UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
                                 IN THE
                             SOCIAL SCIENCES

                      VOL IV. NO. 2      JUNE 1915

                            BOARD OF EDITORS

                            ERNEST L. BOGART
                             JOHN A. FAIRLIE
                           LAURENCE M. LARSON

                 PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
                UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
                            URBANA, ILLINOIS

                             COPYRIGHT, 1915
                      BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS




                   The Defeat of Varus and the German
                       Frontier Policy of Augustus

                      WILLIAM A. OLDFATHER, Ph. D.
         Associate Professor of Classics, University of Illinois

                                   AND

                      HOWARD VERNON CANTER, Ph. D.
         Assistant Professor of Classics, University of Illinois




PREFACE


The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction
felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature
which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth
anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses
as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety
of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not
forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as
occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In
1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university,
working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: “The Effect of the Defeat of Varus
upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier.” We
desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use
some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a
wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed,
and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the
present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and
continued, with intermissions, to the present time.

In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have
gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current
explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past
opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail
to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two
parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though
this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the
argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration.

To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a
subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is
involved in a momentous conflict. We do not so feel. Disinterested
scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent
emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected.
That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain
glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history,
has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character
and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our
investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but
only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It
is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with
destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation
needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to
shed renown upon the present.

We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A.
S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the
manuscript in proof.

                                                                 W. A. O.
                                                                 H. V. C.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

May 24, 1915




CONTENTS


                                                    PAGE

                         CHAPTER I

    Introduction and General View of the Question      9

                        CHAPTER II

    Sources                                           21

                        CHAPTER III

    Criticism of the Accepted View                    35

                        CHAPTER IV

    A New Interpretation                              82

    Appendices                                       113

    Index                                            117




CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE QUESTION


Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its
bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost
united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A.
D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river
Elbe. Gardthausen[1] unhesitatingly predicates the emperor’s intention
in the following words: “er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und
nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere
Grenze zu geben.” Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In
discussing Drusus’ command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he
says:[2] “Drusus ... übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741)
die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren
Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward.” Further on[3]
Drusus’ successor, Tiberius, is represented as having succeeded in
making this subjugation: “weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten
sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte,
dass sämmtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen
hätten ... fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme.” Again, Mommsen[4] calls
Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national
independence, and speaks[5] of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the
last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer
the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück’s position on the
question is unequivocal[6]. So is that of Schiller.[7] Hübner[8] voices
the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany
was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp[9] hazards
the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine
boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried
into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more
pressing duties prevented Caesar’s heir, for thirty years after Gaul’s
subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the
settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.)
was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B.
C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the
Ubii from the attack of their neighbors.

Seeck[10] and many others assert that not only was Germany subdued
by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new
province.[11] This is stated by Knoke as follows:[12] “Das germanische
Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten ... Römische Verwaltung
und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge
und Tribut gezwungen ... nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das
deutsche Volk die Zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft
Roms verfallen war.” However, there is no general agreement as to when
Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg[13] believes
it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius’
defeat (16 B. C.): “Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschlands
bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich
zweifelhaft.” Abraham’s conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C.
Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but
that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: “Später
indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe ... zur Provinz
machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung
Norddeutschlands für vollendet an.”[14] Many believe that an effort
was made on Augustus’ part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and
they regard this as tantamount to an attempt to subjugate Germany.[15]
The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited
as proofs of Rome’s purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham[16]:
“Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the
Rhine by Augustus’ two stepsons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B.C.-6 A.D.),
had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe]
river.” Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome’s
policy. So Abbott[17]: “To the north the frontier policy of Augustus
was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem
to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans.”
Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work[18] to
the “Conquest of Germania,” concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was
opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of
his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy[19]: “he had persistently
avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had
found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the
people.” We may observe also that Eduard Meyer’s view[20] is not wholly
in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion
frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality
of the German nation: “Wenn wir ... die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen
ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich
hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so
wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger
Wald nennen dürfen.” And although he insists on the necessity resting
upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to
maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the
Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the
desire for imperial expansion[21]: “aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus
nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art
wie Cäsar seinen Geten- und Partherkrieg geplant hatte.”

Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions,
which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number
of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief
that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting
the conquest of Germany; that the disaster which overtook the legions of
Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce
all hope of making Germany a province[22]. Most historians claim in
addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and
that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world’s history.
So Seeck[23]: “Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass
auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet,
aus dem künftig die Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen
sollte.” Gardthausen[24] states the same belief in still stronger terms:
“Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer
deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt,
so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Verdienst des Arminius
... kurz, die Entwickelung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem
Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius
nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er
nicht später—was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen
Germanicus vertheidigt hätte.” The debt of the German nation, and the
world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs,
remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in
scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize
estimates of historical significance.[25] Mommsen and Koepp may be cited
as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of
the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing
in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of
Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube.[26] Koepp is the
more guarded. He says[27], “Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht,
auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der
Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde.” But this
view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of German authors.
Thomas Arnold voices it[28] with all the extravagance that characterizes
rash generalizations: “The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned
among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the
happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius
Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in
the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours
over the invading host of the Mohammedans.” We find it, as one might
expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy[29],
the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from
the epitomator Florus, “Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore
oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” And we need feel no
surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of
P. V. N. Meyers.[30] Here and there, however, are to be found writers
who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who
has been quoted above.[31] Ferrero too shows a saner historical view
when he says[32]: “Historians have long been accustomed to regard the
defeat of Varus as one of the ‘decisive’ battles of the world, and as
an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is
said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved
her grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have
romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality
and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic
nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus
the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of
Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward
line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only
at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always
a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what _might_ have
happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt
to explain what _did_ happen.”[33] It should be observed also that such a
generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed
as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may
properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in
separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For
it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no
literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came
into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the
person of Rome’s new representative, Charlemagne.[34]

Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius’ achievement
will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign
to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius’ one great deed.
Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the
ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior
authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on
the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations,
and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their
peculiar characteristic;[35] that frequently what these sources say in
express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are
the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or
from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never
intended to serve as objective pictures of reality;[36] that only the
less cautious writers assert that Augustus in a spirit of imperialism
sought to conquer Germany;[37] that historians who have the best standing
as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity
resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An
effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province;
that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to
conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in
Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force,
in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the
frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a
wide strip of the enemy’s territory.

It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding
the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading
figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position
of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the
rank of one of the world’s greatest heroes.[38] As Koepp pertinently
observes, many well-meant accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been
written under mere impulse of national feeling.[39] However, that the
glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober
historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German
scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp[40],
who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration
held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: “eher dürften wir heute unseren
Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in
das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die
Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der
Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben.”
So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius’ case historians have
taken liberty with historical facts under motives of idealization[41]:
“Nous désapprouvons les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l’histoire
pour créer, un Arminius legendaire et une Germanie idéale.” Finally, we
may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of
historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at
their disposal.[42]


FOOTNOTES

[1] _Augustus und seine Zeit_, Leipzig, 1891, I, p. 1069.

[2] _Röm. Gesch._, V. p. 24 (6th ed. 1909); cf. _Die germanische Politik
des Augustus_ (originally in _Im Neuen Reich_, 1871, pp. 537-556), p. 14:
“Die Unterwerfung Germaniens, kräftig begonnen, und sieben Jahre hindurch
beharrlich ... geführt.” Other representative expressions of opinion
among recent writers may be found: R. von Poehlmann (in Pflugk-Harttung’s
_Weltgeschichte_, 1910, I, p. 516); E. Kornemann (in Gercke-Norden’s
_Einleitung in die Altertumsw._, 1912, III, p. 208); E. Kornemann,
“Zu dem Germanenkriege unter Augustus,” _Klio, IX_ (1909), p. 449. On
the basis of Tiberius’ campaigns (4-6 A. D.) he speaks also of “die
gewaltigen Anstrengungen Roms zur Unterwerfung Germaniens”; H. F. Pelham,
_Outlines of Roman History_, 1905, p. 460; H. Stuart Jones, _The Roman
Empire_, 1913, p. 34; C. H. Hayes, _Sources Relating to the Germanic
Invasions_, 1909, p. 64.

[3] _Ibid._, p. 28. So J. Beloch, _Griech. Gesch.²_, I, 1 (1912),
Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany
was actually subjugated: “Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht
trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die
Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger
Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach.”

[4] _Ibid._, p. 40.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 50.

[6] See the chapter “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer” in
his _Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte_,
Berlin, 2nd edit., 1909, II, p. 47 f.

[7] _Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit_, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f.

[8] _Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa_, Berlin, 1890, p. 110.

[9] _Die Römer in Deutschland_ (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII),
1912, p. 8. Fischer (_Armin und die Römer_, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4)
is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar’s conflicts with the
Germans were intended merely “die Germanen von Einfällen in Gallien
abzuschrecken,” i. e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride.
However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of
expansion in this direction, “und demgemäss sah er, als Adoptivsohn
Cäsars, die Unterwerfung Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige
Pflicht an” (p. 25).

[10] See _Kaiser Augustus_ (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902,
p. 111: “bedrängte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und
hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen ... Tiberius ... vollendete dann in
den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der
neuen Provinz.”

[11] See also Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, 31 f.; Schiller, _op. cit._, p.
222. Riese (_Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_,
Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was
made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen’s
statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when
Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were
not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons,
is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor’s worship was by
no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this
statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f.; also by Marquardt, _Röm.
Staatsverwaltung²_, I, p. 504. Ferrero (_Characters and Events of Roman
History_, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing
to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a
province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left
to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws.

[12] _Armin der Befreier Deutschland_, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f.

[13] _Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland_, Halle, 1872, p. 49.

[14] _Zur Gesch. der germanischen u. pannonischen Kriege unter Augustus_,
Berlin, 1875, p. 7.

[15] Cf. Koepp, _op. cit._, p. 9: “der Wunsch, eine solche Grenze zu
verkürzen, den einspringenden Winkel zum Reiche zu ziehen, erscheint
fast selbstverständlich. Das bedeutete aber die Eroberung Germaniens
bis zur Elbe”; Idem, _Westfalen_, I (1909), p. 35: “Dieses Ziel hat nun
Augustus ohne Zweifel erstrebt.” See also Schiller, _op. cit._, p. 214:
“Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt, von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht
durch Eroberungen zu mehren, abzugehen und für Gallien die Grenze nach
der Elbe, für Italien und Macedonien nach der Donau vorzuschieben und auf
diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen, welche leichter zu verteidigen und
kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”

[16] _Op. cit._, p. 460.

[17] _History of Roman Political Institutions_, Boston, 1910, p. 282.

[18] _The Greatness and Decline of Rome_, New York, 1909, V, p. 142 f.

[19] So Mommsen, _Die germanische Politik des Augustus_, p. 9: “Caesar
Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner
Herrschaft, den Frieden.”

[20] _Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie_, Halle, 1910, p. 444.

[21] _Ibid._, p. 471.

[22] Niese, _Grundriss der röm. Gesch._ (4th ed. 1910), p. 299: “Eine
Wiedereroberung des Verlorenen ward nicht versucht. Mit Ausnahme der
Küstenvölker, Bataver, Friesen, und Chauken, gingen die Eroberungen in
Germanien verloren, und an Stelle der Elbe ward der Rhein Grenze....
Das römische Germanien beschränkte sich in Zukunft auf die dem Rhein
benachbarten Gegenden”; Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_,
ed. 1910, p. 2: “And though, on the first attack they [the Germans]
seemed to yield to the weight of the Roman power, they soon, by a signal
act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the
vicissitudes of fortune.”

[23] _Op. cit._, p. 117. Cf. von Ranke, _Weltgeschichte_, III, 1,
Leipzig, 1883, p. 28: “Und auch die Geschichte muss bestätigen, dass dem
Ereigniss eine allgemeine und auf immer nachwirkende Bedeutung zukommt.”

[24] _Op. cit._, I, p. 1202 f.

[25] See F. Knoke, _Armin der Befreier Deutschlands_, 1909, p. 80: “Dass
uns die Eigenart erhalten blieb, dass wir unsere Sprache retteten,
dass wir ein freies Volk geblieben seien, dass wir eine Geschichte
erleben durften, dies alles haben wir Armin zu verdanken ... ja selbst
fremde Völker hätten alle Ursache mit uns zusammen ihn zu ehren. Gäbe
es doch, um vom anderen zu schweigen, ohne seine Taten weder ein Volk
der Franzosen, noch der Engländer, selbst nicht der Amerikaner in den
Vereinigten Staaten. Ihnen allen hat er die Möglichkeit ihres Volkstums
erst geschaffen. Das wird ihnen freilich schwerlich zum Bewusstsein
kommen. Um so mehr wollen wir ihn feiern, als den Befreier Deutschlands,
als den ersten Helden unseres Vaterlandes”; Felix Dahn, _Armin der
Cherusker_, München, 1909, p. 43: “ohne ihn [Arminius] und sein
Meisterstück der Kriegskunst wären wir Germanen eben romanisiert worden
wie die Kelten in Gallien.... Wir danken für Kant und Schiller und für
Erhaltung unseres deutschen Art und Sprach Armin und der Varus-Schlacht.”

[26] See Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 53: “wir stehen hier an einem
Wendepunkt der Völkergeschichte. Auch die Geschichte hat ihre Fluth und
ihre Ebbe; hier tritt nach der Hochfluth des römischen Weltregiments die
Ebbe ein”; Idem, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 19: “Die Katastrophe
ist ... von den weitgreifendsten Folgen geworden, ja man kann sagen ein
Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte.”

[27] “Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung,” _Westfalen_, I
(1909), p. 34.

[28] _History of the Later Roman Commonwealth_, London, 1845, II, p. 317.

[29] _The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World_, London, 1859, pp. 179,
195: “Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors
would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along
the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of
England.... Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an
oppressed people more instantaneous and complete ... within a few weeks
after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the
invader.”

[30] _Rome: Its Rise and Fall_, Boston, 1901, p. 323: “The victory of
Arminius ... was an event of the greatest significance in the history of
European civilization ... the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being
completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts
of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe
would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving
them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of
England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence.”

[31] Note 20.

[32] _Op. cit._, p. 325.

[33] Oskar Jäger (_Deutsche Geschichte_, München, 1909, I, p. 28)
is correct in denying any significance to Arminius’ victory further
than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were
not invincible: “Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es
erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen
Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht
in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt
geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er
konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um
dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch
die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts
weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht
zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Cf. also Jullian, _Histoire de la Gaule_,
Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: “Mais la victoire d’Arminius n’eut point
d’autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu’au Rhin. Il ne put
rien entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie”; p.
127: “Les temps n’étaient donc point venus ni de la défaite pour l’Empire
romain ni de l’unité pour la Germanie.”

[34] Ch. Gailly de Taurines, _Les Légions de Varus_, Paris, 1911, p. 312:
“Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin,
champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus
germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les
avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles,
elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument,
ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de
Coulanges, _Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_,
Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source
germanique ... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une
monnaie.”

[35] Delbrück, _op. cit._, p. 53: “Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der
Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist.
Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie
sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern
sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und
Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die
den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind,
diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben,
doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug in Rechnung gezogen worden
ist.”

[36] For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as
though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or
Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might
cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton,
_History of Rome_, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about
military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes
and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among
the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence
only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the
standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes
between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome.
The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A.D. to quell the
revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had
advanced into the Teutoberger [_sic_] forest. Then Arminius turned and
defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were
covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000
soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own
hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The
Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against
the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’”

[37] Creasy, _op. cit._, p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though
apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign
policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy
to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame
outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had
followed a very different course.”

[38] Cf., e. g., the poem _Hermann_ (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by
Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning:

    “Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,
    Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;
    Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,
    Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen.”

See also J. E. Riffert, “Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur,”
_Herrigs Archiv_, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, “Armin
in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte,” _Preussische Jahrbücher_, 36, pp.
332-40.

[39] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 24: “Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen
die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim
Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis!
Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so ungenau, mit
Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher
wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto
geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: ‘In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus
Nationalgefühl hat er’s angefertigt.’” A good instance of blind adulation
is that of Hertzberg, _op. cit._, p. 307: “Niemals wieder spiegelten sich
die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten
Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin
gewesen ... das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation ... die
eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius.”

[40] _Westfalen_, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp
is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a
similar celebration, by T. Beneke, _Siegfried und die Varusschlacht
im Arnsberger Walde_ (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier),
Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: “Sechsundzwanzig Jahre war Siegfried
alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten
weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem
Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin
in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht
... Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge
in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit,
Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gediegenheit, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit
und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte
die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des
Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der
Ueberlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung
der Welt ausgehen sollte.”

[41] Quoted by Gardthausen, _op. cit._, II, p. 793.

[42] _Histoire des Institutions politiques_, etc., II, p. 247: “Il y a
une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains,
comme une école historique en France se plait à parler des anciens
Gaulois. On ne connait pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se
figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu’il decuple le peu de
renseignements que l’on posséde.”




CHAPTER II

SOURCES


The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on
the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius,
II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, _Annales_, I, 60-62. These
we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining
their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors,
of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose
had in view.[1]

Cassius Dio (_ca._ 150-_ca._ 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient
writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the
catastrophe.[2] Although he wrote in Greek, Dio must be regarded as a
Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office
of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.)
in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as
a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere
compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents
what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a
product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence
he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises.[3] Noticeable also
is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military
character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of
his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after
the rhetorical manner.[4] Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars
of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or
fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when
the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well
as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since
these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an _opus
oratorium_, and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by
brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.

