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                                 MEMOIR

OF THE EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN,


                  BY AN OFFICER EMPLOYED IN HIS ARMY.


                                LONDON:
                     JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET.

                                 1820.




  London: Printed by W. CLOWES,
      Northumberland-court.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                   A
                                MEMOIR,
                                 _&c._


The following sheets pretend to no merit in composition, the writer
pretends to no reputation as an author; the subject must be interesting
to every British reader, and if the events are faithfully recorded, the
work will deserve some attention.

Unaccustomed for a series of years to any great or continued exertion
upon the continent, the people of England almost doubted their power or
means of supporting one. The genius of Lord Wellington, the bravery of
British troops, have removed this doubt.

To the detail of the brilliant exploits by which the early campaigns in
Portugal and Spain were distinguished, this work is dedicated. The
author has undertaken it, emboldened by the consideration, that from the
opportunities which he enjoyed of observing the transactions in the
Peninsula, in most of which he was personally engaged, he has the means
of relating them correctly.

In the summer of 1808 the first deputies from the Asturias arrived in
England; they were so rapidly succeeded by others from every part of the
Peninsula, that after a very short time there remained no doubt that the
great people, whom they came to represent, were determined to struggle
for independence.

The British ministers did no more than echo the sentiments of the nation
when they decided to give every support to this people; and Sir Arthur
Wellesley, who had been appointed to the command of a corps destined for
a different service, was selected to lead the first armament which
should carry assistance to Portugal and Spain.

The force under his orders sailed from Cork in the beginning of July;
Sir Arthur Wellesley himself proceeded in a single ship to Corunna. The
state of things upon his arrival at that port was unfavourable to the
Spaniards. The Gallician army under Blake, and that of Castile under
Cuesta, had been defeated by a French corps commanded by Marshal
Bessières, in the neighbourhood of Rio Seco; and there appeared no
obstacle to the march of the enemy to Corunna. In this situation of
affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley hinted to the Junta, that if a request to
land his army for the protection of Gallicia should be made to him, he
would not hesitate in acceding to it. The Junta, however, actuated by a
feeling of pride and jealousy which has so often brought the affairs of
Spain to the brink of ruin, neglected to make this proposal. Sir Arthur
consequently proceeded to the coast of Portugal, and arrived in Mondego
Bay on the 26th of July. Leaving there the expedition he commanded, he
went to the mouth of the Tagus, to procure information, and to combine
his operations with Admiral Sir C. Cotton. When these objects were
accomplished, he returned to the Mondego, determining to land his troops
as soon as the corps which he expected, either from Cadiz, under General
Spencer, or from England, under General Ackland, should have arrived.
The former joined on the 2d of August; and Sir Arthur Wellesley
immediately disembarked his army. At this moment three-fourths of
Portugal were in insurrection against the French. Junot, who had entered
the country in the November preceding, had commanded a corps of 40,000
men, of which about 10,000 were Spaniards; Oporto was occupied by a part
of the Spanish troops, the rest of them were at Lisbon.

At the commencement of the revolution in Spain, Junot entertained so
great a suspicion of the Spaniards in that capital, and in its
neighbourhood, that, under pretence of sending them to other quarters,
he succeeded in surrounding and disarming them, and afterwards in
placing them as prisoners on board ships provided for that purpose in
the Tagus. As soon as the intelligence of this event reached Oporto, the
Spanish garrison seized the few French officers who were in the town;
invited the inhabitants to follow the example of Spain, and resist the
French; and themselves marched off to join their companions in Gallicia.

The Portuguese had, however, before this time, raised the standard of
their prince. The Bishop of Oporto assumed the government of the
northern provinces of Portugal; and General Frere and other persons took
the lead in the insurrection in the other parts of that country. The old
soldiers, who had been disbanded by the French, were called to arms; and
in a short time three armies were formed; one at Oporto, another at
Coimbra, and the third at Viseu. Officers had already been despatched
from England to ascertain the state of the Oporto and Coimbra corps; and
Sir Arthur Wellesley sent an officer to Viseu to report to him the state
of the force assembled there under General Barcellar. It is needless to
observe, that an army formed as the Portuguese had been, could not be
very effective; such as it was, however, it was hearty in the cause of
its country, and most anxious for an opportunity of revenging the wrongs
which had been inflicted upon the nation.

The corps of Oporto was joined to that of Coimbra, and was destined to
act with Sir Arthur Wellesley. The corps of Viseu was sent to Guarda;
whence, in conjunction with some Spaniards under the orders of the
Marquis of Valadares, it was directed to march upon Abrantes, and from
thence co-operate in the meditated attack on Lisbon. There was also a
corps of Spaniards of some force collected at Badajos under General
Galluzzo, which it was hoped might have given some assistance to these
combinations, by a simultaneous operation in the Alemtejo.

Such was the state of the allied force when Sir Arthur Wellesley first
landed his army on the banks of the Mondego. The French were in
possession of Lisbon, and the country north of it as far as Leyria,
which had been recaptured from the Portuguese by a force under the
orders of General Margaron. On the entry of the French into this town,
they committed the most atrocious acts of cruelty[1]. As an instance of
the brutality of a superior officer, the —— of —— related of himself,
that upon entering the town, he met a woman with a child at her breast,
that the appearance of the infant excited his pity, but “_se rapellant
qu’il était soldat_,” he pierced the two bodies with a single thrust of
his sword. When the English advanced guard arrived there, it found in
one of the convents the dead bodies of several Monks, who had been
killed by the French soldiers; some of whom had dipped their hands in
the blood of their unfortunate victims, and had daubed with it the walls
of the convent.

Footnote 1:

  The cruelties committed by the French army in this instance, and
  throughout the whole of its campaigns in Portugal, had their origin in
  the nature of the war in which it was now for the first time engaged.
  Till this period, wherever the French soldiers had established
  themselves, whether by the defeat of the armies which defended the
  country invaded, or otherwise, they found the people submitting to
  their rule; when, in Portugal, therefore, the nation rose in hostility
  against them, they considered such resistance as rebellion, and looked
  upon the inhabitants taken in arms, as disturbers of the public peace,
  and therefore entitled to no mercy or consideration. The officers also
  hoped, by inflicting vengeance on the patriots, to arrest the progress
  of an insurrection which menaced their total overthrow. It would not
  be fair to argue, from the conduct of the French in Portugal, that in
  other situations they would be led to adopt similar proceedings.

To the southward of the Tagus, the French had been unable to retain any
part of the Alemtejo.

About the end of July, Junot detached a corps, under the orders of
General Loison, to repress, in the first instance, the insurrections of
that province; next, to give whatever assistance might be wanted by the
garrison of Elvas; and, lastly, to return by Abrantes to the north of
the Tagus, and to wreak a signal vengeance upon Coimbra. General Loison,
in execution of these directions, marched to Evora, where the Portuguese
had collected the force of the provinces, and, assisted by some
Spaniards, resolved to defend the town. General Loison attacked it, and
after meeting with a considerable resistance, entered it, and delivered
it over to pillage. The inhabitants, threatened with indiscriminate
massacre, endeavoured to shelter themselves in the churches and
convents, where they had been accustomed to look for protection; but
this was of no avail against their merciless enemies; thousands of them
were drawn from their places of refuge, and fell victims to a licentious
soldiery, excited by the unrestrained desire of plunder and revenge.

From Evora, General Loison marched to Elvas, and from thence returned by
Abrantes to Thomar, where he was arrested in the further execution of
his instructions, by the news that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed, and
was at Leyria, upon his march towards Lisbon.

During this period Sir Arthur had prepared for the campaign he was about
to undertake.

He had 13,000 British infantry and 300 cavalry; he selected 5,000 of the
best Portuguese troops that were assembled at Coimbra, and with an army
so composed, determined to move forward. He was in daily expectation of
a corps of 5,000 men from England, and he was also apprized that the
body of men who had been under Lieut.-General Moore in Sweden, had
received orders to proceed to the Peninsula.

The Commissariat, under Sir Arthur Wellesley, was defective; an army
just landed must necessarily be without the means of transport; it was,
therefore, evident that it must depend entirely upon its communication
with the shipping for its support throughout its operations: Sir Arthur
Wellesley upon these considerations determined to advance by the road
nearest the coast; by that movement he secured to himself the advantages
of being able to receive his reinforcements at any time they should
arrive; and in addition, he was not cramped by any line of communication
which it would be necessary for him to maintain, or which he must have
defended, had the enemy (as was once contemplated) made any
demonstrations upon his rear.

Before he quitted the Mondego, he left instructions for the corps under
General Ackland to proceed along the coast to join him. He also left a
statement of the information he had obtained, and of the opinions he had
formed, to be delivered to Sir John Moore upon his arrival. Sir Arthur
Wellesley recommended, that the corps under that officer should be
landed in the Mondego, and marched to Santarem, so as to operate to the
southward of the Tagus, if necessary, and to prevent the enemy from
retiring through the province of Alemtejo, in case he should be beaten
by the force which Sir Arthur was leading against him. Other objects
were in contemplation, but these were the principal.

This proposed system of operations was afterwards subjected to
considerable discussion; it was objected to, and set aside. The mind,
however, which conceived it, would have executed it with success, though
in other hands it might appear impracticable. The battle of Vimiera, in
which only half the force under Sir Arthur Wellesley was engaged, proved
the correctness of his calculations, and warrants a belief that if the
whole campaign had been directed according to his views, the result
would have proved more advantageous than it did under a different
arrangement.

On the 9th of August, Sir Arthur Wellesley made his first movement from
the Mondego, and reached Leyria on the 10th; he halted two days to make
the necessary arrangements for his advance, and to bring up the
Portuguese who were at Coimbra. On the 13th he moved to the ground about
Batalha, where a patrole of French, from the corps under General La
Borde, at Alcobaça, was first discovered. General Frere, who commanded
the Portuguese, here made an objection to advance any further, stating,
as his reason, the improbability of finding provisions. Sir Arthur
Wellesley was not disconcerted by this defection: after attempting in
vain to alter General Frere’s determination, he decided to move forward,
taking with his army a detachment of 1,600 men, from the force under
that officer’s command, which he placed under the orders of Colonel
Trant, and which Sir Arthur undertook to provision. These arrangements
being made, he advanced to attack the corps that occupied Alcobaça; the
enemy had, however, abandoned it in the night, and the British army took
up its position upon the heights beyond it. The next day the army moved
forward to Caldas; the advance, under Brigadier General Fane, to Obidos;
where some skirmishing took place between the light troops under his
orders, and the French rear.

On the 17th Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to attack General La Borde, who
had not as yet been joined by the force under General Loison, which was
marching by Alemquer, to effect that object. General La Borde was posted
at Roliça, in a strong position upon some heights which covered the road
from Obidos to Lisbon.

Sir Arthur first formed his army in columns of battalions, behind
Obidos, from thence he detached the light troops, under
Brigadier-General Fane, supported by Major General Ferguson’s brigade,
along some heights which led to the right of the enemy’s position. The
rest of the army passed through Obidos, and advanced along the plain
towards Roliça.

The enemy was first discovered, drawn up at the foot of the hill, and in
front of the position; but upon seeing our advance he retired to the
heights.

Sir Arthur, upon a close examination of the ground thus taken up, and
wishing to prevent the possibility of General La Borde’s retiring upon
the fortress of Peniche, determined to advance the right of his army as
well as the left, and thus to attack both flanks of the enemy’s
position. The attack on the enemy’s left was led on by the brigade under
Major General Hill, while the 45th and 29th Regiments under Major
General Nightingale were ordered to advance upon the centre; Major
General Ferguson’s brigade was brought from the heights on the left into
the plain, to support this movement; by continuing however its original
direction, that corps might have rendered more essential service, since
it would have fallen upon the French right, and in conjunction with
Brigadier General Fane’s corps, would have decided the fate of the
action sooner: but some mistake having arisen in an order delivered to
it, this advantage was not obtained.

The 29th Regiment ascended the hill, by a hollow way which led to the
summit, and encountered a most determined resistance on the height where
the enemy was formed. The path along which the regiment moved was so
narrow, as to admit but three or four men abreast; so that when it had
reached the ground upon which it was to deploy, the soldiers were
exposed to the fire of the French corps which occupied the vineyards,
while they were unable to form any front, from which to return it; the
grenadier company, however, charged that part of the enemy which was
upon the open, and by that act of heroism, (although it was afterwards
driven back by the fire from the vineyards), gave time to some of the
companies behind it to form, and to maintain the ground they had got
possession of. In the mean time, the light troops, under Brigadier
General Fane, had got upon the right of the position, and Major General
Hill had ascended the hill upon its left; so that the enemy was obliged
to abandon his first line, and retire into the village of Zambugera in
the rear.

From this he was driven by a most gallant charge under the direction of
Major General Spencer, which terminated the action.

General La Borde continued to make some resistance upon a height beyond
the village, only for the purpose of collecting, and forming his troops
in the plain behind it, which he executed with considerable ability.
After having formed them, upon two lines he retired, filing from his
left upon the road to Torres Vedras.

Such was the first battle fought by British troops in the great cause of
the Peninsula: it cost us some valuable lives, among whom Colonel Lake,
and Captain Bradford were the most distinguished; but it gave a sample
of that bravery and good conduct which have since marked the progress of
our arms, and have raised the military renown of England to the glorious
eminence on which it at present stands. The advantage which resulted
from this action was great. General Loison was marching to join General
La Borde, in the position of Roliça; his columns, the next day, were
distinctly perceived in the direction of Torres Vedras, to which place
he was forced to retire, in consequence of the action of the preceding
morning; but if the two corps had been at the battle of Roliça, the
British loss must have been considerably greater, and the general
operations of the campaign proportionally delayed.

The following day, the 18th, Sir Arthur Wellesley marched the army to
Lourinhal, for the purpose of bringing supplies from the shipping, as
also to receive the reinforcements which were understood to be upon the
coast from England.

The 19th he moved to Vimiera, on which day, the brigade under the orders
of General Anstruther, landed, and on the morning of the 20th marched up
to the army. Sir Arthur Wellesley had during the last two days supplied
his army with provisions, had received part of his reinforcements, and
directed the rest which were in the offing, under Major General Ackland,
to land in the course of the night; he determined, therefore, to move
forward to Mafra, and the orders to that effect were given.

The enemy was known to have collected his force at Torres Vedras; his
cavalry had patroled about the British army during the preceding days,
without being opposed; the superiority of numbers in that arm was
decided.

But Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived that by moving along the coast road
to Mafra, he should turn the position which the French occupied, and by
that operation force them to retire upon Lisbon. He was also of opinion,
that from the rapidity of his own march, he should arrive in the
neighbourhood of that town, before the enemy would be able to occupy,
with advantage, the ground which would defend it, and upon which he
should force them to give him battle. On the evening of this day,
however, a frigate, on board which was Sir Harry Burrard, arrived in
Marciera Bay; Sir Arthur Wellesley immediately waited on that officer,
to receive his orders, and to communicate to him the plans he was about
to pursue. Sir Harry Burrard disapproved of them, directed counter
orders to be issued to the army, to prevent its march in the morning,
and determined to await the arrival of the corps under the orders of Sir
John Moore. Sir Arthur Wellesley represented that the French army was
now so near, that it was impossible to prevent an action; that the corps
under his orders was equal to the contest with it; that the army of Sir
John Moore would be of infinitely more service by marching upon
Santarem; and that the greatest disadvantage would arise, from our
changing at once from an offensive to a defensive line of operations.
Sir Harry Burrard remained, however, fixed to his first intention; the
counter orders were given, and a messenger was despatched to Sir John
Moore, to direct him to move down in his transports, to Marciera Bay.
Thus was the whole system of our campaign changed in a moment. With the
enemy collected within three leagues of us, we were directed to remain
stationary, till a corps of which we had, as yet, no tidings, should
arrive.

The event, however, proved what Sir Arthur Wellesley had foretold. At
nine in the morning of the 21st, our advanced posts were attacked, and
the glorious battle of Vimiera evinced that the British army was worthy
of the confidence which its General had reposed in it, in the discussion
of the preceding evening.

Early on this day, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been to the advanced posts,
and had returned to his quarters, when the first shots were exchanged
with the advance of the enemy, who had passed from Torres Vedras,
through the defile in front of it, and had been marching during the
whole of the night.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had posted the light troops and the 50th Regiment,
under Brigadier General Fane, upon a height near a windmill, in front of
the village of Vimiera. Brigadier General Anstruther was upon the right
of this corps, but a part of his brigade was detached during the action,
to occupy Vimiera; the left of the army was placed upon a ridge of
heights, which run eastward into the country, and across which the
brigades of Major General Ferguson and Major General Nightingale were
placed in position. The rest of the army was in reserve, upon heights in
rear of Vimiera, which in reality formed the position, the one in which
the action was fought being only the advance of it. The French army was
divided into two divisions, under Generals La Borde and Loison, and the
reserve, composed of the grenadiers and light infantry, together with
the cavalry, under General Kellerman.

Junot separated his army, to attack the positions of our right and left
at the same moment, connecting his two wings by the force under General
Kellerman; they were, however, at too great a distance from each other,
and their attacks were unconnected.

The left column was first engaged with the brigade of Brigadier General
Anstruther; it attempted to turn his right, but after a contest of some
duration, in which the superiority of the British fire, in the first
instance, and afterwards of British bayonets, was completely proved, the
enemy was repulsed with great slaughter, and forced to abandon his
undertaking. The right column (which had moved to the left of the
British) began its attack upon the brigades of Major Generals Ferguson
and Nightingale, at the time that the left had been beaten by Brigadier
General Anstruther. It commenced with considerable vigour, but the
steadiness with which it was received, soon stopped its career; in less
than half an hour the column was beaten, and pursued beyond the heights;
General Bregnier and six guns taken. A French regiment afterwards
rallied near the village of Ventoso, at the extremity of the hill, and
made an attack, in column of mass, to recover the guns; but it was
completely routed, with great loss. The attack upon the village of
Vimiera, as the decisive effort, was made by the reserve, in close
column, supported by artillery, but was most gallantly resisted by the
50th and part of the 43d Regiments, who charged the flank of the column
and totally defeated it. Two squadrons of the 20th Regiment of cavalry
moved upon it when broken, and cut down and took prisoners a
considerable number of those composing it, who were escaping from the
infantry.

A short time before the victory was decided, Sir Harry Burrard arrived
from the frigate, on board which he had remained during the night; Sir
Arthur Wellesley was preparing to follow up the advantages he had
gained; and had already brought up Brigadier General Bowes’ and Major
General Ackland’s brigades, (who had as yet been in the reserve and
unengaged) with which he had intended to pursue the enemy. He had also
directed Major General Hill to be ready to move from his right along a
road which he was in possession of, and which led by the nearest line to
Torres Vedras. But Sir Harry Burrard, conceiving that such a movement
would be attended with risk, desired Sir Arthur Wellesley to discontinue
the pursuit, and to rest satisfied with the advantages that had been
gained.

Sir Arthur Wellesley remonstrated on the field against the order to
halt, but it was of no avail; the decision was not to be changed or
modified; the enemy retired at his leisure; our light troops even were
not ordered to attend his movements, and a part of the rear-guard
remained upon a hill within a short distance of our position till the
following morning.

Without wishing to cast any reflection upon the conduct of Sir Harry
Burrard, admitting that (called upon to take the command of an army
already considerably advanced in the operations it had undertaken, and
so nearly in contact with the collected force of the enemy as to make an
action inevitable), he was placed in a situation of great difficulty;
yet it is impossible not to regret that the person, in whose mind the
plan of the campaign originally was formed, was not allowed to execute
it throughout.

The system which Sir Arthur Wellesley had laid down had now been altered
in three most essential points. First, the not proceeding on the morning
of the 21st to turn the left of the enemy, by the movement he had
ordered upon Mafra; thereby changing the operations of the army from the
offensive to the defensive. Secondly, the not pursuing the enemy after
the victory of Vimiera; and, lastly, the having changed the direction of
Lieutenant General Sir John Moore’s corps, from its march upon Santarem
to its junction with the army of Sir Arthur Wellesley.

It may not be uninteresting to trace the probable effects which these
movements would have produced.

General Junot had taken the command of the whole disposable force under
his orders in Portugal (amounting to 14,000 men), at Torres Vedras on
the 20th; and presuming upon the boasted superiority of French troops to
those of any other nation, he had resolved to attack the left of the
British army, thereby leaving it no retreat if defeated, but to the
sea-shore, and to its transports, if it could effect its embarkation.
With this intention he marched on the night of the 20th by a road
leading through a most difficult defile, which brought him to the
eastward of Vimiera, near which place he arrived soon after nine o’clock
on the 21st. The order which had been issued the day before for the
British army was to march at five o’clock, by the road to the Ponte de
Roll, and from thence direct upon Mafra. This road was separated about
two leagues from that upon which the French army was advancing, and
leading in a totally different direction; divided also from it by a
woody and almost impervious tract of country; so that if the movement
had been executed, the British army would have been considerably
advanced towards Mafra, before the enemy had arrived at Vimiera.

If indeed this march had been discovered by the French patroles, it
would still have been impossible to arrest our progress, from the
difficulty of getting to us; and in all probability, the enemy would
have had no other resource than to have returned to Torres Vedras (where
the whole of his baggage had remained), and from thence tried to attack
us at Mafra, which would have been attempted under many disadvantages;
or to have marched in the greatest haste by the Cabeça de Montachique to
have covered Lisbon. To those who are acquainted with the country I am
speaking of, the difficulty of such movements (with an army which had
already been marching since the morning of the 20th), will be duly
appreciated: if the attempt to cover the capital had been made, the
confusion and hurry with which a position must have been taken up would
have bid fair for the success of our attack upon it, which could not
have been delayed beyond the 23d; the proximity of Lisbon, which was
ripe for insurrection, must have added to the difficulties of the enemy;
and upon a review of all the circumstances of the case, together with
the great talents which Sir Arthur Wellesley has since displayed, we may
be warranted in believing that complete success would have attended his
operation; and that the possession of Lisbon would have been effected
with a smaller loss, with greater advantages, and at a much earlier
period, than it was obtained by the system which was adopted.

The next point to be considered is the effect which would have been
produced by following up the enemy after the victory of Vimiera. General
Junot had advanced from Torres Vedras by a circuitous road to Vimiera;
and after his defeat the corps under Major General Hill, which had taken
no part in the action, was in possession of the direct road to that
place. The ground about Torres Vedras is extremely strong; and it is the
only good pass by which the French army could have retired to Lisbon.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was convinced that Major General Hill might have
occupied the town before the enemy could have reached it; and that he
might have defended the positions about it, till the army which was to
have followed the French should have been able to communicate with him.

The great objection that was raised to this project was, that the
British army was almost destitute of cavalry, whilst the French had of
that arm a force of at least 1,200 men; but Sir Arthur Wellesley relied
upon his own genius to provide a remedy to this objection; our infantry
was in the best order, and it has too often since been tried in presence
of a superior cavalry, to leave doubt in the mind of any British
officer, that (if judiciously managed and supported with artillery), it
is competent to advance in the face of cavalry. If, therefore, Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s intentions had been carried into effect, the
probability is, that General Hill would have taken the enemy’s baggage
at Torres Vedras; that pursued by the British army, General Junot would
have been unable to force the positions about that town; that he must,
consequently, have retired by some other road, and his army have been
subjected to considerable loss.

