Transcriber's Notes:

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_ and bold text by
  =equal signs=.

  Small uppercase have been replaced with regular uppercase.

  Blank pages have been eliminated.

  Variations in spelling and hyphenation have been left as in the
  original.




[Illustration: From painting in Navy Department by R. S. Meryman]




                            OUR NAVY AT WAR


                                  BY


                           JOSEPHUS DANIELS
                         SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
                             1913 to 1921


                            [Illustration]


              Illustrated with Reproductions of Original
                       and Official Photographs


                           Pictorial Bureau
                           Washington, D. C.
                                 1922




                             COPYRIGHT BY
                           PICTORIAL BUREAU
                                 1922




                   _To the Six Hundred Thousand Men_

                 _Who Served in the United States Navy
                        and Marine Corps in the
                              World War_


_Manning more than two thousand vessels--_

_Operating with Allied Navies from the Arctic to the Adriatic--_

_Transporting troops and supplies across the Atlantic--_

_Protecting ships from attack and destruction--_

_Driving off and defeating the murderous submarines, You made safe the
seas, and Kept open the Road to France, so that, Of all the vast Army
sent overseas, Not one soldier on an American troop-ship Lost his life
on the way to France._

_Fighting with the Army, your comrades, The Soldiers of the Sea, won
fame in Hard-fought battles that saved Paris, Drove back the German
hordes, and Won for Humanity Complete and Glorious Victory._


_In recognition of your splendid service, your dauntless deeds, this
work is dedicated by one who was sometime your commander and always
your shipmate._




CONTENTS


  CHAPTER      PAGE

       I. When the War Call Came                        1

      II. "To Be Strong Upon the Seas"                  9

     III. The Break with Germany                       19

      IV. The Day of Decision                          30

       V. Sending Sims to Europe                       36

      VI. Naval Allies in Historic Conference          45

     VII. "We Are Ready Now, Sir"                      53

    VIII. Race Between Wilson and Hindenburg           70

      IX. The Fleet the Kaiser Built for Us            89

       X. Guarding the Coast of France                 99

      XI. Gibraltar and the Convoy                    116

     XII. Shutting up the Hornets in Their Nests      125

    XIII. President Wilson as a Strategist            143

     XIV. Comrades of the Mist                        151

      XV. Cinderellas of the Fleet                    161

     XVI. "Do Not Surrender"--"Never"                 173

    XVII. When the U-Boats Came to America            187

   XVIII. Marines Stopped Drive on Paris              206

     XIX. The Answer to the 75-Mile Gun               218

      XX. The Navy That Flies                         228

     XXI. The Ferry to France                         241

    XXII. Radio Girdled the Globe                     250

   XXIII. A Surprise for Count von Luxburg            259

    XXIV. American Admiral Saved Kolchak              268

     XXV. The Half-Way House                          275

    XXVI. To Victory on a Sea of Oil                  280

   XXVII. Edison--and 100,000 More                    285

  XXVIII. Building a Thousand Ships                   297

    XXIX. Making Sailors out of Landsmen              309

     XXX. Three Hundred Thousand Strong               318

    XXXI. Women in the Navy                           328

   XXXII. Coast Guard Wins Distinction                332

  XXXIII. Winning the First Battle of the War         341

   XXXIV. Fighting the Profiteers                     347

    XXXV. "Sirs, All Is Well with the Fleet"          354

   XXXVI. After the Armistice                         366




ILLUSTRATIONS


  Josephus Daniels                                      _Frontispiece_

                                                           FACING PAGE

  War Chiefs of the Navy, the Secretary and his Advisory
  Council                                                           16

  A Friendly Bout                                                   17

  School Hour Aboard a Battleship                                   17

  President Wilson and the War Cabinet                              32

  American Dreadnoughts, the Embodiment of Sea Power                33

  American Destroyers in Queenstown Harbor                          52

  The Return of the Mayflower                                       53

  The Surrender of the U-58                                         58

  Crew of the Fanning, which sank the U-58                          59

  They, Too, Were Ready                                             67

  The Seattle and Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves                       68

  A Dash through the Danger Zone                                    68

  The Sinking of the President Lincoln                              80

  The Secretary of the Navy with Captain Dismukes and the
  men who saved the Mount Vernon                                    81

  The Mount Vernon safely in port after being torpedoed             81

  Brest, Center of the Great System of Naval Operations in
  France                                                           112

  A German "Sub" and Some of its Enemies                           113

  At Gibraltar, Key to the Mediterranean                           124

  The Great Mine Barrage against the Submarines                    125

  Planting Mines in the North Sea                                  128

  How the Big Mines in the North Sea Barrage Worked                129

  One of the Perils of Mine-Sweeping                               136

  The Mine-Sweepers Proved Wonderful Sea Boats                     136

  United States Naval Officers in Important Commands               137

  American and British Naval Officials                             137

  The Transport which carried President Wilson to the Peace
  Conference                                                       144

  Allied Naval Council in Session at Paris                         145

  Fifth Battle Squadron Joining the British Grand Fleet            160

  Surrender of the German High Seas Fleet                          161

  American Sub-chasers at Corfu, Greece                            168

  A Flock of Sub-chasers with their Mother-ship                    169

  Gun-crew of the Luckenbach has a Four-Hour Fight with a
  Submarine                                                        192

  Chief Gunner's Mate Delaney, of the Campana, Defying his
  Captors                                                          192

  The Merchant Submarine Deutschland                               193

  Leaders of the Marines                                           208

  The Marines in Belleau Wood                                      209

  Naval Railway Battery Firing from Thierville upon Longuyon       224

  On the Turret Platform of a Battleship                           225

  Assembling Naval Airplanes at Brest                              228

  A Navy Blimp Leaving Hangar at Guipavas, France                  229

  Naval Aviation Hangars at Guipavas                               229

  Pauillac, Naval Aviation Station                                 240

  Fliers whose Exploits Brought Prestige to Naval Aviation         241

  The Station Whose Messages are Heard around the World            256

  The Tablet on the Main Building of the Lafayette Radio
  Station                                                          257

  Eagle Boats at Anchor in the Ice of the White Sea                274

  The Half-Way House                                               275

  The Naval Consulting Board and the Navy Department Chiefs        288

  Secretary Daniels and Thomas A. Edison                           289

  Fitting Out for Distant Service                                  304

  Hanging up a Record                                              305

  The Living Flag                                                  320

  United States Naval Academy at Annapolis                         321

  Yeomen (F) in Liberty Loan Parade, New York City                 328

  Cyclops, the Collier which Disappeared without Leaving a
  Trace                                                            329

  Lost with Every Man on Board (Coast Guard Cutter Tampa)          336

  They Saved Survivors of Torpedoed Vessels                        337

  Gallant Officers of the Coast Guard                              337

  A General View of Bantry Bay                                     352

  A Close-up View of American "Subs" at Berehaven                  352

  Rodman and Beatty                                                353

  From Manila to the Adriatic                                      368

  Scorpion, only American Naval Vessel Interned during the
  War                                                              369




Our Navy at War




CHAPTER I

WHEN THE WAR CALL CAME

  NEWS FLASHED TO SHIPS AND STATIONS FIVE MINUTES AFTER PRESIDENT
  SIGNED DECLARATION--ENTIRE NAVY MOBILIZED AT ONCE--FLEET, ON WAR
  BASIS SINCE BREAK WITH GERMANY, WAS AT YORKTOWN--"IN BEST STATE OF
  PREPAREDNESS IT HAD EVER BEEN," ADMIRAL MAYO SAID--OFFICERS AND MEN
  EAGER FOR ACTION.


Five minutes after President Wilson signed the war resolution passed by
Congress April 6, 1917, the Navy's radio operators were flashing this
message to every ship and station:

  Sixteen Alnav. The President has signed act of Congress which
  declares a state of war exists between the United States and
  Germany. Acknowledge. 131106.

                                                       SECNAV.

That dispatch had been prepared hours before. Radio and telegraph
operators were at their keys waiting for the word to "let it go."
Lieutenant Commander Byron McCandless, my naval aide, was waiting in
the executive office at the White House. Lieutenant Commander Royal
Ingersoll was stationed at the Navy Department, across the street,
watching for the signal. The moment the President appended his
signature, McCandless rushed out and wigwagged that the resolution had
been signed. Ingersoll dashed down the corridor to the Communication
office, and ordered the operators to start the "alnav" (all navy)
dispatch.

Flashed from the towers at Arlington, in a few minutes it was received
by the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, by vessels and stations all along
the coast. By radio, telegraph and cable, the message was carried to
Panama, across the Pacific to Honolulu, the Philippines, to the vessels
on the Asiatic station. By the time the newspaper "extras" were on the
street, the naval forces had received notice that we were at war.

The fleet was mobilized that afternoon by the following telegram to the
five flagships:

  _U. S. S. Pennsylvania_
  _U. S. S. Minnesota_
  _U. S. S. Seattle_
  _U. S. S. Columbia_
  _U. S. S. Vestal_

  Flag Sigcode. Mobilize for war in accordance Department's
  confidential mobilization plan of March 21. Particular attention
  invited paragraphs six and eight. Acknowledge.

                                             JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

  [Paragraph 6 assigned the rendezvous of the various forces, and
  paragraph 8 contained instructions with regard to vessels fitting
  out at navy yards.]

When this message was received by the Atlantic Fleet, at 1:33 p. m.,
Admiral Henry T. Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, hoisted on his flagship, the
_Pennsylvania_, the signal, "War has commenced." At 5:50 o'clock he
received the mobilization order, for which officers and vessels were so
well prepared that Admiral Mayo said he did not have to "give a single
order of any kind or description to pass the Fleet from a peace to a
war basis." The entire Navy--Department, Fleet, yards and stations--was
on a war footing within a few hours after war was declared. Complete
instructions and plans, brought up to date, had been issued two weeks
previous, and mobilization was completed without an hour's delay.

The Fleet was at its secret rendezvous "Base 2," to which it had sailed
from Hampton Roads on April 3, the day after President Wilson delivered
his war message to Congress. "Base 2" was Yorktown, Va., one of the
most historic spots in America, and our battleships were in sight of
the place where Cornwallis surrendered to George Washington. They rode
at anchor in the waters where the timely arrival of De Grasse's ships
assured the success of the war for American independence.

In those waters, first made historic in naval annals by the presence
of the French ships sent to aid the struggling colonists in the
crucial days of 1781, the American Navy was making ready to repay that
invaluable assistance--to send its vessels to the beleaguered French
coast, both to safeguard the vast army America would send to France and
to drive back the onrushing enemies that threatened its life. In 1917
the York and the Chesapeake were again the rendezvous of fighting men
of the same mettle as those of 1781, who were to strengthen by united
service and common sacrifice in the World War the bonds of friendship
between France and America that had been forged more than a century
before.

And those who fought each other then were comrades now. "Old wars
forgot," Great Britain and France for years had held the lines, and
America was taking its place beside them, throwing all its power and
strength with them against the common foe. From Yorktown went the
first United States forces, ordered overseas just after war began.
Sent to England's aid, to serve with the British forces, their
arrival was hailed as the beginning of a new era in the relations
of the nations--the "Return of the Mayflower." And later went huge
dreadnaughts to the North Sea, joining the Grand Fleet in the mightiest
aggregation of naval power the world has ever seen.

That is a wonderful harbor, there in the York River, with water deep
enough for the largest battleship, and broad enough to accommodate a
whole fleet. With defenses at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, and nets,
mines and patrol across York River, no submarine could ever hope to
penetrate to this safe haven.

"When the active fleet arrived in Hampton Roads about the 1st of April,
after its training period in Cuban waters, it was in the best state of
preparedness that it had ever been," said Admiral Mayo, "and there was
a feeling of confidence in the personnel of being able to cope with any
emergency."

"At the end of March, 1917, when we were on the verge of entry into
the war," said Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, Director of Gunnery
Exercises, "the gunnery was in the highest state of efficiency that it
has been in the history of the American Navy."

When the break with Germany came the fleet was in Cuban waters, engaged
in target practice, engineering exercises, and battle maneuvers. This
intensive training had been going on under regular schedule for more
than two years. Every man in the fleet, from the Commander-in-Chief to
the youngest recruit, felt in his bones that the maneuvers that spring
were a real preparation for war. Eager to get a chance at the Germans,
confident that they could defeat any force of similar strength and
tonnage afloat; they were just waiting for the word "Go!"

Is there such a thing as mental telepathy! Would you call it that or a
mere coincidence, if the same thought at almost the same moment came
to the Admiral of the Fleet at Guantanamo and to the Chief of Naval
Operations in Washington? That is exactly what occurred on February 4,
1917. And the two dispatches stating the same conclusions in regard to
moving the fleet were en route at the same time.

At 3:59 o'clock that afternoon Admiral Mayo sent this message from his
flagship at Guantanamo:

  Unless instructions are received to the contrary, propose to shift
  fleet base to Gulf of Guacanayabo after spotting practice February
  5th; then proceed with schedule of all gunnery exercises.

Before that message reached Washington, in fact in less than ten
minutes after it was handed to the operator in Cuba, the following to
Admiral Mayo from Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Operations, was
being sent from the Department:

  Position of fleet well known to everybody. If considered advisable
  on account of submarines, shift base to Gulf of Guacanayabo or
  elsewhere at discretion. Inform Department confidentially.

The first duty was protection of the Fleet from submarine attack. Four
months before the U-53 had called at Newport, and sallying forth, had
sunk British vessels just off our coast. On January 16th a Japanese
steamer, the _Hudson Maru_, captured by Germans, a prize crew placed
on board, had put into Pernambuco with 287 survivors from half a dozen
vessels sunk by a German raider. That raider, as was learned later, was
the famous _Moewe_, which captured twenty-six vessels, sinking all
except the _Hudson Maru_ and the _Yarrowdale_, which carried several
hundred prisoners to Germany, among them fifty-nine American sailors.

The Germans could easily send their U-boats across the Atlantic. There
was a possibility that they might strike quickly without warning. Naval
strategists do not yet understand why Germany did not make an immediate
dash against our coasts in the spring of 1917, instead of waiting until
1918. Allied and American officers alike expected the submarines to
extend their operations to this side of the Atlantic when this country
entered the war. It was necessary to provide for the fleet a rendezvous
with which the Germans were not familiar, one easily defended, where
battleships could carry on their work free from attack until the time
came to bring them into action. But why Guacanayabo?

Though you would hardly notice it on the average map, the Gulf of
Guacanayabo is a sizeable body of water, extending in a sort of
semicircle some seventy miles, the broadest part about fifteen miles
wide. On the southern coast of Cuba, it extends from Santa Cruz del Sur
to below Manzanillo, nearly to Cape Cruz. With plenty of deep water
inside, once the main channel is closed, only a navigator familiar with
the turnings and depths can navigate safely through the other channels,
for the Gulf is surrounded by a chain of islands, with many shoals.
Difficult for submarines to negotiate submerged, it is easily defended
against them.

When Admiral Mayo had placed his ships in this landlocked harbor, shut
the door and turned the key, they were as safe as my lady's jewels in
a safety deposit vault. At Guacanayabo the fleet continued its work,
going out to sea for battle practice and long-range gunnery in the
daytime, returning at night to conduct night firing with the secondary
batteries, torpedo attack, and other exercises. There was even room
in the Gulf to carry on torpedo firing and defense at 10,000 yards
distance.

There the fleet remained until it was ordered north, on March 20th.
"I feel sure that if this force had engaged an enemy on its cruise
north in the spring of 1917, the victory would have been ours," said
Admiral Henry B. Wilson, commander of the flagship, and Admiral Joseph
Strauss, in command of the _Nevada_, declared: "In April, 1917, we
could have gone out in mid-ocean and engaged the German fleet and come
out successfully. Our ships were superior; our guns were superior; I
believe our morale was superior."

Upon the arrival of the fleet, Yorktown became the center of battle
training. During the entire war this base was one of the busiest places
in America. Every ship was carrying on intensive training day and
night--training gunners, engineers, firemen, deck officers and crews,
armed guards for merchant vessels, men of every rank and rating to man
transports, destroyers, patrol craft, and all the many vessels put into
European and trans-Atlantic service. In addition to new men in their
own crews, the special training squadron of older battleships trained
more than 45,000 officers and men for service in other vessels.

When the bugle sounded, they all wanted to get into action. They had
looked for the declaration of war as the signal to weigh anchor and
set sail for Europe. As the destroyers and patrol craft went overseas
and the cruisers plunged across the Atlantic escorting troop-ships
and convoys, those who were left behind envied those who had received
such assignments. But teaching recruits, tame and tiresome as it was,
was their job, most necessary and useful. Until they had their heart's
desire and were ordered abroad, they stuck to it with the vim and
determination with which they afterwards entered upon the U-boat chase.
That was the spirit that won.

Three thousand miles across the seas the men on the British Grand Fleet
were likewise eating their hearts out because the enemy dreadnaughts,
after the one dash at Jutland, were hugging the home ports, denying
to Allied naval forces the chance for which all other days had been
but preparation. All naval teaching for generations had instilled into
American and British youth the doctrine that, whereas battles on land
might continue for months, domination of the sea would be lost or won
in a few moments when the giant dreadnaughts engaged in a titanic duel.
German naval strategy, after the drawn battle at Jutland, defeated all
naval experience and expectation. Hiding behind their strong defenses,
never venturing forth in force, they imposed the strain and the
unexciting watchful waiting which more than anything else irks men who
long to put their mettle to the test by a decisive encounter.

The acme of happiness to the fleets at Yorktown and at Scapa Flow to
which all looked, both before and after the American division joined
the British Grand Fleet, was a battle royal where skill and courage
and modern floating forts would meet the supreme test. It was not to
be. The disappointment of both navies was scarcely lessened by the
knowledge that they had gained a complete victory through successful
methods which a different character of warfare brought into existence.
They wished the glorious privilege of sinking the ships in an
engagement rather than permitting the Germans later to scuttle them.
Admiral Beatty voiced the regret of both navies in his farewell address
to his American shipmates, when he said: "I know quite well that you,
as well as all of our British comrades, were bitterly disappointed
at not being able to give effect to that efficiency you have so well
maintained."

The sense of disappointment at the drab ending was heightened by the
belief entertained that there had been times when the bold and daring
offensive would have compelled a great naval battle. In Germany, fed
up for years on the claim of naval superiority and stuffed with fake
stories of a great German victory at Jutland, there had been demand
that their navy make proof of its worth by giving battle instead of
rusting in home ports. Men of the navies that had produced Nelsons, and
Farraguts and John Paul Joneses and Deweys grow restive under inaction.
They knew that the existence and readiness of the two great fleets
and of the French and Italian fleets held the German High Seas Fleet
in behind shore protection, rendering impotent the force Von Tirpitz
had assured Germany would sink enemy ships. But the dreary program of
blockade carried on during four long years was not to their liking.
It succeeded, but it was not the finish for which they had trained.
They longed to the very end for the real fight, the daring drive, the
bringing of their big guns into play, the final combat which could end
only with annihilation of the enemy's fleet.

Whatever may be said of the wisdom of the ancient prudent doctrine of
"a fleet in being," I shall always believe that, if, at the opportune
time, such fighting sailors as Beatty and Carpenter, Mayo and Rodman
and Wilson, could have joined in a combined assault, they would
have found a way or made one, to sink the German fleet, in spite of
Heligoland and all the frowning German guns.




CHAPTER II

"TO BE STRONG UPON THE SEAS"

  PRESIDENT IN 1914 LAID DOWN POLICY WHICH GUIDED THE NAVY IN
  YEARS OF PREPARATION--ON VERGE OF WAR IN 1916--FLEET PREPARED
  TO MOBILIZE--"DEUTSCHLAND" AND U-53 WARNED US TO EXPECT
  SUBMARINES--CONGRESS AUTHORIZED BUILDING OF 157 WARSHIPS--MERCHANT
  SHIPS LISTED, MUNITIONS ACCUMULATED, COUNTRY'S INDUSTRIES SURVEYED.


"We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas," declared President
Wilson in his annual message to Congress in December, 1914, and this
was the guiding policy in the years of preparation that preceded the
war. And the two years that followed were the busiest the Navy has ever
known in time of peace.

The United States was on the very verge of war a year before it was
declared. All preparations were made to mobilize the Fleet when
President Wilson, after the sinking of the _Sussex_, sent his ultimatum
to Germany declaring:

  Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and
  effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare
  against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government
  of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic
  relations with the German Empire altogether.

That note was despatched on April 18, 1916. Germany did not reply
promptly and in a few days the following order was issued:

                            NAVY DEPARTMENT

                                            Washington, April 27, 1916.

  CONFIDENTIAL.

  From: Chief of Naval Operations.

  Subject: Mobilization Plan.

  The following order had this day been approved by the Secretary of
  the Navy:

    "1. In case of mobilization for war in the Atlantic the
    organization of the naval forces will be as indicated in
    the mobilization sheets published from time to time by the
    Department.

    "2. Plans will be developed by all officers concerned for
    execution upon the receipt of the order to mobilize.

    "3. The order to mobilize when received will be construed as an
    order to take all necessary action for the rapid assembly of
    ships at the rendezvous in all respects ready for war service.

    "4. The rendezvous is designated as Chesapeake Bay."

  Copies of mobilization sheets are forwarded herewith.

All our battleships except three, and 40 of our 47 destroyers were
reported immediately available. Mobilization is the next step to actual
hostilities and is only justifiable when conditions are extremely
threatening. That was the case in the spring of 1916. In fact, what
threatened then was what actually occurred a year later.

The German Government in its note of May 4th met all Wilson's demands,
declaring it would do its utmost to confine the operations for the rest
of the war to the fighting forces of the belligerent. "Guided by this
idea," it notified the United States Government that the German naval
forces had received the following orders:

  In accordance with the general principles of visit and search
  and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international
  law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as
  naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without
  saving human lives, unless such ships attempt to escape or offer
  resistance.

It was not until Feb. 1, 1917, that Germany repudiated this pledge and
resumed ruthless U-boat warfare. But it did give us warning that it
could send its undersea craft to American waters whenever it chose.

If there ever had been any fancied security from their submarines,
it was removed that Sunday, July 9, 1916, when the _Deutschland_
bobbed up in Chesapeake Bay, and a few hours later reached her dock
in Baltimore. Coming from Bremen via Heligoland, it had made its way
through the North Sea and around Scotland, crossed the ocean and
entered Hampton Roads under the very noses of the British cruisers
just outside. Two hundred and thirteen feet long, with a displacement,
submerged, of 2,200 tons, it had a surface speed of 12 to 14 knots an
hour, and could run under water at 7-1/2 knots. Though unarmed, and
called a "mercantile submarine," by the placing of guns and torpedo
tubes aboard, she could be quickly converted into a man-of-war. The
_Deutschland_ came again to America in November, going to New London,
Conn., reaching Germany, on her return, December 10. This was her last
trip as a merchantman, for she was soon afterwards converted into
a warship, and was one of the submarines sent to sink shipping in
American waters in 1918.

Even more startling was the visit of the U-53. This German submarine,
almost as large as the _Deutschland_, suddenly appeared off Point
Judith and calmly steamed into Newport, R. I., the afternoon of
October 7th. Flying the German man-of-war ensign, she carried two guns
conspicuously placed. The cruiser _Birmingham_, Rear Admiral Albert
Gleaves commanding, was near by, and the U-53 asked to be assigned a
berth. Kapitän Leutnant Hans Rose, her commander, in full uniform,
called on the commandant of the Naval Station, stating that his object
in entering the port was to "pay his respects," and that he intended to
sail at 6 o'clock. He invited our officers to visit his ship, saying he
would be glad to "show them around." The crew seemed anxious to impress
the Americans with the boat and its mechanism.

While in port, the U-53 was careful not to violate neutrality
regulations, but the day after leaving Newport she began a slaughter of
vessels. On October 8th, she sank the British steamships _Stephano_,
_Strathdine_ and _West Point_, the Dutch steamer _Blommersdijk_, and
the Norwegian _Chr. Knudsen._ The first two were attacked within sight
of Nantucket Lightship, just outside the three-mile limit. The others
sunk were farther away, but all were near our coast.

The first news we had of this raid was that the American steamer
_Kansan_ had been stopped early in the morning by a German submarine,
which, after examining her papers, had allowed her to proceed. A short
time later a radio message was received stating that the British
steamer _West Point_ was being gunned. After that, distress signals
came thick and fast. Rear Admiral Gleaves immediately ordered our
destroyers to the relief of the vessels attacked, and they rescued
crews and passengers, bringing them safely to port.

Within seven or eight months those destroyers were across the Atlantic,
fighting the undersea raiders in European waters. And they had their
revenge in September, 1918, when an American destroyer and sub-chasers
bombed the U-53 with such effect that according to reports, she
abandoned the fight, glad to be able to get to her home base.

Thus Germany in 1916 gave us a taste of submarine warfare, showing
what it could do and did do in American waters in 1918, and what sound
strategy caused naval experts to expect it to undertake in the spring
of 1917. The U-53 had been careful not to attack any American vessels,
and had conducted its operations outside our territorial waters. But
this piece of German bravado aroused the indignation of the entire
country. It was a warning--and probably so intended--that the Germans
could at any time send their U-boats across the seas to sink our
vessels off our own shores.

Even then the country at large seemed to regard our entrance into
war as improbable, and to the average man it did seem only a remote
possibility; but our attaché in Berlin reported that Germany was
building U-boats by scores, the parts being made at plants in various
parts of the country, and assembled at coast shipyards. The Germans
continued to talk peace, but our Navy continued to build ships, enlist
men, and accumulate reserves of guns, ammunition, and war materials.

Congress on August 29, 1916, authorized the construction of 157 war
vessels--ten battleships of the largest type and six huge battle
cruisers, larger and swifter than any then in existence; ten scout
cruisers, fifty destroyers, nine fleet submarines, fifty-eight coast
submarines and one of the Neff type; three fuel ships, two destroyer
tenders, two gunboats and two ammunition ships, a repair ship, a
transport, a hospital ship and a submarine tender. Sixty-six vessels
were appropriated for, to be begun in the current year. That bill
carried total appropriations of $312,678,000, the largest amount ever
granted for naval purposes in time of peace, and larger than previous
appropriations when this country was actually engaged in war.

Usually, after vessels are authorized, months are required to prepare
the plans and specifications. That was not the case this time. The
Bureau of Construction and Repair, under the direction of Rear
Admiral David W. Taylor, regarded in this country and abroad as one
of the world's ablest naval constructors, had begun work on the plans
long before. They were ready when the bill passed Congress. Bids were
advertised for the next day, and as soon as the law allowed, contracts
were let. Before the end of 1916, we had entered upon the biggest
shipbuilding program ever undertaken by any navy at one time.

Providing for an enlisted strength of 74,700 regulars, Congress also
authorized the President to increase the Navy to 87,000 in case of
emergency. This, with the 6,000 apprentice seamen, the Hospital Corps,
and allowance for the sick, prisoners and men on probation, would give
us an emergency strength of some 95,000--including both officers and
men, a force of over 100,000. Five thousand additional enlisted men and
255 more officers were authorized for the Marine Corps, which could be
raised in emergency to 17,500. The increases alone were larger than the
entire number of men employed by the Navy in the Spanish War. The Naval
Reserve, instituted in 1915, was made a Naval Reserve Force unlimited
in numbers.

The Naval Militia had grown to a force of nearly 10,000, and interest
had been stimulated by a training cruise for civilians on eleven war
vessels, known as the "Ocean Plattsburg." The Act of 1916 laid the
basis for the enormous personnel we secured during the war--over half
a million men in the Navy, and 75,000 in the Marine Corps. Immediately
after its passage, a vigorous recruiting campaign was begun.

Large reserves of powder and shells had been accumulated, but orders
were given for much more, and efforts were made to speed up projectiles
under manufacture. "We had at the end of 1916," Admiral Strauss, then
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, stated, "batteries of four guns each
for 189 auxiliary ships. These batteries were housed at navy yards, and
the full supply of powder, shell, primers, etc., were all prepared and
ready for these ships at the nearest ammunition depots, so that in the
event of war the guns could be secured on the ships and the magazines
and shell-rooms supplied at once."

Equipment for ships to be converted, and spare parts of all kinds
were accumulated and stored at points where they would be quickly
available. All the bureaus concerned with construction, shipbuilding,
conversion, and repair, engines and machinery, ordnance and supplies
were increasing production, reporting, as did our vessels, constant
improvement in "readiness for war."

This was the result of two years' constant work. Special duties were
imposed from the beginning of the European conflict in 1914. Only a
few days after hostilities began, the cruisers _Tennessee_ and _North
Carolina_ sailed, carrying millions of dollars in gold to relieve the
thousands of Americans stranded in Europe, unable to get home. Naval
vessels were kept busy along our coasts, enforcing neutrality in our
territorial waters. Naval censors were placed at wireless stations,
preventing the sending of unneutral messages. Intelligence officers
were active in thwarting the machinations of German spies and plotters.
But all this was small in comparison with the efforts we were making to
increase and improve the Navy in its every branch and prepare it for
any emergency.

The sinking of the _Lusitania_, May 7, 1915, was followed by such
naval activity as had never been seen before, except in the midst of
hostilities.

Congress had created in the current naval bill a Chief of Naval
Operations, charged with "the operation of the fleet and its
readiness for war." For this important position, I had, after careful
consideration, selected Rear Admiral William S. Benson, whose ability
and experience admirably fitted him for this vital task. He assumed
office on May 10, three days after the _Lusitania_ went down. It was
a critical period. The President on May 13 addressed to Germany his
vigorous note giving notice that this Government would omit no word or
act to protect its citizens against murder on the seas. Many Americans
were urging that war be declared at once. The crisis lasted for weeks,
and ended only when the German government gave its promise that
non-belligerent vessels would not be sunk without warning.

Admiral Benson, bureau chiefs, commanders, and officials devoted every
energy to preparing the fleet for war. Abolition of the cumbersome
system of naval aides brought the bureau chiefs in closer touch with
the Secretary. There was no longer any division of authority and
responsibility, and we could get direct action. On this basis we built
up a departmental organization so efficient that no change was found
necessary during the entire war period, the bureaus merely expanding to
meet the enormously increased demands, each new activity easily fitting
into some part of the existing organization.

The General Board of the Navy, of which Admiral Dewey was the
head until his death Jan. 16, 1917, had developed a comprehensive
administrative plan, under which each bureau was required to report,
periodically, on its readiness for war. This enabled us to keep
informed of exact conditions and progress made. The Board also worked
out a scheme for development of shore bases and stations.

Navy yards were expanded not only to repair and convert vessels, but
to build warships of every type. These new ways and shops formed
a substantial and valuable addition to the nation's shipbuilding
facilities.

I created the Secretary's Advisory Council, consisting of the Assistant
Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations and the chiefs of the various
bureaus. Meeting regularly once a week and oftener when necessary,
this Council brought together the chief administrative officers of
the Department, and discussed all matters of general interest to the
service. Thus the heads of bureaus kept in close touch with each other;
having the advantage of a General Staff without its many disadvantages.

Comprehensive plans for possible war against Germany--we then called
it "war in the Atlantic"--had been made by the General Board, and were
constantly corrected and brought up to date in accordance with war
developments.

When the fleet was reviewed by President Wilson at New York, May 15,
1915, Admiral Dewey wrote:

  The people of New York have just cause for pride in the fleet now
  assembled in their harbor. Not only is it composed of the finest
  and most efficient warships that we have ever had, but it is
  not excelled, except in size, by the fleet of any nation in the
  world. Our ships and guns are as good as any in the world; our
  officers are as good as any; and our enlisted men are superior in
  training, education, physical development and devotion to duty to
  those of any other navy. As President of the General Board for the
  past fifteen years, I can say with absolute confidence that the
  efficiency of the fleet has steadily progressed, and has never been
  so high as it is today.

For months we had been at work on a plan for reorganizing the fleet.
Completed and put into effect in July, 1915, that plan proved so
efficient that it was continued throughout the war. Four battleships,
the _Pennsylvania_, _Nevada_, _Oklahoma_ and _Arizona_, ten destroyers,
seven submarines, and two tenders, the _Melville_ and the _Bushnell_,
were completed in 1915-16.

Battle and target practice were conducted with a constant improvement
in gunnery. In August, 1916, there was held off the North Atlantic
Coast the largest "war game" in the annals of the Navy. Eighty-three
vessels, including twenty-eight battleships and thirteen submarines,
engaged in this strategic maneuver, which lasted for four days, and
simulated the conditions of a great naval battle.

Congress had, in 1913-14, authorized the construction of five
dreadnaughts as compared with only two granted by the previous
Congress, and we were building more destroyers and submarines than in
previous years. Forty-one more ships were in commission, and there
were 5,000 more men in the service than there had been in 1913. The
fleet was incomparably stronger than it had ever been before, but we
were heartily tired of the hand-to-mouth policy that had prevailed so
long, a policy that made it impossible to plan far ahead and develop
a consistent and well-balanced fleet. In common with its officers, I
wanted the United States to possess a navy equal to any afloat, and to
initiate a building program that should be continuous and not haphazard.

Consequently, in July, 1915, I requested Admiral Dewey to have the
General Board submit its opinion of what should be done to give us a
navy worthy of this country and able to cope with any probable enemy.
In response the General Board set forth this policy, which has guided
us ever since and is now nearing a triumphant reality:

  The Navy of the United States should ultimately be equal to the
  most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world. It
  should be gradually increased to this point by such a rate of
  development, year by year, as may be permitted by the facilities
  of the country, but the limit above defined should be attained not
  later than 1925.

[Illustration: WAR CHIEFS OF THE NAVY, THE SECRETARY AND HIS ADVISORY
COUNCIL

Seated--Secretary Daniels. Standing (left to right):--Maj. Gen. George
Barnett, Commandant U. S. Marine Corps; Capt. W. C. Watts, Judge
Advocate General; Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy; Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan, Paymaster General, Chief of
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; Rear Admiral Robert S. Griffin,
Engineer-in-Chief, Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering; Rear
Admiral David W. Taylor, Chief Constructor, Chief of the Bureau of
Construction and Repair; Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval
Operations; Rear Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance;
Commander H. G. Sparrow, Naval Aide to the Secretary; Rear Admiral
Charles W. Parks, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Rear Admiral
Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation; Rear Admiral
William C. Braisted, Surgeon General, Chief of the Bureau of Medicine
and Surgery.]

[Illustration: A FRIENDLY BOUT

Spectators on the U. S. S. Bushnell are having as much fun as the
boxers.]

[Illustration: SCHOOL HOUR ABOARD A BATTLESHIP]

It was in accordance with this policy, and at my direction, that the
General Board developed the continuous building program, comprising
157 war vessels, later known as the "three-year program," which was
authorized by Congress in the next naval appropriation act. Presented
in my annual report for 1915, it was strongly urged by President Wilson
in his message to Congress, and he sounded the keynote in his speech
at St. Louis, February 3, 1916, when he declared: "There is no other
Navy in the world that has to cover so great an area of defense as the
American Navy, and it ought, in my judgment, to be incomparably the
most adequate Navy in the world."

With all the Navy striving to build up and expand the service, I
turned attention to other forces that might be utilized. War had
become a science; inventions were playing a vastly greater part
than ever before, and on July 7, 1915, I wrote to Mr. Thomas A.
Edison, suggesting the formation of a board of eminent inventors and
scientists, and asking if he would consent to become its head. The
idea appealed to Mr. Edison, as it did to the various scientific and
engineering societies, and in a few weeks the Naval Consulting Board
became a reality. Composed of men of eminence and distinction, this was
the first of those organizations of patriotic civilians which, when war
came, rendered such signal service to the nation.

This board began in 1915 a survey of all the country's industries and
resources which might be employed, in case of war, for the production
of munitions and supplies, and the thousand and one things required by
armies and navies.

The Navy made a survey of all merchant ships and privately owned craft
which might be utilized as auxiliaries. The Board of Inspection and
Survey was increased, each vessel listed for service to which it could
be adapted, and plans made for all the changes needed to convert it to
war purposes. This was worked out to the last detail, even to the yards
to which the vessels would be sent, and the accumulation of machinery
and materials for their conversion. A standardized schedule was
developed of all ammunition, materials, equipment and supplies needed
by vessels in case of war.

Aviation received earnest attention. Seaplanes and flying boats were
secured, and a school and station established at Pensacola, Fla.,
for the training of aviators. The cruisers _North Carolina_, _West
Virginia_, and _Washington_ were fitted with a launching device, from
which aeroplanes could fly from ships. Operating with the fleet, our
aeroplanes began developing the tactics of aircraft at sea.

During the _Sussex_ crisis, arrangements were made for the mobilization
of the communications of the entire United States radio, telegraph and
telephone. This important experiment was carried out from May 6 to
8, 1916, and was a complete success, proving that in a day we could
link all methods of communication and put in touch all our yards and
stations and our ships at sea. Congress had previously authorized
the erection of a chain of high power radio stations to span the
Pacific--at San Diego, California; Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and at Cavite,
in the Philippines--and these were under construction.

The Naval Communication Service was created and under its direction
all our communications, wire and wireless, were prepared for war.
This entire service was mobilized the day the United States severed
relations with Germany.

Admiral Dewey said, in the autumn of 1916: "The last three years have
been wonderful years. I have been in the Navy since 1854, and both in
material and personnel, we are more efficient today than ever before."
Admiral Charles J. Badger, who, upon the death of Dewey in January,
1917, became head of the General Board, stated: "I do not mean to say
that we had attained to perfection in the Navy--we never shall; that
no errors of judgment or mistakes were made--they will always occur;
but I assert that the Navy when it entered the war was as a whole, well
prepared and administered."




CHAPTER III

THE BREAK WITH GERMANY

  SURPRISE AND TERROR PLANNED IN STARTING U-BOAT WAR--BERNSTORFF
  WITHHELD NOTE UNTIL JUST BEFORE SUBMARINES STRUCK--AMERICA'S
  ENTRANCE COULD NOT AFFECT "TREND OF THE WAR," HOLTZENDORFF
  INSISTED--FLEET PUT ON WAR BASIS--PLANS MADE TO COOPERATE WITH
  ALLIES--"GET AND KEEP THE BEST MEN," PRESIDENT TOLD SECRETARIES OF
  WAR AND NAVY.


Germany struck practically without warning in inaugurating ruthless
U-boat warfare. Surprise of Allies and neutrals, giving no time
for negotiations, was one thing upon which its Admiralty insisted.
Terrorizing America was a part of the plan, and if the United States
entered the war, the Teuton naval authorities contended that it would
exert no marked influence, and could furnish little assistance in
troops or vessels.

Admiral von Holtzendorff, head of the German Admiralty, set forth all
this in his memorandum detailing the arrangements for the "U-boat war."
That document, one of the German official papers made public after the
war, is marked "Strictly secret--B-35840-I," and is dated, "Berlin,
Dec. 22, 1916."

"The beginning and the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war,"
said Holtzendorff, "must follow so quickly one upon the other that
there is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the
neutrals. The wholesome terror will exercise in this case upon enemy
and neutral alike."

The submarines were to begin the general attack not later than February
1, 1917. England was to be starved out in five months, and the
Allies forced to surrender by August 1st. This is all stated in that
memorandum, and those exact dates are given.

The probable entrance of the United States as a belligerent was
discussed, and Holtzendorff took pains to set forth what little
influence this country's participation could have upon the "trend of
the war," saying:

  As regards tonnage this influence would be negligible. It is not
  to be expected that more than a small fraction of the tonnage of
  the Central Powers lying in America and many other neutral harbors
  could then be enlisted for the traffic to England. For the far
  greatest part of this shipping can be damaged in such a way that it
  cannot sail in the decisive time of the first months. Preparations
  to this effect have been made. There would also be no crews to be
  found for them.

  Just as little decisive effect can be ascribed to any considerable
  extent to American troops, which, in the first place, cannot be
  brought over through lack of tonnage.

Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, carried out his part
of the plans to the letter. It was not until a few hours before the
submarines were to strike, late in the afternoon of Jan. 31, 1917,
that he presented the note of the German Government to the Secretary
of State. He had that note in his possession twelve days before
he presented it. He admits that it reached the German Embassy in
Washington on January 19, the same day that Zimmermann, the German
Foreign Minister, sent to Mexico his crafty but absurd proposal that
Mexico form an alliance with Japan, and make war with the United States
to recover the "lost territory" of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas. That
proposal also passed through the Washington embassy, in the Berlin
diplomatic code, and was read by the Ambassador.

Before he presented the note declaring submarine warfare, Bernstorff
had given the order that "the engines of all German ships lying
in American harbors were to be destroyed." "I had already given
instructions to this effect at the time of the _Sussex_ crisis, and
these instructions had now been repeated from Berlin," he says in his
book. "As a matter of fact it was dangerous to allow of any delay,
for on the evening of January 31, our ships were already seized by
the American police. As far as I know, however, all of them without
exception were made unfit for use before this occurred."

The day ruthless U-boat warfare began, new mobilization plans were
prepared and sent out to the entire Navy. Formal action had not then
been taken by our Government. Its course was still under consideration
and the Cabinet was to meet the next day. But the moment I read the
German note, I regarded a break as inevitable, and active hostilities
almost certain to follow.

As the Cabinet assembled on Friday, February 2d, all of us realized the
significance of the occasion. Parley and negotiation were ended. The
time had come for decisive action. That was the conviction, I believe,
of every man who rose to greet the President when he entered the room.
Usually genial and smiling at the gatherings of his official family, he
was now grave and serious. The destiny of a hundred million people lay
in his hands, perhaps the destiny of the world.

The Cabinet members had, of course, read the text of the German note,
whose meaning was plain enough, camouflaged as it was in diplomatic
terms and pretended concessions. All had studied it, and were familiar
with its provisions. But the President read it to us again. He read it
in measured tones, giving weight to every significant syllable.

His mind was already made up, I felt certain. But before giving voice
to his own decision, he called upon his official advisers to state
their views. They spoke freely and frankly, each stating just what he
thought the situation demanded. Expressions varied, of course, and each
man approached the problem in his own way. There were differences of
opinion as to details, but none as to the main point. On that, all were
agreed. They felt that relations with Germany must be severed.

This was the President's position. He had never wavered from the firm
stand he had taken a year before that, if unrestricted submarine
warfare was continued, or resumed, the United States could have no
further relations with Germany. It was no surprise to him that his
colleagues, to a man, shared his views that the Cabinet was a unit for
the dismissal of Bernstorff, and the sharpest possible warning to the
German Government.

Although the session lasted several hours, this decision was soon
reached. It had required no debate. The German note itself was a
compelling argument.

Most of the time was devoted to discussing what steps each department
should take, particularly State, War and Navy. It was recognized
thoroughly that the severance of relations would create a difficult
situation, one likely in a few weeks at most to lead to open warfare.
It was realized that Germany might strike without waiting for formal
declaration from the United States. The sinking of American vessels
without warning would be, in itself, an overt act, an act of war. We
had to prepare for any eventuality, to map out a program for immediate
action.

The following telegram was sent to the entire Navy that night:

  Six Alnav. In view of the present international situation, take
  every precaution to protect Government plants and vessels.

All who received that message knew what it meant, that they were to
guard against surprise, and be ready for anything that might arise.

The next afternoon at two o'clock, the President, addressing a joint
session of the two houses of Congress, pointed out that Germany had
"suddenly and without prior intimation of any kind," deliberately
withdrawn the solemn assurances given in its note of May 4, 1916, and
announced that all diplomatic relations with Germany had been severed.

At the very hour the President began his address, and Bernstorff was
handed his passports, Admiral Mayo, in Cuban waters, issued the first
campaign order, putting into effect the plan for the defense of the
fleet in Guantanamo Bay. As soon as I returned from the Capitol, this
order was sent out:

  One Alatl. Radicode. Mobilize Naval Communications.

                                                       SECNAV.

That placed all our communications--radio, telegraphs, telephones, and
signals--on a war basis. This message was just going out by wireless,
when I was called to the White House, where I found the Secretary of
War, who had likewise been summoned.

The President was concerned about the safety of Government property.
There was enough cause for this anxiety, for there were thousands
of aliens who could not be interned legally unless or until war was
declared. Among them were hostile Germans who would resort to almost
any violence to vent their resentment or to cripple this Government in
its manifold preparations for war.

Navy yards and army posts were closed, and orders sent to every naval
and military plant in the United States, Porto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Hawaii, Alaska, Guam and the Philippines, to exclude all
visitors and strengthen the guards. The guards in the Panama Canal Zone
were doubled, and special precautions were taken to protect the canal.

To prevent information from reaching Germans, we stopped publishing
the movements of naval vessels and the daily orders to naval officers.
Since the outbreak of the war in Europe we had maintained along the
coast a number of naval vessels to enforce neutrality regulations. Now
this force was increased, and a virtual coast patrol established.

That night I sent out the order, "Alnav availability," which directed
all vessels to report their actual readiness for war.

The President kept in close touch with all our preparations. Not
satisfied with general reports, he wanted to know just what was being
done. Monday afternoon, while I was hard at work with officers on plans
and orders, Mr. Wilson suddenly appeared in my office. Glad as I was to
see him, his visit was a surprise. Documents concerning a number of the
matters we were working upon were on my desk, and in a few moments I
reviewed in detail the plans, told him what we had done and were doing,
and asked his directions as to certain operations.

Then he suggested that we go to the War Department, to talk matters
over with the Secretary of War. Mr. Baker was in his office and the
three of us held a long conference, discussing the situation in all its
phases. Some things the President said to us are indelibly impressed on
my memory.

The breach in diplomatic relations, he pointed out, did not necessarily
mean war, but it brought us so close to the possibility that we must
put our house in order, and be ready for any emergency.

Men concerned him quite as much as measures, and he inquired
particularly about the officers in important positions and commands.
If there were any who did not seem equal to the tremendous tasks they
would be called upon to perform, he wanted them replaced. If abler men
were available, he wished us to secure them.

"Each of you must surround yourself with the ablest men you have,"
he said. Turning to me, he asked whether I felt that my immediate
advisers, those in the Navy Department and in command afloat, were the
men to retain in those positions.

"They are the best men in the Navy," I replied.

He asked the same question of the Secretary of War. Mr. Baker told him
that the officers in responsible positions in the War Department and
the Army knew their jobs and were going ahead earnestly with them. Some
were necessarily slated for early retirement, but to anticipate this,
he thought, would be unwise, as it might occasion needless alarm and
disturb morale.

The President listened intently to us. When we finished, he again
impressed upon us that only the ablest, most alert and energetic
officers should be put in places of responsibility.

"Get and keep the best," he said as our conference ended.

Mr. Wilson had no sympathy with the fear of hurting some man's
"feelings," which, he said, is the rock upon which efficient public
service often goes to pieces. The big job called for the big man, and
no personal consideration had any weight with him in getting the thing
done, and done in the best way. "Get and keep the best," without regard
to friendship, past performance, prestige, social or political pull,
guided the President in his entire conduct of the war. It was that
policy which enabled American power to be thrown into the scales so
quickly and decisively.

It is gratifying to recall that under the rigid test of war, every
responsible officer in the Navy Department measured up to his full
duty. Not one failed to meet the requirements of his position. No
change whatever was required. Franklin D. Roosevelt was Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, Admiral William S. Benson was Chief of Naval
Operations, Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger head of the General Board.
The bureau chiefs were: Rear Admirals Robert S. Griffin, Engineering;
David W. Taylor, Construction and Repair; Ralph Earle, Ordnance; Leigh
C. Palmer, Navigation; Samuel McGowan, Supplies and Accounts; William
C. Braisted, Medicine and Surgery; F. R. Harris, Yards and Docks.
Captain W. C. Watts was Judge Advocate General, and Major General
George Barnett, Commandant of the Marine Corps. When Admiral Harris
resigned in December, 1917, to become head of the U. S. Emergency Fleet
Corporation, he was succeeded as Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks
by Rear Admiral Charles W. Parks. Captain Watts, requesting sea duty
in March, 1918, was succeeded by Rear Admiral George R. Clark as Judge
Advocate General. Thus, practically all those who were in office when
war began served to its end. And no men ever did better service. Able
and energetic, they worked together with a harmony and efficiency never
excelled.

U-boat warfare being aimed directly at shipping, our own as well as
that of other nations, the protection of American merchantmen was of
prime importance. As the President was announcing the severance of
relations with Germany, February 3d, the steamer _Housatonic_ was sunk
in European waters, and on February 12th, the schooner _Lyman M. Law_
was sent down by the Germans.

Though he considered that under the general powers of the Executive he
had the authority to arm merchant vessels for protection, the President
desired, before taking such an important step, which must almost
inevitably result in gunfire engagements with U-boats, to ask the
support of Congress. Before that time, at a cabinet meeting at which
this matter was discussed, the President turned to me and asked:

"Daniels, has the Navy the guns and gunners for this job?"

"We can arm them as fast as the ships are ready," I replied.

On February 26th, in an address to the two houses, President Wilson
requested that Congress authorize him to "supply our merchant ships
with defensive arms, should that become necessary, and with the means
of using them, and to employ any other instrumentalities or methods
that may be necessary and adequate to protect our ships and our people
in their legitimate and peaceful pursuits on the seas." A bill to
this effect, introduced at once, promptly passed the House by a large
majority, but failed in the Senate by reason of a filibuster conducted
by a handful of Senators who by continual debate prevented the bill
from coming to a vote before the end of that Congress on March 4th.

It was this filibuster that called forth the President's denunciation
of the "little group of willful men" who had, with reckless disregard
of the country's needs, prevented important legislation, and his
suggestion that the rules of the Senate be changed so as to make
impossible any such occurrence in the future. Before adjournment a
large majority of the senators signed a document stating that they
favored the bill to arm American merchantmen, and would have voted for
it, had they been given the opportunity.

Confident that he had the power under the Constitution, and a large
majority of Congress having expressed its willingness to grant him
specific authority, the President on March 12 directed me to furnish
guns and naval gunners to American ships. Guns and men were ready, and
the work of arming merchantmen began immediately. In two days guns were
installed on the _Manchuria_, _St. Louis_ and _Aztec_, and four days
later the _New York_ and _St. Paul_ were equipped. The _Manchuria_
sailed for England March 15, and thereafter a constant succession of
merchant ships carrying armed guards left our ports for Europe.

The day after Bernstorff was dismissed the General Board had submitted
the following specific steps to be taken in case of conflict with
Germany:

             G. B. No. 425. Confidential. Serial No. 666.

                                                      February 4, 1917.

  From: Senior member present.

  To: Secretary of the Navy.

  Subject: Steps to be taken to meet a possible condition of war with
  the Central European Powers.

  On account of existing conditions, the General Board recommends
  that the following steps be taken to meet a possible condition of
  war with the Central European Powers:

    1. Complete complements and allowances of all kinds, first of the
    A and B fleet, then of the C fleet, and naval districts.

    2. Mobilize the A fleet in the Lower Chesapeake, and increase it
    immediately to the B fleet. (See Black Plan.)

    3. Dock and repair all ships in reserve and ordinary that will be
    used.

    4. Arrange for the supply of fuel to the fleet and stock all fuel
    depots to capacity.

    5. Establish additional recruiting stations and increase
    personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps to the total number
    required to supply complements for all the ships built,
    building, and authorized, and to maintain shore establishments
    and naval defense districts, including aviation service, with
    10 per cent additional for casualties as follows: Enlisted
    force--Navy, 150,000; Marines, 30,000; officers in the proportion
    prescribed by law.

    6. Mobilize the naval districts, including the Coast Guard and
    Lighthouse services, and put patrol vessels, mine sweepers, etc.,
    of the Atlantic coast districts, on their stations; no commercial
    vessels to be mobilized in the Pacific coast districts at present.

    7. Prepare to the utmost detail for the employment of mines along
    our coast as may be necessary.

    8. Prepare nets and other obstruction for submarines, ready
    for immediate use, at the Chesapeake Capes, Delaware Capes,
    entrance to New York Bay, eastern entrance to Long Island Sound,
    Narragansett Bay, Panama Canal, and Guantanamo. Other places as
    their need becomes apparent. The General Board considers it of
    the utmost importance that net protection shall be immediately
    provided for the fleet during its mobilization in Chesapeake Bay.

    9. Establish immediately the guards at all navy yards, magazines,
    radio stations, powder factories, munition plants, bases,
    shipbuilding yards, and naval shore utilities in accordance with
    the mobilization plans.

    10. Reduce the force of Marines in Haiti and Santo Domingo to
    the smallest number that can maintain order there, transferring
    these men to the United States to perform necessary guard duty at
    navy yards, magazines, radio stations, shipbuilding plants, and
    to form cadres for the organization of new regiments as recruits
    are obtained. Organize the advanced base force and complete its
    equipment.

    11. Leave in the Caribbean a sufficient number of light cruisers
    to keep a lookout for submarines in those waters and for the
    protection of our interests there. Protect the Canal and
    Guantanamo as far as possible, by the use of mines and where
    possible by monitors, submarines and nets.

    12. For the present use the greater part of the destroyer
    flotillas as patrol for submarines in the vicinity of the
    principal ports or entrances leading to them.

    13. Base the submarines at Canal, Guantanamo, and points along
    the coast in accordance with the Black Plan.

    14. Rush to completion all naval vessels building or authorized;
    also build up the Aviation Service as rapidly as possible.

    15. Guard all bays and harbors on the coast of Maine to prevent
    their use as bases of supply. Patrol waters of Haiti, Santo
    Domingo, Porto Rico, and Danish West Indies, the Cuban Coast
    Guard Service to assist in patrolling all bays and gulfs of the
    coast of Cuba.

    16. Prepare to close entrances to all ports at night and
    discontinue or change such aids to navigation as may be
    necessary.

    17. Organize a comprehensive system of intelligence service
    covering the whole theater of war in accordance with the plans of
    the Office of Naval Intelligence.

    18. Take possession of all interned vessels of war of Central
    Powers; also take control of all commercial vessels of Central
    Powers now in United States waters.

    19. Place under surveillance all citizens of the Central Powers
    in the Navy or in Government employ in naval establishments, and
    remove them from positions in which they may do possible harm.

    20. Arm our merchant ships for purposes of defense.

    21. In accordance with Black Plan, carry out the following:

      (a) Issue proclamation prescribing defensive sea areas and put
      rules in regard to them in force.

      (b) Issue proclamation prescribing press regulations and
      establishing censorship of cable and radio, including naval
      control of all commercial and private radio stations.

      (c) Issue President's order in regard to visit and search,
      capture, etc.

    22. And as most important, arrange, as soon as possible, plans
    of coöperation with the naval forces of the Allies for the joint
    protection of trans-Atlantic commerce and for offensive naval
    operations against the common enemy.

                                              CHAS. J. BADGER.

General war plans, as I have stated, had been developed years before
under the direction of Admiral Dewey. Among these was the "Black Plan"
designated for "war in the Atlantic," really for war with Germany.
Revised from time to time as the progress of the European conflict
suggested changes, this was constantly kept up to date, and covered
thoroughly general policies and operations. The recommendations of
February 4th and various others submitted later were for specific
things to be done in consonance with the general scheme.

A week after the break with Germany, I sent the following to the
General Board:

                                                     February 10, 1917.

  To: The General Board.
  Subject: Solution of Problem.

    1. The Department desires the General Board to consider the
    following problem and submit its solution as soon as practicable:

                           PROBLEM

    General situation--Conditions as at present except that war with
    Germany is declared.

    Special situation--The Allies do not desire our battleship force
    at present.

    Required--Naval estimate of the situation: first, as to the grand
    strategy demanded by the situation; second, as to the disposition
    of the battleship force; third, as to the method of assisting
    in maintaining communications with Europe, including scheme
    for coöperation with Allies; fourth, as to method of driving
    submarines from the sea.

    Assume--Mobilization of all naval vessels and possibility of
    mobilizing merchant vessels as required.

                                             JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Anti-submarine warfare, coöperation with the Allies, was the keynote of
all our plans, as of this "problem," the solution of which the General
Board submitted on February 17. We were then, as always, planning
"for the joint protection of trans-Atlantic commerce," as the Board
expressed it, "and for offensive naval operations against the common
enemy."




CHAPTER IV

THE DAY OF DECISION

  MOST IMPORTANT CABINET MEETING OF WILSON ADMINISTRATION HELD MARCH
  20, 1917, WHEN IT WAS DECIDED TO CALL CONGRESS IN SPECIAL SESSION
  TO DECLARE WAR--"I WANT TO DO RIGHT, WHETHER IT IS POPULAR OR NOT,"
  SAID THE PRESIDENT--FLEET ORDERED NORTH--NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
  INCREASED TO EMERGENCY STRENGTH.


Tuesday, March 20, 1917, is not fixed in the war chronologies, so far
as I can find. But it should be, for that was the Day of Decision.
That was the occasion of the most important Cabinet meeting of the
Wilson administration, in fact without doubt the most important of our
generation.

Eleven days earlier the President had called Congress to meet in
special session April 16th, "to receive such communication as may be
made by the Executive." But events were moving rapidly. Four American
vessels had been sunk without warning--the _Algonquin_, _City of
Memphis_, _Illinois_, and _Vigilancia_--with the loss of American
lives. German U-boats were destroying shipping by the hundred thousand
tons. We had been arming merchant vessels, but it was evident that this
"armed neutrality" in itself was insufficient, valuable as it was.

The "overt act" had occurred. The Germans were sinking our ships,
killing our citizens on the high seas. There were matters of vital
importance to be discussed when the Cabinet met. Congress had already
been summoned to meet within a month. But every day counted.

Should the special session be called at an earlier date? What message
should be sent to Congress in view of the situation? These were the
questions propounded by the President, who was grave, feeling the deep
sense of responsibility. He wished every member of the Cabinet to
state his conviction of the national duty, he told us, and each spoke
from his standpoint.

I have often wished that it might have been possible to preserve a
record of Cabinet meetings, particularly in the months preceding and
during the war. If the American people could have seen the President
and heard him as he spoke to us on March 20th, they would have felt a
confidence and admiration which nothing else could have imparted. I do
not feel at liberty to give from memory what he said, or the statements
of the ten members of the Cabinet. His severest critics have praised
President Wilson's power to express national sentiment and set forth
problems and solutions in living sentences in his public addresses.
That power was even more markedly displayed in the bosom of his
official family.

That day he began by sketching the steps this country had taken to
protect American lives. He was disinclined to the final break. As
he so often did in laying weighty matters before the cabinet, Mr.
Wilson clearly stated the events culminating in repeated sinking of
American ships by German submarines, and then, with a sort of seeming
detachment, invited the views of the Cabinet.

It was a supreme moment. Some of us, fully in harmony with the
President's patient and long successful efforts to protect American
rights by peaceful means, had at last, like himself, lost hope of
world and national safety without resort to war. Others, approving
of steps taken, had earlier wished entrance into the struggle. It is
interesting, even when the matter is not one greater than life and
death, as was this determination, to observe how ten men with the
same objective will differ in the presentation of their views or the
reasons which prompt their conclusions. No two of the Cabinet on that
day gave expression to precisely the same reasons, or rather, I should
say, aside from the impelling reason, each had been influenced by
some incident or argument he presented. But all were convinced that
the character of the warfare being waged by the Central Powers could
no longer be tolerated and that no course was open but for America to
throw the weight of its great power into the scales against Germany.

After all had advised that Congress be called in session as early
as practicable, one member read a number of telegrams conveying the
impression that popular opinion was strongly in favor of our early
entrance into the war.

"We are not governed by public opinion in our conclusion," said the
President. "I want to do right whether it is popular or not."

The next morning the proclamation was issued summoning Congress to
meet April 2, "to receive a communication by the Executive on grave
questions of national policy which should be taken under consideration."

War was only a matter of days. Under the conditions, the place for
the fleet was in home waters. When I returned to the Department after
the Cabinet meeting, orders were sent to Admiral Mayo to bring the
fleet north at once. Some smaller vessels were left in the Caribbean
to protect tankers coming from Mexico and Texas. Though the day
previous I had asked the General Board to consider carefully whether
everything possible was being done for the protection of our ships
entering the proscribed area, that afternoon, accompanied by Admiral
Benson, I attended a meeting of the Board, informing its members that
the President wished them to outline every measure that the Navy could
employ for protection of American shipping entering European ports,
beyond the provision of armed guards which we had already undertaken. I
told the Board that we desired the fullest and most ample protection,
regardless of effort or expense.

Replying immediately, the Board recommended:

  Escort vessels to deep water from our ports, and similarly from
  deep water to our ports.

  Arrange with British and French Governments for the convoy of our
  ships through the barred zones.

  Merchant ships to proceed on high seas from points of leaving and
  receiving escorts, depending upon their guns for protection and
  upon changes of course to follow alternate routes.

  Arrange with British and French Governments a code of signals to be
  used in directing merchant ships as to routes to be followed and
  points of meeting escorts.

  Establish a patrol of the Atlantic coast.

  Recruit up to the limit allowed by law for emergencies in order
  to provide crews for patrols and auxiliaries, and fill battleship
  complements which have been depleted to supply gun crews to
  merchant ships.

[Illustration:

                                                       © Harris & Ewing

                 PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE WAR CABINET

Around the table, from left to right: the President, Secretary of
the Treasury McAdoo, Attorney General Gregory, Secretary of the Navy
Daniels, Secretary of Agriculture Houston, Secretary of Labor Wilson,
Secretary of Commerce Redfield, Secretary of the Interior Lane,
Postmaster General Burleson, Secretary of War Baker, Secretary of State
Lansing (in light suit).]

[Illustration: AMERICAN DREADNOUGHTS, THE EMBODIMENT OF SEA POWER]

At the next meeting of the Cabinet, on Friday, I presented the
authority granted by Congress to increase the enlisted strength of
the Navy to 87,000, and the President directed me to fill up the Navy
and Marine Corps to the full number authorized in case of national
emergency.

On Saturday afternoon the President called at the Navy Department.
Mrs. Wilson came with him. The rapid approach of war weighed upon him,
and he wished to keep in close touch with all military preparations.
It was then that I brought up the matter of sending to London a naval
officer of high rank, which resulted, a few days later, in the sending
of Admiral Sims.

I also informed him of the result of the important conference we had
held that morning with shipbuilders to secure rapid construction of
additional destroyers. Before that time we had always insisted upon and
been able to secure "fixed price" contracts, under which it could be
known precisely what a vessel would cost, the builders being under bond
to deliver it to us at the price agreed upon. But this was no longer
possible. With the rising cost of labor and materials, the builders
were unwilling to name specific figures. Reluctantly, I agreed to a
contract based on actual cost of construction with ten per cent profit.
Destroyers were sorely needed, we wanted all the shipyards could build,
and expedition was worth all it might cost. As a matter of fact, no
other construction during the war was accomplished with so little
increased cost.

That night the President signed the order directing that the authorized
enlisted strength of the Navy be increased to 87,000 men, and the next
day I sent a telegram to the newspapers of the country, more than a
thousand of them, asking them to print the order on the first page and
also make an editorial appeal for recruits, saying:

  New ships and ships in reserve are being fully commissioned as
  rapidly as possible, and the need is imperative for a larger
  enlistment to man them. There has been a net increase of over 6,500
  in enlistment since Congress recently authorized an increase, but
  many more are needed and needed now.

This appeared in nearly every paper in the United States, and most of
them accompanied it with an editorial. It was an example of the fine
spirit of coöperation and patriotism shown by the American press during
the entire war. Every recruiting station was telegraphed to increase
the force and to engage doctors to examine applicants, so there would
be no delay. Within a few hours after the President signed the order to
increase the Navy, the recruiting campaign was under way in every part
of the Union.

Thursday afternoon at 4:30 o'clock, as I was holding the daily
interview with the press, President Wilson, unannounced, came into the
Navy Department. It was several minutes before I knew he was there.
There had been a rapid fire of interrogations and answers between
the Secretary and the correspondents when an officer came to my desk
and said, "The President is here." He was sitting quietly at the
other end of the big room, listening to the cross-examination which
a cabinet officer undergoes at the hands of press representatives
twice every day. And they always ask "searching questions." As soon as
the newspaper men knew the President was in the room, they lost all
interest in me and I asked to be excused from further questioning.

"Do you have to undergo that ordeal every day?" Mr. Wilson asked.

"Yes, twice every day," was my reply; "but it is not usually an ordeal.
Being a newspaper man myself, I recall that most of my life has been
spent in doing to other public officers what those reporters are doing
to me--and, besides, I rather like it."

What to do with the interned German ships was still a puzzling and
undecided question, and that was one of the matters that Mr. Wilson had
come to discuss.

"We must keep in close touch," he said, as he opened the conversation.
He spoke of the submarine situation and the interned ships, and then
showed me a letter from a man of importance to the effect that an
Austrian had arrived in the United States on a submarine, had called
upon the Austrian Consul at New York, and given him important papers
which had been brought from Europe in the undersea boat. He understood
that two submarines had come over from Germany, the writer said.

While this seemed improbable, a telegram was sent in code to all naval
commanders and stations to be on the lookout. That night a message
was received from the Commandant of the New York district that two
submarines had been sighted off Montauk Point. Destroyers and motor
boats were sent there to search the vicinity.