To Velleius (_ca._ 19 B. C.-_ca._ 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author
who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account.[5]
A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with
undeniable _studium_, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to
the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius
to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut
legatus.”[6] His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify
everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely
more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military
campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies,
it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment
of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and
no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon
individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical
anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated
style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram,
and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver
Age, of which he is the earliest representative.[7] His reflections
and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius’
training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the
taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions
and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.

L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of
Hadrian’s time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two
short books of Rome’s wars from the foundation of the city to the era
of Augustus. As to Florus’ purpose in writing, and his rating as a
rhetorician, scholars are agreed.[8] He composed solely from rhetorical
motives[9], hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both
intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions,
and contradictions.[10] Florus’ work is declamatory in tone, shows no
traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper
demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual,
and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to
the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as _ingens_, _immensus_,
_incredibilis_, _perpetuus_, etc., and that he was himself conscious
of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as _quippe_,
seventy-five times, and _quasi_, more than a hundred times. In Florus
each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on
the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster
could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the
honor of being our chief authority.[11]

It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts
given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are
contradictory[12], notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to
show that there is no conflict between them.[13] According to Dio,
supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the
march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly
dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.[14]
Further, a detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry
particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many
inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in
accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of
which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of
the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio
tells us[15] that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine
and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled
him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the
other writers, and is in itself improbable[16], as Roman generals had
frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior
without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when
we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into
greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of
fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest
officers committed suicide.[17] If this remarkable event took place, it
is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in
Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to
the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’
body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to
Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to
surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted.
Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction
to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as
discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he
came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its
headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished
army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow
trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down,
i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting.
Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered
or accumulated, just as Varus’ men had fled or made their stand in the
final catastrophe.[18] Tacitus’ description of a regular camp, the “wide
circuit and headquarters” on a scale suitable for the whole force, is
utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was
pitched “after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on
a wooded mountain.” And so is there contradiction in Tacitus’ statement
that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first
encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were
on the first day’s march before their first encampment; on the second
the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the
greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.

According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding
court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly
correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect
real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it.
Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly
security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by
which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility
that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp
without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with
the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by
Segestes of the enemy’s plans. Further, the storming of a single camp
is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly
implied in Dio’s narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus
would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests,
swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where
the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an
army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the
functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus’ account is contradicted
by Velleius[19], who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus’
camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part
of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first
camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment (for which there
is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out
in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans
could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly
not the summer camp, as Florus relates.

Florus’ account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he
bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and
the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very
words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as
the theme for the part that follows: “Germaniam quoque utinam vincere
tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita.”
The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under
Varus’ rule: “sed difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere.”[20]
Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain
the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking;
that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was
ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who
asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned
for this conquest is as follows: “set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C.
Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem
concupierat facere provinciam.”[21] It is absurd to believe that Augustus
ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as
merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter “had not charged the heirs
of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the
north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly
as with the conquest of Britain.”[22] If Augustus had desired to make
a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered
Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar’s supposed wish. Julius
Caesar’s expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen
himself[23], merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable
to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer
Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy
of his father.

How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the
following: “quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque
nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam
ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus
quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.”[24] That is, according to Florus,
Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of
the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a
long series of important events.[25] The reason for this statement is
Florus’ indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme
“_difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere_,” and hence to bring
into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was
directly responsible for its loss.[26] Florus’ method is observable
elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a
series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his
guard. It suits Florus’ purpose, however, to represent them as having
recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that
laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical
way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the
difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence
of Florus’ inaccuracy is found in his statement that “to this day the
barbarians are in possession of the two eagles.” They had as a matter of
fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the
time of Tiberius[27], and the third during the reign of Claudius.[28]
With this fact established, Florus’ story to the effect that one of the
standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any
basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus’ concluding
statement: “hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non
steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” This has no value save that
of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the
account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who
discuss the effect of Varus’ defeat upon Rome’s imperial policy.

Velleius’ undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a
contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his
one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable
light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus
against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius’
second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus
is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of
Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who
could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise
the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of
Varus’ legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence
and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower
of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were
severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman
spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though
none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty
deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman
empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates
that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the
beginning of his command still continued with him.

Certain disagreements between Tacitus’ account of the Varus disaster
and that of our other sources have already been cited.[29] But of even
more importance for our discussion is Tacitus’ warm personal eulogy of
Arminius at the notice of his death.[30] There can be no doubt that this
tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect
of Varus’ defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus’
sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic;[31]
that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become
impossible and the monarchy necessary[32], the terrors and indignities of
Domitian’s reign embittered his whole thought;[33] that although he felt
that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state
the best possible combination of liberty and authority[34], “those happy
and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say
what they thought”[35], the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising
judgment found in Tacitus’ representation of the whole imperial period
covered by the Annals owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that
the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct
preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus
himself felt at the hands of Domitian.[36] Having at best little or no
sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial
expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of
Augustus.[37] He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors[38] that
down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the
empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination
to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe
the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus
and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire.
These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering
on affection.[39] And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those
features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the
Roman aristocracy[40], so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial
Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led
by the supine and incompetent Varus.

It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus’ generalization,
“liberator haud dubie Germaniae.” Does Tacitus here summarize correctly
the facts as given by him of Rome’s conflict with Germany under the
leadership of Varus and his successors?[41] Did Arminius become a
liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus’
successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes
victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the
Romans? An examination of Tacitus’ narrative forces a negative to each
of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one
of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against
whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D.[42] In this
year Germanicus fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured
or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods.
Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before
Germanicus marched back to the Rhine.[43] Then acting on an appeal
from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus
marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued,
together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the
wife of Arminius.[44] Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusci and
bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under
lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri[45], himself pursued
Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes.[46] The Germans, after
engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered
and the slaughter continued as long as daylight lasted.[47] Tacitus
adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and
wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health,
and abundance.

With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of
his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering
that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted
to fighting.[48] The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman
stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report
of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the
Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser, Tacitus, after
giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell
the Germans[49], says that it was a great victory for the Romans and
without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a
succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans.[50] But after
the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by
fleet to winter quarters[51], the Germans were encouraged to renew their
attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who
either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly
defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any
misfortune.[52] Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict
the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this
expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are
his concluding words: “nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering
to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if
another summer were added the war could be brought to completion.”[53]
Immediately following this we read of Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius to
celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further
operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this
step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for
this reason or for the far more probable one, assigned by Tiberius
himself[54], it is evident to any one following the story as told by
Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his
defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus’
successors. Tacitus’ account shows on the one hand that the Romans were
not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the
other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout
the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus
recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi
led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusci,
led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against
each other;[55] that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius
aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen,
and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen.[56] The opportunity here
for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country’s
liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist.
Hence, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae,” notwithstanding the fact that
this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman
historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to
adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.


FOOTNOTES

[1] The great interest in the story of Arminius and his victory has led
to an examination of the sources by many investigators. The following is
a partial list of the works of which use has been made:

Knoke, _Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland_, Berlin, 1887,
pp. 4-17; 63-82. Knoke, _Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland:
Nachtrag_, Berlin, 1889, pp. 19-31; 174-189. Knoke, _Fleckeisens
Jahrbr. f. Phil._, CXXXIX (1889), pp. 361-368. Delbrück, _Gesch. der
Kriegskunst_, II, p. 65 f. Koepp, _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 25 f.
Koepp, _Westfalen_, I, p. 35. Von Ranke, _Weltgeschichte_, III, 2, p.
272 f. Höfer, _Die Varusschlacht_, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 133-166. Asbach,
_Rhein. Jahrbr._, LXXXV (1888), pp. 14-54. Deppe, _Rhein. Jahrbr._,
LXXXVII (1889), p. 53 f. Riese, _Das rhein. Germanien in der antiken
Litteratur_, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 39-84. Riese, _Forsch. zur Gesch. der
Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_, Frankfurt a. M., 1889. Mommsen, _Röm.
Gesch._, V, 41. Gardthausen _Augustus_, II, 802. _Wilisch, Neue Jahrbr.
f. d. kl. Alter._, XXIII (1909), p. 322 f. Hayes, _Sources Relating to
the Germanic Invasions_, New York, 1909, p. 36 f. Wolf, _Die That des
Arminius_, Berlin, pp. 9-13. Winkelsesser, _De Rebus Divi Augusti in
Germania Gestis_, Detmold, pp. 42 f. Edmund Meyer, _Untersuchungen über
die Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde_, Berlin, 1893, p. 56 f.

[2] For details of his life, and an estimate of Dio as a writer, see
Schwartz, Pauly-Wissowa, _R. E._, VI (1899), p. 1684 f.; Christ-Schmidt,
_Gesch. der griech. Literatur_⁵, 1913, II, 2, p. 629 f.; Wachsmuth,
_Einleitung in das Studium der alten Gesch._, 1895, pp. 596-601; Peter,
_Die gesch. Lit. über die röm. Kaiserzeit_, 1897, II, 84-101.

[3] Schwartz, _loc. cit._: “Die Schlachtbeschreibungen Dios sind
ausnahmslos rhetorische Schildereien ohne jeden Wert.... Ein drastischer
Beweis, wie unmöglich es dem im Praktischen verständigen Manne war, als
Schriftsteller den Bann der Schultheorie zu durchbrechen.”

[4] As an example of this tendency Christ (_l. c._) cites 40, 41, where
Dio writes a whole chapter of rhetorically effective scenes on the
surrender of Vercingetorix and his last meeting with Caesar, whereas his
source, Caes., _B. G._, VII, 8, has only “Vercingetorix deditur.”

[5] For Velleius as a historian, see Schanz, Röm. Literaturgesch., II, 2
(1913), p. 255 f.; Wachsmuth, p. 60 f.; Peter, I, 382 f.

[6] Velleius, II, 104, 3.

[7] Norden, _Antike Kunstprosa_, I, p. 302: “Velleius ist für uns der
erste, der, jedes historisches Sinnes bar, Geschichte nur vom Standpunkt
des Rhetors geschrieben hat.”

[8] Rossbach, Pauly-Wissowa, _R. E._, VI, pp. 2761-70; Wachsmuth, p. 610
f.; Peter, II, 278 f.; Schanz, III (1896), p. 56 f.; Eussner, _Philol._,
37 (1872), pp. 130-136.

[9] Cf. Rossbach, _loc. cit._, p. 2763: “Dabei ist er nicht Historiker,
sondern Rhetor ... und will kein Handbuch der römischen Geschichte
schreiben, sondern aus dem besonders geeigneten Stoff seine Beredsamkeit
zeigen”; Wachsmuth, p. 610: “So ist bei Florus sachliches Interesse ganz
geschwunden und nur ein rhetorisch-stilistisches übrig geblieben und
damit sein Werth als Geschichtsquelle auf Null reducirt”; Eussner, _op.
cit._, p. 133: “Ihm ist die Geschichte Roms, welche die Weltgeschichte
in sich begreift, nichts als ein _corpus vile_, an dem die stilistische
Begabung und Kunst sich erproben kann ... Freilich fehlt dem Künstler
der Sinn für das Massvolle, der Geschmack für das Einfache. Die Umrisse
der Zeichnung verrathen seine Vorliebe für das Colossale, die Farben des
Gemäldes seine Neigung zum Glänzenden und Blendenden.”

[10] Cf. Wachsmuth, p. 612: “Wie ein solcher Litterat mit den
historischen und chronologischen Thatsachen umspringt, kann man sich
denken, und das Sündenregister seiner absichtlosen Versehen und
absichtlichen Verdrehungen ist ellenlang.” See also Peter, II, 289; 292.

[11] Equally pertinent for Florus is von Ranke’s criticism (II, 2, p. 396
N. 1) of Dio: “Bei Dio muss man immer seine Bemerkungen, die aus einer
späteren Epoche herrühren, von den Thatsachen, die er authentisch kennen
lernt, scheiden; dann haben auch die ersten ihren Wert.”

[12] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, III, 2, p. 275: “Schon daraus sieht man,
dass die Nachrichten bei Dio mit den beiden andern Autoren sich nicht
vereinigen lassen. Es ist eben, als wenn von zwei ganz verschiedenen
Ereignissen die Rede wäre, die nur durch den Namen des Varus
zusammengehalten werden.”

[13] Knoke, _Fleck. Jahrbr. f. Phil._, CXXXIX (1889), p. 368; cf.
also Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 41; “Der Bericht des Florus beruht
keineswegs auf ursprünglich anderen Quellen ... sondern lediglich auf dem
dramatischen Zusammenrücken der Motive, wie es allen Historiken dieses
Schlages eigen ist.”

[14] On the assumption that a choice must be made between Dio and
Florus, a great difference of opinion has arisen among investigators as
to their respective value. Von Ranke, followed by Höfer, Asbach, and
others, argues that Dio’s report is untrustworthy, while that of Florus
is correct. This view has been rejected by Knoke, Edmund Meyer, Deppe,
Mommsen, and Gardthausen.

[15] 56, 18.

[16] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, p. 275: “Dass sich nun Varus in unwegesame
Gegenden mit seinem ganzen Lager, seinem ganzen Gepäck habe führen
lassen, um eine kleine Völkerschaft niederzuwerfen, ist ... kaum zu
glauben.”

[17] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, p. 275: “Diese letzte Nachricht ist die
unglaubwürdigste von allen.”

[18] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, I, 61: “Prima Vari castra lato ambitu et dimensis
principiis trium legionum manus ostentabant; dein semiruto vallo, humili
fossa occisae iam reliquiae consedisse intellegebantur. Medio campi
albentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disiecta vel aggerata.”

[19] II, 119, 4.

[20] This same observation is made in slightly different words (I, 33, 8)
with respect to affairs in Spain, recently won by Scipio Africanus: “plus
est provinciam retinere quam facere.”

[21] We must notice that in Florus’ account _provincia_ is used several
times, and in no clearly defined way. He says, e. g. (II, 30, 23):
“missus in eam provinciam Drusus primos domuit Usipites”; and again (II,
30, 26): “et praeterea in tutelam provinciae praesidia ubique disposuit.”
In the first _provincia_ = “land,” since at that time, before Drusus’
campaigns, it is clear there could have been no province even in a
rhetorical sense; in the second it can easily refer to the province of
Gaul.

[22] Mommsen, _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 9. In point of fact what charge had
Julius Caesar given his heirs at all? At the time of his death he was
planning an expedition against the Getae and the Parthians. There is not
a shred of evidence that he himself contemplated action of any kind in
the northwest, or ever enjoined it upon his heirs.

[23] _Ibid._, p. 155.

[24] II, 30, 30.

[25] Drusus died in 9 B. C. Tiberius was in command during the years 8
and 7; Domitius Ahenobarbus, years 6-1. M. Vinicius took charge in 1 B.
C. Tiberius, on his return from Rhodes, was again in command in 4, 5, and
6 A. D., and after he started on his great campaign against Maroboduus
(year 6), Varus was placed in charge in Germany, probably at once, or at
all events early in the year 7.

[26] Note also the purpose of Florus’ insipid and misleading exaggeration
of the result of Drusus’ deeds, II, 30, 27: “ea denique in Germania pax
erat, ut mutati homines, alia terra, caelum ipsum mitius molliusque
solito videretur.” Drusus’ success is magnified by way of contrast
with Varus’ failure, and with the aim of preparing the reader for the
statement “sed difficilius est,” etc.

[27] Tac., _Ann._, I, 60; II, 25.

[28] Cassius Dio, 60, 8.

[29] See p. 25 f.

[30] _Ann._, II, 88: “liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia
populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium
lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello victus. Septem et triginta annos
vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturque adhuc barbaras apud
gentes, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis
haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus recentium incuriosi.”

[31] Boissier, _L’Opposition sous les Césars_, 1892, p. 288 f.

[32] _Hist._, I, 16.

[33] _Agr._, 45: “praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et
adspici, cum suspiria nostra subscriberentur; cum denotandis tot hominum
palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem
muniebat”; _Ibid._, 2: “dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum; et
sicut vetus aetas vidit quid ultimum in libertate esset, ita nos quid in
servitute.”

[34] Cf. Boissier, _op. cit._, p. 30: “il possédait enfin le gouvernement
qui lui semblait préférable aux autres, et, sous les plus mauvais
empereurs il n’a jamais attendu et souhaité que l’avènement d’un bon
prince.” _Agr._, 3: “nunc demum redit animus; sed quamquam primo statim
beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit,
principatum ac libertatem, augeatque quotidie felicitatem temporum Nerva
Trajanus.”

[35] _Hist._, I, 1.

[36] Spooner, _Histories of Tacitus_, 1891, Introd., p. 7.

[37] See Chapter III, n. 68.

[38] That Tacitus disliked Tiberius’ conservative attitude toward Germany
is clear from such a passage as _Ann._, IV, 74, where it is implied
also that for selfish reasons Tiberius was unwilling to entrust the war
to any commander who might thus gain military prestige: “clarum inde
inter Germanos Frisium nomen, dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum
permitteret. Neque senatus in eo cura an imperii extrema dehonestarentur.”

[39] Ferguson, “Characterization in Tacitus,” _Class. Weekly_, VII, 4 f.

