of the problems in the Eastern Territories.
Besides giving that message to Funk you are supposed to have passed it
on to Göring and Keitel. From that fact the conclusion has been drawn by
the Prosecution that Funk was one of the influential persons concerned
with the preparation for aggressive war against Russia.

Can you tell us whether and, if so, why you also passed that message on
to the Defendant Funk at that time?

LAMMERS: Either the Führer told me to do so—which I do not think was
the case—or I believed that from the economic point of view Funk would
be interested in this information. I passed it on to him as a special
personal gesture; I do not remember any particular reason now. I
certainly must have passed the same message on to others, but not in
writing; the others probably received it orally.

There was no question at all of an aggressive war when Rosenberg was
given that task by Hitler. He was supposed to be merely a sort of
political commissioner for the Eastern Territories. He was to study the
conditions of the peoples there.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Lammers, roughly at the same time, that is to say, the
spring of 1941, and shortly before the beginning of the Russian
campaign, you are supposed to have had some further discussions with the
Defendant Funk on the subject of what turn the foreign political
situation in respect to Russia might possibly take in the near future.
On that occasion you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk something
regarding the reasons why Hitler believed in the possibility of a war
against Russia. What did you tell Defendant Funk at that time regarding
these preparations for the war undertaken at one time or another?

LAMMERS: It must have been what I knew myself at the time, namely,
information which the Führer had given me, that troop concentrations in
Russia had been observed, which allowed the conclusion to be drawn that
an armed conflict with Russia might occur. These were the words the
Führer used. He believed that things would come to a head with Russia
and therefore wished that one man, and that was Rosenberg, should
concern himself with Eastern questions, since the possibility of an
armed conflict with Russia did exist. That is probably what I told Funk.
I cannot imagine what else I could have told him.

DR. SAUTER: At that time, Dr. Lammers, you are supposed to have
mentioned not only troop concentrations on the Russian side along the
Eastern frontier of Germany, but also the Russian march into Bessarabia.

LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that that was the case. The Southeast, at
any rate; and perhaps I mentioned that the discussions which had taken
place with Russia, with Molotov, were unsatisfactory.

DR. SAUTER: In that connection, since you now refer to the discussion
with Molotov, you are supposed to have told Defendant Funk in particular
that Russia was making considerable claims on the Balkans and in respect
to the Baltic Sea, and that because of these claims Hitler was reckoning
with the possibility of war. Could that be correct?

LAMMERS: It is possible that we have talked about it, but I cannot
remember for certain.

DR. SAUTER: And you know, Dr. Lammers, that in this connection an
organization was established under the heading “Central Planning?” Do
you know that?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: Defendant Funk was also made a member of the Central
Planning, and I think that was at the end of 1943. Is it correct that
Funk, when he joined the Central Planning, was no longer at all
interested in the use of workers for German production, and why was that
so?

LAMMERS: I believe that Funk’s only interest in the Central Planning was
to receive raw materials for civilian production.

DR. SAUTER: For civilian production at home?

LAMMERS: Yes, at home. That was his interest in the Central Planning,
since he was responsible only for the distribution of these economic
goods, and civilian production had been transferred to Minister Speer.

DR. SAUTER: When?

LAMMERS: I think that was at the very moment when the Minister for
Armament and Munitions was converted into a Minister for Armament and
War Production. I think that was in 1942. Thus Funk was, of course, very
interested in raw materials; but the employment of labor, in my opinion,
interested him very little, since he did not have enough raw material at
all to allow civilian production to go on.

DR. SAUTER: And then, Dr. Lammers, I have one last question: Can you
remember that Defendant Funk in the year 1944—it is supposed to have
been in February and also a few times during subsequent months—visited
you and told you of his trouble because of the unsatisfactory position
which he was occupying as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for
Economics, and that on this occasion he talked to you about the question
of whether his conscience would allow him to retain his position as
President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics, and, if so,
why he did so and why he did not place this office at the disposal of
somebody else? Perhaps you can say something about this?

LAMMERS: I have frequently discussed these questions with Funk.

DR. SAUTER: When?

LAMMERS: In 1943, but particularly afterwards in 1944. I know that he
was considerably worried about this and that he wanted very much to have
an opportunity to take his worries to the Führer personally. If he did
remain in office then it was only because he realized that during
wartime he could not resign from his post; that would not be the right
thing for a good German, to resign during wartime. But he had the most
fervent wish to be able to report to the Führer about the economic
situation and mainly about the particular impressions which the
Gauleiter in the individual districts had. He had the most fervent wish,
once for all, to report to the Führer and learn at least something about
the war situation and talk about the question of ending the war. That
was since the beginning of September. I made several attempts to submit
the matter to the Führer; and I nearly succeeded later by camouflaging
the real reason and pretending there was another important reason, some
question of finance.

I submitted the matter to the Führer; but the Führer sized up the
situation, and, although Herr Funk had been waiting at my office for
days for the report, he refused the request, probably because of
Bormann’s efforts towards this end. With the best intentions Funk did
not succeed in seeing the Führer and I did not succeed in taking him to
the Führer.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have otherwise no further question.

DR. RUDOLF DIX (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr. President, if you
wish to close the session at 5 o’clock, I must say that I shall not have
finished by 5 o’clock; and I am reluctant to break off my examination. I
leave it up to the Tribunal whether we should extend the session or
whether we should break off now.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better go on, Dr. Dix; we have nearly 10
minutes.

DR. DIX: Witness, other witnesses and you too—you on the strength of
vast experience and your position as Chief of the Reich Chancellery from
the seizure of power until the collapse—have stated that applications
for resignation were prohibited by Hitler. I therefore do not want to
put any more questions on that subject; I merely want to discuss the
attempts to resign which Schacht actually made. I ask you first of all
to answer the general questions with “Yes” or “No.”

Did Schacht send in applications for resignation or not?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. DIX: I should now like to discuss with you the individual
applications for resignation. I cannot expect you, without any help, to
recall individual occasions. I permit myself therefore to help your
memory along a little in connection with the first question.

Please recall March 1937, when Schacht stopped Reichsbank credits, that
is, gave notice with reference to them and you visited him in connection
with this. Was that the first application for resignation?

LAMMERS: I remember that very exactly, since Herr Schacht’s application
for resignation was very unpleasant for Hitler; and he gave me the task
of straightening the matter out with Schacht. Thus I made several
personal visits to Schacht, but he refused to withdraw his application
for resignation; and he gave, as his reason, the fact that he could not
approve any longer the Führer’s credit policy and that he was afraid of
inflation and would have to protect the German nation from that. As for
the freedom of action, he had to...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, is it necessary to go into details? We gather
that there are several offers to resign. Is it necessary to go into the
details of each one?

DR. DIX: In that case we leave it. It is enough for me, Dr. Lammers, if
you confirm that in March 1937 Schacht made his first application for
resignation.

LAMMERS: And then there was a compromise and Herr Schacht, first of all,
was to remain in office 1 more year, although the law called for a term
of 4 years.

DR. DIX: Please try to remember what happened further in August 1937.
Göring had issued a decree concerning mines. It was Schacht’s view that
this was an unwarranted interference with matters under his
jurisdiction. Did a second application for resignation follow?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. DIX: And did not Schacht write a letter on that occasion addressed
to Göring, 5 August, a copy of which he sent to Hitler? Can you remember
that?

LAMMERS: Yes. It was because of that letter that Hitler dismissed
Schacht afterwards.

DR. DIX: Now we come to the war. Did Schacht also repeat his
applications for resignation during the war? Please recall the summer of
1941 and a memorandum which Schacht sent to Hitler regarding the
necessity of a speedy conclusion of peace?

LAMMERS: The first application for resignation was handed in because it
had been prohibited to listen to foreign broadcasting stations. Schacht
was thereby forbidden to listen to many foreign stations; and he
complained about it and handed in an application for resignation,
whether in writing or verbally, I do not know. The request was refused,
and later he submitted a memorandum in which he discussed the end of the
war and the political and economic situation. I had to tell Schacht, in
answer to this memorandum, that the Führer had read it and had nothing
to say in reply. Thereupon, in 1942, Schacht again asked me to ask the
Führer if he was disposed to receive another memorandum. At this the
Führer gave me the order to write to Schacht and tell him to refrain
from submitting any further memoranda.

DR. DIX: I could, Mr. President, recall the important points of this
memorandum of the summer of 1941 for the witness. If the Tribunal is
familiar with the details of this memorandum, which we do not have and
which we could ascertain only on the basis of the witness’ memory by
asking him questions, then I should like to present to him the exact
contents of this memorandum. If on the other hand the Tribunal is of the
opinion...

THE PRESIDENT: Have you the memorandum?

DR. DIX: No, we do not have the memorandum—only in memory—that is to
say, Schacht remembers it.

THE PRESIDENT: If the memorandum is lost and you can prove the loss, you
can put the contents of it to the witness. If the contents are not
relevant it is no good even for the witness. Are the contents of the
document relevant?

DR. DIX: These points which I want to submit I do consider relevant. It
is not very long either. It is not long.

THE PRESIDENT: So far as the question of proof is concerned, the rule
is, I think, if the document has been lost, you can prove the contents
of it and you can put it to the witness. Yes, you can put the main
points to him, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: The question which you put to me involves considerable
responsibility. At the moment I can merely assure you that I am
convinced that the memorandum has been lost; but whether I can prove it,
the negative fact that it is lost, that is something I cannot say at the
moment. I am convinced it is lost.

THE PRESIDENT: Herr Schacht presumably is going to say it was lost. You,
of course, cannot prove it yourself but I mean you can prove it by
Schacht.

DR. DIX: Yes, Schacht will prove it when he becomes a defendant on the
stand.

[_Turning to the witness._] This was in September 1941, that is to say,
after the great successes in Russia by the German Army. Then Schacht
wrote in this memorandum to Hitler that Hitler had now reached the peak
of his success and that this was the most favorable moment for him to
aim at peace. In the case of any further duration of the war...

MR. DODD: I suggest, would it not be more proper for counsel to ask this
witness, first of all, whether or not he recalls the contents of the
memorandum before reading what purports to be the contents?

THE PRESIDENT: I think he should, yes.

DR. DIX: I did not remind him of the contents; I just wanted to recall
to him the individual points. Dr. Lammers has already said that.

THE PRESIDENT: I think you had better put it to him sentence by sentence
and not all at once.

DR. DIX: But, I am not proposing to read it, Your Honors, I am merely
trying to repeat the contents as Schacht remembers them. I cannot read
it, of course, since I do not know it.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you ask the witness if he remembers what the
contents were, not putting it in a leading form.

DR. DIX: Yes, I shall certainly ask him. But I think he has already
answered, that he no longer remembers all the details, therefore I
wanted to aid his memory by recalling the main points.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask him what he does remember of it.

DR. DIX: Well then, Dr. Lammers, without my presenting the main points
to you, what do you remember?

LAMMERS: I think that in this memorandum Herr Schacht set forth the
economic capacities of Germany and of foreign countries, that he pointed
out that this period in 1941—I believe it was in the autumn—was the
most favorable moment for peace negotiations, for bringing the war to an
end. He also explained the world situation but I cannot remember how. He
sketched the political situation in other countries. He talked about
America, Italy, Japan, and he compared the factors. After the Führer had
looked at the memorandum he put it aside and he said, “I have already
disapproved of that; I do not want that.”

Further details I do not know.

DR. DIX: When you mention “other countries,” do you remember that he
stated that Italy’s withdrawal was merely a question of time, since the
opposition group around the King would not rest until Mussolini was
brought down?

LAMMERS: Yes, it is possible that it did say that, but I cannot remember
definitely.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. The Tribunal will adjourn now.

      [_The Tribunal adjourned until 9 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                        ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD DAY
                          Tuesday, 9 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

[_The witness Lammers resumed the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: Witness, it has been pointed out that I am putting my question
too soon after your answers and that you are replying to my questions
too quickly.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States):
I should like to take up a matter before the examination of the
witnesses, if I may ask the indulgence of the Tribunal.

I regret to say that this matter of printing documents has proceeded in
its abuses to such an extent that I must close the document room to
printing documents for German counsel. Now, that is a drastic step, but
I know of nothing less that I can do and I submit the situation to the
Tribunal.

We received from the General Secretary’s office an order to print and
have printed a Document Book Number I for Rosenberg. That document book
does not contain one item in its 107 pages that, by any stretch of the
imagination, can be relevant to this proceeding. It is violent
anti-Semitism and the United States simply cannot be put in the
position, even at the order—which I have no doubt was an ill-considered
one—of the Secretary of the Tribunal, of printing and disseminating to
the press just plain anti-Semitism; and that is what this document is.
Now, I ask you to consider what it is.

I should say it consists of two kinds of things: anti-Semitism and what
I would call, with the greatest respect to those who think otherwise,
rubbish. And this is an example of the rubbish we are required to print
at the expense of the United States and I simply cannot be silent any
longer about this:

    “The philosophic method suited to bourgeois society is the
    critical one. That holds true in a positive as well as a
    negative sense. The domination of purely rational form, the
    subjugation of nature, the freeing of the autonomous
    personality, all that is contained in the method of thinking
    classically formulated by Kant, likewise, the isolation of the
    individual, the inner depletion of nature and community life,
    the connection with the world of form which is contained in
    itself and with which, all critical thinking is concerned.”

Now, what in the world are we required to print that for?

Let us look at some of the anti-Semitism. Now, let us look at what we
are actually asked here to disseminate, Page 47 of this document book:

    “Actually, the Jews, like the Canaanites in general, like the
    Phoenicians and Carthaginians, represent a bastard
    population...”

And it goes on largely upon that theme. Then it goes on:

    “The Jews are arrogant in success, obsequious in failure, shrewd
    and crooked wherever possible, greedy, of remarkable
    intelligence, but nevertheless not creative.”

I do not want to take this Tribunal’s time, but last night we received
an additional order to print 260 copies more of this sort of thing, and
I have had to stop the presses; and we cannot accept the duty of
printing this stuff unless it is reviewed by the Tribunal.

Most of this book, as far as we have been able to check it, has already
been rejected by the Tribunal; and nobody pays the least attention to
the Tribunal’s rejection, and we are ordered to print. Now, with the
greatest deference, I want to say that the United States will print any
document that a member of this Tribunal or an alternate certifies, but
we can no longer print these things at the request of the German counsel
nor at the ill-considered directions which we have been receiving.

DR. THOMA: At the moment I want merely to explain that on 8 March 1946 I
was expressly given permission by the Tribunal to quote excerpts from
philosophical books in my document book. Consequently, I have based my
work on the assumption that Rosenberg’s ideology is an offspring of the
so-called new romantic philosophy and have quoted philosophical excerpts
from serious new romantic philosophical works, works which have been
recognized by science.

Secondly, Your Honors, I have earnestly endeavored not to submit any
anti-Semitic books. What has just been read to me must be simply
translation mistakes.

I have quoted the work of a famous Evangelical theological teacher,
Homan-Harling; and secondly, I have quoted a work of a recognized Jewish
scholar, Isma Elbogen; and, thirdly, I have quoted from an excerpt from
the periodical _Kunstschatz_ written by a Jewish university professor,
Moritz Goldstein. I have deliberately refrained from bringing
anti-Semitic propaganda into this courtroom. I request, therefore, that
the documents quoted by me be investigated to see whether they are
really trash and literary rubbish. I still maintain that the works which
I have quoted were written by American, English, and French
scholars—recognized scholars—and that the quotations which Mr. Justice
Jackson has just read about the bastard race, _et cetera_, come as far
as I know, from non-German scholars. But I should have to look at that
once more. At any rate, may I ask the Tribunal that my compilation of
excerpts be investigated to see whether it is in any way nonscientific
or not pertinent.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal thinks that there must
have been some mistake in sending to the Translation Division this book
of documents without having it presented to Counsel for the Prosecution
first. The Tribunal made an order some time ago, saying that Counsel for
the Prosecution should have the right to object to any document before
it is sent to the translation department.

Some difficulty then arose because documents had been mostly in German.
There was a difficulty about Counsel for the Prosecution making up their
minds as to their objections until they have been translated. That
difficulty was presented to us a few days ago; I think you were not in
court at the time, but no doubt other members of the United States
counsel were here. We had a full discussion on the subject, and it was
then agreed that Counsel for the Prosecution should see Counsel for the
Defense and, as far as possible, discuss with them and point out to them
the documents which Counsel for the Prosecution thought ought not to be
translated, and, in case of disagreement, it was ordered that the matter
should be referred to the Tribunal. So that so far as the Tribunal are
concerned, they have done everything that they can to lighten the work
of the Translation Division. Of course, insofar as documents have been
presented to the Translation Division for translation, which the
Tribunal had already denied, that must have been done by mistake because
the General Secretary’s office, no doubt, ought to have refused to hand
over to the Translation Division any document which the Tribunal had
already denied. But the general principles which I have attempted to
explain seem to the Tribunal to be the only principles upon which we can
go, in order to lighten the work of the Translation Division. That is to
say, that Counsel for the Prosecution should meet Counsel for the
Defense and point out to them what documents are so obviously irrelevant
that they ought not to be translated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if Your Honor pleases, I do not think it is a
mistake. It arises from a fundamental difference which this Tribunal has
not, I think, made clear.

What the issues here are—counsel says that he thinks he should try the
new romanticism of Rosenberg. We are charging him for the murder of 4 or
5 million Jews. The question here is one of ideology. The only purpose
in ever referring to the anti-Semitic sentiments is the motive. There is
no purpose here in trying the question of anti-Semitism or the
superiority of races, the fundamental difference in viewpoint. They
believe—and, of course, if they can try this issue with this Tribunal
as a sounding board, it forwards their purpose—they believe in trying
that issue.

The first thing we get is this book with the order to print it. We
cannot tell when they are going to present something in the document
room. I simply must not become a party to this spirit of anti-Semitism.
The United States cannot do it. And the Tribunal’s directions to counsel
are simply being ignored; that is the difficulty here.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know if you have in mind the order which we made
on 8 March 1946, in these terms:

    “To avoid unnecessary translation, Defense Counsel will indicate
    to the Prosecution the exact passages in all documents which
    they propose to use, in order that the Prosecution may have an
    opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of
    disagreement between the Prosecution and the Defense as to the
    relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will decide
    what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only
    the cited passages need be translated, unless the Prosecution
    require the translation of the entire document.”

Now, of course, if you are objecting to that ruling on principle, well
and good, but the ruling seems to the Tribunal, up to the present at any
rate, to be the best rule that can be laid down, and we reiterated it
after full discussion a very few days ago.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I am calling Your Honor’s attention to the fact
that Your Honor’s order is not being observed and that we are being
given these documents to print without any prior notice. The boys in the
pressroom are not lawyers; they are not in the position to pass on these
things. I do not have the personnel; my personnel, as this Tribunal well
know, is reduced very seriously. I cannot undertake it in the pressroom
here after an order comes from the General Secretary’s office—a review
of what can be done.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, but did you...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The order is not being carried out; that is the
difficulty.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that none of these documents were submitted to
the Counsel for the Prosecution?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The documents were not submitted to Counsel for
Prosecution. They came to the pressroom with an order to print from the
General Secretary’s office. That is what I am arguing, a grievance; one
I shall have to remedy. We are in the very peculiar position, Your
Honor, of being asked to be press agents for these defendants. We were
ordered to print 260 copies of these stencils that I have. The United
States cannot be acting as press agents for the distribution of this
anti-Semitic literature, which we have protested long ago was one of the
vices of the Nazi regime, particularly after they have been argued on
and have been denied by the Court. This, it seems to me, is a flagrant
case of contempt of court, to put these documents through after the
Tribunal has ruled on them and ruled out this whole document book of
Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, so far as these documents have been denied,
they ought never to have been submitted to the translation department.
Might not the Tribunal hear from Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, because he was
here on the previous occasion, the last occasion that we dealt with this
subject?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: May it please Your Lordship, my understanding of
the matter is that the Rosenberg documents had been processed—that was
what we were informed—before our last discussion of the matter, and I
therefore suggested to the Tribunal that the practical application of
the proceeding should begin with the documents of the Defendant Frank.
That is what I said to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Then my recollection is that, after we made this rule of
8 March 1946, Counsel for the Prosecution—I think all four prosecutors,
and I rather think the document came in signed by the United States, but
I am not certain of it—pointed out that there were great difficulties
in carrying out this ruling of 8 March, because of the difficulty of
Counsel for the Prosecution making up their minds about what documents
were irrelevant, having regard to the fact that they had to be
translated for them to do it. Is that not so?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That difficulty arose with Dr. Horn over the
Ribbentrop documents.

THE PRESIDENT: But a written application was made to the Tribunal to
vary this rule of 8 March 1946, and it was then after that that we had
the subsequent discussion in open court when we came to the conclusion
that we had better adhere to the ruling of 8 March 1946. And I see from
Rosenberg that the documents, these documents, had been processed
already beforehand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Since our last discussion, of course, we have
been trying to get this procedure going. Dr. Dix has met Mr. Dodd and me
on the Schacht documents, and I understand that other learned Defense
Counsel are making arrangements to meet various members with regard to
theirs. But before this time, before the matter arose sharply on the
Ribbentrop documents, there had not been any discussion with Counsel for
the Prosecution. That is the position.

THE PRESIDENT: But what I am pointing out is that that was because the
Prosecution were not carrying out the rule of the 8th March 1946. It may
have been impossible to carry it out, but they were not carrying it out.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know exactly how Your Lordship means,
“The Prosecution were not carrying it out.”

THE PRESIDENT: Both the Prosecution and the Defense, I suppose; because
the application which came to us after the ruling of 8 March 1946 was
made on behalf of the Prosecution that they had such difficulties in
getting translations for the documents that they proposed another
ruling.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if we have not carried it
out. It is the first time that anybody suggested this to me...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean to criticize you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We all have taken immense trouble. Everyone
co-operated in every way. I was not aware that we were at fault; I am
very sorry if we were.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not mean that, Sir David, but I think there was a
difficulty in carrying this out, and I think there was a proposal that
the rule should be varied. I will look into that and see whether I am
right about it. I remember seeing such an application, and then we had
the subsequent discussion in open court in which we decided to adhere to
this rule of 8 March; and no doubt this difficulty has arisen, as you
pointed out, because of the Rosenberg documents’ having been processed
before.

Probably the best course would be now...

[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]

Mr. Justice Jackson, wouldn’t the best course be for you to object in
writing to all the documents which you object to, and then they will be
dealt with by the Tribunal after argument.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But, Your Honor, the Tribunal has once rejected the
documents, and yet we get an order to print. The Tribunal’s orders are
not being observed, and—I do not want to criticize counsel—but we have
had no opportunity to pass on these. These stencils that I stopped
running last night are not anything that has been submitted to us. They
have no possible place in the legitimate issues of this Tribunal, and we
will get nowhere talking to Dr. Thoma about it. He thinks their
philosophy is an issue.

What I think must be done here, if we are going to get this solved, is
that the Tribunal—if I may make a suggestion, which I do with great
deference; I may be a biased judge of what ought to be done; I never
pretended to complete impartiality—that the Tribunal name a master to
represent it in passing these things. We won’t finish this by discussion
between Dr. Thoma and anybody I can name. My suggestion is that an
official pass on these documents before they are translated. If the
master finds a doubtful matter he can refer it back to you. We should
not be in the position either of agreeing or of disagreeing with them in
any final sense, of course. I realize it is too big a burden to put on
the Tribunal to pass on these papers in advance and too big a burden on
the United States to keep printing them. Paper is a scarce commodity
today. Over 25,000 sheets have gone into the printing of a book that has
been rejected. I think there is no possible way except that a lawyer
with some idea of relevance and irrelevance represents this Tribunal in
passing on these things in advance, rather than leaving it to counsel.

I would not even venture to sit down with Dr. Thoma, because we start
from totally different viewpoints. He wants to justify anti-Semitism. I
think it is not an issue here. It is the murder of Jews, of human
beings, that is an issue here, not whether the Jewish race is or is not
liked by the Germans. We do not care about that. It is a matter of
settling these issues.

COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): With
the Tribunal’s permission, I would like to add a few words to what Mr.
Jackson has said.

I do not wish to criticize the counsel either, but the Tribunal has
already said that there may possibly be a mistake. And I would like to
draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that this mistake took
place too often. I will permit myself to remind you about the documents
in connection with the Versailles Treaty, which were rejected by the
Tribunal in the most decided manner as not relevant; the Tribunal will
remember also that a considerable amount of time was spent in listening
to the reading of the documents presented by Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Horn.
And I would like to remind the Tribunal about another fact, when another
decision of the Tribunal was violated. Perhaps it was done by mistake;
perhaps not. It took place when one of the documents which was presented
by Dr. Seidl was published in the papers before it was accepted by the
Tribunal as evidence. And it seems to me that it would be very useful if
the Tribunal could, for the purpose of saving time, guarantee more
effectively that the rules set out by the Tribunal should be obeyed, not
only by the Prosecution, who always follow them carefully, but also by
the Defense Counsel.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma?

DR. THOMA: I am very much disconcerted by the reproach that I have not
followed the instructions of the Tribunal. During discussions regarding
which documents were admissible, I explained in detail just which
philosophical works I want to quote from and why. It has been stated
during the case for the Prosecution, that Rosenberg invented his
philosophy for the purpose of aggressive war and for the committing of
war crimes, _et cetera_. I considered it my duty to prove that this
so-called national...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you tell the Tribunal where the Prosecution states
that he invented his philosophy, whether in the Indictment or in the
presentation?

DR. THOMA: I can prove it. It appears in the Churchill speech; and also
in the speech by Justice Jackson there are similar expressions that
Rosenberg’s philosophy had led to that.

THE PRESIDENT: You say it appears in Churchill’s speech?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What have we got to do with that? I asked you whether the
Prosecution alleged it in the Indictment or alleged it in the course of
the presentation of the Prosecution, and you answer me that Mr.
Churchill...

DR. THOMA: No, it is not Churchill, but rather Mr. Justice Jackson. In
his presentation he said things, the sense of which was about the same.
Consequently I felt that it was my duty to present to the Tribunal that
philosophy which, before Rosenberg, raised similar arguments and which
is indeed the philosophy of the entire world.

Regarding the presentation of the document book, the following happened:
The Translation Division asked me to submit my document book without
delay, as they had time at the moment to deal with it before it was
handed to the Tribunal. So the Translation Division actually received
this document earlier than the Tribunal. But the Tribunal in their
resolution of 8 March 1946 had expressly given me permission to use
quotations from these philosophical works; they refused me only the
anti-Semitic works of Goldstein, Elbogen, and Homan-Harling.
Consequently I immediately informed the Tribunal that documents were
contained in my document book which had not been granted me.

And now, Your Honors, something of great importance: I have just
ascertained that the quotation which Mr. Justice Jackson has just read
comes from a French research scholar, Mr. Larouche.

Secondly, I have marked with red pencil those passages in my document
book which were to be translated. The passage quoted by Mr. Justice
Jackson was not marked in red and was not meant to be included in the
document book. This is a regrettable error.

Thirdly, I should like to refer to the fact—my attention has just been
called to this—that the passage reads literally, “Rosenberg developed
the philosophical technique of the conspiracy and thus created an
educational system for an aggressive war.” That was the expression in
Mr. Justice Jackson’s presentation. I therefore felt justified in
pointing out that this entire philosophy was already in the air and was
a philosophical necessity which had to make its appearance. I therefore
believe that I have cleared myself of the accusation of not having
obeyed the ruling of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, were these documents sent to the
pressroom or were they sent to the translation department?

DR. THOMA: In my opinion, they were sent to the Translation Division,
since this department had told me that they had time at the moment, but
expected a terrible rush soon. I had my document ready and I gave it to
the Translation Division.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson stated apparently that they had been
sent to the pressroom and were being disseminated to the public in that
way, but on the outside of each document book there is this notice that
they are not to be publicized until they are presented before the
Tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as
evidence. Therefore, any documents which are sent to the translation
room are not disseminated, or ought not to be disseminated to the press
and ought not to be publicized until they are presented before this
Tribunal.

There seem to be a number of misunderstandings about this which seem to
have arisen principally from the fact that you submitted your documents
to the translation department before they had been submitted to the
Tribunal, and therefore some of them got translated which were
subsequently denied by the Tribunal. Is that right?

DR. THOMA: No, Your Honors, that is not right. First of all, this was
actually a matter of internal procedure in the various offices of the
Translation Division. I gave the Translation Division this document book
because they asked me to do so, and then...

THE PRESIDENT: I did not say who had asked whom. I said that the
translation department got the documents for translation. They received
them before they were submitted to the Tribunal, and, in consequence,
they translated certain documents which were subsequently denied by the
Tribunal.

DR. THOMA: The only rejected works were, as is known, the three
anti-Semitic works. That these documents from the courtroom reached the
press I naturally did not know. I was merely trying to lighten the work
of the Translation Division. I subsequently informed the General
Secretary that I had submitted the document book and I referred him to
it. The quotations from my philosophical works, however, were granted to
me later. I want to point out again that I was always of the opinion
that this was an entirely internal matter and that these documents could
by no means reach the press. I was not informed about that. I am very
well aware that quotations not read in court are not supposed to reach
the press. I have adhered to that rule. Nothing has as yet been stated
in court and therefore it should not reach the press.

THE PRESIDENT: As you no doubt know, the first granting of documents
when they are applied for is expressly provisional, and afterwards you
have to submit your documents in open court, as Dr. Horn did, and then
the Tribunal rules upon their admissibility; and this other rule was
introduced for the purpose of preventing undue translation. It was
decided then that after the Tribunal had given its provisional ruling as
to what was provisionally relevant, you should then submit the passages
you wanted to quote, to the Prosecution Counsel to give them an
opportunity to object, so that the translation department should not be
unduly burdened. That, as you have explained and as Sir David
Maxwell-Fyfe has said, was not carried out in your case, partly
possibly, because, as you say, the Translation Division was prepared to
undertake certain work. Therefore, documents were submitted to them
which the Tribunal subsequently ruled to be inadmissible.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: May I correct something which has led to
misunderstanding? I did not mean to say that counsel had sent the
documents to the press in the sense of a newspaper press. They were sent
to the press, the printing press. They were, of course, printed. The 260
copies we were ordered to print contained the usual release notice that
they were not to be released until used. They have not reached the
press, and I did not mean to say that they had been sent to the
newspaper press; they were sent to our printing press.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Dix?

DR. DIX: Your Honors, before a resolution is made to the matter under
discussion, I should like to make just a few remarks, not referring to
the case of Rosenberg but to the Defense in general. Very serious
accusations against the entire Defense have been raised. The expression
was used that the Prosecution was not the press agent of the Defense.
The accusation was raised that the Defense were trying to make
propaganda, and then these accusations reached their peak in the most
serious charge which one can possibly make in reference to a participant
in a trial, that of contempt of Court.

In the name of all Defense Counsel I oppose these heavy accusations with
the best and strongest argument possible, that of an absolutely clean
and pure conscience in this respect. Anyone who has listened to the
debate of the last 30 minutes must have recognized that the differences
of opinion, which have cropped up here and on which the Tribunal will
now have to announce a decision, are due again to misunderstandings
which have occurred in this courtroom.

Mr. Justice Jackson has generously made it clear that he was not talking
about the newspaper press when he said “press,” but about the printing
press. My colleague Dr. Thoma has stated that the only reason why these
documents went to the Translation Division, was the fact that the
Translation Division, very understandingly and reasonably from their
point of view, had said, “We do not have very much work at the moment.
Please let us have it, and we can start to translate it.” I believe that
we could avoid all these difficulties if we mutually agree that both
parties, the Prosecution and the Defense, are working with good will and
loyalty, and that the thought of deliberately disregarding the rulings
of the Tribunal is far from us. Errors and mistakes can always happen.
May I just remind you that this leakage of news to the press, that some
announcements were released to the press before they were actually the
subject of proceedings here in court, that that was something that
happened quite frequently at the beginning of the Trial. I do not want
to mention examples since the Tribunal knows that it was not the
Defense. I do not know who it was; at any rate it was not the Defense.
But I make no charges. Things like that do happen, and such an apparatus
as this Trial must have a breaking-in period. There was no ill will at
that time either. But I remind you that it was we, the Defense—I was
the spokesman—who quite energetically supported the ruling that only
such matters should reach the press as had been introduced into the
record here in the public sessions, and that it was after that that the
Tribunal passed its ruling. Previously it had been different.

I never considered that an insult, but rather merely the God-given
dependence of human beings. For instance, it was impossible for me to
get the Charter, the basis of our Trial, at the beginning of the Trial,
but eventually it was graciously placed at my disposal by the press.

Thus whenever so complicated an apparatus is set in motion, there are
naturally many errors and mistakes. But we have now already begun with
Sir David to deal with questions of documents in the most practical
manner possible. As long as we had only the German text, we conferred
with the Prosecution in order to find out what passages the Prosecution
believe they can object to. There were technical difficulties,
linguistic difficulties, as long as we had only the German text and the
Prosecutors spoke other languages. I spoke to the Prosecution, and we
realized the problem confronting the other partners. But that, too,
could be solved with good will; when necessary we used an interpreter.
Thus it was an excellent and a practical method, first, for saving the
Translation Division unnecessary work and, secondly, for saving the
Tribunal unnecessary decisions. And it was working beautifully; it had a
good start. I want to claim for the Defense—and I am sure that Sir
David will not contradict me—that this was really our idea as well as
the practice to co-operate in coming to an unofficial agreement
beforehand by conferring with the Prosecution.

The Defense in this Trial are in a very difficult position. I think
every one of you will admit that human ability and an almost exceptional
degree of political tact is required in order to defend in this Trial
without ever making some small mistake. At any rate, I, for myself, do
not claim that I am absolutely sure of myself in this respect or that I
will not perhaps commit some small faux pas. We find ourselves in a very
difficult situation, difficult as far as the world is concerned,
difficult as far as the Tribunal are concerned, and difficult as far as
the German public is concerned.

May I urge Mr. Justice Jackson to appreciate our difficult task and not
to raise such accusations as those which, unfortunately, we often have
to read in the German press. We cannot always, when we are attacked in
newspaper articles in which unjust accusations are raised against us,
run to the Tribunal and say, “Please help us.” The Tribunal have more
important tasks than that of continuously protecting the Defense.

However, as to the particular accusation that National Socialist
propaganda or that anti-Semitic propaganda is being made here, I think I
can say, with a clear conscience, that none of the Defense Counsel, no
matter what his own philosophy or what his political views in the past
may have been, has ever dreamed of trying to use this courtroom to make
ideological propaganda for the dead—I emphasize the word “dead”—world
of the Third Reich. That would not only be wrong; it would be worse than
a wrong; I might say, using Talleyrand’s words, that it would be
unbearable stupidity to do a thing like that.

But, just because we are being attacked and because we cannot defend
ourselves, and because we cannot decently ask the Tribunal to protect us
against every accusation, I am asking Mr. Justice Jackson to clear the
atmosphere somewhat and to state to us that these serious
accusations—contempt of Court, anti-Semitic propaganda, or National
Socialist propaganda, and so forth—were not really meant to be raised
seriously.

I think that the friendly co-operation which has existed between us and
the Prosecution so far—I must openly confess that I look back to this
co-operation with gratitude and that I wholeheartedly acknowledge the
help and comradeship which these gentlemen have shown me. This should be
preserved. Where would it lead us, if we were to oppose each other here
like fighting cocks in the cock-pit? We are all pursuing the same aim.

Not only do I ask him to do this but, knowing him as I do, I am sure
that even without my request he will make a statement in order to clear
the atmosphere in regard to this accusation which is extremely painful
not only for the Defense but also for the entire Court.

May I thank you, Your Honor, for being good enough to listen to me for
so long; but I believe that the matter was sufficiently important to
call for further co-operation, without friction and in the interest of
the cause, between the Prosecution and the Defense.

DR. THOMA: Your Honors, I ask to be permitted a few words in order to
make a factual correction.

I should like to quote exactly in which passage it becomes apparent that
Rosenberg is being held solely responsible for the mistaken ideology. It
says in the presentation of the case for the American Prosecution, on
Page 2254 (Volume V, Page 41) of the German transcript, that Rosenberg
remodeled the German educational system in order to expose the German
people to the will of the conspirators and to prepare the German nation
psychologically for a war of aggression. That is a quotation which is
here at my disposal.

Secondly—one word more, I am forced to reply in person to the
accusation raised by Mr. Justice Jackson—I must state something which I
should normally not have said in this courtroom, namely, that I have
told Herr Rosenberg repeatedly, “Herr Rosenberg, I cannot defend your
anti-Semitism; that, you have to do yourself.” For that reason I have
limited my documents considerably, but have considered it my duty to
place at Rosenberg’s disposal every means necessary for him to defend
himself on this point.

I should like to draw your attention once more to the fact that this
passage which has been quoted by Mr. Justice Jackson was not marked in
red in the document book and has been included by error.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I certainly do not want to be unfair to our
adversaries; I know they have a very difficult job. However, I hope the
Tribunal has before it—and I shall withdraw all characterizations and
let what I have to say stand on the facts—the order of 8 March 1946,
Paragraph 3 thereof. I call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact
that that reads, “The following documents are denied as irrelevant:
Rosenberg...” And then follows a list of documents: _Kunstwart_,
_History of the Jews in Germany_, _History of the Jewish People_. Those
are the only three that I shall take time to call to your attention.

Two days after that order Rosenberg’s counsel filed with this Tribunal,
on 10 March 1946, a rather lengthy memorandum in which he renewed his
request for quotations from the books listed.

On 23 March 1946, this Tribunal again denied that request as irrelevant.

I will now hand to you the stencils which we were ordered, by the order
of 8 April 1946, to print. They are a little difficult to read. The
first is a quotation from the _History of the Jewish People_, one of the
prohibited books. The next is a quotation from _Kunstwart_, another of
the prohibited documents. And the third is from the _History of the Jews
in Germany_, the third of the books that I have mentioned.

We have not had time to examine all of these stencils, but a hurried
examination of them indicates that they are very largely, if not
entirely, quotations from the prohibited documents.

I will make no characterization of it; I simply rest on those facts.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, doesn’t the whole point turn upon
the date at which those documents were submitted to the translation
department? Because what Dr. Thoma says is that in consequence of the
translation department’s being ready to accept documents, he handed them
in before they were actually denied by the Tribunal. And if that is so,
it would be obvious, would it not...

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: My Lord, I do not know what he said. I did not
understand that they were handed in before 8 March 1946. But in any
event, even if they were translated, the order to us to print is dated 8
April 1946 and was delivered with them on 8 April. Now certainly there
was time after the denial to have stopped our spending of money and
effort printing things that had been prohibited, and which were
prohibited twice.

I will not characterize it; the facts speak for themselves.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, can you help us about the dates at all? Can
you help us as to this? Mr. Justice Jackson has stated that after these
three documents had been refused in the first instance, you then renewed
your request for them on 10 March 1946 and that on 23 March 1946 they
were finally denied.

Well now, when did you send the documents to the translation room?

DR. THOMA: The documents, I believe, were given to the Translation
Division before 8 March. There was a session regarding the admissibility
of documents; and it was about that time, before a decision had been
made, that the Translation Division had been in touch with my secretary
and asked her to hand in the document book, since they had heard that it
was ready.

I then endeavored in this courtroom to have the philosophy admitted and
had the impression that the Tribunal would not want to agree to these
documents. Thereupon I once more submitted a written application to the
Tribunal in order to have these documents admitted. When I was then
informed that the anti-Semitic books would not be permitted—and that
was a few days after the date of this decision—I informed the Tribunal
that I wanted to draw their attention to the fact that books which had
not been approved were being translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, quite naturally, you are not able to give us
the exact dates at this moment, but we will look into this matter fully.

DR. THOMA: I should like once more to draw your attention to the fact
that I myself pointed out that there are excerpts in the document book
which had been refused. I beg you to draw from that the conclusion that
I was not trying to do anything which was not permissible.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, if the document had been denied, the proper
course would have been to withdraw the documents from, or to communicate
with the Translation Division notifying them that they should be
withdrawn.

However, the Tribunal thinks that the best course in this matter would
be for the Tribunal to consider Mr. Justice Jackson’s suggestion. That
is, in order to relieve the Prosecution of the task of deciding or
objecting to the documents which are to be submitted to the translation
rooms, that matter should be considered by somebody deputed by the
Tribunal as a master.

The Tribunal thinks that Mr. Justice Jackson or the prosecutor’s
committee should apply in writing to strike out all the irrelevant
documents of which they complain in the document book on behalf of the
Defendant Rosenberg, which has been submitted.

Third, for the present the Tribunal would adhere to the system which
they have established with the consent of the prosecuting counsel.

The only thing I need add to that is that I find that I was right in
saying that the Court Contact Committee of the Prosecutors did apply to
the Tribunal on 29 March 1946—I have the document before me—requesting
the Tribunal to vary the ruling which they had made, namely, Ruling 297,
made on 8 March 1946.

DR. THOMA: I actually visited the officer and told him that the
documents must be taken out, that they must not stay in. However, it
transpired that hundreds of copies had already been bound and prepared
and I was told, “Well, after all, they are not going to be quoted, so
they might as well stay in since they are not going to be quoted.” I
expressly made the request to have them taken out of the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I did not mean that the Tribunal were asking
the Prosecution to apply in writing to strike out documents which have
already been rejected. Those documents, of course, will go out without
any application; but if and insofar as there are other documents
contained in the Rosenberg document book to which the Prosecution
object, then they might conveniently apply, although, of course, that
matter will have to be discussed in open court.

As I have already pointed out, the granting of any documents is
expressly provided to be provisional, and the application for the final
admission of the documents has to be made in open court.

The Tribunal will have a report made to it by the General Secretary as
to these dates and these matters. And now the Tribunal will adjourn for
10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have come to the conclusion that it will
save time if the defendants are called first as the first witness in the
case of each defendant; and, therefore, in the future the defendant must
be called first unless there are some exceptional reasons, in which case
defendant’s counsel may apply to the Tribunal and the Tribunal will
consider those reasons for calling the defendant in some position later
than first witness.

Yes, Dr. Dix.

DR. DIX: Witness, I had started to say that it had been pointed out to
me that I had asked my questions too quickly after you had given your
answers and that you were answering too quickly after I had put the
question. The interpreters cannot follow, nor can the stenographers. I
ask you, therefore—and I shall do the same—to pause after each
question. I am sure that the Tribunal will not interpret these pauses as
meaning that you are not sure of your answers.

Yesterday you made detailed statements to the Tribunal regarding the
various applications for resignation which Schacht presented to Hitler
and regarding various moves and proposals for peace which Schacht made
or wanted to make, orally or in writing, during the war to be delivered
by you to Hitler. We were speaking about such a memorandum of the summer
of 1941, and I had the feeling that the Tribunal have procedural
objections because I was putting the contents of the document to the
witness and having him confirm them. The copy of this document is in the
strong box which has already been mentioned repeatedly and which was
confiscated on Schacht’s estate by the Red Army when the Red Army
marched in. Despite all efforts the Russian Delegation have not yet
succeeded in getting this strong box.

Although some rather good passages are contained therein, I am perfectly
willing to break off here and to put these questions to Herr Schacht if
the Tribunal would prefer that. May I have the Tribunal’s decision on
this question; if necessary I can cease to discuss the memorandum any
further.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal had no objection to your asking this witness
about it, but they thought you ought not to put a leading question and
that you ought to ask the witness if he remembers the document and what
the contents of the document were; not to put to him that it was such
and such in the document or some other passage in the document, but just
to ask him what the contents of the document were.

DR. DIX: The dividing line between leading questions and putting the
contents of a document to the witness, a document which the witness does
not remember exactly, is rather fluid. Therefore, I should prefer to
have Herr Schacht give the rest of the contents of the memorandum; then
we would avoid these difficulties. I shall therefore leave this point
and proceed to another field.

Witness, you quite correctly stated yesterday in answer to a question in
connection with the defense of Funk by my colleague, Dr. Sauter, how it
was the practice in 1939, that Hitler simply decreed that the Reichsbank
would have to give so much credit. I want to avoid a mistaken impression
on the part of the Tribunal as to the former position of the Reichsbank
in regard to this question.

You know that by Hitler’s decree, the Reichsbank in January 1939 lost
its former independence. In this decree Hitler ordered that he would
decide what credits the Reichsbank would have to give; and this
restricted decree of Hitler’s was announced and became effective as a
law in June 1939.

Therefore, in order that the Tribunal get a proper impression of the
general and also of the former position of the Reichsbank, I am asking
you how the situation was before January 1939, that is, during Schacht’s
term in office as Reichsbank President, which ended, as is known, in
January 1939. Was it possible at that time for Hitler simply to decree
that so much credit was to be given, or was the Reichsbank still
independent and could it refuse such credit or cancel it?

LAMMERS: I do not remember the legal regulations which existed in this
connection to such an extent that I can give a complete answer as to
when and how they were altered. I can confirm one thing, however; that
is that during the period when Herr Schacht was President of the
Reichsbank he must have made certain difficulties for the Führer with
reference to the granting of these credits. I was not present at the
discussions between the Führer and Schacht, but I know from statements
made by the Führer that regarding those credits he met with considerable
difficulties and restraints on Schacht’s part, restraints which finally
brought about Schacht’s resignation from his position as President of
the Reichsbank. On the other hand, I know that at the moment when Funk
became President of the Reichsbank, these difficulties ceased to exist.
These were obviously removed by legal regulations and also by orders
which the Führer had given; for when Funk became President of the
Reichsbank, these credits were simply handled in the way which I
described yesterday, when I described the technical procedure; in the
main orders for credits and Reich loans from the Reichsbank were merely
a simple matter of signature for the Führer. They were a matter...

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think he is able to answer your question,
really. I do not think he is able to answer the question which you put
to him, which was as to the position before 1939, so I think you must
rely upon the decrees and documents.

DR. DIX: One moment, Herr Lammers: I shall clarify that right away. You
have just stated how things were handled in practice in 1939, in the
books. Do you not remember that the Reichsbank had previously been
independent as far as the Government was concerned?

LAMMERS: Yes, I do remember. I also recollect that certain legal
alterations were made, but I cannot remember just when. Without seeing
the law books I cannot tell you exactly the contents of these legal
regulations, just what the limitations were in terms of figures. All I
do know is that the position of the President of the Reichsbank was
later reduced considerably according to orders coming from the Führer.

DR. DIX: That is enough. Now, as to the same subject: It is very
difficult even for a German who has lived here the whole time but
particularly for a foreigner, to understand the powerful machinery of
the Third Reich. I think that in spite of the statements that you made
yesterday in answer to the questions which my colleague, Sauter, put to
you, not everything has yet been said and that you can say still more to
inform the Tribunal. If I did not know what you know, if I were an
outsider, then your statements of yesterday would give me the
impression: Well, it was like this—the Reich Minister of the Interior
could not give orders to the Police; the Reich Minister of Economy did
not direct economy independently; all Reich Ministers were without
official authority and could not give instructions as far as the Reich
commissioners for the occupied territories were concerned.

MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I respectfully suggest that Dr. Dix is
really testifying here. I think perhaps he could put his questions more
simply and we can get along faster and get the answer better.

DR. DIX: I shall put my questions more precisely, but I cannot put that
question precisely unless I first of all ascertain, by means of
statements, what has not yet been said up to now. Otherwise the most
precise and shortest question cannot be put, for the Tribunal would not
understand what I am aiming at. I can assure Mr. Dodd, I shall not ask
anything of an uncertain nature; rather I shall put a very precise
question. Let us proceed at once.

[_Turning to the witness._] We have already talked about the office of
the Reichsbank President. Now I should like to ask you: If all these
ministers were so hampered in respect to their authority, who were the
men and who were the authorities who could interfere in departmental
jurisdiction and who held the real power? That is my question. And I
might mention that as far as Frank is concerned, Himmler’s interference
has already been mentioned. But we must go into that question more
deeply so that the Tribunal can see clearly what we are talking about.

LAMMERS: The infringement on the authority of the individual ministers
arose because of the number of institutions which the Führer had created
obviously quite consciously as a counterpoise, I might say, to the
various ministers. That is the one faction. Secondly, it was done
through offices created on a higher level, which, in the interest of a
certain uniformity in particular fields, were to have sole authority. In
the last category the typical example is, in the first instance, the
Four Year Plan. In this connection the Führer desired a comprehensive
unified direction which was not to depend on the wishes of the ministers
of the departments, and consequently, he created the Four Year Plan. In
other sectors, in some way or other, the minister was confronted with a
counterpart; for instance, by the appointment of Herr Ley as Reich
Commissioner for Housing the Minister for Labor lost his jurisdiction in
the important field of housing. He was relieved of one of his main
duties by the appointment of the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor, Herr Sauckel, in the field of labor employment. As
far as economy was concerned, the Minister of Economy, as I have already
mentioned, was considerably limited in his powers by the setting up of
the Four Year Plan and the powers given to it and later, in addition to
that, by the powers which were transferred to the Minister for Armament
and War Production. In the Ministry of the Interior the actual authority
of the Chief of the German Police...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal thinks that once the general aspect
of the matter has been explained by the witness the matter can be
explained by the defendants themselves from their particular point of
view. I mean the witness is now explaining to us, and probably
indicating he will do it at some length, that with reference to the Four
Year Plan, for instance, there was to be a unified command which was not
to be interfered with by individual ministers. That explains the general
system and when it comes to the individual defendants they can explain
how it applied to them, and, therefore, we do not want this dealt with
at any great length or in any great detail.

DR. DIX: I shall take that into consideration and ask merely a few more
concrete questions.

It is not merely a question, Your Lordship, of the ministers having had
to hand over certain fields in their departments to third persons, but
there is also the fact that third persons, because of their authority,
actually interfered in a field which was really under the jurisdiction
of the minister. And now I shall give the witness a lead: What was, for
example, the position of Reichsleiter Bormann?

LAMMERS: The Reichsleiter Bormann was a successor to Reich Minister
Hess.

DR. DIX: And as far as interference in the ministries is concerned?

LAMMERS: He was appointed secretary to the Führer by the Führer and was
thereby directly included in the State sector. As Chief of the Party
Chancellery he was merely the successor to Reich Minister Hess, who was
supposed to represent the wishes and ideas of the Party. The fact that
he was appointed secretary to the Führer, which meant that in the State
sector a considerable number of things would have to go through
Bormann’s hands gained him a strong position in the State affairs. I had
to experience this personally to a large extent, since I, who originally
had at least been able, on occasion, to report to the Führer alone,
could no longer do that and could get to the Führer only by way of
Bormann. Most of my reports were given in Bormann’s presence and
everything which I formerly had been able to dispatch to the Führer
directly, even pure and simple matters of State, had now to go through
the Secretary of the Führer, through Bormann.

DR. DIX: This resulted, of course, in Bormann’s influence in the various
ministries?

LAMMERS: Yes, he had that influence, for all departmental matters which
I could not settle by reporting them to the Führer directly or by asking
for his decision had to be made in writing and had to go through
Bormann. I would then receive word from Bormann saying this or that is
the Führer’s decision. The possibility of a personal report, which would
have enabled me to speak on behalf of the minister for whom I was
reporting, was lacking. They were not my own affairs; they were always
complaints or protests or differences of opinion among the members of
the Cabinet which I finally could no longer take to the Führer
personally.

DR. DIX: Thank you, that is enough.

And what you say about Bormann, does that not apply to some extent to
the Gauleiter, too, who also interfered in the ministries?

LAMMERS: Gauleiter as such, had, of course, to go through the Party
Chancellery; that was the prescribed channel for them. Since the
Gauleiter as a rule, however, were at the same time heads of Prussian
provinces or Reichsstatthalter these two positions were, of course,
somewhat mixed up; and a number of matters, instead of going through the
prescribed channels from the minister concerned and through me, went
directly from the Gauleiter to Reichsleiter Bormann. There are, in fact,
cases where this channel was chosen deliberately.

DR. DIX: Thank you. Regarding the position of Himmler in the same
respect, that of the appointment of a third person with authority, you
made statements yesterday in connection with the cases of Frank and
Frick. Can your statement be extended, in fact, to all leading
ministries, with reference to the increased power given to Himmler and
the SS and his Police?

LAMMERS: I did not quite understand the question.

DR. DIX: You did not hear the question?

LAMMERS: I did not understand the question completely.

DR. DIX: Well, under the heading “interference with other departments”
you have talked about Bormann and you have talked about Gauleiter;
yesterday you talked about Himmler, his Police, and his SS with
reference to the cases of Frick and Frank. I am now asking you whether
this increasing power of Himmler’s and the SS did not similarly affect
the other ministries?

LAMMERS: To a considerable extent in the most varied fields.

DR. DIX: That exhausts that question.

I am now coming back to Schacht. We have talked about the applications
for resignation. Now we come to the actual dismissal. Ministers who were
dismissed were usually given a letter of dismissal by Hitler?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. DIX: And this letter of dismissal, I assume, was drafted by you and
discussed with Hitler?

LAMMERS: Yes.

DR. DIX: Was considerable attention paid by Hitler to the wording of
this letter of thanks on the occasion of a dismissal?

LAMMERS: Hitler usually looked at it carefully and he frequently made
his own improvements, a sharper or a milder wording.

DR. DIX: The two letters of dismissal, Your Honors, which concern
Schacht’s dismissal from his office as President of the Reichsbank and
as Minister without Portfolio are included in my document book as
evidence. Therefore I do not propose to put them to the witness to any
extent. There are only two sentences I propose to quote in the letter of
dismissal from Hitler to Schacht on the occasion of his dismissal from
his position as President of the Reichsbank: “Your name particularly
will always be connected with the first period of national rearmament.”
Schacht considered that this sentence was written deliberately and that
it contained a slight reprimand, a limitation of the praise he was
getting. What is your view to this question, as one concerned in the
drafting of that letter of dismissal?

LAMMERS: As far as I can recollect, I drafted the letter in such a way
that a general expression of thanks was made to Schacht. This additional
sentence is due to a personal insertion by the Führer, as far as I can
recollect, because it was not like me to make such a subtle difference
here.

DR. DIX: In a later letter of dismissal of 22 January 1943, not signed
by Hitler, but by you by order of the Führer it is said:

    “The Führer, with regard to your general attitude in this
    present fateful struggle of the German people, has decided to
    relieve you temporarily of your office as Reich Minister.”

Herr Schacht’s feeling regarding his personal safety could not have been
exactly pleasant when he read that sentence.

May I ask you, since you drafted this letter on Hitler’s order, was
Schacht’s anxiety unjustified?

LAMMERS: As to the reasons which caused the Führer to dismiss Schacht, I
know merely that a letter from Schacht to Reich Marshal Göring caused
the Führer to dismiss Schacht from his position. The Führer did not
inform me of the actual reasons. He was very violent and ordered me to
use this text, implying that he even wanted it to be somewhat sterner,
but I put it in the rather acceptable form which you find in this
letter. The Führer did not tell me, of course, what further measures
were intended against Schacht. But he had expressly ordered me to use
the word “temporarily.”

DR. DIX: A last question: Originally I had intended to ask you in
detail, as the person best informed on these points, about the slow
development from the year 1933 until Hitler’s complete autocracy. The
answers which you gave to my colleagues yesterday have, in the main,
settled these questions. I do not want to repeat them. But two questions
I should like to have clarified. The Enabling Act of 1933—that is the
law by which the Reichstag deprived itself of its powers—did this law
empower Hitler, the Reich Cabinet, or the Reich Government?

LAMMERS: This Enabling Act gave legislative powers and the right to
alter the Constitution to the Reich Government, and the Reich
Government, in turn, used this power to alter the Constitution, both
expressly as well as by implication, by creating public law based on
usage which...

DR. DIX: Yes, thank you. You explained that yesterday. You do not need
to go into that again. Yesterday you pointed out that this Reich
Government consisted not only of National Socialists but that the
majority of their members belonged to other parties. You mentioned only
members of the German National Party, such as Hugenberg, Dr. Dorpmüller,
and Gürtner, and you mentioned the Stahlhelm, the head of which was
Seldte; but you forgot—and that is why I am asking you—to mention the
Center Party. Is it true that Herr Von Papen came from the Center Party?

LAMMERS: Yes, I admit that is correct; but I do not know whether Herr
Von Papen was a member of the Center Party or not.

DR. DIX: In my opinion you talk in rather scholarly and euphemistic
terms about public law based on usage. I am going to give it a different
name, but let us not discuss that. All I want you to tell me is whether
during that gradual development toward complete dictatorship by Hitler,
there were some other laws which were important and, as such,
significant?

Do you not consider the law after Hindenburg’s death which unified the
offices of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President with the result
that the incumbent of this office became simultaneously the supreme
military commander to whom the Wehrmacht swore their oath—do you not
consider that law a further milestone in that development?

LAMMERS: That law was one of the most important milestones in this
development, particularly because, by decree of the Reich Government, it
was confirmed by a plebiscite with nearly 100 percent votes.

DR. DIX: And no further laws were issued to support this development?

LAMMERS: No, I do not know of any.

DR. DIX: Nor do I.

And the other question is whether a combination of terror and ruse can
be called public law based on usage and whether one should want to call
it that. That is a question I do not want to raise at the moment; I
think we are of different opinions in that connection.

Your Lordship, I have now finished my questions to the witness Lammers
on behalf of my client. But my colleague Dr. Kubuschok is away on duty.
I do not think the airplane took off yesterday and therefore I do not
think that he can be back. He asked me to question the witness on behalf
of Herr Von Papen, and I wanted to ask the Tribunal whether I may ask
the witness the question now—there is only one short question—or
whether I should wait until Papen’s defense comes up at the proper time.

THE PRESIDENT: No, now, because this witness will not be called again
except for some very exceptional reason.

DR. DIX: No, I meant, did you want me to ask the question later today,
when Von Papen’s turn comes in the proper sequence of defendants?

THE PRESIDENT: You may go on now. I think you had better ask it now.

DR. DIX: [_Turning to the witness._] Please call to mind the Röhm
Putsch. Papen’s experiences during that revolt will be discussed later.
But do you remember that Von Papen, who was Vice Chancellor at the time,
demanded his dismissal from Hitler on 3 July 1934, and received this
dismissal?

LAMMERS: Yes, I cannot tell you whether the date is right, but it
happened right about that time.

DR. DIX: Do you also remember whether a short time afterwards, probably
only a few days afterwards, between 7 and 10 July, you went to see Herr
Von Papen by order of Hitler and asked him whether he was prepared to
accept the position of Ambassador to the Vatican?

LAMMERS: I can remember that I visited Von Papen and, acting on the
Führer’s order, was to give him the prospect of another position and
that this concerned a position with the Holy See. But whether I had been
ordered to make him a direct offer, that I cannot recollect now.

DR. DIX: Do you remember what Papen replied to that?

LAMMERS: At that time he was not very much inclined to accept such a
position.

DR. DIX: Thank you. I have no further questions.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Defendant Sauckel): Witness, on 21
March 1942 Sauckel was appointed Plenipotentiary for Allocation of
Labor. What were the reasons for Sauckel’s being chosen for this
position?

LAMMERS: The Führer was of the opinion that the allocation of labor had
not been pushed with the necessary intensity by the Reich Minister for
Labor and that this task would, therefore, have to be transferred to a
particularly energetic person.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Führer demand the use of foreign workers with
particular emphasis?

LAMMERS: He demanded that all laborers who could possibly be made
available should be used.

DR. SERVATIUS: Particularly with reference to foreign laborers?

LAMMERS: Yes, foreign countries were also mentioned in that connection,
because at home we had exhausted all possibilities.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive the assignment of informing the highest
offices in the occupied territories of the demand that they do their
best to support Sauckel’s task?

LAMMERS: That happened very much later. First the appointment of the
Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor took place and was announced to
all important offices. I do not think I added any particular demand to
that. But at the beginning of 1944 a conference took place at the
Führer’s headquarters dealing with the program of labor allocation for
the year of 1944. At the end of that conference, during which Sauckel
had been given a number of injunctions expressed in definite figures, I
had the task of writing to all offices concerned and telling them that
they should support the task Sauckel had just been given, with all the
powers at their disposal.

DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking about a meeting at the beginning of
January 1944. An extensive report which you prepared on that is
available. According to this report, Sauckel said during that meeting
that with regard to the number of foreign laborers he would find it
difficult or perhaps even impossible to fulfill the demands made by the
program. What was the reason he gave for that?

LAMMERS: The statement is correct, and the reason he gave was that the
executive power necessary for the carrying out of that task was lacking
in the various sectors. He said that if he were to fulfill his task,
then under all circumstances he should not have to rely on a foreign
executive power, as, for instance, was the case in France, but that
there must be a German executive power which supported his actions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he not talk about the fact that fulfillment of the
demand was impossible because of the danger of the partisans?

LAMMERS: He pointed out these difficulties repeatedly, namely, the
partisan danger; and it was regarded as self-evident that no recruitment
of labor could be carried out by him in territories where the partisans
were still fighting.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he demand the pacification of these agitated partisan
territories and demand executive powers in that connection?

LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did he wish to have the authorities protected against
these resistance movements?

LAMMERS: Yes, he wanted the local office to take action, so that he
would have a free hand to work.

DR. SERVATIUS: I am quoting one sentence from the report, and I want you
to explain to me how that is to be understood. There it says:

    “The Reichsleiter of the SS explained that the forces at his
    disposal were extremely small, but that he would try by
    increasing them and by using them more intensively to win
    success for Sauckel’s actions.”

How is that to be understood?

LAMMERS: That referred mainly to the Russian territories, in which there
were partisans, and Herr Sauckel thought that he could not be active
there unless these territories were cleared up. Himmler, who was
present, promised to do his best, but he had misgivings as to whether
enough police battalions or other forces would be at his disposal.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then it is right to say that it was a question of
safeguarding the authorities, of safeguarding the territories, and not a
transfer of the recruiting to the SS?

LAMMERS: A transfer of this recruiting to the SS, as such, was not
provided. The German executive power demanded by Sauckel referred in
every case to whatever executive power was available. In France, for
instance, it was not the SS but the field command who had to look after
that; and in Russia it was necessary, in part, for the police battalions
to pacify the partisan regions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Now, I have a question regarding the Leadership Corps. A
document has been presented here under Number D-720. It bears the
signature of Gauleiter Sprenger and has no date, but it obviously dates
from the spring or the beginning of 1945. In this letter there is
mention of a new Reich health law, and it is supposed to contain a
ruling on people suffering from heart and lung diseases, who are to be
eliminated. It says that this law is to be kept a secret for the time
being. On the strength of that law these families could no longer remain
among the public and could not produce any offspring. Did you know
anything about that law?

LAMMERS: I did not understand the word. Did you say insane or what sort
of sick people?

DR. SERVATIUS: It is a Reich health law referring to people suffering
from heart and lung diseases.

LAMMERS: I know nothing whatsoever about that law.

DR. SERVATIUS: I did not understand you.

LAMMERS: I know nothing about it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Would you have had to know about it?

LAMMERS: Yes, the Minister of the Interior would have had to know about
it. Health matters were dealt with in his ministry. It never reached me.

DR. SERVATIUS: Thank you. I have no further questions.

DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Witness,
one day after the German troops marched into Austria a law was
published—on 13 March 1938—which has the heading, “Law for the Reunion
of Austria with the German Reich.” Seyss-Inquart and his Government were
surprised by the contents of this law. I now ask you whether you know
the details as to how this law was decreed in Linz on 13 March 1938.

LAMMERS: Like every other radio listener I heard about the march of
German troops into Austria through the radio. And since I assumed that I
might be needed I went to Vienna. At that point the law had already been
signed and published. I did not participate in the drafting of this law;
the Minister of the Interior and State Secretary Stuckart drafted that
law. I did not work on it at all, because I did not even know that this
action was to take place.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did these gentlemen you just mentioned tell you,
perhaps, why this law was published so precipitately?

LAMMERS: It was the wish of the Führer.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. At the same time Dr. Seyss-Inquart was named
an SS Obergruppenführer, not an SS general, as the Prosecution have
stated and in addition the Führer promised him that within a year he
would be made a member of the Reich Government. In 1939 he actually did
become Minister without Portfolio. Did Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as
an SS Obergruppenführer and as Minister without Portfolio carry out any
functions of any kind?

LAMMERS: As far as I know, Seyss-Inquart did not become
Obergruppenführer but Gruppenführer. That was merely an honorary rank
which was given him. He had no authority in the SS and he never served
in the SS, as far as I know. He merely wore the uniform and later he
became Obergruppenführer.

DR. STEINBAUER: In other words, this was purely an honorary rank, a
matter of uniform, as you correctly say?

LAMMERS: Yes, a sort of honorary rank.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you.

One year later Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands, and in the Law Gazette for the Netherlands
_Verordnungsblatt_ as well as in the _Reichsgesetzblatt_, this
appointment was published. Do you know whether, apart from this
published decree which appointed him Reichsstatthalter he was also given
a duty within the framework of the Four Year Plan?

LAMMERS: From the moment of his appointment as Reich Commissioner for
the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart experienced the same limitations of
authority as I described yesterday in connection with Herr Frank and
Herr Rosenberg. In other words, certain powers were held in reserve for
the Delegate for the Four Year Plan who everywhere exercised
comprehensive command powers. To this extent his position was limited
from the very beginning.

DR. STEINBAUER: What was the position of the German police in the
Netherlands? Was the German police directly under the command of the
Defendant Seyss-Inquart or was it under the Reichsleiter SS Himmler?

LAMMERS: The conditions here are exactly the same, or similar, as I
described them yesterday in connection with the Government General. The
Higher SS and Police Leader was at the disposal of the Reich
commissioner but his technical instructions came from Himmler.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you.

Do you, Witness, recollect that at the beginning of 1944 you forwarded
to the defendant, in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the
Netherlands, an order from the Führer according to which he should draft
250,000 workers in the Netherlands, and that Seyss-Inquart refused this?

LAMMERS: This is the letter which I mentioned previously when I was
being asked questions in connection with Sauckel. It is a circular
letter in which everybody was asked to support Sauckel’s action and
individual offices were given orders regarding the numbers of workers
they were to supply. However, I cannot remember whether the number was
250,000 workers in Seyss-Inquart’s case. But I do know that
Seyss-Inquart told me that he had considerable misgivings about getting
the number ordered of him. He wanted to take up these misgivings with
the Führer.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and High Command of
the German Armed Forces): Witness, did Hitler come to power in 1933 with
the help of the Reichswehr, that is, was there any military pressure
employed at that time?

LAMMERS: I myself did not participate directly in the seizure of power.
I cannot tell you, therefore, the exact details. At any rate, nothing is
known to me about the Reichswehr’s having had any influence on the
seizure of power. I assume that if that had been the case one would have
heard about it.

DR. LATERNSER: In 1934 there followed co-ordination of the offices of
the head of the State and Reich Chancellor in the person of Hitler.
Could the military leaders have refused to swear the oath of allegiance
to Hitler without violating a law?

LAMMERS: The law regarding the head of the State was decreed
constitutionally and thereby the Führer became the Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces. Any possibility of resisting did not exist. That would
have been pure revolt; it would have been mutiny.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you ever hear that military leaders made proposals
regarding the starting or the preparation of an aggressive war?

LAMMERS: No, not in the least.

DR. LATERNSER: It is well known that Hitler did not permit military
leaders any influence upon his political decisions. Do you know of any
statements made by Hitler in which he denied the generals the right to a
political judgment?

LAMMERS: From the military point of view the Führer praised the generals
as a group and also individual generals very highly. As far as politics
were concerned, he was always of the opinion that they knew nothing
about politics and that one should, as far as possible, keep them away
from a position where political matters had to be decided.

DR. LATERNSER: It is also known that Hitler would not suffer any
contradiction. Was not that the real reason for Blomberg’s dismissal and
the dismissal of Fritsch and Beck—the fact that they repeatedly
contradicted him?

LAMMERS: Yes, I could assume that such personal differences in the end
did bring about the dismissal of Schacht, Blomberg, Neurath, and
Fritsch. But I was never present at such conferences and I cannot
therefore report what was said. But I do think that they often
contradicted the Führer.

DR. LATERNSER: Did Hitler distrust the generals, particularly those of
the Army?

LAMMERS: One cannot generalize about that. The Führer was rather
reserved in his behavior toward most people. He told each one only what
actually concerned him. If you call that distrust, then this distrust
was present in his relations with almost all ministers and generals, for
nobody was told any more than the Führer wanted him to hear.

DR. LATERNSER: Among the circle of persons who had Hitler’s complete
confidence was there any military leader?

LAMMERS: I do not believe so. I do not know of one.

DR. LATERNSER: Now one last question: What was the reason for putting
most of the occupied territories under Reich commissioners and only a
few of them under military administration?

LAMMERS: As a rule it was the Führer’s wish that occupied territories be
administered by political leaders. He considered generals unsuited for
that task, because he accused them—I might put it this way—of having
no political instinct.

DR. LATERNSER: Was it not the plan to replace the military
administration in Belgium by a civilian commissioner even before 1944?

LAMMERS: That had long been provided for. Preparations had already been
made, but the Führer could not decide to put it in force, because he had
always been told that in the case of Belgium there were important
military reasons for not establishing a civilian administration, since
Belgium might possibly become again a zone of combat. So the decision
was postponed a year and still longer.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MAJOR F. ELWYN JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness,
there is one matter upon which I want to ask you—as to the powers of
Reich ministers under the Constitution of Nazi Germany. It appears, from
your testimony, that they were men with very little authority, or
jurisdiction, or power of command of any kind, that they were men of
straw. Is that so?

LAMMERS: Well, to say no authority goes too far. I mean in respect to
politics...

MAJOR JONES: But, they were of an extremely limited character. That is
what you are saying to the Tribunal, isn’t it?

LAMMERS: In the main they were administrative chiefs in their
ministries. They were not political ministers who were consulted in
regard to large-scale political matters.

MAJOR JONES: Less authority than the ministers of Germany had under the
previous Constitution?

LAMMERS: That, beyond doubt, was the case, for under the former
Constitution votes were taken and the minister could at least give
expression to his authority by voting against something in the Cabinet.

MAJOR JONES: I am now going to put to you some observations which you
yourself made in 1938 about the powers of ministers in the Führer’s
State. I am referring to Document 3863-PS. This is your comment on the
Staatsführer in the Third Reich:

    “From this basic total concentration of supreme power in the
    person of the Führer there results, however, no excessively
    strong and unnecessary centralization of administration in the
    hands of the Führer. In my general elaborations on the basic
    concept of the Führer State I have already pointed out that the
    respect for the authority of the subordinate
    leader”—Unterführer—“by those beneath him forbids interference
    with every one of his individual orders or measures. This
    principle is applied by the Führer in his governmental
    leadership in such a manner that, for example, the position of
    the Reich ministers is actually a much more independent one than
    formerly, even though today the Reich ministers are subordinate
    to the Führer’s unlimited power of command, in respect to their
    entire official sphere and in respect to every individual
    measure and decision on the most trivial matters. Eagerness to
    bear responsibility, resolution, energy, coupled with initiative
    and real authority, these are the qualities which the Führer
    demands above all of his subordinate leaders. Therefore he
    allows them the greatest freedom in the execution of their
    affairs and in the manner in which they fulfill their tasks. He
    is far from exercising petty or even nagging criticism.”

That is a picture of the power of Reich ministers, which is very
different from the picture you are painting to the Tribunal, is it not?

LAMMERS: In my opinion there is not the least contradiction. All I am
saying here is that every minister normally had no say in respect to
large-scale politics. In his own sphere however, he was the supreme
administrative chief. I explained here that as a subordinate leader he
had the widest powers, insofar as the Führer had left him those powers,
and that the Führer did not narrow-mindedly interfere with these powers.
He did not think of doing that. This concerns matters of second- and
third-grade importance; large-scale politics were not discussed here.

MAJOR JONES: You see, your picture of the administration of this vast
State of Nazi Germany is a picture of one man deciding all principal
matters himself out of his own intuitive powers. Is that the picture you
seek to present to this Tribunal?

LAMMERS: Yes. The Minister was the supreme leader in his own sphere and
insofar as he was not limited, he had greater powers than any minister
previously had had, because the Führer did not interfere in small
matters.

MAJOR JONES: In the case of the Defendant Funk, for instance, you say
that he was a small man with no authority, with no influence upon the
decisions of affairs. Is that so?

LAMMERS: Regarding the large-scale political issues he had no authority.
But within his department he had considerable influence. But those were
matters of second- or third-grade importance.

MAJOR JONES: But decisions, but as to profound important economic
questions like the amount of wealth that was to be extracted from the
occupied territories, the Führer’s decisions were based upon the
representations and recommendations of ministers like Funk, were they
not?

LAMMERS: I do not know that. The finance policy in occupied territories
was handled by the Minister for the Eastern Territories or the Reich
commissioners together with the Reich Finance Minister.

MAJOR JONES: But as to decisions on economic matters concerned with the
occupied territories, like recommendations as to occupation costs, as to
the technique of purchasing on the black market, men like Funk had to
give recommendations for determination of policy on these matters, did
they not?

LAMMERS: He co-operated, yes, but he had no authority as Reich
commissioner in the occupied territories. The Reich commissioner was
directly under Hitler.

MAJOR JONES: All these ministers co-operated in their sphere and were
indispensable to the running of this Nazi State, were they not?

LAMMERS: Yes, of course, co-operation was a necessity. This does not
mean that Funk had power to issue orders in the occupied territories. He
certainly had none.

MAJOR JONES: You, so far as Funk is concerned, were concerned with
making quite clear what his position was in the State. Do you recollect
that you were concerned with clearing up the matter as to whether he,
Funk, was directly subordinate to the Führer or not? Do you remember
that?

LAMMERS: Yes, of course Funk, as Minister, was under the Führer.

MAJOR JONES: And he was advising the Führer himself, was he not?

LAMMERS: He very rarely saw the Führer.

MAJOR JONES: But, in the vital sphere of the financing of rearmament,
for instance, he had important decisions to communicate to the Führer
and advise the Führer upon, did he not?

LAMMERS: I do not know to what extent the Führer sent for him for I was
not present at conferences regarding armament credit and rearmament.

MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you one further question regarding
ministerial matters. Ministers without portfolio did continue to receive
communications as to the Reich Cabinet, did they not?

LAMMERS: They received texts of subjects up for discussions.

MAJOR JONES: The Defendant Frank, for instance, was a Minister without
Portfolio?

LAMMERS: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: He continued to receive communications in his capacity as a
Minister without Portfolio?

LAMMERS: He received all the texts which were received by other
ministers, provided there was a general distribution.

MAJOR JONES: And indeed, when he was the Governor General of the
Government General, he maintained a ministerial office to deal with the
incoming matters of the Reich Cabinet?

LAMMERS: Who are you talking about? Frank?

MAJOR JONES: I am now talking about the Defendant Frank, yes.

LAMMERS: Frank had an office in Berlin where ministerial matters were
delivered to him.

MAJOR JONES: So that the Reich Cabinet did not actually meet, but it
continued to exist, did it not?

LAMMERS: The Reich Cabinet existed only for those legislative and
administrative matters which could be handled in writing and by means of
circulating letters.

MAJOR JONES: And the members of the Reich Cabinet, like Frank, continued
to receive communications as to the legislative tasks and performances
of the Reich Cabinet, even though they were not available for
conferences or meetings?

LAMMERS: They got such communications.

MAJOR JONES: I think it is time to break off.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                           _Afternoon Session_

MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you some questions about the
Defendant Frank. Frank is a friend of yours, is he not?

LAMMERS: Frank?

MAJOR JONES: Yes.

LAMMERS: No, I have no very close connection with Frank.

Before answering this question, I would like permission to return to a
document which you submitted to me previously, and which I have just now
been able to finish reading. I would like to say just two sentences in
connection with that document.

MAJOR JONES: If the Counsel for the Defense desire you to return to it,
I have no doubt they will draw your attention to the matter in due
course.

Will you now deal with the question that I put to you on the Defendant
Frank? You say he is not a friend of yours?

LAMMERS: I did not know him particularly well, and I had no closer
relation to him than with any of the other people in the Reich
Government.

MAJOR JONES: Would it be right to say, like yourself, he was one of the
leading Nazi jurists?

LAMMERS: Well, I never really thought of myself as a leading National
Socialist jurist.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you were not a leading jurist, or that
you were not a National Socialist?

LAMMERS: I considered myself in the first place as a lawyer, an expert
on constitutional law, which I have been for many years, in fact, since
the year 1920 and under other governments; then I joined the National
Socialist Party and naturally in my position in the National Socialist
State, I made every effort to propagate the National Socialist idea of
law.

MAJOR JONES: And you have said that so far as Hans Frank was concerned,
he was a jurist who opposed the arbitrary use of power by the Police.

LAMMERS: He did that in some of his speeches; and the Führer did not
approve of these speeches.

MAJOR JONES: He was a man who believed in fair trials, was he?

LAMMERS: What kind of trials do you mean? I cannot hear you; there is
such noise.

MAJOR JONES: Criminal trials.

LAMMERS: I did not hear the word.

MAJOR JONES: He was in favor of fair trials and he resisted, the
arbitrary power of the SS? That is your evidence, is it?

LAMMERS: He told me that repeatedly, and he frequently expressed this
view in his speeches, too.

MAJOR JONES: And you say he was a man who favored a liberal
administration in the territory of which he was Governor General? Is
that so?

LAMMERS: I am sorry, but I cannot follow this. There is so much noise
that I can barely hear half of what you are saying; the other half is
completely lost.

MAJOR JONES: Well, we will try again. Did you ever hear of the “AB
Action,” for which Frank was responsible in the Government General?

LAMMERS: That is an action of which I know nothing at all. Someone
mentioned this name to me about a week ago and said that Frank was
accused of this AB Action. I do not know of any AB Action.

MAJOR JONES: You were getting frequent reports by Frank as to the
administration of his territory, were you not?

LAMMERS: Reports were occasionally sent in.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Frank never informed you about the AB
Action?

LAMMERS: Yes. I do not know what the AB Action is.

MAJOR JONES: I will remind you. It was an action which resulted in the
slaughter of the flower of the Polish race, of the Polish
intelligentsia.

LAMMERS: I know nothing about such an action.

MAJOR JONES: If you will look at the Document 2233-PS, which has already
been exhibited as USSR-223, and which is Frank’s diary, you will see the
history of this action and perhaps you will then remember something of
the circumstances of it.

LAMMERS: What page is that, please?

MAJOR JONES: On Page 8 of the annex to that text. You will see on that
page that the action started on the 16th of May with a conference at
which Frank, the Governor General, and Reich Minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart,
Secretary of State Bühler, SS Brigadeführer Streckenbach, and a Colonel
Müller were present. You will see there that Frank decreed, with
immediate effect, that the task of carrying out an extraordinary
pacification program be given to the Chief of the Security Police, to
commence immediately. The more important details of the action were then
discussed, and Brigadeführer Streckenbach was formally given the
necessary authority by the Governor General. The Governor General
ordered a detailed report to be made on the 30th of May.

Then, I want you to look at Page 2 of that text, at a report of the
conference on the 30th of May, where you, and what is more important,
this Tribunal, may be able to judge what kind of jurisprudence Nazi
jurists believed in.

You will see, on Page 43 of the English text of 2233-PS, a report of the
Police conference on the 30th of May, where Frank and Krüger and others
were present.

LAMMERS: I was never present at these conferences of the Government.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to see how far removed Frank, the apostle of
decency in administration, was from the true Frank that was Governor
General of Poland. You will see there that Frank states, “If I had not
the old Nazi guard of fighters of the Police and SS here in the country,
with whom could we then carry out this policy”? The report, which the
Tribunal is already familiar with, goes on to describe how, now that the
German aggressions in the West were in full swing, it was possible for
Frank to go through with this action against the Polish intelligentsia.

LAMMERS: If the entries in the Governor General’s diary do not agree
with what I gathered from the speeches which he made in public, I cannot
make any comment. I do not know what he said about this. It may be that
many of his speeches contradict other speeches which he made at a
different time. What I said concerned only those speeches of which the
Führer disapproved, to which he objected, and which led to Frank’s being
forbidden to make speeches or to have them printed. I was referring to
those speeches. I cannot say at the moment what other speeches the
Governor General made and what he entered in his diary.

MAJOR JONES: Let us be quite clear. Do you know that the regime of Frank
in the Government General was a murderous one?

LAMMERS: I never heard anything about that.

MAJOR JONES: Did you receive any reports from him, or from other
sources, of misgovernment in the Government General?

LAMMERS: Complaints about misgovernment in the Government General came
in frequently from Frank himself as well as from other departments
against Frank.

MAJOR JONES: Did you have knowledge of the utter ruthlessness of Frank’s
methods in the Government General?

LAMMERS: I only heard half your question.

MAJOR JONES: You were receiving reports from Frank as to what he was
doing in the Government General, were you not?

LAMMERS: Yes. Reports came in frequently and I immediately passed them
on to the Führer as transmit matters. Most of them went to Reichsleiter
Bormann or the adjutant office of the Führer. These were reports...

MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. If you deal with the questions I put to you,
we shall get on much faster, you know. Just answer the question I put,
briefly. I am going to put to you one message which Frank’s diary
indicated that you received. At Page 41 of the English text of Frank’s
diary, there is this entry for the 5th of August:

    “The Governor General sends the following teletype to Reich
    Minister Dr. Lammers:

    “The city of Warsaw is for the most part in flames. Burning down
    the houses is also the surest way of depriving the insurgents of
    hiding places. After this rising and its suppression, its
    deserved fate of complete annihilation will rightfully overtake
    Warsaw or be imposed upon it.”

Do you recollect receiving that teletype?

LAMMERS: To my knowledge this report did come in and was immediately
transmitted to the Führer. However, I was not concerned in the action
itself; that was a military measure and military reports normally went
straight to the Führer. In all probability I passed on this teletype
message not only to the Führer, but probably also to the Chief of the
OKW.

MAJOR JONES: I am not concerned with the action you took in these
circumstances; I am concerned with your knowledge, because you have
denied to this Tribunal, time and time again, that you ever knew
anything of these abominations that were going on under the Nazi regime.
So just deal with the question of your knowledge at the moment.

You have said...

LAMMERS: I know that this report was received...

MAJOR JONES: And that was a characteristic Frank message, was it not?

LAMMERS: And that an annihilation action had been decreed in Warsaw and
that there was fighting in Warsaw. After all, I had no right to give
orders to the Governor General. I could only transmit his report to the
Führer. The report was meant for the Führer and not for me personally.

MAJOR JONES: You say that Frank was opposed to the institution of
concentration camps. That is your evidence, is it not? Is it your
evidence that Frank was opposed to concentration camps?

LAMMERS: Yes. Frank himself told me that in principle he was opposed to
internment in concentration camps, for he agreed with my view that such
a proceeding must at least have a legal basis.

MAJOR JONES: That is what he told you?

LAMMERS: Yes, he told me that. Yes.

MAJOR JONES: Just let me read to you one brief extract from his diary to
show why he disapproved of concentration camps. I am reading from Page
45 of the diary. He is referring to the Polish intelligentsia, and he
says:

    “First, we do not need to deport these elements to the
    concentration camps in the Reich, because then we should only
    have annoyance and unnecessary correspondence with their
    families; instead we shall liquidate matters in the country
    itself.”

Then he goes on to say that:

    “...we do not intend to set up concentration camps in the real
    sense of the term, here in the Government General. Any prisoners
    from the Government General who are in concentration camps in
    the Reich must be put at our disposal for the AB Action, or
    dealt with there. Any one who is suspected here must be
    liquidated immediately.”

That is why Frank opposed the institution of concentration camps. He
believed in immediate murder, did he not?

LAMMERS: It may be that Frank’s diaries and his actions do not agree
with what he told me, but I only know what he told me to be his opinion
of concentration camps. I do not know what he wrote in his diaries nor
do I know what he did in practice, I had no right to exercise
supervision over the Government General.

MAJOR JONES: You have spoken of the battle between Frank and various
other Reich commissioners and Reich ministers and the SS. I suggest to
you that the battle between Frank and the SS Brigadeführer Krüger was a
battle for power, a battle between personalities, and was not connected
in any way with Frank’s desire to see decency and justice determine the
administration of the Government General.

LAMMERS: If you mean that Frank’s statements to me do not agree with his
actions, you must question Herr Frank on the point. I am not responsible
for his actions. I can say only what Herr Frank told me.

MAJOR JONES: You see, you were receiving reports not only from Frank
himself but from the SS, were you not?

LAMMERS: A great many reports came in to me and were passed on in the
routine way, for I was but a channel for such reports. In any case,
reports from the SS in most cases did not go through my office.

MAJOR JONES: You were another of these highly placed post offices on
which the Nazi Reich was founded, were you?

LAMMERS: I am sorry, I did not understand that.

MAJOR JONES: Do you remember communicating with Himmler about the
situation in the Government General?

LAMMERS: Yes, certainly. I know that Himmler would have liked to remove
Governor General Frank from the Government General. He would rather have
had some one else as Governor General.

MAJOR JONES: You submitted a report to Himmler on the strength of a
discussion you had had with SS General Krüger, did you not?

LAMMERS: I cannot recall a discussion with General Krüger at the moment,
unless I am given more exact information as to when it took place.

MAJOR JONES: Will you just look at the Document 2220-PS, which is
Exhibit USA-175. That is your report to Himmler. You will see that that
report is dated the 17th of April 1943, addressed to Himmler, with
reference to the situation in the Government General. I just read some
of it; it has not been read before:

    “Dear Herr Reichsführer:

    “We had agreed at our conference on 27 March of this year that
    written material should be prepared on the situation in the
    Government General, on which our intended mutual report to the
    Führer could be based.”

That was the mutual report of the SS and yourself, and then the next
paragraph reads, “The material...”

LAMMERS: That was a report made on instructions given me by the Führer
to investigate certain complaints made against Frank. A series of
complaints against Frank had been received and the Führer had given
instructions that Himmler and I should investigate the matter. That is
the matter we are concerned with now.

MAJOR JONES: And you and your colleague, Himmler, you see, were actively
interested in this matter. I just want you to look further at this
report. You will see that in the report itself it is headed, in
Paragraph A:

    “The tasks of the German administration in the Government
    General.

    “The German administration in the Government General has to
    fulfill the following tasks:

    “1. For the purpose of guaranteeing the food supply for the
    German people, to increase agricultural production and to
    collect it as completely as possible, to allot sufficient
    rations to the native population occupied with work important
    for the war efforts, and to deliver the rest to the Armed Forces
    and the homeland.”

Then it goes on to deal with the difficulties of extracting sufficient
manpower and wealth from the territory of the Government General for the
benefit of the Third Reich. And then towards the end it deals
specifically with the utilization of manpower, and it is to that
paragraph that I desire to draw your particular attention. Have you
found the paragraph headed, “Mobilization of manpower,” dealing with the
difficulties that the administration in the Government General was
confronted with? I draw your attention to it because it contains this
sentence: “It is clear that these difficulties have been increased by
the elimination of Jewish manpower.”

LAMMERS: Where is that, please?

MAJOR JONES: It is in the paragraph headed, “Mobilization of manpower.”

LAMMERS: Yes, but that is not my report.

MAJOR JONES: But you said that in your covering letter that the
memorandum was checked with SS Obergruppenführer Krüger, who agreed with
it in full. You recollect in your covering letter you indicated that
this memorandum had received your consideration. Now, whether you wrote
that or not, is not the matter that I am concerned with at the moment.
What I want you to explain to the Tribunal is, first of all, did you
appreciate that this report contained the sentence, “It is clear that
these difficulties of manpower have been increased by the elimination of
Jewish manpower?”

LAMMERS: May I please be allowed time to read this document through? I
cannot reply to documents several pages long unless I have read them. I
find it quite impossible; and I ask for time to read this report which
is several pages in length.

MAJOR JONES: You have the time required; but I only want you to concern
yourself with one sentence, you see. You can take it that in the last
paragraph but one of that report there appears this sentence about the
elimination of Jewish manpower, and what I am going to suggest to you is
that...

LAMMERS: No—where is that? I have not read this sentence. I have not
yet found the place. Where can I find it? Is it at the top or at the
bottom of the page? If I may read the whole page, I will find the
sentence; I will need a few minutes for this. Can you give me the
approximate place? This is evidently Krüger’s report and he probably
means the further evacuation of the Jews to the East. I do not know what
you mean by “elimination.” With the best intentions I am not in a
position to give an explanation on the spur of the moment of one
sentence taken out of a context of 14 pages. It is absolutely
impossible.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that elimination of Jewish manpower is to be
translated as emigration of Jewish manpower?

LAMMERS: I do not know. I will have to read the complete document in
order to give you an explanation of the report. There are 14 closely
written pages in it, not written by myself; and I do not know what the
connection is.

MAJOR JONES: You know, do you not, that Hans Frank himself was in favor
of a policy of extermination of the Jewish people?

LAMMERS: I do not know whether he held this view. He told me exactly the
opposite, and as a witness I can only tell you what he said to me and
not what he said elsewhere.

MAJOR JONES: You see, this Tribunal has had read to it extracts from
Frank’s diary in which he says that, “My attitude towards the
Jews...”—and this is found at Page 12 of the German copy—“My attitude
towards the Jews is such that I expect them all to disappear.” And he
says, as to the 3½ million Jews in the Government General, that, “One
cannot shoot them or poison them, but we will be able to take steps in
order to successfully annihilate them. The Government General must
become as free of Jews as the Reich is.”

Are you saying that Frank did not express similar views to you?

LAMMERS: If Frank made these entries in his diary and if he actually did
say that, then it contradicts what he told me. That is all I have to say
on that point.

MAJOR JONES: Did you know that Frank’s diary indicates that on the 9th
of September 1941 there were 3½ million Jews in the Government General
and when he makes an entry on the 2d of August 1943, he says that only a
few labor companies are left? Did you not know that?

LAMMERS: I do not know that this happened because he told me nothing
about it. He himself must account for what he said in his diary. He
himself must establish whether he did it or not. I knew nothing about
these things.

MAJOR JONES: In view of your translation of “elimination” as
“emigration,” Frank says in connection with those millions that this
Tribunal knows were murdered, “All the others have, let us say,
emigrated.” Are you using the word “emigrated” in an equally cynical and
brutal sense as that?

LAMMERS: I am not in a position to comment on Herr Frank’s diary. Herr
Frank himself will have to do that.

MAJOR JONES: You, Witness, were from the beginning of this tale of
terror involved in assisting in drafting legislation towards achieving
the end of racial persecution, were you not? Is that not so? Did you not
put your signature to the Führer’s decree empowering Himmler to carry
out the necessary measures to eliminate from the territory of the Reich
racial elements that you, as Nazi, did not approve?

LAMMERS: I do not recall ever signing anything like that.

MAJOR JONES: Well, I will draw your attention to it. It is Document
686-PS, which is Exhibit USA-305. It is the decree of Hitler to
strengthen German folkdom. That is the title of it. It is dated the 7th
of October.

LAMMERS: Yes, I know of the decree.

MAJOR JONES: I thought it would not surprise you.

LAMMERS: But this says nothing about what you asserted.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first clause of it. It reads:

    “The Reichsführer SS is responsible, in accordance with my
    directives:

    “1. For finally returning to the Reich all German nationals and
    racial Germans abroad;

    “2. For elimination of the harmful influence of such alien parts
    of the population as represent a danger to the Reich and the
    German people.”

Then it goes on with, “Formation of new German settlement districts, by
resettlement...” and it says:

    “The Reichsführer SS is authorized to take the necessary
    measures to carry out his duties.”

You signed that decree, did you not?

LAMMERS: It is correct, but it says nothing about killing Jews. It
speaks of the elimination of a harmful influence exercised by alien
populations. There is no mention of the elimination of aliens, but only
of the elimination of the influence of alien elements of the population;
the removal of a person’s influence does not mean the removal of the
person himself.

MAJOR JONES: Are you, as the head of the Reich Chancellery, the man who
knew all the secrets of the Third Reich, saying to this Tribunal that
you had no knowledge of the murder of millions and millions who were
murdered under the Nazi regime?

LAMMERS: I mean to say that I knew nothing about it until the moment of
the collapse, that is, the end of April 1945 or the beginning of May,
when I heard such reports from foreign broadcasting stations. I did not
believe them at the time, and only later on I found further material
here, in the newspapers. If we are speaking now of the elimination of a
harmful influence that is far from meaning annihilation. The Führer did
not say a word about murder; no mention was ever made of such a plan.

MAJOR JONES: I now want you to turn your attention to the Defendant
Rosenberg. You have told us that the first you heard of several of the
major military operations of the Third Reich, was through the
newspapers. Was it from the newspapers that you heard of the Nazi plans
to invade the Soviet Union?

LAMMERS: I learned of the war of aggression against Russia only when
everything was complete. The Führer never said a word about a war of
aggression against Russia before that. He spoke only of military
complications with Russia which might be imminent, but I did not
interpret that as meaning a war of aggression against Russia.

MAJOR JONES: Did you know that the war between Nazi Germany and the
Soviet Union was a defensive war on the part of Nazi Germany?

LAMMERS: The Führer never told me anything except what I have already
stated here, that troop concentrations had been observed which led us to
the conclusion that military complications with Russia might be
expected. “I want to be prepared for any eventuality, and therefore Herr
Rosenberg is to deal with Eastern questions.” That was all I heard and I
was completely unaware of the fact that a war of aggression was to be
waged against Russia.

MAJOR JONES: Just one minute.

LAMMERS: From various incidents it could be inferred that we had to
expect an attack; at least, it was represented to us in that way, as far
as we were informed.

MAJOR JONES: But you—you know, Witness, that as early as the 20th of
April 1941 Hitler was planning and plotting the details of action
against the Soviet Union. Just look at Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143,
will you? That, as you will see, is a decree of the Führer, dated the
20th of April 1941, and let me remind you that the invasion of the
Soviet Union by Nazi Germany did not take place until the 22d of June.
On the 20th of April you signed that decree in which Hitler named
Rosenberg as “My Commissioner for the central control of questions
connected with the East European region.”

LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct. I have never testified to anything else.
That was the assignment, the first assignment which Rosenberg was given,
and on this occasion the Führer spoke of possible military complications
with Russia and granted Rosenberg his authority.

MAJOR JONES: Just a minute. Answer the question I am putting to you at
the moment. You can give your explanations later. You look further down
that Document 865-PS. You see it is a letter from you to Keitel, dated
the 21st of April, in which you say:

    “Herewith I am sending you a copy of a Führer decree of the 20th
    of this month by which the Führer appointed Reichsleiter
    Rosenberg as his Commissioner for the central control of the
    question of the East European region. In this capacity,
    Reichsleiter Rosenberg is to make all the necessary preparations
    for a possible emergency with the greatest speed.”

Are you saying that these activities of yours and Rosenberg, at that
time, were not connected with aggressive plans on the part of Nazi
Germany?

LAMMERS: I most certainly will not say that. By an emergency the Führer
meant, as I said before, that the Führer believed that there might be
war with Russia. That was the emergency which led to Rosenberg’s
assignment. There is not a word here about a war of aggression and,
indeed, there was no question of it.

MAJOR JONES: You know that Rosenberg was in communication with other
government departments of the Third Reich, in connection with this
preparation for aggression against the Soviet Union, weeks before the
invasion took place; do you not?

LAMMERS: Whom is he supposed to have influenced? I did not hear whom he
is supposed to have influenced.

MAJOR JONES: Perhaps I was not understood. He was collaborating with
other departments of the Third Reich weeks before the invasion happened.

LAMMERS: He may have worked with other departments in carrying out his
assignment, but I do not know to what extent or with what purpose. Nor
do I know what other assignments he was given by the Führer.

MAJOR JONES: At least you do know that Hitler made clear to Rosenberg
before he took office, what the main principles of Nazi policy towards
the conquered territories of the Soviet Union was to be, do you not? You
attended the conference of Hitler on the 16th of July 1941, when he set
out his principles and aim with regard to the Soviet Union?

LAMMERS: This happened after the outbreak of war but not before it.
Previous to this, there was never any discussion about a war of
aggression in my presence.

MAJOR JONES: You said that Rosenberg was a man who believed again in
liberal treatment for those whom the Nazi armies conquered, but you were
at Hitler’s conference in July 1941, in the very first weeks of this
man’s responsibility, and you heard Hitler in that conference
enunciating a program of terror and brutality and exploitation, did you
not?

LAMMERS: On 16 July Herr Rosenberg had already raised objections to it.

MAJOR JONES: But they were doubts which did not cause him to leave his
post and he continued until the Red Army made his position somewhat
uncomfortable in the East, did he not?

LAMMERS: Yes, but he always followed principles of moderation. I have
discussed Rosenberg’s activities only generally. I cannot testify to all
the special measures which he took and I can but tell you what Rosenberg
told me, the complaints he made to me personally and what he described
to me as his aims. If he acted at all differently, I know nothing about
it.

MAJOR JONES: You were familiar with the conflict between Rosenberg and
Koch, the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, were you not?

LAMMERS: Yes, I know all about that. Rosenberg was always in favor of
moderation and reasonable application of all political measures. Koch
inclined towards a more radical solution.

MAJOR JONES: When you say a “more radical solution,” what do you mean by
that, “mass murder”?

LAMMERS: No, I do not mean that at all.

MAJOR JONES: But you did in fact know that Koch was a murderer, did you
not?

LAMMERS: That Koch was a murderer?

MAJOR JONES: Yes.

LAMMERS: I do not know the particulars. I had no control of it.

MAJOR JONES: I will just draw your attention to them. Look at the
Document 032-PS, which will be Exhibit GB-321, the document which has
not yet been exhibited. That is a report dated the 2d of April 1943,
from Rosenberg to Himmler, with a copy to you. It is a report on the
murder of the people of the Zuman wooded area so that there could be
established a place for Reich Commissioner Koch to hunt in.

LAMMERS: I know of this complaint and I even submitted it to the Führer.
Herr Rosenberg explained that Reich Commissioner Koch had had a large
wooded area cleansed of all towns and villages too because he wanted to
hunt there. That was submitted by Rosenberg to the Führer as a
complaint.

MAJOR JONES: And this word “cleansed”—does that mean emigration or does
that mean murder?

LAMMERS: “Cleanse” means to free the area.

MAJOR JONES: I do not want you to shut this document. I just want you to
look at this document because you have denied knowledge that Koch was a
murderer. In Paragraph 2 of the report you see this:

    “I have just received the following report from an old Party
    comrade who has worked for 9 months in Volhynia and Podolia with
    a view to preparing to take over a district commission or a main
    division in the General District of Volhynia and Podolia. This
    report reads:

    “‘On orders from the highest quarters, steps were taken to
    evacuate the whole district of Zuman. Germans and Ukrainians
    both stated that this was done because the entire wooded area of
    Zuman was to become a private hunting ground for the Reich
    Commissioner. In December 1942, when it was already bitterly
    cold, the evacuation was begun. Hundreds of families were forced
    to pack all their belongings over night and were then evacuated
    a distance of over 60 kilometers. Hundreds of people in Zuman
    and its vicinity were shot down with the aid of an entire police
    company, because they had communist sympathies. None of the
    Ukrainians believed this...’”

Have you not found it, Witness? Because I want you to follow this, you
see. Have you found it?

LAMMERS: No, I have not found it yet.

MAJOR JONES: It is very difficult to follow these embarrassing parts of
the document, you know.

LAMMERS: Yes, I have found the place.

MAJOR JONES: I will read the last sentence, in order to refresh your
memory as to these murders:

    “‘Hundreds of people in Zuman and its vicinity were shot down
    with the aid of an entire police company, because they had
    communist sympathies. None of the Ukrainians believed this; and
    the Germans were also puzzled by this argument, because even if
    this was done for the security of the country, it would, at the
    same time, have been necessary to execute elements infected by
    communism in other regions. On the contrary it is flatly
    maintained all over the country that those men were ruthlessly
    shot down without trial simply because the evacuation was too
    extensive and could not possibly be carried out in the short
    time at their disposal and because, in any case, there was not
    enough space available at the new spot where the evacuees were
    to be settled.’”

Do you mean to say that after reading that report you did not know that
Koch was a murderer?

LAMMERS: On receiving that report I did everything in my power. The
report was immediately submitted to the Führer, and if it is true, I
admit it was murder; but I do not remember this report just now. If he
killed these people, he is a murderer; but I am not Herr Koch’s judge.

Rosenberg complained very bitterly about this matter and it was
immediately passed on to the Führer.

MAJOR JONES: Rosenberg continued in office with this man as one of his
commissioners, did he not?

LAMMERS: The Führer asked Bormann and myself to decide; and he tried to
console Rosenberg. Rosenberg tried to resign repeatedly but was not able
to do so.

MAJOR JONES: I want to turn to another territory so that you can give
further information to the Court as to the conditions in the occupied
territories because what I am putting to you generally, you see, is that
the battles that were going on there were battles between ruthless men
struggling for power and that there was totally absent from this scene
of Nazi control any person who was pressing for human decency, pressing
for human pity. You were not pressing for either of those things, were
you?

LAMMERS: I did not hear; what would I not initiate? There are continual
disturbances on this channel. Will you please repeat the question.

MAJOR JONES: You, in the situation in which you found yourself, were not
acting on the side of human decency in this regime, were you?

LAMMERS: I was always on the side of human decency and pity. I have
always done such things. I have saved the lives of perhaps one to two
hundred thousand Jews.

MAJOR JONES: All you did was to forward annihilation reports to the
Himmlers and Bormanns and Hitlers, was that not so?

LAMMERS: I never transmitted annihilation orders.

MAJOR JONES: There is one matter which went through your hands relating
to the Defendant Keitel and the ruthless policy that Terboven was
carrying out against the Norwegian people. I draw your attention to the
document...

LAMMERS: I only asked Herr Keitel to define his point of view and I
objected to the Führer against the shooting of hostages. My subordinates
can vouch for that.

MAJOR JONES: I just want to draw your attention to Document 871-PS,
which will be Exhibit GB-322, which is a letter from Keitel to yourself
and is related to the report by Terboven in Document 870-PS, which my
learned friend Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe put in in connection with the
Defendant Keitel.

Now, you will see that that letter, 871-PS, is a letter from Keitel to
yourself and it says in the first paragraph:

    “In connection with the problem of checking sabotage in Norway,
    I agree with the view of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied
    Norwegian territories to the extent that I expect results from
    reprisals only if they are carried out ruthlessly and if Reich
    Commissioner Terboven is authorized to have the offenders shot.”

LAMMERS: I submitted that to the Führer expressing at the same time my
views on the shooting of hostages; and my representations to the Führer
were successful.

MAJOR JONES: You were successful in what respect?

LAMMERS: The Führer, in a discussion in which Terboven participated,
expressly stated that the shooting of hostages was not to take place on
the scale he and some others wanted. Hostages were to be taken only from
the offenders’ intimate circle.

MAJOR JONES: So the effect of your intervention was that the murders did
not take place on the scale that Terboven wanted to commit them, did it?

LAMMERS: Yes, Terboven wanted hostages shot on a large scale but the
Führer did not approve of that and I objected to every shooting of
hostages. The officials of the Reich Chancellery know that and can vouch
for it.

MAJOR JONES: And as a result...

LAMMERS: Yes, it is true that I received this letter. Matters took the
following course: First I received Terboven’s request and then I wrote
to Field Marshal Keitel and told him that I intended to submit
Terboven’s request to the Führer. I asked him to comment on it. Then the
teletype came from Keitel and the request was submitted to the Führer.

Terboven’s request was watered down. The Führer took the position that
the most important thing was to apprehend the miscreants and hostages
were to be taken, only in case of necessity. There was no mention of
shooting them.

MAJOR JONES: Witness, you know perfectly well that over all the
territory where Nazi power ruled hostages were taken, fathers and
mothers were killed for the actions of their sons against the Nazi
regime. Are you saying you do not know that?

LAMMERS: No, I did not know that for I was not the controller of the
occupied territories and I have never been there myself.

MAJOR JONES: But you were receiving regular reports from there and you
were the link between the ministers of the occupied territories and
Hitler. Just a minute—you were the link between the—now will you
please listen to my question? You were the link between the ministers of
the occupied territories and Hitler, were you not?

LAMMERS: Not in all cases. A great many of them went through Bormann,
especially Terboven. My subordinates in the Chancellery can vouch for
that. Terboven constantly avoided sending his reports through me and
sent them through Bormann.

MAJOR JONES: You were working hand in hand.

LAMMERS: Yes, I had to collaborate with him.

MAJOR JONES: You were working hand in glove with Bormann, you know, were
you not?

LAMMERS: Yes, I had to work with him.

MAJOR JONES: You had to work with him? You were the head of the Reich
Chancellery.

LAMMERS: In order to submit proposals to the Führer I had to work
through Bormann. I had to collaborate closely with him in order to have
the sanction of the Party in countless instances where the sanction of
the Party was prescribed, and for that reason I was forced to work
closely with Bormann.

MAJOR JONES: Did you find it distasteful to work with Bormann?

LAMMERS: I did not find it distasteful. It was my duty to work with him.

MAJOR JONES: Of course I am suggesting to you, you see, that the power
which you and Bormann exercised was very great.

LAMMERS: Yes; it was also exercised in a very one-sided manner; for
Bormann could see the Führer every day and I could see him only once
every 6 or 8 weeks. Bormann passed on to me the Führer’s decision and
had personal interviews with the Führer, but I did not.

MAJOR JONES: You were seeking to the very end to maintain your
collaboration with Bormann, were you not?

LAMMERS: I had to work with Bormann; that was the only way in which
certain things could be brought to the Führer’s notice at all. During
the last 8 months of the Führer’s regime I had no interviews with him
and I could only achieve through Bormann the things which I did
accomplish.

MAJOR JONES: You wrote to Bormann, you remember, as late as the first of
January 1945, a letter, Document D-753(a), Exhibit GB-323.

LAMMERS: Yes, I remember. The letter contains—I can tell you that from
memory without reading the letter—my complaints about the fact that I
was no longer admitted to the Führer’s presence and said that this state
of affairs could not go on any longer.

MAJOR JONES: And you say in that letter in the last paragraph but one:

    “For our former harmonious co-operation has for a long time been
    a thorn in the flesh of various persons who would like to play
    us off one against the other.”

That is the last paragraph but one of your letter, right at the end of
it.

LAMMERS: Where is the place?

MAJOR JONES: The last paragraph but one of your letter, the last
sentence but three.

LAMMERS: The sentence before the last?

MAJOR JONES: The one before.

LAMMERS: “In conclusion I would like to say,” is that the paragraph you
mean?

MAJOR JONES: The sentence before that, “For our former harmonious
co-operation...”

LAMMERS: Yes, but I would like to add that at the end I repeated my wish
for our cordial personal relations and I repeat that it was a New Year’s
letter and when I write to some one wishing him luck for the New Year, I
cannot write that things went badly the year before; so in order to
maintain cordial relations I say that everything went well.

MAJOR JONES: You were not seeking to shift responsibility in this matter
to Bormann. You were the link between the occupied territories and
Hitler.

LAMMERS: I was; but not exclusively, only for matters of secondary
importance. The Reich commissioners were directly responsible to the
Führer.

MAJOR JONES: I want to ask you some questions now, not about terror
which existed in the territory that Germany conquered, but about the
terror in Germany itself. You have testified as to the Defendant Frick
that as Minister of the Interior he was in effect a man without power, a
man of straw. That is the rough effect of your evidence, is it not?

LAMMERS: I said that he had no influence on the Police.

MAJOR JONES: Did you not know that appeals against arrests in
concentration camps went to Frick?

LAMMERS: Yes, many cases were referred to Frick.

MAJOR JONES: Do you know whether he exercised his power in any
substantial way for the victims who were in those camps? Did you not
hear my question?

LAMMERS: I cannot hear it all; I can hear about half of what you say.
Other voices keep on interfering on my channel. Perhaps I had better
take the earphones off.

MAJOR JONES: No, put them on. Just try again, just put them on, will
you? Put your earphones on, will you and just try—patiently, you see, a
little patience.

Is it not a fact that Frick was the person to whom petitions for release
from concentration camps went?

LAMMERS: Frick received such petitions, of course; but a great many
petitions of that kind came to me, too; and I took care of them. I
treated them as petitions to the Führer. They were given careful
attention and I frequently secured the release of certain people in this
way.

MAJOR JONES: But what did Frick do in his capacity as having authority
in these matters?

LAMMERS: Frick often passed on such complaints to me to be reported to
the Führer. It is impossible for me to know what he did with all the
other complaints.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to listen to an affidavit by a Dr. Sidney
Mendel, a Doctor of Law, which is Exhibit GB-324 (Document Number
3601-PS). He says that he is a Doctor of Law, that until the end of 1938
he was a member of the Berlin Bar and admitted as an attorney-at-law to
the German courts. His legal residence is now 85-20 Elmhurst Avenue,
Elmhurst, L.I., State of New York.

In his capacity as attorney he handled numerous concentration camp cases
in the years 1933 to 1938. He remembers distinctly that in the years
1934 and 1935 he approached, in several cases, Frick’s Reich Ministry of
the Interior as the agency superior to the Gestapo for the release of
concentration camp inmates. Frick’s Ministry had special control
functions over concentration camps.

The deponent further states that he informed the Ministry about illegal
arrests, beatings, torture, and mistreatment of inmates, but the
Ministry declined the release and upheld the decisions of the Gestapo.

That was Frick’s attitude towards these matters, was it not?

LAMMERS: I really do not know what steps Frick took with regard to
complaints received. You will have to ask Dr. Frick.

MAJOR JONES: But you have testified on his behalf, you see—of Frick. If
you now say you know nothing about him, then I shall not trouble you
further with the case of the Defendant Frick; but you gave evidence for
him, you know.

LAMMERS: I could only speak generally on his attitude on the Police but
I cannot possibly know what steps he took in regard to letters which he
received.

MAJOR JONES: You said that in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
Frick again was a man without power. That was the effect of your
evidence, was it not?

LAMMERS: I said then that he was mainly a decorative figure. That does
not mean that he received no petitions or requests; but I do not know
what he thought fit to do.

MAJOR JONES: You say he was a decorative personality. That is a matter
of taste. But one of his functions, at any rate, was that he was the
person to decide whether death sentences in his territory were carried
out or not. That is not a small matter for the human beings in the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, you know.

LAMMERS: Yes, please delete the word “decorative.” I mean more
decorative than active, like the head of a state, for instance, who
usually deals with certain matters only. Frick was in that position. He
was the head of the German organization and had authority to remit
sentences. That was a very important matter, of course; I do not doubt
it.

MAJOR JONES: You know, Witness, perfectly well that it was within
Frick’s power to reprieve the death sentences that were being carried
out in the territory of Bohemia and Moravia, do you not?

LAMMERS: Yes, certainly that was in his power; there is no doubt about
it.

MAJOR JONES: And I suggest to you that Frick did not exercise clemency
or influence by moderation, but on the contrary enforced brutal means
against the victims of Nazi administration in that unfortunate part of
Europe.

LAMMERS: Frick was empowered to use his own judgment in the matter of
remitting sentences. I do not know on what principle he based his
actions.

MAJOR JONES: You were concerned with Frick and the Ministry of Justice
in the drafting of penal laws against Poles and Jews in the annexed
Eastern territories, were you not?

LAMMERS: There was a proceeding pending at the Ministry of Justice at
one time; and the Ministry of Justice corresponded with me, but I
believe nothing ever came of the matter.

MAJOR JONES: You had no part in the drafting of that legislation, did
you?

LAMMERS: No, I am not acquainted with it. I believe no special law was
issued; as far as I remember, it was left to the Gauleiter to establish
laws. I do not know.

MAJOR JONES: The laws were left to the Gauleiter, to the Kochs and the
Franks and the Rosenbergs; is that what happened?

LAMMERS: No, we are talking about the provinces of West Prussia and of
Posen now; that is what our correspondence was about.

MAJOR JONES: I now want you to answer some questions about Sauckel.

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn for 10 minutes?

MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lammers, can you hear what I say?

LAMMERS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you kindly try and answer the questions after
they have been put to you and not break into the questions? Try and wait
for a moment until the questions have been put because the interpreters
and the reporters are finding it very difficult to take down what you
say and to interpret what you say.

MAJOR JONES: I want to deal with your relations, for the moment, with
Seyss-Inquart. You were receiving reports from him as to his
administration in the Low Countries, were you not?

LAMMERS: It was like this: Every three months or so, a general report
was sent in and then passed on to the Führer. We also received
individual reports.

MAJOR JONES: And in the Low Countries, as elsewhere, you know that the
object of German administration was to extract and exploit that
territory for the German advantage as much as possible, do you not?

LAMMERS: Our aim was naturally to make use of the occupied countries for
our war production. I know nothing about any orders for exploitation.

MAJOR JONES: To reduce their standard of living, to reduce them to
starvation, that was one of the results of the Netherlands policy. You
knew that, did you not?

LAMMERS: I do not believe that we went as far as that. I myself had
friends and relatives in Holland and know that people in Holland lived
much better than we did in Germany.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at the Document 997-PS, which is already
Exhibit Number RF-122, which consists of a letter which you sent to
Rosenberg, the defendant, enclosing a report given to you by Stabsleiter
Schickedanz to the Führer, together with a report delivered by Reich
Commissioner Dr. Seyss-Inquart, about the period from May 29 to July 19,
1940. If you look at Page 9 of your text, Page 5 of the English text, of
997-PS, you will see there is a first statement of the outlines of
German economic policy in the Low Countries. You will see the paragraph
is marked on your copy, so that your difficulty of finding where these
passages are, might be eliminated. You see it reads, “It is necessary to
reduce consumption by the population...”

LAMMERS: It goes without saying that in wartime consumption by the
population must be reduced. There is no intention of gaining supplies
for the Reich.

MAJOR JONES: Just one moment and I will read out the passage to you:

    “It was clear that with the occupation of the Netherlands a
    large number of economic and, in addition, police measures had
    to be taken. The first of these were intended to reduce the
    consumption of the population in order, partly to gain supplies
    for the Reich and, partly, to secure a uniform distribution of
    the remaining stocks.”

That is a very concise statement of the economic policy that
Seyss-Inquart was pursuing towards the Dutch people, is it not?

LAMMERS: Yes, it is also a very reasonable policy. Supplies had to be
reduced in order to distribute them equally and to gain some for the
Reich. In any case, the report is not mine but was made by Herr
Schickedanz, and I do not know if it is correct.

MAJOR JONES: But the object of this reduction of consumption of the
population was to benefit the Reich so that the territory of the Low
Countries should be robbed in order that the Reich should profit. That
was the whole policy, was it not?

LAMMERS: That is certainly not here. It says here, firstly, that
supplies must be acquired for the Reich; and secondly, that the various
supplies must be equally distributed; that means among the Dutch people.
There is not a word about a policy of exploitation.

MAJOR JONES: If it please the Tribunal, they have the document and can
read the language in which it appears.

[_Turning to the witness._] I want you now to turn your mind to the
Defendant Sauckel. You, Witness, knew quite well of the vast program of
enslavement of the people conquered by the Nazi forces that Sauckel was
engaged upon, did you not?

LAMMERS: I have seen Sauckel’s program and also the regulations he drew
up to enforce it. I did not have the impression that it was a program of
slave labor. Sauckel was always very kind and very moderate in his views
and he made every effort to recruit the necessary quotas of foreign
workmen by means of voluntary enlistment.

MAJOR JONES: Are you suggesting that you thought that the millions of
foreign workers that Sauckel dragged into the Reich came there
voluntarily?

LAMMERS: They did not all come voluntarily. For instance, they came from
France through a compulsory labor law introduced by the French
Government. They did not come voluntarily but due to a measure decreed
by the French Government.

MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at one of the first reports that you
received from Sauckel on his labor program. It is Document 1296-PS,
Exhibit Number GB-325. It starts with a letter from Sauckel to you dated
the 29th of July 1942:

    “Dear Reich Minister,

    “I enclose for your information a copy of a report to the Führer
    and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich. Heil
    Hitler! Yours faithfully”—signed—“Fritz Sauckel.”

LAMMERS: Yes, this report must have reached me.

MAJOR JONES: Yes. And you must presumably have examined it, did you not?

LAMMERS: Yes, not now; it was submitted to me for information.

MAJOR JONES: And you examined it at the time?

LAMMERS: I assume that I read it, that I glanced through it quickly. It
was of no further interest to me.

MAJOR JONES: You will see in the first page of the report itself that it
indicates, for instance, that in the period from April to July 1942,
which was the first period of activity of Sauckel as Plenipotentiary
General for Manpower, he had obtained a total of 1,639,794 foreign
workers, and of those you see that 221,009 were Soviet Russian prisoners
of war. You saw that, did you not?

LAMMERS: I probably read it. I had no reason to object to it. Sauckel
was not under my orders. He was really under the Four Year Plan, as the
signature here shows; but for all practical purposes he was immediately
under the Führer. He sent the reports straight to the Führer, and the
only reason why I myself did not pass this report on to the Führer was
because I knew that the same report had reached the Führer via
Reichsleiter Bormann. Otherwise I had nothing at all to do with this
matter.

MAJOR JONES: But you knew perfectly well that it was wickedly wrong, did
you not, to compel soldiers that had been captured in battle to go to
work against their own country?

LAMMERS: It was Sauckel’s job to arrange that with the offices with
which he worked. I never bothered about this question. That was a matter
for Sauckel to arrange with the appropriate departments, with the
Wehrmacht, and possibly, in respect to international law, with the
Foreign Office. Moreover, I see no mention of prisoners of war here.

MAJOR JONES: I do not want to suggest that you are...

LAMMERS: I have not yet read anything about prisoners of war.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first page of the report. There is no
mystery about this, you know. You can read German perfectly easily.

LAMMERS: Yes, but I cannot read reports of several pages in one minute.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at the first page of the report.

LAMMERS: Yes, now I see it.

MAJOR JONES: And you knew it at the beginning of the questioning of this
matter...[_The witness attempted to interrupt._] Just a minute, if you
please. When I am speaking would you mind waiting until I have finished
before you interrupt. Otherwise the translation machinery is not able to
offer a prompt translation. You see from that report, quite clearly, do
you not, that in the very first 4 months of Sauckel’s career as a slave
driver, he obtained 221,009 Soviet prisoners of war to work in this
labor machine?

LAMMERS: The details did not interest me. I had no authority to
supervise Sauckel. A report was sent in stating how he had done this. As
to whether he had a right to do it, that was a question which he had to
settle in agreement with the appropriate departments. I did not
investigate the matter because the report was only sent to me for
information.

MAJOR JONES: You have testified on Sauckel’s behalf that he resisted the
suggestion that the SS should work in this sphere of labor personnel.
Did you not say that?

LAMMERS: No, I did not say that. I merely said that he did not want to
have the SS alone, but that he wanted support from any executive
authority which was available at the moment; it is obvious, of course,
that in the partisan regions this would be mainly Police and SS.

MAJOR JONES: And quite simply, you knew that Sauckel was asking for more
help from the SS to get more labor. That is what he was after, was it
not?

LAMMERS: Yes. Otherwise he could not work in these regions, if order was
not maintained.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at the Document 1292-PS, which is Exhibit USA-225
and RF-68. That is the report of a conference on the allocation of labor
in 1944, the 4th of January, the minutes of which you wrote yourself, so
that if anything you say is to be relied upon, that is your report. You
will see that at that conference Hitler was there, Sauckel, Speer,
Keitel, Milch, Himmler.

LAMMERS: The new work program for 1944 was made out and I was instructed
to inform the departments concerned. I took part in this conference only
because it concerned a measure in which the respective fields of a
number of offices had to be made known. Otherwise I would not have
participated in this at all.

MAJOR JONES: And in that conference Hitler said that Sauckel must get at
least another 4 million workers for the manpower pool, did he not?

LAMMERS: That is possible. The Führer asked more of Sauckel than Sauckel
thought he could provide.

MAJOR JONES: And Sauckel said that whether he could do that depended
primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available; his
project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents. And then
your record goes on:

    “The Reichsführer SS explained that the executives put at his
    disposal were very few in number but that he”—that is to say,
    Himmler—“would try to help on the Sauckel project by increasing
    their number and working them harder. The Reichsführer SS
    immediately made 2,000 to 2,600 men from the concentration camps
    available for air-raid precautions in Vienna.”

That is to say, it is clear from that report, is it not, that Sauckel
was seeking more help from the SS and that Himmler was saying he would
do his best to help him? Is that not so?

LAMMERS: There is no doubt of that, but Sauckel did not want to have
help from the SS only, he wanted to get any help he needed in the
country in question by the appropriate service, as I said before, the
Feldkommandantur, for instance.

MAJOR JONES: There is a last document which I want to put to you on
Sauckel. It is Document 3819-PS, Exhibit Number GB-306, a small part of
which was read into the record by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. That is a
report from Sauckel to Hitler, dated 17 March 1944. I take it that you
probably saw a copy of that report, did you not?

LAMMERS: I do not know.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at it, because it is most illuminating on the
attitude of Sauckel toward the assistance of the SS and the German
Police.

LAMMERS: Yes; this is dated 11 July 1944. I have one here which is dated
11 July 1944.

MAJOR JONES: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, he is saying that he has in his hand a
document of 11 July 1944. The document you referred to was 17 March, was
it not?

MAJOR JONES: Yes.

[_Turning to the witness._] You have got your minutes of the conference.
Is there not attached to it a report of Sauckel dated 17 March?

LAMMERS: There is a report attached here dated 5 April.

MAJOR JONES: I shall not proceed with that part of the document, My
Lord.