There remains only for us to consider the effects produced, by bringing
the corps under the orders of Sir John Moore to Marceira Bay, instead of
allowing it to proceed to Santarem.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had from the first conceived, that the corps under
his immediate command was as considerable as could conveniently be
employed upon the advance to Lisbon, and was of sufficient force to
secure the success of that operation; but he foresaw that it would be
impossible for him to prevent the French army from retiring through the
Alemtejo, to Elvas, unless he could bring a separate corps to intercept
it; with that view he had recommended the march of Sir John Moore upon
Santarem, and that excellent officer, upon his arrival in Mondego Bay,
disembarked a considerable portion of his troops with the view of
executing that movement.

From the moment Sir Arthur Wellesley was apprized of the determination
of Sir Harry Burrard to prevent that operation, and found himself
arrested in his pursuit of the enemy after the battle of Vimiera, he
gave up all hope of enclosing the French in Lisbon, or of preventing
their protracting the campaign (if they thought fit to do so) by a
movement into the southern provinces of Portugal.

We must now proceed to the relation of the events which took place after
the battle of Vimiera.

Sir Arthur Wellesley employed himself, in the evening of the 21st, in
getting stores and provisions landed for the troops, and strenuously
urged an advance on the 22d; but on the morning of that day, he was
informed that Sir Hew Dalrymple was arrived in Marceira Bay, and was
landing, to take the command. This officer soon afterwards reached
Vimiera; he gave directions for the advance of the army on the next day;
but about three o’clock in the afternoon, General Kellerman arrived at
the advanced posts, and requested a conference with the English
commander-in-chief. Some officers were directed to conduct him to
head-quarters, with the persons who formed his suite; and soon
afterwards he proposed the terms to Sir Hew Dalrymple, upon which
General Junot was prepared to conclude an armistice, with a view to his
total evacuation of Portugal.

General Kellerman insisted much upon the still remaining strength of the
French army; that 10,000 Russians were prepared to land from the
squadron which was in the port of Lisbon, and to assist in the defence
of Portugal; that General Junot (in possession of the fortresses, and
with his movements upon Elvas undisturbed) was not in a situation to be
dictated to, as to the terms upon which he was willing to evacuate the
country; that although a part of the French army had been repulsed from
the position of the British, it still possessed considerable resources;
that it had the opportunity of occupying, undisturbed, the positions
which had been marked out for the defence of Lisbon; it therefore
commanded respect; but that General Junot was willing to surrender the
entire kingdom, with the ports and fortresses, upon condition that the
French army should be sent, with its whole military baggage, and at the
expense of England, to its own country.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had conceived from the first, that the policy of
Great Britain was, to bring as early as possible to the assistance of
the Spaniards, who were now upon the Ebro, the British army that was
occupied in Portugal.

The plan upon which he had commenced the campaign was formed with that
intention; the hope of seeing it accomplished, by force of arms, was now
nearly at an end. The march of the French Emperor into Spain was already
talked of; and there seemed to be no hope, if the French were determined
to protract the campaign in Portugal, that a British army, after having
beaten them in the field, and besieged the fortresses they occupied in
the country, could arrive in time to be of any assistance to the
Spaniards. If, on the contrary, the terms proposed for the evacuation of
Portugal were, agreed to, the embarkation of the enemy might be
immediately effected, and the British army might in a short time be
marched to the assistance of the Spaniards.

With this view of the various circumstances of the moment, Sir Arthur
Wellesley gave his voice in favour of the principle of the armistice
proposed; the minor details of it were objected to by him, particularly
the wording of the article which related to the baggage, and which might
be construed into a permission to carry off the plunder of Portugal; but
it was thought, (after an understanding with General Kellerman, that it
included only the baggage “_purement militaire_,”) that the most proper
moment for its correction, would be, in the arrangement of the
convention.

With this explanation Sir Arthur Wellesley, in pursuance of Sir Hew
Dalrymple’s directions, signed the Armistice.

It would be needless to relate here the terms of a document, which gave
rise afterwards to so much discussion in England, and which must
consequently be in the recollection of every Englishman. The period of
the armistice was two days, with twenty-four hours’ notice of its
rupture, and it precluded the British army from advancing beyond the
line of the Zizandra. To give an opinion upon its merits would be
presumption; but if the opportunity which it afforded of preparing the
British army for its advance into Spain, had been properly made use of,
and if the execution of this object had not been so considerably
delayed, by the tardiness of the embarkation of the French, it is
probable that greater advantages would have resulted from it, than have
generally been brought into consideration, in the discussions which it
has occasioned.

The morning after the signature of the armistice, the British army
advanced to Ramalhal. Colonel Murray was sent into the French
head-quarters, to discuss the terms of the convention, and the French
retired from Torres Vedras, to their positions in the vicinity of
Lisbon. After the lapse of some days, the corps of Sir John Moore
arrived in Marceira bay, and was landed near Vimiera. The following days
it was advanced, and the whole army moved into Torres Vedras. The second
day from its entrance into that place, Sir Arthur Wellesley was directed
to proceed with the corps with which he originally landed, to the town
of Sobral, which commanded one of the great passes to Lisbon; on his
march to that place he received a message from Sir Hew Dalrymple,
informing him that Colonel Murray had arrived with the convention which
he had signed, and that Sir Hew was prepared to ratify it.

The feeling of the army which had fought the battle of Vimiera, was at
this time most hostile to the armistice which had been agreed upon.

The expression of a private in one of the regiments which had most
gallantly asserted the superiority of the British arms, deserves to be
recorded: whilst marching in his column to Sobral, he appeared to be
looking for something which he had lost; and upon being asked what he
was in search of, replied, _ten days_, which he believed he should never
find again.

Sir Arthur Wellesley took up the ground about Sobral, with the corps
which he commanded; a patrole of French fired upon one of his piquets,
but upon its being returned, retired. The second day, Sir Arthur
Wellesley moved on to Bucellas, where a line of demarcation was drawn
between the British and French posts.

The corps under the orders of Sir John Moore marched from Torres Vedras
to Mafra. The leading division, under Major General the Honourable
Edward Paget, had nearly reached that place, when a French officer, who
commanded a piquet in the town, desired that the English army would not
advance, as he had no orders to retire; the circumstance was reported to
Sir Hew Dalrymple, who attempted to persuade the French officer to
evacuate, but finding his efforts ineffectual, and being desirous to
avoid engaging in any fresh hostilities, he ordered his troops to
bivouaque, for the night, on the ground they occupied. The next morning
the French officer sent word, that he had received orders to retire with
his 100 men, and that the British army was at liberty to enter the town.
This story was the occasion of much witticism among the soldiers.

From Mafra, Sir Hew Dalrymple removed his head-quarters to Cintra; from
thence to the village of Acyras, near Fort St. Julian’s; and from thence
to Aquinto, between Paço d’Aquas and Lisbon, where he remained till the
embarkation of the French army had been completed.

After the signature of the convention by Sir Hew Dalrymple, at Torres
Vedras, and not at Cintra, as has generally been supposed, two officers,
Major General Beresford and Lord Proby, were sent into Lisbon to
superintend its execution. The history of their disputes with the French
would hardly be believed. It would be interesting to record them, as
instances from which the characters of many of the individuals belonging
to the French army might be collected, and the value of their point of
honour appreciated.

The first object to which the attention of the British commissioners for
the execution of the convention was drawn, was to enforce the spirit of
that instrument, by preventing the French from carrying off the plunder
of Portugal. With this view General Junot, after much opposition on his
part, was constrained to issue an order to his army, requiring it to
deliver up, into the hands of the commissioners appointed for that
purpose, every species of plundered property which it retained in its
possession. Within a few hours, however, of the issuing of this order,
information was brought to Major General Beresford, that Colonel
Cambyse, aide-de-camp to General Junot, had seized upon the Prince
Regent’s horses, had carried them from the royal stables, and was
embarking them as the property of General Junot.

The statement, upon being inquired into, was found to be correct, and
General Kellerman was applied to, to prevent this robbery; he
immediately attacked Colonel Cambyse with great severity of language,
and ordered the horses to be restored.

The next day an attempt of the same sort, by the same officer, was made
upon one of the carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex, which was
actually embarked; Major General Beresford, upon being made acquainted
with it, sent his aide-de-camp to Colonel Cambyse, to remonstrate with
him (in terms not very agreeable) upon the repetition of a conduct so
disgraceful to the character of an officer. This lecture was, however,
of but little avail, for during the time that Major General Beresford’s
aide-de-camp was speaking, the second carriage belonging to the Duke of
Sussex was removed to the river, for the same purpose of embarkation;
both carriages were afterwards recovered, and Colonel Cambyse threatened
with a voyage to England as a prisoner, if he continued a line of
conduct such as he had till then pursued. Various other traits might be
related of this officer, but an act of General J——’s will be more
interesting, and more worthy of record: he had carried off a
considerable number of pictures, and embarked them on board his own
vessel, from the house of the Marchioness of Anjija; upon being required
to give them up, he answered, that they had been given to him. This
having been found to be incorrect, he denied all knowledge of the
transaction, and impeached a relation of his who was on board the ship
with him, but who immediately proceeded to one of the transports, where
he hoped to remain concealed. A threat of preventing the General from
sailing, till the pictures were disgorged, soon brought this gentleman
back to the frigate, and Captain Percy directed him to go on shore to
give an account of the transaction; he refused, however, to acknowledge
the jurisdiction of the commissioners, and declared his determination
not to land. The bayonets of the marines were called for, to persuade
him; they proved effectual, the gentleman was landed, and soon after,
the pictures were returned. Another general officer, on the day of his
embarkation, carried off, from the office of the commissioners, all the
papers and documents which he was able to collect, in a short visit he
made to it while the commissioners were absent; and if he had not been
driven back to Lisbon by contrary winds, (when he was forced to return
them) would have involved their proceedings in complete confusion.

On the 10th of September the French garrison evacuated Lisbon, and
General Hope was appointed Governor.

The joy of the inhabitants, when the national flag was hoisted, is
beyond any description; an universal shout re-echoed through the town;
innumerable banners, emblems of a new life of liberty, were displayed
from every corner of the capital. The ships in the river, decorated with
the proud symbols of national independence, proclaimed the triumph of
the day, by repeated discharges of artillery; and for nine nights the
town was universally illuminated, in token of the joy of the inhabitants
at their deliverance, and of hatred to the oppressors, who still
witnessed from their transports the detestation which was manifested of
them.

Thus was ended the campaign in Portugal. Parts of it are to be
regretted, but the great object for which it was undertaken was
accomplished. Portugal was freed from the enemy by the genius of Sir
Arthur Wellesley, and the bravery of British troops. Those means have
preserved it independent, and have since accomplished the deliverance of
the Peninsula. The succession of general officers to the command of an
army considerably advanced in the operations of a campaign, will rarely
be attended with advantage; to cast any blame upon those who succeeded
in this instance to the command of the British army in Portugal, would
be unjust; but we may be permitted to observe, that the genius of a
great commander was marked in the first operations of the campaign;
whilst a cold calculating policy conducted it to its final issue. Sir
Arthur Wellesley soon after embarked for England; Sir Hew Dalrymple and
Sir Harry Burrard were recalled; and the British army was intrusted to
the command of Sir John Moore.

The events of the campaign in Spain had been various, during the period
of which we have been speaking.

When the revolution first broke out in that country, when the massacre
of the 2d of May had roused every patriot to revenge the murder of his
countrymen, the force of the French in Spain was unprepared to repress
so universal an insurrection. A corps of 20,000 men was, however, soon
despatched, under the orders of General Dupont, to relieve the French
fleet at Cadiz, and to seize upon that important post. General Dupont
was too late; the Governor Solano, suspected of some attachment to the
French, was murdered by the people, and the revolution was organized
throughout Andalusia. General Castanos was appointed Captain-General,
and was invested with the command of all the troops in the south of
Spain.

He had a considerable number of veteran regiments, besides the
volunteers who had at that time hastened to enrol themselves under the
banners of their country. With an army so composed, General Castanos
marched to oppose the progress of General Dupont. This officer was
waiting, at Cordova and Andujar, the junction of a corps under General
Wedel, which was marching to his assistance from Madrid; for although
General Dupont had not as yet been opposed by any regular force, yet the
universal hostility he had met with from the peasants, as well as the
loss he had sustained by their desultory warfare, made it dangerous for
him to attempt a further advance into the country.

General Castanos resolved to meet the French force before it should
receive its expected reinforcements; he arrived with rapidity upon the
Guadalquivir, opposite Cordova, and advanced upon Andujar. At the same
time he detached a considerable corps, under Generals Coupigni and
Reding, to pass the river higher up, to place itself in rear of Dupont,
and to intercept his communications with Madrid. This object was
effected; the corps reached Baylen on the 19th of July, and was placed
between the army of Dupont and the reinforcement of 6,000 men under
General Wedel. General Dupont had on the same evening determined to
break up from his position near Andujar, where he had suffered
considerably from the hostility of the peasants, as well as from the
army of Castanos, which was engaged in continual skirmishes with his
troops. He marched during the whole night towards Baylen, and arrived
there in the morning; he found, however, the Spanish corps in position
to receive him. General Dupont made immediate dispositions for attack;
but he was foiled in all his attempts to penetrate the Spanish lines. He
expected the arrival of General Wedel; but being at last exhausted, and
dreading an attack both in front and rear, (as the corps of Castanos was
following him), he sent a flag of truce to the Spaniards about two
o’clock in the afternoon, and desired to capitulate. While the terms
were discussing, but after some advantages had been seized over General
Dupont’s army, the corps of General Wedel began to appear in rear of the
Spaniards; it soon after made an attack upon them, but was repulsed; and
General Dupont was told, that unless General Wedel was ordered to
desist, and unless his corps was included in the capitulation, the whole
of his army would be put to the sword. General Dupont was obliged to
agree, and General Wedel was ordered to remain quiet, and to consider
his corps as a part of the army which was to surrender. General Wedel
feigned obedience to this order, but finding his communication with
Madrid was open, he moved off in the course of the night, and
endeavoured to reach La Mancha. When his march was discovered, the
Spaniards announced to Dupont, that his whole army should pay for the
atrocities committed by the French throughout Spain, and be immolated in
the morning, unless Wedel was brought back. General Dupont had no means
of preventing the execution of so alarming a menace, but complying with
the alternative; he sent a senior officer in quest of Wedel, and brought
him back from Carolina, which he had already reached: the whole of the
two corps laid down their arms the same day, in conformity to a
capitulation entered upon for that purpose.

There never was a more singular extinction of an army of near 25,000 men
than that which has been described. General Dupont was esteemed the best
officer in the French army; yet he surrendered a most effective corps to
an army but just formed, and in part composed of inexperienced officers
and soldiers. The results were most fortunate for the Spaniards; the
kingdoms of Andalusia were freed from enemies, and their armies rendered
disposable for the other operations of the war.

About the time that Dupont had been detached to Cadiz, General Moncey
had been sent with 8,000 men to reduce Valencia to obedience; he marched
for that purpose from Madrid, and arrived without much opposition within
sight of the town.

Valencia is an old Moorish capital, surrounded by a very high wall, and
secure against a _coup de main_. Moncey determined to attack it; but,
without a battering train, he was reduced to the necessity of storming,
without having made any preparations for it. The assault was directed
against the southern gate, where the Spaniards had placed two guns, and
secured them by some works which were not easy to be carried; the troops
advanced from one of the streets of the suburbs, along which the Spanish
guns did great execution, and at last obliged Moncey to give up the
attempt, and retire with a considerable diminution of his numbers. The
Spanish corps that were without the town menaced his retreat and Moncey
was forced to march with great rapidity towards Alcira and St. Philippe,
to secure a passage by a different road from that by which he had
entered the kingdom. He was continually harassed, but he succeeded in
crossing the river Xucar, and afterwards retired to Madrid with about
half the corps he had originally taken from it.

The French were more successful in the battle of Rio Seco, mention of
which has already been made in the first pages of this work, yet they
were unable to follow up their successes; and the noble resistance of
Saragossa, under the directions of Palafox, obliged them to march a
considerable corps to besiege it.

The events of this campaign were so destructive to the enemy, that
Joseph resolved to quit Madrid, and seek a safer and more concentrated
position behind the Ebro. The first columns of his troops began to
retire from the capital upon the 30th of July, and it was totally
abandoned on the 10th of August; the siege of Saragossa was also raised,
and the head-quarters of the French armies were established at Vittoria.
Such was the state of things when Lieutenant General Sir John Moore was
ordered to carry the British army from Portugal to the assistance of the
Spaniards.

The Spanish troops were generally assembled in two great corps; the
left, under the orders of General Blake, in the provinces of Asturias
and Biscay; the right, along the south bank of the Ebro, at Logrono,
Tudela, &c., and under the command of Castanos; Palafox commanded the
army of Arragon; which, (although incorporated with that of Castanos),
yet yielded but an unwilling submission to his orders. The Marquis of
Romana, with the troops that had been withdrawn from Denmark, had landed
in Gallicia, and was moving forward to take the chief command of the
troops of Blake and the whole northern army.

Sir John Moore began his march from Lisbon on the 27th of October; he
determined to assemble his troops at Salamanca; but, from the
difficulties of roads, and of subsistence for the army, he was induced
to separate his corps, and to march them at distances so great from each
other, that they no longer were of any mutual support. The infantry
arrived in good order at Salamanca towards the end of November; but the
cavalry and artillery, which had moved within a few leagues of Madrid,
did not reach that place till three weeks or a month afterwards. Sir
David Baird was sent from England with a corps of 13,000 men to Corunna,
and was directed to place himself under the orders of Sir John Moore,
and effect his junction with him as early as possible. This officer met
with considerable obstructions from the Junta of Gallicia; he was, in
the first instance, refused the permission to land; and afterwards was
subjected to great inconvenience in provisioning his troops.

Soon after the arrival of Sir John Moore at Salamanca, he was apprized
that Buonaparte, with a large army, was already in Spain; and that his
first successes had been considerable; Sir John Moore seemed to think
them decisive.

The army of General Blake was beaten at Espinora de los Monteros on the
10th and 11th of November; and the battle of Tudela on the 28th put to
rout the army of Castanos. Sir John Moore had a most difficult card to
play. His army was not assembled, his cavalry and artillery had not
formed their junction, and a considerable distance divided him from the
corps of Sir David Baird. He resolved therefore to abandon offensive
operations, and directing this last-mentioned corps to retreat to Vigo,
and there embark for Lisbon, he himself prepared to retire into
Portugal. The direction of the French army upon Madrid changed, however,
Sir John Moore’s determination. He stopped the movement of Sir David
Baird, and ordered him to advance his corps to Benavente; from whence it
was his intention to combine an operation with the whole British force
upon the rear of Buonaparte.

General Soult commanded a corps of the French army upon the Carrion; Sir
John Moore determined to attack him, and moved forward with that
intention with the whole force under his command, which he had assembled
on the 20th of December at Mayorga, combined with the corps of Romana
upon his left. The British force amounted to 29,360 effective men. After
severe marches, Sir John Moore reached Sahagun on the 21st of December,
and prepared on the 23d to force the position of General Soult. He
received, however, information that Buonaparte was marching upon
Salamanca, and was seeking to surround his army. Sir John Moore
instantly gave up the offensive, and retired in the greatest haste upon
Benavente. When he arrived there, he found the advanced guard of
Buonaparte’s army at a short distance from the place; and on the 29th of
December, the British rear guard of cavalry distinguished itself in an
affair with the cavalry of the imperial guard.

The superiority of the British was manifest on this occasion; they had
in several preceding actions given samples of their bravery and good
conduct; Lieutenant General Lord Paget and Major General the Honourable
C. Stewart had led them on to the most decisive successes, and in an
affair at Sahagun, on the 21st of December, had almost annihilated a
regiment of French cavalry.

The fall of Madrid, after an inconsiderable resistance, had made a deep
impression upon the mind of Sir John Moore; he looked with despondency
upon the affairs of the Peninsula, after its surrender; and considered
the great cause of Spanish independence completely lost. He had made one
effort to relieve the southern provinces of Spain from the irruption
with which they were threatened; he succeeded in diverting it against
himself; and from that time he conceived that his first duty was to
withdraw from the country. With that view he commenced his retreat into
Gallicia; he at first determined to embark his army at Vigo; he
afterwards led it to Corunna. It had been expected that he would have
defended the strong ground he was passing over, but he continued his
retreat, and once only, on the 8th of January at Lugo, offered battle to
his pursuers[2]. The enemy was neither strong enough nor mad enough to
accept it; and after a retreat, the most disastrous for an unbeaten but
brave and gallant army that history records, Sir John Moore arrived at
Corunna on the 11th of January 1809. He took up a position in front of
the town to await the arrival of the transports; fortunately they were
not long delayed; they reached the harbour on the 14th; and Sir John
Moore prepared to embark his troops. Happily for the honour of the
British army, though we must lament the loss that ensued, the French
were too proud of the reputation they had gained against other armies,
to permit the embarkation to be unmolested. They attacked the British
corps, reduced by fatigue, by loss upon the march, by sickness, and by
the absence of its cannon, which was already on board the transports;
they attacked it when mustering only 16,000 men, placed in a bad
position, with its retreat cut off if beaten; yet they were completely
repulsed, with very severe loss, and a part of the position which they
occupied before the action, was carried at the point of the bayonet, and
maintained. The loss on the side of the British was considerable; Sir
John Moore fell in the arms of victory; he died a death worthy of the
character he had maintained through a long life of service and renown;
he fell by a cannon-shot while directing a charge against the enemy, and
commanded the respect, the admiration, and regret of his brother
soldiers and his countrymen. Sir David Baird was severely wounded, and
obliged to quit the field, and the command-devolved upon Sir John Hope.
This officer withdrew his troops from the position, and embarked them in
the course of the night and succeeding day; the rear-guard was commanded
by Major General Beresford, and the whole army was embarked without
loss, and sailed on the 17th of January; Thus ended the second campaign
in which the British troops had been engaged in the Peninsula. It would
be a melancholy task to canvass it throughout; the last action was
worthy of the men that have since delivered Spain from its merciless
invaders; but the movements which preceded it were far from being
generally approved. Great difficulties were indeed opposed to Sir John
Moore; but it would appear that in his own mind they were too highly
rated. He discharged his duty to his country, however, with his utmost
zeal. He died fighting to maintain its glory, and his name will ever be
ranked amongst its heroes.

Footnote 2:

  One of the principal causes of the uninterrupted continuation of this
  retreat was the total failure of the Commissariat in the establishment
  of the Magazines which had been directed to be formed on the line of
  march now pursued by the army.

During the period of Sir John Moore’s campaign in Spain, Sir John
Craddock had been appointed to the command of the British troops in
Portugal. Their number was small, and varied considerably during the
winter; some detachments which had been sent to Sir John Moore returned
without having effected their junction, and many stragglers and sick
from that army found their way into Portugal, and were formed into
battalions. The brigade under Major General R. Stewart was also
incorporated with the army under the orders of Sir John Craddock.