[40] Cf. Mackail, _Latin Literature_, p. 210: “What he [Tacitus] has in
view throughout [the Germania] is to bring the vices of civilized luxury
into stronger relief by a contrast with the idealized simplicity of the
German tribes ... the social life of the Western German tribes is drawn
in implicit or expressed contrast to the elaborate social conventions of
what he considers a corrupt and degenerate civilization.” Gudeman (ed. of
_Agricola and Germania_, Boston, 1900, Introd., p. xli), though rejecting
the ethical purpose of the Germania, says: “Now to a man like Tacitus
who, dissatisfied with the conditions in which his lot was cast, longed
to dwell in the ‘good old times,’ these sturdy vigorous Germans naturally
came to serve as a welcome background for his pessimistic reflections.”

[41] See T. S. Jerome, “The Tacitean Tiberius: A study in Historiographic
Method,” _Class. Phil._, VII, pp. 265-292. In this valuable study two
main conclusions are reached: (1) That the disharmonies between data and
generalizations in the _Annals_ are so constant and glaring as to give
conclusive evidence of Tacitus’ untrustworthiness in that work; (2) that
the _Annals_ are “an example of historical writing done according to the
method of the rhetorician, and that this is the true explanation of those
disharmonies which are not explicable on the theories that Tacitus told
the truth, or followed an established tradition, or that a strong bias
against Tiberius entered into the composition thereof.”

[42] _Ann._, I, 55.

[43] _Ibid._, I, 56.

[44] _Ann._, I, 57.

[45] _Ibid._, I, 60.

[46] _Ibid._, I, 63.

[47] _Ibid._, I, 68.

[48] _Ibid._, II, 5.

[49] _Ibid._, II, 17-18.

[50] _Ibid._, II, 19-22.

[51] _Ibid._, II, 23-24.

[52] _Ibid._, II, 25.

[53] _Ibid._, II, 26.

[54] _Ann._, II, 26: “se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum
plura consilio quam vi perfecisse; sic Sugambros in deditionem acceptos,
sic Suebos, regemque Maroboduum pace obstrictum; posse et Cheruscos
ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esset,
internis discordiis relinqui,” i. e. that the Romans were acting from
diplomatic considerations, and in accordance with this policy he himself,
sent nine times into Germany by Augustus, had by diplomacy brought the
Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus into peaceful relations; that the
Cherusci also, and other hostile tribes, now that enough had been done
to satisfy Roman honor, might be left to their own internal dissensions.
See also Jäger (_l. c._): “die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer
eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Lang (_Beiträge zur
Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius_, Diss. Jena, 1911, p. 56) says that
Germanicus was not recalled through envy; that Tiberius avoided all wars
except such as were immediately necessary: “Aus diesem Grunde (nihil
aeque Tiberium anxium habebat quam ne composita turbarentur, _Ann._, II,
65), suchte er alle Kriege zu vermeiden, die nicht unbedingt im Interesse
des Reiches lagen. Den Abbruch der Germanenfeldzüge veranlasste nicht
Angst oder Neid gegen Germanicus, wie kurzsichtige Schriftsteller jener
Zeit vermuten, sondern die Tatsache, dass wenig dabei erreicht, den
Provinzen jedoch grosse Lasten aufgebürdet wurden.”

[55] _Ibid._, II, 44.

[56] _Ibid._, II, 88.




CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF THE ACCEPTED VIEW


Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians
base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which
these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part
without question by later writers—and their availability for sound
historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a
general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted
view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.

The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising
to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts
revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions,
which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000
troops.[1] The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the
Romans were hemmed in, we are told[2], by woods, lakes, and bodies of
the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests,
a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to
the Roman defeat.[3] Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed
by a leader very generally represented[4] as indolent, rash, and
self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.[5]

This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have
been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending
forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to
take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the
known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the
loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that
great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few
years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against
Maroboduus[6], while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian
insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of
troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united
under the same command.[7] This difficulty has not escaped notice.
Schiller recognizes it[8], and while denying that the explanation is to
be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of
Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new
revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen
observes[9]: “We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction
of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences
should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously
governed universal empire.” Immediately following this Mommsen offers
as explanation: “there is no other reason to be found for it than that
they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for
twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable
of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the
Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the
empire.” Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome’s policy in the
time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus[10], believes
that Augustus turned back to his “weaker wisdom” of an earlier day
(the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because
the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the
Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to
subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius’ revolt and the battle
as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and
victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was
decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient
to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being
raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas
the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army,
the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial
burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which
permitted service in the army only to citizens.[11] To have subdued
Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as
inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.

These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome’s lack of resources
necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect
of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and
Germany at this period.

When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of
Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former,
had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof,
been employed. The population of the empire under Augustus was not
far from 55,000,000[12], and, as service was voluntary and men of any
nationality were admitted, at least into the _auxilia_, practically the
whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There
was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions
were restricted to Roman citizens, and the _auxilia_, consisting of
foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries[13],
but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the
so-called _legiones vernaculae_), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius
and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil,
_Ecl._ I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and
out “miles ... barbarus.”[14] Now Augustus appears to have made some
consistent efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the
eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least,
from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the
Latin Occident[15], and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were
more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly
disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army.[16] Seeck indeed, after
a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the
conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing
the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman
citizens of the provinces.[17] But granting this position for the sake of
argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legionaries only
from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order
to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of
the empire (about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.)[18] was sufficient to raise an
army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause,
which, with an equal number of _auxilia_, would yield a total potential
military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently
employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn
upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken.[19]
That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact
that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a
total army of between five and six hundred thousand men[20], while after
Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and
after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together
no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything,
and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000
men.[21]

However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not
appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we
must remember that the resources of the whole population were available
to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency,
and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men;
for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception contributed
abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great
numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of
immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such
as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy
of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather
positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that
rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective
use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty
of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed
was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on
the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing
roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the
territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt
in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from
two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed.
Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or
three campaigns.

For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to
have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions
varied somewhat from time to time. After Actium Augustus had about 50
legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the
outbreak of the Pannonian revolt.[22] Three were lost in 9 A. D., and
in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death
was 25.[23] Taking this latter as that of the average number about the
time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the
legion at 6000 men[24], and adding in an equal number of _auxilia_, the
city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached
contingents[25], we get about 325,000. The effective force would be
somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if
any under 300,000 men.[26] Now the majority of these could have been
launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions,
or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been
concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, _Tiberius_, 16),
and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at
once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now
accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds
of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in
Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen
legions and the whole of the otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute
an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as
large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.

On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe,
and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities
(Tacitus, _Germania_, 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the
nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while
there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land
on the marches between hostile tribes.[27] Agriculture was primitive,
and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density
of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view
represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in
fact (Gutsche und Schultze, _Deutsche Geschichte_, I (1894), p. 236,
for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than
15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such
utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with
which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the
conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a
very difficult undertaking.[28] Fustel de Coulanges long since and H.
Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the numerical weakness of the
tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century[29], and
Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual
numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in
Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small.[30]

H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the
calculation of the population of Germany.[31] On the basis of Beloch’s
calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of
4-5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine,
Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a
population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it
at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of
this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region
between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000
inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the
first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole
nation.[32] This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally
different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could
take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting
this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as
five thousand, at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of
the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these
between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same
figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.

A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after
Delbrück’s critique.[33] Taking the results of extensive studies in the
population of nations at different stages of economic development, he
estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for
“the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about
the beginning of the Christian era” to have varied between the limits
5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the
area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of
roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking
this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly
in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results
reached by these three different methods employed independently, the
historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an
exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one
or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are
the following.

Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included
a large number of tribes (even the distant Semnones and the Longobardi)
seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of
74,000 men.[34] This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out[35],
bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force,
twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which
Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him.[36] Now this is
probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear
arms, i. e., following the customary Roman calculations[37], one-fourth
of the whole population. The Marcomannic confederation at its greatest
development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let
us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan
confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even
terms; hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the
two confederations was about equal.[38] Of course a large number of the
tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held
aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the
Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control,
but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district
concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either
confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the
struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we
would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures
which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and
Schmoller.

Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has
calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members,
the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as
E. Levasseur, who has used this _datum_ for his calculations of the
population of Gaul, observes[39], the number of large tribes was
probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000)
must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i.
e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great
altar at Lyons[40], existed in Posidonius’ day, one would get a total
population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch’s
own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but
prefers 5,700,000.[41] Now the Germans being without cities, developed
agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier
population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and
probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should
get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes[42], a maximum of
3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23
tribes[43], a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of
about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while
somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet
reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in
any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the
population of Germany.

Finally, one might note Lamprecht’s ingenious estimate of the population
in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative
number of place names recorded for different epochs.[44] He finds that
a district which in 1800 A. D. had a population of about 450,000, had
in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements
of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one
thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about
23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have
been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this
result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era[45], we must
bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure
minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient
seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for
some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other
localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question
had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were
favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior
district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we
should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports
in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly
inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.

We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe,
and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead
of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest
of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of
three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar’s calculation of one man for
every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people
could collect from a considerable extent of territory[46], we should
get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans
could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate
organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not
be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful
whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number
of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower
Rhine, remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have
to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say
roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of
the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when
Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled
twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and _auxilia_.
Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions[47],
and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than
eight[48], and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all
of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We
cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted
his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions
alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in
number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical
superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used
against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to
infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of
meeting his eight legions.[49]

We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in
tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the
great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady
and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the
Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing
them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence,
partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service,
and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of
the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry
an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very
important rôle in the great battles, and in the one serious defeat
of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned.[50]
Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult
terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The
first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be
questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than
that of Gaul in Caesar’s time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as
that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued
with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for
the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit
them at various stations inland as the armies advanced; besides, the
numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any
desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often
the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far
up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army.[51]

This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that
of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three
sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select
their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any
direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took
up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other,
or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of
being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are
numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for
Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight
risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans
know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan
of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet
cooperated with the Rhine armies.

To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority[52] in total
population, size of army, general resources, equipment, tactics,
strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort
at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore,
did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not
desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on,
the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at
subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire
is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different.
We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in
the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of
these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while
Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those
of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes.
To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable
position.

It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance
for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative
strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less
noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat.
One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous
engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself,
if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is
recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above[53], “without further
direct military consequences.” If there was an advantage on either side
it was with the Romans[54], for immediately the army was increased to
eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its
head.[55] It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by
the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for
victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched
over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the
tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition.
Tiberius’ activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius
(II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter’s partiality and
proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general
statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt
that Tiberius proceeded cautiously[56] in the years 10 and 11, but in
the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up
the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri[57],
resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt
Tiberius’ assassination.[58] Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before
his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested
only one more year for the completion of his work.[59] This means that
Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the
preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to
tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control
of as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of
having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it
doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the
days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed
force shows beyond doubt that Rome’s resources were as yet by no means
exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had
Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just
as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was
no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well
as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says[60]: “Nevertheless they had already
once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war
these results could not fail to be reached.” Gardthausen[61] too agrees
that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had
she tried.

As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into
the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops.
If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the
larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia
had been put down.[62] It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had
sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany’s subjugation, if he had
wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put
forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to
subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for
this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought
to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with
what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious
undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat?
Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus
reveals preeminently in his public and private life.[63] Nor is
there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus’ nature a desire
for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time
with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might
attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without
careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable
to the undertaking.[64] Meyer, after contrasting Augustus’ calm and
deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says[65]: “In all
seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand.... Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder
zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten
Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art.” No basis whatever exists for the
reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even
if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar.[66] Considering then
that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation,
that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery,
there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given
up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be
remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome’s entire previous
history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial
reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But
even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to
believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that
necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been
so greatly diminished.[67] That too in the face of the fact that he
was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from
one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: “nulli genti
bello per iniuriam lato.”[68] That he was a man of peace is shown also
by the statement of Suetonius;[69] and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect
that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian
territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit
of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the
effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus laid down as his policy that
“he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the
former [subject territory] or that any new regions should be acquired,
but deemed it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already
possessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate.” Similar
too, we note, is the view of Gibbon:[70] “It was reserved for Augustus
to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and to
introduce a spirit of moderation into the public councils. Inclined to
peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that
Rome, in her present exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear
from the chance of arms.” Finally, Augustus found no joy in war for war’s
sake, as did Julius Caesar.[71]

Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes and
character would determine the policy of the empire. And, as seen above,
it was contrary to Augustus’ character and wishes to carry on extensive
wars of conquest. Further, that peace was Rome’s object at this period
is universally admitted.[72] The reason for this desire for peace Meyer
sums up as follows[73]: “weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so
furchtbaren Charakter getragen hatten, weil ... aus dem entsetzlichen
Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben hatte, die
Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sicherheit um jeden Preis.”
While it is true that this feeling and condition refer more particularly
to the early part of Augustus’ reign, the same policy of peace manifested
itself all through his rule, and was continued by his successors.[74]
The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for
more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since
Rome’s beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the
first few years of Augustus’ reign[75] proves that he was eager for a
cessation of war.

The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus’ defeat has long
been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, “a wound to
the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire.”[76] While it
was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius’
legion[77], which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions
across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming
at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome’s policy more
than Varus’ misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as
many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome
to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems
highly improbable that “a wound to her pride” could have done so, when
she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth
in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany
into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why
he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political
consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.

We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very
important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did
Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued
by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt
was made, why was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence
of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to
explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination,
contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of
Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for
world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to
see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans
to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little
consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent
historian who has investigated the subject[78], despite the fact that
it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in
the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus’
plans with respect to Germany “das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung[79],
welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man
meinte, nach Osten weiter schiffend in das caspische Meer gelangen zu
können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde
umkreise.” Further, he speaks of Augustus’ ambition as directed toward
the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded
Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander.
Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic
error of Strabo.[80] And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming
a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must
have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any
attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either
directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western
coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important
milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign
of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer
conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of
European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these
same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost
confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other
hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it
is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had
become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium.
And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with
small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that
each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the
frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion
its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the
“Emperor of the Sahara” would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck
and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for
universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the
Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the
less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind
that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy
of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing
him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that
his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing
his military renown can be used as a valid reason for his having altered
his belief in this respect.[81]

Kornemann[82] indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike
about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for,
such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the
Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir
presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of
twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to
share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of
public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution
of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added
to the _Monumentum Ancyranum_ (which Kornemann believes was a political
document written in five distinct parts and at as many different
periods[83]), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates
with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city
of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the
same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the
establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus,
forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of
peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added,
about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35,
in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power
in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on
the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this
achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as
to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial conquest find contradiction in
an article by Wilcken[84], who argues that while Augustus worked long
over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the
three parts, _honores_, _impensae_, _res gestae_, form a whole, and were
written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline
with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the
provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany.
Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at
the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that
it was inserted after the other two.[85] For Germany could not have been
called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9
B. C. Hence the first outline of the _res gestae_ antedates not only
the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore
Augustus’ warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the
date claimed by Kornemann.

This conclusion Kornemann combats[86] with the assumption that while
the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of
interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A.
D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius’ naval
expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each
item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into
relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir.
But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons
for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier[87], on
the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to
follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates to each fragment of the
_Monumentum Ancyranum_ and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14
A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said
is that the three parts, _honores_, _impensae_, _res gestae_ were written
at three different times and that they correspond to the different and
successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however,
that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that
he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D.[88] Kornemann’s theories
are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent
suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their
rejection by such scholars as Wilcken, Gardthausen, Koepp, Marcks, Vulić,
and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude
toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly,
as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining
Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore
attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes
their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which
down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for
reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really
was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever
since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered
creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of
any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of
events.

More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus,
in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under
the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year
16 B. C. is cited as the time which brought a significant change in
Rome’s foreign policy[89], and committed Augustus to the subjugation of
Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg[90] as follows:
“es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des
römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben,
abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege
zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from
all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made
their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants
and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of
Melo[91], attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their
midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide[92], cut off
and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its
standard.[93] To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the
Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated
and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach
Germanien hinein und ... ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.”[94]
It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat
Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or
a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening
the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that
he finally decided on the latter.[95] Eduard Meyer finds not only
the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant
boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus’ wars against Germany[96]:
“nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation
Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien
zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter
von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen.” So Schiller urges the same
reasons.[97] Likewise it is Mommsen’s view[98] that Augustus’ change in
policy was necessary to Rome’s security; that it is easy to understand
how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a
policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for
the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps;
that “Great Germany” (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in
like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans
on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far
more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the
zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg[99] thinks that Augustus was greatly
influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the
three military leaders of his household, his spirited stepsons, Tiberius
and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.[100] Gardthausen
also believes[101] that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding
a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support
of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable
weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial
conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation
by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious.
As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and
no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But
with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and
while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered
policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero
at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania”[102]
discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and
modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by
conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change
of personal will.”[103] The urgency of the undertaking depended on
the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the
value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the
economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages
also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern
in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the
orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a
more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the
empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus
under the advice of Licinus may have regarded the rich and populous
province of Gaul ... as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the
teeming populations of the eastern provinces.” Finally we may note
the view expressed by Seeck[104], viz., that Rome discovered from the
events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit
Roman territory bordering the empire’s boundaries to come to quiet and
fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need
of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if
these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under
Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then
the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural
protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: “so wurde
denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins
Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.”