[_Turning to the witness._] If you will turn to the document dated 12
July, that will do for my present purposes. You remember that is your
own report of the conference of 12 July 1944 on the question of the
increased procuring of foreign manpower. And you opened that conference,
Witness, did you not?

LAMMERS: I was always a neutral agent. If there were any differences of
opinion, I offered my service as go-between.

MAJOR JONES: What were you neutral about, Witness?

LAMMERS: I was not in charge of an office. The other departments had
their own departmental interests.

MAJOR JONES: You were not being an honest broker between Sauckel and
Himmler, were you?

LAMMERS: I frequently had to try to effect a compromise between various
people, including on occasion Himmler or Sauckel, when a dispute arose;
and I think I need not blush to say that in that case I was an honest
broker. I wanted to bring about an agreement between these two so that
it would not be necessary to involve the Führer in such differences of
opinion.

MAJOR JONES: Just look at the manner in which you opened that
conference. You said there—it is the second sentence under your name:

    “He limited the subject of the discussion to an examination of
    all the possible means of making good the present deficit of
    foreign workers.”

Then you say in the next question:

    “The question of whether and in what form greater compulsion can
    force people to accept work in Germany must remain in the
    foreground.”

The operative word is, you know, “compulsion.”

LAMMERS: Yes; they were obviously thinking of female labor and of a
reduction of the age limits set for juvenile workers.

MAJOR JONES: Just go on to the next sentence of your statement:

    “In this connection we must consider how the executives, whose
    inadequacy is the subject of strong complaints by the
    Plenipotentiary for Allocation of Labor, can be strengthened on
    the one hand by the exercise of influence on the foreign
    governments and on the other by the expansion of our executive
    forces and the intensified use of the Wehrmacht, the Police, or
    of other German services.”

That is how you opened that conference, you know.

LAMMERS: That is quite correct. These were the problems that had to be
discussed.

MAJOR JONES: To produce more forced labor and discover by what
terrorizing by the police and what pressures by Ribbentrop the results
could be achieved? That was the object of the conference, was it not?

LAMMERS: No, our object was not to consider how we might terrorize
people but how we could carry out official decrees with the necessary
executive power to back them up. Surely no terrorist measures are
implied in saying that something must be done in a matter. I could
describe a case in France, for instance. The workers recruited by
Sauckel in France were brought to the railroad station by French
executives for transportation as prescribed by the French compulsory
labor decree. Everything was in order...

MAJOR JONES: Just answer my questions, will you? You are going on to a
different matter.

LAMMERS: I did not suggest terrorist measures. Some compulsion must be
exercised by every state authority; but to talk of compulsion is by no
means terrorism, or a crime, or violation.

MAJOR JONES: I just draw your attention to the contribution of General
Warlimont in this discussion, where he said that:

    “The troops assigned to fighting the partisans will take over,
    in addition, the task of raising manpower in the partisan areas.
    Everyone who cannot account satisfactorily for his presence in
    these areas is to be seized.”

And you said:

    “On further inquiry by the Reich Minister, Dr. Lammers,”—this
    is on Page 10 of the English, record—“as to whether members of
    the population fit for employment could not be withdrawn along
    with the troops, Colonel Saas, Plenipotentiary for Italy, stated
    that Field Marshal Kesselring had already decreed that the
    population of an area extending to a depth of 30 kilometers
    behind the front was to be ‘captured’.”

The whole emphasis of that conference was on the use of force, was it
not, and the collaboration of the executive agencies of the State to
procure the necessary forced labor for the Reich?

LAMMERS: A certain degree of coercion was to be applied undoubtedly.

MAJOR JONES: There are only two more matters, My Lord, which I feel that
it is my duty to put to the witness.

[_Turning to the witness._] On the question of the massacre of the
Jewish people, you said in your evidence before the adjournment that you
had saved 200,000 Jews yourself. Do you remember saying that to the
Tribunal?

LAMMERS: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: You saved them from extermination, you meant, I take it?

LAMMERS: No. I merely saved them from evacuation and nothing else. I
found out afterwards, of course—now—that in actual fact I really did
save them from death. You have...

MAJOR JONES: You know you have testified—just a moment—you have
testified to the Tribunal as to a conference which took place early in
1943 where you were invited by the Reichssicherheitshauptamt to send a
representative to the conference dealing with the Jewish problem. Do you
remember saying that to the Tribunal?

LAMMERS: Yes, the matter was discussed. It was a conference of experts.

MAJOR JONES: That was the famous conference which Eichmann presided
over, do you remember?

LAMMERS: That I do not know. I did not attend it myself; I merely sent a
subordinate.

MAJOR JONES: The invitation to attend the conference, that came from
Kaltenbrunner, did it not?

LAMMERS: The invitation came from the RSHA.

MAJOR JONES: Not from Kaltenbrunner personally.

LAMMERS: I do not know.

MAJOR JONES: And you sent a representative to the conference, did you
not?

LAMMERS: Someone had to go as my representative; and he had specific
orders simply to listen and not to make any comments during the
conference, because I reserved for myself the right to report this to
the Führer.

MAJOR JONES: Was your representative at this conference instructed by
you to take no attitude? Was that what you said to the Tribunal?

LAMMERS: He was given express orders not to make any comments. My State
Secretary, who gave him the instructions, can confirm this. He could not
do so in any case, since no decisions were reached. But he was not to
make any comments on his own initiative because I intended to discuss
this question, which was at that time described as “the final solution
of the Jewish problem,” with the Führer. For this reason, I deliberately
gave the order, “No comments!”

MAJOR JONES: You sent Gottfried Bohle as your representative to that
conference, did you not?

LAMMERS: I did not send him; my State Secretary sent him, and he was not
even the competent expert, but was accidentally...

MAJOR JONES: Just answer my questions, briefly, won’t you? Gottfried
Bohle made a report to you, did he not?

LAMMERS: I received a short written report, not a verbal report.

MAJOR JONES: And did that report indicate to you that Eichmann was
planning extermination?

LAMMERS: No, there was nothing about that; and we did not know about it.
At least, I cannot remember that there was anything in it that would
have caused me to take any immediate action.

MAJOR JONES: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that concentration camps
were not mentioned in the Reich budget. Do you remember saying that?

LAMMERS: That what was included?

MAJOR JONES: Yesterday...

LAMMERS: I do not know. I did not find or read anything about it.

MAJOR JONES: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that nothing was mentioned
in the Reich budget about concentration camps.

LAMMERS: I did not find anything and I did not read anything on that
subject. I do not know anything about it. Such matters did not interest
me much anyway.

MAJOR JONES: You are saying now that you do not know whether there were
any references to concentration camps in the budget or not?

LAMMERS: I could not say for certain. I do not remember any specific
mention of the concentration camps in the budget.

MAJOR JONES: Does it surprise you to know that for the 1939 budget for
the armed SS and concentration camps in the Ministry of the Interior
budget there was a sum of 104,000,000 marks and 21,000,000 marks set out
as expenses for these items? Did you know that?

LAMMERS: I did not study every item of the budget drawn up by the
Minister of the Interior. I did not read any budgets at all. I was
interested only in my own budgets in the Reich Chancellery; I did not
read those of other offices. I had no reason to do so.

MAJOR JONES: Did you know that there were over 300 concentration camps
in Nazi Germany?

LAMMERS: No, I did not know that.

MAJOR JONES: How many did you, as head of the Reich Chancellery, know of
the existence of?

LAMMERS: I only knew about a few.

MAJOR JONES: Only a few.

LAMMERS: Three at the most.

MAJOR JONES: Are you solemnly, on oath...

LAMMERS: But I did know that others existed.

MAJOR JONES: Are you solemnly, on oath, saying to the Tribunal that you,
in the very center of the web of Nazism, did not know of the existence
of more than three concentration camps?

LAMMERS: Yes, I do mean to say so. I was not in the very center of
Nazism; I was the head administrative official who did administrative
work for the Führer. I did not concern myself with concentration camps.
I knew of some concentration camps, that is of two or three; and it was
clear to me that others must exist. I cannot say more under oath.

MAJOR JONES: I put it to you that you knew quite well of this regime of
terror but continued to serve in it until the last. Is that not so?

LAMMERS: What regime of terror? The concentration camp system existed. I
knew that; everyone knew that.

MAJOR JONES: But that did not trouble your conscience, I take it.

LAMMERS: That they existed? I submitted my proposals with regard to the
concentration camps to the Führer; and he excluded me from the entire
question as early as 1934 after I had made suggestions to him about
concentration camps, and turned the whole matter over to Himmler to whom
I had to transmit all complaints about concentration camps. I had
nothing whatever to do with concentration camps except when I received
complaints which I considered as being addressed to the Führer. I
pursued them as far as was possible and had them remedied in part.

MAJOR JONES: You, of course, were an SS Obergruppenführer. Perhaps you
did not recognize terror when you heard and saw it.

LAMMERS: I was SS Obergruppenführer, which was an honorary rank, just as
I said before of Seyss-Inquart. I performed no official duties in the
SS; I had no command, no authority, or anything.

MAJOR JONES: And you profited considerably, you and your Nazi
colleagues, from this regime, did you not? You, as the Comptroller of
the Reich Chancellery funds, can probably assist us in that matter.

LAMMERS: What did I have? Considerable what?

MAJOR JONES: Funds, money, marks, Reichsmark.

LAMMERS: Yes. I had an income, naturally.

MAJOR JONES: And you were responsible for distributing...

LAMMERS: Not as an SS Führer.

MAJOR JONES: As Reich Chancellor you were responsible for distributing
the largess of the Nazis among yourselves, were you not?

LAMMERS: I was in charge of the Führer’s funds; and on his instructions
I made the necessary payments out of those funds. I could not spend
money as I pleased.

MAJOR JONES: You, as Reich Chancellor, delivered a million Reichsmark to
Dr. Ley, did you not?

LAMMERS: That was a donation that the Führer specifically granted to
Ley. I did not do that on my own initiative.

MAJOR JONES: And Ribbentrop was another recipient of a million, was he
not?

LAMMERS: He received a million in installments, first one half and then
the other.

MAJOR JONES: And Keitel was another millionaire, was he not? He received
a million, did he not?

LAMMERS: He received a sum of money and an estate, because the Führer
renewed the practice of the old Prussian kings of granting land and
money to his generals.

MAJOR JONES: And you yourself received 600,000 marks, did you not?

LAMMERS: I received 600,000 marks on my 65th birthday. I received this
sum because I had never received anything in my previous positions,
since I had never asked for it—also because I had twice been bombed out
and had no house or property of my own. The Führer wished me to buy a
small house.

MAJOR JONES: That is all.

If your Lordship will allow me to clarify the exhibit numbers of the
documents I have put in: Document 3863-PS is Exhibit GB-320; 2220-PS is
USA-175; 686-PS is USA-305; 865-PS is USA-143; 032-PS is GB-321; 871-PS
is GB-322; D-753(a) is GB-323; 3601-PS is GB-324; 997-PS is RF-122;
1296-PS is GB-325; 1292-PS was USA-225 and RF-68; 3819-PS was GB-306.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, have you put in the budget which shows
the figures that you gave us?

MAJOR JONES: It is on Page 1394 of the 1939 budget. For the purposes of
the record, it will be Exhibit GB-326 (Document 3873-PS).

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

MAJOR JONES: The Prosecution will have an extract made from this vast
volume, My Lord, for the purposes of the court document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal thought that there was going to be only
one cross-examination of the witnesses who were not defendants.

COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Delegation wished to question the witness
Lammers. It was suggested that the interrogation be split up into two
parts, some of the questions to be asked by the British Delegation and
the others by the Russian Delegation.

MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases...

THE PRESIDENT: Was this the one case that was mentioned?

MAJOR JONES: This is the exceptional case, My Lord, and the agreement
was made before the new regime of cross-examination was introduced. My
colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, and I did agree to share the work; and
there are very few matters which Colonel Pokrovsky has indicated which
he desires to put; and that was in agreement between the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. POKROVSKY: On 6 November 1945 you were interrogated by a
representative of the Soviet Prosecution. Do you remember this
interrogation?

LAMMERS: Yes, I do remember an interrogation by a representative of the
Soviet Prosecution.

COL. POKROVSKY: You testified at the time that Hitler...

LAMMERS: Yes. I testified.

COL. POKROVSKY: You do not know what I am talking about, so do not
hurry.

Now, you testified that Hitler authorized you to render your help to
Rosenberg. You remember that, do you not?

LAMMERS: Yes, Rosenberg was to take over the political work in
connection with Eastern problems.

COL. POKROVSKY: That is correct. What was your help to Rosenberg?

LAMMERS: To begin with, it only meant that I had an interview with him
at which he discussed his plans for a possible administration to be
established. The Führer had given him instructions to consider how, in
the case of war with Russia, the country might be occupied and
administered. For this Herr Rosenberg...

COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, wait a moment. I did not ask you what the
Führer asked Rosenberg to do. I am asking you, what did the Führer
authorize or ask you to do? You said, “To help Rosenberg.” Exactly what
form did your help to Rosenberg take? You assisted in... [_The witness
attempted to interrupt._] Wait a minute. Did you participate in the
development—wait a moment, please listen to my question. Did you
participate in working out a plan for the economic organization of the
Eastern territories? Do you understand me?

LAMMERS: I did not take part in working out the organization of the
economy.

COL. POKROVSKY: I want you to take a look at Document Number 1056-PS. Do
you recall this document now?

[_The document was handed to the witness._]

LAMMERS: I must see it first.

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, that is the reason why it was given to you.

LAMMERS: I do not seem to recognize this document, nor do I believe that
I prepared it. It is obviously a plan drawn up by Herr Rosenberg.

COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, you affirm that you did not know
anything; and you do not know anything at all about this document?

LAMMERS: It is possible that Herr Rosenberg handed me a plan of the
kind, but at the moment I cannot say whether I ever had these 30 pages
in my hands or not. I do not know.

COL. POKROVSKY: Yesterday you testified before the Tribunal—and your
testimony was very detailed—in regard to the economic administration of
Eastern territories. How could you give any truthful testimony if you
did not know anything at all about this basic document? This particular
document really defines and determines the structure of the
administration in territories which were under Rosenberg. Do you
understand me?

LAMMERS: I cannot give any opinion as to what is contained in this
document. I cannot form an opinion of a document of 30 pages in one
moment here. Please let me have the document so that I read the whole of
it. I do not believe that I ever had this document in my hands.
Rosenberg attended to organization in the East. I simply co-operated in
a decree, a basic decree, in which Rosenberg was given the authority in
the East. I was not at all interested in the details.

COL. POKROVSKY: If your memory is so weak in regard to this document,
then would you please be good enough to look at another document? It is
less than 30 pages long. Now, you will be shown a document signed by
yourself. It deals with the question of the Soviet prisoners of war. It
is Exhibit USSR-361. There is one passage marked in this document which
says that the Soviet prisoners of war should not be treated according to
general rules, but be put under the charge of the Ministry for the
Eastern Territories. Have you found the place? [_There was no
response._] Witness Lammers, I am asking you...

LAMMERS: I have not found the place.

COL. POKROVSKY: Take a look at the second page.

LAMMERS: The appendix?

COL. POKROVSKY: Yes, yes, in the appendix. For your convenience, the
place is marked with a pencil.

LAMMERS: Not here. There is no marked passage in the one I have.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the document I have—if it is the same
one, 073-PS is in paragraphs. Might you refer him to the paragraphs?

COL. POKROVSKY: Just a minute, please.

Unfortunately the paragraph is not mentioned in the excerpt I have.
However, the exact place will be shown to the witness.

[_The place in the document was indicated to the witness._]

This place is really marked with a pencil. He simply did not notice it.

[_Turning to the witness._] Did you find it?

LAMMERS: Yes, I have it now.

COL. POKROVSKY: And now have you convinced yourself that it is marked
with a pencil?

LAMMERS: Yes, the Foreign Office...

COL. POKROVSKY: I am not asking you about that. I am interested in
another place where it says, “The exception to this regulation is the
Soviet prisoners...” Did you find it?

LAMMERS: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: “The exception to this regulation is the Soviet
prisoners of war”—that is what I am interested in—“who are under the
charge of the Minister administering Occupied Eastern Territories, since
the general Geneva Convention does not...”—and so forth.

Did you find the place?

LAMMERS: Yes, I have the place.

COL. POKROVSKY: Did you sign this document?

LAMMERS: I did not sign this document, because it has been drawn up by
the Foreign Office. I simply signed a letter forwarding this memorandum
from the Foreign Office to Minister Rosenberg for his information.

COL. POKROVSKY: Also, with a covering note. You also sent your letter...

LAMMERS: In this covering note I say that I am enclosing a memorandum
from the Foreign Office, “The Foreign Office comments on your letter,
_et cetera_; and I may inform you of this.” I simply acted as
intermediary and forwarding office. I did not draw up the memorandum or
sign it.

COL. POKROVSKY: Then do I understand you, in this way, that you actually
substantiated the authenticity of this document, the document that went
through your hands?

LAMMERS: I do not know; I can only substantiate...

COL. POKROVSKY: How could you not say it? You told us you were
forwarding it; you gave this document and forwarded it to somebody else.
Did you send it to some address?

LAMMERS: I sent on the document signed. I signed the letter informing
Herr Rosenberg of the attitude taken by the Foreign Office. Whether the
enclosure is authentic or not, I do not know.

COL. POKROVSKY: I am quite satisfied with this answer.

On 8 April, here before the Tribunal, you stated that the solution of
the Jewish problem was referred by Hitler to Göring and Heydrich and
later on to Heydrich’s successor, Kaltenbrunner. Now, I want you to tell
us exactly how Göring, Heydrich, and Kaltenbrunner participated in
solving the Jewish problem.

LAMMERS: I only knew that a Führer order was transmitted by Reich
Marshal Göring to Heydrich, who was at that time head of the RSHA. I
believe that it was then transferred to Kaltenbrunner’s authority. This
order was called, “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem,” but no one
knew what it dealt with or what the term meant. In the period which
followed I made several efforts to clarify the real meaning of the term
“final solution” and what was to happen. I attempted yesterday to
explain this question, but I was not allowed to say all I wanted.

COL. POKROVSKY: Well, it is not sufficiently clear exactly through whom
and how—in what way—you attempted to clarify the meaning of the
expression, “final solution of the Jewish problem.” To whom did you
appeal? Whom did you ask?

LAMMERS: At first I appealed to Himmler and asked him what the meaning
of it was. Himmler told me that the Führer had ordered him to evacuate
the Jews who were still in Germany, and this led to a number of problems
referred to as the “Final Solution of the Jewish Problem.” That is what
I said yesterday.

COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, wait a minute. You said that Hitler charged
Göring and Heydrich, and subsequently Kaltenbrunner, with the solution
of this problem. Did you address yourself to Göring in regard to this?
to Heydrich and to Kaltenbrunner? Did you ask them that question, the
question in which you told me you were interested?

LAMMERS: No, I cannot remember doing that, because I believed that
Göring was merely transmitting the Führer’s order. I have no knowledge
of Keitel’s participation; I did not hear of that until today.

COL. POKROVSKY: Who has been talking of Keitel? He was not mentioned at
all; it was Heydrich.

LAMMERS: Heydrich had this assignment. I discovered from the reports of
my assistants that such an assignment existed. I was interested in
ascertaining what kind of assignment it was, and I applied to Himmler
for information.

COL. POKROVSKY: And so you were not successful?

LAMMERS: I did not see a written order.

COL. POKROVSKY: Yesterday you said, “all except me” expressed their
opinion on Jewish problems. Who are all these, “all” except you? You
remember that testimony yesterday?

LAMMERS: I testified yesterday that I had spoken to Himmler about this
question and that I reserved for myself the right to report to the
Führer. I also testified that I had this interview with the Führer but
that the Führer was very difficult to persuade in these matters. I also
testified yesterday that there were rumors about Jews being killed which
led me to make investigations. I further testified yesterday that these
rumors, as far as I could find out, were gossip. So there was nothing
else for me to do but to go to the Führer in this matter—first to go to
Himmler, and then to the Führer.

COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, I do not ask you what you said yesterday. I do
not want to hear your testimony for the second time. What I am
interested in, and what I want to clarify at the moment, is the fact
that you mentioned yesterday that, “All except me expressed their
opinion in regard to the Jewish problem.” “All” means whom? Name them.
Whom do you mean? And answer my question directly.

LAMMERS: I do not understand the question “all.”

COL. POKROVSKY: I will repeat this question for the third time, so that
you can understand it better: Yesterday you said, when you were
testifying on the solution of the Jewish problem, “All except me
expressed their opinion and defined their attitude in regard to the
Jewish problem. I was also asked to give my opinion.” Do you remember it
now?

LAMMERS: Yes, I remember that.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.

LAMMERS: The word “all” refers to all the departmental representatives
invited to attend their conference. The heads of the departments
concerned were invited to attend all these RSHA conferences. That is
what “all” applies to.

COL. POKROVSKY: Which of the defendants here were present?

LAMMERS: There were no ministers present at all. This was merely a
conference of experts. I was not there. I do not know who attended this
conference.

COL. POKROVSKY: You were present at the conference in Hitler’s quarters
on 16 July 1941? You understand what conference I mean, do you not? That
is the one which was for the purpose of considering objectives of war
against the U.S.S.R. Do you understand it now?

LAMMERS: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Was Keitel present at the conference?

LAMMERS: To my knowledge, yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Do you not remember what Keitel said about the aims of
the war against the U.S.S.R.?

LAMMERS: I cannot remember whether he mentioned that subject.

COL. POKROVSKY: And did you stay until the end of the conference?

LAMMERS: I assume I stayed to the end.

COL. POKROVSKY: And Keitel, too? And Keitel also stayed until the end?

LAMMERS: I cannot remember that now. I assume that he did but he may
have left earlier.

COL. POKROVSKY: You cannot be positive about it?

LAMMERS: No, I cannot be certain.

COL. POKROVSKY: On 13 October 1945, you were interrogated by a
lieutenant colonel of the American army, and on that occasion you
testified that Rosenberg was appointed Minister for the Eastern
Territories according to the personal wish of the Führer. Do you
remember this testimony?

LAMMERS: I know that I testified.

COL. POKROVSKY: Further, you testified, on the same day and during the
same interrogation, that you did not recommend Rosenberg for this post,
since you had certain objections in regard to his candidacy. What were
the objections against Rosenberg’s candidacy?

LAMMERS: There were many objections to Rosenberg’s appointment. These
were specifically raised by Bormann. Reichsleiter Bormann did not want
to have Rosenberg in this position.

COL. POKROVSKY: Tell us something about your objections. What were your
own objections?

LAMMERS: I submitted the question to the Führer at the time whether, if
military complications arose, it was necessary to have such a man at all
for the East; and, if so, whether Rosenberg was the right man to
organize the matters.

COL. POKROVSKY: That was in April 1941?

LAMMERS: I no longer remember; it was in the spring.

COL. POKROVSKY: On orders from Reich Minister Rosenberg, forced labor
was introduced, forced labor for the Jewish population of the Eastern
regions, on 16 August 1941. Everyone of Jewish origin between the ages
of 14 and 60 had to perform forced labor. If they refused to work they
were liable to be executed. Do you know about this order or not?

LAMMERS: I did not know of it. I cannot recall it.

COL. POKROVSKY: Take a look at this document and try to remember.

Mr. President, this document is printed on Page 50 of the second part of
Göring’s Green Folder, which is already submitted to the Tribunal under
Document Number EC-347.

LAMMERS: I cannot remember this document.

COL. POKROVSKY: All right. We will let that go. Take a look at another
document. Perhaps your memory will be somewhat better in regard to this
document.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, in that last document that you were
referring to, have these paragraphs of the ordinance been read into the
record?

COL. POKROVSKY: I would not be quite positive about that, Mr. President;
I do not know whether this particular paragraph was read into the
record. All the second part of Göring’s Green Folder was presented to
the Tribunal in evidence and listed under Exhibit USA-320 (Document
Number EC-347). The document about the preliminary investigation bears
the Number EC-347. This part was read into the record. I think that
inasmuch as the witness does not remember this document now, we shall
touch upon it when it is needed more urgently at the interrogation of
another defendant.

Now, we will take care of something else.

[_Turning to the witness._] Take a look at the Führer directive of 29
August 1941. This document, of course, will be easy to remember, since
your signature appears on it. This is a directive in regard to the
economic measures in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

This document, Your Honors, is also one of the documents of the second
part of Göring’s Green Folder. It is presented to the Tribunal in
English.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, do you recognize this document?

LAMMERS: Yes, I signed this document. This is a measure which the Führer
decreed at the Reich Marshal’s suggestions.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well; and how do you explain the fact that Keitel
was signing directives or orders like this one, concerning general
governmental matters of the Reich which were not of a military nature?
How do you explain this? Why should it be signed by Hitler, Keitel, and
Lammers?

LAMMERS: This was a Führer decree; and Führer decrees were attested by
myself and also signed by Keitel, as Chief of the OKW, if the Wehrmacht
was in any way interested. They might also be signed by Bormann as a
third member, if Party interests were involved. That caused Bormann’s
signature...

COL. POKROVSKY: Bormann’s signature is not here. It is signed by Hitler,
Keitel, and Lammers. Is that right?

LAMMERS: It was signed first by Keitel because it dealt with the
occupied regions in the East.

COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, Keitel was responsible for all
legislation in occupied territories; is that so? Do you hear my
question? Was the Defendant Keitel responsible for all legal measures in
occupied territories? Do you hear my question?

LAMMERS: The signature does not involve any responsibility...

COL. POKROVSKY: Then why his signature and what was the purpose of his
signature? Just for decorative purposes?

LAMMERS: Since he was interested or concerned in the matter, he attested
that, along with us, but to speak of responsibility...

COL. POKROVSKY: You should know better than anybody else. All the same
it is not quite clear why there was any necessity to have his signatures
on the document; and his signature is right above yours. What does it
deal with?

LAMMERS: It was probably assumed that this decree would affect Wehrmacht
interests. Field Marshal Keitel must know better than I do why he signed
it at that time.

COL. POKROVSKY: You read this document yourself, and you could see very
well for yourself that the Armed Forces are not affected by it.

I have two more questions for you. You testified today that
Seyss-Inquart received SS rank and uniform but he did not have the
rights of a commander of the SS. Is that correct?

LAMMERS: Yes, that is correct.

COL. POKROVSKY: Well, then, should one conclude after this that the rank
of a police official and the police uniform were really an honorary
distinction in the Reich?

LAMMERS: Seyss-Inquart did not belong to the Police but to the General
SS.

COL. POKROVSKY: But the SS was actually being used for police measures,
was that not so?

LAMMERS: No, the general SS had no police assignments; that is not
correct. And the SS uniform represented a special distinction in the
Reich.

COL. POKROVSKY: He received his uniform as a sort of reward for certain
work he had done?

LAMMERS: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Now, I want to ask you one last question...

LAMMERS: It was not always a reward for exceptional service, but certain
leading personages in the Reich received...

COL. POKROVSKY: I am satisfied with your answer and I do not need any
further details. Now I want to ask you one last question. On 17 January
the Defendant Keitel sent an application to the Tribunal to have you
brought in as a witness. He stated in his application that you could
testify here before the Tribunal that he, Keitel, as the head of the
Armed Forces along with the military agencies under his charge in the
occupied territories, opposed Rosenberg’s plunder squads and issued
orders for their arrest. You were called before the Tribunal to answer
this question and for some unknown reason this was the only question not
put to you. I would like you to answer this question now. What do you
know about the struggle of Keitel and the Armed Forces against
Rosenberg’s looting squads, as Keitel calls them?

LAMMERS: I know only that Rosenberg was commissioned to buy up objects
of art and that he was also commissioned to get furniture in the western
occupied territories which was needed for the offices in the East. He
received this assignment in his capacity of Minister of the Reich.

COL. POKROVSKY: Witness, evidently you misunderstood me. [_The witness
attempted to interrupt._] Wait a moment. Now, we are not talking about
the worries of Rosenberg; but I am asking you what you know about the
fight of the military command against Rosenberg’s looting squads—to use
Keitel’s words. Do you understand my question? Do you know anything at
all about this or do you know nothing?

LAMMERS: No, I know nothing about that.

COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I am quite satisfied. I have no further
questions to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, in order to be accurate: I understood
you to say with reference to that document that you were putting to the
witness just now, of 2 June 1941, that this document had no reference to
military authority. But Paragraph 2 of it says: “To achieve this end
he”—that is Göring—“may give direct orders to the respective military
authorities in the Eastern Occupied Territories.” Therefore, it is not
accurate to say that the document does not refer to the military
authority at all.

COL. POKROVSKY: I suppose that the Tribunal remembers the testimony
which was given here in regard to the circumstances under which Keitel
signed general directives and general law. He explained it by saying
that all these orders and directives were of an operational staff
nature.

In this particular case the question concerns but a general Reich office
which has directly nothing to do with staff affairs.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not want to argue with you. I only want to point out
it was not accurate to say that the document did not refer to military
matters at all.

Dr. Nelte, do you want to re-examine?

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I should be grateful if Colonel Pokrovsky
would make clear his last question to the witness, Dr. Lammers. He has
stated that the Defendant Keitel called Dr. Lammers as a witness to the
fact that he, Keitel, had opposed the efforts made by Rosenberg’s
special staff in the Eastern territories. Did I understand him
correctly? Perhaps the translation from Russian into German was not very
good.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that I understood the question, but I
understood the witness was not able to answer it. But I do not think it
can be of very great importance. The witness was not able to answer the
question.

DR. NELTE: No, I thought that the Soviet prosecutor meant that Dr.
Lammers had been called as a witness to give certain evidence and I did
not ask the witness any such question. I only want to make it clear that
this is not the case; otherwise I have no query on the matter, nor have
I personally any further questions to put to the witness on behalf of
the Defendant Keitel.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think the Tribunal think that it is necessary
for you to go into that. You have covered the ground fully in your
examination-in-chief. Then, Dr. Nelte, have you any other witnesses to
call?

DR. NELTE: I can finish in half an hour tomorrow morning. I have no
further witnesses to examine.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): I would
like to ask two or three questions about the Reich Cabinet. You said the
first meeting was on 30 January 1933 and the last was in November 1937.
Were there any other meetings in 1937?

LAMMERS: No, the Cabinet meetings were not replaced by any other
meetings.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I did not ask you that. Would you listen? You
said there was a meeting in November 1937. Were there any other meetings
in the year 1937?

LAMMERS: Yes, there were some before that. There were several Cabinet
meetings but not very many. There were comparatively few in 1937.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How many would you say in 1937?

LAMMERS: How many? There might have been five or six Cabinet meetings. I
do not think there were more.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many there were in...

LAMMERS: There may have been less.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know how many there were in 1936?

LAMMERS: There were rather more Cabinet meetings then, but not as many
as at the beginning of 1933 and 1934. The number of Cabinet meetings
has...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is enough, thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Laternser?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I have no questions to put to the witness,
but I simply wanted to interpose a few remarks on the following matter:

My colleague, Dr. Nelte, has dispensed with the examination of further
witnesses. By so doing he has dispensed with Colonel General Halder,
among others and, of course, he is entitled to do so, although in
dispensing with the examination of the witness Halder, he is encroaching
on my rights. The Tribunal will recall that when a written statement by
the witness Halder was submitted, the Tribunal...

THE PRESIDENT: Doctor, if Dr. Nelte does not call General Halder then
you can apply for calling him yourself and the matter will be
considered. Presumably you have already asked for him and you have been
referred to the fact that he has been specified by Dr. Nelte. Now, Dr.
Nelte has not called him. You can renew your application if you want to,
in writing.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I do not believe that that point of view
is quite correct. When the written statement was presented by the
Russian Prosecution it was stated, upon objection by the Defense, that
the witness Halder should be called for cross-examination and in
agreement with my other colleagues, I changed this so that Halder would
be heard during the proceedings for the Defendant Keitel. Dispensing
with this witness will encroach upon my rights. I believe, consequently,
that I have a right to ask that the witness be put at my disposal for
interrogation.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we will consider the matter of General
Halder and let you know in the morning. It is 5 o’clock now.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I should have liked to ask the witness some
questions which have been made necessary by the cross-examination and
which touch on certain questions...

THE PRESIDENT: You cannot do it tonight at any rate. We will consider it
and let you know tomorrow morning, but you cannot do it tonight.

DR. SEIDL: I simply wanted to bring it up so the witness would still be
at hand tomorrow morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, he shall be at hand.

MR. DODD: Your Lordship, if I may have one minute of the Tribunal’s
time, Justice Jackson asked me to bring to the attention of the Tribunal
for its information these facts apropos of the discussion of this
morning.

We have received from Colonel Dostert the original transcript which was
handed to him by Dr. Thoma and it shows that there was a red line drawn
in the margin beside this passage which was translated and mimeographed
and included in the document book. Dr. Thoma this morning felt that he
had not underlined it and he also felt that there was undoubtedly a
mistake in the translation and Colonel Dostert tells us that there is no
mistake in the translation and that it was underlined.

THE PRESIDENT: Well now, Dr. Nelte, we should like to know what your
position is about General Westhoff and—I think it is the
Obergruppenführer Wielen or something of that sort. You were given the
opportunity of calling those witnesses and we understand you do not
desire to do so.

DR. NELTE: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I think that the cross-examination
has made it clear that the Prosecution has abandoned the original charge
against Keitel, namely, that he issued an order, or transmitted an order
from Hitler, to the effect that the 50 Royal Air Force officers should
be shot.

Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe confronted the defendant with the four points of
which he accused the Defendant Keitel in connection with this case; and
the defendant admitted these four points.

Since I named General Westhoff as a witness only to testify that Keitel
did not issue the order and he did not pass it on, and as Westhoff was
not present at the conference at the Obersalzberg and has no first-hand
knowledge, there is no further need for me to call this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you, of course, are to decide whether you call
him or not. But unless Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe says that he has withdrawn
any charge against Keitel I do not think that you ought to refrain from
calling him on the ground that a charge has been abandoned. There has
not been any express abandonment of any charge. Subject to anything that
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe says I should not have thought that that would be
a good reason for not calling him, but it is entirely a matter for you.

Yes, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, there is no abandonment of any charge.
In fact, the Prosecution stands by what is stated by General Westhoff in
his statement which I put to the Defendant Keitel. That is the evidence
for the Prosecution and the Prosecution stands by that as it is put in.

DR. NELTE: May I ask whether the Prosecution wish to assert that General
Westhoff has testified that Keitel did issue this order or transmit it?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, you have seen the document which contains an
excerpt of the statement by General Westhoff. You therefore know what he
says in that statement. The Tribunal, subject to what counsel desires to
address them on the subject—they will, of course, hear them—but the
Tribunal propose to call General Westhoff themselves in order to hear
his statement whether he adheres to his statement; and also Wielen,
Wielen’s evidence, of course, is principally against the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner.

DR. NELTE: Then may I also ask the Prosecution to submit to the Tribunal
the affidavit deposed by General Westhoff with regard to this matter, so
as to make clear...

THE PRESIDENT: When you say affidavit, do you mean the statement?

DR. NELTE: No; I mean the affidavit, not an unsworn statement. So far,
the Prosecution have dealt only with statements not made under oath.
Apart from these, however, Colonel Williams required and received an
affidavit from the witness Westhoff, and this affidavit contains a
precise statement from Westhoff to the effect that he does not wish to
say and never has said that Keitel ever issued or transmitted any such
order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no affidavit. I have checked with Mr.
Roberts and we have not got one. There were two interrogations, if my
recollection is correct, one which was early and one on 2 November.
There were two interrogations, one of which I put in. They are in Dr.
Nelte’s document book. I have no affidavit. If I had, of course, I
should produce it at once. I do not know where Dr. Nelte got the
information, but certainly no affidavit has ever been brought to my
attention.

THE PRESIDENT: The only thing the Tribunal has got is a statement made
by General Westhoff which is annexed to the report of a certain
brigadier whose name I have forgotten. Oh yes, Brigadier Shapcott. The
course which the Tribunal proposes to do is to call General Westhoff and
to ask him whether his statement made in that document is accurate and
also true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Prosecution has not the slightest objection
to that.

THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will have General Westhoff and also
Wielen—they will be here tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock.

MARSHAL (Colonel Charles W. Mays): Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH DAY
                        Wednesday, 10 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

DR. THOMA: High Tribunal, Mr. President, I stated yesterday that the
Lapouge passage was not marked red in my document book and should not be
read. My assertion was not correct. I made this assertion for the
following reasons:

My client, Herr Rosenberg, sent me the following note yesterday while I
was delivering my case: “The passages in the document book to be cited
are certainly marked in red; the other parts do not have to be
translated at all.” The passages referred to in the French text had not
been marked. I consequently assumed that the passages should not be
translated. This communication from Rosenberg, however, had a different
meaning. Rosenberg had made a sign in certain documents that were marked
in red to indicate that these passages do not have to be read. That
includes the quotation from Lapouge, and therefore the error occurred.

I also said yesterday that the passage cited by Mr. Justice Jackson was
incorrectly translated. That, too, was an error which occurred on my
part apparently because the emphasis of the word “Bastardisierung”
shocked me. I presume that “miscegenation” was meant. I request the
translation department to pardon me. The document book itself...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal quite understand that there must
have been some mistake, and no one, I hope—and certainly not the
Tribunal—is accusing you of any bad faith in the matter at all. The
Tribunal quite understand that there must have been some
misunderstanding or some mistake which led to whatever happened.

DR. THOMA: I thank you very much.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, permit me to ask the Tribunal a short question
related to procedure matters in the case of Westhoff. Yesterday I stated
the reasons why I believed I could forego calling the witness Westhoff.
According to the explanation of the British Prosecution the error has
been cleared up, and therefore my assumption is no longer true. I should
like now to ask the Tribunal, “Is the original situation thereby
automatically restored, and may I also claim to examine this witness
before the Court as a defense witness, or must I make a formal
application to be authorized to call this witness again?”

THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal do not desire you to make any
formal application. You can ask the witness any questions when he has
answered the questions which the Tribunal will put to him, and the
Prosecution, of course, can also ask him questions.

DR. NELTE: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Seidl, I think you wanted to put some questions
to this witness, did you not, on behalf of the Defendant Frank? We hope
that they won’t be very long.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, the Prosecution asked you a question yesterday in
connection with the AB Action. For your information AB Action means
extraordinary pacifying operations. It was necessary in connection with
uprisings during 1940 in the Government General. In this connection the
Prosecution read you a quotation from Frank’s diary of 16 May 1940. I
want to read to you, first of all, one further sentence from this same
citation, from the same entry. It reads as follows:

    “Every arbitrary action is to be prevented with the most severe
    measures. In every case the point of view which takes into
    consideration the necessary protection of the Führer’s authority
    and of the Reich must be in the foreground. Moreover, action
    will be postponed until 15 June 1940.”

The Prosecution then read you a further citation from 30 May from which
one could draw the conclusion...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not think that you really can read
passages of Frank’s diary to the witness. I mean, you are re-examining
to clear up. He had not seen the diary.

DR. SEIDL: I shall ask him a question. Before that, however, I must read
another short passage; otherwise he cannot understand the question.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the question? You can put the diary to Frank when
you call Frank.

DR. SEIDL: The witness was heard yesterday in connection with this AB
Action, and he was presented with a passage from this diary that must
have given him the impression that a rather large number of Poles had
been shot without any court proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: What question do you want to put?

DR. SEIDL: I want to ask him whether he knows Ministerial Counsellor
Wille, what position he occupied in the Government General, and what
kind of assistance this Dr. Wille could possibly give if he had anything
at all to do with this action.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, ask him that, Dr. Seidl, if you like, but the diary
has no relevance to that question at all.

DR. SEIDL: But the question can only be answered sensibly if I, Mr.
President, read him the corresponding passage from the diary. Otherwise
he certainly won’t see the connection.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not see the connection, either, and the
Tribunal thinks there is no point in reading the diary to him.

DR. SEIDL: That will become apparent, Mr. President. I ask to be allowed
to read one more passage from the diary, namely of 12 June 1940.

THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Seidl. You can ask him your question, but you
can’t read the diary to him. You stated what the question was, whether
he knew somebody held a certain position in the Government General. You
can ask him that question.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, do you know Ministerial Counsellor Wille?

LAMMERS: No, I can’t remember him.

DR. SEIDL: You also do not know that he was the head of the main justice
division in the Government General?

LAMMERS: No; that, too, I do not remember.

DR. SEIDL: Then the one question is already settled.

The second question which I had to present to the witness is related
again to an entry in Frank’s diary in connection with concentration
camps. I can, however, also ask this question only if beforehand I can
read the witness a corresponding passage from the diary.

THE PRESIDENT: Tell us what the question is.

DR. SEIDL: The question would have read, “Is the point of view expressed
in the entry in Frank’s diary”—which I intended to read—“the correct
point of view? Does it agree with his first explanation on Monday, or is
the view expressed in the passage from the diary which the Prosecution
presented yesterday the correct one?”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal think you can put the question, if you
put it in the form, “Do you know what was the attitude of Frank towards
concentration camps?”—if you put it in that way—“and what was it?”

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the witness has already answered this question
in his direct examination. He declared that Frank held a negative
attitude toward concentration camps. Yesterday, however, an excerpt was
read to him from Frank’s diary which could prove the opposite. However,
there are dozens of entries in Frank’s diary that corroborate the point
of view of the witness and which contradict that which was presented by
the Prosecution. I can therefore only ask the witness a sensible
question if I read him something from the diary.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, all those matters can be gone into with Frank.
You can prove then every passage that ended in argument; you can prove
every passage in the diary which is relevant; and you can put the most
necessary passages to Frank.

DR. SEIDL: The third question would have been in reference to the
telegram...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, it is only a very exceptional privilege that
you, as counsel for Frank, are allowed to re-examine at all, and the
Tribunal have expressed the opinion to you that they do not think this
is a matter on which you ought to be allowed to re-examine. The person
to re-examine is the one who calls a witness in the first place. We
can’t allow, in ordinary cases, re-examination by everyone.

DR. SEIDL: I then renounce any further question to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

And now the Tribunal wishes to have General Westhoff brought in.

Sir David, could you find me the German version of General Westhoff’s
statement in these papers here?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I looked for it, but could not find it, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: You can’t find it?

[_The witness Westhoff took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give me your full name?

ADOLF WESTHOFF (Witness): Adolf.

THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?

WESTHOFF: Adolf Westhoff.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

General Westhoff, you made a statement before Brigadier Shapcott or
before Captain J. B. Parnell, did you not?

WESTHOFF: I do not know the captain’s name. I made a statement in
England.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. On the 13th of June 1945?

WESTHOFF: That is possible, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You don’t know English, I suppose?

WESTHOFF: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will read you—have the Prosecution got another
copy of this document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, Sir David, if you would follow me whilst I
read it and draw my attention to any passages which are really
relevant...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Since it is a considerably long document, I don’t wish to
read it all to the witness.

What the Tribunal wants to know, General Westhoff, is whether you adhere
to this statement or whether you wish to make any alterations in it. And
I will read to you, so that you may remember it, the material passages
from the statement.

WESTHOFF: Very well.

    THE PRESIDENT: “I was in charge of the ‘General’ department
    (Abteilung ‘Allgemein’) when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F.
    P.W. from Stalag Luft III took place. It was the first occasion
    on which Feldmarschall Keitel had sent for me. I went with
    General Von Graevenitz. He had been sent for and I was to
    accompany him. A certain number of officers had escaped from the
    Sagan Camp.”

Am I going too fast?

    “I don’t remember how many, but I believe about 80...”

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, can I be of service to the Tribunal by handing
him a German translation which has been placed at my disposal by the
Prosecution?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am very grateful to Dr. Nelte.

THE PRESIDENT: General Westhoff, would you read that statement of yours
through as quickly as you can? You will be able to see what are the
really material passages, and then tell the Tribunal whether that
statement is correct.

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, there is still another part of the statement
which I have also received from the Prosecution. It was a very extensive
compilation. May I also in addition submit this to the witness?

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean that he has not the whole document?

DR. NELTE: No, he does not have all of it yet.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, certainly.

DR. NELTE: I received it from the Prosecution in three sections and I
should now like to give him these three parts so he may have it
complete.

THE PRESIDENT: The statement that we have here in English is five pages
done in type, and is certified in this way:

    “This appendix contains an accurate translation of oral
    statements made to me by Major General Westhoff on 13 June 1945
    in reply to questions concerning the shooting of 50 R.A.F.
    officers from Stalag Luft III. Dated this 23rd day of the ninth
    month of 1945. J. E. Parnell, Captain, Intelligence Corps.”

Is that on...

DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I do not know whether General Westhoff was not
perhaps interrogated several times. In this document he also made
statements regarding the whole policy regarding prisoners of war—in
other words, not only about the Sagan case. We are here concerned with a
continuous report, and the witness...

THE PRESIDENT: The only document which is in evidence is this document
which I have in my hand, which is annexed to the report of Brigadier
Shapcott.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I looked at the document, the part that
Dr. Nelte has. I think my German is sufficient to identify it. It is the
same document. If Your Lordship will look at Page 2, Your Lordship will
see the passage, “Generalinspekteur, General Roettig.” My Lord, that is
where it starts, and I have checked it as to the last paragraph. It is
the same, “I cannot remember having received any reports....” As far as
my German goes, that is the same here; so this part of the document is
the last half of the document that Your Lordship has.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Yes, Dr. Nelte, and Sir David, perhaps the best
course would be if Sir David put the passages upon which he relies to
the witness, and the witness could then be asked whether those were
accurate.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And Dr. Nelte can ask any questions that he wishes to
after that.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, counsel is going to ask you
questions upon this document now, so you need not go on reading.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, have you had a chance of reading the
first paragraph of this statement?

WESTHOFF: Yes, I have read it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is that correct? Is that true?

WESTHOFF: There are a few things in it that are not entirely correct.
For instance, on the first page there is...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me take it, then I read it to you, and see
how far it is correct:

    “I was in charge of the ‘General’ department (Abteilung
    ‘Allgemein’) when the shooting of the escaped R.A.F. P.W. from
    Stalag Luft III took place.”

That is correct, is it not?

WESTHOFF: Here is missing the phrase, “... when the shooting took
place.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now:

    “It was the first occasion on which Feldmarschall Keitel had
    sent for me. I went with General Von Graevenitz. He had been
    sent for and I was to accompany him.”

Is that right?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

    SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “A certain number of officers had
    escaped from the Sagan Camp. I do not remember how many, but I
    believe about 80.”

That is correct, too?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:

    “When we entered, the ‘Feldmarschall’ was very excited and
    nervous, and said, ‘Gentlemen, this is a bad business.’”

Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then:

    “We were always blamed whenever P.W. escaped. We could not tie
    them to our apron strings!”

That is your own comment. Then you go on as to what the Field Marshal
said:

    “This morning, Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler
    for having let some more P.W. escape. It was unheard of!”

You go on with your comment that:

    “Then they must have had a row because the camp did not come
    under us; it was a G.A.F. camp.”

Is that correct, that the Field Marshal said:

    “This morning, Göring reproached me in the presence of Himmler
    for having let some more P.W. escape?”

WESTHOFF: Not in Himmler’s presence, but in Hitler’s presence. Hitler’s
presence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It ought to be in Hitler’s presence?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the next sentence:

    “All G.A.F. camps came directly under the G.A.F. itself, but the
    inspector of P.W. camps was in charge of all camps for
    inspection purposes. I was not inspector yet.”

We have had all that explained. I do not think that there is any dispute
about the organization. I won’t trouble you about that. We have gone
into that in this court in some detail. Unless the Tribunal want it, I
did not intend to trouble this witness again. You say, “I was not
inspector yet. General Von Graevenitz was inspector, and all camps came
under him in matters concerning inspection and administration.”

Then you say:

    “Göring blamed Keitel for having let those men escape. These
    constant escapes were a bad show. Then Himmler interfered—I can
    only say what the Feldmarschall told us—and he complained that
    he would have to provide another 60,000 or 70,000 men as
    ‘Landwachen,’ _et cetera_.”

Is that right? Did the Field Marshal say that?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, the second paragraph:

    “Feldmarschall Keitel said to us, ‘Gentlemen, these escapes must
    stop. We must set an example. We shall take very severe
    measures. I can only tell you that the men who have escaped will
    be shot; probably the majority of them are dead already.’ Keitel
    said that to us at the conference.”

Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then you say:

    “We were amazed as that was a conception we had never come
    across before. The affair must have happened in March. We were
    sent to the ‘Feldmarschall’ in Berlin a few days after the
    escape, not on that account but for some other business. We knew
    they had escaped, and we were taken by surprise by that
    declaration at the conference.”

Then you go on again with your account of the conference:

    “General Von Graevenitz intervened at once and said, ‘But, Sir,
    that is out of the question. Escape is not a dishonorable
    offense. That is specially laid down in the Convention.’”

Is that correct, that General Von Graevenitz said these words?

WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz made objections with reference to the
Geneva Convention, but there is missing in this report the fact that the
Field Marshal said to General Von Graevenitz that this was a matter of a
Führer decree. That is missing here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you look at the next sentence that I
was going to read to you, you say:

    “He”—that is General Von Graevenitz—“raised these objections,
    whereupon Keitel said, ‘I do not care a damn; we discussed it in
    the Führer’s presence, and it cannot be altered.’”

Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: No. The Field Marshal said, “That is a matter of indifference
to me. That is a matter of indifference to me.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be easier, General, if you told
the Tribunal now, to the best of your recollection, what did the Field
Marshal say after General Von Graevenitz had made his objections?

WESTHOFF: I have deposed a sworn statement to the Court on that subject,
which I might perhaps read:

    “Regarding the presence of General Von Graevenitz and myself at
    the headquarters in March of 1944, Field Marshal Keitel...”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: General Westhoff, the Tribunal may want that
later. It would be easier if you would try to stick to this statement
for the moment—whether it is right or wrong at the moment—and then we
will deal with any other one later on. It is just this point, if you
could direct your mind to it: After General Von Graevenitz had made his
objection, as you have told us, on the ground of the Convention, what
did the Field Marshal say? What did he say at that point? If you would
just try and do that, it would be a great help to us all.

WESTHOFF: The Field Marshal then said, “It is now a matter of
indifference; we must set an example.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought you said that he did mention that
there was a Führer decree to that effect, or a Führer order, or
something of that sort. Did he mention that?

WESTHOFF: That he had already said at the very beginning, that this was
a matter of a Führer decree.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In the next paragraph you point out in this
statement—and I think it is only fair to yourself to read it; it is the
second sentence:

    “But in this case none of our men”—the men of the
    Wehrmacht—“had shot any of the P.W. I made inquiries at once.”

Then you say:

    “None of them had been shot by a soldier, but by Gestapo men
    only or else police sentries. That proves that probably
    Himmler—of course, I do not know whether he made the suggestion
    to the Führer, or how they arranged it. It should be possible to
    find that out from Göring, who was present at the conference.
    Naturally, I do not know.”

Do you remember making these answers?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, you say again:

    “At any rate, it is a clear fact that our men did not shoot any
    of them; they must all have been shot by policemen.”

And you point out in the last sentence:

    “But in this particular case, only those caught by our people
    were brought back to the camp, that is, those caught by
    soldiers.”

Now, in the next paragraph you say that you had no authority to give the
police orders, and you repeat that the members of the Wehrmacht did not
shoot any of them. And then in the third sentence you say:

    “I had a report sent me at once, and told General Von
    Graevenitz, ‘Sir, the only thing we can do is to see that no
    dirty business is carried out where we are in charge.’”

Is that right: Does that correctly describe what you did, General?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you go on to say, a sentence or two later,
that you were faced with a _fait accompli_; and then you say, after
repeating General Von Graevenitz’s protests to Field Marshal Keitel,
when he had said, “That’s quite impossible, we cannot shoot any people”:

    “How the shooting was carried out I heard from the
    representative of the protecting power, Herr Naville, of
    Switzerland.”

Is that right?

WESTHOFF: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did you hear of the shooting?

WESTHOFF: I turned to the Gestapo and wanted the particulars of the
shootings for the Foreign Office, and I did not get them. The
representative of Switzerland, Herr Naville, whom I had sent to the
camp, visited me on his return, and from him I learned the only thing
that I ever heard about this matter, namely, that apparently a
prisoner-of-war who had returned to the camp had seen that the escaped
airmen had been driven out of the Görlitz Prison on a truck heavily
chained and under strong guard. That is the only thing I learned about
this affair at all, and I have up to now not found out in what way these
airmen perished. The Gestapo refused to inform me of this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is correct that generally what
information you did receive you received from the representative of the
protecting power. I don’t know if you remember whether his name was
Naville or not. But it is right, isn’t it?

WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What information you did receive—you tell us
that it was very little—you received from the representative of
Switzerland, of the protecting power. Is that right?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want to deal with the next bit in
the statement where you tried to get in touch with the Foreign Office,
and if you look down the paragraph you will see that you say:

    “At any rate, we did not get any news, and so it was pointed out
    to the Field Marshal that such a state of affairs was
    impossible, that we had to get in communication with the Foreign
    Office. Then he emphatically stated that it was forbidden to get
    in touch with the Foreign Office.”

Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will read on, two sentences:

    “Then the affair was raised in the House of Commons in England,
    and then a note was sent by our side. Then I was quite suddenly
    called up by Admiral Bürckner of the Foreign Department
    (Amtsgruppe Ausland) in the OKW, which keeps contact with the
    Foreign Office. He called me up by telephone at night and said,
    ‘The Feldmarschall has given me orders to prepare an answer for
    England immediately. What is it all about? I don’t know anything
    about the case.’ I said, ‘Herr Admiral, I am sorry, but General
    Von Graevenitz received strict orders not to talk to anyone
    about it. Nothing was allowed to be put down in writing either.
    Apart from that, we ourselves were faced with an accomplished
    fact. This order was apparently issued by Himmler, and the
    position was such that we could do nothing more at all about
    it.”

Is that a correct account?

WESTHOFF: Here again the word “Himmler” stands where the word “Hitler”
should stand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That should be Hitler. Apart from that, that is
correct? I mean, in substance is that a correct account of the
conversation between Admiral Bürckner and yourself?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You then go on to say that Admiral Bürckner
wanted you to tell him about the affair; that you only knew what the
gentlemen from Switzerland had told you; and that you had made various
attempts to approach the Gestapo. And then, if you look at just before
the end of that paragraph:

    “Then the Foreign Office itself got into touch and took charge
    of this affair. Then another of my men, Lieutenant Colonel
    Krafft, went to Berchtesgaden while I was on a journey. At that
    time a note to England was to be prepared. Then, when we read
    this note to England in the newspaper, we were all absolutely
    taken aback. We all clutched our heads. Mad! We could do nothing
    about the affair.”

Is that correct? Did you say that, and is that correct?

WESTHOFF: The matter was then turned over to the Foreign Office, and the
Foreign Office was charged with the preparation of a note to England. At
this discussion Lieutenant Colonel Krafft was apparently called in as a
specialist for the Sagan case to clarify any doubts, if such were still
at hand. That is not to mean at all, however, that Lieutenant Colonel
Krafft was in any way concerned with the preparation of the note; that
was purely a matter for the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office had only
called him in so that, if there were still any doubts about the matter,
they could be clarified on the spot.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, General, the next part of the statement I
did not intend to read unless the Tribunal wanted it, because you are
making quite clear that in your opinion the Inspector General, General
Roettig, had nothing to do with the affair at all. And if you accept it
from me that that is the substance of the next two paragraphs, I won’t
trouble you with it in detail. You are making clear that General Roettig
had nothing to do with it. Is that right?

WESTHOFF: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I am sorry. If you will look at the first
sentence—I thought it represented it fairly. Look at the first
sentence:

    “Generalinspekteur General Roettig had nothing to do with it,
    nothing at all. He did not have any hand in the affair at all.
    He was completely excluded from it by the fact that these
    matters were taken out of his hands, apparently at that
    conference with the Führer in the morning, that is to say, the
    conference between Himmler, Field Marshal Keitel, and Göring,
    which took place in the Führer’s presence.”

Is that right? I only wanted to put it shortly that you were trying to,
and quite rightly if it is true, to give your view that General Roettig
had nothing to do with it. Is that right, that is, that sentence I read
to you?

Did you say, “yes”?

WESTHOFF: The Inspector General was responsible for measures to prevent
escape, but had nothing to do with this matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is no difference between us. That is what
I was suggesting. Now, I’d like you to look at the next paragraph. It
also deals with General Roettig. Then, after that, you explain the
position of the officers. You say this:

    “I only know an order existed that only officers, and, I
    believe, only those who were caught by the Gestapo, should be
    handed over to them.”

Then you say—you talk about intelligence—I don’t want to trouble you
about that. Then, if you would look at the next paragraph:

    “I received a report from the camp saying so-and-so many men had
    been shot whilst attempting to escape. I did not hear from the
    Gestapo at all. It is like this. The reports are sent to the
    camp. Then the camp informed us that a certain number of men had
    been recaptured and a certain number shot. Things are reported
    in that way. The Gestapo sent me no information whatsoever; they
    merely told us casually whenever we made inquiries, that they
    had recaptured a certain number.”

Now the next sentence I want you to look at carefully:

    “The Field Marshal gave us detailed instructions to publish a
    list at the camp, giving the names of those shot, as a warning.
    That was done. That was a direct order which we could not
    disobey.”

Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: It was ordered that a list of all those who were shot be
posted up in the camp as a warning.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then the next sentence says:

    “Apparently the bodies were burned and the ashes put into urns
    and sent to the camp.”

And then there is arrangement about the burial.

Then you say that that raised great difficulties. A sentence or two
later you say that matters of that sort were always passed to higher
authority. They went to the Party Chancellery, and then there was hell
to pay. The cremation of prisoners of war was forbidden.

And then later on, when you say that you raised the question of it being
contrary to the Convention, you say:

    “Whenever I addressed the Officers’ corps and said, ‘Gentlemen,
    we only act according to the Convention,’ someone from higher
    authority from the Party Chancellery, arrived the following day
    and said, ‘Gentlemen, the Convention is a scrap of paper which
    doesn’t interest us.’”

Is that correct as to the general procedure?

WESTHOFF: It is not entirely correct. The OKW took the point of view
that the Convention should be observed, but the prisoner-of-war affairs
as such in Germany were only apparently in the hands of the OKW. The
people who really formed the decisions on prisoner-of-war affairs were
the Party and economic offices. Thus, for example, my office had to
submit to the deputy of the Party Chancellery every order that was
issued, and the Party Chancellery decided how this order was to be
issued, and not the OKW at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to go into it in detail. You had an
interview with Bormann’s deputy, Friedrich, at the Party Chancellery.
And then in the next long paragraph beginning, “The Air Force P.W. camps
were under G.A.F. administration...” We have gone into that, if Your
Lordship agrees, in detail—the Air Force side of it. I did not intend
to put that.

Then I want you to come to where it says, in the paragraph after you
talked about the question of handing over prisoner-of-war camps to
Himmler’s organization—you see it reads, “We were told all men who get
away are to be shot!” It may be the beginning of the next paragraph in
my English version. Do you see it after a long paragraph about Air Force
camps?

WESTHOFF: What page please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The trouble is the pages are different, but it
begins, “We were told all men who get away are to be shot...” It is the
third last paragraph of the document. If you start from the end of the
document, you will see a paragraph: “I cannot remember...” One before
it: “We arranged with the ‘Feldmarschall’...” It is the one before that:
“We were told all men who get away are to be shot...” Have you got it?

    “The ‘Feldmarschall’ prohibited anything concerning this to be
    put into writing. Nothing at all. Only the camp was to be
    informed in order to put them in the picture. I discussed the
    matter with Graevenitz once more. I can’t tell you the exact
    details anymore. We contacted the Gestapo regarding the return
    of the bodies. We had to have them back. Then Von Graevenitz
    left for the front.”

Now it is the next bit I want you to look at carefully.

    “I then said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I won’t do it like that;
    I am going to cover myself at all costs so that we are not
    involved in it afterwards. It is true the “Feldmarschall” has
    forbidden it to be put in writing, but I want to have it in
    writing. It must be signed by the Führer.’”

Now that is what you said to Krafft—comparatively unimportant.

WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Tell us what you would like altered in it.

WESTHOFF: I wanted it in writing, signed by the Field Marshal, and for
this purpose I issued a memorandum describing this discussion. And thus
I had the Field Marshal’s signature with my office for future events so
that I would have something in writing to prove it actually true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just look at the next sentence. I think
that entirely agrees with what you have said:

    “Contrary to Feldmarschall Keitel’s orders—I pretended that I
    had not understood properly—I worked the thing out on paper. I
    said to Oberstleutnant Krafft, ‘I want to have the word “shoot”
    included so that Keitel can see it in writing. He may adopt a
    different attitude then.’

    “When I got the thing back, he had written the following in the
    margin: ‘I did not definitely say “shoot”; I said, “Hand over to
    the police or hand over to the Gestapo.”’”

WESTHOFF: That is not entirely correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What change would you like to make in that,
General?

WESTHOFF: I stated that clearly in my sworn statement, that the Field
Marshal had written on the margin, “I did not say ‘shoot,’ but ‘turn
over to the Gestapo.’”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the same as is in this statement? It
says he wrote in the margin, “‘I did not definitely say ‘shoot.’ I said,
‘hand over to the police or hand over to the Gestapo.’”

WESTHOFF: Well, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted this to be quite clear, General. The
draft order or note of information that you had put up to the Field
Marshal contained the word “shoot”?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now there is only one other bit. You go on to
say:

    “We arranged with the ‘Feldmarschall’ to have the matter
    submitted to the Führer. We had the feeling that there was
    something not quite in order.”

And then you say that you had to approach the police authorities on a
slightly lower level, and about 10 lines down you say this:

    “In the end, I could not get where I wanted with this affair. So
    I went to Berlin myself—it was the only time I ever saw
    Kaltenbrunner—and I said to Kaltenbrunner, ‘This matter is
    still outstanding. It should be submitted to the Führer. I can’t
    carry on like this. A decision must be made some time. But apart
    from that, I am of the opinion that the whole affair should be
    dropped. The whole thing is madness. It has already led us into
    so much unpleasantness and is so monstrous that I am still of
    the opinion that this affair should either be stopped in some
    way or the Führer be dissuaded from continuing it any further.’”

Is that generally, again, in substance, a correct version of what you
said to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?

WESTHOFF: This does not directly concern this matter, however, but
rather an order that was to be issued by Wagner in connection with it
and to be submitted to the Führer in two ways, one via the chief of the
OKW and the other via Himmler. This order had been submitted to Keitel
in draft form which then went to the Gestapo. The Gestapo read this
draft, and then the matter was carried no further. I was never able to
find out why this was so, and for this reason I myself duly addressed
Kaltenbrunner about this matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was this the order in its final form, that
escaped prisoners of war should be handed over to the Gestapo or the
police?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. So this, General Westhoff, if I may have
your attention, was really dealing with the future, was it? This was
dealing with what was to be done in the future?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I don’t think one need go into it in
details again, unless the Tribunal want. My Lord, the rest of the
statement is only a general account of the attitude of the British
prisoners of war, and I have no complaint about it at all.

My Lord, there is one problem that has arisen which perhaps the
Tribunal, would now consider the convenient time. My friend, Colonel
Pokrovsky, has certain quite different matters with regard to the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war which he wanted to raise with this
witness, and perhaps the Tribunal would consider it a convenient time to
do it.

THE PRESIDENT: It probably would be more convenient if Dr. Nelte put his
questions to this witness, if he has any, first, before Colonel
Pokrovsky.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should respectfully agree to clear up this
topic first.

THE PRESIDENT: Unless Colonel Pokrovsky’s questions might relate to the
Defendant Keitel?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They do relate, of course, to the position of
the OKW with these prisoners of war, but they have nothing to do with
Sagan.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, have you any questions you want to put to this
witness?

DR. NELTE: Witness, what was just read to you was called a “statement”
and was presented here. Have you ever given this statement in complete
form orally or in writing?

WESTHOFF: I was interrogated on different occasions, and this
interrogatory which has been presented to me is a summation of my
testimony. Of course, I found errors here and there because it has been
summarized, and the questions have been omitted.

DR. NELTE: In other words, this is a summation of the answers you gave
to questions at various interrogations?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Was this summation ever submitted to you?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: I had the impression that the passages read to you here just
now were on occasion very long and that you actually answered always
only the latter part of these passages. I should like to ask you whether
after this interrogation in London you were not again interrogated?

WESTHOFF: I was interrogated here in Nuremberg.

DR. NELTE: By Colonel Williams?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: What did Colonel Williams say to you at the conclusion of
this interrogation? What did he request of you?

WESTHOFF: At the conclusion of the interrogation, Colonel Williams asked
me to describe briefly the basic central point of my testimony and to
sum it up in a sworn statement.

DR. NELTE: Did you swear to this statement before Colonel Williams?

WESTHOFF: Yes, I swore to it.

DR. NELTE: Now, I should like first of all to go through with you the
interrogation that you had with Colonel Williams, and which is to be
found in Document RF-1450. I am having this document handed over to you.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by Document 1450?

DR. NELTE: RF-1450 is contained in the document book, in my document
book as Number 5.

THE PRESIDENT: But you mean RF-1450, do you?

DR. NELTE: Yes, RF. This document is entitled, “Summary of Interrogation
of General Adolf Westhoff by Colonel Curtis L. Williams, on 2 November
1945.”

THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute, Dr. Nelte. Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal think
that you can put to this witness, “Did you or did you not make a
different statement in an interrogation at some other time?” But the
document that you are referring to now is a document which the Tribunal
refused to admit on your objections. When the French presented that
document, you objected to it and it was therefore not allowed to be put
in, so that the proper way in which to put the question now is, “Did you
say to Colonel Williams so-and-so?”

DR. NELTE: I have here a compilation of those points in the document or
in the notes of Colonel Williams which according to your declaration are
supposed not to be correct. I now ask you, what did you, or did you not
upon being questioned by Colonel Williams...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it is not right for you to say that they are
different—you must ask him questions about it, not make statements
yourself.

DR. NELTE: What did you say to Colonel Williams to his question, whether
the prisoner-of-war camps in their entirety were supposed to be
subordinate to the OKW and to Field Marshal Keitel?

WESTHOFF: The prisoner-of-war camps were subordinate to the OKW only to
the extent that the OKW had the legal control of them and insofar as the
protective powers, that is, the International Red Cross was involved.
The OKW did not have the power to give orders or dole out punishment in
the camps.

DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams’ question, on the
right of the OKW regarding the inspection of the camps?

WESTHOFF: The OKW was entitled to inspect. That can be seen also in my
official orders in which it states clearly that the inspector was
entitled to inspect the camp.

DR. NELTE: What did you answer to Colonel Williams’ question, to whom
Stalag Luft III, Sagan, was subordinate?

WESTHOFF: Stalag Luft III, Sagan, was subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, because the Commander-in-Chief of
the Luftwaffe, on his own wish and already at the beginning of the war,
had all prisoner-of-war camps containing airmen placed under his
control.

DR. NELTE: Did you answer to one of Colonel Williams’ questions that
Göring, Himmler, Keitel, and Hitler had decided to shoot the officers
who escaped in Sagan?

WESTHOFF: No, that is a mistake. Colonel Williams asked me what the
Führer had said to Field Marshal Keitel; thereupon, I answered clearly
that I could give no information about this, since I had not taken part
in that conference. I could only make statements about the conference
which Field Marshal Keitel had with General Von Graevenitz.

DR. NELTE: Did you answer Colonel Williams that Field Marshal Keitel,
during this conference with Graevenitz, said, “This is my order”?

WESTHOFF: No, the Field Marshal could not issue an order regarding the
shootings, since the shootings were not within the competence of the
Wehrmacht but in that of the Gestapo.

DR. NELTE: During your interrogation, particularly also with Colonel
Williams, did you state clearly that it never had been a question of an
order issued by Keitel himself or of an order which Keitel transmitted
to you on higher orders?

WESTHOFF: It concerned information given to General Von Graevenitz. That
is also stated with no reservations in my sworn statement.

DR. NELTE: Then, if I understand you correctly, you declare that Field
Marshal Keitel never issued an order of his own nor ever expressed the
idea that he at all wanted to give you an order regarding a shooting of
the officers?

WESTHOFF: No, that he could also not do.

DR. NELTE: During the previous interrogation by the prosecutor there was
talk of a report which the camp commander at Görlitz is supposed to have
delivered to you. This is also in the notes. Did you ask for or receive
a report from the camp commander?

WESTHOFF: I had no personal connection at all with the camp commander at
Görlitz. That must be a confusion with the statement of the Swiss
representative, Naville.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that during the discussion between Keitel, on
the one hand, and General Von Graevenitz and you, on the other, two
matters were brought up: First, the case of the escaped Royal Air Force
officers; and, second, the question as to what should be done in the
future, or how escapes should be prevented?

WESTHOFF: Yes, that is so.

DR. NELTE: I now have questions to ask you which I request you to
answer, if possible, with “yes” or “no.” Is it true that in the first
case, namely, the affair of the 50 Royal Air Force pilots, only
conversation afforded the possibility of gaining information of what had
happened in the higher circles?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did General Graevenitz, upon his return from headquarters,
not say to you, “What can we do at all if the Gestapo once gets things
into their hands”?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: In other words, it is clear from your whole conversation with
Keitel, that it was a question here of an order directed to Himmler from
Hitler?

WESTHOFF: In regard to the shooting, yes.

DR. NELTE: After Professor Naville visited the Sagan Camp, did he say to
you that his impression was that certainly stronger forces were at work
here against which the OKW could do nothing?

WESTHOFF: Yes, he said that.

DR. NELTE: With reference to the escaped pilots, did the OKW do anything
regarding their capture or treatment, or was it clear that in this
respect this matter was unfortunately settled so far as the OKW were
concerned?

WESTHOFF: The OKW could do nothing further because the matter had been
taken entirely out of their hands.

DR. NELTE: Accordingly, then, it is not correct to say that, after this
discussion between Keitel, Graevenitz, and Westhoff, a conference was
again called by the OKW?

WESTHOFF: No, there was no further conference in the OKW.

DR. NELTE: A document has been submitted in which Colonel Walde—it is
Document D-731, Mr. President—in which Colonel Walde deposes—and to be
sure, he says at the beginning that he had to reconstruct from memory
what had happened—according to his recollection, he believed that the
OKW had called a conference that took place in the Prinz
Albrechtstrasse. Do you know anything about that?

WESTHOFF: I only know about this conference from you yourself. It could
not have been called by the OKW, for then it would have been held by us
in Torgau. Without a doubt, however, it was held in Berlin, as you told
me, and that is no conference called by the OKW.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that prisoner-of-war officers recaptured by the
Wehrmacht were again put in the Sagan Camp and also remained there?

WESTHOFF: Yes, that is right.

DR. NELTE: Were recaptured prisoners of war, who were turned over to the
camp in any case, let out again?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: On the other hand, is it true that you gave the camp
commander strict orders on the part of the OKW that recaptured prisoners
should under no circumstances be let out of the camp again?

WESTHOFF: The order was not given by me to the camp commander but to the
commanders in the military administrative districts in charge of
prisoners of war.

DR. NELTE: But by them to the camps?

WESTHOFF: To the camps, yes.

DR. NELTE: An order was mentioned to the effect that the names of the
escaped prisoners who had not come back, were to be published. You
stated before “as a warning.” In order to clarify this question—the
purpose of this order which, of course, came from above—I should like
to ask you whether Field Marshal Keitel did not say as justification, “I
hope, however, that the prisoners will be so shocked by this that in the
future they will not escape any more”?

WESTHOFF: Yes, the Field Marshal said that.

DR. NELTE: You deposed, or rather, it was read to you that Field Marshal
Keitel said to you and General Von Graevenitz that nothing should be put
down in writing about the whole matter, nor should it be discussed with
any other office.

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Is it then correct to say that you drew up a memorandum
regarding this matter, namely, the conference, and had it submitted to
Keitel?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that Field Marshal Keitel did not find fault
with this fact as one might certainly really have expected but wrote his
initial “K” on the upper corner of this memorandum?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore correct that you, because you had to
report, repeatedly got in touch with the Reich Security Main Office in
order to find out something about the fate of these unfortunate
officers?

WESTHOFF: Not only did I get in touch with the Reich Security Main
Office but, since I myself did not succeed in this effort, I also
reported the matter to the General Office of the Wehrmacht, but as far
as I know, it also did not succeed in this effort.

DR. NELTE: Is it further correct that you asked the representative of
the International Red Cross, Dr. Naville, to visit the Sagan Camp in
connection with this event?

WESTHOFF: I brought about this visit, yes.

DR. NELTE: Is it furthermore true that Field Marshal Keitel called you
up and told you that the Foreign Minister had to have precise knowledge
of the whole occurrence, in order to draw up a note of reply?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And that consequently you were to tell the Foreign Office
about the occurrence in all its details?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did Keitel say on this occasion that you were to conceal
anything or to put anything in a false light?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: Was the OKW involved in the composition of the note as it was
sent in final form?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: Is it correct that your representative, Lieutenant Colonel
Krafft, was ordered by the Foreign Office to attend a meeting in
Berchtesgaden for the sole purpose of giving correct information in
reply to possible further inquiry by the representative of the Foreign
Office, in case the information were demanded?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Is it finally correct that Lieutenant Colonel Krafft reported
to you that the Foreign Office had presented a note to Hitler, and
Hitler had rejected it and then composed the text himself?

WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, that is right.

DR. NELTE: The second part of the conferences between Keitel,
Graevenitz, and Westhoff concerned itself with the question of what
action should be taken in the future. You stated in this connection that
an order was to be drawn up, and that it was a question of certain
spheres of competence that had to be discussed with the Reich Security
Main Office. Tell me in this connection what, if anything, did the Reich
Security Main Office or Himmler have to do with the administration of
prisoners of war?

WESTHOFF: Himmler was responsible for the security of the Reich and,
insofar as all the prisoners of war were concerned, he had to concern
himself with the search for all escaped prisoners.

DR. NELTE: Did he, because of this, come into conflict in any way with
your OKW Prisoner of War Department?

WESTHOFF: Insofar as we often asked, whenever prisoners of war escaped,
what had been done with them and received no information, or information
with which we could do nothing, for which we had no use.

DR. NELTE: Does that mean that it was possible that Himmler or his
office gave you no information when they caught prisoners of war?

WESTHOFF: That is absolutely possible, and we also supposed that such
was the case repeatedly.

DR. NELTE: Did you on one occasion, while drawing up or drafting orders
which were concerned with the treatment of escaped prisoners of war, use
the words “Stufe III”?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: Do you know whether the meaning of these words signifying a
death sentence were known at all in the OKW?

WESTHOFF: They were not known to me. I was asked about that the first
time in London and had to state then also that I could not give any
information about that.

DR. NELTE: When you say, you personally, then you probably mean the
organization as well, since you belonged to the OKW.

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: I have a document here, Number 1514-PS. It concerns a
collective order of the commander of Wehrkreis VI regarding the
treatment of escaped prisoners of war. You will see in this order a
whole number of references to years as far back as 1942.

I ask you now according to your knowledge and experience, would not an
order supposed to have been issued on 4 March 1944 also have been
entered here, had its contents been very important?

WESTHOFF: If it was a question of a secret order, yes.

DR. NELTE: It is in the German...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute Dr. Nelte. Aren’t you getting very far away
from the subject upon which this witness was being examined? I mean, he
was being examined about an interview which he had with the Field
Marshal Keitel, and here you are asking him about something which has
nothing to do with that at all, as far as I am able to see.

DR. NELTE: I believe that I shall make clear that this has something to
do with the second part of this conference, namely, regarding the
treatment of recaptured escaped officers. These are preparatory
questions that I must ask to make clear, in my opinion...

THE PRESIDENT: But it is a very long cross-examination of a witness whom
you did not wish to call. The Tribunal wish you to make your
cross-examination as brief as possible.

DR. NELTE: I shall make it as brief as the interests of the defendant
permit.

[_Turning to the witness._] Is it not customary in the German system of
issuing orders that in referring to an order issued by higher
authorities the date and archive number is given?

WESTHOFF: Yes, always.

DR. NELTE: Did you ever give any information to the representatives of
the protecting powers or to the International Red Cross that prisoners
of war, of whose capture you were fully aware, that these had not been
recaptured?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. NELTE: Do you know anything about—and here I have the last document
shown you, 1650-PS...

[_Document 1650-PS was submitted to the witness._]

THE PRESIDENT: What was the point of showing 1514-PS to him? He has not
been asked any relevant questions about it at all.

DR. NELTE: From this document I found corroboration of the answer of the
defendant through the witness that if an order had been issued on 4
March 1944, as it was presented here, it would have had to be contained
in this document.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it is a waste of time, Dr. Nelte.

DR. NELTE: I shall be through in a few minutes, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, would you please look on Page 3 of
this document, under Number 2. It reads:

    “The OKW is requested to inform the prisoner-of-war camps that
    in the interest of camouflage the recaptured officers are not to
    be turned over directly to Mauthausen but to the local State
    Police authority.”

Did you ever in your activity in the OKW know anything of such a request
or such an order?

WESTHOFF: That is not familiar to me. That also took place at a time
when I was not chief.

DR. NELTE: But on taking over on 1 April 1944 you must have known of all
important events or must have taken note of them?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did you ever find out in this connection that such a document
had been presented?

WESTHOFF: No, I do not know of it.

DR. NELTE: And now the last question. Look at the first page of this
document. It is a teletype from the Chief of the Sipo and SD, of 4 March
’44. It reads in the first part as follows:

    “The OKW has ordered the following: Every recaptured escaped
    prisoner-of-war officer”—_et cetera_—“is, after his recapture,
    to be turned over to the Chief of the Sipo and SD with the code
    word ‘Stufe III’....”

The Defendant Keitel has stated here that he does not know of such an
OKW order.

I ask you, did you find such a command, such an order in the files, in
the files which must have been presented to you when you took over
office on 1 April 1944?

WESTHOFF: I did not find such an order, but an order of this kind
existed without a doubt.

DR. NELTE: In what way?

WESTHOFF: So far as I recall, General Graevenitz brought this order
either from the field headquarters or from the General Office of the
Wehrmacht.

DR. NELTE: How is it possible then that such an order was not in your
files?

WESTHOFF: Because there was an order that this order was to exist only
orally.

DR. NELTE: Then please tell me what the procedure was when such an order
was given orally.

WESTHOFF: It could be transmitted orally.

DR. NELTE: That is, your office?

WESTHOFF: It was then transmitted through the Chief of the Prisoner of
War Department.

DR. NELTE: Chief?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And you know that such an order was transmitted?

WESTHOFF: General Von Graevenitz brought such an order with him and, as
far as I know, the order was also transmitted further.

DR. NELTE: Then you certainly must have known what “Stufe III” meant?

WESTHOFF: No, that I did not know. I have said that I knew only that
there was an order to turn over these recaptured prisoners to the
Gestapo but I cannot remember details because I never saw a written
order.

DR. NELTE: Can you then state that this order, as you see it there
before you, was issued by the OKW?

WESTHOFF: No, that I cannot say.

DR. NELTE: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President;
permit me to put only a few questions which refer to the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner. Witness ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we are going to call the Witness Wielen
afterwards. You realize that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: But you want to ask this witness questions, don’t you?

DR. KAUFFMANN: The name Kaltenbrunner has been mentioned here, and I
have only a few questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you mentioned a little earlier that
you spoke with the Gestapo, and that you received no information from
the Gestapo. Do you know with whom you spoke at that time?

WESTHOFF: No. The conferences with the Gestapo took place continuously.
In cases when we missed prisoners of war and we did not know where they
were, we continuously made inquiries at the Gestapo. But, on one
occasion I was with Kaltenbrunner—namely, on the occasion of some other
matter which had nothing to do with Allied prisoners of war—and since
this occasion gave me the opportunity to talk to Herr Kaltenbrunner
personally, I immediately brought the matter up for discussion and tried
to have that order rescinded. Kaltenbrunner and Müller were present at
the time.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on in Berlin after the Sagan case you talked to
Kaltenbrunner personally?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the Sagan case discussed there?

WESTHOFF: I talked about the Sagan matter there with Kaltenbrunner, and
I expressly pointed out that this was an unbearable situation.

DR. KAUFFMANN: About how long after the Sagan case was that?

WESTHOFF: I cannot tell you that any more now; it may have been 4 weeks
later.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was Kaltenbrunner’s view on this problem? What did
he tell you?

WESTHOFF: Kaltenbrunner himself said next to nothing to me, but rather
Müller carried on the conversation, and I left without having been given
either “yes” or “no.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Müller also present during the second conference in
Berlin?

WESTHOFF: I was in Berlin only once.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Wasn’t the subject of that conversation in any way the
question as to how one was to form the prisoner of war system in the
future?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, the Sagan case was discussed exclusively?

WESTHOFF: Not the Sagan case exclusively. But I was ordered to see
Kaltenbrunner for another reason, namely, because of German prisoners of
war, but made use of the opportunity to discuss this case with him at
once. That is the only time that I saw Kaltenbrunner at all.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference you neither received a positive
nor negative answer?

WESTHOFF: That is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the impression with which you left that
conference?

WESTHOFF: The impression was that apparently not much could be done.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you then report to your superiors about this
conference?

WESTHOFF: Yes, I duly informed the General Office of the Wehrmacht about
it at that time.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the content of that report?

WESTHOFF: That I had again spoken with Herr Kaltenbrunner about it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, that alone, Witness, would certainly not be enough.
In this important matter you must certainly have reported then about the
business of that conference, not just about the fact?

WESTHOFF: Of course, I reported about the business; that I had brought
the matter up again, and that the Gestapo took the attitude that they
wanted to wait.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions, Mr. President.

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, did you depose
the statement from your own knowledge or did you learn of this fact only
through Field Marshal Keitel, namely, the fact that the meeting
mentioned by you between Hitler, Himmler, and Keitel regarding the
escape of these 80 flyers is supposed to have taken place in the
presence of Reich Marshal Göring?

WESTHOFF: I learned of it through Field Marshal Keitel.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.

[_Dr. Laternser approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if you are going to ask questions on
behalf of the High Command—is that what you wanted to do?

DR. LATERNSER: I was going to ask the witness a few questions on behalf
of the OKW and the General Staff.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has given his evidence about the fact that
the OKW had nothing to do with these matters in connection with
prisoner-of-war camps and he has not been cross-examined with reference
to that by the Prosecution; so that the matter is not in dispute. And
therefore it appears to the Tribunal that no question need be put by
you.

You better specify your question.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, up to now the procedure has been that
whenever a witness appeared, every Defense Counsel had the opportunity
to ask this witness questions which he considered necessary. Are we now
going to depart from that?

THE PRESIDENT: I did not ask you to argue the matter; I asked you to
specify your questions.

DR. LATERNSER: Very well.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, were you yourself active in the
Eastern campaign?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?

WESTHOFF: First of all in command of a battalion and then a regiment.

DR. LATERNSER: In what sector was your unit engaged?

WESTHOFF: To begin with, in the Ukraine; later before Leningrad, and
then at Staraya-Russa.

DR. LATERNSER: Before the beginning of the Eastern campaign did you give
special instructions to your company commanders?

WESTHOFF: In what respect?

DR. LATERNSER: After you had received the order to attack, I assume you
must have gathered your company commanders together as battalion
commander and discussed some orders with them before the beginning of
the campaign.

WESTHOFF: I told them how they had to conduct themselves during the
battle, how they had to behave toward the Russian population, and how
they had to act toward the prisoners of war.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, and what kind of instructions did you give your
company commanders?

WESTHOFF: I very briefly gave the company commanders instructions that
every prisoner-of-war was to be treated as he would like to be treated
himself were he to become a prisoner.

DR. LATERNSER: You said that specifically?

WESTHOFF: Yes, that was ordered.

DR. LATERNSER: How did the troops behave when they marched in?

WESTHOFF: We fought practically all the way to Kiev, and were marching,
and had hardly any contact with the civilian population.

DR. LATERNSER: During the advance into Russia did you notice
considerable destruction?

WESTHOFF: Partly, yes; in part, villages had been destroyed. Also small
towns had been destroyed.

DR. LATERNSER: Railways?

WESTHOFF: Railways also, yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Industrial works?

WESTHOFF: Yes—I saw that afterwards outside of Leningrad—yes indeed!

DR. LATERNSER: In your sector was the order carried out by which Soviet
Russian commissars were to be shot after being taken prisoners?

WESTHOFF: We had nothing to do with that. Prisoners of war that we took
were all sent back to the division right away. We ourselves, the troop
commanders—regimental and battalion commanders—had nothing to do with
it, had even no opportunity at all to do this.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you have not answered my question correctly. I
have asked you whether you had applied the order.

WESTHOFF: I know nothing about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you ever receive the order to take action against the
Jewish population in Russia?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Did your troops ill-treat or shoot civilian persons or
prisoners?

WESTHOFF: No! There was a special order for the maintenance of
discipline, stating that this was not to be permitted.

DR. LATERNSER: Was plundering allowed?

WESTHOFF: No, this was strictly forbidden.

DR. LATERNSER: Did any plundering occur?

WESTHOFF: Not by my troops.

DR. LATERNSER: Did members of your unit commit rape?

WESTHOFF: No; in no case known to me.

DR. LATERNSER: Was the civilian population compelled to clear the houses
for complete occupation by the troops?

WESTHOFF: No. There was merely an order saying that those houses in
which the offices were set up had to be cleared. Other houses did not
have to be evacuated, and as a rule the system was that I, for example,
whenever I was billeted, would always sleep in the same room with the
people who lived there.

DR. LATERNSER: Have you experienced destruction which was not due to
military necessity?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Have you on occasion or frequently fed the hungry
civilian population from the field kitchens?

WESTHOFF: The regiment was ordered that all food which was surplus in
the regiment was to be issued to the population mostly at midday or in
the evening, so far as we had any contact at all with the population.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes. And then one last question: Do you consider it
possible that German soldiers invited Russian children for coffee, and
then killed these children by giving them poisoned cake?

WESTHOFF: No.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: You aren’t suggesting, are you, that this witness is one
for the High Command?

DR. LATERNSER: No, no.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you suggesting that you ought to be entitled to
examine every witness who has any military rank on behalf of the High
Command.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as far as I understood it, it has been the
rule up to now, and the procedure has been, that every means of
evidence—thus also witnesses who are brought in here—could be examined
by everyone of Defense Counsel; and I have adhered to that rule up to
now, and also felt that it was my duty to put those questions which I
have put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, I asked you very simply: Are you
suggesting that you are entitled to ask questions on behalf of the High
Command of every person who is called here who has any military rank?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it seems to me that would be highly cumulative. We
shall then have evidence on behalf of the High Command from possibly 30
or 40 witnesses. And when you say that it has been allowed in the past,
every other member of the Defense has been confined to evidence, so far
as possible, which is not cumulative. That is the reason why I
interrupted you, because it seems to me if you are going to do that, to
claim the right to ask questions of everybody who has military rank—and
you have done it up to now—the evidence is going to be extremely
cumulative on your part.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: You see, Dr. Laternser, the questions you have been
putting to this witness are questions directed to show that the
regimental officers and soldiers in the German Army behaved properly and
could not be expected to behave improperly. That does not seem to be
really relevant to the questions to whether the High Command is a
criminal organization or not. And in any event it is—in my opinion, at
any rate—cumulative if you do that.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, already so much heavily incriminating
material regarding the Wehrmacht has been presented, especially by the
Russian Prosecution, that the Russian Prosecution are definitely of the
opinion that relevant orders were issued from above, that is to say,
issued by the people comprising the circle of the General Staff and the
OKW. By questioning this witness, who was a regimental commander, I
wanted to establish whether any effects extended downwards. This
statement has confirmed me in the fact that this is not the case.
Otherwise, I must...

THE PRESIDENT: Anyhow, Dr. Laternser, we have your position now, and the
Tribunal will consider how far you may be allowed to proceed in future.

DR. LATERNSER: Very well.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Colonel Pokrovsky.

COL. POKROVSKY: It seems to me, Witness, that on 28 December 1945 you
were interrogated by a representative of the Soviet Prosecution; is that
not so?

WESTHOFF: Yes, sir.

COL. POKROVSKY: You gave correct and accurate testimony, did you not?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Would you please confirm some of your answers to the
questions that you were asked then? I will help you to recollect the
questions that were put to you.

WESTHOFF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: In your section there were, as you stated, six different
subdivisions or departments?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: You said that the first subdivision of the section—that
is, I mean the section (Allgemein Abteilung) which you headed from 1
March 1943 up to 31 March 1944—was dealing with prisoners of war. Is
that correct?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Now, the first subdivision of this section was concerned
in general with the treatment of prisoners of war and, in particular
with the questions of punishments and legal proceedings. This
subdivision got the reports on the moods and reactions and was in
constant touch with the Abteilung Abwehr (counterintelligence section).
Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: With the Abwehr, yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Now, in connection with the reply which you gave to that
question, I would like you to state to the Tribunal right now, just how
much or what did you know about the way the Soviet prisoners of war were
treated, both in concentration camps and during transference from one
camp to another.

WESTHOFF: As far as I know, until 1942, the Russian prisoners of war
were treated on the basis of purely political considerations. After 1942
this was changed, and in 1943, as long as I was in the German High
Command, prisoners of war were treated in accordance with the Geneva
Convention, that is to say, in all points their treatment was adapted to
that of the other prisoners of war. Their rations were the same as those
of the others, and their employment and their treatment was in every
detail in accordance with the treatment given prisoners of war of other
powers, with certain exceptions.

COL. POKROVSKY: If I am not mistaken, the fourth subdivision of your
department was especially concerned with the questions of feeding and
clothing the prisoners of war. Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: The task of Group IV was matters of administration. It had to
elaborate the instructions regarding rations, along with the Ministry of
Food and Agriculture. It also had to deal with clothing.

COL. POKROVSKY: If I understand you correctly you have stated that until
you took charge of the Prisoner of War Department the information which
you received about the Soviet prisoners of war was to the effect that
the Soviet prisoners of war were not treated according to international
law. Is that correct?

WESTHOFF: No, I said that prisoners of war during the first years were
treated on the basis of political considerations, which originated not
from the OKW but from Hitler personally.

COL. POKROVSKY: Just what do you want to say about that?

WESTHOFF: I want to say that they were not treated in accordance with
the Geneva Convention until 1942.

COL. POKROVSKY: In other words, not according to international law,
right?

WESTHOFF: I cannot give you any more detailed information on that, since
at that time I was still serving at the front and did not know details
regarding these regulations.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Tell me, was there in the OKW a special group
or section which dealt exclusively with railway transportation of
prisoners of war?

WESTHOFF: The OKW had attached to me a group which brought about the
transport of prisoners of war. The transport itself was not a matter for
the OKW but a matter for the individual camp commanders.

COL. POKROVSKY: Are you aware under what conditions the transport of the
prisoners of war from one camp to another took place?

WESTHOFF: Transports of prisoners of war were ordered by the OKW. The
execution of such transports of prisoners of war was a matter for the
individual camp commandants who received their orders in this respect
from the commanders of prisoners of war in the military administrative
districts. The OKW had nothing to do with the actual transport.

COL. POKROVSKY: The question I asked is whether you are aware or were
informed under what conditions the transport from one point to another
took place. Do you know that thousands of prisoners died en route from
cold and hunger? Do you know anything about it at all?

WESTHOFF: The transports, during which prisoners of war died, can at
most be traced back to the earlier years when I was not yet in the High
Command. As long as I was there, I had no reports on a large scale
saying that people lost their lives in large numbers. The orders which
the OKW gave regarding transports of prisoners of war were clear-cut and
so given that the commanders of the camps concerned were responsible for
these transports being carried out in an orderly manner.

COL. POKROVSKY: You have just confirmed that you were aware of the fact
that en route prisoners of war died by thousands. Now I would like you
to look at a document, Document Number 1201-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-292.
It consists, Your Honors, of the minutes of the meeting of the war
economy administration of the OKW. It has not been submitted to the
Tribunal so far. It is dated 1000 hours, 19 February 1942. The minutes
were taken of the meeting which took place at the Reich Chamber of
Commerce. The report by Ministerial Director Dr. Mansfeld of the office
of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was heard.
The three lines which particularly interest me are underlined with red
pencil on the copy that is before you right now. Look at it, Witness. It
states there:

    “The utilization of these Russians is exclusively a question of
    transportation. It is senseless to transport this manpower in
    open or unheated closed boxcars and then to unload corpses at
    the place of destination.”

Have you found this place?

WESTHOFF: Yes.

COL. POKROVSKY: Have you heard anything about transports of this kind,
wherein, in place of a train of living persons, corpses were unloaded?
Have you heard anything about that before you took charge of your
particular job in the OKW? Has anyone reported to you about these
things?

WESTHOFF: I have heard nothing about these transports, as that did not
come under the jurisdiction of the OKW, but came, as is clear from this
document, within the sphere of the operational sectors. The jurisdiction
of the OKW comprised mainly the German Reich and the border states, and
only here did the OKW have authority over the prisoners of war—not in
the operational sector, not in the rear army area. To this extent, it is
a matter which did not come to the OKW at all. We received the prisoners
of war from the Army, and then we were informed that we would receive
so-and-so many prisoners of war, and we took them into our camps. What
happened to those people in the operational territory was something we
could not control in detail.

Apart from that, this story also goes back to 1942—the time when I was
still at the front.

COL. POKROVSKY: Look at the left side of the document at the top. There
is a note there that this comes from the War Economy and Armament Office
of the OKW does it not? Left, at the top, under the number K 32/510.

WESTHOFF: My office never had anything at all to do with the Armament
Office.

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well. Does it not seem to you that this document
confirms the fact that the OKW knew about these transports?

No more questions, Mr. President, to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, as this document has not been put in
before, and as it does not appear whether it has been translated, should
you not read the first paragraph of it? It seems to contain material
evidence.

COL. POKROVSKY: I will read it now. The first paragraph of the document,
the way it appears in the Russian translation, reads like this:

    “File note. Subject: Report of the Ministerial Director, Dr.
    Mansfeld, of the Office of the Plenipotentiary General for the
    Allocation of Labor, on General Questions Regarding the
    Allocation of Labor.

    “Time: 19 February 1942. 1000 hours; place: Reich Chamber of
    Economy; present: Dr. Grotius, Wi Rü Amt KVR.

    “The present difficulties in the question of the utilization of
    manpower would not have arisen had we decided in time to utilize
    the Russian prisoners of war on a larger scale.”

This is the first paragraph, Mr. President. Further down there are three
lines which interest me in this document:

    “There were 3,900,000 Russians at our disposal, of which at
    present there are only 1,100,000 left. From November 1941 to
    January 1942 alone 500,000 Russians died.”

Have I read sufficiently, Mr. President? It seems to me that that is
clear, and further reading of the document is superfluous.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

    COL. POKROVSKY: “It will hardly be possible to increase the
    number of the Russian prisoners of war employed at present
    (400,000). If the typhus cases do decrease there may be a
    possibility of employing from 100,000 to 150,000 more for the
    economy. In contrast with that, the employment of Russian
    civilians is constantly gaining greater importance. There are,
    all together, between 600,000 and 650,000 Russian civilians
    available, among whom 300,000 are skilled industrial workers and
    from 300,000 to 350,000 agricultural workers. The utilization of
    these Russians is exclusively a question of transportation. It
    is senseless to transport....”—and so on.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what you read before.

COL. POKROVSKY: That is right. I would like to direct your attention
once more to the fact that there is a stamp on the document, “The War
Economy and Armament Office of the OKW....”—left corner, at the top.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, that does not appear in our
translation, but I guess you are right. At least, I don’t see it. Could
you let us see your document?

COL. POKROVSKY: The original will be shown to you immediately. The stamp
is at the top, in the left corner.

THE PRESIDENT: These letters and numbers indicate OKW although they
don’t say it?

COL. POKROVSKY: That is right.

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you say that? I mean, the actual letters which are
there look to me like Rü III Z St AZ i K 32/510 Wi Rü Amt/Rü III Z St.

COL. POKROVSKY: When you decipher these abbreviations, which has already
been done by our American colleagues, then those letters and figures can
be understood as corresponding with the facts regarding the structure of
the OKW which are at the disposal of the American Prosecution. These are
customary abbreviations for the departments and offices.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like you to ask the witness whether he
knows anything about the employment of the man mentioned a little way
further down at the right, Dr. Grotius.

I will ask him.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, do you know who Dr. Grotius was and
whether he was employed in the OKW or in the Army?

WESTHOFF: No, I have never heard the name “Dr. Grotius”; I also never
had anything to do with him.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the document before you?

WESTHOFF: No, I have not got it any longer.

THE PRESIDENT: I see. Just look at it and see whether the letters which
are put in the front of Dr. Grotius’ name indicate that he was a member
of the OKW?

COL. POKROVSKY: Mr. President, I did not put the question concerning Dr.
Grotius since the witness, as he has already told me, entered the Army
administration later, in 1943, whereas the document is dated 20 February
1942.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the witness._] Do those letters in front of Dr.
Grotius’ name indicate that he was in the OKW?

WESTHOFF: I do not know what the letters are supposed to mean; the OKW
has also nothing at all to do with this matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know what the letters on the top left hand side of
the document mean—the ones I read out just now to you?

WESTHOFF: Rü III?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

WESTHOFF: That is probably the Armament Office III. That is what it
probably means.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that would be in connection with the OKW, would it
not?

WESTHOFF: I am not informed about that since I have never had anything
to do with the armament departments. The High Command of the Army, at
least my office, had written communications only with the
Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and the Speer
Ministry. Just how it was organized in detail is unknown to me.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you know of, or did you know, Dr. Mansfeld?

WESTHOFF: I did not understand the question.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you know Dr. Mansfeld?

WESTHOFF: No, I did not know him, and I have never heard his name.

COL. POKROVSKY: The question about Dr. Mansfeld could be asked probably
of the Defendant Sauckel.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, technically speaking, the Tribunal
can’t accept from you that these letters at the top mean the OKW. It may
be perfectly true, but you can’t give evidence about it. So you can
prove it some other way perhaps.

COL. POKROVSKY: The scheme of the OKW has already been reported to the
Tribunal. Those persons who deciphered these abbreviations are
sufficiently competent in this matter, and it seems to me that the
witness’ affirmation in the court fully proves that the document in
question concerns Section III of the OKW. But, generally speaking, it
would, of course, be quite easy to prove by comparing it with the scheme
of the OKW. We will do it.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

The Tribunal will adjourn now, and they will want the other witness,
Wielen, here at 2 o’clock.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _ Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I do not know if Your Lordship wanted
the words for which these short collections of letters stand. I have
them if Your Lordship wants them—on the last document, 1201-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, thank you very much; yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I think all that Your Lordship need
look at is where the name Dr. Grotius appears.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Wi. Rü Amt is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt,
the Economic and Armament Office, which is, Your Lordship will remember,
General Thomas’ department of the OKW.

My Lord, the other letters “KVR” are Kriegsverwaltungsrat, War
Administration Counsellor.

My Lord, I do not think there could be any dispute that the document
comes from General Thomas’ department of the OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I say something in regard to this
document. I want only to point out certain considerations. It must be
ascertained from where the heading comes, that is, the first line. The
second line, which Sir David just referred to, begins with the letters
“AZ.” AZ (Aktenzeichen) means “file number,” in other words, a reference
to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office. It does not explain
however, the author of this document, which can only be ascertained when
we find out what the heading, or the first line, means.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you understand it?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I understand it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. LATERNSER: The author of this writing can be ascertained only if we
find out what the first line means; because the second line is only the
document file number, which is to be seen from the first two letters,
“AZ,” which means Aktenzeichen; and in this letter, reference seems to
be made to a letter from the Economic and Armament Office.

That is all I have to say in regard to this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not know if Your Lordship wants any further
information. It seems to me quite clear. That is, it is from the file of
the department I mentioned, the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You mean it goes back to the same letters.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The same letters, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It has just been explained to me that what Dr. Laternser
was saying is that the letters “AZ i. K. 32/510” only mean that it is
from the file of that department.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. Then, to find the office whose
file it is, you get Wi. Rü again, which is the Wirtschaftsrüstungsamt,
which is the Economic and Armament Office, and it is the Armament
Department, Number III.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Sir David, the Tribunal thought that the best way would be to put this
witness in the box and then to leave him to Counsel for the Prosecution
and the Defense.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, my friend, Mr. Roberts,
is going to deal with this witness, and, My Lord, he has selected the
passages quite shortly from the statements which will be read.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The witness Wielen took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you stand up please?

MAX WIELEN (Witness): Yes, certainly.

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

WIELEN: Max Wielen.

THE PRESIDENT: Your full name?

WIELEN: Max Wielen.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure
truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): Max Wielen,
you made two statements in London through Colonel Hinchley Cook.

WIELEN: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And are these photostats of the two statements—the first
one dated 26 August 1945, and the second dated 6 September 1945?

[_The documents were submitted to the witness._]

Are those the photographs of your true statements? Do you identify them?
Do you see your signature at the end of each?

WIELEN: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And in those two statements did you tell the truth?

WIELEN: Yes, I told the truth.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, perhaps I should now read some passages so that
they may go into the record.

[_Turning to the witness._] If you take the first statement first—the
statement begins with your name and the positions which you held in the
SS and in the Criminal Police. That is right, is it not?

WIELEN: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And now, will you just follow the beginning of this
statement.

WIELEN: Of which declaration, 6 September?

MR. ROBERTS: I said the first one.

WIELEN: The first one? I see.

MR. ROBERTS: Just follow it while I read. I will read the whole of the
first page:

    “Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat, SS Obersturmbannführer...”

WIELEN: Oberregierungsrat and Kriminalrat of the Criminal Police, not of
the SS...

MR. ROBERTS: I do not want you to read it, just listen to me.

    “...formerly officer in charge of the Criminal Police at
    Breslau.

    “I have to state in answer to the question, whether I know
    anything about the shooting of English prisoners of war, Air
    Force officers of the prison camp at Sagan, that I have
    knowledge of this matter and wish to make the following
    statement without reserve.

    “The shooting took place on the express personal orders of the
    former Führer, Adolf Hitler, and was carried out by the
    officials of the Geheime Staatspolizei.

    “The officer in charge of the Staatspolizeileitstelle at Breslau
    was Oberregierungsrat, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Scharpwinkel.
    His immediate superiors were the Chief of the Sipo, SS
    Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner, and the Chief of Amt IV of
    the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, SS Gruppenführer Müller. I am
    unable to give the names of the officers in charge of other
    districts of the Geheime Staatspolizei who carried out shootings
    in their districts.

    “I insert here a small chart showing the organization of the
    Sicherheitspolizei....”

I now go to the bottom of Page 3 in the English copy, and it is at the
bottom of Page 3 in the copy in German, which the witness has in his
hands:

    “During the course of time”—and this is talking about Stalag
    Luft III—“99 escape tunnels had been dug. All of them had been
    discovered by the military. The hundredth tunnel, dug in March
    1944, proved successful to the extent that 80 officers were able
    to escape.

    “On receipt of a telephone message from the camp headquarters to
    the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle, I gave the order for
    ‘Kriegsfahndung,’ in accordance with the emergency instructions
    laid down. At Dr. Absalon’s suggestion, and having regard for
    the time lag, ‘Grossfahndung’ was ordered. Moreover, the officer
    in charge of the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt had to be informed,
    who approved and confirmed the order for ‘Grossalarm.’

    “Gradually the search, which was carried out in all parts of
    Germany led to the re-arrest of practically all the escaped
    English officer prisoners, with the exception of three, I
    believe. Most of them were recaptured while still in Silesia. A
    few had got as far as Kiel, Strasbourg, and the Allgäu.

    “It was then that one day at noon I received a telegraphic
    instruction from General Nebe to proceed at once to Berlin to be
    informed of a secret order. When I arrived in Berlin that
    evening, I saw General Nebe in his office Am Werdierschen Markt
    5/7. I gave him a short, concise report on the whole matter as
    it stood at the time. He then showed me a teleprint order signed
    by Dr. Kaltenbrunner, in which was stated that, on the express
    personal orders of the Führer, over half of the officers escaped
    from Sagan were to be shot after their recapture. The officers
    in charge of Department IV, Gruppenführer Müller, had received
    corresponding orders and would give instructions to the
    Staatspolizei. Military offices had been informed.

    “General Nebe himself appeared shocked at this order. He was
    very distressed. I was afterwards told that for nights on end he
    had not gone to bed but had passed the night on his office
    settee.

    “I, too, was appalled at the horrible step to be taken and
    opposed its execution. I said that it was against the laws of
    war; and that it was bound to lead to reprisals against our own
    officers who were prisoners of war in English camps, and that I
    absolutely refused to take any responsibility. General Nebe
    replied that in this particular case I had indeed no
    responsibility whatever, because the Staatspolizei would act
    completely independently, and that, after all the Führer’s
    orders had to be carried out without demur. I want to point out
    that when I first refused I acted on impulse and feeling, well
    knowing that I could not hope to prevail in view of the
    conditions that had recently arisen within the
    Sicherheitspolizei.

    “Nebe then added that I, on my part, was, of course, under an
    obligation to preserve absolute secrecy, and that I had been
    shown the original order so that I should not make any
    difficulties vis-à-vis the Staatspolizei. My own duties as
    regards the transport of some of the prisoners would be
    transferred to the Staatspolizei.

    “In this connection I want to explain that until then the
    bringing back of prisoners to the camp had been the
    responsibility of the Kriminalpolizei; either they had to take
    them back to the camp themselves, or they had to hold them until
    they were fetched by the camp staff. In answer to a question, I
    declare that Oberregierungsrat Dr. Schulze was present at the
    discussion with General Nebe. He nodded his head in agreement
    when I raised my objection, but otherwise took no part in it.

    “On my return to Breslau, I learned from Dr. Scharpwinkel that
    the Geheime Staatspolizei had been duly informed by
    Gruppenführer Müller. I was not apprised of the actual
    instructions. I also do not know whether a similar order was
    issued to every officer in charge of the
    Staatspolizeileitstellen, or whether orders were only given to
    those in whose areas arrests had been made and executions were
    to be carried out.

    “According to instructions the police in the districts where
    arrests had been made had to inform the Reichskriminalpolizeiamt
    (Kriegsfahndungszentrale) by telegram or telephone that officer
    prisoners of war had been taken into custody. The
    Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau was also to be informed.

    “How the shooting was carried out, I do not know; but I presume
    that after the Staatspolizei had collected the officers
    concerned from the prisons, they were shot in some remote
    spot—forests, _et cetera_—with pistols, service pistols of the
    Stapo.

    “In answer to the question whether the officers were possibly
    beaten to death, I state that I do not believe this, because the
    Führer’s order specifically mentioned ‘shooting.’

    “The Staatspolizei had, in accordance with instructions received
    from RSHA, Department IV, described the shooting as if it had
    occurred in transit for the purpose of self-defense or to
    prevent re-escape. This I afterwards learned from Dr.
    Scharpwinkel.

    “Later the Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Breslau received a letter
    from the RSHA, Department V, which had to be communicated to the
    camp commandant with the request that its text should be made
    known to the English officer prisoners of war in order to
    frighten them. The letter explained that the shooting had
    occurred for the above-mentioned reason. The text of the letter
    was communicated to Oberst Lindeiner or one of the camp staff
    officers.

    “As regards the selection of the officers to be shot, a list had
    been prepared by the camp authorities, at the request of
    Department V, in which those officers who were regarded as
    disturbing elements—plotters and escape leaders—had been
    specifically mentioned. The names were selected either by the
    commandant or by one of his officers. Thereupon the shooting of
    officers mentioned by name was accordingly ordered by Department
    IV and corresponding instructions sent to the Staatspolizei of
    the district concerned.”

I omit the next paragraph, and I go to the bottom of the English copy,
Page 4; at the bottom of the witness’ copy, Page 7. Witness, would you
turn to Page 7, please. You will find the passage marked in pencil at
the bottom of Page 7. Have you got the page? I carefully numbered the
pages.

WIELEN: There is nothing marked in this.

MR. ROBERTS: I know, but if you turn over the page you will get
something which is marked.

WIELEN: Nothing is marked on Page 7, but on Page 8...

MR. ROBERTS: You will find something marked at the very bottom of Page
7. At any rate, just follow these words—follow these words, will you:

    “To revert to the shooting...”

WIELEN: Yes, I have found it now.

    MR. ROBERTS: “...approximately 40 English officers who had not
    been arrested by the Staatspolizei but by the Kriminalpolizei
    had meanwhile been taken back to camp.”

When you said that—you just answer this question, Witness; you said
approximately 40 officers—you didn’t know the actual numbers, did you?

WIELEN: The number is not correct. It was not 40. I did not know at that
time.

MR. ROBERTS: That’s right, because it isn’t the correct number. I think,
50.

WIELEN: I made a mistake at that time.

MR. ROBERTS: That’s right.

    “They had come to no harm whatsoever; I must assume that...”

WIELEN: Fifteen additional were brought back.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, yes. I just want you now to listen to it, if you will
be kind enough:

    “...I must assume that their treatment was perfectly correct. It
    had been impossible to avoid putting them into police prisons
    due to the general conditions then prevailing.

    “I do not know who interrogated the officers in the police
    prisons. I assume this was done by the local police authorities,
    as an interrogation must necessarily follow every notification
    of arrest. I do not know the names of the officials of the
    Staatspolizei or the Gemeindepolizei (small local police force)
    who co-operated in this matter, but Dr. Absalon should be able
    to supply the answer to this question.”

I go on to the paragraph beginning, “The urns...” if Your Lordship
please:

    “The urns containing the ashes of the officers who had been shot
    were transmitted by the Staatspolizei to the Kriminalpolizei.
    Which crematoria had been used by the Staatspolizei, I am unable
    to say. The urns were handed over to the camp commandant by
    order of the RSHA for a military funeral. By this means the
    return of the urns through the Kripo—the fact that the
    Staatspolizei was connected with the matter was to be
    camouflaged.”

Then I miss the next paragraph. Then I read one sentence, the next line:

    “I do not know why five officers were interrogated in Berlin.”

And then, My Lord, I turn to Page 6.

And, Witness, would you go to the bottom of your Page 10—the bottom of
your Page 10—you just turn over the page in the ordinary way. My Lord,
I take the middle paragraph. Just two paragraphs out of Page 6:

    “In a general way it may be of interest that, even before my
    departure for Berlin, Kriminalkommissar Dr. Absalon had told me
    that he had heard in Camp Sagan—he was told this in a very
    secretive way—that shootings were to take place in order to
    deter the officers. From this may be deduced the fact that the
    camp had already been informed through military channels of the
    order to shoot issued by Dr. Kaltenbrunner.

    “It would be useful to ascertain what Göring knows about the
    whole affair, because the Führer must surely have informed him
    of the order, since it concerned a camp of the Luftwaffe.”
    (Document Number UK-48.)

My Lord, that is all of that statement that I think I need to read. My
Lord, I am anxious to avoid reading as much of the second statement as I
possibly can, because there is a good deal of repetition.

Will you take the second statement now, Witness? That one, I am afraid,
has not been marked.

The third paragraph, My Lord, the third and fourth paragraphs on the
first page of the statement:

    “As to when the Staatspolizei had begun with the shootings, I am
    not in a position to say; but I imagine it happened when only
    very few prisoners were still at large and their recapture could
    no longer be reckoned with.

    “As regards the lapse of time between the order for
    ‘Grossfahndung’ and being shown the order for the shootings,
    this could only have been a matter of a few days. I can no
    longer recall exact dates. I do know however, for certain, that
    no shootings had taken place anywhere at the time when the order
    was shown to me.”

Then, perhaps, I could read the last paragraph but one on that page:

    “Before the last mass escape had taken place, I had heard
    nothing about the prospect of more drastic measures to be taken
    against the prisoners. I heard of it only after the final
    escape, but before I had been shown in Berlin the order for the
    shootings. It was then that Dr. Absalon had told me that he had
    heard in Sagan Camp—from whom I do not know, although I believe
    it was from Colonel Lindeiner—that in future shootings would
    take place. When this particular order was shown to me in
    Berlin, it appeared to me to be merely a proof that the military
    were behind this brutal measure or at least had had knowledge of
    it before the RSHA.

    “As regards the expression ‘more than half’ in the order of
    Kaltenbrunner, this is how the wording is now fixed in my mind.
    It is, however, quite possible that a specific number was given,
    and that I, in quickly glancing through the order, interpreted
    it thus in my mind, ‘but that is more than half,’ and this is
    what has now stuck in my memory.”

My Lord, perhaps I might read—omitting the first several paragraphs
which are really repetitions—a paragraph just a little more than
halfway down the page. It begins:

    “I do not know how the Geheime Staatspolizei took over from the
    local police prisons those officers who were to be shot. It is,
    however, possible that the Stapo got into touch with the local
    offices of the Kriminalpolizei.

    “In Lower Silesia, the firing squads were detailed by the
    officer in charge of the Staatspolizei, Dr. Scharpwinkel, or by
    his orders. I never heard who belonged to these squads.”

Then the last paragraph on that page:

    “I declare, in answer to the question as to why the Kripo did
    not carry out the shootings, that in the execution of its duties
    the Kriminalpolizei feel themselves bound by the provisions of
    the Staatsprozessordnung and the Reichsstrafgesetzbuch, and that
    their personnel were trained in accordance with these standards.
    On the other hand, during the war, the Staatspolizei had,
    incited by Himmler, become less scrupulous. They carried out
    executions on the orders of the RSHA, or with the approval of
    that department, whenever required. That is the reason why the
    German citizens’ general detestation of the Staatspolizei did
    not extend to the Kriminalpolizei.

    “The urns were obviously returned to the Kriminalpolizei for the
    sole reason that the intervention of the Staatspolizei should
    not become publicly known; that is, the English officers in the
    camp should not become aware of it.”

My Lord, I think that is all I need read.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions
of the witness?

DR. NELTE: Witness, during your activities and during this terrible
matter, were you in touch with the OKW or the defendant, Field Marshal
Keitel, in any way?

WIELEN: No, neither with the OKW nor with Field Marshal Keitel, nor with
any of the other high officers.

DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly when you stated that the order
that we are talking about here, so far as you know, went through the
following channels: From Hitler to Himmler, to the Reich Security Main
Office, and then the lower offices?

WIELEN: Yes, that is the correct organizational path.

DR. NELTE: By whom was the list of which you spoke demanded, the list
that was to contain the names of those who were the disturbing element?

WIELEN: That was asked for by the Reich Security Main Office.

DR. NELTE: In the second half of what was read just now, a sentence is
contained that reads: “The camp commander must have been informed
through military officers of the intended shooting ahead of time.”

Would you, with regard to this sentence...

WIELEN: Well, I should not like to repeat that here so strongly. It is
possible, since shootings might have been discussed in the camp, or the
fact that more ready use of firearms in general would be taken towards
English officers if escapes continued; but in this connection I know
nothing more specific, namely, in the connection in which this remark
was made.

DR. NELTE: Then you do not want to insist on the fact that we are here
dealing with remarks that were made before the escape?

WIELEN: Well, at least not so far as these shootings are concerned; at
least not in direct relationship to this particular escape.

DR. NELTE: But it is not possible to know ahead of time if someone is
going to escape. For that reason I ask you whether this remark is
related to some discussion that took place subsequent to the flight of
these officers and which perhaps was directed toward the future
prevention of escapes?

WIELEN: That is altogether possible because at Sagan attempts to escape
were made daily.

DR. NELTE: Then would you like to clarify the statement, according to
which Colonel Lindeiner is said to have stated that military officers
stood behind these measures and had been previously informed of them?
That is how...

WIELEN: I do not believe that I expressed myself just that way. Could
you please repeat that?

DR. NELTE: According to my notes, you said that Colonel Lindeiner stated
that military officers stood behind this measure and had been informed
of it ahead of time.

WIELEN: I do not think that I could have made such a statement.

DR. NELTE: Then do you want to say that you cannot state that Colonel
Lindeiner made such an assertion?

WIELEN: I never had the impression that Lindeiner was personally
informed in this matter. At any rate, I have not the slightest reason to
believe so.

DR. NELTE: No further questions, thank you.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, according to the minutes, you stated that the
Criminal Commissioner Absalon had informed you even before your
departure for Berlin that he had heard in Camp Sagan that shootings were
to take place.

WIELEN: I just spoke in connection with this same matter, yes.

DR. STAHMER: Is that what you just...

WIELEN: That is the same matter.

DR. STAHMER: Another question: During the discussion that you had with
General Nebe in Berlin, General Nebe said to you that the military
offices were informed, and stated more precisely what military offices
were concerned?

WIELEN: No, that was not told to me. Nor do I know whether this
intention was at all realized, because the military offices were
actually not to be informed, and this whole matter was to be regarded as
secret and was to be kept secret.

DR. STAHMER: In your testimony here, you mentioned Reich Marshal Göring.
Have you any documentary proof that Reich Marshal Göring knew of these
shootings, or is that merely conjecture on your part?

WIELEN: No, please consider from what was said and the way it was said,
that I wanted to leave that question entirely open. Therefore, I also
said that I did not know it positively, and had no evidence for it; but
since it concerned a Luftwaffe camp I ask or propose that the Reich
Marshal be heard, since he should be able to give information about it.

DR. STAHMER: In other words, it was only a suggestion on your part to
interrogate the Reich Marshal as to whether he was informed?

WIELEN: Because I had to leave this matter open, I made the suggestion
only in order to proceed further in the matter at all.

DR. STAHMER: That is all.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you stated that the order had been given by
Kaltenbrunner and Müller. Now I ask you, was this order in the form of a
teletype or a telegraphic communication, or did you see the order with
the original signature?

WIELEN: I believe I can state definitely that it was a teletype
communication.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know for sure it was not an original signature?

WIELEN: It was not an original signature. In fact I felt doubts about
this later. You can very well imagine that I thought about it hundreds
of times, wondering whether it were not entirely possible...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Speak more slowly.

WIELEN: ...that it was Himmler’s signature; but from the organizational
point of view it would have had to be Kaltenbrunner who signed it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So, if I understood you correctly, you can also not state
definitely that the teletype really had Kaltenbrunner’s signature under
it, but rather you simply assume that from your knowledge of the
organization.

WIELEN: I was so impressed by the contents of the communication, by the
results, and by the necessity to prepare the working out of the whole
affair that I paid little attention to the mechanical matters, that is,
the externals involved. As a result, they did not imprint themselves on
my memory in such a way that I could make a statement about them with
definite reliability.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

MR. ROBERTS: No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

Dr. Nelte, does that close the case for the Defendant Keitel?

DR. NELTE: As far as witnesses are concerned, that closes the case for
Keitel. I have a few further remarks to make with regard to the
presentation of evidence.

The Tribunal have approved an affidavit by Krieger by its ruling of 6
April 1946. I ask the Tribunal to permit me to put this affidavit in
evidence as Document Keitel-15. I have the German original here and I
should like to read only that part of the affidavit that describes the
relations between Hitler and Keitel. This involves three short
paragraphs:

    “The relations between Hitler and former Field Marshal Keitel
    were officially correct and, on Hitler’s part, appeared
    confiding as a whole, springing from appreciation of or respect
    for a zealous co-worker. Keitel’s attitude was upright and
    soldierly. There was, however, no further friendly or
    confidential note between them. Apart from official receptions,
    and so forth, Keitel, as far as could be ascertained, hardly
    took part with Hitler in informal conversations nor shared any
    meals with him. Also, summons to discussions with Hitler outside
    the official conferences, when there were no stenographers
    present, were not observed.

    “In preparing decisions or in formulating orders, Keitel gave
    expression to his own opinions, even if they happened to differ,
    in an unbiased, clear, soldierly manner. He apparently knew
    exactly, from many years of collaboration with Hitler, the
    limits of possibility as far as influencing his opinions or
    decisions or changing his mind was concerned. For that reason he
    generally accepted Hitler’s decisions as orders in a soldierly
    manner. In individual cases he tried and succeeded by emphatic
    reasoning in changing decisions, or at least in delaying them in
    order to have them further examined.

    “That Hitler, at least at times, did not trust Keitel completely
    I believe I can conclude from one of Hitler’s remarks...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, it appears to the Tribunal that it is not
really necessary to read this. Keitel has already said it, it is
cumulative to him, and the document itself is in evidence so we can read
it ourselves.

DR. NELTE: It is not necessary, but it simply corroborates what has been
testified to here. Therefore, I can...

THE PRESIDENT: It is sufficient that you tell us that.

DR. NELTE: I have further received the answers to several
interrogatories that were permitted by the Tribunal.

First, there is the answer to the interrogatory by Herr Romilly. I can
put this sworn interrogatory in evidence before the Tribunal and can
forego any reading of it.

The same is true of the answers to the interrogatory submitted to the
witness Rotraud Roemer as to the question of the branding of Russian
prisoners of war.

The interrogatories of Professor Naville and Ambassador Scarpini are not
yet at hand. I shall submit them as soon as they arrive. There
remains...

THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution had these documents?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you given numbers to these? You gave Document
Keitel-15 to the last affidavit. You ought to number the others.

DR. NELTE: Romilly is Document Keitel-16, and Roemer is Document
Keitel-17.

I have now only the affidavit of the late Field Marshal Von Blomberg. As
ruled by the Tribunal on 26 February, it was allowed that he be
interrogated. I have sent the original to the Prosecution and I ask to
be allowed to put in evidence the sworn answers of Von Blomberg. It is
in Document Book 1 and is known both to the Tribunal and to the
Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: That concludes my case.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you—Now, Dr. Horn, I think—Dr. Nelte, you are
lodging these original documents that are numbered Keitel-16, 17, and
18, you are lodging them with the General Secretary?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have they been translated?