Before the retreat of Sir John Moore was known in England, a corps,
under the orders of Major General Mackenzie, had been sent to Cadiz,
with the view of being admitted as the garrison of that place. The
conduct of the Spaniards, in refusing to allow the British army to enter
Ferrol, although pressed by a superior enemy, made it necessary for the
Government of England to secure a point of safety for its fleet and
armies, before it could consent to the further co-operation of any
British force in Spain. It therefore required, as a condition to the
employment of an army for the defence of the southern provinces of the
Peninsula, that a British force should be admitted within the walls of
Cadiz. Much negotiation took place upon this point, but the Spanish
Government at last refused the permission, and thus put an end to the
proposed assistance of a British army.

The corps under Major General Mackenzie sailed from Cadiz to Lisbon, and
added to the force under Sir John Craddock.

After the evacuation of Corunna, by Lieutenant General Sir John Hope,
the French had entered it with two corps, those of Marshals Ney and
Soult; the latter was detached, about the beginning of February, to the
attack of Portugal. He succeeded, with little opposition, in occupying
the country to the north of the Douro. In Oporto, the Portuguese force
was collected to a considerable amount; but having neither discipline
nor regularity, it was unable to oppose more than a feeble resistance to
the French. Marshal Soult, who was anxious to strike terror amongst the
inhabitants of Portugal, permitted his soldiers, after storming the
town, and destroying an immense number of people, to continue their
cruelties during several days. The plunder of the place was accompanied
with every description of outrage; but the measure only succeeded in
increasing the detestation in which the enemy was held, without
effecting the subjugation of the country.

After the success of Buonaparte in the centre of Spain, and the
expulsion of the English army from Gallicia, General Victor had been
detached against the Spanish corps of General Cuesta, which was
quartered about Medellin. After some previous movements a general battle
was fought, in which the Spanish army was completely routed; it retired
to the mountains about Monasterio, where, with the assistance of the
reinforcements which were sent to it, it made head against the French
army. Victor at this time concerted with Marshal Soult, in Oporto, a
combined attack upon the unconquered provinces of Portugal. Soult was to
move through Coimbra, upon Lisbon; while Victor was to co-operate from
the Spanish frontier, through Portalegre, or Alcantara, upon Abrantes,
and from thence to march upon the capital. Sir John Craddock had
collected the British force, which had now become respectable from the
different reinforcements which had arrived, in positions in front of
Santarem, and upon the road to Coimbra, so as to be prepared to move
upon either of the two French corps, which threatened to advance upon
him. But on the 22nd of April, Sir Arthur Wellesley (who had been
selected for the command in Portugal) arrived with some reinforcements,
and assumed the direction of the army.

He decided to proceed instantly against the corps under Marshal Soult,
in Oporto. He left a division under Major General Mackenzie, with the
brigade of heavy cavalry under Major General Fane, at Abrantes, to watch
the corps of Marshal Victor: some Portuguese were placed to observe the
bridge of Alcantara, and with the rest of the army he proceeded to the
Douro. By the rapidity of his movement, Sir Arthur Wellesley
disconcerted the plans of the French; he drove their advance guard, in
three days, from the Vouga to Oporto, and arrived on the Douro, opposite
to that town, upon the 11th of May.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had detached Marshal Beresford, (who had lately
been appointed to the command of the Portuguese army,) to pass the
Douro, near Lamego, and to occupy Amaranthe; he had also directed
General Silviera with the troops under his command, to retain possession
of Chaves. By these movements he had hoped to enclose the French corps,
in the north of Portugal. On the morning of the 12th he determined to
cross the Douro, in face of the enemy, and to attack the town of Oporto,
although the bridge had been destroyed, and the boats (with the
exception of two that conveyed over the first soldiers) had been removed
to the opposite side of the river.

No operation could be more difficult, or require greater bravery in the
troops to execute, or talent in the general to combine; but complete
success attended it. Marshal Soult was surprised; the British army
passed the river in spite of every obstacle, and of the superior numbers
which were brought to overwhelm the first regiments that crossed; and
the French army was driven, with the loss of its sick and wounded, of
great part of its baggage, and of a considerable number of guns, from
the town of Oporto. Sir Arthur Wellesley pursued the French on the
following day; Marshal Beresford had driven them from Amaranthe; so
that, being pressed on all sides, they were obliged to abandon the whole
of their guns and baggage, and to fly the country by the mountain roads
to Orense; their rear was several times attacked, but the main body
could not be attained; and Sir Arthur Wellesley, unable any longer to
pursue an enemy who had abandoned every thing which constitutes an army,
and who fled without artillery, baggage, or equipment, halted on the
18th at Monte Alegre, and gave up the pursuit.

This short campaign, of only ten days, is perhaps the most brilliant
that ever has been executed. Marshal Soult, represented as the best
officer in the French army, had occupied the northern provinces of
Portugal, for upwards of two months; he had contemplated the entire
conquest of the country, and was employed in organizing the necessary
means. To defend himself from any attack, he had the Vouga, and the
Douro, both formidable rivers, and the advantage of the strongest
country in the Peninsula; he had a force equal in amount to the British,
or within very little of it, and in a state of superior military
organization. He had a perfect knowledge of the country; he commanded
its resources; and was in every way formidable from his talents and his
means. Yet the genius of Sir Arthur Wellesley deprived him at once of
the advantages of which he was possessed. In the space of four days he
was driven from Coimbra to the Douro; and in six days after, not having
had the time or opportunity of defending himself in a single position,
he was chased from the frontiers of Portugal.

The movements of the Portuguese about Chaves had disappointed the
expectations of Sir Arthur Wellesley, or his triumph would have been
more complete. He had entertained the hope of surrounding the French
army; but by the non-execution of a part of his plan the individuals who
composed it escaped; but there never was a more disgraceful escape; or a
retreat (if it deserve that name, and not a flight) more humiliating to
the officer who conducted it.

Lieutenant General Paget, who had displayed the greatest talent and
bravery in the attacks he conducted, with the advanced guard under his
command, before his arrival upon the Douro, passed that river with the
first company of the Buffs; and having most gallantly sustained the
desperate attack of the enemy upon the few troops under his orders,
which had as yet arrived upon the Oporto side of the river, was
unfortunately wounded in the arm, and suffered amputation. Major Hervey
also lost his arm, in a most gallant charge of the 14th light dragoons,
which he had led.

Whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley had been engaged in the pursuit of Marshal
Soult, Marshal Victor had made a movement upon the bridge of Alcantara,
and had threatened to enter Portugal in that direction; the bridge was
destroyed, and Marshal Victor made no further advance; but Sir Arthur
Wellesley, after making the necessary dispositions for the security of
the northern frontiers of Portugal, brought back his army to the Tagus.
The state of the French in the Peninsula, at this moment, was as
follows. Marshal Ney was at Corunna, Soult was retreating from Portugal,
and Mortier was at Valladolid; these corps together amounted to about
60,000 effective men, and kept the provinces of Gallicia, Asturias,
Biscay, and Castile, in tolerable subjection. There were other corps
employed in those provinces, but the amount of force of which we have
spoken, was to a certain degree disposable. In the centre of Spain,
Victor was at Merida; Sebastiani in La Mancha; and Joseph, with Jourdan,
at Madrid; their force amounted to 50,000 men; Suchet was at Saragossa,
in occupation of Arragon, with a corps of 20,000 men. The French force
in Catalonia was considerable, but, from the state of that province, it
could not be disposable for any offensive operations.

The distribution of the Spanish force was, General Cuesta at Monasterio,
with 40,000 men, mostly recruits; Vanegas, with 25,000 in the Carolina;
Romana, with 25,000 in different parts of Gallicia; and General Blake,
with 20,000 in Valencia. There were several other corps in different
quarters, of small amount, but which could not be considered as
efficient for the duties of a campaign. In Portugal, the army of Sir
Arthur Wellesley consisted of about 22,000 effective infantry, and 2,500
cavalry. The Portuguese, under Marshal Beresford, were as yet backward
in organization, but amounted to about 15,000 men, collected and ready
to take the field; besides the troops in garrisons, depôts, &c.
According to this estimate, the French had a force of 130,000 effective
men, while that opposed to them was about 150,000.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, upon his arrival on the Tagus, determined, if
possible, to liberate Madrid. To effect this object, he proposed to
bring the greater part of his own force, with that under General Cuesta,
and the corps under General Vanegas, amounting in the whole to near
90,000 men, to operate upon the forces of Joseph, Victor, and
Sebastiani, estimated at 50,000. He proposed to leave Marshal Beresford,
in conjunction with the Duke del Parque, to watch Soult, from the
neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo; and he hoped that the troops under
Romana would give sufficient employment to Marshal Ney, in Gallicia.

During the month of June, Victor, (in consequence of the successful
operations of Sir Arthur Wellesley against Soult, and his return upon
the Tagus) withdrew his corps from the neighbourhood of Monasterio,
crossed the Tagus at the bridge of Almaraz, and took up a position at
Talavera de la Reyna; General Cuesta followed him to that place, but
finding him in position, retired to Almaraz, where he remained, with his
advance corps, under the Duke of Albuquerque, at Arzobispo. Towards the
end of the same month, Marshal Soult arrived with the corps under his
command, at Puebla di Senabria, from whence he marched to Zamora and
Salamanca.

In this state of things, Sir Arthur Wellesley (after having received the
most distinct declarations from the supreme Government of Spain that his
army should be supplied with provisions) advanced on the 25th and 26th
of June, from Abrantes, towards Placencia. Marshal Beresford moved at
the same time to the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. Sir Arthur
Wellesley went on the 12th to the head-quarters of General Cuesta, at
Casas del Puerta, near the bridge of Almaraz, to concert with him the
operations of the campaign. He proposed as the first object, to occupy
in strength the positions of Baños and Bejar, which commanded the only
road from Upper Castile into Estremadura, and the country about Coria,
and Placencia. Sir Arthur Wellesley, (aware that his own army was the
only one that was efficient for the operations of a campaign,)
recommended that a corps of Spaniards should be destined for this
service.

It has since been known, that amongst the numberless intriguers who at
this moment sought to disunite the counsels of the allies, one of the
most busy had awakened the jealousy of General Cuesta upon this point,
and had represented to him, that the English general, with a view of
weakening the Spanish force in the field, would recommend him to make a
considerable detachment from his army. When the recommendation was
given, therefore, General Cuesta was convinced that the information he
had received was correct; and from the violence of his own nature, could
not easily repress his resentment at a proposal, which he thought was
intended to reduce his army, for the purpose of diminishing his share of
glory in the expulsion of the French from Madrid; a result which he
anticipated from the movements about to be carried into execution.
General O’Donaju, the adjutant-general of the Spanish army, prevailed
upon him, however, to agree to the arrangement, but General Cuesta never
carried it fairly into effect. The small force he afterwards sent to
Bejar was incompetent to any resistance, and was totally unprovided,
even with ammunition.

The remainder of Sir Arthur Wellesley’s plan was, that his army should
join that of General Cuesta, and should advance in the first instance to
the attack of Victor at Talavera. By a movement in co-operation, General
Vanegas was ordered to break up from the position in La Mancha, about
Madrilejos; to march upon Pembleque and Ocaña, and pass the Tagus at
Fuente Dueñas; where he was to arrive on the same day, the 22d of July,
that the armies under Sir Arthur Wellesley and General Cuesta, were to
arrive at Talavera, and attack the corps of Victor. General Vanegas
received this order, and agreed to its execution. Sir Arthur Wellesley
removed his army from Placencia, according to the plan which had been
arranged; passed the Tietar, and arrived at Oropesa on the 20th of July;
where he effected his junction with the army under the orders of General
Cuesta, amounting to 35,000 effective men. The next day, the Spanish
army advanced towards Talavera; and on the 22d the British corps moved
forward to the same place. While upon his march, Sir Arthur Wellesley
received several messages from General Cuesta, stating that the enemy
was disposed to attack him. Sir Arthur Wellesley pushed forward, but
upon reaching the ground, found only two squadrons of French, who had
come from Talavera to reconnoitre the position of the Spaniards.

The light troops of both armies advanced upon the rear-guard of the
French, the Spanish cavalry attempted to charge it, but without effect,
and the whole French army took up a position upon the heights, to the
eastward of the Alberche. The British and Spanish armies occupied the
ground about Talavera with their advance upon the right of the same
river. Sir Arthur Wellesley had expected to hear from General Vanegas:
according to the orders which had been sent to him, he should have been
at Fuente Dueñas upon the 22d; but from every information which could be
obtained, no movement appeared to have been made by him. The history of
the defection of his corps deserves to be recorded. When General Vanegas
received the orders from General Cuesta to move upon Madrid, he returned
for answer, that he would do so; he despatched, however, at the same
time, a courier to the supreme Junta, communicating to it the orders he
had received. That body replied, that he was not to execute the
movement, but to await its further commands in the positions which he
occupied. These directions, (which were neither announced to Sir Arthur
Wellesley nor to General Cuesta), arrived in time to stop General
Vanegas. It was difficult to explain the motive of this conduct; but it
was afterwards discovered that the supreme Junta, amongst other reasons,
was not anxious that General Cuesta should enter Madrid. He was supposed
to entertain sentiments hostile to many of those who composed it, and
not friendly to the whole body; the Junta, therefore, feared, that if he
reached Madrid, he would effect a counter-revolution, and place himself
at the head of the government; or at least overturn the Junta’s power.
This explanation of its motive gained considerable weight from the
conduct of that body, when it received General Cuesta’s despatches,
stating that he had formed his junction with Sir Arthur Wellesley at
Oropesa, and was proceeding to Madrid. The Junta then, with as much
alacrity as it had sent counter-orders before, directed General Vanegas
to move forward, and constituted him Captain-General of the province of
Madrid; so that, upon his arrival there, he would be superior to General
Cuesta, under whose orders up to that moment he had been placed.
Although by this conduct the general effect of the plan proposed by Sir
Arthur Wellesley was destroyed, yet he resolved to attack the corps of
Marshal Victor, and on the morning of the 23d moved his columns for that
purpose into a wood close to the Alberche, and stretching along the
right of the French army.

The plan of the movement which he determined upon, was to cross the
river, attack the right of Marshal Victor with the whole of the British
infantry, move the whole cavalry upon the centre of the enemy, and
engage their left with the Spanish infantry.

The corps of Marshal Victor was 22,000 men; the allied army was 50,000.
The troops of which it was composed were not all of equally good
materials; but the number of English only would almost have secured
success if the attack had taken place. General Cuesta, however, refused
to march till the following morning; and Sir Arthur Wellesley with
considerable reluctance was constrained to yield to his determination.
Some alterations were made in the course of the night in the disposition
of the troops. General Bassecour, with a Spanish division, was ordered
to the left of the British, and was to have passed the Alberche in the
rear of the enemy. Sir R. Wilson, who commanded a corps of light troops,
Spanish and Portuguese, was also ordered still further along the banks
of the Alberche to Escalona.

Marshal Victor, however, got information of the intended attack, and
retired from his position in the night. Nothing could have been more
unfortunate for the allied army; infinitely superior in numbers, it was
at the point of making a combined attack upon him, from which it would
seem almost impossible he should have escaped without considerable loss;
by his retreat unhurt, the nature of the campaign was changed, and the
bright prospects of the allies destroyed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, since his arrival at Talavera, had complained of
the total failure on the part of the Spaniards in the supply of his army
with provisions. The necessities of the British troops made it
impossible to advance; and after the retreat of the French army, Sir
Arthur Wellesley was compelled to remain at Talavera till supplies
should arrive to him: but recommended the Spaniards, who had not the
same deficiencies, to move upon Cavalla, upon the road to Toledo, and
endeavour to communicate with General Vanegas, who was still supposed to
have made some movement in La Mancha. General Cuesta, however, without
communicating with Sir Arthur Wellesley, took the road to Sta. Olalla,
where he arrived with the whole Spanish army on the morning of the 25th.
From this place he gave notice of the defection of the corps of Vanegas.

On the morning of the 26th General Cuesta’s advance was attacked by the
advanced guard of the French army. It appeared that Joseph had called
General Sebastiani from La Mancha to Toledo; that with all the force he
could withdraw from Madrid, he had marched himself to join him; and that
he had formed a junction with these two corps and the corps of General
Victor, at or near Torrijos; that he had immediately advanced upon
General Cuesta; and was in hopes of beating him before he should be
joined by the British. General Cuesta, however, upon learning the force
of the enemy, retired to Talavera. Sir Arthur Wellesley had endeavoured
to find a situation in which to fight a battle in front of the Alberche;
but not having succeeded, determined to take up a position, the right
upon the town of Talavera, the left upon some heights, about a mile to
the northward of it. The Spanish army retired during the 26th and 27th,
and took up the ground marked out for it about the town of Talavera. On
the morning of the 27th Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a brigade of cavalry
and two brigades of infantry; the whole under the orders of Major
General Mackenzie, to watch the enemy upon the left of the Alberche, and
to protect the retreat of the Spaniards.

Towards two o’clock in the afternoon the French advance of cavalry began
to skirmish with the British. Major General Mackenzie soon after
retired, and about four o’clock passed the Alberche with the whole of
his corps. He took up a position in a wood upon the right bank of it,
from which he could observe the movements of the enemy.

Joseph had brought the whole of his army to the opposite side of the
river; and believing (from the small number of troops that were to be
seen upon the right bank,) that the allies were retreating, he
determined to push in their advanced guard immediately, with the hope of
falling upon their army on its march to the bridge of Almaraz; to which
place alone, after abandoning the line of the Alberche, he thought it
could be retiring. The French infantry passed the river; the brigade of
Colonel Donkin, which was posted to defend it, was to a certain degree
surprised. The river was fordable at all points, and the French advanced
guard fell upon this brigade and caused it considerable loss. Sir Arthur
Wellesley (who had just arrived upon the ground) ordered the whole of
Major General Mackenzie’s division to retire from the wood, and to fall
back upon the position in the rear, into which the army was at this time
moving. The French, elated with their first, successes, pushed forward
as rapidly as the passage of their troops would allow, and threw their
right forward, with the view of turning the town of Talavera. The Duke
of Albuquerque shewed, however, so good a front with the cavalry under
his orders (which was in a plain upon the left of the British,) that
this movement was considerably delayed. Sir Arthur Wellesley was
tempted, (while a part only of the French army had passed the Alberche),
to attack it with the whole of the allies; but upon considering the
lateness of the hour, he continued his movement to the position he had
fixed upon. The British advanced guard retired under cover of the
cavalry, and took up the ground allotted to it. The French continued to
press forward; and, at last, when it was nearly dark, brought a battery
of six guns, supported by a considerable corps of infantry, to some high
ground opposite the height upon which the left of the British was to
rest. The troops destined for this point had not at that moment reached
it. Colonel Donkin’s brigade, which was retiring near it, was ordered to
form at the foot of the hill upon the left of the Germans under General
Sherbrooke. But the French, supported by their guns, attacked these
corps, drove them from the ground they occupied, and carried the height.
Lieutenant General Hill’s and Major General R. Stewart’s brigades were
at that moment ascending it from the other side; their advance found the
French upon the top. The battalion of detachments under Colonel Bunbury
wheeled into line, charged, and retook the hill. The French, however,
returned to the attack, but were finally driven to the foot of it. The
action upon this point was severe; Major General Hill was at one moment
mixed with the French soldiers; several men of both armies were killed
or wounded with the bayonet, but the gallantry of British soldiers, and
the intrepidity of their officers, prevailed.

During this attack, the Spanish troops were alarmed by the fire of the
French, who were following the British cavalry in its retreat through
the centre of the allies; they immediately began a fire which was taken
up by the whole of the first line. Several of the officers of the Guards
who were standing in front of their men, and many of the light troops of
the Germans who were posted in advance, were killed or wounded by this
fire. The French, however, were checked by it, and remained without
making any further attack during the night. It appeared afterwards that
the French officers discovered that the whole army was in front of
Talavera, only from the firing which has just been described; they were
ignorant of any position about that town, and, therefore, till then, had
given out to their soldiers that the allied army was retiring.

At day-break on the 28th the French recommenced their attack with 14,000
men, by assaulting the hill from which they had been driven the night
before. Their troops had been collected during dark, and were formed at
the bottom of the height; they moved at a signal given, and succeeded in
ascending to a considerable distance before they were checked by the
fire of the British. From the conical shape of this hill it was
difficult to form any considerable number of men to defend it: but the
regiments which were on it charged the French troops with an impetuosity
they were unable to resist, and drove them, with considerable loss and
in total confusion, beyond the ground from which they had moved to the
attack.

The British cavalry had been ordered up to charge the French right as
they were retiring, but unfortunately it was at too great a distance to
effect this object.

After the failure of this attempt upon the hill, the French continued to
cannonade the British line for a considerable time; but the fire ceased
at length on both sides, and perfect tranquillity reigned throughout the
opposing armies. During this interval, Sir Arthur Wellesley communicated
with General Cuesta near a house in the centre of the lines, and
afterwards slept, till some fresh movements in the enemy’s camp were
reported to him.

Joseph, having been defeated in the several efforts he had made upon the
British left, determined to try his fortune upon the centre of the
allied army. The attack which followed was made under cover of a wood of
olives, and fell principally upon the brigade commanded by Major General
Alexander Campbell; this officer had taken advantage of some high banks
which intersected the ground he occupied, and through the means of which
he was enabled, with a very inferior force, to arrest the progress of
the enemy’s principal column. Being at one time, however, driven from
one of these banks, he rallied the regiment which was retiring, charged
the column which was pursuing him, drove it from the ground of which it
had taken possession, and took twelve pieces of artillery; at the same
time some squadrons of the Spanish regiment of cavalry of the King,
charged the head of a French column of infantry which was advancing
through the wood (in pursuit of some Spanish infantry that had given
way,) and cut up a considerable part of it. Thus terminated the second
attack of the memorable 28th of July; the enemy was completely repulsed,
with the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery upon different points,
and a very considerable number of his best troops. His failures seemed
decisive of the day; another pause ensued, considerable movements on the
part of the enemy were observed, and for some time were construed by the
allied army as indicative of a retreat; but the severest action was yet
to come.

The whole état major of the French was observed to have collected in
front of the left of the British; after some consultation amongst the
officers who composed it, they appeared to have decided upon a new
arrangement of their army. The aides-de-camp were despatched in
different directions, and soon after the French divisions were observed
to be moving to their new destinations. It now seemed to be the
intention of the enemy to bring the great body of his force to act upon
that part of the British line which was occupied by the Guards; and, at
the same time, to move with three columns of infantry and a regiment of
cavalry, along the valley which extended under the height which formed
the left of the British line. These columns were supported by some light
infantry, which the enemy had thrown upon the chain of hills which run
westward beyond the valley, and which were destined to turn the British
left and attack it upon the flank and rear.

To meet this movement Sir Arthur Wellesley directed the cavalry (which
was concealed in the valley) to be prepared to charge the columns of
infantry, as soon as they should have extended their formation, and
exposed their flank. He also directed the guards to be prepared for the
attack which was going to be made upon them, and upon no account to move
from the ground they occupied.