Gardthausen voices the belief[105] that political reasons also forced
Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle
and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with
both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever
anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought
out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier’s desire for his natural
element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service
in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even
when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the
state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen
and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary
to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was
now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now
filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for
the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer
its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen
itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus’ government were
easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome’s position
abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of
the individual diminished by the empire’s enlargement. But of special
moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war
as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for
booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a
peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions
in Gaul, finds[106] a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus,
and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by
virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important
enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention
of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of
a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of
the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus’ social reforms.
Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the
Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in
physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which
were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new
generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and
as Egyptian influence grew stronger.

       *       *       *       *       *

By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of
opinions and explanations given above:

    (1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus’ peace policy
    through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have
    been shown to have no basis in fact.

    (2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul
    and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it
    a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck
    admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been
    necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as
    each new province became civilized the bordering territory
    must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a
    frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great
    plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well
    as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such
    a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality
    that we must not impute to one of the most astute political
    geniuses of the ancient world.

    (3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing
    his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the
    desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance
    to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no
    evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it
    is at variance with what we do know of Augustus’ caution and
    singular independence in dealing with matters of state.

    (4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to
    yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is
    there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for
    conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of
    military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire
    no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active
    campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness
    of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted
    because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and
    go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and
    successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be
    revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence
    to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had
    to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there
    was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden
    ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied
    when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no
    instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the
    demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of
    wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of
    the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for
    war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example,
    pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the
    perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were
    not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even
    more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a
    corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the
    nobility. As for the _plebs urbana_, they had by this time lost
    practically all their political activity and influence. Neither
    their condition nor their temper would prompt them to yearn
    for a war, which would likely result in their being called away
    to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the
    largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and
    splendid than ever.

    (5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited
    above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only
    means at Augustus’ disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his
    conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than
    Germany’s subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing
    further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end
    battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented
    to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome
    was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military
    strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of
    territory between these borders and the strongholds of the
    enemy. A study of Rome’s several campaigns from this point of
    view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome
    have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant
    boundary from Italy. The “bufferstate” policy (see Chapter IV),
    once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any
    speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus’ military advisers
    was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long
    maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy,
    in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the
    longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the
    part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely
    needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman
    state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could
    have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the
    decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during,
    and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had
    grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from
    the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of
    earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper
    classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid’s writings appealed,
    that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of
Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation was complete or practically
complete;[107] that the provincial organization was just about to be
put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an
organization forever impossible.[108] Gardthausen thinks[109] that
Drusus’ death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his
three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of
a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the
subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain
evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the
very heart of the land[110]: Koepp sees no reason to conclude that
Germany was ever a Roman province[111]; he is quite sure that the part
on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the
battle with Varus.[112] Zumpt[113] was probably the first to deny the
existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen’s view became
the accepted one.[114] He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a “governor
of Germany”, and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land
between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as “a province, though still
by no means reduced to tranquillity”, a discussion on the “Organization
of the province of Germany”, as evidence for which he adduces the
administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to
Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the
“province of Germany”, as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle
of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for “giving up the new German
province” (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): “The original
province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the
Elbe, subsisted only twenty years”, i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on
(p. 108) we are told that “the governorship and the command were not, in
a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so
to speak, placed in suspense”, and that out of the parts on the left of
the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were
formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany[115]; that
these were “in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic”,
but that the latter, since “a separation of the military and civil
administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was
placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two
armies, so long as the troops were stationed there” [east of the Rhine].

The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great
Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld[116], who believes
that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the
Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner
Marquardt[117] thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east
side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower
Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected
events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two
provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned
rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the
left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces
set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später
auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in
Lugdunum] theil.”[118] On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year
9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz
Germaniae.”[119] Further on[120] we are told that after Quintilius Varus
succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the
provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change
in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober-
und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant,
bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem
Rheine am linken Ufer.”[121] Riese, who has carefully examined all the
available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made,
and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul,
which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.[122] The east boundary of
Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions
in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears
on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the
other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa
in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the
presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided
into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.[123]
The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all
Gaul[124], which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank
of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans
on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very
properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1):
“accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well
known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman
Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus’ command, in the year 12
B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after
him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more
certainly Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both
the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands.
The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus
is called by Velleius “legatus Augusti in Germania”, and by Dio “τῆς
Γερμανίας ἄρχων”. But this does not mean that at that time there was a
German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of
Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a
German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe.
Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready
to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in
his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius (“in formam provinciae
redacti”), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but
“sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret
provinciae” (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports
the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II,
30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term _provincia_ in
different senses.[125] Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than
“land”, since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in
another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of
Gaul. In answer to Mommsen’s view that the establishment of a separate
province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and
in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that
the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic
governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to
Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case
it had been customary in every province for the emperor’s worship to be
observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen
from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same
province[126], e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes
that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire
Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient
sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as
the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus,
and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor’s
policy from the beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this
position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with
the emperor’s house.[127] And not only are we nowhere told the contrary,
but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the
Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would
have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under
Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power
of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the
status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously
accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province,
or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s
presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for
further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is
the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite
his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a
conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted
to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part
of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would
have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know
Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state
of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they
were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This
very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested
as directly responsible for the catastrophe which befell Varus. So
Ferrero says[128]: “In Germany ... the people, apparently subdued, were
not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely
and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman
conquests.” Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that
such an anomalous “conquest” should not long since have been recognized
as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory
series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome
and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do
so? Many, as shown above[129], argue that Rome was unable to accomplish
her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point
in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt.[130]
Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a
more remote one.[131] He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement
which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus
to suspend or give up a plan that was well considered and already
successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost,
since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius[132], and
was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were
necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war
with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the
opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the
war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner
or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available
forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.[133]. But
the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was
apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war
itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had
become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same
relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to
Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for
his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself
between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between
Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not
only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his
disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war.
Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even
if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after
watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus,
and the Germans remained free.[134] Koepp[135] sees the reason for
Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius,
but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too
expensive.[136] Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given
above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus,
but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty
in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and
recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the
Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never
again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great
leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the
frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany,
and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular
legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of
these armies to be united with that of Gaul.[137]

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no
satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s
alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many
have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus,
a clear indication that it in itself is insufficient. If one must
assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed
conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances,
etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the
most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was
only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small
concern, and significant only because of chance association with other
reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full
of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the
evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes
were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional
view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction
that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a
simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but
explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize
the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus
had in mind the conquest of Germany:

    (1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was
    absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.

    (2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and
    Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years
    later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to
    meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were
    severely defeated.

    (3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a
    united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a
    thorough conquest had that been the desire.

    (4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known
    character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and
    in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the
    undertaking.

    (5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of
    Rome at this period.

    (6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on
    account of a single setback.

    (7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus,
    certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any
    conquest ever undertaken, and a rational criticism will try
    to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a
    preconceived theory.

    (8) There was certainly no “_provincia_” to abandon, under any
    circumstances.

    (9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius,
    and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time.
    Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had
    after the defeat of Lollius.

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the
student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of
Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the
determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And
since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after
disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of
Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties,
and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In
the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other
purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations
of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians[138], and to make
the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly
relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was
not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a
subject province.


FOOTNOTES

[1] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 41; 51; Idem, _Die Oertlichkeit der
Varusschlacht_, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines
(_Les Légions de Varus_, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as
probably 22,000.

[2] Vell., II, 119.

[3] Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents
and conditions: “ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate
fortunae circumventus ... inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also
Tac., _Ann._, I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus
emersum”.

[4] Vell., II, 117; II, 120: “ex quo apparet Varum magis
imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se
magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum”; Suet., _Tib._, 18:
“Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse.” Cf. also
Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “quoniam tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis
ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army
marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper
leadership. So Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann
... von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische
Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (_Rh. Jahrbr._, 87, p. 59) accepting
Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see
_Westd. Zeitschr._, 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a
feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men
could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren
an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet,
entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den _Ann._, II, 46, nennt
‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.

[5] Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point
than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle
continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them,
particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (_Die Oertlichkeit_, etc.,
p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in
the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three
times their equal.

[6] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus
petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen
(_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and
auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost
double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry
and 4,000 horsemen.

[7] See Eduard Meyer, “Kaiser Augustus” (in _Kleine Schriften_, Halle a.
S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, Suet.,
_Aug._, 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling (“Zur Geschichte des römischen
Heeres in Gallien,” _Rh. Jahrbr._, 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis
of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27
legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the
well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the
year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the
uprising in Illyricum.

[8] _Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit_, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag
16.000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um
eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (_Die
Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that
the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so
ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden
aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte,
dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the
same view is expressed by him in _Westfalen_, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob
der Untergang dreier Legionen ein Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich
in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien
fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine
ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des
Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist
Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf
gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden.”

[9] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German
conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political
balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of
an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which ... an isolated failure
in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship
gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”

[10] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 116.

[11] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches
undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in
the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted
especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous
to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See
examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., _Aug._, 25. According to Suetonius
_libertini_ were employed twice by Augustus: “Libertino milite,
praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona
metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum
contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni.” These two occasions, at
the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned
also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.

[12] This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer (“Bevölkerung des Altertums,”
_Conrad’s Handw. d. Staatsw._, 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who
accepts with slight modifications, Beloch’s calculations. The latter
(_Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt_ (1886), p. 507) gave
54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (_Rh.
Mus._, IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of
the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible,
would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (_Gesch.
d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch’s revision,
calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions,
and O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik_, III, 13
(1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous
calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch’s vigorous
reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more
conservative figure.

[13] That this was the custom followed for the _socii_ and _auxilia_
during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, _N. H._, 25, 33,
6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as
Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5, in speaking of the “sociae triremes alasque et
auxilia cohortium,” adds, “neque multo secus in numero virium.” Detailed
information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere
given. See Liebenam, art. “Exercitus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1601, 1607. G.
L. Cheesman (_The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army_, Oxford, 1914 p. 53
ff.) finds that the _auxilia_ under Augustus were at least as numerous as
the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the
year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf.
also Delbrück, _op. cit._, II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).

[14] Cf. Ed. Meyer, _ibid._, p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of
foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by
Liebenam, art. “Dilectus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, V, 611 ff.

[15] Mommsen, _Eph. Epigr._, V (1884), p. 159 ff.; _Hermes_, XIX (1884),
p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.

[16] We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of
the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus,
whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, _l. c._, p.
611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to
which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was
gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing
in the general conditions which required it.

[17] _Rh. Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part
rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently
motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at
the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after
the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a
Galatian contingent, the _Deiotariana_, which was given citizenship and
a place in the army (Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, 2nd ed. (1885),
p. 70; O. Seeck, _Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd ed., I, p.
260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome
(Tac., _Ann._, I, 31, “vernacula multitudo”; cf. Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX
(1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck’s statement of the system which he believes
Augustus followed is: “Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus
Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen
Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die
Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der
Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und
Alen und einen Theil der Flotte.”

[18] In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the _Mon.
Anc._, 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen
and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population
(_Augustus_, II, 532; and _Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik_,
III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men
might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the
numbers in the _Mon. Anc._ include women and children seems the only
one possible. See Meyer’s complete refutation of Kornemann, _Jahrb. für
Nationalökonomie_, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.

[19] This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the
total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France
have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their
war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at
one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her
total population in the field, even according to the most conservative
estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1908),
pp. 349, 355 ff.

[20] Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman
citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as
300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.

[21] The details in Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsver._, V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884),
p. 444 f.

[22] Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, “Zur Geschichte des
Rheinheeres,” _Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt_, 1910, on the date of
the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There
is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the
size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above
note 7.

[23] Mommsen, _op. cit._, p. 75; Liebenam in _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1605.
We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually
raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and
Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have
been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three
more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for
extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been
regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the
evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, _op. cit._,
p. 448 ff.

[24] The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently
summarized by R. Cagnat, “Legio,” _Daremberg et Saglio_, III, p. 1050
f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially
that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, _Lager und Heer der Römer_, 1912, pp.
1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size,
from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can
hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich’s review of Stolle’s
work, _Berl. Philol. Wochenschr._, 1913, 530 ff.

[25] A list of these is given by Liebenam, _op. cit._, p. 1607 ff.

[26] Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of
Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (_The Annals of Tacitus_, I (1884),
p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (_Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently
excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (_Rh.
Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which
would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen
soldiery out of Italy: in his _Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd
ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus
to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000
to 350,000; H. Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1904),
p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other
contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even
on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (_Augustus_,
I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives
on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18
legions were maintained. G. Boissier’s number, 500,000 (_L’opposition
sous les Césars_, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the auxilia three
times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in
doubling that!

[27] For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen
Semple, _Influences of Geographic Environment_, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.

[28] E. M. Arndt, _Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft_, III (1845),
p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile,
but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that
the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were
incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine,
Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in
the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000.
H. Von Sybel (_Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums_, 1881, p. 80) estimates
the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic
series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri
once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the
west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, _Deutsche Geschichte_
(1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone
amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the
total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz,
_Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte_ (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face
value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and
Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose
an incredibly dense population.

[29] _Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_, I
(1875), “L’Invasion Germanique,” p. 310 ff. For Delbrück’s results see
the chapter entitled “Zahlen,” _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed.
(1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies,
a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, _Preuss.
Jahrb._, 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u.
Statistik_, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the
older view, but Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p.
308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.

[30] “Observations sur l’état et le nombre des populations germaniques
dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle, d’après Ammien Marcellin,”
_Mélanges Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.

[31] “Der urgermanische Gau und Staat,” _Preussische Jahrbücher_,
81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the
detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p.
474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his _Gesch. d.
Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, _Gesch. der
deutschen Stämme_, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück’s calculations
indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the
absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.

[32] _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 482.

[33] _Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre_, I, Leipzig, 1901,
p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.

[34] Velleius, II, 109.

[35] _Op. cit._, I, p. 48; II, p. 209.

[36] See Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I. p. 1169 on this campaign.

[37] This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (_Bell.
Gall._, I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf.
Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of
one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system
of reckoning. Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, 81, p. 480, uses the one to
five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend
the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost
that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.

[38] That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than
the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection
of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, _Ann._,
II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus’ statement
that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most
improbable; see L. Schmidt, _op. cit._, II, 2, 181.

[39] _La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789_,
I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (_Sitzungsber. d. Berl.
Akad._, 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for
calculations. Beloch, however, (_Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 414 f.)
utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄνδρες here as
equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes
arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so
well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus,
who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total
population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch’s
remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but
only of the fighting men, seems to go too far. If one number be known
it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was
capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for
their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the
whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted
proportion between the total population of a district and the number of
fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to
make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever
have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on
just such estimates.

[40] Strabo, IV, 3, 2.

[41] _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.

[42] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the
total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge
of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the
designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.

[43] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 428, note, and _Geschichte der
Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.

[44] _Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter_, Leipzig, 1886, I, p.
148 ff., esp. 161 ff.

[45] Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time
of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire.
Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was
to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, _Nat. Hist._, IV, 98.

[46] See Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his
_Bevölkerung_, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a
fraction.

[47] Tac., _Ann._, I, 56.

[48] Tac., _Ann._, II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine.
Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.

[49] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman
claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and
concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from
the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one
in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength
of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the
Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.

[50] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the
advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.

[51] Velleius, II, 106.

[52] The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted
by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See
especially Fustel de Coulanges, _Histoire des institutions politiques
de l’ancienne France_, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891,
p. 328; Ed. Meyer, _Kl. Schr._, p. 486; von Domaszewski, _Geschichte
der_ _römischen Kaiser_, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant
also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die
Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war”
(_Griechische Geschichte_, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).

[53] See p. 37.

[54] Cf. Koepp, _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 35: “Kurz, als Tiberius
am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon
zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer
ergänzt, ja vermehrt”; Hübner, _op. cit._, p. 111: “Nach des Varus
Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen
werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder”; Mommsen, _Hist. of
Rome_, V, 53: “The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine
army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably
reinforced”; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: “damals ... wurde die Rheinarmee
auf acht Legionen verstärkt.” So Niese, _Röm. Gesch._, p. 298.

[55] Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam ... ultro Rhenum
cum exercitu transgreditur.”

[56] Suet., _Tib._, 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.

[57] Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.

[58] Suet., _Tib._, 19.

[59] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis
coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (_Hist. of Rome_,
V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he
should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding
this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the
Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes
between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion
of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the
campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere
continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in
the record Riese explains, _Forschungen_, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness
of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of
Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early
years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, _op. cit._, p. 34.

[60] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 62.

[61] I, p. 1201.

[62] Cf. p. 36.

[63] Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: “Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe
geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs
so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger.” These
characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically
embellished gossip about Augustus’ discomposure after the defeat of
Varus; see Suet., _Aug._, 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest
evidence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except
Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time
before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars
and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that
in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided
with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111, 1). So there was profound alarm
at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius
Capitolinus, _Marcus Antoninus_, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13),
while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied
with fear (Sall., _Jug._, 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the
defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now
well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and
granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the
successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and
successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that
in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary
weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt,
and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily
lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.

[64] Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated
by Gardthausen’s further statement: “Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht
zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er
darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte.” These words are nothing more than
an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are
forced to explain, viz., Augustus’ reversal of policy in “die schwere
Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der
fortgesetzten Eroberung.”

[65] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 462.

[66] Meyer, _l. c._: “Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss
unbegründet.”

[67] The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that
Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for
the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I,
p. 637; Furneaux, _Tacitus_, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, _Germanische
Politik_, etc., p. 8: “ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen
in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte.”