This proved to be a "false alarm," as did so many reports which were
sent forth with every particularity in that early period. But we had to
investigate all that seemed possible, for we could not afford to take
any chances of surprise attacks.




CHAPTER V

SENDING SIMS TO EUROPE

  COÖPERATION WITH ALLIES THE KEYNOTE OF OUR POLICY--ADMIRAL WILSON
  FIRST CHOSEN--SIMS' MISSION AND INSTRUCTIONS--SAILED AS "S. W.
  DAVIDSON," PRIVATE CITIZEN--BRITISH HAD NO PLANS THAT PROMISED
  SUCCESS, LORD JELLICOE TOLD HIM--CARSON PRAISED AMERICA'S "SPEEDY
  ACTION."


The most important thing, perhaps, that I discussed with the President
when he visited the Navy Department March 24th was sending to London an
officer of high rank who would put us in more intimate touch with the
British Admiralty.

The text of that discussion was the following cablegram just received
from the American Ambassador:

                                        London, March 23, 1917, 7 p. m.

  Secretary of State,

  Washington.

  Mr. Balfour has shown me the informal suggestion conveyed by the
  Navy Department through Gaunt [British naval attaché on duty in
  Washington] regarding closer relations and his reply. The British
  Government will heartily fall in with any plan we propose as soon
  as coöperation can be formally established. It was intimated to
  me that a submarine base on the coast of Ireland would then be
  assented to.

  The whole subject of active coöperation and the best methods to
  bring it about have been informally discussed by me with Mr.
  Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Prime Minister, Admiral Jellicoe, and
  others at their invitation, and they will most gladly assent to any
  proposals that we are likely to make. They withhold proposals of
  their own until the way has formally been opened by us lest they
  should seem to push themselves upon us, which they, of course, do
  not wish to do.

  I know personally and informally that they hope for the
  establishment of full and frank naval interchange of information
  and coöperation. Knowing their spirit and their methods, I can not
  too strongly recommend that our government send here immediately
  an admiral of our own navy who will bring our navy's plans and
  inquiries. The coming of such an officer of high rank would be
  regarded as a compliment and he would have all doors opened to him
  and a sort of special staff appointed to give him the results and
  methods of the whole British naval work since the war began. Every
  important ally has an officer of such high rank here. In a private
  conversation with me today at luncheon Mr. Balfour expressed his
  enthusiastic hope that such a plan would be immediately carried
  out. Many things of the greatest value would be verbally made known
  to such an officer which would never be given in a routine way nor
  reduced to writing.

  Admiral Jellicoe has privately expressed the hope to me that our
  navy may see its way to patrol our coast and possibly relieve the
  British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic. He hopes too that
  in case more German raiders go out we may help capture them in
  waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South America.

  If our Navy Department will send an admiral it would be
  advantageous for me to be informed as soon as possible. The
  confidential information that he will come by would be of immediate
  help. Such an officer could further definite plans for full
  coöperation.

                                                         PAGE.

We had presented the proposition informally through the British naval
attaché, as the Ambassador pointed out. Captain McDougall, our naval
attaché in London, was given access to all records which were not
confidential, and his intimate association with the officers of the
Admiralty enabled him to keep the Navy Department in constant touch
with the situation and to give us data bearing on many phases of naval
effort. But there were, of course, many things kept secret, unrevealed
to any neutral. Our break with Germany brought about new conditions,
and made possible a more intimate exchange of views between the
American and British navies. Ruthless U-boat warfare begun only a few
weeks before, the Germans sinking shipping by the million tons, and
the British naturally concealing their losses and their plans, made
it important for us to secure the fullest information as to the exact
situation, and what steps were being taken to meet it. And in case war
was declared, to have in London an admiral to aid the Department in
putting into immediate effect the coöperation with the Allies which we
were planning.

That Saturday afternoon I discussed Ambassador Page's cablegram
and the whole matter with the President, and he approved the plan.
Then the question arose as to what officer should be selected for
this important mission. The choice was Admiral Henry B. Wilson,
later commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, then commanding the
battleship _Pennsylvania_. But we were creating a strong patrol force
and Admiral Wilson was regarded as the best man to organize and command
it.

Admiral Jellicoe was, as Ambassador Page said, particularly anxious
that our Navy might "see its way to patrol our coast and possibly
relieve the British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic," and
also, in case more German raiders got out, as was feared, to "help
capture them in waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South
America." This was in line with the policy we had already adopted.
Formally organized on March 28, Admiral Wilson was put in command
of this force, which accomplished just what Admiral Jellicoe then
suggested, and what was one of the first requests made, after war was
declared, by Admirals Browning and Grasset.

The Germans, naval officers pointed out, might well conclude as soon
as we declared war to send submarines across the Atlantic to attack
shipping and cut down the flow of munitions and supplies to Europe. One
or two operating in the Gulf might interrupt the shipment of oil from
Mexican fields, the largest source of supply for the British Fleet. A
strong patrol force would not only protect all shipping on this side of
the ocean, but, well organized and equipped, would be ready when called
upon, to operate in European waters, as it did later on. So, it was
determined to assign Wilson to that duty and Admiral William S. Sims
was then chosen for the London mission.

On Monday, March 26, I telegraphed him to come to Washington. He
arrived on the 28th and came to the Navy Department in the afternoon.
Referring to Mr. Page's telegram, I told him the President had decided
to send an admiral to England, and he had been selected. Informing him,
in confidence, of our belief that the time was near at hand when the
United States would enter the war, I told him that, in that event, we
must prepare for the fullest coöperation with the British Navy. But his
immediate duty, I pointed out, was to secure all possible information
as to what the British were doing, and what plans they had for more
effective warfare against the submarines.

In the course of the conversation, I said: "You have been selected for
this mission not because of your Guildhall speech, but in spite of it."
In that speech Sims had said, "If the time ever comes when the British
Empire is seriously menaced by an external enemy, it is my opinion that
you may count upon every man, every dollar, every drop of blood of your
kindred across the sea." Impressing upon him the fact that the United
States was still neutral, and that until Congress should declare war
his mission must be a secret and confidential one, I informed him that
it had been decided not to issue written orders detaching him from his
duties at Newport, but for him to go quietly as a civilian passenger,
and report to Ambassador Page personally before any public announcement
was made.

Among the matters discussed was the extent of the sinkings by
submarines. Ambassador Page had written me confidentially that the
situation was more serious than the British admitted. I told Admiral
Sims that the President believed the British had not taken the
necessary vigorous offensive to prevent destruction of shipping by the
U-boats and that he strongly believed two things ought to be done:

First, that every effort should be made to prevent the submarines
getting into the Atlantic--that they ought to be shut up in their own
coasts, or some method should be found to prevent their ingress and
egress.

Second, that all ships ought to be convoyed. The President had been of
this opinion for a long time, and had insisted that it was essential to
give protection to shipping. The General Board had strongly recommended
convoy, and I favored it. But, as I told Admiral Sims, I had taken this
matter up with naval officers in the Department, and there was division
of opinion, most of them seeming to agree with the British Admiralty,
which apparently opposed the convoy system. It had not been adopted
abroad.

Admiral Sims seemed pleased with his mission and instructions. And the
only official instructions he received were those I gave him. But,
someone may ask about the sensational statement in his letter that he
was given the explicit admonition, "Don't let the British pull the wool
over your eyes. It is none of our business pulling their chestnuts out
of the fire. We would as soon fight the British as the Germans."

I never heard of that until I read it in Sims' letter of January 7,
1920. Later, testifying before the Senate investigating Committee he
stated that the remark was made by Benson, who afterwards in Paris made
a similar statement. "I will admit that I had completely forgotten the
incident," said Sims in regard to the latter. "It was recalled to me by
a member of my staff who was present, and who heard it. I think that
the reason I did not remember that distinctly was because I regarded
it as a personal idiosyncrasy of the Admiral. I had known the general
opinion that he was intensely anti-British, but it did not affect me
particularly."

"I have always had the best possible personal relations with Admiral
Benson," he continued. "I regard him as an upstanding and honest
man who has exceedingly strong convictions and who is very firm in
adherence to those convictions. I believe everything he has done during
the war has been done conscientiously, and to get along with the war."

Benson said he could not recall just what was said; that he strongly
approved Sims' selection, but probably used "very forcible language" in
impressing upon him the seriousness of the situation and the importance
of being very careful that "his feelings toward the British did not
lead him into any indiscretion." He denied strongly that his words
could be interpreted to mean anything else.

In view of these statements and the known fact that Admiral Benson and
everybody else in our navy earnestly coöperated with the British, and
that Benson had a large part in arranging this coöperation before Sims
reached London, I think there is no occasion for any further allusion
to the remark.

On the last day of March, a week before war was declared, Admiral Sims
and his aide, Commander J. V. Babcock, boarded the steamship _New
York_, entered upon the passenger list as "S. W. Davidson" and "V. J.
Richardson." Their fellow voyagers had no idea that "Mr. Davidson"
was an admiral of the United States Navy going abroad on an important
mission, and "Mr. Richardson" was his aide.

Reaching Liverpool April 9th, after an uneventful voyage, the _New
York_, as it approached the outer harbor, struck a mine. Though
the ship was not damaged beyond repair, it was crippled, and the
passengers were transferred to another vessel and taken ashore. At
the dock the American officers were welcomed by Rear Admiral Hope,
and they found that a special train, provided by the Admiralty, was
waiting to take them to London. Admiral Sims on arrival there at once
conferred with Ambassador Page and the British naval authorities, and
was admitted to the confidence of the Admiralty.

Since his departure from America, there had been a radical change in
the situation. The United States had declared war against Germany,
and we were free to deal with the Allies as associates in the
great conflict. While Sims was having his first interview with the
authorities in London, we were in conference at Washington with the
ranking British and French admirals in the Western Atlantic. In fact
a working agreement was perfected, and orders had been issued to send
destroyers to Europe before we received Sims' first dispatch. Thus
Sims in London and our authorities in Washington carried out with the
utmost cordiality that splendid coöperation between the British and
American navies which continued throughout the war and which has hardly
a parallel in naval history.

In his first cablegram from London, April 14, 1917, Sims reported:

  The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people
  realize in America. The recent success of operations and the
  rapidity of construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The
  morale of the enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four
  are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders
  have been recorded. * * *

  Supplies and communications of forces on all fronts, including the
  Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.

  German submarines are constantly extending their operations into
  the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling.
  Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five
  admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies
  there is insubordination.

  The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February
  was 536,000 tons, in March 571,000 tons, and in the first ten days
  of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these
  losses are increasing.

The Germans, he said, had seventy mine-laying submarines, and were
building new ones at a rate approaching three a week.

What were the British doing to meet this perilous situation? What plans
did they have to defeat the U-boats? That was what we particularly
wanted to know, and were surprised when it was not stated in that
dispatch.

Describing his first interview with Lord Jellicoe, Admiral Sims says,
in his book, published three years later:

  "It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," I remarked.

  "They will win, unless we can stop these losses--and stop them
  soon," the Admiral replied.

  "Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked.

  "Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced.

What the British were doing in regard to protecting ships was set forth
clearly in Sims' letter of April 19, in which he said:

  After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the
  Admiralty now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion.
  They use about six relatively large avenues or arcs of approach
  to the United Kingdom and Channels, changing their limits or area
  periodically if necessity demands.

There was considerable criticism of the Admiralty, he said, "for not
taking more effective steps," and one of the principal demands was for
"convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection
within the war zone." But not only officers but ship owners and
captains opposed convoy, favoring the arming of merchant vessels and
independent sailings, he informed us, saying:

  The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with merchant masters
  and sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is: "Give us
  a gun and let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent
  that it is impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in
  formation, at least in any considerable numbers, due principally
  to difficulty in controlling their speed and to the inexperience
  of their subordinate officers. With this view I do not personally
  agree but believe that with a little experience merchant vessels
  could safely and sufficiently well steam in open formations.

In this Sims was right, as was shown when, later, convoy was adopted.
The system President Wilson had long advocated, which shipping
interests and many naval officers had opposed, proved not only
practicable, but a very effective measure.

Urging that the maximum number of destroyers and anti-submarine craft
be sent to Europe, Sims in his first cablegram informed us:

  It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids
  on our coasts or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep
  our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through
  effect upon public opinion.

We had to expect this and to provide against it; and at the same time
extend all possible aid to our Allies in Europe. Destroyers had already
been ordered abroad, the first arriving May 4, and others were sent
over in rapid succession.

Was this quick response? The English so considered it. Sir Edward
Carson, First Civil Lord of the Admiralty, called it "speedy action"
when he said in his address to the British Navy League on May 17:

  "The toast that I have to propose is that of the American Navy.
  I give it to you from the bottom of my heart. The date of this
  particular function is very opportune. It almost coincides with
  the arrival in our seas of the first installment of the assistance
  which the American Navy is going to give us in the terrible task
  that is before us. It enables us who are members of our Navy
  League, and it enables me as for the moment presiding over the
  great service of the Admiralty in this country, to express and
  demonstrate our appreciation of the speedy action of the American
  Navy and to offer a hearty welcome to the officers and men who have
  reached our shores. * * *

  I don't underestimate the submarine menace. It is a great, a novel,
  and a terrible menace. It is a menace that has been unsolved by any
  navy--our own navy, the German navy, the Austrian navy, the Italian
  navy, or the American navy. But don't imagine you will solve it by
  abuse or funk. No, the way to look upon it is that it is a real
  danger, and it is the work of men to face and solve real dangers."

The problem being still unsolved, it was up to our Navy to devise
some plan that might solve it. And we did propose, nine days after
this country entered the war, the biggest project that was put into
effect--mine barrages to shut in the U-boats, preventing their egress
into the Atlantic. On April 15 our Bureau of Ordnance presented plans
for mine barriers across the North Sea and the English Channel. On
April 17, I cabled Sims to report on the practicability of blocking the
German coast, to prevent submarines from getting out from their bases.
He replied that this had been tried and found "unfeasible," and said:

  To the best of my knowledge and experience we should adopt present
  British methods and base further developments only upon actual
  experience in coöperation with them.

That the barrage was unfeasible was the opinion of the Admiralty
officers, but it was not the view of the Prime Minister, Lloyd George,
who like President Wilson and our own ordnance officers, did not regard
it as impossible, for Sims in his mail report to us April 19th said:

  The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion
  that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely
  sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The
  fact that all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.)
  inherently involve the added necessity of continuous protection
  and maintenance by our naval forces is seldom understood and
  appreciated. I finally convinced the Prime Minister of the fallacy
  of such propositions by describing the situations into which we
  would be led: namely, that in order to maintain our obstructions we
  would have to match the forces the enemy brought against them until
  finally the majority if not all of our own forces would be forced
  into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual
  torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favorable to
  the enemy.

But the naval administration at Washington had faith in that idea, and
urged it again and again, until it was adopted, and the vast barrage
was laid across the North Sea.




CHAPTER VI

NAVAL ALLIES IN HISTORIC CONFERENCE

  FOUR DAYS AFTER WAR WAS DECLARED, BRITISH, FRENCH AND AMERICAN
  ADMIRALS MET AT FORTRESS MONROE TO MAP OUT PLANS FOR IMMEDIATE
  COÖPERATION--CONFERENCE AT WASHINGTON, APRIL 11TH, FIXED THE POLICY
  OF UNITED NAVAL EFFORT--FREQUENT AND FULL INTERCHANGE OF OPINION
  WITH ALLIES.


Four days after war was declared, admirals of the United States, Great
Britain and France were in conference at Fortress Monroe. Immediately
upon the action of Congress, without awaiting the arrival of Admiral
Sims, then on the ocean bound for London, arrangements were made to
confer with the commanders-in-chief of the British and French forces on
this side of the Atlantic, who were familiar with conditions overseas
as well as on this coast. When they arrived Admiral Benson asked:
"Where can our Navy render the best immediate service?"

Then these sea fighters sat down to an all-day session to find the best
answer to Benson's question. The Allied admirals, who had been in the
war from the beginning, told what had been attempted, what achieved,
and the ways wherein they hoped America could come to the rescue.

Hampton Roads was the site of a historic conference, between Abraham
Lincoln and Alexander H. Stephens and others in 1865, when there was
hope that the War between the States might be brought to an end.
That conference failed, but this of April 10, 1917, was a pronounced
success; for it was followed the next day by the conference at the Navy
Department in Washington, which laid the foundations for the perfect
coöperation in the war with Allied governments, the first agreement
the United States Navy ever made with foreign naval officials to wage
war together. At the time even the fact that it was held was secret,
and its conclusions were sent abroad only in code. For secrecy was
necessary in regard to this as well as other plans and operations.

Since 1914 both the British and French navies had maintained their
ships in the Western Atlantic from Halifax to Southern waters. Vice
Admiral Browning and Rear Admiral Grasset, in command of the British
and French forces, respectively, were at Bermuda when war was declared
and came at once to Hampton Roads. Admiral Benson, Chief of Naval
Operations, accompanied by Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief of the
fleet, went from Washington on the President's yacht, the _Sylph_, and
were joined by Admiral Wilson, in command of the United States Patrol
Force. In sight of the spot where the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_
met in their epoch-making fight over half a century before, these
admirals exchanged views regarding the naval conduct of the war.
Admiral Browning had been in command of a squadron in the North Sea,
and acquainted the American officers with conditions abroad, and they
in turn advised the visiting admirals of conditions here.

At the conclusion of this meeting, all these admirals came to
Washington for a conference with the Secretary of the Navy. They sailed
on the _Sylph_, and the unprecedented spectacle was witnessed of that
little ship flying the flags of staff officers of three nations. It was
symbolic of the unity which marked their joint operations during the
war.

Upon their arrival, in addition to the admirals who had met them in
Hampton Roads, I invited to confer with them the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy, and the members of the General Board. "This conference,"
I stated when we had assembled in the rooms of the General Board, "has
been called to consider and carry out without delay the best plans
for the fullest coöperation of the navy of the United States with the
allied navies, and to place every ounce of our naval strength into the
struggle in the ways where it will do most to win victory."

Turning to the British and French representatives, I said that as their
nations had been long in the war we desired to learn by their successes
and be warned by their failures, if they had made any. The conference
was a protracted one and discussed every phase of the naval situation.
The British and French admirals told of their long and satisfactory
talks with Benson, Mayo and Wilson, and stated that they were
practically agreed as to the plans which they thought would best aid
in the object all had in view. They made certain suggestions and the
following arrangements were made by which, it was agreed, the United
States could best throw its weight into the struggle:--

1. The United States Navy to take over the patrol of the Atlantic coast
from Canada to South American waters. They explained the importance of
that patrol and why they had felt it essential to preserve it since
1914. They gave three reasons for its continued maintenance: (a)
protection of shipping for the Allied armies, including food for their
civilian populations, and oil from Mexico for their fleets and armies;
(b) protection against the coming of U-boats, which was deemed not only
possible but probable; and (c) readiness to destroy German raiders.
They told us that if we could take over this patrol it would serve the
double purpose of protecting shipping on this coast and releasing their
ships, which were needed at home.

At that time both here and abroad there was a general belief that
German strategy would dictate the sending of U-boats to our coast.
There was a fear too (and there were many reports), of possible
submarine bases at out-of-the-way places on the Atlantic and Gulf.
Indeed, from the beginning of the war in 1914 the Navy had been
vigilant in sending craft into all places on our coast, from Canada
to the Panama Canal, which might possibly enable U-boats to subsist
in our waters. That conference agreed that this vigilance should be
continued and made more effective, because it was thought the incentive
to submarine activity on this side of the Atlantic would be stimulated
by the desire to sink transports carrying American troops.

2. The United States to have in readiness squadrons to operate against
any raider in either the North or South Atlantic. That was regarded as
of great importance by the French and British conferees, and it was one
of the chief duties of our Patrol Squadron. Speaking later of that,
Admiral Badger, head of the General Board, said: "While a discussion
of the general subject was had, the British and French admirals were
particularly concerned as to the patrol of the east coast of North and
South America, for which their forces were considered inadequate." The
Chief of Naval Operations was directed, at this meeting, to strengthen
the patrol force and to send it wherever it would render the quickest
and best service against the enemy. It was later sent to Gibraltar, to
protect the vast volume of shipping plying between the Mediterranean
and Northern Europe. The Pacific fleet, under Admiral William B.
Caperton, was later on duty on the coast of Brazil and other South
American countries for the protection of Allied shipping in the South
Atlantic.

3. Recognizing the accepted naval doctrine of all countries that
destroyers should be provided for operation with every dreadnaught,
the British and French admirals said they hesitated to request the
detachment of any destroyer from the fleet. "Of course your fleet
naturally would not be willing to part with or weaken the screen of
destroyers," said Admiral Browning, but he expressed the hope that we
might send at once one or two destroyers to Europe for the moral effect
this would inspire, as well as their aid in combatting submarines.
Though the commander-in-chief felt it would be taking desirable
protection from his fleet, it was agreed immediately to send six.
"We will send a division at once," I informed the British and French
admirals, "and all other aid in our power." Admirals Benson and Mayo
were then directed to issue the necessary orders for the destroyers to
make ready for distant service. Later the number was increased, and
by the end of May twenty-eight were at or on their way to Queenstown.
In pursuance of the policy of the United States adopted at this
conference, the American Navy continued to send destroyers, submarine
chasers, yachts and other craft overseas until the number in Europe
reached 373.

4. Our Navy agreed to look after the west coast of North America from
Canadian to Colombian boundaries.

5. It was promised that United States armed government vessels would
maintain continuous service to Chile, from which country America and
the Allies obtained nitrates indispensable for the manufacture of
munitions. All during the war there was fear that the steady flow of
nitrates might be interrupted, and every effort was made to transport
large quantities as rapidly as possible. It was gratifying when
Admiral Browning reported that the British relations with Chile were
"excellent." While our relations with that country were also cordial,
scarcity of ships and hazards of transportation were such that the
United States spent many millions to establish nitrate plants within
its own borders.

6. It was agreed that our Asiatic fleet should be maintained. It
operated in close coöperation with Allied fleets all during the war and
they acted together when conditions in Russia became acute.

7. Our Navy undertook to supervise the Gulf of Mexico and Central
American waters as far south as the Colombian boundary and as far east
as Jamaica and the Virgin Islands. It was through this area that Allied
navies transported their oil, chiefly from Tampico. The protection of
tankers was always of prime importance and the patrol of those waters,
begun before we entered the war, was carried on until its close, first
under Admiral Wilson and afterwards by Admiral Anderson. The vigilance
of this patrol was never relaxed.

8. Our Navy assumed the duty of sending submarines to Canadian waters,
"if and when enemy submarines appeared off that coast."

9. The French Admiralty was assured that, as soon as possible, we would
send patrol vessels to the French coast. This was done, our armed
yachts sailing early in June for Brest.

10. We also undertook to send armed naval transports for carrying
needed railway material to France, one immediately, and others as soon
as possible.

After the conference adjourned, I suggested that the Chief of
Operations and the French and British admirals perfect the details of
coöperation agreed upon. They did so, and a cablegram was sent by these
admirals to their governments setting forth the foregoing definite
steps agreed upon for active participation by the United States with
the naval forces of the Allies.

Many other conferences followed, some of them notable, with Allied
officers and government officials who came to Washington for
consultation. All the Allied nations sent naval officers to Washington,
many of whom remained during the entire war for the specific duty
of expediting coöperation with our Navy. Some of them had authority
virtually to conclude arrangements. There was always frequent, frank
exchange of views, and the same spirit of oneness existed on this as on
the other side of the Atlantic.

The French mission, which came in April, 1917, headed by Marshal
Joffre and Viviani, was a distinguished body, embracing soldiers and
sailors who had seen hard service. Joffre, the beloved "hero of the
Marne," was the commanding military figure, and Washington, accustomed
as it was to celebrities, gave him a reception never excelled in its
wild enthusiasm. Everybody fell in love with him. Unaffected, simple,
charming, he was the embodiment of French courage and comradeship.
Other representatives of foreign governments had pressed the need of
money and ships; but Joffre said, "Send fresh soldiers. We can arm
them, and they can be trained in France as well as here."

Marshal Joffre expressed more than once his admiration of the
appearance of the ships and crews on the American warships which
he visited. "It is evident from their appearance, they are ready,
enthusiastically ready, and their spic and span appearance is in marked
contrast to the grimness of the French naval vessels," he said upon the
occasion of his visit to Mt. Vernon, where in his tribute to Washington
he said the early coming of American troops to France "will tighten the
links of affection and esteem which have ever united France and the
United States."

With Joffre came Admiral Chocheprat of the French Navy. He was met at
Hampton Roads by Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt, and came
to Washington for conference with naval officials, who obtained from
him valuable information from the seat of war. This enabled our Navy
to render better assistance in French waters and led to the opening of
more French ports for the landing of American troops and the quicker
turn-around of transports.

The British mission, which was headed by the distinguished Mr. Balfour,
arrived on April 21st. Its members brought the inside story of
conditions, particularly in the desperate fight against the submarine.
They had been met at Halifax and welcomed on behalf of the Navy by
Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, who accompanied them to Washington. Mr.
Balfour had, until a short time before, been First Civil Lord of the
Admiralty. With him as naval representative was Admiral Dudley S. de
Chair. They emphasized the seriousness of the submarine sinkings,
holding back nothing. American officials discussed the necessity of
new naval offenses; attacking the German bases or constructing mine
barrages to prevent egress and ingress of submarines and other plans
to end the U-boat menace. As representative of the foremost sea power,
the interchange of views between Admiral de Chair and our naval experts
was most helpful. The Admiral was well pleased with the arrangements
completed earlier in the month with Admiral Browning and with our broad
plans and construction program.

Naval Allied coöperation was strengthened by conferences with the
Prince of Udine, and the Italian mission; the Belgian mission headed by
Baron Ludovic Moncheur; the Russian mission, whose naval representative
was the ill-fated Admiral Kolchak; the Japanese mission, which
included the able Vice Admiral Takeshita--all these and other special
representatives who came from time to time or remained attached to
their embassies in Washington. Later the British Admiralty sent as its
representative Admiral Lowther Grant, who was in almost daily touch
with officers of the Navy Department until the close of the war and won
the regard of all.

Through the United States Naval Representative in London, American
admirals on duty at Brest and Gibraltar and naval attachés abroad, the
representatives of the Allied navies in Washington, who were kept fully
informed by their governments, and the diplomatic and naval missions,
the Navy Department was enabled to reach its decisions with all the
possible lights before it. It never had to depend upon any single
source of information.

These conferences at Washington were of the utmost importance because
all large policies had to be settled by the Navy Department. Officers
abroad were in command of ships assigned to them, and in emergencies
upon their own initiative employed their forces to the best advantage.
The ships overseas never were under independent command, but, as
distinctly stated in orders, constituted a "task force of the Atlantic
Fleet." Their orders stated: "The individuality of the United States
forces should be such that they may be continuously ready to change
their areas of operations as may be made necessary or by orders of the
Navy Department."

In the World War it was necessary for the Navy to maintain close
relationship with the President, the Council of National Defense, the
State and War Departments, the War Industries Board, the War Trade
Board, the Shipping Board and other war agencies, and the supply system
for Army as well as Navy. It was essential to be in constant touch with
the plans for the sending of troops and to have daily interchange of
views with representatives of Allied navies. Intimate contact made for
prompt action. The efficiency secured and maintained would have been
impossible if the naval control had ever passed from Washington.

The decisions to establish bases at Brest, at Gibraltar and in the
Azores were made by the Navy Department in Washington after conference
with Allied powers. The result of their establishment justified
the action taken. Routing of ships called for joint action between
Allied and American naval agencies working together on both sides of
the Atlantic. The movement of vessels carrying troops and supplies
was necessarily dependent upon daily conference with War Department
officials in Washington. Admiral William V. Pratt, who was Assistant
Chief of Operations during the war, thus stated the main naval duty:
"Our total naval effort in this war consisted less in the operation of
forces at the front than in a logistic effort in the rear, in which
the greatest problems we had to contend with originated and had to be
solved, here at home. It must be noted that in this war the main united
naval effort was one of logistics."

Building ships by the hundred; training men by the hundred thousand
to operate them; producing munitions, materials and supplies by
millions of tons; providing vessels to carry troops and men-of-war
to protect them--all these problems of production and transportation
were necessarily settled in Washington. It was this vast effort in
America, directed from the Navy Department, which made possible all our
activities in Europe, all the assistance we were able to render to the
Allies and the general cause.

[Illustration: AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN QUEENSTOWN HARBOR

The depth charges are conspicuous on each stern.]

[Illustration:

                                From the painting by Bernard F. Gribble

                      THE RETURN OF THE MAYFLOWER

First American destroyers arriving in Queenstown harbor, May 4, 1917.]




CHAPTER VII

"WE ARE READY NOW, SIR"

  DESTROYERS, AFTER 3,000-MILE VOYAGE, PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE
  SERVICE--FIRST OF AMERICAN FORCES SENT TO EUROPE--DEADLIEST FOE OF
  U-BOATS, THEY SAILED VAST AREAS, PROTECTING TROOPS AND CARGOES--256
  ATTACKS ON SUBMARINES--"FANNING" SANK U-58 AND CAPTURED CREW--NO
  RANK IN SACRIFICE OR HONORS.


"Fit out for long and distant service!" was the order the Eighth
Destroyer Division received from the flagship of the Atlantic Fleet the
night of April 14, 1917. It was then 9:30 p. m., and they were directed
to sail at daylight. At five o'clock next morning they started for
their home navy yards.

Speeding to New York and Boston, the ships went into drydock, made
repairs, tuned up machinery, and took aboard three months' stores and
provisions--all in ten days.

Sailing from Boston April 24th, under sealed orders, it was not until
midnight, when they were fifty miles at sea, that the officers of the
flotilla knew its destination. Breaking the seal, the commander read
the following, the first operating order issued to any American force:

                            NAVY DEPARTMENT

                  OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

                                           Washington, D. C., April 14.

  SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL.

  To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet; U.
  S. S. _Wadsworth_, flagship.

  Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain
  and Ireland.

  1. The British Admiralty have requested the coöperation of a
  division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near
  the coasts of Great Britain and France.

  2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in
  every way possible.

  3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval
  officer present, and thereafter coöperate fully with the British
  Navy. Should it be decided that your force act in coöperation with
  French naval forces, your mission and method of coöperation under
  French Admiralty authority remain unchanged.

  Route to Queenstown: Boston to latitude 50 N., Long. 20 W., to
  arrive at daybreak, then to latitude 50 N., Long. 12 W., thence to
  Queenstown.

  When within radio communication of the British naval forces off
  Ireland, call GCK and inform the Vice Admiral at Queenstown in
  British general code of your position, course, and speed. You will
  be met outside of Queenstown.

  4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty.

  5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear Admiral Sims at
  London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make
  no report of arrival to Navy Department direct.

                                             JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

Signed only three days after the conference with British and French
admirals in Washington, this put into effect the verbal orders given
the moment they requested that one or two destroyers be sent. Six were
on the way--the _Wadsworth_, _Conyngham_, _Porter_, _McDougal_, _Davis_
and _Wainwright_. They were the first of the United States forces
despatched to Europe, the pioneers of the large fleet we sent across
the Atlantic.

It was no smooth voyage they had in that long trip. Caught in a
southeast gale which lasted for seven days, they were so tossed about
by the heavy seas that they could not even set the mess-tables. "We ate
off our laps," one officer remarked. But the welcome received when they
reached port more than made up for these hardships. Nearing the coast,
the ninth day out, a British destroyer, the _Mary Rose_, was sighted,
flying the international signal, "Welcome to the American colors!"

"Thank you, we are glad of your company," the Americans replied.

Next morning, Friday, May 4th, they reached Queenstown. Though efforts
had been made to keep secret their coming, the American flag floated
from public buildings, business houses and residences, and from vessels
in the harbor. Crowds assembled on the hills and along the shore,
cheering as the ships from over the sea hove in sight.

It was a brilliant scene, flooded with sunshine--a historic day,
marking the arrival of the first American forces to take part with the
Allies in the struggle against the Central Powers. Through cheering
crowds the Navy boys proceeded to the American Consulate, where the
lord mayors of Queenstown and Cork extended a formal welcome. Sir
John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty, in a letter
to Commander J. K. Taussig, in command of the flotilla, offered the
"warmest welcome possible in the name of the British nation and the
British Admiralty," concluding: "May every good fortune attend you, and
speedy victory be with us."

Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, Commander-in-Chief of the Coasts of
Ireland, invited the destroyer commanders to dine with him that
evening, closing his invitation with the characteristic note: "Dine
in undress; no speeches." Able and energetic, he was known as a "hard
driver"; a man of few words who hated talk and demanded results.

"When will you be ready to go to sea?" was about the first question he
asked. He naturally supposed that, after a long and stormy voyage, they
would ask some time for rest and repairs.

"We are ready now, sir," Commander Taussig replied; "that is, as soon
as we finish refueling."

"I will give you four days from the time of arrival," the Admiral said.
"Will that be sufficient?"

"Yes," was the answer, "that will be more than ample time."

Four days later they were all at sea, hunting submarines. Before the
month was out they were swearing by Admiral Bayly, and he was calling
them "my boys."

"Things were looking black," Commander Taussig said. "In the three
previous weeks the submarines had sunk 152 British merchant ships.
The night before we entered the harbor a German submarine had planted
twelve mines right in the channel. Fortunately for us they were swept
up by the ever vigilant British mine-sweepers before we arrived.
The day following our arrival, one of the British gunboats from our
station was torpedoed and her captain and forty of her crew were lost.
Patrol vessels were continually bringing in survivors from the various
ships as they were sunk."

The convoy system had not then been instituted, the British depending
on patrol. This was trying duty, searching for the U-boat that might be
anywhere within four or five hundred square miles, for the ocean was
strewn with wreckage for three hundred miles from shore.

The Queenstown "area" comprised twenty-five thousand square miles,
and yet this wide zone of trans-Atlantic shipping, west and south of
Ireland, had been left almost unprotected. "Sometimes only four or five
British destroyers were operating in this great stretch of waters,"
said Admiral Sims, "and I do not think the number ever exceeded
fifteen."

Soon after the Americans arrived, the few British destroyers at
Queenstown were withdrawn. Urging the sending of all floating craft
available, Sims had informed us in his cablegram of April 28th:

  Yesterday the War Council and Admiralty decided that coöperation
  of twenty-odd American destroyers with base at Queenstown would no
  doubt put down the present submarine activity which is dangerous
  and keep it down. The crisis will be passed if the enemy can be
  forced to disperse his forces from this critical area.

Within a month twenty-eight destroyers and two tenders were either in
Queenstown or on the way there. On May 17th a second division arrived,
followed by two other divisions, and two additional destroyers and the
tenders _Melville_ and _Dixie_. The _Melville_, which arrived May 22nd,
was the "mother ship" and became the flagship of the United States
forces stationed there. On June 1st, Sims wrote to the Navy Department:

  It is gratifying to be able to report that the operations of our
  forces in these waters have proved not only very satisfactory, but
  also of marked value to the Allies in overcoming the submarine
  menace. The equipment and construction of our ships have proved
  adequate and sufficient and the personnel has shown an unusually
  high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation
  presented.

As a special compliment to the American Navy, Admiral Sims had been
invited, a few days before, to assume command at Queenstown in the
absence of Admiral Bayly on a brief vacation, and for several days
the American flag floated from Admiralty House. "So far as exercising
any control over sea operations was concerned, this invitation was
not particularly important," said Admiral Sims. "Matters were running
smoothly at the Queenstown station; Admiral Bayly's second in command
could have kept the machine in working order; it was hardly likely in
the few days that I was to command that any changes in policy would
be initiated. The British Admiralty merely took this way of showing a
great courtesy to the American Navy, and of emphasizing to the world
the excellent relations that existed between the two services."

In his book, "The Victory at Sea," Admiral Sims said:

  One day Admiral Bayly, Captain Pringle of the _U. S. S. Melville_,
  Captain Campbell, the Englishman whose exploits with mystery ships
  had given him world-wide fame, and myself, went out on the _Active_
  to watch certain experiments with depth-charges. It was a highly
  imprudent thing to do, but that only added to the zest of the
  occasion from Admiral Bayly's point of view.

  "What a bag this would be for the Hun," he chuckled. "The American
  Commander-in-Chief, the British admiral commanding in Irish waters,
  a British and an American captain."

  In our mind's eye we could see our picture in the Berlin papers,
  four distinguished prisoners standing in a row.

The destroyers which escorted the first troop convoys were, after
they reached St. Nazaire, sent to the base in Ireland. By July 5th
we had thirty-four destroyers at Queenstown. Thirty-seven vessels of
the Force--35 destroyers and two tenders--had been sent to Europe, as
follows:

  Destroyers and Date of Sailing          Commanding Officer

     _Wadsworth_--April 24             Lt. Comdr. J. K. Taussig
     _Conyngham_--April 24             Lt. Comdr. A. W. Johnson
     _Porter_--April 24                Lt. Comdr. W. K. Wortman
     _McDougal_--April 24              Lt. Comdr. A. P. Fairfield
     _Davis_--April 24                 Lt. Comdr. R. F. Zogbaum
     _Wainwright_--April 24            Lt. Comdr. F. H. Poteet
     _Rowan_--May 7                    Lt. Comdr. C. E. Courtney
     _Tucker_--May 7                   Lt. Comdr. B. B. Wygant
     _Cassin_--May 7                   Lt. Comdr. W. N. Vernou
     _Ericsson_--May 7                 Lt. Comdr. C. T. Hutchins
     _Winslow_--May 7                  Lt. Comdr. N. E. Nichols
     _Jacob Jones_--May 7              Lt. Comdr. D. W. Bagley
     _Melville_ (tender)--May 11       Commander H. B. Price
     _Cushing_--May 15                 Lt. Comdr. D. C. Hanrahan
     _Nicholson_--May 15               Lt. Comdr. B. A. Long
     _Sampson_--May 15                 Lt. Comdr. B. C. Allen
     _Cummings_--May 15                Lt. Comdr. G. F. Neal
     _Benham_--May 15                  Lt. Comdr. J. B. Gay
     _O'Brien_--May 15                 Lt. Comdr. C. A. Blakely
     _Patterson_--May 21               Lieut. J. H. Newton
     _Warrington_--May 21              Lieut. I. F. Dortch
     _Drayton_--May 21                 Lieut. D. L. Howard
     _Jenkins_--May 21                 Lieut. W. H. Lee
     _Paulding_--May 21                Lieut. J. S. Barleon
     _Trippe_--May 21                  Lieut. R. C. Giffen
     _Sterrett_--May 23                Lieut. G. W. Simpson
     _Walke_--May 23                   Lieut. C. F. Russell
     _Jarvis_--May 25                  Lieut. L. P. Davis
     _Perkins_--May 25                 Lieut. F. M. Knox
     _Dixie_ (tender)--May 31          Commander J. R. P. Pringle
     _Burrows_--June 14                Lieut. H. V. McKittrick
     _Fanning_--June 14                Lieut. A. S. Carpender
     _Allen_--June 14                  Commander S. W. Bryant
     _Wilkes_--June 14                 Lt. Comdr. J. C. Fremont
     _Ammen_--June 17                  Lieut. G. C. Logan
     _Shaw_--June 17                   Lt. Comdr. M. S. Davis
     _Parker_--June 17                 Lt. Comdr. H. Powell

Others were sent as they became available, and new destroyers, in
course of construction when war began, were dispatched to Europe upon
completion. All but two of the destroyers we had in April, 1917, served
in foreign waters. We also sent to Europe nine of the old type later
designated as "coast torpedo vessels"--the _Bainbridge_, _Barry_,
_Chauncey_, _Dale_, _Decatur_, _McDonough_, _Stewart_, _Truxtun_ and
_Worden_--and, old and small as they were, they did excellent service.
Eighty-five destroyers, in all, saw service in the "war zone."

Hunting U-boats, going to the relief of vessels attacked, rescuing
survivors, and later, when the convoy system was put into effect,
escorting vessels--troop and supply ships, passenger steamers and
merchantmen--through the danger zones to and from port, the destroyers
had plenty to do.

[Illustration: THE SURRENDER OF THE U-58

The crew of this submarine surrendered to the Fanning, after the
destroyer's depth charges had disabled the undersea boat. Inset, the
first officer of the U-boat, who traded his Iron Cross for a clean
undershirt.]

Finding a "sub" was the hardest part of the game, for the mere glimpse
of a destroyer through a periscope was sufficient for the submarine
to submerge and scurry away. Yet our vessels in European waters were
credited with 256 attacks on U-boats, and there were not a few exciting
encounters.

[Illustration: CREW OF THE FANNING, WHICH SANK THE U-58

The star on the funnel indicates a submarine victim.]

No more striking example of prompt action and quick results occurred
during the entire war than that of the _Fanning_ and the _Nicholson_
when they "got" a German submarine, the U-58, on November 17, 1917.
Sailing along with a convoy, at 4:10 p. m. Coxswain David D. Loomis,
lookout on the _Fanning_, caught a glimpse of a periscope. It was a
finger periscope, a tiny thing an inch and a half in diameter, no
larger than a walking stick. It was lifted for only a few seconds,
but the keen eyes of Loomis spied it, and he estimated its distance
and location--three points on the port bow, 400 yards distant, moving
across the bow at two knots' speed. The _Fanning_ headed for the spot,
full speed, and as it crossed the course dropped a depth-bomb. Changing
course, the _Nicholson_ was dashing across to drop another charge when
the conning tower appeared. The _Nicholson_ headed for the submarine,
and the _Fanning_ turned in her wake to attack. Dropping a depth-charge
alongside the U-boat, the _Nicholson_ turned, firing from her stern
gun. The sub's bow came up rapidly. She seemed to be down by the
stern and was evidently badly damaged, but tried to right herself and
increased her speed. As the _Nicholson_ cleared, the _Fanning_ opened
fire with her bow gun. At the third shot the German crew came on deck,
and held up their hands shouting, "Kamerad!" At 4:28 the submarine
surrendered. It had been only 18 minutes since Loomis had sighted her
periscope.

Getting a line to the crippled craft, the destroyers prepared to take
it in tow. But two of her crew disappeared for a moment. They scuttled
the boat. As it sank, the Germans jumped into the water and swam for
the _Fanning_. Heaving lines were thrown to them, and all but one,
Franz Glinder, managed to get aboard. When it was seen that he was
sinking, two of the _Fanning's_ crew, Chief Pharmacist's Mate Elzer
Harwell and Coxswain Francis G. Connor, jumped overboard to rescue
him. They got him aboard the ship, but in spite of all efforts to
resuscitate him, he died.

The commander, Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav Amberger, his three other
officers and thirty-five men were prisoners. They were given hot
coffee, sandwiches and cigarettes, and men of the _Fanning_ loaned
their warm clothing. No prisoners were ever better treated. As they
entered the boats that were to take them ashore, they cheered the
_Fanning_ and its crew.

A larger volume than this would be required to detail all the exploits
of our destroyers in European waters, or even to give the reports of
their contacts with submarines. But a few examples will give some idea
of the work they did.

Not long after her arrival in Queenstown, the _O'Brien_ (Lieutenant
Commander C. A. Blakely) defeated a U-boat which was trying to attack
the British steamer _Elysia_, twelve miles south of Ballycotton Light,
off the Irish coast. This encounter occurred at 4:21, June 16, 1917,
and the London Headquarters' report of June 20th, said:

  It is reasonably certain now that the _O'Brien_ destroyed the
  submarine mentioned. She was escorting a valuable ship when the
  two periscopes of a submarine were observed about 800 yards on her
  bow. She altered course immediately, headed for it, and increased
  to full speed. The periscopes were again seen about a minute
  later about 100 yards dead ahead, the submarine having apparently
  attempted to avoid the _O'Brien_ and torpedo her escort astern
  of her. From the last position sighted, the submarine apparently
  started to dive, and must have barely escaped being rammed.

  The lookout on the top observed her hull distinctly alongside the
  _O'Brien_ and gradually disappearing as she proceeded downward, on
  almost exactly the opposite course to the _O'Brien_. A depth-charge
  was dropped when the submarine was under the after deck-house, and
  although the _O'Brien_ was making 20 knots by this time, less than
  three minutes after the submarine had been sighted, the explosion
  of the depth-charge gave the ship a very severe shaking. The
  _O'Brien_ circled over the spot, but saw no evidence of damage. A
  British destroyer passing over the same spot, nearly three hours
  later found and reported large patches of strong-smelling oil. The
  _Cushing_, on the following morning, passed the same area and also
  reported a large amount of oil. This incident occurred just off
  Queenstown entrance and was unfortunately one of those cases the
  exact results of which cannot be determined.

The _Trippe_, _Warrington_, _Jenkins_, _Wadsworth_, _Cummings_,
_Wilkes_ and _Benham_ all had encounters in July which were not only
successful but showed evidence that the U-boats were damaged, if not
disabled. The _Parker_ (Lieutenant Commander Halsey Powell) on August
3rd had a long U-boat encounter. With the _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_,
she had been escorting steamers and had just returned to patrol when a
submarine was reported about 30 miles away. Speeding to the locality,
at 2:15 she found the steamship _Newby Hall_ had been attacked, and
was told that the U-boat had submerged probably six miles distant.
Escorting the steamer toward port, the _Parker_, at 4:10 p. m. turned
her over to the _Burrows_, and returned to look for the "sub." The
steamship _Rio Verde_, which was in the vicinity, was escorted out of
the dangerous locality, and the destroyer resumed the hunt for the
enemy.

At 6:50 the _Parker_ sighted the submarine, which submerged when the
destroyer came within 8,000 yards. But the U-boat left a long oil
slick which the _Parker_ followed down. "On reaching the end of the
slick, saw submarine underneath the end of the bridge," the commander
reported. "Dropped two depth-charges on the submarine and from all
evidence she was very probably sunk. There was practically simultaneous
explosion of the depth-charges, followed by another explosion. There
was discovered on the surface of the water air bubbles, and a heavy
scum of oil, and particles of what appeared to be cork." As no wreckage
or prisoners were obtained, the Admiralty gave the credit "probably
seriously damaged"; but the men aboard the _Parker_ were convinced that
the submarine had been destroyed.

The _Jacob Jones_, _Davis_ and _McDougal_ were credited with successful
encounters in September, the _McDougal_ being credited in Admiral Sims'
Headquarters' report of Sept. 15th, with "protection of two meeting
convoys against enemy submarine," and "possible destruction" of the
U-boat.

While escorting a New York convoy the _McDougal_ (Commander A. P.
Fairfield) at 1:21 a. m. sighted the submarine on the surface, and gave
chase. The "sub" submerged 500 yards ahead. Dropping two depth-charges,
the _McDougal_ circled around the spot, and soon noticed oil rising,
apparently from the U-boat. A northbound convoy from France to Wales
was sighted only a half mile away. "One or more ships of convoy were
undoubtedly saved by the fact that the submarine was forced to submerge
hastily," said the Headquarters' report. "Submarine believed to be
damaged or sunk."

When the large British steamship _Orama_ was torpedoed October 19,
1917, the _U. S. S. Conyngham_ attacked and drove off the submarine,
saving other ships of the convoy. Her commanding officer, Commander A.
W. Johnson, made this report:

  During the afternoon _Conyngham_ hailed _H. M. S. Orama_ and
  suggested that, due to submarine reported ahead, convoy change
  course. This was not thought advisable by the commanding officer of
  _H. M. S. Orama_ and convoy proceeded on original course.

  At 5:30 p. m. _Parker_, in position 48 degrees N. 09-20 W., escort
  about two miles ahead of convoy, reported sighting discolored water
  (brownish).

  At 5:50 p. m., while _Conyngham_ was alongside starboard side of
  _Orama_ passing her recognition signals, a torpedo crossing _Clan
  Lindsay's_ bow struck _H. M. S. Orama_ in port side, about No. 3
  hold. A distinct report was heard, followed immediately by cloud of
  smoke arising from _Orama_ forward of her bridge. _Orama_ listed
  to port and began to sink by the bow. _Conyngham_ by radio ordered
  convoy to disperse. _Conyngham_ sounded general quarters and went
  full speed ahead and crossed _Orama's_ bow by going full left
  rudder, then proceeded to make circle between VA and VR columns.

  When circling, a wake was sighted on starboard quarter. A periscope
  about one foot emerged visible for few seconds only was seen in
  this wake. A short time afterwards a periscope was sighted sharp
  on our starboard bow. This periscope submerged almost immediately,
  but wake was plainly visible. _Conyngham_, then a few yards from
  the periscope, headed for same and dropped depth-charge over
  the wake. An explosion resulted. Large quantities of discolored
  water was seen to rise in the air and a number of crew and
  officers distinctly made out a quantity of wreckage, one piece of
  which might have been the wireless mast of the submarine, when
  _Conyngham_ circled near the spot of the explosion.

The _Jacob Jones_ and the _Conyngham_ remained by the _Orama_ to save
life. It was night when the vessel began to settle and was abandoned by
her crew. But the destroyers rescued all the 478 persons who were on
board the _Orama_.

American destroyers had been operating in European waters six months
with no damage from enemy action, when, on October 15th, the _Cassin_
(Lieutenant Commander W. N. Vernou) was torpedoed. Her rudder was blown
off, a gun blown overboard, and the after part of the ship wrecked; yet
by expert seamanship she was kept afloat and taken to port, repaired
and put back into service. Nine men of the crew were wounded, but only
one was killed--Gunner's Mate Osmond K. Ingram, who gave his life to
save the ship.

Patrolling off the Irish coast, 20 miles south of Mine Head, at 1:30
p. m. the _Cassin_ sighted a submarine, but it vanished before the
destroyer could get close to it. Half an hour later Commander Vernou
sighted a torpedo running at high speed toward the ship. Double
emergency full speed was rung, the rudder put hard left, and for a
moment it looked as if the torpedo might pass astern. When only fifteen
or twenty feet away, it porpoised, leaving the water and sheering to
the left; and struck the vessel well aft, on the port side.

When the torpedo was sighted, Ingram, who was at his gun, realized that
if it struck among the depth-bombs astern, the explosion might sink
the ship. Instantly, he ran aft to strip these charges and throw them
overboard. He was blown to pieces when the torpedo struck. The memory
of this heroic gunner's mate, who made the supreme sacrifice to save
his shipmates, is preserved in the name of one of our new destroyers,
the _Ingram_, the first naval vessel ever named for an enlisted man.
There is no rank in sacrifice or honors.

The officers and men worked heroically to save the _Cassin_. Her
rudder gone, she was moving in circles. Efforts were made to steer by
use of the engines, but something carried away and put the starboard
engine out of commission. The ship seemed absolutely unmanageable. All
was dark below, the electric generator having been disabled. Radio
apparatus broken, a temporary auxiliary antenna had to be rigged up
before assistance could be summoned by wireless. But the crew were
undismayed, the gunners were at their stations, and when, at 2:30
o'clock, a conning tower was sighted, the _Cassin_ opened fire. Two
shots struck close to the U-boat, which submerged and did not again
attempt to attack the crippled ship.

Just before 4 o'clock the _U. S. S. Porter_ arrived. At 9 the British
ships _Jessamine_ and _Tamarisk_ appeared on the scene. But the sea was
rough, the wind high, and it was not until 2:30 a. m. that a hawser
was made fast and the _Tamarisk_ started towing the _Cassin_. An hour
later the hawser parted. The _Tamarisk_, two trawlers and a tug worked
until morning, attempting to get the vessel in tow again. But it was
not until 10:37 a. m. that a towing line from the _Snowdrop_ was made
fast, and the _Cassin_ taken to port.

Thirty-five feet of the stern was blown off. Living compartments and
store-rooms in the after part of the ship were wrecked or gone. The
equivalent of 850 pounds of TNT, in torpedo and depth-charges, had
exploded on the _Cassin's_ fantail. Twenty-odd men were in the wrecked
living compartments when the torpedo exploded. Their escape was almost
miraculous. Dazed by the shock, they automatically closed water-tight
doors and performed other emergency duties, but could never tell just
how they did it or got away. All declared that from the instant of the
explosion they were absolutely blinded. Forty-five members of the crew,
including the chief petty officers, lost all their belongings except
the clothes they had on. But that did not bother them. The ship was
saved, they were still alive, and that was happiness enough.

The _Chauncey_, one of our small, old-type destroyers, was rammed and
sunk by the steamship _Rose_ near Gibraltar at 1:46 a. m., November
19th. Three of the officers--Lieutenant Commander Walter E. Reno,
commanding, Lieutenant (junior grade) C. F. Wedderburn, and Ensign H.
G. Skinner--and 18 men were lost.

On December 6th, the _Jacob Jones_ was sunk, with the loss of two
officers--Lieutenant (junior grade) Stanton F. Kalk, of Washington, D.
C., and Gunner Harry R. Hood, of Atlanta, Ga.--and 62 men of the crew.
The _Jones_ was proceeding alone from off Brest to Queenstown when, at
4:21 p. m., a torpedo was sighted rushing toward the ship. The rudder
was put hard left, the destroyer put on all its speed, but could not
maneuver in time to escape.

Broaching and jumping clear of the water, the torpedo submerged again
50 or 60 feet from the ship, striking in the fuel-oil tank, three feet
below the water-line. The deck was blown clear for twenty feet, a
number of men were killed; the auxiliary room wrecked, a torpedo-tube
thrown into the air, the mainmast and radio apparatus were carried
away. The vessel settled aft immediately, and the after deck was awash.
The gunnery officer, Lieutenant J. K. Richards, ran aft to set the
depth-charges "safe"; but they were already under water. Rafts and
lifeboats were launched, circular lifebelts and splinter masts set
adrift to provide floatage for the crew.

The ship went down in eight minutes. Most of the men were on rafts
or wreckage, but some were swimming astern of the vessel. Lieutenant
Commander David W. Bagley and other officers jumped overboard as the
destroyer began to sink. Officers and men bore themselves with great
coolness. "Bagley's handling of the situation after his ship was
torpedoed," wrote Admiral Sims, "was everything I expected in the way
of efficiency, good judgment, courage, and chivalrous action."

Going down stern-first the destroyer twisted through 180 degrees, as
she swung upright. As she turned, her depth-charges exploded, killing
or stunning the men near by.

Twenty minutes later the submarine appeared, two or three miles
distant, then gradually approached and picked up two men from the
water, Albert De Mello and John F. Murphy, whom she carried to Germany
as prisoners. All the survivors in sight were collected, and rafts and
boats gotten together. The ship's radio had been wrecked, preventing
the sending out of distress signals. Two shots had been fired from
her guns in the hope of attracting some nearby ship, but none was in
hearing. There seemed no prospect of assistance except from shore,
and leaving Lieutenant Richards in charge of the rafts, Lieutenant
Commander Bagley, the ship's commander, and Lieutenant Norman Scott,
the navigating officer, with four men, started to row to the nearest
land to secure assistance.

Night soon came on, and the men on the rafts prepared for a long vigil.
When help would arrive, none could tell. Shivering from cold, shaken
by the experience through which they had passed, the survivors kept up
their courage with the amazing cheerfulness of the sailor in stress
and disaster. Their very lives depending on keeping warm, men who had
thick clothing divided it with those more thinly clad. Officers and men
shared their belongings and worked together for the common safety.

One small raft, which had been separated from the others, was picked up
at 8 p. m. by the steamship _Catalina_. The other survivors remained in
their perilous position all night, and it was not until 8:30 o'clock
next morning when they were discovered and rescued by the British
steamship _Camellia_.

One brave young officer died before relief arrived. Though still
suffering from the effects of the explosion, which had stunned him,
and weakened by his efforts after the ship sank, Lieutenant Kalk swam
from one raft to another to equalize the weight on them. Striving for
the safety of his men, he overtaxed his own strength, and died of
exhaustion and exposure. Men who were on the raft with him said, "He
was game to the last." His courage and self-sacrifice are commemorated
in a destroyer that bears his name.

There was no other serious damage to destroyers until March 19, 1918,
when a British vessel collided with the _Manley_. The collision
exploded the depth-charges on her decks, killing Lieutenant Commander
Richard McC. Elliot, of New York, and 33 enlisted men, and injuring
22 others. The _Manley_, though badly damaged, was gotten to port and
repaired.

The destroyers never halted in their warfare on the submarines, and
many encounters were reported in the early part of 1918, probably the
most notable being those of the _Allen_, Feb. 2d; the _Reid_, March
18th; the _Isabel_; the _Stewart_, April 23; the _Porter_, April 28;
the joint attack of the _Patterson_, _Beale_, _Burrows_ and _Allen_ on
May 19th, and that of the _Sterrett_ on June 1st. All these were given
official credits by the British Admiralty, which also gave the _Tucker_
(Lieutenant Commander W. H. Lassing), which bombed and sent down a
U-boat on August 8th, the credit "possibly sunk."

The armed yachts, the sub-chasers and all the rest played well their
parts. But after all it was the gallant destroyers which did most
to combat the submarine menace. At sea two-thirds of the time, they
escorted thousands of vessels in and out of European ports. Some of
them made astounding records. The first year after we entered the war
at least three, the _Porter_, _Davis_ and _Conyngham_, steamed nearly
65,000 miles each, over twice the distance around the globe, while the
_Caldwell_ for some time averaged 8,500 miles a month, over 280 miles a
day. No class of ship, big or little, ever excelled these records.

Commander Byron McCandless, who commanded the _Caldwell_, went to Mare
Island Navy Yard not long after her keel was laid, and banged away
so persistently to get his ship finished that the workmen called him
"Captain Bing-Bang." It was completed in quick time, and for its trial
trip made a record run from San Francisco through the Panama Canal to
Hampton Roads, going thence across the Atlantic and into service in the
war zone.

There were many stories of the destroyers' efficiency, and one told me
by a gentleman on his return from Europe impressed me particularly.
Making its way across the North Atlantic, a convoy of troop-ships was
still some three hundred miles from land when a voyager, who was making
his first trip across, remarked: "All you can hear about nowadays is
the Navy. It is the Navy this, the Navy that; but as far as I can see,
the Navy is not doing much in this war."

One of the civilians in the party who had a son in the Navy, rose to
his feet, pulled out his watch and said: "In ten minutes six United
States destroyers will meet this convoy."

"What are you talking about?" asked the voyager. "How do you know?"

"Well," was the confident answer, "it is now 4:05 o'clock. The
destroyers are ordered to meet this convoy at 4:15, and they will be on
time."

The party went out on deck to watch, and on the minute, at 4:15,
destroyers hove in sight. Swinging into line, on each side of the
convoy, the saucy little vessels, heaving foam and spray from bow to
stern, spanked along through the heavy seas.

"Good heavens!" exclaimed the doubting Thomas, "if these little
destroyers can come three hundred miles to sea in any kind of weather,
keep their schedule, and locate a convoy on the dot, I will believe
anything I hear regarding the Navy." That's just an example of the way
our destroyer boys went at the job, and they kept it up until the last
horn blew.

Their skill in navigation, in locating convoys or vessels in distress
or boats containing survivors was positively uncanny. When the
_President Lincoln_ was sunk five hundred miles at sea, the _Smith_
and the _Warrington_, two hundred and fifty miles away, hurried to
the rescue. A wireless message stating the locality was all they had
to steer by. It was 11 p. m. when they arrived. Boats and rafts had
drifted fifteen miles. But so accurately had the destroyer officers
estimated the drift that in the darkness they almost ran into the
rafts!

American destroyers at Brest operated under direct command of Admiral
Wilson and those at Gibraltar under command of Admiral Niblack. Though
operating under Admiral Bayly and subject to his orders, our Destroyer
Force at Queenstown had its own organization. The chief-of-staff was
Captain J. R. P. Pringle, whose ability and untiring energy won the
respect and regard of British and Americans alike. The senior commander
was Commander David C. Hanrahan, of the _Cushing_, whose enterprise and
energy were a fine example to his juniors.

The splendid work done by our vessels, the excellent condition in which
they were maintained, the superb morale of the entire force, called
for the highest praise. A year after the arrival of the first group,
Admiral Bayly issued the following order:

  On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States
  men-of-war at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to
  the United States officers and ratings for the skill, energy and
  unfailing good nature which they have all consistently shown and
  which qualities have so materially assisted in the war by enabling
  ships of the Allied Powers to cross the ocean in comparative
  freedom.

  To command you is an honor, to work with you is a pleasure, to know
  you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race.

A thrilling example of the courage, quick decision and prompt action
that characterized the Destroyer Force was that of the _Shaw_ October
9, 1918. Escorting the British transport _Aquitania_, the _Shaw_ was
just completing the right leg of a zigzag that brought her close to
the convoy, when her rudder jammed. As the huge transport turned,
the destroyer was aimed straight toward her side. Commander William
Glassford, captain of the _Shaw_, saw that a collision was inevitable.
Either destroyer or transport would be sacrificed. If the sharp-prowed
_Shaw_ struck the _Aquitania_, the big troop-ship, with eight thousand
men aboard, might be ripped and sunk, with heavy loss of life.

[Illustration: THEY, TOO, WERE READY

Above, a view through the stem of the Cassin after she had been hit
by a torpedo; although crippled, she continued the search for the
submarine. Inset, Gunner's Mate Osmond K. Ingram, who gave his life
to save the Cassin. Below, the U. S. S. Shaw alongside deck after her
collision with the Aquitania.]

Glassford decided instantly to sacrifice his own ship. Unable to turn
it aside, he gave the order, "Full speed astern!" A moment later, the
_Aquitania_ struck the destroyer and sliced her almost in two, passing
through her without even slowing speed. Striking just forward of the
bridge, the _Aquitania_ cut off ninety feet of the _Shaw's_ bow
and raked the whole length of her side, stripping open the forward
boiler room, and tearing out the mainmast, which, in falling, jammed
the starboard engine. Sparks ignited the oil in the forward tank,
setting fire to the vessel. The _Duncan_ and the _Kimberly_ went to her
assistance, the _Kimberly_ rescuing the survivors in the bow, which was
floating two hundred yards from the remainder of the ship.

[Illustration: THE SEATTLE AND REAR ADMIRAL ALBERT GLEAVES

The Commander and Flagship of the Cruiser and Transport Force.]

[Illustration:

                                     From the painting by Burnett Poole

                    A DASH THROUGH THE DANGER ZONE

  The Leviathan, largest of the transports, escorted by the Kimberly.]

That the vessel kept afloat at all seemed remarkable; to get her to
port appeared almost impossible. But those brave men of the _Shaw_ put
out the fire, in the face of bursting ammunition. They rigged up her
engines and got them working again, and repaired the steering gear.
And they navigated that remnant of a ship to port, reaching Portland
at 1:30 in the afternoon. Two of her officers and ten men of her crew
were dead, killed in the collision. Three officers and twelve men were
injured. Her bow and most of the forward part of the ship was gone. But
what was left of her was taken to a shipyard, and a new forward part
was built. Some months afterwards, on a visit to Portsmouth, England,
where she was repaired, I saw her again in commission, doing splendid
service in the Navy.

Could there be a better tribute than that to the staunchness of our
destroyers and the undying spirit and superb efficiency of their
officers and men?




CHAPTER VIII

RACE BETWEEN WILSON AND HINDENBURG

  BIGGEST TRANSPORTATION JOB IN HISTORY--TWO MILLION TROOPS CARRIED
  3,000 MILES OVERSEAS--FIRST CONVOYS ATTACKED BY U-BOATS NO AMERICAN
  TROOP-SHIP SUNK, NOT ONE SOLDIER ABOARD LOST THROUGH ENEMY ACTION,
  ON THE WAY TO FRANCE--NAVAL TRANSPORTS TOOK 911,000 TO EUROPE,
  BROUGHT HOME 1,700,000--U. S. NAVY PROVIDED FOUR-FIFTHS OF ESCORTS.


What was the greatest thing America did in the World War?" That is a
question I have often been asked, and it is easily answered. It was
the raising and training of an army of 4,000,000 men, a navy of over
600,000, and the safe transportation of more than two million troops to
Europe. And all this was accomplished in eighteen months.

When the issue hung in the balance, in the spring of 1918, Lloyd George
said: "It is a race between Wilson and Hindenburg." Could America land
enough soldiers in France in time to check the German offensive? That
was the one vital question.

Carrying the American Expeditionary Force across the Atlantic
and bringing our troops home has been justly termed the "biggest
transportation job in history." Sailing through submarine-infested
seas, they constantly faced the menace of attack from an unseen foe,
as well as the perils of war-time navigation. Yet not one American
troop-ship was sunk on the way to France, and not one soldier aboard a
troop transport manned by the United States Navy lost his life through
enemy action.

That achievement has never been equalled. It was not only the most
important but the most successful operation of the war. The Germans
never believed it could be done.

When Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, commander of the Cruiser and
Transport Force, came to Washington for his final instructions, just
before the first troop convoys sailed for Europe, as he was leaving my
office, I said to him:

  Admiral, you are going on the most important, the most difficult,
  and the most hazardous duty assigned to the Navy. Good bye.