The French columns of infantry which had moved into the valley, were
more advanced than those destined for the attack upon the Guards; they
had halted near a house within gun-shot of the British left, and
appeared to be waiting for orders to advance. Major General Payne, who
commanded the British cavalry, seized this opportunity to attack them;
the enemy, observing the forward movement of the cavalry, formed himself
against the side of this house in solid column; he had a deep ravine, or
water-course, along his front, of which the British cavalry was not
aware, and he was besides supported by sixteen guns. The charge of the
cavalry was thrown into confusion by this ravine; many of the horses
fell into it; and the portion which got over it was so divided and
broken as a body, that the effect of the charge was completely done
away. The bravery of the British soldier was not, however, to be daunted
by this check. The Honourable Major Ponsonby led the men who were near
him upon the bayonets of the enemy; but their valour could not
compensate for the total confusion into which they had been thrown. The
bravery of individuals could effect nothing against a solid body of
infantry; the soldiers who were repulsed by the French columns galloped
forward upon the regiment of cavalry which supported them, and in a
short time the whole plain was covered with British dragoons dispersed
in all directions, and totally without formation. In this state they
were charged by some French regiments which were in reserve; many of
them were taken, the remainder passed through the intervals in the
French columns, and those that escaped their fire, (of whom Lord William
Russel was one), retired within the British lines.

In this attack the 23d Light Dragoons lost two-thirds of its number; its
charge was injudicious; the ground in front had not been reconnoitred,
and the French infantry was too strongly posted to promise it success.
The order for the cavalry was to charge when the French columns had
extended and exposed their flank. They had done neither when the attack
was made, but the bravery with which it was conducted, put an end to the
movements which the enemy had intended on that side; and he never
stirred afterwards from the ground upon which he was formed.

Sir Arthur Wellesley observed this hesitation, and profited by it, in
detaching the 48th Regiment, (which he had called for the defence of the
height when it was threatened with an attack), to support the movement
which the guards had at this moment made upon the enemy. These troops,
with a part of Major General Cameron’s brigade, had been attacked by the
whole reserve of the French army; but they had received it with so
tremendous a fire, that they forced it to give way; charged it with
great impetuosity; and pursued it into a wood. They had not proceeded to
any great distance, however, when the enemy brought so considerable a
number of guns to bear upon their flank, that in a very few moments all
their mounted officers were killed or wounded and near 500 of their men.
In this situation the Guards were forced to fall back in considerable
confusion: they passed through the intervals of the 48th Regiment, which
had just arrived to support them, and which checked the advance of the
enemy. The attack was most severe upon this regiment; it maintained its
ground in the most gallant manner, till the guards had re-formed, and
moved forward to its support. When the French perceived these troops
advancing, they retired; the Guards instantly huzza’d; the cry was
echoed along the whole line; the enemy continued their retreat; and thus
ended the last achievement of the battle of Talavera. The enemy was soon
perceived to be moving to the rear; he shewed a considerable force of
cavalry, and maintained a heavy cannonade to cover the retreat; and at
the close of the day he had already passed a portion of his troops
across the Alberche.

There never was a more extraordinary battle than the one which has now
been described: the French brought into the field a force of not less
than 47,000 men, and the whole of their attacks, with the most trifling
exception, were directed against the British army, not exceeding 18,000
infantry, and 1,500 cavalry. Yet the British general had nerve to
maintain the contest, and ability to baffle the efforts of the enemy.
The army displayed a courage and perseverance, which did justice to the
confidence with which its commander had relied upon it; and proved to
Spain and to the world, what the dauntless spirit of the British soldier
is capable of effecting, when under the direction of such an officer.

The enemy did justice to the talent of Sir Arthur Wellesley, and to the
unrivalled bravery of his troops; Marshal Victor admitted to an English
officer who was taken prisoner, that much as he had heard of the
gallantry of English soldiers, still he could not have believed that any
men could have been led to attacks so desperate as some that he had
witnessed in the battle of Talavera. The glory of the British arms shone
forth in brighter colours on this memorable day than it had ever done
amidst its countless triumphs of years preceding. The soldiers struggled
against privations of every description; as well as against a force
which seemed calculated to overwhelm them; their native valour spurred
them on to conquest, and stifled every feeling which could arrest or
make it doubtful.

On the morning of the 29th, the light division of 3,000 men, under Major
General Crawford, joined the army from Oropesa; it was immediately
ordered to form the advance, and take up a position in the front of the
field of battle. The allies were employed in attending their wounded,
and burying or burning the dead of both armies.

The British loss was 5,000 men in killed or wounded; the loss of the
Spaniards was much inferior. The French loss was estimated by themselves
at 14,000 men. Joseph retired in the course of the 29th with the
greatest part of his army, to Sta. Olalla; a rear guard of 6,000 men was
left at Casas Leguas, to cover his retreat, but it retired on the night
of the 30th, and joined the corps to which it belonged, near Toledo.

The army of General Vanegas, which had advanced from Madrilejos, in
obedience to the orders of the supreme Junta, had arrived upon the
Tagus, near Aranjuez and Toledo on the 28th. The advance of his corps
pushed on in the night to within a short distance of Madrid, and took
some patroles which had been sent out from the garrison; but General
Vanegas having heard that the French army was retreating towards the
capital from the field of Talavera, recalled the parties that had
crossed the Tagus, and abandoned any further offensive operations. Sir
Arthur Wellesley (who was still unable to advance, from the total want
of provisions in which the Spaniards kept him) recommended to General
Cuesta to form a junction with General Vanegas; but while this movement
was in contemplation, information was brought from Placencia, that the
corps of Soult was moving upon that town, and that the troops at Bejar,
hearing of its advance, had abandoned that position, and left the road
open to its march. Sir Arthur Wellesley could hardly believe that the
strong positions about Bejar had been so hastily given up; the corps of
Marshal Beresford was ready to have assisted the troops in occupation of
them, and a brigade of British, under the orders of Major General
Catling Crawford, was within a few days’ march, and would have assisted
in their defence. But the intelligence being soon after confirmed, Sir
Arthur Wellesley decided to carry the British army to attack General
Soult; and proposed to General Cuesta to remain in the position of
Talavera, to cover the movement of the English upon Placencia. Sir
Arthur Wellesley also proposed to leave his wounded in charge of General
Cuesta, to whose kindness and generosity he intrusted them, with a
solemn promise from him, that if any thing should oblige the Spanish
army to retire, his first care should be, to move the British to a place
of safety. General Cuesta was delighted with the plan which was proposed
to him. He felt that his own army was unequal to any contest with the
French in an open plain, and that it must be to the British only, that
he could look for the expulsion of the enemy from his rear; he also
expressed himself most particularly gratified by the confidence which
Sir Arthur Wellesley reposed in him, intrusting the wounded to his care.

The necessary arrangements being made, and Major General Mackinnon
placed in the command of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley
marched on the morning of the 3d of August for Oropesa. A short time
after his arrival at that place, he learnt that the advanced guard of
Soult’s army was arrived at Naval Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had
retired from Bejar, had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and destroyed the
bridge; he determined, however, to move upon the French, and was in
hopes of finding them the following day. General Bassecour, with a
Spanish division, was moving along the Tietar, and was destined to act
upon the left and rear of the French. About four o’clock in the
afternoon, however, a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, announcing
to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from intelligence upon which he could
rely, he was persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had evacuated
Gallicia, and formed a junction with the corps of Marshal Mortier, from
Valladolid; that the two were united with Marshal Soult; and that the
amount of the collected force upon the rear of the allied army, could
not be less than 55,000 men; that Marshal Victor was at no great
distance from Talavera, upon the other side; that he (General Cuesta)
apprehended an attack from him; and had in consequence determined to
break up immediately from that town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at
Oropesa. This information was as disastrous as it was unexpected: the
letter from General Cuesta further stated, that his movement was already
begun, and that his army would form its junction with the British in the
course of the night: there remained, therefore, no hope of preventing or
delaying it, and the whole plan, upon which Sir Arthur Wellesley had
undertaken his operation, was at once destroyed.

The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in existence; the bridge of
Arzobispo was exposed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to the corps of
Victor, and the whole allied army, if it advanced, might be cut off from
any retreat across the Tagus, while its movement upon Portugal must
depend upon the success of its attack upon the combined army of Ney,
Soult, and Mortier. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley
did not hesitate to give up offensive operations, and retire across the
Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had every reason to complain of the conduct of
General Cuesta; he had abandoned the position intrusted to him, without
any ground for so doing; for it afterwards appeared that Victor was at
some distance from Talavera, and not occupied in a movement upon the
corps of General Cuesta; but, at any rate, the Spaniards evacuated the
post intrusted to them, and abandoned the British wounded, with a
precipitancy that nothing but the actual presence of an enemy could
justify. If General Cuesta was actuated by a desire of bringing his army
to the assistance of Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was about to attack a
force which he had reason to believe was superior to him, he ought to
have waited a few hours, till he had communicated with him, and in the
mean time, he should have given assistance to the removal of the British
wounded. If he thought that the return of a messenger from Oropesa (a
distance of only five leagues), would have exposed him by too much
delay, he ought at least to have left a corps to check the enemy in his
front, and to have protected the retreat of the hospitals. And, last of
all, it was his duty, to which he had also pledged himself in the most
solemn manner, to have given all the means in his power to facilitate
the removal of the British wounded. He did, however, the direct reverse:
he abandoned his position with his whole army, without communication
with Sir Arthur Wellesley; (indeed, he precluded the possibility of any,
by stating in his letter that his army was in march); and to the
wounded, instead of every assistance he could command, he gave but _four
carts_, for the whole 4,000 men. It is impossible to conceive, that the
importance of the occupation of Talavera, to the movement of Sir Arthur
Wellesley, should have escaped the observation of General Cuesta, the
ground about that town afforded the only situation in which the advance
of the French army upon the rear of the British, while moving upon
Soult, could possibly be resisted; the rest of the country was plain,
and offered no defensive position; so that in abandoning it, General
Cuesta exposed the whole allied army to an attack, in front and rear. In
short, it is very difficult to discover a sound or equitable reason for
the precipitancy with which this movement was executed; but the total
disregard which was shewn to the British wounded, the paltry number of
four carts which was afforded them, by an army that was provided with
them to excess, remains a stain upon the character of General Cuesta,
that no time will ever efface.

Sir Arthur Wellesley moved his army, upon the morning of the 4th of
August, to the bridge of Arzobispo; the nature of the campaign was
changed; Gallicia was delivered from the French; and the corps of Romana
was now in peaceable possession of it, with the opportunity of
augmenting its own numbers, and improving its discipline; the whole
province was in a situation to dispose of its military means, and to
create, in a short time, a powerful diversion, upon the rear of the
enemy assembled upon the Tagus. The north of Spain was almost entirely
in the same situation as Gallicia. The French had abandoned it, with
very few exceptions, to concentrate their force against the British
army; and Sir Arthur Wellesley conceived, that although he had been
foiled in his attempt to rescue Madrid, yet he had restored independence
to Gallicia, and in great part to the provinces adjoining it; which
might, in the end, prove most advantageous to the cause of Spain. This
opinion has since been proved to be correct; Gallicia retained its
freedom, and the other northern provinces were never afterwards but in
partial subjection to the enemy.

As soon as Sir Arthur Wellesley had crossed the Tagus at Arzobispo, he
detached Major General Crawford, with the light division, to occupy,
with as much rapidity as possible, the pass at Almaraz; where it was to
be feared the enemy, whose advanced guard had seen the passage of the
allies at Arzobispo, might push a force across the Tagus, and endeavour
to intercept the British army on its march upon Deleytosa. Major General
Crawford arrived, however, in time to prevent that operation; the
movement of the army was undisturbed; General Cuesta remained at
Arzobispo; and the British moved to Deleytosa. The Spaniards were,
however, attacked a few days after by the French at Arzobispo; their
advanced guard was driven from the bridge; and their whole army retired
to Deleytosa, whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley moved to Jaraseco.

The force under General Vanegas had remained since the battle of
Talavera, in the neighbourhood of Toledo, but to the southward of the
Tagus. General Cuesta was in communication with it, and apprized Vanegas
of his retreat from Arzobispo. He directed him in consequence to fall
back to the positions about Madrilejos, from which he had originally
moved, and upon no account to risk an action with the enemy, but to keep
his corps ready to make any movement, in co-operation with the allied
army, that might afterwards be determined upon. General Vanegas prepared
to carry these orders into execution, and retired a considerable
distance through La Mancha; but, from a fatality which has never been
explained, he was induced to move forward again, over some of the ground
which he had passed, and to engage his corps in a general action with
the French under Sebastiani, at Almonacid. The Spaniards were completely
routed in this battle; their best troops were engaged in it, and many of
the corps behaved with great gallantry and good conduct; but they were
defeated with considerable loss, and were driven to the Sierra Morena.
This disaster was severely felt; the dispersion of the troops that could
be most depended upon, and who were intrusted with the defence of the
great pass into Andalusia, was an event that could not easily be
repaired; and, in addition, it destroyed all confidence in the movements
of the Spaniards; they were no longer to be depended upon, for the most
trifling operations: when they were required to act, they remained
unmoved; when intrusted with a position, as at Talavera, they deserted
it without reason; when directed to avoid an action, which, if
successful, could be of no benefit to their cause, they seemed to court
one; and when engaged, exposed themselves to the most disastrous
defeats. With this battle terminated the campaign, which had been
undertaken for the relief of Madrid, and the expulsion of the enemy from
the central provinces of Spain. The corps under Sir Robert Wilson
retired through the mountains from Escalona to Bejar, where it was
attacked and routed by the advanced guard of Marshal Ney, who was
returning from the Tagus to the neighbourhood of Salamanca.

Sir Arthur Wellesley remained at Jaraseco, till the French, who had
collected upon the Tagus, had dispersed their corps; and till the total
failure of supplies obliged him to retire to the frontiers of Portugal,
from whence alone he could secure the provisioning of his army.

He placed his head-quarters at Badajos, his advance at Merida, and the
rest of his army in cantonments, upon the frontiers of Spain and
Portugal. The supreme government of Spain was thrown into considerable
consternation by this movement, of which it had been the sole and entire
cause. The individuals who composed it sought, notwithstanding, to throw
the blame from themselves, upon those who had the most materially
suffered by their misconduct.

The Marquis Wellesley, who was at this time the British representative
in Spain, complained most bitterly of their inattention and neglect to
an army, which had so valiantly fought in their defence; and whose blood
had been so profusely spilt, in supporting the great cause in which they
were engaged; but these complaints were only too ably urged. The
Spaniards (proud of their former glories) can but ill brook the
interference of foreign powers; their pride and haughty independence
prompt them to spurn the assistance or control of foreigners; and when
their government was justly accused of neglect, and even treason to
Spain herself, yet as that reproach was from a foreign hand, they
rallied round that government, and repelled the accusations, by the most
idle and unfounded attacks upon those who made them, and who had full
reason to complain of their unjust and unfriendly conduct. A spirit of
hostility was thus raised between the allied nations, and for some time
there was much of that unpleasant feeling which is generated by mutual
accusations. The magnanimous conduct of the British government, however,
soon set those jealousies at rest, and by degrees acquired for itself
the unbounded confidence of the Spanish nation.

The supreme government of Spain had displaced General Cuesta from the
command of his army, during the time that Sir Arthur Wellesley, (now
become Lord Wellington) remained at Jaraseco, and General Eguia was
intrusted with that important situation. This officer was soon after
directed to move the Spanish army, (leaving only the Duke of Albuquerque
with a small corps in Estremadura) and to form a junction with General
Vanegas, in the Sierra Morena, and in the neighbourhood of La Carolina.
This operation was dictated, in no small degree, by a feeling of
jealousy towards the English. The Spaniards wished to keep their army
separate from the British, because they believed it could be rendered
more subservient to their own views. While it remained in presence of so
distinguished an officer as Lord Wellington, it was curbed, and
restrained in the movements it might be directed to undertake; his
advice must necessarily be listened to, and it is not too much to say,
that some of the rulers of the country were not at that time unwilling
to see their armies directed by weaker counsels than such as would be
derived from him. There was another reason for the movement of that
army. It was believed, by many persons in the direction of affairs in
Spain, that Lord Wellington was determined to evacuate the country, and
retire into Portugal; they thought, however, that by removing the
Spanish army from Estremadura, they should shift the defence of that
province upon the shoulders of Lord Wellington; by which means they
flattered themselves, they should retain him against his will. Lord
Wellington was not so easily to be overreached: he stated to the Spanish
government, that he should remain at Badajos so long as he felt he could
be serviceable to its cause, but without neglecting the first object
which he was directed to attend to; namely, the defence of Portugal. He
pressed the government to make such arrangements as would secure the
provisioning of his army, if he was enabled again to take the field; but
above all, he recommended it to preserve the Spanish armies from being
harassed, or on any account risked with the French, excepting in such
operations as should be agreed upon, according to a general combination
of all the forces that could be brought against them. The army of the
Marquis of Romana was moved from Gallicia to Ciudad Rodrigo; where it
was placed under the orders of the Duke del Parque.

A state of tranquillity now succeeded to the active operations of the
preceding months; the French armies had been in almost constant movement
since the entrance of Buonaparte into Spain, in the month of November.
When he quitted the country to prepare for the German war, he had left
his armies in possession of all the north of Spain; Soult afterwards
added the north of Portugal. Victor was advanced to the confines of
Andalusia, near Monasterio; and Sebastiani occupied La Mancha; Suchet
was in force in Arragon, and St. Cyr was employed in the siege of the
fortresses in Catalonia. The situation of these corps was now
considerably changed. The north of Spain and Portugal was almost
entirely free from the incursions of the French; the province of
Estremadura was relieved from them; and a great portion of La Mancha was
in the occupation of the Spanish armies. The French had therefore lost
considerably during the last months; and, notwithstanding their activity
and military talents, they had been forced to retire from the provinces
which they had subdued, and to concentrate for their own defence, in a
country which they believed, after the capture of Madrid, they had
totally subjected. When Buonaparte re-crossed the Pyrenees, he directed
his imperial eagles to be placed upon the towers of Lisbon; he
proclaimed his empire in the Peninsula, and boasted that there no longer
existed any force that was capable of obstructing the accomplishment of
his imperial mandate. But the strength of patriotism in a whole people
was as yet unknown to him. The constant reduction of his forces, the
ever succeeding evacuation of apparently conquered provinces by his
troops, the never-ending conflicts in every corner of the Peninsula,
have since convinced him that a great people with one intent and one
resolution, with patriotism as their guide, are too powerful to be
subdued, though they have neither armies nor military science to oppose
to the invaders.

The British troops had been also in constant activity since the arrival
of Lord Wellington in Portugal, they therefore required rest. It became
then the interest of both French and English to preserve that state of
tranquillity which had succeeded since the passage of the Tagus.

The state of Spain about this time, was most extraordinary; the whole
people were hostile to the French, yet their exertions at the
commencement of their struggle had so far surpassed any former efforts
they had been called upon to make, that they now reposed in security,
confiding their cause to the means which they had already provided, and
sheltering themselves from any further calls, by the loud and re-echoed
declarations that they were invincible. It was in vain to combat against
this argument; if a doubt as to its validity was started, the instances
of Moncey’s retreat from Valencia and of Ney’s from Gallicia, were
thought sufficient to remove all apprehensions, and to silence for ever
the discussion of the subject; the best informed amongst the Spaniards
were carried away by feelings so congenial to their haughty spirits, and
so well adapted to the indolence of their natures. The defence of
Saragossa and of Gerona convinced them that the attempt to conquer Spain
would be unavailing, and they sunk at once into a security for which
they since have most dearly paid. If at Granada, you questioned the
public authorities as to the preparations they were making to bring new
armies into the field, they answered by an account of what had already
been produced. If in Valencia, the defeat which the French had already
sustained there was a guarantee of the destruction which would await a
second corps, that should attempt the invasion of their country; Murcia
could boast the terror with which it had inspired the enemy, since he
had never ventured to attack it; and in this manner every part of Spain
relied with confidence upon the levies which it had already produced,
and looked upon its entire deliverance from a foreign yoke, as within
little of being accomplished.

During the period of which we have been speaking, Marshal Ney commenced
an operation against the corps of the Duke del Parque: that officer had
collected his troops in a strong position at Tamanes; the French made a
desperate assault upon him, but were repulsed with considerable loss.
This action confirmed the Spaniards in the belief that they were
invincible; and a general feeling was raised, that their armies should
advance upon Madrid, and that the successes of Baylen would shrink
before the glories that awaited them in the neighbourhood of the
capital.

The disastrous termination of the German war seemed in no degree to
shake the confidence of the Spanish nation; proud of its own feats, it
disdained a feeling of dependence upon any other people for the success
of its cause.

The government partook of the same sentiment; and, most singular to
relate, during the period of this eventful repose from active
operations, made not the slightest effort to prepare for the struggle
which was to succeed.

The army of Lord Wellington which was cantoned upon the Guadiana became
extremely sickly; and numbers of the officers and men fell victims to
the disorders generated by the noxious exhalations of that river, and to
the fatigues which, amidst the greatest privations, they had previously
undergone. The Spaniards made no exertions to secure provisions for the
army; so that it was incapable of active operations.

The Spanish government seized this opportunity to attempt a scheme,
which will ever stand unrivalled in absurdity and folly. The Spanish
army which was assembled at the Carolina formed an effective force of
48,000 men; it had been placed under the orders of General Eguia, when
he marched with the greatest proportion of his army from Estremadura;
but it had afterwards been entrusted to the command of General Arisaga,
a very young and inexperienced officer; he was only a brigadier when he
was appointed to this important station, but was advanced to the rank of
a major-general upon assuming it.

It appears that this officer was befriended by a strong party of the
ministers at Seville, who had considerable influence with the supreme
government, although their views were hostile to it. He was appointed
for the purpose of carrying their objects into effect; and every officer
senior to him was removed, to enable him to assume the command. The
other Spanish corps which communicated with the central one, were
commanded by the Dukes of Albuquerque and Del Parque, both of superior
rank to General Arisaga; it was, therefore, the object of his employers
to prevent their co-operation with him, lest by taking upon themselves
the direction of the forces, to which they were entitled by their rank,
they should prevent the execution of the project the ministers had in
view.

These persons conceived that it was possible to enter Madrid; and they
are supposed to have purposed, in so doing, to effect a revolution, to
displace the government of the Junta Suprema, and to seize it for
themselves.

The capital was believed to be the most advantageous place for the
execution of these projects; first, because the triumph of its
successful deliverance would secure popularity to those who had effected
it; and next, because the existing government had ever been most
unpopular in that city. With these views, therefore, General Arisaga was
ordered to break up at once from his position at La Carolina, and to
march directly upon Madrid. This order was neither communicated to Lord
Wellington, nor to any of the Spanish generals in the command of other
corps.

General Arisaga, in conformity with his instructions, moved with
considerable rapidity through the whole of La Mancha, and arrived on the
8th of November upon the Tagus, in the neighbourhood of Ocaña. The
French (who were surprised at the boldness of this operation),
concentrated their troops behind the Tagus, and after a sharp rencontre
with the Spanish advanced guard, upon the 12th, they passed that river,
and attacked the Spanish army. General Arisaga had placed his whole
force in two columns of battalions, separated by a ravine, and with a
corps in advance of considerable strength, which was in possession of a
village which covered his front. The French began the engagement by the
attack of this village; but, under cover of some ground about it, they
turned the right column of the Spanish army, charged it, and in a very
short time totally dispersed it. The left column was as yet untouched,
but General Arisaga was so confounded by the destruction of his right,
that he does not appear to have made any disposition for its retreat, or
for the support of the attack that was coming upon it. The Spanish
cavalry, which was retiring with considerable precipitation, first threw
this corps into confusion by galloping through a considerable portion of
it; the French, who were fast coming up with the remainder of it,
completed its dispersion; and thus destroyed in a few hours the whole
army that had been marched against them. The Spaniards lost their guns,
their baggage, their equipments, and out of 45,000 stand of arms, not
more than 13,000 were brought back to the Carolina. The loss in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, was immense; a great portion of the soldiers,
who had dispersed during the action, never returned to the army; so that
the greatest number that was ever collected, of individuals who had been
present at Ocaña, did not amount to more than 25,000 men.