[68] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., _Aug._,
101; Tac., _Ann._, I, 11: “quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus
addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu
an per invidiam.” The sneer, “metu an per invidiam”, found in the words
of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of
Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of
Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to
restrict Augustus’ peace policy to the period _after_ Varus’ defeat. But
no such restriction should be made. We now know that the _Monum. Ancyr._
was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus’ life, but was
finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his
counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire
was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9
A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.

[69] _Aug._, 21: “nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum
intulit.”

[70] _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.

[71] Gardthausen, I, p. 317: “Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist
bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen
Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte.” Tacitus’ statement (_Ann._, I,
3), that Augustus’ later wars against the Germans were “abolendae magis
infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi
imperii”, does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the
earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.

[72] Vell., II, 89: “Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa,
revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus,
iudiciis auctoritas.” This is well expressed by Botsford, _Hist. of
Rome_, p. 205: “The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers,
to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of
peace.”

[73] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 455.

[74] Gardthausen, I, p. 477: “Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich
die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger
haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt.” Cf. Lang,
_op. cit._, p. 56: “Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur
Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines
Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe
und Ordnung zu verschaffen.”

[75] Suet., _Aug._, 22: “Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita
urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra
marique pace parta ter clusit.”

[76] Davis, _Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire_, New York, 1907, p. 59.

[77] Dio, 54, 20; Suet., _Aug._, 23.

[78] See Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might
have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest
and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new
constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made
world-conquest impossible”; _Ibid._, p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p.
1069; Drumann, _Röm. Gesch._, IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p.
57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be
singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf.
J. Geffcken, _Kaiser Julianus_, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt ...
wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In
_The Caesars_, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not
give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire
at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by
nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering
the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you
gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my
leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.”
(Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).

[79] _Op. cit._, p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s
position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany
would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the
weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest
was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results,
contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his
times.

[80] II, 39.

[81] Cf. Drumann, _Gesch. Roms_,² 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff
als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur
gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht
in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich
zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung.
Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”

[82] “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” _Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, II (1902), pp.
141-162.

[83] This view, together with the statement that the last addition was
made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann
in placing the number of revisions at seven (_Klio_, IV (1904), pp.
88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D.
(_Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, III (1903), p. 74 f.).

[84] “Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyr.,” _Hermes_, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.

[85] Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” _Riv. di Storia
Ant._, XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation
in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et
Germaniam ... pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered
real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which
for the time Rome’s beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of
bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word
“provinciae” (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the
abandonment of the geographical order.

[86] “Nochmals das Monum. Ancyr.,” _Klio_, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.

[87] “Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti,” _Mélanges
Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, p. 144.

[88] Cf. Bésnier, _op. cit._, p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’
Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a
commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C.
et peut-être plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ére il a cessé d’y
travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement
d’additions nombreuses et significatives.... Le souple génie politique
d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous
le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspire tour à tour
pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”

[89] Cf. Ritterling, _op. cit._, p. 176: “Aber eine durchgreifende
Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des
durch diese hervorgerufenen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber
den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die
Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen ... Eine Eroberung
des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik
durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens
bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit
in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen
zur Ausführung dieses Planes.”

[90] _Op. cit._, p. 25.

[91] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, VI, 3.

[92] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian,
_Histoire de la Gaule_, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.

[93] Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., _Aug._, 23.

[94] Paul Meyer, _Der Triumphzug des Germanicus_, p. 85.

[95] I, p. 1067. According to Niese, _op. cit._, p. 295, the decision
came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: “Dann
erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward
beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein
hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen.”

[96] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 471.

[97] _Op. cit._, p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem
Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und ...
auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu vertheidigen
und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”

[98] _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 9.

[99] _Op. cit._, 29.

[100] The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale,
_General Hist. of Rome_, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (_Hist. of the
Roman Empire_, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of “The project of
extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious
emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus.” Cf.
Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 10: “Ob Augustus ganz von freien
Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob
er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die
Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag.”

[101] I, p. 1049 f.

[102] _Op. cit._, V, p. 142.

[103] Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision
against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and
consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the
question, how it came to pass that the ... Germans were not bent under
the yoke of Rome ... the only reason history can give is that it was
the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal
organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the
battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own
free will.” On the other hand Beloch, _Griech. Gesch.²_, I, 1 (1912), p.
15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den
Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten
dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt
wert war.”

[104] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 111.

[105] I, p. 1048 f.

[106] _Op. cit._, V, p. 153 f.

[107] Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13: “wie Gallien durch
Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche
gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt
worden.” In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius’ time,
Germany is spoken of as “almost a province” (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen
says: “so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben
desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war.” Niese,
_Grundriss der röm. Gesch._, 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr.
Kauffman, “Deutsche Altertumskunde” (in _Matthias’ Handbuch d. deutschen
Unterrichts_, München, 1913, p. 317): “In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb.
bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein
bis zur Elbe unfasste.”

[108] But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did
not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus’
own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is
of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider
it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary
to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some
convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a
province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is
no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was
hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For
since no part of the _Monum. Ancyr._ was written after 6 A. D., it cannot
be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus’ views after 9 A. D., as
is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document
took place in 14 A. D.

[109] II, p. 1089.

[110] I, p. 1198: “Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste
zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die
Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben.”

[111] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in _Kleine
Schriften_, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: “Now
the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact
that Germany was not subdued by the Romans.... Caesar would have subdued
Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the
military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman
world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to
herself.”

[112] _Westfalen_, p. 40: “das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals
eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht.”

[113] _Studia Romana_, 1859, P. 130.

[114] _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23 f.

[115] In _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these
terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the
small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original
designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct
status, see Riese’s view as given below, p. 73 ff.

[116] “Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze,” etc., _Commentationes philologae
in honorem Th. Mommseni_, p. 434.

[117] _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I (1881), p. 271.

[118] _Op. cit._, p. 212.

[119] p. 219.

[120] p. 229.

[121] p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in
_Essays on Roman History_, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of
Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the
period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along
the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement
(_Germ._, 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper
Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that
Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it
was in reality “debatable land” (_dubiae possessionis_ of Tacitus), and
had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates
that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her
own territory.

[122] _Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_, p. 5
f. See also Riese in _Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst,
Korrespondenz-Blatt_, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two
provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the
time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab
es also ... nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als
superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitiger Hülfe verbundenen
Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine
Germania inferior.... Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der
Heeresbezirk der gallischen Provinzen.”

[123] Plin., _N. H._, iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.

[124] Ritterling (_op. cit._, p. 162) believes, however, that there
were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning
of Augustus’ reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der
Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke
geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere
Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und
Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.

[125] See p. 27 and note.

[126] Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I², 504.

[127] There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the
Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further
that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of
all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling,
_op. cit._, p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen
Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste
notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos
zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in
deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte
unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung
des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die
Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinandergreifen der geplanten
Operationen am Mittel- und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando
notwendig.”

[128] _Characters and Events of Roman History_, p. 165.

[129] See also Sadée, _Römer und Germanen_, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter
“Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius”); Wolf, _Die That des
Arminius_, p. 41 f. (“Der Befreiungskampf”). Eduard Meyer’s statement
that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to
win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p.
38).

[130] Reitzenstein, “Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus,” _Hermes_, 48
(1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had
no such significance; that there was no change in Rome’s policy until
Germanicus’ time, and that Rome’s contest with Germany through three
decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred
toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political
situation which is found at a much later time.

[131] Cf. also Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 14 f.: “Die
Unterwerfung Germaniens ... stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich.
Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an
die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor.” As
reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and
Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius’ return
and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1)
the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall
of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of
Tiberius.

[132] II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, _Characters and
Events_, p. 165.

[133] _Op. cit._, p. 117: “Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse
Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das
germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in
Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur
8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch
grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein
schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten
wehren können.”

[134] Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, _op. cit._, p.
86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns,
but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe
his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well
deserved triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, _op. cit._,
p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed
against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur
darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman
troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit
Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen
unschädlich.”

[135] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 45.

[136] This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten
diese Schädigungen ... nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der
Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such
a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between
maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was
relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of
artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to
hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while
living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army
was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the
greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight
drain on the treasury.

[137] See _op. cit._, p. 20.

[138] Cf. Merivale: _History of the Romans under the Empire_, IV, p.
240: “These repeated advances ... though far from having the character
of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of
Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a
strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the
same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern
civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a
distance from the sources of its power.”




CHAPTER IV

A NEW INTERPRETATION


Every empire of the ancient world was bordered on one or more sides, if
not actually surrounded by barbarian tribes which envied its prosperity
and were ever on the alert to organize a _razzia_ into its prosperous
domains. It was therefore a prime policy of every empire builder, not
merely to mark out distinctly the limits of national authority and
responsibility, and to round off the lines of dominion by the inclusion
of the whole of some tribe or nation, or the complete extent of a certain
well defined district possessed of a unified economic character, but
beyond all else to secure an easily defensible frontier line against
the aggression of his civilized rivals, and the chronic brigandage of
barbarian neighbors. Certainly no civilized country of ancient times
enjoyed such immunity from annoyance on the part of its neighbors as
did ancient Egypt, when once the upper and the lower kingdoms had been
united, for it is wholly surrounded by seas and deserts; yet even here
the barbarian was an intermittent danger, the Nubian and Ethiopian in the
south, against whom many a Pharaoh waged punitive campaigns; the Libyan
in the west; the Bedouins at the northeast; and even the sea could not
protect the Delta from the ravages of freebooters from the isles, the
far spread front of the latest wave of the Hellenic invaders of Greece.
And two of the barbarian nations actually invaded the country in such
numbers as to set up dynasties of more than an ephemeral character, the
Hyksos and the Ethiopians. Less favorably situated was the civilization
in the Mesopotamian valley; Elamites, Kassites, Mitanni, Khita,
Aramaeans, and the brigands of the mountains, the last and most powerful,
the Medo-Persians, were ready to devastate their peaceful preserves.
Persia had to contend with Massagetae and Scythians;[1] Philistia had
the Hebrews, and they in turn the Amalekites and other dwellers in the
wastes; Carthage, the Numidians, Libyans, and Moors; the Macedonians had
the Thracians and Paeonians; the Greeks in Asia Minor had the Lydians,
in Italy, the Sabellians, Bruttians, Lucanians, Iapygians,—in short the
Greek colonies had upon every coast of the three continents a fringe
of warlike and rapacious enemies with whom permanent peace was an
impossibility.

Rome was, of course, no exception to the rule, and once her power
had spread beyond the confines of Italy it was inevitable that her
extraordinary national vitality and genius for organization must keep
extending her confines until strong and satisfactory frontiers were
secured. By the beginning of our era the great permanent boundaries of
the empire had in the main been reached. To the west lay the Atlantic
ocean; the south and southeast was covered by the deserts of Sahara,
Arabia, and Syria; the north had the Black Sea[2] and the Danube; only
two quarters were inadequately provided for, the northeast, Armenia,
and the northwest, Germany. In the former case the uplands of the
Taurus constitute a welter of confused peaks and ranges, whose trend
is, however, in the main east and west, so that neither the crest of
a long line of mountains nor the course of some large river supplies
any satisfactory north and south line.[3] In the latter, a relatively
small river, that showed a marked tendency to flow in parallel channels,
with a rather sluggish current except in a few places, and with a
considerable number of islands, so that it could be crossed almost at
will even by barbarian tribes, furnished inadequate protection to the
rich provinces of Gaul.[4] Had the population on the right band of the
Rhine been extremely thin, or sluggish, as for a long period it seems
to have been on the north bank of the Danube, no great danger need have
been anticipated here, but the Germans were, for barbarians, relatively
numerous,[5] brave, and adventurous to a fault, and passionately addicted
to warfare and marauding. Under these circumstances it seems clear that
an ordinary frontier line would have been thoroughly insecure. No matter
how many forts and trenches might be established along the Rhine it would
have been impossible to hold a single line intact even with the full
standing army of the Empire. If the hostile territory extended right up
to the ramparts of the legionaries, the Germans, secure in the protection
of their hills, forests, and swamps, could gather an overwhelming force,
cross the river and break through the fortifications at any point they
pleased along a line of several hundred miles in length, before an
adequate force, with the slow methods of communication then available,
could be gathered to resist them. And once past the defenses, either the
invaders must be allowed to harry and plunder at will, while the breach
was repaired to stop the influx of others, or else, if they were pursued
and hunted down, the forts must be weakened to the imminent danger of a
repetition of the same event at some other point.

There were but two ways to remedy this situation. One was to give up
the Rhine as a frontier and to push on; but this would merely have
transferred the scene of difficulty, not removed it, for bad as the
Rhine may have been it was the best available frontier in this direction
until one came to the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains;[6] or if only
the Germans were so dangerous as neighbors, the limits of the empire
must have been pushed to the almost equally impossible line of the
Vistula, or beyond, in order to include them all within its confines;
and finally, a very material increase must have been made in the size
of the standing army, because the legions on the Rhine served not only
the purpose of warding off the Germans but also of keeping in restraint
the restless Gauls, while, if the frontier were fixed at the Elbe or
the Oder, quite as many troops would be needed to defend it there, and
many additional legions for garrison service in Belgica, Gaul, and
Noricum.[7] The other way was to buttress the frontier by securing on
the right bank of the Rhine a series of friendly states or tribes, whose
leading men or factions were to be kept well disposed to the empire by
all the expedients of force and diplomacy. In this way the danger from
the barbarian would be minimized, no sudden attacks from the proximate
tribes need be apprehended, and even against a great tribal movement in
the remote hinterland, like that of the Basternae, the Galatians, the
Cimbri and Teutones, the Helvetians, and many another even before the
_Völkerwanderung_, the Romans would be amply prepared in advance. The
shock could be absorbed by the launching of friendly tribes, more or
less strongly supported by Roman troops, against the newcomers, and, if
worst came to worst, and the foe pushed his way relentlessly onward, the
issue could be decided on foreign territory beyond the frontiers, and
with the assistance of tribes which otherwise would have been forced
to join the invaders against Rome, or at the best, have remained
neutral.[8] Once established, such friendly relations might easily be
maintained by the countless devices of a resourceful diplomacy, the
honors and recognitions, the flattery and gifts which are so dear to the
barbaric heart, and for which incalculable values have ofttimes been
rashly bartered away; or, when a chief proved recalcitrant, it was easy
among so ambitious and independent a nobility as was that of Germany
to raise up a rival who could either compel obedience or else take his
place.[9] We can readily believe that the subtle and resourceful Tiberius
accomplished during his German campaigns more by diplomacy than with the
sword[10], and characteristic not merely of the man but of the general
situation which had been produced was his effort to console the impetuous
Germanicus with the observation that the Germans could well be left to
themselves now, i. e. to cutting one another’s throats at the artful
suggestion of Roman diplomacy.[11] But diplomacy alone could never have
initiated such a condition in Germany; nothing less was needed than the
vivid fear of the legionaries, and that too not as a static body of
troops however powerful, but dreaded through bitter experience of what it
meant to have the cohorts carry fire and sword to the innermost recesses
of the country. Barbarian peoples are easily impressed by a portentous
occurrence, but with them the effect wears rapidly away, unless by
frequent repetition it be seared into their consciousness. This process
of terrorization had to be kept up until the fear of Rome was so great
that the mere thought of invasion would be recognized as madness. The
readiness with which the tribes of Gaul and even of Germany[12] expressed
their submission to Caesar, after some heavy stroke, is familiar to
all readers of the _Gallic Wars_, but no less characteristic is the
readiness with which they would take up arms at the least rumor of a
reverse, or even without any change in the situation whatsoever, merely
after the first effects of the news of disaster had worn away.[13] For
years therefore after the Rhine had been definitely determined upon as
a frontier it was necessary for Roman generals to march at frequent
intervals into Germany, making powerful demonstrations in force not
simply among the proximate tribes, but penetrating far into the interior,
so that even the remotest might trust no more to their forests and their
swamps; bringing ships of war up the larger rivers not merely to support
the land troops, but also to demonstrate the mastery over water as well
as land, and to show how far beyond the actual frontier of the empire
its outstretched arm could strike; rewarding friends and establishing
them more firmly in places of authority, punishing foes individually and
in small groups, beating down any armed opposition that dared to raise
its head (and that was relatively seldom in the numerous campaigns that
were waged), and ruthlessly devasting the territory of the intransigent,
frequently in the more completely pacified districts adjusting disputes
between Roman merchants and the natives, or acting as arbitrators in
difficulties which had arisen between individuals and factions among
the Germans themselves. Such is the picture of these German campaigns
as we should draw it, filling in the meager outlines of events as given
by the ancient historians. Of a similar nature are the punitive or
monitory expeditions carried on by the French, the British, and the
Russians, in their dealing with similar barbarous or semicivilized
tribes upon the borders of their African or Asiatic empires. Real warfare
was rare, a pitched battle seldom took place[14], but the repetition of
the demonstrations gradually had its effect even upon the fierce and
rapacious Germans.