DR. NELTE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

Dr. Nelte, we have not seen a translation of Keitel-16, but you are sure
that it has been translated, are you?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have seen an English translation of it.

THE PRESIDENT: You have?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was shown to me when it came in. I am quite
sure I remember reading it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, perhaps the General Secretary’s department
will see that we are furnished copies of it.

Yes, I think that is the one. That is Keitel-16.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly, I think Romilly is Keitel-16. I have
seen it.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

Dr. Horn, do you remember that we read these documents at the time that
we approved of their admissibility?

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Yes, Mr.
President.

THE PRESIDENT: So perhaps it won’t take you long to introduce them in
evidence?

DR. HORN: I shall limit myself to a minimum, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

DR. HORN: I should like to ask the Tribunal first to take judicial
notice of Document Ribbentrop-75, contained in Volume III, on Page 191,
of Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a question here of an agreement
between the Allied and Associated Powers and Poland of the year 1919.
This agreement defines the rights of the German minority in Poland. In
Article 12 of this Treaty, which is on Page 3 of this document, it is
said that Poland agrees that insofar as the provisions of the above
article apply to persons of racial, religious, or linguistic minorities,
these provisions form the basis for obligations of international
interest and are placed under the supervision of the League of Nations.

In subsequent years Poland repeatedly violated this Treaty. That can be
seen from the two following documents, Document Ribbentrop-82, on Page
208 of Document Book Number 4.

This is a legal judgment by the Permanent International Court. It is of
10 September 1923. In order to save time I might just read the
conclusion, where it is said:

    “The Court is of the opinion that the attitude of the Polish
    Government defined under Points ‘a’ and ‘b’ does not stand in
    accord with Poland’s international obligations.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, as well as
the next document, Document Ribbentrop-84, which is on Pages 212 and
212-a of the Ribbentrop Document Book Number 4. This, too, is a
statement on the part of a judicial committee of the League of Nations
on minority questions. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
this report.

Immediately after the Government had been taken over by Hitler, this
Government attempted to establish a good relationship with Poland. As
evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-85, which is on Page
213 of the document book. I am reading from Page 2 of that document.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Is that Ribbentrop Document Book 4?

DR. HORN: It is Ribbentrop Document Book 4, Mr. President, Page 213. I
am reading from Page 214, center of the last paragraph, as follows:

    “He, the Chancellor, wished only that the pending political
    questions existing between Germany and Poland could be examined
    and treated without passion by the statesmen of both countries.
    He was convinced that some way out of the present untenable
    position could be found. Germany desired peace. The forceful
    expropriation of Polish territory was not his intention, but he
    was reserving for himself those rights to which he was entitled
    according to the pact, and he would insist upon them at any time
    and whenever he thought fit.”

Concerning this conference, two official communiqués were issued by
request of the Polish Ambassador. This is Document Ribbentrop-86, which
is the German communiqué, and I request the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of it and also the next document, Document Ribbentrop-87, on Page
216 of the document book, which is the Polish communiqué. So as to save
time, I do not propose to read these communiqués.

On 15 July 1937 considerable parts of the German-Polish pact which was
signed in Geneva in 1922, regarding Upper Silesia, expired. The
necessity arose, therefore, to create a new pact between the two
countries, particularly since difficulties again arose due to the
question of minorities and the treatment of German minorities. As
evidence for this I refer to Document Ribbentrop-117, on Page 257 of the
document book, and I should like to read the second paragraph where it
says:

    “The Reich Minister also pointed out to the Polish Ambassador
    that the rigorous Polish point of view regarding the expulsion
    of those who had indicated a preference for Germany could not be
    accepted by us.”

THE PRESIDENT: I could not see that on Page 254.

DR. HORN: Page 257, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see it.

DR. HORN: The result of those conferences between Poland and Germany is
the pact which has been submitted as Document Ribbentrop-123, on Page
263 of the document book. This is a co-ordinated declaration by the
Polish and German Governments regarding the protection of their
respective minorities, which was published on 5 November 1937. So as to
save time, I can point out that the German minorities were given those
rights which are usual between civilized states in similar cases. May I
also point out that this agreement does not contain anything which can
be considered the sanctioning of any wrong previously committed in this
field, a point of view which was recently presented by the Prosecution.

So as to remove the difficulties between the Free City of Danzig and the
Polish Government which had arisen with regard to minorities and
economic matters, an agreement was reached on 5 August 1933, which is
Document Ribbentrop-127 and found on Page 270 of the document book. May
I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, too?

Since, in spite of these treaty agreements on the question of minorities
and the problem of the Free City of Danzig, difficulties between the two
nations continued to arise, Hitler gave the order to the Defendant
Ribbentrop, after the solution of the Sudeten-German question in October
1938, to commence negotiations regarding the Danzig and Corridor
questions as well as the question of minorities. For this reason the
then Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, was invited to come to
Berchtesgaden. The discussions which took place on that occasion between
Hitler and the Polish Foreign Minister are contained in Document
Ribbentrop-149, on Page 301 of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. May I
quote from Page 2 of the document to explain what the main features of
this conference were? On Page 6, it says:

    “For Germany there was not only the Memel question, which would
    be settled in a manner consonant with German views—for it
    looked as if the Lithuanians would be willing to co-operate in
    finding a reasonable solution—but within the direct
    German-Polish relationship there was also the problem of Danzig
    and the Corridor to be solved, which, from the point of view of
    sentiment, was very serious for Germany.”

On Page 3 of the same document, last line of the next to the last
paragraph, it says Foreign Minister Beck promised that “he would,
however, be glad to give calm consideration to the problem.”

With that Germany considered that negotiations regarding this problem
had begun.

On 24 January, that is to say the following day, the then Reich Foreign
Minister Von Ribbentrop had another discussion with the Polish Foreign
Minister Beck during which the question of minorities was once more
touched on. That discussion is contained in Document Ribbentrop-150, on
Page 304. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.

By invitation of the then Foreign Minister Beck, Reich Foreign Minister
Von Ribbentrop went to Warsaw on 24 January 1939. Once more the entire
problem was discussed there.

On 21 March, after the Czech question had been settled, a reorganization
in the East became necessary. The then Reich Foreign Minister Von
Ribbentrop, therefore, asked the Polish Ambassador on 21 March 1939 to
come to visit him. The account of that conference is contained in
Document Ribbentrop-154, on Page 310 of the document book. May I quote
the third paragraph, Page 2, which is the leading point regarding that
conference:

    “Generally, the decision on the Corridor was considered the
    heaviest burden put on Germany by the Versailles Treaty.”

A few lines later the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop explained:

    “A prerequisite for this was, however, that the purely German
    city of Danzig should return to the Reich, and that an
    extraterritorial motor road and railway connection be
    established between the Reich and East Prussia.

    “He promised that Germany would in exchange guarantee the
    Corridor.

    “Ambassador Lipski promised to inform M. Beck accordingly and
    then to give an answer.”

May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well?

Although the German Government at that time expected that on the
strength of these discussions the question of the minorities and the
question of Danzig and the Corridor would find some solution, these
discussions had the opposite effect.

It appears from Document Ribbentrop-155, on Page 313, and Document
Ribbentrop-156, on Page 314 of the document book, that Poland at that
time ordered partial mobilization. That partial mobilization could have
been directed only against Germany.

Moreover, the settling of the Czechoslovakian question on 15 March 1939
had led to a change of attitude on the part of Britain. The then Prime
Minister, Chamberlain, under pressure from the opposition, had opened
consultations with various European states. As evidence of this fact, I
refer to Document Ribbentrop 159, which is Page 317 of the document
book. This is a conversation of the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Von Ribbentrop, with the Polish Ambassador, Lipski, in Berlin on 26
March 1939. May I quote the beginning, which is as follows:

    “On 21 March the British Government proposed first in Warsaw, as
    well as in Paris and Moscow, that a ‘formal declaration’ by the
    British, French, Russian, and Polish Governments shall be made.”

I shall then skip a few lines and quote further as follows—Line 7 from
bottom:

    “The Polish Government, which ordered partial mobilization on 23
    March, was in no way satisfied with this British proposal for
    negotiations but rather demanded far more concrete commitments
    from England on behalf of Poland. Therefore, also on 23 March,
    Foreign Minister Beck instructed the Polish Ambassador in
    London, Count Edward Raczynski, to submit to the British
    Government the following proposal for an Anglo-Polish union:

    “‘Referring to the English proposal’”—it says further on—“‘of
    21 March, I request you to ask Lord Halifax if: (1) In view of
    the difficulties and the unavoidable complications and ensuing
    loss of time...’”

MR. DODD: If Your Honor pleases, I see no reason—if I may say so with
greatest respect—for reading any part of any of these documents. They
are all in evidence, or will be, I assume. All that needs be done, it
seems to us, is to give them numbers. I know that we read and commented
at the time we put in the Prosecution’s case, but the compelling reasons
for that system are not present now and cannot apply as far as these
defendants are concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, the Tribunal would like to know what the
compelling reasons were that you were referring to.

MR. DODD: Yes, I shall be glad to. At that time it was physically
impossible for the Prosecution to have its material all translated in
the four languages, or the three languages in addition to the one in
which the original was written. Now the defendants do have those
facilities. Had we been able to have our papers all translated, we would
have submitted them and we would not have commented; but the necessity
for comment seemed very real to us, because we had to read everything
that we wanted into the record over the speaking system, and if we read
a lot of disjointed excerpts from documents we could not have presented
any reason of evidence before this Tribunal. But I say that now the
Defense can do so, it can submit the whole document, and later on, as I
understand the rules and the Charter, Counsel will have an opportunity
to argue and comment about it as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: But you will remember that this matter was argued—I
think it was a week or so ago. And if I remember rightly, Dr. Dix argued
in favor of the defendants’ counsel being still entitled to read such
passages as they wanted, and with short connecting remarks; and we
adhered to that rule.

MR. DODD: I did not understand that Your Honors had already ruled. I
remember Dr. Dix’s statement. One of his principal reasons was that he
wanted an opportunity to make this information available to the press or
the public. If that is still his reason, they are all available; the
press can have them without having them read over this microphone.
However, I won’t press the matter if the Court has already ruled.

THE PRESIDENT: I think so.

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I would like
to say a few words on the subject of Mr. Dodd’s proposal. I fully
support...

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I just pointed out to Mr. Dodd that we
have made a specific ruling upon this subject, and, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, Dr. Horn has been performing his task with great
discretion.

GEN. RUDENKO: I still would like to be permitted to make a few remarks
in regard to Mr. Dodd’s proposal.

As the Tribunal will remember, just before the start of the questioning
of the Defendant Keitel the Defense gave full documentation for Keitel,
and the Tribunal looked into the matter of what document was to be
accepted as evidence and what was to be declined...

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if you are repeating, you are repeating
the very words I used to Dr. Horn when he began, and, as I say, in the
opinion of the Tribunal Dr. Horn has met the views of the Tribunal and
has made his reading of these documents reasonably short.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I merely wanted to remark
that the Soviet Prosecution consider that Dr. Horn’s comments are
superfluous as the defendant has already given us too many comments on
the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, I am sure you will continue to use every
possible means of cutting it short as much as you can.

DR. HORN: I hope, Mr. President, that I have convinced the Tribunal that
I will be as brief as possible and that I shall read as little as
possible, only that which is necessary to make understandable why I am
presenting the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now?

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. HORN: I had last quoted some passages from Document Ribbentrop-159,
Page 317 of the document book, and I wish to briefly summarize what
these documents refer to.

This document contains the request from England to the Polish Government
to formulate the consultation into a concrete agreement. This agreement
was then in fact made, between 21 March and 26 March, between England
and Poland.

Furthermore, and as a parallel to this, there is the coalition policy on
the part of England which is proved by Documents Ribbentrop-182 to 186,
on Pages 370 and following of Ribbentrop Document Book Number 5. As is
shown in Document 182, the following states were concerned. I am quoting
from Document 182, at the bottom of Page 6:

    “The following countries are said to have been invited to
    participate in the question of guarantees: Russia, Poland,
    Turkey, and Yugoslavia. It is said to be definitely
    established”—it says further—“that Hungary was not approached.
    It was left up to Poland to approach Lithuania, Estonia, and
    Latvia. The same is supposed to apply to Turkey with regard to
    Greece.”

As evidence of this policy of coalition, I refer to Document
Ribbentrop-185, Page 372 of the document book. This is a telegram from
the German Chargé d’Affaires in London to the Foreign Office, and I
should like briefly to quote a few passages from that. They read:

    “The available news proves clearly that the plan for a
    declaration pre-announced by telegram on the part of Britain can
    actually be divided into two parts. The first part deals with
    guarantees to Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland; the second part
    aims to protect the Eastern countries against aggression. The
    British Cabinet is said to have been informed by a military
    spokesman that Romania, because of her oil wells, will
    definitely have to be protected against German military
    seizure.”

The same subject is dealt with in Document Ribbentrop-186. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading from it. And I
also ask that Document Ribbentrop-183, which is on Page 375 of the
document book, be taken judicial notice of; once more, so as to save
time, I do not propose to read it.

Based on this policy of coalition on Britain’s part which was directed
against Germany, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Germany
and Italy was concluded on 22 May 1939. I am submitting it as Document
Ribbentrop-187, on Page 376 of the Ribbentrop document book. I request
the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it without my reading it.

The result of the guarantee given by England to Poland was that
Ambassador Lipski, on 26 March 1939, on the occasion of a conference
with the Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop, declared—and I am here
referring to Document Ribbentrop-162, and quoting from the third
paragraph:

    “Mr. Lipski replied that it was his unpleasant duty to point out
    that any further pursuance of these German plans, particularly
    regarding a return of Danzig to the Reich, would mean a war with
    Poland.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document. The same
applies to the previous document, Document Ribbentrop-160, on Page 320
of the document book, which refers to the consultations between Britain
and the governments previously mentioned.

On the strength of the declaration of Lipski which I have just
read—namely, that further pursuance of an attempt to alter the _status
quo_ regarding the Corridor and Danzig would mean war—the Reich Foreign
Minister declared to the Polish Ambassador on 27 March 1939—I again
quote from Document Ribbentrop-163, on Page 335 of the document
book—that this attitude of Poland could not be the basis for a
settlement of these questions so far as Germany was concerned. The
corresponding passage is the next to the last paragraph on Page 2 of
this document, where it says:

    “In conclusion, the Foreign Minister remarked that he no longer
    knew what to make of the attitude of the Polish Government. They
    had given a negative answer to the generous proposals which
    Germany had made to Poland. The Foreign Minister could not
    regard the proposal, submitted yesterday by the Polish
    Ambassador, as a basis for the settlement of the problems. The
    relations between the two countries were, therefore, more and
    more strained.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document.

So as to prove that the Anglo-Polish Pact for Mutual Assistance was
clearly aimed against Germany, I submit to the Tribunal as evidence
Document Ribbentrop-164, which is on Page 338 of the document book. I
quote the last two lines, where it says:

    “...that the pact applied only in the case of an attack by
    Germany. The Polish Government affirms that this is so.”

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.

The result of the Anglo-Polish agreement of 6 April 1939, which has been
submitted by the Prosecution as Document Number TC-72, and which appears
on Page 337 of my document book, was the termination of the
Polish-German agreement of 26 January 1934, since Germany was convinced
that the Anglo-Polish guarantee declaration was contrary to the spirit
of this agreement.

Subsequently there were a number of excesses against the German
minorities in Poland. The documents referring to this are contained in
my document book under Documents Ribbentrop-165 to 181. I am asking the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of these numbers, and to save time I
shall limit myself to very short quotations.

I refer to Document Ribbentrop-166, which states that serious incidents
occurred in Pommerellen, Njevo, and Bromberg.

I also refer to Document Ribbentrop-167, on Page 353 of the document
book. This document shows that in the last days there was a public
declaration in Warsaw which openly appealed for a boycott of German
trade and handicraft.

Furthermore, as evidence for my statement, may I refer to Document
Ribbentrop-180, which is on Page 368 of the Ribbentrop document book.
May I read this brief report, which I quote as follows:

    “During the last few months the German Foreign Office has
    continuously received reports from the German Consulate in
    Poland about the cruel treatment to which racial Germans are
    subjected by the Poles, who have been more and more stirred up
    and have abandoned themselves to unbridled fanaticism. In
    Appendix 38 especially grave cases have been collected.”

From Document Ribbentrop-181, on Page 369 of the document book, it
appears that these clashes, as a matter of fact, took place with the
knowledge and under the protection of Polish statesmen and high
officials. As evidence for this, I refer to Document Ribbentrop-181, but
for reasons of time I am not going to read from it, but ask the Tribunal
to take judicial notice of it.

At the beginning of August 1939 an acute crisis developed in
German-Polish relations. As evidence of this I present Document
Ribbentrop-188, on Page 381 of my document book. The cause was actually
a small one. There was dispute regarding the functions of the customs
officials on the Danzig frontier. Because of this dispute, the
diplomatic representative of the Polish Republic in Danzig made a
protest to the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig. This
protest is contained in Document Ribbentrop-188. It contained an
ultimatum, which becomes clear from Paragraph 3 of the document.

On 7 August the then President of the Free City of Danzig replied to
this as appears in Document Ribbentrop-189. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of this document also.

In Document Ribbentrop-190, on Page 383, the Reich Government warns
Poland not to deliver any ultimatum. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial
notice of this document, and I do not propose to read from it.

The next document I am presenting is Document Ribbentrop-192, which is
on Page 385 of the document book. This is a document from the Under
State Secretary at the Polish Foreign Ministry to the German Chargé
d’Affaires in Warsaw, and it is dated 10 August 1939. It appears from
the last two lines of the document that Poland would consider any
intervention of the Reich Government to the detriment of Danzig’s rights
an aggressive act.

These notes created an even more critical situation in German-Polish
relations. The Reich Government and their departments attempted, in the
time that followed, to avoid a threatening conflict. As evidence of this
I submit Document Ribbentrop-193, which is on Page 404 of the document
book; and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it.

This is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office
regarding—it is in Ribbentrop Document Book 6, Page 404—this is a
memorandum regarding a visit of the French Ambassador to the State
Secretary of the Foreign Office, Weizsäcker. During that conversation
the then State Secretary, Weizsäcker, emphasized that Germany had no
more urgent wish than German-Polish agreement regarding Danzig. The
French Ambassador assured him that his Government would co-operate in
these attempts.

I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document, Document
Ribbentrop-193, and the next document, Number 194, on Page 406 of the
document book.

The last document concerns the discussion between the State Secretary
and the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, during which the
German State Secretary pointed out the seriousness of the situation.

I read from Page 1 of the document, the third paragraph, fifth line, the
following sentence which characterizes the situation:

    “Danzig was only protecting itself against its protector.”

Apart from that, the State Secretary pointed out that the situation
regarding Danzig had now reached extreme tension.

The next document I refer to is Document Ribbentrop-195, on Pages 408 to
415 of the document book. This document refers to a conference between
Hitler and Ambassador Henderson on 23 August 1939. This conference is
contained in Document Ribbentrop-199, on Page 422 of the Ribbentrop
document book. I also ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of this
document, and, so as to clarify the content of that conference briefly,
I am going to refer to Page 4 of the document, where it says:

    “He once more drew attention to the Danzig and Polish question
    in connection with which England’s attitude was, ‘Better war
    than something to Germany’s advantage.’”

The second paragraph after that reads:

    “The Führer stated that the fact that England opposed Germany in
    the Danzig question had deeply shaken the German people.

    “Henderson then stated that one was merely opposing the
    principle of force, whereupon the Führer wanted to know whether
    England had ever found a solution by negotiation for any of the
    idiocies of Versailles.

    “The Ambassador had no reply to this, and the Führer then stated
    that, according to a German saying, it took two to make a
    friendship.”

Because of the tense relations the late Prime Minister Chamberlain, on
22 August 1939, wrote a letter directly to Hitler. This letter is
Document Ribbentrop-200, on Page 426 of the document book. I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document also.

The next document is Document Ribbentrop-201, and it contains Hitler’s
reply to the British Prime Minister Chamberlain.

On 25 August 1939 there was yet another meeting between Hitler and
Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson. That meeting is contained in Document
Ribbentrop-202, which is on Page 431 of the Ribbentrop document book.
May I refer to Paragraph 5, where Hitler emphasized once more that, “The
problem of Danzig and the Corridor would have to be solved.” On the
following page, in Paragraph 3 on Page 2, Hitler says:

    “But after the solution of this problem he is prepared and
    determined to approach England with a major, all-inclusive
    proposal.”

This offer is contained in detail in the same Document Number 202.

Henderson made an entry regarding this discussion in his diary, which is
Exhibit Ribbentrop-195, and on Page 415 he refers to this last-mentioned
meeting of 25 August 1939:

    “My interview with Hitler”—says Henderson—“at which Herr Von
    Ribbentrop and Dr. Schmidt were also present, lasted over an
    hour on this occasion. The Chancellor spoke with calm and
    apparent sincerity. He described his proposals as a last effort
    for conscience’s sake to secure good relations with Great
    Britain and suggested that I should fly to London myself with
    them.”

Under Number 8, on the same page, 415, Henderson continues to say:

    “Whatever may have been the underlying motive of this final
    gesture on the part of the Chancellor, it was one which could
    not be ignored...”

The next document, which gives in detail the course of events and the
crisis which led up to the outbreak of war, is Document Ribbentrop-208,
on Page 451 of the document book. To the extent that I do not read from
it, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the entire document.

The first extract from this document, which is a telegram from Lord
Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw, states the following, and I quote:

    “Our proposed reply to Herr Hitler draws a clear distinction
    between the method of reaching agreement on German-Polish
    differences and the nature of the solution to be arrived at. As
    to the method, we wish to express our clear view that direct
    discussion on equal terms between the parties is the proper
    means.”

This request for direct negotiations is an essential part of the events
which followed.

Under Number 5 of the same document, on Page 452 of the document book,
it states as follows:

    “As the Polish Government appear in their reply to President
    Roosevelt to accept the idea of direct negotiations, His
    Majesty’s Government earnestly hope that, in the light of the
    considerations set forth in the foregoing paragraph, the Polish
    Government will authorize them to inform the German Government
    that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussions
    with Germany.”

In the following document, which has the same number and is on the same
page, is a telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax, which was
dispatched on 29 August 1939. Great Britain’s role as mediator is once
more clarified. It says under Number 3 of this document:

    “Note observes that German proposals have never had for their
    object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares
    that the German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain
    with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary.
    German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such
    plenipotentiary tomorrow, Wednesday, 30th August.

    “I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but,
    after some heated remarks, both Herr Hitler and Herr Von
    Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress
    urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilized armies were
    standing face to face.”

These proposals, which I have previously submitted in a special exhibit,
had the following reaction in Great Britain—I read from Page 453 of
Ribbentrop’s document book. It is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir
Nevile Henderson of 30 August 1939. It says:

    “We shall give careful consideration to German Government’s
    reply, but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can
    produce a Polish representative in Berlin today, and German
    Government must not expect this.”

In the meantime the situation had become so serious that Sir Nevile
Henderson did not consider that a success of Britain’s action would be
possible. This is shown in the same document on Page 454. This is a
telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax. I am reading only a
short quotation, to save time, from Point 3 of the telegram:

    “While I still recommend that the Polish Government should
    swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact
    with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that
    they were prepared to make their own sacrifices for preservation
    of peace....”

The Polish Government was, nevertheless, not willing to enter into
direct negotiations. This can be seen from the same document on Page
455, from which I will read only the first three lines. It is a telegram
from the British Ambassador in Warsaw to Lord Halifax, and it states:

    “I feel sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish
    Government to send M. Beck or any other representative
    immediately to Berlin....”

In the same telegram the British Ambassador emphasizes, under Number 4,
and I quote:

    “I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government,
    nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler’s reply until I
    receive instructions, which I trust will be without delay.”

Through the failure to pass on the German Government’s proposals to the
Polish Government, direct negotiations were frustrated. As evidence of
the fact that the Polish Government, too, had no intention of entering
into such direct negotiations, I refer to Page 465 of the same document,
which is a telegram from Lord Halifax to Sir Kennard in Warsaw. Once
more he is asking the Ambassador to invite the Polish Government to
enter into direct negotiations. I will not quote from this document, but
I will quote from the next document, Page 466, which is an extract from
the British _Blue Book_, and which refers to the Polish reaction. It is
a telegram from Sir Kennard to Lord Halifax, 31 August 1939.

I am going to read the first three paragraphs of this document. From
these paragraphs it becomes clear what the Polish attitude was regarding
the possibility of direct negotiations. I quote:

    “M. Beck has just handed me in writing the Polish reply to my
    _démarche_ last night.”

The second paragraph states:

    “I asked M. Beck what steps he proposed to take in order to
    establish contact with the German Government. He replied that he
    would instruct M. Lipski to seek an interview with the Minister
    for Foreign Affairs or State Secretary in order to say Poland
    had accepted British proposals. I urged him to do this without
    delay.

    “I then asked him what attitude the Polish Ambassador would
    adopt if Herr Von Ribbentrop, or whomever he saw, handed him the
    German proposals. He said that M. Lipski would not be authorized
    to accept such a document as, in view of past experience, it
    might be accompanied by some sort of ultimatum.”

This extract from the British _Blue Book_ proves that, as far as Poland
was concerned, all possibilities of clarifying the question of Danzig or
the minorities were refused. In this manner it was no longer possible
for the German Government or the British Government to discuss this
question with Poland any further. As evidence for further efforts, I
submit to the Tribunal Document Ribbentrop-209, on Page 494, of which I
ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. I will not quote from it, or
from Document Ribbentrop-210, which I also offer to the Tribunal for
judicial notice.

The next document is Document Ribbentrop-213, which is on Page 504-b of
my document book. This last document is an official German report
regarding the subject and basis of negotiations during the time of the
Polish-German crisis.

Since Poland was unable to discuss these questions of Danzig or the
Corridor with Germany, a war arose between these two countries. In my
final defense speech, I shall discuss specifically the legal aspect of
this war and its nature in respect to international law. What I want to
state today is that the lack of any effective international institution
for the alteration of the insufferable _status quo_ was the final reason
which led to the outbreak of war in 1939.

The next group of documents which I am submitting to the Tribunal are
those which refer to the occupation of Denmark and Norway by Germany.
These are the Documents Ribbentrop-216(a)—on Page 509 of the document
book—216(b), and 217. I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of
these documents, and, as far as evidence and the actual events are
concerned, I refer to the documents and statements which my colleague,
Dr. Siemers, will submit to the Tribunal when he speaks on behalf of
Raeder.

The next group of documents are those which refer to the occupation of
Holland and Belgium. They are Documents Number 218 and the following, on
Page 518 of the document book. The documents are contained in Document
Book Number 7. So as to explain the German viewpoint, I quote from
Document Ribbentrop-218 Page 518 in Document Book Number 7. I am going
to quote the following brief passages, Paragraph 2:

    “As the Reich Government has long been aware, the true aim of
    England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately
    imminent attack on Germany in the West, so as to advance through
    Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr. Germany has
    recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and
    Holland, it being a natural prerequisite that these two
    countries, in the event of a war between Germany and England and
    France, maintain the strictest neutrality.

    “Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition.”

On Page 2 in the same document, under Number 8, reference is made to the
evidence which was known to the German Government at the time and which
I will submit in due course in support of the assertion just made. It
says:

    “Documents at the disposal of the German Government prove that
    preparations by Britain and France on Belgian and Netherlands
    territory are already far advanced.

    “Thus, for some time, all obstacles on the Belgian border toward
    France which might hinder the entry of the English and French
    invasion army have been secretly removed. Air fields in Belgium
    and the Netherlands have been reconnoitered by English and
    French officers, and their enlargement has been ordered. Belgium
    has made transport facilities available at the frontier, and
    recently advance parties of staff personnel and units of the
    French and English Army have arrived in various parts of Belgium
    and the Netherlands. These facts, together with further
    information which has accumulated in the last few days, furnish
    conclusive proof that the English and French attack against
    Germany is imminent and that this thrust will be directed
    against the Ruhr through Belgium and the Netherlands.”

As proof of these statements I refer to Documents Ribbentrop-221 through
229, which I submit to the Tribunal for judicial notice. They are the
Anglo-French plans in preparation for violation of Holland’s and
Belgium’s neutrality in agreement with these countries.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal has to adjourn at 5 o’clock into a
closed session. They hope very much that you will conclude your
examination of these documents by then.

DR. HORN: Very well, Mr. President. So as to save time, I shall only
state briefly what these documents are. Document Ribbentrop-221 is the
proof of an intended intervention in Belgium. This is a report from the
military attaché at the French Embassy in London, General Lelong,
addressed to the Chief of the French General Staff for National Defense.
I am going to quote a very brief passage from it which says:

    “Intervention in Belgium.

    “The British Delegation readily recognized how uncertain the
    conditions are for eventual intervention in Belgium. It was
    proposed that we, in order to prevent a battle of junction on
    the Belgian flatlands, must plan to organize our defenses at
    least along the Schelde, or preferably, along the Albert Canal.
    By request of the British Delegation, the following points have
    been considered:

    “(1) The possibility of intervention along the line
    Antwerp-Brussels-Namur, assuming that it were possible to
    organize such a position in good time.

    “(2) The importance of holding the Belgian and Dutch territory
    as a base for a resumption of the offensive against Germany.”

Again, to save time, I shall not refer to any other documents in
connection with this group. I merely ask the Tribunal that Document
Ribbentrop-219, on Page 521 of the document book, which is a memorandum
of the German Government to the Luxembourg Government, of 9 May 1940,
and Document Ribbentrop-220, should be taken judicial notice of, so that
I can refer to them when I present my case. Furthermore, I ask the
Tribunal to take judicial notice of the Documents Number 230, 230(a),
231, 231(a), 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244,
and 245, which, again are documents which originate from the French
General Staff and are clear proof that on the part of Britain and
France, before 9 May 1940, detailed plans for military co-operation had
been prepared, and that British and American advance parties were
already on Belgian and Dutch territory before German troops crossed the
border. That is the end of this particular group.

I now come to those documents which I intend to submit to the Tribunal
with reference to the occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece. These are
Documents Ribbentrop-272 and the following, Pages 604 and the following,
of the document book. Here again, we are concerned with documents which
partly come from the files of the French General Staff. The first
document of the type is Document Ribbentrop-272, which is a note from
the German Government to the Yugoslav Government, dated March 1941. This
is concerned with the joining of the Three Power Pact by Yugoslavia.
This document shows that Germany and the Axis Powers did not intend to
put demands to Yugoslavia during the war at all, least of all with
reference to the march of troops through Yugoslav territory. Documents
Ribbentrop-273 and 274 contain the minutes of Yugoslavia’s entry into
the Three Power Pact on 25 March 1941, and connected with it is a note
from the Reich Government to the Yugoslav Government. With Document
Ribbentrop-277 I submit to the Tribunal a note from the Reich Government
to the Greek Government, which was handed to that Government after Greek
territory had been occupied by British troops. From Page 3 I quote the
following sentence:

    “During recent days, Greece had become an operational territory
    for British forces.”

Under Document Ribbentrop-278, I submit to the Tribunal an official
statement from the Reich Government, dated 6 April 1941, which is
addressed to both Yugoslavia and Greece. In this note the reasons are
stated which, after the Simovic revolt, led to military action by
Germany in Yugoslavia. These reasons can be found on Page 4 of this
document. As evidence that the statements contained therein are true, I
am referring to the so-called “Charité Files” which are the files of the
French General Staff.

This completes the group of documents with reference to Yugoslavia and
Greece, but I should like to add that once again I will rely on further
evidence which will be submitted by my colleague, Dr. Siemers, for the
Defendant Raeder, and which also refers to the German action against
Greece.

The next group of documents refer to Russia. They are the ones in
Documents Ribbentrop-279 and the following, which can be found on Pages
619 and the following of the document book. I ask the Tribunal to take
judicial notice of Numbers 279, 280, 282, 283, and 284. During the
presentation of my argument I shall refer to these documents further.

The next and last group of documents are those which refer to the
accusation against the Defendant Ribbentrop regarding the Anti-Comintern
Pact and his policy in connection with Japan and the U.S.A.

The first document of this type is Document Ribbentrop-291, on Page 652
of the document book. This document contains the text of the
Anti-Comintern Pact. Document Ribbentrop-281 refers to the extension of
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Three Power Pact of 27 September 1940. I
submit these documents to the Tribunal as proof of the fact that
Ribbentrop and the Reich Government made efforts, by means of this
policy, to keep the United States out of the war. In spite of this
policy, an active support of our opponents by the United States took
place. As proof of this, I refer to the documents in Document
Ribbentrop-306 and Document Ribbentrop-308, on Pages 700 and 702 and
following of the document book. These documents are the last I am
submitting to the Tribunal with reference to the policy of Germany
during the years when the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was Foreign Minister.
Finally I refer briefly to Document Ribbentrop-313. That is an affidavit
from the Legation Counsellor, Bernd Gottfriedsen. This affidavit
actually has nothing to do with the aggressive war, but it refers to
questions which have been brought up by the Prosecution in connection
with the case of Ribbentrop, and this affidavit contains statements
regarding the real estate property of the Defendant Ribbentrop and
regarding his ownership of art works.

May I point out that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen, as he has stated
in the affidavit, handled the financial affairs of the Foreign Office
and particularly those of the Foreign Minister. I will quote a brief
passage in connection therewith from question Number 5:

    “Question: ‘What is the situation with regard to Von
    Ribbentrop’s art possessions?’

    “Answer:”—by Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen—“‘Herr Von
    Ribbentrop was a wealthy man before he entered diplomatic life.
    During the time of his activities in the above-mentioned
    department he acquired some paintings, for the most part on the
    art market in Germany itself. Every one of these paintings was
    acquired properly and, above all, at correct prices, and of
    course paid for out of the private funds of the Reich Foreign
    Minister.

    “‘During the time he was Foreign Minister, Herr Von Ribbentrop
    acquired art objects abroad for purposes of furnishing the
    Foreign Office and German missions in foreign countries, which
    became state property and were used accordingly. All these art
    objects were catalogued and carried in the books as inventory.
    No foreign art objects were acquired illegally, that is by
    pressure, _et cetera_. Herr Von Ribbentrop’s private art
    objects, too, were catalogued, and the objects themselves marked
    distinctly by me.’”

I now skip one paragraph and read the end of the statement which says:

    “‘During the war he did not acquire any art objects illegally
    from any of the territories occupied by German troops, be it for
    his own private use or for the Foreign Office of the Reich.’”

I should like to add that Legation Counsellor Gottfriedsen knew
thoroughly the private property affairs of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop,
and had annually made a survey of them together with a certified
accountant for the purpose of taxes and inventory.

Finally, I should like to quote a paragraph from the affidavit which is
Document Ribbentrop-317, and which is in the document book on Page 749.
This is an affidavit from Frau Von Ribbentrop given before a notary in
Nuremberg. It refers to accusations raised by the Prosecution in
connection with the Russian policy pursued by Ribbentrop. I am quoting,
as follows:

    “In 1940 we had a very inadequate air-raid shelter in the
    Foreign Office (official residence). During air raids,
    therefore, on the order of Adolf Hitler, we used the air-raid
    shelter of the Reich Chancellery, since he considered it
    important that my husband, in his capacity as Reich Foreign
    Minister, and the documents of the Foreign Office should be safe
    from air raids. I was at that time expecting my youngest child,
    which was born on 19 December 1940, and can therefore clearly
    remember an air-raid which took place shortly before this event,
    which caused us to go to the air-raid shelter of the Reich
    Chancellery. On this occasion Adolf Hitler was also present and
    came into our room in the shelter. He, my husband, and I sat at
    a table in this room. In the course of our stay my husband spoke
    at length of his efforts to induce Russia to join the Tripartite
    Pact. He developed the possibilities of such diplomatic action
    and his ideas of how he imagined the conclusion of such a pact.
    I remember clearly that Adolf Hitler closed the conversation
    with the words, ‘Ribbentrop, why shouldn’t we be able to manage
    that, when we have managed so many things?’

    “My husband presented his ideas with great _élan_ and with great
    impressiveness. After he had finished I noticed that Adolf
    Hitler, who had received my husband’s statements without
    pertinent remarks, seemed to be a little absent-minded, so that
    I had the impression that my husband’s statements had not made
    any convincing impression.”

I have offered this affidavit so as to prove that at that time
Ribbentrop was still eager to avoid a conflict with Russia.

This ends the presentation of the documents on behalf of the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, could you inform us how far you have been able
to get with Dr. Thoma in connection with his documents, that is, the
Rosenberg documents?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the American delegation, the Soviet,
and the French are dealing with Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps Mr. Dodd can tell us.

MR. DODD: Captain Krieger of our staff, Your Honor, has been in
consultation with Dr. Thoma and will continue to be, in an effort to
follow the procedures laid out by the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: While on that subject, if I may, I would like to inform the
Court that we have concluded our conversations with Dr. Dix, and we are,
I think it fair to say, at some differences. I think it would be
necessary to have a hearing by the Court on these matters that we do not
agree on. However, we have agreed to a considerable number of Schacht
items.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but what I want to insure is that there shall be no
delay at the end of Kaltenbrunner’s case with reference to Rosenberg’s
case. And as I understand it, the documents in the Rosenberg case, which
it has been suggested we might have to consider, are very numerous; and
the sooner the Tribunal gets to them the better.

MR. DODD: We shall be available at all times to talk with Dr. Thoma and
move right along—in the evening if he cares to do it.

THE PRESIDENT: It might possibly be desirable, it seems to me, to have
the documents which have been translated presented to the Tribunal
before the others; I mean to say not have them all together, because
there are, no doubt, various volumes.

MR. DODD: There are three so far; I understand there will be more. But
we will press it and continue to talk with Dr. Thoma, and just as soon
as possible on the first book we will be prepared to come before the
Court for a hearing.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, wouldn’t the best thing be for you to
submit the volumes which have been translated to the Court so that they
can consider them beforehand as we did with Dr. Horn’s books?

DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible. The documents have already
been processed. With reference to my Document Books Number 2 and 3, I
have discussed them with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, and we came to an
agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well you could specify that agreement in the books.
I suppose you could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, as soon as possible you will let the General
Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made
with Captain Krieger; is that right?

DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have come to an agreement
with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, only with reference to Books 2 and 3
and that refers only to the Einsatzstab and the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.

I have not yet come to an agreement regarding the philosophy and
writings of Rosenberg, but I shall do that in due course.

THE PRESIDENT: No; one—is that in Book 1?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement, you can
specify that, and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could
take some time with Captain Krieger—take time off from Court—in order
to come to an agreement with reference to Book 1 and with reference to
the other books.

How many more books have you got?

DR. THOMA: All together four document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Four more?

DR. THOMA: All together four document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see. So there is only one more to be
translated.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH DAY
                         Thursday, 11 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Funk.

Mr. President, on Saturday last, when sickness prevented me from
attending the session, the question came up in which sequence the
defense for the Defendants Dr. Funk and Dr. Schacht should be conducted,
and the President has expressed the wish to hear my statement on the
subject as soon as possible. I have discussed the matter with my client
and the defense counsel for Dr. Schacht and I agree to and suggest that
the defense for the Defendant Dr. Schacht come first and that the case
of the Defendant Funk, for reasons of suitability, should follow after
the evidence for the Defendant Schacht has been completed. For the
information of the Tribunal I wanted to inform you of that, Mr.
President. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I should like to call the attention of
the Tribunal to the fact with respect to the documents for the Defendant
Rosenberg, we have finished our conversations with Dr. Thoma on a number
of matters which will require a hearing before the Tribunal. We were not
able to agree on a number of them and, as I said yesterday, we are
prepared to be heard on the applications of Dr. Schacht.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will arrange a time for that. Now, Dr.
Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I am now beginning the defense by
presenting evidence in the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I need
not emphasize how extraordinarily difficult this defense is, considering
the unusual severity of the charges brought against him. I intend to
present the evidence in the following way: With the permission of the
Tribunal, I shall read two small documents first from the short document
book; then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call the
defendant to the witness stand and after that I shall examine one or two
witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that that course would be appropriate
but I wanted to draw your attention...

Dr. Kauffmann, there were four witnesses who were called for the
Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, and Wisliceny—you asked for leave
at an earlier stage to cross-examine witnesses called for the
Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, Wisliceny, and Schellenberg; and the
Tribunal then ordered that they might be recalled for cross-examination
but that they must be called before your witnesses. Therefore, the
Tribunal wants to know whether you wish to call any of those for
cross-examination. You do not?

DR. KAUFFMANN: No, Mr. President, I do not wish to call Ohlendorf,
Wisliceny, Höllriegel, or Schellenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now read these two documents? To begin with there
is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Mildner in the document book. I am
asking that notice be taken of it. It is Document Kaltenbrunner-1. I am
now reading:

    “Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Mildner, at present in
    prison in Nuremberg, make the following affidavit in answer to
    the questions put to me by attorney Dr. Kauffmann for
    presentation to the International Military Tribunal in
    Nuremberg:

    “Question Number 1: Give particulars of your career.

    “Answer: I was entrusted with certain tasks of the Gestapo for
    about 10 years. From 1938 to 1945 I was subordinate to Amt IV,
    which is the Gestapo of the Reich Main Security Office in
    Berlin. I was in the RSHA in Berlin itself, for only about three
    months, that is to say, from March to June 1944. The rest of the
    time I was mostly chief of provincial branches of the Gestapo.

    “Question Number 2: What can you say in regard to
    Kaltenbrunner’s personality?

    “Answer: From my own knowledge I can confirm the following: I
    know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner personally. In his private life
    he was beyond reproach. In my opinion his promotion from Higher
    SS and Police Leader to Chief of the Security Police and the SD
    was due to the fact that Himmler, in June 1942, after the death
    of Heydrich, his chief rival, would suffer no man beside or
    under him who might have endangered his position. The Defendant
    Kaltenbrunner was, no doubt, the least dangerous man for
    Himmler. Kaltenbrunner had no ambition to gain influence by
    special deeds and eventually to push Himmler aside. There was no
    question of lust for power in his case. It is wrong to call him
    the little Himmler.

    “Question Number 3: What attitude did Kaltenbrunner adopt toward
    Amt IV (Gestapo)?

    “Answer: I know of no specific limitation of the Defendant
    Kaltenbrunner’s power with regard to the offices which were
    under the RSHA. On the other hand, I can say that Müller, the
    Chief of Amt IV, acted independently by virtue of his long
    experience and did not give to anyone, not even the chiefs of
    the other offices of the RSHA, any insight into his tasks and
    methods of his Amt IV. He had, after all, immediate protection
    from Himmler.

    “Question Number 4: Did you ever see any executive orders by
    Kaltenbrunner?

    “Answer: I have never seen any original order—that is to say,
    something signed in handwriting—from the Defendant
    Kaltenbrunner. I know quite well that orders for protective
    custody bore facsimile signatures or typewritten signatures.
    This was a routine initiated during Heydrich’s time.

    “Question Number 5: Did orders for executions rest in
    Kaltenbrunner’s or Himmler’s hands? Who was responsible for the
    setting up and running of concentration camps?

    “Answer: I know that execution orders rested in Himmler’s hands.
    So far as I know no other officials of the RSHA could issue such
    orders without his permission. I know, furthermore, that
    concentration camps were run by a special main department,
    namely, the SS Main Office for Economy and Administration, the
    chief of which was Pohl. The concentration camps had nothing to
    do with the RSHA. This applies to the whole administration,
    food, treatment, camp regulations, _et cetera_. The inspector of
    concentration camps was Glücks. The official channels were
    therefore: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks, camp commandant.

    “Question Number 6: Did Kaltenbrunner order any of the
    concentration camps to be evacuated?

    “Answer: It is not known to me that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
    had issued any orders regarding the evacuation of concentration
    camps.

    “Question Number 7: Did Kaltenbrunner issue the order to arrest
    all Danish citizens of Jewish religion and transport them to the
    concentration camp at Theresienstadt?

    “Answer: No. The reason why I can answer this question exactly
    is because I, myself, as a member of the Gestapo, was concerned
    with this matter in Denmark in September 1943. The Chief of the
    Security Police and the SD had received the order in September
    1943 to arrest all Danish Jews and transport them to
    Theresienstadt. I flew to Berlin to have this order canceled.
    Shortly afterwards an order of Himmler arrived in Denmark
    according to which the anti-Jewish action was to be carried out.
    Kaltenbrunner, therefore, did not issue the order. I did not
    speak to him; in fact he was not even in Berlin.

    “Read and found correct.

    “Nuremberg, 29 March 1946; signed, Dr. Mildner.”

Then follows the certification.

The next affidavit comes from Dr. Höttl.

MR. DODD: We are faced with a new problem. I do not think this question
has arisen heretofore. The Prosecution submitted a cross-interrogatory
to this man Dr. Mildner, and we are not quite certain as to just how we
should proceed. Should we now offer our cross-interrogation, or at a
later stage?

THE PRESIDENT: We think you should read it now.

MR. DODD: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I just say one thing about that. This
is the first time that I hear that the Prosecution have also put
questions which have been answered by the same witness. I think this is
the first case of this kind which has been put before the Tribunal.

Would it not have been appropriate to have these answers communicated to
me, since I have put my affidavit at the disposal of the Prosecution a
very long time ago?

THE PRESIDENT: They certainly should be. The Tribunal thinks they
certainly should have been communicated to you at the same time that
they were received.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is the answer to be read nevertheless? I would rather
like to raise formal objection to that and ask the Tribunal for a
decision.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, why were these not submitted to Dr. Kauffmann?

MR. DODD: This cross-affidavit and interrogatory was taken only
yesterday, and the material just was not ready until this morning. We
regret that, and had it been ready it would, of course, have been turned
over to him. If he would like to have some time to look it over, we, of
course, would not object.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, in the circumstances we will postpone the
reading of these cross-interrogatories in order that you may consider
them, and, if you think it right, you may object to any of the questions
or answers and we will then consider that matter.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

May I now read the second and last document:

    “Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the
    following affidavit in answer to the questions put to me by
    attorney Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International
    Military Tribunal.”

THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a number to this document?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, Document Kaltenbrunner-2.

    “Question Number 1: Give details about yourself. What was your
    official position in the SD? Where did you know Dr.
    Kaltenbrunner?

    “Answer: I was born on 19 March 1915, in Vienna; by profession,
    a historian. My occupation up to the time of the German collapse
    was that of a sub-department chief in Amt VI, Foreign
    Intelligence Department, of the RSHA. After Austria’s Anschluss
    in 1938, I voluntarily joined the SD. Coming from the National
    Catholic Youth Movement, I made it my aim to achieve a moderate
    political course for my country.

    “I made the acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner in 1938; he knew that
    the above was my aim.

    “In 1941, on personal orders of Heydrich, I was called before
    the SS and Police Court for having religious ties and for lack
    of political and ideological reliability, and I had to join the
    ranks as an ordinary private. After Heydrich’s death I was
    pardoned and, at the beginning of 1943, I was detailed to the
    office of Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA. Here I was
    in charge of matters relating to the Vatican, as well as of
    matters relating to some states in the Balkans.

    “When Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA at the
    beginning of 1943, I was continually in touch with him at work,
    particularly since he was endeavoring to draw the group of
    Austrians in the RSHA nearer to him.

    “Question Number 2: Give an estimate of the numbers involved at
    the Main Office of the RSHA in Berlin.

    “Answer: The Main Office in Berlin, Amt IV (Gestapo) had
    approximately 1,500 members; Amt V (Criminal Police) 1,200; Amt
    III and Amt VI (intelligence service at home and abroad) 300 to
    400 each.

    “Question Number 3: What is understood by SD and what were its
    tasks?

    “Answer: Heydrich organized the so-called Sicherheitsdienst
    (known as the SD) in 1932. Its task was to give to the highest
    German authorities and the individual Reich ministries,
    information on all events at home and abroad.

    “The SD was purely an information service and had no sort of
    executive authority. Only individual persons belonging to the SD
    were drafted to the so-called special action commands
    (Einsatzkommandos) in the East. They thereby assumed executive
    positions, and they resigned from the SD during that period.
    There were special action groups and special action commands of
    the Security Police and the SD up to the last; also in Africa,
    and in Hungary, and Czechoslovakia even up to 1944. These
    Kommandos had nothing to do with executions. Their tasks had in
    the meantime assumed the nature of general security police
    matters. As far as I know, executions were carried out only in
    Russia, due to the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ by Hitler.
    Whether these Kommandos stopped or continued their activity
    after Kaltenbrunner was named Chief of the RSHA, I do not know.

    “Question Number 4: Do you know about the ‘Eichmann Operation’
    to exterminate the Jews?

    “Answer: I learned details of the Eichmann Operation only at the
    end of August 1944. At that time Eichmann himself gave me
    detailed information. Eichmann explained, among other things,
    that the whole action was a special Reich secret and was known
    to only very few people. The total number of members of this
    Kommando, in my opinion, could hardly have exceeded 100.

    “Question Number 5: What do you know about the relations between
    Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner?

    “Answer: I know nothing about the official relations between the
    two. However, Eichmann may well have had no direct official
    contact with Kaltenbrunner. He often asked me to arrange a
    meeting with Kaltenbrunner for him. Kaltenbrunner always
    refused.

    “Question Number 6: What was the relationship between
    Kaltenbrunner and Müller, the Chief of the Secret State Police
    (Gestapo)?

    “Answer: I cannot give any details about their official
    relations. It is certain, however, that Müller acted quite
    independently. He had gained great experience in Secret State
    Police matters over a period of many years. Himmler thought a
    great deal of him. Kaltenbrunner did not think very much of him.
    Kaltenbrunner had neither technical schooling in police problems
    nor any interest in them. The intelligence service took up the
    main part of his attention and all his interest, especially
    insofar as it concerned foreign countries.

    “Question Number 7: Who was in charge of the concentration
    camps?

    “Answer: The SS Main Office for Economy and Administration had
    sole charge of the concentration camps; that is, not the RSHA,
    and therefore not Kaltenbrunner. He, consequently, had no power
    to give orders and no competency in this sphere. According to my
    opinion of him as a man, Kaltenbrunner certainly did not approve
    of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. I do not
    know whether he knew about them.

    “Question Number 8: Did Kaltenbrunner issue or transmit an order
    according to which enemy aviators who made forced landings were
    to be given no protection in the event of lynch justice being
    carried out by the population?

    “Answer: No, I never heard about anything of the kind from
    Kaltenbrunner, although I was with him a great deal. As far as I
    can remember, however, Himmler issued an order of this kind.

    “Question Number 9: Did Kaltenbrunner issue orders that Jews
    were to be killed?

    “Answer: No, he never issued such orders, and in my opinion, he
    could not issue such orders on his own authority. In my opinion
    he was opposed to Hitler and Himmler on this question, that is,
    the physical extermination of European Jewry.

    “Question Number 10: What church policy did Kaltenbrunner
    pursue?

    “Answer: As adviser on Vatican matters, I often had the
    opportunity of speaking to him officially on this subject. He
    immediately supported my suggestion, made to Hitler in the
    spring of 1943, that a change in church policy should be
    effected so that the Vatican could be won over as a peace
    negotiator on this basis. Kaltenbrunner had no success with
    Hitler, as Himmler opposed him violently. Baron Von Weizsäcker,
    German Ambassador to the Holy See with whom I discussed the
    matter, failed likewise in his efforts, the result of which was
    that Bormann had an eye kept on him.

    “Question Number 11: Did Kaltenbrunner intervene in foreign
    policy in the interest of peace?

    “Answer: Yes; in the Hungarian question, for example. When, in
    March 1944, the German troops occupied Hungary, he succeeded in
    persuading Hitler to be moderate and to prevent Romanian and
    Slovak units from marching in as planned. Due to his support, I
    was able to prevent a National Socialist government from being
    formed in Hungary as planned, for another 6 months.”

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kauffmann, are you going to call the defendant?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have committed a small oversight. I did
not read Page 5 of my document book. Those are Questions 12 and 13 of
the affidavit, which I, inadvertently, did not read. I wish to apologize
and ask your permission to finish it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I continue on Page 5:

    “Kaltenbrunner wanted the old Austria-Hungary to be
    re-established on a federative basis. Since 1943 I had told
    Kaltenbrunner that Germany must endeavor to end the war by a
    peace at any price. I had informed him about my connection with
    an American office in Lisbon. I also informed Kaltenbrunner that
    I had recently made a contact with an American office in a
    neutral country through the Austrian resistance movement. He
    also declared his willingness to travel to Switzerland with me
    and start personal negotiations with an American representative
    in order to avoid further senseless bloodshed.

    “Question Number 12: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner instructed
    the Commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the
    camp to the approaching troops?

    “Answer: It is correct that Kaltenbrunner did give such an
    order. He dictated it in my presence, to be forwarded to the
    Camp Commandant.

    “Question Number 13: Can you say something briefly about
    Kaltenbrunner’s personality?

    “Answer: Kaltenbrunner was a man completely different from
    Himmler or Heydrich. He was therefore by conviction strongly
    opposed to both of them. He was appointed Chief of the RSHA, in
    my opinion, because Himmler did not want to run the risk of
    having a rival like Heydrich. It would be wrong to call him
    ‘little Himmler.’ In my opinion, he was never in complete
    control of the large office of the RSHA and, being very little
    interested in police and executive tasks, he occupied himself
    preponderantly with the intelligence service and with exerting
    influence on general policy. This he regarded as his particular
    sphere.”

This is followed by signature, date, and certification.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any more documents?

DR. KAUFFMANN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Now you wish to call the defendant?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER (Defendant): Ernst Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty
and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and
add nothing—so help me God.”

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During the last 2 years of the war, since 1943, you have
been the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Chief
of the Reich Security Main Office, the RSHA. You are aware, of course,
that you are under extremely serious charges. The Prosecution charge you
with having committed Crimes against Peace, and with having
intellectually aided and abetted or participated in the crimes against
the law of war and against humanity, and finally, the Prosecution
connect your name with the Gestapo terror and the atrocities of the
concentration camps. I now ask you, do you assume responsibility for the
Counts charged as outlined and which are known to you?

KALTENBRUNNER: In the first place, I should like to state to the
Tribunal that I am fully aware of the serious character of the charges
against me. I know the hatred of the world is directed against me; that
I—particularly since Himmler, Müller, and Pohl are no longer
alive—must here, alone, give an account to the world and the Tribunal.
I realize that I shall have to tell the truth in this courtroom, in
order to enable the Court and the world to fully recognize and
understand what has been going on in Germany during this war and to
judge it with fairness.

In 1943—that is to say, 2 years before the ending of this war—I was
called into an office, which fact I shall explain in detail later on.

Right at the beginning, I would like to state that I assume
responsibility for every wrong that was committed within the scope of
this office since I was appointed Chief of the RSHA and as far as it
happened under my actual control, which means that I knew about it or
was required to know about it.

May I ask permission for my defense counsel to put questions to me so as
to direct my line of thought?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly describe, in rough outlines, your career
until you entered public life, and Austrian politics, that is until
about 1934.

KALTENBRUNNER: I was born in 1903. My father and my grandfather were
lawyers of repute; for the rest I am a descendant of farmers and
scythemakers. My mother is of modest descent. She was adopted by the
Belgian Ambassador to Romania and lived there for 25 years. During my
childhood, which I spent in the country with a family which took very
good care of me, I enjoyed on the one hand the best education and on the
other hand I became familiar with the life of the simple people. I
attended secondary school, high school, graduated, and in 1921 went to
Graz University. First I studied chemico-technical sciences at the
Institute of Technology and later on, when my father returned from the
war seriously ill and when the possibility arose that I might have to
take over his solicitor’s practice, I studied law. I completed these
studies with the degree of Doctor of Law and Political Science in 1926.

I had a hard time. I had to earn my own living and the expenses for my
studies. I had to work while I studied and for 2 years I worked as a
coal miner during the night shift; and I have to thank my fate that thus
I got to know the German workman much better than people usually do.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you be slightly more brief? Please get as quickly
as possible to the period after 1934.

KALTENBRUNNER: After leaving the University I had to complete 7 or 8
years work as a candidate for the bar examination in accordance with the
Austrian law, of which I spent one year in court as assistant and the
rest of the time in lawyers’ offices in Salzburg and Linz.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for one moment with a question. Is
it correct that in 1932 you became a member of the Party?

KALTENBRUNNER: I became a member of the Party in 1932 after I had
belonged for several years to the Non-Partisan Movement for the
Protection of the Austrian Homeland.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you join the SS in that same year?

KALTENBRUNNER: I think it was at the end of 1932 or maybe at the
beginning of 1933.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that even before 1933, as maintained by the
Prosecution, you were public speaker of a Gau and legal adviser of an SS
sector?

KALTENBRUNNER: That statement requires clarification. It is true that I
made speeches in my own home province, the Gau Upper Austria, at
National Socialist meetings but primarily—or rather exclusively—to
promote the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other
lawyer of any party who, at that period of economic emergency, was
willing to give legal information and advice free of charge for some
hours at the end of the day to the needy, who in this case were National
Socialists.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that later, in 1934, the Dollfuss Government
had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National
Socialists, were sent to the Kaisersteinbruch Concentration Camp? What
was the cause for that?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is correct. I think that with regard to this point I
must briefly describe the political situation in Austria at the time.

The Government was in the hands of a group of men who had very few
followers among the people. There were two large groups of size which
did not participate in the Government; the first being the leftist
group, that is, the Social Democrats and Austro-Marxists, and the second
being the National Socialists, which was at that time a very small
group. The Government, then, did put not only the National Socialists
but also Social Democrats and Communists into their detention camps in
order to eliminate any political strife originating from meetings or
demonstrations. I was one of those National Socialists who were arrested
at that time, whose number was approximately 1,800.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have another conflict with them? And were you
eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the Government
and thereupon discharged from the custody under which you had been
placed? Give in a few sentences the reasons for this procedure.

KALTENBRUNNER: This was considerably later. I was arrested in May 1935.
I should say first of all that in the meantime the National Socialist
attempt at revolt had taken place in Austria in July 1934. This attempt
at revolt, which unfortunately also included the murder of Dollfuss, was
defeated and avenged by most severe measures against a large number of
National Socialists. One particularly severe measure was the law by
which many thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs or
professional license and the necessity arose to bring about a
pacification, I should say a mitigation in principles of the Government
policy. That was primarily done by two men: Langot, then the Chief
Deputy of Upper Austria, and Reinthaller, a farmer and engineer. That
appeasement action started at the end of 1934 in September or October,
and I was invited to join that action.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please, if possible, get to the period of 1938,
in rough outlines?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was in no way implicated in this attempted revolt of
July 1934 and that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement
action. Within that program the Government themselves demanded that
certain men should maintain connections with the Party leaders, with the
SA, SS, and all organizations of the then forbidden movement. With the
knowledge and consent of the Government and the proper police
departments, I took up the connection with the SS.

In May 1935 I was arrested, suspected of establishing an illegal
connection with the SS and of being engaged in high treason activity. I
remained in custody for 6 months and was arraigned before the military
tribunal in Wels on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted
of this crime since the Government themselves admitted that this
assignment had been granted to me with their knowledge. All that was
left over was a minor sentence for conspiracy which, however, was served
by my custody.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How did you participate in the Austrian revolution which
occurred in March 1938 and how did the SS participate?

KALTENBRUNNER: Shortly after my activities in connection with the
Reinthaller-Langot appeasement action, I got in touch first with circles
of the Anschluss movement clubs and second with those circles whose aim
it was to improve conditions in Austria peacefully, by an evolutionary
movement and development, and, on the other hand, to enlarge the
Anschluss movement so as to win over the government themselves to that
idea.

In 1937 and 1938 I attempted to come into closer personal contact with
Seyss-Inquart, later Minister, and I completely adopted his political
conceptions.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in
April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation?

KALTENBRUNNER: The plebiscite of 10 April 1938 was completely in
accordance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.73
percent for Anschluss to the German Reich was perfectly genuine.

DR. KAUFFMANN: On the occasion of the Anschluss is it right that you
were promoted to SS Brigadeführer and leader of an SS sector?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but first I would like to add the following to the
question of the Anschluss:

The representation and opinion of the Prosecution are completely
incorrect when they think that National Socialism in Austria at that
time could in any way be compared with the development which had already
taken place in Germany. The development of Austrian National Socialism
was on the contrary completely different. The starting point was the
abnormal economic depression in Austria and beyond that the Anschluss
movement, and finally National Socialism made the Anschluss come true.
This course, from economic depression via Anschluss movement to National
Socialism, was the road of nearly all National Socialists, and the
ideology of the Party program of the time was in no way responsible.

I believe this has to be taken for granted and I believe I also ought to
say it first, that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the
people; the fact that the plebiscite in the various provinces, like the
Tyrol or Salzburg, had already in previous years—I believe from 1925 to
1928—shown a result of more than 90 percent of the votes in favor of
the Anschluss should now be taken into consideration.

Back in 1928 the National Council of Austria and the Austrian Federal
Council signed the decree of the National Council of the year 1918 which
said that both these assemblies had resolved to join the Reich; and they
did not swerve from that resolution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these
subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such
detail. Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to
the material period?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I thought that the defendant was being held responsible
for his participation in the change of regime. Therefore I wanted to
have at least a few sentences said about that before this Tribunal, but
I am now prepared to change the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular
plebiscites long before the Anschluss, and that seems to be quite
irrelevant detail.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, in September 1938, you were promoted to SS
Gruppenführer; is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. After the ensuing Anschluss I had to take over the
leadership of the General SS in Austria, namely, the SS Main Sector
Danube. At that time I had been promoted to brigade leader without going
exactly through the preceding ranks of SS leaders. And I think it was in
September that I was appointed Gruppenführer, so that my rank was made
the same as that of all the other main SS sector leaders in the entire
Reich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I question you regarding your further career in the
SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?

KALTENBRUNNER: In March 1938 I became a member of the Austrian
Government; that is, I had to take over the position of State Secretary
for Security in Austria, which was under the Ministry of the Interior.
That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, their
activity was discontinued in favor of such bodies of administration
which prevailed in the Reich; consequently, the Office of State
Secretary for Security was also dissolved, and in order to retain me at
the same level in the budget, I was appointed Higher SS and Police
Leader, I think in July 1941.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And on 30 January 1943 you were appointed Chief of the
Security Police and the SD, that is, of the so-called Reich Security
Main Office. How did that appointment come about? Did you have
connections with Himmler? What was said between you and Himmler on the
occasion of your appointment?

KALTENBRUNNER: I must describe briefly my activities from 1941 to 1943,
that is, 2 years, so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin.

The Prosecution charge that I had led the Security Police already in
Austria. In that respect the Prosecution are mistaken.

The State Police and the Criminal Police as well as the Security Service
in Austria were directed centrally from Berlin and were completely
removed from the power of Seyss-Inquart, then the responsible Minister,
and his deputy, Kaltenbrunner. My activity as Higher SS and Police
Leader in Austria—unlike the activity of the same men in the Reich—was
therefore limited merely to the task of representing or leading the
General SS, which in no way took up all my time.

During these 2 years I therefore followed out my intentions concerning
political activity and developed a rather large political intelligence
service radiating from Austria toward the southeast. I did that because,
in the first place, I regretted that the Reich did not make use of at
least the political and the economic resources, of all the resources
which Austria could have put at the disposal of the Reich, and because
the Reich with unequalled shortsightedness did not fall back upon
Austria’s most significant mission as an intermediary with the
Southeast. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin, and
since Himmler was continuously reproached by Hitler that his
intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did not
furnish adequate reports on political results, Himmler, 8 months after
Heydrich’s death, felt obliged to look for a man who could free him from
Hitler’s reproaches that he had no intelligence service worth
mentioning.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did you discuss with Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: In December 1942 he ordered me to come to Berchtesgaden,
where he resided at the time, because the Führer’s headquarters were in
the neighborhood, on the Obersalzberg. He told me first of Hitler’s
reproaches and demanded that I create a central intelligence service in
the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion on this subject with reference to
my reporting activity of the previous years. He was then of the opinion
that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich
Security Main Office as a transition basis for the creation of such an
intelligence service. I refused to do that, giving detailed reasons,
namely, that I had maintained a watching and critical attitude in
Austria toward the over-all development in the Reich, especially the
inner political development. I explained to Himmler in detail why the
Germans in Austria were disappointed and where I saw dangers that the
same Austrians, who 4 years ago had turned with enthusiasm to the Reich,
would become tired of the Reich. I have...

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct,
of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main
Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive
powers?

KALTENBRUNNER: I am coming to that immediately. But, I must now describe
that first conference with Himmler; the second one took place 2 weeks
later. On that occasion I was given the order; I am referring to the
first order.

But I should like to state right now—and this is drawn like a red
thread through my entire career to the last days of the war—that even
then I explained to Himmler on which essential points I differed with
National Socialism as to the home policy of the Reich, the foreign
policy, the ideology, and the violations of law by the Government
themselves. I declared to him, specifically, that the administration in
the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was violently criticizing
that centralized system, particularly since a federative status had been
granted to other countries, such as Bavaria. I told him that the
creation of a new German criminal law, the way it was attempted, was
wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic. The Austrian criminal
law, based on a tradition of more than one hundred years, had proved to
be the best and had also been recognized abroad. I explained to him that
the concepts of protective custody and of concentration camps were not
approved of in Austria, but that every man in Austria wanted to be tried
before a court of law.

I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria had developed in a
completely different way and also required a different handling. No one
in Austria, I said, had ever thought of going beyond the limits of
anti-Semitism as laid down in the Party program. I also said that there
was hardly any understanding in Austria for the fact that the Nuremberg
Laws went beyond the Party program in this respect. In Austria, since
1934, there had been a peaceful, regulated policy to allow the Jews to
emigrate. Any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely
unnecessary. I am referring to a document, which is somewhere in the
court record. It is a report from the Chief of Police in Vienna, dated,
I believe, December 1939, which proves in accordance with statistics
that between 1934 and 1939, I think, of a total of 200,000 Jews more
than half had emigrated to foreign countries. Those were the problems
which I discussed at that time...

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did Himmler tell you?

KALTENBRUNNER: And I told Himmler at that time that he knew very well
that I had not only no training in police matters at all, but that all
my activity up to then had been in the field of political intelligence
work, and that therefore, when taking over the Reich Security Main
Office I did not only refuse to have anything to do with such executive
offices as the Gestapo and the criminal police, but that my task to
which he was appointing me, namely to set up and cultivate an
intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. I also said that
I was not only extremely different from Heydrich personally but that
also material differences existed insofar as Heydrich was an expert in
police matters, whereas I was not, and that the policy with which he,
Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich could not be
carried on by me. My name, my honor, and my family were too sacred to me
for that.

He reassured me in this respect by saying:

    “You know that in June 1942 Heydrich was assassinated and that
    I, myself, since his death”—and this was about 6 or 7 months
    after Heydrich’s death—“have been handling his entire office
    myself. This is to continue insofar that I”—this means
    Himmler—“will retain the Executive Offices for myself in the
    future. For this purpose I have at my disposal my well-trained
    experts, Müller and Nebe. You will not have to concern yourself
    with it. You take over the Intelligence Service, that is Amt III
    and Amt VI, as the transition basis for your Intelligence
    Service.”

I told him at that time that an intelligence service could not be built
up on the SD alone. An intelligence service which until that time had
been so narrow-minded because of Heydrich, and which had been forced
more and more into executive work, is _a priori_ unfit to search for
intelligence material.

Secondly, I told him an intelligence service ought to be smaller and, in
particular, I considered it madness to have political and military
intelligence separated from each other. No country in the whole world
except Germany and France has adopted a two-division set-up for an
intelligence service. I therefore demanded from him that he first
procure a Führer order on the strength of which the intelligence system
of the Armed Forces, which rested in the OKW counterintelligence office
(Amt Abwehr), should be united with the SD and should be furnished a new
body of personnel, which ought to be selected and carefully screened...

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for a moment. Can you tell me in
one sentence whether that unification which you just mentioned took
place?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it did.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With Amt VI?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes...

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then another question...

KALTENBRUNNER: [_Continuing._] The union was achieved by an order of
Hitler dated 14 or 15 February 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am asking you: After what you have just explained,
did Himmler relieve you of the executive tasks and was it made known to
your section chiefs and others within the Reich Security Main Office
that you had been so relieved? Did this exemption of executive powers
become apparent outside the office; if so, how?

KALTENBRUNNER: After this conference with Hitler in December 1942, he
discharged me because I did not want to take over the Reich Security
Main Office under those conditions which he had offered to me, namely,
that the executive departments should be managed by himself as
previously. He was so angry with me that he did not give me his hand and
made me aware of his indignation in various other ways during the
subsequent weeks. Toward the middle of January, the 16th or 18th, I was
ordered by telegram to report to headquarters, which in the meantime had
been transferred to East Prussia. I assumed that I was to get a post at
the front because I had asked him for such a post. I went to
headquarters with complete front equipment because I thought I had
finally to expect the same fate that had been the fate of my brothers
and of my other male relatives. But I was wrong. He told me:

    “I have talked to the Führer and the Führer believes that the
    centralization and reorganization of the Intelligence Service is
    the right thing to do. He will initiate the necessary
    negotiations with the Armed Forces, and you will have to
    organize and build up this Intelligence Service. It still holds
    that I, with Müller and Nebe, will have direct charge of the
    executive offices.”

If you ask me now whether this limitation must have become apparent at
once outside of the office, I have to answer that it was not publicized.
Therefore, formally the Prosecution are right in charging me: “As far as
the outside world is concerned, you never drew a demarcation line.” To
that I can say only that I believed I could rely on the words of my then
superior. He had stated it to me in the presence of Nebe and Müller and
had given them the personal order to communicate with him directly and
to report to him and receive the orders from him directly, just as it
had been done for the 8 months since Heydrich’s death.

I am stating here emphatically that the special assignments which had
been given to Heydrich, such as, for instance, the assignment with
regard to the final solution of the Jewish problem, were not only not
known to me at the time but were not taken over by me. Nominally I was
the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. As such, I considered the
Intelligence Service and the reorganization of this Intelligence Service
my proper sphere, as I have said before. The directives were given by
Himmler, but in State Police and Criminal Police matters things were
often done, as I found out very much later, in the name of the Chief of
the Reich Security Main Office, that is, in my name, without my knowing
of or seeing these orders when they were issued.

The chiefs of the Gestapo office and the Criminal Police office
sometimes carried out these orders from Himmler, as I said, in such a
way that they also signed my name as Chief of the Reich Security Main
Office and, as I probably might have to state in detail later, they so
continued routine habits which prevailed during Heydrich’s time, who
united all executive powers in his hand and who could delegate the
respective powers to Müller and Nebe. But I never had those powers from
the beginning, and therefore I could never delegate any partial powers.
Perhaps I ought to supplement the declaration of my responsibility in
this respect by saying that possibly I have not taken the necessary care
to make it clear that no order of the State Police or the Criminal
Police should bear my name. That I did not concern myself with that
sufficiently is Himmler’s fault but probably also my fault.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I draw your attention to the testimony given by
Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III, on 3 January 1946, here in court. I am
putting this testimony to you briefly, and will you please make your
comment. This testimony refers to the question of the executive power.
The witness Ohlendorf said, in reply to my question:

    “If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about
    executive actions I must answer in the affirmative. If you then
    name Müller and Himmler, to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then
    I must point out that according to the organization of the Reich
    Security Main Office Müller was the subordinate of
    Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller
    were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to
    inform Kaltenbrunner of them.”

And then he goes on to say:

    “I can say that I know absolutely that”—I refer to the
    expression that often came up, namely—“‘to the last
    washerwoman’ Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As
    to whether or not Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this
    regard, I can make no statement.”

I am asking you now: Are the essential points of Ohlendorf’s testimony
correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: It needs clarification. He is right insofar as nothing in
the construction, or rather organization of the Reich Security Main
Office had changed since Heydrich’s time. Therefore he could immediately
assume that there was an official channel Himmler-Kaltenbrunner-Müller.
But during the conferences, that is, when Himmler gave orders, it was
specifically not the case. And to the other remark, that Himmler
reserved for himself the decision to the last washerwoman, that proves
that the situation actually had changed insofar as, contrary to that of
Heydrich’s time, I, the medium between Himmler and Müller, was not
active, so that orders from Himmler went immediately to Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to the individual charges preferred by
the Prosecution and first submit to you a document for your statement.
It is the Document L-38, Exhibit USA-517. It is now Kaltenbrunner-3.
This deals with the charge preferred against Kaltenbrunner...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, has this already got an exhibit number?
You do not want to give it another exhibit number.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. If it is not necessary I shall be glad to drop
that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The question here is, first, whether all
signed orders for protective custody bore your name either in facsimile
or typewritten; and the second question is whether you have given such
orders—that means whether these orders are authentic; and further, in
case both these questions are to be answered in the negative, whether
you had knowledge of these orders. Please, will you comment on this
document?

KALTENBRUNNER: I must say that not once in my whole life did I ever see
or sign a single protective custody order. During the interrogations
before the Trial a number of protective custody orders which bear my
name were put before me when I was being questioned. Every one of these
protective custody orders had this signature, that is, my name, either
typewritten or in teletype, and I think in one or two cases it was a
facsimile.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You will admit that, naturally, this statement of yours
is not very credible. It is a monstrosity that the office chief should
not know that such orders were signed with his name. How do you explain
this fact, a fact which appears from the documents which bear your
signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had not finished my explanation. I stated that this
signature “Kaltenbrunner” on protective custody orders can only have
come about through the fact that the office chief, Müller, signed the
name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office on these protective
custody orders, as he had done during Heydrich’s time when he was
allowed to do so, and that in addition he instructed his sections, for
instance, the protective custody section. Accordingly quite obviously he
continued to do so during my time, because otherwise these orders could
not have been put before me now. But he has never informed me of this
and he never had authority from me to do this. To the contrary, this was
out of the question and, on the other hand, superfluous, because he was
immediately under Himmler and he had authority from Himmler, so that he
just as well might have written “Himmler” or “By order of Himmler” or
“For Himmler.” I admit that this remains a fact about which the Tribunal
will not believe me, but nevertheless it was so and Himmler never gave
me a cause to define my attitude in this respect, since he had told me
that I was not to carry out these executive tasks.

DR. KAUFFMANN: This means you are trying to say that the use of your
signature was in fact a misuse?

KALTENBRUNNER: Müller did not have authority to use it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it known to you that protective custody was possible
at all, that it was admissible, and that it has been carried out very
often?

KALTENBRUNNER: As I stated, I discussed the concept “protective custody”
with Himmler as early as 1942. But I think even before that, already on
two occasions in detail, I have had correspondence about this concept
once with him and once with Thierack; I consider protective custody as
it was handled in the German Reich as being a necessity in the interests
of the State, or rather a measure which was justified by the war, only
in a small number of cases. Apart from that, I have declared myself
against and protested against this concept and against the application
of any protective custody as a matter of principle, and have often used
profound legal historical arguments as reasons. On several occasions I
had reported on that subject to Himmler and also to Hitler. I have, in a
meeting of public prosecutors—I think it was in 1944—publicly voiced
my views against it, since I have always been of the opinion that a
man’s liberty must be counted among his highest privileges and that only
a judgment of a court, firmly rooted in a constitution, should be
allowed to infringe on that liberty or to deprive him of it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now discussing with you the reasons stated in such
orders for protective custody. The following, among others, were given
as reasons: activities hostile to the Reich; spreading of atrocity
rumors; assault; refusal to work; religious propaganda. Please, will you
express your views on the reasons for these protective custody orders.
Are they to be approved of?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. I consider these reasons for protective custody to be
wrong. I think I had better explain in detail. My attitude is due to the
fact that all the offenses which have been enumerated here might just as
well have been dealt with by due process of law in the state courts. For
that reason I consider protective custody as such to be wrong, and more
so if ordered for the reasons mentioned.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So that, if I understand you rightly, I can summarize
your attitude as follows: You want to say that you had no knowledge of
the protective custody orders, that you had no authority to issue them,
and that you did not sign them, but since these protective custody
orders were issued within the Amt IV, you ought to have had knowledge of
them. Is this summary correct or is it not?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: We now come to another charge preferred against you by
the Prosecution. The Prosecution claim that you are the intellectual
principal or accessory in the crimes committed when you, as the Chief of
the Security Police and the SD, had civilians murdered and ill-treated
by the so-called Einsatzgruppen. I am going to quote a few sentences
from the testimony given by the witness Ohlendorf here in this courtroom
on 3 January 1946. Ohlendorf’s testimony incriminates you. I wish to
have your comment on it. Ohlendorf says with reference to the
Einsatzgruppen:

    “After his entry into service, Kaltenbrunner had to concern
    himself with these questions and consequently must have known
    the background of the Einsatzgruppen which were under his
    authority.”

He goes on to say with reference to the valuables taken away from the
executed persons that these had been sent to the Reich Ministry of
Finance or to the Reich Security Main Office, and he finally states that
the officer personnel for these Einsatzgruppen were recruited from the
leading personnel of the State Police and only in a small percentage
from the SD. What do you have to say in answer to the question whether
or not you knew of the existence and the significance of these
Einsatzgruppen?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no idea of the existence of these Einsatzkommandos
as described by Ohlendorf. Later on I heard that they existed, but this
was many months later. With regard to this point I want to say the
following: It is known to the Tribunal from Ohlendorf’s testimony and
from Hitler’s and Himmler’s decrees which have been discussed here that
orders for the killing of people had been given. These Einsatzkommandos
have never been reorganized during the time when I was in office. These
Einsatzkommandos which had been active up to that time were also
dissolved or had been put under different commands before I took over
the office. I do not know whether the witness Ohlendorf has stated here
just when he returned from his Einsatzkommando.

DR. KAUFFMANN: 1942.

KALTENBRUNNER: That is before I came into office. The Einsatzkommandos
must later on have come under the charge of the Higher SS and Police
Leaders in the occupied territories or, what is even more probable,
under the charge of the chief of the anti-partisan units. I cannot
answer your question precisely, since I have, as a consequence of my
imprisonment for 1 year, no possibility at my disposal for re-examining
the organizational scheme.

I think you also asked me whether it is known to me that valuables,
which had been taken away from executed persons, had been sent to my
office or the Reich Ministry of Finance. I know nothing of such
shipments but I do know that Himmler had given an order to
everybody—not only to the Security Police but also to other
organizations in the occupied territories, be it the Municipal Police or
the anti-partisan units or those sections of the Armed Forces which were
under his command—saying that all such property was to be surrendered
to the Reich Ministry of Finance.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were these Einsatzgruppen the result of an order from
Hitler or of an order from the Reich Security Main Office?

KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be due to an order from Hitler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You just said that in the course of time you heard about
the existence and significance of these Einsatzgruppen. Can you say
exactly on which date you gained that knowledge?

KALTENBRUNNER: I assume that this was at the time when I had my first
audience with Hitler, or it may have been on the following day when I
reported to Himmler, in November 1943.

DR. KAUFFMANN: 1943?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: If you had knowledge at that time of the Einsatzgruppen
and their significance, then the question arises what your attitude
about them was and, in case you condemned them, what you did to have
them abolished? Did you have a possibility to do so or did you not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I said before that an Einsatzkommando was never set up
under my direction or my orders. The existence and the previous
activities of such Einsatzkommandos became known to me late in the fall
of 1943 and I knew that I would have to resist this misuse of the men
who were under the Reich Security Main Office. I think on 13 September
1943, I saw Hitler on the occasion of a visit of Mussolini who had just
been liberated. However, my attempt to talk to him failed, because of
this State visit. Consequently, in November, after Himmler had put it
off repeatedly, I had to go again to headquarters to report officially
on my activities up to that time. And on that occasion I talked to the
Führer about the facts on the Einsatzkommandos which had become known to
me; and not only about that, but also I had the first opportunity to
approach him about the entire Jewish problem, and about the orders
given, by him and by Himmler against the Jews which had also become
known to me at that time. However, I would like to make a detailed
statement on this subject, if you will go through that problem in detail
with me.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now present...

KALTENBRUNNER: I should like only to add that the Einsatzkommandos no
longer came into the picture, so far as I was concerned, because the
entire personnel was committed to the anti-partisan fighting or rather
to the Higher SS Police Leader, I believe, on exactly the same day when
I entered my office in Berlin. I believe I can remember distinctly that
Von dem Bach-Zelewski was appointed Chief of anti-partisan fighting on
30 January 1943. This may also be the reason for the fact that I did not
see any reports from the Einsatzkommandos themselves.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to another document, L-51, Exhibit
USA-521. This is an extremely incriminating document on which I want to
have your comment.

Zutter is the adjutant of the camp commander of Mauthausen. He reports
regarding a...

KALTENBRUNNER: Is this photostat copy the same?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is the same.

He is reporting regarding an execution order, referring to 12 or 15
American parachutists who were captured in 1945. Will you please look
through the document and state to the Tribunal whether you have given
this order, and whether you had authority to issue such an order?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You have discussed this same document with me only
yesterday. Therefore it is known to me. I declare that this incident and
this order never did come to my knowledge until this document was put
before me or until its presentation by the interrogator.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Ziereis?

KALTENBRUNNER: As I have already said once, I have never had authority
to sign on my own initiative a so-called order for execution, that is to
say a death sentence. Apart from Hitler nobody in the whole Reich had
such authority except Himmler and the Reich Minister of Justice.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With regard to this point, I wish to mention that the
Prosecution have also presented execution orders which bore the
signature of Müller. Do you want to say something about that?

KALTENBRUNNER: If an execution order had Müller’s signature, Müller can
have signed it only on the strength of an order from Himmler, or on the
strength of a sentence submitted by a court.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It suggests itself to say that if Müller had authority to
issue execution orders, then you ought to have had such authority to a
much higher degree? Is that right?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not so, because Himmler never gave me such
power; also the set-up of the chain of command—the State Police
remained under Himmler after Heydrich’s death even after I took
office—would have contradicted that.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The incident referred to in this document is of such
importance, particularly since foreign parachutists are involved, that
one ought to suppose that it was known in the high offices in Berlin,
that means also in the Reich Security Main Office. Did you receive no
knowledge of the matter afterwards?

KALTENBRUNNER: I want to add the following statement: The incident
definitely did not come to my knowledge.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished with Document L-51?

DR. KAUFFMANN: No, I am still concerned with Document L-51, but I am
about to leave it.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, ought you not to refer him to the particular
incident which is referred to toward the end of the document, where it
says, “Concerning the American military mission which landed behind the
German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January 1945”? It
goes on, then, to say that the—I think it was adjutant of the camp
said, “Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of the execution. This letter was
secret and had the signature, ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’”

I think you should put that to him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, certainly. He knows the document, and I believe he
knows every single word of this document, but I will put it to him
again.

[_Turning to the defendant._] It says here:

    “I estimate the number of those persons captured to have been 12
    or 15. They were wearing a uniform which was either American or
    Canadian, brown-green color, and blouse and beret. Eight to 10
    days after their arrival, the order for their execution was
    received by means of a radio message, or a teletype.
    Standartenführer Ziereis—that is the Camp Commandant—came to
    see me in my office and said: ‘Now Kaltenbrunner has approved of
    the execution.’ This letter was secret and had the signature,
    ‘signed, Kaltenbrunner.’

    “These men were then shot on the spot, and their valuables were
    given to me by Oberscharführer Niedermeyer.”

Would you, very briefly, go into this?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is completely out of the question that this incident
was ever brought to my knowledge, or that it happened with my
participation. This is not only plainly a crime against the laws of
warfare, but it is, in particular, an action which could or necessarily
had to produce the most serious foreign political consequences.

Certainly, in such an incident it is out of the question that Müller or
even I, myself, as Müller’s superior, could have taken action; but in
such a case thorough discussions must absolutely have taken place
previously between Himmler, himself, and the Führer.

It is to be assumed, furthermore, that quite definitely someone—maybe
the competent section for international law—would have been consulted
on the subject first, and that such an action, of course, would have
been decreed either by the Führer or by Himmler. In any case, it would
have been an order from one of these two personalities. However, even
that is unknown to me.

If, therefore, this man Zutter relates here that the order bore my
signature, then this can only have been an order which, as I have
described before, bore my name falsely since I never had authority to
issue an order for execution. Therefore, the signature should have been
“Himmler” or “By Himmler’s order, Müller.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: So that you attribute this signature also to a misuse?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I believe that it does not concern my signature at
all here, but that Ziereis should have said “Himmler.” It cannot be
assumed that Müller would have signed his or my name in such a way.

DR. KAUFFMANN: We are now coming to another subject. I am referring now
to Document 1063(b)-PS, Exhibit USA-492, which is a letter from the
Reich Security Main Office, dated 26 July 1943. It has the signature,
“Signed, Dr. Kaltenbrunner,” and the letter is addressed to all Higher
SS and Police Leaders. It refers to the establishment of correctional
labor camps.

Will you please look through the letter? The Prosecution charges you
with the establishment of correctional labor camps. Please explain what
your attitude really was, and state whether that letter originated from
you.

KALTENBRUNNER: With regard to this point I have to make the following
statement: I conclude from the fact that my name is typewritten that
this order had not been shown to me before it went out: otherwise I
would have signed it in handwriting.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know of a Himmler order?

KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I can remember, I learned of it afterwards.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What is a correctional labor camp? Is it identical with a
concentration camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, correctional labor camps were camps in which men were
put if they were Germans, if they had dodged the compulsory labor
service in spite of repeated reminders, or foreign workers who had left
their place of work without permission and had been arrested, or workers
who were caught during round-ups on trains, railway stations, and roads,
and who had no permanent labor contract. Confinement to such
correctional labor camps covered a period of 14 to 56 days.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It says in this letter that these correctional labor
camps, so far as administration and orders were concerned, are under the
State Police offices and, furthermore, under the commanders of the
Security Police and the SD. Did you have knowledge of that?

KALTENBRUNNER: A so-called breach of labor contract in the Reich or an
evasion of the Compulsory Labor Service by a German citizen is an
offense which actually could have been dealt with by the law courts just
as well. The law had provisions to that effect but because of the
enormous number of workers employed in the entire Reich—not only
Germans, who amounted to 15 or 20 million, but also 8 million foreign
workers—it would have been impossible to start hundreds of thousands of
proceedings in courts, in hundreds of thousands of cases, for failure to
work or breach of contract, or willful desertion from the place of work,
_et cetera_. It goes without saying that furthermore the police
departments had no kind of prison accommodations extensive enough to
give short-term sentences in such cases. For these reasons such
correctional labor camps were established at the headquarters of the
State Police or Criminal Police offices.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you, in principle, approve of the establishment of
such correctional labor camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, in principle I approved of them although I myself
did not participate in issuing this order. I did, however, learn of it
later and considered it proper in view of the labor shortage and the
conditions then prevailing in the Reich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge regarding the treatment of the
internees: for what period of time they were confined to these camps,
what their food ration was, and how they were employed?

KALTENBRUNNER: As I said, these correctional labor camps were designed
to impose confinement for a period not exceeding 56 days. Even this, I
believe, was possible only after a man had previously been sentenced for
3 similar offenses. Normally, confinement to correctional labor camps...

THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew the condition in the
camps? You are not answering it at all.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please answer my question?

KALTENBRUNNER: I think you asked me...

DR. KAUFFMANN: I asked you whether you knew anything regarding the
treatment, the food, and the employment of the internees in these
correctional labor camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: I knew only that correctional labor camps had the task of
doing labor for public works, that is, in public construction work like
roads, railroad maintenance, and, in particular, for repair of damage
due to air raids. The internees of correctional labor camps have been
seen by the entire population when so employed. The impression which the
appearance of these internees made...

THE PRESIDENT: He still is not answering the question.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I put three exact questions to you. I want exact answers
to these questions. Do you know anything about the treatment, the food
rations, and the employment? Did you have any knowledge of this, “yes”
or “no”?

KALTENBRUNNER: I said with regard to the employment...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have knowledge?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I did. The other two factors I did not know from
personal observation.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did officers of Amt IV ever report to you on this?

KALTENBRUNNER: Not officers of Amt IV; but this problem has, of course,
been discussed repeatedly within the political home intelligence
service, namely, about the utilization of such labor for emergency work.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you see no cause to interfere?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no cause to interfere with these camps for any
misuse, since no case of abuse of camp internees was known.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to another document, Document Number
2542-PS, Exhibit Number USA-489. This is a statement, an affidavit by
Lindow. He states that until the beginning of 1943, and by order of
Himmler, Soviet Russian political commissars and Jewish soldiers were
taken out of prisoner-of-war camps and transferred to concentration
camps, to be shot. Furthermore, he states that Müller, the Chief of Amt
IV, had signed the execution order. If the Tribunal so desire, I shall
quote a few sentences from this document.

[_To the defendant_.] What is your statement with reference to this
document?

KALTENBRUNNER: This order of Himmler’s was not known to me, and may I
point out that it was used from 1941 until 1943, which means, in the
main, during the time when I was not in Berlin.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now reading a particularly incriminating
passage—Paragraph 4. Will you please make a statement regarding the
question whether this report on these facts also refers to the time
after 1943 or to the time before 1943, or whatever you may be able to
say about the date.

KALTENBRUNNER: I know the passage.

    DR. KAUFFMANN: “In the prisoner-of-war camps at the Eastern
    Front, there were small Einsatzkommandos which were led by
    members of the Secret State Police of lower rank. These
    Kommandos were attached to the camp commandant and had the task
    of selecting those prisoners of war who were to be executed in
    accordance with the orders issued, and of reporting their names
    to the Gestapo office.”

KALTENBRUNNER: About this, I...

DR. KAUFFMANN: One moment. From Paragraph 2, I am quoting the last
paragraph: “These prisoners of war were first of all discharged as a
matter of form and then taken to a concentration camp for execution.”
Now I am asking you what knowledge did you have of these facts?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of these facts. Moreover, it is
impossible that I could have gained knowledge of them, of orders which
were issued in 1941 and which, as this witness says, continued to be
actually in force until the middle of 1943; it is impossible that, in
order to stop the execution of these orders, during the last days, I
could have in time...

DR. KAUFFMANN: But actually, it cannot be denied that within the Reich
Security Main Office there was a Section IV A 1, that is, a part of the
Gestapo, and that this section functioned from 1941 until the middle of
1943, and that it carried out such orders. It can be assumed obviously
that you, too, must have been informed about this extremely grave
situation, which was inhuman and prohibited by international law, does
it not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was not informed of it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now turning to the subject of concentration camps
and the responsibility of the defendant in that sphere.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _ Afternoon Session_

MR. DODD: Dr. Kauffmann has told me that he had an opportunity to read
two cross-interrogatories which we wish to submit—the
cross-interrogatories of Dr. Mildner and Dr. Höttl. I told Dr. Kauffmann
that it might be well, in order not to disquiet the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner, if they were read before he completed his examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree that it would be better that this
cross-examination should be read now, so that the defendant can deal
with any points he wishes to deal with?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that will be satisfactory.

COLONEL JOHN HARLAN AMEN (Associate Trial Counsel for the United
States): The first affidavit, if it please the Tribunal is the affidavit
of Dr. Rudolf Mildner:

    “I, the undersigned, Dr. Rudolf Mildner, made the following
    affidavit in answer to cross-interrogations by representatives
    of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, relating to my
    affidavit of 29 March 1946, made in response to questions by Dr.
    Kauffmann for presentation to the International Military
    Tribunal:

    “Question Number 1: Confirm or correct the following
    biographical data:

    “Answer: In December 1939 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office
    in Chemnitz; in March 1941 I became Chief of the Gestapo Office
    in Katowice; in September 1943 I became Commander of the Sipo
    and SD in Copenhagen; in January 1944 I became Inspector of the
    Sipo and SD in Kassel; on 15 March 1944 I was made Deputy Chief
    of Groups IV A and IV B of the RSHA; in December 1944 I became
    Commander of the Sipo in Vienna; in December 1944 I became
    Deputy Inspector of the Sipo in Vienna.

    “All of these appointments after January 1943 were made by
    Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD.

    “Question Number 2: Is it not true that while you were Gestapo
    leader at Katowice you frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz
    for imprisonment or execution; that you had contacts with the
    Political Department (Abteilung) at Auschwitz during the time
    that you were Chief of the Gestapo in Katowice with regard to
    inmates sent from the district of Katowice; that you visited
    Auschwitz on several occasions; that the Gestapo ‘SS
    Standgericht’ frequently met in Auschwitz and you sometimes
    attended the trial of prisoners; that in 1942 and again in 1943,
    pursuant to orders by Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Gestapo,
    the Commandant of Auschwitz showed you the extermination
    installations; that you were acquainted with the extermination
    installations at Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your
    territory to Auschwitz for execution?

    “Answer: Yes, these are true statements of fact.

    “Question Number 3: With respect to your answer to Question
    Number 5 in your affidavit of 29 March 1946, did all orders for
    arrest, commitment to punishment, and individual executions in
    concentration camps come from RSHA? Was the regular channel for
    orders of individual executions from Himmler through
    Kaltenbrunner to Müller, then to the concentration camp
    commandant? Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration
    camps for administration, utilization of labor, and maintenance
    of discipline?

    “Answer: The answer is ‘yes’ to each of the three questions.

    “Question Number 3-a: Is it true that conferences took place
    between SS Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and SS
    Obergruppenführer Pohl, Chief of the WVHA and Chief of
    Concentration Camps? Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner acquainted with
    conditions in the concentration camps?

    “Answer: Yes, and because of these conferences and on the
    occasion of discussions with the two Amt chiefs—Gruppenführer
    Müller, IV, and Gruppenführer Nebe, RSHA, the Chief of Sipo and
    SD—SS Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner should be acquainted
    with conditions in concentration camps.

    “I learned from SS Gruppenführer Müller, Chief of Amt IV, that
    regular conferences took place between RSHA and Amt Group D of
    WVHA.

    “Question Number 4: Is it not a fact that in July or August of
    1944 an order was issued to commanders and inspectors of the
    Sipo and SD by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of the
    Sipo and SD, to the effect that members of all Anglo-American
    Commando groups should be turned over to the Sipo by the Armed
    Forces; that the Sipo was to interrogate these men and shoot
    them after questioning; that the killing was to be made known to
    the Armed Forces by a communiqué stating that the Commando group
    had been annihilated in battle; and that this decree was
    classified top secret and was to be destroyed immediately after
    reading?

    “Answer: Yes.

    “Question Number 5: With respect to your answer to Question
    Number 7 of your affidavit of 29 March 1946, is it not a fact
    that:

    “a) After you sent a telegram to Müller requesting that the
    Jewish persecution be stopped, you received an order by Himmler
    that the Jewish actions were to be carried out?

    “b) That you then flew to Berlin for the purpose of talking with
    the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner, personally, but
    that since he was absent you saw his deputy, Müller, Head of
    Office IV of the RSHA, who, in your presence, wrote a message to
    Himmler containing your request that the persecutions of the
    Jews in Denmark be stopped?

    “c) That shortly after your return to Copenhagen you received a
    direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner as Chief of
    the Sipo and SD, stating that ‘The Anti-Jewish actions are to be
    started immediately’?

    “d) That for the purpose of carrying out this action the
    Sonderkommando Eichmann, which was under the Gestapo, was sent
    from Berlin to Copenhagen for the purpose of deporting the Jews
    in two ships which it had chartered?

    “Answer: Yes, to each question—a), b), c), and d).

    “Question Number 6: Is it not a fact that the action of
    Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller ordered
    you to make a report explaining the causes for the lack of
    success in deporting of Jews; and that you sent this report
    directly to the Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?

    “Answer: Yes. That is right.

    “I have read the above questions and answers as written and
    swear they are true and correct....”—_et cetera_.

And now, may it please the Tribunal, the cross-affidavit of Wilhelm
Höttl...

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the defendant._] Did you want to say something?

KALTENBRUNNER: I wanted to ask the High Tribunal for permission to reply
immediately to this interrogatory, so that I...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you will have an opportunity in a moment. The
purpose of having it read now was that your counsel might ask you any
questions with reference to it, and then you can make any comment that
you want to. Colonel Amen will go on and read the other
cross-interrogatory, and then your own counsel will continue your
examination-in-chief. Do you understand?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I understand. I merely wanted to suggest, since
these two matters are treated separately and concern two different
spheres, that I may first express my views and then later...

THE PRESIDENT: We cannot have the matter interrupted in that way. You
will be able to deal with it in a moment.

Go on, Colonel Amen.

COL. AMEN: The affidavit of Dr. Mildner dated 9 April 1946 will become
Exhibit Number USA-791 and the affidavit of Wilhelm Höttl which I am
about to read, dated 10 April 1946, will become Exhibit Number USA-792.

    “I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the following
    affidavit in response to cross-interrogation relating to an
    affidavit executed by me on 30 March 1946 answering questions
    put by Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International
    Military Tribunal.

    “1) With respect to question Number 3: Please give the following
    information:

    “a) Explain the basis of your statement that when persons
    belonging to the SD were transferred to the Einsatzkommandos of
    the Sipo and SD they resigned from the SD. Your attention is
    invited to the fact that Ohlendorf, the head of the SD, has
    testified to the contrary.

    “b) Explain the basis for your statement that Einsatzkommandos
    had nothing to do with executions. Your attention is invited to
    the fact that your testimony in this regard is likewise in
    direct conflict with the head of the SD, Ohlendorf.

    “c) What was Hitler’s so-called ‘Commissar order’ and when did
    you first acquire knowledge of this order?

    “With respect to 1a): In my affidavit I did not speak of a
    permanent separation from the SD but of a leave of absence for
    the time of activity with an Einsatzkommando. By that was meant
    that they did not exercise their SD functions during this time;
    that this function was inactive.

    “With respect to 1b): My affidavit appears to have been
    misunderstood concerning this point. I did not state that
    Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions but only that
    not all Einsatzkommandos were concerned with executions. I
    mentioned as an example the Einsatzkommandos in Africa, Hungary,
    and Slovakia. In connection with that, I said that these
    Einsatzkommandos had nothing to do with executions; by that I
    meant not directly with the actual executions.

    “With respect to 1c): I, myself, do not know the so-called
    ‘Commissar Order’ of Hitler. Dr. Stahlecker, who commanded an
    Einsatzgruppe of the Sipo and the SD in Russia, told me in the
    summer of 1942 that the executions of commissars and Jews were
    carried out on the basis of the Commissar Order which covered
    the extermination of the Jews under the reason of their being
    bearers of Bolshevism.

    “2) With respect to question Number 4: Is it not a fact that
    Heydrich, as Chief of Sipo and SD, gave the initial instructions
    to Eichmann concerning the extermination of Jews; that in the
    RSHA Eichmann’s immediate superior was Müller, Chief of the
    Gestapo; that Müller was first the deputy of Heydrich and later
    of Kaltenbrunner?

    “With respect to 2): Yes, I heard from Eichmann, probably in
    August 1944, that Heydrich had given him these directives. It is
    also correct that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, was Eichmann’s
    immediate superior. As far as I know, Müller was the deputy of
    Heydrich and later of Kaltenbrunner only in the field of the
    Gestapo, as likewise were the other office chiefs in their
    respective fields.

    “3) With respect to question Number 5: Is it not a fact that you
    know from your discussions with Kaltenbrunner and with Eichmann
    that they came from the same community in Austria and were
    exceptionally close friends; that Eichmann always had direct
    access to Kaltenbrunner and that they frequently conferred
    together; that Kaltenbrunner was well pleased with the manner in
    which Eichmann carried out his duties; that Kaltenbrunner was
    very interested in the extermination work performed by Eichmann;
    that you personally know that Kaltenbrunner went to Hungary for
    the purpose of discussing the extermination program in Hungary
    with officials of the Hungarian Government and with Eichmann and
    other members of his staff in Hungary? Please confirm or correct
    these statements and make any statement necessary to clarify
    your answer.

    “With respect to 3): I heard from Eichmann that he knew
    Kaltenbrunner from Linz and that they served there together in
    1932 in an SS Sturm. I do not know that they were particularly
    close friends or that Eichmann always had direct access to
    Kaltenbrunner and that they conferred frequently.

    “I do not know the details about their official relationship. I
    do not know whether Kaltenbrunner also had conferences
    concerning the program of extermination of Jews in Hungary
    during his stays in Hungary in the spring of 1944. Winkelmann,
    the former Higher SS and Police Leader in Hungary, must know
    exactly about that, since, according to my knowledge, he,
    together with Kaltenbrunner, visited persons in the Hungarian
    Government.

    “4) With respect to question Number 6:

    “a) Is it not known to you that Müller, Chief of the Gestapo,
    always conferred with Kaltenbrunner on matters of importance
    relating to the functions of his office—particularly with
    respect to executions of special inmates?

    “b) Did you know that Kaltenbrunner was the Higher SS and Police
    Leader and State Secretary for Security in Austria after the
    Anschluss until his appointment as Chief of the RSHA, a period
    of 5 years, during which time his attention was devoted
    exclusively to police and security matters?

    “c) What is the basis of your statement that the intelligence
    service took up the main part of Kaltenbrunner’s attention and
    all his interest?

    “With respect to 4a): Details concerning the official
    relationship between Müller and Kaltenbrunner are not known to
    me. However, I could note on several occasions that Müller was
    with Kaltenbrunner to report about the work of his department.

    “With respect to 4b): Kaltenbrunner was not exclusively occupied
    with police and security matters during his activity as Higher
    SS and Police Leader in Austria or as State Secretary for
    Security respectively. Without a doubt he had political
    interests besides, since the Higher SS and Police Leaders were
    the representatives of Reichsführer SS Himmler in all matters.

    “With respect to 4c): I could note that by virtue of my official
    relationship with him. Members of other departments also
    frequently expressed themselves in the direction that he favored
    and furthered Amt III, and particularly Amt VI and the Mil
    (Military Amt).

    “5) With respect to question Number 7: Answer the following:

    “a) What did you personally have to do with concentration camps
    and what, therefore, is the basis for your answer to this
    question?

    “b) Did you know that all orders for commitments to, releases
    from, and executions in concentration camps came from the RSHA?

    “c) Did you know that the RSHA gave direct orders to commandants
    of concentration camps? State such orders of which you have
    personal knowledge.

    “d) What are the atrocities committed in concentration camps to
    which you refer in your answer to this question, and when and in
    what manner did you acquire knowledge that atrocities were
    committed in concentration camps?

    “With respect to 5a): Personally, I had nothing at all to do
    with concentration camps. However, I liberated a number of
    persons from concentration camps and therefore know the
    difficulties that were made by the concentration camp staffs who
    always called attention to orders of the WVHA of the SS in such
    cases since the inmates were needed for the armament industry.

    “With respect to 5b): It is known to me that orders for
    commitments into concentration camps and discharges therefrom
    came from the RSHA. I did not know that all such orders came
    from the RSHA. I have no knowledge of orders for executions by
    the RSHA.

    “With respect to 5c): I do not know any details and do not know
    personally any orders concerning this. In the cases in which I
    intervened for discharges I addressed myself either to
    Kaltenbrunner directly or to Amt IV. When the processing was of
    long duration, I received the answer several times from
    officials of Amt IV that difficulties had come about through the
    WVHA of the SS.

    “With respect to 5d): When Hungary was occupied by German troops
    in March 1944, several of my Hungarian acquaintances went to
    concentration camps. After I had achieved their liberation, they
    told me of bad treatment and atrocities in the Mauthausen
    Concentration Camp. At that time, I sent an official
    communication concerning this to the director of the Linz
    Gestapo Office, with the request to inquire into this matter
    with the concentration camp commandant Ziereis. Ziereis,
    however, denied this, as I was informed in the reply. In August
    1944 Eichmann told me that there were extermination camps
    (Vernichtungslager) besides concentration camps.

    “6) With respect to question Number 9: What is the basis for
    your opinion that Kaltenbrunner opposed Hitler and Himmler on
    the program for the physical extermination of European Jewry?

    “With respect to 6): Kaltenbrunner told me after his conference
    with representatives of the International Red Cross in March
    1945 that he was against Hitler’s and Himmler’s program on the
    question of the extermination of the European Jews. In my
    response to Question 9, that Kaltenbrunner had given no orders
    for killing of Jews, the words ‘according to my knowledge’ are
    missing.

    “7) With respect to question Number 11: Who was the American
    whom you told Kaltenbrunner that you had contacted in a neutral
    country in 1943? Did Kaltenbrunner agree to travel to
    Switzerland with you to meet a representative of the Allied
    Powers with whom you were in touch through the Austrian
    Resistance Movement; and, if so, whom?

    “With respect to 7): The American liaison man in 1943 was a
    member of the United States Legation in Lisbon. I am no longer
    familiar with his name. The connection via the Austrian
    Resistance Movement with an American organization in Switzerland
    existed only from the beginning of fall 1944. Kaltenbrunner
    agreed to travel there with me about 20 April 1945.

    “8) With respect to question Number 12: On what date did
    Kaltenbrunner order the commandant of Mauthausen Concentration
    Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops? At whose
    insistence did Kaltenbrunner issue this order, and for what
    reason?

    “With respect to 8): I cannot state the exact date of
    Kaltenbrunner’s order to the commandant of Mauthausen
    Concentration Camp to hand over the camp to approaching troops.
    It should have been during the last days of April 1945. It is
    not known to me at whose insistence and for which reason he gave
    this order; possibly this was connected with his discussions
    with SS Standartenführer Becher whom I met with him at the time.

    “The above statements are true; I made this declaration
    voluntarily and without compulsion...”—_et cetera_—“Dr.
    Wilhelm Höttl.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do the High Tribunal wish the defendant to state his
position or reply to these two documents?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I request that I may do so right away.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then please give us your views first on the Mildner
document. I shall call your attention, perhaps, to question Number 2
which seems relevant to me. It says:

    “Is it not true that...in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to
    orders by Gruppenführer Müller, the Commandant of Auschwitz
    showed you the extermination installations...?”

It would seem from this that the Chief of Amt IV knew about these
matters.

KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, may I interrupt you.

As far as I could notice in the last sessions a procedure of so-called
surprise affidavits is being employed against me. This surprise
affidavit is applied for the first time in my case. In spite of that I
am glad and grateful, even without having had the opportunity to see
this affidavit before, to express my views on the whole and on each
point of this affidavit.

As to Dr. Mildner—question Number 1: He is asked about his position
which he held in the Security Service. He enumerated the positions which
he held from 1939 to 1944. During the time I was in office he served as
an inspector of the Sipo and the SD in Kassel, as a deputy in Amt IV, as
a deputy inspector in Vienna in 1944, and as a commander of the Sipo in
Vienna also in 1944. He said, “All of these appointments after January
1943 were made by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and the
SD.”

That is incorrect. I never appointed anybody to high positions such as
these held by Mildner.

Were Mildner asked about this before this Tribunal, he would have to
confirm that. He was apparently not questioned on that by the
Prosecution. In case of an appointment of an official for the Security
Police and the SD I was simply asked and notified in each case of such
an appointment of a functionary of the Security Police and SD, because
as an inspector of the SD and of the Security Police he had to have in
this capacity a strong intelligence section, that is, a subdivision of
Amt III and IV which were at my disposal as far as intelligence was
concerned, so that as Chief of the intelligence service I had to know
who was inspector of a subdivision in Vienna, Kassel, or in Copenhagen.
Later he also had to have my intelligence orders for his groups. That
was the only reason why I had to be notified of such appointments. It
was not within my competence to appoint any official of the Sipo; that
is a definite misrepresentation arising from this affidavit of Dr.
Mildner.

In reply to Question 2, if it is said that in his positions in Chemnitz
and Katowice, in the year 1939 and 1941, he had to transport prisoners
to Auschwitz for imprisonment and execution, then, in the first place,
this falls into the period before I had assumed office, and, secondly,
this was purely an executive measure of those agencies of which I was
never in charge and never took over. He therefore can never have acted
here as my deputy.

As to question Number 3, here the Prosecution accuses him:

    “...That the Gestapo ‘SS Standgericht’ frequently met in
    Auschwitz and you sometimes attended the trial of
    prisoners;”—in other words that he attended the
    executions—“that in 1942 and again in 1943, pursuant to orders
    by Gruppenführer Müller ... the Commandant of Auschwitz showed
    you”—that is Mildner—“the extermination installations; that
    you were acquainted with the extermination installations at
    Auschwitz since you had to send Jews from your territory to
    Auschwitz for execution.”

In my opinion, I could perhaps only be incriminated on one point. The
question is this: “Did Mildner once, in the year 1943, see such
installations or did he attend the shootings?” First of all, the
Prosecution did not show whether this “one time” took place before or
after I assumed office.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please be a little briefer and more to the
point.

KALTENBRUNNER: Excuse me, Doctor, but I have to be able to refute every
single word.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want the witness to argue upon
this document. If he has anything to say about the facts, then he can do
it, but not argue on it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that is my opinion, also.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I am asking you—an especially important
and incriminating point, it seems to me, is question Number 3; explain
if you will, I read: “...did all orders for arrest...”—_et
cetera_—“individual executions from the RSHA”; and then: “Was the
regular channel from Himmler through Kaltenbrunner to Müller, and then
to the concentration camp commandant?” And then the answer, “yes.”

Please answer briefly.

KALTENBRUNNER: I have already explained today that the authority and
power to order executions rested only to a small extent with the
Minister of Justice, and with Himmler. Nobody else in the entire Reich
had the possibility or the authority to order that. Further, despite the
official channels—Himmler, Kaltenbrunner, Müller—such an order from
Himmler was never forwarded to me; these orders must have gone from
Himmler to Müller. To put this question to Mildner is wrong for the
single reason that the man was not with me and cannot know whether I
ever received such an order from Himmler. It is only a conclusion which
he draws from the normal organizational set-up.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a matter for the Defense later on; you need not
talk about that.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not looking at the words. What he is asked is,
“Was the regular channel...?” That is the question. What is the regular
channel for orders from Himmler to you and Müller?

KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, I have already explained the question how
Himmler himself ruled on the competencies. Just think of June 1942, of
Heydrich’s death. From that day on—it is a written order and was
announced publicly—Himmler took charge of the entire RSHA and assumed
all the duties which had been Heydrich’s. In January 1943 I was
appointed Chief of the RSHA, after it had been announced that the
executive power and competence of the State Police and Criminal Police
remain with Himmler, no change was to be made, and the Chiefs of Amt IV
and V, Müller and Nebe, would continue to be directly under Himmler. For
that reason the organizational scheme as it existed at the time of
Heydrich was no longer applicable for Amt IV and V when I joined the
staff.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, Question 3-a: There it says, “Was Dr. Kaltenbrunner
acquainted with conditions in the concentration camps?” Here also it is
not explained just what is meant by “conditions” in concentration camps,
but it is most likely to be interpreted that those conditions which have
been attested by witnesses are meant. The witness said, “Yes.”

KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, you are overlooking a very important
sentence, the last one, on Question Number 3. Here the Prosecution ask:
“Did the WVHA have supervision of all concentration camps for
administration, the utilization of labor, and maintenance of
discipline?” This sentence is tremendously important for the following
reasons: The Prosecution endeavor to shift the entire guilt for the
destruction of human life from the WVHA to the RSHA, and, if the High
Tribunal want to find the truth...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. This is again a long argumentative speech.
The only question which arises, it seems to me, upon this question 3-a,
is: Did a conference take place between Kaltenbrunner, Pohl, and the
chief of the concentration camps? If he says that they did not, then
that is an answer that he makes to the affidavit; that is the only
question of fact.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, that was not the question; I am of the same opinion.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Please answer “yes” or “no” to the
question which was just put to you. Did such conferences between Pohl,
Müller, and yourself take place?

KALTENBRUNNER: I never had conferences with Pohl and Müller. I had to
have semi-annual conferences with Pohl because Pohl was, as Chief of the
WVHA, the Finance Minister for the entire SS and Police and the funds
for my entire intelligence service had to come from Pohl insofar as the
Reich Finance Ministry did not provide for all the personnel.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, please answer one further question: Who was
responsible for the administration of concentration camps, the general
treatment, food, _et cetera_?

KALTENBRUNNER: The entire competence and jurisdiction in concentration
camps, from the moment an internee stepped through the gate of a
concentration camp until his release or his death in the concentration
camp, or—the third possibility—until the end of the war at which time
he was liberated, rested exclusively with the WVHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now another question for the complete clarification. I am
assuming that these things were exclusively under the jurisdiction of
the WVHA, which had nothing to do with the RSHA. But it is correct, is
it not, that only through measures of the Secret Police—by issuing
orders for protective custody—that internment in these camps could take
place. I just want to define clearly these limitations.

KALTENBRUNNER: There is no doubt that that is correct in respect to
individual internments on the basis of individual orders for protective
custody which, I admit, were partly based on illegal reasons, as I have
already stated. However, most of the internments did not take place on
orders from the RSHA but came from the occupied territories—and from
there came, for instance, the big transports which Fichte mentioned in
the first document.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But then these are, without doubt, the offices which were
in charge of internments: the Gestapo offices or the Gestapo regional
head offices.

KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But they did participate?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, not alone. One way for internment was the order for
protective custody by the Gestapo, another one was the order for
protective custody by the Kripo or the courts.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, a further statement. Will you please make a
statement to Question Number 5, the action in Denmark?

THE PRESIDENT: Have you dealt with Question Number 4 yet?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Not yet, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I go over to Question Number 4. “Is it not
a fact that in July or August of 1944 an order was issued to
commanders...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner, as chief...to the effect
that members of all Anglo-American commando groups should be turned over
to the Sipo by the Armed Forces?”

Mr. President, I wanted to deal with this question comprehensively at a
later time and by means of documents, but, if you wish me to, I can deal
with it now.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not care how you deal with it. I thought you were
taking him through this document.

KALTENBRUNNER: High Tribunal, may I perhaps answer it right away? The
answer to this question is very simple. The Prosecution itself, through
a document, has, in a completely different form, charged that the State
Police had incriminated themselves by falsifying the facts. In that
document the Prosecution states that Müller gave the approval; but here
the deponent is told, “issued...by Himmler through Kaltenbrunner as
Chief of the Sipo and SD.” And that document, as far as I recall—I do
not know the number—is signed by Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I will submit that document to you. It is Document
1650-PS, Exhibit USA-246. This document is headed, “Gestapo office,
Cologne; Branch Office Aachen.” It is a teletype and dated “4 March
1944; top secret”:

    “Subject: Measures against escaped prisoners of war who are
    officers or nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the
    exception of British and American prisoners of war.”

THE PRESIDENT: Surely that has nothing to do with it. This is a document
of March, and the document that the question refers to is in July or
August.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I cannot hear.

THE PRESIDENT: The document you have now put forward is a document in
March 1944. The Question Number 4 relates to a document in July or
August 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: July or August 1944? I have no such document, Your Honor.
Perhaps the defendant can tell us now whether such an order by Himmler
existed and whether such a Himmler order was transmitted by him—“yes”
or “no.”

KALTENBRUNNER: I heard about the existence of such an order for the
first time here. I believe it is a mistake on the part of the
Prosecution that the question was put to Mildner as July or August. I
believe the Prosecution means the document of 4 March 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then you are saying that this order from July is not
known to you?

KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know this order nor did I know about it during
my term of office.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is perfectly obvious, isn’t it, that
the document to which you are referring has nothing to do with this
question at all, because this document of March concerns measures to be
taken against captured, escaped prisoners of war who are officers or
noncommissioned officers, except British and American prisoners of war.
That is the document.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not have a document of July or August 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t know whether there is a document of July or
August 1944 at all. What I am saying to you is that the document which
you put to the witness now—of March 1944—can’t be the document
referred to in question Number 4, for it deals with an entirely
different subject.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes. That is right, Your Honor. I believe I can explain
this, Mr. President. I assume that the testimony by the witness refers
to the so-called Commando order of Hitler of 18 October 1942, and that a
result of this order is meant here. I believe it is that way.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you tell us whether the Prosecution, in
putting this question, were referring to a document of March 1944, or
whether they were referring to a document of July or August 1942?

COL. AMEN: We, Your Lordship, were not referring to any document that
was brought up by the witness. But since that time we have confirmed
from another document—which I think we have here at the
table—referring to this same document or a document of that same date.
Now, the witness’ feeling was that that document had been destroyed
after reading. But that there was such an order apparently is borne out
by another document which we have here which has not come before the
Tribunal in any way at all. In other words, this document was brought up
in the first instance by the witness himself.

THE PRESIDENT: But has the document to which Dr. Kauffmann has referred
of March 1944 got anything to do with it?

COL. AMEN: That is not the document and has nothing whatsoever to do
with it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then shall I pass on to the next question, Your Honor?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It is the question of the persecution of Jews in Denmark.
Will you make a statement to that?

KALTENBRUNNER: The statement in the affidavit of Mildner which was read
by you this morning is alone correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that your statement?

KALTENBRUNNER: I never had anything to do with the removal of Jews from
Denmark. Such an order could have been given only by Himmler; and that
this was a direct order given by Himmler was confirmed by Mildner.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Point c) of the question Number 5 says, “That shortly
after your return to Copenhagen you”—that is, the witness
Mildner—“received a direct order by Himmler sent through Kaltenbrunner,
as chief...”

KALTENBRUNNER: I never had an order like that go through my hands and I
never received an order like that from Himmler. It is also absolutely
impossible, because Denmark had her own Higher SS and Police Leader who
was the direct representative of Himmler right there, and who was
immediately subordinate to him and not to RSHA. This Higher SS and
Police Leader was at the same time Commander of the Sipo.
Organizationally I could not give such an order to Denmark.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In Question Number 6 it is asked: “Is it not a fact that
the action of Sonderkommando Eichmann was not a success; that Müller
ordered you”—that is Mildner—“to make a report ... directly to the
Chief of the Sipo and SD, Kaltenbrunner?”

The witness Mildner answered that in the affirmative. Is such a report
from Denmark known to you?

KALTENBRUNNER: I not only do not know this report, but I know with
certainty—I spoke to Himmler not once but a dozen times about
this—that he received every report from Eichmann directly, in many
cases without informing Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then let us turn to Höttl’s affidavit. As far as I can
see there are no important changes from the affidavit given me. Do the
High Tribunal wish for me to put questions on that matter?

Then let us turn to question Number 5b). It states:

    “It is known to me that orders for commitments into
    concentration camps and discharges therefrom came from the RSHA.
    I did not know that all such orders originated with the RSHA. I
    have no knowledge of orders for executions by the RSHA.”

What can you say to that?

KALTENBRUNNER: Orders for execution could only have come through RSHA
when Himmler had ordered Müller to forward these orders. But I believe
that took place only in a few isolated cases and mostly after Müller had
informed Himmler that a court had passed judgment.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, the defendant asked me several minutes ago
to make a statement with reference to Document 1063-PS which we have
discussed. He had contested his signature; I believe that he wishes to
say now that it is his signature. It is the document of the RSHA of 26
July 1943. Do you want the document?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, is it 1063-PS? Have you the original
there?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only a photostatic copy; not the original, Your
Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what is the question?

DR. KAUFFMANN: [_Turning to the defendant._] Are you ready?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. There is a mistake on your part, Dr. Kauffmann. I
have not contested my signature, but have stated that I must assume that
I received knowledge of this order only after it had been published and
that the original order presumably did not carry my signature. That is
what I said. But I do remember now, through the clause,
“certified-Employee,” that it was apparently an order of which the
original was signed by me at the time.

Furthermore I remember from the first few words of the decree, “The
Reichsführer SS has approved...” _et cetera_, that this order was based
on a personal report which I must have made to Himmler, and that with
this report—I call your attention to the date, 26 July 1943—I
apparently made the first attempt with Himmler to mitigate or alleviate
the conditions; namely, that in such cases for which people hitherto
were committed to concentration camps they should in minor cases no
longer be put in concentration camps but in labor education camps and
that there was to be a differentiation between concentration camps and
labor education camps. Therefore, in my opinion it was the result of my
first attempt with him against the system of concentration camps.

And third, I would like to point out that this decree carries the number
IIc and thereby is not a decree which came from the Police executive
offices such as State Police or Kripo but from the administrative level.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is a sufficient explanation.

The Prosecution hold you responsible for the commitment of politically
and racially undesirable persons into concentration camps. How many
concentration camps became known to you after your appointment as Chief
of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: At the time of my appointment I knew three concentration
camps. At the end of my official activity there were 12 in the entire
Reich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How many were there in all?

KALTENBRUNNER: There was a thirteenth. That was the SS prison camp near
Danzig. There were altogether thirteen concentration camps in the Reich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain the chart which you saw here with the
many red dots which were alleged to be concentration camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: That presentation is definitely misleading. I saw this
chart hanging here. All the armaments centers, factories, _ et cetera_,
in which internees from concentration camps were used for labor must
have been characterized as concentration camps. I cannot explain in any
other way the deluge of red dots.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you differentiate between the smaller camps and the
regular concentration camps, and if so, why?

KALTENBRUNNER: The difference is very obvious for the following reasons:
Any worker who worked in armament industries—that is, each
internee—worked in the same enterprise, in the same factory, as every
other German or foreign worker. The difference was merely that the
German worker at the conclusion of his working hours, at the end of the
day, returned to his family, whereas the internee of the labor camp had
to return to the camp.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You are accused of establishing the Concentration Camp
Mauthausen, that you visited this camp repeatedly. The witness
Höllriegel, who testified here, said he had seen you in this camp. He
also claims to have seen you inspecting the gas chambers while they were
in operation. There is an affidavit of Zutter, who has already been
mentioned today and who claims to have seen you at the Concentration
Camp Mauthausen. From this the Prosecution conclude that you, too, must
have known exactly about these conditions which were beneath human
dignity. I am asking you now, is this evidence correct or wrong? When
did you inspect these camps, and what observations did you make?

KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong. I did not establish any
concentration camps in Austria where I was until 1943. I did not
establish a single concentration camp in the Reich from 1943 onwards.
Every concentration camp in the Reich as I know today, and as has been
proved here with certainty, was established on orders of Himmler to
Pohl. This applies also—and I wish to emphasize this—to the Mauthausen
Camp. Not only were Austrian authorities excluded from establishing the
Mauthausen Camp, but they were unpleasantly surprised because neither
was the conception of a concentration camp in that sense known in
Austria, nor was there a necessity for establishing concentration camps
anywhere in Austria.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, in Germany, in the Reich proper?

KALTENBRUNNER: What do you mean by that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking regarding your knowledge of conditions there.

KALTENBRUNNER: I heard gradually more and more about conditions in
concentration camps. It is apparent that I must have heard of these
things already by way of the entire Reich intelligence service and its
news channels for home politics.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you not, as testified by Höllriegel, see the gas
chambers in operation?

KALTENBRUNNER: Never; neither while they were operating nor at any other
time did I see a gas chamber.

THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast. Make pauses between your
questions and answers and don’t speak too fast. He said that he had
gradually by way of Intelligence, heard of the concentration camps in
the Reich. Is that right?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You heard gradually about conditions in
the concentration camps, that is what you said, is it not?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you recall my last question?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether you saw the gas chambers in operation?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I already answered that I never saw a gas chamber,
either in operation or at any other time. I did not know that they
existed at Mauthausen and testimony to that effect is entirely wrong. I
never set foot in the detention camp at Mauthausen—that is, the
concentration camp proper. I was at Mauthausen, but in the labor camp,
not in the detention camp. The total complex of Mauthausen, as I
remember it today, extends over an area of 6 kilometers. Within this
area there is a space of perhaps 4½ or 5 kilometers of labor camps.
There are the largest granite quarries in Austria, and they were owned
by the city of Vienna.

DR. KAUFFMANN: A picture has been shown in which you appear together
with Himmler and Ziereis.

KALTENBRUNNER: I was just coming to that. The quarries belonged to the
city of Vienna. The city of Vienna had a vital interest not to be
excluded from the deliveries of granite which they used for paving the
streets of Vienna. Now, according to a Reich law, as I learned later,
this large quarry was expropriated from the city of Vienna by the
WVHA—Pohl—and the city of Vienna was excluded from the supply of
granite for quite some time. Now, the city turned to me to approach
Himmler on this. It happened that Himmler was visiting and inspecting
southern Germany and decided to visit Austria and Mauthausen and asked
me to see him there. In that way, it came about that I was with Himmler
at this quarry. Whether or not I was photographed at that time, I do not
know. I have not seen the picture and I cannot say whether I am in it.

I might add something. Neither at this time nor at any other time did
Himmler ever take me into a concentration camp or suggest that he do so;
as I learned later, he had certain reasons for not doing so. I would not
have attended such an inspection for I knew very well that as far as I
was concerned, he would, as he did with others whom he had invited on
such visits, show me “Potemkin villages” and not conditions as they
actually were; and, except for a handful of men in the WVHA, no one else
was allowed to see how things really were in concentration camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, may I ask you—you are speaking about a handful of
men—you did not belong to this group?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not. This handful of men were Himmler, Pohl,
Müller, and Glücks, and the camp commanders.

DR. KAUFFMANN: As far as Camp Mauthausen is concerned, there is a
document on which we would like to have your views. The Document Number
1650-PS, which has already been submitted, dated 4 March 1944, is the
so-called Bullet Decree. It deals with Camp III:

    “Measures against recaptured prisoners of war, officers and
    nonworking, noncommissioned officers, with the exception of
    British and American prisoners of war.”

This document is known to the Tribunal in its contents. I do not believe
that I need read it. The Defendant Kaltenbrunner is to make a statement,
whether these facts became known to him.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the reference to it, the number.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1650-PS, Exhibit Number USA-246.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off for 10
minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, a report is made that the
Defendant Göring is absent from this session of the Court.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you the Document 1650-PS, and have you read it?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have read it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: This, as emphasized, is the famous Bullet Decree. When
did you hear of this?

KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know the actual decree; this must have been a
decree issued long before I came into office. Neither had I seen this
teletype copy of the document given to me here.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am drawing your attention to the signature which reads
“Müller.”

KALTENBRUNNER: Actually, the man was entitled to sign such a decree if
it did in fact exist. But I have heard—this I would like to add—at the
time of 1944-1945 from the liaison officer between Himmler and Hitler by
the name of Fegelein when I made my report to headquarters, which at
that time, I believe, was already in Berlin, I heard the name Bullet
Decree, which to me was an absolutely strange conception. So I asked him
what it was. He replied that this was a Führer order and that he knew no
more than that, except that he had heard that this was a special type of
prisoner-of-war.

I was not satisfied with that reply, and so, on the same day, I sent a
teletype message to Himmler in which I asked him to look into an order
of the Führer which was called Bullet Decree. At that time I did not
know either that the State Police was concerned with the Bullet Decree.

Then a few days later, Müller came to see me on Himmler’s behalf, and
gave me a decree to read which, however, did not come from Hitler, but
from Himmler, in which Himmler stated that he was transmitting this to
me as a verbal order of the Führer. Referring to this, I replied to
Himmler that I noticed in this Führer decree that again the most
elementary principles of the Geneva Convention were violated, although
this had been going on from a time long before I had assumed office and
there had been other violations following that. I asked him to intervene
with the Führer, and I attached to this letter the draft of a letter
from Himmler to Hitler, asking the Führer (a) to cancel that decree, and
(b) at any rate, to relieve the subordinate departments of the burden on
their conscience.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the result?

KALTENBRUNNER: The result was positive. Although the Bullet Decree and a
number of other equally depressing orders were not repealed, it was
positive insofar as in February 1945 Hitler permitted me for the first
time to get in touch with the International Red Cross, an action which
had been strictly prohibited before.

DR. KAUFFMANN: This action with reference to the Red Cross was initiated
by you, and did this action refer to the inspection of concentration
camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: In that connection I must answer “yes” and “no,” for it
coincided with the request made by the Red Cross and its president,
Burckhardt, for immediate and direct contact. I would like to say the
attempt of both sides coincided.

But please do not misunderstand me. Apart from that there were, of
course, numerous attempts—I would almost like to say, behind Hitler’s
back—to get in contact with the Red Cross, in which connection I call
attention for instance to the continuous contact the Foreign Office had
with them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: If I understand you correctly, you want to cite the
request to Professor Burckhardt to visit the concentration camps, as an
exonerating circumstance for yourself.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course, but I should like to talk about that
later in greater detail, because it is premature at this stage.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution have stated that during the time you were
in office two concentration camps had been newly established, Lublin and
Hertogenbosch. Did you hear anything about that? Who could have ordered
the establishing of these two camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the date when these two camps were set up.
The one in Lublin and the other one in Hertogenbosch were subordinate
through the channel of the WVHA to the Higher Police and SS Leader of
the occupied countries in which they were situated, so that the main
offices in Berlin had nothing to do with them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, will you please answer this question with “yes” or
“no”: Had the concentration camp at Auschwitz been known to you as such?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know about it until November of 1943.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you, simultaneously with learning of the camp’s
existence, informed of the significance of this camp, namely, that it
was exclusively an extermination camp for Jews handed over by Eichmann?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, it could not have been known to anybody as such, for
the question put to Himmler, “Why was such a large camp being installed
there?” was always answered by him, “Because of the proximity of the
large armament works.” And I think he mentioned then Vitkovice and
others.

At any rate—and I think this must be emphasized—there was such a
complete secrecy regarding what went on in Auschwitz, that the
statements of not only the defendants but of anyone else who might be
asked by the Americans, “Do you know about it?” and answers in the
negative must be believed.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The most atrocious excesses are connected with this camp
in Auschwitz. This concentration camp was under the spiritual leadership
of the infamous Eichmann. Now I am asking you: When did you get
acquainted with Eichmann?

KALTENBRUNNER: I became acquainted with Eichmann in my home town, Linz.
The Prosecution have stated—and today the attempt was made to establish
from an affidavit—that I was a friend, or at least a close
acquaintance, of Eichmann. I would like to make the following statement
on this with particular reference to my oath. I have a different
conception of a close acquaintance or even a friendship.

I learned of Eichmann’s existence in Linz because his father, as
director of an electrical construction company at Linz, consulted my
father as a lawyer, and thus they knew each other; and because, he, the
son of his father, attended the same high school as my brothers.

Therefore, the statement of Höttl that I had met Eichmann in an SS
platoon at Linz is wrong, because when I joined the SS Eichmann had
already fled to Germany, as I learned later.

Secondly, the Prosecution state that I met the same Eichmann for the
first time in 1932 and for the second time in February or March 1945.
Therefore, I did not see him for 13 years and after that last meeting I
never saw him again.

On the basis of these two personal meetings, I can draw the conclusion
that I was neither a friend of his nor that we were closely acquainted.
It is true that on that second occasion he accosted me and said,
“Obergruppenführer Eichmann is my name; I come from Linz too.” I said,
“Pleased to meet you. How are things back home?” But there was no
official contact.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness Lammers stated yesterday that in the RSHA a
conference took place regarding the so-called “final solution.” Did you
know about it?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. I think that the witness Lammers, and another
witness, too, stated that Eichmann, possibly under my name, had called a
meeting at the RSHA in Berlin during February or March 1943, a so-called
discussion with department chiefs. I have to say to that, that nominally
I did commence my services in Berlin on 30 January, but in fact, until
May I was not in Berlin except for a few official visits, but in Vienna,
where I was enlarging my intelligence service in order to transfer it
eventually to Berlin.

DR. KAUFFMANN: One further question to that. When did you hear, for the
first time, that the camp at Auschwitz was an extermination camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: Himmler told me that in 1944, in February or March. That
is, he did not tell me, he admitted it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was your attitude upon learning this?

KALTENBRUNNER: I did not hear the question.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What attitude did you adopt when you heard about it?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of Hitler’s order to Heydrich
regarding the final solution of the Jewish problem at the time I took up
my office. In the summer of 1943 I gathered from the foreign press and
through the enemy radio...

THE PRESIDENT: This is not an answer to your question. You asked him
what he did when he found out that Auschwitz was a concentration camp.
He is now making a long speech about Heydrich. You asked for his
attitude. I suppose you meant what he did when he first heard that
Auschwitz was an extermination camp, in February or March 1944. He is
now telling us a long story about something having to do with Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please try to give me a direct answer to that question.
What was your attitude after you heard about that? Answer quite briefly
and very concisely, please.

KALTENBRUNNER: Immediately after receiving knowledge of this fact, I
fought, just as I had done previously, not only against the final
solution, but also against this type of treatment of the Jewish problem.
For that reason I wanted to explain how through my intelligence service
I became acquainted with the whole Jewish problem, and what I did
against it.

THE PRESIDENT: We still don’t know what you did...

DR. KAUFFMANN: What did you do? I am asking you for the last time.

KALTENBRUNNER: In order to explain what I did I must explain how I
reacted, just as I have to tell you what I heard about it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Just explain to us your reactions.

KALTENBRUNNER: First I protested to Hitler and the next day to Himmler.
I did not only draw their attention to my personal attitude and my
completely different conception which I had brought over from Austria
and to my humanitarian qualms, but immediately, from the first day, I
concluded practically every one of my situation reports right to the
very end by saying that there was no hostile power that would negotiate
with a Reich which had burdened itself with this guilt. Those were the
reports I put to Himmler and Hitler, particularly pointing out also that
the intelligence sector would have to create the atmosphere for
discussions with the enemy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When did the Jewish persecution end?

KALTENBRUNNER: October 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to say that this was due to your
intervention?

KALTENBRUNNER: I am firmly convinced that this is chiefly due to my
intervention, although a number of others also worked toward the same
end. But I do not think that there was anyone who kept dinning it into
Himmler’s ears every time he met him or that there was anyone who would
have spoken so openly and frankly and with such self-abnegation to
Hitler as I did.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was that instruction to Eichmann an instruction which
came from Hitler and Himmler to the RSHA and then to Eichmann, or was it
a strictly personal order outside the competence of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally I can only reconstruct the situation today,
since I was not there when these orders were issued; but I have reason
to assume that the channels for this order were: Hitler, Heydrich,
Eichmann; and that Himmler, shortly after Heydrich’s death, kept on
working with Eichmann and probably very often even excluded Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Wisliceny, who was examined here—and this I
am going to put to you—stated on 3 January that practically the final
solution was carried out between April 1942 and October 1944. Wisliceny
referred to a personal order from Himmler and stated further that
Eichmann was personally charged with the task. But he goes on to say,
“The extermination of Jews continued under Kaltenbrunner without any
reduction or alleviation.” Reports made by Eichmann to that effect were
sent at regular intervals to Kaltenbrunner through Müller. It is stated
that in 1944 Eichmann called personally on Kaltenbrunner, and Wisliceny
affirms having seen Kaltenbrunner’s signature on such reports to
Himmler.

That was Wisliceny’s testimony. Now my question: Is this testimony true
in its essential points?

KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony is wrong, but I can clarify it. Wisliceny
may have seen my signature once, not on a report to Himmler which I had
received from Eichmann and Müller, but on a letter which I wrote to
Himmler, a copy of which I passed on to Müller and Eichmann for their
information and in which I referred to my last report—verbal report—to
Himmler regarding the Jewish question. It was on this occasion that, for
the first time, I heard of Eichmann’s activity in that respect, and, in
order to make it clear to Eichmann that I did not want to be associated
with that activity, I had Müller give this man a copy of the letter to
Himmler. In that letter I asked Himmler to define his attitude so that,
since the Führer again had ordered me to report to him, I could give the
Führer a full report on Himmler’s activities and therefore wanted an
early decision.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness Höttl has stated in an affidavit that he had
heard from Eichmann that a total number of 4 to 5 million Jewish persons
had been exterminated, about 2 million of them in Auschwitz. Have you
heard any such figures?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have never heard such figures. But I approached Himmler
on that subject and asked him whether he had any idea of all these
crimes so far. The reason I put that question to him was that he would
realize the extent of the catastrophe which was bound to follow. He
replied to me that he had no figures. I do not believe it. I believe he
had them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you want to assume a responsibility in this connection
or do you want to deny it?

KALTENBRUNNER: I must deny it completely, because I hope to be able to
prove through Burckhardt that there was nobody who exposed himself more
on this question in favor of another solution.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now referring to a document, which is Document
R-135, Exhibit USA-289. It is a letter from the Reich Commissioner for
Riga and dated 18 June 1943. It refers to an action against the Jews at
the Minsk prison. It is a letter from the commandant of the prison,
addressed to the Commissioner General for Bielorussia at Minsk. Please,
will you make a statement on that document?

KALTENBRUNNER: I can see from both the signature and the name of the
addressee that this letter could not have come to my knowledge. Nor have
I knowledge of its contents either. Presumably this is the result about
which the person is reporting in June 1943, of events which occurred
before I came into office, at any rate this must refer to events which
took place previously and which needed a certain amount of time.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am coming to the next document, Number D-473,
Exhibit Number USA-522. It is a letter from the Chief of the Security
Police and the SD, dated 4 December 1944. From this also the Prosecution
conclude the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s great responsibility. It deals
with the combating of criminality among the Polish and Soviet Russian
civilian workers. As means for their punishment, the letter states, the
Criminal Police have at their disposal police detention and transfer to
a concentration camp of all asocial or dangerous prisoners. The document
has the signature, “Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” What are your views on that?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have no recollection that I have ever signed any such
decree.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you deny having signed this letter at all? Or, to be
more accurate, do you know anything about the matter?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now submit Document 1276-PS, Exhibit Number USA-525.
The Prosecution have referred to this document. It is a consequence of
Hitler’s order dated 18 October 1942. According to this, parachutists
and sabotage troops are to be exterminated, and Commandos to be
surrendered to the SD. In a letter with the signature “Müller,” dated 17
June 1944, addressed to the High Command, it says that such parachutists
in British uniform were to be treated in accordance with Hitler’s order.
I am now asking you if you knew of this document signed by Müller, dated
17 June 1944, and if you had any knowledge at all of the matter
contained in this document?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge of the matter or of this document. But
I should like to say the following in this connection: Later I received
knowledge of this Hitler order and of his basic attitude to this
question. I think it was at the Führer’s headquarters in February 1945;
and I have there, before witnesses, publicly stated that I was not only
personally opposed to such treatment of soldiers and prisoners, but also
that I would refuse to carry out any such order from Hitler. I think
another defendant here is calling a witness by the name of Koller, and I
request that you ask this witness, who was at that time the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, how I expressed it—I believe it was in Hitler’s
presence—what my attitude was regarding that question, which came to my
knowledge for the first time in 1945. I can do no more than I did before
this most powerful and almighty man Germany ever had, who declared, “He
who does not obey my orders, no matter who the commander, will be shot.”
I can do no more than what I did say in his presence to the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force and other officers: “I will not obey such an
order.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to Document 2990-PS, Exhibit Number USA-526.
This is an affidavit from the witness Schellenberg. According to it, in
1944 a meeting took place between Kaltenbrunner and Müller.
Kaltenbrunner is supposed to have stated that actions of the populations
against terrorist fliers must not be interfered with; that, on the
contrary, the hostile attitude of the population must be encouraged. I
shall quote a few sentences from the examination of the witness
Schellenberg on 3 January 1946, where he says:

    “In 1944 on some other occasion during a conference I heard
    fragments of a conversation between Kaltenbrunner and Müller.
    The following remark by Kaltenbrunner remains clearly in my
    recollection: ‘All departments of the Security Police and the
    Sipo must be informed that actions on the part of the population
    against British and American terror-fliers must not be
    interfered with; on the contrary, the hostile attitude of the
    population must be encouraged.’”

Do you know Schellenberg?

KALTENBRUNNER: Regarding Schellenberg I must say...

DR. KAUFFMANN: In a few sentences please.

KALTENBRUNNER: ...with reference to his credibility in the matter of
this document, that he was a protégé of Heydrich’s and when I took
office he was in charge of...

THE PRESIDENT: He wants to know whether you know Schellenberg. That is a
question you can answer.

The question was, “Do you know Schellenberg?” And he goes off into a
long speech without answering the question.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you know Schellenberg? “Yes” or “no”?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, of course. He was the Chief of Department VI.

DR. KAUFFMANN: My question: What were the relations between you and the
Chief of Department VI? Do you regard this statement as true or not?

KALTENBRUNNER: That statement is not true, and I should like to give you
the reason so that the Tribunal can evaluate that statement.
Schellenberg was Himmler’s most intimate friend. By Himmler’s order, he
remained with him to the last day. He is the man who, on Himmler’s
behalf, established contact with the Swedish Count Bernadotte. He was
the man who, at the very last minute, through M. Muehse in Switzerland,
established a connection which was used to permit a very few Jewish
prisoners to go to Switzerland, the purpose of which was to create
quickly a favorable impression for Himmler and Schellenberg abroad. He
is the man who, together with another friend of Himmler’s, started an
action to make an agreement with an organization of rabbis in the United
States whereby they were to get him a favorable press in some of the
larger newspapers in America. I have criticized Himmler for these tricks
and complained and discredited them with Hitler, stating that it was
demeaning to the cause and the Reich that in so important a matter these
methods should be used by Himmler and Schellenberg. I said the only
correct way would be to establish contact with the International Red
Cross immediately. Consequently, I prejudiced Himmler before President
Burckhardt, and forced him to adopt a different attitude in this
question by asking Burckhardt personally to visit these camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But I put a completely different question.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but I had to say this so that you can see how
disappointed Schellenberg and Himmler were about what I was doing and
why he, now, is interested in accusing me, as has been done in the
affidavit, of breaking my word on international matters.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that Schellenberg was in
opposition to you and against you, and is implicating you unjustly.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now then, in this Schellenberg document the event with
reference to these 50 fliers is mentioned; and Schellenberg states that
you, together with Müller and Nebe, had a conference and that all of you
were trying to find an excuse in order to keep the actual truth of these
events from the public. I am asking you: When did you first hear of the
shooting of these 50 fliers?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is the Case Sagan.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you hear of it? It is a simple question, please.

KALTENBRUNNER: The first time that case became known to me was about six
weeks after it happened.

DR. KAUFFMANN: My next question: Do you want to say that you were not
involved in the shooting in any way, that to the contrary you were only
much later able to investigate the matter?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, that is what I want to say.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also mean to say that the conference with
Schellenberg dealt exclusively with the later attempt to conceal the
truth of the matter?

KALTENBRUNNER: It can only have referred to that.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am coming to Document 835-PS, Exhibit Number USA-527.
This document also is held against the defendant by the Prosecution. It
is the so-called Nacht und Nebel Decree, which is an order from Hitler
dated 7 December 1941. Is the expression “Nacht und Nebel Decree”
familiar to you? When did you hear of it for the first time?

KALTENBRUNNER: The first time I heard of it was in June 1945 in London.

[_A document was handed to the defendant._]

DR. KAUFFMANN: This document which I have submitted to you is a letter
from the OKW, dated 2 September 1944, addressed to the German Armistice
Commission. It is signed by Dr. Lehmann, and in it is stated:

    “According to the decrees all non-German civilians in occupied
    territories who have endangered the security and preparedness of
    the occupying forces by means of terror or sabotage or in any
    other way are to be handed over to the Security Police and the
    SD.”

In the case of so important a matter, it appears improbable that the
matter and the Nacht und Nebel Decree were not known to you.

KALTENBRUNNER: I had no knowledge and I beg to be given permission to
clarify the situation. May I first of all say that no document shows
better proof than this of the fact that an executive function is
wrongfully attributed to the SD. It says here on Line 4:

    “...who have endangered...in any other way are to be handed over
    to the Security Police and the SD.”

First of all, it is complete nonsense to state that one and the same
thing should be handed over to two different authorities; either it is
the Security Police or the SD.

This error in the use of the German language found its way into the
Führer decree because Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
was referred to in short as Chief of SD, but it is an absolute mistake.
Whereby, God knows, I am not trying to exonerate the SD from other
things which it may, perhaps, have committed, but I want to make it
clear that it is wrong to conclude from this that it had executive
powers.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, but it is not only the question of the SD, but also
of the Security Police.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and to that I want to say the following: This Führer
decree from the year 1941 was not known to me. I am asking you to put
yourself in my position. At the beginning of 1943 I came to Berlin. With
the exception of a few official visits I commenced my activity in May
1943. In the fourth year of the war the decrees and orders within the
Reich and also in the executive sector reached the thousands and were
accumulating on the desks and the cabinets of the civil servants. It was
absolutely impossible for any man even to read them all within a year,
and it was quite impossible for me to know of the existence of all these
orders even had I considered it my duty to do so. But it was not my duty
at all.

Then I am asking you to consider the following fact: The beginning of my
activity was February 1943. On 2 February Stalingrad was surrendered and
the largest military catastrophe...

THE PRESIDENT: This is a long speech in answer to a question as to
whether he had seen this letter. He says he did not see the letter. Then
he makes this long speech.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now putting this question to you: When did you
realize what significance this Nacht und Nebel Decree had and what it
meant regarding the treatment of persons it affected? Please give a
precise answer.

KALTENBRUNNER: Dr. Kauffmann, the existence of the decree was unknown to
me. Had I known that this matter would be held against me here, then I
would have been able to nominate a witness in captivity in London who
can prove that even in London I had no idea that it existed. We have
talked about that in the cell.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The end result, therefore, is that you did not know?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, absolutely ignorant regarding that decree.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the Document 526-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-502, which has been used by the Prosecution.

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

This refers to the landing of an enemy cutter in Norway on 30 March
1943. That report contains a sentence: “Führer order carried out by SD.”
The signature on that document is lacking. It is dated 10 May 1943. It
is a secret command matter and the heading is “Note.”

Please, will you make a statement regarding that sentence, “Führer order
carried out by SD.”

KALTENBRUNNER: The execution of such a Führer order is unknown to me. I
want to point out that this note is obviously one made by a military
department regarding an event which took place shortly after I had come
into office but at a time before I had come to Berlin. I could not have
had knowledge of it at all.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It says at the end of the document, “Armed Forces report
dated 6 April 1943.” It states further as follows: “In northern Norway
an enemy ship carrying sabotage troops was forced to fight when
approaching the coast and was destroyed.”

Do you know anything about the connection of this Armed Forces
report—as far as you knew of it at all—with the actual decree?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. Of course, I read, daily, practically every incoming
Armed Forces report. But from its composition I am unable to determine
any participation of any military agency within my sphere.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to the next document which has been held
against the defendant by the Prosecution, Document L-37, Exhibit Number
USA-506. This is the so-called “responsibility of relatives,” that is to
say, it refers to crimes committed against relatives of the guilty
persons. This document refers to a letter from the commander of the
Security Police to the SD at Radom, dated 19 July 1944, according to
which male relatives of saboteurs are to be shot and female relatives to
be sent to concentration camps.

What is your explanation to the Tribunal with reference to that document
and the whole matter?

KALTENBRUNNER: The report commences with the words: “The Higher SS and
Police Leader East has ...” and so on and so forth, and then, “ordered”
or “issued the following order.”

The Higher Police Leader East is a department, which, as a department in
an occupied territory, is directly under the jurisdiction of the
Reichsführer SS and not under any central department in Berlin.
Therefore I could not have had knowledge of that order. The police
leaders in occupied territories were immediately subordinate to Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the next accusation of the Prosecution
regarding the concentration camp at Dachau. A document exists which has
the number Document 3462-PS, Exhibit Number USA-528. It is a statement
by the Gaustabsamtsleiter Gerdes.

The Prosecution are accusing the defendant of contemplating the wiping
out of the concentration camp at Dachau and its adjoining camps at
Mühldorf and Landsberg by bombs or poison. I shall read a few sentences
from that document. They are on Page 2 of the German text, near the end
of the page:

    “In December 1944 or January 1945 I was in the office of
    Gauleiter Giesler in Munich, Ludwig Street 28, and had the
    opportunity of learning about a secret order from Kaltenbrunner.
    Gauleiter Giesler received that order in my presence through a
    courier and, after I had been given permission to read it, it
    was destroyed in accordance with the remark on the document; ‘To
    be destroyed after cognizance has been taken.’ The order which
    was signed by Kaltenbrunner was worded roughly as follows:

    “‘In agreement with the Reichsführer SS I have instructed all
    higher police departments that every German who participates in
    the future in the persecution and destruction of enemy fliers
    will remain unpunished.’

    “Giesler told me that Kaltenbrunner was in constant contact with
    him since he was considerably worried over the attitude of
    foreign workers and particularly the inmates of the
    concentration camps at Dachau, Mühldorf, and Landsberg, which
    were in the path of the approaching Allied armies.

    “On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call
    from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a
    night conference. In the course of our conversation that evening
    Gauleiter Giesler disclosed the fact to me that
    Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner had given him instructions, in
    accordance with an order from the Führer, that there should be
    made an immediate plan regarding the liquidation of the
    concentration camp at Dachau and the two Jewish work camps at
    Mühldorf and Landsberg. The instructions stated that these two
    Jewish work camps at Landsberg and Mühldorf were to be destroyed
    by the German Air Force, since the sites of those two camps had
    lately and repeatedly been affected by hostile bombing attacks.
    The action was given the camouflage name ‘Cloud A-1.’”

KALTENBRUNNER: May I say something to that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: First, please, do you know Gerdes?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know Gerdes and I have never seen him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know Giesler?

KALTENBRUNNER: The last time I saw Giesler was in 1942, in September.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was an order of Hitler in existence regarding the
destruction of concentration camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you give a reasonable explanation regarding this
document?

KALTENBRUNNER: To give a reasonable explanation for that document is
almost humanly impossible, because from the beginning to the end it is
an invention and a fake. I brand this document a complete and utter lie
coming from Gerdes, and I can only refer you to the deposition
supporting my statement by the Higher SS and Police Leader who was the
sole competent authority in Bavaria, Freiherr Von Eberstein, who himself
calls Gerdes’ statement completely incredible. I would like to refute
these accusations in detail as follows: He says:

    “On a Tuesday in the middle of April 1945 I had a telephone call
    from the Gauleiter ordering me to keep myself available for a
    night conference.”—He—“... disclosed ... that Kaltenbrunner
    had given him instructions, in accordance with an order from the
    Führer ...”—and so on.

Nobody in the Reich knew better than Hitler who was responsible for
concentration camps and how he had to give an order. He would never have
given me such an order and he could not have given it to me because I
was, on Hitler’s personal order, in Austria from 28 March until 15
April. As to the time from 10 April until 8 May, when I was captured,
including the few days when I was in Berlin I can state exactly just
where I have been and what I have done, so that the question of giving
an order in this connection is impossible. And, anyway, it must have
happened earlier, if the witness is talking about the middle of April,
which would mean that I would have had to talk to Hitler about this
before the middle of April, since otherwise he could not have been asked
to be available for a night conference by the middle of April.

The existence of Jewish work camps in Bavaria as branches of Dachau, was
completely unknown to me. And I am asking you to recognize the absurdity
of my sponsoring in April of 1945 such an order, when I tried in March
1945 to start discussions with the President of the International Red
Cross, Burckhardt, regarding the release and help to be given to all
Jews, and when I made all efforts to have him personally look after the
Jewish camps—in which I succeeded.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have any possibility at all to exert influence on
the German Air Force in this respect?

KALTENBRUNNER: I neither had the possibility of giving the Air Force
orders—I could only have asked the Chief of the Air Force to give them
and there, of course, it would have been turned down, because you must
realize that at this point, when everyone knew that the war had come to
an end, the Air Force would not have lent its hand to a terrible crime.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And now, with the permission of the Tribunal, and because
it is a terrible accusation, I am quoting a few sentences from this
document, because the Prosecution, too, have read these sentences into
the record. The document goes on to say:

    “I was aware that I would never carry this order out.”—this is
    Gerdes talking—“Since the action ‘Cloud A-1’ was supposed to
    have been carried out already, couriers from Kaltenbrunner kept
    arriving, and I was supposed to have discussed the details of
    the Mühldorf and Landsberg action with the two district leaders
    concerned. The couriers, who in most cases were SS officers,
    mostly SS Untersturmführer, made me read and initial brief and
    sharp orders. I was threatened with severe punishment including
    execution in case of disobedience. I could always excuse the
    failure to carry out the plan with bad weather for flying or
    with lack of petrol or lack of bombs.

    “Therefore, Kaltenbrunner ordered that the Jews should be
    marched from Landsberg to Dachau, so that they should be
    included in the poisoning action which was going on in Dachau,
    whereas the action at Mühldorf was to be carried out by the
    Gestapo. For the Dachau Concentration Camp Kaltenbrunner ordered
    the action ‘Cloud Fire,’ which stipulated that the inmates of
    the concentration camps at Dachau, with the exception of the
    Aryan members of the Western Powers, were to be liquidated with
    poison.

    “Gauleiter Giesler received that order directly from
    Kaltenbrunner and in my presence he discussed with the health
    officer of the Gau, Dr. Harrfield, the procurement of the
    necessary amount of poison. Dr. Harrfield promised that the
    necessary quantity, in accordance with the order, would be
    obtained, and he received instructions to wait my further
    orders. Since I wished to prevent this action from being carried
    out in any event, I gave no further instructions to Dr.
    Harrfield. The inmates of the camp at Landsberg had hardly
    arrived at Dachau when a courier from Kaltenbrunner brought the
    order for the action ‘Cloud Fire’ to be carried out. I prevented
    the execution of the two actions, ‘Cloud A-1’ and ‘Cloud Fire’
    by telling Giesler that the front line was too near and to
    convey that reason to Kaltenbrunner.

    “Kaltenbrunner gave written instructions to Dachau that all
    internees who were members of the Western European Powers were
    to be loaded on lorries and transported to Switzerland, whereas
    the remaining inmates were to be marched afoot into the Ötztal
    territory (Tyrol), where the final liquidation of the internees
    was to be carried out, in one way or the other.”

Perhaps you can explain in a few words, without going into detail,
whether or not this document contains the truth.

KALTENBRUNNER: This document is completely untrue.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It is completely untrue?

KALTENBRUNNER: But, Doctor, I must have an opportunity to define my
views. I must be given an opportunity to clarify the details.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You have already defined your attitude. If you have to
say anything important in addition to that, you can state it now.

KALTENBRUNNER: The following appears to be important to me: According to
his statement, I must have had dozens of couriers during my stay in
Austria. Two persons were in my company, my driver and my administrative
adjutant, his name was Scheitler, a man who had nothing to do with
intelligence and police. There were three of us. I had not even the
possibility of dispatching so many couriers.

Secondly, as far as Bavaria was concerned, there was no need for me to
carry out any preparations, not even under pressure from Himmler. Why?
Because, as far as Bavaria is concerned, plenipotentiary powers were
given to Obergruppenführer Berger, the same day I was given
plenipotentiary powers for Austria. So that there was no reason for me
to take such action.

Thirdly, I could not even have carried such insane orders regarding a
concentration camp in my heart when, at the same time, I was ordering
exactly the opposite. I am thinking of Mauthausen. I had given an order
to Mauthausen that the camp was to be completely handed over to the
enemy. If you can put yourself in Himmler’s place, then this would have
been completely wrong, since the real criminals were in Mauthausen,
whereas the people in Dachau had nothing or little against them. So that
even if you thought as Himmler—that the exact opposite would have been
necessary—from that point of view, too, it is completely insane to
accuse me of any such action.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Finally, the Prosecution hold you responsible for the
fact that you, as Chief of the Security Police and the SD, tolerated the
persecution of the church, particularly the Catholic Church, by the
Gestapo. I recall to you in this connection that the Department B-2 of
Amt IV was concerned with education and confessional questions, and
Department 1 of Amt IV with political Catholicism. Do you know anything
regarding the fact that within that department there was a twofold
policy regarding the churches with a so-called “immediate goal” and a
“distant goal”? By “immediate goal” they meant that the churches would
not be allowed to regain a single inch of ground; “distant goal”
signified the final destruction of the churches in Germany at the end of
the war. What do you know about these aims?

KALTENBRUNNER: All I can say to these theoretical statements is that
they were completely unknown to me. The church policy of the Reich, as I
had to recognize in 1943, was different. In 1943, to maintain Hitler’s
policy meant to achieve a covert truce with the churches, at least for
the duration of the war; that is, to refrain as much as possible from
attacks and to proceed only against individual misdemeanors by the
clergy, if express authorization had been forthcoming.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you? I am asking you: Did you in the
spring of 1943...

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I want to come to that.

DR. KAUFFMANN: ...did you undertake anything with Hitler, and what was
the result?

KALTENBRUNNER: Well, I just wanted again to give you a picture of the
state of affairs which I found. In spite of Hitler’s policy, I found
that Bormann was actively continuing the fight against the churches.
Therefore as early as March, I think, I wrote to Hitler, and later
requested verbally a full clarification of the church policy. I asked
him to alter it with a view to effecting a rapprochement. Above all I
wanted to bring about a different policy toward the Vatican.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not think there is any need for you to go into too
much detail.

KALTENBRUNNER: But I was blocked. First of all, Himmler opposed the idea
to Hitler, and, secondly, I had the very strong resistance of Bormann
against me. He even went so far as to undermine completely the
reputation of the German representative to the Vatican, Weizsäcker, by
sending a man to shadow him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough about that.

Mr. President, do you want me to go on, because it is now 5?

THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in a short time, we would like you to
go on. How long are you going to be?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I would say it would take me about another hour, since I
must discuss those documents which have been submitted by the
Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I will say the Tribunal will sit on
Saturday in open session until 1 o’clock.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH DAY
                          Friday, 12 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner resumed the stand._]

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, yesterday the case of Sagan was dealt with
by the defendant, but regarding his own participation he said only a few
sentences. The Prosecution are assuming that he was an immediate
participant even before the fliers had been shot. The two witnesses,
Westhoff and Wielen, in my opinion, produced evidence in favor of the
defendant, and I am now asking the Tribunal to tell me whether the
defendant may have permission to speak in detail regarding the manner in
which he was actively involved in the affair, or whether the Tribunal is
satisfied with the treatment this problem has been given.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that if the defendant has knowledge of
the facts connected with it, he had better give them. He need not give
them in any greater detail than is necessary, but in view of the
evidence of the witness Wielen, I think he ought to deal with it.

DR. KAUFFMANN. [_To the defendant._] You stated yesterday that you heard
about the Case Sagan for the first time after the event had taken place.
Do you maintain that position today?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In what manner did you become acquainted with the Case
Sagan later on, and what did you do about it?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was never officially informed of Case Sagan, but
roughly 6 weeks after this event I received knowledge of it. At the time
these fliers escaped and at the time the orders were given—which in my
opinion went this way: Hitler-Himmler-Müller-Nebe, or possibly
Himmler-Fegelein-Nebe—I do not know, as at the time I was not present
in Berlin but was in Hungary and, with a number of stops, finally
finished up in a visit to Minister Speer in Dahlem. On 2 or 3 April I
returned to Berlin. Up to that time, no one had informed me of it. The
first time I heard of the affair was when the Foreign Office made
complaints, or rather, demanded from Nebe and Müller that the case
should be clarified so that they could answer a note which, I believe,
had been sent to the Foreign Office by the protecting power.

The description of the witness General Westhoff is, in my opinion,
misleading. I think he said something about mentioning the Case Sagan
approximately 4 weeks after the shooting, during another conversation
with me. I think that it was at least 6 weeks afterwards. It should be
possible to ascertain when the Foreign Office made that inquiry. Then it
would be possible to ascertain the exact date.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Later on, when you talked to Müller and Nebe, what was
devised as a camouflage for this matter and what was thought of?

KALTENBRUNNER: No camouflage was devised nor discussed in our office,
but when Müller and Nebe said that they would have to reply to the
Foreign Office’s inquiry and in that connection informed me of that
dreadful order for the first time, I asked them who had given that order
and they replied, “Himmler.” I told them that they ought to get in touch
with this superior immediately and ask him how the case should be dealt
with further. I refused to have any connection with that matter. It had
been unknown to me up to that time, and I considered it a dirty affair.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But was it not mentioned in that connection that it would
be said that the fliers had lost their lives through bombs or that they
had been shot while trying to escape? What do you know in that respect?
The witness Schellenberg has stated that there were such conversations.

KALTENBRUNNER: Such words may have been said, yes. It has been described
here how the large-scale searches were handled; and in connection with
these manhunts, there were shootings. Even Germans were shot in that
connection. An SS Oberführer in Alsatian territory was shot when he did
not answer a stop signal at a road block which had been erected in the
course of this search. Two or three of the fliers were killed by bombs,
as I was told. I think that was along the Baltic coast in Kiel or
Stettin, and I understand that two Criminal Police officials also lost
their lives in this accident. Their widows received pensions
subsequently. That is something that ought to be ascertainable. In this
connection bombing and losses through bombing were certainly mentioned,
but a camouflage of the whole affair was not discussed in our office; in
any case the answer was prepared by Müller, Nebe, and Himmler, in
Himmler’s headquarters. I know that immediately after the inquiry from
the Foreign Office these two left by air for Himmler’s headquarters.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you trying to say then that the statement according
to which these fliers had lost their lives by bombs, or had been shot
while escaping, did not originate from you?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not; it did not originate from me.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With reference to the church policy of Department IV, the
Prosecution are charging you with the following: so-called
Bibelforscher, or International Bible Students, had often been sentenced
to death on the strength of their inner convictions, only because they
refused to serve in the war in any way. My question to you is this: Do
you know of this state of affairs, and in what manner did you
participate in that matter?

KALTENBRUNNER: German jurisdiction used as a basis for proceedings
against this sect of International Bible Students was the law for the
Protection of the Defense of the German Nation. Under this law any one
who was interfering with German defense strength by refusing to serve in
the forces could be penalized with detention or death. According to this
law, military as well as civilian courts pronounced even the death
sentence also against these International Bible Students. Death
sentences, of course, were not pronounced by the Secret State Police.

In this connection it was often spoken of as an unjust harshness against
the attitude dictated to these sectarians by their creed. I approached
the Party Chancellery as well as the Ministry of Justice and Himmler and
Hitler during my reports, and pointed out these facts to them; during
several conferences with Thierack I demanded that this kind of
jurisdiction should be discontinued. As a result two things were done.
On the occasion of the first conference, after Thierack had made an
inquiry at the office of Bormann and Hitler whom he evidently did not
see personally, a directive was at once issued to the Public
Prosecutors’ offices stating that sentences which had already been
pronounced were to be stayed.

During a further conference another step was taken, which was that the
public prosecutors in general were given instructions not to demand the
death sentence any longer.

The third step was that International Bible Students were no longer
brought before the court.

I consider it a definite success of my personal intervention with
Thierack—which later had been discussed with Hitler himself—that this
jurisdiction against these sects was completely abolished.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now submitting a Document 1063...

KALTENBRUNNER: May I supplement my statement by saying the following:
These developments and this alteration of German law became also known
abroad at that time. I remember quite well that a very well-known
Swedish medical man thanked me personally and stated that this deed had
been well received in Sweden.

THE PRESIDENT: This really is an unnecessary detail about what happened
with some Swedish person outside of Germany, as to what they thought of
his actions.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

I am now coming to Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit Number USA-219. This is
a directive from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, dated 17
December 1942. It is a secret letter, and it is addressed to all
commanders of the Security Police and SD; and it goes for information to
Pohl, to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the inspectors of
concentration camps. It is a directive according to which at least
35,000 persons capable of work are to be transferred to concentration
camps by the end of January 1943 at the latest. The letter is signed by
Müller.

I am asking you, do you know of this letter, or do you know of any such
affair at all?

KALTENBRUNNER: I neither know the letter, nor do I know about the
affair.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number again?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Document 1063(d)-PS, Exhibit USA-219.

KALTENBRUNNER: From the date of the letter, it becomes apparent that
this was written before I came into office. It was not made known to me
afterwards either. The signature is “Müller,” who acted on Himmler’s
behalf, as is shown from Line 2. It is a typical case, which proves how
unlimited Müller’s authority was and the extent to which he enjoyed
confidence, if he could issue a decree like this.

I gather from the whole content of this letter—it refers to a day at
the end of January 1943—that it is impossible that this affair had been
reported to me.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution hold you responsible in the following
connection: There was an agreement between the former Minister of
Justice Thierack and Himmler, dated 18 September 1942, according to
which Jews, Poles, and so forth, were to be subjected to penal police
proceedings instead of being dealt with by ordinary law courts. I ask
you: Did you know of this agreement; and, if so, what attempt did you
make so as to reinstate ordinary law proceedings so far as that was
possible?

KALTENBRUNNER: Such an agreement between Thierack and Himmler is not
known to me. As you said, it was made in the autumn of 1942, I believe.
But repeatedly, again and again, I worked towards the end and submitted
proposals that all police courts should be done away with in favor of
proper law proceedings. I am legally trained, and for that reason I have
more respect for the courts than Himmler. This was one of the main
reasons why we never understood each other, and it was one of the main
reasons for differences which cropped up even during our first
discussions in 1942 at Berchtesgaden.

I cannot understand Thierack either, his making such an agreement with
Himmler, because later on, as I know myself, he repeatedly spoke against
the police court system.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the question of whether you had knowledge
of the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto, which was carried out in 1943.
A report is available on this from the SS and Police Leader in Warsaw,
whose name was Stroop. The report is addressed to the General of the
Police Krüger, and refers to the so-called solution of the Jewish
question in Galicia.

Now I ask you: When did you hear of this solution of the Jewish problem
in Galicia, and did you exhaust every possibility so as to possibly
prevent that solution?

KALTENBRUNNER: First of all, in this connection, I must state that I
perhaps did not know enough about the tremendous instrument of power
which Himmler had created by putting under his direct command the Higher
SS and Police Leaders, in the occupied territories. For SS and Police
Leaders, Stroop in this case, were subordinated to the Higher SS and
Police Leaders—in this connection for instance, General Krüger in the
Government General. No department in the Reich was informed of or
participated in any action, neither before nor afterwards, which was
ordered by Himmler through Krüger to Stroop. Certainly, Berlin did not
know anything of such an order in advance.

Afterwards—I cannot tell you how long afterwards—they wrote and talked
regarding the Warsaw Ghetto both in this country and abroad. Most
serious accusations were made in foreign countries.

Yesterday, I started to state here that in this connection I had
delivered to Reichsführer Himmler the first file documents which I had
in my possession on his measures and policies. I did that after
reporting to the Führer in November 1943. On that occasion I certainly
talked to him about Warsaw, too, since for one thing, he and his “final
solution of the Jewish question” were being criticized abroad.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When was the date of that report in comparison to that
action against the Jews in Galicia?

KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot remember when that action was. My reports, first
to Hitler and a day later to Himmler, were in November 1943.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to a document which has already been mentioned
by the Prosecution, Document L-53, Exhibit Number USA-291. The
Prosecution hold the defendant, as Chief of the Security Police and SD,
responsible for the cleansing—as it is put—at Security Police and SD
camps and concentration camps. This document is a letter from the
Commander of the Security Police and SD at Radom, dated 21 July 1944,
according to which the Commander of the Security Police and SD in the
Government General had ordered that all the prisons which are mentioned
must be cleansed and that their inmates must be liquidated. Look at this
document, sender and signature, and then make a statement in this
connection particularly regarding the question of whether you knew of
these events.

KALTENBRUNNER: I draw your attention to what I have just said. This
channel of command falls into the jurisdiction of the Higher SS and
Police Leader for an occupied territory. The channel for
orders—Himmler, Higher SS and Police Leader, his expert,
Commander-in-Chief and commander of the Security Police and SD—that
channel has nothing whatever to do with the centralized channel of
orders coming from Berlin.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, you want to say that these Higher SS and
Police Leaders were immediately subordinate to Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, indeed.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you also want to say that you as Chief of the RSHA had
no possibility of interfering with orders and directives of such Higher
SS and Police Leaders?

KALTENBRUNNER: It was out of the question for they were immediately
subordinate to Himmler. There was no other way for opposing such men, as
is quite obvious from the interrogation of the Defendant Frank.
Repeatedly I have of course received information about wrongdoings and
crimes committed through these channels of orders. For instance, Krüger
in the Government General was most violently attacked by me. It was due
to me, too, that Krüger was removed from his position in Kraków, a fact
which must also be shown by Frank’s diary.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now turn to another document—Number 1573-PS, Exhibit
USA-498. The Prosecution are holding the defendant as Chief of the RSHA
responsible that, under alteration of existing methods, slave workers
had been used in the armament industry. This document before us is a
secret order, which once again is signed by Müller. It is addressed to
all police service departments. The date is 18 June 1941. The order
refers to measures against emigrants and civilian workers from Russian
territories. It states that for the prevention of their unauthorized
return and any interference on their part, the persons concerned will be
arrested if the occasion arises. Until further notice these people
cannot change their place of residence unless they receive permission
from the Security Police; and if they leave their place of work without
this permission they will be arrested.

Were such events known to you?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. In this respect, too, I can only point out that this
is an order from Müller which was given 1½ years before my appointment.
Müller, receiving orders from Himmler directly and enjoying tremendous
power and authority, saw no reason to inform me of this, even later on.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain it that Müller was in a position to
exercise such power, and that even during your term of office, 1943-45,
this state of affairs continued without your having the possibility of
stopping the man? Therefore I now ask you: Was it generally known to you
that Müller had this power? In this connection, will you tell the
Tribunal what the size of Department IV of the Secret State Police was
and how it might be explained that you were not informed about those
hundreds or even thousands of orders and instructions?

KALTENBRUNNER: Müller was the Chief of the Secret State Police
Department. I do not know when he was appointed, but I must assume that
it must have been in 1933, 1934, or at the latest 1935. But much
earlier, as I know today, he had the closest contact with Himmler and
later with Heydrich. He came from the Bavarian Landespolizei, where
Himmler met him. He had his personal confidence for at least 12 or 15
years. He participated in and carried out, with him, every action which
in the domain of State Police Himmler ordered in his eagerness for power
or in pursuance of his aims as Chief of the German Police. This
confidence I might say was continually increased for 12 or 15 years and
remained unshaken to the very last days of the war. Müller also remained
in Berlin after he had the order to remain with Himmler. Himmler relied
on him as his blind and trustworthy instrument.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, the question that you have put to him, or
the questions which you put—you put several—he does not seem to be
answering. The main question was whether he knew of these actions of
Müller. He is giving us a long speech now about how much confidence
Himmler had in Müller. He has not said anything else yet.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I think that this question particularly
ought to be dealt with at some length, because what the Gestapo and
Müller are being accused of, is what Kaltenbrunner is accused of as
Chief of the Gestapo.

THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out to you was that you had asked him
several questions in one, and the main part of the question was whether
he knew that Müller had these powers and was exercising them.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Answer that question right now briefly and clearly.

KALTENBRUNNER: The relations between Himmler and Müller were so direct
that there was no cause for him to give me any reports. I had no
knowledge, and as early as December 1942 Himmler stated clearly that the
chiefs of Departments IV and V were his immediate subordinates, as had
been the case since Heydrich’s death.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now it is going to be put to you that, based on certain
statements of witnesses and other evidence, it must be assumed that
conferences of department chiefs must have taken place between you and
Müller, and that it appears improbable that you were not aware in
general of the things which Müller decreed. Is that accusation
justified?

KALTENBRUNNER: It appears to be justified, but it is not. What is called
a conference of department chiefs here, was a joint luncheon which was
not taken every day but let us say three or four times a week, a joint
luncheon of adjutants, department chiefs, and any guests who might have
been in Berlin at the time. That personal atmosphere alone made it
impossible that internal or rather secret events might have been
discussed in front of all these people.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In 1943 and the following years, were you always in
Berlin—or I think I had better say—were you mostly resident in Berlin?
Or did your work as Chief of the intelligence service make it necessary
for you to leave Berlin often?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was frequently absent from Berlin. I think I can say
that half of all the working time was spent away from Berlin. I was
constantly in Berlin only from the moment the headquarters were
transferred there.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?

KALTENBRUNNER: That was in the months of February and March 1945. I was
not in Berlin even in April 1945 in two long periods from 28 March until
15 April, then from 19 April until the last day of the war. During the
years 1943 and 1944 I did not come to Berlin until May 1943, because up
to that time I had my own services in Vienna to reorganize so that they
could be transferred to Berlin. I think only once during the first or
second week in February 1943 did I stay in Berlin so as to pay visits,
and from the middle of February 1943 to February 1945 I was away on
trips for at least half the time. I have covered more than 400,000
kilometers by plane and car in my duties.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What were your activities when you were absent from
Berlin? Did you have no direct contact with Müller during that time?

KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not with Müller. During all these journeys of
mine in the entire Reich, I never entered one single service department
of the Secret State Police. An exception is the Secret State Police
office in Linz where my family was living for a short while and from
where I could send teleprints to Berlin; taking advantage of the Local
State Police office for purely technical reasons. I had no other
teleprint facilities there.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now going to discuss an affair of which you are
accused by the Prosecution. In a few words, these are the facts
concerned: During the suppression of the revolt in Warsaw in 1944,
inhabitants of the city of Warsaw were taken to concentration camps. The
Prosecution put the figure at about 50,000 to 60,000. Further
deportations are supposed to have ceased due to an intervention of the
Defendant Frank with Himmler, you personally having been involved by the
fact that Defendant Frank and his State Secretary, Bühler, had asked you
to get these people out of the concentration camps and return them to
their homes. To begin with, I ask you, did such a conference on that
subject take place in your office?

KALTENBRUNNER: A conference between Bühler and myself took place. The
subject was something quite different and I am asking you to let me
state it clearly. The so-called uprising of Warsaw was quelled in a
purely military action. I think that this fight took place under the
command of the chief of the anti-partisan units, Von dem Bach-Zelewski.
I do not know which fighting units he was commanding, but I must assume
that there were mixed troop units of the Armed Forces and the Police.
Any participation of my office in this purely military action is out of
question from the start. What Himmler and the troop units did with the
prisoners was naturally not reported to me. The reason why Bühler came
to see me was quite a different one. Frank, I think, for 1½ years or
even longer, had been trying to get Hitler to employ a different policy
in the Government General. Frank was in favor of increased autonomy for
the Polish people. In October 1944, I think on the occasion of a Polish
National holiday, Frank had been planning to announce the increase of
their autonomy. Hitler’s refusal, in which he was encouraged by Himmler,
and also other factors, was apparent. Therefore he sent Bühler to me
with the proposal that I should make suggestions through the information
service to the same end, that is, the participation of the Poles in the
district administration and in the high positions of the Government. I
promised Bühler both these things. He went on to say, “On this occasion
Frank wants a generous amnesty to be pronounced in Poland and that
includes the release of the prisoners from the Warsaw uprising. Can’t
you help us with that?” I asked him, “Where are those prisoners?” He
replied, “Himmler has, at all events, sent them to prisoner-of-war
concentration camps.” My answer could only have been, “Then he must have
employed them in any case in the armament industry and it will be hard
to get them out from there, but I shall favor an amnesty.” According to
my knowledge that was the state of the case.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would it have been possible for you to bring about a
release by asserting your full influence?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, during the time I was in office, as I have repeatedly
stated during interrogations before the Trial, I have received at least
1,000 individual applications for release and every single case was put
before Himmler or sent to him—put before him mostly, since I put them
in my report file and discussed them with Himmler during my periodical
reports to him. In perhaps two-thirds of all the cases I was successful
to the extent that he arranged a release. But to such an extent as Frank
wanted to achieve from Himmler with the help of Bühler, I never had the
possibility of making a decision or of bringing about a decision; that
was entirely in Himmler’s hands and was determined by the policy which
he and Hitler agreed upon regarding Poland.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now put before you a statement from the witness
Schellenberg. On 3 January this witness stated before this Tribunal that
the evacuation of the Buchenwald concentration camp had been ordered by
Kaltenbrunner. “Kaltenbrunner,” he said, “had stated yes, this is
correct; this evacuation is due to a Führer order which had been
confirmed to him, Kaltenbrunner, by the Führer.” Can you give an
explanation of this?

KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is quite definitely incorrect. It is
incorrect by the mere fact that Hitler quite definitely never ordered an
evacuation or a nonevacuation of concentration camps. Such an order
could only originate from Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: Was there an affidavit or did he give the
evidence—Schellenberg?

DR. KAUFFMANN: It was a statement of a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: It was given in evidence, was it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, it is a statement of a witness on 3 January.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But, then, who did actually give such an order?

KALTENBRUNNER: It could certainly have been an order only from Himmler
himself. The channel of command is quite clear: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks,
and the camp commandant. It is not impossible that Himmler may have
given the order direct to the commandant of the camp. That I do not
know.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question. Did you gain knowledge of
this order?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I neither heard of it nor could these orders be in
any way connected with me, since I had ordered exactly the contrary
regarding Mauthausen. I shall explain later why, in the case of
Mauthausen, I was able to give an order for the first and only time. It
has to do with the powers given to me on 19 April 1945. Until then, I
never had any possibility at all of giving any such order in the name of
Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In the same connection I am mentioning the statement made
3 January by the witness Berger. I read one or two sentences:

    “The commandant of Dachau”—says Berger—“or his deputy,
    telephoned about 12 o’clock and stated to me that he had
    received this order, that is, the order for the evacuation from
    Kaltenbrunner after he had been summoned by the Gauleiter of
    Munich, the Reich Commissioner.”

I ask you: Do you know anything about the evacuation of Dachau?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. This statement of Berger must be doubted quite
definitely because he was the man who had been given full authority by
Himmler, concerning Bavaria and all the territory west of it. That was
given to him the same day I received full power regarding Austria.
Therefore it would be for me...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the concentration camp at Dachau come under Berger’s
sphere of power just mentioned by you, or did it come under your sphere
of command?

KALTENBRUNNER: Since Dachau is near Munich in Bavaria, of course it was
only Berger’s sphere of command.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was Dachau evacuated at all?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know; I have never been to Bavaria after 19
April.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness refers to the date 23 April 1945, or a little
later, he says.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I forgot about that.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Where were you at that time?

KALTENBRUNNER: On 19 April, at 3 o’clock in the morning, I left Berlin
and went via Prague to Linz, my goal being Innsbruck where I wanted to
meet Burckhardt’s representative again. From that moment onwards, I no
longer had any connection with Berlin nor did I ever set foot on
Bavarian soil or give orders there. My sphere of duty stopped at the
Austrian border.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How can you explain such a statement?

KALTENBRUNNER: The only way I can explain it is that this must be a
mistake and if I am put face to face with Berger, I am completely
convinced that it can be cleared up.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Could it have been an evacuation order bearing the
signature of Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly; perfectly possible.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Among other things you have been accused by the
Prosecution of having committed a crime against peace. Will you tell the
Tribunal whether you did anything, and if so, what during your time of
office, to bring the war to an end?

KALTENBRUNNER: I started my duty on 1 February 1943. The situation which
I found in the Reich was such that on this day—to be more exact, 2
February 1943, with the case of Stalingrad—it was my conviction that
the war was to be regarded as absolutely lost for Germany. The
conditions which I found, coming from a completely different atmosphere,
from Austria, only confirmed this point of view. I recall that I paid my
inaugural visit to Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign
Office—I think it was on 2 or 3 February. I talked to him from half
past 11 in the morning until 2 o’clock in the afternoon, suspecting
nothing. We were talking about foreign political intelligence tasks
which we would have to carry out together. At 4 o’clock in the afternoon
the same Under Secretary of State Luther was arrested by the Gestapo and
taken to a concentration camp.

I do not think I can explain with a more drastic example the situation
in which I was put and how such events...

THE PRESIDENT: What is this in answer to? What is the question it is in
answer to?

DR. KAUFFMANN: You ought to come to the point a little more quickly. The
question was what you did to bring the war to the quickest possible end?

KALTENBRUNNER: I could quote a lot of factors in this connection. My
first effort was in the spring of 1943; I think it was even in February
1943, when I favored a considerable alteration of the church politics in
order to win the Vatican for the first peace mediations. That was my
first effort in that direction.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now mention the name Dulles. Did you have direct or
indirect contact with him and what was the purpose of your taking up
those connections?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I was in contact with him, namely, through Höttl.
Since May 1943, I won over step by step, Höttl and other Austrians who
were politically in the opposition, and learned of their peace feelers
directed to foreign countries. Through these channels I heard of
Roosevelt’s representative for central Europe. I think he was his
economics expert, a Mr. Dulles, who was reported as being in
Switzerland.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I want to interpose a question in that connection. What
would have happened if Hitler or Himmler had heard of that attitude of
yours?

KALTENBRUNNER: My order to Höttl and my knowledge of his activity was,
if you interpret it strictly, high treason since the Führer’s views were
known to me at the time. They were that there should be no contact
regarding peace and no discussions about peace. Hitler changed his
opinion only on 15 April 1945 in a discussion with me in the presence of
a certain Wolf.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In the course of this so-called peace policy which you
have described, did a representative make journeys to Switzerland so as
to make contact with the so-called Mr. Dulles?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, there was a large number of journeys, and indeed not
only by Höttl but by several other persons. For instance, I point out a
discussion which I had with a Count Potocki, whom I asked to get in
touch with such circles and forward the same information to
Anglo-American circles in Switzerland.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I think we can leave this subject. In my opinion you have
related the essential parts.

KALTENBRUNNER: These were not the only attempts, there were numerous
others.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to your relations with the President of the
Red Cross, Professor Burckhardt, and I ask you: Is it true that you had
a conference with Professor Burckhardt in 1945 with the aim that
camps—prisoner-of-war camps and concentration camps—should be opened
to the Red Cross so that medical supplies could be taken into these
camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I tried for a long time to achieve this with
Burckhardt. I was helped by the fact that he himself had asked for a
meeting with Himmler. Himmler, however, did not get Hitler’s permission
for such a meeting because he was, at the time, the Commander-in-Chief
on the northern front of the Vistula River. A meeting with Burckhardt
could have taken place only there at the front. I tried, therefore, to
take it upon myself to arrange a meeting between Burckhardt and a
responsible personality in the Reich. After a lot of ado and in spite of
many difficulties I succeeded. A private meeting with Burckhardt was
held on 12 March.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you come to an agreement, and within this agreement
was any help really given and in what manner?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, considerable help was given. An agreement was
reached, according to which all foreign civilian internees, with the
help of the Red Cross, were to be taken from all camps in the Reich and
released to their home countries. But in the first place, by granting
Burckhardt’s request during these discussions I achieved the aim that
the leading departments of the Reich were involved to such an extent
that they could no longer detach themselves from this agreement, and I
think that was my greatest success with Burckhardt.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that to get about 3,000 French and Belgian
civilian internees through the front line at that time, you got in touch
with General Kesselring’s headquarters?

KALTENBRUNNER: I sent a wireless message to the headquarters asking that
as soon as the Americans and British would agree to this, it should also
be allowed by the Germans that such internees go through the fighting
lines.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he said 12 March but he did not give the
year.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not understand—Yes, 12 March.

THE PRESIDENT: What year?

DR. KAUFFMANN: 1945.

[_Turning to the defendant._] What is the total number of people who,
due to your intervention reached their homeland?

KALTENBRUNNER: You must differentiate here between two different
periods: the first period before the private meeting on 12 March and the
period after that.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In my opinion you can give me a brief answer to that
question. The periods of time do not matter.

KALTENBRUNNER: At least 6,000 civilian internees coming from France and
Belgium and all the Eastern European States including the Balkan States
were included in these talks. At least 14,000 Jewish internees were
handed over to the Red Cross in the town of Gunskirchen for their
immediate care. This applies to the whole camp of Theresienstadt.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And finally is it correct—please answer very briefly
either in the affirmative or in the negative—that because of your
intervention, a special liaison department with the Red Cross was
installed at Konstanz for the purpose of facilitating and carrying out
this program further.

KALTENBRUNNER: A liaison department with the Red Cross was established
in Lindau and at Konstanz.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough.

The Prosecution hold you responsible for a wireless message you are
alleged to have sent to Fegelein in which it says:

    “Please report to the Reichsführer SS and inform the Führer,
    that all measures regarding Jews, political and concentration
    camp prisoners in the Protectorate, have been carried out by me
    personally today.”

I ask you: Did you send such a wireless?

KALTENBRUNNER: It did not get sent because the technical connection was
not re-established.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the number?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I did not mention a number. It was not
presented in court but it is contained in the trial brief on Page 14.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is Document 2519-PS. It was presented to the
Court.

KALTENBRUNNER: The wireless message was planned—the text probably was
written by the adjutant who was accompanying me. I did not write it
personally and as I say, it could not be sent.

On 19 April 1945 I had been given authority to act independently in
accordance with the discussions with Burckhardt with reference to
foreign civilian internees and regarding the entering of all camps by
the Red Cross. On that occasion I stated in Hitler’s and Himmler’s
presence that my route would be via Prague and Linz to Innsbruck and
that I would pass by Theresienstadt. I said that there were not only
Jewish prisoners there who were to be looked after by the Red Cross but
also Czechoslovak political prisoners. I suggested that their release
should also be carried out. That is the explanation for that wireless
message. But not until 19 April at 6 o’clock in the evening was I given
full power in this connection.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But the Prosecution might assume from that statement, and
at first, rightly so, that you might also have had jurisdiction over
concentration camp questions. I ask you—and please answer this question
with “yes” or “no.” Is it true that the powers you have mentioned as
given to you on 19 April 1945 were the first powers in that sphere
altogether?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would not have needed a renewed authority at all
if I had had it up to that time.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In a speech Himmler made on 3 October 1943 at Posen
before the Higher SS and Police Leaders, you are called Heydrich’s
successor. The Prosecution consider that this is a confirmation of the
entire executive power and your extraordinary powers in this sphere.

Does this formal expression, which was certainly used in this
connection, do justice to the situation or not?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I protest strongly—I have done so during all the
interrogations—against being called Heydrich’s successor. If in my
absence Himmler referred to me as such, or if earlier such a notice or
announcement coming from him was once published in the press then this
was done without my knowledge and without my wish. The first time, in
connection with that press notice, there was a violent reaction to
Himmler on my part. The day which you mentioned here I was ill in Berlin
with an inflammation of the veins and in plaster, and therefore I did
not join this discussion.

Neither the extent of my power nor outward appearance permitted the
slightest possibility of comparison with Heydrich. I want to say quite
briefly now that to the very last day of my activity I was paid 1,820
Reichsmark, which is the salary of a general of the police, and that
Heydrich’s income from his office was more than 30,000 Reichsmark, not
because he was paid for a higher rank but in recognition of his
completely different position. Any comparison is completely unjust.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, my next question: Is it correct that Himmler feared
Heydrich and this was because Heydrich had been given too much authority
from his point of view, and that for that reason he thought that by
appointing you he had found the very man who would be completely safe
for him, Himmler? In this connection the Prosecution have drawn a
parallel between you and Heydrich, and, as I have already just said,
they have described you as the second Heydrich.

KALTENBRUNNER: The relationship between Himmler and Heydrich can be
characterized shortly as follows: Heydrich was by far the more
intelligent of the two. He was at first an unusually docile and
obedient...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, we do not want to know anything about
Heydrich’s intelligence. The witness has said over and over again that
he was not his successor.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In that case I will repeat the question which I put
earlier, and which is the following: Did Himmler, by calling on you,
want a man who was completely safe for him, Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: He never again wanted to give away such executive power
out of his own hands to the extent that Heydrich had it. The moment
Heydrich was dead, Himmler took over the entire department and after
that never let the executive powers out of his hands. He had once had
the experience, in the person of Heydrich, of how dangerous a Chief of
the Security Police could become to him. He did not want to run that
risk a second time.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In other words, what you want to say, finally, is that
after Heydrich died, Himmler wanted to and did retain the whole
executive power in his hands?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, another question. You stated yesterday that you
learned of the conception of the so-called “final solution” only later
on. In effect, such instructions went from Himmler to Heydrich and to
Eichmann as early as 1941 or 1942. Is it true that you frequently met
Himmler? Were you a friend of Himmler’s?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is utterly wrong to call the relation between Himmler
and myself friendly. Just like every other official, I was treated by
him in an extremely cool and reserved manner. He was not a man who could
enter into personal relationship with anyone.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It is natural to assume, if I place myself in the
position of the Prosecution, that you must have had knowledge of the
“final solution” and of that idea, if you met Himmler frequently. I
therefore ask you again: Did not Himmler at some time put to you clearly
what this “final solution” was?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, not in this form. I said yesterday that on the basis
of all information which accumulated during the summer and autumn of
1943, including reports from enemy broadcasts and foreign news, I came
to the conviction that the statement regarding the destruction of Jews
was true, and that, thus convinced, I immediately went to see Hitler,
and the next day Himmler, and complained to both of them saying that I
could not for one single minute support any such action. Beginning with
that moment...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, well, you said so yesterday. You need not repeat it
again.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, he told us that before and you told us
that you would finish in an hour; you have now been nearly an hour and a
half.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have only two or three questions.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The trial brief of the Prosecution
contains a statement of Schellenberg, and it runs as follows: “What am I
going to do with Kaltenbrunner? He would have me completely under his
thumb in that case.”

This is stated by Schellenberg in an affidavit, and it is supposed to
have been said by Himmler. Please, will you give a very brief statement
regarding the fact whether you would consider such a statement by
Himmler at all probable?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not consider such a statement probable. If he did
say it, then it can have been only in connection with...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is a possible question
to put to the witness.

DR. KAUFFMANN: [_To the defendant._] In the trial brief a document of
this kind has been presented and charged against you but, if the
President does not wish that question, I shall be glad to withdraw it.

THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be merely a matter of argument, and you
cannot criticize this affidavit, if the affidavit is in evidence.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I now come to the last question. I ask you whether the
possibility existed that you, after you gradually became aware of
conditions within the Gestapo and concentration camps, _et cetera_,
could have brought about a change? If that possibility did exist, can
you say that by staying on in your position you achieved any alleviation
in this sphere and an improvement of conditions?

KALTENBRUNNER: I repeatedly asked to join troops at the front, but the
most burning question which I personally had to decide was: Will
conditions be thus improved, alleviated? Or will anything be changed? Or
is it my personal duty in this position to do everything necessary to
change all these sharply criticized conditions?

Upon repeated refusals to my request to be detailed to the front, I had
no other alternative than to try myself to alter a system, the
ideological and legal basis of which could not be altered by me, as had
been proved by all the orders issued before my time and offered in
evidence here. All that I could do was to try to modify these methods
while striving to have them abolished altogether.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did your conscience permit you to remain in office in
spite of it?

KALTENBRUNNER: When I considered the possibility of exerting again and
again influence on Hitler and Himmler and other persons, my conscience
would not allow me to leave my position. I thought it my duty to take,
personally, a stand against wrong.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions of the defendant?

DR. DIX: Do you know, Witness, that Schacht, before he was taken into
custody by the Allied Forces, had been in a concentration camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. DIX: How long have you known that?

KALTENBRUNNER: Since his wife wrote me a letter; and I believe that she
requested me to present a petition so that she might get her husband
out.

DR. DIX: And about when was that?

KALTENBRUNNER: I assume around Christmas 1944.

DR. DIX: Do you know or have you any idea at whose suggestion Schacht
was interned in a concentration camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that on the very same day I sent this letter
from Herr Schacht’s wife by courier to the office of Hitler’s adjutant,
and I believe I received word through Fegelein or one of Hitler’s
adjutants, that Hitler was to be consulted in this matter. Some time
later I learned that Schacht had been interned on Hitler’s order,
because he was suspected of working together with Goerdeler or in any
case was one of the instigators of the high treason plan and of the
assassination attempted on Hitler on 20 July 1944.

DR. DIX: I have a letter I received a short time ago, written by a
former concentration camp inmate, who was told by Obersturmbannführer
Stawitzky—Do you know him?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. DIX: He was the last commander of the concentration camp at
Flossenbürg. In this letter I am told that this Stawitzky had told him
that he had been ordered to murder Schacht along with the other special
internees like Canaris, _et cetera_. Do you know anything about an order
for the murder of Schacht?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. DIX: Do you consider it possible that Stawitzky might have decided
on such a step through his own authority?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. DIX: If I interpret your answer correctly, such an instruction could
have come only from the highest level, that is, either from Hitler or
Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, you may assume that. As far as Schacht is concerned,
it could only have been an order from Hitler himself.

DR. DIX: Thank you.

DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for Gestapo): I have some questions to put to
the witness.

Witness, the Indictment contends that the Secret State Police in the
years 1943 to 1945 had about 40,000 to 50,000 members. What can you
remember about this?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that this figure is slightly too high.

DR. MERKEL: What do you estimate the figure was?

KALTENBRUNNER: I would rather assume 35,000 to 40,000.

DR. MERKEL: Approximately how many Gestapo officials were active in the
occupied countries?

KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot tell you even approximately, but I believe
I have heard a figure of 800 people, for example, for the occupied
region in France.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know to whom these officials in the occupied
countries were subordinate?

KALTENBRUNNER: In the occupied countries, to the commander of the
Security Police, who in turn was subordinate to the Higher SS and Police
Leader of the occupied territory.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know at all whether in the offices of the commanders
of the Sipo and SD, Kripo officials, that is, officials of the Criminal
Police, were carrying out tasks of a state political nature?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is possible.

DR. MERKEL: What approximately was the number of the Gestapo officials
assigned in the East to the Einsatzgruppen A to G?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know.

DR. MERKEL: Can you tell me whether these officials, when assigned to
the Einsatzgruppen, were released from the authority of the State Police
and were acting as a special body in the Einsatzgruppen engaged in tasks
with which the State Police themselves had no more to do?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe one can assume that. Personnel affairs were
still attended to, that is, their salaries were paid as usual, but the
powers to issue orders, the authority to give orders was certainly
different.

DR. MERKEL: Approximately how were the members of the State Police
organized, that is, proportionally according to their functions? First,
officials who had purely administrative functions?

KALTENBRUNNER: At least 20 percent.

DR. MERKEL: Officials with purely Security Police functions?

KALTENBRUNNER: The same number; for the greater part were in any case
the subordinate personnel, that is, the technical personnel...

DR. MERKEL: This is what I intended to ask you.

The technical personnel, that is radio men, teletypists, drivers, and
office personnel, how many were they altogether?

KALTENBRUNNER: The first group is 20 percent, that is the administrative
group, and the so-called executive personnel is 20 percent, then the
remaining 60 per cent fall into two equally large groups of 30 percent
each, the technical auxiliary personnel and the office personnel.

DR. MERKEL: Tell me in one brief sentence the aims and tasks of the
State Police.

KALTENBRUNNER: They have been explained here repeatedly. The State
Police had for their main function, as in every other country, the
protection of the State from any attack coming from within.

DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution contend that the membership in the State
Police was voluntary. What can you say to that?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that contention can in no way be maintained nor
proved. I would like to say that obviously the official staff in
existence in 1933 could be made up only of officials who already had
been police officials at that time.

DR. MERKEL: In what way did they come to the State Police?

KALTENBRUNNER: They were ordered.

DR. MERKEL: Ordered or transferred?

KALTENBRUNNER: There was a State Police in existence prior to that time;
to be sure, they were not called the State Police at that time, but the
Political Police Department.

DR. MERKEL: Then the personnel of the State Police was later on
apparently completed, just like the personnel of every other State
office, in conformity with the principles of the German Government
Employees Law?

KALTENBRUNNER: Absolutely, yes.

DR. MERKEL: Did the Führer Decree Number 1 regarding secrecy apply to
the service in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt? You certainly know
it—that no one was to know more about a matter than absolutely
necessary for his job? Did this rule also apply in the office of the
Gestapo?

KALTENBRUNNER: This decree applied not only to the Wehrmacht but also to
the entire internal executive power, for all administrative offices, and
it was posted in every office throughout the Reich. So, of course, we
were especially strict in observing this order in the Police.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know anything about the 1 October 1944 decree,
according to which the entire Customs and Border Protection, which had
been under the Reich Finance Office until that time, was transferred to
Amt IV, that is, the Gestapo, of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: The Customs and Border Protection was transferred to
Himmler and taken out of the sphere of the Reich Finance Ministry—I
believe in September—by order of Hitler in the fall of 1944.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know about how much personnel was involved in that
transfer?

KALTENBRUNNER: In the beginning the Customs and Border Protection
comprised 50,000 people. At this time I think there must have been at
least 10,000 people less, because recruiting by the Wehrmacht had taken
place several times, that is, younger men were put into the fighting
forces.

DR. MERKEL: Can you sum up in one sentence the function of the Customs
and Border Protection?

KALTENBRUNNER: As the name implies, the Customs and Border Protection
had to guarantee the financial sovereignty of the Reich through border
security measures.

DR. MERKEL: Can one say at all that these estimated 40,000 officials
joined the Gestapo voluntarily?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, by order.

DR. MERKEL: The Border Police (Grenzpolizei) is different from the
Customs and Border Protection (Zollgrenzschutz). Do you know that as
early as 1935 it already formed part of the State Police?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. Müller was General Border Inspector of the Reich.

DR. MERKEL: Sum up in one sentence the tasks of the Border Police.

KALTENBRUNNER: The Border Police checked passports at borders, airports,
railways, highways. It was entrusted with the entire normal border
control.

DR. MERKEL: Was this task different from what it was in the years before
1933; had anything changed?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. MERKEL: Did it vary from the tasks of the Border Police in other
countries?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.

DR. MERKEL: How were the relations between the members of the State
Police, their officials and employees, and the SS; did they mostly enter
the SS voluntarily or was it on the basis of an order?

KALTENBRUNNER: Voluntary enlistments must have been comparatively few. I
know that later Himmler, as far as promotions were concerned, was more
hesitant if the official did not belong to the SS, so for that reason
enlistments occurred, if not from inner conviction, at least from a
desire to be promoted.

DR. MERKEL: Thus, the larger part then joined because of this.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it was based on Himmler’s promotional system.

DR. MERKEL: Did the members of the State Police, particularly the
officials, have any possibility of leaving their posts when they wanted
to?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

DR. MERKEL: A large part of the members of the State Police were
so-called “Notdienstverpflichtete.” Will you very briefly explain the
term to the Tribunal?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is not true of those officials who had executive
standing. As far as the other personnel were concerned there were more
of that kind among them, especially as the war went along, because
losses ran very high, as of course, in all branches of the Police and
Wehrmacht. Thus towards the end, the personnel could be kept up only by
recruiting Notdienstverpflichtete. That is true in any case of the
technical and office personnel.

DR. MERKEL: Did those Notdienstverpflichtete join the State Police
voluntarily?

KALTENBRUNNER: They had nothing to say in the matter. After
consultations with the competent labor offices they were put into the
Notdienst positions wherever the Reich ordered it.

DR. MERKEL: What happened to the members of the State Police who at
interrogations committed excesses or trespassed on foreign property?

KALTENBRUNNER: The same rules were followed which applied to all
organizations subordinate to Himmler. They had their own SS and Police
courts. In one sentence I may characterize this system by stating that
the penalties were much more severe than in a civil court.

DR. MERKEL: A certain man has asserted that for an offense of taking
away a few unimportant things from a prisoner, he had to serve a long
period in the penitentiary. Was that the ordinarily normal and just
punishment?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know who was taken to the SS Concentration Camp
Danzig-Matzkau?

KALTENBRUNNER: Anyone who had been sentenced to imprisonment by SS and
Police courts was put into the Danzig-Matzkau SS Concentration Camp,
which was called an SS punishment camp rather than a concentration camp.

DR. MERKEL: Could a Gestapo member, especially of a higher rank, visit a
concentration camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: Only with the express approval of Pohl or Glücks.

DR. MERKEL: Is that also true of the Higher SS and Police Leaders for
the camps which were situated within their districts?

KALTENBRUNNER: I could not say that with certainty. In any case, I
assume they also applied or had to apply to make these visits.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know of the so-called “severe interrogations?” Are
these in force in other countries, too?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was President of the International Criminal Police
Commission, and in this capacity I had the opportunity to speak about
this topic at a meeting in the autumn of 1943. From this conference and
also from my reading of the foreign press over a number of years I
gathered that the police system of each state also makes use of rather
severe measures of interrogation.

DR. MERKEL: Could a State Police official...

THE PRESIDENT: What happened at some international police commission
does not seem to be relevant to anything in this case.

DR. MERKEL: I only wanted to question him as to whether these “severe
interrogations” were applied not only in Germany but also in other
states.

THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with that.

DR. MERKEL: However, the severe measures of interrogation are used as a
charge in the trial brief against the State Police, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Could a State Police officer, when
executing a protective custody order of limited duration, consider
corporal punishment or even the putting to death of the prisoner upon
his commitment into the camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: Emphatically no when a custody of limited duration was
concerned.

DR. MERKEL: Did a so-called proceedings for investigating the reasons
for imprisonment apply also to the inmates of the concentration camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: Every case of protective custody underwent investigation;
in time of war twice, in time of peace, of course, more often...

DR. MERKEL: One last problem...

KALTENBRUNNER: ...but this investigation was not just a matter of the
State Police. It had to be made by the camp commander, who had to report
on the behavior of the prisoner. This report had to be given by the camp
commander to the Inspector of the Concentration Camps. Then the State
Police had to decide on the matter.

DR. MERKEL: The Prosecution have put in evidence a considerable amount
about ill-treatment and torture during the questionings which took place
in occupied Western countries, especially France, Holland, Belgium,
Norway. Were there any instructions from the RSHA in this connection to
use torture?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, certainly not.

DR. MERKEL: How do you explain the fact of this ill-treatment?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have heard nothing about such ill-treatment with which
the State Police is charged. In my opinion it concerns only excesses of
individuals. A decree to that effect certainly was never issued.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know that in the occupied countries members of the
resistance movement and also criminal elements masqueraded as members of
the German State Police in order to facilitate their tasks?

KALTENBRUNNER: That has been repeatedly stated, but I also cannot
remember in detail having seen any exact records about that.

DR. MERKEL: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no further questions.

DR. CARL HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS): Witness, in the year 1932 you
joined the Austrian SS, according to your testimony.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Was there a difference between the Austrian SS and the
German SS, or was it a similar group?

KALTENBRUNNER: There was a certain organizational similarity, which took
effect only after the Anschluss. Up to the time of the Anschluss, the SS
in Austria could hardly be differentiated from the Party or from the SA
itself.

DR. HAENSEL: Sum up with a number the strength of the Austrian SS, to
which you belonged; first of all, before the Austrian Anschluss in 1938
and then at the time when you joined. How did the development take place
approximately, expressed in figures?

THE PRESIDENT: Too fast.

DR. HAENSEL: Did the development of the Austrian SS, to which you
belonged, take place in 1938 as in 1932?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that at the time of the Austrian Anschluss, the
maximum membership was perhaps 7,500.

DR. HAENSEL: Did that group play the role of a Fifth Column in Austria?
Is “Fifth Column” a concept at all as far as you are concerned?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, “Fifth Column” became a concept to me through the
statements of the enemy, but to term the Austrian SS a Fifth Column is
entirely wrong. The Austrian SS never had the task of being an
intelligence unit or a sabotage unit or anything like that.

DR. HAENSEL: Did there exist in the Austrian SS, to which you belonged,
the slightest intention to bring through force the annexation of Austria
to Germany or was this to be brought about through a plebiscite, through
legal measures?

KALTENBRUNNER: There was by the SS neither such a plan of annexation by
force nor do the facts of the political development comply with this.
There was never any necessity for any such step, for the Anschluss
Movement, without any such outside urge, was conclusively strong enough
in itself.

DR. HAENSEL: It has been asserted that the SS Standarte 86—That must
have been the one at Vienna...

KALTENBRUNNER: You are thinking of the Dollfuss Putsch?

DR. HAENSEL: Right. Can you tell me something about that? Did the work
of this corps have any connection with the assassination of the Austrian
Chancellor?

KALTENBRUNNER: I consider that incorrect. I must say that this corps
later on did not have the number 86 but 89. In addition the group which
had entered the Chancellery on 25 July 1934 was not a group of the SS,
but a group of former members of the Austrian Army who, because of
National Socialist activity, had been discharged from the Army.

I do not know the matter in detail. However, the chief of the Austrian
Police at that time, Dr. Skubl, who as far as I know is demanded here as
a witness in another case, should be able to give you exact information
about that. I ask that you question him about this matter.

DR. HAENSEL: Try to remember the entry of the troops on the night of 11
March 1938. What kind of troops marched in, according to your
recollection? I ask: Were they SS units or were they other units? Were
they Army units? Were there SS Verfügungstruppen? What is your
recollection?

KALTENBRUNNER: My recollection is that, first of all, there were
Wehrmacht units, the Luftwaffe of course, and there was one regiment of
the Waffen-SS—I cannot recall which one, probably the Standarte
Deutschland—participating in the entry.

DR. HAENSEL: Can you compare the size of the Wehrmacht and the Standarte
Deutschland approximately?

KALTENBRUNNER: The Standarte Deutschland at that time had 2,800 men
perhaps. So far as the Wehrmacht is concerned, I do not know how many
units took part.

DR. HAENSEL: In order to establish the relationship and according to
your idea, what is the entire number of SS men? I would like to make it
a little easier for you. I have seen a communication in which it is
stated that, in all and in the course of time, 750,000 to 1 million men
have passed through the SS. Is such a figure correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: One million certainly is too high. All branches of the SS
taken together, including the General SS and the Waffen-SS and including
the SS members in the various police activities, I believe add up to
720,000 to 750,000 men. Out of that number at least 320,000 to 350,000
men died in action. These losses might even be a little higher than what
I just stated, but I believe a more precise figure might be obtained
from one of the defendants who belonged to the Wehrmacht. I do not know
it exactly.

DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge how many men of this entire
number do you believe were connected with concentration camps, that is,
with the supervision, administration, and so forth? Can you give me any
figure as to just how many were so connected?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is a rather surprising question to me, which I
cannot answer immediately. I would have to have pencil and paper in
order to make calculations.

DR. HAENSEL: Could you, through your own knowledge...

KALTENBRUNNER: Of course, it is only a fraction, a very small fraction
of the entire figure.

DR. HAENSEL: Did those SS members, no matter how many or how few they
were, who were not connected with the administration of concentration
camps have any insight into these conditions or in this administration
and the things that took place in the camps?

KALTENBRUNNER: Certainly not.

DR. HAENSEL: How can you tell me that with such certainty?

KALTENBRUNNER: From my own personal knowledge that Himmler and his
organization kept the concentration camps behind an iron curtain.

DR. HAENSEL: Were the officials of the office which you headed, for
example the Main Security Office, recruited only from the SS or mostly
from the SS?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, not at all. The proportion of the SS members to those
who did not belong to the SS was 5 percent if I consider only the
confidence men and the staff of the SD inside Germany.

DR. HAENSEL: Therefore, for 100 officials, there were 5 who had gone
through the SS?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: According to your knowledge were there regulations
prohibiting the physical ill-treatment of concentration camp inmates and
were these regulations known in the SS?

KALTENBRUNNER: They were issued in print: that is, contained in nearly
every gazette of the Reichsführer SS and the Chief of the German Police.
Every SS man knew these regulations were laws, and they were punished
heavily if ill-treatment was reported or became evident.

I do not know to what extent and in what state the SS Punishment Camp
Danzig-Matzkau fell into the hands of the enemy, but I am convinced that
all those who underwent a term of imprisonment there will give
information about this severe punishment in connection with any
ill-treatment which may have occurred.

DR. HAENSEL: I have finished, Your Honors.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

COL. AMEN: Defendant, in order to shorten as much as possible the time
of this cross-examination, I want to be sure that we understand each
other as to just what your position is as to several specific items.

Now, first, you concede that you held the title of Chief of the RSHA and
Chief of the Security Police and SD from the end of January 1943 up to
and including the end of the war. Is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it applies with those limitations which I enumerated
yesterday with regard to my authority in the State and Criminal Police.

COL. AMEN: And when you speak of those limitations, you are referring to
this supposed understanding with Himmler? Is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: It was not a supposed understanding with Himmler but a
well-established fact which existed from the very first day, that I had
the task of establishing a centralized intelligence service in the Reich
and that he would retain command in the other sectors.

COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, you concede that you held that title, but
you deny that you exercised some of the powers? Correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And this title which you held was the same title which was
previously held by Heydrich, who had died on 4 June 1942? Is that
correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: There was no change in title?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: And you testified that you assume responsibility for all of
the things which you did personally or knew about personally. That is
correct, is it not?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I could add one thing, that my title was extended on
14 February 1944, when the Military Intelligence Service of the OKW, Amt
Abwehr, was transferred to Himmler by Hitler. Then my title as Chief of
the entire Reich Central Intelligence Service became known in other
departments.

And I might add also, perhaps, that the capacity of a man or his duties
in an intelligence service which not only comprised a big country like
the Reich but also extended to foreign countries were not made public. I
might refer to England, where the Chief of the Secret Service over
other...

COL. AMEN: Defendant, will you please try to confine yourself to
answering my questions “yes” or “no” whenever possible, and making only
a brief explanation, because we will come to all these other things in
due time. Will you try to do that?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, very well.

COL. AMEN: Did you have any personal knowledge or anything personal to
do with any of the atrocities which occurred in concentration camps
during the war?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility before this
Tribunal for any such atrocities? Is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not assume any responsibility in that regard.

COL. AMEN: And, in that connection, such testimony as has been given
here, by Höllriegel for example, to the effect that you witnessed
executions at Mauthausen, you deny? Is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was already told yesterday of the testimony of
Höllriegel. I consider the statement that I ever saw a gas chamber,
either in operation or at any other time, wrong and incorrect.

COL. AMEN: Very good. You had no personal knowledge of and did nothing
personal about the program for the extermination of Jews; is that
correct—except to oppose them?

KALTENBRUNNER: No—except that I was against it. From the moment I knew
of this as facts and had convinced myself of it, I raised objections
with Hitler and Himmler, and the final result was that they were
stopped.

COL. AMEN: And therefore you assume no responsibility for anything done
in connection with the program for the extermination of the Jews, right?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And does the same thing apply to the program for forced
labor?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies, does it not, to the razing of the
Warsaw Ghetto?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the execution of 50 fliers in
connection with Stalag Luft III?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And the same thing applies to the various orders with respect
to the killing of enemy fliers, correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And, as a matters of fact, you made all these same denials in
the course of your interrogations before this Trial, correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you still make them today?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. But as far as the preliminary interrogations are
concerned, may I make a statement again in the course of the
cross-examination?

COL. AMEN: Well, when we come to the proper place let us know.

Is it or is it not a fact that the Gestapo, Amt IV, RSHA, prepared
reports on concentration camps which were submitted to you for signature
and then passed on to Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. I do not recall any such reports. The normal channel
was that Müller reported to Himmler directly.

COL. AMEN: Do you likewise deny...

KALTENBRUNNER: I would like to add that of course certain matters
existed of which I had to be informed for several reasons, for instance
the great domestic political event, the plot of 20 July 1944 of course;
I was informed in such cases, not through Amt IV but through...

COL. AMEN: I am speaking of the general course of activity and not of
any special exceptions, you understand.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: You likewise deny that Müller, as chief of Amt IV, always
conferred with you with respect to any important documents?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I not only deny it but the facts speak against it.
He had direct authority from Himmler. He had no reason to discuss this
matter with me beforehand.

COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown a document, L-50, which
will become Exhibit Number USA-793.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t this been put in before?

COL. AMEN: No, Your Lordship, I am told it has not.

[_Turning to the defendant._] By the way, were you acquainted with Kurt
Lindow, who makes this affidavit dated 2 August 1945?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: Although he was an official in the RSHA until 1944? Let us
read together Paragraphs 2 and 4 only. I won’t take the time of the
Tribunal to read Paragraphs 1 and 3. 2, you will note, reads as follows:

    “On the basis of general experience as well as individual cases
    I can confirm that the Gestapo (Amt IV) wrote reports about
    practices of the administrative authorities in the concentration
    camps and that these were given by the Chief of Amt IV to the
    Chief of the Security Police who submitted them for signature to
    Reichsführer Himmler.”

KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to that immediately? It might be important
perhaps to read Paragraph 1, too.

COL. AMEN: Please make it as brief as you can.

KALTENBRUNNER: Paragraph 1 seems to be important to read, for in
Paragraph 1 it is said that the witness Lindow, from 1938 until 1940,
was in the section in which such reports were written. From 1940 to 1941
he was in counterespionage; in 1942 and 1943 he was in the section for
combating of Communism; and later he was in the section for educational
matters. I believe, therefore, that his testimony in Paragraph 2—that
he knew of the custom of the State Police, that is that via the Chief of
Department IV, through the Chief of the Security Police, reports were
sent to Himmler about happenings in concentration camps—holds true only
for the period 1938 to 1940. Judging from his own testimony, he has no
personal experience about the later periods.

COL. AMEN: Well, in other words he is not telling the truth as it was at
the time when you were active in RSHA; correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read anything about that. He maintains that...

COL. AMEN: I am calling your attention to two paragraphs. We have
already covered 2, and now we will read 4:

    “To my knowledge no chief of office or any of the officials of
    the RSHA authorized to sign had the right to sign in any
    fundamental affairs of particular political significance without
    consent of the Chief of the Security Police, not even during his
    temporary absence. From my own experience I can furthermore
    declare that particularly the Chief of Office IV, Müller, was
    very cautious in signing documents concerning questions of a
    general nature of possibly greater importance, and that he put
    aside documents of such nature in most cases for the return of
    the Chief of the Security Police, whereby, alas, often much time
    was lost.”—Signed—“Kurt Lindow.”

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I would like to make two statements: First, this
assertion is completely contrary to the testimony of several witnesses
who spoke of the extraordinary authority and independence exercised by
Müller and testified to it.

Secondly, the description of Lindow is applicable to that period of time
in which Heydrich was active, that is, the time between 1938 and 1940,
in which Lindow could obtain experience. But this does not apply to the
period in which Himmler gave direct orders to Müller. That was Himmler’s
prerogative, for my tasks were of such scope that it was almost
impossible for one man to handle the work that I did.

COL. AMEN: I don’t want to spend too much time on it now, Defendant, but
the paragraphs which I read you conform to the testimony of Ohlendorf
before this Tribunal, do they not?

KALTENBRUNNER: The testimony as given by Ohlendorf was shown to me
yesterday by my counsel. But also the testimony as given by Ohlendorf, I
believe, leads us clearly to see that any executive order, even for
protective custody—and he used the term “down to the last
washerwoman”—needed the direct consent of Himmler, who could delegate
this authority only to Müller. He did add, however, that he did not know
whether my authority suffered any such restrictions and whether,
perhaps, I might not have had such powers, but he could not state that
with certainty. And the rest of his testimony contradicts the assumption
that I had such broad authority.

COL. AMEN: We all know what Ohlendorf’s testimony was. I merely want to
ask you if you accept the testimony of Ohlendorf. You told us in the
course of interrogations that you had the most contact with Ohlendorf
and that you would trust him to tell the truth before any of your other
associates; is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall the last statement. The first statement,
that he was one of my chief collaborators, is justified and is proved by
the fact that he was chief of the Intelligence within Germany, which
became a part of my Intelligence Service. All domestic political
reports, reports about all German spheres of life, I received mostly
from this Amt III, in addition to the news from the other departments
which I organized myself.

COL. AMEN: Shortly after Easter 1934 you were under arrest in the
Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: What year did you say, please?

COL. AMEN: 1934.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, from 14 January until the beginning of May.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever, in company with other SS functionaries, make an
inspection of the Mauthausen Camp?

KALTENBRUNNER: With other SS officials, no. To my recollection I went
there alone and had to report there to Himmler, who, as I stated
yesterday, was conducting an inspection tour through southern Germany.

COL. AMEN: And you went only in the quarry? Right?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Karwinsky, the State Secretary in
the Dollfuss and Schuschnigg Cabinets from September 1933 to October
1935—Karwinsky?

KALTENBRUNNER: I saw Karwinsky once. I believe he visited us in the
Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp at that time during our hunger strike.
Otherwise I never saw him. It might be that one of his representatives
visited us. That I cannot say.

COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3843-PS,
which will be Exhibit Number USA-794. I would like to say to the
Tribunal that there is rather objectionable language in this exhibit but
I do feel that in view of the charges against the defendant, I do feel
it is my duty to read it nonetheless.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

If you will turn to Page 3, defendant.

KALTENBRUNNER: On Page 3 there are just a few lines. May I read the
entire document first, please?

COL. AMEN: It would take much too much time, Defendant. I am only
interested in the paragraph which is on Page 3 of the English text, and
commences, “Shortly after Easter...” Do you have it?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

    COL. AMEN: “Shortly after Easter 1934 I received the news that
    the prisoners in the Kaisersteinbruch Detention Camp had gone on
    hunger strike. Thereupon I went there myself, in order to inform
    myself about the situation. While comparative calm and
    discipline prevailed in most of the barracks, one barrack was
    very disorderly. I noticed that one tall man seemed to be the
    obvious leader of the resistance. This was Kaltenbrunner, at
    that time a candidate for attorney-at-law, who was under arrest
    because of his illegal activity in Upper Austria. While all the
    other barracks gave up their hunger strike after a talk which I
    had with representatives of the prisoners, the barracks under
    Kaltenbrunner persisted in the strike.

    “I saw Kaltenbrunner again in the Mauthausen Camp, when I was
    severely ill and lying on rotten straw with several hundred
    other seriously ill persons, many of them dying. The prisoners,
    suffering from hunger oedemata and from the most serious
    intestinal sicknesses, were lying in unheated barracks in the
    dead of winter. The most primitive sanitary facilities were
    lacking. The toilets and the washrooms were unusable for months.
    The severely ill persons had to relieve themselves in little
    marmalade buckets. The soiled straw was not renewed for weeks,
    so that a stinking liquid was formed, in which worms and maggots
    crawled around. There was no medical attendance or medicines.
    Conditions were such that 10 to 20 persons died every night.
    Kaltenbrunner walked through the barracks with a brilliant suite
    of high SS functionaries, saw everything, must have seen
    everything. We were under the illusion that these inhuman
    conditions would now be changed, but they apparently met with
    Kaltenbrunner’s approval for nothing happened thereafter.”

Is that true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: I can refute this document, evidently presented in order
to surprise me, in every point.

COL. AMEN: I ask you—first, I ask you to state whether it is true or
false?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true and I can refute each detail.

COL. AMEN: Make it as brief as possible.

KALTENBRUNNER: It is not possible to me to take less time in refuting
it, Mr. Prosecutor, than you took in reading it. I have to refute each
word which is incriminating me. Here Karwinsky maintains...

COL. AMEN: Just a moment. Perhaps you will wait until I have read to you
two more exhibits I have along the same line. Then perhaps you can make
your explanation of all three at the same time. Is that satisfactory to
you?

KALTENBRUNNER: As you wish.

COL. AMEN: I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number 3845-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-795.

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

You have already denied, I believe, having visited or going through the
crematorium at Mauthausen; correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Do you know Tiefenbacher, Albert Tiefenbacher?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: If you have the document you will note that he was at
Mauthausen Concentration Camp from 1938 until 1 May 1945 and that he was
employed in the crematorium at Mauthausen for 3 years as carrier of dead
bodies. You note that?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, passing to the lower half of the first page, you will
find the question:

    “Do you remember Eigruber?

    “Answer: Eigruber and Kaltenbrunner were from Linz.

    “Question: Did you ever see them in Mauthausen?

    “Answer: I saw Kaltenbrunner very often.

    “Question: How many times?

    “Answer: He came from time to time and went through the
    crematorium.

    “Question: About how many times?

    “Answer: Three or four times.

    “Question: On any occasion when he came through, did you hear
    him say anything to anybody?

    “Answer: When Kaltenbrunner arrived most prisoners had to
    disappear. Only certain people were introduced to him.”

Is that true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is completely incorrect.

COL. AMEN: Now I will show you the third document and then you can make
a brief explanation. I ask that the defendant be shown Document Number
3846-PS which will become Exhibit Number USA-796.

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

I might ask you, Witness, do you remember ever having witnessed a
demonstration of three different kinds of executions at Mauthausen at
the same time? Three different kinds of execution?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not true.

COL. AMEN: Are you acquainted with Johann Kanduth who makes this
affidavit?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: You will note, from the affidavit, that he lived in Linz;
that he was an inmate of the concentration camp at Mauthausen from 21
March 1939 until 5 May 1945; that besides the work in the kitchen he
also worked in the crematorium from 9 May, and he worked the heating for
the cremation of the bodies. Now, if you will turn to the second page,
at the top:

    “Question: Have you ever seen Kaltenbrunner at Mauthausen on a
    visit at any time?

    “Answer: Yes.

    “Question: Do you remember when it was?

    “Answer: In 1942 and 1943.

    “Question: Can you give it more exactly, maybe the month?

    “Answer: I do not know the date.

    “Question: Do you remember only this one visit in the year 1942
    or 1943?

    “Answer: I remember that Kaltenbrunner was there three times.

    “Question: What year?

    “Answer: Between 1942 and 1943.

    “Question: Tell us, in short, what did you think about these
    visits of Kaltenbrunner which you described? That is, what did
    you see, what did you do, and when did you see that he was or
    was not present at such executions?

    “Answer: Kaltenbrunner was accompanied by Eigruber, Schulz,
    Ziereis, Bachmeyer, Streitwieser, and some other people.
    Kaltenbrunner went laughing into the gas chamber. Then the
    people were brought from the bunker to be executed, and then all
    three kinds of executions: hanging, shooting in the back of the
    neck and gassing, were demonstrated. After the dust had
    disappeared we had to take away the bodies.

    “Question: When did you see the three different kinds of
    executions? Were these just demonstrations or regular
    executions?

    “Answer: I do not know if they were regular executions, or just
    demonstrations. During these executions, besides Kaltenbrunner,
    the bunker leaders, Hauptscharführer Seidl and Duessen, were
    also present. The last named then led the people downstairs.

    “Question: Do you know whether these executions were announced
    for this day or if they were just demonstrations or if the
    executions were staged just for pleasure of the visitors?

    “Answer: Yes, these executions were announced for this day.

    “Question: How do you know that they were set for this day? Did
    somebody tell you about these announced executions?

    “Answer: Hauptscharführer Roth, the leader of the crematorium,
    always had me called to his room and said to me, ‘Kaltenbrunner
    will come today and we have to prepare everything for the
    execution in his presence.’ Then we were obliged to heat and to
    clean the stoves.”

KALTENBRUNNER: May I answer?

COL. AMEN: Is that true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: Under my oath, I wish to state solemnly that not a single
word of these statements is true. I might start with the first document.

COL. AMEN: Could you note, Defendant, that none of these affidavits were
taken in Nuremberg, but that they all appeared to have been taken
outside of Nuremberg in connection with an entirely different proceeding
or investigation. Did you note that?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, but it is irrelevant as far as the testimony itself
is concerned. May I now start to talk about this document?

COL. AMEN: Yes, go ahead.

KALTENBRUNNER: The Witness Karwinsky states having seen me in the year
1934 in connection with the hunger strike in the Kaisersteinbruch
Detention Camp. He singles out the barracks in which disorders were
taking place at which a tall man, meaning myself, was present. According
to him, I was interned there because of my illegal activity in Austria.
As far as these statements are concerned, up to now, they are completely
wrong.

First of all, I was not interned there because of National Socialist
activities. The note of imprisonment we had received in writing, which
must have been known to Herr Karwinsky, who was then Austrian State
Secretary for Security, stated literally that we were arrested to
prevent us from performing National Socialist activities. So there was
no prohibited activity at this time charged against me. Then, further,
when Karwinsky came, the hunger strike was in its ninth day. We had
not...

COL. AMEN: May I interrupt you just a moment, Defendant. I am perfectly
satisfied if you testify that these statements are false. If you are
satisfied, I am perfectly satisfied with that answer. I do not need an
explanation of all of these paragraphs when we have no way of verifying
what you say.

KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I cannot be satisfied if the High
Tribunal and the whole world is presented with testimony and documents
which are pages long and which you contend are the truth, and which
incriminate me in the gravest manner. I must certainly have the
opportunity to answer with more than “yes” or “no.” I simply cannot just
like some callous criminal only...

THE PRESIDENT: You’d better let him go on. We do not want to argue about
it. Go on, make your comments on the document.

KALTENBRUNNER: Karwinsky arrived on the eighth day of the hunger strike.
He did not come into our barracks, but we were brought on stretchers
into the administrative building of this Austrian detention camp. None
of us were even able to walk any more. And for this fact, there are a
great many more witnesses—490 internees who had been confined in this
camp with me. Karwinsky talked with us in this administration building
and stated that if the hunger strike were to stop the Government would
be willing to consider a dismissal of all internees. We had been
interned without having committed any offense at all, and prior to that
the Government had already given their promise three times to release us
but had never kept these promises.

Therefore, we requested a written statement from Karwinsky, either
signed by him or signed by the Federal Chancellor. We wanted this
statement so that we could believe the promise, then we would
immediately end the strike. He refused. The hunger strike went on and we
were taken to a hospital in Vienna. On the 11th day, the hunger strike
stopped because even the giving of water was prohibited on that day.
These were the facts, and not that we created disorder.

THE PRESIDENT: When I said you could make your comments, I did not mean
you could go on giving the details of the hunger strike.

KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, I just wanted to point out that what has been
testified by the witness is incorrect—that I was the leader in the
resistance and that I was still in my barracks. I had to be carried on a
stretcher all through the camp; none of us could walk any more at that
time.

Point 2; I talked with the cousin of Karwinsky again and again later on.
His cousin was in charge of the social insurance department at Linz. He
told me that his cousin, that is the witness mentioned here, never had
been at Mauthausen, that he was at Dachau from the first day of his
detention. There is a difference whether it is Mauthausen or Dachau, for
he was sent there as a former member of the Austrian Government who had
committed crimes against National Socialists. He was arrested by the
RSHA, which already existed, I believe by Heydrich in Berlin, and not by
some Austrian office. I also never saw this man afterwards. I also never
visited Dachau. It should, therefore, be easy to ascertain whether this
man was in Dachau from the beginning of his detention or in Mauthausen.
If he was in Dachau, as I am charging, then everything is a lie. If he
were in Mauthausen, it must be first proved whether he does not confuse
me with another man. This first proof, whether he has erred in the
person, is not up to me. If the Prosecution endeavor to find out whether
he was in Dachau from the very beginning—for I know he was in Dachau;
he was arrested in Innsbruck when trying to escape to Switzerland, his
cousin had let me know that when asking me to intervene on his behalf. I
could not intervene because the man was transported to Dachau directly
via Innsbruck-Mittenwald. Thus, he was completely out of my sphere and
power as the then State Secretary for Security of the Austrian
Government.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, I suppose the defendant wants to say
something about these other documents. He had answered the one, had he
not?

COL. AMEN: I do not know whether he had finished, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: [_Turning to the defendant._] Had you finished with the
affidavit or the statement of Karwinsky?

KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, not quite.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on then.

KALTENBRUNNER: I have no longer the document before me and I request
that it be given back to me. May I please ask you to return the document
to me?

COL. AMEN: Yes, it is coming.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: This document has not been shown to me during previous
interrogations before the Trial. Otherwise, I would have immediately
answered with a request that the cousin of the witness Karwinsky, who
was chief of the Social Insurance Department at Linz and who bears the
same name, be called as a witness and be asked whether it is correct
that he expressly told me that this Karwinsky was detained at Dachau and
never at Mauthausen. May I add that the witness Dr. Skubl, who will
appear before the Tribunal in another matter, can probably make a
statement on the same matter, particularly regarding the fact that this
witness Karwinsky was arrested near the Swiss border when he escaped
after the Anschluss and that he was taken from there to Dachau.

The reason he was taken to Dachau is not exactly known to me, but Dr.
Skubl will be able to give information on that subject, presumably to
the effect that the intention was to prevent any intervention from
Austria in connection with this former member of the Austrian
Government, since Himmler was of the opinion that something might be
attempted by the new Austrian Government in favor of Karwinsky.

THE PRESIDENT: Your counsel can apply to call any witnesses that you
want in rebuttal. He can make application for that request. It is not
necessary to go into that now.

KALTENBRUNNER: Very good, Your Lordship. I should like to make the
following statement regarding the other two documents. I declare their
entire contents to be untrue and incorrect. Had they been put before me
in the interrogations, then, as I did in other cases—I refer to the
testimony of the witness Zutter—I would have made an urgent request
that this witness be brought face to face with me. Regarding the witness
Zutter, at least twice I have asked the prosecutor, who holds the rank
of major and is sitting at the table over there next to Colonel Amen,
that this witness who is making such serious statements against me be
brought face to face with me. Today Prosecutor Colonel Amen was also
present when I made that request at the time the question of Mauthausen
was discussed. These gentlemen retired to consult with a third officer
and discussed in English whether or not Ziereis and Zutter could be
called in. Both are in this prison. All this was untrue.

THE PRESIDENT: I have already told you that your counsel can apply to
call any witnesses that you wish in rebuttal.

KALTENBRUNNER: I shall ask my counsel to apply for the calling of those
two witnesses.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, who was responsible for the order to kill all
inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly before the end of the
war?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I say a few words in connection with
these two documents? Only now have they been introduced into the Trial
for the first time, and only now is it possible for me to discuss these
serious accusations with the defendant. He also said to me that he
denies the truth of these statements. I think I should be neglecting my
duty as a defense counsel if I did not ask immediately that these
witnesses be heard. It might be that the Prosecution later on...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, what is the point of delaying the Trial? I
have just said that you might make application and you know perfectly
well that application has to be made in writing.

I have said twice to the witness that you, Dr. Kauffmann, his counsel,
can apply for the calling of any witnesses you like in rebuttal. What is
the good of delaying the Trial by getting up and making your application
verbally now?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Far be it from me to cause delay, but I wanted to state
here and now that I want to call these witnesses and I shall certainly
make application in writing.

COL. AMEN: Did you understand the question, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. You asked me who had given the order for the killing
of the inmates at Mauthausen at the end of the war, and to that I reply
that such an order is unknown to me. I gave only one order with regard
to Mauthausen and that was to the effect that the entire camp and all
internees were to be surrendered to the enemy without any ill-treatment.
This order was dictated by me in the presence of the witness Dr. Höttl,
and taken to Mauthausen by a courier-officer. I draw your attention to
the statement of Dr. Höttl in which he confirms that fact. A
questionnaire has been sent to a second person by my Defense Counsel. I
requested a similar statement from him, but it is still unanswered.

COL. AMEN: I did not ask you about that order. I asked you about an
order to kill all inmates at Mauthausen Concentration Camp shortly
before the end of the war. Who was responsible for that order? Were you?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: You are acquainted with the person who tells the story,
Ziereis?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I knew Ziereis.

COL. AMEN: And you had your picture taken with him and with Himmler, and
this is now in evidence before this Tribunal. Do you recall that?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not seen the picture. It was handed to the
Tribunal while I was in the hospital.

COL. AMEN: Well, never mind the picture then.

I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3870-PS, which will be
Exhibit Number USA-797.

Now, if the Tribunal pleases, this is a fairly long document which I do
not propose to read at length, but it is one of the more important
documents in the case, and so I hope that the Tribunal will read the
entire statement, even though I do not bring it all out today in the
interest of saving time.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a new document?

COL. AMEN: A new document, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it in German?

COL. AMEN: Yes.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

This, you will note, Defendant, refers to a dying confession of Ziereis,
as reported to the individual making the affidavit, and I call your
attention first to the last two paragraphs on the first page, which we
will read together:

    “There was one SS man for 10 prisoners. The highest number of
    prisoners was about 17,000, not including the branch camps. The
    highest number in Mauthausen Camp, the branch camps included,
    was about 95,000. The total number of prisoners who died was
    65,000. The complement was made up of Totenkopf units numbering
    5,000 men, comprising guards and the command staff.”

And, now, at the middle of the next page, the paragraph begins:

    “According to an order by Reichsführer Himmler, I was to
    liquidate all prisoners on the instructions of SS
    Obergruppenführer Dr. Kaltenbrunner; the prisoners were to be
    led into the tunnels of the Bergkristall works of Gusen and only
    one entrance was to be left open.”

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet found the passage.

COL. AMEN: It is in the middle of Page 2. Have you got it?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, sir.

    COL. AMEN: “Then I was to blow up this entrance to the tunnels
    with some explosive and thus cause the death of the prisoners. I
    refused to carry out this order. This meant the extermination of
    the prisoners in the so-called ‘mother camp’ Mauthausen, and in
    the camps Gusen I and Gusen II. Details of this are known to
    Herr Wolfram and to SS Obersturmführer Eckermann.

    “A gas chamber camouflaged as a bathroom was built in Mauthausen
    Concentration Camp by order of the former garrison doctor, Dr.
    Krebsbach. Prisoners were gassed in this camouflaged bathroom.
    In addition to that, there ran, between Mauthausen and Gusen, a
    specially built automobile in which prisoners were gassed during
    the journey. The idea for the construction of this automobile
    was Dr. Wasiczki’s, SS Untersturmführer and pharmacist. I,
    myself, never put any gas into this automobile; I only drove it.
    But I knew that prisoners were being gassed. The gassing of the
    prisoners was done at the request of the physician, SS
    Hauptsturmführer Dr. Krebsbach.

    “Everything that we carried out was ordered by the Reich
    Security Main Office, Himmler or Heydrich, also by SS
    Obergruppenführer Müller or Dr. Kaltenbrunner, the latter being
    Chief of the Security Police.”

Then, passing on to Page 5, just below the center of the page, the
paragraph commencing, “In the early summer of 1943...” Have you the
place?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

    COL. AMEN: “In the early summer of 1943, SS Obergruppenführer
    Dr. Kaltenbrunner visited Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Camp
    Commandant Ziereis, Gauleiter Eigruber, Chief of the Detention
    Camp Bachmeyer, and several others accompanied Dr.
    Kaltenbrunner. I saw Dr. Kaltenbrunner and the people who
    accompanied him with my own eyes. According to the testimony of
    the ‘corpse carriers’ at that time, the former prisoners Albert
    Tiefenbacher”—whose affidavit has been read—“present address
    Salzburg; and Johann Polster, present address Pottendorf near
    Wiener-Neustadt, Austria, about 15 prisoners under detention
    were selected by the detention chief, Unterscharführer Winkler,
    in order to show Dr. Kaltenbrunner three ways of extermination;
    by a shot in the neck, hanging, and gassing. Women whose hair
    had been shorn were among those executed and they were killed by
    shots in the neck. The above-mentioned ‘corpse carriers’ were
    present at the execution and had to carry the corpses to the
    crematorium. Dr. Kaltenbrunner went to the crematorium after the
    execution and later he went into the quarry.

    “Baldur von Schirach visited the Mauthausen Concentration Camp
    in the autumn of 1944. He, too, went to the detention building
    and also to the crematorium.”

Do you still say that you had nothing to do with the order referred to
or the matters set forth in the affidavit?

KALTENBRUNNER: I maintain that most emphatically, and I want to draw
your attention to the fact that you, sir, have said that this statement
was taken when Ziereis was on his deathbed, but you did not say that
what you read from Pages 7 and 8 does not come from Ziereis, but from
Hans Marsalek, who is responsible for these statements. This Hans
Marsalek whom, of course, I have never seen in my life, had been an
internee in Mauthausen as were the two other witnesses. I have briefly
expressed my views as to the value of a statement concerning me from a
former concentration camp internee and my inability to speak face to
face with this witness who now confronts me, and my application will be
made through my counsel. I must ask here to be confronted with Marsalek.
Marsalek cannot know of any such order. In spite of that he states that
he did.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, Marsalek is merely the individual who took the
dying confession from Ziereis. Do you understand that?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not, because thus far it is new to me that the
Prosecution were using internees from concentration camps for the
interrogation of Ziereis, who had been shot in the stomach three times
and was dying. I thought that such interrogations would have been
carried out by a man who was legally trained and who would be in a
position to attach the right value to such statements.

COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps, Defendant, if you were conducting the
Prosecution, you would do it differently; but, in any event, your
testimony is that everything in that affidavit which was read to you is
false; is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is false. I have never given an order to the
Mauthausen Camp with the exception of that one order which I was
entitled to do on the strength of special powers and for the contents
and transmission of which I have offered sufficient evidence. Mauthausen
was never under my jurisdiction in any other way, and I could not issue
any such orders. The Prosecution know perfectly well, and it must have
been proved to them by dozens of testimonies, that I had never had any
authority over Mauthausen.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you do not seem to understand what this
document is. It is an affidavit of Hans Marsalek, and Paragraph 2 shows
the fact that he made the interrogation of Ziereis, who was about to
die, in the presence of the commander of an armored division; and he
then sets out what Ziereis said, and then he goes on to declare, in
addition, what is contained in Paragraph 3; and it is perfectly obvious
to the Tribunal that what is said in Paragraph 3 is not what Ziereis
said, but what Marsalek said—the person who was making the affidavit.

KALTENBRUNNER: My Lord, may I say in reply that Marsalek, as an internee
in the camp, was of course not in a position to know that Ziereis was
never under my command. For that reason alone, it appears likely that
Marsalek, when he questioned Ziereis, could not possibly know the facts
of the case. I have proved to the Tribunal, and proved it to the
Prosecutor, that authority was not given to me until 9 April.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; that is only a matter of argument. I was
only drawing your attention to the fact that it is perfectly obvious
from the document itself that what Colonel Amen was reading was a
statement of Marsalek and not a statement of Ziereis, which was the
point you were making.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall having given an order to the
commandant of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp on the 27th of April
1945, that at least 1,000 persons should be killed at Mauthausen each
day? Is that true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have never given such an order. You know...

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with SS Colonel Ziereis, the same person
we have just been speaking of?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And were you acquainted with Kurt Becher or Becker, a former
colonel in the SS?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3762-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-798.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: You asked, sir, whether I knew an SS Colonel Becker, and
I answered, “No”; but the man is Kurt Becher.

COL. AMEN: That is all the better. You do know him then, do you?

KALTENBRUNNER: I know him, yes.

COL. AMEN: Very good.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, have these documents been translated into
all languages?

COL. AMEN: I believe they have, every one of them, yes. No, I am told
that all of them have not; some of them have. This one is in English and
German, Your Lordship. We did not have time to get them translated into
the Russian and French, although it is now in process.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then it will be done?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir; it is being done, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

KALTENBRUNNER: May I reply to it?

THE PRESIDENT: In order that the record should be properly complete, the
Tribunal would like the Prosecution to state when the translation has
been done, so that the matter should be thoroughly in order.

COL. AMEN: Precisely.

Defendant, we will now read this document together:

    “I, Kurt Becher, former SS Standartenführer, born 12 September
    1909, at Hamburg, declare the following under oath:

    “1. Between the middle of September and the middle of October
    1944 I caused the Reichsführer SS Himmler to issue the following
    order, which I received in two originals, one each for SS
    Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner and Pohl, and a copy for myself:

    “‘By this order, which becomes immediately effective, I forbid
    any extermination of Jews and order that, on the contrary, care
    should be given to weak and sick persons. I hold you—and here
    Kaltenbrunner and Pohl were meant—‘personally responsible even
    if this order should not be strictly adhered to by subordinate
    offices.’

    “I personally took Pohl’s copy to him at his offices in Berlin
    and left the copy for Kaltenbrunner at his office in Berlin.
    Therefore, in my opinion Kaltenbrunner and Pohl bear the
    responsibility after this date for any further killings of
    Jewish prisoners.

    “2. When visiting Mauthausen Concentration Camp on 27 April 1945
    at 0900 hours, I was told in the strictest secrecy by the camp
    commandant, SS Standartenführer Ziereis, that ‘Kaltenbrunner
    gave me the order that at least a thousand persons would still
    have to die at Mauthausen each day.’

    “The facts mentioned above are true. These statements are made
    by me voluntarily and without any coercion. I have read them
    through, signed them, and confirmed them with my oath.”

Is that true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: In part it is correct and in part it is not. I shall
explain it sentence by sentence.

COL. AMEN: No, suppose you simply tell us what you claim to be false,
because we must get on with this.

KALTENBRUNNER: I quite believe that you want to save time, but this is a
question of establishing my guilt or my innocence and to do that I must
be given an opportunity to make a statement in detail. Otherwise neither
you nor the Tribunal would know the truth; and that is what we want
here, I hope. I am glad that this witness, Becher, was found and that
this statement is available, because it proves, first that in September
or October 1944 Himmler was forced to issue this order—that same
Himmler about whom it has been definitely established that since 1939 or
1940 he had become guilty of the crime of killing Jews on the largest
scale.

And now we must find out why in September or October Himmler had given
such an order. Before I had seen this document I stated yesterday and
today that this order was issued by Hitler on my representations, and
obviously this order from Himmler is based on another order which he
received from Hitler.

Secondly, it is clear to me that Himmler gave such an order to Pohl as
the person responsible for those concentration camps in which Jews were
kept; and thirdly, that he has informed me, Kaltenbrunner, of this as
the person who opposed Himmler. As to Becher, I have to go farther back.

Through this man Becher Himmler did the worst things which could
possibly be done and brought to light here. Through Becher and the Joint
Committee in Hungary and Switzerland he released Jews in exchange,
first, for war equipment, then secondly, for raw material, and thirdly,
for foreign currency. I heard about this through the intelligence
service and immediately attempted to stop this, not through Himmler
because I would have failed but through Hitler. At that moment any
personal credit of Himmler with Hitler was undermined, for this action
might have changed the reputation of the Reich abroad in the most
serious manner.

At the same time my efforts in connection with Burckhardt had already
been going on, and now you understand why the witness Schellenberg
stated that Himmler had said to him, “I am alarmed; now Kaltenbrunner
has got me under his thumb.” This means that Kaltenbrunner had
completely revealed all the things Himmler was doing in Hungary and had
told Hitler about it.

By this order Himmler attempted to camouflage it and to get out of the
whole thing by pretending that the responsibility rested on
Kaltenbrunner and Pohl anyhow. Even according to this document the
responsibility rested on Himmler and Pohl, but Kaltenbrunner had to be
included and be told about it because otherwise he might bring the
subject up with Hitler any day. That is the sense of the document.

This witness, Becher, is now in Nuremberg. I beg absolutely to be
confronted with him here. I am quite able to prove to the public with
the help of this witness how, starting with the transfer of the
so-called Weiss A.G. in Hungary up to that day, Himmler, with Pohl and
Becher and the two committees in Hungary and Switzerland were running
this business. And I can prove how I fought against it.

There is yet another accusation in this document, that on 27 April I am
supposed to have given a strictly secret order to Ziereis that 1,000
Jews had to be exterminated in Mauthausen every day. I ask you to have
the witness Höttl, who is also here, called in immediately, so that I
may ask him on what day I dictated and sent by courier-officer to
Mauthausen the order that the entire camp with all its inmates be
surrendered to the enemy. This witness will confirm to you that this
order was given several days before 27 April and that I could not have
given orders to the contrary on 27 April.

I ask you, sir, not to take me unawares and maneuver me into a position
where I might go to pieces. I shall not break down. I swear to you and I
have sworn that I want to help you establish the truth.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard evidence at this Trial with respect
to the meaning of the phrase “special treatment,” have you not? Have you
heard that in this courtroom?

KALTENBRUNNER: The expression “special treatment” has been used by my
interrogators several times every day, yes.

COL. AMEN: You know what it means?

KALTENBRUNNER: It can only be assumed, although I cannot give an
accurate explanation, that this was a death sentence, not imposed by a
public court but by an order of Himmler’s.