That was not overstating it in any particular. No nation in history had
ever attempted to transport so huge an army overseas. It would have
been difficult enough under the most ideal conditions, with nothing to
hinder or molest.

The German navy could have no greater object than to prevent our troops
from getting to France. There could have been no greater victory for
them than to have sunk a transport loaded with American soldiers. Words
can hardly express the strain of those anxious days when our first
transports were running the gauntlet to France; or our relief when we
received the news that they had all arrived safely at St. Nazaire.

Sailing in a dense fog on June 14, 1917, the first group arrived on
June 26th; the last, the cargo ships, on July 2nd. The first group,
Gleaves reported, was attacked by submarines the night of June 22nd, at
10:15 p. m.; the second group encountered two, and a torpedo was fired
at the fourth group on June 28th. That they had escaped the submarines
was an added cause for rejoicing. Not a ship was damaged or a man
injured, and an officer reported: "We didn't lose but one horse, and
that was a mule."

"The German Admiralty had boasted that not one American soldier should
set foot in France," Gleaves said. "The bluff had been called, and it
could not have been called at a more psychological moment."

The question of the hour had been successfully answered; France, as
well as America, celebrated the event in a very delirium of rejoicing.
This was the beginning of that vast stream of troops and supplies that
poured across the Atlantic until the Germans were overwhelmed.

Getting that first group of transports together was a job. The army
had only a few troop-ships, none of them fitted for trans-Atlantic
service. The Navy had only three--the _Henderson_, just completed;
the _Hancock_, and the former German commerce raider, _Prince Eitel
Friedrich_, which we converted into an auxiliary cruiser and renamed
the _DeKalb_. The Army secured fourteen mail and cargo steamships,
and hastily converted them. It had to be quick work. We had not
contemplated sending troops so soon. From a military standpoint it
would have been better, many experts in this country and Europe held,
to have retained the regulars for a while to aid in training the new
officers and raw recruits, and not to have begun transportation until
we had a larger army.

But war-weary France, grimly holding back the Germans, and England,
beset by submarines, needed cheering up; needed visible evidence that
reënforcement was certain, that the Americans were coming. Marshal
Joffre asked that some troops be sent at the earliest possible
moment--"a regiment or two, if possible a division." He told Secretary
Baker that he looked forward to the day when the United States should
build up its "splendid army of 400,000 or 500,000." What must he
have thought when he saw an American army of 4,000,000 men, with two
millions of them in France! He appreciated the necessity, he said, of
retaining the regulars to train the new army, and knew that few could
be spared. But the very sight of American troops on French soil, of
our men marching through the streets of Paris, would be a tremendous
inspiration to all France. The wise old Marshal was right.

Secretary Baker immediately began his preparations to send troops. When
he told Congress he would have an army of 500,000 men in France in the
summer of 1918, a leading senator declared it was "impossible." It was
impossible to those without vision. But the Secretary of War's figures
were increased three-fold.

General Pershing was chosen to command the forces to be sent to Europe,
and was summoned from the Mexican border. He arrived in Washington
May 10th. Preparations were already under way by both Army and Navy.
Officers of both services were working out in detail the system by
which they were to secure ships and coöperate in transportation.

I selected Gleaves, then in command of our destroyer force, to direct
the troop transportation, and I never had reason to regret this
choice. No man could have done a big job better; no job was ever better
done. On May 23, he was summoned to Washington and informed that he had
been chosen to command the first expedition to France.

General Pershing and his staff sailed May 28th on the _Baltic_ and
arrived at Liverpool June 8, reaching France at Boulogne, June 13th.
The troop convoys sailed from New York the next day. Admiral Gleaves,
on his flagship, the cruiser _Seattle_, was in command. The vessels
were arranged in four groups, which sailed six hours apart:

  Group 1--Transports: _Saratoga_, _Havana_, _Tenadores_, _Pastores_.
  Escort: _Seattle_, armored cruiser; _DeKalb_, auxiliary cruiser;
  _Corsair_, converted yacht; _Wilkes_, _Terry_, _Roe_, destroyers.

  Group 2--Transports: _Henderson_, _Momus_, _Antilles_, _Lenape_.
  Escort: _Birmingham_, scout cruiser; _Aphrodite_, converted yacht;
  _Burrows_, _Fanning_, _Lamson_, destroyers.

  Group 3--Transports: _Mallory_, _Finland_, _San Jacinto_. Escort:
  _Charleston_, cruiser; _Cyclops_, fuel ship; _Allen_, _McCall_,
  _Preston_, destroyers.

  Group 4--Transports: _Montanan_, _Dakotan_, _El Occidente_, _Edward
  Luckenbach_. Escort: _St. Louis_, cruiser; _Hancock_, cruiser
  transport; _Shaw_, _Parker_, _Ammen_, _Flusser_, destroyers.

No convoy that ever sailed had a stronger escort or was more closely
guarded. Their protection was our supreme duty. Before they left, I
cabled Admiral Sims: "I hereby instruct you to furnish escorts, to
consist of one division of destroyers for each convoy group from the
point of meeting to the point of debarkation."

Submarines were reported operating in the area that had to be crossed.
Three of the groups encountered U-boats, Admiral Gleaves reported, and
Admiral Sims cabled on June 30th, "First group attacked by submarines,
longitude 25 degrees 30, before arriving at first rendezvous; second
group attacked longitude 8"; and the next day he cabled: "It is
practically certain that enemy knew position of the first rendezvous
and accordingly sent a submarine to intercept before juncture with
destroyers."

About 10:15 p. m., June 22, the officer of the deck and others on the
bridge of the _Seattle_, which was leading the first group, saw a
white streak about 50 yards ahead of the ship, crossing from starboard
to port. The cruiser was immediately run off 90 degrees to starboard
at full speed. The officer of the deck said, "Report to the admiral a
torpedo has just crossed our bow." General alarm was sounded, torpedo
crews being already at their guns. When Gleaves reached the bridge, the
_DeKalb_ and one of the transports astern had opened fire, the former's
shell fitted with tracers. Other vessels of the convoy turned to the
right and left. The destroyer _Wilkes_ crossed the _Seattle's_ bow at
full speed and turned toward the left column in the direction of the
firing.

Two torpedoes passed close to the _DeKalb_ from port to starboard, one
about 30 yards ahead of the ship and the other under her stern, as the
ship was turning to the northward. Captain Gherardi stated that at
10:25 the wake of a torpedo was sighted directly across the _DeKalb's_
bow. A second torpedo wake was reported ten minutes later by the after
lookouts.

The torpedoes fired at the _Havana_ passed from starboard to port about
40 yards ahead of the ship, leaving a distinct wake which was visible
for 400 or 500 yards.

The submarine sighted by the _Seattle_ was seen by the _Wilkes_ and
passed under that ship, Lieutenant Van Metre reported, stating that the
oscillator gave unmistakable evidence of the presence of a submarine.
The radio operator at the receiver reported, "Submarine very close to
us." As the U-boat passed, it was followed by the _Wilkes_, which ran
down between the columns, chasing the enemy.

The _Birmingham_, leading the second group, encountered two submarines,
the first about 11:50 a. m., June 26, in latitude 47° 01´ N. longitude
06° 28´ W., about a hundred miles off the coast of France, and the
second two hours later. The _Wadsworth_ investigated the wake of the
first without further discovery. The _Cummings_ sighted the bow wave of
the second at a distance of 1,500 yards, and headed for it at a speed
of 25 knots. The gun pointers at the forward gun saw the periscope time
and again, but as the ship was zigzagging, it disappeared each time
before they could fire at it. The _Cummings_ passed about 25 yards
ahead of a mass of bubbles which were coming up from the wake and let
go a depth-charge just ahead. Several pieces of timber, quantities of
oil, bubbles and debris came to the surface. Nothing more was seen of
the submarine. The attacks on the second group occurred about 800 miles
to the eastward of where the attacks had been made on the first group.

The voyage of the third group, Admiral Gleaves reported, was
uneventful; but the _Kanawha_, with the fourth group, on June 28th,
fired on what was believed to be a submarine. The _Kanawha's_ commander
saw the object; and a minute or two later the port after gun's crew
reported sighting a submarine, and opened fire. The lookouts said they
saw the U-boat under the water's surface, about where the shots were
landing. Lieutenant (junior grade) Lee C. Carey, in charge of the
firing, reported that he saw the submarine fire two torpedoes in the
direction of the convoy, which sheered off when the alarm was sounded.
"All the officers and men aft had observed the torpedoes traveling
through the water and cheered loudly when they saw a torpedo miss a
transport," reported the _Kanawha's_ commander.

When he was in Paris Admiral Gleaves was shown a confidential bulletin
of information issued by the French General Staff, dated July 6, which
contained the following:

  Ponta Delgada was bombarded at 9 a. m., July 4. This is undoubtedly
  the submarine which attacked the _Fern Leaf_ on June 25, four
  hundred miles north of the Azores and sank the _Benguela_ and
  _Syria_ on the 29th of June 100 miles from Terceira (Azores). This
  submarine was ordered to watch in the vicinity of the Azores at
  such a distance as it was supposed the enemy American convoy would
  pass from the Azores.

"It appears from the French report just quoted above and from the
location of the attack that enemy submarines had been notified of our
approach and were probably scouting across our route," Gleaves said.

On the evening of July 3rd, I had the pleasure of announcing the safe
arrival of all our convoys, without the loss of a man. This occasioned
general rejoicing in France, England and Italy, as well as America. For
us, the national holiday that followed was truly a glorious Fourth.
Secretary Baker wrote the thanks of the Army, adding: "This splendid
achievement is an auspicious beginning, and it has been characterized
throughout by the most cordial and effective coöperation between
the two military services." In replying, "in behalf of the men whose
courage gave safe conduct to courage," I said that the Navy waited "in
full confidence for the day when the valor of your soldiers will write
new and splendid chapters in the history of our liberty-loving land."

The policy of the Department, with reference to the safety of ships
carrying troops to France, was laid down in this cablegram which I
wrote with my own hand:

                                      Washington, D. C., July 28, 1917.

  Admiral Sims:

  The paramount duty of the destroyers in European waters is
  principally the proper protection of transports with American
  troops. Be certain to detail an adequate convoy of destroyers and
  in making the detail bear in mind that everything is secondary to
  having a sufficient number to insure protection to American troops.

                                             JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

From the small beginning was built up the great Cruiser and Transport
Force which took to France 911,047 American soldiers, and brought
home 1,700,000--a total of 2,600,000 carried across the Atlantic in
naval transports. In less than a year this Force grew to a fleet of
83 vessels, and after the armistice comprised 142 vessels carrying
troops, with facilities for 13,914 officers and 349,770 men. Rear
Admiral Gleaves' headquarters were at Hoboken, N. J., where most of the
transports docked. His chief of staff was Captain De W. Blamer. The
Newport News Division was commanded by Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones,
now commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, with Captain J. F. Hines
as his chief of staff.

Of the 194,965 troops which sailed before the end of 1917, 113,429 were
carried in American vessels, all but 8,535 of these in our transports;
and 75,500 were taken in British ships. In January, February and March,
1918, British vessels carried 57,399; U. S. naval transports, 123,917.
Foreign shipping in large quantity did not become available until
after the famous "March drive" made by the Germans in 1918. Then the
most important thing to all the Allies was getting American soldiers
to Europe, and British, French and Italian ships in numbers were
furnished. In April, 1918, 67,553 sailed in U. S. transports, 47,362
in British ships. In May the British carried more than we did, 133,795
to our 99,561, besides 12,127 carried in Italian vessels leased by the
British. In the next five months up to the armistice, 520,410 were
carried in U. S. naval transports, and 28,973 in other American ships;
British vessels carried 692,931; British-leased Italian ships 53,493
and French, Italian and other foreign ships, 38,218.

The records of the Cruiser and Transport Force show that, in all,
2,079,880 American troops were transported to France before the
armistice--952,581 in American vessels, 911,047 of these in U. S.
naval transports; 1,006,987 in British ships; 68,246 in British-leased
Italian vessels; 52,066 in French, Italian and other foreign ships.
American vessels carried 46.25 per cent, 43.75 of this in U. S. Naval
transports; British vessels 48.25 per cent; British-leased Italian
ships, 3 per cent; French, Italian and others, 2.5 per cent.

The purely naval duty was escorting these vessels, guarding them
against attack by raiders or submarines. Of this the British navy
performed 14.125 per cent, the French 3.125, and the United States Navy
82.75 per cent, over four-fifths. Of the total number of troops, 61,617
were under French escort, 297,903 under British escort, and 1,720,360
sailed under the escort of the United States Navy.

But that is only half the story. When hostilities ended, that vast
army had to be brought back from Europe. For this, very little foreign
shipping was available. Of the 1,933,156 Americans returned from
November 11, 1918, to the end of September, 1919, the Navy brought home
1,675,733; all other vessels, American and foreign, 257,423. During
hostilities we had returned 11,211 sick, wounded, casuals, etc.; some
were returned after September, so that the total number brought by the
Navy from Europe to America ran well over 1,700,000.

Of the total troop and official passenger movement incident to the war,
approximately 4,000,000, the Navy transported more than 2,600,000. Not
only did the Navy man and operate the United States transports, but
provided the food for this vast army of soldiers en route. And during
the entire war period, four-fifths of all the American troops who
sailed were guarded by American cruisers, destroyers and patrol craft.

This country could not have sent over nearly so many troops as it did,
if we had not been aided by the British, French and Italian vessels.
This was no gift, of course. The United States Government paid for
every soldier transported on a foreign vessel. The aid of our Allies
was invaluable, and highly appreciated. They should be given full
credit for all they did; but this should not detract one iota from
the great task performed by our Navy, which was the biggest factor in
putting through this biggest job of the war.

Not a single vessel of the Cruiser and Transport Force was torpedoed on
the way to France. Two, the _President Lincoln_ and the _Covington_,
were sunk returning, as was also the _Antilles_, an Army chartered
transport not manned by the Navy. Two American transports were
torpedoed, the _Finland_, manned by a civilian crew, and the _Mount
Vernon_, manned by the Navy; but both were successfully navigated
to port and repaired. The _Tuscania_ and the _Moldavia_, sunk while
carrying American troops to Europe, were British chartered vessels, as
was also the _Dwinsk_, which was sunk while returning.

The first transport lost was the _Antilles_, October 17, 1917, two days
out of Brest. Eleven days later the _Finland_ was struck by a torpedo.
In both cases there was loss of life and confusion among the civilian
crews. After these experiences, it was decided to man all American
troop-ships entirely by naval personnel; and it was not until May 31st
that another was lost.

Returning to America, in company with the _Susquehanna_, _Antigone_
and _Rijndam_, the _President Lincoln_ (Commander P. W. Foote), was
steaming along, 500 miles from land. At 9 o'clock a terrific explosion
occurred on the port side of the _Lincoln_, 120 feet from the bow. In
an instant there was another explosion in the after part of the vessel.
The ship had been struck by three torpedoes, fired in a salvo from a
submarine. Two struck together near the bow, the other near the stern.
Officers and lookouts had sighted the wakes, but the torpedoes were so
close that it was impossible to avoid them.

There were 715 persons on board, including 30 officers and men of the
army, a number of whom were sick, two helpless from paralysis. It was
realized that the vessel could not long remain afloat, but there was no
confusion. Crew and passengers coolly waited for and obeyed orders.
Boats were lowered and life-rafts placed in the water. Fifteen minutes
after the torpedoes struck, all hands except the guns'-crews were
ordered to abandon the ship.

Gunners stood at their stations, awaiting any opportunity for a shot
at the submarine. Commander Foote and several other officers remained
aboard. All the rest of the ship's company were in the boats or on the
rafts. When the guns began firing, they broke into cheers. The firing
was kept up until the water covered the main deck, and the gunners did
not leave their posts until they were ordered off just before the ship
sank.

With her colors flying, twenty-five minutes after the torpedoes
exploded, the _Lincoln_ went down. Three officers and 23 men were
lost. Seven working below decks were either killed by the explosion,
or drowned by the inrush of water. Sixteen men on a raft alongside
were caught by the current and carried under as the ship went down.
The officers lost were Passed Assistant Surgeon L. C. Whiteside, the
ship's medical officer; Paymaster Andrew Mowat, the supply officer, and
Assistant Paymaster J. D. Johnson. Dr. Whiteside and Paymaster Mowat
had seen that the men under their charge had gotten away safely, the
doctor having attended to placing the sick in the boat provided for
them. Paymaster Johnson was on the raft which was pulled down as the
ship plunged.

Admiral Sims cabled that the "small loss of life is due to thorough
discipline of ship's company, and excellent seamanship of Commander
Foote." This he said was "evidenced by actual results even after the
ship had sunk and the personnel was adrift in boats and on rafts."
Admiral Gleaves wrote to Foote: "Your action and judgment under such
trying conditions were in accord with the best traditions of the
service." Half an hour after the ship went down a large submarine
emerged, and went among the boats and rafts, seeking the commander
and other senior officers, whom they wished to take prisoners. The
Germans could identify only one officer, Lieutenant Edouard Victor M.
Isaacs, who was taken on board and carried away. The submarine--it was
the U-90,--remained in the vicinity for two hours, and returned again
in the afternoon, evidently seeking to attack other vessels of the
convoy. But they were far away, having, in accordance with standard
instructions to avoid attack, put on all steam and left the scene as
soon as the _Lincoln_ was hit.

The U-boat was so menacing that some feared it would fire upon the
life-craft. When several of the crew went to its gun, apparently
preparing it for action, a man in one of the boats exclaimed: "Good
night! Here come the fireworks!"

By dark the boats and rafts had been lashed together. Lighted lanterns
were hoisted and flares and signal lights burned every few minutes.
None knew when aid would arrive. Distress signals had been sent out,
but the nearest destroyers were 250 miles away, protecting another
convoy. Military necessity might prevent their being detached.

Five hundred miles from land, waiting for aid until far in the night,
the men cheered and sang such songs as "Over There," "Keep the Home
Fires Burning," "Hail, Hail, the Gang's All Here," and "Where do we
go from here, boys?" At 11 p. m. the destroyers _Smith_ (Lieutenant
Commander Kenyon) and _Warrington_ (Lieutenant Commander Klein)
arrived. With only the wireless distress message sent at 9 a. m. to
guide them, they had located the life-craft in the middle of the night,
though boats and rafts had drifted 15 miles. The hundreds of survivors
were taken aboard the destroyers, which remained until daylight to
search for survivors, departing at 6 a. m.

Though their decks were crowded with the _Lincoln's_ officers and men,
the _Smith_ and _Warrington_ made a fast run to Brest, arriving there
next day. En route they sighted the wake of a periscope and rained
depth-bombs on the very submarine which had sunk the _Lincoln_, but by
descending to a great depth the U-90 escaped.

[Illustration:

                                  From the painting by Frank Dana Marsh

                 THE SINKING OF THE PRESIDENT LINCOLN

The U. S. S. President Lincoln, commanded by Captain P. W. Foote, was
one of the two vessels of the Cruiser and Transport Force which were
sunk by submarines. She was lost on May 31, 1917, going down with
colors flying twenty-five minutes after the torpedoes struck her. Of
the 715 persons on board, all but 26 were saved.]

[Illustration: THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WITH CAPTAIN DISMUKES AND THE
MEN WHO SAVED THE MOUNT VERNON]

[Illustration: THE MOUNT VERNON, FORMERLY THE GERMAN LINER
KRONPRINZESSIN CECILIE, SAFELY IN PORT AFTER BEING TORPEDOED, SEPTEMBER
5, 1918.]

That it was the same U-boat was learned positively when, months
afterward, Lieutenant Isaacs escaped from prison. His experiences
aboard the submarine and in Germany make a thrilling story. Describing
his capture, after the sinking of the _Lincoln_, and his being taken
aboard the U-boat, Lieutenant Isaacs said:

  We passed north of the Shetlands into the North Sea, the Skagerrak,
  the Cattegat, and the Sound into the Baltic. Proceeding to Kiel, we
  passed down the canal through Heligoland Bight to Wilhelmshaven.

  On the way to the Shetlands we fell in with two American
  destroyers, the _Smith_ and the _Warrington_, who dropped 22
  depth bombs on us. We were submerged to a depth of 60 meters and
  weathered the storm, although five bombs were very close and shook
  us up considerably. The information I had been able to collect was,
  I considered, of enough importance to warrant my trying to escape.
  Accordingly in Danish waters I attempted to jump from the deck of
  the submarine, but was caught and ordered below.

  The German Navy authorities took me from Wilhelmshaven to
  Karlsruhe, where I was turned over to the army. Here I met officers
  of all the Allied armies, and with them I attempted several
  escapes, all of which were unsuccessful. After three weeks at
  Karlsruhe I was sent to the American and Russian officers' camp
  at Villingen. On the way I attempted to escape from the train by
  jumping out of the window. With the train making about 40 miles an
  hour, I landed on the opposite railroad track and was so severely
  wounded by the fall that I could not get away from my guard. They
  followed me, firing continuously. When they recaptured me they
  struck me on the head and body with their guns until one broke his
  rifle. It snapped in two at the small of the stock as he struck me
  with the butt on the back of the head.

  I was given two weeks solitary confinement, for this attempt to
  escape, but continued trying, for I was determined to get my
  information back to the Navy. Finally, on the night of October 6,
  assisted by several American Army officers, I was able to effect an
  escape by short-circuiting all lighting circuits in the prison camp
  and cutting through barbed-wire fences surrounding the camp. This
  had to be done in the face of a heavy rifle fire from the guards.
  But it was difficult for them to see in the darkness, so I escaped
  unscathed.

  In company with an American officer in the French Army, I made my
  way for seven days and nights over mountains to the Rhine, which
  to the south of Baden forms the boundary between Germany and
  Switzerland. After a four-hour crawl on hands and knees I was able
  to elude the sentries along the Rhine. Plunging in, I made for the
  Swiss shore. After being carried several miles down the stream,
  being frequently submerged by the rapid current, I finally reached
  the opposite shore and gave myself up to the Swiss gendarmes, who
  turned me over to the American legation at Berne. From there I made
  my way to Paris and then London and finally Washington, where I
  arrived four weeks after my escape from Germany.

It was my pleasure to greet Lieutenant Isaacs on his return,
congratulate him on his escape, and commend him for the heroic courage
and enterprise he had displayed under such trying circumstances.

The _Covington_ (Captain R. D. Hasbrouck) was torpedoed July 1st at
9:15 p. m., the torpedo smashing a hole in the vessel's side and
throwing into the air a column of water higher than the smokestacks.
Engine and fire rooms quickly filled, the ship lost headway rapidly and
in fifteen minutes lay dead in the water.

Listing heavily to port, it was feared the vessel might take a lurch
and sink suddenly. Twenty-one boats were lowered, three had been
smashed by the explosion. "Abandon ship," was ordered. The bugle
sounded "Silence," and silently the men went down the Jacob's ladders
as if they were at drill. The destroyer _Smith_ stood close by, taking
the men from the boats. Thirty officers and men remained aboard with
the Captain until an hour after the torpedo struck.

Hoping to save the transport, a salvage party was organized, to go
on board as soon as the men could be collected from rafts and boats.
The little _Smith_, which in addition to its own crew of one hundred,
had aboard 800 of the _Covington's_ officers and men, encircled the
transport to keep off the submarine and prevent it from firing another
torpedo.

Another destroyer, the _Reade_, came to the rescue; at 4:20 a. m. the
British salvage tugs, _Revenger_ and _Woonda_ arrived, and at 5:30
o'clock the American tug _Concord_ reached the scene. The _Smith_,
which was ordered to take to port all the crew not needed, at 5:20 left
for Brest. By 6 o'clock the three tugs had the _Covington_ in tow,
and were making from five to six knots through the water. Two more
destroyers joined shortly after to guard the crippled ship from attack.
She was then listed about twenty degrees to port, and about noon took a
quick list of ten degrees more.

By 1:30 p. m. she had heeled to an angle of 45 degrees. Sensing sinking
conditions, the working party was directed to leave the ship, the
_Nicholson_ taking them off. At 2:30 the _Covington_ began to sink
rapidly by the stern and disappeared two minutes later. The ship went
down with her colors flying.

The only fighting ship of the Cruiser and Transport Force that was
sunk--in fact, the only large United States naval vessel lost during
the war--was the armored cruiser _San Diego_ (Captain H. H. Christy)
sunk by a mine off Fire Island, N. Y., July 19, 1918.

Proceeding from Portsmouth, N. H., to New York, the cruiser was
steering what was regarded as a safe course to avoid the submarines,
then operating in Atlantic waters, and the mines they had laid.
Lookouts, gun-watches, fire control parties were at their stations, the
whole crew on the alert. There was no sign of any U-boat or mine.

Suddenly, at 11:05 a. m., there was an explosion at frame No. 78,
on the port side well below the water line. "Full speed ahead," was
rung by the Captain, who hoped the ship could be kept afloat, and the
starboard engine operated until it was stopped by rising water.

Machinist's Mate Hawthorne, who was at the throttle in the port engine
room, was blown four feet under a desk. He got up, closed the throttle
on the engine, which had already stopped, and then escaped up the
ladder. The lieutenant on watch in the starboard engine room, closed
the water tight doors, and gave instructions to the fireroom to protect
the boilers.

The vessel listed to port so heavily that water entered the gun ports
on the gun deck. Listing 8 degrees quickly, the vessel hung for seven
minutes; then gradually turned until 35 degrees was reached. At this
time the port quarter-deck was three feet under water. The cruiser then
rapidly turned turtle and sank.

Captain Christy was last to leave the ship. Going from the bridge down
two ladders to the boat deck, he slid down a line to the armor belt,
then dropped four feet to the bilge keel, and thence to the docking
keel. From there he jumped into the water. The men cheered their
captain as he left the ship. On the rafts they sang "The Star Spangled
Banner" and "My Country 'Tis of Thee," and more cheers arose when the
United States ensign was hoisted on the sailboat.

Two dinghies with six officers and twenty-one men pulled to shore,
arriving at 1:20 p. m. The steamer _Malden_ picked up 370 officers and
men, the _Bossom 708_; the _E. P. Jones 78_. Six men were lost, three
of these being killed by the explosion. The court of inquiry reported
that "the conduct of the Captain, officers and crew was in the highest
degree commendable," and that "the remarkably small loss of life was
due to the high state of discipline maintained on board."

This was the last loss sustained by the Cruiser and Transport Force
until September 5th. Then the troop-ship _Mt. Vernon_ (Captain D. E.
Dismukes) was torpedoed, but by splendid seamanship was taken to
port under her own steam. The _Mt. Vernon_, homeward bound, was 250
miles from the coast of France when she was struck. The explosion was
so terrific that for an instant it seemed that the ship was lifted
clear out of the water and torn to pieces. Men at the after guns and
depth-charge stations were thrown to the deck, and one gun thrown
partly out of its mount. The torpedo struck fairly amidship, destroying
four of the eight boiler-rooms and flooding the middle portion of the
vessel from side to side for a length of 150 feet. The vessel instantly
settled 10 feet increase in draft, but stopped there. This indicated
that the water-tight bulkheads were holding, and she could still afford
to go down two or three feet more before she would lose her floating
buoyancy. The immediate problem was to escape a second torpedo.
Depth-charge crews jumped to their stations, and started dropping a
depth-bomb barrage.

Men in the firerooms knew that the safety of the ship depended on them.
The shock of the explosion, followed by instant darkness, falling
soot and particles; the knowledge that they were far below the water
level inclosed practically in a trap; the imminent danger of the ship
sinking, the added threat of exploding boilers--all these dangers and
more must have been apparent to every man below, said Captain Dismukes,
and yet not one man wavered in standing by his post of duty.

C. L. O'Connor, water tender, was thrown to the floor and enveloped in
gas flames from the furnaces. Instead of rushing to escape, he turned
and endeavored to shut a water-tight door leading into a large bunker
abaft the fireroom, but the hydraulic lever that operated the door had
been damaged and failed to function. Three men at work in this bunker
were drowned. If O'Connor had succeeded in shutting the door, all would
have been saved. Caught in the swirl of inrushing water, O'Connor was
thrust up a ventilator leading to the upper deck.

The torpedo exploded on a bulkhead separating two firerooms, the
explosive effect being apparently about equal in both firerooms, yet
in one fireroom not a man was saved, while in the other two of the men
escaped. The explosion blasted through the outer and inner skin of
the ship and through an intervening coal bunker and bulkhead, hurling
overboard 750 tons of coal. The two men saved were working the fires
within 30 feet of the explosion and just below the level where the
torpedo struck. How they escaped is a miracle. One of the men, P.
Fitzgerald, landed on the lower grating. Groping his way through the
darkness, trying to find the ladder leading above, he stumbled over
the body of a man apparently dead. Finding he was only unconscious,
Fitzgerald aroused him and took him to safety. The man would have been
lost, for the water rose 10 feet above this grating as the ship settled.

Shortly after the Mt. Vernon arrived at Brest, Captain Dismukes
received this letter from Brigadier General George H. Harries, U. S. A.:

  Sorrow mingled with pride, for those who died so nobly.
  Congratulations on the seamanship, discipline and courage. It was a
  great feat you accomplished.

  Passengers whom I have seen this morning are unable to fully or
  fitly voice their praises of your always worthy self or of your
  ship's company.

  The best traditions of our Navy have been lifted to a higher plane.
  What a fine thing it is to be an American these days!

  The olive drab salutes the blue.

Every American vessel available was pressed into service to bring the
troops home after the war.

Fifty-six cargo vessels were converted into troop-carriers. Nine of the
German vessels turned over under the armistice were assigned to us--the
_Imperator_, _Kaiserin Augusta Victoria_, _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_,
_Zeppelin_, _Cap Finisterre_, _Graf Waldersee_, _Patricia_, _Pretoria_,
and _Mobile_. The capacity of all our transports was considerably
increased.

But more was needed, and I gave orders to use our old battleships
and cruisers to carry troops. Naval officers objected, saying these
warships were not fitted for such duty. I was told the soldiers on
board would be uncomfortable, and would return home with a grouch
against the Government and the Navy. What happened? Army officers
and men were glad of the chance to come home on a warship. It was an
experience no other soldiers had enjoyed. Once aboard, they fell to and
made themselves thoroughly at home. Upon the arrival at Hampton Roads
of the first battleship bringing troops, the Army officers sent me a
letter of thanks for the fine voyage and the opportunity to return on a
naval vessel, and later other officers expressed themselves in similar
fashion.

In a few months we had in operation 142 vessels carrying troops with
facilities for 363,684 officers and men. The maximum was reached in
June, when 340,946 embarked from France, 314,167 of them in United
States transports. This exceeded the largest number carried overseas by
all American and Allied vessels in any one month during the war. By the
end of July, 1919, 1,770,484 men had been returned to America. The big
troop movement was virtually over by October 1st, at which time nearly
two million had been returned, 1,675,733 of them in naval transports.
Several thousands more came later, and 11,211 had returned previous to
the armistice.

The record of the ten leading vessels of the Cruiser and Transport
Force, in troops carried to Europe and passengers and sick and wounded
returned, was:

                     Transported  Transported    From Europe      Total
                      to Europe   Passengers   Sick and Wounded  Carried
  Leviathan            96,804        93,746         10,913       192,753
  America              37,768        46,823          4,668        86,801
  George Washington    48,373        34,142          5,085        83,350
  Agamemnon            36,097        41,179          4,425        78,249
  President Grant      39,974        37,025          3,301        77,129
  Mount Vernon         33,692        12,500          4,015        76,402
  Siboney              20,299        34,702          5,307        55,169
  Mongolia             19,013        34,813          2,707        54,337
  Manchuria            14,491        39,501          6,186        54,230
  Great Northern       28,248        22,852          5,522        54,085
                     --------      --------       --------      --------
                      374,679       427,283         52,129       812,505

These ships also brought back 2,366 passengers before the armistice,
which are included in the total numbers carried.

The other vessels used in transporting to France, as well as returning
troops were:

  _Aeolus_
  _Antigone_
  _Calamares_
  _Covington_
  _DeKalb_
  _Finland_
  _Hancock_
  _Harrisburg_
  _Henderson_
  _Huron_
  _K. der Nederlanden_
  _Kroonland_
  _Lenape_
  _Louisville_
  _Madawaska_
  _H. R. Mallory_
  _Martha Washington_
  _Matsonia_
  _Maui_
  _Mercury_
  _Northern Pacific_
  _Orizaba_
  _Pastores_
  _Plattsburg_
  _Pocahontas_
  _Powhatan_
  _President Lincoln_
  _Princess Matoika_
  _Rijndam_
  _Sierra_
  _Susquehanna_
  _Tenadores_
  _Von Steuben_
  _Wilhelmina_
  _Zeelandia_

The battleships and cruisers employed in troop transportation brought
back more than 145,000 men, as follows:

  Battleships--_Connecticut_, 4,861; _Georgia_, 5,869; _Kansas_,
  7,486; _Louisiana_, 4,714; _Michigan_, 1,052; _Minnesota_, 3,955;
  _Missouri_, 3,278; _Nebraska_, 4,530; _New Hampshire_, 4,900;
  _New Jersey_, 4,675; _Ohio_, 778; _Rhode Island_, 5,303; _South
  Carolina_, 4,501; _Vermont_, 4,795; _Virginia_, 5,784; total,
  66,481.

  Cruisers--_Charleston_, 7,704; _Frederick_, 9,659; _Huntington_,
  11,913; _Montana_, 8,800; _North Carolina_, 8,962; _Pueblo_,
  10,136; _Rochester_, 317; _Seattle_, 9,397; _South Dakota_, 3,463;
  _St. Louis_, 8,437; total, 78,788.

Merchant ships converted into troop-carriers, and used in bringing
soldiers home were:

  _Alaskan_
  _Amphion_
  _Ancon_
  _Arcadia_
  _Arizonian_
  _Artemis_
  _Black Arrow_
  _Buford_
  _Callao_
  _Canandaigua_
  _Canonicus_
  _Cape May_
  _Comfort_
  _Dakotan_
  _Eddelyn_
  _El Sol_
  _El Oriente_
  _Etten_
  _Eurana_
  _Floridian_
  _Freedom_
  _Gen. Goethals_
  _Gen. Gorgas_
  _Housatonic_
  _Iowan_
  _Kentuckian_
  _Lancaster_
  _Liberator_
  _E. F. Luckenbach_
  _Edward Luckenbach_
  _F. J. Luckenbach_
  _Julia Luckenbach_
  _Katrina Luckenbach_
  _K. I. Luckenbach_
  _W. A. Luckenbach_
  _Marica_
  _Mercy_
  _Mexican_
  _Minnesotan_
  _Montpelier_
  _Nansemond_
  _Ohioan_
  _Otsego_
  _Panaman_
  _Paysandu_
  _Peerless_
  _Philippines_
  _Radnor_
  _Roanoke_
  _Santa Ana_
  _Santa Barbara_
  _Santa Cecilia_
  _Santa Clara_
  _Santa Elena_
  _Santa Elisa_
  _Santa Leonora_
  _Santa Malta_
  _Santa Olivia_
  _Santa Paula_
  _Santa Rosa_
  _Santa Teresa_
  _Scranton_
  _Shoshone_
  _Sol Navis_
  _South Bend_
  _Suwanee_
  _Texan_
  _Tiger_
  _Troy_
  _Virginian_
  _Yale_

These converted cargo ships brought 441,986 passengers, 10,452 wounded;
total 452,438. The nine German passenger ships employed after the
armistice brought back 138,928.

When the troop movement was near its close, in September, 1918,
Admiral Gleaves, who had been in charge from the beginning, was made
commander-in-chief of the Asiatic fleet. He was succeeded by Captain
C. B. Morgan. The Cruiser and Transport Force, which at its maximum
comprised a fleet of 142 vessels, of 2,341,038 tons displacement,
carried across the Atlantic, going to or returning from Europe,
approximately 2,600,000 persons. And this without the loss, through
navigation or enemy action, of any soldier entrusted to its care.




CHAPTER IX

THE FLEET THE KAISER BUILT FOR US

  EX-GERMAN VESSELS CARRIED 557,000 AMERICAN TROOPS TO
  EUROPE--ENGINES AND MACHINERY WRECKED BY THEIR CREWS, GERMANS
  BELIEVED THEY COULD NEVER BE USED--NAVY REPAIRED LINERS, AND HAD
  ALL RUNNING IN TRANSPORT SERVICE IN A FEW MONTHS--TRIUMPH OF
  AMERICAN GENIUS AND ENGINEERING SKILL--REMARKABLE RECORD MADE BY
  "LEVIATHAN."


More than half a million of the troops that defeated the Germans
were transported across the Atlantic in German vessels. I sometimes
wonder if the Kaiser ever dreamed, when his liners came scurrying into
American ports in 1914, that he was presenting us with the one thing we
needed most, a lot of the finest transports that ever sailed the sea.

That could not happen according to the Teuton mind. They had figured it
all out. If America kept out of the conflict, their ships would be as
safe here as in their home ports. If we did enter the war, they would
be so badly damaged that we could not use them. This was all carried
out according to schedule. Before ruthless U-boat warfare was declared,
Bernstorff had issued his orders, and all the interned vessels were
disabled, their engines and machinery smashed.

"Some you may get running in a year; some you can never use," boasted
the German crews.

"If America can repair this ship, I will eat my hat," said another. He
has not yet tested his digestion by a diet of headgear.

But they, like the Kaiser and Admiral Von Holtzendorff, underestimated
American ingenuity and enterprise. By using new methods, and keeping at
the task day and night, in a few months all these vessels were repaired
and in service, carrying troops and supplies.

The German _Vaterland_, re-christened the _Leviathan_, alone carried
nearly a hundred thousand troops to Europe. When she was performing
such prodigies for us it interested me to recall an occurrence when
this great vessel, the largest afloat, reached New York on its first
voyage, not long before the war began in 1914. Glorying in the
attention it evoked, the _Vaterland's_ officers gave a dinner, inviting
leading American shipbuilders and engineers, as well as prominent
citizens, to view this latest creation in marine construction.

"It is a veritable floating palace for voyagers to Europe," remarked
one of its officers, "but that is not the best or most important thing
about the _Vaterland_."

"Well, what is it?" asked the visitors.

"Come below," said he, "and I will show you."

Below went the party, and there they were shown how the whole vessel
had been planned so that it could quickly be converted into a carrier
for 10,000 soldiers. "In a remarkably short time, if need arises," the
officer remarked, "it can be turned into a troop transport."

He was right. We proved it in 1917, not only in regard to the
_Vaterland_, but the other Teuton liners.

Repaired, renamed, manned and operated by United States naval officers
and men, those former German vessels carried to Europe 557,788 American
soldiers. Here is the record in detail:

  German Name               American Name        U. S. Troops Carried
  _Vaterland_               _Leviathan_                 96,804
  _Kaiser Wilhelm II_       _Agamemnon_                 36,097
  _Koenig Wilhelm II_       _Madawaska_                 17,931
  _President Lincoln_       _President Lincoln_         20,143
  _President Grant_         _President Grant_           39,974
  _Barbarossa_              _Mercury_                   18,542
  _Grosser Kurfurst_        _Aeolus_                    24,770
  _Hamburg_                 _Powhatan_                  14,613
  _Friedrich der Grosse_    _Huron_                     20,871
  _Prinzess Irene_          _Pocahontas_                20,503
  _George Washington_       _George Washington_         48,373
  _Martha Washington_       _Martha Washington_         22,311
  _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_   _DeKalb_                    11,334
  _Amerika_                 _America_                   39,768
  _Neckar_                  _Antigone_                  16,526
  _Cincinnati_              _Covington_                 21,628
  _Kronprinzessin Cecelie_  _Mount Vernon_              33,692
  _Prinzess Alice_          _Princess Matoika_          21,216
  _Rhein_                   _Susquehanna_               18,345
  _Kronprinz Wilhelm_       _Von Steuben_               14,347
                                                      --------
       Total                                           557,788

The repair of those vessels was a triumph of ingenuity and engineering
skill. But they were not the only interned ships the Navy restored.
When war was declared there were seized German merchant vessels
aggregating 592,195 gross tons, Austrian ships, 40,461 tons--a total of
632,656 tons of shipping placed under the United States flag from these
two sources.

The machinery was so badly damaged that those in charge had practically
decided that new cylinders and various other parts would have to be
manufactured and installed. This would have caused many months' delay.
Captain E. P. Jessop, engineering officer of the New York Navy Yard,
who had been acting as advisory officer in connection with these ships
before they were turned over to the Navy, was confident that the most
serious breaks could be repaired by electric welding. Rear Admiral
Burd, industrial manager of the New York Yard, was of the same opinion,
as were engineering experts in the Navy Department. But there was
doubt among other engineers, and strong opposition to the new method.
The vessels were then under control of the Shipping Board, but it was
expected that those to be used as troop-ships would be assigned to the
Navy. Anticipating such action, Admiral Griffin, Chief of the Bureau
of Engineering, in June sent his assistant, Captain O. W. Koester,
to New York to make a thorough investigation. He returned convinced
that repairs could be successfully made by electric welding, and this
process was immediately adopted.

Sixteen of these vessels were turned over to the Navy on July 11,
1917. Work was begun the next morning. Cylinders had been broken,
throttle and engine valves destroyed, pipes cut, fittings smashed.
Parts easily removable had been thrown away. The German crews had done
all they could to put the ships out of business. Memorandums found
aboard bore the frequent comment, "Cannot be repaired." There were
serious injuries that had been carefully concealed, evidently with the
idea of disabling the vessels if they ever got to sea. Important parts
were cut in half, then replaced so the cut would not be discovered.
Obstructions were placed in cylinders to wreck the engines as soon as
steam was turned on. Every inch of the machinery had to be examined
inside and out. The fact that nothing escaped detection is evidence of
the thoroughness with which the work was done.

The _Barbarossa_, which we renamed the _Mercury_, was the first ship
repaired by the new welding process. Given a sea trial of 48 hours, she
was put to every imaginable test. The results proved satisfactory in
every particular. On all the other vessels, virtually the same methods
were used--electric or oxy-acetylene welding, mechanical patching, and
at times a combination of these. Each ship was, upon completion, tested
by long runs at sea, so that no doubt might exist as to the safety of
the troops they were to carry. It is noteworthy that no weakness ever
developed in the engines so repaired.

Of the 103 German and Austrian vessels seized, the Navy converted 34
into troop and freight transports. Subsequently it repaired 20 more for
the Shipping Board.

To build new cylinders, replace burned-out boilers and other machinery,
would have required at least a year, perhaps more, it was estimated. By
using new methods, the Navy quickly restored the ships assigned to it.
In a few months all were in service--and some of them were running at
higher speed than the Germans had ever been able to attain.

Twelve months in time was saved, during which these vessels transported
hundreds of thousands of troops. The entire saving was estimated at
more than $20,000,000.

Until the United States declared war, these vessels were, under
strict interpretation of international law, not liable to seizure.
They could not leave our ports, but the crews remained aboard and,
though under constant surveillance to prevent unneutral acts, they
caused the American authorities considerable trouble. There were nine
German liners at their piers in Hoboken when Germany declared war.
All had been ordered not to sail. Being a part of the German Naval
Reserve, they were subject to the orders of the German Admiralty. The
_Vaterland_ was scheduled to sail that day, having booked some 3,600
passengers. Angry crowds who had purchased tickets stormed the piers,
and extra guards had to be placed around the vessel. German crews held
a mass-meeting in Hoboken, discussing mainly how they could get back
to Germany. Ten thousand reservists on August 6th demanded of the
German Consul that he send them back on the _Vaterland_ to rejoin their
regiments. But not one of those vessels ever escaped from American
ports.

Their crews, however, were always seeking to help Germany and injure
the Allies. Most of their plots and plans were foiled, though they
did succeed, now and then, in "putting something over." The _Grosser
Kurfurst_ (_Aeolus_) was, we found later, used as a sort of "clearing
ship" for German officers in this country. They had secret orders to
go aboard her and stay until arrangements could be made for them to
travel aboard outbound steamers. Disguised, often carrying forged or
illegally-obtained passports, some of them managed to get to Germany.
The captain of the _Aeolus_, its chief engineer and purser were among
those who successfully ran the British blockade. Given command of a
Zeppelin, the captain took part in several airship raids, but was
brought down and killed near London. When news of his death came, the
flags on all the German interned ships were placed at half-mast.

When the ship-bomb conspiracy was unearthed--the scheme to place
explosives in cargoes, timed to go off and sink vessels when they were
far out at sea--it was found that men on board the _Friedrich der
Grosse_ (_Huron_) had been making parts of these bombs, which were
assembled at a plant in Hoboken. This plot, however, was nipped in the
bud. The sailors and others involved were promptly arrested, tried,
convicted, and sent to jail.

When the _Lusitania_ was sunk in 1915 the German sailors held a
celebration. Thinking war with the United States was imminent, they
prepared to destroy the ships, only waiting for the word to carry out
the orders previously given them. This was, again, the case in 1916,
when we came so near war after the sinking of the _Sussex_. But the
orders did not finally come until January 31, 1917, when, obeying
Ambassador Bernstorff's instructions, they smashed the machinery of the
vessels.

They regarded it as a huge joke when, on the morning of April 1st, a
naval vessel anchored off Pier 2, and set watch over them. But they
laughed on the other side of their mouths when, four days later, United
States officials rounded up officers and men, and sent them to Fort
Oglethorpe, Ga., and other Federal prisons and internment camps.

The _Vaterland_ was taken over at 4 a. m., April 5th. On that day the
United States armed forces seized 91 German ships in various ports.
The night before, U. S. Government officials held a conference on the
_Vaterland_ with the German commanders, who were warned against any
violence. There was no resistance when the ships were seized.

The _Vaterland_, with a displacement of 69,000 tons, was the biggest
craft afloat. There was no drydock in America large enough to hold
her. When the engineering officers reported to Captain J. W. Oman,
her commander, that the former _Vaterland_ (she had been renamed the
_Leviathan_) was "in all respects ready for sea," it was decided to
test her out by a longer run than that to which any other vessel had
been subjected, making a trial trip to Cuba.

On her return, the ship was carefully gone over again, every part put
in prime condition, and on December 15, 1917, in a snowstorm, she
sailed on her first trip across the Atlantic. The ship's complement was
68 officers and 2,240 men. She had aboard 7,254 troops, including base
hospitals 31 and 34, the 163rd and 164th Infantry, and headquarters of
the 82nd Brigade, Brigadier General Edward Vellruth commanding.

Running for the first day or two at 20 knots, the ship then speeded up
to 21-1/2 knots. The _Leviathan_ had "struck her gait." She made the
run across in record time. In describing this voyage, the "History of
the _Leviathan_" says:

  On the morning of December 23rd, at 4 a. m., out of the black sky,
  just before dawn and in a heavy sea with a strong wind blowing, a
  small white wake was seen by the lookout on the bridge. At first
  it was taken for the wake of a periscope and the gun crews were
  called to quarters, then as the guns were trained on it, a small
  white flash was seen blinking the American recognition signal, and
  we then knew that it was one of our destroyers. We picked them up
  out of the black sky and a heavy sea until there were seven little
  wasps that spelled danger to the Hun submarine. They sped along
  with us while we zigzagged in and out on our course. They crossed
  our bow and ran in and far out on each side of us, always looking
  for the "sub" that might be lying in wait for us. Their motto was,
  "Go get 'em." They never waited for a "sub" to attack first, they
  always started the fight provided that "Fritz" was willing to show
  himself; and we want to say right here that he was very reluctant
  to do so when an American destroyer showed itself.

That night the _Leviathan_ dropped anchor outside Liverpool, proceeding
next morning, Dec. 24th, to the landing-stage, where the soldiers
disembarked. The ship had to be sent into drydock to have her bottom
thoroughly scraped and cleaned. Three years in disuse, she was covered
with barnacles, and even oysters were found attached to her keel. The
Gladstone Dock at Liverpool was the only drydock outside of Germany
which would accommodate her. Even then, she had to wait more than two
weeks for a tide high enough to float her in. Docking was completed
successfully, but there was considerable delay before the big boat
could get away, and it was not until Lincoln's birthday that she
started back for America, reaching New York Feb. 19th. On her second
trip, sailing March 4, 1918, the _Leviathan_ carried 8,242 troops,
under command of Major General J. T. Dickman. Liverpool was again the
destination and she arrived there March 12th. Going up St. George's
channel, there was considerable excitement when the destroyer _Manley_,
head of the escort, sighting signs that led her to believe a submarine
was near, swerved out of position, and began firing. One depth-bomb it
dropped shook the _Leviathan_ from stern to stern, and many persons
aboard thought she had struck a mine. But she got in safely, and soon
landed all her troops.

Low water again held the _Leviathan_ in port for weeks, and it was not
until April 10th, that she was able to sail. This was the last time she
was sent to Liverpool. Thereafter, she went direct to Brest, and there
were no more delays. In fact, on the third trip, when she carried 8,909
soldiers, under command of Brigadier General Walter H. Gordon, she
disembarked her troops, took aboard 4,600 tons of coal, and the third
evening after her arrival was on the way back to New York.

The _Leviathan_ was so big a target and the German eagerness to sink
her was so well known that there was at first opposition to the use
of this big vessel as a troop-ship, and Admiral Sims wrote to me on
November 2, 1917:

  I have previously reported against using the _Vaterland_ for the
  present until we have a little more experience in handling the
  other large transports. The _Vaterland_ is, of course, a much
  larger target, and injury to her would be a serious affair. I am
  assuming too that all of the troops that we have to transport
  for the next few months can be accommodated in other transports,
  assisted by British liners. Whenever the situation becomes
  pressing, I presume we shall have to use the _Vaterland_ and take
  the additional risk.

We did use the former _Vaterland_ with such success that during all the
war she was never touched by the enemy; but the fears entertained of
attack on this biggest transport afloat were justified. On the fourth
voyage, when in sight of the coast, May 30, 1918, the _Leviathan_
recorded her first encounter with a submarine, following being the
entry in the ship's log:

  12:29 p. m.--Sighted submarine pursuing us on our port quarter
  about 1,500 yards distant. Ordered full speed, 165 revolutions.
  Opened fire with Number Six and Number Eight guns, three shots.
  Stopped zigzagging. Changed course 12:40 p. m.

  12:59 p. m.--Submarine appeared again. Opened fire with Number Six
  and Number Eight guns. Nine shots.

  1:19 p. m.--Submarine appeared again. Opened fire with Number Six
  and Number Eight guns. Seven shots.

  1:34 p. m.--Threw in maneuvering combination. Standard speed 112
  revolutions.

  1:45 p. m.--Entering harbor at various courses and speeds.

Of this attack, the _Leviathan_ History says:

  The coolness of our commanding officer, Captain H. F. Bryan, and
  the splendid coördination of the entire crew were so perfect, that
  only three distinct orders were issued in this moment of peril
  as follows: 1. Hold your course. 2. Open fire on submarine, port
  quarter. 3. Sound General Alarm.

  Every shot fired was greeted by cheers and shouts of encouragement
  from the enthusiastic soldiers on the decks, who crowded to
  favorable positions to witness the accurate firing of our
  gun-crews. The Army nurses left their luncheon to take a peek at
  the "fun," and their calmness and enthusiasm in the face of a
  deadly menace were an inspiration to the sailors manning the big
  guns.

Sailing the afternoon of June 1st, accompanied by the destroyers
_Nicholson_ and _Wadsworth_, at 7:16 o'clock a periscope wake was
sighted on the starboard quarter. "Full speed ahead!" was rung, and the
_Leviathan_ sprang forward, a cloud of black smoke pouring from her
funnels. Her guns began firing, and from the signal bridge floated the
green-and-white submarine warning flag. The destroyers turned quickly
and charged down the wake, laying a barrage of depth-bombs which shook
the _Leviathan_, by that time nearly two miles away. The _Nicholson's_
blinker lights flashed:

  We saw periscope of submarine and laid barrage of depth-charges
  around the spot. Will report to Force Commander.

The _Wadsworth_ then inspected the locality, but soon signaled, "We see
no submarine now." A few minutes later both destroyers steamed up to
the big vessel and resumed escort.

Twilight had come, and it was an impressive scene when the chaplain
(always called the sky pilot), as was his daily custom, went to the
navigation bridge and offered the sunset prayer at sea--a prayer for
the safety of captain, officers and crew; for soldiers, passengers and
all on board.

Making the most of her speed, the _Leviathan_ traveled alone, except
for man-of-war escort, until August. Then she was accompanied by the
_Great Northern_ and _Northern Pacific_, and these fast ships made
several voyages together. After arrival from her eighth trip, Sept.
19th, Captain William W. Phelps became the _Leviathan's_ commanding
officer, succeeding Captain Bryan. In April, 1919, he was succeeded by
Captain E. H. Durell.

There were rumors of peace when the _Leviathan_ sailed on her tenth
trip October 27th, and as the destroyers met her they signaled that
all the German submarines in that area had been recalled October
21st. Arriving at Liverpool November 3rd, she landed her last load
of troops going to the front. A week later, when she was in drydock
undergoing repairs, the armistice was signed; the fighting was over.
The _Leviathan_ had transported to Europe 96,804 officers and men of
the American Army. She had carried across 119,215 persons, including
her crew and naval supernumeraries. She had carried on a single voyage
as many as 10,860.

In returning the troops all war-time records were broken. On the
sixteenth west-bound trip, there were on board, including the naval
crew, 14,300 persons. The vessel brought home 93,746 soldiers. She
carried to or from Europe, including naval personnel and passengers,
over 200,000 persons.

Completed in 1914, the _Leviathan_ made but one round trip under the
German flag. She had just arrived in New York on her second voyage when
war broke out in Europe. That was all the use the Germans ever got of
this wonder of the seas, which cost millions to build and was the pride
of Germany.




CHAPTER X

GUARDING THE COAST OF FRANCE

  BREST THE CENTER OF GREAT SYSTEM UNDER COMMAND OF WILSON--PATROL
  SQUADRON SENT OVER IN JUNE, 1917--ARMED YACHTS AND DESTROYERS
  ENABLED TROOPS TO REACH PORTS SAFELY--"STEWART" PLOWED THROUGH
  BLAZING AMMUNITION TO RESCUE SURVIVORS OF "FLORENCE H."--WRESTLE
  WITH DEPTH-BOMB.


On the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, the French national
holiday, July 14, 1917, our naval forces began work with the French,
whose vessels under DeGrasse had, 136 years before, given such signal
aid to America in its struggle for liberty.

France was the center of American activities, military and naval, and
our most important operations in Europe were in French waters. It was
the vast system built up by the Navy, the splendid work of our armed
yachts and destroyers and aircraft, which kept the sea lanes clear,
protected transports, and enabled American troops and supplies to reach
French ports in safety.

Sending naval vessels to France, and establishing bases were two of the
first things considered by the Navy Department. They were discussed
with the French mission, with Marshal Joffre and Admiral Chocheprat,
when they reached Washington in April. They recommended Brest and
Bordeaux as the principal ports to be used by the Americans, and we
decided to establish bases there as well as at St. Nazaire, where our
first troops landed.

Preparations were at once begun to send patrol craft, and for this
purpose, the largest and best of American yachts, stripped of their
luxurious fittings, were armed and converted into men-of-war. A special
force was organized under command of Rear Admiral William B. Fletcher,
and on June 9, the first of the "U. S. Patrol Squadrons Operating in
European Waters," sailed from New York for France. In this group were
the _Noma_, (Lieutenant Commander L. R. Leahy); _Vedette_, (Lieutenant
Commander C. L. Hand); _Christabel_, (Lieutenant Commander H. B.
Riebe); _Kanawha_, (Lieutenant Commander H. D. Cooke); _Harvard_,
(Lieutenant Commander A. G. Stirling), and the _Sultana_, (Lieutenant
Commander E. G. Allen). Proceeding by way of the Azores, they reached
Brest July 3. Two speedier yachts, the _Corsair_ (Lieutenant Commander
T. A. Kittinger), and the _Aphrodite_ (Lieutenant Commander R. P.
Craft), sailed from New York with the first troop convoy June 14,
reaching St. Nazaire June 27, and arriving at Brest July 2.

Protection of vessels carrying troops was the primary mission of our
forces in France, and after that the storeships loaded with munitions,
materials and supplies for the Army. But this was by no means all their
work. They escorted convoys sailing from Verdon, vessels coming from
Bordeaux, Pauillac and other points up the Gironde river; from Brest;
from Quiberon Bay (St. Nazaire); ships of all kinds sailing along the
coast of France, for England or southern ports.

With headquarters at Brest, where the American admiral had his offices
next to those of the French Chief of the Brittany Patrol, Vice Admiral
Schwerer, who acted directly under Vice Admiral Moreau, senior Allied
naval officer, an organization was built up extending all along
the French coast. Working in closest coöperation with the French,
our forces were always under American command, first under Admiral
Fletcher, and then under Admiral Henry B. Wilson, who succeeded him on
Nov. 1, 1917.

Captain T. P. Magruder was made senior naval officer at Lorient,
with a division of mine-sweepers to keep clear the approaches to St.
Nazaire. Captain N. A. McCully commanded the Rochefort district, which
extended from the Lorient line to the Spanish coast. Six yachts were
based at Rochefort, to give prompt service to convoys entering the
Gironde River, for Bordeaux or Pauillac. The Brest district, from Cape
Brehat to Penmarch Point, was in command of Captain H. H. Hough, and
the Cherbourg district, north of this, was assigned to Commander David
Boyd. Naval port officers, stationed at Brest, Havre, Cherbourg,
Rouen, St. Malo, Granville, St. Nazaire, Nantes, Quiberon Bay, Sables
d' Olonne, Bordeaux, La Pallice, Rochefort, Royan, Verdon, Pauillac and
St. Jean de Luz, kept in touch with Army officials and shipmasters,
expediting dispatch of vessels and the flow of transportation and
commerce. Military and naval officers pulled together with a will, and
the saying was: "There is no Army and Navy at Brest. It's all one gang!"

From Brest radiated lines of command, communication, and
coöperation--to our own forces, and the French naval commanders on the
coast; our naval representatives and naval attaché in Paris, and the
French Ministry of Marine; through the superintendent of ports and
coding officer to Army officials, those in charge of troops and supply
transport; to the Chief of Aviation and the American and French air
forces; and to U. S. Naval Headquarters in London.

The development of this organization brought such success in
anti-submarine operations as the French coast had never known, changing
the entire situation in these waters, not only for our vessels but
for all Allied shipping. Here is a chart record of vessels sunk by
submarines on the west coast of France for six months and it tells the
story:

  October, 1917       24
  November, 1917      13
  December, 1917       4
  January, 1918        9
  February, 1918       1
  March, 1918          0

Describing an evening with Admiral Wilson, Reginald Wright Kauffman
wrote:

  The Admiral and his staff sleep in rooms just below their office.
  That is, they say they sleep. I asked the Admiral's orderly if he
  had ever seen him in bed, and he said, "No, sir."

  The Admiral, after a long day's work, spoke of how good it was to
  draw his chair close to the open fire. One of the three guests had
  to leave early, because, although he is our host's nephew, he had
  volunteered as a common seaman and had to be aboard ship betimes.
  That orderly of the commander, a Lehigh graduate with six months'
  experience of the service, muttered in the hall:

  "This is the most democratic Navy I ever saw; an Admiral helping a
  gob on with his coat!"

That intimate view of Admiral Wilson shows the side of his character
which makes officers and men love him. Strict in discipline, firm in
administration, a master of his profession, he illustrates the military
truth that he is the greatest officer who is the best shipmate. It was
this combination of qualities which enabled him to do the big job in
France, where he was beloved and honored by the French as well as the
Americans.

What Mr. Kauffman described at Brest was characteristic of our Navy
in the war, as it was of our crews on the French coast. In one gun's
crew a young New York millionaire served with a former mechanic and
an erstwhile clerk from the East Side. In the crew of a yacht was
a Philadelphia policeman and a Texas ranger; the first boatswain's
mate had his sheepskin from Cornell; there was a Lehigh senior in the
forecastle and a Harvard post-graduate assisting in the radio room.
Several young men served as sailors on ships their fathers owned, and
had turned over to the Government for war use.

They were nearly all reservists or recent recruits, the crews of the
armed yachts and sub-chasers. But they put it over like veterans, and
took things as they came. And they had some lively brushes with the
"subs."

The yachts got a taste of U-boat warfare on the way over. The _Corsair_
was with the troop-ships when the group she was escorting was attacked
by submarines. Nearing the French coast on July 2, the _Noma_ sighted a
periscope, and with the _Kanawha_ circled the vicinity for some time,
but without result. The next evening the _Sultana_, which was somewhat
behind the other yachts, arrived at Brest, bringing 37 of the crew and
13 of the armed guard of the American steamship _Orleans_, which had
been sunk, apparently by the same submarine which had been sighted by
the _Noma_.

The day after they began patrol duty, the _Harvard_ brought into port
59 survivors picked up from two British ships that had been torpedoed.
A torpedo was fired at the _Noma_ on July 19, and on August 8th she
took part in a fight between a noted British decoy-ship--"Q-boats,"
they were called--and a submarine in the Bay of Biscay.

"SOS," came the distress call from the _Dunraven_, "Shelled by
submarine." The _Noma_ had just finished repairing one of her boilers,
but she put on all steam and headed for the scene. As she came up,
the vessel, torpedoed, seemed to be sinking. The submarine, which was
close to the steamer, was still shelling her. The _Noma_ headed for
the U-boat, attempting to ram her, but she submerged and the yacht
dropped depth-bombs around the spot. Then she turned attention to the
_Dunraven_. This decoy ship, commanded by Captain Gordon Campbell, most
noted of "Q-boat" captains, had pursued its usual tactics when the
"sub" was sighted, part of the crew, disguised as merchant sailors,
taking to the lifeboats, leaving hidden aboard the gunners ready to
fire shells or torpedo when the submarine ventured nearer. But this
time the U-boat got the best of it. One of its shells struck the
steamer and blew up a depth-bomb. Two more shots landed, and set the
ship afire. The flames swept down to where ammunition, shells and
torpedoes were piled, and they exploded, hurling gun and gun-crew into
the air.

Then came the torpedo, which as it hit the ship caused another big
explosion. But the _Dunraven_ fought on, and it was only after she had
fired two torpedoes at the "sub," and many of her crew were wounded,
that she sent out the distress call.

The "sub" driven off, the _Noma_ circled the vicinity, keeping a
sharp lookout for the enemy. Two British destroyers arrived shortly
afterward, and with the _Noma_ rescued the decoy-ship's crew. One
of them, the _Christopher_, took the _Dunraven_ in tow, the _Noma_
acting as escort until the next day, when she was relieved by a French
destroyer. But the _Dunraven_ was too badly damaged to remain afloat,
and sank before she reached port.

Our forces in French waters were reinforced in August and September by
nineteen more vessels, these being:

  Second Patrol Division, Commander F. N. Freeman--_Alcedo_,
  (Lieutenant Commander W. T. Conn); _Remlik_, (Lieutenant
  Commander I. C. Johnson); _Wanderer_, (Lieutenant Commander P. L.
  Wilson); _Guinevere_, (Lieutenant Commander Guy Davis); _Corona_,
  (Lieutenant Commander L. M. Stevens); _Carola_, (Lieutenant
  Commander H. R. Keller); and the _Emeline_, (Lieutenant Commander
  R. C. Williams).

  Third Division, Captain T. P. Magruder--_Wakiva_, (Lieutenant
  Commander T. R. Kurtz), armed yacht; _Anderton_, (Boatswain H.
  Miller); _Cahill_, (Lieutenant A. E. Wills); _Rehoboth_ and
  _McNeal_, (Lieutenant C. N. Hinkamp); the _Lewes_, _James_,
  _Douglas_, _Bauman_, _Courtney_, and _Hinton_, (Lieutenant A.
  McGlasson), mine-sweepers; _Bath_, supply ship.

Sixteen American-built submarine chasers, which we had turned over to
the French Government, also arrived in September, and began patrol off
the French coast, and soon afterward the yachts _Nokomis_, (Commander
D. Boyd); _May_, (Commander F. T. Evans), and _Rambler_, (Lieutenant
E. G. Rose) and the mine-sweeper _Hubbard_ were added to our force at
Brest.

All along the French coast and in the Bay of Biscay our vessels were
kept busy, escorting convoys, troop and cargo ships and hunting
U-boats. This was done so effectively that we had no loss until
October, when a mine-sweeper, the _Rehoboth_, foundered, the Army
transport _Antilles_ and the yacht _Alcedo_ were sunk, and the
_Finland_ torpedoed.

Two days out from Quiberon Bay, on October 17th, the _Antilles_, bound
for America, was proceeding with the _Henderson_ and _Willehad_,
escorted by the _Corsair_ and _Alcedo_, when she was struck by a
torpedo. Shivering from stern to stern, she listed immediately to port
and began to sink. One of the lookouts in the main-top was thrown clear
over the five-foot canvas screen, and killed as he struck a hatch.
Everyone in the engine-room was killed or disabled except one oiler,
who crawled through the skylight just as the ship went down. Of the 21
men in the engine and firerooms, only three survived--the oiler, and
two firemen who escaped through a ventilator.