Let us examine from this point of view the actual conduct of the Germanic
campaigns, bearing in mind the utter dissimilarity with the methods
employed by Caesar for the conquest of Gaul under similar conditions.
In the first place no army posts, forts, or powerful garrisons were
established and maintained in Germany. Aliso was nothing more than a
station for munitions of war and no doubt traders’ stocks of goods[15],
and it was established so short a distance from the Rhine, only a
trifle more than 30 miles from Vetera, as to have little more effect in
overawing the tribes in its vicinity than did the powerful fortresses
along the Rhine itself.[16] The fort built by Drusus in Mt. Taunus can
hardly have been much out of sight of the Rhine, and doubtless served
merely to secure an easy entrance into the upland country for the
garrisons farther south along the river.[17] These two posts certainly
could have had no direct influence upon the maintenance of authority in
the remote interior. Flevum on the coast was a feeble trading post for
merchants, sufficient only to hold their supplies, give a safe anchorage
for their vessels, harbor an occasional Roman war vessel which would be
needed to guard against the danger of piracy, and protect a few ships
engaged in coast traffic towards the north and the northeast. On rare
occasions it might serve as a naval base for a large fleet sent out to
make a demonstration along the coast and rivers of Germany.[18] None
of these can properly be denominated a “Zwingburg”, yet how could the
Romans have expected to maintain and make permanent a conquest over
such fierce barbarians without overawing them in some wise with great
fortresses located at strategical points in their very midst?

It is noteworthy also that no Roman army ventured to spend the winter on
German soil except on one occasion, and that was in 4-5 A. D., when for
some unknown cause (doubtless one of considerable importance judging from
the way in which Velleius speaks of it), Tiberius was so long delayed
in the north that his active campaign was not over until December, and
winter must have been upon him before he could reach the Rhine.[19] In
this case he remained “ad caput Iuliae”, as near the permanent camps
doubtless as he could get.[20] The next summer an extensive campaign was
undertaken to the north and east, and with the cooperation of the fleet
even the Elbe was reached, but that this encampment in the confines of
Germany the preceding winter had meant nothing singular, and established
no new policy, is clear from the fact that after this summer’s campaign,
when, if ever, it would have been necessary to retain a powerful army in
the “conquered” territory whose limits are supposed to have been greatly
extended, Tiberius calmly led his troops back to the Rhine as usual (“in
hiberna legiones reduxit”, Velleius, II, 107, 3).[21]

Furthermore, there was no building of a network of great military roads
to facilitate the march of the legions far into the interior, yet if such
roads were anywhere needed it was surely in Germany, where the trifling
commercial trade routes could not possibly have sufficed for the sure and
speedy movements of the legions and their large baggage trains. There are
some vague statements regarding engineering works by Drusus[22], and
we hear likewise of certain structures of Domitius, the _pontes longi_
in the northwestern swamps[23], and certain _limites_ and _aggeres_
with which Germanicus connected Aliso and the Rhine[24], nothing at all
commensurate with the ambitious schemes which the Romans are supposed to
have entertained for the conquest of the country.[25]

Finally there was no civil administration established for any part of the
country, even that which might have some appearance of being under Roman
sway; no colonies were founded, either military or commercial; there was
no effort to push forward, to settle, and to absorb the newly acquired
“province”.[26] Nor can shortness of time be put forward as an excuse
for failure to perform these characteristic features of a regular Roman
conquest. Two generations had passed between Caesar’s first passage of
the Rhine and the defeat of Varus, forty-seven years since Agrippa had
crossed the same river, or, if we consent to take the date generally
set for the conquest of Germany, the last campaign of Drusus, 9 B. C.,
eighteen years of Roman domination had elapsed before the battle of
the Teutoburg forest, yet nothing of any real importance had been done
to organize the “new province”. For the earlier part of this period
since Caesar, one might indeed argue that Rome had been engaged in more
absorbing enterprises, to wit, the civil wars, but since the battle
of Actium, or at all events since the establishment of the dyarchy,
Augustus had a perfectly free hand to complete any project whatsoever
that he may have had in mind with regard to Germany. Drusus, Tiberius,
Domitius, Vinicius, and Tiberius again had campaigned often enough beyond
the Rhine, but nothing was actually done toward finishing any formal
conquest. Nor will it do to ascribe to Augustus, as is generally done,
the policy of turning over to Quintilius Varus the last formal act of
organizing the province. What less opportune moment could possibly have
been selected than just the period of the Pannonian revolt, when the
Rhine armies were reduced below their normal strength, and a man placed
in charge, who, whatever his other virtues may have been, was certainly
not an experienced general? For it would certainly be expected that the
formal establishment of complete imperial administration in Germany would
have aroused what little spirit of independence yet remained (according
to this theory) in German bosoms, and to have entrusted such a mission
to such a man, at such a time, with such small forces, and without any
of the necessary preliminary work of roadbuilding, fortress erection,
stationing of garrisons and the like, would have been an act of colossal
and criminal folly on the part of one of the shrewdest and most patient
and calculating statesmen of the ancient world.[27]

We must here examine the arguments of the authorities who are cited
for the statement that Varus was engaged in organizing a full civil
administration for the “province” when disaster overtook him. The
rhetorical nature of these documents and their general untrustworthiness
have already been emphasized; when we look for perfectly definite acts we
find either the vaguest language, or else utterly improbable statements.
Much has been said of the presence of “causarum patroni” in Varus’ army,
but just how much is properly to be inferred therefrom is doubtful. In
the first place the evidence for their presence is the worst possible,
Florus alone mentioning them (II, 30, 36 f.), and that with the most
patent rhetorical purpose, and the highly colored story of how, when the
tongue of one was cut out and the lips sewed together he was taunted
with the remark, “Viper, you have finally ceased to hiss”. But granted
that some “causarum patroni” attended Varus, how much does that signify?
When was the organization of a province entrusted to these men, or what
official rôle would they play in such a process? Their presence is easily
enough explained as an aid to the general in his semilegal activities.
We have already observed that he must often have been called upon to
settle disputes between the numerous rival nobles of Germany. Who indeed
was better suited to act as arbitrator than a powerful and disinterested
official of the great neighboring empire?[28] Doubtless many an appeal
regarding the business dealings of Roman traders with the Germans was
referred likewise to him. The only regular course of procedure would have
been to act in accordance with the recognized Roman legal traditions—one
surely would not expect a Roman general to dispense German law or to
act merely on his passing whims—, and it would be perfectly natural to
have on his general staff a few legal advisers. That Varus took their
advice frequently, and that some persons felt that they had been injured
when such advice was followed, and bore a special grudge against those
men, may very well be, but that the final steps of turning a barbarian
country into a province were being then and there taken surely cannot be
established by the presence of a few legal advisers on Varus’ staff.

More serious is the statement that tribute was being assessed and
collected.[29] That this was literally true on any comprehensive scale
is clearly impossible. We hear nowhere of _publicani_[30], or any of the
paraphernalia for collecting the tribute of a conquered province.[31]
That certain things were given Varus and his army by allied and friendly
chiefs and tribes there can be no doubt, and these may have been objects
of high specific value, as choice pieces of amber and the like, or mere
supplies of grain, meat, hides, and similar material. It was not to be
expected that Roman armies should march through Germany without being
amply assisted by their _socii_ and _amici_. An example of what such
assistance may have been is the well-known case of the Frisians, who
were expected to furnish a few oxhides annually for military uses,
and who started to fight when an exacting officer modified the terms
of the original understanding. That the Frisians however were really a
free, though allied people, at this time, there can be no question, for
there is not a hint of actual Roman administration of their affairs.[32]
Similar must have been the case with the Cheruscans and other tribes
farther inland. A certain amount of assistance was doubtless quite
properly expected, and in fact the genuineness of the friendship might
well have been doubted if there were no willingness manifested to be
helpful.[33] That Varus or some of his officers may occasionally have
regarded a voluntary service of friendship or policy in the light of
an obligation, and may have requested and even insisted upon more than
friendship or policy would lead the Germans to regard as a fair offering,
is quite possible, although with a weak force and while the Pannonian
revolt was still unsubdued, it would indeed have been preternatural
folly. But we are not justified in admitting any more, and this is all
that our sources, stripped of a little rhetorical embellishment, really
assert.[34]

Finally, Dio speaks of a division of Varus’ forces, whereby a large
portion of his army was serving on garrison duty at one point or
another in the country, and adds that after the defeat of the main
body of his troops all these separate detachments were hunted down and
destroyed.[35] This would be important if it could be used as evidence
for the establishment of Roman garrisons throughout the land, but it
cannot. There is no hint in any other author that a large number of
forts and strongholds were captured in consequence of this defeat, yet
as intensifying the importance of the reverse, that must surely have
been referred to by some one. Every other authority knows merely of the
annihilation of Varus and his army, not of the capture of a whole series
of strongholds all over the land.[36] Besides, one asks in vain what
these places were and when occupied. There is nothing in the accounts
of earlier or of later operations which furnishes any answer to such
questions, or a parallel to such a military policy on the part of Varus.
And finally, what could have been more foolish than to divide a force,
unusually small in itself, at a critical period, when the great revolt in
Pannonia was not yet put down? That Varus might not have had every man of
his three legions with him on the fatal occasion, is quite conceivable.
Some detachments might have been with convoys of provisions, others
out to look for supplies, yet others engaged in hunting down some band
of outlaws, or in putting into execution some decision favorable to a
conspicuous supporter of Rome, and that these small bands may have fallen
victims after the great disaster is perfectly possible. That is all that
we are justified in inferring from Dio after the veneer of rhetoric has
been removed.

For we must bear in mind the marked tendencies of our sources for the
administration of Varus. Florus was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging
an explanation, which should save the credit of Rome and the Roman
soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius
distorting everything _in maiorem gloriam_ of Tiberius, for whom Varus
must serve as a foil at every turn. There is therefore nothing so stupid,
arrogant, or wilful that it is not cheerfully ascribed to him, while
perfectly proper and natural things, like the presence of lawyers on his
staff, the making of arrangements regarding the quantity and character of
the assistance to be rendered by the _socii_, the dispersion of little
detachments of troops upon one or another small but necessary service,
are exaggerated into acts of wanton folly and oppression, and interpreted
as the inauguration of a totally new policy. Yet every one of these
things must inevitably have taken place on all the numerous similar
demonstrations that had been made in Germany; the only reason that they
are not mentioned elsewhere is that we have no accounts regarding other
operations in Germany in which such details would have been in place.
They were the ordinary routine of campaigning and of no interest to the
average ancient historiographer, save as they served to point a lurid
description of a disaster, or to supply a basis, however flimsy, for a
misrepresentation.

Varus was, we may feel assured, doing no more, in all probability much
less, than his predecessors had done on numerous occasions. Two years
of heavy fighting had not broken the Pannonian revolt. The forces
along the Rhine, if not actually weakened in order to enlarge those in
Pannonia, would doubtless be so represented by hot-headed Germans of the
nationalist persuasion, particularly after two years of utter inaction.
It was doubtless in response to suggestions that Roman prestige needed
some refurbishing in the interior, and very likely at the express
command of Augustus, that Varus undertook his fatal demonstration. The
very fact that he left so large a force at the Rhine under Asprenas would
indicate that he felt it safer to keep two armies in readiness for action
at different points, rather than to concentrate his forces and so risk
the breaking out of trouble in some quarter from which pressure had been
removed. Without any open show of violence, rather with every expression
of courtesy, confidence, and good will, he was engaged in the ordinary
routine of a commanding officer upon such a demonstration in force, when
suddenly attacked and destroyed. Graciousness and friendliness had been
taken for weakness, as too often with the barbarian, and he and his men
had to pay for a conciliatory attitude with their lives. All this is but
the thing which we should reasonably expect under the circumstances;
it is all that the sources, critically examined, will justify us in
asserting. We do not possess, to be sure, the actual documents of
alliance between Rome and various tribes or chieftains of Germany; we
have in fact scarcely the name of any German preserved from Ariovistus to
Arminius, but we can be perfectly certain that negotiations of friendship
and alliance were frequently and solemnly entered upon. If Rome had made
an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B. C. (see above n. 8), while as yet
he was a relatively unknown force, hundreds of miles from the frontier,
how much more must she have been busy in organizing friendly relations
with the German tribes that were immediately contiguous to the Rhine and
through whose territories her armies so often marched in peace?

Finally, we would emphasize the general defensive character of the
campaigns. In the great majority of cases some disturbance in Germany is
definitely given as the cause of the operations, and if our sources for
the Germanic wars were not so hopelessly fragmentary we should doubtless
find that in every instance the Germans were the aggressors.[37] Even
the proposed campaign against Maroboduus we have no right to regard as
an act of wanton aggression, for Maroboduus had retired sulkily into the
forests of Bohemia, and there developed a formidable army, and though
his overt acts were conciliatory, his very presence, considering the
inflammable character of the nation to which he belonged, and in which
he might incite greater disturbances than had ever yet broken out, was
a cause of justifiable apprehension.[38] Indeed any other German than
Maroboduus and the fact that he did not seems to have been regarded
by his fellow Germans as disloyalty to the national cause. Likewise
the campaigns of Germanicus in 14 A. D., while apparently at the very
moment unprovoked, were in reality a bit of deferred revenge for the
treacherous attack upon the legions of Varus. Is it in fact not truly
singular that among so many scattered references to the Germanic wars,
there is nowhere, save in Florus, who has been dealt with elsewhere, any
direct assertion that the purpose was conquest, reduction to a state of
subjection, or the like? (Cf. pp. 27 and note; 75). All writers represent
the Romans as being compelled to send troops from time to time into
Germany to preserve the peace, and to make powerful demonstrations;
there are none of the characteristic marks or processes of conquest.
Were it not for the all but universal preconception that conquest was
intended the sources speaking for themselves would tell a very different
tale. That is briefly the following: for a generation from the time of
Caesar to that of Drusus, Rome had been content with merely repelling
attacks and punishing the immediate offenders, together with a local
demonstration of her forces. That procedure finally appeared to be
ineffective, and so a vigorous policy of terrorizing the Germans from
further disturbances of the peace was tried. Some canals were dug to
facilitate the movements of the fleet which was greatly needed for
the purpose of transporting supplies upon the marches into the remote
interior; close to the Rhine some swamp road construction was undertaken,
subsidiary apparently to the naval operations; a few _castella_ near to
the Rhine and along the highways leading into the interior were erected
as munition depots, and nothing further.[39] Preparations were made to
facilitate incursions into Germany, and these were repeatedly undertaken,
but every year Drusus came back to his starting point upon the Rhine,
after the most approved manœuvers of the noble Duke of York, or of the
perplexed Persian poet who tried to become a philosopher,

                              “but evermore
    Came out by the same door where in I went.”

The campaigns of Domitius and of Tiberius are of exactly the same
character, a rally, a raid, and a relapse. Regarded as attempts at
conquest these operations represented from the political point of view
sheer folly, from the military point of view a sequence of grandiose
fiascos; considered as a prolonged series of demonstrations intended to
establish a line of buffer states in the form of friendly, allied tribes
as a further protection of a naturally weak frontier against the barbaric
hordes of the remote swamps and forests, they were sagaciously conceived
and to the highest degree successful.

Our argument has thus far followed the process of exclusion. The Roman
operations in Germany were either those of permanent conquest or of
demonstration; there is no _tertium quid_. If not conquest, and we
have endeavored to refute that view at every point, it must have been
demonstration. The nature of our sources does not permit a positive and
detailed proof of our new interpretation; that, properly interpreted,
however, they are in harmony with it, we have been at pains to show.
By way of conclusion we shall undertake to strengthen our position by
pointing out analogies and parallels, not merely in the general course of
ancient history, but in the foreign policy of Augustus himself.

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity
without any attempt whatsoever at making permanent conquest. Such were
the oft repeated _razzias_ into Nubia made by the Pharaohs, the countless
raids of Assyrian monarchs into the mountains to the east and north,
especially the great campaign of Darius among the Scythians in 512 B.
C.[40] Of the same sort were the frequent campaigns of the Macedonian
kings against the Paeonians and Thracians, though no serious attempt
was made to extend their dominion greatly in this direction. A typical
example of such chronic punitive campaigning was the service of Clearchus
in the Chersonese, who used that peninsula as his base of operations
while raiding the Thracians above the Hellespont.[41] The whole history
of the more powerful Greek colonies is filled with the record of such
punitive expeditions intended to keep the restless barbarians at peace.
Of this identical nature were Caesar’s demonstrations across the Rhine in
Germany, and beyond the channel in Britain. He had surely no thought of
making a permanent conquest, at least at that time, but desired merely to
make a display of Roman power to the barbarians who were, or might be,
interfering with the security of his conquests in Gaul.[42] It is true
that the Romans were not generally in the habit of keeping a foe off at
arm’s length in this fashion, but preferred to close with and destroy him
once for all, but the time was bound to come soon or late when even the
amazing vitality of the Romans would reach its limit, and when they must
content themselves with defense instead of new conquest. And this limit
was first reached along the Rhine, where an effort at further advance
would have involved endless difficulties.

But we are not without examples of quite the same thing from the very
reign of Augustus, and that too at a period considerably prior to the
disaster of Varus. Of precisely this nature was the raid into Arabia
in 25-24 B. C. There is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the
land was intended; but occasion was taken to demonstrate the power
of Rome, and then the expedition returned. That there may have been
some intention of seizing or securing fabled wealth we cannot perhaps
wholly deny, although men so well informed as the Roman merchants and
administrators of Egypt could hardly have been guilty of such folly, but
its main purpose seems to have been merely a demonstration of the vigor
of the new Egyptian administration.[43] For it is significant that in
the very next year began the Ethiopian wars, which lasted until 20 B.
C., wherein likewise no effort was made at extending the limits of the
new province, but the Ethiopians or Nubians were given a taste of Roman
steel, and made to realize how serious a thing it would be to harass the
new lords of Egypt.[44] Of quite the same nature was the invasion of
Dacia, 12-9 B. C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolt, 6-9
A. D. Augustus had certainly no intention of adding Dacia to the Empire;
he merely wished to punish the tribes north of the Danube for interfering
in the affairs of the province and to give a sharp warning against a
repetition of the offense.[45] That the invasions of Germany were made
more frequently and probably upon a larger scale than elsewhere, there
can be no denial, but that is due to the fact that the Germans were
more warlike and martial than the other contiguous barbarians. We have
already observed that practically every campaign in Germany was preceded
by grave provocation on the part of the barbarians, while frequently
the difficulties raised were settled by diplomacy without recourse to
armed intervention. But the lesson that an invasion of the Empire was
likely to cost far more than it was worth, while it took a long time to
teach, was in the end thoroughly learned. For two hundred years after
the death of Tiberius almost unbroken peace reigned along this quarter
of the frontier, which had been for half a century the storm center of
the empire[46], and when the northern defenses finally began to crumble,
it was towards the north and northeast, not the northwest, that they
first succumbed. The policy of the first two _principes_ was therefore
abundantly justified by its lasting success.