So decisive a defeat produced great consternation throughout the
country; the only considerable army that remained to fight for the cause
of Spain had been totally destroyed; and to enlightened and unprejudiced
minds, it was no longer doubtful that the French might at any time
march, unresisted by any military force, to the walls of Cadiz. This
opinion was far, however, from being general in Spain. All true
Spaniards were yet bound to believe that the battle of Ocaña was
unfortunate from some unforeseen accident; that such was never likely to
happen again; and that the forces which were collected at the Carolina
would yet form an impenetrable barrier to the advance of the French
armies, and protect the Andalusias, till the necessary numbers should be
collected to fall with certain destruction upon the forces of the
invader. If a doubt was started upon any part of this position, one
general answer was given, that a cat could not pass through the defile
of Despeña Perros, much less a French army. Thus you were requested to
be convinced, that no force the enemy could bring would ever succeed in
penetrating to the southward of the Sierra Morena; or in subjugating the
people of Andalusia.

Marshal Soult, who had been appointed Major-General of the French
armies, a short time before the battle of Ocaña, seized the opportunity,
which was offered by the destruction of the central army of Spain, to
detach a considerable corps against the Duke del Parque, who had lately
succeeded in occupying Salamanca. The French were fortunate enough to
bring his army to action at Alba de Tormes, and, in spite of the good
conduct of some of his troops, entirely to disperse it. The defeat of
this corps laid the north of Portugal open to the incursions of the
French; the whole of Castile fell into their possession; Salamanca
became a depôt, from whence they could prepare the means of a powerful
attack; and there no longer remained a force that could oppose or delay
their operations.

Lord Wellington saw the absolute necessity of removing his army to the
north of the Tagus, to oppose the invasion which was thus preparing. He
had no longer any Spanish armies that he could co-operate with; the only
two, of any considerable force, with which he was in communication, had
brought destruction upon themselves, without either listening to his
counsels, or communicating to him their movements; they were now no
longer in a state to be of any assistance to him, nor could he protect
them against the powerful reinforcements which were arriving from
Germany to the French, and which bid fair to over-run the whole of the
Peninsula. The system of war was now to be completely changed. When Lord
Wellington entered Spain, the Spaniards had an army of considerable
strength, with which he had hoped to co-operate with effect against a
comparatively small and extended force of French. The tables were now
reversed; the Spanish armies could scarcely be said to have any military
existence; they had proved that, while in strength, they were not to be
depended upon, much less were they to be looked to for any assistance in
their present state. The French were marching an army of more than
100,000 men into the country; so that a defensive war was the only one
which could be carried on against them. Lord Wellington was convinced
that the hostility of the Spaniards to the French was not to be
overcome: although their armies were beaten from the field, yet the
determined opposition of the people repelled the yoke which was
attempted to be forced upon them. The nature of the country was
favourable to a protracted, desultory warfare; and its extent and
poverty seemed to bid defiance to a subjection, which, to be made
complete, would require a more considerable force than France seemed
able to afford, or Spain could produce the means of supporting. As far
as experience could lead to any conclusion as to the future, in the new
warfare which the Spanish nation was waging against its invaders, there
appeared no advantage to the enemy from the occupation of any part of
the country, for any period of time. The moment a province was
evacuated, it rose in more determined hostility, than it had shewn
before its invasion. No advantage accrued to the French from either
violent or conciliating measures; they were always looked upon as
enemies; and, after months of peaceable occupation, if they exposed
themselves unprotected by numbers in the provinces which they had
considered as subdued, they were sure of meeting with the same hostility
they had from the first experienced.

With this state of things to direct Lord Wellington in the system of
warfare upon which he was called upon to decide, he felt no hesitation
in prescribing to himself, and to the allies, a conduct which should
protract the war; should lead the enemy to extend his forces; should
encourage the whole people of the Peninsula to intercept his
communications; and should give the governments of the countries engaged
in the contest, the opportunity of increasing and improving the more
regular means of resistance or attack.

Lord Wellington moved his army in the beginning of December, from the
neighbourhood of Badajos to the North of the Tagus. It arrived, in the
first weeks of January, in the new cantonments which had been prepared
for it; they extended from Coimbra to Pinhel, while a corps, under
Lieutenant General Hill, was left at Abrantes. In this position the army
went into winter-quarters: it was abundantly supplied, and was employed
only in recruiting itself from the dreadful effects of the preceding
campaign, and the sickness which had followed it. Head-quarters were
placed at Viseu.

While Lord Wellington was employed in this movement, Marshal Soult
concentrated the French armies in La Mancha; for the purpose of making
an irruption into the southern provinces of Spain.

The British officers who had been at the Carolina were satisfied, that,
notwithstanding the boasted impossibility of forcing the Spanish army at
the pass of Des Peña Perros, there was in reality nothing easier. The
pass itself was strong, but no fortifications, which deserved that name,
had been thrown up to defend it. The old road from Madrid, by the Puerto
del Rey, was almost unobserved; and the force which was employed to
defend the position of the Sierra Morena, which was fifty leagues in
extent, did not exceed 25,000 men, most of them the unfortunate
fugitives from the battle of Ocaña. With such an army, it would have
been impossible for the most able commander to have defended the entry
into Andalusia; but even that chance was denied the Spaniards, for they
still had General Arisaga at their head. The Junta Suprema was urged to
make some exertion to recruit the Spanish forces, and to prepare for the
struggle which was fast approaching; but that body could only prove its
patriotism by echoing the national cry, that Spaniards were invincible.
Several nuns, who believed themselves inspired prophetesses, were
produced to the loyal inhabitants of Seville, to assure them, that if
ever the French should see the walls of that town, the fire of heaven
would fall upon them, before they should reach its gates. In many other
towns the same prophetic inspiration descended upon the nuns; they
foretold in every instance the destruction which awaited the invaders;
but the misfortunes they were themselves to suffer, appear not to have
been so correctly foreseen by them. The preparations of the French in La
Mancha seemed, however, at last to have roused the Junta from its state
of apathy; Seville and the world were called as witnesses of its new
vigour, by a decree for the fabrication of 100,000 _knives_, to be
distributed amongst the voluntary defenders of the country. This piece
of absurdity will hardly be credited by those who were not at Seville at
the moment; yet it is a fact which stands recorded amongst the vigorous
measures of the Junta, and will hereafter be a standard to judge of the
hands to which the defence of Spain was at that time intrusted. The
credit of the Junta, which had been fast declining, was completely
destroyed by the promulgation of this decree; to raise itself again in
the estimation of the public, it published an order for the assembling
of the Cortes; but its race was nearly run, all confidence in it was
gone, and a few days more completed the term of its existence.

Marshal Soult had terminated his preparations for the invasion of
Andalusia, towards the end of December; he had collected a force of
50,000 men, and commenced his movements in two columns; the more
considerable one, with the whole of his artillery, he destined to the
attack of the principal pass by the Carolina; the other was directed to
move by the mountain-road upon Cordova; neither of these corps
experienced any resistance: the much-talked-of pass of Des Peña Perros
was abandoned without a shot, and the Spanish army which was to defend
it, retired toward Jaen. The corps which moved upon Cordova was equally
successful. Marshal Soult directed a part of his army to pursue the
Spaniards upon Jaen, which had been fortified at very great expense, but
which surrendered a few hours after it was summoned. With the remainder
of his army he moved with great rapidity upon Seville.

When the Junta Suprema was made acquainted with the successful irruption
of the French, its first object was to escape to a place of safety, and
it made choice of Cadiz for this object; but its members had
considerable apprehensions, lest the populace, who were enraged against
them, should impede their flight. They fell, however, upon a most
extraordinary expedient to save themselves:—A bulletin was published by
authority, and distributed throughout Seville, stating, that a courier
to the British Minister had arrived, bringing dispatches from Lord
Wellington, who was moving with the British army upon Salamanca, and was
left with his advance within a few leagues of that place; that the
courier, had passed through the armies of the Dukes del Parque and
Albuquerque, who were within a short distance of each other, and were
about to fall upon the flank of Marshal Soult. Under cover of this
communication (the whole of which was false, for no courier whatsoever
had arrived at the British Minister’s, nor were any of the movements
making by any of the corps which were mentioned), the individuals who
composed the Junta, began to escape to Cadiz; the populace of Seville
were not long, however, in discovering the imposition which had been
practised upon them; and a pursuit of the Junta immediately commenced;
many of its members were seized upon the road to Cadiz, and imprisoned
in the convent of the Cartjuo, near _Xeres_; they were afterwards
carried to the Isla de Leon, where they were required to abdicate their
authority, and appoint a Regency. They concurred in these directions,
and named General Castanos (who was but just released from the
confinement in which they had placed him) the president of a board of
Regents, who were to govern the country in the name of Ferdinand the
Seventh.

While these changes were effecting, the people of Seville reinstated the
former Junta of their province, and added the Marquis of Romana, the
Duke of Albuquerque, and some English to its number; but this body had
not time to act; Marshal Soult was already within a few days’ march of
the town: it constituted, however, the Marquis of Romana Captain-General
of Estremadura; and directed the Duke of Albuquerque, who had brought
his corps with him from Estremadura, to take up a position at Carmona,
to defend the approach to Seville. The army which the duke commanded
was, however, too weak to resist the French; he therefore fell back upon
their approach; and, in spite of their efforts to prevent it, retired to
the Isla de Leon. To this place Marshal Soult pursued him, and thus, in
one movement, without a single action, reduced the whole of the southern
provinces of Spain to the subjection of France. He extended his army to
the walls of Gibraltar; he occupied Malaga, Granada, Jaen, Cordova, and
Seville, and he prepared for the siege of Cadiz, which was the only bar
to the complete reduction of Andalusia.

This operation was as rapid and as successful, as it was possible to
execute. The great resources of the Spanish monarchy were reduced at one
blow; the riches of Andalusia were abandoned to the enemy without a
struggle; and the great nursery of the Spanish armies, the provinces
from which innumerable bands of patriots might have been drawn, were at
once delivered into the hands of the invader. Some persons thought,
that, in the tame relinquishment of these treasures, they perceived a
readiness in the Spaniards to abandon the cause for which they had, till
that moment, so gloriously been struggling; but the fallacy of that
opinion has since been proved. The revolution in Spain had found that
country merged in all the vices of its former weak and imbecile
governments. Spain had not for many years been called into any extensive
warfare; it was without any military organization; it was unused to
great exertions; yet the people were proud of their former exploits;
and, without adverting to the changes which had taken place, believed
themselves and their armies as invincible, as they had been during the
most brilliant periods of their history. The nation had been long sunk
in ignorance and oppression; it had no military science, no commanders
to whom it could look for assistance, no army that could defend it; yet
it had universally risked a contest with the greatest military power the
world had ever seen; and which had armies, more powerful than any the
nation could oppose to them, within its territory. Elated by the first
successes at Baylen and Saragossa, the Spaniards afterwards sunk into
their former habits of indolence. Pride dictated to them a feeling of
security, which reason would have made them doubt; but their succeeding
reverses never changed their first opinions; although the total want of
confidence, in their generals or their governments, made them little
anxious to place themselves under their directions. The Supreme Junta,
which had been established to rule the country in circumstances of the
greatest difficulty, was totally unable to call forth the energies of
the nation. The same intrigues, which had existed under the long reign
of the Prince of the Peace, continued under its auspices. The want of
money was soon felt throughout the country, the Junta was unacquainted
with the means of obtaining it, and was not very scrupulous in the
application of the sums it received. The army was unpaid, and was
consequently without discipline. The generals were unsupported by the
government, which was too weak to uphold them in the execution of their
duty. The Juntas of the different provinces yielded but a limited
obedience to the central one; they were composed of persons who looked
most to their own advantage in the high situations to which they had
been called, and who were unwilling to make exertions, the burthen of
which would fall upon themselves. In this state of things, the
declaration that Spain was invincible, was the readiest mode of
abstaining from those efforts which were necessary to make her so, but
which accorded too little with the character of the people who were to
make them. Andalusia was in consequence totally unprepared for the blow
which was struck at her, her population however was not the less hostile
to the invaders; there was no point round which it could rally in the
hour of danger, the people sunk under the power of their enemies, but
they still were Spaniards; they moaned the cruel fate which had attended
them, but they remained steadfast through all their misery to the great
cause of their nation and their independence.

While Marshal Soult was employed in overrunning the southern provinces
of Spain, General Suchet (who in the month of June had defeated the army
of General Blake on the heights of Santa Maria), marched with a
considerable corps to reduce the kingdom of Valencia. He reached, with
little opposition, the walls of that capital; but the resistance of the
people was there so determined, and the means he brought with him so
inadequate to the task imposed upon him, that he retired from the
country without having effected any object for which he had commenced
his operation; he resumed his position in Arragon, and afterwards
employed himself in the siege of the fortresses of Catalonia.

The first act of the new regency of Spain was to request Lord Wellington
to afford some assistance from his army, for the garrison and defence of
Cadiz. Lord Wellington, in compliance, detached to that place a force of
3,000 men, which arrived there after a short passage from Lisbon, and
which contributed materially to its defence. The siege was begun under
the directions of Marshal Soult, in the end of January, 1810; and it
lasted almost without interruption till August 1812.

The great body of reinforcements that about this time arrived to the
French armies in Spain took the direction of Salamanca: it became
therefore evident that an attack on Portugal was determined upon.
Marshal Ney placed the advance of his corps upon the Agueda, and
threatened to invest Ciudad Rodrigo; but the difficulty of obtaining
provisions in the winter season prevented him from undertaking that
operation till later in the year. A detachment from the French army
attacked a part of the British rifle corps, under Colonel Beckwith, at
Barba del Puerco, but was repulsed with considerable loss. This was the
first affair which took place between the army, which was entitled that
of Portugal, and the British corps destined to defend that kingdom; it
was a sample of what its whole body was afterwards to meet with. Marshal
Ney, commanded in chief at Salamanca; General Junot was second to him.
These officers were anxious to engage Lord Wellington to break up from
his winter-quarters, and, if possible, to draw him into the open country
of Castile. With this view General Junot was detached to Astorga, to
undertake the siege of that town. Lord Wellington was not induced to
depart from the system which he had prescribed to himself, by the
movements of the enemy; he felt, that however important the possession
of Astorga might be to the cause he was employed in defending, yet it
was more essential to maintain his army in the positions it occupied,
and to preserve it unbroken for the great contest which, he foresaw, it
would soon be called upon to maintain. He remained, therefore, in
perfect quiet, recruiting his army, and giving the Portuguese the
opportunity of forming and improving their troops. Astorga was taken
after a defence of five weeks, and Junot returned with his corps to the
neighbourhood of Salamanca. Marshal Soult detached General Regnier with
his corps to operate in Estremadura against the Spanish troops, of which
the Marquis of Romana had the command. Lieutenant General Hill, who had
been left at Abrantes with a corps of 13,000 men, British and
Portuguese, advanced to Portalegre, to co-operate with them, and to
prevent the investment of Elvas or Badajos. He was directed, however,
not to engage in offensive operations. General Regnier effected little.
He had several engagements with parts of the Marquis of Romana’s corps,
but none of them were productive of any decisive results.

In the beginning of May, Lord Wellington was apprized of some movements
in the French army, which indicated an advance in strength upon Ciudad
Rodrigo; he lost not a moment in putting his army in motion, and placing
it on the frontiers of Portugal. He established his head-quarters at
Celorico, and his divisions at Pinhel, Alverca, Guarda, Trancoso, and
along the valley of the Mondego, as far as Cea, and upon the opposite
bank of that river at Fornos, Mangualde, and Viseu. He determined in
this position to await the movements of the enemy; he could decide from
it, in security, either to co-operate in the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo,
or to attack the French army if an opportunity was given him. Marshal
Ney moved, however, but a small corps to the neighbourhood of Ciudad
Rodrigo; the roads from Salamanca were still extremely bad, and
impracticable for a train of artillery; he gave up therefore any further
object. Marshal Massena was at this time sent by Buonaparte to take the
command of the army of Portugal, and he arrived at Salamanca in the end
of May. The corps of General Regnier was added to his army, which was
now composed of the 6th corps under Ney, the 8th corps under Junot, and
the second corps under Regnier. Massena brought this latter corps from
the south of the Tagus to the neighbourhood of Coria, from which place
it was in communication with him; and Lieutenant General Hill, who had
been directed to observe it, made a corresponding movement, crossed the
Tagus at Villa Velha, and established his head-quarters at Sarzedas.
Marshal Mortier was detached by Soult to supply the place of Regnier in
Estremadura; and the Marquis of Romana remained in observation of the
corps which that officer had brought with him. A reinforcement of some
regiments which had returned from the Walcheren expedition, was sent
about this time, under Major General Leith, from England. As the men
were extremely sickly, Lord Wellington did not choose to bring them to
the army; they were embodied with some regiments of Portuguese; and
placed upon the Zezere, where General Leith commanded the whole corps.
The force of the allied army destined for the defence of Portugal, may
be computed at the following amount:—

                                                                    Men.

 The Corps with Lord Wellington                                   30,000
 The Corps with Lieutenant General Hill                           14,000
 The Corps with Major General Leith                               10,000
                                                                  ——————
                                                                  54,000

 In co-operation with this force was a corps of Portuguese
   Militia                                                        10,000
 The corps under the Marquis Romana                               12,000
                                                                  ——————
                                               Making a total of  76,000

The French force under Massena was

                                                                    Men.

 The Infantry of the 2d, 6th and 8th corps                        62,000
 The Cavalry                                                       6,000
 The Artillery, &c.                                                4,000
                                                                  ——————
                                                           Total  72,000

To this were afterwards joined two Divisions of

 The 9th corps under Count Erlon                                  10,000
 The remaining division of this corps under General Claparede      8,000
 The corps of Marshal Mortier which cooperated to the south of
   the Tagus,                                                     13,000
                                                                     ———
                                               Making a total of 103,000

These numbers are the very lowest at which the French army can be
calculated. Buonaparte always called the force under Massena alone
100,000 men; and the French officers, before the invasion of Portugal,
gave the same account of the numbers with which they were to overwhelm
us.

In comparing the amount of the two armies, the description of force of
which they were composed should be taken into consideration. The
Portuguese had as yet been perfectly untried; and their militia was so
defective in organization as to be evidently unfit for the operations of
a campaign. Yet Lord Wellington was not alarmed at the disparity of
numbers, or the superior organization of the troops of the enemy; he
relied upon his own genius to baffle their efforts, and combined his
plans with reference to the troops he had to command.

In the latter part of the year 1809, while Lord Wellington was still at
Badajos, he had contemplated the possibility of his being attacked in
Portugal by a superior force; he had considered the nature of the
country he should have to defend, as well as the system of warfare which
would most tend to support the contest in the Peninsula: he looked upon
the preservation of his own army as the guarantee of the future triumph
of the cause he was to maintain: the extension of the enemy, in the
occupation of distant provinces, must be a source of weakness to him;
the lengthening his communications must add considerably to his
embarrassments. Lord Wellington, therefore, fixed upon the heights of
Sobral and Torres Vedras, as the best positions in which he could
collect his army, and offer battle to the superior forces of his enemy.

With such a determination, he spared no pains in fortifying and
strengthening these places; the range of positions connected with them
extended from the Tagus at Alhandra, to the sea at the mouth of the
Zizandra; the accessible points were occupied with forts; and every
resource was employed to make a line of defence, in which so eventful a
contest was to be decided, as formidable as art, combined with its
natural advantages, could render it. The early decision of Lord
Wellington was supported by the events which succeeded each other in the
early parts of the year 1810. The great force of the enemy which menaced
Portugal, and the total destruction of all the effective Spanish armies
which could co-operate with the British in defence of it, confirmed Lord
Wellington in the wisdom of his plan of retreat. The French had a force
in Spain of not less than 300,000 men; this army was distributed over
almost every part of the country; Gallicia, Valencia, and Murcia, were
the only provinces that were free, the rest were in the occupation of
the enemy. The amount of this force, when collected, was sufficient to
overwhelm the small numbers of the allies that were in a state of
military organization in the Peninsula; but from great extension, it
became unequal to the task imposed upon it. It was employed in
completing the subjugation of the provinces that had been conquered; and
yet that object was not advancing, although the force was frittered away
in seeking to accomplish it. The animosity of the people was working in
silence the destruction of the French armies. Every succeeding day
brought reports of skirmishes, or individual rencontres, in which the
enemy were worsted, and no account represented any part of Spain as
diminishing in its hostility, or as being treated with more confidence,
or relied upon with greater security, by the French.

The army of Marshal Massena, while attempting the conquest of Portugal,
could lend no aid towards the reduction of the people in the Peninsula:
as long as it was in observation of the British troops, whether on the
Spanish frontier or in the lines of Lisbon, it could as little assist
the views of Buonaparte in reducing the country to obedience; the
destruction of Lord Wellington’s army could alone enable Massena to
fulfil the objects of his Imperial Master. The preventing that
catastrophe formed the basis of Lord Wellington’s plans for the
campaign. He was neither strong enough, nor had he any wish, to
undertake offensive operations: the state of Spain was not such as to
make them advisable; they must necessarily be commenced at considerable
risk against a superior army; and if they were unsuccessful, the cause
of the Peninsula was lost. By the plan which Lord Wellington had
determined upon, he promised to preserve his army, to increase its
discipline, to augment its numbers, to draw the French into a country
where their means of subsistence would be confined, and where their
force would not be sufficient to maintain even their communications with
the depôts, which must necessarily be placed at a distance from them.

Massena advanced from Salamanca in the beginning of June, to commence
the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; he brought with him a considerable train of
artillery, and expected the place would surrender upon being summoned.
But it was defended with considerable ability and valour, and was only
yielded into the hands of the enemy upon the 18th of July, after the
breaches were practicable and the principal defences destroyed. Many
persons at the time conceived that Lord Wellington had seen the fall of
this fortress with considerable indifference, since he had made no
movement to relieve it; but it is only necessary to point out the
results of victory or defeat to the different armies, to shew the
propriety of Lord Wellington’s determination not to risk a general
action. To attack the French he must have crossed the Coa and the
Agueda; if he had been defeated, he would have had great difficulty in
repassing those rivers, and saving the wrecks of his army; he would no
longer have been able to provide for the defence of Portugal with a
beaten army; he must have evacuated the country. If he beat the French
they would have retired upon reinforcements, and would have been
prepared to advance upon him again in a very short time. Lord Wellington
would have had to lament the brave men he must have lost in an action,
which would but have relieved Ciudad Rodrigo for a short time, as he
must afterwards have abandoned it to the superior numbers of the enemy.
His army must also have been considerably weakened; and most likely
would have been unequal to the task afterwards to be imposed upon it, in
the defence of Portugal.