Commander Daniel T. Ghent, senior naval officer on board, gave the
order to abandon ship. Boats were lowered, distress signals sent out.
Guns were manned in the hope of getting a shot at the submarine. There
the gunners remained until ordered to leave, and two of them--John
Walter Hunt and J. C. McKinney--went down with the ship.

The vessel sank in four and a half minutes. Commander Ghent said:

  The behavior of the naval personnel throughout was equal to the
  best traditions of the service. The two forward guns' crews, in
  charge of Lieutenant Tisdale, remained at their gun stations while
  the ship went down, and made no move to leave until ordered to
  save themselves. Radio Electrician C. L. Ausburne went down with
  the ship while at his station in the radio room. When the ship
  was struck Ausburne and McMahon were asleep in adjacent bunks
  opposite the radio room. Ausburne, realizing the seriousness of
  the situation, told McMahon to get his life preserver on, saying,
  as he left to take his station at the radio key, "Good-bye, Mac."
  McMahon, later finding the radio room locked and seeing the ship
  was sinking, tried to get Ausburne out, but failed.

Radio Electrician H. F. Watson was also lost. He remained with
Commander Ghent on the bridge until the guns' crews were ordered to
leave, and was on his way to a lifeboat when last seen.

The _Alcedo_ rescued 117 and the _Corsair_ 50 of the 234 persons who
were on the _Antilles_. Sixty-seven were lost--4 men of the Navy, 16 of
the Army; 45 of the ship's merchant crew; a civilian ambulance driver
who had been serving with the French army, and a colored stevedore.

Rafts, set free by the blast of the explosion, were spread broadcast.
Men who had been unable to get into the boats swam for them, and for
boxes, planks or anything floating they could reach. As the _Corsair_
was picking up the survivors, a sailor was seen calmly roosting on a
box. As the yacht steamed for him, he stood up and, waving his arms,
wigwagged:

"Don't come too close, box contains live ammunition!"

They rescued him with care, and with due respect for the explosive as
well as for the gunner who considered the ship's welfare before he
thought of his own safety.

Eleven days later the _Finland_ was torpedoed, the explosion blowing in
her side for 35 feet, the V-shaped hole running down to the bilge-keel.
Three of the naval gun-crew, James W. Henry, Newton R. Head and Porter
Hilton; two men of the Army, a colored transport worker, and six of
the ship's merchant crew were lost. But the vessel, under the skilful
direction of the senior naval officer, Captain S. V. Graham, made port
under her own steam, was repaired and put back into service.

Repairing this ship was a striking example of the versatility of the
American Army in France. The repairs were undertaken by the French
naval arsenal, but man-power was scarce and the work was going slowly.
A regiment of U. S. Army engineers, stationed at a point not far
distant, offered assistance. Among them were a number of locomotive
boiler riveters, and structural workers. It was these American
"engineers" who came to the bat and actually repaired the _Finland_.

Neither the _Antilles_ nor the _Finland_ was a naval transport, both
being chartered by the Army, and manned by civilian crews, the only
Navy personnel aboard being the senior naval officer, the armed guard
and the radio operators. It was the experience with these undisciplined
crews which hastened the arrangement by which the Navy manned and
operated, as well as escorted, all American troop-ships.

Only one of our armed yachts in French waters was sunk, the _Alcedo_,
torpedoed at 1:45 a. m., November 5, 1917. She sank in eight minutes.
About 75 miles west of Belle Ile, she was escorting a convoy, when a
submarine was sighted, and then a torpedo, which struck the ship under
the port forward chain-plates. Boats were lowered, and as the vessel
began going down, Commander W. T. Conn, Jr., the commanding officer,
ordered the men who were still aboard to jump over the side, intending
to follow them. Before he could jump, however, the vessel listed
heavily to port, plunging by the head, and sank, carrying him down with
the suction. Coming to the surface, he swam to a raft, and later got
to a whaleboat, which, with several dories, went among the wreckage,
picking up survivors.

Half an hour after the _Alcedo_ sank, the submarine approached, but
after remaining twenty or thirty minutes steered off and submerged.
After searching the vicinity for three hours, Commander Conn's boat
and the others with him, containing 3 officers and 40 men, headed
for Penmarch Light. They rowed until 1:15 that afternoon, when they
were picked up by a French torpedo-boat. Reaching Brest at 11 p.
m., Commander Conn was informed that two other dories, containing
3 officers and 25 men, had landed at Penmarch Point. One of the
_Alcedo's_ officers, Lieutenant (junior grade) John T. Melvin of Selma,
Ala., and 20 enlisted men were lost.

This was the last American naval or troop-vessel sunk in many months by
the submarines, which were kept on the run by our forces. The _Wakiva_,
_Noma_, and _Kanawha_ fought off two U-boats and it is believed sank
one, which appeared as they were escorting the storeships _Köln_ and
_Medina_ on November 28, 1917. At 6:20 p. m., the lookout on the
_Kanawha_ reported a periscope on the port beam, heading towards the
_Medina_. It disappeared, but at 6:50 the _Noma_ saw a periscope on
her starboard beam. Twelve minutes afterward the _Wakiva_ sighted a
periscope heading towards the convoy. Swinging into position to fire a
torpedo at the _Wakiva_, the submarine crossed the yacht's wake. The
_Wakiva_ fired three shots, apparently striking the periscope, which
disappeared. She also let go two depth-charges.

As the _Wakiva_ approached, what appeared to be the conning tower of
the submarine emerged. The yacht fired at it, and the conning tower
sank. The _Wakiva_ dropped numerous depth-charges and after they
exploded her commander saw what seemed to be three men clinging to a
piece of wreckage. He hailed them, but received no response, and when
the yacht went near the place they had disappeared. In the meantime the
_Noma_ had continued search, and sighted a periscope on her starboard
bow, turned toward it, and let go several depth-charges. Officers were
convinced that there were two submarines, and that one of them was sunk
by the _Wakiva_.

The _Christabel_, smallest of the converted yachts, surprised her big
sisters by smashing up a submarine so badly that it was just able
to reach a Spanish port, where U-boat and crew were interned for
the remainder of the war. Escorting the _Danse_, a British steamer
which had fallen behind its convoy two miles from Ile de Yeu, on May
21, 1918, the _Christabel_ at 8:52 p. m. sighted a periscope, and
made for it, firing two depth-bombs. As the second charge exploded,
there followed another violent explosion which threw up, between the
_Christabel_ and the water column raised by the bomb, a large amount of
water and debris. Heavy black oil and a number of splintered pieces of
wood rose to the surface.

That was the last the _Christabel_ saw of the "sub," but three days
later the report came that the UC-56 had arrived at Santander, Spain,
too seriously damaged to attempt to return to Germany. Its officers and
men were glad enough to escape with their lives.

Fine as was the record of the armed yachts, it was more than equaled
by the destroyers, which bore the heaviest part in escorting the vast
number of troop and cargo ships sent to France. This duty was performed
at first by our force at Queenstown, but from October on, when the
tender _Panther_ (Commander A. M. Procter) and five destroyers
arrived, destroyers were sent to Brest as follows:

  _Reid_, (Commander C. C. Slayton); _Flusser_, (Lieutenant Commander
  R. G. Walling); the _Preston_, (Lieutenant Commander C. W.
  Magruder); _Lamson_, (Lieutenant Commander W. R. Purnell); _Smith_,
  (Commander J. H. Klein); _Monaghan_, (Lieutenant Commander J. F.
  Cox); _Roe_, (Lieutenant Commander G. C. Barnes); _Warrington_,
  (Lieutenant Commander G. W. Kenyon); _Whipple_, (Lieutenant
  Commander H. J. Abbett); _Truxtun_, (Lieutenant Commander J. G.
  Ware); _Stewart_, (Lieutenant Commander H. S. Haislip); _Worden_,
  (Lieutenant Commander J. M. B. Smith); _Isabel_, (Lieutenant
  Commander H. E. Shoemaker); _Nicholson_, (Lieutenant Commander J.
  C. Fremont).

Recounting what they accomplished, Admiral Wilson said:

  The record of the service of these vessels on the coast of France
  furnishes one of the finest tributes in the history of our Navy
  to the soundness of their construction and to the ability of the
  personnel under trying conditions.

  Until about the first of June, 1918, when the original lot of
  destroyer captains was detached and ordered to the United States to
  fit out new vessels, no American destroyers sent from France had
  ever missed contact with a convoy; no destroyer dispatched with
  a mission had ever returned to port before the completion of her
  duty, and furthermore, during this period, after the torpedoing of
  the _Finland_, on October 28, 1917, no vessel en route from America
  to France or from France to America, when escorted by American
  vessels based on France, had ever been torpedoed or successfully
  attacked on the high seas.

The _Jarvis_ (Lieutenant Commander R. C. Parker), and the _Drayton_
(Lieutenant Commander G. N. Barker), two of the 740-ton oil-burning
destroyers, joined the force on February 15, 1918; then on March 4th,
the _Wadsworth_ (Lieutenant Commander C. E. Smith). The following
destroyers that had also previously operated out of Queenstown were
sent to Brest in June:

  _Sigourney_, (Commander W. N. Vernou); _Wainwright_, (Commander R.
  A. Dawes); _Fanning_, (Lieutenant Commander F. Cogswell); _Tucker_,
  (Lieutenant Commander W. H. Lassing); _Winslow_, (Lieutenant
  Commander F. W. Rockwell); _Porter_, (Lieutenant Commander A.
  A. Corwin); _O'Brien_, (Commander M. K. Metcalf); _Cummings_,
  (Lieutenant Commander O. Bartlett); _Benham_, (Lieutenant Commander
  F. J. Fletcher); _Cushing_, (Commander W. D. Puleston); _Burrows_,
  (Lieutenant Commander A. Steckel); _Ericsson_, (Lieutenant
  Commander R. R; Stewart); and on July 23, the _McDougal_,
  (Lieutenant Commander V. K. Coman).

The Navy Department had decided that all additional destroyers built
would be sent to Brest and to Gibraltar, and Admiral Wilson's forces
were augmented from time to time by these new destroyers:

  _Little_, (Captain J. K. Taussig); _Conner_, (Captain A. G. Howe);
  _Taylor_, (Commander C. T. Hutchins); _Stringham_, (Commander N. E.
  Nichols); _Bell_, (Lieutenant Commander D. L. Howard); _Murray_,
  (Lieutenant Commander R. G. Walling); _Fairfax_, (Lieutenant
  Commander G. C. Barnes).

For more than a year American mine sweepers pursued their dangerous but
tedious task, sweeping up mines and keeping clear the channels leading
to ports. Mainly converted fishing boats, the constant duty along the
coast was not easy for them. The _Rehoboth_ foundered off Ushant in a
heavy sea October 4, 1917. Steaming in a fog near Concarneau, January
12, 1918, the _Bauman_ struck one of the numerous rocks that make
navigation in that region so dangerous. Though she was badly damaged,
Ensign P. J. Ford, her executive officer, and several of her crew
remained aboard, hoping to save her, and the _Anderton_ started to tow
her to Lorient, but she sank before reaching port. Soon afterwards, on
January 25, the _Guinevere_, attempting to get to Lorient in a dense
fog, ran on the rocks.

The mine force was not infrequently called upon to reinforce coastal
convoys or go to the aid of vessels grounded or in distress. When the
U-boats began attacking coastal convoys near Penmarch in January, 1918,
the sweepers were sent out to patrol those waters at night. Lying in
darkness, they spent long hours listening through the "C" tubes for any
sound of a "sub." They were often hurried out to sweep mines discovered
at various points. In a heavy sea, the _Hinton_, _Cahill_ and _James_
swept up a mine field near Belle Ile in record time, the _James_
cutting four mines in fifteen minutes. These are only a few instances
of the fine work they continually performed.

Heroes? There were plenty of them in our forces in France, as there
were everywhere else in the Navy--men who feared no danger and, when
necessity arose, risked their lives without a thought of self. Hear
the story of the _Florence H._ The rescue of her survivors when that
munition ship blew up off Quiberon Bay, April 17, 1918, is one of the
war's most thrilling events.

The night was dark and cloudy, the sea smooth. Steaming along quietly,
the convoy was nearing port. At 10:45 someone was seen signaling with
a searchlight from the bridge of the _Florence H._ An instant later
the vessel burst into flames, which soon enveloped the ship, and rose
a hundred feet into the air. In ten minutes the vessel split open
amidships and five minutes later went down, blazing like a torch. Smoke
and flames prevented those on the ships around from seeing what had
occurred aboard the steamship. Survivors reported later that there was
a tremendous explosion in No. 2 hatch which lifted the deck and blew
out the ship's starboard side. Her chief engineer, John B. Watson,
said: "She just burned up and melted in about twenty minutes."

The whole thing occurred so suddenly that a naval commander, as he saw
the flash, remarked: "Not a living soul will get off that ship."

Rescue seemed almost hopeless. The waters around were covered with
flaming powder-cases and wreckage, so thickly packed that they spread
to leeward like enormous rafts. All over the vicinity ammunition was
exploding, shooting flame and gas ten to twenty feet into the air.

As soon as the fire broke out, two naval vessels started for the
stricken ship. As they got near, the ammunition on the deck of the
_Florence H._ began to explode, showering up like fireworks. Then her
guns went off. For the wooden yachts to venture into that sea of flame
was almost certain destruction. The destroyers, their decks laden
with depth-charges, were in almost equal danger. When the _Stewart_
drew near the ship, the senior commander signaled her to be careful.
It seemed hardly possible that any of the _Florence H.'s_ crew had
escaped. But Lieutenant Commander H. S. Haislip heard cries in the
water. That meant that there were men still alive, struggling in that
horror.

There was only one way to rescue them. That was to plough through the
blazing wreckage. Haislip knew what chances he was taking, risking
his ship and crew. But it was to save human lives and he did not
hesitate a moment. The _Stewart_ led the way, and the other destroyers,
the _Whipple_ and the _Truxtun_, followed. Pushing through bursting
powder-casks, and burning boxes, they made a path for the other ships.

Lines were thrown out and seamen jumped overboard to hold up men who
were blinded or drowning. Lifeboats put out from half a dozen ships.
The flames lit up the whole area so that it was almost as bright as
day. Men could be seen clinging to ammunition boxes, and the rescuers
rowed or swam to them.

Three men were found in a blazing lifeboat hemmed in by wreckage. A
naval vessel steamed alongside and pulled them aboard. F. M. Upton,
quartermaster third class, and J. W. Covington, ship's cook, plunged
overboard to rescue a sailor too exhausted to help himself. Chaplain
William A. Maguire assisted in the rescue, going out in a lifeboat
which had to pole its way through the smouldering wreckage. Surgeons J.
A. Flautt and G. E. Cram and Pharmacist's Mate W. Lorber were out in
small boats, giving aid to the wounded, many of whom were burned about
the head and arms.

Lieutenant (junior grade) M. L. Coon, took a boat into the wreckage
and rescued three men. A motor-boat in charge of Lieutenant H. R.
Eccleston ploughed its way through to a man who could not be reached
by the rowers. Other boats were assisting in the rescue, directed by
Lieutenant (junior grade) H. E. Snow, and Ensigns William O. Harris,
Sherburne B. Rockwell and R. A. Johnston.

All the naval vessels did splendid work--the destroyers _Stewart_
(Lieutenant Commander Haislip); _Whipple_ (Lieutenant Commander H. J.
Abbett), and _Truxtun_ (Lieutenant Commander J. G. Ware); the yachts
_Wanderer_ (Lieutenant Commander P. L. Wilson); _Sultana_ (Lieutenant
Commander F. A. LaRoche); _Christabel_ (Lieutenant Commander M. B.
McComb), and _Corona_ (Lieutenant H. H. J. Benson). More than a dozen
officers and fifty enlisted men performed deeds for which they were
officially commended. Upton and Covington were awarded the Medal of
Honor. But Haislip, born in Virginia, appointed to the Naval Academy
from Wisconsin, his later home in California, won most distinction,
the highest honors we could bestow. The French Vice Admiral praised
his courage and decision, saying that he exhibited not only "superb
contempt of danger," but, "remarkable qualities of seamanship."

Thirty-two of the 77 men aboard the _Florence H._ were rescued. Had it
not been for the heroic work of these men of the Navy, not one would
have escaped alive.

Thrilling as Victor Hugo's description of the cannon which broke loose
and threatened the ship, was John Mackenzie's wrestle with a depth-bomb
on the _Remlik_. A storm was raging in the Bay of Biscay, and the
_Remlik_, patrolling off the French coast, was having a hard time
weathering the gale. Suddenly a periscope was sighted, and there was a
cry from the lookout: "Submarine 400 yards off starboard beam!"

"General quarters" alarm was sounded, and stations manned. Heavy seas
were breaking over the vessel, but the after gun's crew stayed at its
post, trying to get a shot at the U-boat. Before they could fire the
submarine submerged. Then followed one of the queerest of situations
at sea, patrol ship and submarine both so tossed by wave and wind that
they could not use their weapons against each other.

The U-boat poked up its double periscope three times, each time
submerging as she saw the patrol ship's guns turned toward her. She
could not launch a torpedo with any success in that raging sea; neither
could the _Remlik_ drop a depth-bomb on her, as the _Remlik_ could
make only two knots against the gale and a bursting depth-charge might
damage her as much as it would the "sub." There they maneuvered like
two tigers, unable to spring at each other. After a few minutes the
submarine, which had never shown enough of herself for our gunners to
plant a shell in her, finally submerged and stayed under. The Americans
kept sailing over the locality, hoping she would reappear; but, not
wanting to risk a gunfire contest, the "sub" had given up the fight.

Tossed about by that stormy sea, a more imminent danger threatened
the _Remlik_. The waves breaking over the stern tore loose one of the
huge depth-bombs. The box that held it fell overboard, but the bomb
was hurled in the opposite direction. There it went, rolling around
the deck, while the crew amidships watched it with the fascination of
danger.

[Illustration: BREST, CENTER OF THE GREAT SYSTEM OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN
FRANCE]

[Illustration: A GERMAN "SUB" AND SOME OF ITS ENEMIES

  Above: The German submarine UC-56 in internment at Santander,
  Spain, where it was forced by the Christabel, the smallest of the
  American armed yachts in European waters.

  Inset: High officers of the French and American Navies. Left to
  right: Vice Admiral Moreau, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Vice
  Admiral Schwerer, Rear Admiral Benoit, Vice Admiral Wilson.

  Below: Patrol Boats and Sub-Chasers at Finisterre Dock, Brest, Base
  Section Number 5.]

"The safety-pin's come out!" some one shouted.

They all knew what that meant. If the firing mechanism should hit,
sending off that bomb; if its 300 pounds of TNT should explode, the
_Remlik_ would be shattered.

To catch and hold that heavy bomb, with the vessel rolling and pitching
as it was, seemed almost impossible. Even to venture into that part of
the ship was to risk life. The seas were breaking over it, threatening
to sweep off anyone who went down the deck. All knew the ship faced
destruction; that anyone who went after that bomb risked being swept
overboard or blown to pieces. But quickly a voice rang out:

"Watch me; I'll get it!"

Mackenzie dashed down the deck and flung himself upon the plunging
cylinder. He almost had his arms around it, when it broke away. He
jumped for it again, and again it tore loose from him.

"Hey!" he yelled. "Stand by and lend a hand. It won't do for this colt
to get away from me."

As he grabbed for it the third time, the big charge lurched, and
falling, came near crushing him. But he caught his footing, and on
the fourth attempt got a firm grip on it. Exerting all his strength,
he heaved the "can" up on end, and then sat on it and held it down.
Holding on firmly, he managed to retain his grip until lines could be
run to him, and the bomb lashed down. Mackenzie had risked his life,
but he had saved his ship and shipmates.

Recommending that the Medal of Honor be bestowed on Mackenzie, the
first reservist to whom it was awarded, the commanding officer of the
_Remlik_ said:

  Mackenzie, in acting as he did, exposed his life and prevented
  serious accident to the ship and probably loss of the ship and
  entire crew. Had this depth-charge exploded on the quarter-deck
  with the sea and wind that existed at the time, there is no doubt
  that the ship would have been lost.

There was no more striking instance of resourcefulness and good
seamanship than the double service of the Americans in rescuing the
survivors of the French light cruiser _Dupetit Thouars_, and salvaging
and taking 350 miles to port the American steamship _Westward Ho_. The
steamer was in a convoy from New York to the Bay of Biscay which had
been escorted across the Atlantic by the French cruiser. At 10 o'clock,
the night of August 7, 1918, the _Dupetit Thouars_ was torpedoed, and
soon sank. The destroyers _Winslow_, _Porter_, _Drayton_, _Tucker_,
_Fanning_ and _Warrington_ went to her aid and rescued the survivors.

The next morning at 6:40 the destroyers caught a distress signal, found
that the _Westward Ho_ had been torpedoed, and took aboard her crew.
The American yachts _May_ and _Noma_ and the French sloop _Cassiopee_
soon afterwards arrived and found the ship still afloat. But she was
apparently in a sinking condition, so deep in the water that attempts
to tow her failed. A volunteer crew from the _May_ headed by Lieutenant
T. Blau, went aboard and though they had no experience with oil burning
or turbine machinery, got up steam, started the pumps, and at last got
the engines going. She was so deep in the water forward that they could
not make much headway steering the ship bow first. So the volunteer
crew turned her around, and with the two yachts towing and the French
sloop looking out for submarines, ran that big steamship backwards
three hundred and fifty miles, and got her safely into harbor.

A week later another surprising feat was accomplished. Proceeding in
convoy 400 miles from the French coast, the _West Bridge_, on August
15, stripped her main turbine and lay helpless. She had hardly sent
a radio to Brest, asking assistance, when the convoy was attacked by
a submarine. The _Montanan_ was torpedoed, and after she went down,
the U-boat turned its attention to the _West Bridge_. Struck by two
torpedoes, she was apparently about to founder. But the destroyer
_Smith_ went to her aid, and a volunteer crew under Lieutenant R. L.
Connolly went aboard the disabled steamer. There was no possibility
of raising steam. She had to be steered by hand. Eventually four tugs
arrived and with the yacht _Isabel_ started to tow. The well-deck
forward of the ship's bridge was flush with the sea, the waves broke
over her in a constant roar. Holds, engine and fire rooms were flooded.
Keeping her afloat and keeping her moving was slow and hard work. For
five days and nights those men struggled to save that ship, and at last
they got her to port. When she reached Brest they beached her on a
flat. The officers who examined her for repairs declared she did not
have a hundred tons of positive buoyancy, hardly enough to keep her
up an hour. Yet those Navy men had kept her afloat for five days and
pulled her four hundred miles to port!

The spirit of America in Europe, its high ideals, the attitude of
officers and men could not have been better expressed than in this open
letter of Admiral Wilson to the forces under his command in France:

  We are guests in the house of another people. Our home will be
  judged by our conduct in theirs. We still live under the rules,
  laws, and spirit of the place from which we come.

  Every great nation in history has stood for some one definite idea:
  Greece for beauty, Rome for law, Israel for religion. America, in
  the eyes of the world, stands preëminently for freedom and the
  ideal of manhood. We must not shake that opinion but do all that we
  can to strengthen it.

  We have come to this side of the world to record, by the indelible
  imprint of arms, our protest against that which is brutal, wicked,
  and unjust, to give expression to that measure of indignation
  stirred in the hearts of America by the deeds of terror which the
  enemy has written across the face of France. Our Nation stands for
  everything that is contrary to the spirit of arrogant power and
  tyranny. Let us prove that by our lives here.

  The only history of America that many of the people of Europe will
  ever read is that which is recorded by our lives.

  Live here the proud, manly existence that is justly expected.

  Be courteous, temperate and self-controlled.

  We fight against the Hun's ill-treatment of women; let no man be
  tempted to do, by insinuation, what we charge our enemies with
  doing by force. Let the women of France remember the men of America
  as those who would shield them against all harm, even that which
  might spring from their defenders.

  You would fight the man who insulted your uniform; do not insult
  it yourself. Let it not be carried into places of disrepute or
  into any discrediting act. We are here for a great, high, and
  solemn purpose. Let every personal desire be subordinated to that
  righteous purpose, then we will return to our homes clean and proud
  and victorious.




CHAPTER XI

GIBRALTAR AND THE CONVOY

  AMERICAN VESSELS ESCORTED NINETY PER CENT OF SHIPPING BETWEEN
  ENGLAND AND MEDITERRANEAN--GREAT WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY SHIPS UNDER
  COMMAND OF ADMIRAL NIBLACK--U. S. NAVAL FORCES MADE POSSIBLE
  OPERATION OF CONVOY SYSTEM, ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF
  THE WAR.


Gibraltar was the gateway through which passed one-fourth of all the
shipping of the Allies. When the convoy system was applied to the
Mediterranean, July, 1917, it became the principal convoy port of the
world.

United States naval vessels furnished ocean escort both going and
returning for 90 per cent of all convoys between Gibraltar and Great
Britain--200 of the 225 groups which sailed, 4,269 ships, representing
12,000,000 gross tons. The Mediterranean escort protected 5,120
vessels; our destroyers in that region, 1004; our Marseilles escort
73; and our men-of-war accompanied 12 other special ships, transports,
cable layers and submarines. Thus the United States vessels of this
force escorted a total of 10,478 ships.

Realizing the strategic importance of Gibraltar, the Navy Department,
on July 5, 1917, decided to establish a base there, and on July 14th,
directed 11 vessels, including gunboats and light cruisers, under
command of Admiral Wilson, to prepare for distant service, and sail for
Gibraltar at the earliest possible date. This base, one of the most
important in Europe, was established by the Navy Department on its own
initiative, as had been the bases at Brest and Bordeaux and the Azores.
By the time our vessels arrived it became, for protection of Allied
shipping, a point of prime importance.

The convoy system was inaugurated in the Mediterranean, by British
Admiralty order, on July 22, 1917. Five days afterwards the first
regular convoy of 14 ships sailed for England. August 6th the vanguard
of the United States naval vessels, the cruiser _Sacramento_ (Captain
T. T. Craven) reached Gibraltar. On the 17th Admiral Wilson arrived
in the _Birmingham_ (Captain C. L. Hussey), followed next day by the
_Nashville_ (Captain H. E. Yarnell). Other ships followed--the gunboats
_Castine_ (Captain W. C. Asserson), _Machias_ (Commander Austin Kautz),
_Wheeling_ (Commander H. W. Osterhaus), _Paducah_ (Commander H. H.
Royall), the cruiser _Chester_ (Captain Philip Williams), the Coast
Guard cutters _Seneca_ (Captain W. J. Wheeler), _Manning_ (Lieutenant
Commander A. J. Henderson), _Tampa_ (Lieutenant Commander Charles C.
Satterlee), _Ossipee_ (Lieutenant Commander W. H. Munter), _Yamacraw_
(Lieutenant Commander Randolph Ridgely), _Algonquin_ (Lieutenant
Commander G. C. Carmine), the converted yachts _Yankton_ (Lieutenant
G. E. Lake), _Nahma_ (Lieutenant Commander E. Friedrick), _Druid_
(Lieutenant Commander J. F. Connor), _Wenonah_ (Lieutenant Commander P.
E. Speicher), _Arcturus_ (Lieutenant Commander C. F. Howell), _Lydonia_
(Lieutenant Commander R. P. McCullough), _Cythera_ (Lieutenant
Commander W. G. Roper), _Wadena_ (Lieutenant Commander W. M. Falconer),
and _Venetia_ (Commander L. B. Porterfield), the Coast and Geodetic
Survey vessel _Surveyor_ (Commander R. E. Pope), the destroyers
_Bainbridge_ (Lieutenant T. A. Thomson, Jr.), _Barry_ (Lieutenant H.
P. Sampson), _Chauncey_ (Lieutenant Commander W. E. Reno), _Dale_
(Lieutenant Roy Pfaff), _Decatur_ (Lieutenant Ralph R. Stewart),
_Gregory_ (Commander A. P. Fairfield), _Dyer_ (Commander F. H. Poteet),
_Stribling_ (Commander G. C. Logan), _Luce_ (Commander R. C. Parker),
_Israel_ (Lieutenant Commander G. N. Barker), _Maury_ (Commander J. H.
Newton), _Lansdale_ (Lieutenant Commander C. W. Magruder), and _Schley_
(Lieutenant Commander R. C. Giffen), and the destroyer tender _Buffalo_
(Captain C. M. Tozer).

American vessels took a prominent part in escort duty practically from
the beginning of convoy in that region, becoming in a short time, the
largest factor in the system. In the latter part of October, Admiral
Wilson was ordered to command our forces on the French coast, and
was succeeded by Admiral A. P. Niblack, who directed our forces at
Gibraltar to the end of the war, with fine judgment and ability. He
and his force became a tower of strength in that region, to the Allies
as well as our own Navy.

As the American vessels arrived, they were immediately placed on duty
with convoys and as danger-zone escorts. The ships of the Allies were
employed almost exclusively in the Mediterranean, with headquarters at
Malta, and our naval vessels did nearly all the escort duty between
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. They also convoyed over 4,000 vessels
in local Mediterranean traffic, or bound for Mediterranean and Far
Eastern ports; ships supplying the American army through Marseilles,
the French forces in North Africa; the Allied armies at Salonika; the
British in Egypt and Palestine; and the forces of Italy.

Soon after our vessels arrived in August, 1917, Rear Admiral H.
S. Grant, British Royal Navy, senior naval officer in command at
Gibraltar, drew up the plans by which the "H. G." (Home-Gibraltar) and
"G. H." (Gibraltar-Home) convoys were organized between the United
Kingdom and the Mediterranean. These also included ships bound to and
from French ports in the Bay of Biscay and ships bound to the United
States. Destroyers, sloops and special service vessels accompanied each
convoy as a danger-zone escort through the Straits of Gibraltar to 10
degrees west longitude and there waited for, or met, an incoming convoy
from England. Men-of-war acted as ocean escort to the convoys from that
point to British waters, where they were met by a danger-zone escort at
the end of the route.

At the beginning of October, 1917, a system of fast convoys, sailing
every sixteen days, between the United Kingdom and Port Said, and vice
versa, was organized. These were met at a rendezvous in approximately
longitude 10 degrees west by naval vessels which escorted them to
Gibraltar, where they were relieved usually by ships from the Malta
command, to take them through the Mediterranean. These convoys were
joined at Gibraltar by ships of over 10-1/2 knots speed, which were
taken out by relief escorts and joined the convoy off Europa Point.
The first of the through outward-bound convoys, _O. E. 1_ (outward
eastward) passed Gibraltar October 11th, and the first through homeward
bound convoy, _H. E. 1_, passed on November 26th.

By December most merchantmen which arrived at Gibraltar had been in
convoy at one time or another, and it was possible to sail ships bound
for North and South American ports in separate small convoys, with one
master and commodore, escorted through the danger zone to longitude 10
degrees west. Between that time and the middle of February, 1918, 207
ships were thus sailed to the Americas.

More escort ships being available, and enemy submarine cruisers
becoming active, ships for United States and South American ports
were, beginning February 27, formed into convoys, two, a fast and a
slow one, sailing on the same day, each accompanied by the danger-zone
escort to longitude 30 degrees west, then proceeding "on their own" to
longitude 70 degrees west to be dispersed to their proper destinations.
Under this revised system there were sailed to American ports 1,013
ships, totalling 4,371,063 gross tons. These were called W. A. Convoys
(Western Atlantic).

The main artery for supply of the Allied armies operating in Egypt,
Palestine, Greece, Italy, Northern Africa and Southern France ran
through the Gibraltar area, requiring a great amount of offensive
work against enemy submarines, in addition to escorting convoys.
Patrol of the Straits was carried on by torpedo boats, motor launches,
sub-chasers and vessels of small displacement, entailing hardships and
exposure in every kind of weather.

Numerous attacks on U-boats were reported in this region. The British
Admiralty credited the _U. S. S. Lydonia_ (Lieutenant Commander R. P.
McCullough) and _H. M. S. Basilisk_ with sinking a submarine while
escorting a Mediterranean convoy, May 8, 1918. In latitude 38 degrees
06´ north, longitude 3 degrees 3´ east, the _Lydonia_ sighted the
wake of a torpedo which sank the British steamship _Ingleside_. The
British and American ships immediately attacked, dropping a barrage of
depth-charges, which destroyed the enemy. The submarine was the German
UB-70, and the British Admiralty awarded these vessels the credit,
rarely given, of "known sunk."

Commander Richard P. McCullough, commanding the _Lydonia_, was
officially commended by the British Admiralty and the British senior
naval officer at Gibraltar, as well as by our own authorities.
Lieutenant Claud F. Reynaud, the executive officer, was also given
special commendation. Sighting the torpedo at the instant it was fired,
Reynaud started his stop-watch, timed the run of the torpedo, made
immediate change of course to the position of the submarine and noted
its bearings. This enabled the commanding officer to track the probable
movements of the submarine, which was destroyed by depth-charges from
the _Lydonia_ and the _Basilisk_.

Credit was also given for the sinking of a submarine by the _Wheeling_,
_Surveyor_ and _Venetia_. While on escort duty, May 15, 1918, in
latitude 36-03 N., longitude 1-47 W., these vessels sighted the track
of a torpedo which struck a merchant ship of the convoy. They dashed
down the wake made by the U-boat's periscope, dropping depth-charges
which soon put the submarine out of business.

The notable record of the _Venetia_ is recited in Admiral Niblack's
recommendation of its commanding officer, Commander L. B. Porterfield,
for special commendation:

  While escorting Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy, on May 11, 1918, an enemy
  submarine, which was not seen, torpedoed the French steamship
  _Susette Fraisenette_ at 3:39 a. m. With excellent judgment he
  assumed that submarine had dived under the convoy, and in following
  out the theory sighted the submarine on the surface at daylight,
  compelling it to submerge. This submarine was subsequently sunk in
  the Adriatic, and the survivors testified that the attack of the
  _Venetia_ on this occasion drove them off, and saved the convoy
  from further attack. Commended in British Senior Naval Officer's
  letter 78-14 of 24th May, 1918, and British Commander-Chief's
  Mediterranean letter No. 2089-93 of 23 June, 1918.

  While escort to Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy on May 17, 1918, the
  British steamship _Sculptor_ was torpedoed at 6:48 p. m. Submarine
  was not seen, but the _Venetia_, having been previously detailed
  to attack with depth-charges, and remain behind four hours to keep
  down submarine, did so. At 7:02 p. m. wake of submarine was sighted
  and depth-charges dropped. On May 18th an enemy submarine interned
  at Cartagena, Spain, and was officially assumed to have been
  damaged by the _Venetia_.

  While on escort duty, Gibraltar-Genoa, the British steamship
  _Messidor_ was torpedoed at 7:24 p. m., July 23, 1918, and the
  _Venetia_ instantly made attack, dropping thirteen depth-charges on
  pre-arranged plan.

The cruiser _Chester_ had two encounters with submarines. While on
convoy duty November 9, 1917, it attacked with gunfire a submarine
which had sunk one of the vessels of the convoy, compelling the U-boat
to submerge. On September 5, 1918, at 1:04 a. m., the _Chester_,
on ocean escort, sighted a submarine close aboard on the starboard
bow. First the cruiser attempted to ram the enemy, then attacked the
undersea craft with depth-charges, which apparently damaged the U-boat.

Four days later a submarine attacked Convoy GGA-54, torpedoing and
sinking the British steamship _Arabis_. The _Paducah_ attacked with
depth-bombs and, according to reports, damaged the submarine. The
_Seneca_ on September 16th drove off a submarine which attacked Convoy
OM-99. The _U. S. S. Druid_ and _H. M. S. Gilia_ repulsed an attack on
Convoy BG-65, on September 22nd. Escorting Convoy BG-67, on September
30th, the _Seneca_ sighted a periscope and attacked with depth-charges
and gunfire.

Convoy BG-68, escorted by the _Cythera_, was attacked the night of
October 3rd, and two steamships, the British _Ariel_ and the French
_St. Luc_, were torpedoed. The _Cythera_ went for the submarine, laying
a pattern of depth-charges. While being escorted through the Straits
of Gibraltar by _H. M. S. Defender_ and the _U. S. S. Decatur_, _H. M.
S. Britannia_ was torpedoed and sunk at 7 a. m., November 9, 1918. The
_Decatur_ attacked with depth-charges. The same day a torpedo was fired
at the _Parker_, which was on temporary duty on the western barrage
line, in the Straits. But the torpedo missed, and the _Parker_ went
after the U-boat, dropping depth-bombs around her.

German submarine activity around Gibraltar continued up to the very end
of hostilities. On November 10, 1918, the day before the armistice, the
_Israel_, which was operating on the barrage line with a sub-chaser,
discovered and attacked a U-boat, and the same day Sub-chaser Unit C,
while patrolling off Point Boassa, also made contact with a submarine.

Two vessels of the Gibraltar force were lost--the destroyer _Chauncey_,
sunk in collision with the British steamship _Rose_, November 19, 1917,
and the Coast Guard cutter _Tampa_, sunk in British waters September
30, 1918.

The six little destroyers sent from the Philippines to Gibraltar made
the long voyage of 12,000 miles under their own steam, arriving in
October. The work they did was amazing, when their small size and age
are considered. One of them, the _Decatur_, 420 tons displacement,
which had been condemned as not seaworthy enough to venture out of
sight of land, successfully negotiated the long voyage from Manila, and
in service at Gibraltar steamed over 48,000 miles, making a total of
60,000 miles steaming before her departure for the United States.

The _Wenonah_, an armed yacht of hardly more than 200 tons, steamed in
escort work 29,979 miles. The U. S. Coast Guard cutter _Seneca_, which
arrived at Gibraltar September 4, 1917, escorted 600 ships in convoys,
carrying total cargoes of 2,100,000 tons. These are only a few of the
phenomenal records made.

United States naval vessels based on Gibraltar assisted in escorting
562 convoys, and 79 single ships, furnishing an average of fifty per
cent of all escorts. Under way 46 per cent of the time and 68 per cent
available at all times for operation, our vessels were, in addition
to the Gibraltar-England service and danger zone escort, employed in
escorting ships to Bizerta, Genoa, Oran and Marseilles. They maintained
a monthly service to the Azores, escorted cable ships, and also did
other odd jobs.

No vessels performed more convoy duty than these, and Admiral Niblack,
who commanded them, thus states what was expected of the system:

  (a) That a relatively small number of escort vessels could protect
  more ships if they were in convoy than in any other way.

  (b) That ships in convoy could not be visited and sunk by bombs, as
  were single ships.

  (c) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire by
  submarines.

  (d) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find
  and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo.

  (e) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines would lay
  for convoys the escort by anti-submarine craft could be made so
  strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous.

"The great advantage of the convoy," said he, "was that the ships
arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where
an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted
with depth-charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of
submarines extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy."

But, in considering the effect of convoy in lessening sinkings, Admiral
Niblack said:

  I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo points
  out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use
  of the depth-charges, mystery ships, airships, kite balloons,
  the laying of mine barrages, the firing of torpedoes from Allied
  submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with
  listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically. * * * *

  One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system
  which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire
  war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to
  Gibraltar. * * * All the rest of the million tons of shipping which
  crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single
  ships, going "on their own," as it were. These ships depended on
  their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy
  system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on
  their guns for protection.

The convoy system, however, accomplished all that was expected of it,
and was markedly successful.

It was our destroyers at Queenstown, our forces on the French coast and
at Gibraltar, our cruisers escorting convoys crossing the Atlantic,
that made it the success it was--and it was one of the most successful
measures of the war.

President Wilson, as I have said, favored its adoption from the
beginning; in fact, wondered why the Allies had not adopted it upon the
outbreak of war in Europe. It was one of the first measures recommended
by the General Board. But at the time this country entered the war, the
Allies were pursuing exactly the opposite method; that is, dispersion
of shipping.

When troop transportation was first determined upon, in May, 1917,
we adopted the convoy system for troop-ships. It was in that month
that the British decided to try out the plan for merchant ships, to
see whether it would work. The first experimental convoy arrived in
England from Gibraltar, May 20. A few convoys were despatched in June,
and on June 22 Sims cabled me: "The British Admiralty have now adopted
the convoy system and will put it into effect as fast as ships can be
obtained for high sea convoy against raiders, and destroyers for escort
duty in submarine zone." He reported two routes in operation, stated
that eight convoys a week were planned, and recommended that we furnish
one cruiser or battleship a week for high sea escort. On June 30, I
informed him that the Department would assign seven cruisers for this
duty. Our destroyers were engaged in the danger-zone from the time the
first trans-Atlantic convoys were started.

Putting the convoy system into effect was a big job, involving the
larger part of the world's shipping--a reversal of method that
necessitated a radical change in the naval scheme. Concerning the part
the United States Navy played in this great task, Admiral Sims wrote in
the _World's Work_:

  I do not wish to say that the convoy would not have been
  established had we not sent the destroyers for that purpose, yet
  I do not see how it could have been established in any complete
  and systematic way at such an early date. And we furnished other
  ships than destroyers, for, besides providing what I have called
  the modern convoy--protecting the compact mass of vessels from
  submarines--it was necessary also to furnish escorts after the old
  Napoleonic plan. It was the business of the destroyers to conduct
  merchantmen only through the submarine zone. They did not take them
  the whole distance across the ocean, for there was little danger of
  submarine attack until the ships reached the infested waters. This
  would have been impossible in any case with the limited number of
  destroyers.

  But, from the time the convoys left the home port, say New York or
  Hampton Roads, there was the possibility of the same kind of attack
  as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days--that is,
  from raiders or cruisers. We always feared that German cruisers or
  raiders of the Moewe type might escape into the ocean and attack
  these merchant ships, and we therefore had to escort them across
  the ocean with battleships and cruisers just as they did a century
  ago. The British did not have ships enough available for this
  purpose, and here again the American Navy was able to supply the
  lack; for we had a number of pre-dreadnaughts and cruisers that
  were ideally adapted to this kind of work.

[Illustration: AT GIBRALTAR, KEY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

Above: U. S. S. Buffalo, Schley and Jupiter.

Inset: Rear Admiral Albert P. Niblack, commanding American naval forces
in the Mediterranean.

Below: The signal tower and American sub-chasers.]

[Illustration: THE GREAT MINE BARRAGE AGAINST THE SUBMARINES

This map shows the location of the mine barrage across the North Sea as
well as the smaller one across the English Channel. The dangers of this
barrage, more than any other single factor, destroyed the morale of the
German submarine crews.]




CHAPTER XII

SHUTTING UP THE HORNETS IN THEIR NESTS

  MINE BARRAGE ACROSS NORTH SEA A TERROR TO U-BOATS--GERMANS PLANNED
  BIG DRIVE, BUT SUBMARINE CREWS REFUSED TO GO TO SEA--MORALE
  SHATTERED, KAISER'S NAVY WAS WRECKED BY MUTINY--PROPOSED BY U.
  S. NAVY IN APRIL, 1917, EIGHTY PER CENT OF BARRAGE WAS LAID BY
  AMERICANS.


Germany planned a great naval offensive in the fall of 1918--that is,
the German authorities did, the High Command. Why was it never carried
out? Why were the U-boats recalled? Why did the Kaiser's High Seas
Fleet surrender without striking a blow?

When Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the British Admiralty, visited
Washington in October, 1918, he told me that we might expect a decided
increase in submarine activity, a German drive at sea. In the official
conferences we held, Sir Eric and his associates predicted that,
notwithstanding all the efforts we were making, vastly more tonnage
might be sunk in the ensuing months. The British were striving to
increase ship production, and put as many war vessels as possible into
commission.

The next day I telegraphed the leading shipbuilders of the country,
asking them to come to Washington. Over 200 destroyers were under
construction or contracted for, and rapid progress was being made on
them. But I thought that, by special effort, we might rush a larger
number to completion. The critical situation outlined by the British
authorities was explained to the builders, and they were directed
to make construction continuous--to run three shifts of eight hours
each, working day, night and Sundays, and to speed up to the utmost on
destroyers and all anti-submarine craft. They pledged their earnest
assistance, proposing to increase forces, if labor could be secured,
and to push the program already undertaken on the highest gear.

While the visit of the British mission as announced was to "discuss
certain matters concerning the naval situation," and its conferences
were confidential, its members in public statements made clear their
belief that easy or early victory was not to be expected.

"I have made it the keynote of all my policy and all my advice to
others not to be deluded with hopes of an early peace, but to prepare
for an ever-receding duration of the war," said Sir Eric Geddes. "We
must always be prepared for two years more, and then only shall we have
the sure means of victory in our hands."

More significant still, more to the point, was the remark made by Sir
Eric just before he sailed for Europe:

"A great renewed effort on Germany's part is impending. We know it, and
its extent."

Before he reached England, U-boat warfare was practically ended. Within
ten days the submarines were recalled to their home bases. As they were
returning to Germany they sank a few ships. But these were the last few
examples of German frightfulness on the seas.

What had brought about that tremendous change? It was not due to any
lack of determination on the part of the German Admiralty, or the
Kaiser. But they found that the big stick with which they were to
strike was only a broken reed. The morale of their navy was shattered.
Officers were willing enough to obey orders, but their men refused to
fight.

The U-boat crews, for years the pick and pride of the service, refused
to go to sea. Germany was building hundreds of submarines, they were
being turned out by the score. She might soon have sent out a dozen for
every one she had when ruthless warfare began. But willing crews were
lacking to man them.

This was a complete reversal of previous experience. A year before
U-boat duty had been the most sought-for branch of the service.
Essaying long voyages in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, cruising
for weeks around the waters of England and France, their officers
and men had braved many dangers, and returning were hailed by their
countrymen as conquering heroes.

Sinkings had been made more difficult by the convoy system. Listening
devices had made it more dangerous for submarines to remain in the
vicinity of naval vessels. Patrol, by surface ships and aircraft,
had become more efficient. Shipping was more difficult to get at and
destroy. More submarines were being sunk than in the early days. But,
with all these operating against them, the U-boats, even if they could
not make such high scores in tonnage, had more than an even chance to
reach their home bases unscathed.

Now was another danger to face, however; one that was hidden and
deadly, and it had to be faced by every boat departing or returning.
Some U-boats, putting out to sea from their nesting places on the
German coasts, vanished utterly. No trace was left, no record of what
fate befell them.

Others, badly damaged, limped back to port. Survivors told of colliding
with mines hidden far below the surface, whose presence could not be
guessed. No vigilance could locate or action avoid them. They might
run into them anywhere within hundreds of miles. This was a terror the
undersea boatmen were unwilling to face. The revolt of the U-boat crews
spread to other branches of the naval service, and the entire German
navy began to disintegrate.

The mutiny in the German sea forces, the demoralization of its
personnel, has no parallel in naval history. This was undoubtedly due
to various causes, but, in my belief, there was no one thing that had
more influence in breaking the German morale, particularly in the
U-boat service, than did the Northern Mine Barrage.

Stretching across the North Sea, from Norway almost to the Orkneys,
this heavy barrier of powerful mines opposed any enemy vessels which
attempted to make their way around the north of Scotland into the
Atlantic. The Germans had only two exits from the North Sea, the one
covered by this mine barrier, and, to the south, the narrow Straits of
Dover, also partially mined and guarded by the famous Dover Patrol.

It was a new factor in war, this vast barrage, the most successful
innovation, the biggest new naval offensive put forth after our
entrance into the war. American in conception, it was also mainly
American in construction. A joint British and American undertaking,
as it was, four-fifths of the mines laid were of American design and
manufacture, made in this country, taken across the Atlantic in
American ships, and laid by American naval vessels.

Though not actually laid until the summer of 1918, this was the first
big project proposed by the United States Navy after our entrance into
the war. In fact, it was only nine days after war was declared that
the Bureau of Ordnance presented an elaborate memorandum, outlining
the proposition. But the British Admiralty, without whose consent and
coöperation it could not be constructed, and Admiral Sims pronounced it
"impractical" and "unfeasible." It was not until six months later that
we secured the Admiralty's approval, and the great project got under
way.

The first mine was laid on June 8, 1918. "The barrier began to take
toll of the enemy's submarines as early as July 9, when one was
disabled on the barrier and compelled to return to Germany," reported
Admiral Joseph Strauss, commander of American mining operations in the
North Sea. "It is not known how many submarines were sunk or disabled
in the mine field. It has been placed as high as twenty-three. My own
estimate, based on known sinkings, is ten, although I am inclined to
think that is a modest one."

Captain Reginald R. Belknap, commander of Mine Squadron 1, says the
barrage began to yield results before it was half way across. "From the
nature of the case it may never be known definitely how many actually
did come to grief there," he said; "but the best information gives
a probable ten before the middle of October, with a final total of
seventeen or more. In addition to this toll, the squadron should be
given credit for two submarines lost in the field of British mines laid
by the _Baltimore_ off the Irish coast."

Eight and one-half per cent of the total number of submarines lost
during the war were brought into the list of missing by the barrage,
was the estimate of Admiral Ralph Earle, Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance, under whose administration and leadership the mine barrage
was conceived, projected and constructed. Admiral Earle reported to me:

  It has been established that six submarines were lost in the
  barrage and three more so badly damaged that they never again put
  to sea. However, from further evidence, the British Admiralty
  officially credit the barrage with fourteen additional, or a
  total of twenty-three. Two hundred German U-boats were destroyed
  in the war, or fifty more than the Allies could account for.
  To err on the conservative side, we claim but eight out of the
  fourteen credited the barrage by the British Admiralty, or a total
  of seventeen. This is also the figure arrived at by Captain R. R.
  Belknap, commander of Mine Squadron 1. What does this figure show?
  Eight and one-half per cent of the total number of submarines
  lost during the war were brought into the list of missing by the
  barrage, which existed for only six per cent of the period of the
  war. Such results more than justified the effort and time and funds
  expended.

[Illustration: PLANTING MINES IN THE NORTH SEA

A squadron of American mine planters at work. Inset: Rear Admiral
Joseph Strauss, who was in general command of mining operations.]

[Illustration: HOW THE BIG MINES IN THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE WORKED

Fig. 1. Mine and Anchor leaving launching rails.

Fig. 2. Fifth wheel released, plummet supported by dashpot.

Fig. 3. Plummet released and unwinding cord.

Fig. 4. Plummet at end of cord. Slip hook pulled off.

Fig. 5. Anchor paying out mooring cable as it sinks. Plummet strikes
bottom and locks cable drum.

Fig. 6. Anchor on bottom submerging mine distance equal to length of
plummet cord.

  A. MINE CASE
  B. ANCHOR
  C. PLUMMET
  D. PLUMMET CORD
  E. SLIP HOOK
  F. MOORING]

The barrage did more than take toll of submarines sent to kingdom come
by its mines. "There is no doubt," reported Sims in the "Summary of
Activities of American Forces in European Waters," "that the barrage
had a considerable moral effect on the German naval crews, for it is
known that several submarines hesitated some time before crossing.
Also, reports from German sources are that the barrage caused no small
amount of panic in some of the submarine flotillas. It is also probable
that the barrage played a part in preventing raids on Allied commerce
by fast enemy cruisers."

Admiral Strauss, in his testimony before the Senate Investigating
Committee, declared that if the Northern Barrage and that across the
Straits of Dover had been fully completed as we planned, "it would have
ended the submarine menace, so far as submarines going from the North
Sea into the Atlantic were concerned;" and that the building of the
mine barriers across the Adriatic and Aegean seas, for which we were
preparing materials, "would have actually ended submarine operations."

Could it have been built in 1917, a year earlier than it was? Strauss
said it could, and this was the firm belief of Earle and other
ordnance experts. True, the antenna mine we developed later was a big
improvement, superior to any previously devised. It would have taken
two or three times as many mines of the type then in use, perhaps
180,000 of them, as was estimated. We manufactured 100,000 of the
antenna type, and could have made as many more, if necessary. The
British had no antenna mines, Admiral Strauss pointed out, and all the
mines they laid in the barrage were of the older type. After all the
objections were presented to him, Admiral Strauss, when asked if he
still considered it would have been feasible to have gone ahead with
the barrage in 1917, unhesitatingly answered: "Yes."

Not laying that barrage earlier--in fact, at the earliest possible
moment--was, in my opinion, the greatest naval error of the war. If the
British had erected it early in the war, and put a similar effective
barrier across the Straits of Dover and Otranto, the Germans would have
been so restricted that widespread U-boat warfare, with its terrible
destruction of life and shipping, would have been impossible.

"Shutting up the hornets in their nests," as President Wilson expressed
it, was the first idea that occurred to us when we went to war. The
Bureau of Ordnance on April 15, 1917, submitted a memorandum urging
that we "stop the submarines at their source" and suggesting that
mine barriers be laid across the North Sea, the Adriatic and the
Dardanelles. "The northern barrier," it stated, "would extend from the
mid-eastern coast of Scotland to the Norwegian coast, a distance of
about 250 miles," and the southern (that is, to close the Straits of
Dover) would extend "from the southeast coast of England and to a point
on the French coast near the Belgian frontier, a distance of about
forty miles." Next day I cabled Admiral Sims, who had just arrived in
London:

  Is it not practicable to blockade German coast efficiently and
  completely, thus making practically impossible the egress and
  ingress of submarines? The steps attempted or accomplished in this
  direction are to be reported at once.

Two days later came the answer:

  To absolutely blockade the German and Belgian coast against
  the entrance and departure of submarines has been found quite
  unfeasible.

The next day he wrote a long letter, amplifying the difficulties and
reporting against any such barriers. But our ordnance experts were
thoroughly convinced the project was feasible. On May 9th they outlined
their plans in a memorandum to be submitted to the British Admiralty,
and on May 11th I cabled to Admiral Sims: "Much opinion is in favor of
concerted efforts by the Allies to establish a complete barrier across
the North Sea, Scotland to Norway, either direct or via the Shetlands,
to prevent the egress of German submarines." I added, "The difficulty
and size of the problem is recognized, but if it is possible of
accomplishment the situation would warrant the effort." He was directed
to consult with the British Admiralty regarding this plan. Two days
later came the reply:

  From all experience Admiralty considers project of attempting to
  close exit to North Sea to enemy submarines by the method suggested
  to be quite impracticable. Project has previously been considered
  and abandoned.

In a dispatch on May 14th Sims said: "The abandonment of any serious
attempts at blockading such passages as Scotland-Norway, the Skagerrack
and Scotland to Shetland has been forced by bitter and expensive
experience."

"As may well be imagined," he wrote later, "this whole subject has
been given the most earnest consideration, as it is, of course,
realized that if submarines could be kept from coming out, the whole
problem would at once be solved." But he said, "I cannot too strongly
emphasize the fact that during nearly three years of active warfare
this whole question had been the most serious subject of consideration
by the British Admiralty," which had concluded that no "barrier can be
completely effective."

This, however, did not deter our ordnance experts. The more they
studied the question, the more were they convinced that the barrier
could be "put across." Believing in mines, preparing for mine
operations on a large scale, they were astonished when, on May 31st,
Sims reported that, instead of our giving attention to mine production,
the British Admiralty "consider we can more profitably concentrate on
other work."

Earle and his associates in the Bureau of Ordnance never doubted final
success. They experimented with mines, firing and anchoring devices,
and on July 30th announced the development of a new type of mine,
particularly adapted to deep waters. A unique feature of this mine was
that it did not have to be struck to explode, but would explode if a
submarine passed close to it. This was due to the firing apparatus,
which was evolved from an electrical device submitted by Mr. Ralph C.
Browne, of Salem, Mass., to be used on a submerged gun. Officers of the
Bureau concluded this could be adapted to mines, and in May began work
to that end. Commander S. P. Fullinwider, chief of the Mine Section,
was aided by Mr. Browne, Lieutenant Commander T. S. Wilkinson, Jr.,
and Commodore S. J. Brown in producing this firing device, and others
who assisted in developing the mine were Lieutenant Commanders O. W.
Bagby, J. A. Schofield, W. A. Corley, C. H. Wright and H. E. Fischer,
Lieutenant S. W. Cook and Lieutenant (junior grade) B. W. Grimes.

With this improved mine as an argument, our ordnance officers renewed
the proposal of a mine offensive in the North Sea. The memorandum the
Bureau submitted was comprehensive, and contained all the essential
features of the barrage plan that was later adopted and carried into
effect.

How could the project be best presented to the British Admiralty again?
Admiral Mayo was preparing to sail within a short time for Europe. Just
before his departure the entire project was discussed and the operation
of the improved mines explained, as he was to bring the whole matter to
the attention of the British Admiralty and the Allied Naval Council. To
prevent loss of time and further insure the Admiralty's consideration,
on August 17th, before Mayo sailed, I cabled Sims:

  Bureau of Ordnance has developed a mine which it hopes may have
  decisive influence upon operations against submarines. Utmost
  secrecy considered necessary. Request that an officer representing
  the Admiralty, clothed with power to decide, be sent here to
  inspect and thoroughly test mine, and, if found satisfactory,
  arrange for coöperation in mining operations.

The Allied Naval Conference, held in London September 4th and 5th,
which Mayo attended, took up not only the barrage project, but another
proposition our Navy Department had suggested months before, a close
offensive in German waters. After the meeting Mayo cabled:

  Conference completed after agreement upon the following points:

    1. That close offensive in German waters should be carefully
    considered by Allies, after which they should indicate to British
    Admiralty contribution of old war ships they are prepared to
    furnish should offensive prove practicable.

    2. That alternative offensive employing effective mine field or
    mine net barrage to completely shut in North Sea not practicable
    until adequate supply satisfactory type mines assured, and
    that pending such supply, extension present system mine fields
    desirable and that mine net barrage impracticable.

This indicated to us that the British still doubted the effectiveness
of a barrage, as well as our ability to furnish an adequate supply of
mines. It was evident that, after five months of earnest advocacy,
further urging was needed to secure approval of the project. Benson,
therefore, on September 12th, cabled Mayo:

  There are great possibilities in the satisfactory solution of
  the mine and depth-charge question. Officers sent over here most
  satisfactory and remarkably well posted. I think it would help the
  whole situation wonderfully if Commodore Gaunt could visit the
  Admiralty for a few days and have a heart-to-heart talk. No time to
  be lost.

What happened next? The day after Benson's message was received,
the British Admiralty made out for Mayo a paper entitled, "General
Future Policy, Including Mine Policy," with an appendix, "Mine Barrage
Across the North Sea." The policy outlined by the Admiralty, announced
September 14th, was the same the Navy Department had suggested nearly
five months previous.

Even then there was delay. On October 9th, Sims reported that the
Admiralty was "thoroughly investigating the question" and that "the
discussion of this question will probably be postponed by the Admiralty
until the return of the commander-in-chief." We were still not certain
as to whether the British were ready to put it through. But, believing
that the plan must finally be put into effect, our Bureau of Ordnance
went ahead, and let the contracts for 100,000 mines. Upon Mayo's return
October 15th, the amendments suggested by the British were approved by
the General Board and accepted by the Department. Nothing definite,
however, had come from London and on October 20th Sims was cabled:

  The Department requests to be informed whether the plan for
  the placing of a mine barrier across the North Sea on the
  Aberdeen-Egersund line has the approval of the Admiralty.

Finally on October 22nd, an answer direct from the British Admiralty
said, "Admiralty has approved mine barrier and now confirms approval."

All the details were then perfected--this required several days--and
on October 29th I received and approved the completed plans. The
President, who for months had been impatient of delay, gave his
approval as soon as they were laid before him. This was at a cabinet
meeting on October 30th. The same day a cable was sent to the Admiralty
that we had taken steps to fit out mine-planters; that shipment of
mines would begin the first of January, and officers would be sent in a
few days to arrange details.

So after months of opposition, doubt and indecision, the two navies
united in the construction of this most stupendous job of the kind ever
conceived or undertaken. It was well done and the result demonstrated
its effectiveness. Admiral Sims himself, after its completion and
success, said that "no such project has ever been carried out more
successfully" and that "as an achievement it stands as one of the
wonders of the war."

I am not giving these details in any spirit of criticism of the
British Admiralty or our representative in London, but to do justice
to the vision, initiative and resource of the American Navy. It was,
indeed, a bold and gigantic experiment, calling for many millions of
money and the strenuous and dangerous work of many men. That it was so
successfully done reflects credit alike on Britons and Americans, and
both share in the honor of its accomplishment.

Manufacturing 100,000 mines was a big order, but that was only
the beginning. They had to be shipped 3,500 miles overseas, which
necessitated a fleet of mine-carriers. Twenty-three cargo vessels
were converted, and assigned to this duty. To fill the mines with
explosives a mine-loading plant of 22 buildings was erected at St.
Julien's Creek, Va., capable of receiving, loading and shipping 1,000
mines a day. Advanced bases, for inspection and assembly of the mines,
were established in February, 1918, on the east coast of Scotland, at
Inverness and Invergordon, with Captain O. G. Murfin in charge.

For the work of mine-laying, a Mine Squadron was created, under command
of Captain Reginald R. Belknap. This consisted of the flagship _San
Francisco_ (Captain H. V. Butler), and her consort, the _Baltimore_
(Captain A. W. Marshall), "crack cruisers of the vintage of 1890,"
as Captain Belknap called them; and eight former merchant vessels
converted into naval mine planters. Four of these were Southern
Pacific or Morgan liners, carrying freight between New York and
Galveston, renamed the _Roanoke_ (Captain C. D. Stearns), _Canonicus_
(Captain T. L. Johnson), _Housatonic_ (Captain J. W. Greenslade), and
_Canandaigua_ (Commander W. H. Reynolds). Two were the Old Dominion
passenger liners _Jefferson_ and _Hamilton_, running between New York
and Norfolk, renamed _Quinnebaug_ (Commander D. Pratt Mannix), and
_Saranac_ (Captain Sinclair Gannon). The remaining two were the fast
Boston and New York passenger steamers, _Massachusetts_ and _Bunker
Hill_, of the Eastern Steamship Corporation, renamed _Shawmut_ (Captain
W. T. Cluverius), and _Aroostook_ (Captain J. Harvey Tomb). They were
accompanied abroad by several seagoing tugs, the _Sonoma_, _Ontario_,
_Patapsco_ and _Patuxent_.

Admiral Strauss, who was in general command of mining operations,
went to England in March, inspected the bases, and conferred with the
British authorities as to the general arrangements. His flagship was
the _Black Hawk_ (Captain R. C. Bulmer), which was also the repair
vessel of the mine force. The British began mine laying in March, but
one of their vessels, the _Gailardia_, was sunk; and operations were
suspended for a time until the safety of the mines could be assured.

The _Baltimore_, the first of our vessels sent over, arrived in the
Clyde in March. Submarines were very active in Irish waters, and the
Admiralty decided to lay a deep mine-field off the north coast of
Ireland, in the North Channel. As all British mine-layers were employed
elsewhere, the Admiralty requested the use of the _Baltimore_. This was
readily granted and the _Baltimore_ engaged in this from April 13th
until the latter part of May, joining our squadron in Scotland June
2nd. The _Roanoke_, sent over to assist her, was instead ordered to our
base at Invergordon.

Sailing from Newport, May 12th, the _San Francisco_ and other vessels
arrived at Inverness, May 26th, all ready to begin operations.
Twelve days later the squadron started on its first mine-planting
"excursion." On these expeditions, which lasted usually from 40 to
80 hours, the squadron was regarded as a part of the British Grand
Fleet. Screening it against submarines, and hostile mines casually
placed, was an escort of eight to twelve British destroyers, which
formed around the squadron upon its leaving the base and kept with it
until its return. To guard against attack from enemy cruisers, while
away from the coast, the squadron was accompanied by a supporting
force, consisting of a battleship or battle-cruiser squadron and a
light-cruiser squadron of the Grand Fleet, sometimes by all three,
according to the estimated probabilities of attack. On the second
mining excursion the support was the Sixth Battle Squadron, the
American battleships, commanded by Admiral Rodman. Captain Belknap gave
a vivid picture of the dangerous character of mine-laying when he said:

  One may imagine with what feelings we saw our own great ships file
  out of Scapa Flow, form line on our quarter, and slowly disappear
  in the haze, as they swept off to the southeastward. It will be
  readily understood that the way had to be made smooth for the mine
  planters. As long as it was so, all would go well; but a single
  well placed torpedo or mine, or a few enemy shells, would certainly
  finish one vessel, and probably destroy all ten of them. Each mine
  planter carried from 24 to 120 tons of high explosive, a total of
  nearly 800 tons in the squadron, many times more than the amount
  that devastated Halifax. With this on board, the squadron was
  hardly a welcome visitor anywhere.

Operations as a whole were conducted in conjunction with a British
mine-laying squadron of four vessels, under command of Rear Admiral
Clinton-Baker. American and British squadrons often went out at the
same time, under protection of the same heavy vessels, but except on
two occasions they worked separately, in different parts of the barrage
area. Thus there were altogether fourteen mine planters at work at the
same time.

On the first excursion, June 7th, the American squadron planted a mine
field 47 miles long, containing 3,400 mines, in 3 hours and 36 minutes.
Everything went without a hitch. One ship emptied herself of 675 mines
without a single break, one mine every 11-1/2 seconds through more than
two hours, a record never before equalled.