As regards the secondary policy, i. e., that of the upbuilding and
support of friendly or buffer states immediately contiguous to the actual
frontier, there is no lack of parallels from antiquity.[47] Tiglath
Pileser IV in 732 B. C., after annexing certain parts of Palestine,
set up such a buffer between his empire and Egypt along the marches of
Philistia, in the shape of a vassal principality under a Bedouin chief
called “_kipi_, (or resident) of Musri” (i. e. Egypt).[48] Similar was
doubtless the purpose of Nebuchadrezzar in leaving Jehoiakim of Judah
upon the throne of a subject kingdom after his conquest of Palestine in
704 B. C. Only after two revolts, both instigated apparently by Egypt,
did he apparently feel compelled to give up a policy which, though it
made it unnecessary to invade Egypt directly, nevertheless allowed the
temptation to renew hostilities without a desperate risk.[49] Something
similar, though under very different conditions was the policy of Sparta
in building a ring of Perioeci about her own Helot population on every
side save that of Messenia, where by the destruction of cities and the
closing of harbors the Helots were likewise cut off from contact with the
outside world. The Perioeci thus formed a double barrier, warding off
the enemy on the outside, and helping to keep in a disaffected servile
population.[50] Again, this was clearly the policy of Alexander in the
East, who set the Indus as his actual frontier, but secured that by
establishing two powerful protected states, the kingdoms of Porus and of
Taxiles, on the eastern bank.[51] A parallel not too remote, perhaps,
can be pointed out in the case of the first contact of Rome and Carthage
in Spain. Here the Romans seem to have set up Saguntum as an allied state
to act as a buffer or check to the advances of Hannibal to the Ebro, and
towards what they chose to regard as their proper sphere of influence
(or, if one prefer, that of their ancient ally Massilia). That the policy
in this case failed to prevent war is of course no proper criticism of
its intent. There were also the numerous but ephemeral protectorates
of the eastern marches, which served for the most part the purpose of
preparing the formal advance of the empire rather than actually covering
a difficult frontier, and so lasted only a short time. But in Armenia
we have a truly classical example of a buffer state, whose fortunes
no less an authority than Lord Curzon compares directly with those of
Afghanistan, similarly situated between the two great rival powers of
Russia and Great Britain.[52] One Roman general or emperor after another
might have made Armenia a province, as Trajan actually did, although his
successor immediately restored it to its former state of uncertainty, but
for more than four centuries it was preserved as a buffer state against
Parthia.[53] Less notorious but equally clear is the case of Mauretania.
In 25 B. C. Augustus transferred King Juba from Numidia, which he
thereupon transformed into a province, to Mauretania, which, after having
been eight years a province, was once more made a kingdom. The purpose of
this singular interchange of political status, must have been to protect
the actual confines of the empire from direct contact with the barbarians
of the south and west, who were not yet accustomed to the presence of the
Romans.[54] It was not until sixty-five years afterwards, 40 A. D., when
danger from this quarter might have been expected to have diminished or
disappeared after two generations of a strong and peaceful government,
that Mauretania was once more made into a province.[55]

With this brief list of parallels and precedents to the German frontier
policy which we have ascribed to Augustus, we hope to have shown that
there was no striking innovation involved therein, nothing really beyond
the range of the expedients and experiences of an ancient statesman. In
thus attributing to Augustus in Germany a policy bearing so modern a
designation as that of the “buffer state”, we feel convinced that we are
not modernizing the ancients, but only recognizing how very ancient some
of our supposedly modern expedients of statesmanship in reality are.


FOOTNOTES

[1] The whole history of Iran has been dominated by the ever recurring
struggle with Turan, the barbarians of the northeastern steppes and
deserts, down even to the 18th century. Compare Ed. Meyer’s excellent
characterization of this relation, _Gesch. d. Alt._, III, p. 103 ff.

[2] The feeble Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea, though
dependent upon the Empire, were hardly an integral part thereof, and
really existed more through the favor of the barbarians, for selfish
personal ends, than by reason of their own strength or the protecting arm
of Rome. They were little more than trading posts preserved for their
mutual serviceability, not the frontiers of empire. Compare Mommsen,
_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 277 ff., especially 286.

[3] See V. Chapot, _La frontière de l’Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête
arabe_, Paris, 1907, pp. 377, 381.

[4] Upon the general inadequacy of rivers as frontier lines there are
some good remarks by Lord Curzon, _The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers_,
Oxford, 1908, p. 20 ff., and Miss Ellen Semple, _Influences of Geographic
Environment_, New York, 1911, p. 360 ff. It is only rarely in fact that
a large river actually forms a boundary line; exceptions like the Rio
Grande, a short stretch on the upper St. Lawrence, the La Plata, the
Amur, the lower Aras and the lower Danube, only emphasize the rareness of
the phenomenon. Besides, rivers play a relatively slight rôle in military
history; they can be crossed only too easily, if not in the direct face
of the foe, as at Wagram, Fredericksburg, or the Yalu, at least at some
point above or below. In the long course of the German wars the river
Rhine plays a most subordinate part; battles were fought freely on one
side or the other, but none, that we have noted, for its actual passage,
unless an exception be made of an action of Drusus in 12 B. C., which Dio
54, 32, 1, thus describes: “Having watched for the Kelts until they were
crossing the Rhine he cut them to pieces.” This may have been a battle
for a crossing, but it seems much more plausible that it was a mere
attack from an ambuscade, the river playing merely an incidental part. Of
course these remarks apply only to the period of mobile armies. In modern
trench warfare, with solid lines hundreds of miles long, any ditch, even
such as the trifling Yser canal, may be a formidable obstacle; but this
is a wholly new phase of military tactics.

[5] The North American Indians were incomparably less numerous and more
widely scattered than the Germans, but our Indian wars were frequent,
difficult, and costly to life and property. Probably no other nations
with which civilized peoples have had to deal have made such a cult of
valor and of rapine as did the ancient Germans and the North American
Indians.

[6] O. Seeck (_Kaiser Augustus_, p. 110 f.) only partly recognizes the
difficulties involved in the constant pushing forward of the lines of
empire. It is wrong to ascribe to Augustus the absurdities which a policy
of indefinite advance entails. Cf. p. 67.

[7] See p. 65.

[8] These are perhaps the “strategical considerations which tempted
the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been
tempted across the Indus”, to which Lord Curzon (_The Romanes Lecture:
Frontiers_, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of
the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the
similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those
of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f.,
and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon’s generalization is not
quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in
the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the
West, where, to use his own words: “protectorates, strictly so-called,
were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided
was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his
numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in
Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed” (p. 38).
Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not
exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to
create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes
closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist,
at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was
the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the
Rhine, and the Weser seem to have been _socii_ of Rome, and it was the
case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been
allies (called actually “fratres”) of the Romans (at least since 121 B.
C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, _Bell. Gall._, I, 11, 3
and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of
danger, had been solemnly recognized as _rex_ and _amicus_ in 59 B. C.
That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted
to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C.,
is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (_Die Germanen im römischen
Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I._, Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.)
has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, _Caesar’s Conquest of
Gaul_, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more
eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his
neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing
else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the
face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them.
A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will
be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith
in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon’s statement is no doubt perfectly
applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous
offensive-defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure
and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men
merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might
dash himself to pieces against it.

[9] A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed,
is Caesar’s treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the
Treveri (_Bell. Gall._, V, 3 f.).

[10] Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 26: “Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam
missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse”.

[11] _Ibid._: “internis discordiis relinqui.” Cf. above p. 34. An example
of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special
territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a
time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the
national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1085).
Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial
relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported
against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitius experienced a
humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from
exile in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 3), but later commanders were more
successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own
land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety
within the empire.

[12] The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even
before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 16, 5).

[13] Compare Caesar’s admirable characterization of the Gauls (_Bell.
Gall._, IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most,
primitive peoples.

[14] Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In
his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could
dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: “fuga
rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non
fuere qui vincerentur”). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—“he crossed
the Rhine for the purpose of making war”, says Dio (48, 49, 2), not
that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other
German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe
engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty
of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare.
Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle
(Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54,
33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the
field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward.
This was hardly a “decisive, brilliant victory” as Gardthausen
(_Augustus_, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the
two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only
certain “battles” that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent
campaigning.

[15] Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire.
They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul. For
example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the
surrendering of the Aduatuci (_Bell. Gall._, II, 33) as to purchase and
take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was
undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them
(_Ibid._, III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (_Ibid._,
I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a
marked influence upon the Ubii (_Ibid._, IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar’s
advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany
(Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus’ army had a large _tross_ (Dio,
56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders.
A. C. Redderoth (_Der Angrivarierwall und die letzten Römerschlachten
des Jahres_ 16 p. C., Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.) is doubtless correct in
emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in
Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give
only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests
upon history. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

[16] See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

[17] Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 56: “positoque castello super vestigia paterni
praesidii in monte Tauno.” This is probably the same fort which Dio (54,
36, 3) describes as “among the Chatti beside the Rhine”; (cf. Koepp,
_op. cit._, p. 20). The location is generally thought to be not far
from Höchst, only a few miles up the Main. A _castellum_ here would
merely command the entrance to a road into the interior; it would be no
“Zwingburg.”

[18] Kornemann (_Klio_, IX, 1909, p. 436) regards the words of Tacitus,
_Ann._, IV, 72: “haud spernanda illic civium sociorumque manus litora
Oceani praesidebat,” as proving that “das Kastell eine starke Besatzung
hatte.” On the other hand the inability of the garrison to do more than
hold the fort against the uprising (IV, 73) would indicate that the force
was rather small. A Roman fort was an easy thing to protect against
the Germans; even the feeble garrison of Aliso held out easily against
great numbers after the disaster to Varus (cf. Delbrück, _Gesch. d.
Kriegskunst_, 2nd ed., 1909, II, p. 138). That Flevum was not established
until the time of Germanicus, Kornemann (_loc. cit._, p. 437) has argued,
in refusing to accept the plausible identification of Drusus’ naval base
with Flevum, and locating Borma (Florus, II, 30, 26, a form which he very
properly defends) between the Cannanefates and the Frisii (_loc. cit._,
pp. 430 ff., especially 437-8). Our argument is not seriously affected
thereby, for Borma must have been yet closer to the Rhine than Flevum
(Kornemann, _loc. cit._, p. 437), and neither was so situated as to be a
far flung outpost designed to hold conquests fast. At the very most they
were merely starting points for hostile or commercial activity. To be
sure, if Borma could be identified with the modern Borkum, as has been
frequently attempted (cf. Kornemann, _loc. cit._, p. 433, n. 1), its
foundation might, with a certain degree of plausibility, be regarded as
a serious move looking towards conquest, but Kornemann’s localization of
Borma seems unassailable, the philological obstacles are great, and the
military difficulty of setting a naval base at this period so far away
from the Rhine quite insuperable.

[19] Velleius, II, 105, 3. Dio indeed (56, 18, 2) speaks of the Roman
soldiers in Varus’ time as “spending the winter in Germany”. The tense
used, however, the imperfect, at the head of a series of the same tenses
which are used in the inceptive sense, shows clearly that the word means
no more than: “were beginning to spend the winter.” A single instance
would be sufficient justification for the expression.

[20] This is generally changed, following Lipsius, to _caput Lupiae_, and
is identified with Aliso. If Aliso be at Haltern it is strange indeed
that he did not move on to the Rhine; if near Paderborn there is good
reason for his having remained at a depot of supplies fully 90 miles away
from Vetera.

[21] Ritterling (_op. cit._, p. 181) suggests the possibility that these
“hiberna” are the same as those that were occupied the preceding winter,
while others speak without reserve of a second winter in Germany (e. g.,
Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1168). But Velleius uses “reduxit”, which
distinctly implies that the legions were being led back across the Rhine.
Besides, “in hiberna reducere” was a phrase which any one acquainted with
the conduct of the German wars would at once understand as implying the
recrossing of the Rhine. For “hiberna” alone as meaning the Rhine forts,
see Velleius, II, 120, 3: “ad inferiora hiberna”; see also §2 of the same
chapter: “in hiberna revertitur”, of the campaign of Tiberius in 10 A.
D., where there is no doubt that the Rhine forts are meant (see Zonaras,
10, 37 ex.). Compare also Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 38: “reduxit in hiberna”;
_ibidem_, I, 51: “miles in hibernis locatur”; II, 23: “legionum aliae ...
in hibernacula remissae”; and II, 26, “reductus inde in hiberna miles”;
and finally, Dio, 55, 2, 1, where Tiberius with the corpse of Drusus
comes from the interior of Germany “as far as to the winter camp”, i. e.,
across the Rhine. It is clear that “hiberna” or the equivalent, when used
without a special qualifying phrase, as in Velleius II, 107, 3, means the
Rhine forts and nothing else. In order to make clear that these “hiberna”
were in the interior of Germany it would have been necessary to add some
special note calling attention to that fact. Finally, as the spending of
the preceding winter in Germany is told with such a flourish (“in cuius
mediis finibus ... princeps locaverat”), the repetition of the same deed,
as enhancing its significance, could not have failed to be emphasized.

[22] The most important was certainly the _fossa Drusiana_ which led
from the Rhine to the North Sea, through a lake, probably that of
Flevum (Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 8). This may very well be identical with
the _fossae Drusinae_ (Suetonius, _Claud._, 1). Drusus also did some
work to regulate the course of the Rhine (Tacitus, _Ann._, XIII, 53,
and _Hist._, V, 19). Whether he built corduroy roads (_pontes longi_)
over the swampy land is not so certain, though Becker, Domaszewski, and
Kornemann (the references in Kornemann, _Klio_, IX, p. 432 ff.) are
probably correct when they interpret _pontibus_ (Floras, II, 30, 26)
in this sense. If this was actually a coast road connecting two naval
bases, Borma, a short distance from the Rhine, with Gesoriacum-Bononia
(Boulogne-sur-mer), as Kornemann very plausibly argues (p. 432, 435),
then it really connected only such naval bases as were necessary to hold
the mouth of the Rhine with the general military road system of Gaul.
Of course both banks of a river at its mouth must be seized in order to
insure certain control, but neither the establishment of Borma nor the
construction of this particular bit of road can properly be regarded
as measures which necessarily had the conquest of Germany in mind, nor
would they have furthered very materially such a conquest, even if it
had been intended. Professor Frank (_Roman Imperialism_, New York, 1914,
p. 352) seems to make too much of this canal of Drusus as evidence “that
serious measures were planned from the first”. The Romans unquestionably
made preparations to march into Germany and to support armies upon
such excursions; the critical consideration, however, is what they did
after entering the country, not their preliminary preparations. If they
constantly marched out again every fall, it is impossible to speak of
permanent occupation. Nor is it satisfactory to restrict the attempts at
conquest to the campaigns of Drusus, 12-9 B. C., and of Tiberius, 4-5 A.
D., alone. Domitius penetrated deeper into Germany than either of them,
as he alone crossed the Elbe. If some invasions imply conquest then
all should, or else Augustus was guilty of an incredibly shilly-shally
policy. And if all the invasions aimed at conquest, then there is an
absurd disparity between their number, scale, and extent and the utterly
negligible results obtained. Kornemann’s view (p. 440 ff.) that Drusus
constructed a coast road as far as the mouth of the Ems can hardly be
established by the evidence which he presents. It does not appear how any
number of campaigns along the coast could have accomplished the conquest
of the remote interior. Even if the view be accepted, however, it could
only show the importance of the control of the coast, a circumstance to
which we shall revert later.

[23] For the literature on these see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, II, p.
763 f. Nothing definite is known about them. If very significant for
the “conquest” of Germany, why was their construction deferred to the
period of Domitius, years after Drusus and Tiberius had been engaged in
carrying on the most extensive campaigns? The very fact that these early
incursions into Germany had been repeatedly made without the erection
of any elaborate network of solidly constructed roads, is the clearest
evidence that no permanent occupation of the country was intended.
For the purposes of the occasional demonstration mere “war-paths”,
supplemented here and there with some light, temporary construction
were entirely adequate. It is a striking fact that of permanent road
construction not a trace has been found in Germany, not in the lower
Lippe valley, where, if anywhere, the highways of armies must have been
solidly constructed if Germany was to be held as a province, nor even
before the very gates of the camp at Haltern (cf. Koepp, _Die Römer
in Deutschland_, 2nd ed., p. 136). Yet along the _limes_ roads were
regularly constructed, and were an essential part of the system of
defense. Tiberius seems to have begun a _limes_ in the _silva Caesia_,
but not to have completed it (Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 50: “limitemque a
Tiberio coeptum”). It was obviously a slight undertaking.