Soon after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the British advanced guard, under
Major General Crawford, retired from the fort of La Conception, and was
placed in a position under the walls of Almeida. Lord Wellington
directed this corps to fall back across the Coa; but, from some
misapprehension, these orders were not executed, and it was attacked
upon the 24th of July. The French had the whole corps of Ney engaged in
this affair; it manœuvred under cover of its cavalry upon the right of
Major General Crawford, who did not decide upon his retreat until it had
gained his flank. The British and Portuguese troops behaved with great
gallantry, but they could not cope with numbers so superior to their
own; they retired across the bridge over the Coa, in some confusion, but
formed to defend it, and repulsed the repeated attacks of the enemy to
gain possession of it. Major General Crawford had been previously, for a
considerable time, with his advanced guard close to the French army.
During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, he had maintained a communication
with the place, and had assisted Don Julian Sanches in his successful
effort to leave it. This officer, who had for a long time commanded a
corps of Guerrillas, and who had been most fortunate in his enterprises
against the enemy, was enclosed within the walls of this fortress, by
the rapidity with which the French had invested it. Massena was aware of
the circumstance, and vowed vengeance against this chief of banditti (as
he was pleased to designate him). But Don Julian determined to force his
way through the besieging army. He formed his corps in close column,
placed his wife by his side at the head of it, and left the town soon
after dark. As soon as he was challenged by the French sentries, he
moved at full gallop upon them; cut down those that he met with, and
continued his course till he had passed through the army. He arrived in
safety at the quarters of Major General Crawford, and soon after
retaliated upon several of the enemy the vengeance they had threatened
to inflict upon him.

On the day on which Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered, General Crawford, while
making a reconnoissance, fell in with a strong patrole from the French
army; he engaged in an affair with it, which did not turn out
successfully; the French infantry repulsed three successive charges of
the British cavalry, in one of which Colonel Talbot, of the 14th Light
Dragoons, was killed; and, profiting by a mistake amongst our own
troops, who took each other for enemies, it retired with little loss to
the corps which was supporting it: the cavalry which accompanied it was
taken.

Marshal Massena invested Almeida on the 24th of July, immediately after
the affair under the walls of that place with the corps of Major General
Crawford. Lord Wellington retired from Alverca (where he had placed his
head-quarters during the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo) to his former station
at Celorico; he also drew back the divisions that were at Pinhel and
Trancoso, and placed them in rear of Celorico, along the valley of the
Mondego; he was thus prepared to commence his retreat upon the lines, in
case the enemy had determined to push forward, before the capture of
Almeida. Massena preferred, however, the surer game, and commenced the
siege of that place. He was considerably delayed in his operations by
the nature of the ground, and was not able to open his fire upon it till
the 23d of August. Lord Wellington determined to assist the place in its
defence, although he did not choose to risk an action to relieve it; he
moved up his whole army as soon as the firing had commenced from the
trenches, and, on the 27th of August, had determined to place it upon
the banks of the Coa. In the course of that day, however, Lord
Wellington, while reconnoitring, was surprised to find that all firing
had ceased about Almeida. The telegraph, by which he communicated with
it, no longer sent him any information, and he was afraid it had
surrendered; he observed a person walking upon the glacis, which
confirmed his suspicions, and he was informed of a considerable
explosion which had taken place the night preceding. Lord Wellington
immediately ordered his army to be ready to fall back to its positions
in the rear, but the place recommenced its firing about ten o’clock at
night; it ceased, however, at twelve; and the following morning, in a
skirmish with the enemy’s cavalry, a German serjeant, in the French
service, called to a dragoon of the 1st German hussars, and told him to
apprize his General that Almeida had surrendered. The order for the
retreat was soon after given; and the allied army was again placed in
its position, in the valley of the Mondego.

The loss of Almeida, after only three days firing, was a severe
mortification to Lord Wellington; he found afterwards, that an order
which he had given when he visited the place in the February preceding,
to remove the great magazine from the centre of the town to one of the
casemates, had not been executed; that a shell having fallen near the
door of this depôt, while some men were employed in getting powder, the
whole provision of that article for the garrison had been blown up; the
town had been nearly destroyed by the explosion; the ramparts had been
materially injured; and the place had been left without the means of
defence. In this situation the governor, General Cox, endeavoured to
capitulate, upon being allowed to retire with his garrison; but the
Portuguese officer, who was sent to negotiate (and who is the only
instance of a traitor among the officers of that nation, who have acted
with the British army), betrayed the disastrous situation of the place,
and refused to return within it. Marshal Massena insisted upon
unconditional surrender, which Brigadier General Cox refused; the firing
recommenced, as has been already stated, but at midnight the town was
surrendered.

The Marquis de Alorna, who was with the French army, desired the
Portuguese garrison to enter the service of France, and to become a part
of a Portuguese legion, of which he was to be the commander; but the
whole of the men and officers refused. They were then threatened with
every sort of persecution; they were menaced with the utmost rigour of
the law as traitors to their country; but if they would enlist under the
French banners, they were promised protection and advantage. Seeing no
other mode of escaping from a treatment so contrary to every principle
of justice, the garrison consented to serve under the Marquis de Alorna;
but its object was the reverse of what the French expected; the moment
the individuals were restored to liberty, they planned the means of
returning to their army; and, on the third day from the time of their
enlistment, there remained with the French out of the whole 20th
Regiment, a squadron of cavalry and a company of artillery, but thirty
men and a few officers, who had been detected at the moment they also
were escaping. These troops were immediately re-formed, upon their
return to Portugal; and the 20th Regiment particularly distinguished
itself throughout the campaign that followed.

An incident which took place on the night of the surrender of Almeida,
deserves to be mentioned, to shew the hostility of the Portuguese
peasantry to the French. Colonel Pavetti, the chief of the gens
d’armerie of France, in Spain, had gone to Almeida with Marshal Massena,
when he left his head-quarters at the fort of La Conception, to induce
the garrison to surrender; when the firing recommenced, Colonel Pavetti
(who was unwell) set out upon his return to his quarters; he was
accompanied by a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Captain, and twelve men; the
night was extremely dark and stormy, and he lost his way. He met with a
Portuguese shepherd, whom he took for his guide, and who promised to
conduct him (the vengeance of these Frenchmen hanging over him) to the
fort of La Conception. But this peasant could not resist his feelings of
animosity; he found courage to mislead the party; and under the pretence
of having missed his way, brought it to his own village. He persuaded
Colonel Pavetti to put up for the night in the house of the Jues de
Fora, and pretended that he would procure provisions for him. Instead,
however, of employing himself in that way, he collected the inhabitants,
fell upon the French, killed them all, except the colonel, whom he beat
most severely, and his servant who stated himself to be a German. The
next day the colonel was brought, with two ribs broken and other
damages, to the head-quarters of Lord Wellington; where he was attended
to, and afterwards sent prisoner to England.

To appreciate this event, it must be remembered that it took place in
the middle of an army of 60,000 Frenchmen; that their revenge awaited
those who were concerned in it; but that, notwithstanding, the animosity
of the Portuguese was too strong to be resisted by any calculations of
the retaliation which was likely to follow the act that was committed.

It will not be uninteresting to cite a trait of the character of Colonel
Pavetti. Lord Wellington treated him with great kindness; bought the
horse which had belonged to him of the peasants; returned it to him, and
asked him to his table. While at dinner, this officer took an
opportunity of stating to Lord Wellington that the Duchess of Abrantes
was with her husband Junot; he added, “Qu’elle était grosse, et qu’elle
comptoit faire ses couches dans son duché[3].” Lord Wellington took
little notice of this impertinence; but General Alava, a Spanish
officer, who was attached to the British head-quarters, answered, “Qu’il
ferait bien de faire savoir à madame la duchesse, qu’elle eut garde de
ces messieurs habillés en _rouge_, car ils étaient de très mauvais
accoucheurs.”

Footnote 3:

  Abrantes was at that time 150 miles behind our army, and throughout
  the whole succeeding campaigns, it was never taken by the enemy.

During the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, General Regnier had
continually made movements with his corps upon Castel Branco,
Pena-Macor, _&c._, with a view of inducing Lieutenant General Hill to
leave the positions he occupied, and to expose himself to an attack,
which was meditated upon him from a part of the force under Massena, as
well as from Regnier. It was also hoped that Lord Wellington might be
induced to venture an attack upon Regnier’s corps, which seemed exposed,
but which Massena was prepared to support with his whole army. Lord
Wellington, however, was faithful to the system he had prescribed to
himself; no artifice could draw him from the position which made his
retreat secure; and Massena was at last obliged to come into Portugal,
to seek him upon the ground he had chosen for his operations.
Detachments of French were also sent upon Lord Wellington’s left, with
the same view of engaging him to break up from the positions he
occupied; but all these movements failed in their object.

From the neighbourhood of Almeida there are three roads which lead
directly to the centre of Portugal; that on the right by Trancoso to
Viseu, the centre by Celorico to Fornos Mangualde and Viseu; the third
by Celorico, Villa Cortes, Pinhancos, Puente de Marcella, and from hence
to Coimbra and Thomar; from Viseu the road also leads by Busaco to
Coimbra. The right and centre roads were extremely bad; so much so, that
Lord Wellington condemned a considerable part of them as improper for
artillery; he chose the road to Puente de Marcella as the fittest for
his operations, and bestowed the greatest pains in improving it. After
the fall of Almeida, he had placed the infantry of his own corps along
this road with the rear divisions, as far back as Puente de Marcella.
The corps of Major General Leith was moved from the Zezere to Thomar, so
as to be within reach for any assistance that might be required from it;
and Lieutenant General Hill was kept at Sarzedas to cover the road along
the Tagus upon Abrantes and Lisbon; but was directed to be prepared to
move by the road of Formoso and Pedragoa Grande, to Puente de Marcella,
in case Lord Wellington should require him to do so. The cavalry was in
front of the whole army, and had its advanced posts at Alverca.

Massena commenced his march into Portugal upon the 16th of September;
his army advanced in three corps; the 8th corps under Junot, moved by
Pinhel upon Trancoso, the 6th corps under Ney, upon Alverca; and the 2d
corps, under Regnier, upon Guarda; the British cavalry retired to
Celorico. The next day the two latter corps moved into Celorico; from
which place they were observed to take the road to Fornos. As soon as
Lord Wellington was persuaded that the enemy had made choice of that
road, and that no part of their army was moving upon the road by the
Tagus, he sent directions to Lieutenant General Hill to break up from
Sarzedas, and to move by Pedragoa Grande, to the Puente de Marcella; he
moved the corps of Major General Leith to the same place from Thomar,
and he withdrew his own divisions with the view of collecting the whole
army upon the Sierra of Busaco.

Marshal Massena had commenced his operations with the hopes of turning
the left of Lord Wellington, and of reaching Coimbra before the British
army could be collected to oppose him; he had been induced to believe
that Lord Wellington had prepared to meet him at the Puente de Marcella;
but he hoped that by this movement on the right of the Mondego, he
should turn that position, and find Lord Wellington unprepared to
assemble in any other. He was miserably deceived; Lord Wellington was
aware of the nature of the roads the enemy had fixed upon for his
movements; he calculated the delays he would meet with, and arranged his
plans accordingly. He directed a portion of the militia that was at
Lamego under the orders of Colonel Trant to march upon Sardao; the rest
was directed to move upon Trancoso and Celorico, upon the rear of the
enemy, to intercept their communication with Almeida.

Marshal Massena arrived at Viseu upon the 19th of September; his
artillery had suffered so much from the badness of the roads that he was
obliged to remain there for some days to repair it. General Junot joined
him at this place from Trancoso, so that the whole French army was
collected there. On the 23d the advanced patroles of the British and
French armies met each other near St. Comba de Dao. The bridge over the
Cris, by which the great road to Coimbra passes, was blown up; but the
following day the French advanced guard passed that river, and the
greatest part of the British retired to the heights of Busaco, where the
whole army was collecting. On the 25th Marshal Massena joined his
advanced guard, and on the 26th pushed forward to the foot of the
position which was occupied by Lord Wellington.

The ridge of heights upon which the British army was posted runs nearly
north and south, from a point about four miles to the north of Busaco,
to the confluence of the river Alva and the Mondego; the extreme points
are nearly fifteen miles distant. Two great roads to Coimbra cross over
this Sierra, the one close to the convent of Busaco, the other four
miles to the southward of it, at St. Antonio de Cantaro. The corps of
Lieutenant General Hill which had made a most rapid though difficult
march from Sarzedas, arrived upon the Mondego on the evening of the
26th, and was directed to move into the right of the position of Busaco
early on the following morning. Lord Wellington had made a road along
the heights, by which his flanks communicated, and in this situation he
awaited the attack of the enemy.

We may be allowed for a moment to consider the brilliancy of the
movement by which the allied army had thus been collected. Massena
conceived that he should surprise his antagonist by the rapidity of his
march upon his flank; the British officers generally thought that it
would be impossible to oppose him before he had possessed himself of
Coimbra; and the corps of Lieutenant General Hill was universally
thought to be totally beyond the reach of the army of Lord Wellington.
Marshal Massena for a long time disbelieved the fact of its junction at
Busaco; and after he had been convinced of it, denied the possibility of
its having marched from Sarzedas. Yet Lord Wellington, in spite of the
difficulties opposed to him, of the able movements intended to surprise
him, and of the triumphant predictions of his adversary, collected his
force from situations in which it seemed totally divided from him, and
was prepared to fight the enemy with the whole strength of the allied
army, without having lost a single man in the attainment of his object.
The corps of militia under Colonel Trant, which had been ordered to
Sardao, from whence it was to have moved into the Sierra of Caramula,
was the only one which had not reached the ground assigned to it; this
failure was occasioned by some false information as to the possession of
a pass by the enemy, which obliged that corps to move by a circuitous
road through Oporto. It arrived upon the Vouga on the 28th, but too late
to effect the object for which it was intended.

On the morning of the 27th of September the whole French army was
arrayed in front of the British position, from whence every part of it
was distinctly to be seen. The corps of Marshal Ney was formed in close
columns at the foot of the hill opposite the convent of Busaco. The
corps of General Regnier was opposite the third division of British
under Major General Picton, and prepared to advance by the road to
Coimbra, which passed over the height by St. Antonio de Cantaro. The
corps of General Junot was in reserve with the greater part of the
cavalry, and was posted upon some rising ground about a league in the
rear of Marshal Ney.

The battle commenced by a fire from the light troops of both armies, in
advance of the position which was occupied by the allies; a detachment
from the corps of Marshal Ney next made an attack upon a village in
front of the light division, which was ceded with little opposition;
this village, although of importance to the allied army, was without the
position in which Lord Wellington had determined to receive the enemy’s
attack; he therefore abandoned it, choosing rather to suffer some
annoyance from its possession by the enemy, than risk the chance of an
action to maintain it, in less advantageous ground than the position he
had fixed upon. Marshal Massena was now convinced that he must fight
Lord Wellington upon his own ground; he therefore directed General
Regnier to advance to the assault of the position in his front, while
the 1st division of Marshal Ney’s corps, supported by the other two, and
a great proportion of artillery, was ordered to establish itself upon
the heights occupied by the light division. General Regnier first
brought his corps into action; the British regiments opposed to him had
not reached the positions that were assigned to them; and, for a moment,
a considerable column of French possessed itself of a point within our
line. Major General Picton instantly marched against this column with a
few companies which he had collected; Major General Lightburne’s
brigade, directed by Lord Wellington, moved upon its right, while the
88th, 45th, and Colonel Douglass’s Regiment of Portuguese, attempted to
gain its left; the troops with Major General Picton, however, first
dislodged the enemy by a most brilliant attack with the bayonet, driving
him, though infinitely superior in numbers, from the strong ground he
had got possession of; the other regiments came up in time to harass him
in his retreat; and the arrival of Major General Leith’s division, which
took place at this moment, convinced General Regnier that he had better
discontinue a contest, in which he had so little prospect of success. He
withdrew his divisions, therefore, and formed upon the ground from which
he had originally moved. During this attack, Marshal Ney formed a part
of his corps in column of mass, and directed it to ascend the height
upon the right of the village, of which he had before obtained
possession. The ground was extremely steep, and the column was but
little annoyed in its ascent; as soon, however, as it had gained the
summit, the guns attached to the light division opened a most
destructive fire upon it, and the division charged it with the bayonet.
The column was overthrown in an instant; the riflemen charged its flanks
while Major General Crawford pursued it down the hill; the foremost
regiments of the column were almost totally destroyed, General Simon
wounded and taken and the whole division completely routed. The
expression of a French soldier engaged in this attack, who was
afterwards taken, “Qu’il se laissa rouler du haut en bas de la montagne,
sans savoir comment il échappa,” best explains the mode in which the
remnants of this column escaped. The allies pursued it across the
valley, and thus put an end to the sanguine expectations of the enemy,
and to their boasted promise, of driving us like sheep from our
position. The rest of the day was occupied by an incessant fire between
the light troops of the two armies; Marshal Massena had placed a
considerable number of battalions in the road, which extended along the
ravine, at the foot of the ridge on which we were formed; and he had
hoped to induce Lord Wellington to reinforce the troops that were
engaged with these battalions, and by that means to get him into an
action of some consequence, out of the position which he occupied. This
system had frequently been successful to the French; the commanders who
have been opposed to them have been unwilling to allow their too near
approach to their army, and have continued to reinforce the advanced
posts, till the greater part of their troops had been drawn into an
action, away from the ground on which they had decided to accept a
battle; but Lord Wellington was not thus to be imposed upon; he directed
the light troops, when pressed, to retire, and to give the enemy an
opportunity of attacking his position, if he could persuade himself to
do so. At the approach of night, Marshal Massena having lost all hopes
of succeeding against the allies, withdrew his troops from the advanced
positions he occupied, and placed them at some distance in the rear,
near the ground which was occupied by General Junot. Major General
Crawford then sent to the officer who commanded in the village, which
had been ceded in the morning, telling him that the possession of it was
necessary to his corps, and therefore directing him to abandon it. The
officer refused, with a declaration that he would die in defence of the
post he was intrusted with. Major General Crawford immediately ordered
six guns to open upon him, and some companies of the 43d and Rifle Corps
to charge the village. The French were instantly driven out of it, and
the advanced post of the light division put in possession of it.

The battle of Busaco was thus terminated. The French lost 10,000 men
killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the course of the day; and Marshal
Massena was first enabled to form an estimate of the talents of the
General, and the bravery of the troops which he was directed to drive
headlong into the sea.

On the morning of the 28th, the two armies maintained their respective
positions; towards the middle of the day, however, the French were
observed to be retiring; they set fire to the woods to conceal their
movement, but the height of Busaco so commanded the whole country, that
their march was distinctly seen. Lord Wellington had been extremely
anxious for the arrival of the corps of militia, under Colonel Trant,
upon the Sierra of Caramula, the road over which communicated from Viseu
to the great road from Oporto to Coimbra, near Sardao, Bamfiela and
Avelans. This was the only pass by which the positions of the Sierra of
Busaco could be turned, and there were parts of it so extremely
difficult, that if this corps of militia had had the necessary time to
destroy the bridges, and to avail itself of the positions afforded by
the ravines which intersect the road, it might have opposed a most
decisive resistance to the advance of the enemy. Lord Wellington did not
choose to detach any part of the force which he considered as his
effective army, to execute his object in this Sierra; such a corps might
be cut off from him, or might have great difficulty in rejoining him;
and he was resolved never to depart from his determination, that the
great contest for the possession of Portugal should be fought by his
whole army, and in a position which should leave the event as little
doubtful as was possible in military operations. The corps of Colonel
Trant did not form a part of the force which Lord Wellington had decided
to keep with him; he intended it for the defence of Oporto, to which
place its retreat was not likely to be interrupted from the Sierra of
Caramula; it had therefore been ordered to occupy the latter position;
but Lord Wellington would not supply its absence by any other
detachment.

As soon as Lord Wellington perceived the retreat of the enemy, he
suspected that his object was to pass by the road just described.
Colonel Trant had arrived upon the Vouga, late on the 28th; Lord
Wellington was already aware, that a considerable corps of the enemy was
by that time in possession of the Sierra; he therefore gave up the hope
of seeing it occupied, and in the same night withdrew his whole army
from Busaco, moving with his own corps into Coimbra, and directing
Lieut.-General Hill to move by Thomar to Santarem. The cavalry was
placed in observation of the enemy, and was directed to cover Lord
Wellington’s movement to the rear. Colonel Trant was ordered to post his
corps along the north bank of the Vouga; and a part of the militia from
Lamego was ordered to enter Viseu in the enemy’s rear.

The situation of the French army began at this time to wear a less
promising appearance; its communication with Spain was totally cut off;
its supply of provisions was nearly exhausted; it had no means of
obtaining subsistence but from the country; and the total evacuation of
it by the inhabitants, of which, according to the French accounts, they
had not seen twenty since their entry into Portugal, made this last
resource extremely precarious. The allies, on the contrary, had beat the
whole French army; they had gained confidence in themselves; the
Portuguese troops had behaved with great bravery; the army relied with
implicit faith on its commander; and it felt that, notwithstanding his
movement to the rear, he was not afraid of encountering the enemy, but
was leading it to stronger positions than the one in which he had
already beaten him.

Marshal Massena appears at this time to have felt the difficulty of his
situation: he had two lines of conduct open to him; either to rest
satisfied with the progress he had made, and to endeavour to
re-establish his communications with Spain, or to push forward in
pursuit of the allies. The first would have been extremely difficult; he
would have weakened his army by detaching to his rear; he would have
suffered considerably from want of provisions, till the supplies should
have reached him; and he would have exposed himself to an attack from
Lord Wellington, while reduced in numbers. He was, besides, assured that
there were no positions which the allies could take up in the vicinity
of Lisbon; and he hoped, by a vigorous pursuit, to put into execution
the orders of his master. He decided upon this operation.

Lord Wellington evacuated Coimbra on the approach of the enemy, upon the
1st of October; the town had generally been quitted by the higher
classes of inhabitants during the preceding days; a considerable
proportion, however, still remained, hoping that the enemy might yet be
prevented from getting possession of it. But about ten o’clock on the
morning of the first, there was suddenly an alarm that the enemy was
approaching; the report was soon magnified into his having entered; and
at one burst the whole of the remaining inhabitants ran shrieking from
the town. The bridge, which is very long and narrow, was at once choked
by the crowds which were pouring upon it; and the unhappy fugitives, who
found their flight impeded, threw themselves into the river, and waded
through it. The Mondego was fortunately not deep at this time, the dry
season had kept it shallow; but there were three or four feet of water
in many of the places where the unfortunate inhabitants passed it. In
the midst of all the horrors of this scene; of the cries of the wretched
people who were separated from their families; of those who were leaving
their homes, their property, their only means of subsistence, without
the prospect of procuring wherewithal to live for the next day, and of
those who believed the enemy (with his train of unheard-of cruelties) at
their heels; the ear was most powerfully arrested by the screams of
despair which issued from the gaol; where the miserable captives, who
saw their countrymen escaping, believed that they should be left victims
to the ferocity of the French.

The shrieks of these unhappy people were fortunately heard by Lord
Wellington; who sent his aide-de-camp, Lord March, to relieve them from
their situation; and thus the last of the inhabitants of Coimbra escaped
from the enemy.