[Illustration: ONE OF THE PERILS OF MINE-SWEEPING

An explosion close astern of the Patapsco. The greatest care was
exercised to avoid accidents of this character, but to eliminate them
entirely was impossible.]

[Illustration: THE MINE-SWEEPERS PROVED WONDERFUL SEA BOATS

These tiny craft rode many a rough sea which worried larger and more
powerful ships.]

[Illustration: UNITED STATES NAVAL OFFICES IN IMPORTANT COMMANDS

Left to right: Admiral Sims, Admiral Mayo, Captain Nathan C. Twining,
Captain O. P. Jackson, Admiral Wilson.]

[Illustration: AMERICAN AND BRITISH NAVAL OFFICIALS

Left to right: Admiral Benson, Secretary Daniels, Sir Eric Geddes,
Admiral Duff.]

Dangerous as was the work, there were very few casualties. One man
fell overboard from the _Saranac_ and was drowned, but he was the only
man lost at sea, and there were but four other deaths in that force of
4,000. Laden with high explosives, navigating waters where enemy mines
had been laid, operating near mine fields, and in danger of premature
explosion from those they themselves had laid, it is remarkable that
not one of these ships was lost or seriously damaged.

The eighth excursion in which British and American squadrons joined,
both in command of Admiral Strauss, closed the western end of the
barrier, off the Orkneys. The next expedition was conducted in the
same manner, with Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, of the British Navy, in
command. The American squadron made fifteen excursions, the British
eleven, operations being completed October 26th. In four hours on one
expedition, 6,820 mines were planted, 5,520 by our vessels, 1,300 by
the British. Our squadron alone planted a field 73 miles long in one
day.

Seventy thousand, two hundred and sixty-three mines were laid--13,652
British, 56,611 American. Numerous lines were laid near the surface;
others were placed at from 90 to 160 feet; and the lowest went to
depths from 160 to 240 feet.

Beginning near the northern Orkneys, the barrier ran to Udsire Light,
near Bergen, on the coast of Norway, 230 miles. Its average width was
25 miles, in some places it was 35 miles across, and at no point was
it less than 15 miles wide. At its narrowest, this meant more than
an hour's run for a submarine. Mines were planted, row after row, at
various depths. If a U-boat proceeded on or near the surface, it would
encounter from six to ten lines of mines. If it tried to break through
by going deeper, there were more of the deadly explosives. Submergence
was, in fact, as dangerous as running the gauntlet on the surface. No
matter how far the sub went down there were mines to meet it, to the
furthest limit of submarine descent. One touch--even a slight jar from
the vibration of the U-boat--was enough to set off one of these mines,
and when it exploded the U-boat was done for.

Mine-laying was not the only role played by the American force, Captain
Belknap wrote:

  In addition to the value of the barrage itself, in keeping the
  enemy submarines in or from their bases, the mine squadrons were
  expected to serve as bait, to draw out the German fleet; the
  squadrons' role being neatly expressed by one high officer as
  "an important military offensive with a front seat at the Second
  Battle of Jutland." This ever present possibility and the fact
  that the working ground lay in the principal thoroughfare of enemy
  submarines, with attendant incidents of periscope sightings,
  submarine reports, depth charges, smoke screens, floating mines,
  and dead Germans floating by, lent spice to the work, which, like
  the proverbial sporting life, was often hard but never dull. * * *

  On every excursion, during the mine laying, one or more of the
  mines would go off fairly close astern--lest we forget! The mines
  were very sensitive, and no witness of an excursion could retain
  any doubt as to the fate of a submarine that "luckless dares our
  silent wake."

The eastern end of the barrage extended to the territorial waters of
Norway. That country being neutral we could not, of course, mine to its
shores. With the growth of the barrier, U-boats took advantage of this,
going within the three-mile limit to slip by into the open sea. The
Norwegian Government then announced its decision to mine its waters,
which closed that gap.

Our original plan was to plant mines clear to the Orkneys, and this we
urged. But Admiral Beatty and others strongly objected, fearing that
it might hamper the operations of the Grand Fleet. So the mine-fields
ended ten miles east of the islands. But this ten-mile passage was
heavily patroled, and any "sub" attempting to pass that way must run
the risk of attack by numerous naval vessels. Thus the U-boats could
not get through anywhere except at great risk. Months were required to
lay that barrier, and during that time there were unmined areas through
which vessels could pass.

The barrage was completed October 26th, almost coincident with
Germany's recall of its U-boats, which practically ended submarine
warfare. Some of those recalled did not reach these waters until the
armistice had been signed, hostilities were over, and they were immune
from attack. Some "ran" the barrage, and several met the fate of the
U-156, one of the undersea cruisers which operated off our own coasts.
Attempting to get through the barrier, she struck a mine and went down.
So far as known, only 21 of her crew were saved.

The Northern Barrage cost us approximately $80,000,000. Shipping sunk
by submarines averaged, for a long period, over $70,000,000 a month, at
times ran over $80,000,000, in actual monetary value, not counting the
resultant military effect of its loss. Admiral Sims estimates that the
war cost the Allies $100,000,000 a day. Thus, if the Northern Barrage
shortened the war one day, it more than repaid its cost.

Our mining projects were not confined to the North Sea. Plans had been
accepted and mines were in process of manufacture for a like barrage
across the Straits of Otranto, from Brindisi, the heel of Italy, to
Saseno Island. This would have effectually shut up German and Austrian
submarines in the Adriatic. We had also agreed to undertake to provide
and lay 26,800 mines for a barrage in the Aegean Sea from Euboea Island
to Cape Kanaptitza, except for the part resting on Turkish territorial
waters, which was to be established by Great Britain, since the United
States was not at war with Turkey. The armistice made these barrages
unnecessary.

But our mining operations were by no means concluded with the cessation
of hostilities. Clearing the seas was our next duty, for navigation
would not be safe until the many thousands of mines were removed.
This work was divided among the various nations. The United States
volunteered to remove all the mines we had laid.

Admiral Strauss, in charge of these operations, had his base at
Kirkwall, and his force comprised 34 mine-sweepers, 24 sub-chasers, two
tugs, two tenders and 20 British trawlers, which were also manned by U.
S. naval personnel:

  Repair Ships and Force Auxiliaries--_Black Hawk_ (flagship);
  _Panther_, _Seneca_, _Chesapeake_, _Aspenleaf_, _Crenella_, and the
  British vessels _Hickorol_, _Petronel_ and _Hopkiln_.

  Submarine Chasers--Numbers 37, 38, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 95, 110,
  164, 178, 181, 182, 206, 207, 208, 254, 256, 259, 272, 329, 354,
  and 356.

  Mine-Sweepers--_Auk_, _Avocet_, _Bobolink_, _Chewink_, _Cormorant_,
  _Curlew_, _Eider_, _Falcon_, _Finch_, _Flamingo_, _Grebe_, _Heron_,
  _Kingfisher_, _Lapwing_, _Lark_, _Mallard_, _Oriole_, _Osprey_,
  _Pelican_, _Penguin_, _Quail_, _Rail_, _Robin_, _Sanderling_,
  _Seagull_, _Swallow_, _Swan_, _Tanager_, _Teal_, _Thrush_,
  _Turkey_, _Whippoorwill_, _Widgeon_, _Woodcock_, _Patapsco_,
  _Patuxent_.

  Trawlers--_William Johnson_, _Richard Bulkeley_, _Thos.
  Blackhorne_, _Thomas Buckley_, _George Cochrane_, _John Collins_,
  _William Caldwell, eorge Clarice_, _William Darnold_, _Siam
  Duffey_, _John Graham_, _Thomas Laundry_, _William Ashton_, _George
  Burton_, _John Dunkin_, _Thomas Graham_, _Thomas Henrix_, _John
  Fitzgerald_, _John Clay_, _Pat Caharty_.

I had the pleasure of visiting our mine base in Scotland just before
the squadron sailed on its first expedition. Everything was ready
for operations. The spirit of officers and men was inspiring. Not
minimizing for a moment the difficulties they had to face, all were
eager to begin the task.

They were to set forth on April 28th, but the heaviest snowstorm of the
year was raging, causing 24 hours delay. The next morning the sweepers
and a division of sub-chasers got under way for the barrage, while the
_Black Hawk_ and other chasers proceeded to the new base at Kirkwall.
That excursion, which was experimental, was completed May 2nd.

Mines sometimes fouled in the "kites" which picked them up, and
exploded as the sweep was being hauled in. The _Patuxent_ was the
victim of an accident of this kind on May 12th. Severed by an
explosion, its sweep had to be hauled on board to be repaired. When
the kite came within sight, a mine was seen hanging by its towing
cable. The commanding officer sent all hands forward to a place of
safety, going aft himself to clear it, with the assistance of his chief
boatswain's mate. When the mine got within ten feet of the ship, it
exploded. Several men were blown overboard by the mass of flying water,
but all were rescued. The commanding officer had a narrow escape. Only
a few feet from the exploding mine, his thumb was cut off by a flying
fragment of steel, but luckily he escaped further injury.

Two days later, the same accident befell the _Bobolink_, killing its
commanding officer, Lieutenant Frank Bruce, and badly damaging the
ship. Seeking first the safety of his crew, Lieutenant Bruce went aft
to clear the mine. Before anything could be done, it exploded, killing
him and blowing the boatswain and three other men into the water.
All four were rescued, though the boatswain was unconscious from the
shock. The _Teal_ took her in tow and, accompanied by the _Swallow_ and
sub-chaser No. 45, towed her to Scapa Flow.

While clearing the largest mine-group in June the force found
impressive evidence of the success of the barrage. Crossing the lines
of mines, the _Heron_ and the _Sanderling_ were brought to a standstill
by an obstruction which fouled their sweeps. Oil rose to the surface,
and spread out astern, giving evidence of the wreck of a submarine
underneath. This was the locality in which the mine-laying squadron
had sighted the body of a German sailor floating in the water. From
the records of the Admiralty, it appeared that the obstruction was the
wreck of the German submarine UB-127.

Six mines exploded under and around the _Pelican_ one day in July.
Deluged by the mass of water thrown up by the explosion, the forward
part of the ship ruptured and flooded, the mine-sweeper was rapidly
sinking. Captain R. C. Bulmer, directing the operations, went at
once to her assistance. Placing his flagship, the _Auk_, alongside
the _Pelican_, he connected his wrecking hose with the forward
compartments, and set the pumps going to keep the damaged ship afloat.
The _Eider_ got on the other side, and did the same thing. The _Teal_
took the three ships in tow, and the four, lashed together, headed
slowly for port. The bow of the _Pelican_ was hardly above water, but
for several hours constant pumping held her up.

Then a heavy head sea arose, and the pump-lines were carried away.
Water rose in the _Pelican_, buckling the forward bulkhead, and the
vessel was liable to burst at any moment, going down in a flash. Every
man on her was in danger, and it was decided to leave aboard only a
few men to do necessary work. Twelve volunteers were called for. Every
member of her crew stepped forward. The dozen strongest were chosen and
the others, against their will, were ordered off the ship.

Fifty miles of open sea were still to be traversed. Darkness had
fallen. Crews of _Auk_ and _Eider_ struggled desperately to get the
lines repaired and pumps going. Men stood by with axes to cut the
mooring lines, in case the _Pelican_ should sink. All through the night
this struggle continued, and there was a sigh of relief when day dawned
with the vessel still afloat, and the ships reached the shelter of
Tresness Bay.

A curious accident befell the _Flamingo_. While weighing anchor,
steel touched copper and exploded a mine which her anchor had fouled,
damaging her rudder, bending her skeg, and dishing in her stern.

The most serious disaster encountered in all our mine sweeping occurred
on July 12th, the sinking of the _Richard Bulkeley_. Caught in its
kite, a mine was seen close to her stern, near the surface. To get it
further away the kite wire was being veered when the mine exploded. The
after part of the ship's hull was shattered. She sank in seven minutes.

Commander Frank R. King, who was in command of the division of trawlers
as well as the _Bulkeley_, went down with the vessel. When the blast
came, his first thought was the safety of his crew. Half stunned by the
explosion, one man, whose life-preserver had been blown off, struggled
to the deck. Commander King took off his own life-belt, buckled it
around the sailor, and helped him get clear of the ship before she took
her final plunge. Until the vessel disappeared he was still hunting
for members of the crew who might be left aboard. When last seen, as
the _Bulkeley_ went lower into the water, he was on the bridge. He
went down with his ship, a heroic figure, sacrificing his life to save
his men. It was a solemn privilege to me, a few months later, to pay
tribute to the memory of this gallant officer by naming one of our new
destroyers in his honor.

Altogether, two officers and nine men were killed during these
hazardous operations, and 23 ships were damaged. Regrettable as was
this loss of life, it was small in comparison with that of our comrades
in the British mine-sweeping service.

The mine field was removed, consisting of 50,000 mines, spread over an
area of some 6,000 square miles of the stormy North Sea, and the entire
barrage swept up by September 30th. On that day the hazard to shipping
by this vast enterprise in the North Sea was removed.

When the Mine Force returned to the United States, it was given
a welcome as genuine as that accorded our battleships when they
returned from service abroad. As the vessels steamed up North River,
November 24, 1919, they were reviewed by the Secretary of the Navy,
distinguished officers and citizens on Admiral Strauss' flagship, the
_Black Hawk_.

This marked the end of that enterprise which "shut up the hornets in
their nests"--that bold adventure which was the greatest new naval
offensive of the war.




CHAPTER XIII

PRESIDENT WILSON AS A STRATEGIST

  SPEAKING TO OFFICERS OF THE FLEET AT YORKTOWN, HE ADVOCATED NEW AND
  BOLD METHODS--"WHY NOT SHUT UP THE HORNETS IN THEIR NESTS?"--"LEAVE
  OUT OF YOUR VOCABULARY THE WORD 'PRUDENT'; DO THE THING THAT IS
  AUDACIOUS TO THE UTMOST POINT OF RISK AND DARING."


The world knows President Wilson as a scholar, teacher and historian;
as executive and statesman. But it does not know him, as we did, as a
master of military strategy.

His grasp of the whole situation, his clear conception of Army and
Navy policies and operations, his rare judgment were demonstrated in
important decisions, and his personal interest and influence had a
marked effect on the conduct of the war.

Always interested in the Navy, he kept up with all that was being done
and planned, and his suggestions and directions proved of the utmost
value to officers and officials.

"We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas," he said not long
after the beginning of the European war. In his address at St. Louis,
early in 1916, he declared that ours should be "the most adequate navy
in the world." At the next cabinet meeting a member expressed surprise
at the President's advocacy of so vigorous a naval policy, and asked if
he had been correctly quoted in the newspapers.

"Yes," replied the President, "and it is one thing I said in my swing
around the circle that I absolutely believe."

He strongly urged the big construction program presented several months
before, and exercised a potent influence in putting through Congress
the "three year program" which authorized building 157 naval vessels.

Long before we entered the war, when the Allied navies seemed impotent
before the onslaughts of the submarines, President Wilson pointed to
the vigorous policies which later proved so successful.

"Daniels, why don't the British convoy their merchant ships and thus
protect them from submarines?" he asked me early in the war. As
sinkings increased, he pointed out that their practice of sailing
ships separately had proved a failure, and asked, "Why now, with their
distressing experiences, do they hesitate about adopting the convoy
system?"

He could not comprehend why the British, as soon as Germany declared
war, had not mined the English Channel so that no submarine could pass
through it. As a matter of fact, strange as it seems, the channel from
Dover to Calais never was a complete barrier to submarines, though the
Dover Patrol did brilliant service, and the United States Navy insisted
that closing this channel was one of the first steps toward defeating
the U-boats.

"Why don't the British shut up the hornets in their nests?" he asked
me just before we entered the war, and after we were embarked upon it
he declared that we must insist upon some plan that would prevent the
egress of the U-boats from their bases. "When our Bureau of Ordnance
proposed, in April, 1917, the construction of a mine barrage across the
North Sea, he was deeply interested in the plan and heartily approved
it. That carried out the idea he believed the Allies should have put
into effect earlier in the war. As that plan was debated and delayed,
and characterized in London as "impracticable," he grew impatient
of the long delay in adopting this or some other vigorous offensive
against the submarines.

[Illustration: THE TRANSPORT WHICH CARRIED PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE
PEACE CONFERENCE

An aerial view of the George Washington. This ship carried to France
more soldiers than any other transport except the Leviathan.]

On July 4, 1917, he sent the following cablegram to London:

  "Strictly confidential." From the President for Admiral Sims.

  From the beginning of the war, I have been greatly surprised at the
  failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's great naval
  superiority in an effective way. In the presence of the present
  submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of panic. Every
  plan we suggest they reject for some reason of prudence. In my view
  this is not a time for prudence but for boldness, even at the cost
  of great losses.

  In most of your dispatches you have quite properly advised us of
  the sort of aid and coöperation desired from us by the Admiralty.
  The trouble is that their plans and methods do not seem to us
  efficacious. I would be very much obliged to you if you would
  report to me, confidentially, of course, exactly what the Admiralty
  has been doing, and what they have accomplished, and, added to the
  report, your own comments and suggestions, based upon independent
  thought of the whole situation, without regard to the judgment of
  any one on that side of the water.

  The Admiralty was very slow to adopt the protection of convoy
  and it is not now, I judge, protecting convoys on adequate scale
  within the danger zone, seeming to keep small craft with the Grand
  Fleet. The absence of craft for convoy is even more apparent on the
  French coast than on the English coast and in the Channel. I do
  not see how the necessary military supplies and supplies of food
  and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in any other way
  within the next few months than under adequate convoy. There will
  presently not be ships or tankers enough and our shipbuilding plans
  may not begin to yield important results in less than eighteen
  months.

  I believe that you will keep these instructions absolutely and
  entirely to yourself, and that you will give me such advice as you
  would give if you were handling the situation yourself, and if you
  were running a Navy of your own.

                                               WOODROW WILSON.

[Illustration: ALLIED NAVAL COUNCIL IN SESSION AT PARIS

Admiral Sims at the extreme left, Admiral Benson third from left
end. In the center Sir Eric Geddes (bareheaded), First Lord of the
Admiralty, and M. Legues, French Minister of Marine. At the left of M.
Legues is Admiral Beatty, and back of him, to his right, Admiral Long.]

Admiral Sims made an extended and detailed reply to this cablegram, but
it evidently did not satisfy the President, as was shown a month later,
in his address to the Fleet.

That visit to the Fleet, August 11, 1917, was a notable occasion. It
was the first time, I believe, that a President has, in the midst of
war, gone to the chief naval rendezvous and gathered the officers
about him for a heart-to-heart talk. Standing on the quarter deck of
the _Pennsylvania_, surrounded by admirals, captains, commanders and
other ranks, he could see all around him the dreadnaughts which are the
embodiment of national strength and naval power. In the background was
Yorktown, where Cornwallis' surrender marked the culminating victory of
the Revolution. And in this historic spot American forces were again
making history.

The President had slipped away so quietly from Washington that few knew
he was gone. Not only the speech he made, but the very fact of his
visit was long kept secret. But that address, informal and confidential
as it was, deserves a place in naval history.

Disclaiming any idea that he had come "with malice prepense to make
a speech," he told the officers that he had come to have a look at
them and say some things that might be best said intimately and in
confidence. "One of the deprivations which any man in authority
experiences," he exclaimed, "is that he cannot come into constant and
intimate touch with the men with whom he is associated and necessarily
associated in action." "The whole circumstance of the modern time," is
extraordinary, calling for extraordinary action, he pointed out and
said:

  Now, the point that is constantly in my mind, gentlemen, is this:
  This is an unprecedented war and, therefore, it is a war in one
  sense for amateurs. Nobody ever before conducted a war like this
  and therefore nobody can pretend to be a professional in a war
  like this. Here are two great navies, not to speak of the others
  associated with us, our own and the British, outnumbering by a
  very great margin the navy to which we are opposed and yet casting
  about for a way in which to use our superiority and our strength,
  because of the novelty of the instruments used, because of the
  unprecedented character of the war; because, as I said just now,
  nobody ever before fought a war like this, in the way that this
  is being fought at sea, or on land either, for that matter. The
  experienced soldier,--experienced in previous wars,--is a back
  number so far as his experience is concerned; not so far as his
  intelligence is concerned. His experience does not count, because
  he never fought a war as this is being fought, and therefore he
  is an amateur along with the rest of us. Now, somebody has got to
  think this war out. Somebody has got to think out the way not only
  to fight the submarine, but to do something different from what we
  are doing.

  We are hunting hornets all over the farm and letting the nest
  alone. None of us knows how to go to the nest and crush it, and
  yet I despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when I know
  where the nest is and know that the nest is breeding hornets as
  fast as I can find them. I am willing for my part, and I know you
  are willing, because I know the stuff you are made of--I am willing
  to sacrifice half the navy, Great Britain and we together have to
  crush that nest, because if we crush it, the war is won. I have
  come here to say that I do not care where it comes from, I do not
  care whether it comes from the youngest officer or the oldest, but
  I want the officers of this Navy to have the distinction of saying
  how this war is going to be won.

  The Secretary of the Navy and I have just been talking over plans
  for putting the planning machinery of the Navy at the disposal
  of the brains of the Navy and not stopping to ask what rank that
  brains has, because, as I have said before and want to repeat, so
  far as experience in this kind of war is concerned we are all of
  the same rank. I am not saying that I do not expect the admirals
  to tell us what to do, but I am saying that I want the youngest and
  most modest youngster in the service to tell us what we ought to do
  if he knows what it is. Now I am willing to make any sacrifice for
  that. I mean any sacrifice of time or anything else. I am ready to
  put myself at the disposal of any officer in the Navy who thinks he
  knows how to run this war. I will not undertake to tell you whether
  he does or not, because I know I cannot, but I will undertake to
  put him in communication with those who can find out whether his
  idea will work or not. I have the authority to do that and I will
  do it with the greatest pleasure. The idea that is in my mind all
  the time is that we are comrades in this thing."

"I wish that I could think and had the brains to think in the terms of
marine warfare," he remarked, "because I would feel then that I was
figuring out the future history of the political freedom of mankind."

"We have got to throw tradition to the winds," he exclaimed, and went
on to say:

  Now, as I have said, gentlemen, I take it for granted that nothing
  that I say here will be repeated and therefore I am going to
  say this: Every time we have suggested anything to the British
  Admiralty the reply has come back that virtually amounted to this,
  that it had never been done that way, and I felt like saying,
  "Well, nothing was ever done so systematically as nothing is being
  done now." Therefore, I should like to see something unusual
  happen, something that was never done before; and inasmuch as the
  things that are being done to you were never done before, don't you
  think it is worth while to try something that was never done before
  against those who are doing them to you? There is no other way to
  win, and the whole principle of this war is the kind of thing that
  ought to hearten and stimulate America.

  America has always boasted that she could find men to do anything.
  She is the prize amateur nation of the world. Germany is the prize
  professional nation of the world. Now, when it comes to doing new
  things and doing them well, I will back the amateur against the
  professional every time, because the professional does it out of
  the book and the amateur does it with his eyes open upon a new
  world and with a new set of circumstances. He knows so little about
  it that he is fool enough to try the right thing. The men that do
  not know the danger are the rashest men, and I have several times
  ventured to make this suggestion to the men about me in both arms
  of the service: Please leave out of your vocabulary altogether the
  word "prudent." Do not stop to think about what is prudent for a
  moment. Do the thing that is audacious to the utmost point of risk
  and daring, because that is exactly the thing that the other side
  does not understand, and you will win by the audacity of method
  when you cannot win by circumspection and prudence.

  I think that there are willing ears to hear this in the American
  Navy and the American Army, because that is the kind of folks we
  are. We get tired of the old ways and covet the new ones.

  So, gentlemen, besides coming down here to give you my personal
  greeting and to say how absolutely I rely on you and believe in
  you, I have come down here to say also that I depend on you, depend
  on you for brains as well as training and courage and discipline.
  You are doing your job admirably, the job that you have been
  taught to do; now let us do something that we were never taught
  to do and do it just as well as we are doing the older and more
  habitual things, and do not let anybody ever put one thought of
  discouragement into your minds. I do not know what is the matter
  with the newspapers of the United States. I suppose they have to
  vary the tune from time to time just to relieve their minds, but
  every now and then a wave of the most absurd discouragement and
  pessimism goes through the country and we hear nothing except of
  the unusual advantages and equipment and sagacity and preparation
  and all the other wonderful things of the German Army and Navy.
  My comment is always the very familiar comment, "Rats!" They are
  working under infinite disadvantages. They not only have no more
  brains than we have, but they have a different and less serviceable
  kind of brains than we have, if we will use the brains we have got.
  I am not discouraged for a moment, particularly because we have not
  even begun and, without saying anything in disparagement of those
  with whom we are associated in the war, I do expect things to begin
  when we begin. If they do not, American history will have changed
  its course; the American Army and Navy will have changed their
  character. There will have to come a new tradition into a service
  which does not do new and audacious and successful things.

A short time after the President made this declaration on his flagship,
Admiral Mayo was dispatched to Europe, where he pressed upon the
British Admiralty the necessity of constructing the North Sea barrage.
Finally in October, six months after the plan had been presented, this
great project, in line with President Wilson's idea of bold and new
things in naval warfare, was undertaken.

From many quarters tips came to the President of possible surprise
action and not a few orders to Naval Intelligence to send out secret
service men to run down a clue were the result of suggestions emanating
from the President. Sometimes, unannounced and unheralded, during the
war, he would drop in at the Navy Department, and quite as often at the
War Department, and he never came merely to visit, agreeable as social
intercourse would have been. He had an idea every time, a practical
suggestion, or a desire to be informed of progress in some particular
undertaking which he was following with deep interest.

Sometimes when he dropped in unexpectedly to make a suggestion--(he
had a habit of calling directions "suggestions" when speaking to a
Cabinet member)--I sometimes wondered if he was not as much influenced
in making his personal calls to give encouragement and support, and the
helpful personal touch, as to discuss strategy or tactics or policy.
Certainly these visits heartened and strengthened those of us who in
trying times were charged with heavy responsibility. He knew, too, what
was going on. He often surprised me by his knowledge of the comparative
qualities of men he had never seen--how accurate was his appraisement,
how his questioning of them showed the military leadership which few
people thought the college professor possessed. He never left my
office, and I never left the White House, after a conference during the
war, without the reflection that the world had lost a great military
leader when it gained a great educator and executive.

When we were transporting soldiers through the infested zones he was
anxious, intensely interested, and read every cablegram concerning the
troop-ships. When he did not come in person, in crucial days, there
would come from the White House frequent memoranda written by himself
on his little typewriter, asking for some information or making an
illuminating suggestion, signed " W. W." Those " W. W." notes never
had a spare word, and they showed the same clearness and vision which
John Hay tells us Lincoln had when he would go over to see Stanton, or
Gideon Welles in the dark days of Civil War.

There is a feeling among many military men that civilians "butt in"
when they give their views on strategy. It is notorious how some of the
generals in the War between the States resented the suggestions of Mr.
Lincoln, suggestions which as a rule displayed sounder judgment of the
way to win battles than the military experts had shown.

I recall one admiral during the war, who, upon receiving, through the
diplomatic representatives of our Government, President Wilson's
strong opinion that a certain important offensive should be adopted,
asked: "What does the President want to butt in for? What does he know
about it?" As to that particular matter the President, from long study
and reflection, found that it was necessary to "butt in," because some
naval leaders of more than one nation lacked the vision to do the bold
and the new thing to win.

President Wilson took no perfunctory interest in the Navy. In fact,
he had the keenest naval instinct. People, you know, are born with
a passion for some one thing, or in their youth it comes to them.
When Thomas Woodrow Wilson was a boy--(he had not then dropped the
Thomas)--he picked out for himself a naval career. What a jolly good
captain he would have made of the "_Virginia_" or the "_New Jersey_!"
Living as a boy on a river, he loved boating next to books, or even
before books. He had a penchant for sailing and loved sea stories, and
his ambition was to follow Jones and Farragut.

When the opportunity was within reach to go to the Naval Academy at
Annapolis, his father, a scholarly Presbyterian preacher of the old
school, who knew his son's real mission in life better than Thomas
Woodrow, said, in substance, "No; you are not meant for the sea;
letters, literature, books, statesmanship for you." I do not know
whether the future President accepted the parental dictum with the
nautically cheerful "Aye, aye, sir," but he accepted it, and the Navy
lost an officer who would probably have destroyed many precedents and
won many victories, when the father snatched him from the topsail and
sent him down below to the drudgery of learning languages and political
economy.

I do not know a civilian who employs more naval terms. The call to
the sea is in his blood. His father kept him out of the Navy, but he
could not keep the Navy out of him, or the Navy lore and lingo, any
more than you can keep the Quaker out of a Quaker by turning him out
of meeting. At sea President Wilson loved to wear whites or blues,
as near regulation as a civilian can, to don a cap, to watch the
heaving of the lead and the weighing of the anchor, and listen to the
"shiver-my-timbers" talk that one overhears from the older sailors on
duty.




CHAPTER XIV

COMRADES OF THE MIST

  U. S. BATTLESHIPS WITH BRITISH GRAND FLEET--DREADNAUGHTS
  UNDER RODMAN FORMED SIXTH BATTLE SQUADRON--ASSIGNED POST OF
  HONOR--ATTACKED SIX TIMES BY SUBMARINES--U-BOAT RAMMED THE "NEW
  YORK," CAUGHT IN ITS PROPELLER-- THREE BATTLESHIPS, UNDER RODGERS,
  AT BANTRY BAY--SURRENDER OF GERMAN FLEET.


There was a thrill through all the Grand Fleet, a storm of cheers
sweeping from Admiral Beatty's flagship down to the last destroyer that
December morning when the United States dreadnaughts, under Admiral
Hugh Rodman, steamed around the headlands, up the curved channel, and
down the long line of British battleships, dropping anchor among them.

Twelve days at sea, weathering a gale that raged for three days, they
had had a hard voyage. Nearing the coast in the pitch-black darkness of
a starless night, they had, a few hours before, been met by a division
of destroyers which escorted them to port. The sun, which rises late
in that northern clime, broke through the mist as they reached the
entrance to the harbor. Seaplanes circled the vessels, and a kite
balloon's heliograph flashed its welcome.

The _New York_ led the way, Admiral Rodman and his staff on the bridge,
while Admiral Beatty, commander-in-chief, surrounded by his crew, stood
on the deck of the _Queen Elizabeth_. On all the ships the officers and
crews, manning the rails, stood at attention.

The "Star Spangled Banner" came rolling from the British bands, and
the American bands played "God Save the King." This was according to
custom, but it was a real surprise to our sailors when there came from
the British vessels an outburst of cheers that ran clear down the
line. That seemed like home to our boys, and they replied with Yankee
yells until Scapa resounded with such a roar of sound as it never heard
before.

"This is the most enthusiastic welcome an American squadron ever
received anywhere," Admiral Rodman remarked. As soon as the ships
anchored, Admiral Rodman made his official call on Admiral Beatty, on
the _Queen Elizabeth_. As they exchanged greetings, Admiral Rodman said:

"We are here, and we put ourselves entirely at your command. We ask
no favors or privileges. We only want to be one of you. In a sense we
feel that we are no longer merely the American Navy. We are now rather
an integral part of your fleet for the purpose of unified prosecution
of our great common aim. We have not come merely to take part in
the spectacular side of your work. We want to do our fair share of
everything, duties pleasant and unpleasant alike. We do not come to be
your guests but to be co-workers. We do not want to be entertained; we
want to work." That was characteristic of Rodman, who was selected to
command our greatest ships overseas because of his outstanding ability
as a great officer.

"Today marks an epoch in the history of England and America," said
Admiral Beatty, expressing the pleasure with which he had looked
forward to the coming.

There was sealed the firm friendship of those "Comrades of the Mist,"
the British and American dreadnaughts in that Grand Fleet, which formed
the greatest aggregation of naval power the world ever saw, and whose
very existence kept the German High Seas Fleet contained in its home
ports, never again to venture out until it slunk to Scapa Flow in
surrender.

The American dreadnaughts which served with the Grand Fleet were the
_New York_ (flagship), Captain C. F. Hughes, afterwards commanded by
Captain E. L. Beach; the _Texas_, Captain Victor Blue; the _Wyoming_,
Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the _Arkansas_,
Captain W. H. G. Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; the
_Florida_, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor;
and the _Delaware_, Captain A. H. Scales.

"It is a matter of pride," said Admiral Rodman, "that we were at once
able to coördinate and coöperate with the British intelligently,
without the slightest hesitancy, friction or misunderstanding. We
adopted and could use their signals, radio, secret codes and other
communication--and that is one of the hardest problems we have in the
Navy--and could efficiently execute their tactics and maneuvers and
conform to their war plans. This was put to the test when within three
days after our arrival a signal was made for all ships to be ready to
proceed to sea for active service and we reported ready when the time
came.

"From that day to the end of the war we took part in every major
operation in the North Sea, and some independent smaller ones. There
was never a time but that we were ready when called upon. We could
always steam full speed, maintain our position, and we received nothing
but the highest praise not only from the British admirals, officers and
men, but from those of our own navy who visited us.

"Let me truthfully add, without taking the slightest credit to myself
as the commanding officer, but giving it to the officers and men, where
it belongs, and to the years of preparedness in the American Navy,
that, put it as modestly as I can, the American Squadron was fully
equal to any of the Grand Fleet."

Our ships were, in fact, in such a high state of efficiency that the
British Admiralty made specific inquiries as to our methods with a view
to adopting them for their own ships.

Soon after joining the Grand Fleet, the American dreadnaughts were
designated as the Sixth Battle Squadron, and assigned to one of the two
places of honor and importance in the battle line--one of the two "fast
wings" which would take station at the head or rear of the battleship
force when going into action. On one occasion, when the Grand Fleet
came within a few miles of the German fleet, the American division was
in the van, and would have led the action, but the Germans, as usual,
took refuge behind their defenses before the British and Americans
could run them down and force an engagement.

Describing the activities of the Grand Fleet and of our battleships,
Admiral Rodman said:

  It was our policy to go after the enemy every time he showed his
  nose outside of his ports; no matter when or where, whether in
  single ships, by divisions, or his whole fleet, out we went, day
  or night, rain or shine (and there was mighty little daylight and
  much less shine in the winter months), blow high, or blow low, and
  chase him back in his hole. So persistent was this performance
  on our part, so sure were we to get after him, that, toward the
  end he rarely ventured more than a few miles from his base; and
  immediately we would start after him, back he would go in his hole,
  and haul his hole in after him.

  Every inducement was offered him to come out. Inferior forces
  were sent down into the Heligoland Bight to induce him to attack;
  valuable convoys were dispatched, apparently without protection,
  and other devices to tempt him out; but he would not come. It is
  needless to add that such expeditions, on every occasion, were well
  guarded, and we were ready to pounce on him with unseen forces
  had he attempted to take advantage of the seeming small force or
  unprotected vessels.

  In our operations in the North Sea we were frequently attacked
  by submarines, and our battleships had numerous narrow escapes,
  often only by prompt and skilful handling. On one occasion a
  submarine rammed the flagship _New York_, dented the bottom, and
  demolished the starboard propeller. But there is every reason to
  believe that the blows from the propeller sank the submarine. En
  route to drydock to make repairs and install a new propeller,
  three torpedoes in rapid succession were fired at her by hostile
  submarines. But again she avoided them by clever maneuvering and
  escaped. Once when guarding or supporting a convoy of thirty or
  forty vessels, on the coast of Norway, in mid-winter, a bunch
  of hostile "subs" fired six torpedoes at us. Again only our
  vigilance and instantaneous maneuvering saved us, but by a very
  narrow margin. There were still other attacks by submarines which
  necessitated quick action to avoid them.

Our dreadnaughts were attacked six times by submarines. On February
8, 1918, the _Florida_ and _Delaware_ were off the Norwegian coast,
waiting for a return convoy, when a submarine was sighted. The U-boat
promptly attacked, firing a salvo of torpedoes. Four were aimed at
the _Florida_, two at the _Delaware_. Quick action was required to
avoid the deadly cylinders. Both vessels turned instantly, swerving so
rapidly that the torpedoes swept harmlessly past, neither vessel being
hit. Destroyers dashed at the enemy, dropping numerous depth-bombs, but
the U-boat, which had submerged instantly, apparently left the scene
undamaged.

The _Texas_ had an encounter with a submarine on April 27th. At 12:47
p. m. in latitude 56°-56´ north, longitude 0°-40´ west, a periscope
was sighted. The _Texas_ at once brought her guns to bear, firing at
the moving feather. The "sub" submerged, leaving only its tell-tale
wake. Two destroyers which were nearby went to the scene and dropped
depth-bombs in the vicinity where the U-boat went down, but it had
disappeared.

The _New York_, _Texas_, _Delaware_, _Florida_ and _Wyoming_ were twice
attacked on June 30th. The division was steaming in line abreast, in
open order, when a periscope was reported by the _Wyoming_, and was
also seen by the destroyer _Parker_. The _Delaware_, _Florida_ and
_Wyoming_ opened fire, their shells falling around the spot where the
"scope" was sighted. The "sub" had immediately submerged, and the
destroyers _Salmon_, _Parker_, and _Radstock_ dashed down the wake,
dropping depth-bombs. The battleships moving on, leaving the _Radstock_
to search the vicinity. An hour later, in latitude 58°-44´ north,
longitude 2°-34´ east, the second attack occurred, the _Delaware_
opening fire on a submarine reported astern. The escorting destroyers
did not see the periscope, but three of them scouted down the lines and
dropped ten depth-bombs.

At 9 p. m., on July 28th, while cruising in latitude 57°-55´ north,
longitude 0°-05´ east, the _Arkansas_ sighted a periscope. Opening
fire with her port sky gun, she went to emergency full speed using her
rudder to bring the object fired at ahead. At this moment the wake of a
torpedo running toward the ship was sighted. Swinging to the left, the
torpedo was avoided, and the battleship escaped unscathed.

The occasion to which Admiral Rodman referred, when his flagship was
rammed by a submarine, occurred when the _New York_ was leading the
division into Pentland Firth. While turning with right rudder, her
stern swinging to port, a heavy under-water blow was felt on her
starboard quarter, followed immediately by another, which damaged
the ship's starboard propeller, breaking off two of its blades. The
water was deep, the channel clear of obstructions. No ordinary force
could have delivered a blow powerful enough to smash propeller blades
and dent the big ship's bottom. After weighing all the evidence, and
examining the vessel's hull when she was docked, the court of inquiry
verified the conclusion of Admiral Rodman, that the _New York_ had
struck a submarine. While there were various theories, the one which
seemed most tenable was that, in attempting to dive under the vessel,
to get in position to attack, the U-boat had struck the _New York's_
propellers and been smashed as the battleship turned.

The _New York_ was attacked again on October 16th, at Rosyth, while
en route from a northern base. At one o'clock in the morning, three
torpedoes were fired, all passing ahead of her. Owing to a damaged
propeller, the ship was making only twelve knots. Ordinarily, she would
have been going at the rate of sixteen knots or more. The submarine
apparently misjudged her speed, aiming its torpedoes too far ahead. A
submarine was sighted and reported by a patrol in the vicinity, and it
is believed this was the same one which attacked the _New York_.

There was joy among the Americans on April 24, 1918, when they sailed
with the Grand Fleet "for active service against the enemy." A large
German force was reported operating in the North Sea, probably planning
to attack the Norwegian convoys. Hoping for action, the British and
American vessels found the Germans had turned back to their home bases.
They had missed the enemy by only four hours. A British flagship
had been attacked by a submarine, two torpedoes being fired at her.
Destroyers had dropped quantities of depth-charges. Some floating mines
had been destroyed by gunfire. But they had missed the big game they
were seeking.

It was not until the evening of October 12th that any considerable
German force was reported. Three large enemy men-of-war were said to
have been sighted, steering northwest in the direction of a convoy
off the Scotch coast. The American dreadnaughts, a battle-cruiser
squadron and light cruisers, screened by destroyers, sailed soon after
midnight. They were directed to take position to the north and west of
the Orkneys, and to patrol the passage between the Orkney and Shetland
islands, in the hope of intercepting the Germans. But the German ships
must have again turned back, for, though that whole region was scouted,
there was no sign of an enemy vessel. This was only another of the many
disappointments in the constant effort to engage the German capital
ships.

In that rigorous climate, a latitude as far north as Alaska or
Petrograd, snow and ice are continuous through most of the year. Cold
and sleet and heavy seas made navigation arduous and dangerous.
There was continuous cruising in close formation, without lights, at
high speeds, on winter nights when the darkness lasted for eighteen
hours. The mine-fields, our own as well as those of the enemy, were an
ever-present danger, and battleships had to be always on the alert to
repel attacks by submarines.

The whole fleet had to be ready to put to sea on almost instant
notice. Officers and men had hardly any liberty or leave. No one was
allowed away from the ships after dark, nor for a period longer than
four hours, and then only in the immediate vicinity of the ship, in
signal or telephone communication, subject to recall. All ships were
completely closed and darkened from sunset to sunrise, as a precaution
against air and other attacks. In winter this meant from fifteen to
eighteen hours per day.

Some idea of the immense size of the Grand Fleet may be gained from
the statement that, entering or leaving port, the column of ships,
excluding destroyers, averaged 65 miles long. On one occasion, it was
76 miles.

Hard duty as it was for the officers in that wintry clime, it was even
harder for the enlisted men. Yet our boys bore it with the cheerfulness
that distinguishes the American sailor, who, when hardship comes,
"bears it with a grin,"--not only bears it, but laughs about it. For
a year, every officer and man in the Grand Fleet had been waiting and
hoping for a chance to get at the Germans. And, at last, when that
fleet surrendered without striking a blow, their disappointment was too
deep for words.

That scene has been graphically described, the feeling of officers and
men so well expressed by Admiral Rodman, that I give in his own words
his account of the German surrender:

  After four years of war for the Grand Fleet, and after we have
  been a part of it for the last year, there came the debacle, the
  last scene of the great drama. Not as we had all expected, as the
  successful termination of a great sea battle, but as an ignominious
  surrender without firing a gun. Surely, no more complete victory
  was ever won, nor a more disgraceful and humiliating end could have
  come to a powerful and much vaunted fleet than that which came to
  the German High Seas Fleet. Let me try to describe it.

  The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet demanded and received
  what actually amounted to an unconditional surrender of the whole
  German Navy. Under his orders the enemy's ships were disarmed,
  ammunition landed, torpedo warheads sent ashore, breech-blocks
  and fire-control instruments removed, and every offensive utility
  rendered innocuous. Then, with reduced crews, under the command
  of a German admiral, in one lone column, the heavy battleships
  leading, the Hun fleet sailed for a designated rendezvous, to
  arrive at a specified time, just outside of the Firth of Forth in
  Scotland, where the Grand Fleet lay at anchor.

  Before daylight the Grand Fleet was under way and proceeded to sea,
  heading east, in two long columns, six miles apart, our American
  battleship force being in the middle of the northern line. A light
  British cruiser was directed to meet the Germans, who were heading
  west, and conduct them in between our two columns.

  Let me diverge for a moment and recall to any one who has been in
  China or the Philippines the viciousness of and antipathy which
  the domesticated carabao has for a white man. How ready they are
  to attack, while any native child can, with perfect safety and
  impunity, go up to the most savage of them, take him by the nose,
  and lead him where he pleases. I was reminded of this when a little
  British cruiser rounded to ahead of the much-vaunted German High
  Seas Fleet, and hoisted the signal, "Follow me," and led them down
  between our columns, where our battle flags were mast-headed,
  turrets trained toward the enemy, crews at battle stations, and all
  in readiness for any act of treachery that might be attempted.

  At a pre-arranged signal our forces swung symmetrically through 180
  degrees, and, still paralleling the enveloped Germans, conducted
  them into a designated anchorage in the entrance of the Firth
  of Forth. Then came a signal from the Commander-in-Chief to the
  surrendered fleet: "At sundown lower your colors and do not hoist
  them again without permission." Surely no greater humiliation could
  have befallen them after their frequent and taunting boasts and
  threats.

  There is little else to be told. After an inspection by British and
  American officers to gain assurance that the ships were disarmed,
  they were sent in groups, under guard, to Scapa Flow, in the
  cold, dreary, bleak, God-forsaken harbor in the Orkneys where the
  Grand Fleet had spent many a dreary month and year, waiting like
  ferocious dogs in leash, watching and waiting, to pounce on the
  German Fleet, should the opportunity ever occur. Here the Germans
  lay at anchor in long, symmetrical lines, helpless, innocuous,
  harmless; their sting and bite removed, their national colors
  lowered for good and all as a token of submission to the masters.
  They were corralled like wild and cruel beasts that had been
  hobbled, guarded by a single division of battleships.

  Our mission had been successfully accomplished; the German fleet
  is a thing of the past; the seas are safe and free to our own and
  our Allies' ships. The value of sea power could have no better
  demonstration.

The British and Americans who served together at Scapa Flow and in the
North Sea were bound together by the strongest ties. Admiral Rodman and
all our officers and men felt they were serving with brothers, and our
British allies felt the same way toward our own forces.

On their departure, Admiral Sir David Beatty, the British
commander-in-chief, in an address on board the flagship _New York_,
paid this high tribute to the officers and men of the American
battleships which served with the Grand Fleet:

  There is not much that I have to say, but what I do say I hope you
  will understand comes from the heart, not only my heart, but the
  hearts of your comrades of the Grand Fleet.

  I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains,
  officers, and the ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for
  the wonderful coöperation and the loyalty you have given to me and
  to my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every
  duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that
  of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very
  great deal. As somebody said the other day, "The fighting is now
  over, the talking is now going to begin;" therefore, I do not want
  to keep you here any longer, but I want to congratulate you for
  having been present upon a day which is unsurpassed in the naval
  annals of the world.

  I know quite well that you, as well as all of your British
  comrades, were bitterly disappointed at not being able to give
  effect to that efficiency that you have so well maintained. It
  was a most disappointing day. It was a pitiful day to see those
  great ships coming in like sheep being herded by dogs to their
  fold, without an effort on anybody's part; but it was a day that
  everybody could be proud of. I have received messages from several
  people, offering sympathy to the Grand Fleet, and my answer was
  that we do not want sympathy; we want recognition of the fact that
  the prestige of the Grand Fleet stood so high it was sufficient to
  cause the enemy to surrender without striking a blow.

  I had always certain misgivings, and when the Sixth Battle Squadron
  became a part of the Grand Fleet those misgivings were doubly
  strengthened, and I knew then that they would throw up their hands.
  Apparently the Sixth Battle Squadron was the straw that broke the
  camel's back. However, the disappointment that the Grand Fleet
  was not able to strike their blow for the freedom of the world is
  counteracted by the fact that it was their prestige alone that
  brought about this achievement.

  I thank you again and again, for the great part the Sixth Battle
  Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in
  history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: "Come
  back soon. Good-bye and good luck!"

Suppose German battle-cruisers should evade the vigilance of Allied
capital ships and escape from the North Sea and suddenly attack troop
carrying transports! That suggestion phrased in some such terms was
the thought uppermost in the mind of every naval official when troops
began to go over in 1918 by the hundreds of thousands each month.
They recalled the damage inflicted by German raiders in the early
days of the war. To be ready for such daring incursion a division of
dreadnaughts was sent over, supplemented by submarines. They were kept
in readiness to put to sea, and also at times escorted convoys in the
Channel when submarines were reported in that vicinity. This division
was commanded by Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers, and was composed of the
_Utah_ (Captain F. B. Bassett); the _Nevada_ (Captain W. C. Cole); and
the _Oklahoma_ (Captain C. B. McVay). They had their base on Bantry
Bay, Ireland, ready to oppose any German cruisers which might threaten
shipping in the waters to the south of Ireland and England or on the
routes to the ports of Northern France.

Though the German press, sorely disappointed at the failure of U-boats
to sink transports, demanded that raiders dare every risk and sink
troop-ships, they never ventured away from the protection of home
ports. But the dreadnaughts of Admiral Rodgers kept eyes open and steam
up ready, if they should make the attempt. Like Rodman's squadron, they
did faithful work and deserve to share the commendation accorded to
American dreadnaughts engaged overseas.

Three-fourths of our first line dreadnaughts saw service in European
waters. All the rest, first and second line, would have been taken over
by Admiral Mayo if their presence had been required.

[Illustration: FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON JOINING THE BRITISH GRAND FLEET

Led by Admiral Rodman's flagship, the U. S. S. New York, the American
ships steamed into Scapa Flow amid an outburst of cheers from their
British comrades. Inset: Admiral Hugh Rodman.]

[Illustration:

                                From the painting by Bernard F. Gribble

                SURRENDER OF THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET

Admirals Rodman and Sims, on the deck of the New York, watching the
procession of German ships on their last voyage, to their anchorage in
the Firth of Forth. Then came the signal from the Commander-in-Chief:
"At sundown lower your colors and do not hoist them again without
permission."]




CHAPTER XV

"CINDERELLAS OF THE FLEET"

  SUBMARINE CHASERS BORE BRILLIANT PART IN ATTACK ON DURAZZO--SANK
  ONE SUBMARINE, DAMAGED ANOTHER, AND "THOROUGHLY ENJOYED
  THEMSELVES"--QUEER CODES FOOLED THE GERMANS--OVER FOUR HUNDRED
  "CHASERS" BUILT--STAUNCH LITTLE WOODEN CRAFT DID WONDERFULLY GOOD
  WORK IN EUROPE AND AMERICA.


Cinderella was not the guest first invited, but when she arrived she
became the belle of the ball. The little submarine chasers, originally
designed to protect entrance to harbors, to patrol coasts and keep
close to shore, won fame and admiration by their splendid service
in Europe and America. These "Cinderellas of the Fleet" became eyes
and ears of the anti-submarine forces, hunters rightly feared by
the U-boats, whose commanders had at first looked upon them with
ill-concealed contempt.

Sub-chasers were particularly valuable as "listeners," the submarine
detection devices with which they were equipped being vastly superior
to those previously in use. Organized in "hunting units"--three to
the unit, the commander in the center, with a "wing boat" on either
side--they were real "chasers" of submarines.

  I am most grateful for the valuable service rendered by twelve
  submarine chasers under Captain Nelson, U. S. N., and Lieutenant
  Commander Bastedo, U. S. N., which I took the liberty of employing
  in an operation against Durazzo on October 2. They screened heavy
  ships during the bombardment under enemy fire; also apparently
  destroyed definitely one submarine which torpedoed _H. M. S.
  Weymouth_, and damaged and probably destroyed another submarine.

  During the return voyage they assisted in screening _H. M.
  S. Weymouth_, and in escorting enemy hospital ship which was
  being brought in for examination. Their conduct throughout was
  beyond praise. They all returned safely without casualties. They
  thoroughly enjoyed themselves.

That was the message sent by the British Force Commander regarding the
attack on the Austrian naval base by British, Italian and American
vessels October 2, 1918. And the Italians expressed their appreciation
in this dispatch from Rome:

  Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appreciation of
  useful and efficient work performed by United States chasers in
  protecting major naval vessels during action against Durazzo; also
  vivid admiration of their brilliant and clever operations which
  resulted in sinking two enemy submarines.

The exploits of our submarine chasers formed a notable feature of that
brilliant and successful attack. When, on Saturday, September 28, the
British commodore asked Captain Charles P. Nelson, in command at Corfu,
if he could have twelve chasers, with four days' supplies, ready to
leave in twenty-four hours, for "special service," Nelson's reply was
one word: "Yes."

Sailing Sunday evening, the next morning they reached Brindisi, where
the Allied forces were assembled for the attack, and received their
instructions. It was 1:30 a. m., on October 2nd, that the four units,
under command of Captain Nelson, got under way for the expedition. The
chasers and their commanders were:

  Unit B--Lieutenant Commander Paul H. Bastedo, commanding on S. C.
  215, Lieutenant (junior grade) Wildon A. Ott; S. C. 128, Ensign
  Hilary R. Chambers, Jr.; S. C. 129, Ensign Maclear Jacoby.

  Unit D--S. C. 225, Lieutenant (junior grade) Elmer J. McCluen; S.
  C. 327, Ensign Walter P. Grossmann.

  Unit G--In command, Captain Nelson, on board S. C. 95; S. C. 95,
  Ensign George J. Leovy; S. C. 179, Ensign Erskine Hazard; S. C.
  338, Ensign John M. Beverly.

  Unit H--S. C. 130, Ensign Henry R. Dann; S. C. 324, Lieutenant
  (junior grade) Clifford W. Eshom; S. C. 337, Ensign Andrew J.
  Kelley.

At 8:40 they arrived off Durazzo, and stood by six miles from shore to
await the arrival of the bombarding force. Its smoke could be seen on
the horizon, and as the Italian vessels hove in sight, the sub-chasers
moved to their stations.

Moving along on the flanks of the bombing squadrons, the chasers acted
as a screen for the larger vessels, which poured out a rain of shells
upon the Austrian defenses. Guarding the British Light-Cruiser Force,
the three boats of Unit B had to run in close to shore, only 800 yards
from the enemy batteries. They had a lively experience for fifteen or
twenty minutes, shells falling around them. But, going at full speed
and "zigzagging to beat the band," as the sailors say, they managed to
escape unscathed.

Suddenly came the cry, "Submarine!" Sub-chaser 129 had sighted the
moving feather of a U-boat about 1,600 yards off her port quarter.
Signaling to S. C. 215, S. C. 129 altered her course to the left to
deliver an attack at right angles. The U-boat was heading south,
apparently getting in position to attack the bombarding forces. In a
moment a second feather was sighted a little farther to westward. As S.
C. 129 reached the supposed path of the undersea boat, a depth-bomb was
dropped. When it exploded, the enemy submerged for almost a minute, and
then reappeared, showing both periscopes. S. C. 129 immediately began
laying a pattern of depth-charges ahead of the U-boat and at right
angles to his course.

When the seventh bomb exploded, in the water thrown up objects
resembling pieces of metal appeared, and there was another explosion,
seemingly in the submarine. The chaser crew was confident that
submarine was destroyed.

Sub-chaser 215, sighting another periscope 750 yards away, opened fire
with her three-inch gun and port machine-gun, hoisting signal to form
for attack. The second three-inch shot dropped within two feet of
the periscope, the commanding officer reported, and shattered it, a
column of water six feet high rising into the air. The U-boat seemed
to be turning sharply to starboard in the direction of the British
light cruisers, which were then entering their bombarding sector. S.
C. 215 and S. C. 128 closed in on the submarine and laid a pattern of
depth-charges. As the fourth charge exploded, the executive officer of
S. C. 215 sang out, "That got him!" He had seen what appeared to be a
ship's plate and debris rise to the surface and then disappear. Heavy
oil rose, covering the water in the vicinity, and the chaser crews
concluded the U-boat had been sunk.

S. C. 215 and S. C. 128 then turned and headed for S. C. 129, which had
first reported sighting a "sub," but which was lying to, repairing her
engines. The unit stood over to capture the Austrian hospital ship,
hoisting the international flag, "Stop instantly!" The British cruisers
_Nereide_ and _Ruby_ were, at the time, astern of the Austrian vessel,
and the _Nereide_ signaled that she would stop and take off the armed
guard crew if the chasers wished to take over the hospital ship. The
chasers, which were north of the Austrian port, replied that they would
take her over when clear of Durazzo.

The little American craft took charge of the big Austrian vessel, the
British cruisers _Tribune_ and _Shark_, signaling, "Go to Brindisi."
Reaching Brindisi, they released the hospital ship, which had been
taken to port for investigation. Then, with a sense of duty well done,
the chasers dropped anchor in the harbor, and "called it a day."

While Unit B enjoyed the most exciting experience, all the other units
were busy doing their full share of the work, escorting the bombing
vessels and playing their part in the bombardment. When the British
cruiser _Weymouth_ was torpedoed, Units D, C, and H went to her
assistance, and aided in warding off further attack. Though damaged,
the cruiser was safely navigated to port. The boats of Unit D got close
enough to fire at the houses on Cape Laghi.

The attack on Durazzo was a decided success. The city was practically
put out of business as a naval base, and was of little further use to
the Austrians who, defeated on land and sea, soon sued for peace.

The United States naval base at Corfu, where thirty-six of our
sub-chasers were stationed, was established May 24, 1918, by Captain
R. H. Leigh, Commander of Submarine Chasers for Distant Service. The
primary duty of our forces there was to patrol the Straits of Otranto,
the entrance to the Adriatic. That narrow stretch of water, forty miles
wide, from Corfu to the "heel" of Italy, was the only route by which
Austrian and German vessels from Trieste, Fiume, Pola, and Durazzo
could make their way into the Mediterranean.

There was established the Otranto Mobile Barrage, which, though
comprising mines and nets, depended mainly for its effectiveness on
patrol vessels. There were three lines of these, at some distance
apart, two of British vessels, destroyers and trawlers, and the
third, ten miles below, of our submarine chasers, twelve of which
patrolled this line day and night. While this barrage was by no means
"air-tight," and occasionally U-boats slipped through, it proved very
useful and after its establishment there was a material decrease
in submarine activity in that whole region. After the armistice an
Austrian officer said that six U-boats were lost in that area.

Four hundred and forty sub-chasers were built, 340 manned by the United
States Navy, and 100 by the French. They operated in the Atlantic,
Pacific and Arctic Oceans, in the North Sea, in the Adriatic, the
Ionian and Aegean Seas, and the Sea of Marmora. After the armistice,
special duties carried them to Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, to
Austria, Dalmatia, Greece, and Turkey, and parts of Asia Minor.

"How are you going to get them across the Atlantic?" foreign naval
attachés asked, when we were turning out chasers by scores. That was
a problem, sending small boats over 3,000 miles of ocean in wintry
weather. Pluck, daring, endurance and good navigation were required,
but the problem was solved with surprising success.

Crossing the Atlantic and going through the Mediterranean to the
Adriatic under their own power, they weathered storms that distressed
many a big steamship. But these little 110-footers had some thrilling
experiences. Disabled in a terrific gale Sub-chaser 28, manned by the
French, seemed doomed. The other chasers pulled through, but this one
was missing, and after days was given up as lost. A month later we were
surprised and delighted when the news came that it had reached the
Azores. How did that little boat, disabled and alone, manage to make
its way 700 miles to port?

It was a thrilling story Alexis Puluhen and his men had to tell.
Storm tossed, their engines broke down and the boat began leaking.
Salvoes were fired and distress signals hoisted, but no relief came.
Lubricating oil was exhausted, and all the salad oil and butter aboard
were used in an effort to start up the engines. All motive power gone,
table-cloths, sheets, bed-spreads and blankets were rigged up as sails.
Rationing the crew to the smallest amount of food that could sustain
them, doling out the drinking water, the little boat headed east. With
a favoring breeze, she could sail about four knots an hour.

For a month the sub-chaser kept plodding along, laying its course for
the Azores. Occasionally a steamer would be sighted far away--four in
all were seen--but only one came close enough to see or hear the S. C.
28, and when seven guns, the distress signal, were fired, that vessel
ran away. At last, after a struggle of thirty-three days, Puluhen
sighted land. It was Fayal, one of the Azores. He hoisted the signal
"YP"--"I need a tug"--and not long afterward a tug steamed out, and
towed him into Horta. The sub-chaser was repaired, continued across
the Atlantic, and took its place with the other American-built chasers
which served on the French coast.

Three days at sea and three days in port, many chasers steamed an
average of a thousand miles a month. "You people on yachts and cruisers
don't know what it is to live in a sub-chaser," one seaman remarked.
"Tossed about on ocean swells, swept by seas, with decks leaking and
things below wet; gas fumes from the engines filling the interior,
sometimes half the crew were seasick. The destroyers, I know, were no
pleasure palaces, and they had no easy time, but none of you had a
harder job than we fellows on the 110-footers." But they took things as
they came, with unfailing cheerfulness and good humor.

Some of the sub-chaser squadrons developed codes of their own and got
a lot of fun out of them. "Quack! Quack! Quack!" was one sub-chaser
signal. The first time that queer call was heard over the wireless
telephone in European waters it mystified our English friends quite
as much as it did the Germans. And when the call was answered by an
outbreak of strange words and phrases, listeners at the radio phones in
all that area were plainly puzzled.

"Quack! Red-white-blue," they could understand, though what it
might mean they could not conceive. But when it came to "Quack!
High-low-jack," the thing was beyond all reason.

This was something new, probably a German trick. The British naval
officers were concerned about it, and were decidedly relieved when they
found it was no enemy concoction but came from the American sub-chasers
which had lately arrived from across the Atlantic. They wanted to
know what kind of a "quack" game the Americans were playing. And they
were vastly amused when told that it was a new code they had devised
that could be easily remembered by officers and men, but could not be
deciphered by the Germans.

The commander of one group named his boats in jingles or phrases. Three
boats, as I have stated, constituted a submarine hunting unit. One set
he designated as "red-white-blue," another as "corn-meal-mush," and
a third as "high-low-jack." "Quack! Quack! Quack!" meant "operate at
once."

The men were fond of making parodies on "Mother Goose" and other
familiar rhymes, applicable to their job of hunting the U-boats. One of
these, paraphrasing "The Spider and the Fly," went this way:

    "Won't you come into my area?" said the chaser to the "sub";
    "I'll treat you just as kindly as I would a tiger cub;
    "I will listen to your motors, I will catch you without fail,
    "And then I promise I will put some salt upon your tail."

What do you suppose the Germans thought of all this queer stuff that
was coming over the radiophone? I should have liked to have seen the
U-boat captains under water, and code experts in Berlin searching the
books and racking their brains to find out its meaning, for no boats or
calls or orders were ever phrased in such language before.

The sub-chasers put the Navy flag signals into words instead of
letters. "Able-Boy!" was the code to "Take hunt formation; distance 500
yards." They had a word for every letter in the alphabet: Able, boy,
cast, dog, easy, fox, George, have, item, jig, king, love, Mike, Nan,
oboe, pup, quack, rot, sail, tare, unit, vice, watch, X-ray, yoke, zed.

Almost any necessary order or information could be transmitted by
radiophone by means of this code. Here is a typical instance of how it
worked when a submarine was heard:

  Listener of Boat No. 1 reports: "Submarine, 90 degrees."

  Executive officer; "Submarine, 123 degrees."

  Executive reports: "2 (number of wing-boat) turbine 112 degrees."

  Executive reports: "3 (number of other wing-boat) submarine 130
  degrees."

  Captain orders: "Course 123 degrees."

  Executive to Radio: "Fox-unit; dog-easy-cast!"

  Executive to Listener: "Up tube."

At the order "Up tube," the listening tube was raised from its position
beneath the vessel; the signal-boy beside the mast hoisted the cone,
the position of which showed the other boats what the engine of this
sub-chaser was doing; the steersman put the wheel over, and the vessel
headed for the estimated locality of the U-boat. All this was done in a
moment or two.

If the submarine was not located, the captain ordered "Stop!" the
executive called, "Down tube!" The tube, which extends through the
bottom of the chaser, was lowered, and the listener strove again to
hear any sound of the U-boat.

When the success of our detection devices had been demonstrated, it
was decided that sub-chasers were well adapted to this duty, and were
to be used mainly for this purpose. On May 12, 1918, six arrived at
Portsmouth, England, and with the destroyer _Aylwin_ began training
tests with British submarines, south of the Isle of Wight. Eighteen
chasers soon after reached Plymouth, and this under command of Captain
Lyman A. Cotten was made the chief base, having eventually a force
of 66 vessels. On August 20th, 30 of these chasers were ordered to
Queenstown, where a base had been established under command of Captain
A. J. Hepburn.

The Plymouth sub-chasers were in an area of considerable submarine
activity, and reported a number of contacts. The S. C. 84, 85 and 86,
Ensigns E. F. Williams, A. B. Baker and Gr. H. Lane, respectively,
were credited with attacking and damaging a U-boat on July 10th. Nine
chasers, Units 6, 2, and 10, were on hunt off the English coast on
September 6th, when the listeners heard a submarine. Unit 2 attacked,
dropped depth-charges, but its flagship was damaged by an explosion,
and Unit 6 took up the pursuit. Located again, the U-boat went down,
and the chasers bombarded her with depth-charges. Her machinery was
evidently badly damaged. Listeners could hear the crew at work on the
motors which would at times turn a few revolutions; but at last they
stopped dead. The U-boat was unable to move. The chasers dropped over
the spot all the depth-bombs they had, and at 6:15 two boats were sent
to Penzance to get a fresh supply.

[Illustration: AMERICAN SUB-CHASERS AT CORFU, GREECE

Eleven of these boats took part in the attack on Durazzo, the Austrian
naval base in the Adriatic.]

[Illustration: A FLOCK OF SUB-CHASERS WITH THEIR MOTHER SHIP

The _U. S. S. Melville_ with sub-chasers at Queenstown.]