[24] Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 7. These were probably roads (Delbrück, _Gesch.
d. Kriegskunst_, 2nd ed., p. 128 ff.). The use of “novis” indicates that
such structures had been erected earlier. Their flimsy nature is to be
inferred from the fact that the work had to be repeated in a few years,
and the construction of Germanicus was doubtless no more lasting (see the
preceding note).

[25] As for example Agrippa’s system of roads for Gaul. Yet Gaul needed
them far less than Germany, for it was a relatively civilized country
with means of rapid communication. Caesar seems to have been embarrassed
but little in his campaigns by poor roads, in sharp contrast with the
conditions prevailing in Germany.

[26] Dio (56, 18, 2) states that “their (i. e. Roman) soldiers were
beginning to winter there and were founding cities”, but just what
these “cities” were, he neglects to say, and they appear nowhere else
either in his narrative, or in that of any other ancient writer; yet
the destruction of such incipient “cities” after the defeat of Varus
is just the sort of event that could not possibly have been passed
over in silence by all our sources. When Dio comes to the appropriate
section in his later narrative (22, 2ᵃ = Zonaras) where these should be
mentioned, he speaks of nothing but “forts” (ἐρύματα). It is perfectly
clear that his sources knew nothing about real “cities”, and that from
his knowledge of the way in which settlements grow up about any army post
however small, he is indulging in a little exaggeration in telling of
the foundation of “cities” so as to give the desired background for his
picture of a complete reversal of conditions in Germany.

[27] These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the
latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, _Histoire de la
Gaule_, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to
create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong
garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land.
Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all
these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the
ageing emperor and his entourage. “Il y a eu, de la part d’Auguste, de
veritables aberrations militaires” (p. 117) ... “Une puérile ignorance
des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin” (p.
118) ... “L’empereur vieillissait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât
sur tout son entourage” (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but
quite inadmissable. One must surely recognize in this the _reductio ad
absurdum_ of the whole theory of conquest.

[28] The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by
Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all
by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans “were establishing
markets and making peaceful gatherings”. Dio’s account is a more military
and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if
not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a
contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so
doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and
law suits belong to the conventional equipment of the forum, and must be
played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any
more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the
presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in
the land.

[29] This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: “he gave them
orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as
from subjects.” It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus
is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as
Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus
(“pecuniae vero ... non contemptor”) in a short character study and
sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions
must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact
that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest _argumentum ex
silentio_ against the correctness of Dio’s statement, as far as it can be
considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for
a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally
at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this
they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of
policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban
of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as
having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants:
so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate
seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 30, 37); Tiberius as
early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province
(Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions,
and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3).
Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus,
when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce and
warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were
ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius,
II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more
philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two
pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the
Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would
not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore
Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans
“as slaves” and levies tribute upon them “as subjects.” Florus also
(II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional
tyrant (_libidinem ac superbiam ... saevitiam_), traits about which
his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and
certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical
flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly
gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite
sufficiently motived in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are
that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that
therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than
that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio’s artless
acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier
campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory
consistency.

[30] Certainly if the _causarum patroni_ excited the peculiar animosity
of the Germans the _publicani_ must have done so much more, yet not even
Florus mentions the latter.

[31] It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East
not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the
receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than
an exchange of gifts, as little “_tribute_” on one side as on the other.
Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains,
otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship,
the case of Flavus, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point
(Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 9).

[32] Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of
the outbreak of war, “pacem exuere” (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it
was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned,
only “qui tributo aderant milites.” On the friendly relations with the
Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the
Romans, see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1076.

[33] The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the
early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid
and material assistance, is very much in point.

[34] We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus
(_Ann._, I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: “Germanos numquam satis
excusaturos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam
viderint. aliis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse
supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint”, etc. That this is
a violent _ex parte_ harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an
exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling
Arminius “vaecordem” at the very moment of introducing him. On the other
hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That
criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded
is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish
injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military
agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the
staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally
that assistance of any kind in the form of service or the furnishing
of supplies may have been called “tribute” by an excited patriot need
occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no
better arguments than such statements as these for its support.

[35] Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 2ᵃ (Zonaras).

[36] The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The sea
coast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever _castella_
may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept
among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast),
until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 38; Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location
is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years
later (see references n. 17 above), and it might conceivably have been
destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did
not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the
uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It
was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when
they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three
regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman
outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these
rhetorical _flosculi_ they are found to be either in flat contradiction
to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.

[37] A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not
be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar’s first campaign in
Germany, in 56 B. C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and
Tencteri (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to
yield up the survivors (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 16). The second crossing, in
53 B. C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance
from across the Rhine (_Bell. Gall._, V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul
and Germany compelled Agrippa’s crossing in 37 B. C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2).
In 29 B. C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by Carinas,
but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive
expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B. C. was occasioned by the maltreatment
of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B. C. Gaul was disturbed by German
invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade
Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B. C. was to
drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having
put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The
first act in Drusus’ campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began
the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome
was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much
opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her
arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years
the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive.
The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in
7 B. C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by
the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, “Germania
... rebellavit” (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely
be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in
2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 2; Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 44). More troubles in
Germany which required to be “pacified” in 4 A. D., inaugurated the
second period of activity (Suetonius, _Tib._, 16). Tiberius remained on
the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A. D. From
this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information;
nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never
went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even
then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country
alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let
the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would
have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests
in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the
circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have
wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been
sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).

[38] Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a
general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall
the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On
Maroboduus see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1152 ff.

[39] For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of
_castella_, see Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16 _sub finem_.

[40] Compare A. Wittneben, “Dareios’ Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des
russischen Krieges von 1812”, _Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen_, LXVI
(1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists
that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the
right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas.
As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very
properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar’s invasions
of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, _The Great Persian
War_, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly “that the expedition in the
form it was made was not ... an attempt at conquest”, and he regards it
as either “a reconnaissance in force” or “a display intended to strike
awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory.” J. Beloch, _Griech.
Gesch._, 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest
was intended: “er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen
die Lust zu nehmen, den Istros zu überschreiten” (p. 6). Any other
interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date
we follow Ed. Meyer, _Gesch. d. Alt._, III, p. 114 f.

[41] Xenophon, _Anab._, I, 1, 9.

[42] The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar
himself, _Bell. Gall._, IV, 20: “in Britanniam proficisci contendit
(sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde
subministrata auxilia intellegebat”; and IV, 16: “cum videret (sc.
Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque
rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi
Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.”

[43] On this expedition see Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, p. 106
ff.; Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 789 f.

[44] See Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, p. 108 f.

[45] On these see Mommsen, _Res Gestae_, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, _Geschichte
der römischen Kaiser_, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given
provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the
empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on
the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, _op. cit._, p.
132.

[46] Cf. M. Bang, _The Cambridge Mediaeval History_, 1911, vol. I, p. 195.

[47] An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to
strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There
seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.

[48] See H. R. Hall, _The Ancient History of the Near East_, London,
1913, p. 466, for a brief statement of the facts. For the idea
of a buffer state in this connection, compare E. Klamroth, _Die
wirtschaftliche Lage und das geistige Lehen der jüdischen Exulanten in
Babylonien_. Diss. Königsberg, 1912, p. 20, n. 4.

[49] For the events compare Hall, _op. cit._, p. 543 ff.; for the
interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, _op. cit._, p. 20.
See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49.

[50] We accept upon this point B. Niese’s convincing arguments, “Neue
Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons”, _Nachr. d. Götting.
Ges. d. Wiss._, 1906, p. 101 ff., esp. pp. 131-7.

[51] See J. G. Droysen, _Geschichte des Hellenismus_, I, 2, p. 163 ff.
This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J.
Kaerst (_Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters_, I, p. 369, and n.
2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts
of the empire. J. B. Bury (_A History of Greece_, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807)
very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.

[52] _The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers_, Oxford, 1898, p. 38.—J. Geffcken:
_Kaiser Julianus_, 1914, p. 117 uses the expression “Pufferstaat” in
speaking of Armenia.

[53] The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards
Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, “Le relazioni fra l’impero romano e
l’Armenia a tempo di Augusto”, _Riv. di storia antica_, VII (1903), pp.
505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903).
His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed
is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic
absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, _Riv.
di filol._ LIII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement,
though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian’s dissertation, _Die
politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis
428 n. Chr._, Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of
Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in
Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvers, is correct
enough, but the sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus’ own
inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous.
Of course Rome’s relations to Armenia would have been quite different
had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries
of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement
of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, _La frontière de
l’Euphrate_ etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese’s
“lotta commerciale” theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen’s statement (_Röm.
Gesch._, V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus’ Armenian
policy is admirable.

[54] This has been recognized by Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 706. That
this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and
Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession
of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were
ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn.
Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A. D. This is R. Cagnat’s certain interpretation
of Dio, 55, 28 (_L’armée romaine d’Afrique et l’occupation militaire
de l’Afrique sous les Empereurs_, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff.,
esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best
he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally
when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given
the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for
all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a
developed buffer state policy.

[55] Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient
preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely
put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula’s
act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely
by greed, as Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25),
remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to another native
prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work
of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the
kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, _op. cit._,
I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified;
after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances
in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.),
and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of
the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion
in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the
circumstances.




APPENDIX


CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16

Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being
well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther
away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great
number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp’s remark (_Die Römer in
Deutschland_, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso
sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it
permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more
likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest
army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward
and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual
number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably
very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the
left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As
for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied
in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (_loc. cit._) believes, and
so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of
fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove
this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time;
nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays
such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the
builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a
bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters.
The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was
held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that
it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have
been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can
the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit
of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus’ death from Tiberius’
winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general
plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition
and modification of structure? That a thing is “Augustan” may well be
asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to
Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject
utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to
insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly
observes, “ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der
Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht
vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält.”
But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus’ first fort and Haltern
a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p.
20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of
possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to
prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic
fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose,
one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the
same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated
ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one
is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.——Delbrück’s arguments
against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, 2nd
ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave
difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no
matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe,
our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn
is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the
surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück’s arguments (pp.
48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a “Zwingburg”, but only a center for
munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been
made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling
out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in
the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole
country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must
have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent
fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that
this was never done in Germany; the few _castella_ of which we hear
were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army
of permanent occupation.——We have hitherto paid no attention to the
statement of Florus that “Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam
flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin” (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts
this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser (cf.
Abraham, _Zur Gesch. d. germ, u. pannon. Kriege_, etc., p. 4) and there
is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the
“quinquaginta amplius castella”, that Drusus is supposed to have built
along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, _Römische Herrschaft_, p. 110). So much
however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and
control the coast, and _castella_ may very well have been located at or
near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, _op. cit._, p.
51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed
out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great.
Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in
the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so.
A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the
American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even
later. For the Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg,
_Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte_, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229
ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the
literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus
regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this
feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias
provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis
fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to
indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.


CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49

[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah,
as a “buffer state”, I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen,
who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: “The
two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one
hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and
the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history
of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for
buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region.
Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these
two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem
to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more
from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character
of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an
influence in all directions” (E. Meyer, _Geschichte des Altertums_,
zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other
question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while
there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the
idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt
Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was
not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription
of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well
be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It
is translated by E. Schrader (_Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek_, II, p.
21) as follows: “Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen
Egypten”; similarly by A. S. Strong (_Records of the Past, New Series_,
V, p. 125): “Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed.”
(Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser
under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the
Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, _Altorientalische Forschungen_, II, p. 4;
cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza
and other Philistine cities [i. e. as possible buffer states for Egypt
against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of
Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25,
suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the
nature of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during
the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in
other centuries: “Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria,
the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt
among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a
fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian” (_A History of
Egypt_, p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah
(Isa. 28-30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel
(2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some
of Hezekiah’s territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose
of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states?
(_Taylor Cylinder_ III, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, _Israel_, p. 122).
The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The
rapid advance of Necoh against Assyria through the territory of Judah
(2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against
the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot
afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the
revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state
under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile,
served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote
regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: “A clash with Egypt
was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the
Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of
gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely” (_Prophecy and
the Prophets_, pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see
E. Schrader, _Keilinschriften und das alte Testament_, dritte Auflage,
p. 115; L. W. Batten, _Ezra and Nehemiah_, p. 35. A similar situation
continued to exist in later ages.”


ADDENDUM (p. 87)

Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman
diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is
in Flavius Vopiscus, _Probus_, ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct
report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): “Omnes iam barbari vobis
arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant”. Though the
period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus,
perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler
emperors.




INDEX


    Agrippa, 65 f., 74.

    Alexander, 108 f.

    Aliso, 89, Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.

    Arabia, 106.

    Ariovistus, Chapter IV, n. 8.

    Armenia, 83, 109 f.

    Arminius, 10, 13, 17, 47; in literature, Chapter I, n. 38;
    eulogized by Tacitus, 30 ff.

    Augustus: attempt of to subdue Germany, 9 f., 27; refutation
    of this view—summary, 80; worship of, Chapter I, n. 11; p.
    75; opposed to expansion by conquest, 12 f., 57; purpose
    of operations in Germany, 18, 57; protection of Gaul and
    Italy by him a military and political necessity, 18, 63
    f., 66; character of, 54 f.; policy one of peace, 60 ff.;
    influenced by military leaders, 65 f.; influenced by political
    considerations, 67 ff.

    _Auxilia_, 39, 41.


    Borma, Chapter IV, notes 8 and 22.

    Buffer states: general policy of, 85, 105 ff.; historic
    examples of, 105 ff.


    Caesar, 10, 27 f., 55; in Britain and Germany, 106.

    _Causarum patroni_, 96 ff., Chapter IV, n. 34.

    Commerce in Germany, 92, Chapter IV, n. 15, Appendix, Chapter
    IV, n. 16.


    Dacia, 107.

    Dio, 21 f., 56, Chapter IV, n. 29; p. 99 ff.; his description
    of battle contradicted by Tacitus, 25 f.

    Drusus and Tiberius: campaigns of, 12, Chapter IV, n. 23;
    influence of on Augustus, 65 f.


    Elbe, the, as frontier, 9 f., 11 ff., 65, 75.

    Empires, ancient world, relations of to barbarians, 82 ff.

    Engineering works, 92 ff.

    Ethiopia, 107.


    Fleet, 41, 51, Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.

    Flevum, 90.

    Florus, 23 ff., 27 f., 75, 96, 100, Chapter IV, n. 29.

    Forts, Chapter IV, n. 26; p. 110, 104, Appendix, Chapter IV, n.
    16.

    Frontiers: Armenia, 83; Rhine, 83; rivers, Chapter IV, n. 4;
    western, Chapter IV, n. 8.


    Germanicus, campaigns of, 30 f., 50, 53, 104.

    Germans, attacks and provocations of against Rome, 63 f., 102 f.

    Germany, attempted subjugation of, 9 ff., 27 f.; anomaly of
    “conquest”, 77, 89 ff., 94 f.; not made a Roman province,
    Chapter I, n. 11; p. 70 ff.; 76 ff.; physical conditions of,
    41, 51; military forces of, 46, 49 f.; military operations in,
    87 ff.

    German campaigns, strategy of, 42, 51, 88 f.; defensive
    character of, 102 ff.


    Legions: number of, 36 f., 41; composition of, 38 ff., Chapter
    III, n. 11; size of standing army, 41 ff.; percentage of
    population in army, 41; size of Rhine army, Chapter IV, n. 54.
    See also _Auxilia_.


    Maroboduus, 46, 47, 50, 103 f.

    Mauretania, 110.

    Military roads, 92 f.

    _Monumentum Ancyranum_, Chapter III, n. 67; p. 61 ff., Chapter
    III, n. 108.

    Mount Taunus, fort, 90, Chapter IV, notes 17 and 36.


    Palestine, 108 ff., Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 49.

    Population: of Roman empire, 39, 41; of Germany, 44 f.; of
    Gaul, 47 f.

    Posidonius: on population of Gaul, 47 f.


    Rhine, as frontier, 9 ff., 83 ff.

    Rome: general forces of, 49 f., 50 ff., 54; alleged desire for
    war on part of soldiers and citizens, 67 ff.; alleged change
    of policy toward Germany, 79 f.; general frontiers of, 83 ff.;
    diplomacy of in Germany, 85 ff. _See also_ Population.


    Saguntum, 109.

    Sources: rhetorical character of, 17, Chapter I, n. 11; p. 22,
    24, 34, 96, 101; general account of, 21 ff.; contradictions
    between, 24 ff., Chapter IV, n. 29.

    Sparta, 108.


    Tacitus, 21, 24, Chapter III, n. 68; contradicted by Dio, 25
    f.; his eulogy of Arminius, 30; criticism of eulogy, 34.

    Teutoburger forest: battle of and consequences, 12 ff., 36 f.,
    52, 77, 81; numbers in battle of, 35 ff. See also _Varus_.

    Tiberius: at Rhodes, Chapter I, n. 11; his recall of
    Germanicus, 33 f., Chapter I, n. 43; operations of in Germany,
    53, 74 f., 87, 91; estrangement from Augustus, 77; Character
    of, 78 f.

    Tribute, 97 ff.


    Varus: defeat of, 9 ff., 58; circumstances of defeat, 24 ff.,
    35 f.; relation to Augustus, 75 f.; character of, 95, Chapter
    IV, n. 29; conduct and policy of, 96 ff., 102. _See also_
    Teutoburger forest.

    Velleius, 21 f., 25, 29, 53, 74, 101, Chapter IV, n. 29.