It is not in the nature of this work to dwell upon scenes of misery,
such as have been now described; but the recollection of them will last
long on the minds of those who witnessed them. The cruelties of the
French had made an impression upon the Portuguese, that nothing could
efface; it seemed to be beyond the power of man to await the enemy’s
approach. The whole country fled before him; and if any of the unhappy
fugitives were discovered and chased by a French soldier, they abandoned
every thing to which the human mind is devoted, to escape from what they
looked upon as more than death, the grasp of their merciless
invaders.—Innumerable instances of these melancholy truths might be
detailed; but it would waste the time of the reader, and the relations
of the horrid acts committed by the French would be too shocking to
dwell upon.

When Lord Wellington retired to Coimbra, he passed his divisions to the
rear, and placed them in echellons upon the road to Leyria. As soon as
he was convinced of Massena’s approach, he directed each division to
move one march in retreat, and he fixed his head-quarters at Redinha.
The cavalry which covered the army skirmished with the French in the
plains of the Mondego, and obtained some advantages over those who
attempted to pass the river. The following day, Lord Wellington moved to
Leyria, where he remained till the enemy marched upon him. Massena had
hoped to have overtaken some part of Lord Wellington’s infantry, when he
advanced to Coimbra; but having failed, he pushed forward on the evening
of that day to Condeixa; still he was deceived; Lord Wellington’s
columns were not to be overtaken; and he was obliged to halt for three
days. His army was fatigued with the severe marches it had made; his
provisions were exhausted; he was obliged to sack the town of Coimbra,
to collect what the inhabitants had left; and he was constrained to make
some arrangement for his sick and wounded, who amounted to 5,000 men,
and who were too numerous to be carried with him. Massena’s intercepted
despatch to Buonaparte, proves how strongly he felt the difficulty of
his situation: he says, that he is unable to leave a guard of any
strength to protect his wounded, as it would weaken his army; and that
the best security he can afford them, is by pursuing the allies with the
whole of his force, and driving them from the country. It is surprising,
that the French officers should still have entertained this hope. In a
letter from Marshal Ney to his wife, he says, that every thing is going
on better than could be expected; that the English are flying before the
French army, and that they appear to have no other object in view than
to escape to their transports, and to carry away as great a number of
the youth of Portugal as they can entrap, by way of _dédommagement_, for
the great expenses of the war.

On the 4th of October Massena closed his divisions to his advanced guard
at Pombal, and early on the 5th pushed forward with great rapidity on
Leyria, hoping to reach some part of the allied army, but he was again
deceived; Lord Wellington had placed his troops in echellons to the
rear, and as soon as he was apprized of the movement of the French, he
directed them to fall back; the advanced guard of the British cavalry
had a sharp rencontre with the enemy, where three French officers and a
considerable number of dragoons were taken; this was the only reward
Marshal Massena derived from the rapidity of his advance.

Lord Wellington moved to Alcobaça, the next day to Rio Mayor, the next
to Alemquer, and on the 8th of October he entered a part of his lines at
Arruda. The French army pressed forward during these days with very
great exertion, but by the able arrangements of Lord Wellington it was
unable to overtake any part of his troops; several skirmishes took place
between the cavalry of the two armies; they were universally in favour
of the British, who closed their operations by bringing in a squadron of
French. The rains set in on the 8th; the allied army did not suffer from
them, as it entered its positions on the 9th, and was generally placed
in villages and under cover; the French were materially annoyed by them;
the roads became extremely bad; their horses, which had been short of
forage, and had made some most distressing marches, were in many
instances unable to get forward with the artillery; great numbers of
them perished, and the troops who were without cover, suffered most
severely from the inclemency of the weather.

We have thus conducted the British army to the termination of one of the
most extraordinary operations which was ever carried into effect; the
boldness of the original conception, as well as the perseverance and
success with which it was executed, will command the admiration of all
military men. The ascendency which the character and talents of Lord
Wellington had obtained over the minds of all those who were within his
guidance or control, could alone have enabled him to effect a plan which
involved in it such fearful consequences. To have persuaded a foreign
government and army, but lately subjected to his direction, to abandon
the greater proportion of their country almost without a struggle, to
the ravages of an invader; to see his approach to the capital without
fear or hesitation, speaks of itself a confidence in the talents of the
commander which is without example. Not less extraordinary was the mode
in which a movement in retreat was executed from Almeida to Torres
Vedras, a distance of 150 miles, in presence of a superior army, whose
object was, by every exertion in its power, to harass the corps opposed
to it; yet not a straggler was overtaken; no article of baggage
captured; no corps of infantry, except where the invaders were routed at
Busaco, was ever seen or molested. Of all the retreats which have ever
been executed, this deserves most to be admired. The steady principle on
which it was carried into effect could alone have secured its success.
Lord Wellington never swerved from his purpose; the various changes
which every day occur in war, made no impression on his determination.
The great event of a battle, such as that of Busaco, won over an enemy
who was surrounded by an hostile nation, never induced him to change the
plan of operations which he was convinced would in the end produce the
most decisive advantages. Guided by such a principle, Lord Wellington
was enabled triumphantly to execute his plan; the successes which have
since attended his career are the best evidences of its wisdom. It is a
singular circumstance, that when in his turn Massena had to conduct his
army in retreat over nearly the same ground to the frontiers of Spain,
although he had the advantages of making his preparations in secret, and
of disguising the moment of putting it into execution, yet he was
constantly overtaken; the corps of his army beaten and harassed; and in
every action which he was compelled to fight, he was driven with loss
and disaster from his positions.

Lord Wellington placed his army on the ground marked out for it in the
course of the 8th, 9th, and 10th of October. The lines, as they have
been termed, extended from Alhandra to the mouth of the Zizandra; the
whole distance may be computed at about twenty-five miles from right to
left. The term of lines was but little applicable to them; the defences
procured by art were confined to closed redoubts placed upon the most
essential points, and calculated to resist, although the enemy’s troops
might have established themselves in their rear. They were thus enabled
to protect the formation of the army upon any point attacked, before the
enemy could bring cannon in operation with the troops which he might
have pushed forward between them.

These forts were occupied, (with very few exceptions), not by the
regular army destined to act in the field, but by the militia, of which
that of Lisbon formed a part, mixed up with a certain number of troops
of the line. Their defence was thus intrusted to a description of force,
capable of the service imposed upon it, but which would have been of
trifling assistance in a field of battle. Each redoubt was provisioned
for a certain time, and was supplied with the ammunition, _&c._,
necessary for its protracted defence. The post of Alhandra, which formed
the right of the whole position, was strong by nature, and was, besides,
fortified by several redoubts; its defence was assisted by the gun-boats
in the Tagus. The corps under the orders of Lieutenant General Hill
occupied this part of the position. It defended the great approach to
Lisbon, and its possession was of the greatest importance. Lieutenant
General Hill communicated by his left, which was placed on the ground at
the back of Arruda, on the Sierra de Monte Agraça, with the corps of the
centre, which occupied the heights above Sobral. These heights, over
which passed the second great road to Lisbon, having been fortified as
much as the nature of the ground would admit, formed the principal point
of defence on this part of the line. From this place towards the left,
and in the vicinity of Ribaldiera, there were several passes into the
main position, all of which were fortified; and the principal force of
the army was concentrated in rear of them. The next points of importance
were Runa and Undesquiera, supported by the line of heights in their
rear; they were upon the road leading from Sobral to Torres Vedras, and
were of the most essential consequence, since they commanded the only
pass to the latter place within the Monte Junto; an advantage important
to the strength of the whole position, and which never could with safety
be abandoned. These posts were well fortified; were occupied by a
considerable corps, and supported by the force under Major General
Picton at Torres Vedras.

It is necessary to give some description of Monte Junto, which has just
been mentioned; for, although it was without the position, yet it was
one of the main features which contributed to its general strength. This
mountain runs directly north from Runa, for a distance of twelve or
fourteen miles; there are no great roads or communications leading over
it; the valley to the eastward, which divides it from Sobral, is
impassable; it prevents, therefore, all military communication for an
army from that town to Torres Vedras (excepting that stated as being
occupied,) but round its northern point, and thus requiring a march of
at least two days. The difficulty of passing across this mountain was so
great that two corps separated by it could have carried no assistance to
each other, if either had been attacked. There were therefore two
portions of the British position, one that might be assailed from the
east of Monte Junto, the other, (of which Torres Vedras was the right,
and the sea at the mouth of the Zizandra the left) which might be
attacked from the west. Lord Wellington’s communication from one to the
other of these branches of his whole position was perfectly safe and
easy; and in a few hours the greater part of his troops could be
transported to the defence of either; whereas the direct contrary was
the case, as has been shewn, with the enemy. This formed one of the main
features of the strength of the lines.

Torres Vedras and the ground about it was strongly fortified; forts were
continued, at intervals, to the sea; and, although this part of the
position was never menaced, yet it was occupied by garrisons, and was
prepared to resist any attack that should be made upon it.

In rear of this line of positions was a second, extending from the back
of Alverca to Bucellas, thence along the Sierra di Serves and the Sierra
di Barca to Montachique, from whence by the park wall of Mafra to the
rear of Gradel, and along the line of heights to the mouth of the St.
Lorenzo. Betwixt these two lines of positions, there were strong works
at Enxara di Cavalhieros, at Carasquiera, and Mattacores, covering the
communication between them. To the south, and on the other side of the
Tagus, the heights which commanded the town and anchorage of Lisbon were
also fortified, and a corps of 10,000 men, partly marines from the
fleet, were destined to defend them; they extended from Almada to the
fort called Bugia, opposite Fort St. Julian’s. These last defences were
carried into effect with a view to resisting any force the enemy might
bring through the Alemtejo against the capital, which at one time was
menaced by the corps under Marshal Mortier, then assembled on the
frontier of that province.

Massena arrived with the 6th and 8th corps of his army at Sobral on the
10th, 11th, and 12th of October. The 2d corps followed Lieutenant
General Hill upon Alhandra. These troops were considerably fatigued with
the forced marches they had in vain been making to come up with Lord
Wellington’s army; the rain which had fallen since the 8th instant had
rendered the roads extremely bad, particularly about Sobral; so that the
men, and particularly the horses, were almost exhausted when they
arrived in front of our positions.

Massena occupied himself the first days with reconnoitring the ground on
which Lord Wellington had placed his army; the task was difficult; it
was so concealed behind the hills that a very small part of it could be
discovered; enough, however, was perceptible to convince him that an
attack was no easy undertaking. Lord Wellington occupied a redoubt at
the foot of the great height above Sobral; the French established one at
a short distance, and opposite to it. After several reconnoitres,
Massena determined to carry the British redoubt. The troops which
occupied it were commanded by Colonel the Honourable H. Cadogan, of the
73d Regiment. Massena placed himself on a hill to see the success of his
first operation against our lines. He was disappointed, his chosen
troops were repulsed, and in sight of both armies the French redoubt was
carried and maintained. From this moment no event of any consequence
took place for a considerable length of time. Skirmishes in the rear of
the French army, and particularly from the village of Ramalhal, where
the brigade of British cavalry under Major General De Grey was posted,
were almost the only military events which took place. These were
chiefly brought about by parties of the French, who, in search of
provisions, were continually met by Lord Wellington’s patroles, and in
which a number of prisoners were taken.

It is of consequence here to take a general view of the situation in
which the French army was placed. Massena, when he entered Portugal,
commanded a force of 72,000 effective men. The plan of operations he
adopted was to break in at once upon Lord Wellington’s defences; to
pursue him till he forced him to a battle; to allow no circumstances to
arrest this decision, and finish thus at one blow the campaign intrusted
to his conduct. In pursuance of his system, he marched, with all the
corps of his army concentrated, into the heart of Portugal, taking his
line direct upon Coimbra, at which place, by turning Lord Wellington’s
left, he hoped to have arrived almost without resistance. In effecting
this movement, he left no garrisons behind him; he occupied no posts to
secure even his communication with Spain, or to ensure him any supplies
or protection from the rear of his army. Such considerations were all
sacrificed to preserve his greater numerical force for the battle by
which he hoped at once to decide the fate of Portugal. The first
interruption to this arrangement of the campaign, was the assembling of
the whole British army at Busaco, and the subsequent defeat of the
French. On the day on which this took place, Massena’s communication
with Spain was cut off by a force of Portuguese militia, upon the
frontiers near Pinhel and Celorico. He determined, however, to continue
his original movement; and, hoping to conceal his march through the
Sierra of Caramula, expected again to turn Lord Wellington, and fight a
battle to advantage in the open country, between Busaco and Coimbra.
These hopes were frustrated. Perceiving the difficulties into which the
enemy was plunging, Lord Wellington retired through Coimbra, and
abandoned to him that deserted town and country. Arrived at this point,
Marshal Massena must have begun to feel the difficulties of his
situation. He was encumbered with 5,000 wounded from the battle of
Busaco; he was without the security of any supply of provisions, in the
midst of a most inimical and exasperated population; he was without the
means of communicating with Spain. If he remained where he was, the
boasted conquest of Portugal in a campaign was at an end; the
difficulties to which he must have exposed himself, by the extension of
his army to procure provisions, must also have had weight with him; and
the uncertainty as to our real object in so rapid a retreat, must have
induced him to expect some great result from the bolder measure of
pursuing the allied army. In conformity to this feeling, without leaving
any protection for his rear, or even for his wounded, Marshal Massena
conducted his army to Sobral. His progress here was totally arrested.

The strength of the position occupied by us was such, as, with the
recollection of Busaco fresh upon him, Massena dared not attack; he was,
therefore, reduced at once to the defensive; his mighty vengeance was
conducted harmless to this unpromising position.

The first news, which must have been unpleasant to Marshal Massena, was
the capture of Coimbra, with all the French wounded, by a corps of
Portuguese militia, under Colonel Trant. The loss of the troops was not
alone to be lamented in this case; it brought with it the disastrous
conviction, that the French army was insulated on the ground on which it
stood; no line of communication, no extent of country in subjection,
from which to draw resources, remained to it. Wherever a Frenchman
stood, for the moment, he commanded and desolated the spot; removed from
it, all was in hostility against him. The march of the French, through
Portugal to the lines, was most singular. The troops seldom saw an
inhabitant; they could procure no guides; deserters from them, or
prisoners, could never state the towns or villages from whence they
came, though, in some instances, they had been weeks in the same places;
they had seen no native to instruct them in their names. In this state
of things, the French army began early to suffer from privations of
every sort; its foraging parties were scouring the country in the rear,
and upon their success depended chiefly the provisioning of the troops.
The fatigue and sickness, consequent on this mode of living, were
considerable. The French soldiers were generally bivouacked along the
line they occupied, which, without shelter in the rainy season,
increased the misery of their situation. By these causes, their army
gradually diminished; while, on the contrary, that under Lord
Wellington, excellently provided with all that was necessary, and mostly
under cover in the villages within the position, was gaining strength
and improving in discipline every day. The Spanish corps, under the
orders of the Marquis of Romana, had joined the allied army from the
frontiers of Estremadura; so that the force at this time, (the end of
October and beginning of November) within the lines, was considerably
greater than that of the enemy. Under these circumstances, Lord
Wellington saw there was an opportunity of attacking Massena with
advantage. The problem, whether it were wise to do so or not, engaged
his most serious attention. He was persuaded, that if he attacked, he
could secure a victory; to attempt it he was induced by every personal
consideration; the glory which would have accrued to him in success
would at that time have been immense; in England the word of Buonaparte,
that his eagles should be planted on the towers of Lisbon, was generally
looked upon as a decree which no talent or ability could avert; to have
learnt at such a time that our army had defeated the boasted instruments
Of this prophesying emperor, would have carried the man who executed
such a plan to the pinnacle of greatness. Yet this inducement, as well
as the anxious wish of the whole army to attack, had no effect. Lord
Wellington was persuaded that the sounder line of conduct was to wait
with patience, and in safety, the mischief, which he was satisfied would
be brought upon the enemy by want and sickness, and by the continual
hostility of the natives. He therefore decided steadily to pursue that
plan; he was ever watchful to profit by any advantage which should be
afforded; but unless a decided one was given him, he determined to
remain on the defensive.

About the beginning of November, Massena found his sick so fast
increasing, and his means of obtaining provisions so much diminished,
that he was obliged to detach General La Borde’s division of the 6th
corps, to form a garrison at Santarem for the protection of an hospital,
as well as to assist the foraging parties in that quarter. Lord
Wellington made a corresponding movement to prevent the passage of the
Tagus, by detaching Major General Fane with a brigade of cavalry into
the Alemtejo to assemble opposite to La Borde. In this situation the
armies remained in perfect tranquillity till the 15th in the morning,
when it was found that during the night the whole French army had
retreated. This movement had been carried into effect in such silence,
that no suspicion of it had been entertained.

It was the great triumph of Lord Wellington’s skill and foresight, that,
without exposing a single man in action, he had since the 10th of
October retained at first a superior army in inactivity before him; he
had seen it diminish in numbers every day; and, in the end, without its
having effected a single purpose, he had obliged it to retire, oppressed
with fatigue and sickness. Towards reducing the country it occupied, it
had not made the slightest progress; the provisions of the British army
were drawn from the northern provinces in its rear; Coimbra continued
occupied by the Portuguese militia; Abrantes by the Portuguese garrison;
so that it may truly be described as commanding only the ground on which
it stood.

The state of Lisbon during the period when the enemy was hardly twenty
miles distant from it, deserves to be mentioned. Massena had expected
that his near approach would have caused tumult and a revolution; but
far from this, as a proof of the extraordinary confidence entertained of
Lord Wellington, no town was ever in more perfect quiet; there never
appeared in it the slightest symptom of fear or apprehension. The
ordinary occupations were continued, although the enemy was but a single
march from it. Yet total ruin was known to await the town, if Massena,
by succeeding against the allied army, forced an entry into it. The
apprehension of such a catastrophe was, however, at no time entertained;
implicit reliance on the skill of their chief, and the bravery of the
troops, was the universal sentiment of the Portuguese.

The persons whose property had been surrendered to be laid waste by the
enemy, shewed the same feelings; the poor peasants, who had abandoned
every thing they possessed, were alike persuaded that all was done for
the best; and in the whole country there was not a dissenting voice in
giving unlimited confidence to Lord Wellington.

As soon as the retreat of the enemy was known, the allied army was put
in motion to follow him; his movement was, however, so rapid, that he
was not overtaken till within a few miles of Santarem. The rear guard
was pushed over the bridge in front of that place, where it took up a
strong and formidable position.

Lord Wellington had not pursued the enemy with the whole of his force;
suspecting, that it might, in the first instance, be the intention of
Massena to move round Monte Junto, he retained Major General Picton’s
division in its position at Torres Vedras; he afterwards detached
Lieutenant General Hill with the corps under his orders across the Tagus
at Valada, with a view of communicating with Abrantes, which it might be
the intention of the French to attack, and also to protect the Alemtejo
from any offensive operation.

The rest of the army was brought opposite to Santarem. Lord Wellington
having received a report from Major General Fane, that the baggage of
the French army was retiring towards Thomar, conceived that Massena was
altogether falling back; with this idea he determined to attack what
appeared to be his rear guard, which was placed upon a small river, the
Rio Mayor. A disposition with this view was made; a part of Brigadier
General Pack’s brigade was to have passed, supported by a detachment of
cavalry, on the right of the French position, about a mile beyond it;
Sir William Erskine’s brigade, supported by the Guards, was to have
stormed the bridge; while Major General Crawford, with the light
division, was to have attacked the enemy’s left, and along the Tagus to
have menaced the rear of his advanced position. The rain, which had been
very heavy during the preceding days, had, however, so much swelled the
river where Brigadier General Pack was to have passed, that it was found
impracticable; the enemy also appearing in considerable force, the
operation was given up; Lord Wellington still determining to adhere to
his defensive system, and deciding rather to fall back again upon his
lines than seek the French army, or give it an opportunity of meeting
him upon any thing like equal terms.

Massena continued the succeeding days to strengthen his position at
Santarem; Lord Wellington retained only his light division in front of
it, and placed the rest of his army in echellons to the rear. The
head-quarters were placed at Cartaxo; Sir Brent Spencer, with the Guards
and Major General Cameron’s brigade, in the same place; Lieutenant
General Cole’s division at Azambujo; Major General Leith’s at Alcoentre;
Major General A. Campbell’s at Alemquer; Major General Picton’s at
Torres Vedras, and the Spaniards at Villa-Franca. Massena threw a bridge
over the Zezere at its confluence with the Tagus, as if with the
intention of passing a corps for the siege of Abrantes; he was
contented, however, with reconnoitring that place, which he never after
molested. He placed his army in cantonments stretching as far back as
Thomar, Torres Novas, and Alcanede; and in this situation, protected by
the position at Santarem, remained in quiet, apparently awaiting
reinforcements and orders how to proceed. Lord Wellington saw this with
perfect indifference; he was persuaded that the more the enemy was
reinforced the greater would be his suffering, and the less the general
advantage to his cause in the Peninsula. He determined, therefore, to
undertake no operation to prevent it, nor any other which could either
cause him risk, or could draw him from his general system of defensive
measures.

From this period, the 12th of November 1810, to the 4th of March, 1811,
both armies retained their respective positions; the only events of any
importance, were the arrival of the 9th corps of 10,000 men, commanded
by General Cte. Erlon, which was placed by Massena to protect his right
at Leyria; and the junction of 5,000 men, who were brought by General
Foy upon his return from Paris, where he had been sent by Massena, soon
after his arrival opposite our lines, to render an account of the
operations of the French army, and of its situation. Buonaparte received
the relation of these events with much indifference; and observed upon
the excuses General Foy was directed to make, for the loss of the battle
of Busaco, “Ah bah! les Anglais de tout temps ont battu les Français.”

General Gardane, in attempting to carry a corps of 3,000 men to join
Massena, was driven back by some Portuguese militia. General Claparede
posted himself, with a corps of 8,000 men, in the environs of Guarda;
from whence he had several actions with the irregulars in that part of
the country, by whom the communication of the French army with Spain had
been totally cut off.

During the whole of this period, the French subsisted solely on the
plunder of the country they occupied. The irregular manner in which this
mode of obtaining supplies was conducted, led to the perpetration of the
most revolting atrocities. Torture inflicted upon the inhabitants, to
extract from them the secret of their depôts of provisions and property,
was one of the expedients most common to the French soldiery. The murder
of the peasantry seemed to be committed without remorse; the capture of
the women was converted often into a source of profit. Nothing more
revolting to the mind of civilized man can be produced, than the list of
horrors committed during this lamentable period.

Buonaparte directed Massena to continue his occupation of Portugal, till
he could operate with Marshals Mortier and Soult, (to whom he had given
orders to advance into the Alemtejo,) and thence combine their movements
for an attack on Lord Wellington. In conformity with these views,
Marshal Mortier arrived in the beginning of January in Spanish
Estremadura; he soon after captured Olivenza, and laid siege to Badajos.
Lord Wellington, upon the first notice of these movements, had detached
the Spanish corps which had joined him in the lines, to reinforce the
corps of General Mendizabel, which was already destined to the
protection of these places; he, at the same time, strongly recommended
that officer not to fight a battle, but, by taking up a defensive
position, (which he pointed out to him,) to give every assistance to the
defence of Badajos, and the other fortresses in that quarter.