A water buoy, with 50-fathom wire cable, was dropped near the spot,
lanterns were hung on it; and the chasers got into position for
the night. At times the listeners reported that the U-boat crew made
attempts to start their motors. The next morning a few faint sounds
were heard, and at last there came a noise of firing as if from
revolvers or rifles, first three, then 22 shots. After this, nothing
was heard, though the chasers remained on the scene all afternoon. They
had been there thirty hours from the time the attack began. The chaser
crews firmly believed that the U-boat's crew perished in their steel
tomb, which sank to the bottom, never to rise again.

The best evidence of the good work done by our vessels at Plymouth is
the fact, shown by official records, that from June 30th to the end
of August, during which time our sub-chasers were covering the area
between Start Point and Lizard Head, not a single Allied or merchant
ship was attacked nor were any mines laid by the U-boats. This was
in a section where some months before sinkings were of almost daily
occurrence. After August, when many of our boats were withdrawn for
duty farther to the westward, several ships were attacked and sunk, and
mine-laying, though on a small scale, was resumed. This is regarded as
conclusive proof that it was our little sub-chasers which made that
area safe for Allied shipping in that important period.

While at Gibraltar, on their way to Corfu, the thirty chasers under
command of Captain Nelson engaged in several hunts, on May 17, 1918,
locating and chasing a U-boat to a point 12 miles northeast of
Gibraltar. On June 13th, four of them formed patrol line to guard the
commercial anchorage against a submarine which had been sighted.

Eighteen sub-chasers were sent to the Mediterranean to patrol the
Gibraltar Barrage, and though they were on that duty only from Nov.
6th to 11th, Admiral Niblack reported that they made four contacts and
three attacks, and that one was particularly well conducted and it was
"highly probable submarine was damaged, and possibly destroyed."

This group closed its war service with two exciting experiences.
On November 10th the S. C. 126, 190 and 353, while on patrol, were
mistaken for enemy submarines and were fired upon by the steamship
_Bahia_. The next day, about the time the armistice went into effect,
a British vessel, without waiting for recognition signals, fired on
the S. C. 214. Luckily the shells missed and the sturdy little boats
escaped unscathed.

The organization of our sub-chaser service in European waters was:

  At U. S. Naval Headquarters. London--Captain R. H. Leigh, Commander
  Sub-chasers, Distant Service; Lieutenant Commander W. R. Carter,
  detection devices; Lieutenant Commander E. C. Raguet, communication
  officer; Lieutenant Commander R. M. Griffin, sub-chasers; C. F.
  Scott, technical expert, devices; E. L. Nelson, technical expert,
  radio.

  Sub-chaser Detachment 1, Plymouth--Captain L. A. Cotten,
  commanding; _Hannibal_, repair ship; _Parker_, _Aylwin_,
  destroyers; 36 to 66 sub-chasers.

  Submarine Detachment 2, Corfu--Captain C. P. Nelson, commanding;
  _Hannibal_, repair ship; 36 sub-chasers.

  Submarine Detachment 3, Queenstown--Captain A. J. Hepburn,
  commanding; 30 sub-chasers.

These were the principal bases, though our chasers also did valuable
work from Brest, Gibraltar and other points and at the Azores.

Twenty-four sub-chasers assisted in sweeping up the mines of the North
Sea Barrage from April to the end of September, 1919, and four were
damaged by exploding mines.

The sub-chasers played an important part in operations against the
German U-boats off the American coast in the summer of 1918. Scores of
them were on patrol along the Atlantic, and speeded to the vicinity
whenever a submarine was reported. Immediately after the U-151 appeared
off the New Jersey Coast, June 2, a special hunting group was formed
of 33 sub-chasers, headed by the destroyers _Jouett_, _Henley_ and
_Perkins_, and later another group, headed by the _Patterson_, was
organized. These hunters kept on the move, pursuing the "subs" for
months, from the Virginia Capes to Nova Scotia.

Many were kept busy escorting coastwise convoys, and patrolling
the coast. One group is reported to have escorted from port, with
other naval ships, vessels bearing 400,000 troops. Many chasers were
almost constantly at sea. The Hampton Roads Squadron, in command of
Lieutenant Herbert L. Stone, averaged 75 per cent of the time on duty.
Sub-chasers, under Lieutenant Le Sauvage, in the vicinity of Fire
Island, when the _San Diego_ was lost, were on duty 28 days out of 30.

Patrolling and listening was dangerous work, for the little boats
lying in the shipping lines, with all vessels running without lights,
might be run down or mistaken for enemy craft. This was the fate of
S. C. 209. Shelled and sunk off Fire Island by the steamship _Felix
Taussig_, two of her officers, Lieutenant Henry J. Bowes and Ensign E.
H. Randolph, and fourteen enlisted men lost their lives.

Keeping open the shipping lines from Mexican and Gulf oil fields was
an important duty; it was considered probable that the U-boats would
extend their operations to Mexican waters. Consequently we organized
a special hunting squadron of 12 sub-chasers, headed by the _U. S.
S. Salem_ (Captain S. V. Graham), as a part of the American Patrol
Detachment commanded by Rear Admiral Anderson, which patrolled the
waters of the Gulf and Caribbean.

Twelve sub-chasers served in the Panama Canal Zone, eight being
stationed at the Atlantic entrance, and four at the Pacific entrance to
the Canal, which it was their mission to protect.

Six chasers were assigned to duty in Nova Scotia, three based on
Halifax, and three on Sydney, Cape Breton. Arriving in May, 1918, they
were engaged in patrol, convoy and guard duty, and conducted a number
of submarine hunts when the U-boats were active in that region. Two
were sent with the _Explorer_ to Alaska, for protection against alien
enemies and disturbing elements which threatened the fish pack and
other industries of that region. Sub-chaser 310, to which was assigned
the section between the Canadian boundary and Petersburg, visited 112
canneries and other points, covering 6,079 miles. The S. C. 309, which
patrolled the remainder of southeast Alaska, visited 132 points and
covered 8,500 miles.

Perhaps the most remarkable voyage of these small craft was made by
the group built at Puget Sound Navy Yard, near Seattle. These chasers,
under command of a reserve officer, Lieutenant Roscoe Howard, all
manned by reservists, who were trained at the station while the boats
were building, were brought down the Pacific Coast, through the Panama
Canal and up to New London, and from there several of them sailed
for Europe, reaching the Azores, arriving just as hostilities ended.
Sailing from Bremerton May 6, 1918, this group was joined by others at
San Diego, Magdalena Bay and Pinchilinque until there were fifteen in
the party. August 4th, at 8 p. m., they arrived at New London, where
officers and men began their training in listening and anti-submarine
tactics. They had successfully negotiated a voyage of 7,470 miles;
escorted 2,985 miles, unescorted 4,485. Three of the Pacific coast
boats were in the convoy of 10 American and 19 French chasers which
left New London, October 24th, for Europe, Captain H. G. Sparrow,
in the cruiser _Chicago_, commanding the convoy. They proceeded via
Bermuda, and were only a day off the Azores when the news came that the
war was over.

After the armistice, sub-chasers were sent on various missions, to
Austria, Turkey, Norway, Sweden, Holland and Denmark. They served from
Northern Russia to the Black Sea.

When the work abroad was ended and the homeward bound pennant was
flying over these glory-bedecked Cinderellas, the spirit of contest and
mastery of the sea did not permit them to be towed back to the United
States or to come quietly and deliberately under their own power.
Eternal youth and love of victory was in their blood, and ships which
had won world applause at Durazzo decided upon a race from the Bermudas.

Six which had rendered conspicuous service--the S. C. 90, 129, 131,
217, 224 and 351--were selected for the contest. Starting at 4:21 p.
m., August 16th, their progress was followed with general interest,
being reported by the _Ontario_, their escort, and bulletined all over
the country.

The race was won by S. C. 131 (Lieutenant Joseph L. Day), which arrived
at Ambrose Channel lightship at 1:17 a. m., August 19, 1919. Her
running time was 56 hours, 56 minutes--8 hours and 43 minutes less than
that made by the _Dream_, which had set the fastest pace in 1914. Four
of the others also beat the best previous record.

The sub-chasers, after long and wearing service in the war zone, had
excelled the speedy light pleasure craft.

It was a race of thoroughbreds, and when the winner tied up at the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, there was the same absence of self exploitation
that had signaled the services of the Cinderellas from the first
day they began writing glowing pages of new achievement against new
enemies.




CHAPTER XVI

"DO NOT SURRENDER"--"NEVER!"

  SHIP SHELLED, MEN WOUNDED, NAVY GUNNERS ON "J. L. LUCKENBACH"
  FOUGHT SUBMARINE FOUR HOURS--ARMED GUARDS SAILING WAR ZONE BEFORE
  WAR WAS DECLARED--HAD 227 ENCOUNTERS WITH SUBMARINES--FIRST IN
  SERVICE, THEY WERE FIRST IN SACRIFICE--"HAND IT TO 'EM, JOE!"


Navy gunners, manning Navy guns on American merchant ships, were
sailing the war zone before the United States declared war. First
to get into action, these armed guards had more than two hundred
encounters with submarines, many of them long-fought gunfire battles.
First in service, they were first in sacrifice.

The night President Wilson delivered his war message to Congress, when
I returned from the Capitol to my office in the Navy Department, I was
greeted by this dispatch from the American Ambassador to France:

                                                        Paris, April 2.
  Secretary of State,
  Washington.

  Urgent: Foreign Office has just informed me that the American
  steamer _Aztec_ was torpedoed at nine p. m. last night far out at
  sea off Island of Ushant; that one boat from the steamer has been
  found with nineteen survivors who were landed this afternoon at
  Brest. Twenty-eight persons are still missing and although two
  patrol vessels are searching for them, the stormy condition of
  sea and weather renders their rescue doubtful. Foreign Office not
  informed of names of survivors. Will cable further details as soon
  as obtainable.

                                                        SHARP.

A later dispatch stated that only eleven were missing and that
Lieutenant William F. Gresham and the boys from the _Dolphin_ were
safe. This possessed a personal interest for me, for the _Dolphin_ was
the vessel assigned to the Secretary of the Navy, and had furnished
this first crew for an armed ship. The news that night was reassuring,
but we were saddened to learn, next day, that one of our seamen had
gone down--John I. Eopolucci, of Washington, the first man of the
American armed forces to lose his life in service against Germany.

The first officer lost was Lieutenant Clarence C. Thomas, of Grass
Valley, California, commander of the armed guard on the _Vacuum_, who,
with four of his men, perished after the sinking of that steamer on
April 28th.

The _Mongolia_ was first to report a "hit" against a submarine, April
19th, Lieutenant Bruce Ware stating that a shell from his guns struck
the U-boat's conning-tower, knocking off part of the shell-plating, a
cloud of smoke covering the spot where the "sub" disappeared.

Not long afterward a cablegram was received from Paris announcing that
an American armed vessel had sunk a submarine in the Mediterranean. The
ship was the _Silver Shell_, and the encounter, which occurred off the
Balearic Islands, was thus reported by Chief Turret Captain William J.
Clark:

  May 30, at 5:35 p. m., a submarine was sighted off starboard beam,
  flying no flag or marks of identification. Manned and loaded both
  guns. Hoisted colors and waited about 10 minutes. Fired after-gun
  with sights set at 4,000 yards, scale 49, and fired purposely short
  to see what the submarine would do, as she was closing in on the
  _Silver Shell_. At the same instant of our flash, the submarine
  fired a shot, the shell dropping 100 yards short amidships. The
  ship was swung to port to bring the submarine astern.

  Twenty-five rounds were fired at the submarine, the last two of
  which appeared to be hits. As the last shot landed the submarine's
  bow raised up and went down suddenly. The crew of the submarine,
  who were on deck, did not have time to get inside, so it is
  believed there is not much doubt about her being hit. The submarine
  fired in all 32 rounds, the last four of which were shrapnel and
  exploded overhead.

The master of the _Silver Shell_, John Charlton, was convinced that the
submarine was destroyed, and in his report said: "One shot struck the
submarine flush, hitting the ammunition on the deck. There was a flash
of flame, and within a minute she had disappeared." Captain John R.
Edie, U. S. N. (retired), the naval representative who investigated the
matter and heard all the evidence, made a report, dated Toulon, June 3,
in which he said: "There is no doubt in my mind but that the submarine
was sunk."

The combats of the _Campana_, _Luckenbach_, _Nyanza_, _Chincha_,
_Borinquen_, _Norlina_, _Moreni_ and a score of others are among the
thrilling incidents of the war. These armed guards of 16 to 32 men,
usually under command of a chief petty officer, served on practically
every American merchant vessel that plied the war zone, and made a
record for bravery and efficiency which would be difficult to excel.

One of the longest fights on record was that of the _J. L. Luckenbach_,
which began at 7:30 o'clock, the morning of October 19, 1917, and
continued four hours. The submarine, which was disguised as a steamer,
opened fire at long range. The _Luckenbach_ instantly replied with
both her guns. Closing in to 2,000 yards, the U-boat, which was of
large type, with heavy ordnance, began to pour forth a rain of shells.
One shot exploded on the deck, partially destroying the gun-crew's
quarters, bursting the fire-main, and setting afire that part of the
ship. Another shot landed near the stern, putting the after-gun out of
commission.

Pieces of shell were falling all around the deck. Two shots landed on
the port side forward, striking the oilers' room and blowing a large
hole in the ship's side. One struck on the port side at the water-line,
hitting the fresh-water tank, the water supply pouring out. Another
burst in the petty officers' mess-room, wounding two men. One shot
passed through the weather screen on the bridge, and exploded in the
cargo. Pieces of shell hit V. Louther, of the armed guard, wounding him
in three places. While carrying ammunition forward, a sailor was hit
and severely injured, and a gunner was blinded by fumes. Then a shell
exploded in the engine-room, wounding the first and third engineers,
and putting the engine out of business.

Struck a dozen times, with exploding shells overhead sending down
a hail of steel, nine men wounded and its engine disabled, the
_Luckenbach_ fought on. Its armed guard was under command of J. B.
Trautner, chief master-at-arms.

Distress signals had been sent out soon after the firing began, hours
before, and had been answered by the _Nicholson_, 82 miles away. The
destroyer was hurrying to the steamer's assistance at high speed; but
it hardly seemed possible for her to arrive in time. There was a
constant exchange of messages between steamship and destroyer:

  "S. O. S.--_J. L. Luckenbach_ being gunned by submarine."

  "We are coming," signaled the _Nicholson_.

  "Our steam is cut off. How soon can you get here?"

  "Stick to it; will be with you in three hours."

  "Shell burst in engine-room. Engineer crippled."

  "Fire in our forehold. They are now shooting at our antennae."

  "How far are you away?" asked the _Luckenbach_. "Code books thrown
  overboard. How soon will you arrive?"

  "In two hours," answered the _Nicholson_.

  "Too late," replied the _Luckenbach_. "Look out for boats. They are
  shelling us."

  "Do not surrender!" radioed the _Nicholson_.

  "Never!" answered the _Luckenbach_.

It was after eleven o'clock when smoke was seen and the ship headed
towards the destroyer to lessen the distance. Then that shell
exploded in the engine-room, and put the engine out of business.
As the _Nicholson_ approached, her guns were loaded and pointed,
the torpedo-tubes made ready, and the crew prepared for action. The
watch-officer in the foretop reported that he could see the ship, smoke
coming out of her hull and shells splashing around her.

Then he sighted the U-boat far away, but almost dead ahead. "Train
and fire!" ordered the captain. "Boom!" went the gun. The U-boat
risked another shell or two at the steamer. But when the destroyer's
third shot landed close by, the "sub" quickly submerged, and hurried
away. The U-boat had fired 225 rounds, the _Luckenbach_ 202. When the
destroyer reached the scene, the enemy was gone, hidden under water,
leaving hardly a trace.

The _Nicholson_ sent her surgeon and senior watch-officer to the
damaged steamer. They dressed the wounds of the injured nine. Two armed
guardsmen were found lying under a gun, seriously hurt. The third, hit
in three places by shell fragments, was walking around the deck, his
cap cocked over his ear, proud as a game rooster. Not stopping after he
was first hit, he was carrying ammunition to the gun when he was struck
again in the shoulder. As he laid his projectile on the deck, another
fragment of flying shell hit him. Then he really got mad. Shaking his
fist toward the "sub," he shouted, "No damned German's going to hit me
three times and get away with it." Grabbing his shell off the deck, he
slammed it into the breech, and yelled to the gun-pointer, "Hand it to
'em, Joe!"

The ship's engineer had two ribs smashed, a piece of shrapnel in his
neck, and part of his foot shot away. He was lying down, "cussing" the
Germans. "Put me on my feet, men," he asked, and two oilers set him
up. For ten minutes more he poured out a steady stream of denunciation
of the "blankety-blank" U-boats. After he had expressed, in all the
languages he could command, his full and free opinion of the whole
German nation, he went to work, repaired the engine, got up steam and
the _Luckenbach_ began to move.

Some of the men were so seriously wounded that the _Nicholson's_ doctor
was left on the steamer to care for them. Soon afterward he found he
was the senior naval officer aboard, and all looked to him for orders.
He was a doctor, not a navigator. The ship was bound for Havre, going
alone through the submarine-infested zone. Running without lights in
a locality where vessels were numerous was a risky business, which
increased in danger as they neared the coast. The skipper was not sure
of his course. He had never made a port in France before, and knew
nothing of the tides. The mates were equally uncertain.

The doctor trusted to them until three o 'clock in the morning, when he
found the ship had run aground. Then he took a hand in navigation. The
captain and the mate were examining a chart on deck and wondering how
they had missed the shore light. Studying the charts, the doctor told
them they should have been twenty miles further east, and said, "Now,
I'll take charge."

Fortunately, it was low tide when the ship went on the beach, and when
the flood-tide came at daylight, the vessel, using her engines, was
backed off. By eleven o'clock they had reached the entrance to Havre.

Seeing her coming, with the marks of battle upon her, the people
crowded down to the water-front. They cheered the Navy gun-crew, the
sailors, and there were tears for the wounded and cheers for the doctor
as he came down the gang-plank with them.

Attacked by a submarine off the Spanish coast, a shell exploded in the
gasoline tank of the _Moreni_ and set the ship afire. Chief Boatswain's
Mate Andrew Copassaki and his gun-crew had begun firing as soon as
the "sub" was sighted, but the _Moreni_ was slow and the U-boat had a
decided advantage. Raining shells upon the ship, the enemy shot away
her steering gear, and the vessel, beyond control, began steaming
around in a circle, but the naval gunners kept shooting away.

Two men were wounded; one lifeboat upset as it struck the water and
two of the merchant crew were drowned. But the armed guard kept up the
fight until the entire ship was in flames. During the contest, which
lasted over two hours, the _Moreni_ fired 150 shots, the submarine 200.
The ship was hit 45 times. When the Spanish steamship _Valbanera_ came
up to rescue the survivors, both the Spaniards and the Germans aboard
the submarine cheered the _Moreni's_ naval gun-crew for the brave fight
they had made.

After his return to this country, I had the pleasure of congratulating
Copassaki, who came to my office. Tall and bronzed, with a sweeping
black moustache, he was a stalwart figure, modest as he was brave.

"That must have been a thrilling experience you had," I remarked as I
thanked him. "It must have been terrific for those men at the guns,
with the flames mounting around them." "It was pretty hot," modestly
replied Copassaki, who seemed to think that about covered the subject.

The first Americans taken prisoner by the Germans were Chief Gunner's
Mate James Delaney, four members of the armed guard and the master of
the _Campana_, which was sunk about 150 miles from the French coast on
August 6, 1917. But they were captured only after a running fight of
more than four hours, during which the _Campana_ fired 170 shots and
the U-boat twice as many. After three hours' firing, the _Campana's_
captain wanted to stop and abandon ship to avoid casualties, as
the vessel was clearly outranged by the more powerful guns of the
submarine, but Delaney protested, and kept up the fight for an hour and
ten minutes longer, firing until his ammunition was exhausted.

The submarine, the U-61, headed for the lifeboats, keeping its 6-inch
gun and revolvers pointed at the survivors. They took aboard Delaney
and four of his gunners, and Captain Oliver, the ship's master.

Believing Delaney was a lieutenant, the U-boat officers grilled him
for hours with questions, but could get nothing out of him. The German
captain congratulated him, and told him that he had put up the longest
fight any merchantman had ever made against a submarine. The U-boat had
not only shot away most of its shells, but had fired two torpedoes at
the _Campana_, and its captain told Delaney he would have to carry him
and some of his gunners to Germany, as otherwise they could hardly make
their authorities believe they had had to expend so much ammunition to
"get" a single ship.

That evening about six o 'clock, the U-61 encountered a decoy ship.
Coming up on what appeared to be an unarmed vessel, they fired three
shots, and one of the Germans sitting near Delaney remarked, "One more
ship." But she was not the easy prey they thought she was, and the
U-boat had to make a quick dive to escape. "All the sailors rushed down
through the hatch, the submarine seemed to stand on her bow end, and
everything capsized as she submerged," Delaney said. "We went down 62
meters. Everybody was scared, and they said our Allies were trying to
drown us."

After seven days' cruising the U-boat arrived at Heligoland, where
Delaney and his men were landed, and then sent to Wilhelmshaven.
After four days in barracks, they were taken to the prison camp at
Brandenburg, where there were 10,000 prisoners, British, French and
Italian. Conditions in the camp, which was built around a small lake
which served as a sewage dump, were almost intolerable, and many
prisoners died. When Delaney protested against the guards stealing
parcels sent to prisoners, he was hauled up and "strafed" by the
officers. He defied them and a sergeant drew his sword, and threatened
to run it through the American sailor. But the others held him back.
The six Americans had many trying experiences, and were not released
until after the armistice; yet all survived and, leaving Germany
December 8, 1918, returned safely home.

Dodging a torpedo, which missed her by only ten feet, facing a storm of
shells and shrapnel, the _Nyanza_ fought until the U-boat keeled over,
and went down. This engagement occurred thirty miles west of Penmarch,
France, on a Sunday morning, January 13, 1918. At 9:30 a periscope,
silver plated, was sighted 1,000 yards away, and at the same instant a
torpedo was seen, heading for the vessel. The helm was put hard aport,
and the ship swung clear in time to avoid the torpedo.

The naval gunners opened fire. Falling astern, the submarine came to
the surface and gave chase, zigzagging and firing both her guns, using
shrapnel. Chief Gunner's Mate Benjamin H. Groves, in reporting the
encounter, said:

  At first her shots fell short, but eventually he got our range and
  hit us five times. One shot passed through the after-gun platform,
  through the wood shelter house, through the iron deck, breaking
  a deck beam, exploding in the hold, and passing out through the
  side of the ship. One shot exploded in the armed guard's mess
  room, wrecking the place completely. Two shots exploded in a steam
  locomotive on deck, doing some damage. One shot hit the stern of
  the ship, but did not go through.

  About 11:15 the submarine had our range good again. The ship
  zigzagged a little, which caused his shots to fall a little to
  the right or left of our ship. At the same time, I had his range
  and fired four shells quick at 7,800 yards, causing him to come
  broadside to and keel over, then suddenly disappeared just as he
  had our own range good. This leads me to think he did not quit from
  choice, but from necessity.

  The engagement lasted two hours and 30 minutes. I fired 92 rounds,
  and the submarine fired approximately 200.

Admiral Wilson highly commended the _Nyanza's_ master, her second
officer and the armed guard, while Admiral Sims wrote: "The _Nyanza_
was undoubtedly saved by the prompt work of the ship's personnel and by
the efficient work of the guns' crew."

The _Navajo_ had a lively encounter with a submarine in the English
Channel July 4, 1917, and the court at Havre, which investigated the
matter, reported to the French Ministry of Marine that "the fight
was very well conducted," the men showing "a very fine spirit, doing
honor to the American Navy," and "the conclusion may be drawn that the
submarine was hit and probably sunk." Describing the engagement, Chief
Boatswain's Mate H. L. Ham reported:

  On July 4, at 9:20 a. m., heavy gunfire was heard to starboard and
  shortly afterward the _Navajo_ ran out of the mist and sighted a
  submarine firing on a British topsail schooner about two miles
  away. The _Navajo_ changed her course, the fog shut down again and
  the "sub" was lost sight of. This was about 55 miles northwest of
  Cape La Hague, France.

  About 2:55 p. m. the same day the fog lifted and two shots were
  heard from a point 1,500 yards distant. Upon observation a
  submarine was seen firing with both guns at the _Navajo_. The first
  shot dropped 50 yards short on the starboard beam; the second one
  went over the ship. The _Navajo_ was swung, bringing the submarine
  about three points on the starboard quarter, and opened fire with
  her after-gun.

  The submarine fired about 40 shots during the engagement, which
  lasted 40 minutes, one of which hit the _Navajo_ underneath the
  port counter. This shell exploded before hitting the ship and
  displaced some of the plates, causing the _Navajo_ to leak.

  The _Navajo_ in return fired 27 shots, the last two of which were
  hits. The twenty-seventh shot struck the submarine just forward of
  the conning tower where the ammunition hoist was located, causing
  an explosion on board the submarine which was plainly heard on the
  _Navajo_. The men who were on deck at the guns and had not jumped
  overboard ran aft. The submarine then canted forward at almost 40
  degrees and the propeller could be seen lashing the air. Nobody was
  seen coming up through the conning tower and jumping into the sea,
  nor were any survivors seen.

The armed guard commander concluded: "It is my opinion that the
submarine was sunk."

The men of the _Borinquen_ were also convinced that they sank a U-boat
which they encountered in latitude 56°-32' north, longitude 10°-46'
west, June 4, 1917. Chief Gunner's Mate T. J. Beerman reported:

  Submarine was laying to when first sighted. We think she was
  receiving news from her headquarters. After-gun could not bear on
  her then and while the trainer was training gun around to bear,
  loader fired pistol to wake up men in the shelter house, at the
  same time hoisting our colors. Pointer turned on lights and dropped
  sights from 500 yards to 100 yards. As soon as after-gun could bear
  she opened fire. I did not see the first shot, but petty officer
  said it went just over top of submarine's conning tower. I saw the
  second shot hit, exploding and carrying away the conning tower. She
  was about three points abaft the port beam.

  The ship putting stern to submarine, the third shot was fired about
  astern. I saw it hit and explode. After second shot the submarine
  seemed to be stopped and lay in trough of sea at the mercy of the
  gun. The last seen of her she was going down on swell, listed to
  port, with her bow sticking in air and her stern down. She was
  going down in an upright position.

Struck by a torpedo, the _Norlina_, after "abandon ship" was ordered
and its men had taken to the boats, manned its guns and when the U-boat
reappeared, put the enemy out of business. This engagement, which took
place June 4, 1917, in latitude 56°-32' north, longitude 10°-46' west,
was one of the queerest of war incidents.

At 6:30 p. m., a man on the forward gun platform shouted, "Torpedo!" As
the ship turned the torpedo hit just abaft the beam, glanced off aft
around the stern, and sank. The first mate sounded the "abandon ship,"
signal and the crew made for the lifeboats. Lieutenant Commander J.
Foster, captain of the vessel, three of his mates and the armed guard
commander remained aboard. Inspecting the vessel, they found it in no
danger of sinking, and called all hands to return. Chief Boatswain's
Mate O. J. Gullickson, commanding the armed guard, reported:

  As boats came alongside, a periscope was sighted off the starboard
  beam. Guns were manned, commenced firing from forward gun, range
  2,000 yards. In the meantime the captain had gotten the engineers
  below and we got under way, heading toward periscope. Continued
  firing from both guns, all shots coming very close to the
  periscope, submarine changing speed.

  Suddenly shot from forward gun hit just in front of periscope,
  making it submerge, and a light blue smoke came up from astern of
  the submarine. Periscope appeared again, range now 600 yards, when
  a shot from the after-gun hit it square on the water line, making
  small bits of steel fly, which may have been bursting of shell, and
  causing a great commotion of bubbles, etc., in the water.

  In the meanwhile the captain, seeing the submarine getting closer
  all the time and expecting another torpedo any second, ordered all
  engineers on deck, causing the ship to be absolutely still in the
  water during most of the firing. Hoisted in all boats, laying to
  from 6:30 until 9:05 p. m., seeing no more of submarine, which was
  apparently either sunk or badly damaged.

"It seems certain that the submarine was either sunk or disabled,"
Lieutenant Commander Foster wrote in the ship's log, which gave every
detail of the encounter.

On June 8, 1917, when the steamship _W. H. Tilford_ was off Spezia
Bay, Italy, a periscope was sighted, 1,500 yards off the starboard
beam. Twenty rounds were fired rapidly from the ship's gun, the armed
guard commander reported; and "the submarine came to the surface and
made for the beach," where an Italian torpedo boat took charge of her.

Off the Spanish coast, two or three miles from Sabinal Point, the
_Chincha_ at 7:25, the morning of January 18, 1918, sighted an object
like an enormous whale. Chief Gunner's Mate E. E. Nordquist, commanding
the armed guard, had a good look at it and decided it was one of the
latest type submarines. In his report, he said:

  I commenced firing, range 2,200 yards. After third shot all shots
  fired were good. Fired 10 shots, when submarine disappeared. At
  8:15 submarine again showed itself about 2,000 yards off our
  starboard quarter. Commencing firing fifth shot, which caused an
  explosion and a volume of black smoke was seen. Submarine now
  turned around and headed away from us. As submarine did not dive,
  I continued the fire. Although nearly all shots seemed to hit, but
  five exploded. The fourth explosion caused another volume of black
  smoke. The submarine did not try to dive, but seemed to be trying
  to come up. As I thought she was trying to come up for shell fire
  at us, I kept on firing.

  The submarine now headed for the beach about 1-1/2 miles away;
  29 shots had been fired at her the second time. One of the last
  shots had hit and exploded close, or at, where her propellers
  were churning. As she was heading for the beach and quite a ways
  off, I ceased firing. The bow swells of the submarine could still
  be seen, but the churn of the propellers had ceased. Shortly all
  disappeared, about 4,000 yards away.

On March 21, the _Chincha_, whose armed guard was then commanded by E.
D. Arnold, chief boatswain's mate, encountered a large type submarine,
which was driven off. But one of its shots struck the vessel, killing
one member of the armed guard, and two of the ship's crew.

_El Occidente_ had an exciting fight on February 2, the armed guard
commander, Chief Boatswain's Mate Dow Ripley, reporting that the ship
was apparently attacked by two submarines. One discharged a torpedo,
then came toward the vessel with a rush. The Navy gunners got the
range, Ripley reported, and "as their shots were hitting on top of her,
she suddenly disappeared, acting as if in distress."

When the _Santa Maria_ was torpedoed, February 25, Chief Boatswain's
Mate John Weber and his armed guardsmen stood at the guns until the
water swept around them. Chief Gunner's Mate Joseph E. Reiter and the
gunners on the _Paulsboro_, when that vessel was attacked, held their
posts while shells burst above and shrapnel fell all around them, drove
off the U-boat and saved the ship.

Twenty-four men--eight of the armed guard, and 16 of the merchant
crew--were lost in the sinking of the _Motano_, which was torpedoed the
night of July 31, 1917, in the English Channel off Portland. The vessel
sank in less than a minute after she was struck. There was no time to
launch lifeboats, and the men on deck were washed into the sea.

Survivors of merchant vessels sunk far from land, left in open boats
to make their way to shore as best they could, underwent terrible
hardships. When the _Rochester_ was sunk November 2, 1917, 300 miles
from the Irish coast, the second engineer and an oiler were killed by
the explosion of the torpedo. One of the three lifeboats was lost. In
another four of the crew perished before reaching land, and three died
later from exposure. Five men of the armed guard were lost at sea and
one died after rescue.

After the sinking of the _Actaeon_ (the ex-German _Adamstrum_),
November 24, 1917, a boat containing 19 of the armed guard and 6 of the
merchant crew became separated from the other boats, lost its course,
and rowed, sailed and drifted for eleven days before it reached Cape
Villano, near Coruña, Spain. Four men died before reaching shore, three
of the armed guard and one of the merchant crew.

The _Armenia_ seemed to afford a special target for the U-boats. She
was torpedoed on two occasions, but, though badly damaged, was, in each
instance, safely taken to port and repaired. The night of December 5,
1917, about 20 miles from Dartmouth Light, England, a torpedo tore a
hole 31 feet long and 15 feet wide in the _Armenia's_ port side. Part
of the crew took to the boats, thinking the ship would sink almost
immediately; but the ship's captain and the head of the armed guard,
Stief Homiak, chief boatswain's mate, remained aboard. Prompt measures
were taken to keep the vessel afloat, the armed guard working with the
crew. The hole in the side was covered with collision mats and other
devices to keep out the water, and though the hold was flooded, the
vessel was successfully navigated into Dartmouth. Two months later,
after repairs were completed, the _Armenia_ left Dartmouth, February
8, 1918, for West Hartlepool. Shortly after midnight, when about
nine miles off St. Catherine's Light, Isle of Wight, she was struck
by a torpedo which opened up a hole 40 by 30 feet, carried away the
stern-post and propeller and broke the tail-shaft. Tugs came from shore
and towed the vessel to Stokes Bay, and she was again repaired.

The submarines, particularly in the early months of the war, seemed
especially anxious to get one of the American liners, _St. Louis_,
_St. Paul_, _New York_ and _Philadelphia_. Time and again, U-boats
were sighted, evidently lying in wait for these fast steamers. The
_Philadelphia_, on one occasion, sighted a periscope only a few hundred
yards distant and saw the torpedo as it left the tube. By quick
maneuvering, the steamship turned and escaped the missile. The _St.
Louis_ had several experiences with them. Sighting a periscope on the
port beam, she opened a rapid fire and drove off the U-boat. Another
time a torpedo was seen only 200 yards away, and then a periscope
popped up, but by speed and quick maneuvering the liner escaped. Again
a submarine was sighted three miles distant. The _St. Louis_ opened
fire and for nearly half an hour there was a running fight between
"sub" and liner until at last the _St. Louis_ sailed out of range.

There were many instances in which prompt and effective gunfire
repulsed submarines, and in most cases where the U-boat's guns were not
of superior range, the ship escaped. Thus on July 10, 1917, the _Gold
Shell_ drove off a "sub," as did the _Dakotan_ on Sept. 6, 1917.

The _Albert Watts_ and _Westoil_, oil tankers, had a thrilling
encounter Nov. 28, 1917, with two submarines which, when first
observed, were within 300 yards. Blazing away with all their guns,
the ships compelled the enemy to dive to escape shelling. Then ensued
a running fight that continued for four hours. Every now and then a
periscope would bob up, in an effort to get in position to launch
torpedoes. But the ships would fire again, and the periscopes
disappear. At 10:30 the _Watts_ struck a mine, and was damaged, but
remained afloat. The rest of the convoy got to port that afternoon, and
a few hours later the _Watts_ arrived, crippled but still in the game.

The _Westoil_ had another brush with the enemy March 12, 1918, when
a "sub" appeared some distance astern. After a running fight the
submarine gave up the contest, though she was of big type, and her guns
were apparently heavier than those of the _Westoil_. The vessel's fire
was too accurate for her; for the armed guard commander was a "sure
shot," a gun-pointer from one of our dreadnaughts who in five years had
never missed in short-range battle practice. They were "some gunners,"
those men of the armed guards!

I could fill a book with the exploits of these guards, for the Navy
furnished guns and gunners to 384 vessels, and this service at one time
or another employed 30,000 men. Begun March 12, 1917, in accordance
with the President's order, the arming of merchantmen proceeded until
nearly every American ship crossing the Atlantic was provided with this
protection. The Bureau of Ordnance scoured the country for all the guns
of proper calibers that were available, and some were even taken from
cruisers and older battleships, to be replaced later when more could
be manufactured. But crews were always ready and the guns were secured
and installed in record time. Statistics compiled by an officer of the
Armed Guard Section show that:

  The 384 merchant ships armed made 1832 trans-Atlantic trips while
  in armed guard status.

  347 sightings of enemy submarines were reported.

  227 attacks by submarines were classified as "actual."

  Only 29 ships carrying armed guards were torpedoed and sunk.

  Two ships were sunk by shell-fire, both after long engagements.

  193 attacks were successfully repulsed.

  34 attacks resulted in probable damage to enemy submarines.

  Of the 2,738,026 tons of American merchant shipping armed, only
  166,428 tons was sunk by submarines. As a result of attacks
  repulsed, 1,400,000 tons of American shipping were saved.

Could there be better evidence of the success of this undertaking, or
the courage and efficiency of the gunners who protected our merchant
ships?




CHAPTER XVII

WHEN THE U-BOATS CAME TO AMERICA

  WAR OFF OUR COASTS FROM MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1918--GERMANS SENT
  SUBMARINES TO INTERRUPT TROOP AND SUPPLY TRANSPORTATION, BUT
  TRANSPORTS WERE SO WELL GUARDED THAT NOT ONE WAS ATTACKED OR
  EVEN DELAYED--MANY SCHOONERS AND SOME STEAMERS SUNK, BARGES AND
  LIGHTSHIP SHELLED, BUT GERMANS FAILED IN THEIR MAIN OBJECT.


Europe was not the only "war zone." There was war off our own coasts
from May to September, 1918, and the Navy had to protect transports and
shipping, to escort convoys and hunt submarines on this side of the
Atlantic as well as off the coasts of Great Britain and France.

During that period the Navy was as much in active war service in home
waters as it was in Europe. And our methods were quite as successful
here as there, for in the entire four months in which German submarines
operated off our coasts not one convoy was attacked, and not one
transport was delayed in sailing.

Will you ever forget that Sunday, June 2, 1918, when a German submarine
suddenly appeared off the New Jersey coast and sank six vessels, ending
the day with the destruction of the passenger steamer _Carolina_?

The first news came at 5:30 p. m., from the Ward Liner _Mexico_, which
radioed that she had picked up three lifeboats containing fifty men
of the _Isabel B. Wiley_ and other schooners that had been sunk. This
message was immediately broadcasted with a warning to all ships along
the coast. Naval vessels were at once ordered to the vicinity and
patrol craft in that region and all along the coast were notified to
keep a sharp lookout for the submarine.

The passenger steamer _Carolina_, en route to New York from Porto
Rico, was 13 miles from where the _Wiley_ was sunk, when she received
the warning at 5:55 o'clock. Darkening her lights, she steered due
west, putting on full speed. The captain had just got his vessel
steadied on the new course, when he sighted the submarine two miles
away. In a moment or two the U-boat fired three shells, which landed
near the steamer. At the second shot the captain stopped his ship.
He had ordered the wireless operator to send out an "SOS" signal,
stating that the vessel was attacked by submarine. But, realizing, he
said, the uselessness of trying to escape, and fearing if he sent out
radio messages the U-boat might shell the ship, endangering the lives
of those aboard, the captain recalled the order. The radio operator
stated that the submarine had wirelessed to him, under low power, "If
you don't use wireless I won't shoot." That was the reason we were so
long in getting news of the sinking of the _Carolina_. She sent out no
distress signals.

At his third shot, the submarine bore down on the vessel, which was
flying the signal "A.B."--abandon ship--and was lowering its lifeboats.
"Women and children first," was the rule, and after they had been
placed safely, the men entered the boats. As the captain, the last to
leave, cleared the ship's side, the submarine commander ordered him to
make for shore. The U-boat fired several shells into the vessel, and
she finally sank at 7:55 p. m., with the American ensign and signals
flying. Clouds of fire and steam arose as she went down.

The _Carolina_ carried 218 passengers, and a crew of 117. All got
safely into the lifeboats, which were moored head and stern, one to
the other, except the motor sailer and boat No. 5, and all headed for
shore, on a westward course. They had smooth seas until midnight, when
a squall came on with heavy rain and lightning. The boats, which were
connected by lines, were anchored until the storm passed. At daylight
they began to proceed singly, to make rowing easier.

At 11 o'clock the storm-tossed survivors sighted a schooner, the _Eva
B. Douglas_, which took aboard all that were in sight, 160 passengers
and 94 of the crew. But about noon one boat, in attempting to weather
the rough seas, capsized, drowning seven passengers and six of the
crew. There were still three boats to be accounted for. The next day,
19 survivors were picked up and carried to Vineyard Haven, and 18
were rescued by the British steamer _Appleby_, and taken to Lewes,
Delaware. Lifeboat No. 5 was rowed to shore, and the thousands along
the Boardwalk were amazed when it came in sight and was landed through
the surf at Atlantic City.

That Monday, June 3rd, was one of the busiest days of the war in the
Navy Department, as it was at naval bases all along the Atlantic. The
fact that the Germans were operating off our shores stirred up not only
Washington but the entire country.

Plans for submarine defense had been made out long before, and were put
into effect. Our patrol force, all along the line, was on the job. But
hunting a U-boat and capturing it are two very different things.

News and rumors were pouring in, and when I received the newspaper
correspondents I faced a fire of questions as rapid as that of a
machine-gun:

"What is the Navy doing to protect shipping?"

"Why did it let the submarine sink those vessels?"

"Have you sunk the U-boat?"

"What naval vessels have you sent out? What methods are they using to
get the 'sub'?"

"How many boats have the Germans sent over?"

"Have you got enough vessels to protect our coast and commerce?"

"Will you recall our destroyers from Europe?"

As I was doing my best to answer the questions of the gentlemen
of the press, who had a right to know everything that was not of
advantage to the enemy, telegrams were pouring into the Department by
the hundred, and the telephones were ringing without cessation. In
twenty-four hours, 5,000 telegrams, radio messages, 'phone calls and
other inquiries were handled by the Navy. The halls and offices of the
Department were thronged with anxious people, shippers and ship-owners,
friends and relatives of captains and crews. And everybody wanted
information.

There was alarm along the coast, from Cape Cod to Key West. If one
U-boat was over here, two might be or three or more. That was the
general feeling.

One of the most persistent questions, which came from the country, as
well as the press, was whether we were going to recall our destroyers
from Europe--and in many cases this was put not as an inquiry but a
demand.

We could not tell the public what we were doing, what ships were
being sent out, and where. That was just what the Germans wanted to
know. Most of our destroyers and the best of our patrol craft were
in European waters, 3,000 miles away, performing vital duty against
the enemy in England, Ireland, France and Italy. We had no idea of
recalling them.

Thousands of vessels would have been required to patrol every mile of
our long coast-line, and guard all the boats off our shores. Our duty
was clear. The Germans had sent their U-boats across the sea mainly to
interrupt the transportation of troops and supplies. If they did not
succeed in that, their coming would have no real military effect.

"Our first duty," I said to the newspaper men that morning, "is to
keep open the road to France, to protect troop-ships and Army supply
vessels. We are doing all we can to protect all shipping and commerce,
but the safety of troops must be our first thought."

The policy was so well carried out that not one troop-ship or cargo
transport was delayed in sailing, and the months in which enemy
submarines operated almost continuously off our coasts were the very
months in which we broke all records in troop transportation.

The first submarine that came over in 1918 was the U-151, and the
first craft she sank were three small schooners, the _Hattie Dunn_,
_Hauppauge_ and _Edna_, all sent down by bombs the same day, May
25th. To prevent disclosure of her presence, she kept the crews of
all three, 23 men, imprisoned aboard her, and sailed well out at sea,
submerging whenever a large vessel was sighted, until June 2nd, when
she sank three other schooners, the _Isabel Wiley_, _Jacob M. Haskell_
and _Edward H. Cole_; a small steamer, the _Winneconne_, and late in
the afternoon attacked the steamships _Texel_ and _Carolina_. All the
_Texel's_ crew were saved, but they rowed to shore and the story of her
sinking was not told until they reached Atlantic City next morning. En
route from Porto Rico to New York, with a cargo of sugar, the _Texel_
was stopped at 4:21 p. m. by the firing of shells, one of which struck
the vessel, and an hour later was sunk by bombs placed aboard.

By sinking only small boats which had no radio apparatus, and holding
their crews prisoners, the U-151 had for ten days concealed her
whereabouts. But the Navy had warned shipping to be on the lookout, and
on May 16th had sent this message to all section bases:

  _Most Secret_:--From information gained by contact with enemy
  submarine, one may be encountered anywhere west of 40 degrees
  west. No lights should be carried, except as may be necessary to
  avoid collision, and paravanes should be used when practicable and
  feasible. Acknowledge, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet; Commander
  Cruiser Force, Commander Patrol Squadron, Flag San Domingo,
  Governor Virgin Islands, Commandants 1st to 8th, inclusive, and
  15th Naval Districts. 13016.

                                                        OPNAV.

The Department had been notified from London Headquarters early in
May that a large-type submarine had left Germany for American waters,
and on May 15th, the British steamer _Huntress_ reported that she had
escaped a torpedo attack in latitude 34°-28' north, longitude 56°-09'
west, about 1,000 miles east of Cape Hatteras. Four days later the
_Nyanza_ was attacked 300 miles from our coast; the _Jonancy_ was
gunned about 150 miles at sea, and on May 21st the British steamer
_Crenelia_ reported sighting a submarine.

This information was disseminated to all section bases, coast defense
commanders and forces afloat; and in addition to the regular patrols,
special sub-chaser detachments were organized, and ordered to proceed,
upon the receipt of any "SOS" or "Allo" message, to the vessel attacked
or in distress.

Comprehensive plans for defense, protection of shipping and combating
the U-boats had been made long previously. Before we entered the war
a general scheme had been adopted, a patrol force and naval districts
organized. From that time on we had maintained a vigilant lookout
for the German craft. A special Planning Board had been created in
February, 1918, to study the situation afresh and recommend any
additional measures that might be adopted for coast defense, and
protection of shipping. These plans, approved March 6, placed
coastwise shipping under the control of district commandants, district
boundaries being, for this purpose, extended seaward and sharply
defined. On May 4 a circular letter was sent to all ship-owners and
masters, detailing the procedure they were to follow. Commandants
were instructed to see that all routing preliminaries and shipping
requirements and military and commercial arrangements on shore were
made and thoroughly understood by all the interests concerned.

The morning of June 3rd, the order was issued to commandants, "Assume
control of coastwise shipping and handle traffic in accordance
therewith;" and the following warning was sent out:

  Unmistakable evidence enemy submarine immediately off coast between
  Cape Hatteras and Block Island. Vessels not properly convoyed
  advised to make port until further directed.

A Coastwise Routing Office was organized in the Navy Department as a
part of Naval Operations. Every naval district had its arrangement for
routing and convoying traffic in and through its areas. The commandant
made up the convoy, outlined its route, and provided escort through his
territory, each district in succession relieving the previous escort.
Thus naval protection was provided for shipping all along the coast.

Routing offices were also established at Halifax, Nova Scotia; at
Havana, San Juan and all leading West Indian ports; and Tampico,
Mexico--in fact, eventually at every Atlantic port where coastwise
shipping was likely to originate.

Through the Naval Communication Service full information as to convoys,
rendezvous and other details were sent in code. Each ship's master,
before sailing, was required to go to the routing office and receive
written instructions as to the route to be followed and areas to be
avoided. He was given all the latest submarine information and was told
of the signals and the location of each "speaking station."

[Illustration:

                                From the painting by Frederick J. Waugh

THE GUN-CREW OF THE LUCKENBACH HAS A FOUR-HOUR FIGHT WITH A SUBMARINE]

[Illustration:

                                    From the painting by George Bellows

CHIEF GUNNER'S MATE DELANEY, OF THE CAMPANA, DEFYING HIS CAPTORS]

These speaking stations were established at various points along the
coast. Manned by navy personnel, using a simple code of distance
signals, they could communicate with ships not equipped with radio,
call vessels into harbor if necessary, and divert them from
dangerous localities. They performed a valuable function in expediting
the flow of shipping from district to district, as well as, by prompt
action, warning craft in danger. Ships at sea received by radio all
war warnings and orders, and when it was necessary to divert convoys,
orders to change course could be sent at a moment's notice. Far south
were two "reporting" stations. Vessels passing out of the Gulf of
Mexico coastwise-bound were required to report at Sand Key, those
northbound through the Old Bahama passage, to report at Jupiter.

[Illustration: THE MERCHANT SUBMARINE DEUTSCHLAND IN BALTIMORE HARBOR

Inset: Gun mounted on the U-155, as the Deutschland was called after
its conversion into a war craft.]

Thus escort was provided for vessels through all the areas in which
submarines were likely to operate, and a system provided by which the
Navy could keep track of and in touch with them from the time they
sailed until they reached port. Though this necessitated a large fleet
of escorting vessels, of which our best were at work in Europe, by
utilizing all the patrol craft that could be secured and our sturdy
little sub-chasers, we managed to provide sufficient escorts.

It is a notable fact that, while the submarines sank many schooners
and fishing craft and some steamers proceeding independently, during
the entire four months in which the U-boats operated in the Western
Atlantic not one convoy, coastwise or trans-Atlantic, was attacked off
the coast of the United States.

The alarm which occurred when the U-boats first appeared quickly
subsided. The details of the comprehensive system the Navy had put
into effect could not then be published. But the naval committees of
Congress knew, for we could impart this information, in confidence, to
them. To find out for themselves whether the Navy was doing everything
possible to protect shipping and repel the Germans, Senators and
Representatives came to the Navy Department, and examined all our plans
and arrangements.

Senator Lodge well expressed their convictions in his speech in the
Senate on June 6th, 1918, when he said:

  The Navy and the Navy Department have taken every precaution that
  human foresight could suggest, so far as I am able to judge, and I
  have examined their preparations with such intelligence and care as
  I could give to the matter. * * *

  Mr. President, the Navy and the Navy Department have necessarily
  anticipated a submarine attack from the very beginning of the war.
  They have had it constantly on their minds. They have tried to make
  every preparation to meet it. I think they have. It would be most
  injurious for me to stand here and follow down the map of the coast
  and tell the Senate and the public exactly what those preparations
  are--tell them where the submarine chasers are, where the
  destroyers are, where the signal stations are, what arrangements
  they have made for meeting the danger when it came, as they were
  sure it would come. No human mind can possibly tell when out of
  the great waste of waters of the Atlantic Ocean a submarine, which
  travels by night and submerges by day, will appear. As soon as the
  Navy had any authentic news to indicate the presence of submarines
  on this coast they acted. They will do everything that can be done.
  They have the means to do it. That is all that I feel at liberty to
  say in a general way.

  Mr. President, for four years the greatest Navy in the world
  has been devoting its strength to the destruction of German
  submarines. They were operating in what are known as the narrow
  seas, where the commerce of the world, we may say, comes together
  in a closely restricted area; and even there, with the knowledge
  for years of the presence of the German submarines, it is not
  going too far to say that many of those submarines escaped them.
  They are diminishing now, with our assistance. A larger control is
  being established over the narrow seas, and the work against the
  submarines at the point of the greatest danger--what we may call
  the naval front of this war--is succeeding more than many of us
  dared to hope. It is done by the multiplication of vessels and the
  multiplication of methods, and there is the great center of the
  fight.

  One or two submarines have appeared suddenly on our coast, as
  was to be anticipated. In my judgment, we are doing all that can
  be done. I have taken the pains to go to the Department, where
  everything has been laid before the members of the Naval Affairs
  Committee who cared to investigate the subject, and I am entirely
  satisfied that they are doing everything that is possible. But the
  chase of the submarine is something like searching for the needle
  in the haystack. You can not tell in which particular wisp of hay
  it will come to the surface; but that the defense will be effective
  I have no sort of question. * * *

  We have a patrol along the coast, which is composed chiefly of
  what is known as the Life-Saving Service, or the Coast Guard, as
  it is now known. We also have an organized system for procuring
  information from fishermen and others on the coast, extending from
  Maine to the Gulf. Those sources of information were organized and
  in operation through the Navy Department at least two years before
  we entered the war, so I believe that so far as our own coasts are
  concerned the chances of a base there are almost negligible. * * *

  I did not rise to go into the details to describe to you the
  different naval districts of the country and what has been done in
  each one of them, but simply to tell you what my own opinion is
  after having examined all the arrangements with the utmost care of
  which I was capable and with the most intense interest, and I give
  my word for what it is worth, that in my judgment the Navy and the
  Navy Department, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary, and all the
  officers, the Chief of Staff, and every head of a bureau has done
  everything that human foresight could suggest. * * *

  I want the Senate also to remember that when newspaper editorials
  ask what the Navy is doing I should like to have them consider
  why it is that we have sent all the troops we have sent--and we
  have sent a great many thousands--why it is that they have gone to
  Europe without the loss of a transport, thank God, as I do. How is
  it that that has happened? It has happened because of the American
  Navy, which furnished the convoys, and no other cause.

  I wish I could go on and tell you what the American Navy has been
  doing in the narrow seas. I can not. The Navy has remained largely
  silent about its work and its preparation, and it is one of the
  best things about it, but it has been doing the greatest possible
  work everywhere. It has not failed in convoying the troops. It has
  not failed in its work in the Baltic and the Channel and the coast
  of France and the Mediterranean, and it will not fail here. It
  will do everything that courage and intelligence and bravery can
  possibly do.

In addition to the elusive U-boat, mines laid by the "subs" also proved
a constant danger, quite as much as gunfire, bombs and torpedoes. The
afternoon of June 3, the tanker _Herbert L. Pratt_ struck a mine two
and a half miles off Overfalls lightship, and sank. But she was not in
deep water, and was quickly salvaged and towed to Philadelphia. Late
that evening at 6 o'clock, the U-151, in another locality, overhauled
and sank the _Sam C. Mengel_. The first officer, John W. Wilkins,
stated that when the crew were leaving the schooner, the German
boarding-officer shook hands with them, and exclaimed:

"Send Wilson out here and we will finish him in ten minutes. Wilson is
the only one prolonging the war."

Next morning an "SOS" call came from the French tanker _Radioleine_,
"attacked by submarine." The coast torpedo-boat _Hull_ (Lieutenant
R. S. Haggart), rushed to her assistance. Zigzagging and firing her
stern-gun, the steamer was putting up a good defense, though shells
were falling around her. But before the _Hull_ could get within firing
distance, the U-boat dived and scurried off. As the _Radioleine_,
relieved, sailed away, the _Hull_ picked up the crew of the schooner
_Edward R. Baird, Jr._, which had been bombed two hours before, but
was still afloat, though water-logged, with decks awash.

Moving around from point to point, in the next week the U-151 sank six
steamships, one an American steamer, the _Pinar Del Rio_, and then
headed for Germany.

Naval vessels were on the lookout all the time. But when the submarine
did attack any craft which had radio, it prevented them, if possible,
from sending out signals or messages of distress. This was a great
handicap to the naval commanders, as it prevented them from knowing
where the U-boat was operating. The moment a periscope was reported,
they speeded for the scene.

As it departed for home, the submarine attacked two British steamers,
the _Llanstephan Castle_ and _Keemun_, both of which escaped, and
later sank two Norwegian barks, the _Samoa_ and _Kringsjaa_, 150 miles
at sea. Though sighted several times by merchantmen, the U-151 made
no further attacks until June 18th, when she torpedoed the British
steamship _Dwinsk_, far out in the Atlantic. The vessel remained afloat
and two hours later was sunk by gunfire.

Soon afterward the _U. S. S. Von Steuben_ arrived on the scene and
bore down on the lifeboats. The submarine fired a torpedo at her, but
the cruiser transport avoided the deadly missile, and blazed away
at the "sub's" periscope. She fired 19 shots and dropped numerous
depth-charges. But the U-boat submerged and got away and three days
later, about 200 miles further east, sank the Belgian _Chilier_. The
Norwegian steamer _Augvald_ was sunk June 23. This was the last vessel
sunk, though the submarine made several unsuccessful attacks on British
and American ships.

The U-151 reached Germany August 1, having left Kiel April 14. In
a cruise of nearly three months she had sunk 23 vessels, of 59,000
gross tons. Some submarines in European waters had destroyed that much
tonnage in a week or two.

But this was only the beginning of submarine operations. The U-156,
commanded by Kapitän-Leutnant von Oldenburg, left Germany for America
June 15, and on July 5 attacked, almost in mid-Atlantic, the _U. S. S.
Lake Bridge_, which after a running fight outdistanced her.

Her first appearance in our waters was on July 21st, when she bobbed
up near Cape Cod, Mass., and attacked the tug _Perth Amboy_ and four
barges in tow. Three torpedoes were fired at the tug, it was stated. A
shell crashed through the wheelhouse, and cut off the hand of a sailor
as he grasped the spokes of the steering wheel. The tug on fire, the
German turned his attention to the barges, and kept firing away until
several men were wounded and the helpless craft went down. Three women
and five children were aboard the barges. They, with the crews, were
reached by boats from Coast Guard Station No. 40, and landed at Nauset
Harbor.

Seaplanes from the Chatham naval air station flew to the scene and
attacked the submarine, dropping aerial bombs. Though the haze obscured
the view, bombs fell very near the U-boat, and one or two, it was
reported, actually struck her but failed to explode. Not relishing this
attack from the air, the German submerged and started for Canadian
waters.

Sinking a fishing schooner 60 miles southeast of Cape Porpoise, and
burning another near the entrance to the Bay of Fundy, the raider
turned her attention to the fishing fleet around Seal Island, Nova
Scotia, sinking four American schooners and three Canadians. She
also sank the Canadian tanker _Luz Blanca_ and the Swedish steamer
_Sydland_. On August 11 the British steamship _Penistone_ was torpedoed
and sunk, her master, David Evans, taken prisoner, and the _Herman
Winter_, an American steamer, was attacked, but escaped uninjured.
Sailing southward the U-boat, a week later, sank the _San Jose_,
and Evans was released and allowed to get into a lifeboat with the
Norwegian crew.

The U-156 then went northward again, and on August 20 captured the
Canadian steam trawler _Triumph_, and armed her as a raider, placing a
German crew aboard. Operating together, they sank a dozen schooners in
Canadian waters. Sinking the Canadian schooner _Gloaming_, on August
26, the U-156 started on her homeward voyage. The only attack she made
returning was unsuccessful, an encounter on August 31 with the _U. S.
S. West Haven_, which drove her off.

Beginning by attacking barges and tugs, devoting most of her time to
sinking small fishing craft, the U-156 met an inglorious end in the
Northern Mine Barrage. Attempting to "run" the barrage, she struck a
mine and sank so quickly that, apparently, many of her men did not
have time to escape. Twenty-one survivors were landed on the Norwegian
Coast; the fate of the rest of the crew is unknown. It seems like fate
that this raider which destroyed so many helpless little American
vessels should have been sent down by that creation which was mainly
American, the great barrage which, 3,500 miles from this country,
stretched across the North Sea.

At the same time the U-156 was slaying fishing craft in the north,
another German submarine, commanded by Korvetten-Kapitän Kophamel, the
U-140, was operating in southern waters. Leaving Kiel June 22, only
a week after the U-156, this big undersea boat began work almost in
mid-ocean July 18, gunning the American tanker _Joseph Cudahy_. On the
26th she fired on two British vessels, and later on the _Kermanshah_.
All these attacks were unsuccessful, but she succeeded in sinking
the Portuguese bark _Porto_, and on August 1 the Japanese steamship
_Tokuyama_ was torpedoed 200 miles southeast of New York.

The U-140 had a long and hot fight, before she sank, August 4th, her
first American vessel, the tanker _O. B. Jennings_, Captain George W.
Nordstrom, master; one man being killed and several wounded, before
the ship was sent down. Then the U-140, sinking a schooner on the way,
headed for Diamond Shoals, on the North Carolina coast, near Cape
Hatteras.

The _Merak_, a Dutch steamship taken over by the Americans, was sailing
along at eight knots, when, at 1:40 p. m., a shot crossed her bow.
Putting about, the _Merak_ made for shore, zigzagging, the submarine
pursuing, firing a shell a minute. After the thirtieth shot, the
_Merak_ ran aground and her crew took to the boats. The Germans boarded
the steamer, bombed her, and then turned their attention to other
vessels. Three were in sight, the steamers _Beucleuch_ and _Mariner's
Harbor_, and the Diamond Shoals lightship.

First they turned their guns on the lightship. Unarmed, with no means
of defense, this vessel of 590 tons was of the same type as the other
ships which are stationed at various points along the coast to keep
their lights burning and warn mariners off dangerous points. To destroy
one of these coast sentinels is like shooting down a light-house. But
the Germans evidently thought its destruction would cause a shock and
arouse indignation, if nothing else. So they shot down the sentinel of
Diamond Shoals, while the lightships' crew took to the boats and saved
their lives by rowing to shore. Then the U-140 attacked the Beucleuch,
but the British steamer was too fast for her, and in the meantime the
_Mariner's Harbor_, too, had escaped.

No more was heard of the U-140 until August 10, when she attacked the
Brazilian steamer _Uberaba_. The destroyer _Stringham_ went at once
to the steamship's assistance and drove off the enemy. The Brazilians
later presented the destroyer with a silk American flag and a silver
loving-cup, to express their thanks for the timely aid given by the
_Stringham_ in saving the _Uberaba_ from destruction.

After a brush with the _U. S. S. Pastores_, whose gunfire proved too
hot to face, the U-140 proceeded several hundred miles north, keeping
well out at sea, and was not heard from for a week. Then on August 21,
after a gunfire contest, she sank the British steamer _Diomed_, and the
next night attacked the _Pleiades_, an American cargo vessel, whose
shots fell so close around the submarine that it was glad to get away.

That was the last experience, near our coast, of the U-140, which was
already headed for Germany. She had been damaged, whether by our shells
or depth-bombs, or from some other cause could not be ascertained. Her
passage was slow until she was joined by the U-117, September 9. They
proceeded in company toward Germany, the U-140 reaching Kiel October 25.

The U-117, a mine-layer of large type, commanded by Kapitän-Leutnant
Droscher, had left Germany early in July, and her first exploit on this
side of the Atlantic was a raid on the fishing fleet, near George's
Bank, a hundred miles or more east of Cape Cod. In one day, August
10th, she sank nine little schooners of 18 to 54 tons. Coming nearer
shore, she torpedoed and sank the Norwegian steamer _Sommerstadt_, 25
miles southeast of Fire Island. The torpedo made a circle around the
vessel and returning, exploded, her master, Captain George Hansen,
declared, saying:

  The torpedo went about 1,300 fathoms on the starboard side; then
  it started to turn to the left. When I saw the torpedo start to
  swerve around, I gave orders for full speed ahead. After it passed
  the bow it made two turns, making a complete circle, and then
  struck our vessel aft on the port side exactly between the third
  and fourth holds, right at the bulkhead.

The next afternoon the _Frederick R. Kellogg_, an American tanker, was
torpedoed 30 miles south of Ambrose Channel lightship. The torpedo
struck in the engine-room, and the ship went down in fifteen seconds,
her master, Captain C. H. White, stated. Two steel decks and a wooden
deck were blown up, and a lifeboat was blown in the air. The engineer,
his third assistant, one fireman and an oiler were killed or drowned.
The ship sank in shallow water, however, and was later raised, towed to
port and repaired.

The submarine sank the schooner _Dorothy B. Barrett_ and the motor-ship
_Madrugada_, and on the 17th sent down, 120 miles southeast of Cape
Henry, the _Nordhav_, a Norwegian bark, whose survivors were rescued by
the battleship _Kearsarge_. The U-117 had a long combat on August 20,
with the Italian steamer _Ansaldo III_, the steamer escaping after a
gun duel that lasted nearly three hours, and the next day had another
running fight with the British _Thespis_, which was also unsuccessful.

The final exploit of the U-117 on this side of the ocean was the
sinking of two Canadian schooners on August 30th. She then started
across the Atlantic, ten days later joining the U-140.

It was not until early in August that the _Deutschland_, which had made
two trips to the United States as a commercial submarine in 1916, left
Germany for American waters. Her operations were mainly far out at sea
or in Canadian waters, and she never came within 200 or 300 miles of
the United States coast.

Renamed the U-155, the _Deutschland_ began her activities on this
expedition on August 27, 1918, when she attacked the American steamship
_Montoso_ almost in mid-Atlantic. It was at night, about 9 o'clock,
when the _Montoso_ and the _Rondo_ and _Ticonderoga_, which were with
her, opened fire. The submarine fired several shots, but the guns of
our vessels drove it off.

Five days later the _Deutschland_ attacked the _U. S. S. Frank H.
Buck_, opening fire with two six-inch guns. Firing first with its
3-inch forward gun, then putting into action its six-incher, the _Buck_
made a vigorous reply. Her shots were falling close to the "sub," but
enemy shrapnel was bursting above the vessel and falling on deck. The
_Buck_ reported that one of her shots apparently hit right at the stern
of the U-boat and another forward of the conning tower, under the water
line. The submarine then disappeared. She seemed to have been damaged,
but not enough to put her out of commission, for on September 2nd she
sank the Norwegian steamer _Shortind_ and on the 7th chased and shelled
the British steamship _Monmouth_. Five days later she torpedoed the
Portuguese steamer _Leixoes_, three of the crew being lost, one going
down with the ship and two dying of cold and exposure in the lifeboats.