COL. AMEN: Well, the Defendant Keitel testified that, I think, it was a
matter of common knowledge. Have you not at all times known what was
meant by “special treatment”? “Yes” or “no,” please.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. I have told you; an order from Himmler—I am
referring to Hitler’s order of 1941, therefore also an order from
Hitler—that executions should be carried out without legal procedure.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever discuss with Gruppenführer Müller of Amt IV the
application of “special treatment” to certain individuals? “Yes” or
“no,” please.

KALTENBRUNNER: No; I know that the witness Schellenberg said...

COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3839-PS
which will become Exhibit Number USA-799. By the way, were you
acquainted with Joseph Spacil?

THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Joseph Spacil?

KALTENBRUNNER: Spassel? No.

COL. AMEN: He is the person who makes the affidavit now before you.

KALTENBRUNNER: The name which is mentioned here is Joseph Spacil, and
that man I know, yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, will you look at the center of the first page, a
paragraph commencing “In regard to ‘special treatment’...” Have you the
place?

KALTENBRUNNER: Not yet, no. In order to understand the document I shall
have to read all of it.

COL. AMEN: Well, if you have to read all of these documents, Defendant,
we would never get through, because the first part has nothing to do
with the part which I am interested in or with you.

KALTENBRUNNER: I beg your pardon, sir, I am sure that you are interested
in expediting the procedure as far as possible as we defendants are
anxious not to delay the proceedings; but it is necessary for my defense
that I should at least be allowed to read a document on which I have to
make a statement.

COL. AMEN: But, Defendant, your lawyer is receiving copies of all these
documents, and I am sure that whatever is there, which should be brought
out on your behalf, he will see to it that it will be brought out at the
proper time, which will be after I get through asking you these
questions. Is that not satisfactory?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not enough for me. I must know, at any rate,
what is contained in that document, since you are asking me to make a
statement on it now.

COL. AMEN: Well, go ahead and read it then.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, not only your own counsel will look after your
interests, but the Tribunal will look after your interests; and you must
answer the question, please.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Very well. Now let us read along in the center of the page,
commencing with:

    “In regard to ‘special treatment’ I have the following
    knowledge:

    “On occasion of meetings of the office chiefs, Gruppenführer
    Müller frequently consulted Kaltenbrunner as to whether this or
    that case should be specially treated or if ‘special treatment’
    was to be considered. The following is an example of how the
    conversation went:

    “Müller: Case Obergruppenführer B, please, ‘special treatment’
    or not?

    “Kaltenbrunner: Yes, or submit it to the Reichsführer SS for
    decision.

    “Or:

    “Müller: Obergruppenführer, no answer has arrived from the
    Reichsführer SS in regard to ‘special treatment’ for Case A.

    “Kaltenbrunner: Ask once more.

    “Or:

    “Müller handed a paper to Kaltenbrunner and asked for
    instructions, as described above.

    “When Müller had such a conversation with Kaltenbrunner, he only
    mentioned the initials, so that the persons present at the table
    never knew who was involved.”

And then the last two paragraphs:

    “Both Müller and Kaltenbrunner proposed in my presence ‘special
    treatment’ or submission to the Reichsführer SS for approval of
    ‘special treatment’ for certain cases which I cannot specify in
    detail. I estimate that in approximately 50 percent of the cases
    ‘special treatment’ was approved.”

Are the contents of that affidavit true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: The contents are not correct, when given the
interpretation you are giving to the document. You will see immediately
that the tragic expression “special treatment” is given here an
absolutely humorous turn. Do you know the meaning of Winzerstube in
Godesberg, and of Walsertraum in the Walsertal, and their relation to
the term “Sonderbehandlung”? Walsertraum is the smartest and most
fashionable Alpine hotel of the whole German Reich, and the Winzerstube
is a very famous hotel in Godesberg in which many international meetings
were held. Especially qualified and distinguished personalities were
accommodated there—I would mention M. Poncet and M. Herriot and many
more. They had three times the normal ration for diplomats, which is
nine times the ration of the ordinary German during the war. They were
daily given a bottle of champagne. They were allowed to correspond
freely with their families in France and to receive parcels. These
internees were allowed to receive visits on several occasions, their
wishes were cared for wherever they were. That is what is meant here by
“special treatment.”

I can only state here that it may well be that Müller may have talked
about this to me, since I was extremely anxious from the point of view
of foreign policy and intelligence that the Reich should now follow my
suggestion and treat foreign persons in a more humane manner. It is in
this connection that Müller may have spoken to me, but Winzerstube and
Godesberg, these two final achievements of this so-called “special
treatment,” were the places where political internees upon parole were
accommodated and received preferential treatment.

COL. AMEN: Did you have frequent meetings with your section heads,
including Müller, as indicated in this document?

KALTENBRUNNER: I stated yesterday and today that, of course, I met
Müller when we were lunching together, which we had to do because all
our 38 buildings in Berlin had been destroyed or damaged by bombs, but I
did not talk to him about official matters concerning Amt IV.

This document makes it clear that these were matters of extreme interest
to me as Chief of Intelligence.

May I ask you not to leave this document just yet. It must be put on
record before this Tribunal that these two establishments are used as I
wished for the preferential and better treatment than that enjoyed by
the Germans. That is of great importance to me for my defense, and I am
asking you—I shall ask you through my counsel—that you make detailed
inquiries about these two hotels, and I also request that you ask M.
Poncet, as the leader of the French detainees, about the treatment he
received there. He had such a good time there that he gave French
lessons to the wife of a criminal investigation official, and taught her
French when they went for walks for hours without being guarded at all.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, did you or did you not issue instructions to
Müller, as Section Chief IV, as to whether certain individuals who were
in confinement at Berlin should be transported to southern Germany or be
shot? And for your assistance, I will suggest to you that it was in
February 1945 when the Russian armies were closing in on Berlin. “Yes”
or “no”, if you can.

KALTENBRUNNER: No, the Russian Army was not very near Berlin in February
1945. I think military persons here would be able to give you more
precise information as to where the fighting was going on at the time. I
do not believe that there was a reason for the evacuation of any camps
to the south at that time.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Martin Sandberger, Group Leader VI A
of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. He was the first assistant of this Schellenberg who
has been mentioned several times, and he acted as intermediary with
regard to intelligence news between Himmler and Schellenberg.

COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown the Document 3838-PS, which
will become Exhibit USA-800.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

I call your attention only to the first two paragraphs of that
affidavit:

    “In my capacity as Group Leader VI A at the RSHA, the following
    became known to me:

    “In February 1945 I was told by Group Leader VI B, SS
    Standartenführer Steimle, that he had to represent Schellenberg
    at the daily office chief meetings. On that occasion, Müller,
    Chief of Amt IV, presented to Kaltenbrunner a list of persons
    who were in confinement in or close to Berlin, for Kaltenbrunner
    to decide whether they were to be transported to southern
    Germany or whether they were to be shot, because the Russian
    armies were closing in on Berlin. Steimle did not know who these
    people were. Kaltenbrunner made his decisions in an extremely
    hasty and superficial manner and Steimle expressed his
    indignation to me about the frivolity of this procedure. From
    this I inferred that Kaltenbrunner had ordered a number of
    shootings, because if evacuation had been ordered there would
    have been no talk about the frivolity of the procedure.”

Is that affidavit true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: The statement is not correct, and although it surprises
me I can immediately refute it. Perhaps I may draw attention to the
following points:

First, the document was prepared at Oberursel on 19 November 1945 by the
witness Sandberger. In the second half of the first paragraph he states
that he had been in England together with Schellenberg. I beg your
pardon; he states this in the second paragraph. “As I was informed by
Schellenberg at an internment camp in England when taking a walk....”
You can gather from the second part that he, together with Schellenberg,
was in an interrogation camp near London, in which I also was kept for
10 weeks, where they had detailed discussions. Therefore it is
important, because something more will have to be said about this man
Schellenberg, to know whether Sandberger received this information from
Steimle before February 1945, or whether he got it through Schellenberg
in London when they were interned together. That can be ascertained only
by having Sandberger questioned here directly through my defense
counsel. Until then, I must refute this statement altogether.

COL. AMEN: All right.

KALTENBRUNNER: No, Sir; I have by no means finished what I have to say.
Secondly, Sandberger states that he had heard from Steimle what Steimle
had heard. Personally I would not attach too much credit to any
information at third or fourth hand, and I would strongly challenge a
statement such as Steimle has made. I had not the authority to make such
decisions; nor could Steimle, Sandberger, or Schellenberg ever have had
any doubt of the fact that only Himmler could have made such decisions.

Thirdly, only once did I hear of such treatment of witnesses. I
personally intervened and made that known here. This was in the case of
Schuschnigg, who was in one such camp which was threatened by the
Russians. On 1 February 1945—I remember this date very well and it can
be confirmed by another defendant here—I replied to this other
defendant when he asked, “Could we not do something for Schuschnigg so
that he will not fall into the hands of the Russians? Will you or shall
I make the suggestion to the Führer to have him released from detention
or at least to take him somewhere where he will not fall into the hands
of the Russians but rather into American hands?” Whereupon, one of us—I
cannot remember who, possibly both of us—took this proposal to Hitler.

THE PRESIDENT: Surely you are going very far afield. The Tribunal quite
understands that you point out, which is obvious, that this is hearsay
evidence. The only question for you is whether Müller did on this
occasion present a list of names to you, and we understand that you say
he did not. We do not want to hear argument about it.

KALTENBRUNNER: No, Your Lordship, Müller did not submit such a list to
me, but I must define in some way my attitude to this document which has
just been shown to me for the first time. I do not want it to appear to
the Tribunal that I can defend myself only after I have been in
consultation with my lawyer for hours. I want to tell the prosecutor to
his face that this is not true. And I do; somehow I must defend my
veracity. I cannot give an answer straight away and I cannot make it
easier for the prosecutor except by requesting him to bring this
witness, Sandberger, into court; he can discuss with him at length in
the meantime, so as to tell him why I do not consider it credible. I
must tell the Tribunal beforehand why these things are untrue.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, are you familiar with the so-called “bullet” order
that was directed to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp? “Yes” or “no”?

KALTENBRUNNER: I made a detailed statement on this bullet order
yesterday and I stated that I did not know of that order.

COL. AMEN: Did you ever issue any oral orders supplementing the
so-called “bullet” order—you yourself; did you ever issue any such?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3844-PS, which
will become Exhibit USA-801.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Were you acquainted with Josef Niedermeyer, Defendant? Josef
Niedermeyer?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not recollect having known him.

COL. AMEN: Well, perhaps this will bring it back to you—Paragraph 1:

    “From the autumn of 1942 until May 1945 the so-called
    call-barracks of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp were under my
    supervision.

    “2. At the beginning of December 1944 the so-called ‘bullet’
    orders were shown to me in the political department of the
    Mauthausen Concentration Camp. These were two orders, each of
    which bore the signature of Kaltenbrunner. I saw both of these
    signatures myself. One of these orders stated that foreign
    civilian workers who had repeatedly escaped from labor camps
    were, when recaptured, to be sent to the Mauthausen
    Concentration Camp under the ‘bullet’ action.

    “The second order stated that the same procedure was to be
    followed with officers and noncommissioned officers who were
    prisoners of war, with the exception of British and Americans,
    if they repeatedly escaped from prisoner-of-war camps. These
    prisoners of war were also to be brought to the Mauthausen
    Concentration Camp.

    “3. On the strength of the ‘bullet’ orders and the oral
    instructions of Kaltenbrunner which accompanied them, 1,300
    foreign civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers
    were brought to the Mauthausen Concentration Camp. There they
    were lodged in Block 20 and fed so badly, according to orders,
    that they had to starve. Eight hundred of them died from hunger
    and illness. The bad food and the lack of medical care were the
    result of the personal oral orders of Kaltenbrunner.”

Is that statement true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that is not correct. I believe that I can
invalidate this document right now. May I draw your attention to Page 2.
On Page 2, Paragraph 3, it says in the third lines “1,300 foreign
civilian workers, officers, and noncommissioned officers were
brought....” From the words “civilian workers”...

COL. AMEN: Defendant, I am primarily interested in Paragraph 2, which
has to do with the fact that the person who makes the affidavit saw two
“bullet” orders bearing your signature. Is that, so far as you know,
true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: No; I said yesterday, and I repeat it today under oath
that these bullet orders were not known to me. To dispute the veracity
of the witness and the evidential value of the document, I must be able
personally to raise my arguments on those points where it is
particularly obvious that the Prosecution is wrong, that is, in the
third line of Paragraph 3. Here the witness—whose signature differs
completely from the writing of the statement, and this is a fact to
which I would like to invite the attention of the Tribunal—the witness
completely forgot that the bullet orders, the text of which has been
read here repeatedly, referred to officers and noncommissioned officers,
but not to civilian workers. How, on the basis of a false order, could
such a thing happen at all? I cannot pass the death sentence for murder
on the strength of a civilian paragraph such as 820 of BGB (Code of
Civil Law), nor can I on the strength of the bullet orders lock civilian
workers up in a camp. The witness, in his haste and anxiety to oblige,
had forgotten these details.

Nor do I believe that this man has ever seen a document which bears my
signature. Such a document was never submitted to me either.

Once again, I must ask that this witness—and I am sure there will be
others on the Mauthausen question—that this witness and all the others
should be brought here and questioned as to how their statements came to
be made.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you recall the testimony of the witness
Wisliceny with respect to your participation in the forced labor program
on the defenses below Vienna?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not quite finished answering your last questions.
Excuse me, but I still have something vital to say on this matter.

COL. AMEN: I thought you were through with that.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I thought so, too, but I have just remembered
something important.

COL. AMEN: All right.

KALTENBRUNNER: It is very relevant that I should refer you to what I
said about the bullet orders yesterday. I stated that it became known to
me in December or January 1944-45, and what my reaction was, and how I
opposed it. These circumstances, too, explain the fact that I could not,
shortly before that, have signed the order myself.

Apart from that, it is totally impossible for a Kaltenbrunner to sign a
bullet order, when it is clear to the Prosecution here that it was
signed already in 1941 by Hitler. This is why I wanted to make that
final remark about the document.

Now, will you please be good enough to repeat the next question?

COL. AMEN: I want to call your attention to the testimony of Wisliceny
with respect to your participation in the forced labor program on the
defenses below Vienna. Are you familiar with what he said in this court?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: Well, I will read it to you. It is very short:

    “Question: With reference to the Jews who were left in Budapest,
    what happened to them?

    “Answer: In October-November 1944 about 30,000, perhaps a few
    thousand more, were taken out and brought to Germany. They were
    to be used for work on the defenses in Vienna. They were mostly
    women. A large number of these people were put into the labor
    camps on the lower Danube, and they died there from sheer
    exhaustion. A small percentage, perhaps 12,000, were taken to
    Vienna, the western boundary, and about 3,000 were taken to
    Bergen and Belsen and then to Switzerland. Those were Jews that
    had come from Germany.”

Now, Defendant, do you recall having had any correspondence with the
Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna with respect to the assignment of
this forced labor in the city of Vienna?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have never written a single letter to the Bürgermeister
of Budapest, and I should very much like to ask you to show me any such
letter.

COL. AMEN: I did not say Budapest; I said the Bürgermeister of the city
of Vienna, or I intended to, if I did not.

KALTENBRUNNER: The Bürgermeister of Vienna? I cannot remember having had
any correspondence with him either. I think perhaps I can explain the
matter to you by saying that these frontier fortifications which must be
meant here did not come under the city of Vienna, but under the Gau of
the lower Danube. I did not know that Vienna had a joint frontier with
Hungary.

COL. AMEN: Well, you have already testified that you had nothing to do
with participating in this forced labor program; is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: All right.

I ask to have the defendant shown Document 3803-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-802.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

I call your attention to the first three paragraphs. You will note that
the letter comes from yourself, and reads as follows:

    “To the Bürgermeister of the city of Vienna, SS Brigadeführer
    Blaschke.

    “Subject: Assignment of labor to essential war work in the city
    of Vienna.

    “Re: Your letter of 7 June 1944.

    “Dear Blaschke: For the special reasons cited by you I have in
    the meantime given orders to direct several evacuation
    transports to Vienna-Strasshof. SS Brigadeführer Dr. Dellbruegge
    had, as a matter of fact, already written to me concerning the
    same matter. At the moment it is a question of four transports
    with approximately 12,000 Jews. They will reach Vienna within
    the next few days.

    “According to previous experience it is estimated that 30
    percent of the transport will consist of Jews able to work,
    approximately 3,600 in this case, who can be utilized for the
    work in question, it being understood that they are subject to
    removal at any time. It is obvious that these people must be
    assigned to work in large, well-guarded groups, and accommodated
    in secured camps, and this is an absolute prerequisite for
    making these Jews available.

    “The women and children of these Jews who were unable to work,
    and who are all being kept in readiness for a special action and
    therefore one day will be removed again, must stay in the
    guarded camp also during the day.

    “Please discuss further details with the State Police head
    office in Vienna, SS Obersturmbannführer Dr. Ebner and SS
    Obersturmbannführer Krumey of the Sondereinsatzkommando Hungary,
    who at present is in Vienna.

    “I hope these transports will be of help to you in carrying out
    the urgent work you have in view.

    “Heil Hitler. Yours, Kaltenbrunner.”

Now do you recall that communication?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: Do you deny having written that letter?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Well, I think, Defendant, that this time your signature is
affixed to the original of this letter. Have you the original?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is that not your signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that is not my signature. It is a signature either in
ink or it is a facsimile, but it is not mine.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, I want to show you samples of your signature which
you gave in the course of your interrogations, and I ask you to tell me
whether or not these are your signatures.

[_Documents were submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: I have already made hundreds of such signatures, and they
are probably right. The one in pencil, the document signed in pencil,
has been signed by me.

COL. AMEN: Well, will you indicate them in some way, so that the
Tribunal can look at the signatures which you admit are your own, and
compare them with the signature on this Document 3803-PS, Exhibit
USA-802?

KALTENBRUNNER: The signatures on these papers which are written in
pencil are mine; they are my own.

COL. AMEN: All of them?

KALTENBRUNNER: All three.

COL. AMEN: All right.

KALTENBRUNNER: But not those in ink.

COL. AMEN: Very good.

[_The documents were submitted to the Tribunal._]

Shall I continue, Your Lordship?

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, please.

Go on, Colonel Amen.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, you have heard the evidence with respect to the
establishment of the Warsaw Ghetto and the clearing of the ghetto.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you passing from this document?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE TRIBUNAL: We had better adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I have to begin submitting my evidence in the
next few days, and I do not know yet whether my Document Book 1 is
admissible. Will you please also tell me on what day and at what time
this can be discussed.

[_There was a pause in the proceedings._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal think that, subject to anything
you have to say, half past 12 tomorrow—that is Saturday morning—would
be a good time at which we could decide the admissibility of your
documents.

DR. THOMA: Thank you very much indeed.

COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal please, I want to revert for a moment to
Document 3803-PS with the signature.

Defendant, have you the original of that exhibit before you?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you look at the signature and tell me whether you do not
find, written by hand just above the signature, the letters D-e-i-n?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And as I understand it, that word means “yours”; in other
words, it is an intimate expression used only between close personal
friends, is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: In German there are only two forms of concluding a
letter: either “Ihr,” I-h-r, or “Dein,” D-e-i-n. We use the latter,
“Dein,” if we are on close terms, friendly terms. Blaschke, the Mayor of
Vienna, is a friend of mine and apparently...

COL. AMEN: Now, would it not be an absolutely ridiculous and unthinkable
thing that a stamp or facsimile would be made up which contained not
only a signature but the expression “Dein” above the signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: That would be nonsensical, I wholly agree with that; but
I did not say that it must be a facsimile signature. I just said that it
is not my signature.

It is either a facsimile or it has been put underneath with another
signature. The author of this letter—you did not allow me to finish
before—as it can be seen from the code in the upper left-hand corner,
is to be found in Section IV A and B. Everyone in the department and the
entire German Reich knew that the Mayor of Vienna, Blaschke, and myself
had been close personal friends since our common political activity in
Vienna, that is for about 10 years, and had used the familiar form of
address, “Du.” Therefore, if, for instance, I had been absent from
Berlin, and the letter was urgent—as I assume to be the case from the
contents—the official might have considered it justifiable to write in
this form. I did not authorize him and, of course, it is quite
impossible, but that is the only way I can explain it.

COL. AMEN: Then, Defendant, at least you agree that it is not a
facsimile signature, is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: It would be most unusual to have made a stamp with the
words, “Dein.” It would be entirely out of the question. Therefore, the
official himself must have written the signature. Everybody knew that I
was on familiar terms with Blaschke and therefore the word “Dein” had to
appear, if he used my signature at all.

Please look also at the figure 30 on the top. From many samples of my
writing you can see that I do not write like that at all.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, is it not equally ridiculous to think that a
person, or an official, as you term him, in signing such a letter on
your behalf would try to imitate your signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: Quite right, but, sir, it would be a matter of course,
when writing to the Mayor of Vienna, a man with whom the official
perhaps knew quite well that I was on familiar terms, to put my name
typewritten under a personal letter. That would be impossible as well.
If I were not in Berlin he had only two possibilities open to him:
either to type it in or to make it seem as though I, Kaltenbrunner, were
actually there.

COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that you are simply lying about your
signature on this letter, in the same way that you are lying to this
Tribunal about almost everything else you have given testimony about? Is
not that a fact?

KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, for a whole year I have had to submit to
this insult of being called a liar. For a whole year I have been
interrogated hundreds of times both here and in London, and I have been
insulted in this way and even much worse. My mother, who died in 1943,
was called a whore, and many other similar things were hurled at me.
This term is not new to me but I should like to state that in a matter
of this kind I certainly would not tell an untruth, when I claim to be
believed by this Tribunal in far more important matters.

COL. AMEN: I am suggesting, Defendant, that when your testimony is so
directly contrary to that of 20 or 30 other witnesses and even more
documents, it is almost an incredible thing you should be telling the
truth and that every witness and every document should be false. Do you
not agree to that proposition?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. I cannot admit that because I have had the feeling
each time a document has been submitted to me today, that it could at
first glance be immediately refuted by me in its most vital points. I
ask, and I hope that the Tribunal will allow me, to refer to single
points and to come into closer contact with individual witnesses, so
that I may defend myself to the last. Throughout the preliminary
interrogations your colleague has always adopted the attitude unjustly
that I was refuting and opposing insignificant points. The conception of
expeditious trial proceedings has been unknown to me in this form. Had
he talked to me in broad lines about the ways to find out the real
truth, I believe he would have sooner arrived at considerably larger and
more important issues. I am perhaps the only defendant who, on receiving
the Indictment and being asked, “Are you ready to make any further
statements to the Prosecution,” stated “Immediately,” and I signed
it—please produce the signature—“from today on after receiving the
Indictment I am at the disposal of the Prosecution for any information.”
Is it not so? Please confirm it. That gentleman [_pointing to an
interpreter_] interrogated me. I have always been ready, that is, during
the last 5 months, to give information on any question, but I have not
been asked any more.

THE PRESIDENT: You must try to restrain yourself. And when you see the
light, speak slower. You know about the light, do you not?

COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact, Defendant, that on the occasion of your
last interrogation you stated that you did not wish to be interrogated
any more because the questions seemed to be designed to help the
Prosecution rather than to help your case, and that you were told that
in that event you would not be questioned any more; that you were also
informed that there were other documents and other material with which
you had not been confronted and that if you desired at any time to come
back and be interrogated with respect to those matters, you should tell
your lawyers so and send a note and that the interrogator would be very
happy to continue interrogating you? Is that not a fact, “yes” or “no”?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, sir, that was not the case. I made that statement
repeatedly when I was being interrogated on points of detail. It was in
the evening and it was getting very late. I believe it was about 2000
hours; I can remember the room very well. I was led out of the room.
This interpreter, whom I saw here this morning, I believe, was sitting
at a long table with two or three other officials. They said, “You have
received the Indictment today,” and I said, “Yes, I have.” They said,
“Are you aware that from now on you will have to speak with the General
Secretary about your defense? Do you wish to be interrogated further?”
To which I said, “Yes, certainly I am at your disposal at any time.”
Whereupon this officer here looked at me in a very startled manner, for
he did not expect that answer from me; obviously all the others appeared
to have said, “No, we are glad that these interrogations have come to an
end and we can work now on our defense.”

COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, I want to read to you from your last
interrogation. After a question as to whether the testimony was being
helpful to you sufficiently so that you wanted to continue, you spoke as
follows:

    “This would at least be as important for my defense as the
    material which is helping the Prosecutor’s case and about which
    the Interrogator has asked me repeatedly; therefore, I have the
    feeling that I am still in the hands of the Prosecutor and not
    in the hands of a judge in charge of a preliminary hearing. As
    the Indictment has been served, I find myself now in a position
    where I can prepare my own defense, and I therefore do not find
    it proper that you continue to look for material which would
    incriminate me. Please do not regard this as any criticism or
    rebuttal, because I have never been informed about the procedure
    to be followed in these hearings and I do not know about it; but
    according to my knowledge of legal procedure this is incorrect.
    I have never been given the possibility of confronting other
    witnesses and of reminding them that this or that did not happen
    in this or that way, _et cetera_.

    “Question: Is your statement made in the form of an objection to
    further questioning?

    “Answer: If, as I stated it now, there is a possibility of my
    being confronted with witnesses and to do something about
    testimony in my favor, I would be very glad to continue, but
    even so I have the feeling that it would be better to do this
    during the evidence at the Trial itself. I believe I should
    discuss this first with my defense counsel.

    “Question: Well, if there is any question in your mind about
    whether you should go further in any interrogation by the Office
    of Chief of Counsel, or the U.S. representative to the
    International Military Tribunal, I think you should talk to your
    counsel, too. You have never been under any compulsion to answer
    either before or since this Indictment was served. I think you
    will agree your treatment has been fair in all circumstances.”

Is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, Mr. Prosecutor, it confirms exactly what I have been
telling you. The material that you just read states that I did not agree
that interrogations and discussions should be broken off suddenly. I
said that I had never had any opportunity of speaking with the witnesses
with whom I was confronted. It confirms that I have asked you to bring
me face to face with the witnesses, so that I might talk with them. I do
not deny at all that I also said that I was glad that now I could start
preparing my defense. Actually, that is so. But I did not say in the
course of such a lengthy statement—it has not been read to me—and
worded as no other interrogation has been worded with the exception of
perhaps two or three, that I no longer place myself at the disposal of
the interrogator. I stated just the opposite and you read that, too,
that I am at the disposal of the interrogator.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, let us get to the Warsaw Ghetto. Do you recall
from the evidence before this Tribunal that some 400,000 Jews were first
put into the ghetto and then in the final action SS troops cleared out
about 56,000, of which more than 14,000 were killed. Do you recall that
evidence?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not recall any details of this statement; what I
know about this matter, I have already stated today.

COL. AMEN: Did you know that substantially all of these 400,000 Jews
were murdered at the extermination plant at Treblinka? Did you know
that?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: What did you have to do with the final razing of the Warsaw
Ghetto, nothing as usual?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had nothing to do with it, as I already stated.

COL. AMEN: I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3840-PS,
which will become Exhibit Number USA-803.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Were you acquainted with Karl Kaleske?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, that name is not known to me.

COL. AMEN: Does it help you to remember if I suggest to you that he was
the adjutant of General Stroop?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know the adjutant of General Stroop; the name
which you just mentioned to me, “Kaleske,” I do not know either.

COL. AMEN: Let us get to his affidavit. Have you got it before you now?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

    COL. AMEN: “My name is Karl Kaleske. I was adjutant to Dr. Von
    Sammern-Frankenegg from November 1942 until April 1943, while he
    was SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw. I then became adjutant to SS
    and Polizeiführer Stroop until August 1943. The action against
    the Warsaw Ghetto was planned while Von Sammern-Frankenegg was
    SS and Polizeiführer. General Stroop took over the command on
    the day of the commencement of the action. The function of the
    Security Police during the action against the Warsaw Ghetto was
    to accompany the SS troops. A certain number of SS troops were
    assigned to the task to clear a certain street. With every SS
    group there were from four to six Security Policemen, because
    they knew the Ghetto very well. These Security Policemen were
    under Dr. Hahn, Commander of the Security Police of Warsaw. Hahn
    received his orders not from the SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw,
    but directly from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. This applies not only
    to the Ghetto action but to all matters. Dr. Hahn frequently
    came to our office and told the SS and Polizeiführer that he had
    received such and such an order from Kaltenbrunner, about the
    contents of which he wanted to inform the SS and Polizeiführer
    only. He would not do this for every order but only for certain
    ones.

    “I remember the case of 300 foreign Jews who had been collected
    in the Polski Hotel by the Security Police. At the end of the
    Ghetto action Kaltenbrunner ordered the Security Police to
    transport these people. During my time in Warsaw the Security
    Police were in charge of matters concerning the underground
    movement. The Security Police handled these matters
    independently of the SS and Polizeiführer, and received their
    orders from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. When the leader of the
    underground movement in Warsaw was captured, in June or July
    1943, he was flown directly to Kaltenbrunner in Berlin.”

Are these statements true or false, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: These statements are, without exception, wrong. I will...

COL. AMEN: Just like all the other statements of all the other persons
that have been read to you today? Is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: This statement is not correct. It is not true and can be
refuted.

COL. AMEN: That is what you have said about all the other statements I
read to you today, is that not so?

KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I must...

COL. AMEN: Is that so?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. If you bring false accusations against me I must
declare them to be false. I cannot say “yes” to everything of which you
accuse me just because the Prosecution is wrong in determining who is
Himmler’s representative here.

COL. AMEN: All right, go ahead and say whatever you want.

KALTENBRUNNER: I ask you to bear in mind what I have said about the
competency and rules regarding subordination of all Higher SS and Police
Leaders in the occupied territories. All of them were directly
subordinated to Himmler. The SS and Police Leaders of a smaller
territory were subordinated to the Higher SS and the Police Leader. The
branches of the Order Police and of the Security Police were assigned to
these SS and Police Leaders, who had the exclusive right to give them
orders. The entire organization which thus operated in the occupied
territories was excluded from the command jurisdiction of the central
office of the Reich.

There are men here who can testify to the truth of what I have said.
Bach-Zelewski, who was questioned here, was only in the occupied
territories and knows conditions there. There is also the Defendant
Frank who had to work with such a Higher SS and Police Leader who later
became his State Secretary.

COL. AMEN: Your lawyer can call these people. All I am asking you is
whether or not this document is true or false and then asking you to
make any brief pertinent explanation that you might wish to.

KALTENBRUNNER: This document is not correct...

COL. AMEN: We know about potential witnesses all over Germany, and we
know all these defendants in the box have knowledge about most of these
affairs, but that is not what I am asking you about.

I am merely asking you whether what was in that paper was true or false
and you have said it is false; now, is there anything else you feel you
have to say about it?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct and this witness does not know...

COL. AMEN: Well, you said that six times.

KALTENBRUNNER: ...does not know the conditions.

COL. AMEN: Well, how about General Stroop? Did he know anything about
it?

KALTENBRUNNER: If he was SS and Police Leader of Warsaw—and you have
also shown me his diary and his film-report—then, of course, yes.
Stroop was subordinated to the Higher SS and Police Leader of this
place. Stroop had to carry out the action on the order coming from
Himmler via the Higher SS and Police Leader.

COL. AMEN: Stroop was a pretty good friend of yours, was he not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I probably have not seen Stroop more than two or three
times in my life, at Reichsführer Himmler’s.

COL. AMEN: Well, if Stroop were here he at least would be in a position
to tell the truth, would he not, about this Warsaw Ghetto affair?

KALTENBRUNNER: He would have to confirm my statement at least that he
was subordinated to the Supreme SS and Police Leader in the Government
General and that he was not subordinated to me. I should be very glad if
he could confirm that immediately. From your words I must assume that he
is in custody here.

COL. AMEN: Well, he is not in custody here, but fortunately we have an
affidavit from him on exactly these matters about which I have been
questioning you.

I ask to have the defendant shown Document Number 3841-PS, which will
become Exhibit USA-804.

We will find out whether Stroop confirmed what you are trying to tell
the Tribunal. You will accept what Stroop says, will you, Witness?

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not read the document.

COL. AMEN: No; but I say, knowing Stroop and knowing the position which
he held, you do not question but what he would tell the truth about the
happenings in the Warsaw Ghetto, is that not what you have just said, in
effect?

KALTENBRUNNER: The truth of a witness’ testimony has been questioned
before and rightly so. But as I do not know the document I cannot define
my position as to Stroop’s statement.

COL. AMEN: All right, we will read it:

    “My name is Jürgen Stroop. I was SS and Polizeiführer of the
    Warsaw District from 17 or 18 April 1943, until the end of
    August 1943. The action against the Warsaw Ghetto was planned by
    my predecessor, SS Oberführer Dr. Von Sammern-Frankenegg. On the
    day when this action started I took over the command and Von
    Sammern-Frankenegg explained to me what was to be done. He had
    the order from Himmler before him, and in addition I received a
    teletype from Himmler which ordered me to evacuate the Warsaw
    Ghetto and raze it to the ground. To carry this out, I had 2
    battalions of Waffen-SS, 100 soldiers of the Wehrmacht, units of
    the Order Police and 75 to 100 men of the Security Police. The
    Security Police had been active in the Warsaw Ghetto for some
    time, and during this program it was their function to accompany
    SS units in groups of six or eight, as guides and experts in
    Ghetto matters. Obersturmbannführer Dr. Hahn was Commander of
    the Security Police of Warsaw at that time. Hahn gave the
    Security Police their orders concerning their tasks in this
    action. These orders were not given to Hahn by me, but came from
    Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. As SS and Polizeiführer of Warsaw I
    gave no orders to the Security Police. All orders came to Hahn
    from Kaltenbrunner in Berlin. For example, in June or July of
    the same year, I was together with Hahn in Kaltenbrunner’s
    office and Kaltenbrunner told me that while Hahn and I must work
    together, all basic orders to the Security Police must come from
    him in Berlin.

    “After the people had been taken out of the Ghetto—they
    numbered between 50,000 and 60,000—they were brought to the
    railway station. The Security Police had complete supervision of
    these people and were in charge of the transport of these people
    to Lublin.

    “Immediately after the Ghetto action had been completed, about
    300 foreign Jews were collected at the Polski Hotel. Some of
    these people were already there before the action, and some were
    brought there during the action. Kaltenbrunner ordered Hahn to
    transport these people away. Hahn himself told me that he had
    received this order from Kaltenbrunner.

    “All executions were ordered by the Reich Main Security Office,
    Kaltenbrunner.

    “I have read this statement and I have understood it completely.
    I have made the statement freely and without compulsion. I swear
    before God that this is the full truth.”—Signed—“Jürgen
    Stroop.”

Do you say that that statement of Stroop is true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is untrue and I request that Stroop be brought here.

COL. AMEN: You will find that instead of its bearing out your story it
confirms in substantially every detail the story told by Kaleske, who
was Stroop’s adjutant at the time. Is that not true, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is not true, insofar as witness Stroop is one step
closer to my story, for on Page 1 he declares he had received the orders
regarding the Warsaw Ghetto from Himmler and this is something which
Kaleske has never said anywhere.

COL. AMEN: I will accept that, Defendant.

KALTENBRUNNER: An interrogation of General Stroop will clarify this
point completely, also that Hahn had, of course, received orders from
the Gestapo in Berlin; whether in this matter, too, I do not know, since
as a matter of course the offices of the Security Police had also to be
at the disposal of Amt IV, particularly as far as support in legal
proceedings was concerned. But what matters here, in an action taking
place in the Government General and in Warsaw, is the question of what
organizations were involved in this action and all witnesses versed in
these matters will have to agree that this was within the jurisdiction
of the Higher SS and Police Leader in the Government General, not to the
Reich Security Main Office. It is completely incorrect that these
Security Police forces in Warsaw and officials such as Hahn were not
subordinate to the SS and Police Leader.

It can be testified to and ascertained that all Security Police offices,
especially where an action of this kind was involved, could have only
one leader and that was the local leader. But if, Mr. Prosecutor, you
would give me again the opportunity of defining my position to these
witnesses’ statements more comprehensively through my defense counsel I
could come back to this matter properly.

COL. AMEN: And now, Defendant, I want to refer you to Document 3819-PS,
which is already in evidence as GB-306, which are notes of a conference
in the Reich Chancellery on 11 July 1944, signed by Lammers and the
subject of testimony before this Tribunal the other day. You recall
having attended that meeting I presume.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know yet. I do not know the purpose of that
meeting.

COL. AMEN: You do not deny that you were there, do you?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know. This is the first time I have seen this
document.

COL. AMEN: Now, look at Page 12, in the middle of the page, the sentence
there, “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered...”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I ask for clarification of the
question, whether it might have been more appropriate and correct if the
Prosecution had questioned Lammers about this matter when Lammers was
here on the witness stand.

THE PRESIDENT: Was this put to Lammers?

COL. AMEN: Frankly, Your Lordship, I do not know. The document was
introduced and identified, and I am not sure whether he was asked about
it or not. Sir David says that he introduced the document with Keitel,
at the foot of Page 9.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

COL. AMEN: Have you found the place, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have found the place.

COL. AMEN: “In Paris, the evacuation of which was considered, 100,000 to
200,000 workers could be recruited. In this connection...”

KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor, I have not found the place.

COL. AMEN: Well, it is just above the paragraph which commences, “The
Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.” Can you find that
spot?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, I have it now.

COL. AMEN: Well, passing to that sentence:

    “The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared
    himself willing, when asked by the Plenipotentiary General for
    the Allocation of Labor, to place the Security Police at his
    disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical
    weakness. For the whole of France he had only 2,400 men
    available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could
    be recruited with these weak forces. In his opinion, the Foreign
    Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign
    governments.”

Is that a true reflection of what took place at that meeting, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot say that concerning the wording of the document,
but I might say in explanation that according to the introduction on
Page 1 it was a “Chefbesprechung” (discussion of chiefs), and that does
not mean me, for I was Chief of the Reich Security Main Office.
“Chefbesprechung” means the ministries and the chief Reich departments.

By questioning the witness Lammers it would have to be determined
whether I was there on the orders of the Ministry of the Interior and
Chief of the German Police, Himmler. That would have been possible. That
I was there on the instruction of Himmler seems to become evident for me
from the number mentioned. It mentions here that only 2,400 men were at
our disposal. Neither the Security Police nor the SD, nor both together,
ever had any number like that at their disposal. It must have included
all the forces, even the Order Police and other small organizations,
which were subordinate to Himmler.

Therefore, one thing, at least, is missing in this document; that is the
explanation that Kaltenbrunner, on orders of Himmler, was giving
Himmler’s views; that at least is missing. But by questioning the
witness Dr. Lammers, I am sure we can clarify this matter.

In any case, I would like to point out that it was my opinion that I
could not be helpful in this matter because, first of all, negotiations
between the Foreign Office and the competent foreign—that is, the
French Government, were necessary. Measures to be taken there could not
be introduced without the consent of the French Government.

COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant. Now, do you recall evidence given
before this Tribunal about efforts made by Germany to incite the Slovaks
to revolt against Czechoslovakia and that Hitler used the insurgency of
the Slovakians as one of the excuses for occupying Czechoslovakia in
March of 1939?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know who testified to that.

COL. AMEN: Well, in any event, during the year 1938 to 1939 it is a
fact, is it not, that you were the State Secretary for Security in
Austria? Is that right?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I was not State Secretary for the Security Police. I
was State Secretary for the security system of the Austrian Government
at Vienna, and there is an essential difference, because the Security
Police in Austria was instituted and directed from Berlin.

COL. AMEN: Well, all right.

KALTENBRUNNER: And in Austria I had not the slightest influence—nor
even my Minister—on the Security Police.

COL. AMEN: When did you become Supreme SS and Police Leader for Upper
Austria with your headquarters in Germany?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is a complete misstatement. In Upper Austria there
was no Supreme SS and Police Leader, only in Austria.

COL. AMEN: Well, when was it?

KALTENBRUNNER: That was after the liquidation of the Austrian Government
and after its affairs had been settled; that can be verified exactly
from the _Reichsgesetzblatt_. It was probably in the summer of 1941.

COL. AMEN: And is it not a fact that you, yourself, directed the
activity of the Slovakian rebels and assisted them with explosives and
ammunition? Answer that “yes” or “no,” please.

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall having participated in any conference with
respect to a plan for instigating this revolt of Slovakia?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is not correct; I did not participate in instigating
anything like that in Slovakia. I did take part in the first Government
conferences in Slovakia and in the presence of the Delegate of the
German Reich.

COL. AMEN: Did your friend Spacil assist you in carrying out these
plans?

KALTENBRUNNER: That I cannot recall today. In any case, they were not
German plans. If you investigate the political situation in Slovakia at
that time, you will clearly see that it did not need any instigation on
the part of the German Reich. The Hlinka movement then under the
leadership of Dr. Tuka and also of Dr. Tiso, I believe, had made this
decision a long time ago.

COL. AMEN: Were you acquainted with Obersturmbannführer Fritz Mundhenke?

KALTENBRUNNER: I did not quite catch the name.

COL. AMEN: Well, you will see it on this exhibit which I ask you to be
shown now, Document Number 3942-PS, which will become Exhibit Number
USA-805.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Defendant, this is a fairly long exhibit, which I do not want to go
through in detail; but I first call your attention to the opening lines:

    “With respect to the occupation of Czechoslovakia, I recall that
    there were two different actions taken: the first one for the
    occupation of the Sudetenland and the border districts inhabited
    by German nationals; the second one for the occupation of
    Czechoslovakia proper....”

And the following lines:

    “Some time before the second action, officers of Hlinka Guard
    (the illegal organization resembling the SS in the Slovakian
    part of Czechoslovakia) came to the office of SS Corps Area
    Danube, which at the time may still have had its original name
    of SS Oberabschnitt Österreich.”

Then follow the details of the plans for inciting this revolt. Then,
coming to the end of the first paragraph, you will find the following:

    “There were secret meetings to which I was not invited. I felt
    that I was not fully trusted. I saw the gentlemen only in
    Kaltenbrunner’s anteroom and, as far as I can remember, in the
    dining room. I was told nothing about the object of the
    discussions which referred, without doubt, to the imminent
    action.”

Then he gives his reasons. And, passing to the second page, in the
center, you will find the following:

    “Kaltenbrunner alone was responsible for this action. In charge
    of the action was SS Standartenführer Spacil (nicknamed Spatz)
    as far as the General SS is concerned. He was chief of the
    administration of SS Corps Area Danube and was called later on
    by Kaltenbrunner to Berlin and made administration chief at the
    Reich Security Main Office. Spacil was one of Kaltenbrunner’s
    most intimate friends.”

Then, at the close, Paragraph 1 and 2, and subdivisions:

    “I have made this statement:

    “(1) Not from a feeling of revenge or because I want to be an
    informer, but in the knowledge that in so doing I can serve in
    detecting crimes which I, as a German, am ashamed of;

    “(2) With the full consciousness that because of my statements I
    will be slandered by the other side. I know the men who for
    years have been after me. But this shall not deter me from
    helping the spirit of justice to a victorious end.”

I ask you whether the substance of that document, as I have given it to
you, is true or false?

KALTENBRUNNER: Neither true or false; it is ridiculous and consequently
untrue. The document can best be characterized by drawing attention to
the fact that on the first page in the introduction it says:

    “...the second one for the occupation of Czechoslovakia proper
    (called afterwards the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia and the
    Slovakian State).”

The fact that the Republic of Slovakia has never, in the course of
history, been occupied by the German Reich is sufficient to reveal the
ignorance of this witness, Mundhenke, who comes from North Germany and
knows nothing about history or about politics. But this document
contains so many details which can be clarified almost humorously that
it becomes utterly worthless.

I would like to call your attention to Page 3 of the German text and
explain to you who were the men responsible for the individual big
political actions which led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia.

The first is a Franz Kourik who was a chauffeur. The second is Karl
Spitt also a chauffeur. The third is an SS man whose name is Apfelbeck,
son of an innkeeper and a butcher by trade, and who worked as an
assistant official in the administration after he had suffered a grave
skull injury in a motor accident. Stadler, a small bookkeeper, and the
man Petenka are unknown to me.

These men are supposed to have prepared, with me, the occupation of
Slovakia by the Reich. That is utter nonsense. Excuse me for calling it
so, Mr. Prosecutor, but it is and remains...

COL. AMEN: Very good, Defendant. All right. That is nonsense.

KALTENBRUNNER: One thing is true in this document and I want to come to
that. I was with members of the Hlinka Guard in this house in Vienna,
Park Ring 8, and I did hold a conference with them. This dealt with the
union of the group of racial Germans in Slovakia and the Hlinka Guard,
with a view to nominating joint candidates in the Slovakian Government.
Documents prove it and files, in Pressburg at least, where my name was
sufficiently known. Everybody knows, it there and can confirm it,
including this man Mundhenke, the leader of the racial group. But as an
occupation of Slovakia never took place at all, in my opinion there is
no need for me to defend myself against this accusation.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, in the course of this Trial the order of Himmler
to the effect that the civilian population should not be punished for
lynching Allied airmen has been introduced in evidence, and you have
heard the sworn statement of Schellenberg and Gerdes to the effect that
you, in your capacity as Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued
such instructions to your subordinates. Do you deny these statements?
“Yes” or “no,” please.

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not wish to deny them, but I emphatically state that
I never gave any such instructions, and I ask the Tribunal to allow my
counsel to read the paper which I gave to him at the beginning of the
session. This contains literally the testimony of the witness Koller,
the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, defining my general attitude
towards this problem—that even in the presence of Hitler I declared, “I
will not obey such an order.” That took place somewhat later, but it
shows my own personal feelings about the matter. I made a statement to
my counsel already yesterday about this question.

COL. AMEN: All right, Defendant; now take a look at Document Number
3855-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-806. This bears your own
name at the bottom, whether it be a signature, facsimile, or anything
else you choose to call it. Have you the document before you?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: You will note that it comes from the Chief of the Security
Police and of the SD, and according to the notes in the upper left-hand
portion was prepared for your signature by Amt IV A 2 B, Number 220/44 g
RS.

KALTENBRUNNER: That is, Mr. Prosecutor, the first and a very grave
mistake.

COL. AMEN: All right.

    “a) To all commanders and inspectors of the Security Police and
    the SD (for oral communication to the subordinated offices);

    “b) To Groups IV A and IV B, Sections IV A 1, IV A 3, IV A 4 -
    IV A 6, IV B 1 - IV B 4;

    “c) To Office V, Reich Criminal Police Office, for information
    to the Higher SS and Police Leaders, to the Chief of the Under
    Police;

    “d) To Chiefs of Offices I-III and IV of the Reich Security Main
    Office.

    “Subject: Treatment of enemy airmen who have bailed out.

    “Reference: none.

    “A series of questions dealing with the treatment of enemy
    airmen who have been shot down needs clarification:

    “I. As a general rule captured enemy airmen are to be shackled.
    This measure is necessary and is made with the full consent of
    the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces; a) in order
    to prevent frequent escapes, and b) in view of the severe
    shortage of personnel at the collecting stations.

    “II. Enemy air crews, who a) offer resistance when captured, or
    b) wear civilian clothes under their uniforms are to be shot at
    once when captured.

    “III. Most enemy airmen, especially of the Anglo-American air
    forces, carry with them escape bags filled with daggers, various
    kinds of maps, ration coupons, tools for escape, _et cetera_.

    “It is absolutely necessary that escape bags be secured by the
    Police, as they are of the greatest assistance when making a
    search. They must be given to the Luftwaffe.

    “IV. The order of the Reichsführer SS of 10 August 1943”—which
    I believe you also testified you know nothing about—“is not
    being carried out in full, as it has probably not been passed on
    orally, as ordered, to the subordinate police offices.

    “It is therefore repeated: It is not the duty of the police to
    interfere in conflicts between the Germans and English and
    American ‘terror-fliers’ who have bailed out.

    “V. Near the body of an English airman who had been shot down a
    brassard with the inscription ‘Deutsche Wehrmacht’ and an
    official stamp was found. This brassard is only worn by combat
    troops, and it gives the bearer access to all military and
    strategically important points in the various operation zones.
    Parachuted enemy agents will probably make use of this new means
    of camouflage.

    “VI. During the past months individual cases have shown that the
    German population does seize enemy airmen but afterwards, while
    waiting for them to be handed over to the police or the Armed
    Forces, it does not use the proper restraint. Too strict
    measures on the part of the State Police against these citizens
    would keep them from seizing enemy airmen without restraint,
    since these cases must not be confused with the criminal act of
    helping escaped enemy airmen.

    “Reichsführer SS has ordered the following measures to be
    applied to citizens who conduct themselves in a dishonorable
    manner towards captured enemy airmen either out of bad
    intentions or misunderstood pity:

    “1) In especially severe cases, transfer to a concentration
    camp; announcement in the newspapers of the district.

    “2) In less severe cases, protective custody for not less than
    14 days at the competent State Police office; employment in the
    clearing of damaged areas. Should there be no damaged area
    affording such employment within the jurisdiction of one State
    Police office, the short-term protective custody sentence is to
    be served at the nearest State Police office, _et cetera_.

    “The Reichsführer SS has contacted Reichsleiter Bormann in this
    matter and has pointed out that it is the duty of the Party
    officials to instruct the population to observe absolutely
    necessary restraint towards enemy airmen.

    “3) I leave it to the commanders and inspectors of the Security
    Police, and the SD to notify in writing the subordinated offices
    of Sections V and VI of the above decree.

    “Signed: Dr. Kaltenbrunner; Certified: Rose, office clerk.”

Do you deny having had anything to do with the issuance of that
document? Do you deny that you signed it?

KALTENBRUNNER: This order was never submitted to me. I refer you to what
I said yesterday concerning questions of direction and issuing of orders
in the Secret Police office, Amt IV A which appears at the head of the
letter indicating that it formulated it. In these matters this Amt was
directly subordinated to Himmler.

THE PRESIDENT: I have not heard the answer to the question. Did you sign
it?

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

COL. AMEN: You deny your signature and you deny knowing anything about
this document bearing your name, is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Mr. Prosecutor, I have...

COL. AMEN: Will you answer that, Defendant? You deny this document just
like you have denied every other document that has been shown to you
today, is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I already stated yesterday, and also told my defense
counsel, that these documents were never submitted to me. I should know
it today. To a certain degree I am to blame for not having paid more
attention as to whether such orders were issued in my name. I never
denied yesterday that I was partly to blame in this respect but my
position to this question can be clearly seen from Koller’s testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not understand. Are you saying that the signature on
the document is not yours, or that you may have signed it without
looking at the decree? Which are you saying?

KALTENBRUNNER: Your Lordship, this document and this decree were never
submitted to me. To sign such a document would have been completely
against my inner attitude towards the entire problem. My attitude in
this matter can be seen from Koller’s testimony.

THE PRESIDENT: I am not asking you what your inner attitude is. I am
asking you whether the name on it is written by your hand.

KALTENBRUNNER: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document.

COL. AMEN: It is a typewritten signature, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; let us look at the document.

Defendant, who is Rose?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, can you give any idea how long you will be
with your cross-examination?

COL. AMEN: Perhaps half an hour, depending on the answers of the
defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the Tribunal will adjourn. We will sit
tomorrow at 10 o’clock to continue this part of the case, and will
adjourn at half past 12 in order to hear Dr. Thoma and the Prosecution
upon his documents.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                      ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH DAY
                         Saturday, 13 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

COL. AMEN: Defendant, as I recall, you have testified that you had no
knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October ’42 until some time
in 1945. Is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not think that I said so. I believe that concerns
the order...

COL. AMEN: Well, that was your testimony yesterday, according to the
record, that you had no knowledge of the Hitler Commando Order of 8
October ’42 until some time in the year 1945. Is that not correct? Is
that not now your position?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not believe that I made such an answer. The order
is...

COL. AMEN: Well, what is the fact? When did you first have knowledge of
the Hitler Commando Order of 8 October 1942? I am speaking of the order
of 18 October ’42, not 8. When did you first have knowledge of that?

KALTENBRUNNER: I cannot tell you that now, exactly.

COL. AMEN: All right.

KALTENBRUNNER: In any case, this order, if it were read to me, would
probably be the same one which appeared in a Wehrmacht report or in the
press.

COL. AMEN: All right. And you have also denied the testimony of your own
witness, Mildner, concerning the existence of a decree issued in July or
August ’44, under which the Security Police were to execute members of
Allied commando groups after questioning them. That is correct, is it
not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was never asked about that.

COL. AMEN: Well, I beg your pardon; but never mind, anyway. I will show
you Document Number 535-PS, which will become Exhibit USA-807; and,
before anything else, I want to ask you whether it is your own
signature, in your own handwriting, that appears at the bottom of that
document.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. That is my signature.

COL. AMEN: Oh, it is your signature, is it?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: You admit that? Is that right?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is my signature, yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, when you were interrogated before this Trial, you denied
that that was your signature, did you not?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I do not believe so.

COL. AMEN: Well, I will read you your testimony on that point, to see
whether that helps you to remember whether you denied it or not.

    “Answer: ‘From that it can only be seen that the Wehrmacht
    intended to write a letter to me; whether rightly or wrongly,
    and whether I was the right authority to write to is very
    questionable. In any case, the Wehrmacht wanted to get in touch
    with the Gestapo, as can be seen from this exchange of letters,
    and I am convinced that an officer of the Gestapo, namely, the
    one mentioned at the beginning of the letter, is the one who
    wrote this document.’

    “Question: ‘Well, this is the letter that you know nothing
    about, but which, nevertheless, established just how you
    accomplished your desires by writing to the Supreme Command of
    the Armed Forces. That is very clear.’

    “Answer: ‘But I deny that I wrote this letter.’

    “Question: ‘Just a moment ago, you didn’t know about it, but now
    you deny it?’

    “Answer: ‘I not only did not know about the Hitler Order, but I
    also knew nothing about this letter.’

    “Question: ‘But you acknowledged your signature?’

    “Answer: ‘I did not say that this is my signature. I only said
    it resembles my signature; and I also said it is possible that
    it is only a facsimile. I cannot recall a letter of such
    contents signed by me.’

    “Question: ‘Would it be any more convincing to you if you saw
    the original letter, signed in ink?’

    “Answer: ‘It would certainly be more convincing, but it still
    would not prove that I signed in ink.’”

Did you make those answers to those questions, Defendant?

KALTENBRUNNER: Naturally, I do not remember whether I made these answers
literally. But, I would like to make the following remarks to you.
Questions concerning my signature have naturally always been put to me
hundreds of times during interrogations, especially to confuse me.
Today—I believe this is the first time I have seen this document—I
immediately declared, “Yes, this is my signature.” I certainly know my
own signature; I can recognize it. However, you have also shown me
signatures which certainly were not mine.

Besides, you can see from the date of the letter, 23 January 1945, that
it is correct that I learned about it in 1945, as you have already
stated. I could not have the faintest notion of a Hitler order issued in
the year ’42. And if, in your interrogation which you just read to me, I
stated that I did not write this letter, then this is confirmed by the
very figures which appear on top, where you read IV A 2 a, plus numerals
and letters which obviously indicates that the letter was written in a
section which was in charge of these matters.

That is what I mean when I say that I did not write this letter. That it
may have been submitted to me for my signature among thousands of other
papers which I might have had to look into possibly in the course of one
day, I cannot, of course, deny. From this, however, you cannot draw the
conclusion that I undoubtedly knew about the matter. You cannot imagine
the extent of the official functions which I took over in complete
ignorance of police background, without instructions for carrying out
police functions, but rather for organizing and directing the vast
intelligence service.

THE PRESIDENT: Answer questions and do not make speeches.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, is not the signature on that document before you,
Document Number 535-PS, USA-807, precisely the same and identical with
your signature as it appears on Document Number 3803-PS, USA-802? Just
look at the two signatures, and tell the Tribunal if they are not
identical.

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I never signed in that way. I always signed, “Dr.
K.,” as on this document, even in informal letters.

COL. AMEN: How about the handwriting? Does that look the same to you,
Defendant, or does it look different?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, certainly there is a kind of resemblance, but I
think it has happened to every person in this courtroom that in his
absence any one of his assistants at times signed a particularly urgent
letter using his name.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, the Tribunal will be able to see the
signatures and judge for themselves.

COL. AMEN: Very good, Sir.

Now, do you have the exhibit before you, 535-PS?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: You will note that that emanates from IV A 2 a, as appears in
the upper corner under Chief of the Security Police and of the SD.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, and at the beginning you said the letter was written
by me.

COL. AMEN: That it is addressed to the High Command of the Armed Forces,
right?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And that it refers to the Führer Order of 18 October ’42, as
well as to the other Führer orders referred to in the testimony of
Mildner, namely, the Führer orders of 18 August ’44 and 30 July ’44,
correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: I did not know that Mildner testified on this point. Such
a statement is not known to me, nor has it been submitted to me. But, I
believe, it proves...

COL. AMEN: All right. Do you note that this document refers to the
Führer decrees of 18 October ’42, 18 August ’44, and 30 July ’44. Yes or
no, please.

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. It says so here.

COL. AMEN: So that on 23 January ’45 when you wrote this letter, you
obviously had knowledge of those decrees, right? I mean...

KALTENBRUNNER: That is incorrect inasmuch as, in my opinion, the most
important item in this letter is contained in the sixth, fifth, and
fourth lines from the end: Here it says that they can make no claim upon
the allowances for prisoners of war in accordance with the Geneva
Convention. If, then, under the pressure of work this letter was
submitted to me, it is evident that my eyes would first fall on the spot
where I had to sign and also on the last lines. Here...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The
question was whether you knew the order of the 18th of October ’42, of
30 July ’44, and 18 August ’44, when you wrote this letter. Did you
know?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I did not know of these orders, Mr. President.

COL. AMEN: All right...

KALTENBRUNNER: But please, would you let me defend myself on this point.
It was clear to me that this dealt with the treatment of agents to whom
the provisions of the Geneva Convention for prisoners of war are not
applicable; and you cannot deny a power at war the right to let its
security police take in hand those men who do not come under the
regulations of the Geneva War Convention. That is the perfect right of
any power at war. There were also German agents who were engaged in
hostile activity in England and other countries.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you are not here to argue your case now; you
are here to answer questions.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, you testified, did you not, that you first
acquired knowledge of the case of the British fliers who escaped from
Stalag Luft III in March of 1944, some 6 weeks after the escape
occurred; is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, now I assume it was about 6 weeks afterwards; at any
rate, it was just when, in consequence of the speech in the House of
Commons, the Foreign Office took a stand. The department chiefs turned
to me, but I in turn sent them to Himmler.

COL. AMEN: But when you were interrogated about this matter before the
Trial, you testified as follows, did you not?

    “Question: ‘You remember the case of the 80 British fliers who
    escaped from Stalag Luft III, which took place in March ’44?’

    “Answer: ‘That case is unknown to me.’

    “Question: ‘General Westhoff attempted to find out from the
    Gestapo what had happened to these men.’

    “Answer: ‘If he had negotiations with the Gestapo, he did not
    negotiate with me.’

    “Question: ‘What do you say about the general proposition that
    escaped prisoners were turned over to the Gestapo?’

    “Answer: ‘Such cases are not known to me.’”

Did you make those answers, yes or no?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that I did; but I wish to point out to you
that naturally I was completely confused by the manner in which these
questions were put. I never really heard of 80 escaped airmen. Here,
too, mention was made of 50 only.

COL. AMEN: For your information, 80 escaped and 50 were killed.

KALTENBRUNNER: And in addition, General Westhoff stated here that he did
not discuss the Sagan case with me, but that he tried to obtain
information from the State Police, that he spoke to me about the
transfer of prisoner-of-war affairs to Himmler, who was the Commander of
the Reserve Army, and that Sagan was referred to on this occasion.

COL. AMEN: Now, Defendant, you testified that you had no knowledge
whatever of the fact that Einsatz groups of the Security Police and SD
were operating in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had become Chief of
the RSHA in January ’43, is that not correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you still say that that is correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: You deny that you ever knew that these Einsatz groups carried
out the extermination of Jews in the U.S.S.R. until long after you had
become Chief of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: I only discovered this during the arguments I had with
Himmler and Hitler—I believe later in 1943—probably in November.

COL. AMEN: And you admit, I take it, that you were a Higher SS and
Police Leader in Austria in 1942, right?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And Schirach was a Reich Defense Commissioner in Vienna at
that time, was he not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know when he was appointed, but I must point out
that the Higher SS and Police Leaders received those powers with which
they finally were invested in three different stages. In 1941, when I
became Higher SS and Police Leader, the authority of such a leader was
considerably less than it was at the end of the war.

COL. AMEN: Now, if the Tribunal please, I have a document which arrived
by airplane yesterday, of which there is only one original copy and
which, therefore, we have not been able to get translated. So I have
arranged, if it is satisfactory to the Tribunal, for the interpreter to
read the excerpts from that original document, which was taken from
Schirach’s personal files in Vienna, and then submit the original
document to the Court and have it processed just as quickly as we are
able to do so. Or perhaps the Tribunal would like to see the document
first. It is an original document.

THE PRESIDENT: You will read it so that it will go through into German?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. AMEN: This is Document Number 3876-PS. It is a report issued by
Heydrich to all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and Reich Defense
Commissioners on the activities of the Einsatz groups in the U.S.S.R.
during the month of January 1942, and on the distribution list appears
the name of this defendant.

Will you read the Exhibit USA-808?

THE INTERPRETER: The right-hand side of the document bears the initials
in ink, “Sch,” and then several symbols, “Z-RV-K 4030-519/41 g,” and
below that, “1320-C.” At the left on top:

    “The Higher SS and Police Leader attached to the
    Reichsstatthalter in Vienna and in Upper and Lower Danube,
    within Wehrkreis XVII; the Inspector of the Order Police.”

Below that there are several file numbers. The document bears the
heading, “Secret.” It is dated, “Vienna, 14 October 1941... Subject:
Technical report on the battles in the East.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is that right, 14 October 1941?

THE INTERPRETER: Yes, 14 October 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: The previous date that was given was January 1942. What
is the explanation of that?

COL. AMEN: It covers the month—I think there are two different
documents there. You are giving the date on one. There is a different
date on the other. Is that not correct?

THE INTERPRETER: That is correct.

COL. AMEN: Well, give us the date on the other document so the record
will be clear.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, we shall be able to understand when we see
the document.

COL. AMEN: Yes, Your Lordship. [_Turning to the interpreter._] Go right
ahead.

THE INTERPRETER: The date of the other document is April 23, 1942.

COL. AMEN: Go ahead.

THE INTERPRETER: I continue:

    “Subject: Technical report on the battles in the East.
    Reference...”—and then come series of file numbers—

    “The above decree of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German
    Police in the Ministry of the Interior, and also one copy each
    of the technical reports of the Army Command North and the SS
    Police Division, are herewith forwarded to you for your
    information and use.”

The order is signed “Miegel.”

COL. AMEN: Now, will you just go on to the distribution list and read,
if you find it on the list, this defendant’s name.

THE INTERPRETER: The name of the defendant is not on this distribution.
I am coming to the next document.

COL. AMEN: Well, it is!

THE INTERPRETER: No, it is not contained in this document, and I am now
reading the second document:

    “Berlin, 27 February 1942. The Chief of the Security Police and
    the SD, IV A 1 ...”—and then several different file
    references—

    “Top secret. Subject: Activity and situation report Number 9 of
    the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the SD in the
    U.S.S.R. Attached hereto...”

COL. AMEN: Just a minute. He is reading the wrong document, Your
Lordship. We will have it straight in a minute.

THE INTERPRETER: I am told I am reading the right document. It is the
right document, I continue:

    “Herewith attached, I submit to you the ninth comprehensive
    report regarding the activities of the Einsatzgruppen of the
    Security Police and of the SD in the U.S.S.R. In future these
    reports will be sent to you currently as they appear. Signed,
    Heydrich.”

Then there is a stamp, “The Reich Defense Commissioner for the Wehrkreis
XVII, received 5 March 1942;” and then follows the distribution, of
which Number 13 reads, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS
Gruppenführer, Dr. Kaltenbrunner.”

COL. AMEN: His name is on the list, is it not? Now, if you will skip to
“C” on that document.

THE INTERPRETER: I now read from Page 9 of the document, an extract
under the heading “C. Jews:”

    “The attitude of the Jews towards the Germans is still clearly
    hostile and criminal. It is our aim to cleanse the Eastern
    countries of Jews as completely as possible. Everywhere the
    executions are to be carried out in such a manner that they will
    hardly be noticed by the public. Among the population, and even
    among the remaining Jews, the conviction is widespread that the
    Jews have merely been resettled. Estonia has already been
    cleared of Jews. In Latvia the 29,500 Jews who remained in Riga
    have been reduced to 2,500. In Dünaburg there still live 962
    Jews who are urgently needed for work.”

I am now skipping several paragraphs and I continue:

    “In Lithuania there are now in Kaunas still 15,000 Jews, in
    Schaulen 4,500, and in Vilna another 15,000 who are also needed
    for work. In White Ruthenia the Jews are being cleared out. The
    number of Jews in the part of the country which has so far been
    turned over to the civilian administration amounts to 139,000.
    In the meantime 33,210 Jews have been shot by the Einsatzgruppen
    of the Security Police and the SD.”

I now skip the rest of this extract and continue by reading another
document. This is dated, “Berlin, 23 April 1942,” and shows an illegible
initial in ink. It bears the heading, “The Chief of the Security Police
and the SD, IV A 1,” and several file numbers. It bears the designation,
“Top secret.” This document, which is signed by Heydrich and which shows
as the date of receipt 28 April 1942, lists in the distribution in the
14th place, “To the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS Gruppenführer, Dr.
Kaltenbrunner, Vienna.”

I now read from Page 11 of the report, and I read an extract headed “C.
Jews”:

    “Different methods were used in solving the Jewish problem in
    the various front sectors. Since the greater part of the Eastern
    territory is free of Jews, and since the few remaining Jews, who
    are required for most urgent work, have been put into ghettos,
    it was the task of the Security Police and the SD to round up
    those Jews who were hiding mainly in the country. Many times
    Jews who had left the ghetto without permission or who were not
    wearing the Jewish Star have been arrested. Among others, three
    Jews who had been sent from the Reich to the ghetto in Riga and
    who had escaped, were captured and publicly hanged in the
    ghetto. During large-scale anti-Jewish operations 3,412 Jews in
    Minsk, 302 in Vileika, and 2,007 in Baranowicze were shot.”

I now skip three paragraphs and continue:

    “In addition to taking action against individual Jews who were
    known for their political or criminal activity, it was the task
    of the Security Police and the SD, to clean up generally the
    larger towns in the remaining territories of the Eastern Front.
    Thus, in Rakow alone 15,000, and in Artenowsk 1,224 Jews were
    shot, so that now there are no more Jews there. In the Crimea
    1,000 Jews and Gypsies were executed.”

That is all.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, do you still have the temerity to tell this
Tribunal that you knew nothing about the operations of these Einsatz
groups until after you took over as Chief of the RSHA?

KALTENBRUNNER: At the top left hand corner of the document can clearly
be read, “The Higher SS and Police Leader...”

THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question and then you can look at the document
afterwards. Do you still say that you knew nothing about these
Einsatzgruppen?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have no knowledge of the contents of this document. I
want to point out that the Office of the Inspector of the Public Police
dispatched this letter on 22 October 1941. Technical reports on the
fighting on the Eastern Front and on the operations of the Security
Police and SD, which were drafted at that time, are based on orders
issued by Himmler or Heydrich and not on my orders. In no way can this
document show how I regarded the entire question. If the distribution
lists all the Higher SS and Police Leaders and all the offices to which
these technical reports were sent, I do not regard that as proof that
these offices, that is to say all the men who were working in these
offices—must necessarily have known of it. You cannot assume that
cognizance was actually taken of reports concerning territories over
which the official in question had no jurisdiction or influence
whatsoever. There is no doubt at all today that these crimes were
committed in the East. But it is to be proved whether they are in any
way due to my influence, either intellectually, legislatively, or
administratively, and whether I approved of them, and whether I could
have stopped them; all this I must absolutely deny.

COL. AMEN: Defendant, that was just one of a regular series of monthly
reports, a copy of which went to you every single month. Is that not a
fact, yes or no?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know how often such reports came. I see this
report today for the first time. Of course, it cannot be denied that
such technical reports from all battle zones concerning either the
Security Police, or the Order Police operations, or the experiences of
the Wehrmacht were issued and distributed all over the Reich.

COL. AMEN: All right, that is enough for me. Did you know about a letter
written by your attorney, seeking evidence on your behalf at this Trial?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not yet discussed such a letter with my Defense
Counsel. Please ask him if he has informed me of this letter.

COL. AMEN: Well, are you not familiar with the fact that he wrote a
letter to the Mayor’s office in Oranienburg near Berlin and received a
reply to that letter to be used on your behalf?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. Please ask him. He has not told me anything about it.

COL. AMEN: Now, then I will refer you to document number...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, are you entitled to go into professional
matters between the defendant and his counsel?

COL. AMEN: I believe so in this instance, Your Lordship, because the
letter was sent to us directly by the recipient of the letter, with the
expectation that it would be used by us. This is no confidential
communication. It was a letter...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you let the Tribunal see the letter?

COL. AMEN: Yes, Sir.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, this is the first time that I have heard
of this matter. If the document is addressed to me, may I perhaps have a
look at it before it becomes an item in this Trial?

COL. AMEN: Sure.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, let him look at it first.

COL. AMEN: If Your Lordship pleases...

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I explain it, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we had better hear from Colonel Amen first because
he wants to introduce the document.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I say something first?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann, what do you want to say now?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Perhaps the Tribunal has already noticed that I...

THE PRESIDENT: We have not seen the document.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have seen the document.

THE PRESIDENT: I said we have not seen it yet. We have allowed you to
see it first in order that you can make any objection to it that you
want to make before we see it, and then we will look at it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I see. Mr. President, I am of the opinion that this
is an unfair infringement on the rights and duties of the German
Defense. The whole world may read this document. It is an inquiry which
is addressed to the Mayor’s office at Oranienburg. Oranienburg was a
large concentration camp. Since, according to an agreement with my
colleagues, I had the task of clarifying the question of the “awareness
of the German people,” I sent this letter containing questions which
everybody may read to the Mayor’s office and requested that these
questions be answered. It was my intention to submit these answers, if
the occasion arose, to the Tribunal. The same questions have been sent
out to other towns, and I have already submitted these documents for
translation and shall later submit them to the Tribunal. But it is an
impossible state of affairs that a letter of a defense counsel and the
reply given to that defense counsel should be disclosed here by the
Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Kauffmann. But the document that
Colonel Amen was offering in evidence was not your letter to the Mayor
of Oranienburg nor his answer to you.

COL. AMEN: Yes, it was.

THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, I thought you said it was a letter
that has been sent to the Prosecution.

COL. AMEN: I said that a copy was sent to the Prosecution. As I
understand it, not only by the person who received it—there was no
covering letter—but also turned over to the British Prosecution in a
letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand now. I do not think you said before it was a
copy. What I understood was it might have been sent to you by mistake.
If it were a copy of a letter which was sent to Dr. Kauffmann, then the
position is clear as to what it was.

COL. AMEN: That is my understanding of it, Sir. And, of course, it is a
copy of his letter but I know of no privilege whatsoever of a
confidential...

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by “a copy of his letter”? A copy of the
letter sent to Dr. Kauffmann?

COL. AMEN: Sent by Dr. Kauffmann to the Mayor of Oranienburg and a copy
of the reply made by the Mayor to Dr. Kauffmann; and I think you will
see, if Your Lordship reads the reply, how it is that it came directly
to our attention.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add one more thing, only two or three sentences,
please? I consider the presentation of these two documents a
particularly severe infringement of the rights of the Defense. The
Defense has had no opportunity to look at the documents of the
Prosecution, and it would never have occurred to us to submit to the
Tribunal documents of the Prosecution which are to our advantage. This
is exclusively a matter between me, the sender of the letter, and the
office answering it; how is it possible for the Prosecution to be
allowed to interfere in such entirely personal matters? I do not think
that is fair.

COL. AMEN: Now, if Your Lordship pleases, I think I can clear the whole
thing up. This is a letter dated 2 April ’46 from Major Wurmser to the
British Prosecution, and it reads as follows:

    “Attached please find the original correspondence regarding
    Oranienburg. In accordance with your request, I have ascertained
    that this correspondence was received in the following way. It
    came addressed to the Prosecution and was delivered to the
    General Secretary. The original was apparently sent directly to
    Dr. Kauffmann and the sender, the Mayor of Oranienburg, a Mr.
    Klaussmann, dispatched at the same time a carbon copy to the
    Prosecution which not only consisted of his answer but also of
    the letter which was sent to him by Dr. Kauffmann.”

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think we understand the circumstances now.

COL. AMEN: So I think it was sent to the Prosecution for the very
purpose for which I am now endeavoring to utilize it.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen, apart altogether from the question of
privilege between counsel and his client, how do you say that this
document, which is a letter apparently from a private individual
addressed to Dr. Kauffmann, copy of which is sent to you, is evidence at
all?

COL. AMEN: Because, Your Lordship, there is included in this defendant’s
document book a letter which is on precisely this same point. In other
words, this defendant has raised this point in his own defense. He did
not read the letter.

THE PRESIDENT: That is not quite the point. This letter to Dr.
Kauffmann, of which you have a copy, is not as I understand a sworn
statement.

COL. AMEN: It is not sworn; no, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: How does it become evidence then? The witness is not
here.

COL. AMEN: It has the same probative value that many letters introduced
here in evidence have. In fact, I think it has considerably more than
many of them, because it is a letter from an official, from the mayor
who has conducted an inquiry and has ascertained what I consider to be
one of the most important matters in the case—namely, whether...

THE PRESIDENT: No, I do not want to hear at the moment what is in the
letter.

COL. AMEN: I cannot think of a thing that was more pertinent than this
letter, or more important, to be brought out at this Trial, particularly
when it—well, you do not want me to go into that—particularly when it
is something which the defendant has sought to interpose as his own
defense, and which now turns out...

THE PRESIDENT: But he has not sought to introduce it for his own
defense.

COL. AMEN: Well, I say he has sought to introduce that issue by the
letter in his document book so that, even were it not otherwise perhaps
relevant, it surely becomes so when the defendant has raised that
precise issue in his own documents. But even aside from that, it seems
to me that it is one of the most important issues in this case.

I will not characterize it in words since Your Lordship does not wish me
to, but I can hardly think of anything more pertinent than the matter
set forth there in the form of an official communication.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Amen the only question I was asking you was how
the particular document, which is an unsworn document, came to be
competent evidence. Has it been seen by the witness who is under
cross-examination?

COL. AMEN: Well, as an official communication, Sir, to his counsel. In
the course of the discharge of his official duties as a mayor—it is a
part of his job.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not wish to speak now about the
question of procedure. I merely want to mention that this letter...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I do not want to deal at great length with the question
of procedure which we touched upon just now, but I wish to emphasize
that these two documents have nothing to do with the case of
Kaltenbrunner as such. As I have just said, anyone may look at the
document; but, since this document has nothing to do with Kaltenbrunner,
it has from the very outset no value as evidence.

COL. AMEN: Well, it has even further probative value, Your Lordship, in
that, if the matters referred to in this letter were known, as described
in the letter to the people in Oranienburg, surely the person who
occupies the position as Chief of the RSHA in Germany must certainly
have the knowledge which the smallest local civilian appears to have.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that the document is inadmissible.

COL. AMEN: That was to have been my last document, Your Lordship; so
that concludes the cross-examination, except for one point. There is a
witness named Hoess, who is called on behalf of the defendant, and
through whom I would like to introduce two exhibits. If he is not to be
called, however, then I would like to introduce those exhibits through
the defendant. So I am wondering whether we could obtain a definite
statement as to whether or not the witness Hoess is actually to be
called by the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, are you proposing to call Hoess?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: You are.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I did not hear what you said, Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat. Wait a minute,
wait a minute!

CHIEF COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE L. N. SMIRNOV (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): Just a minute—stay! Mr. President, we have a few questions
to put to the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, we understood the other day that the
Counsel for the Prosecution had agreed that there should be only one
cross-examination of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: We wish to request the Tribunal to allow us to
put to the defendant a few questions, which will not take very long but
which are quite indispensable for further questioning.

THE PRESIDENT: In the opinion of the Tribunal, I think you know counsel
ought to settle beforehand what questions are indispensable and then
have them put by the counsel who cross-examines. That is the whole
object of the scheme.

Sir David, when we saw you on this subject, did you not tell us that all
the prosecutors had agreed that so far as this defendant was concerned
he should only be cross-examined by one?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that was the position. I understand
that the Soviet Delegation have some special points, and they were going
to ask, as a matter of grace of the Tribunal, whether they could put
them. That is what my Soviet colleagues have informed me.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost?

M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): My
explanation will be very brief, Mr. President. In principle, the
Prosecution entrusts one man to ask all these questions. It is
impossible, however, for the entire investigation and examination to be
carried out by one member of the Prosecution only because we do
represent four different nations which have not divergent but certainly
individual interests. The only person qualified to speak in the
interests of a nation is the representative of that nation. I think,
therefore, that the Tribunal should permit us to ask questions from time
to time when we ask to be allowed to do so.

THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, you are not applying now, are you, for leave
to have a third cross-examination; you are just speaking on general
principles?

M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a question of principle. The Prosecution
has limited itself in order to economize on time, but it requests the
Tribunal for authorization to intercede when it is necessary to do so in
order to represent the interests of a country.

I will not ask any questions which might have occurred to me following
the interrogation by my colleague of the United States; I do not wish to
retard the proceedings. I think, however, that the Tribunal could tell
us that in principle we remain free to ask questions which concern our
countries, especially since we alone are competent to represent the
interests of our countries and cannot transfer this competency to one of
our colleagues.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Smirnov, could you inform the Tribunal upon what
questions, what points you want to cross-examine?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yesterday, when the defendant was replying to
Colonel Amen’s questions and denying his participation in the
extermination of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto, he stressed that the
Chief of Police in occupied Poland, Krüger, was allegedly directly
subordinated to Himmler and had no connection with Kaltenbrunner at all.
In the Polish documents which have just reached me, and in connection
with which the Soviet Delegation has changed the order which it has
primarily intended to observe, in these Polish documents there is...

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that point. Are there any other points?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The second point refers to another document
already submitted by the Soviet Delegation, and this point has not been
covered by the preceding question; but it is of intense interest from
the viewpoint of the documents previously presented. It is in regard to
these two questions that I wish to examine the defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: You are aware that we are going to adjourn at half past
12 for the purpose of dealing with the documents of the Defendant
Rosenberg, but you may certainly cross-examine upon these points if you
will do it as shortly as you can.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I believe, Mr. President, that we shall be able
to finish the cross-examination in 15 minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Witness, Colonel Amen yesterday submitted to the
Tribunal a document which disclosed your active participation in the
liquidation of the Warsaw Ghetto. Perhaps you can tell us under whose
orders the police were. Rebutting this document you dwelt at great
length on the fact that the Police Chiefs in the occupied territories
were directly subordinated to Reichsführer SS Himmler and had nothing to
do with you.

Do you stick to this statement?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but it should be supplemented. I also said yesterday
that the Higher SS and Police Chief in the Government General was
subordinate to Himmler and that, in turn, the SS and Police Leaders of
the smaller districts were subordinate to him.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can tell us to whom the police
officials were subordinate?

KALTENBRUNNER: The commanders of the Security Police, the Order Police,
and the Waffen-SS were subordinate to the Higher SS and to the Chief of
Police. They were also subordinated to the Chiefs of Police and SS in
the smaller districts.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Perhaps you can remember your second statement
as well, when you declared yourself opposed to Krüger’s extreme
tendencies towards the Polish Jews, and that you had even attempted to
restrain him?

KALTENBRUNNER: I have stated that I agreed with Frank in favoring the
release of Krüger—that is, his transfer from the Government General.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would like to hand Frank’s diary to the
defendant.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Let him turn to Page 13, where Krüger is mentioned, and then to Page 16.
From this Page 16, I shall read three paragraphs. Read and follow if it
has been carefully translated, “There is no doubt”—says Krüger—“that
the removal of the Jews has had a favorable effect on pacification...”

KALTENBRUNNER: That passage has not been submitted to me here. I have
Page 13 of the document in my hand.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Well then, we shall show you Page 16, beginning
with the words “There is no doubt...” I begin again:

    “There is no doubt but that the removal of the Jews has also had
    a favorable effect on pacification. It was for the police one of
    their gravest and most unpleasant tasks; but it had to be
    carried out by order of the Führer, since it was necessary in
    the interests of Europe.”

I omit one paragraph and would ask you to do the same:

    “One was forced to remove the Jews from the armament industries
    and from all industries and factories of military and economic
    interest unless they are exclusively employed on important war
    work. In such cases the Jews were collected in the large camps
    and from there sent by day to the munition factories. The
    Reichsführer SS, however, desires that the employment of these
    Jews stop, too. He had a long conversation on this subject with
    Lieutenant General Schindler and is of opinion that this wish of
    the Reichsführer SS cannot be carried out in full. There are
    among the Jewish workers specialists, skilled mechanics, and
    other qualified artisans who cannot at present be replaced by
    Poles.”

I draw your attention to the next sentence:

    “He therefore requests the SS Obergruppenführer, Dr.
    Kaltenbrunner, to describe the situation to the Reichsführer SS
    and to request him to refrain from removing these skilled Jewish
    workers. The physically best-conditioned of the Jews had been
    retrained by the industries, the so-called ‘Maccabeans,’ who
    worked magnificently, as well as female workers who had proved
    physically stronger than the male Jews. We experienced the same
    conditions in the clearing of the Warsaw Ghetto. By the way,
    this task had been very difficult.”

I omit a sentence and quote the following:

    “It has been proved that here, too, the Jewesses, arms in hand,
    had fought the men of the Waffen-SS and the police to the end.”

Do these passages not prove that Krüger considered you as his commanding
officer, and that when the majority of Jews had already been murdered in
Poland and only a very small number of good specialists were left,
Krüger appealed to Himmler—through you, as his chief—to allow these
Jews to live? Does this not bear witness to the fact that Krüger
considered you as his chief and acted through you?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, Mr. Prosecutor. This document, on the contrary,
proves something quite different. In the first place, he himself says
here that the evacuation of the Warsaw Ghetto had previously taken
place; in the second place, he says that he begs me to go to Himmler and
to remonstrate with him. What I said to Himmler is not contained in the
document; and the fact that, on that occasion, I told Himmler for the
first time, “Now I know what is going on,” and protested against it,
does not appear in this document. But surely I must be given the
opportunity to declare and prove here that I took steps against this
action; and if you cross-examine Frank or the witnesses...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment, you have already mentioned this,
Defendant.

KALTENBRUNNER: I have not finished. I have not yet finished this point.
If you question the witnesses on the subject of “Government General,”
you will discover exactly how, on that occasion, I paid my first and
only visit to the Government General, and that what I experienced and
learned there became the subject of a discussion with Himmler. You
cannot accuse me, on the one hand, of knowing of all these things
without giving me, on the other hand, the opportunity to describe what
were my reactions. In the last 2 years of the war, circumstances placed
me in a position where I was able to see what was happening in the Reich
and later on, near the end, in the Government General as well. But you
are not giving me an opportunity to explain how I reacted, I the man who
had the misfortune to get such a position at the end of the war.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One little moment. But why did Krüger act
through you?

KALTENBRUNNER: And further, this document does not indicate in any way
in what capacity I was there; not once does he mention that I was there
as his police superior. He knows only that naturally, as Chief of the
Intelligence Service, I had to report very often to Himmler. So he asked
me on this occasion to make these reports. But Krüger was—as it surely
appears in the document—State Secretary for the security system in the
Government General. He was State Secretary there, and as State Secretary
he was subordinate to the Governor General, and as State Secretary...

THE PRESIDENT: You are going too fast, and you are making far too much
of a speech.

KALTENBRUNNER: ...and as State Secretary for police matters in the
Government General, he was, of course, immediately subordinate to
Himmler. That must be...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I beg you to answer briefly: Did Krüger ask you
to report to Himmler on this subject or not? That is the only thing I am
asking you.

KALTENBRUNNER: As far as I know, this meeting was a large meeting of
administrative officials and everyone asked all those who were closest
to the Führer or Himmler...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Tell me, “yes” or “no”: Did he ask you to
report, or not?

KALTENBRUNNER: I do not know that.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: So you do not know. Then I will ask you a second
question.

KALTENBRUNNER: From the wording I can only take...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: One moment.

KALTENBRUNNER: You are not allowing me to finish.

THE PRESIDENT: What did you say to the last question? Was not the
question, “Did you go there?” Colonel Smirnov?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I had another question to put, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you what your last question was.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I asked the following question, Mr. President:
Did Krüger report to Himmler through Kaltenbrunner? I was asking the
defendant to answer “yes” or “no” and to abstain from making speeches.

THE PRESIDENT: What was your last question?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask Kaltenbrunner to report to
Himmler on this subject. My second question—Mr. President, are you
asking about my second question?

THE PRESIDENT: I wanted him to answer your question. Will you tell him
what question you want him to answer. Don’t ask him two; ask him one
question. Can’t you hear what I said?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask him one question, and see whether you can try and get
him to answer it.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Did Krüger ask for this to be reported to
Himmler, and what did he say?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is possible that he did ask me but not as a superior.
You must realize what type of assembly it was; that must also become
apparent from the diary. I did not go there as the Chief of the Security
Police, or as Krüger’s superior; but Krüger, like dozens of other
people, reported on the food situation, the administrative system...

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I would ask you to refrain from further
explanations. You answered my question, and it is not worth continuing
on the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the matter, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, a quotation from Frank’s diary has been read
to the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Frank’s diary consists of 42 volumes and
I should like to suggest that the prosecutor give the place and the
volume and the date of the entry, so that one can determine in what
connection that occurred.

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Here we have a precise indication: This is a
conference of 31 May 1943 in Kraków. There it is headed “Technical
Conference...” The document is registered as Exhibit Number USA-613,
Document 2233(aa)-PS.

THE PRESIDENT: This diary presumably got a date.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is correct. This conference took place on
31 May 1943; there is the date.

THE PRESIDENT: That is what Dr. Seidl wants to know.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have a second question to put to the
defendant.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: If, as the defendant says, he was exclusively
employed on intelligence work and with nothing else, then did he
consider the buying over of the Iran elections and the receipt from
Ribbentrop of 1 million tomans to send to agents as entering purely
within the scope of intelligence work?

KALTENBRUNNER: I certainly had nothing to do with the buying of votes in
Iran; but I admit, of course, that agents of my Intelligence Service did
work in Iran.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: You did not ask Ribbentrop for 1 million tomans
for bribery?

KALTENBRUNNER: No, I had sufficient means to pay my agents myself.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This letter bearing Kaltenbrunner’s signature
has already been submitted to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-178,
during Ribbentrop’s cross-examination. Mention is made in this letter of
the allocation of 1 million tomans. Does the defendant deny this
evidence which Ribbentrop, himself, has admitted?

KALTENBRUNNER: I believe that I did not demand any money from Ribbentrop
because I had enough money. Show me this letter. It might be quite
possible. I had sufficient funds at my disposal for the intelligence
service.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: The original of this letter has already been
submitted to the Tribunal during Ribbentrop’s interrogatory. We have
only the copy but the original, of course, can be brought immediately
from the document room. It is said here that:

    “In order to exert a decisive influence on the election results,
    400,000 tomans would be needed for bribes in Teheran and at
    least 600,000 tomans for the rest of Iran.”

The letter ends as follows:

    “I request you to tell me briefly if it would be possible to
    obtain 1 million tomans from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    It would be possible to transfer this money by people whom we
    are sending there by airplane.

    “Heil Hitler. Your devoted Kaltenbrunner, SS Obergruppenführer.”

The contents of this letter are quite definite. Ribbentrop acknowledged
the letter. Are you denying Ribbentrop’s evidence?

KALTENBRUNNER: Not in the least, but I would like to add the following
as far as this document is concerned. I cannot remember it easily
because it was written in Office VI. I do not know the contents—did not
know them until now. I am absolutely sure that I signed it, because it
is a letter to a Minister of the Reich which, of course, for reasons of
tact, I had to sign personally. As to the subject itself, I am grateful
that the last question in this cross-examination is a question which
actually refers to my sphere of activities proper. You are the first
prosecutor to whom I must be grateful on that account, and who at last
can no longer conceal the fact that my agents and my activities extended
as far as Iran.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Is that your signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: I have no further questions to put to this
defendant, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: What document is that you put to him then?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: This is Exhibit Number USSR-178, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: 178?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: That is Kaltenbrunner’s letter addressed to Von
Ribbentrop, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1943.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you. Now, the Tribunal will deal with
Dr. Thoma’s documents for Rosenberg. Is the Prosecution ready? Are you
ready, Mr. Dodd?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Would it be convenient for Mr. Dodd to tell us how the
position stands? Would it be agreeable to you, Dr. Thoma, if Mr. Dodd
tells us how the position stands?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

MR. DODD: Dr. Thoma has prepared three document books, and there are two
volumes to the first book—two parts, two volumes—and I should like to
take up first, Volumes I and II of the first document book. In the
first, Volume I...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already looked at these volumes.

MR. DODD: Well, there is contained in the book that has been submitted
to us a number of authorities, starting with that first document by
Falckenberg, _The History of Modern Philosophy_, and running down to the
_Introduction into the Psychology of the Nations_, by Hellpach; and
really, as we understand the ruling of the Court, on the 8th of March,
it stated that these books could be used so far as appropriate for the
purpose of argument, and to this end they should be produced and made
available to Defense Counsel; and the Court went on to say that any
particular passage which Counsel for the Defense wish to quote should be
incorporated in the document book for translation.

We object to all of these excerpts and for mostly the same reasons, and
I think I can discuss them as a group rather than individually.

THE PRESIDENT: We have all read them, and we wish only to hear any
arguments which Dr. Thoma desires to make comments upon.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to stress that only the legal
points of view prompt me to offer writings of contemporary historians as
evidence in this Trial. The Tribunal has to decide whether there is a
connection between Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes and crimes
against Jews.

I assert that, in addition to that ideology, other factors—so-called
preliminary conditions, that is, the entire contemporary situation, the
philosophical and mental outlook—contributed their part; but the main
question is this: Did Rosenberg culpably anticipate the dangerous
possibilities of his ideas and nevertheless promulgate them? In what
manner can he be considered guilty if Rosenberg was convinced that his
ideas were right, and if he was unaware of their dangerous development?
I shall therefore indicate facts about the mental outlook of the time
which prove that his ideas were perceived, and even partly championed by
exact science. I will show that other countries introduced certain
National Socialist measures, such as suppressing births of children
unfit for life, even before Rosenberg’s books were written. Further, I
shall allude to the results of the investigations of natural science on
the natural basis for the existence of man and the ensuing limitation of
man’s freedom. I shall point to the effects and consequences of a
technical age; and I want to refer to the fact that irrational ideas and
conceptions have been taken seriously even by rational empirical
science; and I want to show how laws govern the development of
philosophical concepts and political movements which are often
inevitable. On the basis of these scientific conclusions, it is possible
that Rosenberg underestimated or overlooked the dangerous side of his
ideology—to wit, that all ideas and conceptions degenerate according to
the laws governing the human mind. The question of guilt, therefore,
must be regarded in a new light and, in my opinion, also the question of
carelessness should be examined. These theses will be extracted from
works on natural science by Von Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter,
and from the philosophical works of Hellpach, Messer, Tillich, Buber _et
cetera_.

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the belief that a philosophy of the
irrational might be applied to politics may sound ridiculous, but I
would mention that only 15 years ago in Germany it was preached that a
policy based on Christian ethics was nonsensical, because Christian
ethics could not be applied in the political sphere. Today we know that
this is possible, and, therefore, I am pleading before a Tribunal who,
to my conviction, receive their authority from these ethical motives.
That is only one example for the importance of the irrational in
politics. The belief in the power of the ideal and the moral is, after
all, irrational, too.

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, the question of the causal connection between
Rosenberg’s ideology and the war crimes must not, or rather should not,
be confused with the charge of Rosenberg’s actual participation in the
murder of the Jews and the crimes in the East. This has another
connection. I will have to try to refute the actual participation of
Rosenberg in these matters separately.

I would like to draw your attention to one more important viewpoint.
Organizations, whose members formerly had in part been under the
influence of Christianity and the so-called youth movement, and who let
themselves be won over to National Socialism because they believed that
by it their Christian and idealistic interests could be realized, are
also indicated. They are now left helpless in their camps, disappointed
in this world. They, too, have the right to ask that the Tribunal be
told what they believed in and what they had been taught. I believe that
I have made it clear that I am not trying to deliver a lecture on
aesthetics but that these are very important legal problems.

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if any of the authors are unsuitable, then I
shall forego quoting them. Perhaps Lapouge may not be suitable at all. I
withdraw his work, although it is precisely Lapouge who points out that
certain biological laws have also been applied in the legislation of
other states. But Mr. Justice Jackson objected to a passage from
Lapouge, and I withdraw it herewith. There are also one or two works of
Martin Buber which I am willing to withdraw. But I particularly wanted
to use Martin Buber to prove that we are concerned here with principles
which have nothing whatsoever to do with anti-Semitism but merely
represent a philosophy which is as justified as the philosophy of
rationalism during the last centuries. But I ask the Tribunal that,
during the presentation of evidence, cognizance be taken only of actual
philosophical-historical proofs and facts. Gentlemen of the Tribunal, if
I presented these facts in my address, I would run the risk of
presenting only my own knowledge. That is why I need these documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, we understand that you object to all up to that
book of Hellpach’s. Then, with reference to the other volumes, the
others are all Rosenberg’s own documents, are they not?

MR. DODD: Except the two last.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the two last are in the same category, I suppose, as
the ones down to Hellpach, are they not?

MR. DODD: Yes, there are also some quotations from newspapers contained
in the document books, on Pages 182 to 185. We also made objection to
them.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they in Volume II?

MR. DODD: Yes, they are in Volume II of Book 1.

THE PRESIDENT: I was dealing, at the moment, with Volume I of Document
Book 1.

MR. DODD: That was the objection in Volume I.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, you are not objecting to his other books?

MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, we are not.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, in Book 2 there is not an index, is there?

MR. DODD: We have no objection to anything that is contained in Book 2.

THE PRESIDENT: In Volume II to Book 1?

MR. DODD: We were talking about Volume II, Book 1.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; yes, I see. Then in Book 2—you do not object
to Book 2?

MR. DODD: No, we do not.

THE PRESIDENT: Nor Book 3?

MR. DODD: No, we have no objection to Book 3. I think our Russian
colleagues have an objection to the affidavit of Dr. Dencker. I would
prefer, however, that they address the Tribunal on that subject
themselves.

THE PRESIDENT: And then, is there a fourth book?

MR. DODD: No, Your Honor, there is not, but we have not talked about the
second part of the first book.

THE PRESIDENT: I was told that you had.

MR. DODD: No, I think not. I did mention the newspaper articles.

THE PRESIDENT: Where are these documents that you are referring to, in
the second volume of the first book?

MR. DODD: The first one will be found beginning on Page 182 of that
second volume of the first book.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, those are the last two in the index.

MR. DODD: Yes, they are.

THE PRESIDENT: We understand that you are objecting to them.

MR. DODD: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: But the index in the first volume of the first book is
the index for both the volumes.

MR. DODD: Yes, it is.

THE PRESIDENT: And what you are objecting to is all documents up to
Hellpach and the last two?

MR. DODD: Yes, that is exactly right.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand. Then, with reference to Books 2 and 3 you
do not object, but the Soviet Union wishes to offer an objection to this
affidavit by Professor Dencker.

MR. DODD: That is exactly right, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better hear what the Soviets say about
that.

STATE COUNSELLOR OF JUSTICE M. Y. RAGINSKY (Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R.): I invite the Tribunal’s attention to Document Rosenberg-38.
This is in the third document book, Page 29. This document is a letter,
dated 24 August 1931.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, is it not an affidavit?

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: No. I am referring to two documents, Mr.
President, Document Rosenberg-38 and the second one dealing with
Dencker’s affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Yes, I got Page 21. We will deal with Document
38 first, that is Page 29.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: This document is the letter of an unknown wine
merchant, addressed to Rosenberg, concerning some sort of newspaper
paragraph. We do not know this newspaper paragraph since defense
counsel, Dr. Thoma, has not submitted it; and, therefore, we believe it
is not relevant to the matter and all the more so since in none of his
claims and in none of his explanations did Dr. Thoma explain what this
document was supposed to prove nor what this letter was about.

I would then like to mention a few considerations regarding the second
document, concerning Dencker’s affidavit presented by defense counsel
Dr. Thoma. This affidavit is also in the third document book, Pages
8-11, and is registered as Rosenberg Number 35. Judging by the contents,
Dencker, a former member of Economic Staff East, participated in the
perpetration of war crimes in the territories occupied by the German
troops. This Dencker took part in the looting of the occupied
territories of the Soviet Union.

I wish to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that defense
counsel, Dr. Thoma, on 6 April of this year, requested the Tribunal to
allow the admission of this document, and the General Secretary of the
Tribunal got the opinion of the Prosecution. However, before the
Tribunal had made up its mind, before the Prosecution had come to a
conclusion, Dencker’s affidavit was included in the document book,
mimeographed and distributed to everybody. What, may I ask, is this
affidavit? We consider, and it is very easy to prove, that the
information contained in this affidavit throws a false light on the
factual state of affairs. It contains a number of slanderous and
incorrect statements which have already been refuted by various
documents submitted to the Tribunal and read into the record. Therefore,
inasmuch as Dencker has not been summoned before the Tribunal as a
witness and we are deprived of the possibility of exposing the mendacity
of his evidence under cross-examination, we consider that these
documents should not be admitted by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Gentlemen, I agree that Professor Dr. Dencker, who states
that 180 million Reichsmark worth of tractors and other agricultural
machinery was taken to the Ukraine, should be called as a witness. But
this document is striking evidence of the fact that reconstruction was
in process in the Ukraine, that an efficient administration was
intended, that the land was not to be stupidly exploited, but that
long-term plans were made in the interest of the country and the
population. I, therefore, ask the Tribunal to admit this affidavit in
evidence. If necessary, I shall make an application that Professor
Dencker—in Bonn—be called as a witness, in case the Tribunal should be
impressed with the statement of the Soviet Prosecutor.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: And also, Mr. President, I beg your pardon, but I did not
understand the previous objection regarding Document Book Number 3. I do
not have my Document Book Number 3 with me, and I do not know what the
objection was.

THE PRESIDENT: On Page 29 is a letter addressed to Rosenberg by somebody
without signature. It is Rosenberg-38.

DR. THOMA: Oh, yes; but that document has been admitted by the Tribunal,
and the signature is “Adolf Hitler.” Apparently, the typist was not able
to read that.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a letter, is it?

DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir; it has already been approved. It has been approved,
Gentlemen. But, I beg to apologize; I still do not quite understand. Is
Hellpach the only one of my entire document book who has been approved?
Is it Sir David’s or Mr. Dodd’s wish that only Hellpach should be quoted
and nobody else? In that case I should like to have an opportunity to go
a little into detail on what the other authors were intended to prove.
For instance, I...

THE PRESIDENT: We have not made any decision yet.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: We thought that you had given us the reasons in support
of the documents in Book 1, Volumes I and II.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have given us the reasons, it is not necessary for
you to say anything further.

DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President; but I thought that, with reference to the
different books, I might state very briefly what I wished to prove.

With Messer, Tillich, Leeuw, and Bergson, I am trying to prove that
neoromanticism—that is, the philosophy of the irrational, whose
forerunner was Rousseau—invaded Germany with elementary force and was
at the same time influenced by French, English, and American
philosophers.

Secondly, through Martin Buber I wish to prove that this philosophy is
not anti-Semitic, but that, on the contrary, Martin Buber not only
preached this philosophy but also recommended its application in
practice; it is precisely Martin Buber’s work wherein we find those
vital terms and expressions, which have acquired such importance in this
Trial, such as the significance of blood, the myth of blood, the
relation between national character and living space, of intuition, of
the concepts of movement, of the character of inheritage, and so forth.

And further, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, in connection with these
quotations from Eickstedt, Mühlmann, Scheidt, Keiter, I wish to state
that these authors are not National Socialists, but that, in fact, they
were partly opposed to Rosenberg’s ideology; but they are proof of the
fact that the concepts of race, people, nation, blood, and soil, _et
cetera_, are recognized by natural science experts. And Hellpach, in his
_Introduction to the Psychology of Nations_, made the extremely
important statement—and Hellpach is a very famous name in German
philosophic literature—that every thesis leads to a synthesis and
eventually breaks down.

Gentlemen, I have only one brief concluding remark to make. In the last
number of _Die Neue Zeitung_ there was an article to the effect that in
the French Constituent Assembly a few days ago a discussion on one of
the most important and basic issues of our times had begun, a discussion
on the rights of man—during which the inner attitude of the members of
the resistance was examined and definite theses were set up regarding
liberty and the crises liable to affect the rights of man, and various
contradictions were pointed out.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: And, Gentlemen, the following was established: There is a
contradiction between the preaching of liberty and the ever greater
enslavement by the machine. That is exactly what we assert. Secondly,
there is a contradiction between the increase of material wealth and the
decrease of spiritual values. Thirdly, contradiction is involved in
every type of progress, in that every improvement is counterbalanced by
corresponding decadence. Fourthly, there is an opposition between the
ideals of humanism of the 18th century and the discoveries of the
science of the human being—biology and psychoanalysis—which
demonstrate that man is subject to the laws of nature.

Fifthly, contradiction between the broad masses of people who are
“enlightened” by such superficial means as newspapers, radio, motion
pictures, and all types of propaganda, and the disappearance of a
thinking and cultured elite.

That was the subject of debate in the Constituent Assembly of the
present French Parliament, and that is why I suggest, Gentlemen, that
such questions also have a place in this Trial, since they are
indicative of the political and mental attitude of the people, because
highly ethical consideration may be derived from the concept of
nationality. The fact that they have deteriorated is due to
philosophical and biological process and partly to training, but only in
part.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Thoma? Have you finished what you
wanted to say?

DR. THOMA: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal, of course, has not made its decision yet,
and it will consider your arguments. But I am bound to point out to you
that there is no charge in the Indictment or in this case against the
Defendant Rosenberg either that he invented his philosophy, or that he
held certain philosophical ideas. The charge against him is that he made
a certain use of his philosophical ideas. That is all I have to say.

The only other matter which I want to mention to you is an application
you made for calling Rosenberg, not first, but at some other point in
the course of his case; and as to that, if the Tribunal should come to
the conclusion that these other philosophical works are not matters
which ought to be considered, is it not really unnecessary to put off
the calling of the Defendant Rosenberg to some later stage? Would it not
be in the interests of expedition that he should be called first?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, there are two things I might say to that. I
was under the erroneous impression that any evidence that is taken must
begin with the hearing of the accused. I assumed that documents could
not be read prior to that, and that is why I asked that I be allowed to
produce some introductory documents first, so that the examination of
the Defendant Rosenberg could proceed more smoothly, because in my
opinion the Tribunal would become acquainted with the facts much more
quickly through the documents. Furthermore, I asked for the Witness
Riecke, who could also quickly acquaint you with the Eastern problems
and particularly with the food problem and who would expedite matters if
he were heard before Rosenberg. That is how I planned it. I would like
to read in the first sequence the most important documents first—not
only the ideological ones, but all those concerning the Einsatzstab and
the administration of the East; then I would like to call the witness
Riecke, and after that the Defendant Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has already indicated that in its
opinion, in every ordinary case, it tends to expedition if the defendant
is called first; and, of course, any document which is material can be
put to the defendant in the course of his evidence for any explanation
which he may have to give upon it.

DR. THOMA: I believe, Your Honor, that if I were to make very brief
remarks concerning the documents, it would take less time than if
Rosenberg dealt with the individual documents. That is why I thought I
might read some of the documents at the start, only to save time.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, in order that you should be prepared and able to go
on on Monday morning, the Tribunal, having considered this matter, rules
that Rosenberg should be called first. That is the ruling of the
Tribunal.

As to the documents, we will consider what our judgment shall be with
reference to the documents which are objected to.

I said Monday morning. I beg your pardon. I meant at the end of the
Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s case.

DR. THOMA: Your Honors, I merely wish to say a few words with reference
to Rosenberg’s ideology. I am asking the Tribunal to read the speech by
M. De Menthon, who states that this ideology was in itself criminal
since it was related to his activity as editor and publisher of the
_Völkischer Beobachter_ and as author of the _Myth_ and other writings.
He says that in this way he psychologically prepared the German nation
for an offensive war.

THE PRESIDENT: I said that it was not a question of what was the origin
of his philosophy or the mere holding of the philosophical ideas, but
the use to which he puts these philosophical ideas. Well, the Tribunal
will consider it.

MR. DODD: If Your Honor please, I want to make it clear that we do
object to the works of Hellpach. I rather gather that Dr. Dix had asked
me to request that his documents be heard today.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it is too late now, but we will consider them
shortly if Dr. Dix wishes it. We will consider them very soon.

DR. DIX: I would appreciate that. We discussed it first with Sir David,
and then I discussed it with Dr. Dodd and Mr. Albrecht, and these
gentlemen have raised objections which should be brought before the
Court. But translations have not yet been made, and a decision ought to
be made soon, or else the document book will not be ready. I would
appreciate it if we could briefly discuss that on Monday.

THE PRESIDENT: We will try to do it on Monday.

DR. DIX: On Monday?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 15 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTH DAY
                          Monday, 15 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal: The report is made that the
Defendant Ribbentrop is absent from this session of the Court.

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents of the
Defendant Rosenberg.

The Tribunal rules that all the documents in Book 1, Volume I and Volume
II, should be denied, up to and including the book by Hellpach, that is
to say, Exhibits 1 to 6 and also Exhibit 7(e) and Exhibit 8.

Secondly, the Tribunal rules that it will take judicial notice of
Exhibits 7(a) to 7(d); but it rules that those exhibits, 7 to 7(d), are
not to be read at the present stage but may be quoted by counsel in his
final speech.

Thirdly, the Tribunal allows Books 2 and 3.

And fourthly, the Tribunal rules that the Defendant Rosenberg shall be
called first and any documents which have been allowed may be put to him
in the course of his examination.

That is all.

Now, Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With the agreement of the Tribunal, I now call the
witness Hoess.

[_The witness Hoess took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Stand up. Will you state your name?

RUDOLF FRANZ FERDINAND HOESS (Witness): Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, your statements will have far-reaching
significance. You are perhaps the only one who can throw some light upon
certain hidden aspects, and who can tell which people gave the orders
for the destruction of European Jewry, and can further state how this
order was carried out and to what degree the execution was kept a
secret.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, will you kindly put questions to the
witness.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

[_Turning to the witness._] From 1940 to 1943, you were the Commander of
the camp at Auschwitz. Is that true?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And during that time, hundreds of thousands of human
beings were sent to their death there. Is that correct?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, yourself, have made no exact notes
regarding the figures of the number of those victims because you were
forbidden to make them?

HOESS: Yes, that is correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore correct that exclusively one man by the
name of Eichmann had notes about this, the man who had the task of
organizing and assembling these people?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it furthermore true that Eichmann stated to you that
in Auschwitz a total sum of more than 2 million Jews had been destroyed?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Men, women, and children?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You were a participant in the World War?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then in 1922, you entered the Party?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were you a member of the SS?

HOESS: Since 1934.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that you, in the year 1924, were sentenced to
a lengthy term of hard labor because you participated in a so-called
political murder?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then at the end of 1934, you went to the
concentration camp of Dachau?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What task did you receive?

HOESS: At first, I was the leader of a block of prisoners and then I
became clerk and finally, the administrator of the property of
prisoners.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And how long did you stay there?

HOESS: Until 1938.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What job did you have from 1938 on and where were you
then?

HOESS: In 1938 I went to the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen where,
to begin with, I was adjutant to the commander and later on I became the
head of the protective custody camp.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When were you commander at Auschwitz?

HOESS: I was commander at Auschwitz from May 1940 until December 1943.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the highest number of human beings, prisoners,
ever held at one time at Auschwitz?

HOESS: The highest number of internees held at one time at Auschwitz,
was about 140,000 men and women.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that in 1941 you were ordered to Berlin to see
Himmler? Please state briefly what was discussed.

HOESS: Yes. In the summer of 1941 I was summoned to Berlin to
Reichsführer SS Himmler to receive personal orders. He told me something
to the effect—I do not remember the exact words—that the Führer had
given the order for a final solution of the Jewish question. We, the SS,
must carry out that order. If it is not carried out now then the Jews
will later on destroy the German people. He had chosen Auschwitz on
account of its easy access by rail and also because the extensive site
offered space for measures ensuring isolation.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During that conference did Himmler tell you that this
planned action had to be treated as a secret Reich matter?

HOESS: Yes. He stressed that point. He told me that I was not even
allowed to say anything about it to my immediate superior Gruppenführer
Glücks. This conference concerned the two of us only and I was to
observe the strictest secrecy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What was the position held by Glücks whom you have just
mentioned?

HOESS: Gruppenführer Glücks was, so to speak, the inspector of
concentration camps at that time and he was immediately subordinate to
the Reichsführer.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the expression “secret Reich matter” mean that no
one was permitted to make even the slightest allusion to outsiders
without endangering his own life?

HOESS: Yes, “secret Reich matter” means that no one was allowed to speak
about these matters with any person and that everyone promised upon his
life to keep the utmost secrecy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you happen to break that promise?

HOESS: No, not until the end of 1942.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Why do you mention that date? Did you talk to outsiders
after that date?

HOESS: At the end of 1942 my wife’s curiosity was aroused by remarks
made by the then Gauleiter of Upper Silesia, regarding happenings in my
camp. She asked me whether this was the truth and I admitted that it
was. That was my only breach of the promise I had given to the
Reichsführer. Otherwise I have never talked about it to anyone else.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When did you meet Eichmann?

HOESS: I met Eichmann about 4 weeks after having received that order
from the Reichsführer. He came to Auschwitz to discuss the details with
me on the carrying out of the given order. As the Reichsführer had told
me during our discussion, he had instructed Eichmann to discuss the
carrying out of the order with me and I was to receive all further
instructions from him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly tell whether it is correct that the camp
of Auschwitz was completely isolated, describing the measures taken to
insure as far as possible the secrecy of carrying out of the task given
to you.

HOESS: The Auschwitz camp as such was about 3 kilometers away from the
town. About 20,000 acres of the surrounding country had been cleared of
all former inhabitants, and the entire area could be entered only by SS
men or civilian employees who had special passes. The actual compound
called “Birkenau,” where later on the extermination camp was
constructed, was situated 2 kilometers from the Auschwitz camp. The camp
installations themselves, that is to say, the provisional installations
used at first were deep in the woods and could from nowhere be detected
by the eye. In addition to that, this area had been declared a
prohibited area and even members of the SS who did not have a special
pass could not enter it. Thus, as far as one could judge, it was
impossible for anyone except authorized persons to enter that area.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then the railway transports arrived. During what
period did these transports arrive and about how many people, roughly,
were in such a transport?

HOESS: During the whole period up until 1944 certain operations were
carried out at irregular intervals in the different countries, so that
one cannot speak of a continuous flow of incoming transports. It was
always a matter of 4 to 6 weeks. During those 4 to 6 weeks two to three
trains, containing about 2,000 persons each, arrived daily. These trains
were first of all shunted to a siding in the Birkenau region and the
locomotives then went back. The guards who had accompanied the transport
had to leave the area at once and the persons who had been brought in
were taken over by guards belonging to the camp.

They were there examined by two SS medical officers as to their fitness
for work. The internees capable of work at once marched to Auschwitz or
to the camp at Birkenau and those incapable of work were at first taken
to the provisional installations, then later to the newly constructed
crematoria.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During an interrogation I had with you the other day you
told me that about 60 men were designated to receive these transports,
and that these 60 persons, too, had been bound to the same secrecy
described before. Do you still maintain that today?

HOESS: Yes, these 60 men were always on hand to take the internees not
capable of work to these provisional installations and later on to the
other ones. This group, consisting of about ten leaders and subleaders,
as well as doctors and medical personnel, had repeatedly been told, both
in writing and verbally, that they were bound to the strictest secrecy
as to all that went on in the camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Were there any signs that might show an outsider who saw
these transports arrive, that they would be destroyed or was that
possibility so small because there was in Auschwitz an unusually large
number of incoming transports, shipments of goods and so forth?

HOESS: Yes, an observer who did not make special notes for that purpose
could obtain no idea about that because to begin with not only
transports arrived which were destined to be destroyed but also other
transports arrived continuously, containing new internees who were
needed in the camp. Furthermore, transports likewise left the camp in
sufficiently large numbers with internees fit for work or exchanged
prisoners.

The trains themselves were closed, that is to say, the doors of the
freight cars were closed so that it was not possible, from the outside,
to get a glimpse of the people inside. In addition to that, up to 100
cars of materials, rations, _et cetera_, were daily rolled into the camp
or continuously left the workshops of the camp in which war material was
being made.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And after the arrival of the transports were the victims
stripped of everything they had? Did they have to undress completely;
did they have to surrender their valuables? Is that true?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then they immediately went to their death?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, according to your knowledge, did these people
know what was in store for them?

HOESS: The majority of them did not, for steps were taken to keep them
in doubt about it and suspicion would not arise that they were to go to
their death. For instance, all doors and all walls bore inscriptions to
the effect that they were going to undergo a delousing operation or take
a shower. This was made known in several languages to the internees by
other internees who had come in with earlier transports and who were
being used as auxiliary crews during the whole action.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then, you told me the other day, that death by
gassing set in within a period of 3 to 15 minutes. Is that correct?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You also told me that even before death finally set in,
the victims fell into a state of unconsciousness?

HOESS: Yes. From what I was able to find out myself or from what was
told me by medical officers, the time necessary for reaching
unconsciousness or death varied according to the temperature and the
number of people present in the chambers. Loss of consciousness took
place within a few seconds or a few minutes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you yourself ever feel pity with the victims,
thinking of your own family and children?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How was it possible for you to carry out these actions in
spite of this?

HOESS: In view of all these doubts which I had, the only one and
decisive argument was the strict order and the reason given for it by
the Reichsführer Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you whether Himmler inspected the camp and
convinced himself, too, of the process of annihilation?

HOESS: Yes. Himmler visited the camp in 1942 and he watched in detail
one processing from beginning to end.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Does the same apply to Eichmann?

HOESS: Eichmann came repeatedly to Auschwitz and was intimately
acquainted with the proceedings.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did the Defendant Kaltenbrunner ever inspect the camp?

HOESS: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you ever talk with Kaltenbrunner with reference to
your task?

HOESS: No, never. I was with Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner on only one
single occasion.

DR. KAUFFMANN: When was that?

HOESS: That was one day after his birthday in the year 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What position did you hold in the year 1944?

HOESS: In the year 1944 I was the head of Department E-1 in the Main
Economic and Administrative Office in Berlin. My office was the former
Inspectorate of Concentration Camps at Oranienburg.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what was the subject of that conference which you
have just mentioned?

HOESS: It concerned a report from the camp at Mauthausen on the
so-called nameless internees and their engagement in armament industry.
Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner was to make a decision on the matter.
For that reason I came to him with the report from the commander at
Mauthausen but he did not make a decision telling me he would do so
later.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Regarding the location of Mauthausen, will you please
state in which district Mauthausen is situated. Is that Upper Silesia or
is it the Government General?

HOESS: Mauthausen...

DR. KAUFFMANN: Auschwitz, I beg your pardon, I made a mistake. I mean
Auschwitz.

HOESS: Auschwitz is situated in the former state of Poland. Later, after
1939, it was incorporated in the province of Upper Silesia.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it right for me to assume that administration and
feeding of concentration camps were exclusively under the control of the
Main Economic and Administrative Office?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: A department which is completely separated from the RSHA?

HOESS: Quite correct.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then from 1943 until the end of the war, you were one
of the chiefs in the Inspectorate of the Main Economic and
Administrative Office?

HOESS: Yes, that is correctly stated.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean by that, that you are particularly well
informed on everything occurring in concentration camps regarding the
treatment and the methods applied?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I ask you, therefore, first of all, whether you have any
knowledge regarding the treatment of internees, whether certain methods
became known to you according to which they were tortured and cruelly
treated? Please formulate your statement according to periods, up to
1939 and after 1939.

HOESS: Until the outbreak of war in 1939, the situation in the camps
regarding feeding, accommodations, and treatment of internees, was the
same as in any other prison or penitentiary in the Reich. The internees
were treated severely, but methodical beatings or ill-treatments were
out of the question. The Reichsführer gave frequent orders that every SS
man who laid violent hands on an internee would be punished; and several
times SS men who did ill-treat internees were punished.

Feeding and billeting at that time were on the same basis as those of
other prisoners under legal administration.

The accommodations in the camps during those years were still normal
because the mass influxes at the outbreak of the war and during the war
had not yet taken place. When the war started and when mass deliveries
of political internees arrived, and, later on, when prisoners who were
members of the resistance movements arrived from the occupied
territories, the construction of buildings and the extensions of the
camps could no longer keep pace with the number of incoming internees.
During the first years of the war this problem could still be overcome
by improvising measures; but later, due to the exigencies of the war,
this was no longer possible since there were practically no building
materials any more at our disposal. And, furthermore, rations for the
internees were again and again severely curtailed by the provincial
economic administration offices.

This then led to a situation where internees in the camps no longer had
the staying power to resist the now gradually growing epidemics.

The main reason why the prisoners were in such bad condition towards the
end of the war, why so many thousands of them were found sick and
emaciated in the camps, was that every internee had to be employed in
the armament industry to the extreme limit of his forces. The
Reichsführer constantly and on every occasion kept this goal before our
eyes, and also proclaimed it through the Chief of the Main Economic and
Administrative Office, Obergruppenführer Pohl, to the concentration camp
commanders and administrative leaders during the so-called commanders’
meetings.

Every commander was told to make every effort to achieve this. The aim
was not to have as many dead as possible or to destroy as many internees
as possible; the Reichsführer was constantly concerned with being able
to engage all forces available in the armament industry.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There is no doubt that the longer the war lasted, the
larger became the number of the ill-treated and tortured inmates.
Whenever you inspected the concentration camps did you not learn
something of this state of affairs through complaints, _et cetera_, or
do you consider that the conditions which have been described are more
or less due to excesses?

HOESS: These so-called ill-treatments and this torturing in
concentration camps, stories of which were spread everywhere among the
people, and later by the prisoners that were liberated by the occupying
armies, were not, as assumed, inflicted methodically, but were excesses
committed by individual leaders, subleaders, and men who laid violent
hands on internees.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you mean you never took cognizance of these matters?

HOESS: If in any way such a case came to be known, then the perpetrator
was, of course, immediately relieved of his post or transferred
somewhere else. So that, even if he were not punished for lack of
evidence to prove his guilt, even then, he was taken away from the
internees and given another position.

DR. KAUFFMANN: To what do you attribute the particularly bad and
shameful conditions, which were ascertained by the entering Allied
troops, and which to a certain extent were photographed and filmed?

HOESS: The catastrophic situation at the end of the war was due to the
fact that, as a result of the destruction of the railway network and of
the continuous bombing of the industrial plants, care for these
masses—I am thinking of Auschwitz with its 140,000 internees—could no
longer be assured. Improvised measures, truck columns, and everything
else tried by the commanders to improve the situation were of little or
no avail; it was no longer possible. The number of the sick became
immense. There were next to no medical supplies; epidemics raged
everywhere. Internees who were capable of work were used over and over
again. By order of the Reichsführer, even half-sick people had to be
used wherever possible in industry. As a result every bit of space in
the concentration camps which could possibly be used for lodging was
overcrowded with sick and dying prisoners.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now asking you to look at the map which is mounted
behind you. The red dots represent concentration camps. I will first ask
you how many concentration camps as such existed at the end of the war?

HOESS: At the end of the war there were still 13 concentration camps.
All the other points which are marked here on the map mean so-called
labor camps attached to the armament industry situated there. The
concentration camps, of which there are 13 as I have already said, were
the center and the central point of some district, such as the camp at
Dachau in Bavaria, or the camp of Mauthausen in Austria; and all the
labor camps in that district were under the control of the concentration
camp. That camp had then to supply these outside camps, that is to say,
they had to supply them with workers, exchange the sick inmates and
furnish clothing; the guards, too, were supplied by the concentration
camp.

From 1944 on, the supplying of food was almost exclusively a matter of
the individual armament industries in order to give the prisoners the
benefit of the wartime supplementary rations.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What became known to you about so-called medical
experiments on living internees?

HOESS: Medical experiments were carried out in several camps. For
instance, in Auschwitz there were experiments on sterilization carried
out by Professor Klaubert and Dr. Schumann; also experiments on twins by
SS medical officer Dr. Mengele.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the medical officer Dr. Rascher?

HOESS: In Dachau he was a medical officer of the Luftwaffe who carried
out experiments, on internees who had been sentenced to death, about the
resistance of the human body to cold and in high pressure chambers.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Can you tell whether such experiments carried out within
the camp were known to a large circle?

HOESS: Such experiments, just like all other matters, were, of course,
called “secret Reich matters.” However, it could not be avoided that the
experiments became known since they were carried out in a large camp and
must have been seen in some way by the inmates. I cannot say, however,
to what extent the outside world learned about these experiments.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You explained to me that orders for executions were
received in the camp at Auschwitz, and you told me that until the
outbreak of war such orders were few, but that later on they became more
numerous. Is that correct?