Unfortunately for Spain, for the interests of the allies, and for those
persons who, acquainted with the Marquis of Romana, loved and cherished
him for the virtues which adorned his character, he had expired in the
beginning of January at Cartaxo; less able hands were now intrusted with
the army he had commanded. On the 19th of January, General Mendizabel
was attacked in a position close to Badajos by the French army which was
besieging it, and totally defeated. Mortier, from that moment, pushed on
without interruption the operations of the siege. The place surrendered
on the 11th of March, notwithstanding the governor was informed by
telegraph that a strong corps of the allied army was coming to his
relief, and that Massena was already on his retreat from Santarem. It is
a fact worthy of remark, that, in the articles of capitulation for this
place, it was stipulated that the garrison should march out by the
breach; but when this came to be examined; it was found so far from
practicable, that it was necessary to employ some time to make it fit
for the passage of the troops. The garrison was stronger than the corps
which besieged it; so that taking all the circumstances into
consideration, the giving up this important fortress was as
extraordinary as it was disastrous.

Throughout the month of February, Lord Wellington had been looking out
with great anxiety for a reinforcement from England, which was, coming
to him, and which, by the unfavourable state of the weather, had been
unusually delayed, and did not arrive till the 7th of March. The
distressed state of the French army, as well as the menaced movement of
Soult and Mortier, had determined him, upon the arrival of this
reinforcement, (which amounted to 7,000 English,) to attack; and his
plans for this purpose were already decided upon.

The night of the 4th of March, however, put an end to this project:
Massena broke up from all his positions, and commenced his retreat. The
country he had occupied was totally exhausted; his army could no longer
subsist in it. The sickness and misery the French had suffered, together
with the hostility of the peasants, had considerably reduced their
numbers. Lord Wellington had triumphed in his calculations; without the
loss of a single man, he had obliged the enemy, weakened and
disheartened, to abandon all his objects.

Massena, after having previously moved off his sick and baggage upon the
road to the Peunte de Marcella, directed his effective army upon Pombal,
where it appeared he had intended to fight a battle; some altercation is
stated to have taken place here, between him and the Count Erlon; that
officer having received instructions to act in Spain, insisted upon
being allowed to retire from Portugal, and immediately commenced his
movement to effect that object. Lord Wellington had on the 11th,
concentrated a part of his army opposite Pombal; the enemy was driven
from it, and the next day was attacked at Redinha, from the positions
about which place he was also obliged to retire with considerable loss:
from thence he was pushed upon Condeixa, where, appearing to take up his
ground as if to defend it, Lord Wellington instantly detached a corps to
menace his left, and his communication with Miranda do Corvo. This had
the desired effect; Marshal Ney, who commanded the French rear-guard,
retired upon Miranda, thus abandoning the chance of occupying Coimbra
(which was without defence,) or of retaining any advanced position in
Portugal.

To the activity and vigour with which Lord Wellington pushed the French
army, this advantage was entirely due; Massena conceived that an officer
who, for so long a period, had acted with so much caution, would never
seriously venture to disturb his retreat; he had, therefore, relied upon
being able to conduct it at his own discretion: when he found, on the
contrary, that he was most vigorously attacked, he was obliged to
precipitate his movements. To this alone can be attributed his having
been unable to ascertain that there was no garrison in Coimbra, a
position to which it appears he was anxious to have led his army.

Lord Wellington pursued the enemy, and obliged him precipitately to
abandon Miranda do Corvo, leaving a great part of his baggage, and
destroying, at Foz d’Arouse, a considerable number of his carts and
baggage-horses. Ney took up a position on the Ciera; but having left a
considerable part of his advanced guard on the left bank of that river,
it was vigorously attacked by the allies, and, in complete disorder, and
with great loss, driven into the main position. A French eagle was taken
in the river, into which, in the hurry of defeat, a considerable number
of the enemy had been precipitated, and drowned.

On the 17th, Massena formed his army in a strong position behind the
Alva, occupying the Puente de Marcella, and the heights along the banks
of that river. Believing himself secure in this formidable position, he
had sent out detachments from the different corps, to collect
provisions; but Lord Wellington passed the Alva on the left of the
French army, and obliged it to retire without having reassembled the
parties sent out to forage, a considerable number of which were taken.

The whole of these operations were conducted with the most transcendent
skill and ability; whenever the enemy halted to defend himself he was
out-manœuvred, and driven from his ground; he was constantly attacked
and beaten. Besides the loss in battle, his stragglers, his sick and
wounded, and a considerable part of his baggage, became a prey to the
allied army.

Lord Wellington was now obliged, for a moment, to give up the active
pursuit he had hitherto maintained. His army had out-marched its
supplies; he was forced to give time for them to join him; he had
besides been obliged to detach a considerable force into the Alemtejo,
which, having reduced his numbers below those of the enemy, forced him
to proceed with caution.

When Massena commenced his retreat, Lord Wellington had decided to send
the second British division, together with that of General Hamilton of
Portuguese, with the 13th Light Dragoons, and a Portuguese brigade of
cavalry, to protect the Alemtejo, and to oblige Mortier to raise the
siege of Badajos; a part of this corps having, however, passed to the
north of the Tagus at Abrantes, and driven the enemy from the Zezere at
Punhete, its march to the southward was delayed till Lord Wellington,
receiving intelligence of the surrender of Badajos, was obliged to add
to this force the 4th division, under Lieutenant-General Cole, and the
heavy brigade of British cavalry, under Major-General De Grey. This
immense detachment from his army was rendered necessary from the very
great importance of defending the southern frontier of Portugal, while
the remainder of his forces pursued the enemy in the north. It was
intrusted to the command of Marshal Beresford, and began its march
towards Portalegre and Campo Mayor on the 17th. Lord Wellington
considered the possession of Badajos as of the greatest importance to
his future operations; and therefore directed Marshal Beresford, if
possible, to invest it before the enemy should have had time to repair
the fortifications, and provision it. This object was unfortunately not
accomplished; and the recapture of that fortress, at a later period, was
most dearly purchased.

After a few days’ halt upon the Alva, the allied troops continued the
pursuit of Massena’s army; it had taken a position at Guarda, where it
appeared determined to defend itself. The ground about that town is
extremely strong; being at a considerable height, it commands the
country around it, and is most difficult of access. Massena had availed
himself of these advantages, and hoped to maintain his army, protected
by them, within the frontier of Portugal. He had held out this hope to
Buonaparte, and therefore made every disposition within his means to
secure his object; but Lord Wellington, on the 27th, in the morning, had
manœuvred with seven columns, so as to turn him on every side, and
having gained possession of his position, to force him to a precipitate
retreat; a brigade of French infantry, under General Maucune, was near
being taken, and the whole French army was driven across the Coa.
Massena here made a last effort to maintain some footing within the
frontiers of the country, of which he had so triumphantly predicted the
entire conquest; he placed his army along the Coa, and in occupation of
Sabugal; he was attacked, however, on the 2d of April; his hopes were
blasted; he was driven into Spain. Lord Wellington had directed the
light division to pass the Coa on the left, and in rear of General
Regnier’s corps, while two divisions attacked in front; from the badness
of the weather, a battalion of the Rifle Corps, under Colonel Beckwith,
was deceived in the ford at which it was to cross, and got engaged alone
for a considerable time with almost the whole of the French force.
Colonel Beckwith, at the moment of being charged by the French cavalry,
took advantage of a stone enclosure, from whence he defended himself
with the most distinguished gallantry; an opportunity offering, he
charged and took a howitzer, which he maintained; and, after having
caused a severe loss to the enemy, was relieved by the arrival of the
rest of the light division, and afterwards of the other corps which had
been destined to the attack. Regnier was obliged to retire with great
precipitation, leaving a considerable number of killed and wounded, and
losing many prisoners on his march to Alfaiates, where he entered the
Spanish territory.

Thus were the last of Massena’s troops chased from the country, of which
they still maintained the pompous appellation. “The Army of Portugal,”
was yet the title they were distinguished by, though they could boast of
that country but as the scene of disaster and defeat; and out of which,
with the loss of half their numbers, they had been driven headlong,
leaving only the sad remembrance of the atrocities they had committed.

Lord Wellington having reconnoitred Almeida, decided immediately to
blockade it; having appointed the corps for that purpose, and
distributed the rest of his army in cantonments, he went to the
Alemtejo, to visit the army commanded by Marshal Beresford. This force
had arrived at Campo Mayor on the 25th of March; the town had, two days
before, after a spirited resistance, surrendered to the enemy, but the
wretched state of its defences obliged Marshal Mortier to abandon it on
the approach of the allies. The advanced guard, composed of the 13th
Light Dragoons, and some Portuguese cavalry, came up with the enemy’s
convoy, protected by a corps of cavalry, three battalions of infantry,
and a brigade of artillery, as it was retiring to Badajos; Colonel Head
charged the French cavalry, defeated it, and drove it to the gates of
Badajos; from the walls of which place the 13th Light Dragoons suffered
some loss, having, in the ardour of the pursuit, exposed themselves to
the fire from them.

The heavy brigade of British cavalry, composed of the 3d Dragoon Guards,
and the 4th Dragoons, came up to the French infantry soon after this
charge had taken place; but at the moment of attacking it, were halted
by Marshal Beresford, who, in doubt of the event of the charge made by
the 13th, did not venture to expose the rest of his cavalry to any risk.
This infantry therefore was allowed to move off without molestation; and
in the night the French were enabled to carry into Badajos a great part
of the guns, stores, and ammunition, which, in the charge of the 13th
Dragoons, had been taken in the morning. The result of this affair,
after so brilliant a commencement, was unfortunate; the return of the
infantry was a considerable reinforcement to a garrison we were about,
to attack; and the artillery, stores, and provisions were objects of the
first necessity to its defence.

The French having thus been driven over the Guadiana, Marshal Beresford
sought as early as possible to pass that river, to invest Badajos,
according to the instructions he had received. He was delayed, however,
by the state of the river, and his unwillingness to risk its passage,
without having previously secured his after communications across it; so
that he did not effectually establish himself on the left bank, till the
6th and 7th of April, by which time the enemy had provisioned and
repaired the place, and Marshal Mortier (leaving it in a state of
defence,) had retired with his corps towards Seville.

The blockade of Badajos was immediately established; and
Lieutenant-General Cole was directed to conduct the siege of Olivenza,
which, having only a garrison of 370 men, was surrendered at discretion
on the 15th.

Immediately after this event, and while Marshal Beresford was preparing
for the attack of Badajos, Lord Wellington arrived. He was strongly
impressed with the importance of this fortress to his future plans, in
the new system of warfare which the late events had laid open to him.
Snatched from him at the moment all his other calculations had
triumphed, it had already been most detrimental to his general success.
By the large detachment he had been obliged to make from his army, in
consequence of its fall, it had prevented his more vigorous pursuit of
Massena, and had destroyed his hope of undertaking the blockade of
Ciudad Rodrigo (as well as that of Almeida,) before it could be
re-victualled, and placed in a state of defence; and it still menaced,
as long as it remained in the hands of the French, to curb all his
offensive movements into Spain, by protecting their positions in the
south of the country, and by enabling them at all times to threaten the
southern provinces of Portugal.

Lord Wellington found the army of Marshal Beresford in possession of the
whole of Estremadura; an affair of cavalry which had taken place at
Usagre, in which the 3d Dragoon Guards had most gallantly charged and
defeated the French, had, terminated their attempt to maintain
themselves within it. Lord Wellington immediately reconnoitred Badajos
with two battalions of infantry, and some Portuguese cavalry; a sharp
affair was engaged by these troops with part of the garrison, but he
effected his purpose, and decided to besiege the place, and fixed upon
such points to attack as he hoped would lead to the capture of the
fortress within fourteen or sixteen days. He had neither the means nor
the time to undertake a regular siege; besieging artillery, stores, and
ammunition could all be but very inefficiently supplied from Elvas, the
only depôt from whence they could be drawn; and it was evident that
Soult would make every effort to prevent the capture of the place, and
that he would, in about three weeks, be able to collect an army strong
enough to attempt its relief.

The heights of St. Christobal, on the right of the Guadiana, seemed to
offer a favourable _emplacement_ for the establishment of batteries to
protect an attack on the old castle; it was therefore decided to carry,
if possible, the fort which occupied them, and afterwards, from that
position, to endeavour to destroy the defences of the castle, while its
walls should be breached from the batteries in the plain below, and on
the left of the river. Preparations were immediately made to carry this
plan into effect, which Lord Wellington hoped would be in operation on
the 24th. The movements of Massena recalled him to the north; he
therefore left the prosecution of the siege to Marshal Beresford,
recommending, if the enemy attempted to disturb him, to fight a battle,
rather than be driven from his object.

The commencement of the siege was most unfortunately delayed by the
swelling of the Guadiana on the 24th, and the consequent destruction of
the bridge across it, till the 8th of May, when Major-General Lumley
completed the investment on the right of that river, Major-General Sir
W. Stewart having previously effected it on the left. The means provided
for the siege were found very unequal to the undertaking; before any
progress could be made, Marshal Soult had collected his army as had been
anticipated; on the night of the 15th, the attack of the place was
discontinued, and the troops marched to Albuhera, where, on the 16th,
Marshal Beresford obtained a signal victory over the French army.

Lord Wellington returned to his head-quarters at Villa Formoso on the
28th of April. Massena had collected his army at Ciudad Rodrigo; it
consisted of the 2d, 6th, 8th, and 9th corps, with the cavalry and
artillery which belonged to them, and of 1,500 cavalry of the Imperial
Guard, commanded by the Duke of Istria. The whole force amounted to
40,000 men, the remnant of the army of Portugal, which, six months
before, had counted above 90,000 rank and file.

Lord Wellington saw the approach of the enemy without dismay; the French
force was superior to his own,—its object, the relief of Almeida. To
thwart this attempt it was necessary to accept a battle; and, from the
situation of Almeida, on the right of the Coa, the position to defend
the approach to it must necessarily be taken up in front of the town,
thus having the river in rear of the allied army. The banks of the Coa
are extremely steep; there are few fords at which it can be passed, none
in the part of it near Almeida serviceable for an army: the bridge over
it, under the guns of that fortress, is extremely narrow, and at the
time was nearly impassable. The bridge at Castel de Bom was also a most
difficult communication. From Ciudad Rodrigo a road leads to Sabugal,
where there is another bridge over the Coa, which, in case of defeat,
might have served the allied army to retire over. Lord Wellington
(though not entirely from his own conviction) determined to take up a
defensive position, covering both the approach to Almeida, and the road
to Sabugal. He perceived, from the beginning, that this double object
was more than the forces he had with him might be able to maintain; the
extension to the road above mentioned weakened his position; whereas, he
was persuaded that, by confining himself to the protection of Almeida
alone, he could bid defiance to the enemy. The object, however, of
defending the entry by Sabugal into Portugal, and of securing a second
road to retire upon, was not without mature consideration to be given
up; and Lord Wellington felt convinced, that if the necessity of so
doing should arise, he could always withdraw his army to the more
concentrated position.

With these views Lord Wellington took up the ground along the Duas
Casas. He placed the fifth division on his extreme left, near the fort
of La Conception, to defend the great road to Almeida, which crosses the
river at a ford immediately in front of that fortification. The light
and sixth divisions he placed opposite to the village of Almada; the
first, third, and seventh, were placed in rear of Fuentes d’Honor, with
the light infantry of the third division and of the brigades of
Major-Generals Nightingale and Howard occupying the village, supported
by a battalion of the German Legion, the 2d battalion of the 83d, and
the 71st and 79th Regiments. A Spanish corps, under Don Julian Sanches,
was posted on the extreme right, at Nava d’Aver. Brigadier-General Pack,
with a brigade of Portuguese infantry and the 2d British or Queen’s
Regiment, blockaded Almeida.

Massena advanced from Ciudad Rodrigo on the 2d of May; and our troops
having retired from the Agueda, he arrived, on the 3d, opposite to the
position occupied by the allied army. In the evening he made a desperate
attempt to carry the village of Fuentes d’Honor; but after a severe
contest, most gallantly maintained, his troops were totally repulsed.
Defeated with considerable loss in his first attempt, he spent the whole
of the 4th in reconnoitring our position. Lord Wellington penetrated his
intention of attacking the right of the allied army, and in the night
moved the seventh division to Porco Velho, the only ford at which the
enemy could cross the Duas Casas, and where the banks of that river
opposed but a trifling obstacle to his advance.

On the morning of the 5th, the eighth corps was discovered opposite to
this village, and preparing to attack it; Lord Wellington moved the
light division to support the seventh, while he directed the first and
third divisions to occupy some high ground between the Turon and Duas
Casas rivers; thus observing the sixth and ninth corps of the French
army, which had made a movement to their left, and had approached the
ground occupied by the eighth corps.

Massena began the action of this day by an attack on the advanced guard
of the seventh division; which, overpowered by numbers, was obliged to
retire, giving up the village of Porco Velho. The French cavalry, under
General Montbrun, (which had already driven Don Julian Sanches from Nava
d’Aver) charged with a very superior force the cavalry of the allies,
and though (in the first rencontre) its advance was driven back, yet it
afterwards succeeded in penetrating to the infantry, which, supported in
the most gallant manner by the artillery, received the French cavalry
and repulsed it with considerable loss. At this moment Lord Wellington
decided to withdraw his army into the more concentrated position, to
which from the beginning he had felt inclined to confine himself.

He directed the light and seventh divisions, supported by the cavalry,
to retire and to take up the ground extending from the Duas Casas
towards Frenada, on the Coa. This movement, as bold as it was decisive,
was executed with the greatest precision; the enemy could make no
impression on the allied columns while on their march, and the new
position, at right angles with the old one, was taken up with perfect
regularity. Massena declined making any attempt on the troops now formed
on their new alignement; he confined his efforts for the remainder of
the day to successive attacks, made by the sixth corps, upon Fuentes
d’Honor; the contest was most severe in this quarter, and lasted till
night, when, with great loss on both sides, the allied troops, having
completely repulsed the enemy, retained possession of this most
obstinately disputed village.

So terminated this memorable action, the only one throughout the whole
war in which the enemy had to boast of a momentary success against the
allies; the ground at Porco Velho, from which the advance of the seventh
division was obliged to retire, afforded no decisive position, and if
the French infantry had been attacking at the moment of the charge of
cavalry under General Montbrun, our loss in the retreat to the new
alignement might have been considerably greater. Not such, however, as
the French officers assert; the novelty of an advantage to them was so
great, that on our change of position they predicted the entire
destruction of the allied army; and although these hopes were so
blasted, that they dared not afterwards make a single movement in attack
upon us, yet they still persuaded themselves, that if the proper moment
had been seized, we were in total confusion, and must inevitably have
been defeated.

The British army can seldom be calculated upon to verify such
predictions; if the French had attempted to pursue, they would, as on
other occasions of the same nature, have had more to repent than to
boast of[4]. The message of General Foy to Buonaparte, before the action
of Waterloo, “that in the whole war in the Peninsula, the French had
never once beaten the British infantry,” would have been as true in its
application to any attack made at the moment above alluded to, as it
proved to be in the tremendous battle of Mont Saint Jean.

Footnote 4:

  See Book the 5th, Chapter 1st of Sir Walter Raleigh’s _History of the
  World_, “where, in deciding this controversie, whether the Macedonian
  or the Roman were the best warriors,” he answers, “the Englishman,”
  and quotes the French historian, who says, “The English comes with a
  conquering bravery, as he that was accustomed to gain every where
  without any stay.”

Defeated in all his projects, Massena, on the morning of the 6th,
withdrew his troops from the front of the allied position, and, having
given up all hope of forcing his way to Almeida, confined his views to a
simple communication with the place, directing General Brenier to
evacuate and destroy it. The French army remained in a position opposite
the allies till the 10th, when it retired to Ciudad Rodrigo. Lord
Wellington had employed the time since the battle of the 5th, in
entrenching his new position, and had rendered it so strong that the
enemy did not make any attempt against it. Marshal Marmont arrived on
the 7th, and soon after superseded Marshal Massena in his command.

As soon as the French army had retired, Lord Wellington made
arrangements to secure Almeida; aware of the distressed situation of
that place, he detached General Campbell, on the 10th, to resume the
blockade, and to relieve Brigadier-General Pack. In the night of the
same day, however, at 11 o’clock, General Brenier, having previously
destroyed the defences of the place, marched out at the head of his
garrison, and, taking the road to Barba del Puerco, forced his way
through the pickets of the allies, and with the loss of not more than
200 men escaped to the French army. There were a variety of
circumstances which favoured this undertaking. The order for the march
of the 4th Regiment upon Almeida had been delayed by Sir W. Erskine; the
2d queen’s Regiment, not believing the enemy had escaped, remained on
their position; the orderly drummer of the 36th Regiment was not at
General Campbell’s quarters to give the alarm, and this regiment did
not, in consequence, overtake the enemy so soon as it otherwise might
have done. Brigadier General Pack, having been relieved by General
Campbell, had gone from his quarters, and, during his absence, Colonel
Campbell had marched his brigade to more distant villages; when
Brigadier General Pack returned, he found General Campbell in possession
of the house he had occupied, but as it was 9 o’clock he remained there
for the night; he joined the pickets of his brigade, which were still on
duty, on the first alarm, and at the point where the enemy had forced
the chain. He immediately pursued with from 30 to 40 men, but this force
was totally insufficient to give any serious disturbance to the enemy.
The 4th and 36th Regiments did not arrive at Barba del Puerco till
day-light: at this moment Brenier was passing the bridge, and
immediately afterwards joined the French corps which was stationed there
to receive him.

By this event the operations in Portugal were brought to a close; that
country was delivered from the enemy, and was freed for ever after from
his odious oppression.

The glorious and transcendent services of Lord Wellington were duly
appreciated throughout the kingdom; his name was blest, and to the
latest posterity will be handed down in that country with grateful
recollection. He was hailed as one to whom a whole people owed their
emancipation. The governors vied with the governed in expressing to him
their admiration of the exalted achievements which had immortalized his
name, and which had sustained the honour of the combined armies.

Lord Wellington, immediately after the capture of Almeida, detached two
divisions to the southern army, and soon after proceeded himself to join
Marshal Beresford.

He arrived at his head-quarters after the battle of Albuhera had been
fought, and as soon as the means could be collected, commenced a second
time the siege of Badajos.

The detail of these events which followed the deliverance of Portugal,
does not, however, belong to the present work. To describe the capture
of the important fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, in the face
of superior armies, and the destruction of that of Almaraz, by which the
armies of Marmont and Soult were connected; to follow Lord Wellington
through the brilliant operations which led to the battle of Salamanca,
and to the re-conquest of Madrid and all the southern provinces of
Spain; to trace the execution of that magnificent movement, by which,
all the French defences in the northern provinces of Spain being turned
without a blow, their armies were completely overthrown, with the loss
of all their cannon and baggage, at the battle of Vittoria, and Spain,
like Portugal, was delivered from foreign rule—these glorious
transactions must be left to others to record. They will be handed down,
with the rest of those great events which have distinguished the
triumphant career of Lord Wellington, as a beacon to guide hereafter all
military men in the pursuit of fame, combined with justice, with
moderation, and with virtue.


                                THE END.


  London: Printed by W. CLOWES,
      Northumberland-court.


------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                         NOVEMBER, 1827.




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                          TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


 1. The advertising section was moved from the beginning of the book to
      the end.
 2. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in spelling.
 3. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as printed.
 4. Footnotes were re-indexed using numbers.
 5. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.