September 13th was an unlucky day for the _Deutschland_, for in a
gunfire contest with the armed British merchantman _Newby Hall_, she
was struck by a shell which exploded and temporarily put out of action
her forward gun. For the next week she seems to have devoted her
attention to mine-laying, off Halifax and the Nova Scotian coast. Then
she sank a small steam trawler, the _Kingfisher_, and on Sept. 29th
unsuccessfully attacked the British steamer _Reginolite_. On October 3
and 4, she sank the Italian steamship _Alberto Treves_ and the British
schooner _Industrial_.

At 10 a. m., Oct. 12th, the _Deutschland_ attacked the American
steamship _Amphion_, formerly the German _Köln_. Her second shot
carried away the steamer's wireless. Then ensued a gunfire contest that
lasted more than an hour, the submarine firing some 200 shots and the
_Amphion_ 72. The _Amphion_ was hit time and again, her lifeboats were
riddled, and her super-structure damaged, but she gradually drew off
and the U-boat abandoned the chase.

The last American steamer sunk during the war was the _Lucia_, known
as the "non-sinkable" ship--and the reports indicate that it was the
_Deutschland_ that sank her. The _Lucia_, a U. S. Shipping Board vessel
used as an army cargo transport, had been fitted up with buoyancy
boxes. There was considerable interest in this experiment, proposed and
carried out by the Naval Consulting Board, accounts of which had been
widely published. These boxes did not render the vessel unsinkable,
but it is a significant fact that she remained afloat twenty-two hours
after she was torpedoed.

It was 5:30 p. m., October 17, when the torpedo struck in the
engine-room, killing four men. Though the submarine was not seen,
the naval armed guard stood at their guns, which were trained in the
direction from which the torpedo came. The civilian crew took to the
lifeboats as the vessel settled slowly. The gunners remained aboard
until 1:30 o'clock the next afternoon, when the seas were breaking over
the gun platform. The _Lucia_ did not finally disappear beneath the
waves until 3:20 p. m., October 18th.

After sinking the _Lucia_, the former _Deutschland_ cruised towards the
Azores, and did not reach Kiel until November 15, four days after the
armistice.

There was one other submarine assigned to operate in American waters,
and which started out from Kiel, late in August, for this purpose.
This was the U-152, a large craft of the _Deutschland_ type, commanded
by Kapitän-Leutnant Franz. Though she never got within hundreds of
miles of our coast, on September 30th she sank the animal transport
_Ticonderoga_, and caused the largest loss of life any of our ships
sustained in action. But this took place in the Eastern Atlantic,
latitude 43°-05' north, longitude 38°-43' west, nearer Europe than
America. It was the U-152 with which the _U. S. S. George G. Henry_ had
a two-hour running fight on September 29th, in which the _Henry_ came
off victor. This was not far from the point where the _Ticonderoga_
went down.

The nearest point she came to the United States was on October 13th,
when she sank the Norwegian bark _Stifinder_, in latitude 37°-22'
north, longitude 53°-30' west, 600 miles or more from our coast.

Next to attacking vessels, the most menacing activity of the U-boats
was mine-laying. They sowed mines at various points from Cape Hatteras
to Nova Scotia and mine-fields were discovered off Fire Island, N.
Y.; Barnegat, N. J.; Five Fathom Bank, near the entrance to Delaware
River; Fenwick Island, off the Delaware Coast; Winter Quarter Shoal and
the Virginia Capes, and Wimble Shoals, near the North Carolina coast.
Single mines were picked up at other points.

Every protective measure possible was employed against them. A fleet of
mine-sweepers was constantly engaged in sweeping channels and entrances
to harbors, and every point where there was reason to believe mines
might be laid. Fifty-nine vessels were engaged in this duty, most of
them assigned to the districts which handled the largest volume of
shipping.

Naval vessels and the larger merchantmen carried paravanes, which swept
up mines and carried them off from the vessel, where they could be
destroyed. But even the paravanes were not always effective.

It was one of these floating mines which sank the cruiser _San Diego_
July 19, 1918, off Fire Island. The battleship _Minnesota_ struck
one of them at night, September 29th, at 3:15 a. m., twenty miles
from Fenwick Island Shoals lightship. Though the explosion, under her
starboard bow, seriously damaged the hull and flooded the forward
compartments, the _Minnesota_ proceeded to port under her own steam,
arriving at 7:45 p. m. at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, where she was
docked and repaired.

The British steamship _Mirlo_ was blown up off Wimble Shoal buoy, near
Cape Hatteras, at 3:30 p. m., August 16th. The ship, which was loaded
with gasoline, took fire, and one explosion after another occurred,
breaking the vessel in two. The _San Saba_, formerly the _Colorado_,
was sunk off Barnegat, October 4th. Struck amidships, the vessel
practically broke in two, and sank in fire minutes. The _Chaparra_, a
Cuban steamer, was blown up ten miles from Barnegat Light, October 27th.

The U. S. cargo steamer _Saetia_ (Lieutenant Commander W. S. Lynch),
bound for Philadelphia from France, was sunk by a mine on November
9th, two days before the armistice. The ship was ten miles southeast
of Fenwick Island Shoals when an explosion occurred under No. 2 hatch,
which shattered the vessel and sent it down. Besides the crew there
were aboard 11 army officers and 74 soldiers. All were rescued.

Enemy mines, scattered, as they were, over a thousand miles, would
undoubtedly have taken a much greater toll of shipping if the Navy had
not been so energetic in sweeping mines and destroying them whenever
they appeared.

Summarizing the entire operations of German submarines which were
assigned to American waters, 79 vessels were sunk by gunfire or bombs.
Of these 17 were steamers, the others being sailing vessels, most of
them small schooners and motor boats. Of the 14 steamers torpedoed, but
two were American, the _Ticonderoga_ and _Lucia_, both of which were
sunk far out in the Atlantic, hundreds of miles from our shores. Of
the seven vessels mined, one, the _Minnesota_, got to port under her
own steam, and another, the tanker _Herbert L. Pratt_, was salvaged,
both being repaired and put back into service. Several vessels sunk or
bombed by submarine were later recovered and repaired, including the
big steamer _Frederick R. Kellogg_.

Only nine American steamers were lost by submarine activities in
American waters--the _Winneconne_, 1,869 tons; _Texel_, 3,210;
_Carolina_, 5,093; _Pinar del Rio_, 2,504; _O. B. Jennings_, 10,289;
_Merak_ (ex-Dutch), 3,024 tons, all destroyed by direct attack; and the
_San Diego_, 13,680 tons displacement; the _San Saba_, 2,458, and the
_Saetia_, 2,873 gross tons, sunk by mines--a total tonnage of 45,000.

In their chief mission of preventing transportation to Europe, the
U-boats failed utterly. The flow of troops, supplies and munitions to
France and England was not for a moment interrupted. In fact, it was
precisely this period in which it was increased, and we transported to
Europe over 300,000 soldiers per month.

Not one troop-convoy was even attacked. So well were all convoys
protected by naval escort that the submarines avoided them.
Furthermore, they avoided all naval vessels and when one was sighted,
the "sub" instantly submerged, usually when the man-of-war was miles
away. This made it difficult for our ships even to get a shot at them.

They had thousands of miles of water to cruise in, and could choose
their own field of operations. Driven from one point, they shifted to
another, often disappearing for days, then emerging in some locality
hundreds of miles from where they were last seen. If the U-boats were
generally able to elude for months the thousands of British, French and
American patrol and escort craft in narrow European waters, how much
more difficult it was to run down the few, on this side of the ocean,
who could range from Nova Scotia to the Gulf of Mexico.

Though we needed the best and all the patrol craft we could get, not
one of our destroyers or any other vessel was recalled from Europe.
In fact, more were sent over to reinforce them. Operating for months
with submarines of the largest type, the Germans failed to achieve
any real military success, and while they sank many small craft and a
substantial amount of ocean shipping, and cut a few cables, their raids
on the American coast had no effect whatever upon the trend of the war.




CHAPTER XVIII

MARINES STOPPED DRIVE ON PARIS

  THROWN INTO THE BREACH WITH OTHER AMERICANS IN CHATEAU-THIERRY
  SECTOR, THEY HALTED GERMANS FIGHTING DESPERATELY FOR DAYS, MARINES
  CLEARED BELLEAU WOOD--CAPTURE OF BLANC MONT RIDGE, THE KEY TO
  RHEIMS--CROSSED THE MEUSE UNDER HEAVY FIRE THE MORNING OF THE
  ARMISTICE--IN GERMANY IN ARMY OF OCCUPATION.


Enter the Marines!

It was the evening of Memorial Day, May 30, 1918, that they were
ordered to the most critical point in the battle lines. Paris was
threatened more sorely than it had been since the Battle of the Marne.
The Germans were only forty miles away. Hurdling the Chemin-des-Dames,
taking Soissons, they had overcome the strongest French defenses, and
were moving on at the rate of five or six miles a day. Capture of the
city seemed imminent. Parisians by thousands were trekking to safer
abodes. Archives were packed; preparations made to move government
offices and set up a temporary capital in the southwest.

To the rescue came the Americans--the Second Division, which included
the Marines; and elements of the Third and Twenty-eighth Divisions.
"Move at 10 p. m. by bus to new area," was the order received by the
Fifth and Sixth Marine Regiments, and the Sixth Machine-Gun Battalion.
Seventy-five miles from the field, they had to travel in camions, not
even the officers knowing their ultimate destination. But all were in
happy mood, sure they were bound for the front.

The roads were crowded with French, men, women and children hurrying
away from the battle lines, seeking safety. Only the Americans rode
ahead--always forward. They had no tanks, gas-shells, or flame
projectors. They were untried in open warfare and they had to go up
against Germany's best troops. The French hesitated to risk all to them
in the crisis.

"Let us fight in our own way," said General Harbord, "and we will stop
them."

Permission was granted. In their own way they fought and won. Colonel
(later Brigadier General) A. W. Catlin, who commanded the Sixth
Regiment, showed his officers the map, indicating the points to be
held, and the maps were passed around to the men so they would have all
the information available. "I hold," said he, "that men like ours fight
none the worse for knowing just what they are fighting for." One secret
of Marine efficiency in combat is the comradeship between officers and
men. "Theirs not to reason why" has no place in their vocabulary.

When they arrived, June 1st, the Marines were told to "dig in." As
tools they used bayonets and the lids of their mess-gear. "Say, you'd
be surprised to know just how much digging you can do under those
circumstances," remarked Private Geiger afterwards as he lay wounded
in a hospital. "Bullets and shrapnel came from everywhere. You'd work
until it seemed you couldn't budge another inch, when a shell would hit
right close and then you'd start digging with as much energy as if you
had just begun."

At ten o'clock, on June 2nd, they were ordered to back up the overtaxed
French. It was the second battalion of the Fifth Marines, and
particularly the 55th Company, which bore the brunt of the assault at
Les Mares Ferme, the point where the Germans came nearest Paris.

The 55th Company had orders to take position one and a half kilometers
northeast of Marigny. The French, a few kilometers ahead, were reported
falling back, and soon began filtering through. The enemy attack was
launched at 5 p. m. against the French who had remained in front of
Wise's battalion at Hill 165. The Germans swept down the wide wheat
fields. The French, pressed back, fought as they retreated.

Neville's Fifth Marines opened up with a slashing barrage, mowing
down the Germans. Trained marksmen, sharp-shooters, they calmly set
their sights and aimed with the same precision they had shown upon the
rifle ranges at Parris Island and Quantico. The French said they had
never seen such marksmanship in the heat of battle. Incessantly their
rifles cracked, and with their fire came the support of the artillery.
The machine-guns, pouring forth a hail of bullets, also began to make
inroads in the advancing lines. Caught in a seething wave of scattering
shrapnel, machine-gun and rifle fire, the Germans found further advance
would be suicide. The lines hesitated, then stopped. The enemy broke
for cover, while the Marines raked the woods and ravines in which they
had taken refuge.

Above, a French airplane was checking up on the artillery fire.
Surprised at seeing men set their sights, adjust their range, and
fire deliberately at an advancing foe, each man picking his target,
not firing merely in the direction of the enemy, the aviator signaled
"Bravo!" In the rear that word was echoed again and again. The German
drive on Paris had been stopped.

The next few days were devoted to pushing forth outposts and testing
the strength of the enemy. The fighting had changed. Mystified at
running against a stone wall of defense just when they believed that
their advance would be easiest, the Germans had halted, amazed. Put on
the defensive, they strove desperately to hold their lines. Belleau
Wood had been planted thickly with nest after nest of machine-guns. In
that jungle of trees, matted underbrush, of rocks, of vines and heavy
foliage, the Germans had placed themselves in positions they believed
impregnable. Unless they could be routed and thrown back the breaking
of the attack of June 2 would mean nothing. There would come another
drive and another. The battle of Chateau-Thierry was not won and could
not be won until Belleau Wood had been cleared of the enemy.

[Illustration: LEADERS OF THE MARINES

Upper row: Major General John A. Lejeune, Brigadier Generals Wendell C.
Neville, and Logan Feland.

Lower row: Brigadier Generals Smedley D. Butler, A. W. Catlin, Harry
Lee.]

On June 6, the Americans began the assault on that wood and the
strategic positions adjacent, the towns of Torcy and Bouresches being
the objectives. At 5 p. m. the Marines attacked. It was a desperate
task. Before they started, their officers cheered them. "Give 'em
hell!" was the command Colonel Catlin is said to have given. They gave
it to them, but paid a heavy price in blood. As the Marines advanced,
the German artillery let loose a storm of fire. Men on every hand were
killed or injured. Brave Berry was struck in the arm, but with the
blood streaming from his sleeve, he kept on until exhausted. Just as
daring Sibley's men reached the edge of the woods a sniper's bullet
hit Colonel Catlin in the chest. Severely wounded, he was relieved in
command by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee.

[Illustration:

                        Reproduced by permission of the Ladies' Home
                        Journal from the painting by Frank E. Schoonover

THE MARINES IN BELLEAU WOOD]

But the lines never halted or wavered. Fighting strictly according to
American methods, a rush, a halt, a rush again, in four-wave formation,
the rear waves taking over the work of those who had fallen before
them, the Marines moved ever forward. Passing over the bodies of their
dead comrades, they plunged ahead. They might be torn to bits, but
behind them were more waves, and the attack went on.

"Men fell like flies," reported an officer writing from the field.
Companies that had entered the battle 250 strong dwindled to fifty and
sixty, with a sergeant in command; but the attack did not falter. At
9:45 o'clock that night Bouresches was taken by Lieutenant James F.
Robertson and twenty-odd men of his platoon. They were soon joined by
reinforcements. The enemy made counter attacks, but the Marines held
the town. Leading his men through the machine-gun fire, Captain Donald
Duncan, of the 96th Company, was killed.

In Belleau Wood the fighting had been literally from tree to tree,
stronghold to stronghold; and it was a fight which must last for
weeks before victory was complete. Every rocky formation was a German
machine-gun nest, almost impossible to reach by artillery or grenades.
There was only one way to wipe out these nests--by the bayonet.
And by this method were they wiped out, for United States Marines,
bare-chested, shouting their battle cry of "E-e-e-e-e y-a-a-h-h-h yip!"
charged straight into the murderous fire from those guns and won! Out
of those that charged, in more than one instance, only one would reach
the stronghold. There, with his bayonet as his only weapon, he would
kill or capture the defenders and then, swinging the gun about, turn it
against remaining German positions.

Fighting in that forest of horror for eighteen days, the Marines on
June 25 began the last rush for possession of the wood. Following a
tremendous barrage, the struggle started. The barrage literally tore
the woods to pieces, but could not wipe out all the nests. They had to
be taken by the bayonet. But in the day that followed every foot of
Belleau Wood was cleared of the enemy. On June 26th Major Shearer sent
the message: "Woods now U. S. Marine Corps entirely."

In the terrific fighting in that month, the Marine Corps lost 1,062
men killed, and 3,615 wounded. Hundreds of Germans were captured. In
the final assault, Major Shearer's command alone took 500 prisoners.
General Pershing sent a telegram of commendation on June 9, and,
visiting division headquarters, sent his personal greetings to the
Marine Brigade, adding that Marshal Foch had especially charged him to
give the Brigade his love and congratulations on its fine work.

Division General Degoutte, commanding the Sixth French Army, on June
30 issued a general order that, henceforth, in all official papers,
Belleau Wood should be named, "Bois de la Brigade de Marine." It was
thereafter known as the "Wood of the Marines."

General Pershing in his final report said:

  The Second Division then in reserve northwest of Paris and
  preparing to relieve the First Division, was hastily diverted to
  the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and, early on the morning of
  June 1st, was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near
  Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped
  the German advance.

Praise and full credit are due the other troops in that sector--the
Third Division whose machine-gun battalion held the bridge-head at the
Marne, and whose Seventh Regiment fought for several days in Belleau
Wood; the artillery and engineers who supported every advance; and all
who were engaged in the Chateau-Thierry sector. Though the principal
honors went to the Second Division and the Marines, all the Americans
in that region fought well and nobly.

President Wilson said they "closed the gap the enemy had succeeded in
opening for their advance on Paris," and, driving back the Germans,
began "the rout that was to save Europe and the world." Mayors of
the Meaux district, who, as they stated, were eye-witnesses of the
American Army's deeds in stopping the enemy advance, formally expressed
their admiration and gratitude, and Mayor Lugol, in transmitting the
resolution, June 26th, wrote:

  The civilian population of this part of the country will never
  forget that the beginning of this month of June, when their homes
  were threatened by the invader, the Second American Division
  victoriously stepped forth and succeeded in saving them from
  impending danger.

After personal investigation, and study of the area, Melville E.
Stone, manager of the Associated Press, declared that in spite of
heavy losses, the Americans engaged in the operations at and around
Chateau-Thierry did three things:

  1. They saved Paris.

  2. They seriously injured the morale of the best German troops.

  3. They set a standard for American troops that none others dared
  to tarnish.

General Omar Bundy, commanding the Second Division, in General Order
No. 41, issued July 10, said:

  You stood like a stone wall against the enemy advance on Paris....
  You have engaged and defeated with great loss three German
  divisions, and have occupied the important strong-points of the
  Belleau Woods, Bouresches, and Vaux. You have taken about 1,400
  prisoners, many machine guns and much other material.

General Petain, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the
North and Northeast, issued a general order citing and commending
the Marines, mentioning by name Brigadier General James G. Harbord,
commanding the Fourth Brigade; Colonel Wendell C. Neville, commanding
the Fifth Regiment; Colonel A. W. Catlin, commanding the Sixth
Regiment, and Major Edward B. Cole, commanding the Sixth Machine Gun
Battalion. Colonel Neville commanded the Fifth through all these
operations, fighting with his men in Belleau Wood. When Colonel Catlin
was wounded, he was, as I have stated, succeeded in command of the
Sixth by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, who continued to command that
regiment to the end of the war. When, leading his machine-gunners,
Major Edward B. Cole fell, mortally wounded, on June 10th, Captain
Harlan E. Major took charge. A day or two later he was relieved by
Captain George H. Osterhout, and on June 21st Major Littleton W. T.
Waller, Jr., took command of the Sixth Machine-Gun Battalion.

The real beginning of the great series of offensives which finally
routed the German armies and brought complete victory to the Allies,
was when Marshal Foch, on July 18, with picked troops made a vigorous
thrust at the Germans near Soissons, with overwhelming success. The
First and Second U. S. Divisions and the French Moroccan Division were
employed as the spearhead of the main attack.

At a single bound they broke through the enemy's infantry defenses,
overran his artillery, and cut the German communications. The Second
Division took Beaurepaire Farm and Vierzy in a rapid advance, and at
the end of the second day was in front of Tigny, having captured 3,000
prisoners and 66 field-guns. "The story of your achievements," said
General Harbord, "will be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands
tonight."

"Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed by our First and
Second Divisions, the tide of war was definitely turned in favor of the
Allies," said General Pershing. Soissons was relieved, and the Germans
began a general withdrawal from the Marne. General Harbord was in
command of the Second Division, Colonel Neville of the Marine Brigade;
Colonel Logan Feland of the Fifth Regiment, Colonel Lee of the Sixth,
and Major Waller of the Machine-Gun Battalion in this operation, known
as the "Aisne-Marne offensive."

General John A. Lejeune, U. S. Marine Corps, on July 29, assumed
command of the Second Division, which he commanded with marked
distinction to the end of hostilities, during its service with the Army
of Occupation in Germany, and until the Division, on its return to
America in August, 1919, was demobilized.

Of the six Allied offensives designated as major operations on the
Western Front in 1918, the Marines, with the other units of the Second
Division, took part in three. In the battle for the St. Mihiel salient,
the division on September 11th took up a line running from Remenauville
to Limey, and on the morning of the 12th attacked. Overcoming the enemy
resistance, they romped through to the Rupt de Mad, a small river,
crossed it on stone bridges, occupied Thiaucourt, scaled the heights
beyond and pushed on to a line running from the Xammes-Jaulny ridges to
Bonvaux Forest. Then they rested, having occupied two days' objectives
before 3 p. m. of the first day. The Division's casualties were about
1,000 men, 134 killed. It had captured eighty German officers, 3,200
men, 120 cannon and a vast amount of stores.

The taking of Blanc Mont Ridge, the key to Rheims, was one of the most
effective blows struck by the Allies. Determined to break through the
powerful German defenses in the Champagne, Marshal Foch asked for an
American division. The Second was selected, and General Lejeune, on
September 27th, was summoned to French headquarters.

Pointing to a large relief map of the battlefield, General Gouraud,
who directed the operations, said to General Lejeune: "General, this
position is the key of all the German defenses of this sector including
the whole Rheims Massif. If this ridge can be taken the Germans will
be obliged to retreat along the whole front 30 kilometers to the river
Aisne. Do you think your division could effect its capture?"

Studying the map closely, General Lejeune said with quiet assurance
that he was certain the Second Division could take it. He was directed
to propose a plan for the assault, which would be begun in a few days.
He did so. The battle of Blanc Mont Ridge was fought and won by the
Second Division as a part of the French Fourth Army, and that signal
victory was due largely to the military genius of Lejeune.

Setting forth on October 1st, the Americans that night relieved French
troops in the front line near Somme-Py. Charging over desolated white
chalky ground, scarred and shell-pocked by years of artillery fire--a
maze of mine craters, deep trenches and concrete fortifications, the
Second Division cleaned up Essen Hook, and captured Blanc Mont Ridge
and St. Etienne--all in the days from October 3 to 9. "This victory,"
the official report stated, "freed Rheims and forced the entire German
Army between that city and the Argonne Forest to retreat to the Aisne."

Writing to Marshal Foch, General Gouraud proposed a special citation of
the Division, stating:

  The Second Infantry Division, United States, brilliantly commanded
  by General Lejeune, played a glorious part in the operations of
  the Fourth Army in the Champaigne in October, 1918. On the 3d of
  October this Division drove forward and seized in a single assault
  the strongly entrenched German positions between Blanc Mont and
  Medeah Ferme, and again pressing forward to the outskirts of St.
  Etienne-a-Arnes, it made in the course of the day, an advance of
  about six kilometers.

  It captured several thousand prisoners, many cannon and
  machine-guns, and a large quantity of other military material. This
  attack, combined with that of the French divisions on its left and
  right, resulted in the evacuation by the enemy of his positions on
  both sides of the River Suippe and his withdrawal from the Massif
  de Notre Dames des Champs.

Ordered to participate in the Argonne-Meuse operation, the Second
Division marched ankle deep in mud more than a hundred kilometers,
four days with but one day of rest. On November 1st, following a day
of terrific barrage, the Division "jumped off" for its final operation
of the war, which did not end until the morning of the armistice, when
it was firmly established on the east bank of the Meuse. "It was so
placed in the battle line," said the General Headquarters orders, "that
its known ability might be used to overcome the critical part of the
enemy's defense." The salient feature of the plan of attack was to
drive a wedge through Landres-et-St. Georges to the vicinity of Fosse.
If successful, this would break the backbone of the enemy and compel
retreat beyond the Meuse. The Second Division accomplished the desired
result on the first attack. "This decisive blow," said the official
report, "broke the enemy's defense and opened the way for the rapid
advance of the Army." The commander of the Fifth Army Corps wrote:

  The Division's brilliant advance of more than nine kilometers,
  destroying the last stronghold on the Hindenburg line, capturing
  the Freya Stellung, and going more than nine kilometers against not
  only the permanent but the relieving forces in their front, may
  justly be regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements made
  by any troops in this war.

During the night of November 3rd, in a heavy rain the division passed
forward through the forest eight kilometers in advance of adjoining
regiments, and within two days again advanced and threw the enemy in
its front across the Meuse. The next morning at 6 o'clock it attacked
and seized the German defense position on the ridge southeast of
Vaux-en-Dieulet. On the night of November 10th heroic deeds were done
by heroic men. In the face of heavy artillery and withering machine-gun
fire, the Second Engineers threw two bridges across the Meuse and the
first and second battalions of the Fifth Marines crossed unflinchingly
to the east bank and carried out their mission. "In the last battle
of the war," said an order of the Second Division, "as in all others,
in which this division has participated, it enforced its will on the
enemy." Of this achievement the commanding general of the Fifth Army
Corps said: "This feat will stand among the most memorable of the
campaign."

"On the eleventh hour, the eleventh day of the eleventh month of the
year 1918," Brigadier General Neville, commanding the Marine Brigade,
in an order reviewing its great record closed with these words: "Along
the fronts of Verdun, the Marne, the Aisne, Lorraine, Champagne, and
the Argonne, the units of the Fourth Brigade Marines have fought
valiantly, bravely, decisively. It is a record of which you may all be
proud."

Shortly after the armistice, General Lejeune was ordered to proceed
to Germany. Stationed at Coblenz, for months his division was a part
of the Army of Occupation. I had the honor of reviewing the division
on the heights of Vallendar, near the junction of the Moselle and
Rhine rivers, and to note that its discharge of duty in Germany was in
keeping with the glorious record it had made in war. "Your brilliant
exploits in battle," said General Pershing in a general order to the
Second Division, "are paralleled by the splendid examples of soldierly
bearing and discipline set by your officers and men while a part of the
Army of Occupation."

The Marines and their comrades of the Second Division were received
with distinguished honor upon their return to the United States,
President Wilson reviewing the men as they passed the White House to
receive the heart-felt applause of a grateful people. The Secretary of
War in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, upon their return, wrote:
"The whole history of the Brigade in France is one of conspicuous
service. Throughout the long contest the Marines, both by their valour
and their tragic losses, heroically sustained, added an imperishable
chapter to the history of America's participation in the World War."

This mere outline of the outstanding fighting history of the Marines
in France, tells only a small portion of what was done by the "Devil
Dogs," as these Soldiers of the Sea were called by the Germans.
Overseas the largest army concentration camp was Pontanezen at Brest.
It was placed under the command of Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler,
who organized, trained and carried over the Thirteenth Regiment of
Marines. Approximately 1,600,000 men passed through that camp. It was
one of the biggest jobs in France and General Butler performed the
difficult duty with ability and satisfaction. The citation for an Army
Distinguished Service Medal said of him: "He has commanded with ability
and energy Pontanezen Camp at Brest during the time in which it has
developed into the largest embarkation camp in the world. Confronted
with problems of extraordinary magnitude in supervision, the reception,
entertainment, and departure of the large numbers of officers and
soldiers passing through this camp, he has solved all with conspicuous
success, performing services of the highest character for the American
Expeditionary Forces." After his return to America General Butler was
made commandant of the chief Marine training camp at Quantico, Va.

Thirty thousand Marines were sent overseas to join the American
Expeditionary Forces. When, in May, 1917, I tendered the Marines for
service with the land forces abroad, there was objection on the part of
some high ranking officers of the Army. But Secretary Baker, with the
breadth that characterized him in the conduct of the war, accepted the
tender, and the Fifth Regiment, under command of Colonel (afterwards
Brigadier General) Charles A. Doyen, sailed on June 14 with the first
expedition sent to France. The Sixth Regiment and Sixth Machine Gun
Battalion followed later, and the Fourth Brigade of Marines was
organized in October, as a part of the Second Division, which General
Doyen commanded until relieved by Major General Omar Bundy, on November
8. General Doyen continued at the head of the brigade until ill health
compelled him to relinquish his command on May 9, 1918.

The fighting ability which distinguished the Marines in France was the
natural result of training and experience, the "spirit of the corps"
with which they were instilled. When war was declared there were only
511 officers, commissioned and warrant, and 13,214 enlisted men in the
Marine Corps, which eventually contained 2,174 commissioned and 288
warrant officers, 65,666 enlisted regulars, 6,704 reserves and 269
female reservists--a total strength of 75,101.

Recruiting, training, equipment and supply of this large force was a
task without parallel in the history of the Corps. It was conducted
with an energy and ability that reflected the utmost credit upon
Marine Corps Headquarters--Major General George Barnett, Commandant;
the Assistant Commandants, first General John A. Lejeune, afterwards
Brigadier General Charles G. Long; Brigadier General Charles H.
Lauchheimer, Adjutant and Inspector; Brigadier General George Richards,
Paymaster; Brigadier General Charles L. McCawley, Quartermaster; and
others on duty at posts and in the field.

What they did in France was only one phase of the operations of the
Marines. They were employed in practically every area in which the Navy
operated--on battleships in the North Sea, on cruisers in the Asiatic;
in Haiti, Santo Domingo and Cuba, and the isles of the Pacific. In
fact, they claim the honor of firing the first shot of the war in the
far distant island of Guam, where a Marine fired on a motor-launch
which was trying to get to the German ship _Cormoran_ with the news of
the declaration of war before an American naval officer could reach
that vessel and demand its surrender. That was the only German vessel
in our territorial waters which we did not get. Her crew blew her up,
and a number of her officers and men went down with the vessel.

Wherever they were, these Soldiers of the Sea, upon whom Uncle Sam
has called so often when he had a duty to perform anywhere in the
world--these men who, in many conflicts, have been the "first to land
and first to fight"--served well and added fresh laurels to those so
often won in the long history of the Corps. They may be pardoned for
singing with a will their marching song:

    If the Army and the Navy ever look on Heaven's scenes,
    They will find the streets are guarded by United States Marines.




CHAPTER XIX

THE ANSWER TO THE 75-MILE GUN

  GERMAN LONG-DISTANCE FREAK STOPPED BOMBARDING PARIS WHEN NAVAL
  RAILWAY BATTERIES ARRIVED--MANNED BY NAVY CREWS, HUGE 14-INCH
  GUNS OPERATED WITH FRENCH AND AMERICAN ARMIES--ADMIRAL PLUNKETT
  IN COMMAND--MOST POWERFUL ARTILLERY USED BY ALLIES ON THE WESTERN
  FRONT.


"Paris bombarded!" was the news that shocked the world on March 23,
1918. Two days before the Germans had begun their great drive for the
Channel ports. Their armies to the north were breaking through the
Allied defenses, taking one position after another. But their nearest
lines were nearly seventy miles from Paris. No gun known would shoot
half that distance. How could they be shelling the French capital?

That was what mystified the Parisians. Falling out of a clear sky, the
missiles fell, bursting in the streets. Aeroplane bombs, was the first
thought, for Paris was used to aerial raids. But these were undeniably
shells, not bombs, and there were no aeroplanes in sight. And they
continued to fall with painful regularity. Arriving at 15-minute
intervals, it was found that at least 21 shells had fallen that day.
They were not huge, weighing about 260 pounds, but they were large
enough to do considerable destruction, and to kill people in streets,
squares, and markets.

For a week they kept falling, and then occurred a tragedy that shocked
not only Paris but the whole Christian world. It was Good Friday,
and the cathedrals and churches were crowded with worshipers. As the
congregation--women and children, and men too old to fight--prayed in
the Church of St. Gervais, a shell crashed through the roof of the
building, and exploded. Seventy-five persons were killed, of whom
54 were women--and five of these were Americans. Ninety others were
injured.

In all Christian lands people were aghast at this slaughter of the
defenseless. Indignation was stirred all the more by the knowledge that
this bombardment was wholly without military value. Its entire object
was to terrorize the civilian population. It was only another example
of German frightfulness.

After long search by aircraft it was discovered that shells were coming
from the forest of Gobain, near Laon, nearly 75 miles from Paris.
There, inside the German lines, was located this new instrument of
warfare, the latest surprise sprung by the Germans and one of the most
sensational of the whole war. Worst of all, the Allies had no effective
reply. Aeroplane bombing proved ineffective, and the Allies had no guns
which could reach it.

For five months Paris endured this menace. No one knew where the shells
would fall next, or who would be the victim. The city, however, went
about its business and kept up its courage. But here in America there
was being prepared the Nemesis of the Teuton terror.

The United States Navy was at that very time building long-range guns
that, while not capable of firing such great distances as the German
cannon, were far more powerful and effective in action. Germany's gun
was a freak, merely able to hurl comparatively small shells seventy
miles or more. Huge projectiles weighing 1,400 pounds were fired by our
guns, and wherever they hit, everything in the vicinity was smashed.

Elaborate emplacements were required for the German gun, taking
considerable time to construct. Their cannon could be fired from only
one point. The American guns were on railway mounts, and could be
rapidly moved from place to place, wherever they were needed. Only
a few hours were required to get them into position. In fact, if
necessary, they could fire from the rails.

Five of these immense naval railway batteries were built and sent to
France. When the first battery arrived, on its way to the front, the
Germans stopped shelling Paris. Their long-distance gun was hastily
withdrawn, and it never fired another shot.

What these batteries saved us from can be judged from Admiral Sims'
statement that, encouraged by the shelling of Paris, the Germans were
preparing to conduct long-distance bombardments at various points
along the front. They were taking large guns from battle cruisers, to
be mounted where they could bombard Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Marne, Nancy
and other cities. Sixteen huge rifles, it was reported, had left Kiel
for this purpose. But, so far as known, they never got into action.
The Germans never carried out their plan to scatter that terror to the
cities of France.

These railway batteries, the largest ever placed on mobile mounts,
proved an effective answer to the Germans. They were distinguished not
only by what they prevented, but what they accomplished in action.
Engaged with the French and American armies from September 6th until
hostilities ceased, this was the most powerful artillery used by the
Allies on the western front.

The guns were of the largest type on our dreadnaughts--14-inch, 50
caliber, capable of throwing a 1,400-pound projectile 42,000 yards,
nearly 25 miles. In action, the firing was usually from 18 to 23 miles.

Operating at various points along the lines from Laon to Longuyon,
these batteries tore up enemy railways, cutting important lines of
communication; blew up ammunition dumps and bases, and scattered
destruction far in the rear of the German trenches. Manned entirely by
Navy personnel, the force was under command of Rear Admiral Charles P.
Plunkett.

Each battery comprised an entire train of 15 cars, made up as follows:

  1 Locomotive
  1 Gun car
  1 Construction car
  1 Construction car with crane
  1 Sand and log car
  1 Fuel car
  1 Battery kitchen car
  2 Ammunition cars
  3 Berthing cars
  1 Battery headquarters car
  1 Battery headquarters kitchen car
  1 Workshop car

Thus each battery was self-sustaining, carrying not only its own
ammunition, fuel and food, but also machinery and mechanics for making
repairs. The total weight of the gun-car was about 535,000 pounds,
the gun, breech mechanism, and yoke weighing 192,500 pounds. The
five batteries, including the staff train of eight cars, comprised 6
consolidation locomotives and tenders (tractive power 35,600 pounds),
5 gun-cars and 72 auxiliary cars.

The first mount, complete with its huge gun, rolled out of the shops
on April 25, 1918, less than a month from the time of the Good Friday
slaughter in the Paris church. Tested at Sandy Hook, N. J., five days
later, it proved a complete success, hurling its immense projectiles
more than twenty-five miles.

If our guns had been built in Paris we could have had them at the front
in three days. They were made to move by rail, and to be ready for
almost immediate action. But they had to get to France first, and the
difficulties of fighting a war 3,000 miles away were impressed upon
us by this necessity for transporting them. No ship was big enough
to carry one of them set up. Each had to be taken to pieces before
loading. The last of the mounts was completed May 25--a new record for
quick construction. But getting a ship to take them over was no easy
task.

The first ship assigned was so badly battered up on the incoming voyage
that it had to go into dock for repairs. The second ship, the _Texel_,
was sunk by a U-boat near our coast. It was June 29 before the first
of the battery transports, the _Newport News_, heavily laden with
material, sailed for France, arriving at St. Nazaire July 9th.

Setting up these immense batteries was a trying job. Facilities at
St. Nazaire were very limited for the work of assembly. Lieutenant
Commander D. C. Buell, an officer of railroad experience, who as
inspector had watched the building of the mounts, was sent to France.
Admiral Plunkett and his force were on hand when the major part of the
material arrived. All set to work, and in a little more than two weeks
the first train was assembled.

Then arose another complication. When the French saw the size of these
mounts, they were afraid their immense weight would crush the rails
and probably break through or weaken bridges. The railroad authorities
were unwilling for them to move over their lines. For a time it seemed
as if they would never get to the front. But Admiral Plunkett and his
aids had more confidence than did the French. The first train, which
had been completed a week before, left St. Nazaire August 17th. It
proceeded slowly and all doubts were removed when it rode the rails and
passed over bridges without the slightest trouble.

The news of its coming had somehow spread through France and its
progress toward Paris was like a triumphal procession. All along the
route crowds assembled, cheering the American naval gunners "going to
land," and girls decorated the gun with flowers. A second battery was
on the way before the first arrived. Camouflage was no concealment.
Everybody knew the big American cannon were on the way. And the Germans
must have learned it, too. For, when the battery got near the front,
the German long-distance gun was hurried away.

These two batteries were to proceed to Helles-Mouchy, and from there
search out the hidden enemy in Gobain. But when the batteries reached
this position, it was found that the German terrifier was gone, leaving
only its emplacement to mark the spot at which it had so long operated.

Battery No. 1 proceeded to the French proving ground at Nuisemont,
where firing tests were made with complete success. Battery No. 2
proceeded to Rethondes, in the forest of Compiegne, to fire upon an
ammunition dump at Tergnier, but after one shot, fired September 6,
ceased firing, as the French captured the village. Battery No. 1 was
taken to Soissons where, on September 11, position was taken near St.
Christopher Cemetery. No. 2 proceeded to Fontenoy-Ambleny.

While these two batteries were operating, work was continuing on the
remaining three. Trains No. 3 and 4 left St. Nazaire September 13,
followed by No. 5 on the 14th. They arrived at the railroad artillery
base, Haussimont, on September 23rd, 24th and 26th, respectively.

Weather conditions preventing observation by aeroplane or balloon,
it was decided to proceed without observation, so on September 14th
Battery No. 2 fired ten rounds at an ammunition dump in Besny-Loisy,
just west of Laon. No. 1 on September 28th fired into the German lines
at Laon, putting over 47 rounds between 1 and 5:30 p. m., at a range
of 34,000 yards. The target was the railroad yards. One hundred and
twelve rounds were fired against this objective between September 28th
and October 2nd. Battery No. 2 fired twelve rounds into Besny-Loisy on
September 15th.

The Germans began retreating from Laon while this long-range
bombardment was in progress, leaving these targets in the hands of the
Allies. It was found that, though the batteries had only maps to use
in directing the firing and without aeroplane observation, the shots
in nearly all cases were effective hits. One 14-inch shell wrecked
a three-track railroad line, making a gap of 100 feet, tearing up
rails, shattering ties and blowing a crater in the road-bed. Another
projectile struck a moving picture theater during a performance,
killing 40 men outright and severely wounding sixty. Two other shells
struck this theatre, completely demolishing it and several other
surrounding buildings. A freight train on a siding had been struck, and
one of the cars was lifted from the tracks and thrown a distance of
thirty feet.

Time and again enemy aeroplanes bombed the vicinity of these batteries.
Shells were continually passing overhead. On October 5th, at 4:30 p.
m., a shell burst directly over Battery No. 1, followed by three other
high bursts. A succession of shells followed. One struck only 16 feet
from the gun, fragments hitting the sideplates and breaking the casting
of the gas engine support, but doing no further damage.

Battery No. 2 was taken to Flavy-le-Martel, arriving October 8th. No. 1
remained at Soissons until October 24th, firing in all 199 rounds from
the same pit foundation. After the capture of Laon, the target was, on
October 2, shifted to a point northeast of that town, where 87 rounds
were fired at ranges from 28,000 to 36,660 yards.

Having performed so satisfactorily in the vicinity of Soissons with the
Tenth French Army, Batteries No. 1 and No. 2 were ordered to join the
First American Army. They arrived at Nixeville, just south of Verdun,
October 28th. Batteries 3, 4 and 5, already in that region, had fired
several rounds at open fields in the German lines near the targets
selected, in order to obtain aviation photographs and correct the
range. On the 30th and 31st six rounds per gun were fired each day, the
two guns at Thierville firing at an aviation field south of Longuyon
and the two batteries at Charny firing at points near Montmedy. Battery
No. 2 bombarded the railroad yards at Montmedy with 43 rounds on
November 1st and 2nd.

As General Foch was preparing for a big offensive east of Metz, the
French requested that two of the naval batteries be assigned to take
part in this operation. Accordingly Nos. 1 and 2 were assigned to the
French, while the remaining three remained at Thierville and Charny
to keep up the bombardment of Montmedy and Longuyon. No. 1 proceeded
via Champigneulles, arriving at its firing position, in the forest of
Velor, November 6th, its objective being Sarrebourg. Leaving Charny
November 3rd, Battery No. 2 reached Moncel-Lunéville, in the forest
of Mondon, November 9th, having orders to fire on Bensdorf. Both
targets were important German railroad centers. But the signing of the
armistice, on the 11th, put an end to the French offensive for which
huge preparations had been made.

Battery No. 3, which was shifted from Thierville to No. 2's position at
Charny, on November 1, fired at the Longuyon railway yards. No. 4 fired
23 rounds into Montmedy, and No. 5, 44 rounds at the transportation
centres of Longuyon. The next day Nos. 3 and 5 each fired 25 rounds
at Longuyon and No. 4, 20 rounds at the Montmedy railroad. On account
of the enemy's activities at Louppy and Remoiville, No. 4 November 3,
fired 25 rounds at a large ammunition dump and at the lower railroad
dump at Montmedy. On November 4, Battery No. 4 again took up position
at Thierville. No. 3 opened fire on Louppy and Remoiville on the
morning of November 4, firing 44 rounds at the two targets. Twelve
rounds were also fired at Montmedy.

The naval guns were last fired on November 11th, batteries 4 and 5
sending five shells each into Longuyon. The last shot was fired by No.
4, from Charny, at 10:58:30 a. m., ninety seconds before hostilities
ceased.

While direct observations could not be obtained in the Verdun sector,
there was evidence from the enemy of the effectiveness of these
guns. On November 5, the southern part of Montmedy, which was under
bombardment, was reported on fire. Later a German prisoner stated that
the firing on Montmedy had caused a great deal of damage, one shell
which landed in the railway yards, killing all the Germans in two
coaches.

[Illustration: NAVAL RAILWAY BATTERY FIRING FROM THIERVILLE UPON
LONGUYON

Insert: Rear Admiral Charles P. Plunkett, commanding the Naval Railway
Batteries in France.]

The batteries at Charny and Thierville were repeatedly shelled and
bombed. On October 30th, when the enemy was shelling crossroads
between No. 2 gun and its berthing cars, three American engineers
working on the track near by were killed, and the headquarters car and
one berthing car derailed. On the same day five soldiers were killed
and others wounded by shells which fell around Battery No. 4 at Charny.
Three men of Battery 4 were wounded by shell fire on October 28th, one
of these, A. P. Sharpe, seaman first class, dying the next day in the
hospital at Glorieux.

[Illustration: ON THE TURRET PLATFORM OF A BATTLESHIP

A naval airplane is mounted, on the turret platform, ready for the call
to the sea.]

One of the most important services rendered by the naval batteries was
the shelling of the railroad running through Longuyon and Montmedy,
the only line (except one running far to the north through Belgium),
by which the Germans could bring troops to Sedan. Though some shots
fell several hundred yards beyond the ranges calculated from the range
table, the railroad line and yards were struck frequently, and traffic
stopped completely, not only during the actual firing, but from six to
ten hours each day after the firing ceased.

General Pershing, in his report of November 20, 1918, said:

  Our large caliber guns were advanced, and were skilfully brought
  into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmedy,
  Longuyon, and Conflans. On the 6th a division of the First Corps
  reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, 25 miles from our
  lines of departure. The strategical goal which was our highest hope
  was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications,
  and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from
  complete disaster.

Though these batteries fired a total of 782 rounds and were under enemy
shell-fire repeatedly, there was no material damage to guns, mounts or
equipment, which met every condition imposed. The total rounds fired
per gun were: No. 1, 199; No. 2, 113; No. 3, 236; No. 4, 122; No. 5,
112.

In France the naval railway batteries operated as five separate and
independent units, all under command of Admiral Plunkett. His principal
assistants were Lieutenant Commanders G. L. Schuyler and J. W. Bunkley.
The commanders of the batteries were: No. 1, Lieutenant J. A. Martin;
No. 2, Lieutenant (junior grade) E. D. Duckett; No. 3, Lieutenant W. G.
Smith; No. 4, Lieutenant J. R. Hayden; No. 5, Lieutenant J. L. Rodgers.

The use of these guns at the front was first proposed in November,
1917. Impressed by the Allies' lack of long-range artillery, the Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance pointed out that a number of 14-inch guns at
the Washington Navy Yard were available and suggested that they might
be mounted on the Belgian coast to reply to the powerful artillery the
Germans were using against Dunkirk. Upon consideration, it was decided
that it was practicable to place these naval guns on railway mounts,
though they were heavier than any mobile artillery that had been built
by any country. On November 26, 1917, I instructed the Bureau of
Ordnance to proceed with the building of five of these mounts, with
complete train equipment. Though many problems had to be solved, the
naval gun factory completed the designs within two months, and the 136
standard drawings and 36 sketches required were ready to submit to
bidders on January 26, 1918.

With the numerous other war requirements, which taxed steel and
locomotive plants to their capacity, it seemed, at first, almost
impossible to secure the building of the mounts, locomotives and
cars required. But bids were secured, accepted on February 13, 1918,
and the contractors pushed the work so energetically that the first
mount was completed 72 days from the award of the contract. Scheduled
for delivery on May 15, it was completed April 25. The last mount,
scheduled for June 15, was completed May 25. The first gun and mount
complete arrived April 27 at Sandy Hook, N. J., where it was subjected
to severe firing tests. The locomotives and auxiliary cars were
completed June 1, and shipment overseas was begun. Credit for this
speedy construction is due contractors as well as naval officers,
and particularly Mr. Samuel M. Vauclain, president of the Baldwin
Locomotive Works, who took an intense personal interest in the whole
undertaking.

While construction was under way, the Navy had been selecting and
training the personnel, 30 officers and 500 men, required to man
and operate the batteries. Men were carefully chosen--some 20,000
volunteered for this detail--and were given an intensive course of
training.

The approximate cost of the five mounts, locomotives, cars, spare parts
and ammunition was $3,337,970.

As other artillery could accomplish with less expenditure of
ammunition and expense the results desired at the shorter ranges the
naval guns were used entirely for strategical purposes and were fired
at ranges between 30,000 and 40,000 yards, shelling objectives that
less powerful guns could not reach. The ammunition supply which was
gauged by the estimated "life" of the gun--that is, the number of times
it could fire with accuracy--consisted of 300 rounds for each gun, and
this quantity proved adequate. Battery No. 3 made a record for guns of
this size in firing 236 rounds without serious deterioration.

From beginning to end, this entire enterprise was so well planned and
carried out, that we may well consider it one of the most successful
operations in which the Navy ever engaged.




CHAPTER XX

THE NAVY THAT FLIES

  NAVAL AVIATION WATCHED OVER SHIPS AND SEARCHED THE SEAS--FIRST
  OF U. S. ARMED FORCES TO LAND IN FRANCE--FOUGHT ENEMY AIRCRAFT
  FROM HELIGOLAND TO POLA--ATTACKED U-BOAT BASES IN BELGIUM--NAVAL
  AVIATORS, IN TRAINING AND SERVICE, FLEW FIFTEEN MILLION MILES.


The first of the armed forces of the United States to land in France
were naval aviators--seven officers and 123 men, under command of
Lieutenant Kenneth W. Whiting. One group, sailing on the _Neptune_,
arrived June 5, 1917, at Pauillac, the port from which Lafayette
sailed for America to join the struggling colonists in their war for
independence. The other, on the _Jupiter_, reached St. Nazaire June 9,
sailing through the very waters in which John Paul Jones operated in
the Revolution. Eight miles up the river Loire lies Paimboeuf, where
Jones in the _Ranger_ arrived November 30, 1777. Fifteen miles away
is Quiberon Bay, where the French, February 14, 1778, fired the first
foreign salute to the American flag.

Naval aviation stations were erected at both Pauillac, which is on the
Gironde river near Bordeaux, and at Paimboeuf, so the operations of
America's flying navy in the World War were over the very waters where
the name and fame of the first American navy were established 140 years
before.

We had stations all along the coast of France--at Dunkirk, St.
Ingelvert and Autingues, headquarters of the Northern Bombing Group;
L'Aber Vrach, Brest, Ile Tudy, Le Croisic, Fromentine, St. Trojan,
Treguier, Arcachon, La Trinite, La Pallice, Le Fresne, Oye, Guipavas,
Paimboeuf, Pauillac, Rochefort, St. Ingelvert, and Gujan, with a
training school at Moutchic.

[Illustration: ASSEMBLING NAVAL AIRPLANES AT BREST]

In Ireland we had stations at Queenstown, Berehaven, Lough Foyle,
Whiddy Island and Wexford; in England at Eastleigh and Killingholme.
We aided Italy in fighting the Austrians, with our training school
at Lake Bolsena and an operating station at Porto Corsini, on the
Adriatic, across from the Austrian naval base at Pola. Our aviators
flew across the Alps and the Adriatic sea; they patrolled the waters
along the French coast, protecting the vast Allied shipping going into
and out of the French ports, and guarding the convoys of American
troops, munitions and supplies. Our Northern Bombing Group bombed the
German submarine bases and ammunition and supply depots in Belgium.
Operating with their British comrades, our aviators flew over the North
Sea and battled with German aircraft over Heligoland Bight, almost
within sight of the home bases of the German fleet. They took part in
the North Sea patrol in connection with the movements of the British
Grand Fleet, and those assigned to the British stations at Felixstowe
and Portsmouth had a part in the famous Dover Patrol that kept clear
the road from England to France.

[Illustration: NAVAL AVIATION HANGARS AT GUIPAVAS]

[Illustration: A NAVY "BLIMP" LEAVING HANGAR AT GUIPAVAS, FRANCE]

The United States Navy had 44 aviation stations and units in Europe,
with a record of 5,691 war flights, covering a distance of 791,398
miles. This does not include 18,000 flights that were made in training.
Forty-three submarines were attacked from the air, our aircraft being
credited, according to the records of Naval Aviation, with sinking two
U-boats, with probably sending down two more, and damaging others. An
even more striking evidence of efficiency was the fact that during
the last ten months of the war no surface craft convoy protected by
American naval aircraft in the war zone was successfully attacked by an
enemy submarine.

Attacking the German U-boat bases, Bruges, Zeebrugge, Ostend, and the
airdromes and air stations and other enemy establishments in Flanders,
the Northern Bombing Group, which operated in connection with the
British Royal Air Force, dropped more than 155,000 pounds of bombs,
destroying hangars and other structures, blowing up ammunition dumps
and now and then bringing down a kite balloon, spreading such havoc
that it shook the nerve of the German crews that handled the Teuton
aircraft in western Belgium.

Our first naval "ace," Lieutenant David S. Ingalls, was attached
to this Northern Bombing Group, being first assigned to Royal Air
Force Squadron No. 213. His spectacular performances began on August
11, 1918, when, in company with a British officer, he shot down a
two-seater machine in a running flight over the German lines. The
night of the 13th, flying over the German airdrome at Varsenaere, and
dropping to a point where his plane nearly touched the ground, he
sprayed 450 rounds from his machine-gun into the wondering Teutons, who
were making desperate efforts to get him with their anti-aircraft guns.
Swinging in a wide circle, he again swooped down on the hangars and let
loose four bombs in the midst of the camp, putting out searchlights,
scattering Germans and mussing up things generally. At the Uytkerke
airdrome he repeated the stunt he worked at Varsenaere, firing 400
rounds into the German hangars, and dropping bombs upon the Fokkers
grouped on the field below.

On this raid, which occurred September 15, Ingalls led a formation of
five in a wing of twenty biplanes. Returning from Uytkerke, he sighted
an enemy two-seater Rumpler going west from Ostend. With Lieutenant H.
C. Smith, of the British Air Force, Ingalls turned out of formation,
swung in over the shore, and attacked. The Rumpler turned and dived
toward Ostend, the Camels following. Firing 400 rounds from ranges of
fifty to 200 yards, they chased the enemy plane to the Ostend piers,
when the Rumpler went down out of control, burst into flames and
crashed just off the beach.

Three days later Ingalls made one of the most spectacular flights on
record. In company with two English pilots, he sighted a kite balloon
at 3,500 feet elevation near La Barriere. Crossing the coast line,
they attacked. The German kite reeled under the rapid fire, and as it
fell, its two observers opened up their white parachutes and jumped.
Ingalls gave the balloon another spraying with bullets and it burst
into flames. Falling, the blazing balloon landed on a hangar. There was
an explosion, followed by a fire that destroyed the entire station. The
flames were visible as far as Nieuport.

On September 22, in company with four other machines, Ingalls flew
all over Flanders, committing depredations on German hangars, and
ammunition trains. Four bombs were dropped on the ammunition dump at
Handezeame, blowing up a string of wagons loaded with shells. Flying
over Wercken, bombs were landed on a hut filled with explosives,
setting it on fire. Swinging around over the railway station at
Thourout, where the Germans had an enormous supply dump, two more hits
were made. On the way back, his fourth trip for the day, he bombed a
horse transport, and he and his companions by bombs and machine-gun
fire killed or wounded some twenty-five Germans and thirty-five horses.

With three other machines, Ingalls was, on September 24, flying over
the lines at 16,000 feet elevation, when twelve Fokkers were seen
approaching. Though outnumbered, the speedy Allied planes quickly broke
up the German formation. The famous British Captain Brown, of Squadron
No. 213, swung into and gunned a Fokker after a thrilling high bank,
and the German fell to earth three miles below. Another Fokker had got
on the tail of one of the Allied machines and by a well-aimed shot
punctured its gasoline tanks. Ingalls came to the rescue, fighting off
the enemy and in a few minutes shooting him down. The fourth plane was
hard at it, too, succeeding in shooting down another Fokker, after
following it down to within a few feet of the ground. Thus three
Fokkers were accounted for in a few minutes.

On another occasion, Ingalls, single handed, attacked six biplanes,
driving down one of them and eluding the five pursuers. The first of
October he engaged in three successive raids in one day. His second
point of attack was a large farm building at Cortemarck, used as a
shelter for troops. More than 200 Germans were gathered there. Crashing
through the roof, a bomb dropped by Ingalls exploded in their midst,
dealing death and destruction.

I wish it were possible to recount all the daring deeds performed by
our Navy and Marine Corps aviators, who with the British and on their
own engaged in constant attacks on the German bases in Belgium, but
Ingalls' exploits are enough to give an idea of the work performed
by this Northern Bombing Group. And all this was "land duty," a task
seldom assigned to navies.

The Navy's "regular job," far the greater part of its work, was
patrolling the long coast lines, watching for submarines, and
furnishing aerial escort for the convoys of troop, supply and merchant
ships that moved in a constant stream to and from European ports.
Covering vast areas of water, they flew hundreds of thousands of miles,
and they were always on the job.

Though the U-boats usually "ducked" when a seaplane or dirigible
balloon was sighted, aircraft often managed to spot them, and took part
in some exciting encounters. One remarkable engagement, a gunfire fight
between seaplane and submarine, took place off Dunkirk on August 13,
1918.

Four seaplanes left their station for a routine flight in connection
with the Dover Patrol. Eight miles off the coast, between Calais and
Dunkirk, Ensign J. F. Carson, one of the pilots, sighted a large
submarine, with no identification marks, speeding on the surface in
the direction of Holland. Carson challenged it by firing a recognition
signal. The U-boat opened fire on the seaplane with shrapnel from its
forward gun, firing five shots.

Carson nosed his plane down, his machine-gunner firing on the
submarine. As it came into bombing position, he dropped a bomb which
hit the vessel, and as it exploded two of the gun crew fell, apparently
badly wounded. The U-boat cleared its decks and dived. Just as it
plunged beneath the surface, another seaplane came into position and
dropped two bombs. One exploded in the splash where the submarine
plunged, and the second slightly forward of that point in the curving
line of the descending boat. Four minutes later the submarine again
came to the surface. But before Carson could get his plane in position
for bombing, it again submerged, sliding beneath the waves stern
foremost.

Carson unloaded his bombs on the moving wake, and put back to the
station for more ammunition. When he returned oil covered the water and
a lone life preserver floated near the spot where the submarine went
down.

The value of coöperation between aircraft and vessels was strikingly
demonstrated in the sinking of the U-boat called "Penmarch Pete," which
was, according to reports received, destroyed by American seaplanes
from the Ile Tudy Station and the U. S. destroyer _Stewart_, on
April 28, 1918. Two planes left Ile Tudy that morning, one piloted
by Ensign K. R. Smith, the other by Ensign R. H. Harrell, on convoy
duty. Zigzagging along the coast nearly due west, at 11:30 o'clock
they picked up a convoy of twenty ships heading south, six miles
northeast of the Pointe de Penmarch. Heavy fog kept the planes at a
low altitude and in the course of maneuvers about the convoy, a stream
of air bubbles, denoting the wake of a submarine, was sighted by both
planes. Smith descended close enough to the surface to distinguish a
large oil patch. He dropped two bombs, the first being apparently a
direct hit, and the second within ten feet of it. Dropping a phosphorus
buoy to mark the location, Harrell sent down a correspondence buoy in
the vicinity of the _Stewart_, then off the flank of the convoy. The
_Stewart_ speeded to the spot, sighted a dark object in the water, and
dropped a succession of depth-bombs. "These bombs were dropped so close
to the submarine, one on each side and within fifty feet of it, and the
force of the explosion was so great," reported Lieutenant Commander
Haislip, her commanding officer, "that it seems impossible that the
submarine could have survived." For days there rose to the surface
quantities of oil, which spread for miles down the coast. The U-boat
was later identified as "Penmarch Pete," which had operated off the
Pointe for months, and had destroyed over 100,000 tons of shipping.

Working with the British in the early stages of participation, our
aviators made numerous flights over the North Sea, flying as far as
the German coast. One of the first lost in action, Ensign Albert D.
Sturtevant, of Washington, a Yale man, was second pilot of a machine
that was attacked by ten German planes. Fighting against overwhelming
odds, he went down in flames.

The first enemy plane destroyed by an American aviator was shot down in
Heligoland Bight, almost in sight of the great German naval base, by
Ensign Stephen Potter, of Detroit, March 19, 1918. His machine was one
of a group sent out on long-distance reconnoissance. Nearing the German
coast, they were attacked by Teuton planes, and a lively combat ensued.
By dashing fighting, Potter succeeded in bringing down an enemy plane,
which, set afire, fell to the water and burned up. Putting to flight
other German machines, the force returned. It had travelled so far that
six and a half hours steady flying were required to reach the base on
the British Coast. Six weeks later, April 25, Potter lost his life in a
thrilling but unequal encounter over the North Sea.

While on patrol near Hinder Light, Potter and his companion sighted two
German planes and, diving, closed in on them, firing at close range.
Two more hostile planes appeared overhead, attacking vigorously. Four
more enemy planes now appeared in V formation. Of seven Germans in
action, four were attacking Potter, whose gun had jammed. Handicapped
as he was, Potter began to zigzag. Again and again he dodged them, but
at last the enemy machines got him on their broadside, and poured their
fire into him. Bursting into flame his machine crashed down. Potter was
last seen on the surface of the water in his burning plane, from which
arose a cloud of smoke. Two of the enemy circled over, then joined the
other five. When the smoke cleared away, there was not even a splinter
of wreckage to show where this brave young aviator had gone down.

Lost in the English Channel, given up as drowned, Ensign E. A. Stone,
of Norfolk, Va., was rescued after such an experience as few men
survive. With his observer, Sub-Lieutenant Eric Moore, of the British
Air Force, he clung for eighty hours, from Saturday morning to Tuesday
night, without food or drink, to the underside of a seaplane pontoon.

Going out on patrol at 9 a. m., at 11:30 the engine "went dead," and
the plane was forced to descend to the water in a heavy sea. At 2:30
the plane turned over, and the two men climbed up to the capsized
pontoons. With no food or water, soaked and lashed by the waves, there
they hung for nearly four days. They saw convoys in the distance, but
none came to their assistance. Sunday night a mast-head light was
sighted and the ship headed straight for the crippled plane. But when
it got within a hundred yards, she put out her lights and turned away.

"She thinks we are Huns," said Moore.

"I hope she does," said Stone, "Then they'll send patrol boats out to
get us. We couldn't be worse off if we were Germans."

A seaplane flew near them, on Monday afternoon, but, after circling
around, departed. It was not until 6 p. m., Tuesday, that they were
rescued by a trawler which had been chasing a submarine.

Every machine from their seaplane base and those from a station on the
French coast had searched continuously for the lost aviators as had all
the patrols and destroyers in the area.

Ensigns K. W. Owen and J. Phelan, of our Killingholme station, had a
somewhat similar experience May 16, near Flamborough Head. Disabled but
still afloat, by both getting on one wing they swung the tail of the
plane into the wind and managed to head her northwest, and coast about
two knots an hour. Four days they kept this up, and then were drenched
by a thunderstorm which damaged the wings and carried away their
rudder. It was not until one o'clock that night that they sighted what
seemed to be a boat in the distance. Using up their last cartridges,
they sent a stream of "fireworks" from a Very pistol, but this did the
work and in a few minutes a British destroyer drew alongside and took
them aboard. They had had nothing to eat during the entire time, their
only "provender" being thirty cigarettes. They had drifted 180 miles.

With an excellent training camp at Lake Bolsena and an operating
station at Porto Corsini, on the Adriatic Sea, across from the Austrian
naval base at Pola, our aviators did splendid service in Italy.
Patrolling the Adriatic and bombing Austrian bases was their "regular
job." But when, in the later months of the war, we began scattering
over Austria American and Allied propaganda, to convince the Austrians
of the hopelessness of their position, and which had a powerful effect
in inducing Austria to give up the fight, aeroplanes were utilized to
drop these thousands of leaflets and papers over cities. It was while
on one of these flights that our aviators had an exciting experience
and narrow escape.

On August 24, 1918, at 10:30 a. m. a group of five chasse and bombing
machines left Porto Corsini for Pola, with a load of "literature."
Formed in a flying wedge, the American machines soon came in sight of
the high hills back of the Austrian coast, and a few moments later
swept over Pola. At 11:20 the planes, at an altitude of 12,000 feet,
unloaded their propaganda material over the city while the inhabitants,
in response to the siren and bell alarms, sought cover from the bombs
they supposed were about to fall upon their heads. Anti-aircraft
ordnance filled the air with bursting shrapnel and incendiary
explosives, but the aim of the gunners was poor and none of our planes
was hit.

No sooner had the documents been dropped than Ensign G. H. Ludlow, the
leading pilot, saw five Austrian chasses and two seaplanes rise to give
battle to the five Americans. Giving the signal to attack the Austrian
machines, Ludlow dived toward them, immediately followed by Ensign
Austin Parker and Ensign Charles H. Hammann.

The fight started at an elevation of 7,500 feet while the American
planes were still in range of the anti-aircraft defenses. The Austrian
planes were much faster than the bomber, which was in the direct line
of fire. High explosives, shrapnel, pom-poms and incendiary shells
burst all around it, and as the American chasses flew down to give aid,
they in turn were subjected to the heavy rain of projectiles. But the
Austrian planes were also in the range and the anti-aircraft gunners,
fearing they would bring down their own machines, ceased fire, allowing
the American bomber to make good its escape.

In less time than it takes to tell, Ludlow singled out the center
machine of the enemy formation, giving it bursts from his machine-gun,
while handling his controls with his knees. He then swung to the left
after the second Austrian, Parker continuing the fight with the first.
Hammann, in the meantime, engaged two other Austrians which had swung
into action. At this juncture Parker's gun jammed, and he was obliged
to pull out of the melee.

Ludlow had riddled one of the enemy, which fell to the harbor in a
sheet of flame, but his own machine was badly damaged. The right
magneto was shot away; the propeller shattered; the engine crank-case
punctured, letting out the oil, which was ignited by a spark from the
exposed magneto, and the plane burst into flames. Ludlow immediately
slipped into a tail-spin, and the rush of air luckily extinguished the
fire. One pursuer was thrown off the track, but the other followed him
down to 1,500 feet above the water, the last burst from the Austrian
completing the wreck of Ludlow's engine, while two bullets passed
through his leather helmet and grazed his scalp. Ludlow then went into
another spin and, straightening out, made a safe landing on the water
three miles west of Pola.