HOESS: Yes. There were hardly any executions until the beginning of the
war—only in particularly serious cases. I remember one case in
Buchenwald where an SS man had been attacked and beaten to death by
internees, and the internees were later hanged.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But during the war—and that you will admit—the number
of executions increased, and not inconsiderably.

HOESS: That had already started with the beginning of the war.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was the basis for these execution orders in many cases a
legal sentence of German courts?

HOESS: No. Orders for the executions carried out in the camps came from
the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Who signed the orders for executions which you received?
Is it correct that occasionally you received orders for executions which
bore the signature “Kaltenbrunner,” and that these were not the
originals but were teleprints which therefore had the signature in
typewritten letters?

HOESS: It is correct. The originals of execution orders never came to
the camps. The original of these orders either arrived at the
Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps, from where they were
transmitted by teletype to the camps concerned, or, in urgent cases, the
RSHA sent the orders directly to the camps concerned, and the
Inspectorate was then only informed, so that the signatures in the camps
were always only in teletype.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So as to again determine the signatures, will you tell
the Tribunal whether the overwhelming majority of all execution orders
either bore the signature of Himmler or that of Müller in the years
before the war and until the end of the war.

HOESS: Only very few teletypes which I have ever seen came from the
Reichsführer and still fewer from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. Most of
them, I could say practically all, were signed “Signed Müller.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is that the Müller with whom you repeatedly talked about
such matters as you stated earlier?

HOESS: Gruppenführer Müller was the Chief of Department IV in the RSHA.
He had to negotiate with the Inspectorate about all matters connected
with concentration camps.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you say that you went to see the Gestapo Chief
Müller because you, on the strength of your experience, were of the
opinion that this man because of his years of activities was acting
almost independently?

HOESS: That is quite right. I had to negotiate all matters regarding
concentration camps with Gruppenführer Müller. He was informed on all
these matters, and in most cases he would make an immediate decision.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Well, so as to have a clear picture, did you ever
negotiate these matters with the defendant?

HOESS: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you learn that towards the end of the war
concentration camps were evacuated? And, if so, who gave the orders?

HOESS: Let me explain. Originally there was an order from the
Reichsführer, according to which camps, in the event of the approach of
the enemy or in case of air attacks, were to be surrendered to the
enemy. Later on, due to the case of Buchenwald, which had been reported
to the Führer, there was—no, at the beginning of 1945, when various
camps came within the operational sphere of the enemy, this order was
withdrawn. The Reichsführer ordered the Higher SS and Police Leaders,
who in an emergency case were responsible for the security and safety of
the camps, to decide themselves whether an evacuation or a surrender was
appropriate.

Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen were evacuated. Buchenwald was also to be
evacuated, but then the order from the Reichsführer came through to the
effect that on principle no more camps were to be evacuated. Only
prominent inmates and inmates who were not to fall into Allied hands
under any circumstances were to be taken away to other camps. This also
happened in the case of Buchenwald. After Buchenwald had been occupied,
it was reported to the Führer that internees had armed themselves and
were carrying out plunderings in the town of Weimar. This caused the
Führer to give the strictest order to Himmler to the effect that in the
future no more camps were to fall into the hands of the enemy, and that
no internees capable of marching would be left behind in any camp.

This was shortly before the end of the war, and shortly before northern
and southern Germany were cut. I shall speak about the Sachsenhausen
camp. The Gestapo chief, Gruppenführer Müller, called me in the evening
and told me that the Reichsführer had ordered that the camp at
Sachsenhausen was to be evacuated at once. I pointed out to
Gruppenführer Müller what that would mean. Sachsenhausen could no longer
fall back on any other camp except perhaps on a few labor camps attached
to the armament works that were almost filled up anyway. Most of the
internees would have to be sheltered in the woods somewhere. This would
mean countless thousands of deaths and, above all, it would be
impossible to feed these masses of people. He promised me that he would
again discuss these measures with the Reichsführer. He called me back
and told me that the Reichsführer had refused and was demanding that the
commanders carry out his orders immediately.

At the same time Ravensbrück was also to be evacuated in the same manner
but it could no longer be done. I do not know to what extent camps in
southern Germany were cleared, since we, the Inspectorate, no longer had
any connections with southern Germany.

DR. KAUFFMANN: It has been maintained here—and this is my last
question—that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner gave the order that Dachau
and two auxiliary camps were to be destroyed by bombing or with poison.
I ask you, did you hear anything about this; if not, would you consider
such an order possible?

HOESS: I have never heard anything about this, and I do not know
anything either about an order to evacuate any camps in southern
Germany, as I have already mentioned. Apart from that, I consider it
quite impossible that a camp could be destroyed by this method.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel want to ask any
questions?

DR. MERKEL: Witness, did the State Police, as an authority of the Reich,
have anything to do with the destruction of Jews in Auschwitz?

HOESS: Yes, insofar as I received all my orders as to the carrying out
of that action from the Obersturmführer Eichmann.

DR. MERKEL: Was the administration of concentration camps under the
control of the Main Economic and Administrative Office?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: You said already that you had nothing to do with the RSHA.

HOESS: No.

DR. MERKEL: Please, will you emphasize, therefore, that the Gestapo as
such had nothing to do with the administration of the camps or the
accommodation, feeding, and treatment of the internees, but that this
was exclusively a matter for the Main Economic and Administrative
Office?

HOESS: Yes, that is quite correct.

DR. MERKEL: How do you explain it then that you, nevertheless, discussed
different questions concerning concentration camps with Müller?

HOESS: The RSHA, or rather Amt IV, had the executive power for the
directing of all internees into camps, classification into the camp
grades 1, 2, 3, and furthermore, the punishments which were to be
carried out on the part of the RSHA. Executions, the accommodation of
special internees, and all questions which might ensue therefrom were
also taken care of by the RSHA or Amt IV.

DR. MERKEL: When was this Main Economic and Administrative Office
created?

HOESS: The Main Economic and Administrative Office existed since 1933
under various names. The Inspectorate of Concentration Camps was,
however, subordinated only to this Main Economic and Administrative
Office since the year 1941.

DR. MERKEL: Then these concentration camps were from the very beginning
under the control of this Main Economic and Administrative Office, that
is to say the SS and not the State Police.

HOESS: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: You mentioned the name of Dr. Rascher a while ago. Do you
know this doctor personally?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. MERKEL: Do you know that Dr. Rascher before beginning his work at
Dachau had become a member of the SS?

HOESS: No, I know nothing about that. I only know that later he—I still
saw him in the uniform of an Air Force medical officer. Later he was
supposed to have been taken over into the SS, but I did not see him
again.

DR. MERKEL: I have no further questions. Thank you very much.

HERR LUDWIG BABEL (Counsel for SS): Witness, at the beginning of your
examination you stated that when you were ordered to the Reichsführer SS
Himmler, he told you that the carrying out of this order of the Führer
was to be left to the SS and that the SS had been ordered to do it. What
is to be understood under this general title SS?

HOESS: According to the explanations of the Reichsführer, this could
only mean the men guarding the concentration camps. According to the
nature of the order only concentration camp crews and not the Waffen-SS
could be concerned with the carrying out of this task.

HERR BABEL: How many members of the SS were assigned to concentration
camps, and which units did they belong to?

HOESS: Toward the end of the war there were approximately 35,000 SS men
and in my estimation approximately 10,000 men from the Army, Air Force,
and the Navy detailed to the labor camps for guard duties.

HERR BABEL: What were the tasks of these guards? As far as I know, the
duties varied. First, there was the actual guarding and then there was a
certain amount of administrative work within the camp.

HOESS: Yes, that is correct.

HERR BABEL: How many guards were there within the camps for, let us say,
1,000 internees?

HOESS: You cannot estimate it in that way. According to my observations
about 10 percent of the total number of guarding personnel were used for
internal duties, that is to say, administration and supervision of
internees within the camp, including the medical personnel of the camp.

HERR BABEL: So that 90 percent were therefore used for the exterior
guarding, that is to say, for watching the camp from watch towers and
for escorting the internees on work assignments.

HOESS: Yes.

HERR BABEL: Did you make any observations as to whether there was any
ill-treatment of prisoners to a greater or lesser degree on the part of
those guards, or whether the ill-treatment was mainly to be traced back
to the so-called Kapos?

HOESS: If any ill-treatment of prisoners by guards occurred—I myself
have never observed any—then this was possible only to a very small
degree since all offices in charge of the camps took care that as few SS
men as possible had direct contact with the inmates, because in the
course of the years the guard personnel had deteriorated to such an
extent that the standards formerly demanded could no longer be
maintained.

We had thousands of guards who could hardly speak German, who came from
all lands as volunteers and joined these units, or we had older men,
between 50 and 60, who lacked all interest in their work, so that a camp
commander had to watch constantly that these men fulfilled even the
lowest requirements of their duties. It is obvious that there were
elements among them who would ill-treat internees, but this
ill-treatment was never tolerated.

Besides, it was impossible to have these masses of people directed at
work or when in the camp by SS men only; therefore, inmates had to be
assigned everywhere to direct the other prisoners and set them to work.
The internal administration of the camp was almost completely in their
hands. Of course a great deal of ill-treatment occurred which could not
be avoided because at night there were hardly any members of the SS in
the camps. Only in specific cases were SS men allowed to enter the camp,
so that the internees were more or less exposed to these Kapos.

HERR BABEL: You have already mentioned regulations which existed for the
guards, but there was also a standing order in each camp. In this camp
order certainly punishment was provided for internees who violated the
camp rules. What punishment was provided?

HOESS: First of all, transfer to a penal company (Strafkompanie), that
is to say, harder work and restricted accommodations; next, detention in
the cell block, detention in a dark cell; and in very serious cases,
chaining or strapping. Punishment by strapping was prohibited in the
year 1942 or 1943—I cannot say exactly when—by the Reichsführer. Then
there was the punishment of standing at the camp gate over a rather long
period, and finally corporal punishment.

However, no commander could decree this corporal punishment on his own
authority. He could only apply for it. In the case of men, the decision
came from the Inspector of Concentration Camps, Gruppenführer Schmidt,
and where women were concerned, the Reichsführer reserved the decision
exclusively for himself.

HERR BABEL: It may also be known to you that for members of the SS, too,
there were two penal camps which sometimes were called concentration
camps, namely, Dachau and Danzig-Matzkau.

HOESS: That is right.

HERR BABEL: Were the existing camp regulations and the treatment of
members of the SS who were put in such camps different from the
regulations applying to the other concentration camps?

HOESS: Yes; these two detention camps were not under the Inspectorate
for Concentration Camps, but they were under an SS and Police court. I
myself have neither inspected nor seen these two camps.

HERR BABEL: So that you know nothing about the standing orders relating
to those camps?

HOESS: I know nothing about them.

HERR BABEL: I have no further questions to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn for 10 minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. HAENSEL: I have a question that I would like to ask the High
Tribunal. A second defense counsel has been requested for the SS. Is it
permitted that several questions be put for the second defense counsel?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal ruled a long time ago that only one counsel
could be heard.

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Dönitz): Witness,
you just mentioned that members of the Navy were detailed to guard
concentration camps.

HOESS: Yes.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these concentration, camps, or were
they labor camps?

HOESS: They were labor camps.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Are labor camps barracks camps of the
armament industries?

HOESS: Yes, if they were not accommodated in the actual factories
themselves.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I have been informed that soldiers who were
to be assigned for guard duty at labor camps were given over to the SS.

HOESS: That is only partially correct. A part of these men—I do not
recall the figures—was taken over into the SS. A part was returned to
the original unit, or exchanged. Exchanges were continually taking
place.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

COL. AMEN: If the Tribunal pleases, first I would like to submit, on
behalf of our British Allies, a series of exhibits pertaining to the
Waffen-SS, without reading them. It is merely statistical information
with respect to the number of Waffen-SS guards used at the concentration
camps.

I ask that the witness be shown Documents D-745(a-b), D-746(a-b), D-747,
D-748, D-749(b), and D-750, one of them being a statement of this
witness.

[_The documents were submitted to the witness._]

Witness, you made the statement, D-749(b), which has been handed to you?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you are familiar with the content of the others?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And you testify that those figures are true and correct?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Very good. Those will become Exhibit Number USA-810.

Witness, from time to time did any high Nazi officials or functionaries
visit the camp at Mauthausen or Dachau while you were there?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you state the names of such persons to the Tribunal
please?

HOESS: I remember that in 1935 all the Gauleiter inspected Dachau guided
by Reichsführer Himmler. I do not remember them individually.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any of the ministers having visited either of
those camps while you were there?

HOESS: Do you mean by this the inspection tour of 1935?

COL. AMEN: At any time while you were at either of those concentration
camps.

HOESS: In 1938 Minister Frick was at Sachsenhausen with the
Regierungspräsident.

COL. AMEN: Do you recall any other ministers who were there at any time?

HOESS: Not at Sachsenhausen, but at Auschwitz, the Minister of Justice.

COL. AMEN: Who was he?

HOESS: Thierack.

COL. AMEN: And who else? Do you recall any others?

HOESS: Yes, but I do not remember the name for the moment.

COL. AMEN: Well, who?

HOESS: I have already stated that in the record, but at the moment I
cannot recall the name.

COL. AMEN: All right. You have testified that many of the execution
orders were signed by Müller. Is that correct?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of those execution orders to which
you testified were signed by...

DR. STEINBAUER: Pardon me, Mr. President, documents have been submitted
and the witness is being questioned about the contents. The Defense is
not in a position to follow the Prosecution because we do not know the
contents of these documents. I request that we receive copies of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Haven’t copies of these documents been handed to the
defendants?

COL. AMEN: Yes, so I understood. We have copies here. However, five
German copies have been distributed.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the matter can be looked into.

COL. AMEN: Witness, I was asking you about these execution orders which
you testify were signed by Müller. Do you understand?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Is it not a fact that all of these execution orders which you
testify were signed by Müller were also signed by order of, or as
representative of, the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner?

HOESS: Yes. That was on the copies that I had in the originals.
Afterwards, when I was employed at Oranienburg, it said underneath, “I.
V. Müller”—“in Vertretung Müller” (as representative, Müller).

COL. AMEN: In other words Müller was merely signing as the
representative of the Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner? Is that not
correct?

HOESS: I must assume so.

COL. AMEN: And, of course, you know that Müller was a subordinate of the
Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner.

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Witness, you made an affidavit, did you not, at the request
of the Prosecution?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: I ask that the witness be shown Document 3868-PS, which will
become Exhibit USA-819.

[_The document was submitted to the witness._]

COL. AMEN: You signed that affidavit voluntarily, Witness?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: And the affidavit is true in all respects?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: This, if the Tribunal pleases, we have in four languages.

[_Turning to the witness._] Some of the matters covered in this
affidavit you have already told us about in part, so I will omit some
parts of the affidavit. If you will follow along with me as I read,
please. Do you have a copy of the affidavit before you?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: I will omit the first paragraph and start with Paragraph 2:

    “I have been constantly associated with the administration of
    concentration camps since 1934, serving at Dachau until 1938;
    then as Adjutant in Sachsenhausen from 1938 to 1 May 1940, when
    I was appointed Commandant of Auschwitz. I commanded Auschwitz
    until 1 December 1943, and estimate that at least 2,500,000
    victims were executed and exterminated there by gassing and
    burning, and at least another half million succumbed to
    starvation and disease making a total dead of about 3,000,000.
    This figure represents about 70 or 80 percent of all persons
    sent to Auschwitz as prisoners, the remainder having been
    selected and used for slave labor in the concentration camp
    industries; included among the executed and burned were
    approximately 20,000 Russian prisoners of war (previously
    screened out of prisoner-of-war cages by the Gestapo) who were
    delivered at Auschwitz in Wehrmacht transports operated by
    regular Wehrmacht officers and men. The remainder of the total
    number of victims included about 100,000 German Jews, and great
    numbers of citizens, mostly Jewish, from Holland, France,
    Belgium, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, or other
    countries. We executed about 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at
    Auschwitz in the summer of 1944.”

That is all true, Witness?

HOESS: Yes, it is.

COL. AMEN: Now I omit the first few lines of Paragraph 3 and start in
the middle of Paragraph 3:

    “...prior to establishment of the RSHA, the Secret State Police
    Office (Gestapo) and the Reich Office of Criminal Police were
    responsible for arrests, commitments to concentration camps,
    punishments and executions therein. After organization of the
    RSHA all of these functions were carried on as before, but
    pursuant to orders signed by Heydrich as Chief of the RSHA.
    While Kaltenbrunner was Chief of RSHA orders for protective
    custody, commitments, punishment, and individual executions were
    signed by Kaltenbrunner or by Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as
    Kaltenbrunner’s deputy.”

THE PRESIDENT: Just for the sake of accuracy, the last date in Paragraph
2, is that 1943 or 1944?

COL. AMEN: 1944, I believe. Is that date correct, Witness, at the close
of Paragraph 2, namely, that the 400,000 Hungarian Jews alone at
Auschwitz in the summer of 1944 were executed? Is that 1944 or 1943?

HOESS: 1944. Part of that figure also goes back to 1943; only a part. I
cannot give the exact figure; the end was 1944, autumn of 1944.

COL. AMEN: Right.

    “4. Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer of
    1941 and continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised
    executions at Auschwitz until first of December 1943 and know by
    reason of my continued duties in the Inspectorate of
    Concentration Camps, WVHA, that these mass executions continued
    as stated above. All mass executions by gassing took place under
    the direct order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I
    received all orders for carrying out these mass executions
    directly from RSHA.”

Are those statements true and correct, Witness?

HOESS: Yes, they are.

    COL. AMEN: “5. On 1 December 1943 I became Chief of Amt I in Amt
    Group D of the WVHA, and in that office was responsible for
    co-ordinating all matters arising between RSHA and concentration
    camps under the administration of WVHA. I held this position
    until the end of the war. Pohl, as Chief of WVHA, and
    Kaltenbrunner, as Chief of RSHA, often conferred personally and
    frequently communicated orally and in writing concerning
    concentration camps....”

You have already told us about the lengthy report which you took to
Kaltenbrunner in Berlin, so I will omit the remainder of Paragraph 5.

    “6. The ‘final solution’ of the Jewish question meant the
    complete extermination of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to
    establish extermination facilities at Auschwitz in June 1941. At
    that time, there were already in the General Government three
    other extermination camps: Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek. These
    camps were under the Einsatzkommando of the Security Police and
    SD. I visited Treblinka to find out how they carried out their
    exterminations. The camp commandant at Treblinka told me that he
    had liquidated 80,000 in the course of one-half year. He was
    principally concerned with liquidating all the Jews from the
    Warsaw Ghetto. He used monoxide gas, and I did not think that
    his methods were very efficient. So when I set up the
    extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyklon B, which was
    a crystallized prussic acid which we dropped into the death
    chamber from a small opening. It took from 3 to 15 minutes to
    kill the people in the death chamber, depending upon climatic
    conditions. We knew when the people were dead because their
    screaming stopped. We usually waited about one-half hour before
    we opened the doors and removed the bodies. After the bodies
    were removed our special Kommandos took off the rings and
    extracted the gold from the teeth of the corpses.”

Is that all true and correct, Witness?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Incidentally, what was done with the gold which was taken
from the teeth of the corpses, do you know?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Will you tell the Tribunal?

HOESS: This gold was melted down and brought to the Chief Medical Office
of the SS at Berlin.

COL. AMEN:

    “7. Another improvement we made over Treblinka was that we built
    our gas chamber to accommodate 2,000 people at one time whereas
    at Treblinka their 10 gas chambers only accommodated 200 people
    each. The way we selected our victims was as follows: We had two
    SS doctors on duty at Auschwitz to examine the incoming
    transports of prisoners. The prisoners would be marched by one
    of the doctors who would make spot decisions as they walked by.
    Those who were fit for work were sent into the camp. Others were
    sent immediately to the extermination plants. Children of tender
    years were invariably exterminated since by reason of their
    youth they were unable to work. Still another improvement we
    made over Treblinka was that at Treblinka the victims almost
    always knew that they were to be exterminated and at Auschwitz
    we endeavored to fool the victims into thinking that they were
    to go through a delousing process. Of course, frequently they
    realized our true intentions and we sometimes had riots and
    difficulties due to that fact. Very frequently women would hide
    their children under the clothes, but of course when we found
    them we would send the children in to be exterminated. We were
    required to carry out these exterminations in secrecy but of
    course the foul and nauseating stench from the continuous
    burning of bodies permeated the entire area and all of the
    people living in the surrounding communities knew that
    exterminations were going on at Auschwitz.”

Is that all true and correct, Witness?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: Now, I will omit Paragraphs 8 and 9, which have to do with
the medical experiments as to which you have already testified.

    “10. Rudolf Mildner was the chief of the Gestapo at Katowice
    ...from approximately March 1941 until September 1943. As such,
    he frequently sent prisoners to Auschwitz for incarceration or
    execution. He visited Auschwitz on several occasions. The
    Gestapo court, the SS Standgericht, which tried persons accused
    of various crimes, such as escaping prisoners of war, _et
    cetera_, frequently met within Auschwitz, and Mildner often
    attended the trial of such persons, who usually were executed in
    Auschwitz following their sentence. I showed Mildner through the
    extermination plant at Auschwitz and he was directly interested
    in it since he had to send the Jews from his territory for
    execution at Auschwitz.

    “I understand English as it is written above. The above
    statements are true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily
    and without compulsion; after reading over the statement I have
    signed and executed the same at Nuremberg, Germany, on the fifth
    day of April 1946.”

Now I ask you, Witness, is everything which I have read to you true to
your own knowledge?

HOESS: Yes.

COL. AMEN: That concludes my cross-examination, except for one exhibit
that our British allies would like to have in, which is a summary sheet
of the exhibits which I introduced at the commencement of the
cross-examination. That will be Exhibit Number USA-810. It is a summary
of the earlier exhibits that I put in with respect to the Waffen-SS at
the commencement of my cross-examination.

Now, I understand, Your Lordship, that both the Soviet and the French
delegations have one or two questions which they consider peculiar to
their country which they would like to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you will remember that the Tribunal was
assured by Counsel for the Prosecution that, so far as witnesses were
concerned, with the exception of one or two particular defendants, the
Prosecution would have only one cross-examination and now, since that
assurance was given, this is the second instance when the Prosecution
have desired to have more than one cross-examination.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is correct, Mr. President, that the Prosecution did
make that statement; however, the Prosecution reserved the right to do
otherwise on certain occasions when deemed necessary. Since, in this
case, the Prosecution represent four different states, occasions do
arise when each of the prosecutors feels that he has the right to ask
the defendant or witnesses individual questions particularly interesting
to his own country.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you indicate the nature of the questions which the
Soviet Prosecution desire to put? I mean the subjects upon which they
are. I don’t mean the exact questions but the subject.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, I understand. Colonel Pokrovsky, who intends to ask
the questions, will report on the subject to the Tribunal.

COL. POKROVSKY: May I report to you, Mr. President, that the questions
of interest to the Soviet Prosecution are those dealing specifically
with the annihilation of millions of Soviet citizens and some details
connected with that annihilation. At the request of the French
Prosecution, and in order to clarify the contents I would also like to
ask two or three questions connected with the documents which in due
course were submitted as Document F-709(a) to the Tribunal by the French
Prosecution. This is really all there is; however, these questions do
have great importance for us.

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal, as has just been stated,
made the rule, with the assent of the Prosecutors, that in the case of
the witnesses there should be one cross-examination. There is nothing in
the Charter which expressly gives to the Prosecution the right for each
prosecutor to cross-examine and there is, on the other hand, Article 18
which directs the Tribunal to take strict measures to prevent any action
which will cause unreasonable delay, and, in the opinion of the Tribunal
in the present case, the subject has been fully covered and the Tribunal
therefore think it right to adhere to the rules which they have laid
down in this case. They will therefore not hear any further
cross-examination.

Do you wish to re-examine, Dr. Kauffmann?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I will be very brief.

Witness, in the affidavit which was just read, you said under Point 2
that “at least an additional half million died through starvation and
disease.” I ask you, when did this take place? Was it towards the end of
the war or was this fact observed by you already at an earlier period?

HOESS: No, it all goes back to the last years of the war, that is
beginning with the end of 1942.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 3—do you still have the affidavit before
you?

HOESS: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I ask that it be given to the witness again?

[_The document was returned to the witness._]

Under Point 3, at the end you state that orders for protective custody,
commitments, punishments, and special executions were signed by
Kaltenbrunner or Müller, Chief of the Gestapo, as Kaltenbrunner’s
deputy. Thus, do you wish to contradict what you stated previously?

HOESS: No, this only completes what I said over and again. I read only a
few decrees signed by Kaltenbrunner; most of them were signed by Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 4, at the end, you state:

    “All mass executions through gassing took place under the direct
    order, supervision, and responsibility of RSHA. I received all
    orders for carrying out these mass executions directly from
    RSHA.”

According to the statements which you previously made to the Tribunal,
this entire action came to you directly from Himmler through Eichmann,
who had been personally delegated. Do you maintain that now as before?

HOESS: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With this last sentence under Point 4, do you wish to
contradict what you testified before?

HOESS: No. I always mean regarding mass executions, Obersturmbannführer
Eichmann in connection with the RSHA.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Under Point 7, at the end, you state—I am not going to
read it—you were saying that even though exterminations took place
secretly, the population in the surrounding area noticed something of
the extermination of people. Did not, at an earlier period of time—that
is, before the beginning of this special extermination action—something
of this nature take place to remove people who had died in a normal
manner in Auschwitz?

HOESS: Yes, when the crematoria had not yet been built we burned in
large pits a large part of those who had died and who could not be
cremated in the provisional crematoria of the camp; a large number—I do
not recall the figure anymore—were placed in mass graves and later also
cremated in these graves. That was before the mass executions of Jews
began.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you agree with me if I were to say that from the
described facts alone, one could not conclusively prove that this was
concerned with the extermination of Jews?

HOESS: No, this could in no way be concluded from that. The
population...

THE PRESIDENT: What was your question about?

DR. KAUFFMANN: My question was whether one could assume from the
established facts—at the end of Paragraph 7—that this concerned the
so-called extermination of Jews. I tied this question to the previous
answer of the witness. It is my last question.

THE PRESIDENT: The last sentence of Paragraph 7 is with reference to the
foul and nauseating stench. What is your question about that?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Whether the population could gather from these things
that an extermination of Jews was taking place.

THE PRESIDENT: That really is too obvious a question, isn’t it? They
could not possibly know who it was being exterminated.

DR. KAUFFMANN: That is enough for me. I have no further questions.

DR. PANNENBECKER: I ask the Tribunal’s permission to ask a few
supplementary questions, for during cross-examination the witness stated
that the Defendant Frick had visited the concentration camps
Sachsenhausen and Oranienburg in 1938.

Witness, when an inspection of the concentration camp of Oranienburg
took place at that time, 1937-38, was there any evidence at all of
atrocities?

HOESS: No.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Why not?

HOESS: Because there was no question of atrocities at that time.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Is it correct that at that period of time the
concentration camp at Oranienburg was still a model of order and that
agricultural labor was the main occupation?

HOESS: Yes, that is right. However, work was mainly done in workshops,
in wood-finishing workshops.

DR. PANNENBECKER: Can you give me any details as to what was shown at
that time at such an official visit?

HOESS: Yes. The visiting party was shown through the prisoners’ camp
proper, inspected the quarters, the kitchen, the hospital, and then all
the administrative buildings; above all the workshops, where the inmates
were employed.

DR. PANNENBECKER: At that time were the quarters and the hospitals
already overcrowded?

HOESS: No, at that time they were normally filled.

DR. PANNENBECKER: How did these quarters look?

HOESS: At that period of time, living quarters looked the same as the
barracks of a training ground. The internees still had bed-clothing and
all necessary hygienic facilities. Everything was yet in the best of
order.

DR. PANNENBECKER: That is all. I have no further questions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):
Witness, what was the greatest number of labor camps existing at any one
time?

HOESS: I cannot give the exact figure but in my estimation there were
approximately 900.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What was the population of these 900?

HOESS: I am not able to say that either; the population varied. There
were camps with 100 internees and camps with 10,000 internees.
Therefore, I cannot give any figure of the total number of people who
were in these labor camps.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Under whose administration were the labor
camps—under what offices?

HOESS: These labor camps, as far as the guarding, direction, and
clothing were concerned, were under the control of the Economic and
Administration Main Office. All matters dealing with labor output and
the supplying of food were attended to by the armament industries which
employed these internees.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): And at the end of the war were the conditions
in those labor camps similar to those existing in the concentration
camps as you described them before?

HOESS: Yes. Since there no longer was any possibility of bringing ill
internees to the main camps, there was much overcrowding in these labor
camps and the death rate very high.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

Dr. Kauffmann, does that close your case?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I wish to call another witness with the
permission of the Court, the witness Neubacher.

[_The witness Neubacher took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

HERMANN NEUBACHER (Witness): Hermann Neubacher.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, what was your position before the war and during
the war?

NEUBACHER: For 5 years during the war I was abroad on diplomatic
missions. Before the war I was Mayor of the City of Vienna.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner?

NEUBACHER: I do.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How long have you known him?

NEUBACHER: I met Kaltenbrunner for the first time in Austria in 1934 in
connection with the so-called appeasement action of the engineer
Reinthaller in Austria. Later I saw him again, after the Anschluss.

DR. KAUFFMANN: In the year 1943 Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the
RSHA. Are you acquainted with that fact?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I am.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know whether Kaltenbrunner was glad to take this
position?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner told me, I believe at the end of 1943, that he
did not wish to take that position, that he had declined three times but
then had received a military order to accept. He added that he had
requested and had been given a promise to be relieved of this office
after the war.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Have you made any observations from which may be deduced
how the defendant looked upon his task as Chief of the RSHA?

NEUBACHER: I had a number of conversations with Kaltenbrunner during my
official visits to the Main Office from time to time, but they all dealt
with foreign intelligence and foreign policy.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The RSHA was in control of the Gestapo; are you familiar
with that fact?

NEUBACHER: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: According to your knowledge of the defendant’s character
can you tell whether he had the prerequisites and the qualifications
necessary for the taking over of the police executive?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner, as far as I was acquainted with him, had no
knowledge of police work when he assumed his office. Besides, in the
year 1941 he wanted to abandon his police career.

DR. KAUFFMANN: What proofs do you have for this?

NEUBACHER: At that time I was a special representative for economic
questions in Romania. Kaltenbrunner told me that he did not like a
police career, that he did not understand anything about police work and
furthermore, had no interest for it. He was interested, however, in
foreign political affairs.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that is really evidence which
ought to be given. It cannot affect his official position, the fact he
did not like it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner was called the successor of Heydrich. Does
this apply to him in the full sense of the word?

NEUBACHER: It cannot, and that I know because...

THE PRESIDENT: That’s a matter of argument. This witness’ opinion cannot
affect the position of Kaltenbrunner. This witness cannot testify
whether he was called a successor to Heydrich or another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Prosecution speak in a disdainful way that
Kaltenbrunner was the successor of the ill-famed Heydrich. This witness
knows them both, therefore I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already admitted that he was the
successor of Heydrich. You may ask him if he was another Heydrich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please, will you tell whether he was called a second
Heydrich?

NEUBACHER: Himmler himself used this expression...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal feels that that is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I understand. I now come to the next question:

Is there anything to show just why Himmler selected the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner?

NEUBACHER: From remarks which Himmler made to me...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the witness can give any
evidence as to what Himmler thought. Himmler appointed him.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The witness, so far as I am told, will report something
from a conversation with Himmler, which clearly shows that Himmler
selected Kaltenbrunner, and no one else, because he did not fear
Kaltenbrunner in any way. The Prosecution contend exactly the opposite.
He therefore knows that the Prosecution’s contention is entirely
incorrect.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you can ask what Himmler said about
the appointment, if he said anything to this witness. You can ask him
what did Himmler say about the appointment to Kaltenbrunner.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Please begin, Witness.

NEUBACHER: During the course of a conversation with Himmler when I was
at his office at headquarters to look at the death mask of Heydrich,
Himmler said to me that he had suffered an irreparable loss by the death
of this man. After Heydrich, there was not a single person who could any
longer direct this gigantic office. That could only be done by the man
who had built it up. Upon my question, “What about Kaltenbrunner?”
Himmler said as follows:

    “Of course as an Austrian you are interested in that matter.
    Kaltenbrunner will have to become familiar with the work. He is
    now fully occupied with matters of interest to you, with foreign
    intelligence.”

These were the remarks of Himmler.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you have any knowledge of the fact that soon after he
assumed office in the year of 1943, Kaltenbrunner assiduously tried to
establish contact abroad, because he considered the military situation
at that time as hopeless?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner was, as I know from many conversations, always
striving for a so-called “talk with the enemy.” He was convinced that we
could not come out of this war favorably without the use of some
large-scale diplomacy. I did not discuss further details with him
concerning the war. In Germany everyone was sentenced to death who, even
to one other person, expressed a doubt about the victory of Germany.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner support you in your efforts to mitigate
as much as possible the terror policy in Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I owe much to Kaltenbrunner’s support in this respect.
The German police offices in Serbia knew, through me and through
Kaltenbrunner, that the latter, as Chief of the Foreign Intelligence
Service, wholeheartedly supported my policy in the southeast area. I
succeeded therefore in making my influence felt in the police offices,
and the support from Kaltenbrunner was valuable to me in my endeavors to
overthrow, with the help of sensible officers, the former system of
collective responsibility and reprisals.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Do you know the basic attitude of Kaltenbrunner towards
the Jewish question?

NEUBACHER: Once, I spoke very briefly with Kaltenbrunner about this
subject. When rumors of a systematic action swelled up I asked
Kaltenbrunner, “Is there any truth in this?” Kaltenbrunner briefly told
me that that was a special action which was not under his command. He
kept aloof from the action, as far as I could observe, and later—I
believe it was at the beginning or the end of 1944—he told me briefly,
that a new course had been adopted in the treatment of the Jews. His
voice sounded the pride of his success.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Kaltenbrunner is characterized as “hungry for power.” Do
you know what kind of a life he led?

NEUBACHER: Kaltenbrunner led a simple life. He never acquired a
fortune...

THE PRESIDENT. The Prosecution has not called him “hungry for power.”
There is no charge against him as being “hungry for power.”

DR. KAUFFMANN: Hungry for power and cruel. Both of these words were
expressly used.

THE PRESIDENT: But being “hungry for power” or “cruel” is quite
different.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, I am just asking about the first term.

THE PRESIDENT: I was just wondering where these terms were used.

DR. KAUFFMANN: The Indictment contains both these terms: “hungry for
power” and “cruel”.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): It certainly is not in the Indictment. We
find no allegation in the Indictment which reads “hungry for power and
cruel,” and we do not recollect any mention being made in the statement
in the Prosecution’s case.

DR. KAUFFMANN: But I would not have had notes taken on it otherwise. In
the Indictment there is a page with the heading “Summary and
Conclusion.” I am referring to the last paragraph, where it says:

    “As all other Nazis, Kaltenbrunner was hungry for power. In
    order to assure himself of power he signed his name in blood—a
    name which will remain in memory as a symbol for cruelty,
    for...”

THE PRESIDENT: Where are you reading from? What are you reading from?

DR. KAUFFMANN: From the Indictment, on the last page, under the heading
“Summary and Conclusion.”

MR. DODD: I think I can clarify the matter. It is rather clear that the
counsel is reading from my trial brief. The trial brief was never
offered in evidence in court, but it was handed to the counsel.

DR. KAUFFMANN: If that will not be maintained I do not need to ask any
questions on that point.

I now come to the next question. Do you know, Witness, whether
Kaltenbrunner gave an order for the evacuation of concentration camps?

NEUBACHER: No.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did Kaltenbrunner, from your experience and observations,
do everything as chief of this office to mitigate inhuman measures or
prevent their application?

NEUBACHER: I must call your attention to the fact that I was abroad for
5 years and could little observe what was happening within Germany. As I
have come to know Kaltenbrunner, I do not doubt that he gave way to the
illusion that he was able to influence the course of events. He was in
no way capable of doing so.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thus, I come to the last question:

Do you know of a case where he used his power against a measure of the
Police to liberate two church dignitaries of the Orthodox Church in
Serbia?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I am familiar with that. These two church dignitaries...

THE PRESIDENT: How is this relevant to Kaltenbrunner?

DR. KAUFFMANN: He is accused of having persecuted the churches
throughout his whole policy. The Prosecution expressly accuse
Kaltenbrunner of persecuting churches, with the annihilation of
Christianity as his objective; this I can say with assurance is
contained in the records; and it is to this that my question refers.

THE PRESIDENT: The answer to it cannot answer any charge against
Kaltenbrunner, can it?

DR. KAUFFMANN: If a defendant tried to exterminate churches, then he
would not take a measure exactly opposite to that policy. The witness
will be able to attest to this fact.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to churches or with reference to
individual people?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Individual people as representatives of the church of
course. I do not believe you can separate the two.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that the question is incompetent.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you. Then I have concluded my examining of the
witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

[_The witness Neubacher resumed the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished, Dr. Kauffmann?

DR. KAUFFMANN: My examination of this witness is finished.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the Defense want to ask
questions?

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I have some questions to put which are, of
course, not in any way connected with Kaltenbrunner, but which refer to
subjects which will have to be dealt with later during the case of the
Defendant Funk. Since the witness can be called only once, however, I
have no other choice than to put to the witness now these questions,
which really ought to be put later.

Witness, you said today that the German Foreign Service had sent you to
Romania—I believe—on questions of economy. Is it correct that during
the time you were working in Romania, you were also representing and
handling economic interests in Greece?

NEUBACHER: In the autumn of 1942, notwithstanding my assignment in
Romania, I received a special assignment, together with an Italian
financial expert, Minister D’Agostino, to prevent by proper methods the
total devaluation of currency and the total disruption of the economic
structure in Greece.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, were you suited for such a difficult task by
training and previous experience? Please tell us briefly, which posts
you held before, so that we can judge whether you were capable of
carrying out this task in Greece; but please, Witness, be very brief.

NEUBACHER: I was one of the foremost economic leaders in Austria. At the
age of 28 I was a director; at 30 I was the general manager of the
Viennese Settlement Corporation; and at the age of 33 I was directing a
large combine in the building trade and building material industry. I
was an executive of the Austrian National Bank and a member of the
Austrian Customs Auxiliary Council. I was a member of the Russian Credit
Committee of the City of Vienna and a member of the Commission of
Experts for the investigation of the collapse of the Austrian Credit
Bank Corporation. Therefore, I was qualified for this task by extensive
economic experience.

Moreover, I was quite familiar with the economic problems of the
Balkans, since I had last worked on economic questions relating to the
Balkans in the central finance administration of I. G. Farben in Berlin.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, several days ago when I visited you in prison, I
gave you a report of a commission of the Royal Greek Government,
addressed to the International Military Tribunal, and I asked you to
read it and state your opinion. Is this report correct?

Mr. President, it is Exhibit USSR-379, and it has the additional
Document Number UK-82.

Witness, in this report of the commission the matter is presented as if
the economy of Greece had been entirely destroyed by German authorities
and that Greece had been plundered, _et cetera_. In the end this
reflects on the Defendant Funk. Please do not go into detail, but tell
us briefly what is your impression in this connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, General Rudenko.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to make the following
statement before the Tribunal: In regard to the report of the Greek
Government, which was presented before the Tribunal by the Soviet
Prosecution as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it seems to me
that the question of the Defense Counsel, asking the witness to give his
opinion on this particular matter, should be rejected because the
witness is not competent to give an opinion on the report of the Greek
Government. The Defense Counsel can ask him a concrete question in
regard to any particular fact, but that is all.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, if it is desired, I can, of course, put the
questions individually. It will probably take a little longer, but if
the Soviet Russian Prosecution so desires I agree. May I now question
the witness? Witness, is it correct...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Dr. Sauter, what exactly is it that you
want to ask the witness about this report?

DR. SAUTER: The report of the Greek Government, which has been submitted
by the Russian Prosecution, states, for instance, that Germany in its
occupation of Greece plundered the country and brought about a famine by
exporting an excessive amount of goods. It states that the country was
charged excessive occupation costs, and that the country was heavily
prejudiced by the clearing system, _et cetera_. Through this witness,
who as the economic expert of the German Foreign Office handled these
problems in Greece at that time, I propose to prove: First, that these
statements are untrue; second, that this state of affairs prevailed
already when the German troops marched in and was not created by the
German authorities; and, last, that it was the Defendant Funk who tried
repeatedly to improve matters for Greece through the clearing system and
had considerable amounts of gold brought to Greece.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, can’t you put a few short questions to show that
the scheme which this witness introduced into Greece was in accordance
with international law and was not unfair to Greece? If you could do
that, that would meet the case, wouldn’t it?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, that is what I wanted to do, and I am sure that the
witness would have done so on his own initiative.

Now, then, Witness, are you acquainted with the viewpoint of the German
economic authorities, and particularly of the Defendant Funk, in regard
to the question of the clearing of debts incurred by Greece and the
question of how Greece was to be treated with regard to this clearing
system?

NEUBACHER: Concerning the mutual financial charges and obligations, I
spoke at one time to the Reich Finance Minister, Schwerin Von Krosigk,
and it was proposed that at some later date after the war the claims and
counter-claims were to be settled on the basis of a common denominator.

DR. SAUTER: And at that time, during the war, how was the question of
this clearing dealt with?

NEUBACHER: Regarding the economic events in Greece, I can give you
information based on my own observations only, starting with October
1942. At that time, when I first came to Athens, the Greek currency had
already been considerably devaluated, and the circulation of banknotes
had increased by something like 3,000 percent.

Greece also suffered an economic set-back due to the fact that, in
addition to a progressing inflation, an attempt had been made to
introduce in Greece a planned economy with ceiling prices along German
lines. The result was, of course, that the merchants selling Greek goods
suffered losses when they were paid later. On the other hand, when I
arrived there the importers of German goods made tremendous profits,
because they paid Reichsmark at the rate of 60 on the clearing and
resold the goods at a rate of about 30,000. This chaos, due to the
inflation in connection with the attempt of introducing a planned
economy on the German pattern, could be remedied only by transforming
the black market in Greece into a completely free market. The two
experts of the Axis Powers introduced this measure with considerable
success at the end of October 1942. Within a few weeks all shops and
markets were full of goods and foodstuffs; the prices of food dropped to
one-fifth and prices of manufactured products to one-tenth. This success
could be maintained for 4 months in spite of increasing inflation.

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Neubacher, is it true that the Defendant Funk, who was
Reich Minister of Economy at that time, proposed during a conversation
or in correspondence he had had with you that, in spite of the shortage
of goods prevailing in Germany, a considerable amount of goods should be
sent from Germany and other European countries, particularly to Greece?

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk, with whom I discussed the difficulties
of my task, and I both fully agreed that a maximum of goods should be
transported to Greece, and certainly not only food. I secured not only
60,000 tons of food at that time but also German export goods, since it
was hopeless to try to stop an inflation or the effects of an inflation
on the prices, if there were no supplies. Reich Minister Funk supported
exports to Greece with the view to a restoration of normal market
conditions with every means at his disposal.

DR. SAUTER: You know, Witness, that since transport from Germany to
Greece had become impossible, the Defendant Funk made every effort to
have goods transported on neutral ships, furnished with British
navicerts, from Germany to Greece in order to combat as far as possible
the already impending famine.

NEUBACHER: I think that was between 1941 and 1942 when I had not yet
arrived in Greece. In 1943, when shipping in Greek waters had completely
stopped for us, because all ships had been torpedoed and the railroads
had become the object of incessant acts of sabotage and dynamiting, I,
with the help of the Swedish Minister, Alar, who directed the
International Relief for Greece, applied for British navicerts for food
transports to Greece. The British granted this application, and when our
own means of transport had ceased to exist, the Swedish boat _Halaren_
went from Trieste or Venice to the Piraeus once a month, loaded with
German food supplies for Greece.

DR. SAUTER: And Funk, the Reich Minister of Economy at that time, played
an important part in these actions, did he not?

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister of Economy Funk took a very positive interest
in the Greek question, a question which is unique in the history of
economy, and he supported me in my efforts with every means at his
disposal.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, do you know anything about the fact that the
Defendant Funk advocated in particular that the occupation costs should
be kept as low as possible, and that he took the view that it would be
preferable that a considerable part of the occupation costs should
rather be charged to the German account so that Greece should not be
overburdened? What do you know about that?

NEUBACHER: I know too little of the details of what happened in Berlin;
but at long intervals I reported to Reich Minister Funk about the
situation in Greece, and I know that he made my reports the basis for
his own interventions. He was perfectly aware of the fact that the Greek
economic problem during the war and within the blockade was so
infinitely complicated that all efforts had to be made to prevent a
complete dissolution of the monetary value and the economic structure;
and he intervened at all times in that respect.

DR. SAUTER: Witness, did Defendant Funk act in such a way that the Greek
currency, drachma currency, was devaluated, or that it deteriorated? Or
did he, on the contrary, endeavor to back the drachma value,
particularly for the purpose of preventing a catastrophic famine? Please
state briefly what you know about that.

NEUBACHER: Reich Minister Funk always made every effort in the latter
direction. He proved that by enforcing exports to Greece and finally by
the grant of a considerable amount of gold for the purpose of slowing
down the Greek inflation—which grant, in accordance with the Four Year
Plan, involved the gravest sacrifice for Germany.

DR. SALTER: You say “a considerable amount of gold.” There was very
little gold in Germany during the war. Can you tell us how large the
amount of gold was which the Defendant Funk sent to Greece at that time
for the purpose of backing the drachma to some extent and preventing the
impending catastrophe? How large was the amount?

NEUBACHER: All told, one and one third million pounds sterling were
invested in Greece and Albania, to my recollection.

DR. SAUTER: One and one third million pounds sterling?

NEUBACHER: Greece and Albania got that amount.

DR. SAUTER: And now, Witness, I have a last question. Is it correct that
all these efforts on the part of the German economic management and the
German Minister of Economy were often frustrated and foiled,
particularly by Greek merchants? To quote just one example, there were
cases where German factories sold German engines for 60 drachmas to
Greek merchants—that is to say, 60 drachmas which had actually no
value—and the Greek merchant sold these same engines which they had
bought for 60 drachmas from Germans to the German Armed Forces at 60,000
drachmas apiece. These are supposed to be cases which you discovered and
on which you reported to the Defendant Funk, and that is why I am asking
you whether that is true.

NEUBACHER: I have the following comment to make about that. It did, in
fact, happen, but I want to state that the Greek businessmen had to do
that in consequence of inflation and the black market. The Greek people
are much too intelligent to be caught up in an inflation. Every child
there is a businessman. Therefore, the only possible method for
counteracting this obvious speculation, which in itself is not
dishonest, was that of converting the black market into a totally free
market on sound business lines; and that was the end of these
experiments.

DR. SAUTER: This transformation of the black market into a free market,
a problem which also played an important part in France, was brought
about by your activity in agreement with the Defendant Funk?

NEUBACHER: Yes, I introduced this measure together with my Italian
colleague D’Agostino at the end of October 1942.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you very much, Witness.

Mr. President, I have no further questions.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, Members of the Military Tribunal, for
your information I am going to examine the witness on the question of
the Anschluss.

Witness, you have described to the Tribunal your economic activities.
Were you not active politically as well?

NEUBACHER: I was politically active as the chairman of the Austro-German
People’s Union.

DR. STEINBAUER: What were the aims of that Austro-German People’s Union?

NEUBACHER: The Austro-German People’s Union was an organization which
stood above parties and religious denominations, and which, in a
one-sided manner, aimed at revising the Anschluss prohibition in the
peace treaties by solving the question of the Austro-German Anschluss
peacefully through plebiscite. In the executive committee of this
Austro-German People’s Union, all parties were officially represented
with the exception of the National Socialist and Communist Parties. The
German organization of the same name was under the leadership of the
Social Democratic President of the German Reichstag, Paul Loebe.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have here a list of the executive committee
which is dated 1926. You appear as chairman and Staatsrat Paul Speiser
as deputy. Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart is named as treasurer, and then
there is Dr. Benedikt Kautsky, one Georg Stern, Hofrat and President of
the Banks’ Association, and a certain Dr. Stolper. Is that correct?

NEUBACHER: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: Why did all these members who represented different
party lines and religious denominations strive toward the Anschluss at
that time?

NEUBACHER: After the conclusion of the Treaties of Versailles and St.
Germain, a movement on the broadest basis started in Austria for the
union of this country, which was suffering from severe economic
depression, with Germany. Men from all parties and all religions joined
this movement, as you can see from the names which you, Herr Doctor,
have just mentioned.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know by which way and under what conditions this
was intended in 1918, especially with regard to the position of Vienna
as capital of the Reich and seat of the Court?

NEUBACHER: There were no clear ideas about the technical form of such a
distant goal; but every Austrian, on the basis of a historically
well-founded pride, was agreed that the city of Vienna should rank as
the second capital of Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry. The Tribunal isn’t really concerned with
whether or not any Anschluss was desirable, or whether it was just or
not. The Tribunal is concerned with whether it was obtained by violence
and force. Most of this evidence does not seem to be relevant at all.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, unfortunately I must say that my opinion
differs from that of the Tribunal, because I believe—and that applies
not only to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, but also to the other
defendants who participated in the Anschluss, namely, Göring,
Ribbentrop, Papen, Neurath—that it is important to know the economic,
political, and cultural auspices and the political situation of Austria
at the time when these men were striving toward an Anschluss. Therefore,
I am of the opinion that it is important to ascertain just what the
general attitude was. I have taken the liberty of including in my
document book a short historical report to clarify the various views.

Witness, then, in 1938 you became Mayor of the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: That was after the Anschluss.

DR. STEINBAUER: At the same time, Seyss-Inquart was Reichsstatthalter
for the Gau of Vienna, or rather the State of Austria; is that correct?

NEUBACHER: I became Mayor of Vienna under Seyss-Inquart on the morning
of 13 March 1938, when he was still Austrian Federal Chancellor. At that
time Seyss-Inquart was Federal Chancellor of Austria.

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. How long did you remain in office as Mayor of
the City of Vienna?

NEUBACHER: According to the Austrian Law, until February 1939. Then
Bürckel became Gauleiter and Reichsstatthalter of Vienna, and thereby
automatically supreme head of the communal administration. Thus...

DR. STEINBAUER: That is enough. Thank you. And what was the relationship
between Seyss-Inquart on the one hand and the Commissioner for the
Reichsvereinigung, Bürckel, on the other hand?

NEUBACHER: The relations were notoriously bad. Bürckel disregarded the
authority of the Reichsstatthalter, Seyss-Inquart. He ruled over his
head, and he tried by every method of slander, intrigue, and provocation
to overthrow Seyss-Inquart and remove him from office. And he succeeded.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to question?

COL. AMEN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: No questions?

COL. AMEN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: There are still six interrogatories outstanding. I hope
that I will be permitted to submit them as soon as they are received;
and may I also reserve for myself the right, in connection with the
application I made 2 days ago, to apply for some one of the witnesses in
writing, that is, witnesses from among those who appear in the
affidavits submitted by the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean you want to cross-examine somebody from whom the
Prosecution has submitted an affidavit?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of affidavits which have already been
put in?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am speaking of the affidavits which were submitted for
the first time 2 days ago.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal thinks you should make up your mind
very soon as to whether you want to cross-examine those persons.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Certainly. I intended to put that application to you, but
the Tribunal told me to make that application in writing.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I see. Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Apart from that, I have finished my case for today.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we understood that Dr. Dix wanted to have the
question of his documents settled on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.
Did you anticipate that that would take long?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If I might just consult Mr. Dodd—I don’t think
it will, but I would just like to verify that, if Your Lordship will
allow.

THE PRESIDENT: What does Dr. Dix say?

DR. DIX: I do not think it will take long, perhaps a quarter of an hour.
However, I shall have to reply to the Prosecution, and therefore the
length of my reply depends upon the length of the statement made by the
Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Well, there would seem to be some advantages in
taking it now, because otherwise we have got to stop at some particular
time, and we shan’t know how long it is going to take. If we take it
now, it does not so much matter, and then we could go on with Dr. Thoma
afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, my friend Mr. Dodd
thinks it will take about a half hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Dr. Thoma, you have no objection to that, have
you?

DR. THOMA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have before me an index which is submitted by
Dr. Dix on behalf of the Defendant Schacht.

First, I assume that I should proceed by taking up the exhibits to which
we have objected.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I am not sure that I have that index before me. Have
you got a copy of it we could have?

MR. DODD: I have just the one copy, which was supplied to us by Dr. Dix.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it been supplied to the Tribunal?

MR. DODD: I don’t think so; I don’t know.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you could indicate what the documents are without
our having them before us. Would you give the numbers when you indicate
the documents?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor.

As to the first four documents, Number 1 is a book by Sir Nevile
Henderson, _Failure of a Mission_. Number 2 is also an excerpt from that
book; so is Number 3. We object to all of those on the ground that they
only represent the opinion of Sir Nevile Henderson; they do not recount
historical fact. Number 4 is an excerpt from a book written about Dr.
Schacht by a man by the name of Karl Bopp. We object to that on the same
ground; that it is the opinion of the author and not pertinent here.

Exhibit Number 5 is an excerpt from the book written by Mr. Sumner
Welles, _The Time for Decision_. Our objection to this excerpt is based
on the same grounds; it contains only an opinion of Mr. Welles and,
however valuable in some places, it is incompetent here.

Exhibit Number 6 is the book by Viscount Rothermere which was already
passed upon by the Tribunal with respect to the application of the
Defendant Göring. We renew the objection that was made at that time,
citing again that it is only the opinion of this gentleman and is of no
value before this Tribunal.

Exhibit Number 7 is the Messersmith affidavit, which was offered in
evidence by the Prosecution. We have no objection to that, of course.

Exhibit Number 8 is also a Prosecution exhibit. No objection.

Number 9, likewise.

Number 10 is an affidavit or declaration by the late Field Marshal Von
Blomberg, and we have no objection to that.

Passing on, we have no objection until we reach Exhibit Number 14,
Ambassador Dodd’s diary—and it is not really an objection there. We ask
that we be given the dates of the entries—they have not been given to
us thus far—or the pages from the diary from which it is intended to
quote.

We go on to Exhibit Number 18. The intervening exhibits, of course, we
have no objection to...

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I understand this is really a question of what
shall be translated, is it not?

MR. DODD: Yes. We are objecting now, because we want to save the labor
of the translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then you go on to 18.

MR. DODD: Yes. Number 18 consists of three parts: (a), (b), and (c).
They are statements of Paul Boncour, of Briand, and of Lord Cecil. They
are statements about Germany’s right to rearm. We object to them because
they are not statements made by officials of any of these
governments—of these two governments. No source is given in the excerpt
which is to be quoted, and it appears that they are nothing more than
opinions, given after these men had retired from office.

Passing on, then, we come to Exhibit Number 33. That is a speech by Dr.
Schacht in 1937. Our only question about it—we are not questioning at
all its relevancy, of course, but we would like to know whether or not
the original is available. We have not been able to find out yet.

Number 34 is a speech by Adolf Hitler. It is very brief, and I am rather
loath to make too much objection to it, except that I cannot see its
relevancy here. It does not seem to pertain to any of the issues that
have been raised in this place, and unless Dr. Dix has something in mind
that we have not been apprised of, we would object to it.

THE PRESIDENT: What does it deal with, Mr. Dodd?

MR. DODD: It deals with rearmament, generally; but it does not say
anything about Dr. Schacht or any of the allegations here. It seems to
be just a general statement about rearmament.

We have an objection to Exhibit Number 37. It is a letter from Dr.
Schacht to Mr. Leon Fraser. Our objection is that we would like to know
whether or not the original is available; and if it is—why, we would
have no objection.

Number 38 is a newspaper article from a newspaper in Zürich, Switzerland
about what Dr. Schacht’s thoughts were; and we object to that. The
author is unknown, to begin with. It is only a newspaper account and
seems to be immaterial and unimportant here.

Exhibit Number 39 is a letter written by one Richard Morton, addressed
to the Solicitor of the Treasury in Great Britain. It was forwarded here
to the General Secretary, I believe. In any event, we object to it on
the ground that it is not competent. It purports to tell what Morton
thought about Schacht and about some assistance that Morton received
from Schacht. We would suggest that if Dr. Schacht’s counsellor, Dr.
Dix, feels that Morton has really some pertinent and relevant testimony
to give here, it could be done by way of an interrogatory. He is in
London, and it would be, we submit, a more proper way to proceed, rather
than offering this letter, which was written without any direction or
basis.

Then we move down to Exhibit Number 49, being correspondence between the
publisher of Ambassador Dodd’s diary and Sir Nevile Henderson. It is
reprinted in the volume containing Dodd’s diary. It is rather vague to
me just what the relevance of the entry is here, or how it could be
shown in that fashion.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it long?

MR. DODD: Not very long, no.

Now, I am a little bit confused about the last few exhibits, running
from 54 to 61. We are only informed that 54 is the record of Göring’s
testimony before this Tribunal, and so on—the record of so and so
before the Tribunal: three excerpts from Göring’s testimony and four
from the statements of Lt. Brady Bryson, made in connection with the
Prosecution’s presentation of the case against the Defendant Schacht. I,
of course, simply say that it is unnecessary to have these translated or
do anything more than refer to them. They are already in the record, and
I do not know just what Dr. Dix has in mind. I have no objection, of
course, to his reference to them or any other such use as he may
properly make.

THE PRESIDENT: Are those excerpts long?

MR. DODD: Well, I don’t know. It is just a matter of copying them over
again from the record. They are already in the record of this Court.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: You see, if Your Honor pleases, I do not have them before me.

That amounts to our view on the applications of Dr. Schacht’s counsel at
this time. If there are any questions, I should be glad to answer them.
I have not gone into much detail here.

THE PRESIDENT: No, that is all right. Dr. Dix can answer now. Yes, Dr.
Dix.

DR. DIX: Concerning the objections raised to Numbers 1 to 6, I readily
admit to Mr. Dodd that these documents are matters of argument rather
than evidence. Schacht will argue the fact that prominent persons abroad
represented the same views which were the basis for his entire attitude,
including the question of rearmament. He will quote these opinions; and
I, too, in my final speech, shall refer to these passages for the
purpose of argument. If Mr. Dodd says, therefore, that this is not so
much evidence as it is argument, he is right. But, in my opinion we are
not now arguing the question of what is to be officially submitted as
evidence to the Tribunal according to procedure. We are merely
arguing—or rather we are discussing—whether these documents should be
translated, so that if Schacht quotes them during his examination, or if
I quote them during my speech, the Tribunal would be able to follow the
quotation easily. We have observed that the Tribunal—and this seems
fairly obvious—prefer the documents which are being quoted here to be
submitted in translation so that they can follow exactly. Therefore,
regarding Numbers 1 to 6—and, incidentally, the same applies to all the
documents contained in Exhibit Number 18—I am not attempting to have
them admitted in evidence: I am merely recommending that they be
translated in the interest of everyone concerned, so that in case they
are quoted the translation can be given to the Tribunal. It is merely a
question of being practical. This applies to 1 to 6 and all under 18.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, hasn’t the Tribunal already ruled that both the
document books of Viscount Rothermere and the speech or book by M. Paul
Boncour are not to be put in evidence and are not to be referred to?

DR. DIX: I only know of one ruling of the Tribunal to the effect that no
arguments regarding the justice or injustice of the Versailles Peace
Treaty will be admitted. We shall, of course, obey that ruling of the
Tribunal. But we will not quote these passages in order to discuss the
justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty. That is not Schacht’s
intention or mine. To cite an example:

The Prosecution considers that a certain attitude of Schacht’s proves
that by backing armament he supported and wanted aggression. He wants to
disprove this by referring to the fact that certain prominent foreigners
took the same view, and that these men could not possibly mean to
further German aggression by adopting that view. That is only one
example. But at any rate the purpose is not to give academic lectures on
the justice or injustice of the Versailles Treaty—which I had not
intended in any event, since I feel that such arguments would find but
deaf ears. It is not my habit to use arguments which I believe will
receive no response. May I continue?

Concerning Number 18 may I—I beg to apologize. I have just heard Mr.
Dodd’s statements, and I must reply at once. I must first assemble the
material. I have noted down that under Number 18, which I have just
mentioned—and this also applies to Numbers 1 to 6—Mr. Dodd is missing
the sources. That may be due to the fact that he has had only the index
to the document. The sources and documents are quoted in the actual
quotations.

I now turn to Number 37. It is Schacht’s letter to a certain Fraser. I
understood Mr. Dodd to say that he was raising no objection but that he
merely wanted to know where the original document is located. It is a
letter from Schacht to Fraser, the late president of the First National
Bank. The original of that letter—if it still exists—would be among
the papers left by the deceased Mr. Fraser, to which I have no access,
nor has any one else.

One moment, Mr. President. Schacht tells me that he has only a copy
which bears his signature and, therefore, is a so-called auto-copy. This
auto-copy was deposited in Switzerland during the war because of its
contents. This auto-copy, signed personally by Schacht, is here, and the
copy in the document book has been taken from it. The fact that it is a
true copy has been certified by Professor Kraus, and I think that as far
as possible it has been adequately identified. So much for Number 37.
Then I have made a note regarding Number 34. Just one moment, please.
Number 34 is another case where the source was missing. The same applies
as above. The source is stated in the document book—namely, _Dokumente
der Deutschen Politik_. This compilation has been used a great deal as a
source of evidence. Then objections have been raised...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the objection to 34 was not that the original
was not available, but it was a speech by Hitler which was about
rearmament and did not seem to be relevant.

DR. DIX: Yes, that is correct. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Mr. Dodd, of course, could not recognize the relevancy of the document.
Schacht could recognize it, since he alone knows his inner development.
This is a speech of Hitler’s in which there is a passage which confirmed
the slowly developing suspicion on Schacht’s part that this policy not
only would lead to a war of aggression, but that possibly Hitler
actually desired the war. This suspicion was particularly roused by this
passage in the speech made by Hitler in the Reichstag on 28 February
1938. This speech is an important milestone in presenting Schacht’s
inner attitude toward Hitler and his policy, beginning with Schacht’s
adherence in the year 1933 through the turning-point when distrust
started and developed into opposition, which was increased to continuous
preparations for revolt. For that reason, I believe it is relevant
evidence. That is Number 34.

Then there is Number 38. That is the article from the _Basler
Nachrichten_. In my opinion it is evidence of the greatest importance.
At any rate, I shall fight to my very last breath to have that document
admitted. Subject: Before the war—the fight against the war; during the
war—the fight and the attempts to bring about an early peace, the fight
against the spreading of the war.

In 1941—that is to say, before Russia’s entry into the war and before
the entry of the United States into this war—Schacht had a conversation
with a political economist from the United States, which he did not
recollect until an acquaintance sent him the article which had appeared
in the _Basler Nachrichten_ of 14 January 1946. He said, “Of course, now
I remember. Four years ago, in the spring of 1941, I had this
conversation with an American political economist.” The name, he has
still forgotten. This conversation shows once more the efforts he made
as late as 1941 to tie threads and get contacts to prevent any spreading
of the war, particularly by opening _pourparlers_ with the United States
and the men around President Roosevelt.

We have no other evidence to prove the fact that this conversation took
place, since we cannot call upon this professor, because Schacht has
forgotten his name. But it is the professor himself who is anonymously
speaking in this newspaper edition of 14 January 1946.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, what is the nature of the conversation which you
say is reported in this newspaper?

DR. DIX: It is a fairly long article. Perhaps I may pick out a few
points so that the Tribunal can understand the nature of the
conversation. The professor relates in this interview that at that time
Schacht took an extremely critical attitude toward the National
Socialist system of government; that he had pointed out the dangers of
maintaining such a system because this would lead to a complete
mortification of intellectual activities. Thereupon, he goes on further
to tell the professor that this war was entirely senseless, and that,
when considered from a higher level, it would be senseless and futile
even for a victorious Germany. He explained to the professor that every
means should be employed to stop the war, because in an orderly
world—in a world put in order by a just peace—the governments would
automatically become liberal. In the end he suggests, therefore, that an
attempt should be made at all costs to establish contact between the
nations, particularly with representative men from the United States,
before Russia and America entered the war.

He goes on to regret that Roosevelt—I beg your pardon—he goes on to
name Roosevelt—and his friends—as the very man who could carry out the
great task of helping to contrive such a meeting artfully and carefully.
It is an attempt, Your Lordship, similar to the one which appears in the
letter to Fraser, which I quoted before. Fraser, too, belonged to the
closer—at any rate, let us say to these people who had access to
President Roosevelt. It is the last desperate effort, relying on the
confidence Roosevelt had in him personally, to contribute his part to
bring about peace before it was too late.

Such an attitude is, of course, of extraordinary relevancy in rebutting
the charge of aggression, and that is why I think that the Tribunal
should under any circumstances admit this article as evidence. We
cannot, after all, assume that this professor is not telling the truth.
Technically, it might be possible to try to discover his name from the
_Basler Nachrichten_; but I am afraid that the _Basler Nachrichten_ will
not disclose the name without having made further enquiries from the
professor in America. It is questionable whether he will permit his name
to be disclosed, and we may have serious difficulties. Since personal
experience shows that the professor’s report in the _Basler Nachrichten_
is true, then why would he not speak the truth here? Moreover, he is a
respected man. That is why I think that this piece of evidence is
equivalent to a personal examination of the professor. Therefore, I urge
you to admit this document not only for translation but also in
evidence. That was Number 38.

As to Morton, I am perfectly agreeable to sending an interrogatory to
Morton; but I believe that this would be a superfluous effort. Actually,
I need this letter of Morton’s only to prove the fact that Lord Montagu
Norman, on his return from a BIZ meeting to England in 1939, told this
man Morton—who was a respected citizen of Frankfurt am Main, associated
with the Metallgesellschaft and later emigrated—that Schacht was in
considerable personal danger on account of his political attitude. That
is the main fact which I am to prove with this letter, and it is
contained in the letter. This letter was not written by Morton to me or
to Schacht. It is a letter which was addressed to the Solicitor of the
Treasury, and from there it was given to the Prosecution here, and the
Prosecution has been kind enough to inform us of the letter. We thought
it would be too much trouble to have Morton called as a witness. I am
perfectly willing to draft a questionnaire, but I think it would be a
more simple and just as reliable a method if the Tribunal permitted me
to quote two short passages from that letter. I am, however, equally
prepared to send an interrogatory to London. That is Number 39.

Regarding Number 49, this is correspondence between Sir Nevile Henderson
and the editor of the diary of the late Ambassador Dodd. It is of the
greatest importance in establishing the reliability of the statements in
the Dodd diary, which not I but the Prosecution has quoted repeatedly to
the detriment of Schacht, as far as I can remember. In order to prevent
any misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize that we are far from
questioning the reliability of the late Ambassador Dodd. Both Dr.
Schacht and myself knew him personally, and we consider him to be an
absolutely honorable man. But the Tribunal know that this diary, which
was based on hasty notes made by the ambassador, was edited by his
children after his death. Therefore, it is possible that mistakes may
occur, bad mistakes. This becomes evident in the correspondence between
Sir Nevile Henderson and the editor of the diary, where Sir Nevile
Henderson points out that a conversation, or several
conversations—which according to the diary Dodd is supposed to have had
with him—were quoted quite wrongly. I believe there can be no better
proof of the unbiased unreliability of this diary—I repeat, only the
unbiased unreliability—than this correspondence between Sir Nevile
Henderson and the editor. Therefore, in order to test the credibility of
this evidence which was produced by the Prosecution, and to reduce its
value to the proper proportion, I ask to have this document admitted in
evidence.

Regarding Numbers 54 to 61, I do not intend in any way to introduce
evidence by means of these documents. It is perfectly agreeable to me if
they are not translated, but the thought I had in mind was merely that
of making the work of the Tribunal easier. I will examine Schacht with
reference to these passages of Göring’s testimony. If the Tribunal
believe that it is not necessary to have these excerpts available when
they are quoted or if it prefers to use the record only or have the
record which is here brought up for use, then of course it will not be
necessary to translate these passages. It is, therefore, merely a
question of what the Tribunal consider to be the most practical way. We
have made the excerpts, and if the Tribunal wish, they will be
translated.

Now there is left only the affidavits. Mr. Dodd did not mention them;
but I think at the time when Sir David and I discussed the witnesses and
affidavits here in court in open session the affidavits had already been
admitted by the Tribunal. Of course, reserving the right of the
Prosecution to ask counter questions or call the witnesses for
cross-examination after having read the documents, that is their
privilege. We have been satisfied with affidavits instead of the
personal appearance merely in order to save time; but if the Prosecution
wishes these witnesses, from whom we have affidavits, to appear, then,
of course, the Defense is perfectly agreeable to this.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first of all with the documents on behalf of
the Defendant Schacht.

The following documents will be translated:

Number 7, Number 8, Number 9, Number 14, Number 18, Number 33, Number
34, Number 37, Number 38, Number 39, and Number 49.

With reference to documents 54 to 61, which are already in the record,
they will not be translated, but Dr. Dix is requested to give references
to those documents in his document book.

Documents 1 to 6 will not be translated at all.

I meant that the documents which I have not alluded to will be
translated—the documents which I have not referred to specifically will
be translated.

Now, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, first of all I am submitting copies of the
documents which were granted me this morning and which are from
Rosenberg’s publications—_Tradition and Our Present Age_, _Writings and
Speeches_, _Blood and Honor_, _Formation of the Idea_, and _The Myth of
the 20th Century_—as evidence of the fact that the defendant did not
participate in a conspiracy against the peace and in the psychological
preparation for war. These excerpts contain speeches which the defendant
made before diplomats, before students, before jurists, and are meant to
prove that on these occasions he fought for social peace, and that, in
particular, he did not want the battle of ideologies to result in
foreign political enmity. In these speeches he advocated respect for all
races, spoke against the propaganda for leaving the church, advocated
freedom of conscience and a sensible solution of the Jewish problem,
even giving certain advantages to Jews. In particular, he called for
equality and justice in this matter. I ask the Tribunal to take official
notice of these speeches, and with the permission of the Tribunal I call
the Defendant Rosenberg to the witness stand.

[_The Defendant Rosenberg took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

ALFRED ROSENBERG (Defendant): Alfred Rosenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—to speak the pure truth—and withhold and add
nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. THOMA: Mr. Rosenberg, will you please give the Tribunal your
personal history.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you have not given your exhibits any exhibit
numbers, have you?

DR. THOMA: Yes, I have. That is Rosenberg-7(a).

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, they have all been numbered?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. When you refer to any of the documents, you
will give them their exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: Yes, indeed.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you give the Tribunal your personal
history...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait one minute, Dr. Thoma. For the purposes of the
record, you see, which is contained in the transcript, I think you ought
to read out a list of the documents which you are putting in, stating
what the exhibit numbers are. Have you got a list there of the documents
you are going to offer in evidence?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you just read it into the record?

DR. THOMA: Exhibit Rosenberg-7, _The Myth of the 20th Century_.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-7(a), _Gestaltung der Idee_ (_Formation of the
Idea_); Rosenberg-7(b), Rosenberg, _Blut und Ehre_ (_Blood and Honor_);
Rosenberg-7(c), Rosenberg, _Tradition und Gegenwart_ (_Tradition and Our
Present Age_); Rosenberg-7(d), Rosenberg, _Schriften und Reden_
(_Writings and Speeches_); and Rosenberg-8, _Völkischer Beobachter_,
March and September 1933.

THE PRESIDENT: That one was excluded by the Tribunal. Numbers 7(e) and 8
were excluded.

DR. THOMA: I did not cite 7(e) but Rosenberg-8.

THE PRESIDENT: You cited 8, though.

DR. THOMA: Yes, I mentioned Rosenberg-8, and I beg to apologize.

THE PRESIDENT: Number 8 is excluded, too.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Mr. Rosenberg, please give the Tribunal
your personal history.

ROSENBERG: I was born on 12 January 1893 in Reval in Estonia. After
having graduated there from high school I began to study architecture in
the autumn of 1910 at the Institute of Technology at Riga. When the
German-Russian front lines approached in 1915, the Institute of
Technology, including the professors and students, was evacuated to
Moscow, and there I continued my studies in this capital of Russia. The
end of January or the beginning of February 1918 I finished my studies,
received a diploma as an engineer and architect, and returned to my
native city.

When the German troops entered Reval, I tried to enlist as a volunteer
in the German Army, but since I was a citizen of an occupied country, I
was not accepted without special recommendation. Since in the future I
did not want to live between the frontiers of several countries, I tried
to get to Germany.

To the Baltic Germans, notwithstanding their loyalty toward the Russian
State, German culture was their intellectual home, and the experience I
had had in Russia strengthened my resolution to do everything within my
power to help prevent the political movement in Germany from backsliding
into Bolshevism. I believed that this movement in Germany, because of
the precarious structure of the system of the German Reich, would have
meant a tremendous catastrophe. At the end of November 1918 I travelled
to Berlin and from there to Munich. Actually, I wanted to take up my
profession as an architect, but in Munich I met people who felt the way
I did, and I became a staff member of a weekly, which was founded at
that time in Munich. I went to work on this weekly paper in January 1918
and have continued in literary work since that time. I lived through the
development of the political movement here in Munich until the Räte
Republic in 1919 and its overthrow.

DR. THOMA: You just mentioned Germany as your intellectual home. Will
you tell the Tribunal by which studies and by which scientists you were
influenced in favor of the German mentality?

ROSENBERG: In addition to my immediate artistic interests in
architecture and painting, I had since childhood pursued historical and
philosophical studies and thus, of course, instinctively I tended to
read Goethe, Herder, and Fichte in order to develop intellectually along
these lines. At the same time, I was influenced by the social ideas of
Charles Dickens, Carlyle, and, with regard to America, by Emerson. I
continued these studies at Riga and, naturally, took up Kant and
Schopenhauer and, above all, devoted myself to the study of the
philosophy of India and related schools of thought. Later, of course, I
studied the prominent European historians of the history of
civilization; Burckhardt and Rohde, Ranke and Treitschke, Mommsen and
Schlieffen. Finally, in Munich I started to study modern biology more
closely.

DR. THOMA: You frequently mentioned in the course of your speeches “the
embodiment of the idea.” Was this due to Goethe’s influence?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is a matter of course that the idea, to see the world
as an embodiment, goes back to Goethe.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To Dr. Thoma._] The Tribunal, you see, want you to
confine yourself to his own philosophy and not to the origins of these
philosophies, insofar as you are referring to philosophical subjects at
all.

DR. THOMA: How did you come to the NSDAP and to Hitler in Munich?

ROSENBERG: In May 1919 the publisher of the journal which I mentioned
was visited by a man by the name of Anton Drexler, who introduced
himself as the chairman of a newly founded German Labor Party. He stated
that he advocated ideas similar to those expressed by this journal, and
from that time I began to have connections with a very small group of
German laborers which had been formed in Munich. There in the autumn of
1919 I also met Hitler.

DR. THOMA: When did you join Hitler?

ROSENBERG: Well, at that time I had an earnest conversation with Hitler,
and on that occasion I noticed his broad view of the entire European
situation.

He said that in his opinion Europe was at that time in a social and
political crisis, such as had not existed since the fall of the ancient
Roman Empire. He said that seats of unrest were to be found everywhere
in this sphere, and that he was personally striving to get a clear
picture from the viewpoint of Germany’s restoration to sound conditions.
Thereupon, I listened to some of the first speeches by Hitler which were
made at small meetings of 40 and 50 people. I believed, above all, a
soldier who had been at the front, and who had done his duty silently
for 4½ years, had the right to speak now.

At the end of 1919, I entered the Party—not before Hitler, as it is
contended here, but later. In this original Party I was assigned Number
625 as a member.

I did not participate in setting up the program. I was present, however,
when this program was read and commented upon by Hitler on 24 February
1920.

DR. THOMA: Then you gave a justification for the Party program and
probably wanted to solve the problems which referred to the social and
political crisis. How did you picture the solution?

ROSENBERG: In response to different inquiries regarding the 25 points of
the program, I wrote a commentary at the end of 1922, which has been
read to the Tribunal in fragments. Our general attitude at the time may
perhaps be stated briefly as follows:

The technical revolution of the 19th Century had certain social and
mental consequences. Industrialization and the clamor for profit
dominated life and created the industrial state and the metropolis with
all its backyards and estrangement from nature and history.

At the turn of the century, many people who wanted to regain their
homeland and its history turned against this one-sided movement. The
revival of tradition, folk song and folklore of the past, originated
with the youth movement of that time. The works of art, for instance, by
Professor Schultze-Naumburg and by some poets were a characteristic
protest against this one-sided movement of the time, and it is here that
National Socialism attempted to gain a foothold—in full consciousness
though, that it was a modern movement and not a movement of
retrospective sentimentality. It linked itself with the social movement
of Stöcker and the national movement of Schönerer in Austria without
using them in their entirety as a model.

I should like to add that the name “National Socialism,” I believe,
originated in the Sudetenland, and the small German Labor Party was
founded under the name of “National Socialist German Labor Party.”

If I may say so, what finally animated us in essence and the reason for
our calling ourselves National Socialists—for, you see, many terrible
things have been delivered during these 3 months by the Prosecution, but
nothing has been said about National Socialism—we were, at the time,
aware of the fact that there were two hostile camps in Germany, that in
both camps millions of decent Germans were fighting; and we found
ourselves facing the problem of what could be acceptable to both these
camps from the viewpoint of national unity and what was preventing an
understanding between these two camps. In short, at that time as well as
later we explained to the proletarian side, that even if the
class-conflict had been and still was a factor in social and political
life, nevertheless, as an ideological basis and permanent maxim it would
mean eternal disunity of the nation. The direction of a movement for
social appeasement or any kind of social conflict by an international
center was the second decisive obstacle to social reconciliation. The
call for social justice, raised generally by labor, was, however,
justified, worthy, and necessary. Concerning the bourgeoisie, we
believed we would be able to establish that in some cases the
reactionary caste prejudice of privileged circles had worked to the
detriment of the people and secondly that the representation of national
interests should not be based on privileges of certain classes; on the
contrary, the demand for national unity and dignified representation was
the right attitude on their part. From this resulted the ideas which
Hitler...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, would you try to confine the witness to the
charges which are against him? The charges against the defendants are
not that they attempted to reconstruct Germany, but that they used this
form of reconstruction with a view to attacking outside—races and
nations outside.

DR. THOMA: But, in my opinion, we have to devote some time to
Rosenberg’s train of thought to determine the motives for his actions;
but I will now ask him this:

Did you realize that these questions of socialism and the questions of
labor and capital were in truth international questions? And why did you
fight against democracy as a matter of international struggle?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I think this is a continuation of this same
line of examination, and I should like to say that no one in the
Prosecution has made any charge against this defendant for what he has
thought. I think we are all, as a matter of principle, opposed to
prosecuting any man for what he thinks. And I say with great respect
that I feel very confident that is the attitude of this Tribunal.
Therefore, we think it is entirely unnecessary to spell out whatever
thoughts this defendant had on these subjects, or on any other, for that
matter.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the defendant is also accused of fighting
democracy; and that is why I believe I should put this question to him.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the question?

DR. THOMA: Why he was fighting democracy—why National Socialism and he
himself fought against democracy.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that has got anything to do with this
case. The only question is whether he used National Socialism for the
purpose of conducting international offensives.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, National Socialism as a concept must be
dissected into its constituent parts. Since the Prosecution maintains
that National Socialism was a fight against democracy, a one-sided
stress on nationalism and militarism, he ought now to have the
opportunity to say why National Socialism supported militarism, and
whether that was actually the case. National Socialism must be analyzed
as a concept in order to determine its constituent parts.

THE PRESIDENT: What National Socialism was has already been shown to the
Tribunal, and he is not disputing the fact that there was a Führer
principle introduced into Germany. There is no question about that, why
it was introduced. If it was introduced for solely internal purposes
there would be no charge in respect of that. The only charges are that
National Socialism was used for the purpose of making aggressive war and
perpetrating the other crimes which we have heard of.

DR. THOMA: To my knowledge, the charge of waging a war of aggression was
preferred because it was a war against democracy based on nationalism
and militarism.

THE PRESIDENT: Democracy outside Germany, not in Germany.

DR. THOMA: Then I should like to ask the defendant how he will answer
the charge that National Socialism preached a master race.

ROSENBERG: I know that this problem is the main point of the Indictment,
and I realize that at present, in view of the number of terrible
incidents, conclusions are automatically drawn about the past and the
reason for the origin of the so-called racial science. I believe,
however, that it is of decisive importance in judging this problem to
know exactly what we were concerned with.

I have never heard the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) as often as in
this court room. To my knowledge, I did not mention or use it at all in
my writings. I leafed through my _Writings and Speeches_ again and did
not find this word. I spoke only once of super humans as mentioned by
Homer, and I found a quotation from a British author, who in writing
about the life of Lord Kitchener said the Englishman who had conquered
the world had proved himself as a creative superman (Herrenmensch). Then
I found the word “master race” (“Herrenrasse”) in a writing of the
American ethnologist, Madison Grant, and of the French ethnologist,
Lapouge.

I would like to admit, however—and not only to admit, but to
emphasize—that the word “superman” (Herrenmensch) came to my attention
particularly during my activity as Minister in the East—and very
unpleasantly—when used by a number of leaders of the administration in
the East. Perhaps when we come to the question of the East, I may return
to this subject in detail and state what position I took in regard to
these utterances which came to my attention. In principle, however, I
was convinced that ethnology was, after all, not an invention of the
National Socialist movement, but a biological discovery, which was the
conclusion of 400 years of European research. The laws of heredity
discovered in the 1860’s, and rediscovered several decades later, enable
us to gain a deeper insight into history than many other earlier
theories. Accordingly, race...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the defendant is going back now into the
origins of the views which he held. Surely, all we have got to consider
here is his statement in speeches and in documents and the use to which
he put those statements, not as to whether they were 400 years old, or
anything of that sort.

DR. THOMA: The defendant just spoke about the racial problem and I will
take the opportunity to speak on the so-called Jewish problem as the
starting point of this question. I would like to ask the defendant the
following question: How was it...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, already my colleague, Mr. Dodd, pointed out
that the Prosecution has submitted to the defendant an accusation
stating in concrete terms his crimes: aggressive wars and atrocities. I
suppose that the most correct way of carrying on the interrogation of
his client on the part of Dr. Thoma would be to ask him questions
directly connected with the charges of the Prosecution. I do not suppose
that the Tribunal intend to listen to a lecture on the racial theories,
National Socialism, or other theories.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I shall deal with the individual questions
later; but, since the ideology and the philosophy of the Nazis has been
called criminal here, I think the Defendant Rosenberg should be given
some opportunity to state his views.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Of course, it would be better, and perhaps
more appropriate, Herr Rosenberg, if you were a little more brief in
some respects.

Now I would like to ask the following question: You believed that the
so-called Jewish problem in Europe could be solved if the last Jew left
the European continent. At that time you stated it was immaterial
whether such a program was realized in 5, 10, or 20 years. It was, after
all, merely a matter of transport facilities, and, at the time, you
thought it advisable to put this question before an international
committee. How and why did you arrive at this opinion? I mean to say,
how, in your opinion, would the departure of the last Jew from Europe
solve the problem?

ROSENBERG: In order to comply with the wish of the Tribunal, I do not
want to give a lengthy exposition of my views as evolved from my study
of history—I do not at all mean the study of anti-Semitic writings but
of Jewish historians themselves.

It seemed to me that after an epoch of generous emancipation in the
course of national movements of the 19th Century, an important part of
the Jewish nation also found its way back to its own tradition and
nature, and more and more consciously segregated itself from other
nations. It was a problem which was discussed at many international
congresses, and Buber in particular, one of the spiritual leaders of
European Jewry, declared that the Jews should return to the soil of
Asia, for only there could the roots of Jewish blood and Jewish national
character be found.

But my more radical attitude in the political sphere was due partly to
my observations and experiences in Russia and partly to my experiences
later in Germany, which seemed to particularly confirm their
strangeness. I could not conceive how, at the time when the German
soldiers returned, they were greeted by a Jewish university professor
who explained that the German soldiers had died on the field of
dishonor. I could not understand that lack of reverence could go so far.
If it had been but an individual reaction, one could have said that the
man had slipped. But in the course of 14 years, it became apparent that
it was indeed the expression of a definitely alienating tendency.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I believe we should also discuss the fact
that opposition was partly due to the contradiction provoked by certain
National Socialist newspaper articles.

ROSENBERG: The statements of the opposite side, as they appeared
constantly during these 14 years, had in part already appeared prior to
the rise of the National Socialist movement. After all, the incidents of
the Räte Republic in Munich and in Hungary took place long before the
National Socialist movement was in a position to gain influence.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, what did you have to say to the fact that in
the first World War 12,000 Jewish soldiers died at the front?

ROSENBERG: Of course, I have always been conscious of the fact that many
Jewish-German citizens were assimilated into the German environment, and
that in the course of this development many tragic individual cases
appeared, and that these, of course, deserved consideration. On the
whole, however, this did not involve the entire social and political
movement, especially since the leading papers of the so-called
democratic parties recognized the increase of unemployment in Germany
and suggested that Germans should emigrate to the French colonies, to
the Argentine, and to China. Prominent Jewish people and the chairman of
the Democratic Party suggested three times quite openly that, in view of
the increase of unemployment, Germans should be deported to Africa and
Asia. After all, during those 14 years just as many Germans were
expelled from Poland as there were Jews in Germany, and the League of
Nations took no effective steps against this violation of the pact in
favor of the minorities.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the leader of the foreign policy
office of the Party. What was your function?

ROSENBERG: The Foreign Policy Office was founded in April 1933. After
its accession to power, many foreigners came to Germany in order to
obtain information about the origin and nature of the National Socialist
Party. In order to create an information center for the Party, the
Führer assigned me to direct this office. As I said, it was the task of
this office to receive foreigners who were interested in these problems,
to give them information, to refer them to the proper organizations of
the Party and the State, if they were interested in the labor front, the
youth problem, the winter aid work, and so forth. We were also
interested in working provisionally on certain initial suggestions made
to us in the field of foreign trade and, if they deserved support, in
transmitting them to those departments of the government particularly
concerned.

Furthermore, we studied the foreign press in order to have good archives
for future research work and to inform the Party leadership politically
by short excerpts from the foreign press. Among other things, I am
accused here of having written articles for the Hearst press. On
invitation by the Hearst combine, I wrote five or six articles in 1933
or 1934; but, after I had met Hearst once for about 20 minutes at
Nauheim, I did not see him or speak to him again. I heard only that the
Hearst combine did get into extraordinary difficulties because of the
favor shown me by publishing my impartial statements.

DR. THOMA: As the chief of the Foreign Policy Office did you at times
take official political steps?

ROSENBERG: In the documents presented here, Document Numbers 003-PS,
004-PS, and 007-PS, the activity of the Foreign Policy Office had been
discussed and submitted; and in regard to this activity I could give a
brief summary to the Tribunal and read from the documents.

DR. THOMA: But I would like you to tell us what steps you took as the
chief of the Foreign Policy Office to reach a positive agreement among
the European nations.

ROSENBERG: Adolf Hitler called a meeting at Bamberg, I believe in 1927,
at which he stated his foreign political conviction that at least some
nations could have no direct interest in the total extinction of central
Europe. By “some nations” he meant particularly England and Italy. After
that in wholehearted agreement with him, I tried to find a way to an
understanding by personal contacts I had made. Frequently, I had
conversations with British Air Force officers of the British Air Forces
General Staff. On their invitation I visited London in 1931, and at that
time had purely informal conversations with a number of British
personalities.

And when, in 1932, at a meeting of the Royal Academy of Rome, the topic
“Europe” was discussed, I was offered an opportunity to speak, and I
made a speech about this problem in which I explained that the
development of the last centuries had been determined mainly by four
nations and states—namely, England, France, Germany, and Italy. I
pointed out that, first of all, these four should define their vital
interests so that shoulder to shoulder they would defend the ancient and
venerable continent of Europe and its traditions. I believed that these
fourfold national roots of the rich European culture represented a
historical and political legacy. Excerpts of my speech were published,
and parts of it with approval have been translated for the Tribunal.

On the last day of the conference, the former British Ambassador to
Italy, Sir Rennell Rodd, came to me and told me that he had just left
Mussolini who had told him that I, Rosenberg, had spoken the most
important words of the conference.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, may I ask you, please, to be a little more
brief.

ROSENBERG: In May 1933 I was again in London, this time by Hitler’s
personal order; and I visited a number of British ministers, whose names
are not relevant here, and tried again to promote understanding for the
sudden and strange development in Germany. My reception was rather
reserved, and a number of incidents occurred which showed that the
sentiment was very repellent. But that did not prevent me from keeping
up these personal contacts and from inviting a great number of British
personalities to come to Germany later. It was not within the scope of
my assignment to do that.

THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you ask the defendant what the agreement[A] was
to be about? Why doesn’t he tell us what the agreement was to be about
instead of going on talking about an agreement in the abstract?

-----

[A] The President’s question is in response to the foregoing answer of
the Defendant Rosenberg, in which the interpreter said “to bring about
an agreement” instead of “to promote understanding”.

-----

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I asked the defendant that question because he
took steps to come to a positive understanding with England and worked
toward that goal. The defendant is accused...

THE PRESIDENT: But what was the understanding about?

DR. THOMA: We were concerned with the fact that the defendant went to
London in order to...

THE PRESIDENT: I want you to ask the defendant. I don’t want you to tell
me.

DR. THOMA: I have just asked him, Mr. President.

The defendant is accused of having participated in the Norwegian action,
in that he advocated the violation of Norwegian neutrality.

[_Turning to the witness._] Please answer the question. How did you meet
Quisling?

ROSENBERG: I met Quisling in the year 1933, when he visited me, and I
had a discussion of 20 minutes’ duration with him. Subsequently, an
assistant of mine, who was interested in Scandinavian culture and had
written books about it, corresponded with Quisling. It was all of 6
years before I saw Quisling again, and I did not intervene either in the
Norwegian political situation or in the Quisling movement until he
visited me in June of 1939, when the tension in Europe had increased,
and expressed his apprehensions about the situation in Norway in the
event of a conflict. He said it was to be feared that Norway would not
be able to remain neutral in such a case, and that his home country
might be occupied in the North by Soviet troops and in the South by the
troops of the Western powers, and that he viewed things with great
concern. My staff leader made a note of his apprehensions and then
reported them to Dr. Lammers, as it was his duty to do.

DR. THOMA: When was that?

ROSENBERG: That must have been in June 1939. Thereupon Quisling asked
one of my assistants to help to maintain German-Norwegian understanding
and especially to acquaint his Party with the organization and
propaganda of our Party movement.

Thereupon, in the beginning of August there were, I believe, 25
Norwegians in our training school in order to train for this propaganda
work and then to return home.

DR. THOMA: What were they trained in, and how?

ROSENBERG: I did not see them, nor did I speak to them individually.
They were taught how to carry on more effective propaganda, and how the
organization of the Party in this field had been built up in Germany. We
promised to assist them in this field.

Suddenly, after the outbreak of the war, or shortly before—I do not
remember exactly—Hagelin, an acquaintance of Quisling’s, came to me
with apprehensions similar to those expressed by Quisling. After the
outbreak of the war, this assistant of Quisling’s reported various
details about the activity of the Western Powers in Norway. Finally, in
December of 1939, Quisling came to Berlin with the declaration that, on
the basis of exact information, he knew that the Norwegian Government
was only seemingly neutral now, and that in reality it was practically
agreed that Norway should give up her neutrality. Quisling himself had
formerly been a Minister of War in Norway and therefore, he should have
had exact knowledge of these things.

In accordance with my duty as a German citizen, I recommended that the
Führer should hear Quisling. The Führer thereupon received Quisling
twice, and at the same time Quisling, with his assistant, Hagelin,
visited Navy headquarters and gave them identical information. I spoke
once to Raeder after that, and he also recommended to the Führer that he
listen to Quisling’s report.

DR. THOMA: Then you personally transmitted only those reports which
Quisling had given you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I would like to emphasize that although Quisling visited
me, I had not been engaged on this question—I had not been involved in
these political affairs for 6 years. Naturally, I had to consider it my
duty to forward to the Führer reports which, if correct, were a
tremendous military threat to Germany, and also to make notes of, and
report to the Führer, those things which Quisling told me
orally—namely, his plan to bring about a political change in Norway and
then to ask Germany for support. At this time—I do not know, this
development has been described in those documents produced by the
Prosecution in words which express it much more precisely than I could
summarize it here. In Document Number 004-PS, my staff leader made a
short summary of it about 1½ or 2 months after the Norwegian operation.

DR. THOMA: This document—I would like to call the attention of the
Tribunal particularly to this document—was compiled immediately after
the Norwegian operation while the impression of its success was still
fresh, and it describes the measures which were taken quite
unequivocally. It states clearly that Quisling was the instigator, that
he suddenly turned up at Lübeck and made reports, that he begged that
his people be trained further, and that he came back again and again and
always informed Rosenberg about the new developments in Norway.

THE PRESIDENT: What document are you referring to?

DR. THOMA: Document Number 004-PS, Exhibit GB-140. That is in Document
Book 2, Page 113.

THE PRESIDENT: The document book is not numbered or paged?

DR. THOMA: I believe the number is at the bottom, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Which book is it you are referring to?

DR. THOMA: My Document Book Number 2, Page 113. Document Book Alfred
Rosenberg, Page 113, Volume II. It is on Page 72 of the English
translation.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, then, what is your question?

DR. THOMA: I would like to point out that on Page 1 it states, “Before
the meeting of the Nordic Society in Lübeck, Quisling was in Berlin,
where he was received by Rosenberg.”

That was in June 1939, as is shown by the Document Number 007-PS. Then,
on the next page, it says that in August a course was given in
Berlin-Dahlem. It says further that in December of 1939 Quisling
reappeared in Berlin on his own initiative and made his reports—that
was on the 14th and 15th of December—and Rosenberg, in line with his
duty, transmitted to the Führer these reports which Quisling made to
him. He did nothing beyond that in this matter, however. Parallel to
this, and entirely independently of each other, the same reports were
received by Raeder.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you have anything to add to Document
Number 004-PS?

ROSENBERG: Yes. Please let me have the document. [_The document was
submitted to the defendant._] On Page 5 of this Document Number 004-PS,
it is stated that Hagelin, Quisling’s assistant who moved in Norwegian
governmental circles and who had received orders from the Norwegian
Government for the purchase of arms from Germany, after the Altmark
incident, for instance—that is the incident where a German vessel was
fired upon in Norwegian territorial waters—had heard Norwegian deputies
of the Storting say that Norway’s reserved attitude was clearly a
pre-arranged matter. Further, in the middle of Page 7:

    “On 20 March on the occasion of his participation in
    negotiations regarding German deliveries of anti-aircraft
    artillery, he made a detailed report on the unceasing activity
    of the Allies in Norway with the acquiescence of the Nygardsvold
    Government. According to his report, the Allies were already
    inspecting the Norwegian harbor towns for landing and transport
    facilities. The French Commander, Kermarrec who had orders to
    that effect”—incidentally I also remember this name spelled
    Karramac, or something similar—“in a confidential conversation
    with Colonel Sundlo, the Commander of Narvik, who was also a
    follower of Quisling, had informed the Colonel about the
    intention of the Allies to land mechanized troops at Stavanger,
    Trondheim, and perhaps also at Kirkenes, and to occupy Sola
    airport near Stavanger.”

A little further down it says, and I quote:

    “In his report of 26 March he”—that is, Hagelin—“pointed out
    once more that the speech of the Norwegian Foreign Minister
    Koht, dealing with Norwegian neutrality and his protests, was
    not taken seriously either in London by the English or in Norway
    by the Norwegians, since it was well known that the Government
    had no intention of taking a serious stand against England.”

DR. THOMA: That is what Quisling reported to you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, these were the reports which Quisling had instructed
Hagelin to make. I would like to add further that, some time after the
Führer had received Quisling he told me that he had instructed the OKW
to consider this case from the military viewpoint, and he asked me not
to talk about this subject to anybody else. In this connection, I would
like to point out also that—as can be seen from the report Document
Number 004-PS—the Führer had emphasized that he wanted the entire
Scandinavian North to maintain neutrality at all costs, and would change
his attitude only if the neutrality was threatened by other powers.

Later, an assistant of mine was ordered by the Führer to keep up
connections with Quisling at Oslo, and he received a certain sum from
the Foreign Office to support propaganda friendly to Germany to
counteract other propaganda. He also returned to Germany with reports
about the opinions of Quisling. Later I heard—and this was entirely
understandable—that this assistant, who was a soldier at that time, had
also received military intelligence reports which he disclosed after the
Norwegian operation.

DR. THOMA: Please be more brief, Mr. Rosenberg.

ROSENBERG: The Führer did not inform me of his final decision, or
whether he had actually decided to carry through the operation. I
learned of the entire operation of 9 November through the newspaper and
thereupon paid a visit to the Führer on that day. Several weeks later,
the Führer summoned me and said that he had been forced to make this
decision on the basis of concrete warnings which he had received, and
documents which have been found gave proof that these warnings had been
correct. He said it had been true to the letter that when the last
German ships arrived in the fjord of Trondheim, I believe, they had
already been engaged by the first of the approaching British vessels.

DR. THOMA: In this connection I have just one more question: Did Hitler
ever call on you to attend a foreign political or military conference in
your capacity as chief of the foreign policy office?

ROSENBERG: The Führer differentiated strictly between the official
foreign policy and the policy followed on account of an initiative or
suggestion which was urged upon me from outside. I believe all the
documents show that he never asked me to participate in any conference
concerning foreign policy or military preparations.

DR. THOMA: That is, you were never called upon to participate in the
operations against Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, _et cetera_?

I believe, Mr. President, that this is a suitable time to adjourn.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 16 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND NINTH DAY
                         Tuesday, 16 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were the official appointed by the Führer
for the supervision of the entire intellectual and ideological training
of the NSDAP and all its affiliated organizations. Did you exert any
influence on national lawmaking in that capacity?

ROSENBERG: The Führer once spoke to me in this connection and explained
to me that in the leadership of a large movement and of a state three
factors had to be considered. There are, for instance, men who by their
natures feel they must deal with any rising problems fundamentally
through contemplation and then in lectures; then there is the
directorate—that is to say, he, himself—who must select that which
shows possibilities of realization; and finally, there are those people
who have the task of putting the selected problems into practice in the
social, political, and economic fields by dint of painstaking labor.

So it was that he originally conceived of my task, and he entrusted me
with the supervision of training with the intention of expecting me to
adopt a constructive attitude, by reason of my knowledge of the
movement. The executive and legislative powers were in the hands of the
respective ministries—that is, the Ministry for Education and the Reich
Propaganda Ministry—and the general representation of the Party was in
the hands of the Party Chancellery. The Party Chancellery occasionally
asked me to define my position with regard to this or that question but
was not obliged to consider my views.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, did you have any influence on National
Socialist school policies?

ROSENBERG: I did not have any direct influence on school policies. The
school systems were an affair of the Reich Ministry for Education—the
actual internal organization of the schools is not to be confused with
the Party training—and the organization of the universities, the task
of the ministry concerned with this problem.

DR. THOMA: There were National Socialist educational institutions. Can
you tell me what kind of institutions these were and what your function
was in that connection?

ROSENBERG: The so-called National Socialist educational institutions
were special foundations under the leadership and direction of the
Ministry for Education and the Reichsführer SS Himmler, for the purpose
of training a distinct disciplined class; and the inspection of these
educational institutions was in the hands of a special SS leader
detailed to the Ministry for Education.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you are also accused of religious
persecution, especially as it finds expression in your _Myth of the 20th
Century_. Do you admit that occasionally you were a little too severe
toward the church?

ROSENBERG: Of course I will allow that as far as historically founded
creeds were concerned I pronounced severe personal judgment. I would
like to emphasize, in this connection, that in the introduction to my
book I described it as a work dealing with personal opinions; secondly,
that this book was not directed against the religious elements in the
public, as is shown in the quotation on Page 125 of the document book,
Part I; and thirdly, that I rejected a policy of withdrawal from the
church, as can be seen in the document book, Part I, Page 122, and also
rejected political interference by the state in purely religious
confessions which is also expressed clearly in this book. I further
rejected many proposals to have my book translated into foreign
languages. Only once a Japanese translation was submitted to me,
although I was not able to recall having given my approval for the
translation.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you were not trained in theological matters.
Don’t you believe that in some judgments on theological questions you
were wrong?

ROSENBERG: I naturally never assumed that this book, which deals with
many problems, does not contain errors. I was, to an extent, grateful to
receive criticism, and I made certain corrections; but some attacks I
could not consider justified, and I thought that later I would certainly
thoroughly revise this work—which, of course, also contained political
comments.

DR. THOMA: Did you at any time use State Police measures against your
opponents in theology and science?

ROSENBERG: No. I would like to state here that this work was published
2½ years before the assumption of power, and that it was naturally open
to criticism from all sides, but that the main criticism arose after the
assumption of power. I answered these attacks in two pamphlets, but I
never made use of the Police to suppress these attacks or persecute the
authors of these attacks.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, in the RSHA there was an office for the
persecution of “political” churches. Did you have any connection with
this department?

ROSENBERG: I know only that a co-worker of mine was in contact with many
Party offices as a matter of policy and, of course, was also in touch
with the SS. Through him I received many circular letters from the
church authorities: pastoral letters, the circular letters of the Fulda
Conference of Bishops, and many others. No arrests of individual church
leaders came to my attention—although, of course, later on I did find
out that during the war many monasteries had been confiscated,
ostensibly for state political reasons—and so I never was able to find
out in detail the political motives involved.

I must mention that in the year 1935 a bishop sent an official letter to
the administrative head of his province, asking him to prohibit me from
delivering speeches in that city. That, to be sure, was of no avail;
this church dignitary was not harmed either by me or by anybody else,
however.

DR. THOMA: What was your attitude toward the churches coming within the
range of the Ministry for Eastern Territories?

ROSENBERG: After the entry of German troops in the eastern territories,
the Wehrmacht of its own accord granted the practice of religious
worship; and when I was made Minister for the East, I legally sanctioned
this practice by issuing a special “church tolerance” edict at the end
of December 1941.

DR. THOMA: The Prosecution have presented a number of documents—almost
all of them letters by the Leader of the Party Chancellery—to support
their contention of religious persecution. I would like to have you
state your attitude toward these documents, which have been submitted
under Numbers 107, 116, 122, 129, 101; USA-107, USA-351; 116, USA-685...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you are going too fast for us to get these
numbers down. 107-PS, do you mean?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you kindly say PS if you mean PS? 107-PS, 116-PS.

DR. THOMA: Yes, I will add the USA exhibit numbers. 107-PS, 351-USA...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would rather have the PS number. If you will give
me the PS numbers, or whatever the numbers are, as part of the exhibit
number: 107-PS, 116-PS...

DR. THOMA: Yes, Documents 116-PS, 122-PS, 129-PS, 101-PS, 100-PS,
089-PS, 064-PS, 098-PS, 072-PS, 070-PS.

ROSENBERG: The Document Number 107-PS was submitted by the Prosecution
as proof of persecution of the churches. This was a circular letter sent
out by the Party Chancellery and written by the Chief of the Reich Labor
Service. In this circular, on Page 1, it is decreed that denominational
discussions were to be prohibited within the Reich Labor Service. I
believe that was done so that particularly in the Reich Labor Service,
where young people of all classes and backgrounds were taken in,
denominational and religious discussions would be avoided.

On Page 2 it says:

    “Just as it is of no concern to the Reichsarbeitsdienst to
    forbid its individual members to have a church wedding or
    funeral, so the Reichsarbeitsdienst must by all means avoid
    taking part, as an organization, in church ceremonies which
    exclude Germans of other beliefs.”

I considered this decree as the strictest adherence to religious
freedom: for it meant that members of the Protestant faith could not be
forced to attend Catholic services and vice versa; furthermore, that
persons who perhaps did not belong to any religious denomination could
not, on order of their organization, be forced to attend the services of
one denomination or the other. Therefore, I cannot see that in this case
we are concerned with religious persecution.

Document Number 116-PS concerns itself with a letter of the Leader of
the Reich Chancellery sent to the Reich Minister for Science and
Education and is dated 24 January 1939. This document was submitted to
me for my information—I emphasize, “for my information.” It refers to
correspondence between the Party Chancellery and this Ministry regarding
the limitation of theological faculties, in which it is emphasized that
the terms of concordats and church agreements would have to be taken
into consideration; secondly, that it was necessary methodically to
reorganize the entire higher educational system by amalgamation and
simplification; and finally, it states that newly created fields of
research, such as racial research and archeology, were also to be taken
into consideration.

I could not see why, after 6 years of National Socialist revolution, new
fields of specialization in scientific research should not find due
consideration within the budget. I personally was interested in seeing
that the subjects of agrarian sociology and the early history of Germany
received proper consideration, specifically in regard to Germanic
intellectual and spiritual history.

The same applies to Document Number 122-PS, also dated April 1939, into
which I do not need to go in detail. It sets forth similar views by the
Minister for Science, Education, and Popular Culture, stating how many
theological faculties he deemed necessary to be retained.

Document 129-PS is a letter of the Reich Minister for Churches to a
well-known German author, Dr. Stapel, who was especially interested in
religious reform. In this letter, the Reich Church Minister expresses
the view that a common religious denomination should be especially
promoted which would affirm the National Socialist State in particular
and, at the same time, could enjoy and rely upon the support of the
Reich Church Minister.

In the preliminary interrogation, a letter of mine was submitted to me,
written to the Party Chancellery, relative to this matter, in which I
declared myself against the calling of such a church congress by the
Reich Church Minister on the principal ground that a National Socialist
Minister of Churches did not have the function of joining a religious
denomination of which he was the direct head, even if undeclared or only
in appearance. It is exactly the same viewpoint which has provided the
basis for many a reproach against me. If, in addition to publicizing my
personal opinion, I had had the intention of providing or leading a
religious group, then I would have had to give up all my functions,
offices, and activities in the Party. That followed from a point of view
of principle which I held. The Minister of Churches, as a National
Socialist Minister, was, in my opinion, obliged not to promote a
religion to which he was sympathetic, but to be independent of all
religious denominations.

Document 101-PS is a letter from the Chief of the Party Chancellery—at
that time still Chief of Staff of the Deputy of the Führer—in which the
protest is made that many confessional writings tended to impair the
resistance of the troops; and he suggested that it would be better to
have my office issue such publications. An answer by me has not been
presented here—has not been shown to me. My opinion has always been
that, being in a Party office, it was not for me to write religious
tracts, but that, of course, it could be left to every person as an
individual—if one had something pertinent to say, to put it in writing,
as others did.

Document 100-PS is a reproach from the former Chief of Staff of the
Deputy of the Führer, Bormann, that I had stated in the presence of the
Führer that the Protestant Reich Bishop, Müller, had written a very good
book for the German soldiers. Reichsleiter Bormann said that this book
by Müller did not appear suitable to him, because, after all, it was
masked confessional propaganda. I do not believe that the reproach
directed at me for unhesitatingly approving Reich Bishop Müller’s
expression of opinion given in a proper way—and naturally in keeping
with his way of thinking—can be portrayed as religious persecution.

Document 089-PS is a letter by Bormann, which he sent to me for my
information, in which he told me that he had proposed to Reichsleiter
Amann that, because of the general scarcity of paper, religious
writings, which had decreased by only 10 percent, should be further
curtailed. I did not know to what extent the curtailment of all
periodicals was undertaken at that time. I can only state that in the
course of the war even the seven periodicals about art, music, folklore,
German dramaturgy, _et cetera_, which were published by my office, were
constantly curtailed and abbreviated along with the rest of the
periodicals in the German Reich.

Document 064-PS is a letter of the head of the Party Chancellery, in
which I am informed of the letter of a Gauleiter referring to a pamphlet
by General Von Rabenau entitled, _The Spirit and Soul of the Soldier_.
This Gauleiter criticized the very denominationally bound viewpoint of
General Von Rabenau, and he protested against the fact that this tract
appeared in a series of pamphlets published by the Party. In that
connection I would like to say that this tract by General Von Rabenau
appeared in a series published by my Party office, and that I read this
pamphlet personally beforehand and gave him the opportunity to voice his
opinion in this series which contained many political tracts of a
general historical nature. I did not withdraw this pamphlet.

Document 098-PS contains a new reproach against me by the Chief of the
Party Chancellery. He said that Reich Bishop Müller claimed that he had
had directives from me to work out basic principles for the organization
of religious instruction in the schools.

Bormann set forth at great length that it was not the task of the Party
to engage in reform measures with respect to religious instruction in
schools. To this I would like to say the following. I could not give any
instructions at all to Reich Bishop Müller on this topic. Nevertheless,
the Reich Bishop visited me on two occasions, and on one occasion he
told me, virtually with tears in his eyes, that he got no proper
response to his work. I told him, “Your Excellency, as a military
pastor, you are simply not well enough known to the public. It would be
quite apropos if you would write a detailed work setting forth your
views and your objectives, so that the various groups of the Evangelical
Church might get to know your ideas, and in that way you can make your
influence felt in the manner you wish.” The Reich Bishop may well have
spoken about this, and probably made a few additional remarks. I do not
believe that the accusation made here by Bormann can be construed as
persecution of the churches either.

Document 075-PS is a special circular letter by the Chief of the Party
Chancellery, setting forth his personal views on the relationship of
National Socialism to Christendom. As well as I remember, this document
deals with the following: I had once heard that Bormann had sent a
letter of such contents to a certain Gauleiter and also copies of it to
all the Gauleiter. I asked him to let me know about it. After much delay
I finally received this circular letter. As a Party circular, I
considered it improper in form and substance. I wrote Bormann—and I
believe the letter I sent to him should be found in my records—that I
did not consider a circular letter of that sort suitable or proper and I
added, in my own handwriting so that it would be taken more seriously,
that in my opinion the Führer would not approve a circular letter of
this sort. Later I spoke with Bormann about this personally and told him
that each one of us had the right to define his position towards this
problem, but official Party circulars—and especially in this form—were
impossible in my opinion. After this conversation, Bormann was greatly
embarrassed, and—as I incidentally heard from my Codefendant
Schirach—this circular letter, according to him, was rescinded and
declared null and void. I can make no statement about this, however.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to call attention to the fact
that I gave the Document Number 075-PS to this document, but it should
actually be Document D-75.

ROSENBERG: Document 072-PS is a letter from Bormann with reference to
the matter of investigating the libraries of monasteries confiscated by
the State. I was not told the political reasons involved in each case;
but I did hear that the police were demanding the additional right to
take over the investigation of this sort of thing. This was a problem
which brought me into conflict with Himmler in those years. I considered
it completely impossible that such investigation was to be brought under
police control as well, and that motivated me, as can be seen from
Document 071-PS, to place myself in opposition to Bormann in this
matter.

This Document 072-PS gives Bormann’s answer to me, in which he points
out that Heydrich insisted absolutely on continuing this research and
said—I quote: “The scientific refutation of antagonistic philosophy can
only be carried out after preliminary police and political preparation.”
I considered this attitude absolutely untenable, and I protested against
it.

These are the pertinent comments which I have to make on these numerous
documents. I refused to write official Party tracts of religious
semblance or to have catechisms written by my Party offices. I always
strove to take what I considered to be a National Socialist attitude in
not considering my office a “spiritual” police force; but the fact
remained that the Führer had charged Bormann with the official
representation of the Party’s attitude toward the church.

My answer to all of these letters is missing, and I do not recall
whether I replied to everything, or whether I gave these answers orally
to Bormann at conferences. But despite the fact that all of these
answers are lacking, the Prosecution have stated that both of us, that
is Bormann and I, had issued decrees for religious persecution and had
misled other Germans into participating in these religious persecutions.

I would like to summarize and state on principle that this is ultimately
a thousand-year-old problem of the relationship between secular and
church power, and that many states have taken measures against which the
churches have always protested. When in modern times we look at the laws
of the French Republic under the ministry of Combes, and when we look at
the legal system of the Soviet Union, we see that both have supported
the officially promoted atheist propaganda in tracts, newspapers, and
caricatures.

Lastly, I would like to say that in all cases the National Socialist
State, so far as I know, gave to the churches more than 700 million
marks annually out of the tax receipts for the maintenance of their
organizational work, and that up to the end.

DR. THOMA: Witness, the chief of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, in the
course of time, met you in still keener opposition. Was the reason for
the, one may well say, enmity between you and Bormann the fact that in
church matters you were considerably more tolerant than Bormann,
himself?

ROSENBERG: It is difficult to say just which reasons played a role here.
That this hostility was as deep as it finally revealed itself to be,
specifically when dealing with Eastern problems, I realized only later,
much later. Ultimately I had to admit, of course, that in a large
movement many temperaments and many views may exist, and I did not
except myself from having shortcomings and faults which could be
criticized by others. I did not believe that differences and opinions
could lead to a hostility of such proportions that it would result in
undermining the official position of the opponent.

DR. THOMA: Were religious services in the Third Reich, regular Sunday
services, and so forth limited in any way?

ROSENBERG: I cannot tell you that at the moment. As far as I know,
religious services were never forbidden in the whole of Germany up to
the end.

DR. THOMA: Now I come to the Einsatzstab. I give you Document 101-PS,
(Exhibit USA-385) in which the essential matters are summarized, and I
refer you to the document book of the French Prosecution, Document
Number FA-1, in particular. How did the establishment of Einsatzstab
Rosenberg come about?

ROSENBERG: The Prosecution contends that it is a matter of a
premeditated plan for the plundering of the cultural treasures of other
states. In reality, the following was true: We were dealing with an
unforeseen situation. A colleague of mine had accompanied a press
delegation when the German troops marched into Paris and noticed that
the Parisians were returning almost completely with the exception of the
Jewish population, so that all organizations and institutions in that
category of ownership were left behind empty, as well as the residences
and mansions of these leading personalities, so to say, ownerless. He
suggested that research into property, archives, and correspondence
should be made. I reported the matter to the Führer and asked whether he
approved of the carrying out of this suggestion.

This letter of mine to the Führer was submitted to me in the preliminary
interrogation but was not submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution.
Thus, even though the documentary proof of the reason for this entire
transaction is at hand, the Prosecution have still maintained the charge
of a premeditated plan.

The order of the Führer was issued at the beginning of July 1940, and
since a large number of art objects, in addition to the archives, was
found in a dangerous position in many mansions, the safekeeping and the
transporting of these objects of art into the German Reich was decreed
by the Führer.

DR. THOMA: Did you know anything as to what legal reasons Hitler is
believed to have had for these measures?

ROSENBERG: Yes, and I would admit...

THE PRESIDENT: Just one minute. I don’t understand what you are saying.
Are you saying that you made a suggestion to the Führer, and that there
is proof of your letter making that suggestion, and that the Prosecution
are concealing that proof? Is that what you are saying? Will you answer
that question? Are you suggesting that they are concealing a proof of
the suggestion which you made the Führer for this scheme of taking away
Jewish property from France?

ROSENBERG: No, I do not wish to say conceal, but only to say that it was
not submitted, even though it was shown to me in a preliminary hearing.

DR. THOMA: May I add a few details, Mr. President. I would like to point
out that I repeatedly pointed out in my petitions that this letter must
be available, since it was submitted to the Defendant Rosenberg in the
preliminary hearings.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you made any application for the document to be
produced?

DR. THOMA: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: When?

DR. THOMA: I repeatedly called attention to this document—to the
submission of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal are quite unaware of having turned
down any such request. Let me see the written request.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It probably is not a matter of very great importance. I
only wanted to know what the witness was talking about.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I will send for my files.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on in the meantime.

ROSENBERG: Of course, it was clear that we were concerned with an
unusual problem, and for that very reason I did not talk with the
military administration but went directly to the Führer, so that I could
get his opinion. But I believe the fact in itself can be understood,
that we were interested in going into historical research regarding the
extent to which, in the course of recent years or decades, various
organizations had taken part in the activity which is here under
discussion as destructive of peace; secondly, how many prominent persons
individually took part in it; and thirdly, I remembered that many works
of art, which in past times had been taken from Germany had not been
returned to Germany for many decades, despite the agreement of 1815.

Finally, I thought of a measure which in 1914 to 1918 had been
recognized by the Allies as being in agreement with the Hague
Convention. At that period German citizens of a certain category—they
were the racial Germans abroad, in foreign countries, also in occupied
German territory—that is, in the colonies—had their property
confiscated and later taken from them without compensation to the extent
of a value of 25 billion Reichsmark. In the peace dictate of Versailles,
Germany was in addition obliged to post security for these dispossessed
Germans and to set up a special fund.

The Chief French Prosecutor declared at this Trial that the Versailles
Treaty was based on the Hague Convention. Therefore, I drew the
conclusion that this measure against a very distinct category of
citizens in the midst of unforeseen military measures, with all due
respect for private and public property otherwise, appeared justified.

During the preliminary hearing, I was also asked about the legal
hypotheses and had started to point them out, but I was interrupted with
the remark that we were not concerned with that problem at the time. The
record of this interrogation which the French Prosecution presented here
contains the remark that I am supposed to have said...

THE PRESIDENT: We are not concerned with the interrogations until the
interrogations are put in evidence. These interrogations have not been
put in evidence yet. You can give your explanations of them if they are
put to you in cross-examination.

ROSENBERG: Mr. President, this document is mentioned here in the
document book, and the German translation may be found, although not
exactly verbatim, in the French files.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, the defendant only wishes to say that from the
beginning he pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles, Article 279, was
authoritative, that he did not invent that later on.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, all I was pointing out to him was that the
various interrogations which have taken place very likely are not in
evidence. Of course, if he is referring to interrogations which have
been put in evidence—but is he?

DR. THOMA: Yes. This is FA-16 (Document Number L-188). That was
submitted, Mr. President.

ROSENBERG: That is what I was speaking of. That was submitted. But this
interrogation was...

THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. If he is referring to an interrogation
which has been put in evidence, it must have an exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: This interrogation is in the document book, and it is known
as Document Number FA-16.

THE PRESIDENT: If he is referring to an exhibit, no doubt he can do it.

ROSENBERG: I would like only to rectify somewhat an error in the
translation. I did not say, “Yes, it is true; I remember that this
measure was taken;” but I said, “I thought it,” that is to say, I had
thought it earlier, not at the moment when I was asked. I saw this only
when I received the translation, which I had not seen prior to that
time.

As far as Document 1015-PS is concerned, in order not to delay the Court
too long, I would like to point to just a few items—namely, that in the
work report of 1940-44, on Page 2, it was stated that the origin was
determined beyond question, and on Page 3 we see that the taking of
inventories was done in a conscientious manner on the basis of a
scientific catalog, that a workshop for the restoration was set up in
order to ensure their arriving at their destination in good condition.

Finally, I would like to add a few words because they seem important to
me in view of the charges of the Soviet Prosecution relative to the
treatment of cultural treasures by the Einsatzstab in the former
Occupied Eastern Territories. At the end of the work report, there is
stated under the title, “Work in the Eastern regions”—I quote:

    “The activity of Special Einsatzstab ‘Plastic Art’ was limited
    in the Occupied Eastern Territories to scientific and
    photographic recording of public collections, their safeguarding
    and care in collaboration with military and civilian offices. In
    the course of evacuation of the area, several hundred of the
    most valuable Russian icons, several hundred Russian paintings
    of the 18th and 19th centuries, individual pieces of furniture
    and household articles ... were recovered and brought to the
    Reich for safekeeping.”

I only wanted to point out by this that the Einsatzstab in the East did
not transport any Soviet cultural and art treasures to the Reich, but
only brought them to safety—as may be seen from later documents, when
the territories directly menaced by operations were evacuated—first
into the rear areas, then further back and partly into the Reich.

From the same document I would like to point to a letter of 5 July 1942
from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. I refer to
the charge of the Polish Government that the entire removal of works of
art and museum pieces was concentrated in the Einsatzstab or in the
Rosenberg office in Berlin. I will return again to this Polish
accusation. I just want to point to the paragraph in Dr. Lammers’ letter
which says that the Führer had decreed that various libraries of the
Eastern region were to be confiscated; and then there is stated
expressly, “The Government General is not included.”

Furthermore, I refer to the directive of the Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories of 20 August 1941 to Reich Commissioner
Ostler.

DR. THOMA: What page?

ROSENBERG: Page 2 of this document. At the end it says...

THE PRESIDENT: What document are you talking about now? What document
number?

ROSENBERG: I am sorry, but the copy I have is not marked in red, and I
am, therefore, referring to the document in my hands. At any rate, it is
at the end of page 1 of the document. This is no special letter, it is a
circular letter dated 7 April 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: I only want to get this clear. What I took down was that
he was referring to a decree of the 20th of August 1941.

ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon. It is 20 August.

DR, THOMA: 20 August, that is correct, and the year is 1941. It is Page
78 of Document Book 2, at the end of the page.

    ROSENBERG: “I expressly request that you prohibit the removal of
    cultural objects of any kind from your Reichskommissariat, by
    any agencies whatsoever, without your approval. What confiscated
    cultural objects will remain in the Reichskommissariat Ostland
    and what may possibly be utilized for specialized research work
    must come under a later regulation. I request that you inform
    your subordinate general and district commissioners of this
    directive. The national administration of museums, libraries,
    _et cetera_, regardless of the right of inspection and inventory
    by the Einsatzstab, remain unaffected by this directive.”

I shall come back to this directive later when replying to the
accusation by the Soviet Prosecution regarding the administration of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

DR. THOMA: We come now to the furniture operation in France.

ROSENBERG: I am not finished with this matter yet, because exceptionally
serious charges have been preferred in this matter. I refer to a second
directive of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
dated 7 April 1942, in which, at the end, under I, the fundamental
principles I have just read are reiterated. It is in Document Book 2,
Page 94. All are told to refrain entirely from independent action.

Under II, it says verbatim:

    “In special cases, as an exception, immediate steps can be taken
    to secure or remove items to a safe place in order to evade
    threatening dangers—that is, danger of collapse of buildings,
    enemy action, climatic influences, _et cetera_.”

I shall come back to this in connection with the accusation of the
Soviet Government regarding happenings in Minsk. When Document 076-PS
was read, it said at the end that there was never any order given for
the protection of cultural objects. This order has been presented here
twice.

Further, I would like to refer to a directive of 3 October 1941 by the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to the staff leader
of the Einsatzstab in the same document—wherein I again call special
attention to the document which I have just read.

In addition, I call the Tribunal’s attention to an order of the High
Command of the Army of 30 September 1942, which was issued in agreement
with the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Here also
it says literally at the end, under I ...

DR. THOMA: Is that Page 89 of the document book?

THE PRESIDENT: Which is that? September ’42?

ROSENBERG: 30 September 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got that. What about the one of October ’41?
Where is that?

ROSENBERG: October ’41?

THE PRESIDENT: October ’41.

ROSENBERG: That is 3 October 1941.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know where it is, Dr. Thoma?

DR. THOMA: It is contained in Document 1015-PS, Exhibit USA-385, but it
may be that this document is not listed in this particular index. In my
document I cannot locate it at the moment, but it belongs to 1015-PS and
was submitted in its entirety.

ROSENBERG: And the order of the Army High Command of 30 September 1942
says, under I:

    “Except for special cases, in which the safeguarding of
    endangered works of culture is urgent, efforts will be made to
    leave them in their present location for the time being. For
    this purpose, according to reciprocal agreements between the
    Quartermaster General of the General Staff of the Army and the
    Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the latter has been
    granted authority to: c) in order to safeguard against damage or
    destruction in the operational area of the East also such works
    of culture which do not fall under paragraph b—especially
    museum pieces—to protect and/or place them in security.”

At the end of this directive, it says under IV:

    “Independent of the missions of the Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter
    Rosenberg, according to Section I, a, b, c, the troops and all
    military offices located in the operational area are instructed
    now, as before, to preserve valuable art objects if possible and
    to protect them from destruction or damage.”

I believed it my duty to prove, at least very briefly, that my
Einsatzstab, as well as the military offices, issued clear directives
and orders for the protection, even during these bitter battles, of
objects of art of the Russian, Ukrainian, and White Ruthenian people.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, you know that Hitler and Göring diverted some
of the objects of art which were confiscated in France. What part did
you play in this matter?

ROSENBERG: In principle the Führer specified, as can be seen from
information given by the then Field Marshal Keitel, upon order of the
Führer, that he reserved for himself the disposition of these works and
any decision related hereto.

I do not wish to dispute in any way that I had the hope that at least a
large part of these objects of art would remain in Germany, particularly
since, in the course of time, many German cultural works were destroyed
by particularly severe bombing in the West. These works of art were to
be a sort of security for later negotiations. When Reich Marshal Göring,
who by directive of the Führer particularly supported this work of the
Einsatzstab, earmarked a number of these works of art for his
collection, I was—I must say frankly, as the record states—a little
uneasy, because with this commission I had taken on a certain
responsibility in my name for the total of the confiscated cultural and
art objects, and I was, therefore, obligated to catalog them in their
entirety and to keep them available for any negotiations or decisions.
Therefore, I directed my deputy to make as complete a list as possible
of those things which the Reich Marshal, with the approval of the
Führer, was diverting for his collection. I knew that Reich Marshal
Göring intended later to give this collection to the German Reich and
not to bequeath it privately.

In the interrogation record which was produced and read on this point by
the French Prosecution there is also a regrettable error to be found. It
says that I had been uneasy because Reich Marshal Göring had
misappropriated these works of art. In German, the term “entwendet”
means as much as to take illegally (to embezzle). What I said, however,
was “verwendet,” which has a different meaning.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I would like to point out in this connection
the fact that the French used the word “_détourné_,” which means
“divert.”

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. THOMA: I now turn to the furniture operation in France, and for that
purpose I am showing the defendant Document 001-PS, also Volume II of
the French Document Book, and I am asking the defendant to state his
views with respect to it.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: Document 001-PS contains, at the beginning, information to
the effect that in the East accommodations were found to be so dreadful
that I was proposing that ownerless Jewish homes in France and their
furniture should be made available for that purpose. This suggestion was
approved in a decree issued, by order of the Führer, by the Reich
Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery on 31 December 1941.

In the course of the ever-increasing bombardment in Germany, I
considered that I no longer could take responsibility for this, and thus
I made a suggestion that this furniture should be placed at the disposal
of bombed-out victims in Germany—which amounted to more than 100,000
people on certain nights—so that emergency aid would be given to them.

In the report of the French Document Book it is stated in the seventh
paragraph how the confiscation was carried out: that these deserted
apartments were sealed, that they remained sealed for some time in the
event of possible claims, and that then the shipment to Germany was
carried out.

I am aware that this, no doubt, was a serious encroachment on private
property; but here again, in connection with previous considerations, I
thought about the implications and, finally, of the millions of homeless
Germans. I want to emphasize in this connection that I kept myself well
informed; that the homes, their owners, and the main contents in the way
of furniture were recorded in detail in a big book, as a basis for
possible negotiations at a later date.

In Germany the matter was so arranged that those people who suffered
damage by bombing paid for these furnishings and household goods, which
were placed at their disposal; and these deliveries were deducted from
the claims which they had against the state. That money was paid into a
special fund administered by the Minister of Finance.

The Document 001-PS contains under Number 2 a suggestion which I myself
consider a serious charge against me. This is a suggestion that in view
of many murders of Germans in France, not only Frenchmen should be shot
as hostages, but that Jewish citizens also were to be called to account.
I should like to say that I considered these shootings of hostages,
since they were announced publicly, a permissible measure under special
circumstances in wartime. The fact that this sort of thing was being
done by the Armed Forces appeared to me according to the result of the
usual investigations, the more so since it was taking place in a
territory, a State with which the German Reich had signed an armistice.

Secondly, this happened during a period of excitement, due to the war
which had just broken out with the United States of America and to our
recollection of the report from the Polish Ambassador, Count Potocki,
dated 30 January 1939, which the Tribunal has forbidden to be read.

In spite of everything, however, I must say that I consider this
suggestion as a personal injustice. Looking at it from the legal side, I
would like to point out that in Document 1015-PS, under letter Y, there
is a letter from the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery,
which is dated 31 December 1941, and in which it says:

    “Your memorandum dated 18 December 1941 has been submitted to
    the Führer. The Führer has agreed in principle with the
    suggestion under 1. A copy of that part of the memorandum which
    deals with the utilization of Jewish household goods I have sent
    to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Reich
    Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands, together with a
    letter of which a copy is attached hereto.”

In this matter Point 1 was accepted and tacitly, though just as
emphatically, Point 2, which deals with this suggestion, was turned
down. This suggestion, therefore, had no legal consequences. Later on I
never again referred to this suggestion, and I must say that I had
forgotten all about it until it was again put before me here.

DR. THOMA: I now turn to the subject, “Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories.” The defendant is eager to express his opinion with regard
to Molotov’s note—that he, the defendant, was a Czarist spy—since this
affects his personal character. I therefore ask the defendant whether he
at any time had relations with the Czarist police.

ROSENBERG: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, the Indictment which has been presented to
the Defendant Rosenberg at no point incriminates him of having been a
Czarist spy. Therefore, we consider that this question is irrelevant.

DR. THOMA: The Molotov notes have been submitted to the Tribunal, and so
have been put in evidence. Therefore, I think that I may be permitted to
put that question.

THE PRESIDENT: He has answered in the negative already, so you can pass
from it, can’t you? It has formed no part of the Indictment.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

[_Turning to the defendant._] When did you learn that you were proposed
for the position of Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and
for what reason were you given this commission?

ROSENBERG: May I state with regard to this that at the very beginning of
April—as far as I can remember it was 2 April 1941—the Führer summoned
me in the morning and explained to me that he regarded a military clash
with the Soviet Union as inevitable. As reasons he quoted two points:
first, the military occupation of Romanian territory—that is to say,
Bessarabia and North Bukovina; second, the continual re-enforcing for a
long time and on a gigantic scale of the Red Army along the line of
demarcation and in Soviet Russian territory generally. These facts were
so striking that he had already given the relevant military and other
orders and had decided to assign me as a political adviser in a decisive
capacity. Thus I was faced with a _fait accompli_, and an attempt even
to discuss the matter was countered by the Führer with the remark that
the orders had been given and that scarcely anything could be altered in
the matter, whereupon I told the Führer that, of course, I wished the
best of luck to the German arms, and I was at his disposal for the
political advice which he desired.

Immediately afterwards I called a meeting of some of my closest
assistants, since I did not know whether the military operations would
be starting very soon or later on. We made a number of drafts concerning
the possible treatment of political problems and possible measures to be
taken in the territories to be occupied in the East. These drafts have
been submitted here. On 20 April I received a preliminary task, which
was to form a central department for dealing with Eastern questions and
to get in touch with the highest Reich authorities concerned with these
matters.

DR. THOMA: I should like to submit to the defendant the instructions
which he drafted after his appointment.

I have just one more request to the Tribunal. These instructions are now
crossed out in the photostatic copy and bear all sorts of remarks. I
request, therefore, that the Tribunal take personal cognizance of the
photostatic copies so that they can see how these instructions have been
crossed out. The documents themselves have already been submitted to the
Tribunal as numbered exhibits.

ROSENBERG: May I refer to these documents—1017-PS, 1028-PS, 1029-PS,
and 1030-PS...

THE PRESIDENT: They have already been put in evidence?

DR. THOMA: Yes, they have been put in.

[_Turning to the defendant._] May I ask you to state the exhibit
numbers?

ROSENBERG: I have just mentioned the exhibit numbers.

DR. THOMA: What are the USA exhibit numbers?

ROSENBERG: Document Number 1028-PS has Exhibit Number USA-273; Document
1030-PS has Exhibit USA-144. On the others I do not find any USA
numbers.

DR. THOMA: Document 1017-PS is Exhibit USA-142; Document 1028-PS is
Exhibit USA-273; Document 1029-PS is Exhibit USA-145; Document 1030-PS
is Exhibit USA-144. They are contained in the special document book for
the Defendant Rosenberg. I state in this connection that these are
provisional drafts, with notations by the secretary, from the end of
April and the beginning of May. These provisional drafts were not
released but, as can be seen, were crossed out and supplemented with
written remarks in the margin; and, in addition, they contain viewpoints
which later on were not approved by the Führer. For this very reason, as
far as the Ukraine is concerned they could not be applied at all. The
written instructions which went out to the Reich Commissioners for the
East and the Ukraine, after the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories had been formed, were unfortunately not found, so that I
cannot refer to them.

DR. THOMA: On 20 June 1941—that is to say, one day before the outbreak
of the war against Russia—did you make a speech to everybody concerned
with Eastern affairs regarding those Eastern problems? The document
concerned here is Exhibit USA-147, from which the Prosecution quoted a
single paragraph several times.

ROSENBERG: This is a fairly long impromptu speech made before those who
were concerned with, and assigned to deal with Eastern problems. With
regard to this, I state that it was my duty, as a matter of course, to
consider political measures which would have to be proposed to avoid a
situation in which the German Reich would have to fight every 25 years
for its existence in the East; and I should like to emphasize that that
which I authentically said in a confidential speech does not correspond
in any way with the Soviet accusations that I was in favor of a
systematic extermination of the Slavic peoples.

I do not wish to occupy the Tribunal’s time by reading very much here;
nevertheless I would like to read a few paragraphs to justify myself. It
says on Page 3 (Exhibit USA-147):

    “Originally, Russian history was a purely Continental affair.
    For 200 years Moscow-Russia lived under the Tartar yoke, and its
    face was mainly turned to the East. The Russian traders and
    hunters opened up the East as far as the Urals. Some Cossack
    treks went to Siberia, and the colonization of Siberia is no
    doubt one of the great accomplishments of history.”

I think that this expresses my attitude of respect toward that historic
achievement.

On Page 6 it says:

    “From this it follows that Germany’s aim is the freedom of the
    Ukrainian people. This must without fail be made a point in our
    political program. In what form and to what extent a Ukrainian
    State can be formed later is of no purport just now.... One must
    proceed cautiously in this direction. Literature dealing with
    the Ukrainian struggles must be promoted so that the Ukrainian
    people’s historical consciousness can be revived. A university
    would have to be founded in Kiev, technical colleges
    established, the Ukrainian language cultivated, _et cetera_.”

I have quoted this as documentary evidence of the fact that it was not
my intention to destroy the culture of the peoples of the East.

In the next paragraph I pointed out that it was important to win, in the
course of time, the voluntary co-operation of the 40 million people in
the Ukraine. On Page 7 reference is made to the possible occupation of
the Caucasian territories as follows:

    “Here the aim will not be to establish a Caucasian National
    State but to find a solution on Federal lines which, with German
    help, might go so far as to influence these people to ask
    Germany to protect their cultural and national existence.”

Here, too, there is no question of a desire to exterminate.

Now comes a matter which has been described by the American Prosecution
as a particularly serious, incriminating factor. It deals with the
so-called colonization and the property of German peoples in the East.
This paragraph is worded as follows:

    “Quite apart from all these problems, there is a question which
    is of an equally general nature, and which we must all think
    about—namely, the question of German property. German people
    have worked in this immense territory for centuries. The result
    of that work, among other things, was the acquisition of vast
    lands. The land confiscated in the Baltic countries can be
    compared in size with East Prussia; the entire real estate in
    the Black Sea was as great as Württemberg, Baden, and Alsace put
    together. In the Black Sea area more land was cultivated than is
    arable in England. These comparisons of size must make it clear
    to us that the Germans there did not idly exploit or plunder the
    people, but that they did constructive work. And the result of
    this work is German national property; irrespective of earlier
    individual owners. Just how that may one day be compensated
    cannot yet be considered. But a ... legal basis can be
    established.”

I wished to quote this so that I can refer to it later on when we deal
with the agrarian problem, particularly in respect to the Reich
Commission East, where in spite of these reflections the 700-year-old
German property was not restored but handed to the Estonians, Latvians,
and Lithuanians by law, as has been proved.

In a later paragraph it states:

    “We must declare in this connection that even now we are not
    enemies of the Russian people...”

THE PRESIDENT: Are you still reading from Document 1058-PS?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I continue to quote the following paragraph:

    “We must declare in this connection that even now we are not
    enemies of the Russian people. All of us who knew the Russians
    before know that the individual Russian is a very likable
    person, capable of assimilating culture, but lacking only in the
    strength of character possessed by the Western European... Our
    fight for a regrouping is conducted quite in line with the right
    of national self-determination of peoples....”

I shall not read to the Tribunal the end, which they can later take
cognizance of in detail if they so wish.

I made that speech fully convinced that, after my first expository
remarks to the Führer about the subject, he had essentially agreed with
me. I did not know—and he did not tell me—that other military and
police orders had already been issued; otherwise it would have been
practically impossible for me—and particularly in Heydrich’s
presence—to make a speech which obviously contradicted flatly the
conceptions of Himmler and Heydrich.

As far as the passage from this document which had been quoted by the
Prosecution is concerned, I have the following to say: I heard from
people working on the Four Year Plan that, in the event of an occupation
of the Moscow industrial region and of far-reaching destruction by war
operations, large-scale industries could no longer continue, and that
activities would probably be limited to operating a number of key
industries only. That would necessarily result in considerable
unemployment. Besides, it was not clear how large the supply reserves in
the East were, and in view of the general food situation and of the
blockade the German food supply had to be a primary consideration.

This is back of the remark that under certain circumstances a
large-scale evacuation of Russian territories might be necessary where
large numbers of industrial workers might become unemployed. And in
connection therewith, I should like to refer to Document 1056-PS, which
contains the first directive from the Ministry for Eastern Affairs,
according to which the providing of food supplies for the population
also was made a special duty.

DR. THOMA: On 17 July 1941 you were appointed, by decree of the Führer,
to act as Reich Minister for the administration of the newly occupied
Eastern Territories. On the preceding day there had been a conference
between Hitler, Keitel, Göring, and Lammers, during which you stated
your administrative program in detail. I refer to Document L-221,
Exhibit USA-317 and ask you to comment upon it. It is on Page 123 in
Rosenberg Document Book 2.

ROSENBERG: This document, which is obviously a final résumé by Bormann,
has, of course, been submitted here four or five times. During that
meeting I had actually not intended to present a voluminous program, but
this session had been called for the purpose of discussing the wording
of the intended Führer decrees concerning the administration of the
Occupied Eastern Territories and to give all the participants an
opportunity to state their views on that subject. I was also preoccupied
with a number of questions dealing with personnel, which I wanted to
submit to the Führer. I was surprised, therefore, when the Führer began
passionately, and at considerable length, to expound this policy in the
East while making many unexpected observations for me. I had the
impression that the Führer himself was aroused by the unanticipated
powerful armament of the Soviet Union and our hard struggle against the
Red Army. That had obviously caused the Führer to make some of the
statements to which I may perhaps refer at the end.

In the presence of the other witnesses, I countered the unexpected
statements of the Führer, and in addition I should like to read from
Bormann’s record the following paragraphs which have not been read until
now. I quote from the original Document L-221 on Page 4:

    “Reich Leader Rosenberg emphasizes that, in accordance with his
    views, each Kommissariat would require a different treatment of
    the population. In the Ukraine we would have to initiate a
    program furthering art and culture. We would have to awaken the
    historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, and establish a
    university at Kiev, and the like. The Reich Marshal, on the
    other hand, points out that we have to think first of
    guaranteeing our food supply—everything else should be dealt
    with later.

    “(Incidental question: Is there still anything like an educated
    class in the Ukraine, or are upper-class Ukrainians to be found
    only as emigrants outside present-day Russia?)”

This is a comment by Bormann. I continue to quote:

    “Rosenberg continues that certain independence movements in the
    Ukraine deserved support as well.”

Then follows on Page 5 a quotation of the intentions of the Führer,
where it says—and I quote:

    “Likewise the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland
    (territory north of the Crimea), must become Reich territory;
    the hinterland must be as large as possible.

    “Rosenberg complains about this because of the Ukrainians living
    there.

    “(Incidental question:”—again from Bormann—“It frequently
    appears that Rosenberg has quite a liking for the Ukrainians; he
    wants to enlarge the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)”

Thus there is evidence that I tried to persuade the Führer with all my
might to agree to the same points which I made in my speech on 20 June
1941 before the assembled department heads.

The further content of the document shows that the Reich Marshal was
interested particularly in the appointment of the former Gauleiter Koch,
and that I opposed this candidate since I was afraid that Koch, due to
his temperament and being so far removed from the Reich, might not
follow my directives. To be sure, while making the protest I could not
have known that Koch later on, in disobeying my directives, would go as
far as he did and—I shall add—upon special instigation by the head of
the Party Chancellery.

Toward the end, on Page 10 of the original of the record, there appears
a passage which has not been read; which I am now quoting:

    “A lengthy discussion sets in regarding the competency of the
    Reichsführer SS. Obviously the participants have also in mind
    the authority of the Reich Marshal at the time.”

I personally wish to add that this is a private remark made by the head
of the Party Chancellery and does not by any means represent the actual
minutes of a meeting. I quote further:

    “The Führer, the Reich Marshal, and others emphasize repeatedly
    that Himmler shall by no means have greater jurisdiction than he
    had in Germany proper; this, however, was absolutely necessary.”

These minutes show that this was a rather heated discussion, since, not
only during that conference, but before that I had opposed the idea that
the police should have legally independent executive authority in the
occupied territories—that is to say, that they were to be independent
of the civil administration. I also spoke against the presented version
of the Führer decree, which had already been prepared. I did not find
any support whatsoever for my opinion from anyone present, and that
explains to a great extent the later developments and the wording of the
decree, signed on the following day by the Führer, which was the ruling
applicable to the entire administration in the Occupied Eastern
Territories.

DR. THOMA: On 17 July you were appointed Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, and at the same time other appointments were made.
The question now arises: What was the extent of your competency and of
your activities in the Eastern Territories?—Rosenberg Document Book,
Volume II, Page 46.

ROSENBERG: May I refer you to Paragraph 2, which deals with the
establishment of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
where a Reich Minister is appointed, and Paragraph 3, which reads as
follows:

    “Military authorities and powers are exercised in the newly
    occupied Eastern Territories by the commanders of the Armed
    Forces in accordance with my decree of 25 June 1941. The powers
    of the Delegate for the Four Year Plan in the newly occupied
    Eastern Territories, according to my decree of 29 June 1941, and
    those of the Reichsführer SS and Chief of the German Police,
    according to my decree of 17 July 1941, are subject to special
    ruling and are not affected by the following regulations.”

Paragraph 6 states, “At the head of each Reich Commission shall be a
Reich commissioner...,” and then follow detailed regulations, stating
that the Reich commissioners and the commissioners general shall be
appointed by the Führer personally, and that consequently they could not
be relieved or dismissed by me.

Paragraph 7 rules that the Reich commissioners shall be subordinated to
the Reich Ministers and shall receive instructions exclusively from them
wherever Article 3 is not applicable—that is, the Paragraph 3 which
refers to the commanders of the Armed Forces and the Chief of the German
Police.

Paragraph 9 states, “The Reich commissioners are responsible for the
entire administration of their territory with regard to civilian
affairs.”

In the next paragraph the entire management of the German railways and
mails is placed under the jurisdiction of the ministries concerned, as
is not otherwise possible in war.

Paragraph 10 requires the Reich Minister, whose headquarters are
specified as Berlin, to coordinate, in the highest interest of the
Reich, his wishes with those of the other supreme authorities in the
Reich, and in the event of differences of opinion to seek a decision by
the Führer.

I need not submit to the Tribunal the Führer decree concerning Commands
of the Armed Forces, since it is sufficiently clear what we are
concerned with, nor the decree regarding the powers of the Delegate for
the Four Year Plan, dated 29 June 1941, in which it is stated that the
Delegate for the Four Year Plan—that is, Reich Marshal Göring—may also
issue instructions to all civilian and military services in the Occupied
Eastern Territories. Of decisive importance for an estimate of the
entire legal relationship, however, and the consequence finally
resulting therefrom is the decree of the Führer regarding police
protection in the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 17 July 1941. It
says under Provision I as follows, “Police security in the newly
occupied Eastern Territories is a matter for the Reichsführer SS and
Chief of the German Police.”

By this Paragraph I all security measures in the Eastern Territories
were placed under the unlimited jurisdiction of the Reichsführer SS, who
thereby, alongside the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories and next to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan, became the
third independent central Reich authority in Berlin, with the result
that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories could not
install a security or police department in his ministry in Berlin.

Under Provision II it states that the Reichsführer SS is also
authorized, apart from the normal instructions to his police, to issue
instructions directly to the civilian Reich commissioners under certain
circumstances, and that he is obliged to transmit orders of fundamental
political significance through the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, unless it is a question of averting an imminent
danger. This wording gave to the Reichsführer SS the actual possibility
of deciding for himself what he considered politically important in his
orders and what not, and what his orders regarding the averting of
impending danger concerned.

Provision III is of very great importance, since the quotation of
Document 1056-PS (Volume V, Page 60) has given the Tribunal the
impression that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
had units of the SS under his command in the Occupied Eastern
Territories. Even though it appears from Provision I, which I have just
quoted, that this is incorrect, a wording which is often used in
connection with the powers of the SS has led to this misunderstanding.
This wording is quoted under III of the Police Security Decree as
follows:

    “For the carrying out of police security to each Reich
    commissioner shall be attached a Higher SS and Police Leader who
    shall be directly and personally subordinate to the Reich
    commissioner. Leaders of the SS and Police shall be assigned to
    the Commissioners General, to the chief, and to the area
    commissioners, and shall be subordinated to them directly and
    personally.”

Dr. Lammers, who was charged with the drafting of these proposals, has
replied upon questioning that this wording was chosen to mean that the
civilian Reich commissioner could certainly give instructions to the
police on political matters, but that by the choice of the words
“personally and directly subordinate” the actual giving of orders was
exclusively reserved for the Chief of the German Police. And, as far as
I know, Himmler insisted particularly on this wording because it allowed
the Reich Commission outwardly to manifest to the population a certain
uniformity of administration, while, according to Reich law and in
practice, the power to issue orders bypassed the civilian
administration. The agreements between Heydrich and the General
Quartermaster of the Army here submitted, the contents of which I heard
for the first time during this Trial, emphasize that this corresponds to
the facts and point out just how these matters developed and how orders
and authorizations of the police were worded.

The other decrees deal with the establishment of the Reich commissions
themselves, and I do not believe that I need quote them to the Tribunal.
They represent the detailed elaboration of that which has preceded.

I should merely like to refer now to the Lammers decree of 9 February
1942, which refers to technical matters and armament. I point out that,
due to later wishes expressed by other agencies of the Reich, the
departments for technical matters and propaganda, which had been
attached originally to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
and the Reich Commission head offices, were separated from these bodies
and subordinated to the corresponding ministries in such a way that
Reich Minister Speer had his deputies in the Reich Commissions as
liaison officers, just as the Reich Transport Minister also had; and
that political propaganda instructions were to be issued by the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, but their practical
execution left to the Reich Minister for Propaganda.

DR. THOMA: Herr Rosenberg, I think you should be a little briefer.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, the Tribunal hopes you will.

DR. THOMA: The most important thing in the whole matter, apart from the
jurisdiction of the Police and SS Leader, is your position with regard
to the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor. What were the
conditions regarding authority and subordination? Was Sauckel entitled
to give you instructions?

ROSENBERG: The authority which the Delegate for the Four Year Plan had
received from the Führer is clear-cut; and the Führer decree of 21
March...

THE PRESIDENT: The question was: “Was Sauckel entitled to give you
instructions?” Then you begin to tell us about the Four Year Plan. I am
sure you can answer that question directly.

DR. THOMA: I believe...

ROSENBERG: The Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor had the
right to give instructions to all top authorities in the Reich, and that
included, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. This
was...

DR. THOMA: That is enough. Were you entitled to tell Reich Commissioner
Koch that the quotas of laborers which were required would or could no
longer be fulfilled—“yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: I could not do that as simply as that, since the
Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor had been given very
definite quotas by the Führer, and when these quotas appeared too large
to me—and that was always the case—I would call together the
Plenipotentiary General and his representatives and the representatives
of the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories for a conference so
as to reduce the figures to a somehow bearable size; and the reduction
of these quotas did, in fact, often result from such conferences, even
though they still remained very high. Officially, however, I could do no
more than make such representations.

MR. DODD: This defendant continues to make a speech. The question was
very simple. He was asked whether he was entitled to tell the Reich
Commissioner Koch that the quotas of laborers which were required could
not be filled. He has now 3 minutes, and I am sure that he will take 30
minutes if he is allowed to go on. He should be kept to all elements
surrounding that question.

DR. THOMA: Witness, I must underline Mr. Dodd’s suggestion. I have asked
you, were you entitled to tell Reich Commissioner Koch that he should
not carry out this drafting of labor?

ROSENBERG: I could not do that.

DR. THOMA: Then the answer is “no.” Did you, nevertheless, do so on one
occasion? Did you once tell him that he should make use of his rights
and powers and simply not fill these quotas?—“yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I did that expressly in a letter to the Plenipotentiary
General for Allocation of Labor, and the document has been presented in
court. It is dated December 1942; and in that letter I officially drew
his attention to many incidents which took place during this labor
recruitment drive, and I requested him urgently to help me in putting an
end to these intolerable occurrences.

DR. THOMA: May I ask you briefly to refer to this question of labor
mobilization on the basis of the documents. They are documents which
have already been presented by the United States: Documents Number
016-PS, 017-PS, 018-PS, 054-PS, 084-PS, 294-PS, 265-PS, and 031-PS. I
think you can be brief about all these documents since they speak for
themselves.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they in the document book?

DR. THOMA: They are partly in the U.S.A. Document Book “Alfred
Rosenberg”—the special document book.

ROSENBERG: Document 016-PS is a letter written to me by the
Plenipotentiary General, dated 24 April, in which he elaborates his
program. It has several times been referred to by the Prosecution, and I
would like to refer you to two brief points which relate to the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

On Page 17 of the document, under the title, “Prisoners of War and
Foreign Laborers,” Paragraph 3 at the end reads literally:

    “As far as the beaten enemy is concerned—and even if he has
    been our most terrible and implacable opponent—it has always
    been a matter of course to us Germans to refrain from any
    cruelty and petty chicanery and always treat him correctly and
    humanely, even then, when we expect useful service from him.”

And then it says, on Page 18, in Paragraph 5:

    “Therefore in the Russian camps, too, the principles of German
    cleanliness, orderliness, and hygiene must be meticulously
    observed.”

That, as far as I was concerned, was the decisive point; and I fully
agreed with this principle of the Plenipotentiary General. My
letter—Document 018-PS—dated 21 December 1942, is to be understood on
the basis of that agreement.

DR. THOMA: Document Book Rosenberg, Page 64, Volume II.

ROSENBERG: May I summarize and explain briefly? I give therein my
agreement to the solution of the problem of the Eastern Workers, and I
state that we, Sauckel and myself, hold to the same principles—that is,
in reference to the points of Sauckel’s program which have just been
quoted.

I further state that, in spite of these common principles, various
unfortunate occurrences caused me to draw attention to methods not to be
tolerated. On Page 2, I complain that, according to reports received by
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, various hospital
barracks and camps for sick Eastern Workers, which were to be erected
for allowing them recovery before returning home, had not come up to
expectations, and that the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories
had of its own accord communicated with the Reich Commissioner for
Hospitals and Health.

On Page 3, with reference to the quotas for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, I state that my responsibility earnestly bound me, in
filling the quotas, to exclude all methods the toleration and practice
of which could one day be held against me and my officials:

    “In order to attain this end, and to accord the exigencies due
    to the special political situation in the Occupied Eastern
    Territories with the measures of the commissions and staffs of
    your agencies, I have empowered the Reich Commissioner for the
    Ukraine, insofar as necessary, to make use of his authority to
    eliminate recruiting methods which run contrary to the interest
    of the conduct of the war and war economy in the Occupied
    Eastern Territories.”

DR. THOMA: Were you aware of the fact that, at the same time when these
methods were discontinued, the workers demanded could not be shipped?

ROSENBERG: That I could not readily assume, since I knew also that right
at the start of the use of propaganda in many regional commissions, a
large number of volunteers from the country—not from the cities, from
the country—reported, and at this point a legal basis for the
prevention of incidents which had taken place in every camp—as shown by
the complaints of this letter—was given the Reich Commissioner.

I might here very briefly refer to the other documents quoted by the
Prosecution, Document 054-PS—that is a criticism of abuses which
reached me from the liaison officer of the Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories with Army Group South. It is severe criticism. But I
shall refer to Page 1 of the telegram, where it says in Paragraph a:

    “With few exceptions, the Ukrainians in the Reich who are
    working individually—for example, in small workshops, as
    farmhands or as household employees—are very satisfied with
    their conditions.”

But in Paragraph b:

    “Those accommodated in collective camps, on the other hand,
    complain very much.”

This was an attempt to exert influence on questions and dealings
concerning a region under the authority, not of the civil, but of the
military administration with its seat in Kharkov, and to exert influence
even in German national territory where I, as Reich Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, had no right to issue instructions; but by
criticism the lot of all Eastern Workers was always being improved and,
to be sure, to the utmost.

Document 084-PS refers to a number of problems and measures for the
improvement of the lot of the workers’ families and the energy with
which the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories defended a
policy of decent treatment of the Eastern peoples with reference to the
question of pay, the deduction of taxes, _et cetera_. But I do not think
I need to go any further into detail, since the Plenipotentiary General
will probably do that himself. I merely refer to my constant efforts in
this direction. I should also like to mention here that there was an
agreement between the Plenipotentiary General and the Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories according to which Eastern workers, after
returning home, were to receive an allotment of land so that they would
feel no prejudices against those who had stayed at home.

Document 204-PS also contains complaints regarding insufficient
allowances, to which I need not refer in detail, and to which I merely
allow myself to draw the attention of the Tribunal.

Document 265-PS is a report from the Commissioner General at Zhitomir,
in the Ukraine, in which he states that the Plenipotentiary General for
Allocation of Labor, on his tour through the Eastern territories, had
personally pointed out the gravity of the whole labor mobilization
program and had transmitted the unconditional orders of the Führer that
these quotas must be placed at the disposal of the Reich. The
Commissioner General remarks further after this serious portrayal of the
situation, he had no other choice during the enrollment process than to
assign certain workers to the police force to aid the local authorities
which had been set up.

Document 031-PS appears to me personally to be of particular importance
since the Prosecution has stated with reference to this document that I
am accused of having approved of the planning and carrying out of the
biological weakening of the Eastern peoples, according to a statement at
the end of this document. Only the first and last portions of this
document have been quoted; and I must ask that I be permitted to inform
the Tribunal of the true state of affairs.

At the beginning of the document is the observation that the Reich
Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, after he had once turned
down the suggestion that young people should be transferred from Army
Group Center to the Reich, was once more presented with the problem and
under very special conditions and prerequisites. In the actual record it
states that, in view of the fact that a large number of adults were
working and had to leave the young people behind without any care, Army
Group Center had the intention of resettling these youths and taking
care of them in a proper manner. At the end of Page 1 of this document
and at the beginning of Page 2, it states that the Minister was afraid
that this action might have very unfavorable political repercussions,
that it would be considered as deportation of children, and that he
desired it to be greatly curtailed.

Under Point 4 it states that if the Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories would not support that action and carry it out, then
Army Group Center—which, of course, was in no way subordinate to the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories—would carry out the
action on its own authority. This army group, however, was addressing
itself to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories in
particular, because in their opinion—as it says literally, “the
guarantee for correct political and fair dealing would be assured.” The
army group would like to see this action carried out under the most
inoffensive conditions. As far as possible these children should be
accommodated in villages, in groups, or collected in small camps. Later
on, from there they were to be placed at the disposal of small
workshops.

Then, later on, it states:

    “In the event of a reoccupation of the territory, the Ministry
    for the Occupied Eastern Territories can then in a proper way
    return these youths, who then, together with their parents would
    surely be a positive political factor in the reconstruction of
    that territory.”

At the end it states that under these conditions the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories agreed to take care of these youths. I
agreed because I was fully conscious of the fact that through the Youth
Department of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories I would,
wherever possible, be able to guarantee the greatest care for these
children. I want to add that on one occasion I paid a visit to the great
works at Dessau, where four and a half thousand youthful workers were
employed, and where there was a separate children’s camp under the care
of White Ruthenian mothers. I could ascertain that these workers were
wearing very good clothes, that they were being taught mathematics and
languages by Russian women teachers, and that the children’s camp tended
by Russian women had a kindergarten which was looked after by the Hitler
Youth. In the evening of that day the White Ruthenian woman who cared
for the children thanked me, with tears in her eyes, for the humane care
being given them.

I would like to point out a phonetic error which has appeared in this
record. This city—as I said—was Dessau, and not Odessa as is stated in
the record. I never visited Odessa in all my life.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, we have finished the labor problem, and I am
coming to the Reich Commissioners. Perhaps this would be a suitable
moment to break off.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you indicate to the Tribunal how long you are likely
to be with your examination?

DR. THOMA: I am of the opinion that we may be through by 3:30. However,
the Defendant Rosenberg is shaking his head, and, therefore, I cannot
tell you for certain.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Court will recess until 5 minutes past two.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1405 hours._]




                          _ Afternoon Session_

DR. THOMA: First, I wish to submit to the Court as Exhibit Rosenberg-11,
Document 194-PS, the secret order of Rosenberg to Koch of December 1942
on the fitting treatment of Ukrainian civilians—dated 14 December 1942.

Witness, please give us your opinion on this general instruction in
connection with your directions in Document 1056-PS.

ROSENBERG: Document 1056-PS is not a direct instruction of the Ministry
for the Occupied Eastern Territories but it was the result of
discussions with various central agencies of the Reich Government
officially interested in the East. In this document there are contained
directions of the Eastern Ministry itself, and agreements with the
various technical agencies such as the Transportation Ministry, the Post
Office Department, and also the Police, in order to manifest, at least
in the East, a certain unified civil administration. For the reasons
which I have enumerated at the beginning this was no longer possible,
and as far as the other questions of the subordination of the SS and
Police Leader are concerned, to which I have referred the Prosecution on
the basis of this document, I might indicate what I took the liberty of
saying at the beginning in connection with the comment on the staffing
of the administration of the Eastern territories, dated 17 July 1941.

However, as far as Document 1056-PS is concerned, I would like to point
out that among the seven points which are especially stressed here, only
the third point, “Care of the Population,” is quite expressly mentioned.
Then, further along in the document it is again explained that this
supplying of the population with foodstuffs and so forth is to be given
special attention and that the problems of medical and veterinary help
are to be given special consideration, even calling upon military
authorities if necessary. Except for that I do not wish to go into this
document further.

The Document 194-PS is unfortunately the only piece of instruction of
the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories to the Reich
commissioners that could be found. It is an instruction dated 14
December 1942, in which once again the humane and political attitude to
be taken is prescribed. It is emphasized in the beginning—I permit
myself a few short references—that German behavior should never give
the impression that the Ukraine had no hope at all for the future; that
directives of German offices were to be executed but should be given
great thought. It says further:

    “The people of the East have at all times seen in Germany the
    bearer of a legal order, which although bound by severity, is
    not an expression of arbitrariness. If one is able to make it
    clear to the peoples of the East by appropriate legal measures
    that although the war brings fearful hardships, yet
    transgressions will be justly investigated and judged, then
    these peoples will be easier to govern than if the impression of
    an arbitrary tyranny such as theirs is given.”

It continues:

    “The elementary school with its 4-year curriculum should be
    strictly adhered to and should be followed by a proper technical
    school training for practical life. The German administration
    needs men for veterinary work, transportation, farming,
    geological research, _et cetera_, whom the German people is not
    in a position to supply. In these fields, the Ukrainian youth
    taken away from the streets can be roused to the consciousness
    of collaboration in the reconstruction of their country. In
    doing this, it would be inadmissible for German offices to
    confront the population with contemptuous remarks. Such an
    attitude is not worthy of the German.”

Then further:

    “One becomes master by adopting a fitting attitude and behavior
    but not by overbearing conduct. Not by pretentious speech does
    one govern peoples, and not by ostentatious disdain of others
    does one win authority.”

Then, several other questions are dealt with in this directive, but I do
not wish to take up the time of the Tribunal too much with these
details. I was interested in showing in what sense I wanted to form the
attitude of the civil administration, and in order not to have this
directive shelved in the large offices I decreed that it was to be read
in all offices.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like now to turn to the special
charge of the Soviet Prosecution and in particular to refer to those
documents that pertain to Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab in the East and to the
alleged destructions. Therefore, I will submit to the defendant Exhibit
USSR-376 (Document 161-PS), Exhibit USSR-375 (Document 076-PS), Exhibits
USSR-7, 39, 41, 49, 51, and 81.

[_The documents were submitted to the defendant._]

THE PRESIDENT: Are any of these in your document books?

DR. THOMA: The documents of the U.S.S.R., the ones I mentioned last, I
do not have in a special document book. But I assumed and ascertained
early this morning that these documents had been submitted to the
Tribunal: USSR-39, 41, 251, 89, 49, and 353.

THE PRESIDENT: I was asking only for what purpose you were referring to
them now. Of course we haven’t all the books here. They are not in your
books?

DR. THOMA: Number 161-PS is in Document Book 3, Page 34. Nothing else is
mentioned in the document book.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

ROSENBERG: The Document 161-PS deals with an order for the bringing back
of certain archives from Estonia and Latvia. The Soviet Prosecution have
concluded from this that there was a plundering of the cultural
treasures in these countries. I would like to state that the
instructions which I had read from Document 1015-PS requested in an
unequivocal manner that all these cultural objects were to remain in the
country. And that was done. I permit myself to refer to the date of that
document, which is 23 August 1944, when combat activity had spread over
this territory, and when these cultural objects and archives were to be
safeguarded from combat activities. It was here a matter of having the
afore-mentioned archives sheltered in Estonian country estates. That is,
they were still to remain in the country itself, even in the midst of
combat activity. As far as I know some of these archives were still
brought to Germany later and I believe they were safeguarded in Schloss
Höchstadt in Bavaria.

Document 076-PS has been used by the Prosecution as proof of a
plundering of the library treasures in Minsk. We are concerned here with
a report which a deputy of the commander of the rear area had issued and
which was directed to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
From this report we can see in fact that some destruction had taken
place in certain libraries, but that that was a consequence of troops
having been quartered there, because the city of Minsk had been
destroyed and the billeting facilities were overburdened.

But then under Number 1, and again under other paragraphs, it is
expressly shown that posters had been put up everywhere, and that these
things were put under control and were not to be touched after that. It
is added that any further removals would have to be considered as
plundering.

Under Number 2, I would like by all means to point out that it has been
confirmed here that the most valuable part of this library of the
Academy of Sciences came from the library of the Polish Prince Georg
Radziwill, which the Soviet authorities had taken from the occupied
Polish territory to Minsk and had incorporated into the library of the
Academy of Sciences long before any other state or other German offices
were active in that area. There are a number of other documents, namely,
035-PS and several others already submitted to the Tribunal, which make
statements about the taking back of cultural objects from the Ukraine
too. The date on these documents, that is, the year 1943, shows also
that these cultural objects remained in the country until then, as had
been ordered, and that only when combat activity made it necessary, was
a withdrawal carried out. Document 035-PS says, on Page 3, Number 5:

    “The infantry division”—concerned—“attaches great importance
    to the further evacuation of valuable institutions since the
    Armed Forces can in no way protect this area sufficiently and
    bombardment by artillery is to be counted on shortly.”

DR. THOMA: I would like to submit this document under Rosenberg-37; it
has not yet been submitted.

ROSENBERG: It then adds: “Wehrmacht equipment, means of transportation,
_et cetera_, shall be provided as far as possible by the ... infantry
division.”

DR. THOMA: May I have the document again? [_The document was handed to
Dr. Thoma._] I would like to submit it to the Tribunal.

ROSENBERG: The evacuation then actually took place under artillery
bombardment, and hence cultural objects which had come from Kharkov and
other cities also during combat, were transferred only then to Germany.

Now I would like to deal with the documents which the Soviet Prosecution
have given in detailed presentation of the Extraordinary State
Commissions for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. I would like, in this
connection, to discuss just a few concrete details:

On Page 1 of the Document USSR-39 it states:

    “From the beginning of their occupation of the Estonian Soviet
    Socialist Republic, the Germans and their accomplices destroyed
    the independence of the Estonian people and then tried to
    establish a ‘new order’; to demolish culture, art, and science;
    to exterminate the civilian population or to deport them as
    slave labor to Germany; and to lay waste and plunder cities,
    villages, and farms.”

I should like to remark in that connection, first of all, that the
20-year independence, after the Soviet attack in 1919, was broken by the
marching in of the Red Army in 1940, a standpoint that is...

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, it seems to me that the document which is
now being looked over by the Defendant Rosenberg, naturally gives him a
basis for replying to the concrete accusations of his criminal activity
while he was Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.
However, I am of the opinion that what the Defendant Rosenberg has said
just now is plain fascist propaganda and has naturally nothing to do
with the matter.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if the Defendant Rosenberg makes a few
introductory remarks to his statement on the document from which he
wants to quote, I ask that he not be interrupted right away. We will
deal with a few pertinent statements taken from the document.

ROSENBERG: So far as Point 2 is concerned, I would like to remark...

THE PRESIDENT: Is this document he is dealing with, a document that he
wrote himself or had anything to do with? I haven’t got the document
before me.

DR. THOMA: The document has been submitted by the U.S.S.R. and it
contains charges against Rosenberg—charges of having undertaken
demolitions and expropriations in these territories, and he is entitled
to state his position with regard to this.

THE PRESIDENT: But when you say “his question,” can’t he say what he did
in connection with the document, or the subject of the document? I mean,
when you say “state his position,” it is such a very wide phrase it may
mean almost anything. If you ask him what he did in connection with the
subject of the document it is different, but it is more concrete and
special.

DR. THOMA: What did you do in these occupied areas, contrary to the
assertion of the Soviet Prosecution?

ROSENBERG: To refute the assertion that I destroyed culture and art and
science in Estonia, I must point out that one of the first directions of
the Eastern Ministry was to establish indigenous administrations in
these three countries and to have the German administration in principal
serve as a supervisory body. The limitations due to the war conditions
were naturally given in times of war; they applied to spheres of war and
armament economy, to the sphere of police security, and naturally to the
political attitude in general.

A complete cultural autonomy was enjoyed by Estonia and Latvia as well
as by Lithuania; their art and their theaters were active all through
these years; many faculties of the university at Dorpat functioned and
so did some faculties in Riga; the judicial sovereignty of these
countries was under the power of the indigenous administration—national
directorates as they were called—with all the authoritative departments
necessary for the administration. The entire school system remained
untouched. I visited these territories twice, and I can say only that
the commissioners in charge there did everything to work as closely as
possible in accordance with the desires of the indigenous administration
which often expressed itself with criticism regarding the German
administration, although, frankly speaking, we could not quite fully
recognize the political sovereignty in the midst of war.

On Page 2 of this document it is stated, under corporal punishment for
office employees, that the intruders had prescribed corporal punishment
of Estonian workers in accordance with the regulation of the railway
administration of 20 February 1942, for neglect of work or if the
employee came drunk to work. This regulation of the director of the
railway administration corresponds with the facts. But when this
regulation was made known, of course it aroused the indignation of the
German civil administration. Reich Commissioner Lohse at once annulled
it, and we asked the Reich Minister of Transportation to have this
impossible official removed. This took place immediately; he was
disqualified and called home, and the fact that he was recalled was to
be made known in the press. However, I cannot say whether it actually
appeared in the press.

On Page 5 of this document, in Paragraph 2, it is set forth that the
Germans destroyed historical edifices, that they had searched through
and destroyed the Tartu—that is, the University of Dorpat which had a
glorious past of more than 300 years, and was one of the oldest seats of
higher learning.

Now I would like to add that these houses dating from the 17th and other
centuries were constructed by Germans exclusively, and that German
troops would certainly not be interested in destroying arbitrarily the
houses of their own people. Secondly, this 300-year-old University of
Dorpat was a German university for 300 years, which in fact supplied
Russia and Germany with scholars of European repute.

THE PRESIDENT: That is quite irrelevant, quite irrelevant. The question
is whether it was destroyed.

ROSENBERG: In the year 1942 I was once in Dorpat. A large part of the
city had been destroyed through combat activity, but the university
buildings were still standing. In this connection I had the opportunity
to learn that the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in the Ukraine could confiscate
10,000 to 12,000 volumes belonging to the University of Dorpat and
restore them again to their rightful owner.

I consider it out of question that an arbitrary destruction of this old
German university could have been carried out by German troops and I can
assume only that it was the result of combat activity, if a destruction
actually had taken place.

As far as the other details of the document are concerned, I cannot
define my position. It deals with many shootings of a police nature,
matters clearly connected with combat activity, and I cannot make any
statement about this, since it obviously refers to the time of the
retreat.

The Document USSR-41 deals with the report of the Extraordinary State
Commission on matters in Latvia. I would like to correct and say that
the headquarters of the Foreign Minister were not at Riga, but that he
had his regular office exclusively in Berlin.

In Paragraph 4 it is said:

    “The Germans confiscated the country of the Latvian peasants for
    their barons and landowners, and mercilessly exterminated the
    peaceful population—men, women, and children.”

I would like to state in this connection that not a single farm was
given up to the German barons of former times during the period of
civilian administration, but the German administration of the country
issued a decree which, in my opinion, was a singular, progressive piece
of legislation. For this land, belonging to Germans for 700 years and
expropriated by the young Estonian and Latvian Republics almost without
compensation, could certainly have been returned easily to the Germans.
But I signed a law in March, either 1942 or 1943—I do not know—the
so-called Restitution Law (Reprivatisierungsgesetz), which legally
guaranteed the Estonian and Latvian peasants the German property ceded
to them at that time and handed over by solemn charters. With the
occupation by the Soviet Union, a collectivization of this private farm
property was introduced, and what it deals with is that this
collectivization was abolished and therefore the former owners of 1919
came again into possession of their property.

I would like to mention the following in explanation of this statement.
On Page 2 it is stated:

    “For more than 3 years the Germans have made it their task to
    destroy factories, public works, libraries, museums, and homes
    in the Latvian cities.”

I myself have been in Latvian art museums, have seen a great Latvian art
exhibition; I have been in the Latvian State theater, in which all
performances were in the Latvian language, with just a few German guest
conductors and singers. Factories were not destroyed in these 3 years of
administration but their productivity was increased by numerous German
machines. Of course this caused many protests from the native owners,
because it was accompanied by an uncertainty about their own
participation; but in any event there was no destruction, rather an
increase in productive capacity.

And finally, as far as the archives and libraries are concerned, I have
already said what is necessary in connection with Document 035-PS.

In regard to the extermination of 170,000 civilians, I cannot take any
position as to what transpired in the police camps on grounds of police
security. I would like to point out, however, that according to official
statements of the indigenous administration, in the first place more
than 40,000 Estonians in Estonia and more than 40,000 Latvians in Latvia
were deported to the interior of Soviet Russia after the Red Army
occupied these countries. And further that a large number of Latvians
and Estonians volunteered to fight the Red Army and that at the retreat
hundreds of thousands of Estonians and Latvians asked to be taken, to
the Reich and many actually arrived there. The entire population of
Latvia was about 2 million. That the German authorities should have shot
170,000 Latvians seems improbable in the highest degree.

However, regarding other alleged destructions committed during combat
activity, I am not able to take a stand.

The third document, USSR-7, deals with the reports of the Extraordinary
Commission on Lithuania. On Page 1, Paragraph 2, it states that Reich
Minister Rosenberg tried to germanize the Lithuanian people and to
exterminate the national culture. Lithuania was proclaimed a part of the
German “Ostland Province.”

In Lithuania the peasant question was treated the same way as in Estonia
and Latvia. Of course there was one difference insofar as Lithuania had
a larger number of small German peasant farms which at the end of 1939
were taken into the German Reich, and when the Germans marched into
Lithuania they were returned to their original farms and were settled in
as concentrated a manner as possible in certain settlement districts.
That corresponds to the facts; to the rest I cannot agree.

As far as the extermination of national culture is concerned, that does
not seem to me a true representation either. On the contrary, I know
that the staff of my office was very much interested in collaborating
with the representatives of the Lithuanian folklore research, and that
many studies were written on this exemplary folklore work in Lithuania
and Latvia, and I cannot imagine that any arbitrary destruction took
place here. I can remember only that administrative officials from the
capital, Kauen or Kaunas (Kovno), came to me at the time of the
withdrawal and said that they had worked in Kauen for 5 days, even
though the city was already under Soviet artillery fire, by which, of
course, many buildings were destroyed in combat activity; I am not able
to say anything about that from personal experience.

Now I pass to Document USSR-51. In the Note of the Peoples’ Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, of 6 January 1942, the destruction of cultural
values of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is also given introductory
mention. I refer to what I have already said in reference to the
documents that were just submitted. On Page 2, Column 1, it is also
stated that the Germans pillaged and murdered the peasant population
without restraint. Here, too, I would like to refer again to the
declarations I have just made. On Page 6, Column 1, at the beginning, it
says that the Germans in their rage against Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia destroyed all national cultures, national monuments, schools,
and literature. But this, as I have just stated, is not in accordance
with the facts. The Note of the Peoples’ Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of 27 April 1942, which has been read here repeatedly and in detail,
makes on Page 1, Column 1, the same assertion that here the pillage of
the territory of the Soviet State had been carried out. I refer to the
statement I have just made.

On Page 7 it is stated that the Germans intended and actually executed
wholesale robbery of the land given free of charge by the Soviet
Government to the collective farms (Kolkhozes) for their permanent use.
I do not wish to make any statements on this special question here.
State Secretary Riecke, whom the Tribunal has approved as witness, will
make his expert statements on the law for the new agrarian order issued
to strengthen farming in White Ruthenia and the Ukraine.

As the Soviet Prosecution withdrew the charge against me of having been
a former Czarist spy, I do not need to go into that. I also cannot, of
course, check in detail the various quotations which have been submitted
here. But in one case it is possible for me to give an explanation here.
It is on Page 9, Column 1, at the top, where the Foreign Commissar’s
so-called “Twelve Commandments” for the behavior of the Germans in the
East is mentioned. There follows a quotation from which it can be
concluded only that it is an unbroken quotation from a German directive.
These 12 commandments have been submitted by the Soviet Prosecution to
the Tribunal, under Exhibit USSR-89 (Document USSR-89). It deals, as it
has been established, with a directive of the State Secretary Backe, of
the beginning of June 1941, a directive which I have learned of only
here. This apparently unbroken quotation of the Foreign Commissar proves
to be a compilation of fragments of sentences which were actually
dispersed over a page and a half of the document, and these fragments,
moreover, have not been given in their proper sequence, but in a
completely different sequence from that in the document. But I would
like to call your attention to a few changes in the wording.

Under Point 6 of the commandments:

    “You must therefore”—this is directed to the agricultural
    leaders—“you must therefore carry out with composure the most
    severe and ruthless measures that are demanded by the national
    requirements. Deficiencies in character on the part of the
    individual will lead to his recall as a matter of principle.
    Anyone who is recalled for such reasons can no longer have an
    authoritative position in the Reich.”

In the quotation of the official note it says:

    “Therefore, you yourself will have to take with composure the
    most cruel and ruthless measures that are dictated by German
    interests. Otherwise you cannot have any responsible positions
    at home.”

Therefore, instead of the word “severe” the word “cruel” has been
substituted: in place of “national requirements” it says very generally
“German interests”; and in place of the reference to a “lack of
character” it is set down quite generally that if one does not thus take
the most cruel measures one cannot have any responsible positions. I
would not want to identify myself otherwise in any way with these 12
commandments, but I would like to state that on Page 3 under Point 7 it
says:

    “But be just and personally decent, and always set a good
    example.”

And in part 9:

    “Do not spy on Communists. The Russian youth has been trained
    for communism for two decades. Russian youth does not know any
    other education. It is therefore senseless to punish them for
    the past.”

I believe that also there, Herr Backe who otherwise used stronger
language, does not mean any regulation for extermination.

Now, I am passing to the charge by the Polish Government. It concerns me
in one point only. On Page 20, under Point 5, it is stated that the
exploitation, plundering, and the carrying off of art objects, _et
cetera_, from museums and collections of all kinds, was centralized
under the office of Rosenberg in Berlin. That is incorrect, as has been
shown by the report of State Secretary Mühlmann, which has been read
here many times and which shows that an entirely different department
was set up for the safeguarding of these works of art. Furthermore, I
read today a decree by Dr. Lammers, dated, I believe, 5 July 1942, in
which the Government General was expressly excluded.

I must, however, admit that in one case in the beginning, the
Einsatzstab confiscated a German collection of music and it was taken to
the Reich for purposes of research. This action was not right, and from
a correspondence with the then Governor General Frank that must also be
here in my file, it is shown that we had agreed that this collection was
to be returned to the Government General as a matter of course after a
scholarly survey had been made, which I, to be sure, requested.

The incorrectness of this charge may be seen also from the fact that it
is contended here that I had in the Einsatzstab among the various
departments also an office “East” for Poland. The incorrectness of this
statement may be gathered from the fact that the so-called special
purpose staffs which were established for music and the plastic arts in
the East were actually expert special staffs, and besides them the
so-called working groups had regional tasks. I could, therefore, not
have had an office “East” for Poland and at any rate the term “Poland”
was never used in official circles—only the term “Government General.”
I believe I can limit myself to this explanation. In addition, there
have been presented a number of other general documents from Smolensk
and from other cities, referring to much destruction and police
measures. I cannot testify here concerning these points.

In conclusion I would like to refer only to Document 073-PS, which a few
days ago was submitted to the witness Dr. Lammers. This document is
concerned with the transmission of a document of the Foreign Office, in
which some mistaken information was given after it had been said that
the Soviet prisoners of war were under the command of the Reich Minister
for the occupied Eastern countries.

In the introduction, it can be seen that here we are concerned
exclusively with the doctrinary care and propaganda work which Minister
Goebbels considered his province, rather than that of the Foreign
Office. The Foreign Office stated, that it had leading jurisdiction over
all prisoners of war with the exception of this moral and propaganda
care of the Soviet prisoners of war, which in this respect were attended
to by the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, because these
prisoners did not come under the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
This statement, that they were not bound by the Geneva Convention, was
the legal opinion issued by the Führer’s headquarters for the setting up
of the administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. THOMA: Witness, in the course of these proceedings you have been
accused at least four times in the matter of gold dental fillings in the
prison in Minsk. In this connection a document has even been submitted,
regarding the handling of the Jewish question, and a further document
deals likewise with an arson and anti-Jewish “action,” also in the
district of Minsk. Will you please tell us what you have to say in that
connection?

ROSENBERG: I might perhaps give the following general answer about the
many files and reports from my office: In the course of 12 years of my
Party office and 3 years in the Eastern Ministry, many reports,
memoranda, carbon copies from all sorts of divisions were delivered to
my office. I know of some of them, of some I received oral knowledge
which was then entered in detail in the files, and there are a great
number of more important and some entirely unimportant things which I
was entirely unable to take note of during these years.

As far as these documents are concerned, I must say with regard to
Document 212-PS, that this clearly represents a submission to my
office—which is without heading, without signature, and without any
other details—which I never received personally, but which I assume was
probably delivered from police circles to my office. Thus, with the best
intentions I cannot state my position as to the contents of this
document.

As far as Document 1104-PS which deals with the terrible incidents in
the city of Sluzk is concerned, that is a report from October 1941, and
I must say that this report was submitted to me. This report aroused
indignation in the Eastern Ministry, and as is seen here, my permanent
representative, Gauleiter Meyer, sent a copy of this complaint of the
civil administration, together with all the criticism of the civil
administration, to the Police, to the Chief of the Security Police, at
that time Heydrich, with the request for investigation. I must say that
the Police had their own jurisdiction, in which the Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories could not interfere. But I am unable to say
here what measures Heydrich took. Yet, as may be seen from this, I could
not assume that an order—which was attested to by the witness here
yesterday—was given to Heydrich or Himmler by the Führer. This report,
and many other communications which came to my ears, regarding shootings
of saboteurs and also shootings of Jews, pogroms by the local population
in the Baltic States and in the Ukraine, I took as occurrences of this
war. I heard that in Kiev a larger number of Jews had been shot, but
that the greater part of the Jews had left Kiev; and the sum of these
reports showed me, it is true, terrible harshness, especially some
reports from the prison camps. But that there was an order for the
individual annihilation of the entire Jewry, I could not assume and if,
in our polemics, the extermination of Jewry was also talked about, I
must say that this word, of course, must make a frightful impression in
view of the testimonies we think are available now, but under conditions
prevailing then, it was not interpreted as an individual extermination,
an individual annihilation of millions of Jews. I must also say that
even the British Prime Minister, in an official speech in the House of
Commons on 23 or 26 September 1943, spoke of the extermination in root
and branch of Prussianism and of National Socialism. I happened to read
these words from this speech. However, I did not assume that in saying
this he meant the shooting of all Prussian officers and National
Socialists.

Regarding Document Rosenberg-135 (Exhibit USA-289) I would like to say
the following: It is dated 18 June 1943. On 22 June, I returned from an
official visit to the Ukraine. After this official visit I found a pile
of notes about conferences. I found many letters and, above all, I found
the Führer decree of the middle of June 1943 which had already been
given verbally, in which the Führer instructed me to limit myself to the
basic principles as far as legislation was concerned, and not to
interest myself too much with the details of the administration of the
Eastern Territories. I was dejected when I returned from this journey
and I did not read this document. But I cannot assume that this document
was not at all mentioned to me by my office. My subordinates were so
conscientious that I can assume only that in the course of their
reporting to me about many documents, they told me that another great
disagreement between the Police and Civil Administration was again at
hand, as there had been many disagreements of that nature before and I
perhaps said, “Please give this to Gauleiter Meyer or give it to the
police officer, to the liaison officer so that he can investigate these
matters.” Otherwise these terrible details would have remained in my
memory. I cannot say any more in regard to this subject than I was able
to say when it was brought up in the interrogation.

DR. THOMA: I submit do the Tribunal the Exhibit Rosenberg-13, a
memorandum from Koch to Rosenberg, a complaint about Rosenberg’s
criticism and justification of his policy in the Ukraine, dated 16 March
1943, and a letter from Rosenberg to Reich Minister Lammers dated 12
October 1944, in which he states to the Führer his wish to resign. May
it please the Tribunal, regarding Rosenberg-13, memorandum from Koch to
Rosenberg...

THE PRESIDENT: What number?

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-13, Document 192-PS, Document Book Number 2, Page
14; I would like to read this to the Tribunal personally and to make the
following introductory remark.

THE PRESIDENT: It is a very long thing, Dr. Thoma. You do not need to
read it all, surely?...

DR. THOMA: I shall not read all of it, Your Honor. But I have
unfortunately only the opportunity of presenting State Secretary Riecke
as an official of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Territories. The
Tribunal, however, even from this witness, who will appear before them,
will be able to see that the best officials which the German Reich had,
were used in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories and that
every individual complaint was conscientiously checked. It is not so,
that in addition to what we have heard today numerous other crimes have
been committed which have not come to the knowledge of the Tribunal, but
I believe that everything has been exhaustively presented of the
“admittedly terrible things” that happened in the East during these 4 or
5 years. And the question now is how Gauleiter Koch responded to it.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are simply asking you not to read the whole
of the document which covers many pages. That means you can go ahead and
read the essential parts of it.

DR. THOMA: Therefore, I would like to assert that each and every
complaint which was received by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories was followed up. Gauleiter Koch writes:

    “Various recent decrees of the Reich Minister for the Occupied
    Eastern Territories, in which my work was criticized in an
    exceptionally severe and offensive manner and from which have
    resulted misinterpretations of the policies as well as my legal
    position, have induced me to present this report to you, Mr.
    Reich Minister, in the form of a memorandum.”

And then follow remarks which show that the Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories investigated the complaints. He complains:

    “On 12 January 1943, for example, I was informed by the Ministry
    that Anna Prichno of Smygalovka, an Eastern Worker, had objected
    that her parents who remained in the Ukraine could not pay their
    taxes. I was asked to cancel these taxes or to reduce them by
    half and also to report how I decided.”

On Page 13:

    “Lately numerous individual complaints from Eastern Workers
    employed in the Reich have been passed on to me and on each
    single case I have been asked to give a report, usually on such
    short notice that it was impossible to comply with the request.”

On Pages 15 and 16:

    “Hence, I found it strange”—writes Gauleiter Koch—“to have the
    decree I/41 of 22 November 1941 state that the Ukrainian people
    were strongly permeated with German blood, which fact is to
    account for their remarkable cultural and scientific
    achievements. But when on top of this a secret decree of July
    1942, to which I will refer more closely at the end of this
    section, declares that very many points of contact exist between
    the German Ukrainian people, one is no longer only surprised but
    astonished. This decree demands not only correct but even
    amiable manners in dealing with Ukrainians.”

Then:

    “In the following I would like to give a few more examples of
    lack of reserve towards Ukrainians. For instance, by decree of
    18 June 1942, II 6 f 6230, I was informed that you were
    procuring a total of 2.3 million Reichsmark worth of Ukrainian
    schoolbooks, charged to my budget without even contacting me
    about it previously.”

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it necessary to read all this? I am not
quite sure how far you have gotten because I have been reading on.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I make a remark in this connection? I have
already limited my selection. This memorandum is quite a thick copybook;
however, I will try to be still more brief, and want only to emphasize
that on every page you will find a complaint about the conscientiousness
with which Rosenberg followed up all these individual complaints. But I
will be very brief:

    “It is not necessary that your Ministry stress over and over
    again as it does by many written and telephone protests that any
    violence in recruiting of workers has to be discontinued.”

And then there is one further very brief remark:

    “And if I issue more decrees against floggings than actually
    take place, I will make myself ridiculous.

    “That happened a few times, and every single case was strongly
    censured.”

And now we come to something very important, Your Honors, namely, how
Gauleiter Koch threatens representations to the Führer, and says:

    “Nobody has ever asked me, as an old Gauleiter, to submit to him
    articles I write, for nobody but the Führer can ever absolve me
    of the political responsibility that I bear for an article
    signed with my full name...

    “Finally, in addition to these statements on my responsibility I
    should like to allude to the relations between the Führer and
    the Reich commissioners. As an old Gauleiter I am accustomed to
    go to my Führer directly with all my problems and requests, and
    this right, in my capacity as Oberpräsident, has never been
    denied me even by my superior minister...

    “By decree I 6 b 4702/42, I was ordered to abstain from
    referring to the wishes of the Führer in my reports to you, as
    the forwarding of the Führer’s wishes were your affair
    exclusively. I must state here that in my position as an old
    Gauleiter the Führer has repeatedly given me his political
    directives...

    “If one takes away or curtails the position of the Reich
    commissioners in relation to the Führer, then very little
    remains in keeping with the position of the Reich commissioner.”

On Page 50 he says:

    “I have to state expressly that I must, under these
    circumstances, refuse to accept responsibility for the success
    of the labor recruiting and the spring planting.”

Rosenberg recommended to him to go on with the recruiting of labor.

At the end he says:

    “My position has been encroached upon by you so often in the
    last 3 weeks that it can be restored only by the Führer.”

Thereupon a conflict developed in Hitler’s presence at the Reich
Chancellery among Rosenberg, Bormann, and Koch, and the result was that
Bormann and, in the main, Koch, were upheld and the Defendant Rosenberg
was notified to limit himself to matters of principle only.

Thereupon the defendant submitted his resignation.

Now, I ask the defendant to go into this in more detail. It is in
Document Book 2, Page 27.

ROSENBERG: I would like to remark...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I think we had better adjourn now for 10
minutes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. THOMA: Witness, some days ago the document was mentioned from which
it becomes clear that the forest district of Zuman was to be the private
hunting ground for the Reich Commissioner, and that hundreds of people
were shot, because resettling them would have been too complicated and
take too much time. Will you make a statement about that?

ROSENBERG: As time went by I received much information regarding
instances of acts of violence committed in the East. Upon investigating,
it was found very often that these reports did not conform with the
facts. In this case this report appeared to me quite credible so I took
the opportunity to report it to the Führer directly, considering that I
was having trouble with Gauleiter Koch.

Apart from other questions—schools in the Ukraine, establishment of
technical schools, and certain personal statements of Koch which I
submitted as a complaint—I also submitted this report.

At the audience with the Führer, Reich Commissioner Koch submitted an
opinion of the Chief of the Forest Administration of the Ukraine. From
this it appeared that these forest districts had to be used for
supplying timber either for railway ties or other emergency needs. And
since various guerrilla units and partisans had flocked together in
these wooded districts and such a task was extremely dangerous owing to
the insecure situation, it was established that Koch, not in the
interest of the hunting earlier contemplated, but for this reason, had
ordered a cleaning up of this district; and in the course of this
cleaning up a considerable number of partisans had been found and they
had been shot. The remaining population from these forest districts had
been resettled, and, as Koch added, in addition to this statement of the
Chief of the Forest Administration, a number of these resettled persons
had even expressed gratitude for the fact that they had received better
soil to work than they had in these forest areas. On receiving these
reports from Koch the Führer shrugged his shoulders and said:

    “It is difficult to decide here. According to the statement of
    the Forest Administration for the Ukraine that I have here, I
    must leave the matter alone, and the other decisions regarding
    Ukrainian policy will be sent to you.”

This happened in July in the shape of a decree which is also in my
files, but which, unfortunately, has not been found. It is a decree
about which the witness Lammers has spoken and which in principle states
that the Reich Minister should cause no obstruction, the Minister for
the East should confine himself to basic matters, should submit his
decrees to the Reich commissioner for his opinion and, in the event of
conflict, the decision of the Führer must be secured.

After this decree of the Führer I made a renewed attempt to represent
the views which I considered right. But, of course, I will not deny that
on several occasions, due to pressure from the Führer’s headquarters, I
became a little weary. And when it was said, and said in clear-cut
terms, that I was apparently more interested in these Eastern peoples
than in the welfare of the German nation, I made some appeasing
statements; but my decrees and the further application of my
instructions continued in the old way. As I have now been able to
ascertain, I reported to the Führer personally on eight different
occasions on this matter, and I submitted written petitions and
formulated my decrees with this aim in mind.

When then, in 1944, the Reichsführer SS, too, occupied himself not only
with police affairs, but also with policy in the Eastern territories,
and when I had not been able any longer to report to the Führer’s
headquarters, since the middle of November 1943, I made one last attempt
to make a suggestion to the Führer regarding a generous Eastern policy.
At the same time, I asked very clearly, in the event of a refusal, to be
relieved from any further work. This document (Document Rosenberg-14) is
a letter to Dr. Lammers of 12 October 1944, at the beginning of which it
is said that:

    “In the face of current developments in the Eastern problem, I
    beg you to submit the accompanying letter to the Führer
    personally. I consider the way and manner in which the German
    policy in the East is being handled today as very unfortunate;
    while I have not participated in the negotiations, I am
    nevertheless made responsible for them. Therefore I beg you to
    submit my letter to the Führer as soon as possible for his
    decision.”

Dr. Lammers then immediately transmitted this letter to the Führer’s
secretary, Bormann. In the letter to the Führer it says on Page 2:

    “For observation and the steering of this development I have
    created regional offices for all the Eastern peoples in the
    Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which can now,
    after many tests, be regarded as suitable for their purposes and
    well set up. They also contain representatives from the various
    regions and races concerned, and if it seems in the interest of
    German policies, these may be recognized as a special national
    committee.”

These central offices mentioned here had the task of seeing to it that
the representatives of all Eastern peoples received personally the
complaints of their countrymen who were in sovereign German territory
and presented them to the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories
which in turn would take up these complaints with the German Labor Front
authorities, with the Police, or the Plenipotentiary General for the
Allocation of Labor.

On Page 5 it says then:

    “I have informed the Reich Minister and the Chief of the Reich
    Chancellery what the Eastern Ministry has done in the sphere of
    political direction in a letter dated 28 May 1944, and I am
    asking you, my Führer, to have the contents read to you.”

This is a reference to a further statement.

On Page 6 it states:

    “I am asking you, my Führer, to tell me whether you still desire
    my activity in this field, for since it has not been possible
    for me to report to you orally, and the problems of the East are
    brought to you and discussed from various sides, I must, in
    consideration of this development, assume that you perhaps
    consider my activity as no longer necessary.

    “In addition rumors are spread by sources unknown to me of the
    dissolution of the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories;
    in fact it is said that these rumors are used in official
    correspondence to the highest Reich authorities because of
    various demands which have been made. Under such circumstances
    fitting work is not possible, and I ask you to give me
    directives as to how I should act in view of the state of
    affairs which has developed.”

In the middle of the next paragraph, I point out the following, from
ideas that I voiced first in my speech of 20 June and in my protest
during the meeting of 16 June. And it says here literally:

    “This plan provided that in order to mobilize all the national
    forces of the Eastern peoples, they should be promised in
    advance a certain autonomy and the possibility of cultural
    development, with the aim of leading them against the Bolshevist
    enemy. This plan, which in the beginning I ventured to assume
    you approved of, has not been carried out, because the peoples
    were treated in a way which was politically opposite to this.

    “Solely and only because of the agrarian order of 1942, approved
    by you, has their willingness to work been maintained to the end
    in view of a certain hope of acquiring property.”

Attached to this letter to the Führer there is the suggestion for the
adjustment of the Eastern policy, which is reiterated for the last time.
And in Paragraph 2 in the middle of Page 2 it says:

    “These regional and local offices for the peoples of the East,
    attached to the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
    Territories, are, in the name of the Reich Government, to be
    recognized by him as national committees at a date to be fixed
    by the Führer. The term ‘National Committee’ is to be understood
    by the Reich Government to mean that these authorized spokesmen
    can submit the wishes and complaints of their peoples.”

On Page 2 in the middle, it says:

    “In the leadership of the peoples of the East...”

THE PRESIDENT: Is the Tribunal interested in all this detail? The
substance of it has been given by the witness, has it not? He summarized
the whole letter before he began to read any of it. There is nothing new
up to now.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to summarize again
briefly what his ideas were for the Ukraine, namely, autonomy, free
cultural development; and that was the core of the difference with Koch,
namely, that Koch stressed mainly the idea of exploitation; therefore
the defendant wanted to say once more what was the whole plan of his
intentions towards the Soviet Union. But this topic can now be dropped.

Before I make a statement about the question of the willingness to do
construction work in the Ukraine I want to have the defendant make a
statement on the subject of the treatment of prisoners of war. Document
081.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it anywhere in your books? Is it Document 081-PS?

DR. THOMA: It has been submitted under a USSR exhibit number.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

Have you got it, Defendant?

ROSENBERG: It is Exhibit USSR-353. The complaints regarding prisoners of
war came from various sources. Fairly near the beginning they were
already lodged with the Eastern Ministry; then later on, particularly
during the winter 1941-1942, they were brought by passing officers or
soldiers and were reported to me by my political department. We then
passed these complaints on to the competent military offices with a
request that, for obvious reasons, they should be given consideration.

These complaints were received frequently and my staff, as time went by,
stated to me that they encountered a great deal of understanding for
these wishes, particularly for the wish expressed by us that prisoners
from this large number of Soviet prisoner-of-war camps should be
selected according to their nationality and taken to small camps,
because through this national segregation, good political and humane
treatment would be best guaranteed. In view of the numerous complaints
about the death of many thousands of Soviet prisoners, I received more
than once reports that during battles of encirclement, units of the Red
Army had defended themselves in the hardest way and had not surrendered.
In fact they were completely exhausted from hunger when they finally
were captured by the Germans, and even numerous cases of cannibalism had
been established, born of their tenacity not to surrender in any case.

The third complaint I received was to the effect that political
commissars were shot. This complaint too was passed on by us. That an
order existed in this connection was unknown to me. We concluded from
other reports that here clearly there must have been a political or
police reprisal, since we heard that many German prisoners, who later
were freed, were most of them found, again dead or mutilated. Later on I
was informed that such shootings were prohibited, and thus we assumed
that the political commissars also belonged to the regular Red Army.

Now here is Document 081-PS. It has been stated by the Prosecution that
this is a letter from the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
to the Chief of the OKW. The document was also found in my files. But it
is not a letter from me to the Chief of the OKW, Keitel; on the
contrary, it was obviously deposited in my office by the sender. In the
left-hand top corner on Page 1, it can be seen that there is a figure
“I.” That means Department “I.” In the case of letters originating from
me such a reference would always be absent, since “I” was not a
department of my own office. Furthermore, letters of mine to the Chief
of the OKW were always of a personal character, either beginning with
the name of the addressee, or a personal address. Chief of the OKW is
the office. In the same way the ordinary address, “Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories,” would not be a personal letter to me,
but would mean the office.

I will not go into these details, but I will take the liberty of reading
one final paragraph in connection with which I may also state that it is
in keeping with the spirit which I endeavored to instill in my
collaborators. And likewise, they thought that they ought to act and
express themselves in this spirit. It states, literally, on Page 6:

    “The main demand...”

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date?

ROSENBERG: The letter is dated 28 February 1942. That is to say, it was
in the winter, in that dreadful cold period. On Page 6 it states
literally:

    “The main demand will have to be that the treatment of prisoners
    of war be carried out in accordance with the laws of humanity
    and as befits the dignity of Germany...

    “It is understandable that the numerous cases of inhuman
    treatment of German prisoners of war by members of the Red Army
    which have been recorded have so embittered the German troops
    that they wish to pay them back in their own coin.

    “Such reprisal measures, however, in no way improve the
    situation of German prisoners of war but must ultimately result
    in both sides no longer taking any prisoners.”

I merely wanted to quote this letter because I have no other documents
at my disposal on the activity of my political department, and this is
only an example of the work, which I think touches on these problems.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I wanted to bring to an end questions relating
to the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories by submitting an
affidavit from Professor Dr. Dencker on the employment of agricultural
machinery in the Ukraine. Document Rosenberg-35 has already been granted
me by the Tribunal. This affidavit concerns the following...

THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished your examination now?

DR. THOMA: I have finished the questions relating to the Ministry for
the Occupied Eastern Territories. I have only a few more brief
questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has seen this affidavit recently so there is
no need to read it. Now, if you will, give us the exhibit number.

DR. THOMA: Rosenberg-35. This deals with machinery which had a value of
180 millions and was delivered to the Ukraine—agricultural machinery.

Witness, were you a member of the SA or the SS?

ROSENBERG: No, I belonged neither to the SA nor the SS.

DR. THOMA: So you have never worn an SS uniform?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. THOMA: Do you know anything about concentration camps?

ROSENBERG: Yes. This question, of course, has been put to everybody and
the fact that concentration camps existed became known to me in 1933.
But although this may appear a repetition, I must nevertheless state
that I knew by name only two concentration camps, Oranienburg and
Dachau. When these institutions were explained to me I was informed,
among other things, that in one concentration camp there were 800
communist functionaries whose previous sentences averaged 4 year prison
terms or partly also penitentiary terms. In view of the fact that this
involved a complete revolution and even though it had legal basis it was
still something revolutionary, I considered it comprehensible that
protective custody should be for some time decreed by this new State for
these hostile persons. But at the same time I saw and heard how our
toughest opponents, against whom otherwise no charges of a criminal
nature were made, were treated so generously that, for example, our
strongest opponent, the Prussian Minister Severing was retired with full
ministerial pension, and I considered this very attitude as National
Socialistic. Thus I had to assume that these arrangements were
politically and nationally necessary, and I was thoroughly convinced of
this.

DR. THOMA: Did you participate in the evacuation of the Jews from
Germany?

ROSENBERG: I should perhaps add one thing: I visited no real
concentration camp, neither Dachau nor any other one. Once—it was in
1938—I questioned Himmler on how things really were in the
concentration camps and told him that one heard from the foreign press
all sorts of derogatory atrocity reports. Himmler said to me, “Why don’t
you come to Dachau and take a look at things for yourself? We have a
swimming pool there, we have sanitary installations—irreproachable; no
objections can be raised.”

I did not visit this camp because if something actually improper had
been going on, then Himmler, upon being questioned about it, would
probably not have shown it to me. On the other hand I desisted from
going for reasons of good taste; I simply did not want to look at people
who had been deprived of their liberty. But I thought that such a talk
with Himmler made him aware that such rumors were spreading.

A second time, later on—I cannot say, however, whether it was before or
after the outbreak of the war—Himmler himself spoke to me about the
matter of the so-called Jehovah’s Witnesses, that is, about a matter
which has also been submitted by the Prosecution as a religious
persecution. Himmler told me only that it was certainly impossible to
put up with conscientious objections, considering the situation the
Reich was in, that it would have incalculable consequences; and he went
on to say that he had often talked personally to these internees in
order to understand them and eventually convince them. That, he said,
has been impossible, however, because they replied to all questions with
quotations—quotations from the Bible which they had learned by heart,
so that nothing was to be done with them. From that statement by Himmler
I gathered that since he was telling me such a story he could not
possibly want to plan or carry out executions of these Jehovah’s
Witnesses.

An American chaplain has very kindly given me in my cell a church paper
from Columbus. I gather from that that the United States, too, arrested
Jehovah’s Witnesses during the war and that until December 1945, 11,000
of them were still detained in camps. I presume that under such
conditions, every state would answer in some way such a refusal of war
service; and that was my attitude too. I could not consider Himmler
wrong on this point.

DR. THOMA: Could you intervene in the case of Pastor Niemöller?

ROSENBERG: Yes. When the case of Pastor Niemöller was being tried in
Germany I sent one of my staff to the trial because I was interested in
it both from an official and humane point of view. This official—his
name was Dr. Ziegler—made a report to me from which I concluded that
this arraignment was based partly on misunderstandings on the part of
the authorities, and furthermore that he was not as seriously
incriminated as I had assumed. I then submitted that report to the
Deputy of the Führer, Rudolf Hess, and I asked him whether he could not
give this case consideration also, and after some time, when I was with
the Führer once, I brought the conversation around to this subject, and
stated that I thought this whole trial and the subsequent handling most
unfortunate. The Führer told me:

    “I have asked only one binding statement from Niemöller—that
    he, as a clergyman, will not challenge the State. He has refused
    to give that and hence I cannot set him free. Apart from that, I
    ordered that he receive the most decent treatment possible, that
    he, being a heavy smoker, receive the best cigars, and that he
    have the means for carrying on all learned studies, if he wants
    to do this.”

I do not know on what reports the Führer based this statement, but as
far as I was concerned it was clear that I was not in a position to
intervene any further in this matter.

DR. THOMA: We come now to the last question but one: Is it true that
after the seizure of power, you made a certain examination of your
attitude towards the Jews, and that the whole treatment of Jews
immediately after the seizure of power underwent a certain modification?
Further, that originally it had been intended to settle the Jewish
question in quite another way?

ROSENBERG: I will not deny that during that time of struggle up to 1933,
I too had used strong polemic arguments in my writings, and that many
hard words and suggestions appeared in that connection. After seizure of
power I thought—and I had good reason to think that the Führer thought
so too—that now one could renounce this method, and that a certain
parity and a chivalrous treatment of this question should be observed.
Under “parity” I understood the following—and I stated it in a public
address on 28 July 1933 and also at the Party rally in September 1933
publicly over all the broadcasting systems—that it was not possible,
for example, that the communal hospitals in Berlin should have 80
percent Jewish doctors when 30 percent was their ratio. I stated further
at the Party rally that we had heard of conditions that the Reich
government, in connection with all these parity measures and beyond
that, were making exceptions for all those members of the Jewish people
who had lost a relative, father or son, during the war; and I used the
expression that we would now have to make efforts to solve this problem
in a chivalrous way. That it turned out otherwise is a tragic destiny,
and I must state that the activities following in connection with the
emigration and the support of this emigration in many countries abroad
had as a result the aggravation of the situation; then things occurred
which were regrettable and I must say robbed me of the inner strength to
continue petitioning the Führer for the method I favored. As I said,
what was stated here recently in the veiled phraseology of the police
and made known here, and what has been testified to here the other day,
I considered simply impossible and I would not have believed it even if
Heinrich Himmler himself had related it to me. There are things which,
even to me, appear beyond the humanly possible, and this is one of them.

DR. THOMA: I have one last question. In connection with this question I
should like to submit Exhibit Rosenberg-15, Document 3761-PS. This is
contained in the document book but it has not yet been submitted to the
Tribunal as an Exhibit. It contains a letter from Rosenberg to Hitler,
written in 1924, containing the request that he should not be nominated
as a candidate for the Reichstag.

Witness, you have taken part in all phases of the development of
National Socialism from its beginning to its dreadful end. You have
participated in its meteoric rise and its dreadful descent, and you know
well that everything centered in this one person. Will you inform the
Tribunal what you did yourself, and how much you were able to accomplish
to avert having all the power centered in this one single person, and
what you did to have the effect in every way alleviated? I am showing
you first this document given to you, and then Document 047-PS, which
has also already been submitted to the Tribunal under the Exhibit Number
USA-725.

[_The documents were submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: I did actually serve this National Socialist movement from
its very first days on and I was completely loyal to a man whom I
admired during these long years of struggle because I saw with what
personal devotion and passion this former German soldier worked for his
people. As far as I personally am concerned, this letter refers to an
epoch...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, exactly what is your question to the witness?
We don’t want him to make a speech. We only want to know what question
you are putting to him.

DR. THOMA: What suggestions did you make, and did you publicly advocate
suggestions to restrict the authority of the Führer?

ROSENBERG: I must say that at that time I advocated—and this in full
agreement with Adolf Hitler—and I advocated in my book, _Myth of the
20th Century_, the view that the Leadership Principle did not consist of
one head but that both the Führer and his collaborators are to be bound
by common duties. Further, that this Leadership Principle concept should
be understood to mean the establishment of a senate or, as I described
it, Ordensrat, which would have a correcting and advisory function.

That point of view was emphasized by the Führer himself when he had a
senate hall with 61 seats built in the Brown House in Munich, because he
himself considered it necessary. Then I again advocated this policy in a
speech in 1934, but...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think this is in answer to the
question as to what he did to limit the Führer’s power. We want to know
what he did, if anything, to limit the Führer’s power.

DR. THOMA: In a public meeting he pointed out that—I draw your
attention to Document Book 1, Volume II, on Page 118...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, I didn’t want you to point it out to me, I
wanted the witness to point that out to the Tribunal.

DR. THOMA: In that case, will you concentrate on those two speeches
which you made at that time.

ROSENBERG: I can quote the speeches, but they are not a direct answer to
the question either. They signify that I stated that the National
Socialist State may not be a caste which reigns over the German nation
and that the Führer of a nation must not be a tyrant. However, I did not
see in Adolf Hitler a tyrant, but like many millions of National
Socialists I trusted him personally on the strength of the experience of
a 14-year-long struggle. I did not want to limit his own full power,
conscious though I was that this meant a personal exception for Adolf
Hitler, not in keeping with the National Socialist concept of the State.
Nor was this the Leadership Principle as we understood it or a new order
for the Reich.

I served Adolf Hitler loyally, and what the Party may have done during
those years, that was supported by me too. And the ill effects, due to
the wrong masters, were branded by me, in the middle of the war, in
speeches before political leaders, when I stated that this concentration
of power as it existed at that moment, during the war, could only be a
phenomenon of the war and could not be regarded as the National
Socialist conception of a State. It may be opportune for many, it may be
opportune for 200,000 people, but to adhere to it later on would mean
the death of the individuality of 70 million.

I said that in the presence of the Higher SS leaders and other
organization leaders or Gauleiter. I got in touch with the heads of the
Hitler Youth, together with my staff, fully conscious that after the war
a reform would have to be carried out here in the Party, so that the old
demands of our Movement, for which I too had fought, would find respect.
However, that has not been possible any more; fate has finished the
Movement and has taken a different course.

DR. THOMA: Witness, can you state a concrete fact from which it arises
that the Party, from the beginning, did not have the idea of coming to
power alone but also by collaborating with other parties?

ROSENBERG: That, of course, is a historical development of 14 years, and
if I can evaluate that letter here, then I would like to say that at the
end of 1923, after the collapse of the so-called “Hitler Putsch,” when
the then representatives of the Party either were arrested or had
emigrated to Austria, and when I remained in Munich with a few others, I
advocated that a new development must take place and that the Party
should prove itself in a parliamentary contest.

The Führer, who was then in prison at Landsberg, turned that suggestion
down. My collaborators and I continued to try to influence him, however,
whereupon the Führer wrote me a long, handwritten letter, which is also
in the files, in which he once more developed his reasons for not
wanting to comply with my suggestion. Later on, nevertheless, he agreed.

And here in this letter I asked him—he later agreed—not to nominate me
as Reichstag candidate, because I felt not entitled to the privileges of
a Reichstag deputy by favoring a Reichstag election, and secondly,
because I felt myself too new in Germany for exposing myself in such a
way after only a few years of activity.

DR. THOMA: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendant’s counsel want to ask any
questions?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, in September and October 1942 you received
various reports regarding unbearable conditions in connection with the
recruiting of workers in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Did you
investigate to find out whether the statements contained in these
reports were true?

ROSENBERG: These allegations, which were received by the Ministry for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, have been constantly checked by Main
Department of Labor and Social Policy during all these years and I asked
the Tribunal to hear as a witness here the official who always had
charge of this question, Dr. Beil. This request has been granted by the
Tribunal, but I now hear that Dr. Beil is ill and that he can give a
report of his experiences only by a written statement. From my knowledge
I can say the following:

These matters were reported to me frequently by Dr. Beil and the
so-called Central Department for People of Eastern Nationalities. In a
letter which has already been mentioned I transmitted them to Sauckel.
Then they were always sent to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine or
some other administrative officials for investigation and comments. A
part of these proved to be correct, a part proved to toe untrue and
exaggerated; and as far as I know, the Plenipotentiary General for
Allocation of Labor, Sauckel, even made the complaints received from me
an occasion for his own intervention, as did the German Labor Front,
which was responsible for the welfare of all foreign workers in Germany.
There was constant negotiation with the head of this Labor Front, and
the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories made requests here
continuously, until eventually, at the end of 1944, Dr. Ley, as the
chief of this welfare department, thought that he could inform me that
now after considerable difficulties, really lasting and good conditions
had been achieved. I replied to him even then that I could express my
pleasure about it, but that I still received reports that here and there
things were going wrong. In practice the members of my ministry,
together with inspectors of the German Labor Front, went to inspect a
number of labor camps in order to investigate the complaints and then
have them adjusted by the Labor Front.

DR. SERVATIUS: You are talking here mainly about conditions in Germany,
which did not come under your jurisdiction. What did you do regarding
Koch? Is the memorandum of 16 March 1943, which has already been
mentioned here, a reply to these complaints? In that memorandum you
write Koch that he must use legal means only and that he must call the
guilty to account. Was this an answer to these reports?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it was an answer because by December 1942 there had been
quite a number of complaints already.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what did Koch reply?

ROSENBERG: Koch replied to me that he, for his part, also wanted and
would employ legal means, but in the document read today, in his report
dated 16 March 1943, he complained several times that I did not always
believe these assurances, but that in every case the Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories not only intervened, but even demanded of
him a report on the carrying out of these instructions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Thus he denied considerable abuses?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he denied considerable abuses. He referred in the
document to one particularly serious case, namely, that individual
houses had been burned down in Volhynia because those who had been
called upon to work had resisted the recruiting by means of force, as he
explained, and he said that he had no other way of doing it. He added
that this case in particular had caused new complaints on the part of
the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was he entitled to such measures, in your opinion?

ROSENBERG: Reich Commissioner Koch had jurisdiction over the execution
of all orders coming from the highest Reich authorities. He was
responsible for the execution of all measures within the bounds of the
instructions. He had, I now believe, often overstepped the bounds of
these instructions and acted on his own initiative in taking, as he
thought, exclusively war economic measures. Sometimes I heard of these
measures, and often I did not, as appears from the document.

THE PRESIDENT: The question you were asked was whether in your opinion
he was entitled to burn houses because people refused to work, and you
have given a long answer which seems to me to be no answer to the
question.

ROSENBERG: In my opinion he did not have the right to burn down houses
and therefore I intervened, and he tried to justify himself.

DR. SERVATIUS: In order to carry out the labor recruiting, there were to
be recruiting measures which, it is true, had to be applied with a
certain amount of administrative coercion. How far was coercion
permissible, is there legal and illegal coercion, and how do you judge
the measures that were carried out in practice?

ROSENBERG: I myself insisted up until 1943 on a voluntary recruitment.
But in the face of the urgent demands from the Führer I could not
maintain this stand any longer and I agreed therefore—in order to have
a legal form at least—that certain age groups should be called up. From
these age groups all those working who were needed in the Occupied
Eastern Territories were to be excluded. But the others were to be
brought from all sides with the help of their own administrations in the
regional commissariat, that is, the little burgomasters in the Occupied
Eastern Territories, and there is no doubt, of course, that to give
force to these demands the police stood at the disposal of the
administration in the execution of this program.

DR. SERVATIUS: If there were abuses, could Koch stop them? Did you have
no influence in the matter?

ROSENBERG: It was the duty of the Reich commissioner to whom the
regional government of the Ukraine was subordinated to investigate and
to take action, in accordance with the instructions which he had
received from me.

DR. SERVATIUS: But why did you go to Sauckel as well? Was it Sauckel’s
duty also to stop this?

ROSENBERG: Sauckel, as the deputy of the Delegate for the Four Year
Plan, had the right to give instructions to me, as Minister for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, and over and above that, he had the right
to bypass me and give instructions to the Reich commissioners, a right
which, he used a few times in giving lectures in the general districts
of the Ukraine and of the Eastern territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was he—was Sauckel responsible for the conditions in the
Ukraine?

ROSENBERG: Sauckel was not responsible for the execution of these
demands, but of course on the basis of the authority given him by the
Führer he made the demands so harsh and exact that the responsible
regional governments of the commissioner general felt themselves bound
by conviction and appearance to back up the recruiting of labor by force
as appears, for example, from the report, Document 265-PS, from the
Commissioner General in Zhitomir. I think this can also be seen from the
report of the District Commissioner in Kovno, of which I cannot give the
exact number.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have an organization of his own?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he had a staff, but I cannot make a statement on the
size of it. He took care only that the civil administration had labor
offices attached to it, and his requirements as to the civil
administration in the East for the direction of these labor offices were
forwarded to the administrative offices. To my knowledge he did not have
a large organization.

DR. SERVATIUS: Before Sauckel came into your ministry was there not
already a department of “Labor,” which had its corresponding subordinate
departments on the middle and lower levels?

ROSENBERG: I cannot give you a precise answer to that. At any rate, I
think a department “Labor and Social Policy” was set up almost at the
beginning of the ministry, but at the moment I am not able to tell you
the exact date. Perhaps Dr. Beil’s statement will contain some details.

DR. SERVATIUS: Thus, you are not informed regarding the organization of
this recruitment of workers?

ROSENBERG: No, I am informed as far as I have just told you, but I
cannot give you exact information about the date of the foundation of
this main department “Labor and Social Policy” in the Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did labor offices for the Occupied Eastern Territories
exist, which had their head in your ministry?

ROSENBERG: The work—yes, insofar as the Main Department of Labor and
Social Policy did of course co-operate with the civil administration;
that is, both Reich commissioners had continuous contact and had
correspondence with the appropriate department, namely the labor office
attached to the Reich commissioner. A correspondence with the lower
agents, with the general districts, was naturally not carried on, but
there was continuous consultation with the appropriate department
attached to the Reich commissioner.

DR. SERVATIUS: In your letter you speak of “Sauckel offices.” What
offices do you mean by this?

ROSENBERG: Well, I mean, first of all, his immediate deputy Peuckert,
who later, in order to guarantee smooth co-operation, formally took over
the direction of this main department of “Social Policy.” He was but
very rarely at the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories since
he was officially working especially for Sauckel; and apart from that,
Sauckel had a few other gentlemen with whom my main department
negotiated continuously regarding the reduction of the quotas...

THE PRESIDENT: Surely, the witness Sauckel will give all this
information. What is the good of wasting our time putting it to
Rosenberg?

DR. SERVATIUS: It is important in order to ascertain the responsibility.
Later I cannot call on Rosenberg as a witness again; a number of
questions will arise, to which I...

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that, of course, but these are all details
of Sauckel’s administration which Sauckel must know himself.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I will have no opportunity later on to question
the witness Rosenberg regarding the individual authorities within the
organization, namely: Who was responsible, who had the right to
supervise, who had the duty to intervene? Why were letters addressed to
individuals? Why has he to answer them? One cannot understand that, if
one does not ask the witness—if he is not first asked about it before.
I would suggest that the witness Rosenberg should be called again in
connection with Sauckel’s case, after Sauckel has spoken; that would
save time.

THE PRESIDENT: There is no issue with the Prosecution about it. If there
is no issue with the Prosecution, then Sauckel’s evidence about it will
be quite sufficient.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the witness Rosenberg, in his letter—in a
letter addressed to Sauckel—mentioned the fact that his offices were
using these objectionable methods. Since in my opinion such offices did
not exist, and thus Rosenberg was addressing the wrong person, I must
establish what offices there really were. It is a complaint about
conditions that were oppressive to Rosenberg and he addressed himself to
Sauckel, instead of Koch.

THE PRESIDENT: Ask him some direct question, will you?

DR. SERVATIUS: What did Sauckel do upon receiving the letter you
addressed to him?

ROSENBERG: I did not receive a letter in reply to it; but I heard that
Sauckel, then at a meeting of his labor offices in Weimar, went into
these complaints in detail and that he tried to do his best to remove
the grounds for these complaints.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did not that meeting take place a fortnight later, that
is on 6 January 1943, and were you not present also?

ROSENBERG: Possibly. I spoke at a meeting at Weimar once; whether or not
it was this one, I am not able to say.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you hear Sauckel’s speech at this meeting?

ROSENBERG: No, I have no recollection of it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you get the speech in writing later?

ROSENBERG: I cannot remember that either.

DR. SERVATIUS: Later on I want to submit the speech as a document in
connection with Sauckel’s case. I have a number of further questions.

Did other departments, too, in the occupied territories, concern
themselves with the recruitment of laborers?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I received indeed some reports that also, for its part,
the so-called Todt Organization engaged workers for the carrying out of
their technical tasks, and I think also the railway administration and
other offices in the East were making efforts to get new workers for
themselves.

DR. SERVATIUS: Is it not correct that the Armed Forces were demanding
workers, that workers were demanded for road construction, were needed
by the domestic industry, and that there was a general effort to keep
manpower at home and not let them go to Germany?

ROSENBERG: That is correct, and it is a foregone conclusion that the
Armed Forces, the Todt Organization, and other offices wanted to keep as
many laborers as possible in the country for the growing amount of work
there and they probably did not like to part with their workers. That
goes without saying.

DR. SERVATIUS: Sauckel repeatedly pointed out that workers must be
supplied under all circumstances and that all obstacles must be removed.
Did that refer to the resistance of the local offices which did not want
to give up these workers?

ROSENBERG: It certainly referred to this local manpower, and in a
conference which I had with Sauckel in 1943 and which is also in
evidence as a document here but which was not submitted today, reference
was made to it. Sauckel stated that by order of the Führer he would have
to raise a large number of new workers in the East and that in this
connection, I am thinking of the Armed Forces most of all who had been,
as he expressed it, hoarding workers who might instead have been active
in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the recruitment of
workers, which took place in connection with the germanizing of the
East?

ROSENBERG: I cannot quite understand this question. What do you mean in
this case by “germanizing”?

DR. SERVATIUS: The SS undertook the resettlement in the East. In
connection with this manpower was shifted. Was this manpower allotted to
Sauckel upon his request?

ROSENBERG: First of all I do not know exactly which resettlement you are
talking about.

DR. SERVATIUS: A report has been presented to me which concerns the Jews
who were sent into Polish territory. I assume that they reached your
territory, too.

Do you not know about that?

ROSENBERG: Based on my own knowledge, I can say only that this
concentration of the Jewish population from Eastern Germany, in certain
cities and camps in the East, was carried out under the jurisdiction of
the Chief of the German Police, who also had this assignment for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. In connection with the resettlement in
camps and with the concentrations in ghettos, there probably also
developed a shortage of labor or something like that. I merely do not
know what that has to do with Germanization.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I should like to know what the
position is about the Defendant Frank’s documents. Does anybody know
anything about that?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I wish to say that insofar as we are concerned,
we have been in consultation with Dr. Seidl for the Defendant Frank as
well as the representatives of the Soviet prosecuting staff. We are
prepared to be heard at any time that the Tribunal would care to hear us
on the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then, Dr. Thoma, how many more witnesses have you
got and how long do you think you will be in the Defendant Rosenberg’s
case?

DR. THOMA: I have only one witness, Your Honors, the witness Riecke. I
believe that as far as I am concerned, he can be examined in one hour at
the most; I do not think it will take as long as that. After that, it
depends on the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes; then you may finish the Defendant
Rosenberg’s case tomorrow?

DR. THOMA: It depends upon the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. Then, Dr. Seidl, will you be able to go
on at once in Frank’s case? Supposing we finish Rosenberg
tomorrow—tomorrow is Wednesday, is it not? Will you be able to go on on
Thursday morning in Frank’s case?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I can start with Frank’s case as soon as
Rosenberg’s case is finished. As far as the documents are concerned,
there was difficulty regarding only one document and I have foregone the
presentation of this one document. But apart from that, these documents
have for the greater part already been presented by the other side.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one document in question, we can hear
you upon it now. As I understand you, you have only one document about
which there is any difference of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: That has been settled already because I have given up
presentation of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There is no further difference of opinion?

DR. SEIDL: There is no further difference of opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are perfectly ready to go on?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been translated yet?

DR. SEIDL: As far as I know, they already have been all translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, thank you.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                       ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH DAY
                        Wednesday, 17 April 1946


                           _Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Rosenberg resumed the stand._]

MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired
as to the status of the Frank Document Book, and when I informed the
Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had
a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I
think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last
night about 6 o’clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no
difficulty at all about the Frank books.

DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday I spoke
about the request for a document on the setting up of the Einsatzstab
Rosenberg. My client has repeatedly asked me to bring in this document.
However, there is a possibility that I confused this document with other
documents which I requested, but which were not granted. I just wanted
to make that correction.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make
that verbal correction? Very well.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant’s counsel who wishes to ask
any questions?

DR. HAENSEL: Witness, you were the Plenipotentiary of the Führer for the
ideological objectives of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations.
Are you of the opinion that what you did as Plenipotentiary of the
Führer in carrying out your duties and everything you said and wrote for
these aims and for the systematic so-called ideological combating of
Jewry may be considered as an official outline of the activity of the
Party and its affiliated organizations?

ROSENBERG: If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I
would like to say the following: My office, as far as ideological
education was concerned, worked with the SS Main Office for Political
Training. We were, of course, in constant contact with them. The
so-called “guiding pamphlets” of the SS, which appeared as an
instruction periodical, were read in my office. I myself had it
repeatedly in my hands, and during these years I found that in this
Office for Political Training, in these periodicals, a great number of
very valuable articles with mostly very decent ideas was contained. This
is one of the reasons why, through all these years, I did not enter into
any conflict with the SS.

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the objective as to this
problem was expressed in the program of the NSDAP. That is the only
official statement which guided the Party members. Anything which I said
about it, and what others wrote about it, were just reasons that were
set forth. Certainly much of that was accepted, but as far as the Führer
and the State were concerned these proposals were not binding rules.

DR. HAENSEL: Was the objective of your fight against Jewry limited? Did
you envisage that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and State
administration, or did you from the first have a vague notion of
stronger measures, such as extermination, _et cetera_? What was your
objective?

ROSENBERG: In agreement with the Party program, I had the one objective
in mind—to change the leadership in the German State as it existed from
1918 to 1933! That was the vital aim. As to elimination, even from
economic life, we did not talk about it at that time; and yesterday I
already referred to two of my speeches—which are available in print—in
which I declared that after the end of this harsh political battle an
investigation or examination of the problem would have to take place.
There was even earlier talk about the demand for Jewish emigration from
Germany, quite rightly. Later, when matters became more critical, I
expressed this idea again in conformity with the proposals of very
prominent Jewish leaders that German unemployed be deported to Africa,
South America, and China.

DR. HAENSEL: Then, following your train of thought of yesterday and
today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews:
First, until 1933—up to the seizure of power—were the propagandistic
measures; second, after 1933, those measures which found their
expression in the anti-Jewish laws; and then, finally, after the
outbreak of the war certain measures which without doubt can be
considered as Crimes against Humanity. Do you agree with this tripartite
arrangement?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is approximately right.

DR. HAENSEL: Then I would like to call your attention to Group 2, that
is, to those measures which were instituted after the taking over of
power, and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you
participate in the formulating of the laws?

THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What have those questions got to do with the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the
Party as a whole had the objective of a clearly formulated anti-Jewish
legislation, which was in the beginning quite orderly, then the SS was
bound to this objective and for the time being had none beyond that
point. I wanted to establish when the legislation and the measures
against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up to that time the SS
in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was
contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it
not?

DR. HAENSEL: I wanted only to show that the fact that the Jewish problem
was contained in the Party program does not prove that it was in the
Party program as a Crime against Humanity. In the Party program there
was simply a general sentence which I do not believe can be construed as
a Crime against Humanity. In addition to that, there must be...

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It
is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written
document—the Party program is contained in the written documents.

DR. HAENSEL: But, in addition to the Party program, a great number of
decrees and laws were issued later which expanded the Party program, and
the question...

THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to
construe—not for this witness to construe.

DR. HAENSEL: The question is, insofar as the defendant can tell us, how
far the SS participated in the carrying out of these regulations.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts. He cannot tell us the laws or
the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well
and good; but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to
interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.

DR. HAENSEL: Very well.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In your books you advocated the objective
that all Germans should be unified in a Greater Germany, and that point
is also set down in the Party program?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you believe that this was possible only through the
preparation for a war, or did you believe that it was just as possible
through peaceful means?

ROSENBERG: In the beginning of my testimony I referred to a speech of
mine made before an International Congress in 1932. Here this proposal
was expressly approved by the Führer to the effect that the four great
powers should investigate and examine the entire European problem. This
proposal said that we would give up all claims to German colonies, to
Alsace-Lorraine, to the Southern Tyrol as well as claims to the
separated German...

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this before from the Defendant Göring
and the Defendant Ribbentrop, and we said that we did not want to go
into it again. In any event, it has nothing to do with the SS—nothing
directly to do with the SS.

DR. HAENSEL: [_To the defendant._] Just one more question. Do you know
that the SS, as far as the Jews were concerned, followed secret aims and
objectives, others than those that were published officially?

ROSENBERG: That I learned here.

DR. HAENSEL: You do not know that from your own knowledge?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have one single question to put to you. Under
Document 091-PS the Prosecution submitted a letter which you, as the
Chief of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, sent to Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his
capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands. In that letter you
demanded that the library of the so-called Social Institute at Amsterdam
be handed over to you. I do not know whether you recall this library. It
was rather voluminous and of Socialist-Marxist content. The Prosecution
did not submit the answer given by my client. Therefore, I have to ask
you: Do you remember this matter and what answer did Seyss-Inquart give
you?

ROSENBERG: I remember this library very well, for I was told about it.
To my knowledge it represented the establishment of a spiritual center
of the Second International in Amsterdam, in which the history of social
movements in various countries was to be summarized in a library, so
that on the basis of this scientific material now a spiritual political
fight, a scientific fight...

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. We want to be brief, and you know what I am
talking about. What answer did you receive? Did Seyss-Inquart permit
this library to be transferred to Germany, or did he demand that it
remain in Holland?

ROSENBERG: It was at first agreed that this library would remain in
Holland, and that the cataloging and classifying of this collection,
which was not yet classified, was to take place in Amsterdam. In the
course of the next few years this took place in Amsterdam. Only in the
year 1944, when either the invasion had already begun or was surely
imminent, when bombing attacks also increased in this area, part of this
library was taken to Silesia; the other part, to my knowledge, did not
get through, but remained in Emden; and the third part, I believe, was
not removed.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it then correct that Seyss-Inquart prevented the
taking away of this library from the Dutch working class?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Before we begin our discussion of some matters that we would
like to go over, I wonder if you would be good enough to write your name
a few times on these pieces of paper, both in pen and in pencil.

[_Paper, pen, and pencil were handed to the defendant._]

Would you write “A. Rosenberg,” please, with pen, and “Alfred Rosenberg”
with the pen; and would you handwrite the first initial of your last
name with a capital?

Now, would you do the same thing with pencil on another piece of paper,
“A. Rosenberg” in pencil, “Alfred Rosenberg,” and the first initial of
your last name?

And then would you do one thing more, please. Would you print the first
initial of your last name?

[_The signatures were passed to Mr. Dodd._]

Now, yesterday afternoon, while you were on direct examination through
your own counsel, you stated before the Tribunal that you did have a
discussion with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, about
concentration camps, and if I remember correctly, you said that that was
some time in 1938; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I testified that I discussed the concentration camps
with him once, but I cannot say with certainty that it was in 1938, as I
did not make a note of it.

MR. DODD: Very good. He offered to have you go through one or the other
of these camps, Dachau or some other camp; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he then told me that I should take a look at the Dachau
Camp.

MR. DODD: And you declined the invitation?

ROSENBERG: Right.

MR. DODD: And I understood you—if I recollect correctly, you said
because you were quite sure that he would not show you the unfavorable
things that were in that camp?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed more or less that in case there really were
unfavorable things, I certainly would not see them anyway.

MR. DODD: You mean that you simply assumed that there were unfavorable
things; that you did not know there were unfavorable things?

ROSENBERG: I heard this through the foreign press and it is about...

MR. DODD: When did you first hear that through the foreign press?

ROSENBERG: That was already in the first months of 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you continuously read the foreign press about the
concentration camps in Germany from 1933 to 1938?

ROSENBERG: I did not read the foreign press at all for unfortunately I
do not speak English. I received only some excerpts from it from time to
time, and in the German press there were occasional references to it
with the strict declaration that these allegations were not true. I can
still remember the statement by Minister Göring in which he said that it
was beyond his comprehension that something like that could be written.

MR. DODD: But you thought they were true to the extent that there were
unfavorable things in that place that Himmler might not show you.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed that in such a revolutionary process surely a
number of excesses were taking place, that in some districts also on
occasion there might be conflicts, and that the fact that murders of
National Socialists in the months subsequent to the seizure of the power
continued most probably resulted in sharp countermeasures here and
there.

MR. DODD: Did you think that was still going on in 1938, these measures
against the National Socialists?

ROSENBERG: No. The chief reports upon the continuance of murders of
members of the Hitler Youth, of the Police, and of members of the Party
were made especially in 1943 and 1944, but I do not remember that many
reports still were published about this in subsequent years...

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1943 and 1944 or 1933 and 1934? Which is it?

ROSENBERG: 1933 and 1934, excuse me.

MR. DODD: But, in any event, in 1938 you had some knowledge in your own
mind which made you think that it would not be profitable for you to
inspect these camps because some things were going on there that would
not be shown to you. Now, that is so, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: No; but I said very frankly that under some circumstances
excesses might be taking place, and I talked to Himmler about this
matter so that he in any case knew that we were informed about such
things from abroad and that he should watch his step. Only once did I
receive a complaint directly myself.

MR. DODD: Now, turning to another matter, we also understood you to say
yesterday that when you wrote your book, _The Myth of the 20th Century_,
you expressed your personal opinion and you did not intend it to have
any great effect upon state affairs. Is that a fair statement of your
testimony of yesterday with respect to your book?

ROSENBERG: I did not quite follow the last sentence. I must say, I wrote
_The Myth of the 20th Century_ during the years 1927 and 1928
approximately, after certain historical and other preliminary studies.
It was published in October 1930 with an introduction to the effect that
this was a purely personal opinion, and that the political organization
of which I was a member was not responsible for it.

MR. DODD: Very good. I will ask that you be shown Document 3553-PS. That
is also, if Your Honor pleases, Exhibit Number USA-352. It is already in
evidence.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you wrote a preface or a little
introduction for that edition of that book. It is right there before
you. You said in it:

    “To the 150,000th copy: The _Myth_ has today drawn deep,
    ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German
    people. Every new edition is a clear indication that a decisive
    spiritual and mental revolution is growing into a historical
    event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea
    have already become a reality of State policy. Many other things
    will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new
    vigor.”

You wrote that?

ROSENBERG: That is certainly entirely correct. This book of 700 pages
does not concern only those points of which I am accused here. This book
deals with a large number of problems, the problem of the peasants, of
the world states, of the concept of socialism, of the relation between
leadership, industry, and labor, a presentation of the judgment...

MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. I don’t think it is necessary for you to
give us a list of the table of contents of the book. I simply asked you
if you wrote that introduction.

ROSENBERG: Yes, of course.

MR. DODD: Now, with respect to the well-known forced labor program. I
think it is perfectly clear to everyone who has been in attendance at
these sessions before this Tribunal, and of course to yourself, that
there was a forced labor program in effect, or a so-called slave labor
program, both in the East and in the Western occupied countries. Isn’t
that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes, the law of 21 March is concerned therewith with workers
from the occupied countries who were to be taken to Germany. In Germany
there was also a compulsory labor law.

MR. DODD: Now, there are only two possible offices under the then German
State which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be held responsible
either in part or altogether for that forced slave labor program. Isn’t
that so? Two principal offices, at least.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And they were your own ministry and the office of the
Defendant Sauckel. That is pretty simple. Is that true or not?

ROSENBERG: It is correct that Gauleiter Sauckel had been given the
authority to pass orders to me and to all the supreme Reich authorities.
It was my duty to make known and carry through these orders in the
Occupied Eastern Territories according to my powers, my judgment, and my
instructions.

MR. DODD: Did you carry out the compulsory labor directives under your
ministry, force people to leave their homes and their communities to go
to Germany and to work for the German State?

ROSENBERG: I fought for about three-quarters of a year for this
recruitment of workers in the East to be put on a voluntary basis. From
my record of a discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel still in the year 1943,
it is very evident that at all times I made efforts to do this. I also
mentioned how many millions of leaflets, of posters, and pamphlets I
distributed in these countries so that this principle would be carried
through. However, when I heard that if the number of German workers who
had to go to the front could not be replaced, the German Army reserves
would be at an end, then I could not protest any longer against
recruitment of certain age-classes, or use of local authorities and
forces of the gendarmerie to assist in this work. Yesterday I already
...

MR. DODD: What you are telling us is you tried to get them voluntarily
and you found they would not go, so then you forced them to go. Isn’t
that so?

ROSENBERG: That coercion took place here is true and is not disputed.
Where an excess took place—and some terrible excesses took place—I did
my utmost to prevent it or alleviate it.

MR. DODD: All right. You, of course, had promulgated an order in your
own ministry concerning compulsory labor, had you not?

ROSENBERG: Yes. In the beginning, a general compulsory labor service law
was promulgated.

MR. DODD: That’s right, on the 19th of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: It may be that it was promulgated about that time.

MR. DODD: Well, you can accept that as being so, I think, that that is
the date of your decree concerning compulsory labor, the compulsory
labor, significantly—I want to make this very clear to you—in the
Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: That order was promulgated by you as the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I ask that you be shown Document 1975-PS. It is Exhibit Number
USA-820, already in evidence—not in evidence, I’m sorry. I am now
offering it.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

I don’t care to stress this document too much except to have you verify
the fact that this is the order which you promulgated, and in the first
paragraph with the small Figure 1, you stated, “All inhabitants of the
Occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the general liability for
work according to their capacity.” And I wish to point out the paragraph
under that small Number 1, with the Number 3, where you say, “A special
ruling is drawn up for Jews.” That is the 19th day of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: The document which has been submitted to me is signed by the
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine and is concerned with a skeleton law
of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I ask that I be
shown the skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories in order that I may judge correctly the carrying-out
provisions issued by the Reich Commissioner.

MR. DODD: Well, we can make that available to you. This is taken from
the official gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern
Territories. You are not disputing, are you, the fact that you
promulgated this order and that these two paragraphs I read to you were
in it?

ROSENBERG: That I am not disputing.

MR. DODD: All right. If you care to look at all at the other paragraphs
and at other parts, I will see that they are made available to you, but
for the present purposes I can assure you there is no trick in
connection with this.

I want to move on to another document.

ROSENBERG: I would like to refer to just one point. Under Paragraph 1 it
says expressly that people not completely able to work are to be used
according to their capability for work. This shows the state of health
had been considered.

MR. DODD: Yes, I read that to you.

Now, you had a permanent state secretary by the name of Alfred Meyer,
isn’t that so?

ROSENBERG: I do not find anything here regarding the laws about Jews.
There was a point mentioned about the directive for Jews, only it is not
here.

MR. DODD: You will find it just below the sentence to which you made
reference a minute ago, two paragraphs below it. There is a Figure 3 in
parentheses and then this statement: “A special ruling is drawn up for
Jews.”

Don’t you find that there?

ROSENBERG: I do not find it here—oh, on this page, yes. That refers to
another law, yes.

MR. DODD: That’s all right. I just asked you if it was there, and it is.
Let’s go on.

I asked you if you had a permanent staff secretary by the name of Meyer,
Alfred Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I want to show you Document 580-PS, which will become Exhibit
Number USA-821. Now, this is an order from your Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is signed by your permanent staff
secretary, Alfred Meyer, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner
for the Ostland, a man by the name of Lohse, L-o-h-s-e, and also to the
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, a man by the name of Koch about whom
we have heard a good deal in this Trial.

I want to have you agree, if you will, that the order calls for 247,000
industrial workers and 380,000 agricultural workers.

Now, I want you to turn specifically to Page 2 of the English
translation and to Page 2, as well, of the German text, and Line 14 of
the English text and Line 22 of the German text. The paragraph has
before it the Figure 6, and it says:

    “The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be
    avoided; instead, for political reasons, the enlistment should
    be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not
    bring the required results and there should be a surplus of
    workers still available, use may be made in case of emergency,
    and in agreement with the Commissioner General, of the decree
    dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory
    labor in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Promises...”

So that this order, signed by Meyer of your staff, directing the Reich
commissioners in the Eastern Occupied Territories, was founded on your
decree of 19 December 1941 for compulsory labor.

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, you read the introduction, and from that we
can see also that my deputy clearly tried in every way to avoid forced
enlistment and, as he says, the enlistment was to “be kept on a
voluntary basis.” That is proof of what I already said yesterday, that
Meyer, my permanent deputy, most emphatically tried to work along these
lines, and lastly this does not refer to arbitrary measures but rather
to a general compulsory labor law in the Occupied Eastern Territories
which would prevent hundreds of thousands who could neither work nor
study from wandering about idly in the streets. I would however like to
read also the end of the paragraph, and that says:

    “Promises which cannot be kept may not be given, neither in
    writing nor verbally. Therefore, the announcements, posters, and
    appeals in the press and over the radio may therefore not
    contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment
    among the workers employed in the Reich, and thus reactions
    against future recruitment in the Occupied Eastern Territories.”

I think a more legal attitude in the midst of war is not at all
thinkable.

MR. DODD: Very good. All I am trying to indicate here, and to see if you
will not agree with it, is that you, nevertheless, despite these
remonstrances and these objections which we do not deny that you made,
did authorize your people in the Eastern Occupied Territories actually
to conscript and force people to come to work in Germany, and you did it
on the basis of your own decree. That is the point I am trying to make
with you.

ROSENBERG: A compulsory labor law was issued by me at the end of 1941
for the territory of the Reichskommissariat concerned, that is, for the
Ostland and for the Ukraine. The compulsory recruitment of this manpower
for the Reich was not taken until much later, and compulsory labor
service in the occupied countries was, in my opinion, legally necessary
so that on the one hand no wildcat recruitment would take place, and
also to prevent chaos resulting from the hundreds of thousands loitering
in the streets.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long
paraphrase for the one word “yes,” which is the answer you ought to have
made.

ROSENBERG: When compulsory labor service was also instituted for the
Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment. I could not
persist in this attitude for long and therefore, of course, I agreed
that then also compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted. I
already admitted that three times yesterday; I have not disputed it.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know you repeated it three times yesterday and again
this morning. In your own defense document—Rosenberg-11, I think it
is—which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December
1942—I don’t think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I
think you saw it yesterday—you specifically mentioned to Koch the
matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the
streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that
sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor,
didn’t you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.

ROSENBERG: Excesses are connected with every law, and as soon as I
learned of excesses, I did take steps against them.

MR. DODD: Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor
matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your
ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of
forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you
must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to
these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas?

ROSENBERG: I, of course, will take the responsibility for these laws
which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by
my ministry. The territorial governments were legally responsible for
their execution. Where they went beyond these measures—they were 1,500
kilometers away from me—I concerned myself with every case. Many
exaggerations were made and excesses also took place. I admit that
terrible things did occur. I tried to intervene, to apply punitive
measures and because of this quite a number of German officials were
taken to court and were sentenced.

MR. DODD: Leaving aside the terrible things that happened to people,
assuming that no great violence took place, the very fact of forcing
them against their wills to leave is something else that you will accept
responsibility for, I assume.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And you also feel that a considerable part of this...

ROSENBERG: [_Interposing._] I accept the responsibility due to a State
law which empowered Gauleiter Sauckel to place these claims to me which
I applied in legal form to the Eastern territories.

MR. DODD: Briefly, I want to remind you, while we are on this subject,
that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of
children as young as 10, 12, and 14 years old and removing them to
Germany, and I think you told us that at first it did disturb you, but
when you found out there were happy recreational circumstances, your
mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing
those children from the East?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I do not know just what the
translation of the document was, but the opposite was true. I wanted to
prevent anything from happening in any action in the operational zone
which might, under certain circumstances, be of gravest importance for
many children. Then, upon the request of the Army Group Center—which
anyway would have done it on its own—I took over the care of these
children on condition that I take most scrupulous care of them and care
for their own mothers, that they have contact with their parents, and so
that they might be returned to their homeland again later on. That is
certainly the exact opposite of what the Prosecution has submitted from
this document here.

MR. DODD: Well, I don’t want to dwell much longer on it except to remind
you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed
yesterday states, among other things, that by removing these children
out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be
destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That
is what you approved among other things, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Prosecution
and it was already read. I have made it clear by reading the whole
document that my approval did not depend at all on that point, that in
the first report I definitely refused that as an argument, and that only
after hearing other information did I find a method, for which the women
thanked me despite the fact that not I but the Hitler Jugend in Dessau
and elsewhere deserve the credit for taking care of them in this way.

MR. DODD: Actually, I understand from all your testimony that, with the
possible exception of the little while of which we have been talking,
you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your
jurisdiction in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You wanted to be very
kind to them.

ROSENBERG: I do not want at all to claim for myself any such sentimental
phraseology. However, in the midst of this terrible war in the East,
which brought with it the continual murder of German employees and
German agricultural officials, I only tried to carry on an intelligent
policy and to induce the people to heart-felt voluntary co-operation.

MR. DODD: Yes. Now I ask that you be shown Document 1058-PS, which is
(Exhibit USA-147.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you
made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to
before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day
before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to
the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says: “The
job of feeding the German people stands in these years without a
doubt....”

ROSENBERG: What page is that?

MR. DODD: It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the
whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able
to find it. It is at Page 8, Line 54. You may recall it; you talked
about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu
speech. Do you find it on Page 8?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have found it.

MR. DODD: In that paragraph you say, among other things—and I want to
call it to your attention for a specific purpose—you say that the job
of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the
southern regions and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a
balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that
you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people
with the surplus products of the territory. Then you say, “We know that
this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.”

You then go on to say, “A very extensive evacuation will undoubtedly be
necessary and the future will hold very hard years in store for the
Russians.”

Now, you read us some parts of that speech yesterday that you seemed to
think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu
or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now
were impromptu?

ROSENBERG: I just used a few key words and gave the speech that way.
This paragraph has been read by the Prosecution three or four times.
Yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself expressly referred to
this paragraph. Beyond that, I admitted that I was told by people
connected with the Four Year Plan that it was not certain whether the
industry of the Moscow industrial region could be fully maintained after
its conquest—here the “wagon factories” are mentioned. Restriction
might be necessary to some key industries, and through that a difficult
problem in the supply of this area would arise. My remarks pointed out
that, of necessity, these unemployed would probably have to be
evacuated. I expressly referred to this document, namely, the first
document of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on this
question where, under seven most important points for the civilian
administration, Point 3 concerns the feeding of the civilian population.
Later in the document it says that famines are to be avoided in any
event and that in such a case the population was to receive special
rations. I believe that in these hard times, in view of the laws and
directives, it was impossible for me to do more than that. My entire
political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said
yesterday about the demand for liberty and culture in the Ukraine, about
the sovereignty of the Caucasians, and also about the Russian State and
its big...

MR. DODD: All right. I don’t want you to go into all that. I understand
you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point
out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh
necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the
Russians. That is all. And if you don’t want to acknowledge that you
were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things,
then I won’t press you on it.

I want to turn to document...

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been
done for this problem than by planning beforehand how to master the
difficulties rather than afterwards. Other occupation forces have had
the same experience.

MR. DODD: All right.

I ask that you be shown Document 045-PS, Exhibit USA-822.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: Perhaps I might say something more about the translation of
this passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be
carried through “without any feeling.” In the original it says “beyond
feeling,” or “above feeling.”

MR. DODD: All right, I accept your interpretation; we won’t have any
trouble about that. Now, will you please look at this document? This is
a memorandum found in your files, for your information.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: You set out there, in the second paragraph, what you call the
aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down
by the Führer. They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw
materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial
education of the population towards intellectualism, but the
preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive
unconcern with the interior affairs.

Then, moving down a little bit—because I don’t think it is necessary to
read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document—we
come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph. Beginning
at the 14th line:

    “After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the
    Occupied Eastern Territories, I am convinced that German
    politics may have their own, possibly contemptuous opinion of
    the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the
    mission of German political representatives to proclaim measures
    and opinions which could eventually reduce the conquered peoples
    to dull despair instead of promoting the desired utilization of
    manpower to capacity.”

Then, in the next paragraph, you say:

    “If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most
    openly and aggressively, in contrast to the others, the
    political leaders in the East must remain silent where German
    policy calls for necessary harshness. They must remain silent as
    to any derogatory opinions which they may form about the
    conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy may in certain
    circumstances do more in the German interest through
    alleviations which do not affect policy and certain humane
    concessions, than through open, inconsiderate brutality.”

Were you honestly expressing your views when you wrote that memorandum
on the 16th of March 1942?

ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the
preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the
Führer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to
fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that
I saw the Führer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in
the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose
standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time.
From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either
sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their
attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to
act decently.

In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily
decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, “I ask that the
Führer rule on this record and the draft decree.” This instruction is
unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would
have been proved from it.

MR. DODD: All right. Now let’s turn to Document R-36, Exhibit USA-699.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You have seen this document before, haven’t you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.

MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your
subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt,
also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of
August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain
passages from it.

The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says,
“To the Reich Minister; on the premises.” It states that there is
enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the
matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July.

Before we go into this just for a minute—if you will just pay attention
to this—you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with
Bormann about some matters. Is that so?

ROSENBERG: I said...

MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified
that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on
occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was
to...

MR. DODD: All right. Let’s look at this document, which is, as I say, a
memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I
assume 1942:

    “On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a
    letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which
    the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern
    Territories.”

It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Führer dated the 11th of
August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are
already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.

The next paragraph says:

    “Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all,
    by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister”—that is
    you—“apparently was particularly concerned about two points.
    The first relates to the protection of German rule against the
    pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity
    of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive
    problems, of which more will have to be said.”

Then there is this statement:

    “For the rest, the Minister”—referring to you—“not only raises
    no objections against Bormann’s principles or even his
    phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his
    reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into
    practice. When, however, Bormann’s letter was read out by
    Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs,
    grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the
    phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern
    policy.”

Then it goes on to say:

    “In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is
    best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the
    prevailing situation.”

Then, under the Number 1, Markull writes:

    “Let us suppose Bormann’s letter were issued to the Reich
    commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no
    means unrealistic since the Minister”—and that again refers to
    you—“appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland
    presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will
    become probably the most important region politically, the
    following discussion will mainly be based on that region.”

Then, going on:

    “The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged
    by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into
    practice.”

Moving down a little bit, he says:

    “Imagine the formulas of Bormann’s letter translated into the
    language of a member of the German civilian administration, and
    you will get, roughly, the following views:

    “The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them,
    they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German
    health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is
    undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion,
    the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if
    they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces
    useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a
    future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion.
    As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We
    are the masters; we come first.”

Then it goes on to say:

    “These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary
    they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of
    Bormann’s letter. Already at this point the question arises
    whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the
    Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become
    known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already
    today.”

Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says:

    “But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was
    done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in
    the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for
    the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people
    governed by him in three successive speeches at the
    inauguration....”—_et cetera._

And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to
before this Tribunal.

Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member
of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own
observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is
prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements
that have been made by saying, “To be exact, we are here among negroes;
the population is just dirty and lazy,” and so on.

And then, passing on, he says:

    “I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still
    retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his
    professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev
    question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics.
    Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the
    population starved to death.”

Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says:

    “Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the
    views described above. In many conferences with the general
    commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be
    treated decently and with understanding.”

And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will
result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.

And then Markull goes on to say:

    “For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the
    ‘master race’ is to relax the discipline of our officials.”

I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading
it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with
a Number 5:

    “However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an
    agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann
    letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other
    instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as
    tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of
    opinion. The Minister’s reply”—I remind you each time the
    Minister refers to you—“of 11 August might be considered to
    point in this direction.”

Then he goes on to say:

    “In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister
    knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a
    continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics
    and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a
    statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political
    conditions.”—And so on.

And finally he says:

    “Another reason why...”

I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that
perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver,
because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case
the word “liberation” ought never to have been mentioned and no theater
should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university
should be allowed to function.

And finally I would like to read you—not finally—but I would like to
read you this significant paragraph. It states—and I think you will
allow me to summarize it—that this letter of Bormann’s, which
originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a
ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto
announced by the Minister—yourself.

And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:

    “It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity
    between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions
    given in the Bormann letter.”

Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon
this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be
useful, recounting some difficulties.

And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph:

    “Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of
    Reichsleiter Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the
    wording of his letter does not always bring out clearly the
    importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like ‘brisk trade in
    contraceptives’ had better not be brought into connection with
    the name of the Führer. In the same way abrupt phrases like
    ‘vaccination of the non-German population is completely out of
    the question,’”—and so on—“would hardly seem to be entirely in
    keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved
    here.”

Finally, to go on, I want to read you this, under Number III, Markull
states:

    “The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are,
    however, dictated by concern and duty.”

And finally—well, I don’t think there is any necessity to read the last
paragraph. It merely talks about the political philosophy which is being
raised in a grandiose manner by the Japanese ally in his new districts.

Now, you remember this memorandum that you received through your
assistant, Leibbrandt, from your subordinate, Markull? You can answer
that “yes” or “no,” by the way; that is all I want to know right
now—whether or not you remember it. Will you wait just a minute?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I received this report from Dr. Leibbrandt, and I would
like to make the following explanation.

MR. DODD: Just before you do that—you will have an opportunity; I won’t
shut you up on any explanations or even attempt to—I have one or two
things I would like to ask you about it, and then if you feel the need
to explain them or anything else I feel sure the Tribunal will permit
you to do so.

You had written a letter in answer to the Bormann letter, hadn’t you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR. DODD: And you had agreed with these—if I may use the term—shocking
suggestions of Bormann? In your letter you had agreed with these
shocking suggestions of Bormann? “Yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: I wrote an appeasing letter so that I could bring about a
pause in the constant pressure under which I was kept, and I would like
to anticipate and say that my activity, and the decrees which I issued
after this letter, did not change in any way; but, on the contrary,
decrees were issued setting up a school system and for the further
continuation of health control. I will discuss it further in my reply.

MR. DODD: You wrote this letter to the Führer; you did not write it to
Bormann, did you? Your answer went to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote my reply to the Führer, yes.

MR. DODD: And you were appeasing the Führer as well, were you, when you
mouthed back the phrases such as are repeated in this letter about the
use of contraceptives and abortion?

ROSENBERG: No; besides...

MR. DODD: Wait until I finish. I was saying, in your letter to the
Führer you wrote back those horrid suggestions of Bormann, didn’t
you—those nasty, horrid suggestions of Bormann, I might say? You wrote
them to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I wrote a letter to the Führer, but did not use the wording
of Bormann’s letter. I wrote appeasingly to the Führer that I was not
doing any more than could and had to be done. I wanted to ward off an
attack from headquarters for I knew it would come because I did more for
the Eastern peoples than for the German people—that I was demanding
more doctors than the German people had for their sick, that I was doing
more in my capacity as Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for
the health problem and thereby for the Eastern people than German
doctors could do for the German people. The attack had reached such
proportions that Koch finally accused me of promoting a policy of
immigration. That was the reason why the conflict arose shortly
thereafter and was brought to the Führer.

MR. DODD: Just so there will be no doubt about this—I don’t want there
to be any misunderstanding and nobody else does—are you telling us that
you did not write back almost word for word what Bormann wrote to you?

ROSENBERG: I do not have the letter here verbatim.

MR. DODD: But you have the Markull memorandum here, which says that the
Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann’s principles or
even his phraseology. Now surely one of your subordinates would not be
impertinent enough to write you a memorandum like that unless it was
perfectly true that you had done so?

ROSENBERG: I welcomed very much that my collaborators always had the
courage to contradict me and give me their opinion, even concerning
something I myself requested. Dr. Leibbrandt came and said to me, “Herr
Reich Minister, that certainly is not in accord with what we are all
doing here.” I said, “Dr. Leibbrandt, please calm yourself. I have
written an appeasing explanation. Nothing will be changed. Later I will
also speak to the Führer personally about these matters.”

MR. DODD: Your subordinate was not afraid to tell you that you had
written such a letter in which you agreed word for word with Bormann. I
have no trouble with you on that score. That is all I am trying to get
you to tell this Tribunal, because it is true that you did write back
expressing these word-for-word sentences.

ROSENBERG: That is not correct. The author—I rather say Dr.
Leibbrandt—when he gave me this memorandum, read it through in a hurry
saying, “There seems to be a gentleman who believes that I cannot do
anything else but what I consider right.” But in this case I am facing a
serious conflict, and I will maintain my position as I consider it
right. That may be seen in the documents covering a period of 3 years
which I read yesterday. May I give my opinion now on this document?

MR. DODD: Answer this question: Who were you appeasing, Hitler or
Bormann? Or both of them?

ROSENBERG: First, I concurred with my collaborator, Dr. Leibbrandt, in
the idea that ministerial decrees in that sense would never be released
by me. Second, I regulated by a decree the school system in the Ukraine
including a 4-year elementary school, trade school, and professional
colleges.

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. That is not an answer to the question. You
said that you wrote an appeasing answer. The question is whom were you
trying to appease. Was it Hitler or was it Bormann or was it both?

ROSENBERG: Yes, both of them; yes.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, would this be a convenient time to break off?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have stated yesterday that the document
books for Frank have already been translated. However, it appears—I
have just found this out—that the document books are not yet bound
because the office authorized to do that has not yet received permission
from another competent office. Perhaps the Tribunal could order the
binding of the document books, or else the whole translation is useless.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I did not know there was any delay, but I will see to it right
away that they get it as far as we are able to do it.

ROSENBERG: May I say something about this document? This memorandum, as
I stated in the beginning, is based on the supposition of a possible
ministerial decree. It obviously uses phrases which Bormann had used in
his letter, but my letter which I sent to the Führer cannot possibly
contain these phrases. It may have contained appeasing statements to the
effect that I did nothing in the Occupied Eastern Territories for which
I was reproached; that is to say, that I did nothing for the German
population but that I established large health departments, school
departments, education departments, _et cetera_; and that now I was
absolutely compelled to simplify these administrative departments. But
that Bormann made these statements, that he used these phrases! It is
regrettable that he expressed himself in this way; and during the last
few years we were compelled to observe an unnecessarily large number of
similar instances.

I may add briefly that he himself stated that the Minister apparently
intervened to clarify these things there, but I want to indicate one
decisive point, and that is that the opinions advanced by Bormann were
also familiar to Koch’s circle. During these tragic years my entire
efforts were directed against Koch’s personal circle, especially in the
training of administrative leaders; and that can be seen from Paragraph
3, where it says, “Moreover, at least 80 percent of the district
commissioners are opposed to the views described.”

MR. DODD: I think we all know what is in it. If you have any
explanation, I think you ought to make it.

ROSENBERG: Yes. On Page 4, it says the great majority of the
administrative leadership corps set their hopes in the Minister—that
is, myself—and I endeavored and tried to fulfill these hopes of the
administrative leadership corps, which I attempted to educate by means
of my decrees because these thousands of people could not know the vast
Eastern territories, these thousands who, even in the fight against
Bolshevism, sometimes had no very clear conception of the state of
things in the East; and I must emphasize the fact that the author here
says that the decree issued by the Minister on 17 March 1942
re-emphasizes his former decrees in a more rigorous form. The decree of
13 May 1942 attacks the view that the Ukrainians were not a race at all
and attacks the false conception of superiority. Thus, these are two
decrees which I have not received and which are here; and furthermore,
Mr. Prosecutor, I say that he points out quite correctly that of course
the Minister—that is, myself—knows very well that such a continent has
to be treated differently than in accordance with these suggestions
which we have heard. As a consequence of these proceedings, however, I
have positively established that after that correspondence between Koch
and Bormann I introduced the orderly set-up of a school administration
in the Ukraine by issuing a detailed decree. Secondly, I requested the
extension of the...

MR. DODD: I am not interested in that. Just a minute.

ROSENBERG: Well, I have to answer these accusations.

MR. DODD: That is no answer to this, if Your Honor pleases, and no
explanation of this document. He is launching off on one of these long
speeches again about what he did after the document was received or
after he wrote the letter, and I ask that he be instructed to answer
that question and not to go on into statements about what he did in the
administration in the Ukraine. I don’t think it is pertinent.

ROSENBERG: I spoke to the Führer personally about this and told
him—that decree of May 1943 is in my file—I told him that it was
impossible to work in the East with this kind of talk from Koch and his
following.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is a letter in your file or if there is not a
letter in your file, your counsel can re-examine you upon
cross-examination, but you cannot in cross-examination go into long
explanations. You must answer the question “yes” or “no” and explain, if
you must explain, shortly. You have been explaining this document for a
long time.

MR. DODD: When did you first meet Erich Koch?

ROSENBERG: Erich Koch?

MR. DODD: Yes.

ROSENBERG: In the twenties. It may have been 1927 or 1928...

MR. DODD: Apparently you have known him, then, a great many years?

ROSENBERG: I have not seen him often, but as Gauleiter I talked to him
personally now and again.

MR. DODD: When did he become a Gauleiter?

ROSENBERG: I believe in the year 1928 he became Gauleiter in East
Prussia, but I cannot give the exact date when he became Gauleiter.

MR. DODD: That is all right. I want an approximate date. Did you have
much to do with him from the time that he was appointed Gauleiter, let
us say, until 1940?

ROSENBERG: During the fighting years, I had practically nothing at all
to do with him. Then later, after 1933, I talked to him several times.

MR. DODD: You had a pretty good knowledge, I assume, in any event, of
his general reputation among his friends and acquaintances?

ROSENBERG: I knew Koch had a very excitable temperament, going from one
extreme to the other and hard to keep steady, and therefore not reliable
in carrying out a steady policy.

MR. DODD: I take it from your answer, that you were not aware, however,
before he became the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, of his
temperament in this way, that you did not know that he did these
terrible things, which he did do while Reich Commissioner in the
Ukraine, did you?

ROSENBERG: No, and...

MR. DODD: That is an answer and there is no need to explain that.

ROSENBERG: I even knew that Koch had expressed the opposite opinion
previously, and that he had said that the youth of the East embraces
also the German youth. He previously wrote that.

MR. DODD: So I take it you were surprised when this man turned out to be
the kind of man that he did turn out to be. Is that a fair statement?

ROSENBERG: That only came to light gradually later on. Another person
could not foresee that this temperament would involve such results and
it would not have gone so far had he not been supported by somebody
else.

MR. DODD: You don’t think he was quite so good a man as appears from the
record, but was rather encouraged by some others; is that what you are
trying to tell us?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that, of course, contributed.

MR. DODD: I am going to ask that you be shown Document 1019-PS; it
becomes Exhibit USA-823. By the way, before we look at that document,
Koch is the man whom you blame to a very great extent for many of these
terrible things that happened under your ministry in the Ukraine, isn’t
he? There isn’t any doubt about that. You told us about that all day
yesterday.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, could you go just a little bit slower?

MR. DODD: Yes, Your Honor, I will.

[_Turning to the defendant._] If you look at this document, you will see
that it is a memorandum about your recommendations as to the personnel
for the Reich commissions in the East and for the central political
office in Berlin; and it was written on the 7th day of April 1941, and I
take it that that was only a few days after Hitler talked to you about
your new assignment in the East, 4 or 5 days at the most; isn’t that so?
Will you answer that question?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: Now, in this memorandum you set out that you recommended
Gauleiter Lohse and we know from the documents and the testimony that he
was appointed; isn’t that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, turn to the next page of the English text; it
is the paragraph beginning as follows:

    “In addition it will eventually become necessary to occupy with
    troops not only Leningrad, but also Moscow. This occupation will
    probably differ considerably from that in the Baltic provinces,
    the Ukraine, and the Caucasus. It will be aimed at the
    suppression of any Russian and Bolshevik resistance and will
    necessitate an absolutely ruthless person both as regards the
    military representation and also the eventual political
    direction. The problems arising from this need not be detailed
    here. If it is not intended to maintain a permanent military
    administration, the undersigned would recommend the Gauleiter of
    East Prussia, Erich Koch, as Reich Commissioner in Moscow.”

Did you recommend Koch for that job as a particularly ruthless man in
April of 1941? “Yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes...

MR. DODD: Just a minute. You have done a lot of talking here for the
last day and today if you will just give me a chance once in a while.

He is the same man you told us a minute ago you did not know to be
particularly ruthless until after he did these terrible things in the
Ukraine. Now, it is very clear you did know it in April of 1941, isn’t
it? What is your answer to that?

ROSENBERG: That is not correct; that is not laid down here. I have
stated that I know from Koch’s writings from 1933 and 1934 that he had a
special liking for the Russian people. I knew Koch as a man of
initiative in East Prussia. I had to expect that at the center of Moscow
and around Moscow a very difficult job would have to be done. For here
was the center of gravity of Bolshevism and here under certain
circumstances the greatest resistance would arise. Then I did not want
to have Koch in the Eastern territories and not in the Ukraine because I
did not believe I had to fear such resistance there. There was, on one
side, Koch’s devotion to the Russians, on the other side he was a man
with economic initiative; finally I knew he was supported in such a
manner that he was intended for some job in the East by the Führer as
well as by the Reich Marshal.

MR. DODD: When you were looking for a ruthless man you suggested Koch as
early as April of 1941.

ROSENBERG: This expression refers here rather to initiative and, of
course, to the view that he would fight any Bolshevik resistance
ruthlessly; but not in the sense that he would suppress a foreign race
or try to exterminate foreign cultures.

MR. DODD: The truth of the matter is that you had some peculiar and odd
interest in the Ukraine and you had somebody else in mind for that job
but you knew Koch was a bad actor and you wanted him in another part of
Russia, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, for the Ukraine I wanted State Secretary Backe or my
Chief of Staff Schickedanz, as can be seen from this document. I wanted
State Secretary Backe because he is a German from the Caucasus and
speaks Russian, knows the entire southern territory and probably could
have worked very well there. I did not get him and I was forced to
accept Koch, I would like to say, against my personal protest in the
meeting of 16 July 1941.

MR. DODD: Well, if that is your answer I do not care to go any further
with it.

With respect to your attitude towards the Jewish people, in your
Frankfurt speech in 1938 you suggested that they all had to leave Europe
and Germany, did you not?

ROSENBERG: This phrasing was used.

MR. DODD: All you need to say is “yes” or “no.” Did you do that or not
in your speech in Frankfurt in 1938?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but I certainly cannot answer “yes” or “no” on an
incorrect quotation!

MR. DODD: I do not think you need to explain anything at all. I merely
asked you whether you said that in Frankfurt in your Party Day speech.

ROSENBERG: Yes, in substance that is correct.

MR. DODD: Now, in your Party Day speech to which you made reference
yesterday, you said you used harsh language about the Jews. In those
days you were objecting to the fact that they were in certain
professions, I suppose, and things of that character. Is that a fair
statement?

ROSENBERG: I said yesterday that in two speeches I demanded a chivalrous
solution and equal treatment, and I said the foreign nations might not
accuse us of discriminating against the Jewish people, so long as these
foreign nations discriminate against our nation...

MR. DODD: Yes, very well. Did you ever talk about the extermination of
the Jews?

ROSENBERG: I have not in general spoken about the extermination of the
Jews in the sense of this term. One has to consider the words here. The
term “extermination” has been used by the British Prime Minister...

MR. DODD: You will get around to the words. You just tell me now whether
you ever said it or not? You said that, did you not?

ROSENBERG: Not in a single speech in that sense...

MR. DODD: I understand the sense. Did you ever talk about it with
anybody as a matter of State policy or Party policy, about the
extermination of the Jews?

ROSENBERG: In a conference with the Führer there was once an open
discussion on this question about an intended speech which was not
delivered. The sense of it was that now a war was going on and that this
threat which had been made should not be mentioned again. That whole
speech was also not delivered.

MR. DODD: When was it you were going to deliver that speech?
Approximately what was the date?

ROSENBERG: In December 1941.

MR. DODD: Then you have written into your speech remarks about the
extermination of Jews, haven’t you? Answer that “yes” or “no.”

ROSENBERG: I have said already that that word does not have the sense
which you attribute to it.

MR. DODD: I will get around to the word and the meaning of it. I am
asking you, did you not use the word or the term “extermination of the
Jews” in the speech which you were prepared to make in the Sportpalast
in December of 1941? Now, you can answer that pretty simply.

ROSENBERG: That may be, but I do not remember. I myself did not read the
phrasing of the draft any further. In which form it was expressed I can
no longer say.

MR. DODD: Well then, perhaps we can help you on that. I will ask you be
shown Document 1517-PS. It becomes Exhibit USA-824.

[_Document 1517-PS was submitted to the defendant._]

Now, this is also a memorandum of yours written by you about a
discussion you had with Hitler on the 14th of December 1941, and it is
quite clear from the first paragraph that you and Hitler were discussing
a speech which you were to deliver in the Sportpalast in Berlin, and if
you will look at the second paragraph, you will find these words:

    “I remarked on the Jewish question that the comments about the
    New York Jews must perhaps be changed somewhat after the
    conclusion (of matters in the East). I took the standpoint not
    to speak of the extermination (Ausrottung) of Jewry. The Führer
    affirmed this view and said that they had laid the burden of war
    on us and that they had brought the destruction; it is no wonder
    if the results would strike them first.”

Now, you have indicated that you have some difficulty with the meaning
of that word, and I am going to ask you about the word “Ausrottung.” I
am going to ask that you be shown—you are familiar with the standard
German-English dictionary, _Cassell’s_, I suppose, are you? Do you know
this word, ever heard of it?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: This is something you will be interested in. Will you look up
and read out to the Tribunal what the definition of “Ausrottung” is?

ROSENBERG: I do not need a foreign dictionary in order to explain the
various meanings “Ausrottung” may have in the German language. One can
exterminate an idea, an economic system, a social order, and as a final
consequence, also a group of human beings, certainly. Those are the many
possibilities which are contained in that word. For that I do not need
an English-German dictionary. Translations from German into English are
so often wrong—and just as in that last document you have submitted to
me, I heard again the translation of “Herrenrasse.” In the document
itself “Herrenrasse” is not even mentioned; however, there is the term
“ein falsches Herrenmenschentum” (a false master mankind). Apparently
everything is translated here in another sense.

MR. DODD: All right, I am not interested in that. Let us stay on this
term of “Ausrottung.” I take it then that you agree it does mean to
“wipe out” or to “kill off,” as it is understood, and that you did use
the term in speaking to Hitler.

ROSENBERG: Here I heard again a different translation, which again used
new German words, so I cannot determine what you wanted to express in
English.

MR. DODD: Are you very serious in pressing this apparent inability of
yours to agree with me about this word or are you trying to kill time?
Don’t you know that there are plenty of people in this courtroom who
speak German and who agree that that word does mean to “wipe out,” to
“extirpate?”

ROSENBERG: It means “to overcome” on one side and then it is to be used
not with respect to individuals but rather to juridical entities, to
certain historical traditions. On the other side this word has been used
with respect to the German people and we have also not believed that in
consequence thereof 60 millions of Germans would be shot.

MR. DODD: I want to remind you that this speech of yours in which you
use the term “Ausrottung” was made about 6 months after Himmler told
Hoess, whom you heard on this witness stand, to start exterminating the
Jews. That is a fact, is it not?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct, for Adolf Hitler said in his
declaration before the Reichstag: Should a new world war be started by
these attacks of the emigrants and their backers, then as a consequence
there would be an extermination and an extirpation. That has been
understood as a result and as a political threat. Apparently, a similar
political threat was also used by me before the war against America
broke out. And, when the war had already broken out, I have apparently
said that, since it has come to this, there is no use to speak of it at
all.

MR. DODD: Well, actually, the Jews were being exterminated in the
Eastern Occupied Territories at that time and thereafter, weren’t they?

ROSENBERG: Then, may I perhaps say something about the use of the words
here? We are speaking here of extermination of Jewry; there is also
still a difference between “Jewry” and “the Jews.”

MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that at that time and later
on Jews were being exterminated in the Occupied Eastern Territories
which were under your ministry? Will you answer that “yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I quoted a document on that yesterday.

MR. DODD: Yes, and after that you told the Tribunal or, as I understood
you at least, you wanted the Tribunal to believe that that was being
done by the Police and without any of your people being involved in it;
is that so?

ROSENBERG: I have heard from a witness that a district commissioner is
said to have participated in these things in Vilna, and I have heard
from another witness that in other cities the report came through that
the Police would carry it out. From Document 1184 I gathered that a
district commissioner opposed in every possible way and protested
against this so-called “Schweinerei” (scandalous doings).

MR. DODD: Dr. Leibbrandt was your subordinate; he was in charge of
Division II in your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
wasn’t he?

ROSENBERG: Yes, for a time.

MR. DODD: Now, for the second time, I’ll ask that you be shown Document
3663-PS, Exhibit USA-825.

[_Document 3663-PS was submitted to the defendant._]

Now, this document consists of three parts as you will notice. The first
page is a letter written by Dr. Leibbrandt on the stationery of the
Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and it is dated 31
October 1941; that’s not too many days before you had your conversation
with the Führer about your speech, and it is addressed to the Reich
Commissioner for the Ostland in Riga. That was Lohse, the man whom you
recommended. The letter says:

    “The Reich Security Main Office has complained that the Reich
    Commissioner for the Ostland has forbidden execution of Jews in
    Libau. I request a report in regard to this matter by return
    mail. By order”—signed—“Dr. Leibbrandt.”

Now, if you will turn to the next page, you will see the answer. Turn
that document over if you have the original—do you? You will see the
answer, dated Riga, the 15th of November 1941, to the Reich Minister for
the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin. “Subject: Execution of Jews,
re: Decree.” It refers to the letter of Leibbrandt, apparently, of the
31st of October 1941, and it says:

    “I have forbidden the wild execution of Jews in Libau because
    they were not justifiable in the manner in which they were
    carried out. I should like to be informed whether your inquiry
    of 31 October is to be regarded as a directive to liquidate all
    Jews in the Ostland. Shall this take place without regard to age
    and sex and economic interests of the Wehrmacht, for instance in
    specialists in the armament industry?”

And there is a note in different handwriting:

    “Of course, the cleansing of the Ostland of Jews is a main task.
    Its solution, however, must be harmonized with the necessities
    of war production.”

It continues:

    “So far, I have not been able to find such a directive, either
    in the regulations regarding the Jewish question in the ‘Brown
    Portfolio’ or in other decrees.”

Now, that has the initial “L” for “Lohse,” doesn’t it, at the bottom of
it? And then, if you’ll look at the third page—no, it is another
document. There are only two parts to that document.

Now, I wish that you would look at Document 3666-PS, which becomes
Exhibit USA-826.

THE PRESIDENT: That has on it the initial “L,” has it?

MR. DODD: The original has, Your Honor; yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And the defendant agrees that that is the initial of
Lohse; is that right?

ROSENBERG: That could hardly be Lohse. I do not know Lohse’s initial. I
do not know.

MR. DODD: Well, it’s very...

ROSENBERG: It could also be Leibbrandt; I do not know.

MR. DODD: You’re not willing to say that that second letter was from
Lohse and that that is his initial on the bottom of it?

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say.

MR. DODD: All right.

ROSENBERG: That I cannot say because usually typewritten letters are
sent anywhere.

MR. DODD: Well, we’re...

ROSENBERG: This note in the back is not quite clear to me. Essentially,
however, it means that this was a protest against police measures which
had become known and that an instruction...

MR. DODD: We will go into what it means in a minute. We’re just talking
about the initial “L.” While we’re talking about the initial, will you
look at it and see if there are any “R’s,” capital “R”?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here is an “L.”

MR. DODD: Yes, “R”?

ROSENBERG: Yes, here are two “R’s.”

MR. DODD: Did you put those on there?

ROSENBERG: No.

MR. DODD: You initialled them, did you?

ROSENBERG: I cannot decipher that as my “R.”

MR. DODD: You say that it is not your “R”? We will have to be clear
about this. You’d have to know your own initial when you saw it
anywhere.

ROSENBERG: I never made such a pointed “R” on the top. You can compare
it with my handwriting.

MR. DODD: We’ll do that; don’t worry. I just want to ask you now if that
is your initial or not?

ROSENBERG: I cannot identify that as my initial.

MR. DODD: Do you say that it is not your initial?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: All right. Now, I wish you’d look at Document 3666-PS, which
is also related to these other documents, and that is also a letter
written on the stationery of the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories, and it is dated December 18, 1941. Subject: Jewish
Question. Re: Correspondence of 15 November 1941. This is an answer then
to the letter marked “L,” inquiring whether or not execution of the Jews
is to be understood as a fixed policy.

    “Clarification of the Jewish question has most likely been
    achieved by now through verbal discussions. Economic
    considerations should on principle remain unconsidered in the
    settlement of the problem. Moreover, it is requested that
    questions arising be settled directly with the Higher SS and
    Police Leader. By order (signed) Bräutigam.”

Have you seen that letter before?

ROSENBERG: No, I have not seen it; in my opinion no. Here I see again
such an “R,” pointed on the top, and I cannot identify that as my “R”
either.

MR. DODD: So that you do not identify that as having your initial,
either?

ROSENBERG: Well, I could simply not identify that as my “R” because this
was a letter, signed by Bräutigam sent from the Ministry of the Eastern
Occupied Territories to the Ostland, and the notes on the top are from
an office that has received that letter.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to an explicit error
here? This “R” is in connection with a “K.” That apparently means
“Reichskommissar.”

MR. DODD: I am not discussing the “R” on the top of the letter; I am
discussing the one of the handwritten letter.

ROSENBERG: Well, it can be seen from this “R” now quite unequivocally
that this concerns the man who received the letter. “Received on 22
December—R.” And it is addressed from the Ministry to the “Ostland.”
That note, therefore, was written by a person living in Riga, and that
is the same “R” which can be found also on the other document.

MR. DODD: Who is your Reich Commissioner in the East for Riga?

ROSENBERG: Lohse.

MR. DODD: His name didn’t begin with “R,” did it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, but it is clear that this letter obviously was
initialled in his department.

DR. THOMA: May I also help the Tribunal in this matter? In the
handwritten thing with the German “L” you will find on the left margin
“WV 1/12/41,” which means to be presented again (Wiedervorlage). And
then you find “presented (vorgelegt) 1/12/41 R.” That appears to have
taken place in the office of the Reich Commissioner and it is a first
draft and therefore it was marked only with the first letter of his
name.

MR. DODD: We do not accept that as being any statement with which we can
prove this at this Trial. I think the matter as to whose initial it is
will be presented later for determination.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the words at the top mean, “The Reich Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories”?

MR. DODD: That is the stationery upon which it is written. It is
handwritten on this particular paper because this whole letter was
handwritten on the back of the first letter. These were both found in
this defendant’s office in Berlin.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, now, I’d like to call your attention
to another document, Number 36.

ROSENBERG: I maintain emphatically that that initial “R” was put down by
the person who received the letter, to whom the letter was addressed.

MR. DODD: Well, we’ll get around that. Document Number 36—I ask that
you be shown Document Number 3428, which becomes Exhibit USA-827.

THE PRESIDENT: Give me the number again, will you?

MR. DODD: I am sorry. 3428-PS becomes 827, USA-827.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, this is a letter written from Minsk
in the occupied area on July 31, 1942, and it is written by Kube,
K-u-b-e. He was another one of your subordinates, wasn’t he? Will you
answer that please?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: And it is written to Lohse, the Reich Commissioner for the
Eastern territory, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that’s right.

MR. DODD: Now, then, let’s look at it: “Combating of Partisans and
Action against Jews in the District General of White Ruthenia.” It says:

    “In all the clashes with partisans in White Ruthenia it has been
    proved that Jewry, in the former Polish part”—and so on—“is
    the main exponent of the partisan movement. In consequence, the
    treatment of Jewry in White Ruthenia is mainly a matter of
    political concern....”

Then, moving down a sentence or two:

    “In exhaustive discussions with the SS Brigadeführer Zenner and
    the exceedingly capable leader of the SD, SS Obersturmbannführer
    Dr. jur. Strauch, it was ascertained that we have liquidated in
    the last 10 weeks about 55,000 Jews in White Ruthenia. In the
    area of Minsk, Jewry has been completely eliminated, without
    endangering the manpower commitment. In the predominantly Polish
    district of Lida, 16,000 Jews; in Slonim, 8,000 Jews”—and so
    forth—“have been liquidated. Owing to an encroachment by the
    Army supply and communications zone already reported to you, the
    preparations made by us for liquidation of the Jews in the
    Glebokie area, have been disturbed. The Army supply and
    communications zone, without contacting me, has liquidated
    10,000 Jews, whose systematical elimination had been provided
    for by us in any event. In the city of Minsk approximately
    10,000 Jews were liquidated on 28 and 29 July, 6,500 of them
    Russian Jews, predominantly aged persons, women and children;
    the remainder consisting of Jews unfit for commitment to labor,
    the greater majority of whom were deported to Minsk in November
    of last year from Vienna, Brünn, Bremen, and Berlin, by order of
    the Führer.

    “The area of Sluzk, too, had been relieved of several thousand
    Jews. The same applies to Novogrodek and Vileika. Radical
    measures are imminent for Baranowicze and Hanzewitschi. In
    Baranowicze alone, approximately 10,000 Jews are still living in
    the city itself; of these, 9,000 Jews will be liquidated next
    month.”

And it goes on to say:

    “In the city of Minsk 2,600 Jews from Germany are left over. In
    addition, all 6,000 Russian Jews and Jewesses who during the
    action stayed with the units to which they were assigned for
    work are still alive. Even in the future Minsk will still retain
    its character as the strongest center of the Jewish labor
    commitment, necessitated for the present by the concentration of
    the armament industries and by the rail problems. In all other
    areas, the number of Jews to be drafted for labor commitment
    will be limited by the SD and by me to 800 at the most, but if
    possible to 500...”

And so on. It tells of other situations with respect to Jews, all of
which I do not think it is necessary to read. But I do want to call your
attention to the last paragraph, the last sentence:

    “I fully agree with the Commander of the SD in White Ruthenia,
    that we shall liquidate every shipment of Jews which is not
    ordered or announced by our superior offices, to prevent further
    disturbances in White Ruthenia.”

And up above I did omit one sentence or two that I wanted to read:

    “Naturally, after the termination of the economic demands of the
    Wehrmacht, the SD and I would like it best definitely to
    eliminate Jewry in the District General of White Ruthenia. For
    the time being, the necessary demands of the Wehrmacht, which
    are the main employers of Jews, are considered.”

I ought to tell you as well that this document was also found in your
office in Berlin. Now, that is a letter...

ROSENBERG: That seems very improbable to me, that it has been found in
my office in Berlin. If so, it can be at most only that the Reich
Commissioner for the Ostland had sent all his files to Berlin, packed in
boxes. It was not in my office at that time, and this letter was also
never presented to me. There is stamped here, “The Reich Commissioner
for the Ostland,” not the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern
Territories. I stated yesterday, however, that a number of such
happenings were reported to me as individual actions in the fighting,
and that I received this one report from Sluzk personally, and Gauleiter
Meyer was immediately charged to protest to Heydrich and to order an
investigation. That presupposes that he, the Gauleiter Meyer, did not
know of and did not think of such a general action on order of a central
command.

MR. DODD: Well, I only want to suggest to you that it is a strange
coincidence that two of your top men were in communication in this tone
in 1942 without your knowledge.

Did you also tell the Tribunal yesterday that you understood that most
of the difficulty or a large part of the difficulty in the East for the
Jewish people came from the local population? Do you remember saying
that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: I did not receive this translation.

MR. DODD: I asked you if it was not a fact that yesterday you told the
Tribunal that much of the difficulty for the Jews in the East came from
the local population of those areas.

ROSENBERG: Yes. I was informed about that in the beginning by returning
personalities, that it was not due to local authorities but to parts of
the population. I knew the attitude in the East from before and could
well imagine that this was true.

Secondly, I have stated that I had been informed that along with
executions of various other nests of resistance and centers of sabotage
in various cities, a large number of Jews were shot by the police. And
then I have treated the case of Sluzk here.

MR. DODD: I think you will agree that in the Ukraine your man Koch was
doing all kinds of terrible things, and now I don’t understand that you
dispute that Lohse and Kube were helping to eliminate or liquidate the
Jews, and that Bräutigam, an important member of your staff, and that
Leibbrandt, another important member of your staff, were informed of the
program. So that five people at least under your administration were
engaged in this kind of conduct, and not small people at that.

ROSENBERG: I should like to point out that a decree by the Reich
Commissioner for the Ostland is at hand, which in agreement...

THE PRESIDENT: Will you answer the question first? Do you agree that
these five people were engaged in exterminating Jews?

ROSENBERG: Yes. They knew about a certain number of liquidations of
Jews. That I admit, and they have told me so, or if they did not, I have
heard it from other sources. I only want to state one thing: That
according to the general law of the Reich, the Reich Commissioner for
the Ostland issued a decree according to which Jewry, which of course
was hostile to us, should be concentrated in certain Jewish quarters of
the cities. And until the end, until 1943-1944, I have heard that in
these cities such work was still carried out in these Jewish ghettos to
a very large extent.

And may I supplement this with still another case which came to my
knowledge, namely that a district commissioner...

MR. DODD: I don’t want you to point out anything else. You have answered
the question, and you have explained your answer. I don’t ask you
further...

ROSENBERG: What I wanted to add explains another part of my answer in a
very concrete case, namely, a district commissioner in the Ukraine had
been accused before the court of having committed blackmail in a Jewish
community and having sent furs, clothes, _et cetera_ to Germany. He was
brought before court, he was sentenced to death, and was shot.

MR. DODD: Well, that is very interesting, but I don’t think it is a
necessary explanation of that answer at all. And I would ask that you
try to confine these answers. I would like to get through here in a few
minutes.

You are also, of course, the man who wrote the letter, as you told the
Tribunal yesterday, suggesting the out-of-hand execution of 100 Jews in
France, although you said you thought that was what? a little bad
judgment, or not quite just, or something of the kind? Is that right?

ROSENBERG: I made my statement about that yesterday.

MR. DODD: I know you have, and I would like to talk about it for a
minute today. Is that what you said about it, that it was not right, and
that it was not just? “Yes” or “no,” didn’t you say that to the Tribunal
yesterday?

ROSENBERG: You have to quote literally, word for word, if you want me to
answer “yes” or “no.”

MR. DODD: I will ask you again. Didn’t you say yesterday before this
Tribunal that your suggestion in that letter, in Document 001-PS, was
wrong and was not just? Now, that is pretty simple and you can answer
it.

ROSENBERG: I stated that it was humanly unjust.

MR. DODD: It was murder, isn’t that what it was, a plan for murder?
“Yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: No. But I considered the shooting of hostages, which was
publicly made known by the Armed Forces, as an obviously generally
accepted fact under the exceptional conditions of war. These shootings
of hostages were published in the press. Therefore, I had to assume that
according to international law and certain traditions of warfare this
was an accepted act of reprisal. Therefore, I cannot admit...

MR. DODD: Well, were you talking then as the benign philosopher or as a
soldier? When you wrote this letter, 001-PS, in what capacity were you
writing it, as a benign, philosophical minister on ideology and culture,
or were you a member of the Armed Forces?

ROSENBERG: As can be seen from the document, I have spoken about the
fact that certain sabotage and murder of German soldiers was being
committed here, so that good future relations, which I also aimed for,
between Germany and France would be poisoned forever. For that reason
this letter was written, although I regret it from the human point of
view.

MR. DODD: It comes a little late, don’t you think?

The witness Hoess—you were in the courtroom when he testified, Hoess,
H-o-e-s-s?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I heard him.

MR. DODD: You heard that terrible story of 2½ to 3 million murders which
he told from the witness stand, very largely of Jewish people?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: Although it was not brought out here, you can take it from me
as being so. If you care to dispute it, you may, and we will establish
it later. You know that he was a reader of your book and of your
speeches, this man Hoess?

ROSENBERG: I do not know whether he read my books. Anti-Jewish books
have existed for the last 2,000 years.

MR. DODD: Now, you offered to resign in October 1944 from your position
as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories?

ROSENBERG: October 1944.

MR. DODD: You did not have very much to resign from on that date, did
you? The Germans were practically out of Russia, isn’t that a fact? On
October 12, 1944, the German Army was practically out of Russia. It was
on the retreat, isn’t that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. It was the question of my further tasks for the
political end psychological treatment of several millions of Eastern
workers in Germany; it was furthermore a question of refugees who came
from the Eastern territories and from the Ukraine to Germany, and of the
settlement of economic problems, and above all I still had the hope even
at that hour that a military change also might still occur in the East.

MR. DODD: And everybody, pretty nearly everybody who was informed at all
in Germany knew that the war was lost in October of 1944, isn’t that so?
You knew that the war was lost in October of 1944.

ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.

MR. DODD: You did not know that?

ROSENBERG: No, I did not know that.

MR. DODD: I will accept that answer. That is all. I have no further
questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, do you wish to re-examine?

[_There was no response._]

General Rudenko, have you got some additional questions you want to ask?

GEN. RUDENKO: I have some questions to ask in connection with the
defendant’s activities in the Eastern territories.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, General.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, at what time did you begin,
personally and directly, to participate in preparations for an attack on
the Soviet Union?

ROSENBERG: Not at all.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was your appointment of 20 April 1941 to the post of the
Führer’s Commissioner in central control for all questions relating to
the Eastern European territories not directly connected with Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union?

ROSENBERG: That was no longer a planning in which I took part, but it
was the consequence of a decision which had already been made and about
which my advice had not been asked. I was notified that a decision had
been made and military orders had been given. Therefore I have
nothing... Well, if I have to answer the question as much as possible
with “yes” or “no,” I have just answered this, on the basis of the
wording, with “no.”

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny the fact that this appointment took place
in April 1941?

ROSENBERG: That is evident, that I received a task.

GEN. RUDENKO: With this nomination Hitler gave you very wide powers. You
collaborated with the highest authorities of the Reich, received
information from them and summoned the Reich authorities to meetings. In
particular you collaborated with Göring, with the Minister for Economy,
and with Keitel. Do you confirm this? Please reply briefly.

ROSENBERG: There are, again, three questions. As to the first question,
whether I received wide powers, plenipotentiary powers, I had not
received plenipotentiary powers at all. The answer would be “no.”

To the second question, whether I had conferences, the answer is “yes.”
As a matter of course, I conferred with the supreme Reich authorities
who were concerned with the East, as was my duty in connection with my
task.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please reply briefly to the following question:
Immediately after your appointment of 20 April 1941, did you hold a
conference with the Chief of the OKW?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I visited Field Marshal Keitel.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conversation with Brauchitsch and Raeder in
connection with your appointment, regarding the solution of the Eastern
problems?

ROSENBERG: According to my recollection I did not speak to Brauchitsch
and I also have no recollection of having had any conversation at that
time with Raeder.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you have a conference with the Defendant Funk, who
appointed Dr. Schlotterer as his permanent representative?

ROSENBERG: The then Reich Minister Funk, of course, was shortly informed
of this task given me and he named Dr. Schlotterer for purposes of
liaison.

GEN. RUDENKO: You had several conversations with General Thomas, State
Secretary Körner, State Secretary Backe, and Ministerial Director
Riecke, regarding the economic exploitation of the Eastern territories?

ROSENBERG: I do not believe that I spoke to Thomas, and I met the other
gentlemen gradually, one by one. Later I took over Riecke as liaison man
to the Economic Staff East in the Ministry. I must have met Backe also
later on, as is natural in the course of time. I do not know at all
whether I ever met General Thomas personally, maybe I met him in
passing.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then I shall have to produce documents where you yourself
speak about it.

You were negotiating with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and, as a
result, the Defendant Ribbentrop appointed Grosskopf to act as permanent
liaison officer with your organization, and placed on the other hand Dr.
Bräutigam in charge of the political section. Is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct, because the Foreign Minister was, of
course, informed briefly and appointed the then Consul General Grosskopf
as ambassador...

GEN. RUDENKO: You received competent representatives of the Ministry of
Propaganda such as: Fritzsche, Schmidt, Glasmeier, and others?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that may have been so. I met most of these gentlemen for
the first time then, and it goes without saying that I had to inform
myself about the task.

GEN. RUDENKO: You negotiated with the Chief of Staff of the SA and
requested him to place at your disposal the most experienced of the SA
leaders.

ROSENBERG: Of course I also spoke to the Chief of Staff of the SA about
possible capable assistants in the event of an occupation of the Eastern
territories.

GEN. RUDENKO: In this connection, therefore, you will not deny that a
co-ordinating center did actually exist for preparing measures of attack
against the Soviet Union.

ROSENBERG: Not in that form, because all the tasks connected with the
conflict with the Soviet Union were divided up from a military point of
view. They were assigned to Göring in the field of economic planning;
they were, as became evident later on, clearly defined with the Police.
I had been given a political liaison office in order to discuss the
political problems of the East, and to give the different offices ideas
about the eventual political administration and the direction of this
policy. In the main I did that in the sense which you find in my speech
of 20 June.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. One and a half months before the treacherous
attack by Germany on the Soviet Union, you drafted a directive for all
Reich commissioners in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You do not deny
that?

ROSENBERG: I already mentioned that yesterday. In the line of duty, some
provisional drafts were worked out by myself and my assistants. These
drafts which we have here, or which have been shown to me up to now,
were not sent out in this form.

GEN. RUDENKO: I shall return to this question later.

In your report which you submitted to Hitler on 28 June 1941, regarding
the preliminary work on questions connected with the Eastern
territories, you stated that you had had a talk with Admiral Canaris,
during which you asked Canaris, in the interests of counterintelligence
work, to choose certain persons who, while working on
counterintelligence, would also be able to do political work. Do you
confirm this statement?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. But I heard that Admiral Canaris had
organized a certain group of Ukrainians, I believe, and other nationals
for some sabotage or other work. He visited me once and I asked him not
to meddle with the political work, that is with the political
preparatory work, and he assured me he would not.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny your meeting Canaris?

ROSENBERG: The meeting—no.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the conversation in which you asked him, in the
interests of Intelligence, to select certain people to help you. Do you
deny that?

ROSENBERG: No—yes, I deny that. However, I do not deny the fact that,
of course, if Canaris had an interesting political report it would be
proper for him to inform me about it on occasion. I had no
counterintelligence organization or espionage organization. During these
years I never...

GEN. RUDENKO: We are going to submit this document to you.

[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, perhaps we can declare a
recess now, because I still have a series of questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

              [_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]




                          _Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn the hearing of this case at 4
o’clock in order to hear supplementary applications for witnesses and
documents. The Tribunal hope, therefore, that we may be able to conclude
the case of the Defendant Rosenberg before that. I mean, to conclude the
case of the Defendant Rosenberg, including his only other witness, or
any other witness.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, you replied to me that the
conversation with Admiral Canaris did not take place.

ROSENBERG: On the contrary, I said that such a conference with Admiral
Canaris did take place.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then maybe this was wrongly translated.

ROSENBERG: Probably.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you whether you requested Canaris in the course of
your conversation, in the interests of the counterintelligence service,
to choose men who, while working as counterintelligence agents, would be
able to do simultaneously political work. Do you remember my question?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was that the main subject of your conversation?

ROSENBERG: That is not correct. Admiral Canaris had...

GEN. RUDENKO: That is not correct? Well, let us not go into that in
detail.

In order to speed up the interrogation, I will show you a document, and
I will read this passage into the record.

Show this document to the defendant. [_Turning to the Tribunal._] I
mean, gentlemen of the Tribunal, Document 1039-PS, on Page 2. The part
is underlined. I will read this passage.

[_Turning to the defendant._] This is your report on the preliminary
work concerning the organization of the territory of Eastern Europe. I
read:

    “A conference took place with Admiral Canaris to the effect
    that, under the existing confidential circumstances, my office
    could in no way negotiate with any representatives of the
    peoples of Eastern Europe. I asked him to do this insofar as
    counterespionage work required it and then to name persons to me
    who, over and above counterespionage service, might be regarded
    as political personalities, in order to determine their possible
    utilization later. Admiral Canaris said that of course he would
    take into consideration my request not to recognize any
    political groups among the emigrants, and that he intended to
    act in line with my statements.”

ROSENBERG: That is in accord with what I said.

THE PRESIDENT: General, I think you are going a little too fast.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I ask you, do you confirm this quotation?

ROSENBERG: Yes, in the German wording but not in the Russian
translation. I understand Russian also and can, therefore, determine
that the translation is not entirely correct; for it says here that I,
under the existing confidential circumstances, naturally could not
negotiate with other countries for eventual collaboration in a civilian
administration. That is the first point. And point two is that, since
Admiral Canaris had to do with various groups of Ukrainians, Russians,
and other people, I was asking him—apart from counterintelligence, that
is—not to do espionage work for me or ask me to do espionage work but
that he should point out to me people of other nationalities whom I
could use later—under given conditions—in civilian administration.
That was the meaning; and furthermore, at the end it is quite correct
that he agreed not to carry on any political work himself.

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, this absolutely follows the Russian
text. What you just told us now means exactly the same in Russian.

ROSENBERG: According to the German translated into Russian it must have
been that. I can recognize only the German text, not the Russian
translation, which is not in accord with this meaning. You interpret
this text as though I were trying to carry on espionage work. I asked
Admiral Canaris, since I could not carry on political negotiations with
representatives of the Eastern people, simply to tell me from his
personal knowledge, apart from his official capacity, what people of the
Eastern regions, under certain circumstances, might later work in the
civilian administration for me. That is the meaning. The translation is,
therefore, not entirely correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well; but you confirm the German text?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: It means you were connected with counterespionage?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I only received Admiral Canaris and
told him that, in his official capacity in which he had to function, he
should not deal with political negotiations and plans, because I was now
being given that task.

GEN. RUDENKO: You heard the admonition of the President of the Tribunal
about answering briefly, and I beg you to do so.

ROSENBERG: I would answer more briefly if the questions were put to me
factually.

GEN. RUDENKO: I will put to you several questions concerning the aims of
the war against the Soviet Union. Do you admit that Nazi Germany, having
prepared and pursued war against the Soviet Union, aimed at plundering
the economic riches of the Soviet Union, the extermination of her
people, the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and the
dismemberment of the Soviet Union? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or
not?

ROSENBERG: Five questions are being put to me again, and if...

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you please answer briefly: Do you admit the aims of
the aggression as I have put them to you? You will be able to give your
explanation later.

THE PRESIDENT: You can answer that question “yes” or “no.”

ROSENBERG: I must answer “no” to all four questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: You deny it. All right. Let us turn to a new document in
this connection. I mean the Document 2718-PS, which is in the minutes of
the morning session of 10 December 1945. That is your memorandum dated 2
May 1941. [_The document was handed to the defendant._] Will you please
follow? This document reads as follows:

    “1) The war can be continued only if all the Armed Forces are
    fed with stocks from Russia in the third year of the war.

    “2) There is no doubt that as a result many millions of people
    will die of starvation if we take out of this country everything
    that we need.”

I ask you now, did you write that?

ROSENBERG: I neither wrote that nor did I participate in this session,
and I cannot determine whether any one of my collaborators knew anything
at all about this meeting. It says here, “Senior officers only, two
copies, one for the files (I-a) and the second General Limbert.”
Therefore, only two people in the Armed Forces knew about this.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into that in detail, Defendant. You do not know
about this?

ROSENBERG: This document has been submitted twice already.

GEN. RUDENKO: Let us go on to the next one.

THE PRESIDENT: The question was whether you knew of this document.

ROSENBERG: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: We come to the next document, which determines the aims of
the war. This is your instruction to the Reich Commissioner for the
Baltic countries and for Bielorussia. You stated the following—I mean
now the Document 1029-PS; the part which I will read is marked in the
margin:

    “The aim of a Reich Commissioner for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
    and Bielorussia must be to strive for the creation of a German
    protectorate, with a view to transforming these regions later
    into a part of Greater Germany by the Germanization of racially
    admissible elements, the colonization of Germanic peoples, and
    the resettlement of undesirable elements.”

Do you remember these instructions? Please reply first.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I am familiar with this document. I already remarked
yesterday that at the beginning all sorts of drafts were made in my
office which were not approved by me. The corrections were made by me.

GEN. RUDENKO: I asked you very clearly, do you know these instructions
or not?

ROSENBERG: But I still heard the wrong translation. Nothing is mentioned
about “destruction,” but “incorporation,” and the Russian translation
again said “destruction.” If it is translated that way, then my question
appears in the Russian language as an approval of destruction; and that
is a wrong translation which is being made here, which I can follow only
because I speak Russian.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you can be heard perfectly well without
shouting.

ROSENBERG: I beg your pardon.

GEN. RUDENKO: You are only correcting an error in the translation. Now
as regards the rest—Germanization and colonization—is that right? Does
that sound right in German? Answer me. Is that right or not?

ROSENBERG: Even in that way it is not translated quite correctly. Here
it says “colonization of German peoples,” and now you are translating
“Germanization and colonization.” These are two substantives which again
give correspondingly different sense, and I would like to add that these
drafts made by a collaborator of mine were not actually issued, and that
they in no way constitute instructions.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you, was it issued or not; but I ask you was
there such a draft? Will you deny that?

ROSENBERG: I am not disputing that such a draft was submitted to my
office.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We pass on.

These instructions concern the aims of the war. They are instructions
for all Reich Commissioners of the Occupied Eastern Territories, dated 8
May 1941. This is Document 1030-PS. I will read only a short excerpt,
which states—I quote from Page 4. This excerpt is marked in the margin.
In these instructions you state that this coming struggle would be a
struggle for the supplying of Germany and all of Europe with raw
materials and foodstuffs. Do you confirm this?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Then you confirm that.

ROSENBERG: Yes, of course. This document was presented in my office as a
draft. That is correct, and I am not disputing it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Do not go into details again. I will remind you once more,
please reply briefly. You confirmed this point, and that is enough.

ROSENBERG: This document, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. This statement was made by you previous to the
attack on the Soviet Union. I will remind you, but I will not submit the
document to you since it has already been presented to the Tribunal
several times and is at the disposal of the Tribunal. I mean a
conference which took place in Hitler’s office on 16 July 1941.

[_Turning to the Tribunal._] This is Document L-221, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You were present at this conference, were
you?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Hitler said then that the Baltic States would have to
become an integral part of the Reich, and the same applied to the Crimea
with adjacent territories as well as to the Volga districts and also the
Baku area. Do you recall these statements of Hitler?

ROSENBERG: I have seen this document, purporting to be Bormann’s
observations, here for the first time. At that time the Führer made very
long, passionate statements. I did not take any exact notes at that
conference, but he did in fact speak about the Crimea, and he said that,
because of the tremendous power of the Soviet Union, no bearers of arms
should be allowed there later and...

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask why. I ask you: did he say that?

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you are going too fast. You must wait
until the man is finished.

GEN. RUDENKO: He is going into too many details, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Well, you admit the Crimea. You agreed
with Hitler’s idea concerning the seizure of these territories?

ROSENBERG: You can see from the document and you can see from my speech
how I pictured the self-determination of all the peoples in the East in
a new order of states; and I controverted the declarations of the
Führer. That can be seen here. That was how I argued.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not ask you about that. I am asking you whether you
agreed with these ideas of Hitler, or whether you objected to them.

ROSENBERG: Yes, it can be proved that I protested, and it is even shown
in the record.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal are not concerned with whether or not it can
be proved. The question is: did you agree or not. You can answer that, I
suppose. Did you agree, or did you not agree?

ROSENBERG: I agreed with many points and rejected other points; but this
is a compilation of at least 10 to 15 points.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is an answer.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. We will return to this question in a few
minutes.

I am now passing on to your own directives, which you issued as Minister
for the Occupied Eastern Territories. These documents were already
presented to the Tribunal as 1056-PS and EC-347. First of all, I would
like to ask you one question: What is this “Brown Folder”?

ROSENBERG: The Brown Folder was compiled by the administrative
department of the Eastern Ministry in response to certain requests of
industry, of my political department, of the personnel department, and
of the technical supply department for officials in the Baltic States
and in the Ukraine. Thus it was the first attempt at a general
regulation.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, then that is a sort of “Green Folder.” It is
quite clear.

Now, let us turn to your directives, Document EC-347. We will show you
this document right away. Will you note the passage which has been
underlined, on Page 39 of the document, if I am not mistaken. I will
read this paragraph:

    “The first task of the civilian administration in the Occupied
    Eastern Territories is to represent the interests of the Reich.”

I omit a few lines.

    “The stipulations of the Hague Convention regarding land
    warfare, which deal with the administration of territories
    occupied by a foreign power, do not apply, since the U.S.S.R.
    can be considered as nonexistent....”

Then further:

    “Therefore, all measures which the German administration deems
    necessary or suitable in order to carry out this extensive task
    are admissible.”

Do you agree that this exposes your secret designs, although you somehow
too hastily proclaimed the Soviet Union as destroyed?

ROSENBERG: In the Russian translation I again heard the word
“plundering,” but the word “plundering” does not appear in this German
text. If the German text is translated in such a way that the word
“plundering” appears everywhere, although in the German...

GEN. RUDENKO: I interrupt you and say that the word “plundering” is not
in the Russian text, which I just read into the record; so I believe you
are simply inventing, or at least you did not hear rightly.

ROSENBERG: May I say a few words in this connection?

GEN. RUDENKO: I ask you, did you write this?

ROSENBERG: I did not, in fact, write it, but it was a circular letter
which was issued by the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories,
and, therefore, I am officially responsible for this Brown Folder. But I
would like to say a few words of explanation in regard to this—the
explanation about the status of international law in the East I received
from the Führer’s headquarters. It stated that, in accordance with the
attitude of the Soviet Union toward certain conventions, as far as the
Hague Convention was concerned, it did not apply to the Soviet Union in
this instance. Furthermore, as this document contains many pages, I was
not able to read it in its entirety at the time; but on the second page
I have already found a paragraph which shows very obviously what lines
the wording followed. It states as follows...

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, one minute, please.

ROSENBERG: But I must be allowed to read from the document.

THE PRESIDENT: We must try and conduct this cross-examination in an
orderly fashion. Now, what is the question?

[_Turning to General Rudenko._] What is your question?

GEN. RUDENKO: I put to him the question, whether he admitted that he
knew of the tasks put before the civilian administration in the occupied
territories as they are set forth in the quotation which I just read. He
said that he did know. I have exhausted my questions in this particular
sphere. The document is in possession of the Defense and the Defense
will be able to quote other parts of this document which have not yet
been read into the record. This is a very long document. If I had tried
to quote it to the Tribunal in its entirety it would have taken too much
time.

THE PRESIDENT: [_To the defendant._] You answered the question. I
understood what the question was, and that you were told that the Hague
Convention did not apply to Russia.

ROSENBERG: Yes. May I quote this one paragraph on Page 40, the next to
the last paragraph:

    “The most important prerequisite for this”—that is, for the
    development of the East—“is the treatment of the country and of
    the people in a corresponding manner. The war against the Soviet
    Union is—with all necessary regard to the securing of
    foodstuffs—a political campaign with the establishment of
    lasting order as its objective. The conquered territory as a
    whole is, therefore, not to be considered an object of
    exploitation, even if the German food and war economy must lay
    claim to considerable areas on a large scale.”

And I believe I may say that the fact that the necessities of the
inhabitants are taken into consideration cannot be expressed more
clearly.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I will put to you a few more questions as to
how you treated the population, although we have heard quite a lot about
this treatment, as you have too. We pass on.

I asked you about the Crimea and you said, “Yes, Hitler proposed to
annex the Crimea to Germany.” Do you remember that you did not only
approve of these plans, but you also invented new names for towns—for
instance, Simferopol was to be called “Gotenburg” and Sevastopol was to
become “Theodorichshafen.” Do you remember that?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct. The Führer told me that I should think
of a change of names for these cities. The renaming of very many other
cities was discussed, too.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, of course.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I am expected to conclude my entire
presentation of evidence with respect to Rosenberg by 4 o’clock. I do
not know how I can do that.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has not laid that down as a condition. I did
not make any order about it. I said only that the Tribunal hoped, and
the “hope” was addressed more to the Prosecution than it was to the
Defense.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, if I may be permitted to say so, the Soviet
Prosecutor has submitted documents again which I already submitted
yesterday, and on which the defendant has already given answers. I am
referring to Documents 1029-PS and 1030-PS. The defendant himself
already said...

THE PRESIDENT: You are wasting the time of the Court by making this
entire interposition.

GEN. RUDENKO: Thus you admit the change of the names of Simferopol and
Sevastopol.

Next question: You also worked on the reorganization of the Caucasus,
and you had organized a special staff. Will you answer “yes” or “no”?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Furthermore, you favored Prince Bagration-Mukhransky, an
adventurer from the emigré circle, as candidate for the throne of
Georgia. Is that true? Answer briefly.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is true. We did mention that—we spoke about
him—but we turned down such a candidacy.

GEN. RUDENKO: He was turned down. Is that so? Very well.

As regards the reorganization of the Caucasus, on 27 July 1942 you
compiled a special report; is that true?

ROSENBERG; It may be that a report was made. Yes—yes, naturally, it is
quite a lengthy report. It has been submitted here.

GEN. RUDENKO: And I will show you this report in order to draw your
attention to one short quotation.

[_Turning to the President._] I have in mind, Mr. President, a document
which has already been submitted as Exhibit USSR-58.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, please pay attention
to Page 7, a passage which is marked, which says first that the German
Reich must seize all the oil. Have you found this passage?

ROSENBERG: On Page 7 of the text I find the passage—yes, I have found
it.

GEN. RUDENKO: The text reads:

    “From the economic point of view the German Reich must take
    control of the total oil supply. The necessary participation in
    the riches could be discussed in the future.”

Do you confirm that this statement was made by you?

ROSENBERG: This document is a memorandum of my office, and I confirm
that it is true.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.

ROSENBERG: May I make a remark in addition? Here we are not talking
about the oppression of a people but of an assurance of autonomy and of
every possible mitigation for these people. Only I cannot locate that at
once from a document which has 14 pages if I only read one sentence.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have just questioned you concerning the tasks of the
German Reich with regard to this matter of oil. Now if you look at Page
14 of this same report you will find it at the very end—this is how you
define the tasks:

    “The problem of the Eastern territories consists of a
    transference of peoples from a Baltic to a German field of
    culture and the preparation for the military frontiers of
    Germany on a vast scale. The task of the Ukraine is to provide
    Germany and Europe with foodstuffs and the continent with raw
    materials. The task in the Caucasus is, above all, of a
    political nature and represents the decisive extension of
    continental Europe, under German direction, from the Caucasian
    isthmus to the Near East.”

Did you read this passage?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not deny that these were the actual plans?

ROSENBERG: I affirm that this is set down correctly, and that it is in
accord with our hope that eastern continental Europe might, some time,
be incorporated into the total economic system and economic supply of
the rest of the continent, as had been the case before 1914; for at that
time the Ukraine was an important country of exports of raw materials
and foodstuffs.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, your plan concerning the Ukraine is well known. In
this connection I will put the last question concerning aggression.
After having seen these documents, which you do not deny, do you admit
the aggressive and plundering character of Germany’s war against the
Soviet Union and your personal responsibility for the planning and
carrying out of this aggression? Answer briefly. Do you admit this, or
do you not?

ROSENBERG: No.

GEN. RUDENKO: No? Very well.

ROSENBERG: No, because I did not consider this a war of aggression on
our part but just the opposite.

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course; but we will not go into details.

I have a few more questions to put to you concerning the German
administration and the German policy in the Occupied Eastern
Territories.

Who was the highest official in the civil administration in the Reich
Commission?

ROSENBERG: The Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories was
responsible for the administration and legislation in the Eastern
Territories, and the Reich Commissioner, for the territorial
governments.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal have already heard all
about the administration—the former administration—and personnel of
the administration.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I have only two or three more questions in
this particular sphere.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Did the Reich Commissioner have the
authority to issue orders for the arrest and execution of hostages?

ROSENBERG: At this moment I cannot recall whether he had such authority
by law, or whether that came under direct police jurisdiction. I cannot
answer this question with assurance, for at the moment I do not recall a
decree to that effect, but it is not entirely impossible; I do not know.

GEN. RUDENKO: It was possible? Very well.

I would like to remind you that you foresaw in your directive this
authority of the commissioners to shoot hostages. We will pass right on.

A lot has been said here about German policy in occupied territories. I
will, therefore, put only a few questions to you.

First of all, as regards the Ukraine, you have here described the
situation in such a light as to show that Koch was the sole person
responsible, whereas you have always assented that, on the contrary, you
were the benefactor of the Ukrainian people.

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; I never said that I was a
benefactor.

GEN. RUDENKO: In your document, which has been submitted by your defense
counsel and which I will therefore not submit to you, Document
Rosenberg-19, Riecke wrote, in a letter to all Reichsleiter of the press
in November 1942:

    “Koch has declared ‘that the Ukraine is for us only an object of
    exploitation, and that it must pay the expenses of the war, and
    that in a certain way the population must, as a second-rate
    people, be utilized for the tasks of the war, even if they have
    to be caught with a lasso.’”

This was the policy of Koch in the Ukraine. This document was submitted
by your counsel. I will ask you now: Did you write to Koch on 14
December?

ROSENBERG: May I reply to that? I do not have the verbatim document in
front of me. I only know that it was a letter written by Riecke to me
with the big complaint which so many others had also had, and that he
requested me...

GEN. RUDENKO: Koch?

ROSENBERG: Yes—to complain, and that he used rather drastic language,
and that we both strove to reach orderly methods of work here.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have been all over this matter of Koch as to
the Ukraine today, and so it is not helping the Tribunal to go over it
again.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Yesterday you stated here repeatedly in
your explanations as regards the atrocities and extermination of the
Soviet population that you were not informed, and that these were police
measures. Did I understand you correctly?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not exactly true. I was informed of many combats
with partisans and of bands and, as I have stated, of some shootings;
and also I was told about the fact that German agricultural leaders,
German officials and policemen, and peaceful Soviet farmers were
attacked by these partisans and bands and were murdered by thousands.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. We know that the partisans who fought against
the enemies of their country were called bandits by you and treated
accordingly. I do not argue that. But I am speaking of the extermination
of the civilian population, of old men, women, and children. Did you
have knowledge of this?

ROSENBERG: In these combats we tried especially to protect the farming
population and others too; and when we heard about what appeared to us
to be excessive measures by the Police, we put the most severe demands
to them that even in the full heat of battle these matters were to be
considered; and the Police told us that it was easy to make those
demands from behind a desk, but, if in White Ruthenia the partisans
murder and burn 500 White Ruthenian burgomasters with their families in
their houses and we are shot at from the rear, then terrible conflicts
must follow.

GEN. RUDENKO: I will remind you that, in your directive concerning
occupied territories and organization of administration and the primary
task for administration, you personally planned the police measures as
your first task. Do you deny this now? I ask you, do you deny this now?

ROSENBERG: If it is Document 1056-PS, I proposed seven urgent measures.
I cannot tell you at the moment which is the first one here. I ask that
you submit this document to me.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. I will ask that one paragraph of this document
be shown to you, “Police measures,” which is in the very first place.

THE PRESIDENT: Has this document been put to him?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the use of going into it again?

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, Defendant Rosenberg asked for it. I would
like to say simply that the defendant tried to make me believe that he
was not informed and that these were purely police measures. I am going
to prove that he put as his primary task the carrying out of these
police measures.

ROSENBERG: It goes without saying that in an occupied territory in the
middle of such a war the Police are responsible for police protection
measures. And the third point is “the supply of the population with
foodstuffs in order to avoid famine.” I repeat, “supply of the
population in order to avoid famine.”

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Very well. We heard about this in detail
yesterday. I have a few last questions to put to you. First of all, I
would like to ask you about the Zuman incident. The document has already
been submitted to the Tribunal, but I consider it my duty as a
representative of the Soviet Union to put to you this question
concerning the shooting of Soviet citizens for the sole purpose of
obtaining a stretch of land needed as a hunting ground. You remember
this document?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I gave an extensive explanation on it yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, this has been gone into before before
the Tribunal. Why should the Tribunal’s time be taken up by going over
and over again on the same grounds? We have said that we would not have
things done cumulatively.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, a few details of this question are of great
importance, and the defendant did not explain them; therefore, I would
like very much to ask this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will adjourn to consider the
matter.

                        [_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: First of all, the Tribunal will rise tomorrow afternoon
at half past 4.

Now, as to this question, the Tribunal think that the matter has been
sufficiently gone into; but, if there is a particular point which has
not been dealt with before, a question may be asked in that connection.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, on 2 April 1943, you
addressed a letter to Himmler regarding this incident regarding the
shooting of hundreds of Soviet citizens in the region of Zuman, because
this place was needed as a hunting ground. Did you not address such a
letter to Himmler? Until June 1943, furthermore, you were interested in
receiving a reply. What were the results of this letter?

ROSENBERG: First, I wrote to the Chief of the German Police; and I had
to wait for what he, as the official responsible for the measures of
security in the Ukraine, might cause to be done. When I did not receive
any further information, I brought this case as a personal complaint
before the Führer.

GEN. RUDENKO: When did you report it to Hitler?

ROSENBERG: This complaint to the Führer was dealt with in the middle of
May 1943 and, since it was a rather lengthy complaint, probably reached
him several weeks in advance, that is, 5 or 6 weeks elapsed between 2
April and the day it was dealt with, the middle or end of May. I believe
that is a very short time for dealing with a complaint because: First it
had to be investigated rather thoroughly by Lammers and Bormann; then it
had to be reported to the Führer; the Führer then had to make his
decision and give his directives; and then I was summoned.

GEN. RUDENKO: When was this complaint discussed for the last time?

ROSENBERG: In May—between the middle and the end of May 1943.

GEN. RUDENKO: Was it discussed in the presence of Koch?

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yesterday you told the Tribunal that Koch presented a
report to Hitler—a memorandum from the Forestry Office. Is that true?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore, this memorandum confirmed that it was a fight
against the partisans?

ROSENBERG: Not quite exactly like that, but it said that this forest
district had to be utilized for the necessary supply of lumber for the
Armed Forces or the Administration and that these needed forests
harbored many restless partisans and guerrilla bands. Therefore there
was great danger for the workers in these districts and it had come to
shootings between them and partisans and guerrilla bands; and, since one
could not watch over all of them, a transfer of certain groups from
these forest districts into forest areas farther south took place. Koch
added that then many of these people who had been transferred expressed
their thanks for having received better land than they had had before.
That was the information that Koch had given.

GEN. RUDENKO: They were grateful that one December night they were
evicted from their houses and taken away hundreds of kilometers and
hundreds of them shot. They appreciated that very much. I should like to
ask you the following, however. In your letter to Himmler on 2 April
1943, you also attached a memorandum from the Forestry Office; and in
this memorandum it is stated—I am going to read this passage—you
should remember this incident—this terrible incident when men were shot
because hunting ground was needed. In the memorandum of the Forestry
Office it is stated, “There is no doubt that several villages located in
the forest region of Zuman were evacuated principally in order to create
a hunting area.” This is stated in the memorandum of the Forestry
Office.

ROSENBERG: I only want to point out that we are dealing here with an
assistant of the Forestry Office in Berlin, who had added that on the
basis of his reports. What Koch had produced was a report from the Chief
of the Forest Administration in the Ukraine, himself.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right. The last question in connection with this
incident: Did you believe Koch when he stated that?

ROSENBERG: If I am asked on my conscience, that is hard to answer; but
there was a...

GEN. RUDENKO: It is exactly on your conscience, if you like.

ROSENBERG: A description of actual conditions by the Forestry
Administration was included, and I could not protest against such a
presentation since it appeared well-founded, and I had to admit to
myself that I had made a mistake in protesting.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not protest against that, I quite understand. I
shall finish by just reminding you of one quotation from your letter:

    “Hundreds of people in and around Zuman were shot by using a
    whole police company ‘because they were communistically
    inclined.’ No Ukrainian believes that. The Germans are also
    astonished by this argument; because, if this was done for the
    safety of the country, then the communist-infected elements in
    other regions should have been executed at the same time.”

I have here to put to you the last question. Here in the Tribunal
yesterday you declared several times that you wanted to resign from your
post. Moreover, you spoke about your letter to Hitler, dated 12 October
1944, where you asked for directives for the future. Regarding this my
colleague, Mr. Dodd, has already reminded you that at that date, 12
October 1944, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories no
longer had any territories, because the Germans were out of Russia by
that time. I would like to ask you the following question: How could you
ask to be relieved of your post, you, who for years had dreamed about
getting this position of Reich Minister and even becoming a member of
the Secret Cabinet? You asked Hitler to grant you this position of Reich
Minister. Do you remember that?

ROSENBERG: In the first place I was never a member of the so-called
Secret Cabinet. That is not correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I shall correct myself. You dreamed of becoming a
member of the Secret Reich Cabinet.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: And also dreamed of becoming Reich Minister; is that also
true?

ROSENBERG: When the question as to my task became acute, there was a
long discussion one way and another about the form of that task. Dr.
Lammers, commissioned by the Führer, told me that the Führer intended
either to appoint a Reich inspector because he wanted both Reich
Commissioners to...

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Rosenberg, please. So that we shall not linger
too long on that question, I am going to submit to the Tribunal a
document: This is your personal letter—the last document...

THE PRESIDENT: In the first place, I do not know what the question is,
and you are interrupting the witness before he has answered any
question.

GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. I have but one aim here, because I
should also like to shorten my interrogation in accordance with the
desire of the Tribunal. So I am going to submit the letter of Rosenberg
of 6 February 1938, addressed to Hitler, wherein he requests the post of
Reich Minister from Hitler. That is a short letter. I ask permission to
submit this document as Document USSR-117.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, I am going to read
this document into the record. It is not very long:

    “6 February 1938. My Führer, because I was unable...”

THE PRESIDENT: The document is translated into German, is it not?

GEN. RUDENKO: The original is in German.

THE PRESIDENT: It is in German to start with. It is not necessary to
read it all; you can put it in like other documents.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In this letter you expressed your
resentment in connection with the appointment of the Defendant
Ribbentrop as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Yes, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You thought that the post of the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the Hitler Cabinet could have been filled by yourself,
Defendant Rosenberg; is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Yes, and I do not find it so extraordinary that I should not
have expressed my wish to be used in the State service of the German
Reich after so many years of activity.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. You speak in this letter of the existence of a
secret cabinet; is that correct?

ROSENBERG: Well, may I read through this letter a little? Because I
cannot answer fragmentary questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, yes. [_Handing the document to the defendant._]
Please read it through.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have read this.

GEN. RUDENKO: Everything that is contained in it is correct?

ROSENBERG: Certainly, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is your own letter?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You asked to be appointed into this secret Reich Cabinet?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You asked for the position of Reich Minister?

ROSENBERG: I reported that I had spoken to Party Member Göring about the
question of this appointment; and since the Führer had charged me with
the ideological education of the Party and since the foreign political
office of the Party still existed and the impression might thereby arise
in the Party that I had somehow been refused by the Führer, I therefore
asked the Führer to receive me personally to discuss this matter. I
think it quite understandable that I should express the wish to speak
about a matter which was important to me personally.

GEN. RUDENKO: Therefore—here is my last question—you were the closest
collaborator of Hitler in carrying out all his plans and his ideas?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct; that is absolutely wrong.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well, let us consider it as a reply to my question. I
have finished, Mr. President.

M. HENRI MONNERAY (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): I have
only a few questions to ask the defendant.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant Rosenberg, is it correct that
the deportation and the execution of the Jews in France put your
organization in a position to seize furniture and valuables which
belonged to these Jews?

ROSENBERG: It is quite true that I received a governmental order to
confiscate archives, works of art, and later, household goods of Jewish
citizens in France.

M. MONNERAY: The mass deportation of Jews could only increase the
profits of your confiscation and seizures; is that not so?

ROSENBERG: No. The deportation of Jews has nothing to do with that. The
suggestion for these measures was given only when I was informed that
the Jewish people in question no longer inhabited their institutions,
castles, and apartments—that they had left Paris and other places and
had not returned.

M. MONNERAY: Once the Jews were deported they were absent; is that not
true?

ROSENBERG: When the German troops marched in, Paris was almost entirely
depopulated. The rest of the Parisians and inhabitants of cities in the
north of France returned in the course of time; but, as I have been
informed, the Jewish population did not return to these
cities—particularly not to Paris. Therefore they had not been deported,
but they had fled. I believe the number of those who had fled was given
as 5, 6, or 7 millions or more.

M. MONNERAY: Do you mean to say by that, Defendant Rosenberg, that in
the time that followed, when new deportation measures were carried out
in the course of the German occupation of France, the apartments and
homes of people deported were not seized by your organization?

ROSENBERG: No, I cannot express it that way. It may very well be that
the apartments of Jewish persons who had been arrested had also been
confiscated under certain circumstances, but I cannot give any exact
information about that.

M. MONNERAY: One can, therefore, say that the deportation measures gave
to your organization a greater chance of success in seizures and
confiscations; is that not true?

ROSENBERG: No, that does not agree with the facts; but, as may be seen
from the report which the French Prosecution made here, what actually
happened was that confiscated apartments generally were sealed by the
Police. Two months were allowed to elapse to see whether or not the
owners of these apartments would return, and only after the fact had
been established that this was not the case were the household goods
transferred to Germany for those whose homes had been damaged by bombs.
That can be seen from the report which the French Prosecution has
submitted here.

M. MONNERAY: I suppose that there are very few cases—and I am sure you
would agree with me on this—of people who had been deported returning
after two months?

ROSENBERG: On the contrary! I was informed about such cases. Even in
Document 001-PS, regrettable as it is from the humane point of view, it
is clearly stated that we had heard that a large number of Jewish
personalities, who had been formerly arrested, had been released again.

M. MONNERAY: You remember, certainly, the memorandum which you sent to
Hitler on 3 October 1942, which has already been presented to the
Tribunal as Document Number RF-1327. In that document you remind Hitler
of your jurisdiction and your powers; and you say that it is a matter
for you, as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, to
seize the homes of Jews who had taken flight, who were absent, or who
were called upon to leave. I can submit this document to you in order to
refresh your memory if necessary.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

The first lines of that document are the ones I am referring to. I
emphasize the words “the Jews who were called upon to leave later.” It
is a document of 3 October 1942, which has already been submitted.

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct—that is according to the facts. And as
I have already said before, it is possible that a number of apartments
of arrested people—other people who were absent—were included in that;
but as I said before, in the other report there was more detailed
information. But this document as such corresponds to the facts; it is a
letter from me.

M. MONNERAY: The consequence of this act was that you were entrusted not
only with the seizure of apartments which you found vacant at the time
of the arrival of the Germans in Paris but also of apartments of people
who were, as you say, “called upon to leave” in the following period.

You surely know, Defendant Rosenberg, under what conditions, in
territories occupied by the Germans in the West as well as in the East,
Jews were called upon to leave—namely, in special trains which
generally led directly to concentration camps?

ROSENBERG: No, I did not know about those trains. We definitely dealt
with deserted apartments, and I was probably informed that eventually
also the apartments of people who had been arrested, people who were
still living, or had long since fled would be taken into consideration.
Nothing more is stated here, and I could not give you any further
information. As to the reports which have been submitted here at the
Trial, I have seen them here for the first time. I can only tell you
that in the end I was informed that, before the conquest of Paris by
Allied troops, all available furniture and household equipment was
turned over to the French Red Cross.

M. MONNERAY: Do you agree with me on the following point: That your
organization had the right to seize valuables and apartments which had
become vacant after the arrival of the German troops in Paris? Do you
agree with me on that point?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

M. MONNERAY: Defendant, you have just said that you had no knowledge
whatsoever of the deportations in special trains to special
destinations. Do you know—and I suppose you do know it since the
document to which I am referring has already been produced before the
Tribunal—that in Paris every Tuesday since 1941 and until the end of
the German occupation conferences called “Tuesday meetings” brought
together the representatives of the various German organizations in
Paris—that is to say, the experts in Jewish affairs in the different
German administrative organs—to be exact, a representative of the
German Military Command, a representative of the Civilian
Administration, a representative of the Police Department, and a
representative of the Economics Department? At these meetings there was
also present a representative of the German Embassy in Paris and also a
representative of your Special Staff.

I am referring to Document Number RF-1210, which is a report of
Dannecker of 22 February 1942. He was the responsible chief and the main
expert on anti-Jewish terrorist action in Paris during the occupation.
If you wish, I will submit that document to you.

ROSENBERG: I remember these declarations made during the Trial very
well, but I have never received a report about these Tuesday conferences
which took place regularly. The fact that my deputy for the furniture
action had to maintain closest liaison with the Police was a matter of
course, since the confiscations of such articles could not be carried
out by my office, that being an exclusive right of the Police.
Therefore, one had to speak to the Police about these matters. It was
not reported to me that there were regular Tuesday conferences. I
believe that if such a report had been consistently turned in it would
have been submitted to me.

M. MONNERAY: You agree, however, that these Tuesday meetings were
extremely useful to the interests of your organization. As a matter of
fact, the various collective actions which were taken against the
Jews—that is to say, arrests, police raids, and deportations—were
discussed in those meetings. Did it not, therefore, seem completely
logical and natural for your organization to be regularly informed of
these actions in order that it might take the resulting economic
steps—namely, seizures of property?

ROSENBERG: In my opinion that is not logical at all, because if that
certain Chief of Police sent secret transports of that kind into these
camps, as has been revealed here, then it does not follow that he would
report about that every Tuesday to the other gentlemen. Neither do I
believe that this Chief of Police informed the representative of the
Foreign Office about these things in detail.

M. MONNERAY: You are perhaps badly informed on this point, but I would
like to read again the concluding passage of the report which says, “The
conference had as a result an alignment of Jewish policy as complete as
could be realized in the occupied territory...”

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said, has he not, that he does not know
anything about these Tuesday meetings—he received no reports of them?

M. MONNERAY: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Then why are you asking about them?

M. MONNERAY: The agencies in Paris collaborated actively in the
terrorist policy of the Police and benefited by it through the economic
step which followed—namely, the seizure of valuables.

THE PRESIDENT: You have not been able to connect him with these
reports—with the document. He has not signed the document. Nothing
shows on the document that he received it—at least, I suppose not—or
you would have put it to him. He says he did not know the document.

M. MONNERAY: Allow me, Mr. President, in that case to ask, whether he
contests the reality of the evidence concerning the representation of
his Paris organization at this meeting.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Do you deny its presence at this meeting?

ROSENBERG: I cannot give any information about that, because I have not
received any report.

M. MONNERAY: I would like to conclude this cross-examination by
reminding you of a document which has already been produced, quoted, and
discussed—that is Document 001-PS. In that document the defendant
proposes, in the first paragraph, the transport of all seized household
goods to the East, and in Paragraph 2 he suggests to Hitler that French
Jews instead of other Frenchmen should be shot as hostages.

Considering, as a result of the questions and answers, that the
organization of the defendant could benefit by these measures of
execution and deportation, it seems that the real motive of this
document is very clear. It is necessary—is not that your opinion,
Defendant—first to get rid of the people in order to be able afterwards
to seize their property?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not true.

M. MONNERAY: I have no more questions to ask, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to ask anything of the witness, Dr. Thoma?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, may I quite briefly ask the defendant whether
he wants me to ask him another question? I believe I shall have finished
immediately.

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. THOMA: Thank you. The defendant does not want any more questions.
Then, with the permission of the Court, I should like to call the
witness Riecke.

THE PRESIDENT: Will he be long or not?

DR. THOMA: Half an hour at most.

THE PRESIDENT: All right. Well then, the defendant may retire.

[_The witness Riecke took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

HANS JOACHIM RIECKE (Witness): Hans Joachim Riecke.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

Dr. Thoma, will you spell the name, please?

DR. THOMA: R-i-e-c-k-e.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, what position did you have in the
Economic Staff East and in the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern
Territories?

RIECKE: I held both positions upon orders from Göring. I was in charge
of the food and agriculture department.

DR. THOMA: What was the task of these offices?

RIECKE: The first main task of this office was the reconstruction of
Russian agriculture; the second task was the utilization of the surplus
areas in the south for the Armed Forces and for nutrition purposes.

DR. THOMA: What offices were established for administration in the
Occupied Eastern Territories?

RIECKE: In addition to the Foreign Ministry there existed a number of
special assignments: Göring for agriculture, Himmler for police, and
Sauckel for the recruitment of manpower.

DR. THOMA: Who was in charge of agriculture?

RIECKE: Agriculture—and also the entire economy—was under Göring. He
gave his instructions directly or through State Secretaries Körner and
Backe.

DR. THOMA: Were the figures for delivery—the quota in
agriculture—higher than those imposed under the Soviet administration?

RIECKE: The figures imposed for delivery were adjusted to the former
Russian figures. During the first year the actual quantities delivered
were lower than during the Russian era. In the next year, as far as
crops were concerned, they were lower; as far as livestock was
concerned, higher.

DR. THOMA: Were the actual deliveries according to Göring’s directives?

RIECKE: No, Göring had expected considerably higher figures.

DR. THOMA: Did Germany ship agricultural machinery—scythes and so
on—into the Occupied Eastern Territories and in what quantities?

RIECKE: A large-scale program for agricultural machinery under the name
of the Eastern Agricultural Program was set up in Germany whereby, with
regard to war conditions, large amounts of agricultural machinery and
equipment were shipped into the occupied Russian territories. The reason
for that was the removal and large-scale destruction of agricultural
machinery and equipment by the Russians during their retreat.

DR. THOMA: On 5 February 1942 an agricultural decree was issued. What
were the reasons for that?

RIECKE: The main purpose of that agricultural decree was to get the
population to co-operate voluntarily. In the beginning it was intended
to maintain the collective economy. That proved to be impossible,
because—as has been mentioned—part of the heavy machinery, especially
tractors, was no longer available. On the other hand, it was not
possible to resort to individual farming, as some of the population
wished, because smaller equipment was also lacking. Therefore a
compromise solution was reached by so-called agricultural co-operatives
whereby the Russian peasants got a share of the land to work, but a part
of the work was still carried on collectively.

DR. THOMA: What was the result?

RIECKE: The result of the agricultural decree was generally favorable.
The extent and quantity of the tillage increased. A particularly good
example of the results was the conditions in the so-called Kharkov
Basin, where in the spring of 1942 the farms which had been converted to
agricultural co-operatives had already achieved more than 70 percent of
the spring tillage, whereas the unconverted collective farms had
achieved only about 30 percent.

DR. THOMA: On 3 June 1943 the so-called private property declaration was
issued. What were the principles involved?

RIECKE: The basic purpose of the private property declaration was to
turn over to the Russian peasants as personal property the shares of
land which had been allotted to them by the agricultural decree.

DR. THOMA: How was the vegetable supply of large cities handled—for
example, in the Ukraine?

RIECKE: Around the large cities considerable lands for garden plots were
allotted to the working population.

DR. THOMA: Now some questions about Latvia. Did the German
Administration in Latvia confiscate the land of the Latvian peasants?

RIECKE: No; on the contrary. The nationalization measures taken by the
Russians during the occupation were discontinued. The land which had
been separated from the farms for purposes of settlement was returned to
the former owners. To say it in one sentence: The conditions existing
before the Russian occupation were re-established.

COL. POKROVSKY: I beg to be excused, but I cannot understand—with the
best of wishes—what all these questions, even in the remotest way, have
to do with the case of the Defendant Rosenberg. It seems to me that
further questions of the defense counsel, if they are along these same
lines, should not be allowed.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, you ought to show that what the witness is
testifying about is connected in some way with the Defendant Rosenberg.

DR. THOMA: With this question I want, first, to refute the Soviet
assertion that after the occupation the Barons had their land returned
to them—I refer to the Soviet Prosecution’s document, Document Number
USSR-395, which I submitted to the Tribunal yesterday. Secondly, I want
to prove with it that that area was supposed to be administered in an
orderly way and in such a manner that the population co-operated
voluntarily. Thirdly, I want to prove that during the entire German
occupation not one Ukrainian nor one citizen of the Soviet Union
starved, because the agricultural work was conducted accordingly. But I
can demonstrate this proof only through statements of an expert. I
believe that I have only a few more questions, and then I shall have
finished with this subject of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Thoma.

DR. THOMA: Did the German Administration in Latvia confiscate the land
of the Latvian peasants?

RIECKE: I have answered that question already. On the contrary,
socialization was revoked, and the land separated for settlement
purposes was returned to the Latvian peasants. In a word, conditions as
existing before the Russian occupation were re-established.

DR. THOMA: Were former large German estates reinstated?

RIECKE: No. On the contrary, Latvian peasants’ property—which after
1919 had been created at the expense of large German estates—was left
in their hands. It remained their property.

DR. THOMA: What were the ideas behind the so-called reprivatization?

RIECKE: Reprivatization was intended to give the Latvian peasants the
feeling of security derived from working their own property.

DR. THOMA: Did this law also apply to Estonia and Lithuania?

RIECKE: The law applied in a similar manner also to Estonia and
Lithuania.

DR. THOMA: Do you know about a statement of Darré’s to the effect that
the local small farmers should be removed from their property and be
proletarianized?

RIECKE: I do not remember any such statement.

DR. THOMA: Do you know about the Society for the Administration of the
Eastern Territory?

RIECKE: There were two societies by that name. I assume that the one you
are referring to was the one founded in order to take care of the
state-owned property and the plants which were shown to have been formed
during the Russian occupation in the Baltic provinces, and which were
still left after the return to private ownership. In the former Russian
territories of the so-called Reich Commission, the MTS organization also
took care of these areas.

DR. THOMA: What was the attitude of Rosenberg toward the various
measures, such as labor recruitment, delivery of foodstuffs, _et
cetera_?

RIECKE: Rosenberg could not escape the orders given by the Führer. Yet
he always advocated that these measures be carried out without coercion
against the population, and that they be co-ordinated with each other.

DR. THOMA: Who took care of the Eastern Workers in the Reich?

RIECKE: To my knowledge the Labor Administration, through its labor
offices.

DR. THOMA: How were the Eastern Workers quartered in the country in the
Reich? Do you know anything about it?

RIECKE: The provisioning and quartering of the Eastern Workers in the
country in the Reich were quite satisfactory on the whole. I received
reports directly by way of the offices of the Reich Food Estate.

DR. THOMA: Can you tell us something about Rosenberg’s general attitude
toward the Eastern people?

RIECKE: As I have said before, Rosenberg personally wanted to get the
Eastern people to co-operate. This was true especially in the matter of
cultivating and maintaining their cultural life. For instance,
Rosenberg, as far as I know, always intervened for the re-opening of the
colleges and special schools.

DR. THOMA: Did Rosenberg have any restrictions in this sphere? Did he
have to oppose other points of view to attain this goal?

RIECKE: Strong forces were at work counteracting Rosenberg’s efforts;
and especially in the Führer’s headquarters there were Bormann and
Himmler, whose opinions were strongly supported by Reich Commissioner
Koch, and who in turn was supported by Bormann and Himmler in his work.
That led to the fact that a large proportion of the measures which
Rosenberg had planned, especially in the Ukraine, were sabotaged by
Koch.

DR. THOMA: Now one last question: What do you know about the
concentration camps and about the treatment of the inmates in protective
custody?

RIECKE: I, of course, knew of the existence of concentration camps but
not their number and what happened in them. During the years of 1933 and
1934 various representations were made about individual cases of
maltreatment. Later, persons who visited concentration camps turned in
definite, positive reports. In the last days of April of last year, near
Berlin, I met inmates of concentration camps being marched to the rear.
Conditions were so terrible that I immediately saw Himmler and asked him
not to let these people go on marching but to turn them over to the
enemy. That discussion took place in the presence of Field Marshal
Keitel. Himmler unfortunately gave only an evasive answer.

DR. THOMA: There is one more question that just came to my mind. In
addition to providing food for the Armed Forces, were measures taken in
the Occupied Eastern Territories to get foodstuffs for the German
people?

RIECKE: About two-thirds of the supplies of foodstuffs from the Occupied
Eastern Territories went directly to the Armed Forces. The remaining
third was shipped to Germany, and we always considered it as
compensatory for the feeding of the foreign workers, whose number was
increasing continuously.

DR. THOMA: I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any
questions?

DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for
Food and Agriculture; is that correct?

RIECKE: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that the Chief of the Main Department for Food
and Agriculture in the Government General was frequently in Berlin in
order to try to fix quotas there which would be bearable to the
population?

RIECKE: As I recall, he several times expressed that opinion during the
regular negotiations which took place with the Government General.

DR. SEIDL: According to your own observations, what was the food
situation of the population of the Government General?

RIECKE: According to my own observations and the reports which I
received, the rations which had been fixed were far lower than in the
Reich, but considerable compensation was achieved through both the black
market and the open market.

DR. SEIDL: Is it correct that every effort was made by the
administration of the Government General to increase agricultural
production?

RIECKE: Considerable efforts were made by the Government General to
promote agriculture; and one can even say that the entire remaining
industry, insofar as it was not used for armament, worked exclusively
for the production of food. Furthermore, fertilizer was shipped from the
Reich, although only in limited quantities, as well as machinery and
equipment, in accordance with the program for the Eastern territory.

DR. SEIDL: What percentage of the total German food supply did the
occupied countries deliver?

RIECKE: According to the calculations which were made independently by
our Ministry, the deliveries from occupied territories in 1942 and 1943
amounted to about 15 percent of the total food supply of Germany, during
the other years around 10 percent, usually less.

DR. SEIDL: Now one last question: The Soviet Prosecution have submitted
a document, Document USSR-170. It deals with a meeting of the chiefs of
the German offices in the occupied territories which took place on 6
August 1942 under the chairmanship of the Reich Marshal. I will have
this document handed to you, and I want you to tell me whether the
description given in that document correctly characterizes the relations
between Germany and the occupied territories. You were present at that
meeting yourself.

[_The document was submitted to the witness._]

RIECKE: The document represents the minutes of the meeting in which I
took part. First, I have to say that the document—that is to say, the
minutes—principally contains the speech of the Reich Marshal, and does
not indicate the actual relations between Germany and the occupied
territories with regard to the food situation. The demands which Göring
made in this meeting were so high that they could not even be taken
seriously. It was also clear to us, engaged in the food sector, that in
the long run we could never achieve anything by force. The additional
demands which Göring made in that meeting were actually never fulfilled.
I do not think that Göring himself believed that these quotas could be
fulfilled. As far as I know, Göring’s additional demands were never
submitted at all to France; Belgium in spite of a prohibition received
grain; and Czechoslovakia got fats in spite of another prohibition.

On the day before that meeting, there had been a conference of the
Gauleiter which—as well as I can remember—was dominated by the
increasing air attacks in the West and the augmenting difficulties,
especially for the population, resulting therefrom. The western
Gauleiter were of the opinion that the food supply for Germany was
becoming insufficient in view of the increasing burdens for the
population, but that, on the other hand, a large part of the occupied
territories was still enjoying a surplus. The Reich Ministry for Food
and Agriculture and the representatives of the occupied territories
themselves were in a certain sense accused of not demanding and
delivering enough from the occupied territories. Göring followed up
these demands; and, due to his disposition and his temperament, this led
to the strong exaggerations contained in the minutes and in this
document.

DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, how were foreign workers fed in Germany?

RIECKE: All groups of foreign workers, with the exception of the Eastern
Workers, received the same rations as the German population.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what about the supplies for the Eastern Workers?

RIECKE: For certain items the Eastern Workers received less than the
others; and in the case of bread and potatoes, higher rations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the food supply such that the state of health of the
workers was endangered?

RIECKE: That question cannot be answered in a clear-cut fashion. It must
be considered in connection with the performance demanded of the
workers. For normal work these rations should have been entirely
sufficient.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel intervene especially for better nutrition of
these workers?

RIECKE: As far as I know, Sauckel appealed several times to my minister
on behalf of a better supply of food, whereupon Backe always answered
with the counter demand that no additional workers should be brought to
Germany. Backe repeatedly suggested that the number of workers be
limited and that they be supplied with better food instead.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, in your capacity as State Secretary for
Agriculture, did you not also go to Holland at the end of 1944 or the
beginning of 1945?

RIECKE: Yes; at that time I was in the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: On that occasion, was it not the case there that the
Wehrmacht offices and the Police raised serious complaints about
sabotage of Dutch agriculture, particularly about the responsible
government agencies in Holland?

RIECKE: I do not remember a conversation of that kind.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you know that the Defendant Seyss-Inquart intervened
for the reduction of food exports from Holland to Germany?

RIECKE: Yes, on various occasions, and also in that meeting which this
document describes.

DR. STEINBAUER: And also, in spite of complaints, that he left the Dutch
officials in the Food Department?

RIECKE: Yes, that is the case.

DR. STEINBAUER: That is all.

DR. HANS FLÄCHSNER: (Counsel for Defendant Speer): Mr. President, may I
put several questions to the witness?

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, could you give me information about
the following questions? Did the inmates of concentration camps who
worked in the armament industry get the same supplementary rations for
heavy and very heavy labor as the other workers?

RIECKE: During the time when I was charged with these problems, it was
decided to give all prisoners, including concentration camp inmates, the
same rations as the rest of the population, if they were working.
Therefore, they should have received the same rations.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Was the Defendant Speer, or the Ministry under his
direction, competent for the orderly maintenance of the rations in the
plants insofar as the latter—the plants—were in charge of the food
supply?

RIECKE: No, Speer’s Ministry was not competent in these matters. As far
as delivery upon demand was concerned, the food offices were competent.
The distribution of delivered foodstuffs in the plants, however, was the
affair of the camp or plant administrations.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: And one further question: What measures had Speer taken
in order to prevent a general food catastrophe which would have affected
the millions of foreign workers in Germany in an equal manner?

RIECKE: Beginning in December 1944, Speer purposely subordinated
armament tasks to the problem of nutrition with the idea in mind of a
change-over to a new regime, a new administration, an occupying power.
From this time on, Speer gave food transport priority over armament
transport. He saw to it that seed for the spring tillage was distributed
with the transportation means at his disposal. Speer emphatically
advocated reconstructing food processing plants damaged by air attack
even before armament plants. And above all, during that last phase,
Speer helped us prevent the senseless destruction of food processing
plants, against the instructions issued by Hitler. He did this with
complete self-abnegation and without consideration for any possible
consequences.

DR. FLÄCHSNER: Thank you.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, did you participate in the Western campaign?

RIECKE: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: In what capacity?

RIECKE: As commander of a battalion in the field.

DR. LATERNSER: During the Western campaign, did you receive any dubious
orders—I mean to say, orders which were in violation of international
law?

RIECKE: I received no such orders.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you have any reason to believe, or did you establish,
that looting was tolerated by higher military authorities?

RIECKE: No. On the contrary, looting was most severely punished.

DR. LATERNSER: Later you were also in the East, but—as I have heard not
as a soldier. Could you look into the operational areas there, as well
as the regions governed by the commissions?

RIECKE: Both were open to my observations.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the treatment of the local population by the
German soldiers?

RIECKE: Taken as a whole it can be said that, especially in the Ukraine,
the treatment of the civilian population in the army’s sector—in the
operational area—was better than elsewhere; consideration was shown for
the necessities of the civilian administrative sector.

DR. LATERNSER: And what do you think is the reason for that difference?

RIECKE: I attribute it to a different basic attitude of the soldier who
was free of political tendencies and also to the fact that the troops,
of course, wanted to have peace and quiet in the rear areas.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the Prosecution want to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: I can be through in 2 minutes, if Your Honor please.

[_Turning to the witness._] Were you a member of the Nazi Party?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: When did you join?

RIECKE: In 1925.

MR. DODD: 1925?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: You were also a member of the SA?

RIECKE: Yes.

MR. DODD: What rank did you hold in the SA?

RIECKE: My last rank was Gruppenführer of the SA.

MR. DODD: Previously, you were an SA Sturmführer, were you not?

RIECKE: In 1930, yes.

MR. DODD: When did you become an SS Gruppenführer?

RIECKE: In October 1944.

MR. DODD: That is all. I have no other questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any questions to ask in re-examination?

DR. THOMA: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that concludes your case in behalf of the Defendant
Rosenberg, does it not?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to state that the Document
Rosenberg-19, which General Rudenko referred to, was not submitted to
the Tribunal as an exhibit by me. Furthermore, I should like to inform
the Tribunal that a number of affidavits, which have been approved, have
not as yet been received.

THE PRESIDENT: You can mention them later, of course.

DR. THOMA: I should further like to make the request that my document
book Number 1 be not accepted in evidence but considered the same as
before, that is, as having general probative value according to the
decision of 8 March 1946; therefore, not as evidence, not as a matter of
proof, but just as argument. I assume that it had been approved in this
sense previously, and that it was only rejected as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: I anticipate that we shall not interfere in your
argument.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Mr. President, I should like to give an
explanation—that is, about the fact that Document Rosenberg-19
represents a letter from Riecke addressed to Rosenberg, dated 12 March
1943. This document was submitted by the defendant’s counsel, Dr. Thoma.
It is found in the Rosenberg Document Book Number 2, Page 42, and has
been translated into all four languages. It is in the possession of all
the prosecutors and is also in the document book which has been
submitted to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has ruled to accept this
document from the Defense.

THE PRESIDENT: General Raginsky, the position is this: That a document
does not go into evidence unless it is offered in evidence. Dr. Thoma
has not offered this document in evidence, and I understand that the
Soviet Prosecution has not offered it in evidence. If you want to offer
it in evidence, and the document is an authentic document—which I
suppose it is—you can offer it in evidence.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: We did not offer it as evidence, only because
we thought that it was already contained in the document book presented
by the Defense; and, therefore, we had no need to present it again. If
the defendant’s counsel, Thoma, refuses to present it, then we shall do
so.

THE PRESIDENT: You are wrong in assuming this. You see, documents do not
go into evidence unless they are offered in evidence. The fact that they
are in the books does not mean that they are in evidence; therefore, if
you want to offer it in evidence, you must do so.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: In that case, Mr. President, we are going to
offer it in evidence now.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well; you will give it a USSR number.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Yes, we are going to give it a USSR exhibit
number and, with your permission, will offer it in evidence tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. COUNSELLOR RAGINSKY: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Now, we will proceed to deal with the supplementary
applications. The witness can retire.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases, the first application
is that of Dr. Seidl’s with regard to two witnesses. First of all
witness Hilger, who was previously granted as a witness for the
Defendant Von Ribbentrop but withdrawn by counsel on the 2nd of April. I
believe that the witness is in the United States and that there is a
report that he is too ill to travel. But apart from this, My Lord, the
purpose of the witness is to give evidence as to the discussions and
treaty negotiations which took place in the Kremlin at Moscow before the
German-Soviet agreement of the 23rd of August 1939; and the allegation
states the conclusion of the alleged secret agreement dealt with in the
affidavit of the witness Gaus.

My Lord, the other application is for a witness Von Weizsäcker, who is
going to deal with the same point.

The Prosecution, of course, loyally accept the decision of the Tribunal
on the admissibility of the Gaus affidavit, but they respectfully submit
that that does not affect this point. What is desired is to call
witnesses as to the course of the negotiations before these
treaties—before an agreement was arrived at in respect to these
treaties—and that is a point which we have had several times; and, of
course, while all circumstances have a slight difference, the Tribunal
have—as far as I know—ruled universally up to now that they will not
go into antecedent negotiations which have resulted in agreements.

There is also the position that, of course, Dr. Seidl has put in the
Gaus affidavit, and he has had his opportunity to examine the Defendant
Von Ribbentrop; and the Prosecution respectfully submit that to call two
secondary witnesses—without any disrespect to their position in the
German Foreign Office, they are witnesses of a secondary importance
compared with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop—to discuss these
negotiations seems to the Prosecution to be going into irrelevant matter
and entirely unnecessary for the purposes of this case.

I confess I do not myself appreciate any special relevance that these
witnesses could have to the case of Hess, but I do not put it so
strongly on that ground; I put it on the ground which I have just
outlined to the Tribunal.

With regard to the third application of Dr. Seidl, I am not quite sure
whether he means that he wants the Prosecution to provide him with an
original or certified copy of the secret agreement, or whether he
desires to tender a copy himself. But with regard to that, again the
Prosecution take the line that that point—which, after all, is only one
tiny corner of one aspect of the case—is sufficiently covered by the
evidence which has already been brought out before the Tribunal from the
affidavit of Ambassador Gaus and the evidence of the Defendant
Ribbentrop.

That is the position of the Prosecution with regard to that.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Seidl?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the affidavit of the Ambassador Dr. Gaus,
which has been accepted by the Tribunal as Exhibit Hess-16, describes
only a part of the negotiations. Ambassador Dr. Gaus was not present at
the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the pacts. I have,
therefore, made the additional application to call Embassy Counsellor
Hilger as a witness after his having already been approved as a witness
for the Defendant Von Ribbentrop.

I have, furthermore, requested that the Tribunal procure the text of
that secret supplementary appendix. I have to admit, however, that this
request no longer has the importance it had at the time it was made. In
the meantime we have received a copy of that secret supplementary
appendix.

Furthermore, I have a copy of the secret appendix to the German-Soviet
border pact of 28 September 1939; and I have an affidavit by Ambassador
Dr. Gaus of 1 April of this year certifying that these copies are
identical with the text of the secret agreements drafted on 23 August
and 28 September 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, have you any objection to that document being
produced for the consideration of the Tribunal?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, My Lord. As I say, the Tribunal have
considered our objection on relevance, and we have lost on it; and,
therefore, it is not really open to me to argue any question of the
relevance of the document in view of the decision of the Tribunal.

The only point that I make is that if Dr. Seidl produces an alleged copy
of the treaty, supported by an affidavit of Ambassador Gaus, then it
immensely strengthens my argument, I submit, against him being allowed
to call the witness.

COL. POKROVSKY: The Soviet Prosecution, on the question which is now
being discussed by the Tribunal, have submitted today a document to the
General Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal. If this
document is already in your possession, then I need not talk about our
position here; but, if you find it necessary, Your Honors, I am going to
set it forth here. We object on the ground of considerations, which are
set forth in this document signed by General Rudenko.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you presenting an argument or a document of some
sort?

COL. POKROVSKY: No, I am not going to argue about it nor return to this
question if you have this document.

THE PRESIDENT: You misunderstood me. You mentioned a document which you
asserted was in the possession of the Tribunal. I am not aware that we
have any document from the Soviet Prosecution. It may be that it has
been received; and, if so, we will consider it of course.

What I wanted to know is whether it was an argument or an original
document of some sort.

COL. POKROVSKY: The document deals with the official answer of the
Soviet Prosecution on the question as to whether we consider it
necessary to grant the request of Dr. Seidl regarding a group of
questions connected with the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: We will consider the document.

COL. POKROVSKY: You think it would be possible to be content with just
the document which is in your possession now?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, certainly—unless you wish to say anything. We will
consider the document.

COL. POKROVSKY: There is going to be no further information regarding
it. Our position has been defined in detail in this document signed by
General Rudenko; and, if you have this document before you now, I have
nothing more to add regarding it.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, on 13 April I made a written motion to be
permitted to submit a documentary supplement as Exhibit Hess-17. I
submitted six copies of this document with the request to have it
translated. The following documents are included:

1) The German-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, which was
already submitted by the Prosecution under Exhibit GB-145; 2) the
related supplementary protocol of the same date; 3) the German-Soviet
Friendship and Border Pact of 28 September 1939; 4) the secret
supplementary protocol of the same date which is related to it; and 5)
the second affidavit by Ambassador Dr. Gaus, mentioned before.

Furthermore, on 15 April I made the motion to call the witness Dr.
Gaus—who is in Nuremberg—here before this Court if the Tribunal do not
consider the affidavit sufficient. I ask the Tribunal to make its
decision about these motions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the matter.

Now, with reference to Von Neurath.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this is an application for a witness
Dieckhoff, in regard to whom interrogatories have already been granted.
As I understand, the reason is that the witness Tschirschky has been
found to have retired from the German Foreign Office some 18 months
earlier than was thought. Baron Von Lüdinghausen has suggested that, to
balance the calling of Dieckhoff as a witness, he will give up the
calling of the witness Zimmermann and have an affidavit or interrogatory
instead. My Lord, that seems to the Prosecution a very reasonable
suggestion, and we have no objection.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean, no objection to Dieckhoff as a witness and
Zimmermann for an affidavit or interrogatories?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, that is all with regard to the
Defendant Von Neurath.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, with regard to the Defendant Schacht, it
is only the petition of the witness Huelse; and the Prosecution do not
really mind whether Dr. Dix calls him or puts in an affidavit. I think
that it is only a question of whether the witness will be available to
come here from Hamburg; and, if he is available, we have no objection to
him being called as a witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, My Lord, the next one on the list is an
application on behalf of the Defendant Sauckel: Withdrawal of
interrogatories for Mende granted on 23 March, as the prospective
witness is not located; and interrogatories for Marenbach in place of
Mende, who can give the same testimony. Dr. Servatius believes that
Marenbach is located at the Garmisch internment camp. The Prosecution
have no objection to that.

My Lord, I think there was a formal one from Dr. Thoma with regard to
the use of the sworn statement by Professor Denker, but there is no
objection to that.

THE PRESIDENT: We have already allowed that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have already allowed that; this is only the
formal application.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. Then we will consider those matters.
There are a number of documents for the production of which the
Defendant Sauckel’s counsel is applying.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: It has been suggested to us that counsel for the
Defendant Sauckel and Counsel for the Prosecution could help us over
that matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, my friend, Mr. Roberts, has been
dealing with Dr. Servatius upon this point; so, perhaps he could help
the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Roberts, will it take a long time for that or not?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think so. The Tribunal, I understand...

COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to inform the Tribunal that the Soviet
Prosecution did not receive any documents which the British Prosecutor
has just mentioned, and we ask that these documents not be discussed
until the moment when we shall have the opportunity to get acquainted
with them.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that these documents have not been
translated yet. The question really is the preliminary one of which
documents should be translated, and we were only going through the
documents in order to see which documents were sufficiently relevant to
be translated; so that it would not be...

COL. POKROVSKY: Very well.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, the Tribunal—I understand—have made a
preliminary order of just striking out the documents which Dr. Servatius
and I agree should not be presented. My Lord, that leaves a very large
number of documents, of which I think the Tribunal has a list. My Lord,
the first 68 documents—or rather from documents 6 to 68—are
regulations dealing with the conditions of the employment of labor in
Germany. My Lord, I have seen Dr. Servatius’ proposed document book, and
he has marked certain passages which he would desire to read, and which
would have to be translated, My Lord; and that does cut down the bulk of
the documents very considerably.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, of course, we have not read all these documents
yet, and they are not translated. Can you indicate to us whether you
have any objection to them being translated?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not think I could object to those first
documents from 6 to 68—the passages marked “being translated,” because
from their description they appear to be relevant.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, 6 to 68.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the passages which are actually marked?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Then will you go on?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: 69 to 79 he has already struck out.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, 80 and 81 I object to. They are
documents making allegations of breach of the Hague Regulations by the
Soviet nation. My Lord, I submit that that is not relevant.

THE PRESIDENT: The allegations of illegal acts by the Soviet Government
with reference to individuals?

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. My Lord, I submit that that could not be
relevant at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and 82 to 89; you do not object to these?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not object to these—the passages as marked.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Servatius promised, as far as he could, to cut down the
passages which were going to be marked.

My Lord, 90 and 91 I object to. Dr. Servatius wants to put in, under the
description of documents, a large number of affidavits, the number of
which I think is not yet ascertained—affidavits by various persons as
to the conditions of labor and the conditions under which foreign
workers were employed. My Lord, the Defendant Sauckel has been allowed a
certain number of witnesses and also affidavits or interrogatories from
other people. My Lord, I submit that this application under 90 and
91—two files of affidavit—is not really an application for documents
at all, and it should be disallowed.

My Lord, Number 92...

THE PRESIDENT: Number 92 he has struck out.

MR. ROBERTS: 92 has been struck out.

My Lord, Number 93 is, in fact, a book which was referred to by the
French prosecutor; and, therefore, of course, Dr. Servatius would be
entitled to refer to it in his case.

THE PRESIDENT: Are the passages marked in that or not?

MR. ROBERTS: Well, he has not marked any yet. There are some pictures,
My Lord, of...

THE PRESIDENT: He only wants the pictures?

MR. ROBERTS: I think so, My Lord, showing the cherubic happiness of the
foreign workers in Germany.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 94 is an affidavit of Sauckel’s son. It is only
required, I understand, if one of three other witnesses who have been
allowed is not available. My Lord, it is to deal with the allegation
that Sauckel ordered the evacuation of Buchenwald; and, My Lord, I
cannot object to this very short affidavit, if Dr. Servatius cannot
produce one of the three witnesses who have been allowed to him.

My Lord, 95 is Sauckel’s speeches, and Dr. Servatius again has promised
to cut down the passages which he has marked. It is difficult to object
to that in view of the allegation of conspiracy.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, 96 and 97 are books in which there are very short
extracts which have been marked, and, again, as it deals with a relevant
period of the alleged conspiracy, My Lord, I do not see how I can object
to that.

THE PRESIDENT: In the same category, yes. Does that meet with your
views, Dr. Servatius?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I discussed the matter with a representative of the
Prosecution and that represents in principle the result. I would like to
add, however, something with reference to a few documents—namely,
Documents 80 and 81. One is the photostat copy of a deportation order in
the city of Oels, the other an affidavit concerning forced labor in
Saaz. I need the first document in order to prove that the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare was obsolete—that is to say, that before
the armistice, while fighting was still going on, the population of the
Eastern German provinces was sent to Russia for forced labor. I
supplemented the motion orally at that time, because I considered the
proof for the deportation of a large part of the population for forced
labor, obtained by questioning the mayors of cities from Upper Silesia
to East Prussia, as insufficient. I believe that this is of great
importance for the defense of my client, as it proves that the Hague
Regulations for Land Warfare was considered nonexistent in the East.

Document 81 deals with the state of affairs after the armistice—but
which appears as only a continuation of what previously occurred in the
Eastern territories—and confirms the fact that, under the occupation of
the Soviet Army, such conditions generally continued to exist—namely,
the recruitment of the population for work not in the sense of the Hague
Convention for the repair of local roads, for instance, but rather for
the purpose of working in industry and for activities outside the
framework of the Hague Convention and for work outside the country. I do
not believe that I should be refused this evidence.

Now as to Documents Number 90 and 91, their contents have already been
presented. They are two folders with a collection of affidavits. The
attempt is made to bring evidence in refutation of a government
investigation such as we have met up with here. We have received reports
from the Soviet and French Prosecution; we have received reports from
Czechs; all of which constitute a huge quantity of material of
mosaic-like patterns that can only be dealt with in this manner.

I once before explained that I do not have a government at my disposal
which could prepare such a report, and so I suggest bringing a
collection of affidavits. Now I do not intend to read every one of these
affidavits here. My motion is that the Court appoint a deputy who would
study that folder and prepare a brief report about it for presentation
to the Tribunal. A similar problem will arise later when questions
concerning the political organizations are dealt with—namely, the
problem as to how these immense quantities of material can be presented
to the Tribunal.

If I bring one witness, one witness only, it will be said, “Well, one
witness cannot, of course, cover the entire ground.” On the other hand,
I cannot have a hundred or more witnesses. So this would be a middle
way: That a person appointed by the Tribunal study these affidavits and
then give a report. That is the content of these two folders.

THE PRESIDENT: How many affidavits have you in mind or have you
obtained?

DR. SERVATIUS: So far I have received very little. It proves that those
who could give information are very reticent, because they are afraid
that they might be prosecuted on that account. I hope, however, to be
able to make a selection of reasonable statements, which I believe will
amount to about 20 or 30 affidavits. I would limit it to that, because I
do not care to take up the Court’s time with unnecessary work dealing
with these affidavits. Judging from the present state of my collection,
I may even have to consider withdrawing my motion altogether, because I
have to admit myself that the amount of material reaching me is very
small; but I ask to be given another chance, and at the appropriate
moment I shall present the case to the Court again.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Is that all you want to say?

DR. SERVATIUS: There is still Document Number 93, the illustrated
booklet, _Europe Works in Germany_. I should like...

THE PRESIDENT: Did the Prosecution object?

DR. SERVATIUS: No, the Prosecution does not object. I should like to
project some pictures on the screen for the purpose of showing
particularly under what conditions these people from the East arrived
and what their condition was later, insofar as it can be shown from a
propaganda pamphlet.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thank you.

MR. ROBERTS: There was one other point which I ought to mention. Perhaps
Dr. Servatius would be good enough to listen.

My Lord, Dr. Servatius has applied in writing to the Tribunal, by letter
dated 5 March 1946, for all medical reports of Dr. Jäger, who was a
chief camp doctor at Krupp-Essen; secondly, all monthly reports of a man
called Groene, who was a colleague of Dr. Jäger; thirdly, all minutes of
monthly conferences which the chief camp leader held with his
subordinate camp leaders at Krupps.

My Lord the position is this: That the French put in—oh, I think our
American colleagues put in—an affidavit of Dr. Jäger, and Dr. Jäger
himself has been granted as a witness for Sauckel, and so he will be
seen in the witness box.

My Lord, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Jäger being asked, I
suppose, to bring his reports with him if they are available. We do not
have them, and I do not think we know where they are.

THE PRESIDENT: But the witness is being called.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have received a portion of these documents already, and
I assume that the rest may also reach me. I believe the material which I
have now is sufficient for my purposes so that the Prosecution need not
take further pains.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean we need make no order?

DR. SERVATIUS: It is not necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

     [_The Tribunal adjourned until 18 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]




                           TRANSCRIBER NOTES

Punctuation and spelling have been maintained except where obvious
printer errors have occurred such as missing periods or commas for
periods. English and American spellings occur throughout the document;
however, American spellings are the rule, hence, “Defense” versus
“Defence”. Unlike Blue Series volumes I and II, this volume includes
French, German, Polish and Russian names and terms with diacriticals:
hence Führer, Göring, Kraków, and Ljoteč etc. throughout.

Although some sentences may appear to have incorrect spellings or verb
tenses, the original text has been maintained as it represents what the
tribunal read into the record and reflects the actual translations
between the German, English, French, and, most specifically with this
volume, Russian documents presented in the trial.

An attempt has been made to produce this eBook in a format as close as
possible to the original document presentation and layout.

[The end of _Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal Vol. 11_, by Various.]