Then occurred a daring exploit. Hammann, by generalship and fighting
ability, saved the whole squadron from further loss. With terrific
bursts, he drove at the enemy, firing first on their tails and then on
their flanks, and finally, with head-on drives, forced the remaining
Austrian planes to their base. This gave the slow-going bomber an
opportunity to make its final escape, allowed Parker and Voorhees to
make good their distance and start for Porto Corsini, and relieved
Ludlow from further immediate attack.

During a lull in the fighting Hammann swooped down on the surface
alongside of Ludlow and his crippled plane. Austrian destroyers were
on their way from the harbor to gather in both planes, and another
squadron of Austrian aircraft was taking off for pursuit. Ludlow opened
the photographic port of his machine, allowing the boat to flood,
kicked holes in the wings to destroy buoyancy, and slipping overboard,
swam to Hammann's waiting plane, and climbed up on the fuselage. The
machine, a single seater, was so small that he had to sit under the
motor, grasping the struts to keep himself from being swept off when
it gathered speed. The extra load forced the hull into the choppy sea,
where the bow, already damaged by gunfire, was broken in and one of the
wing pontoons smashed.

The crippled and overloaded little plane at last managed to rise from
the water. Hammann, by gunfire, sank the wreck of Ludlow's machine and,
putting on all speed, made for Porto Corsini just in time to escape the
leading Austrian destroyer and a squadron of seaplanes coming around
the southern end of Brioni Island and making for him.

The plane made the sixty mile flight without mishap, but in landing
the smashed-in bow took in enough water to nose the plane over, and,
catching a wing tip in the heavy chop, the machine turned over on its
back. The aviators extricated themselves from the wreckage, and were
rescued by a motor boat from the station. Ludlow had a bad gash in his
forehead, in addition to the scalp wounds received in the fight, and
Hammann was badly bruised and strained. But both soon recovered and
took part in numerous subsequent actions, including raids over the
front during the drive just prior to the Austrian collapse.

Before hostilities ended, U. S. Naval Aviation had 18,736 officers and
men in service in Europe. The long flights along the British, French
and Italian coasts, the patrols far out to sea, the combats with enemy
aircraft and submarines form one of the most brilliant chapters of the
war.

On this side of the water 24 naval aviation units were in operation,
patrolling the coast from Nova Scotia to the end of Florida, with
stations on the Pacific and Gulf, and one unit stationed in Panama
guarding the canal. The Azores, that half-way station between America
and Europe, was guarded by a detachment of Marine Corps aviators.
In America our fliers on patrol flew 2,455,920 nautical miles; and
advanced training flights, many of which were in the nature of patrols,
reached the grand total of 10,949,340 nautical miles. The total flying
by our naval aviators in America, the Azores and Europe was more than
15,000,000 miles, for a nautical mile is longer than a mile as measured
on land.

Naval Aviation grew, during the war, to a force of approximately
40,000, as follows:

  Officers--Qualified aviators, 1,656; student aviators, 288; ground
  officers, 891; student officers under training for commission,
  3,881.

  Enlisted men--Aviation ratings, 21,951; general ratings
  assigned to aviation duty, 8,742.

  Marine Corps--Aviation officers, 282; Enlisted men, 2,180.

This force was equipped with 1,170 flying boats, 695 seaplanes, 262
land planes, ten free balloons, 205 kite balloons, and 15 dirigibles.
Of this equipment 570 aircraft had been sent abroad, before the
armistice.

Captain N. E. Irwin was Director of Naval Aviation, with offices in
the Navy Department. Captain H. I. Cone was in general charge of our
aviation activities in Europe. Construction and operation of air
stations in France were under his supervision until August 1, 1918,
when he moved to London, as head of the Aviation Section of Admiral
Sims' staff. Then all our forces in France, except the Northern Bombing
Group, which was commanded by Captain D. C. Hanrahan, were placed
under command of Admiral Wilson, Captain T. T. Craven, as aide for
aviation, on his staff, being charged with all aviation matters.

Building more than forty stations in Europe, some of them of huge
extent, was a big task in construction. Its accomplishment, under
many handicaps and difficulties, reflects the utmost credit upon
all concerned. Constructors and aviators displayed such energy and
resource, that it was a current saying that, "Naval Aviation can do
anything that comes to hand."

They created in a few months stations that, under ordinary
circumstances, would have required years to build. Let me give one
example illustrative of others. At the big air station at Killingholme,
England, contracts for the buildings had been made, but it became
evident soon after the arrival of our aviation personnel that unless
we did the work ourselves that station would never be built in time to
permit active operations or house the men in comfort. But Lieutenant M.
E. Kelly, with a detail of 200 American blue-jackets, built in thirty
days twenty-eight barrack buildings of brick and concrete, each twenty
feet wide and sixty feet long. That is only one instance of hundreds of
things done by this force in Europe.

The Navy erected its own aircraft factory at the Philadelphia Navy
Yard, which was producing and shipping planes to Europe in the spring
of 1918. This immense plant was of inestimable value in carrying out
the program of aviation construction, which was pushed all along the
line.

Though there was no specific appropriation for erecting an aircraft
factory, this was considered so essential that an allotment of
$1,000,000 was made for the purpose. I signed the order authorizing the
erection of the plant July 27, 1917. Within ten days the contract was
let. Naval Constructor F. G. Coburn was detailed as manager. Under his
energetic direction, construction was pushed so rapidly that by October
17 the first buildings were up, considerable machinery installed and on
November 2 the keel of the first flying boat was laid. The building was
pronounced complete on November 20, only 110 days after the contract
was awarded. That factory was enlarged until it covered forty acres,
with buildings having 888,935 square feet of floor space. At the time
of the armistice, there were 3,642 employees engaged in constructing
aircraft of the latest type. The value of its war-time output was more
than $5,000,000.

Not only did the Navy build and put into operation hundreds of
seaplanes, flying boats and other aircraft, but it originated and built
the largest seaplanes in existence, the "NC" type, the first of which
was completed before the armistice.

Few people seem to realize that these huge "NC" planes--the "Nancys"
they were called--which became famous in the first flight across the
Atlantic in May, 1919, were built for war use, and that the work of
developing this new type was begun only five months after we entered
the war. It takes a long time to develop a new type of such magnitude.

All nations recognized the need of larger seaplanes, able to cruise
hundreds of miles and return without refueling. Shipping space was so
valuable that taking to Europe the large numbers of planes the Army and
Navy had contracted for was a serious problem.

The Chief Constructor of the Navy, Admiral Taylor, had often discussed
these problems with me. One day in September, he sent for Naval
Constructors G. C. Westervelt and J. C. Hunsacker. "I want a plane
designed that will fly across the Atlantic," was the surprising task
he assigned them. Admiral Taylor's daring idea aroused my warmest
enthusiasm. He and his force began work at once. No flying boat of
anything like that size and power had ever before been produced. There
were all kinds of problems to be solved; numerous experiments had to be
made concerning every detail. By the end of 1917 all the main elements
of the design had been formulated, and early in 1918 the work of
construction was begun. The NC-1 was completed by the first of October,
and the first test flight made three days later. This was so successful
that, on November 7, just before the armistice, she flew to Washington,
where she was inspected, going thence to Hampton Roads and back to
Rockaway.

Our dream of building a plane that would fly across the Atlantic had
been translated into reality. Six months later the NC-4 made the first
flight from America to Europe, from Rockaway, Long Island, to Nova
Scotia, the Azores, Portugal and England, landing at Plymouth, the
port from which, three centuries before, the Pilgrims had set sail for
America.

[Illustration: PAUILLAC, NAVAL AVIATION STATION

Pauillac, on the Gironde River near Bordeaux, was one of the great
assembly and repair bases maintained by the Navy.]

[Illustration: FLIERS WHOSE EXPLOITS BROUGHT PRESTIGE TO NAVAL AVIATION

At the left, in his seaplane, is Lieutenant G. H. Ludlow, who was
rescued, after his plane was disabled by enemy fire, by Ensign C. H.
Hammann (inset). At the right is Lieutenant David S. Ingalls, first
naval ace.]




CHAPTER XXI

THE FERRY TO FRANCE

  "N. O. T. S.," THE WORLD'S LARGEST CARGO FLEET--OPERATING 450
  STEAMERS, NAVY HAULED MILLIONS OF TONS OF MUNITIONS, FOOD, FUEL
  AND SUPPLIES TO FORCES ABROAD--ONLY EIGHT SUNK BY U-BOATS OR
  MINES--"TICONDEROGA" TORPEDOED--DISAPPEARANCE OF "CYCLOPS" MYSTERY
  OF THE WAR.


"N. O. T. S." You may not recognize those initials, but every sailor
on the Atlantic was familiar enough with them in 1918, for they stood
for the largest cargo fleet on earth, under a single management--the
Naval Overseas Transportation Service. No one had ever heard of it a
year before. But before the end of hostilities 490 vessels, 3,800,000
deadweight tons, had been assigned to this service, and 378 were in
actual operation, the remainder being under construction or preparing
to go into commission.

If the war had continued through 1919 we would have needed, according
to the estimates, at least 20,000 officers and 200,000 men for this
service alone. The number might have gone well over a quarter-million.
The Shipping Board and American yards were building ships at a rate
never before approached. The schedule for 1918-19 contemplated the
delivery of 1,924 vessels, the large majority of which were to be put
into war service and manned by the Navy. Officers and men had to be
recruited and trained months in advance, and this we were doing, to
have the crews ready to get to sea as vessels were completed. They
manned, in all, 450 cargo ships.

"N. O. T. S." was "The Ferry to France," carrying millions of tons of
munitions, guns, food, fuel, supplies, materials to our army and naval
forces abroad. Remaining in port only long enough to discharge their
cargoes, make necessary repairs, and fill their bunkers with coal, its
vessels plied steadily across the Atlantic, to and from Europe, with
the regularity of freight trains. Five tons of supplies a year were
required for each soldier. Vast quantities of munitions, mountains of
coal, millions of gallons of fuel oil; enormous quantities of steel,
timber, concrete and other materials; food for civilian populations;
locomotives, guns,--all these and a thousand other things were
required, and it was "up to" the N. O. T. S. to get them to Europe. And
that is what it did.

Sailing from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk,
Newport News, Charleston and other ports, they took their cargoes to
Bordeaux, to Pauillac and Bassens, to St. Nazaire and Nantes, to Havre,
Cherbourg, Brest, La Pallice, La Rochelle and Marseilles. Docking and
unloading facilities in French ports were very inadequate. Americans
had to build vast piers and wharves and warehouses. Channels were
tortuous, and nearly every harbor overcrowded. In spite of these
drawbacks, notable records were made in quick turn-arounds.

Incomparably greater were the difficulties and dangers faced at sea.
Suppose some vessel owner had stepped into a group of his ship captains
and told them that they were expected to navigate their vessels 3,000
to 4,000 miles, not singly, where they could give other craft a wide
berth, but in formation with a score of other vessels, hugging them
as closely as possible. Furthermore, that at night they would have no
lights to guide them or indicate the position of other ships in the
convoy, but must sail at full speed, changing course every fifteen
minutes. And finally, warned the ships' masters that at any moment they
might be attacked by submarines, torpedoed and sent to the bottom.
Wouldn't that have been enough to make the most hardened seadog throw
up his hands and resign his job?

Yet that was what every captain and crew of the N. O. T. S. had to
face. They did not fear the submarine half as much as they did the
perils of war navigation, the possibilities of collision. One was
problematical; they were willing to take chances and eager to get a
shot at a "sub." The other danger was constant and might mean the loss
of other vessels as well as their own. Under the circumstances, it is
remarkable that collisions were so infrequent, and so few vessels were
lost or damaged.

Consider the record of the steamship _George G. Henry_. That will give
some idea of the work these ships did, and the perils they faced.
Having made seven round trips to Europe, averaging 76 days--a splendid
record for a cargo steamer--the _Henry_ sailed from France for New
York. When she was far out at sea, alone, footing her way under full
speed, a submarine was sighted 5,000 yards away. This was at 6:50 a.
m., September 29, 1918. "Full left wheel" was ordered, general quarters
rung in, and the guns went into action.

The "sub" opened fire, some of his shells falling a little short,
others going over the vessel. Twenty-one shots from the after-gun made
the U-boat keep his distance and get out of range, but he still kept up
the chase. After two hours the "sub," which had guns of considerable
power, was still pursuing and now and then firing. At last, at nine
o'clock, the Germans scored a hit. A six-inch shell struck the _Henry_,
piercing the after-deck, plunging diagonally downward, breaking the
exhaust pipe of the steering gear and exploding against a magazine
filled with powder and shells.

The ammunition exploded, spreading destruction, and starting such a
blaze that the whole after-part of the ship was soon in flames. Its
powder destroyed, fire raging around it, the after-gun, the one bearing
on the enemy, was useless. The crew turned to fighting the fire. Smoke
bombs were exploded, and a dense smoke-screen overhung the stern.
Thinking he had crippled the ship, the U-boat sailed past the weather
end of the smoke-screen, redoubling his fire, using shrapnel and solid
shot. Though the vessel was not hit again, the shrapnel exploding over
it descended in a rain on the decks and fourteen men of the crew were
struck by flying fragments.

By steering obliquely, the _Henry_ brought its forward gun to bear,
but the "sub" ran out of range. At 10:15 the fire having been got
under control, two shells were fired from the after-gun, both striking
extremely close to, if not hitting the U-boat. Clouds of yellowish
smoke rose from the submarine, which ten minutes later ceased firing
and submerged. It had given up the fight.

The enemy disposed of, the N. O. T. S. ship proceeded on its way.
Plunging along, with all lights out, five days after its encounter
with the submarine, the _Henry_ was nearing the American coast. An
outbound convoy, shrouded in darkness, was proceeding from New York.
It was midnight, pitch dark, and before either the group going east
or the single ship sailing west, knew of each other's presence, the
_Henry_ ran into the convoy. In a moment, before there was time even
to switch on running lights to keep clear of the convoy vessels, the
_Henry_ crashed into the _Herman Frasch_, cutting into her well below
the water line. The _Frasch_ had received a mortal wound, and sank in a
few minutes right under the bow of the _Henry_.

Three days afterwards, on the other side of the ocean, the steamship
_American_ collided with the _Westgate_, sending the _Westgate_ to the
bottom.

Sailors have a superstition that "luck runs in streaks," and it does
seem so, for, with the hundreds of N. O. T. S. vessels running back and
forth, only four were sunk by collision, and two of these accidents
occurred within three days. Of the 450 vessels actually sailing for
the N. O. T. S., only 18 were lost--eight were victims of torpedoes or
German mines, four were sunk as the result of collisions, and six were
lost from other accidents, such as fire or stranding.

One of these cases was the most mysterious thing that happened during
the war--the disappearance of the _Cyclops_.

Sailing from Bahia, Brazil, the _Cyclops_, carrying a cargo of
manganese, was bound for Baltimore. She was proceeding steadily, with
no indication of any doubt as to her seaworthiness. Though she reported
having some trouble with one of her engines, her captain felt confident
that he could easily reach port, even if using only one engine might
somewhat reduce his speed. On March 4th the collier put into Barbados,
British West Indies, to take aboard coal for the rest of the voyage.
While in that port, there was no indication of anything unusual. Among
officers, crew and passengers there seemed to be no apprehension or
foreboding of trouble or disaster. After coaling, she sailed away. Many
persons saw her sail, other vessels hailed her as she passed out to sea.

After that no one ever saw the _Cyclops_ again, or heard one word, or
ever found any trace of her. Almost invariably, when a vessel is sunk,
bodies of the drowned are found, and a mass of floating wreckage. But
never a soul of all those on the big 19,000-ton collier, never a stick
of wreckage or one thing from the lost ship was ever discovered.

The whole area was searched for weeks, scores of vessels joined in the
hunt, rewards were offered for the discovery of anything concerning
the missing collier. Nothing was ever found. She had disappeared
completely, leaving not a trace.

In this connection this last message, the last word received from the
_Cyclops_ is of melancholy interest:

  From: U. S. S. _Cyclops_, Barbados.

  To: Opnav.

  Arrived Barbados, West Indies, 17303 for bunker coal. Arrive
  Baltimore, Md., 12013. Notify Office Director Naval Auxiliaries,
  Comdr. Train (Atl), 07004.

  Class 3                                     U. S. S. CYCLOPS.
  DNAS                     1145AM                           3-4-18.

Three hundred and nine men perished when the _Cyclops_ went down. In
addition to her officers and crew, she was bringing north some 72
naval personnel who had been serving on United States vessels in South
American waters, as well as a few civilians returning from Brazil,
among them Mr. Maurice Gottschalk, United States consul at Rio de
Janeiro.

What happened to her? There were many theories, most of them wild and
untenable; none that seemed to fit the case thoroughly. Many people
jumped to the conclusion that she was sunk by a submarine, but, so far
as known, there was no submarine anywhere near that region. Others,
seizing upon the fact that her captain, Lieutenant Commander G. W.
Worley, was a native of Germany, and that a number of the crew had
German names, thought captain and crew had turned traitors and taken
the ship to Germany. Her captain had come to America as a boy. He had
been employed in the Naval Auxiliary Service for nearly twenty years
with no evidence of disloyalty. But this belief among some outside the
Navy, that the ship had been taken to Germany, persisted until the
armistice, when there was undeniable proof that no such vessel had been
captured, turned over or sighted, and the Germans knew no more about
her fate than we did.

The only theory that seems tenable is that the _Cyclops_ was caught
in a sudden West Indian hurricane; that her cargo shifted, listing
the vessel, which turned turtle and went down. This is the only way
in which seamen account for the absence of wreckage. Our colliers of
that type have high steel beams like cranes, with chains of buckets
to load and unload coal. If she went down bottom-side up, these huge
steel fingers may have pinned down everything on deck, allowing nothing
to float to the surface. But, like everything else connected with the
case, that is all conjecture.

"Fate unknown," is the inscription beside the name of the _Cyclops_
on the Navy list. The waves that sweep over the spot where she lies
conceal the secret. Her fate will probably remain a mystery until that
Last Day when the waters are rolled back and the sea gives up its dead.

The most serious loss of life, next to the _Cyclops_, sustained by
the N. O. T. S., was in the sinking of the _Ticonderoga_. This animal
transport, manned by Navy personnel but with soldiers aboard to care
for the cargo, was almost in mid-Atlantic, though nearer Europe than
America, the night of September 29, when her engines broke down and she
fell behind her convoy. At 5:30 the next morning she was attacked by
the U-152. Though the steamer was riddled by shells, and most of her
men were killed or wounded, she fought on for two hours until both her
guns were disabled. Lifeboats had been smashed by shell-fire, and there
were not even enough rafts left to accommodate all the men. They were
hundreds of miles from the nearest land, the Azores, with little hope
of getting to shore.

The wounded were given the preference in getting into the boats. Of the
237 men aboard only 24 were saved, the majority of them wounded. Two
of the officers, both junior-grade lieutenants, F. L. Muller and J. H.
Fulcher, were taken prisoners and carried to Germany by the submarine.

One of the few survivors, Ensign Gustav Ringelman, officer of the
deck, said the submarine was sighted only 200 yards off the port bow;
the captain put his helm hard to starboard and came within 25 feet
of ramming the U-boat. The submarine fired an incendiary shell which
struck the ships' bridge, killing the helmsman, crippling the steering
gear and setting the amidships section ablaze. Lieutenant Commander
J. J. Madison, captain of the _Ticonderoga_, was severely wounded by a
piece of this shell. But, wounded as he was, he had himself placed in a
chair on the bridge, and continued to direct the fire and maneuver the
ship until the vessel had to be abandoned.

Six shots were fired at the _Ticonderoga's_ 3-inch forward gun, killing
the gun crew and putting the gun out of commission. Then the U-boat
drew away some distance, both ship and submarine keeping up the firing.
"During this time most everybody on board our ship was either killed
or wounded to such an extent that they were practically helpless from
shrapnel," said Ringelman. "The lifeboats hanging on the davits were
shelled and full of holes, others carried away. However, we kept the
submarine off until our fire was put out and our boats swung on the
davits, ready to abandon the ship with the few men left on board.
Possibly fifty were left by that time--the rest were dead."

The submarine still continued to shell the ship and then came alongside
and fired a torpedo, which struck amidships in the engine room. The
ship slowly settled.

There was one life-raft left on top of the deck house. The wounded men
were gathered together and lashed to the raft, which was then shoved
off from the ship. Three or four minutes after that the _Ticonderoga_
took the final plunge. The submarine picked up the executive officer
out of the water and took the first assistant engineer, Fulcher,
off the life raft. As Muller, whom Captain Franz, of the submarine,
supposed to be the captain of the _Ticonderoga_, was picked up, Franz's
first questions were:

"Where's the chief gunner? Where's the chief gunner's mate?"

"Dead," replied Muller.

Alicke, a machinist's mate of German descent, already hauled aboard the
submarine, interpreted for Fulcher. Franz was ordering him to the raft
alongside. He pleaded to be kept on board. "Speak for me," he begged
his officer, but the German captain replied: "Get back on the raft.
What do you mean by fighting against us, against your country? Only God
can save such as you now!"

Wounded men on the raft pleaded: "Won't you please take, us? We have
no food or water; no chance." But Franz answered, "We have room for no
more," and cast them adrift.

All on board that raft were lost. The lifeboat, containing mainly
wounded soldiers, was threatened by the Germans, who went aboard it in
their search for the ship's commander. They failed to discover Captain
Madison, who lay, badly wounded, almost under their feet. The Captain
and 21 men were in that boat for four days before they were rescued by
the British steamer _Moorish Prince_.

The two officers made prisoners found that the submarine was the U-152,
which had left Kiel September 5, ordered to operate in American waters.
The submarine, Muller and Fulcher said, received on October 11 the
order from Berlin, "Engage men of war only; merchant war has ended,"
and on October 20 the radio, "All submarines return to Kiel."

The U-152 arrived at Kiel November 15, four days after the armistice.
The two _Ticonderoga_ officers stated that the executive officer of
the _Kronprinz Heinrich_, the mother ship of the submarines, formally
released them as prisoners, saying, "Naval officers have no more power
over you." He blamed the collapse of Germany upon the entry of the
United States into the war. "You have ruined our country," he added.
"See what you have done!"

He told them that they were free to go ashore and the next day the
lieutenants left for Copenhagen, from which they made their way to
America.

Only eight N. O. T. S. vessels were lost by enemy action, and six
from other causes during the war period. Though the Naval Overseas
Transportation Service was not formally organized under that name until
January 9, 1918, naval vessels had been performing such service from
the beginning of the war. Commander Charles Belknap was the director
of this service from its inception until January 17, 1919, when he
was succeeded by Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones. Six million tons of
cargo were carried by Navy vessels from May, 1917, to December, 1918,
following being the principal items:

  For the Army in France                  3,102,462 tons
  For the Navy (exclusive of coal)        1,090,724 tons
  Coal shipped from Norfolk               1,348,177 tons
  Coal from Cardiff to France for Army       96,000 tons
  Food for the Allies                       359,627 tons
                                          ---------
                                          5,996,990 tons

Five hundred million pounds of meats, butter, etc., were carried to our
forces overseas, only 4,000 pounds being lost on voyage.

In addition to 1,500,000 tons of coal carried overseas or from England
to France, 700,000 tons of fuel oil and gasoline were taken to Brest,
Queenstown, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic. The N. O. T. S. also
operated the mine-transports, which carried across the Atlantic 82,000
complete mine-units for the North Sea Barrage.

When rail transportation broke down in the cruel winter of 1917-18,
threatening to close down New England's industries and cause widespread
suffering, the Navy released large quantities of coal stored at supply
bases, and naval vessels hauled to Boston and other ports the fuel
which brought relief to that section.

During the war, when there was not enough merchant shipping for
commerce in the western hemisphere, N. O. T. S. ships carried American
goods, manufactures and other cargoes to and from the West Indies,
Mexico, and the ports of Central and South America.

The activities of the N. O. T. S. did not end with the armistice. For
many months the Navy continued to haul supplies and fuel to our forces
abroad, took commercial cargoes wherever needed, and carried food to
the distressed regions of Europe. Its vessels plied to nearly every
quarter of the globe--to Russia, Germany, Holland, England, France,
Portugal, Spain, Italy, Austria, Greece, Turkey and Arabia; to South
America; to Hawaii, the Philippines and China, going as far as Burma,
Ceylon, and the Dutch East Indies.




CHAPTER XXII

RADIO GIRDLED THE GLOBE

  IF GERMANS HAD CUT EVERY CABLE, WE COULD STILL HAVE TALKED TO
  EUROPE--FROM ONE ROOM IN NAVY DEPARTMENT FLASHED DESPATCHES
  TO ENGLAND, FRANCE AND ITALY--CAUGHT GERMAN AS WELL AS ALLIED
  WIRELESS--QUEER "NEWS" FROM BERLIN--U. S. NAVY BUILT IN FRANCE
  RADIO STATION WHOSE MESSAGES ARE HEARD AROUND THE WORLD.


If the Germans had cut every cable--and their U-boats did cut some of
them--we would still have been able to keep in touch with Pershing and
the Army in France, with Sims in London, Rodman and Strauss in the
North Sea, Wilson at Brest, Niblack at Gibraltar, Dunn in the Azores,
with all our forces and Allies.

A spark, flashing its wave through the air, would in an instant cross
the Atlantic. Caught by the Eiffel tower in Paris or the Lyons station,
by the British at Carnarvon, by the tall Italian towers in Rome, it
could be quickly transmitted to any commander or chancellery in Europe.
That was the marvel wrought by radio.

President Wilson and Secretary Baker in Washington were, so far as
time was concerned, in closer touch with Pershing and his forces
than President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton were with the
battle-fields a few miles away in Virginia, during the Civil War. It
was infinitely easier for me to send a message or hear from our vessels
3,000 or 4,000 miles distant than it was for Gideon Welles, when he
was Secretary of the Navy, to communicate with the Federal ships at
Charleston or with Farragut at Mobile.

Vessels at sea could be reached almost as easily as if they had been at
their docks. Submarine warnings, routings, all kinds of information and
orders were sent to them, fifty or sixty messages being transmitted
simultaneously. At the same time radio operators were intercepting
every word or signal sent out by ships. Sometimes, as the operators
remarked, "the air was full of them."

"ALLO! ALLO! SOS!" When that call came naval vessels went hurrying
to the scene, for it meant that a ship was attacked by submarines.
Sometimes in the war zone the air seemed full of "Allos," for ships
approaching the European coast could catch the wireless for hundreds
of miles, hearing signals one moment from a vessel off Ireland and the
next from some craft being attacked in the Bay of Biscay.

From one room of the Navy Department--the "Trans-Ocean Room," we called
it--we communicated with all western Europe. Messages went direct to
the high-power sending stations at Annapolis, Sayville, Long Island;
New Brunswick and Tuckerton, N. J., which flashed them overseas. At the
same time dispatches were pouring in at receiving stations, coming into
Washington from abroad without interfering with the volume going out.

Stations at San Francisco, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, and Cavite spanned
the Pacific, keeping us in touch with the Far East, with China, Japan,
the Philippines, and Eastern Russia. North and south from Panama to
Alaska were wireless stations, from Darien, on the Isthmus, to far
up into the Arctic. These were the "high-powers." At various points
along the coast were shore-to-ship stations that communicated with
shipping several hundred miles from shore. And there were radio compass
stations, which could determine a ship's position at sea.

The United States Navy not only built up this vast system in our own
territory, but it erected in France the most powerful radio station in
existence. Located near Bordeaux, at Croix d' Hins, it is named the
Lafayette, and a tablet on the main building bears the inscription:

  Conceived for the purpose of insuring adequate and uninterrupted
  trans-Atlantic communication facilities between the American
  Expeditionary Forces engaged in the World War and the Government of
  the United States of America.

  Erected by the United States Navy in conjunction with and for the
  Government of France.

Planned in 1917, in response to the earnest desire of our military
authorities that steps be taken to insure ample wireless communication,
in case cables should be cut or otherwise interrupted, and to
supplement the inadequate cable service, this immense plant was fast
approaching completion when the armistice was signed. Then work was
suspended for a time, but on agreement with the French government was
resumed, and pushed to completion.

When, after elaborate tests, the plant was put into operation, on
August 21, 1920, I received this radiogram:

  This is the first wireless message to be heard around the world,
  and marks a milestone on the road of scientific achievement.

                                      LAFAYETTE RADIO STATION.

The Navy takes a just pride in having brought into being that great
plant with its eight towers, each 832 feet high, nearly 300 feet higher
than the Washington Monument--the first station to girdle the globe by
wireless.

During the war the Navy controlled all radio in the United States and
its possessions, taking over and operating 59 commercial stations.
These fitted easily into the extensive system which the Navy itself had
developed, for on January 1, 1917, it owned and operated 55 stations
at various points from Panama to Alaska, and from our Atlantic coast
across the continent and the Pacific to the Philippines. This had been
the work of years.

In August, 1914, immediately after the outbreak of war, Commander
S. C. Hooper was sent to Europe to study the latest developments in
radio and war communications, and spent six months in England, France,
Ireland, Holland and Belgium. His report proved of decided value. A
special board, headed by Captain Bullard, was appointed, and this led
to the expansion of Navy Radio and the creation, in 1916, of the Naval
Communication Service.

Nearly a year before we entered the war, May 6th to 8th, 1916,
naval communications, wire and wireless, of the entire country were
mobilized, under the supervision of Captain (later Rear Admiral) W.
H. G. Bullard, Superintendent of Radio Service. All the apparatus
necessary for country-wide communication by radio or telephone was
provided, by the Bureau of Engineering, specially marked, and placed in
readiness for operation on twenty-four hours' notice.

Inaugurating war service was, therefore, comparatively simple, and,
under the supervision of Captain D. W. Todd, Director of Naval
Communications, was easily accomplished. Trans-ocean service with
Europe was improved by increasing the power of Tuckerton, N. J., and
Sayville, L. I., the German-built stations we had taken over, and
placing improved apparatus at New Brunswick, N. J. Work was pushed on
the big new station at Annapolis, Md.

At Otter Cliffs, near Bar Harbor, Maine, a receiving station was built
that more than doubled the capacity of the existing ones at Chatham,
Mass., and Belmar, N. J. Sending and receiving stations were connected
by wire with the Navy Department, and use of high speed apparatus,
automatic senders and receivers enabled us to handle an immense amount
of traffic. Speed in transmission increased from 30 to 100 words a
minute in actual practice, and 300 words in pre-arranged tests, and
there was almost as marked progress in receiving.

In 1916, experts considered it a very creditable record when 125,000
dispatches were transmitted or received. In the twelve months following
April 6, 1918, when traffic was at its height, a million dispatches,
averaging 30 words each, were handled from the Navy Department alone.
The Naval Communication Service in a single year handled, by wire and
wireless, 71,347,860 words.

American merchant ships, as well as naval vessels, were equipped with
modern apparatus and furnished competent operators. Thousands of radio
operators were required, and 7,000 were enlisted and trained. At
Harvard University we established the largest radio school that ever
existed. Beginning with 350 students in 1917, the number grew to 3,400
and operators were graduated at the rate of 200 a week.

Air, surface and undersea craft were linked by radio, easily
communicating with each other at long distances. Battleships received
four messages and transmitted three simultaneously.

During the flight of the Navy planes across the Atlantic, in May,
1919, a message was sent from the Navy Department to the NC-4 far out
at sea. An immediate reply was received from the plane, and this was
transmitted to London, Paris, San Francisco and the Panama Canal Zone,
and its receipt acknowledged by these stations, thousands of miles
apart, all in three minutes after the original message left Washington.

When President Wilson went to France on the _George Washington_ to
attend the Peace Conference in Paris, we kept in touch with the ship by
wireless all the way across the Atlantic. On the return voyage we made
a test with the wireless telephone and from an instrument much like the
'phone in your home or office, I talked with the President when he was
1,700 miles at sea.

The radio compass, used first for locating enemy submarines, became
a most important aid to navigation. Any ship out of its course or
uncertain of its reckoning has only to transmit the signal, "Give me my
position." The operator at the radio compass station turns the wheel
now this way, then that, until he finds from what point the wireless
comes strongest. At the same time other stations along the coast are
doing the same thing. Triangulating the directions reported, the
master out at sea is told the position of his vessel, the latitude and
longitude and, if in danger, is told what course to steer to get out of
his predicament.

The saving in life and property has more than compensated for the cost
of this system. Beginning with a few on the Atlantic, there are now
some 75 of these compass stations all along our coasts.

The necessity of a single control of wireless was shown by an instance
that occurred one night in the Navy Department. A message was being
received from Darien, in the Panama Canal Zone, when some one broke in
on its wave-length and mixed up words and letters in a hopeless jumble.
The operator had to stop Darien until he could find out where the
trouble was. At last they found it was a station in Nova Scotia, that
was testing its apparatus. It had unintentionally "broken" into the
wave-length our operators were using, and caused interference clear to
Panama.

American news was spread throughout the world by Navy radio. Every
night the "Navy Press" was broadcasted, and received by ships far out
at sea. Our boys in the army were quite as eager to hear the news
from home, and a complete service, compiled by the Committee on Public
Information, was sent to Europe each night, and distributed through the
Allied countries, including Russia. Regular reports were sent to South
America and the Orient, the latter being distributed throughout China,
Japan and Siberia.

Germany had a big Cryptographic Bureau in Berlin, with experts
in deciphering languages and codes, which often secured valuable
information from intercepted radio messages. With the assistance of
able civilians, we built up a corps of code and cipher experts who
compared well with those of any country. Frequent changes in codes kept
Germany guessing, and afforded a high degree of secrecy to our official
communications.

"Listening in" on Nauen, the largest of German stations, Navy operators
in America took down nightly the latest news from Berlin. And the
"news" the Germans sent out for home consumption and foreign effect was
weird and startling. One night in July, 1918, the Germans announced:

  Vaterland sunk! Largest German vessel used by Americans as troop
  transport, named by them "Leviathan," was torpedoed and sent down
  today by German submarines!

By wireless, telegraph, bulletins and newspapers, the report was spread
all over Germany, and there was general rejoicing throughout the empire.

I did not believe the report and felt it could hardly be true, but I
must confess that the dispatch gave me a start. Our latest reports
showed that the big transport had sailed from Brest three days previous
and was nearly half way home. My anxiety was not relieved until we
got positive assurance of her safety. The British radio next day
broadcasted the following statement:

  The German wireless and German newspapers have asserted that the
  former German liner the _Vaterland_, now in use as an American
  transport, had been torpedoed and sunk. The statement is false.
  The _Vaterland_ has not been sunk. The Vossische-Zeitung says that
  the Americans had intended to bring over a dozen divisions in the
  course of a year in this ship. If so the intention may be carried
  out, for the _Vaterland_ is afloat and is in the finest possible
  condition.

There was bitter disappointment in the "Fatherland" when the German
Government gradually broke the news that it was not the _Vaterland_,
but another steamer, "almost as big," which had been sunk. It was, in
fact, the _Justicia_, a British vessel which had been carrying troops,
but was returning empty--and she was nothing like so large as the
_Leviathan_, not by 20,000 tons.

That report was only one of the thousand queer things we heard from
Germany.

There was laid on my desk every morning a daily newspaper--I suppose
it was the only "secret" daily ever gotten out in America--which,
compiled and mimeographed by the Naval Communication Service and marked
"confidential," was sent in sealed envelopes to officers and officials
whose duties compelled them to keep in touch with all that was going on
abroad. This contained not only all that Germany was sending out, but a
digest of all that was sent out by the British, French and Italians.

We certainly heard some strange "news" from Berlin--things that were
news to us. One report, received July 25, 1918, when our troops were
proving their valor in Foch's great drive, informed us:

  The American army is lacking in the one essential, the will to
  fight. In any case, it will not be numerous enough to play any
  important part until 1920, and then only provided the transport
  difficulty is got over and the munition industry developed from its
  present nursery stage. Our submarines will see to the transports,
  and America will find it impossible to create a gigantic industry
  and a gigantic army at the same time. Ammunition perhaps, but guns
  cannot be cast in sewing-machine factories. At present the American
  soldiers are without either rifles or artillery.

At that moment there were a million American soldiers in France and we
were turning out munitions at a rate the Germans could not believe was
possible.

[Illustration: THE STATION WHOSE MESSAGES ARE HEARD AROUND THE WORLD

The Lafayette radio station, the most powerful in the world. Inset: a
radio operator at work.]

The more evident it was that U-boat warfare had failed, the more
vehement were the German naval authorities in asserting its success.
Admiral Holtzendorff, head of the Admiralty, announced on July 29, that
they were taking into consideration the counter measures--(that meant
the mine barrage, the destroyers, patrol boats and all the things we
were using to defeat them); that the Germans were building many more
submarines, and that "final success is guaranteed."

[Illustration: THE TABLET ON THE MAIN BUILDING OF THE LAFAYETTE RADIO
STATION]

After submarine crews had mutinied and U-boat warfare had ended with
the recall of their submarines in October, the German chiefs were still
bluffing their own people. As late as November 5, less than a week
before the armistice, we caught this bulletin from Berlin:

  English wireless service reported, and this report was circulated
  also in neutral newspapers, that German submarines had passed
  Norwegian coast on their way home with a white flag at the
  mast-head. This is a pure invention. English wireless has thus
  again circulated a lie.

At that very time the U-boats were all hurrying home, some of them
passing so close to the Norwegian coast, to avoid mines and destroyers,
that they could be plainly seen from shore.

When the French and Americans by terrific attacks drove the Germans
across the Marne, Berlin announced:

  The excellent execution of the movement for changing to the
  opposite bank of the wide River Marne, which took place unnoticed
  by the enemy, demonstrates today the splendid ability of the German
  command and troops.

When the Americans won their notable victory at St. Mihiel we heard
from Berlin that the Germans had only "evacuated" the "bend" there to
improve lines, and that on the whole, the French and American attacks
had failed. And General Wrisberg assured the trusting Teutons back in
the fatherland:

  The American army also can not terrify us, as we shall settle
  accounts with them.

Even in November, with total collapse only a few days away, they were
still talking of the failure of the Americans and the "victorious
repulse" of the French.

After the mutiny at Kiel and other ports, where sailors took possession
of the ships and started the revolution, they sent out this bulletin,
on November 7:

  Concerning situation in Kiel and uprisings in other harbor towns;
  military protection of Baltic has been carried out without a break
  by navy. All warships leaving harbor fly war flags. Movements
  among sailors and workmen have been brought back to peaceful ways.

The surrender of the German High Seas Fleet was gently termed, the
"carrying out of armistice conditions at sea!"

But through the secret service of the Allies, we were kept well
informed of all that was going on in the German navy.

The denials of mutinies and revolts were merely amusing to us. We knew
the facts. We knew their morale was shattered, that the Allies had "got
their nerve."

I do not know any dispatch that amused me more than the one we picked
up from Berlin November 16. This showed that the U-boat crews had to be
reassured that their lives were safe, even after the armistice; that
they had to be coaxed and bribed before they would venture out to take
the submarines to England for surrender. Here it is:

  Pr. 143. W522--Trans-ocean Press. Berlin, November 16.

  German armistice commission has directed to Chancellor Ebert for
  immediate communication to all submarine crews letter in which it
  states that English Admiral Sir Roslyn Wemyss has given unreserved
  and absolute assurance that all crews of submarines to be handed
  over will be sent back to Germany as soon as possible after their
  arrival in the harbor appointed by England. Commission therefore
  requests crews to hand over in good time the submarines.

  In connection with this, workmen and soldiers' council of
  Wilhelmshaven states that all men of ships which are brought into
  an enemy port are insured for 10,000 marks in case of death. A
  corresponding special pension has been provided for accidents.
  Besides, the married men who are concerned in bringing the
  submarines receive a premium of 500 marks, and finally are to be
  immediately discharged after their return home.




CHAPTER XXIII

A SURPRISE FOR COUNT VON LUXBURG

  "HERR DOCTOR BRECHT," SPEAKER AT HIS BANQUET IN BUENOS AIRES,
  WAS U. S. NAVAL AGENT--NAVAL INTELLIGENCE FRUSTRATED PLOTS OF
  GERMANS--FRENCH EXECUTED TWO WOMEN SPIES CAUGHT NEAR ST. NAZAIRE,
  GIVING GERMANS INFORMATION REGARDING AMERICAN TROOPS.


Everyone recalls the Count von Luxburg, German Minister to Argentina,
and his famous "spurlos versenkt" dispatch advising his Government
that Argentine steamers, if not spared by the U-boats, be sunk without
leaving a trace. But there is one incident in connection with that
worthy which may, even yet, be news to the Teutons.

One of the speakers at the last big banquet by the Germans in Buenos
Aires, over which Luxburg presided--one of the orators they applauded
vociferously and patted on the back as the cries of "Hoch der Kaiser!"
rang round the festive board, was an agent of the United States
Government. And thereby hangs a tale.

When this country broke relations with Germany, German activities in
South America were redoubled. The large German population in Brazil
not only planned to keep that country from joining the Allies, but
talked boldly of "uprisings," and joining in action with the Germans
in neighbor countries. We needed to find out more about Teuton
activities in that region. An American of varied accomplishments, who
spoke Portuguese and Spanish, as well as German, offered his services
to the Navy. He had spent years in Germany, and though of a Colonial
American family, was a doctor of philosophy of Leipzig University, and
intimately acquainted with German conditions and German character. He
had volunteered to act as a secret agent, in which capacity he had
served the Navy in Spain itself during the Spanish War.

In February, 1917, he was accepted by Naval Intelligence, and on March
3, a month before we declared war, sailed for Brazil. He was no amateur
in securing information, and he welcomed the chance of going to Brazil
and Argentina, the danger to him rather adding zest to the task.

When he reached southern Brazil as a German emissary coming from
Switzerland, he was taken into their clubs and councils, and told what
they planned and plotted. He was with the optimistic Teuton singers as
they roared out "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Deutschland über Alles," and
toasted "Der Tag"--the day when Germany would gather in its spoils in
South America. He attended the secret meetings of German intriguers and
learned their secrets. But, suspected at last, he was attacked by burly
Teutons and emerged with a broken head and a badly hurt arm.

Departing for Argentina, he appeared there as "Dr. Ernst Brecht,"
bearing tidings from the Germans in Brazil, which had just declared
war. He was taken into their inner circles, their plots and purposes
were poured into his ears. Not once did they have the faintest
suspicion that he was an American, much less a Government agent.

Members of the German legation staff conferred with him. Plotting
and intriguing there, as they did in the United States, they were
pretending the greatest friendship for Argentina, giving officials and
people to understand that, while the U-boats might be sinking vessels
of other nations without warning, Argentinian shipping was exempt. If
any of its ships were sunk, it was only a regrettable mistake. And
at the very time Luxburg was talking this dear friendliness, he was
sending "spurlos versenkt" messages to the German Government.

"Doctor Brecht" had many adventures, but the most picturesque was the
role he played in Buenos Aires. Joining at once the German "Bund,"
which had branches all over the Argentine, the "Doctor" formed one of
the group of well-known Austrians and Germans which gathered at the
famous round-table in the Bismarck restaurant.

At the annual banquet of the Deutscher Bund, the German event of the
year, Count von Luxburg presided. "Herr Doctor Ernst Brecht" was
called upon to speak on behalf of the Germans of Brazil. Giving a
touching account of the situation of the Brazilian Teutons and their
determination and devotion to the cause of the "Vaterland," he ended
by quoting a bellicose poem written by a well-known German poetess who
lived at Blumenau, the hotbed of Teutonism in Brazil.

He was cheered and applauded enthusiastically, and Count von Luxburg
himself unbent far enough to thank the speaker for his inspiring words
and express the hope that his sojourn in the hospitable Argentine would
prove pleasant and profitable. It certainly did--but in a way that the
Count never suspected.

There was general regret when "Doctor Brecht" announced that he felt
compelled within a few weeks to return to Europe. He had found that
the German officials were planning to send important dispatches they
would not entrust to the mails, and they planned at first to make him
their messenger. But before this was arranged, Luxburg's code messages
regarding the U-boat warfare were published by the United States. The
Count was amazed.

Sent in a complicated code known only to himself and the Berlin Foreign
Office, five thousand miles away; cabled by the minister of another
country among his own private dispatches, he could not understand how
those messages could be captured and deciphered by the Americans. It
was evident that they were not so stupid as he and Captain von Papen
thought they were.

Luxburg's dispatches, when made public, led to uprisings against the
Germans, making it impossible for him to remain in Argentina. The day
the Count got his passports, September 12, 1917, "Doctor Brecht" had
left the Bismarck restaurant and was on his way home with a German
acquaintance when they saw a fire in the distance, and found the German
Club was burning. It had been mobbed and set on fire by pro-Ally
students and others. Seeing the club half destroyed, the Doctor and
his companion returned to the Bismarck to inform their confreres.
But they found that the restaurant had been completely gutted by a
mob, the tables and dishes smashed, and every portrait of the Kaiser,
Hindenburg, and other "heroes" slashed to pieces.

Germany had been astonished a few months before by the publication of
Foreign Minister Zimmerman's note to the German Minister in Mexico,
proposing an alliance of Germany and Mexico to make war against the
United States. There was nothing the Germans guarded more closely than
that.

Yet before Bernstorff reached Europe, that secret dispatch was
published, and the first thing the German Ambassador to Sweden demanded
to know when the Count reached Christiania, was how the Americans ever
managed to get hold of it. The Foreign Office was stunned. Not only had
its plot been exposed, but the exposure had shown that the Allies could
decipher the most secret and puzzling code they could devise.

Captain von Papen, who once called us "those idiotic Yankees," might
have told them that we were more alert than he had supposed, for the
exposure of his dealings in every detail; of the activities of Wolf
von Igel, his aide; of Doctor Albert, of Fritz von Rintelen; of the
ship-bomb plots; the plan to blow up the Welland Canal locks, and
various other German intrigues, must have by that time convinced him
that the Americans had some secret service of their own. When, on
December 4, 1915, our Government demanded the recall of Papen, who was
military attaché of the German embassy, and Captain Boy-Ed, the naval
attaché, it was merely stated that the cause was "improper activity in
military matters." Both protested, declaring that they had done nothing
illegal. But later we published a full account of Papen's activities,
with photographs of his checks, the exact amounts paid to his tools who
did the dirty work, to whom they were paid and for what purpose. It was
shown that Boy-Ed had transactions amounting to millions with German
steamship lines whose officials were, through false manifests, sending
out ships laden with coal and other supplies for German raiders.

Boy-Ed, at that, did not seem to be so deeply involved as Papen was. He
protested that he had no part in conspiring with Huerta, and had never
seen the Mexican "ex-President." But it was known that Rintelen had had
dealings with Huerta, and that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed at
least half a million dollars. The dealings of Captain von Papen with
Huerta were too thoroughly disclosed to admit of denial.

Germany, beginning years before, had built up in this country an
extensive spy system, which kept it informed not only of military
developments, but of what was done in every branch of industry. When
the European war began they used every possible means of preventing the
manufacture of munitions or supplies for the Allies. Nearly every large
factory or plant had in its employ workmen who were paid agents of the
German Government. That they could secure information of what was going
on was not so menacing as what they might do, for one or two men could
damage machinery so as to retard work for months. There were explosions
in munition plants, machinery was at times mysteriously wrecked,
shells were damaged; and while the cause seldom could be definitely
determined, it was the general belief that many of these "accidents"
were the work of German agents.

The Office of Naval Intelligence, whose function in peace times is
to gather naval information from all parts of the world, had a more
difficult task to perform when war came. An Investigation Section was
formed to seek out and take into custody persons who were, by sabotage,
explosion, fomenting strikes or other means, seeking to prevent or
retard the manufacture of munitions; to discover and thwart any attempt
to damage vessels, shipyards, bases or factories; to counteract German
propaganda and, in general, restrain the activities of Germans and
German sympathizers.

In each naval district there was an Aide for Information, reporting
to Rear Admiral Roger Welles, Director of Naval Intelligence, at
Washington. Each district was further sub-divided into sections with
representatives working under the district aid. The activity of these
aides was tremendous, especially in our large ports of entry, New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Arrests of suspects sent
fear into the hearts of any who might be plotting sabotage. In one day
I ordered the arrest of more than a score in one plant.

Ships from countries near Germany were examined from truck to keel for
contraband, or papers or literature that might convey secret messages.
Passengers and crews were carefully scrutinized. Close inspection and
censorship of mails and cables prevented Germany from communicating
with its agents in this country, and also prevented them from sending
out military information.

Outgoing ships were carefully inspected to prevent them from taking
supplies or materials to Germany. Some neutral vessels had been
carrying from America quantities of spare machinery and electrical
parts, especially those composed of copper, brass and zinc. There was
reason to believe much of this was smuggled to Germany and used in the
manufacture of parts for U-boats. Radio apparatus was purchased in
quantities. Ships leaving for Holland or Sweden sometimes sailed with
enough lubricating oil to take them around the world. Much of it must
have "leaked" into Germany. This traffic was greatly reduced, and that
in contraband practically ended.

Military guards were placed around piers, no enemy or suspected aliens
were allowed to work around shipping, and all dock workers were
required to carry identification cards. Vessels were under government
supervision during their entire stay in port.

Not only navy yards and shipyards were kept under surveillance, but
all plants engaged on naval work were constantly inspected. Thus
all sources of production were protected from enemy activity. For
this purpose a Plant Division was created, which also reported any
undesirable working conditions or lack of fire protection. This led
later to the creation of the Fire Prevention Section of the War
Industries Board.

Admiral Welles kept in close touch with the Director of Military
Intelligence, the State and Labor Departments, and the Department of
Justice. Naval attachés abroad obtained a large amount of information
regarding "trading with the enemy" as well as military activities, and
this was transmitted to the War Industries Board, the State and War
Departments. The Bureau of War Trade Intelligence coöperated with the
Navy in holding up undesirable imports and exports.

Information regarding foreign navies and ships and war developments was
compiled and disseminated, in confidential publications, to all our
forces afloat. Fleet, Force and Division commanders were kept informed
of the activities of all fleets, Allied and enemy, of ships sunk, and
tonnage destruction; of the number and tracks of submarines in the
Atlantic and Mediterranean; and of all efforts made by the Allied and
associated powers.

The British had a remarkably complete system which constantly improved,
so that, in the latter part of the war, it was said that they were
informed of the sailing of every submarine sent out from Germany, and
its probable destination. We had the advantage of this, as well as the
information obtained by France and Italy. We had our own agents in most
foreign countries, and maintained quite a force in France.

The most important of these activities was along the coast around
Brest and St. Nazaire, the centers of troop and supply traffic. German
agents, it was reported, were using Belle Ile as a signal station to
advise their submarines.

Convoys reported suspicious lights, and it was believed that these were
informers on shore signaling to U-boats. The submarines used various
disguises. One, submerged with its periscope showing, lay hidden for
hours in the midst of a fishing fleet. Yet the fishermen paid so
little attention to it that the French semaphore station, only a few
kilometers away, was not notified. A Greek merchantman hove in sight,
the U-boat fired a torpedo and the steamship was sunk.

The French authorities welcomed our intelligence officers, and together
they set about developing an efficient service all along the coast. A
U. S. Naval Reserve officer who spoke French fluently was attached to
the staff of the French commander-in-chief in Brittany. That coast is
rugged and bold, with groups of small islands. The most important is
Belle-Ile-en-Mer, twelve kilometers from shore, the first land sighted
by convoys going to St. Nazaire, and the last seen on their way home.
At the northern end is the famous "Passage de la Tenouse," leading to
the bay of Quiberon. Once through this passage and in the bay, ships
were considered safe from submarines. One group of our first troop
convoys was attacked three miles west of the Point des Poulin, the
entrance to this passage, and several shells fired by the transports
ricocheted and exploded on the rocky bluffs of the island. West-bound
convoys were assembled in Quiberon Bay. Every effort was made to
conceal their departure, but the information that enemy submarines
seemed to obtain at times was startling. When the merchant convoy
system was inaugurated, ships were instructed to anchor off Le Palais,
in the lee of Belle Ile. Two days later a submarine laid mines in the
roadstead. The next night ships were anchored two miles to the north,
but within twelve hours mines were laid there.

Lights and signals were not the only means of enemy communication. Some
fisherman, seeing the transports in the bay, might go out at night and
inform a submarine, which could radio the news to all the U-boats in
the vicinity.

These were the conditions that had to be met. Every report of
suspicious happenings had to be investigated, and the French were quite
willing that the American Navy assume this task, as it was responsible
for most of the convoy work through these waters.

With the greatest care and secrecy, forty-five of the most intelligent
fishermen who had boats of their own were selected, and formed into a
patrol service. Proceeding with their fishing, they were instructed to
watch for any sign of submarines or mines and report it immediately.
Furthermore, they were to report any mysterious behavior of fishermen
or strangers in boats, and any lights or suspicious happenings along
the coast. Experienced detectives were employed, with headquarters at
Nantes, to investigate all reports. A flood of them came in from the
population who, like the French officers, seemed anxious to aid the
Americans.

Hundreds of investigations were made, fishermen and residents ashore
were aroused to the necessity of reporting everything that seemed
likely to aid the enemy, and an intelligence system was built up that
was no small factor in making safe the coast of France.

Women spies were found, now and then; quite as dangerous as the men in
enemy pay. The most remarkable and pathetic instance, perhaps, was the
"Alvarez Case," handled by the French from its beginning to its tragic
end.

In the spring of 1917, French agents in Barcelona, Spain, reported
that two women known as the Alvarez sisters, were associating with a
man strongly suspected of being in the German secret service. Soon
afterward they disappeared, and for two months their whereabouts was
unknown. The Paris authorities directed that all regions in France,
particularly the American zone, be searched for them. They were at
last discovered in the seacoast town of Sables d'Olonne, thirty
miles south of St. Nazaire, where our troop convoys landed. They were
closely watched and when they boarded a train for Bordeaux, evidently
attempting to get back to Spain, they were arrested. Upon trial it
proved that they had come under the influence of German agents in
Spain and had been induced by an offer of 50,000 francs to obtain
information, among other things, concerning the American troops
disembarking in Brittany.

By this trial the mystery of the blowing up of the French destroyer
_Enseigne Roux_ was cleared up. It turned out that the condemned
sisters had been closely associated with a French sailor named Gaitton,
and evidence pointed to him as having mixed dynamite with the bunker
coal on the destroyer. This was not conclusively proved, but Gaitton
had enough counts against him to be sentenced to twenty years in a
naval prison.

The Alvarez sisters were convicted, and were sentenced to be shot.
The execution took place at daybreak in the courtyard of the ancient
Chateau of Anne de Bretagne, at Nantes. In the courtyard were assembled
the officers in charge of the execution, government officials and
witnesses.

The women were led to two posts near the wall of the chateau, and the
last words were spoken to them by the priest. At their trial they had
confessed all, so there was little left to say. One was in a fainting
condition, but the elder of the two proved unusually courageous. She
refused to be blindfolded, and stood her ground.

An army officer read the sentence. There was a volley of musketry, and
the blindfolded woman dropped to the ground. But the sister who had
shown such courage, though mortally wounded, remained erect, and had to
be despatched by a shot from a revolver.

The Naval Intelligence officer who gave Admiral Welles the account of
this pathetic case, from which are taken the particulars recited above,
wrote:

  "For years to come, when the American tourists visit the now
  historic ports of the American Expeditionary Forces, they will
  see, if they look carefully, a few scars on the thick wall of the
  Chateau courtyard at Nantes. These are the marks of bullets which
  ended the careers of two poor deluded women who attempted to betray
  the Allies. * * *"




CHAPTER XXIV

AMERICAN ADMIRAL SAVED KOLCHAK

  HEAD OF RUSSIAN FLEET RELEASED FROM PRISON AFTER GLENNON'S ADDRESS
  TO MUTINOUS SAILORS--AFTER MISSION TO WASHINGTON, BECAME HEAD OF
  OMSK GOVERNMENT--KILLED BY BOLSHEVIKI--UNITED STATES VESSELS IN
  NORTHERN AND WESTERN RUSSIA--KNIGHT AT VLADIVOSTOK--MC CULLY AT
  MURMANSK AND ARCHANGEL.


When revolution swept Russia in 1917, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet
mutinied, assassinated their commander-in-chief, and murdered a hundred
officers. The Black Sea Fleet for the time remained loyal, but in June
revolted and deposed its commander.

The American mission headed by Elihu Root, of which Admiral James H.
Glennon was the naval representative, had just arrived in Petrograd.
The sailors at Sebastopol on June 20th voted to remove Admiral Kolchak,
send him to prison and elect a commander-in-chief from their own ranks.
When the Admiral was notified, he appeared on the quarter-deck of his
flagship and addressed his men. Appealing in the name of Russia and
the cause for which she was fighting with the Allies, he urged them
to remain loyal. But the sailors refused. They were bent on taking
control. There was nothing for the Admiral to do but to give up his
command, and leave the fleet to be managed by a committee.

They demanded his sword, but he would not give it. Drawing it from
its scabbard, he saluted the Russian flag, and threw the shimmering
blade into the sea. Turning upon his heel sharply, the former
commander-in-chief came down from the quarter-deck, climbed over the
side of the flagship into a waiting boat, and was taken to Sebastopol,
where he was put in prison along with Smirnoff and other officers.
Kolchak might have met the same fate as the commander-in-chief of the
Baltic Fleet. "Execution by order of the Sailors' Soviet" is quite as
deadly as assassination.

Unaware of the serious situation that had developed, Admiral Glennon
set out for Sebastopol to visit Kolchak and the Black Sea Fleet.
With him went Admiral Newton A. McCully, naval attaché, a master of
the Russian tongue and a great admirer of the Russian people, whose
affection and confidence he has held through all events.

The first intimation the American admirals had that they were about
to face unusual circumstances was when, on reaching the station in
Sebastopol, they found a reception committee awaiting them composed
wholly of workmen and sailors. There were no officers. Kolchak was
not there, nor had he sent any members of his staff to greet them.
Glennon and McCully were quick enough to catch the significance of
this unexpected welcome, and to accommodate themselves to its peculiar
character.

"They wore no swords," said Admiral Glennon, "so the American officers
left their swords in the train."

The American officers were taken to the flagship, from which Kolchak
had been deposed the day before. Standing on the quarter-deck, where
Kolchak had stood in his final appeal, Admiral Glennon spoke to the
sailors on the meaning of democracy. He paid a generous tribute to
their ships. He spoke of Russia's bravery, and urged the sailors to
stand by the cause for which the Allies were fighting. Referring
feelingly to the cordial relations which had always existed between
Russia and the United States, he made much of the argument for the
continued friendship and coöperation of these nations, now the two
biggest republics in the world. But not a word did he say of the
deposed officers.

Admiral Glennon is a big man, of commanding appearance, but with a
kindly and genial bearing. His speech made a deep impression on the
sailors. Evidently they talked over the things he had said and decided
to show their appreciation in some way. When the American admirals
and other officers were boarding their train to return to Petrograd,
representatives of the sailors came on board and told Admiral Glennon
that they had voted to restore the arms to all the deposed officers
except Kolchak and Smirnoff. These two, they said, they would probably
keep in prison and bring to trial. Admiral Glennon saw his chance.
Manifestly these sailors wanted to please the Americans. They were a
little afraid of Kolchak and Smirnoff, so they felt obliged to keep
them in prison, but probably, if the Russian admirals were to leave
Sebastopol and the region of the Black Sea, the sailors would be
satisfied. So Admiral Glennon, smiling down from his towering height
upon the shorter Russians, made a proposal. In effect he said: "Release
Smirnoff and Kolchak, and we will take them to Petrograd with us."
Petrograd was far away. Moreover the authority of Petrograd was still
recognized, so the sailors agreed. Kolchak and Smirnoff were taken from
prison and put on board the train with the Americans. For them it was
deliverance from almost certain death. It is little wonder that Kolchak
regarded Glennon with the greatest affection and gratitude. A few weeks
later he came to the United States at the head of a Russian naval
mission, and his renewal of acquaintance with Admiral Glennon was like
the meeting of brothers.

I had a chance to see a good deal of Kolchak while the mission was
here. He was said to be of Tartar descent. Of medium height and very
dark complexion, he had piercing eyes and a determined expression. He
admired Farragut greatly, and made a special trip to his tomb to place
a wreath upon it. He was also a great admirer of our Arctic explorers,
probably because of his own Polar service. I remember the dinner
Admiral Kolchak gave at a Washington hotel to the Secretary of the Navy
and prominent naval officers just before he took his departure in 1917.
It was about the gloomiest, most funereal occasion I experienced in all
my eight years in Washington. News had just arrived of a German victory
over the Russians in the Baltic. The Kerensky government was in a
perilous position. The depressing situation was reflected in the solemn
faces of the banqueters. I did my best to cheer Kolchak, predicting a
wonderful future for a democratic Russia when the Allies and America
had won the war.

"Do you really believe Russia can again have peace?" he asked me, and
the tone of his question spoke his own despair. The premonition of
tragedy must have been in his soul. At the end of October he sailed
from San Francisco, intending to return to European Russia by Siberia.
When he reached Japan he found the Bolsheviki had seized power and
Kerensky was a fugitive. The Bolshevik government offered him and
his officers safe journey to Petrograd, if they would recognize its
authority and swear allegiance. Kolchak refused.

Gathering together the forces opposing Lenine, he became leader of
the anti-Bolshevik movement in Siberia. In the spring of 1919, when
the Admiral was head of the Omsk government, the world thought he was
going to succeed in his great effort to overthrow Lenine and Trotzky.
Then the tide turned. He was driven back. His retreat became a rout.
When he reached the region of Lake Baikal, his forces disintegrated
and fled, leaving him alone. One day in January, 1920, a revolutionary
group raided the village of Innokentieskaya, near Irkutsk, and found
Kolchak. They took him prisoner, and turned him over to the Bolshevik
commissairs. There was a perfunctory court-martial, which passed the
predetermined sentence of death.

In the early dawn of February 7, he was led from his cell to the
courtyard of a building in Irkutsk, where he was stood with his back
to the wall. It was too dark to see his face distinctly, the stories
that came to us stated; so a soldier held a lighted lamp near it to
guide the firing squad. When the command to fire was given, the squad
failed to obey. Angered at their soft-hearted reluctance, the Bolshevik
commissair who was supervising the execution pushed the squad aside,
strode up to Kolchak, and shot him down.

Thus the famous Russian admiral met his fate.

The debacle in Russia profoundly disturbed America. It was due
primarily to the failure of communication and transportation. Russia
was shut off at the Dardanelles by the Turks and at the Danish Sound
in the Baltic by the Germans. When the Kerensky government was
organized there was hope by the oldest republic in the New World for
the success of the newest republic in the Old World. The coup d'etat
of the Bolshevists, who soon made the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with
the Germans, gave pause to the Allied forces, who felt it necessary
to take steps on what had been the "Eastern front" to prevent the
use of Russian man-power against them. Fifty million dollars of
their supplies were piled up at Archangel, which the Bolshevists were
undertaking to confiscate and move into the interior. The Germans were
seeking a submarine base on the Murman coast in order to gain access to
the sea which they had been so long denied.

These dangers drew Allied forces into Northern Russia. In May, 1918,
the _U. S. S. Olympia_, which won fame as Dewey's flagship at Manila
Bay, arrived at Murmansk with Lieutenant General Poole, of the British
army, and a small detachment of troops. They drove off an attack at
Pechenga. A small group of Russian naval officers, who could not
reconcile themselves to Bolshevik rule, spent the winter on a sealing
trip. They believed themselves safe when in sight of the Murman coast
with their cargo of skins worth $35,000. Without warning a German
submarine came up alongside and sank their vessel, few of the crew
escaping.

The Murmansk Soviet could not retaliate because, by the treaty of
Brest-Litovsk, the Russian navy could take no further part in the
war. So they turned over their navy, consisting of three destroyers,
one to the British, one to the French, and one to the _Olympia_ when
she arrived. I dare say few people, even in the Navy, knew that we
possessed a destroyer named the _Karitan Yurasovsky_. Its crew was half
Russian and half American. It was a queer sort of arrangement, but
Admiral McCully, in command of Naval Forces in Northern Russian Waters,
said "It worked remarkably well, there never being the least sign of
friction, and the destroyer always ready for duty."

Not much has been heard of the U. S. flotilla on Lake Onega. When the
Allied forces, including a small detachment from the _Yankton_, were
on the line of march within 300 miles of Petrograd, there was need
of water transportation. Our small naval contingent was equal to the
emergency. Two motor boats, each with a short one-pounder in the bow
and a machine-gun on the beam, were transported by rail down to near
Lake Onega, then hauled miles through the woods, and launched in the
lake on May 27, 1919. Three times they were engaged with Bolshevik
gunboats at long ranges.

In June, 1918, the _Olympia_ sent a detachment 150 strong to Kandalaska
to assist in guarding that point. When the Murmansk government broke
with the Bolsheviki, Allied troops landed in Murmansk. In August a
detachment from the _Olympia_ under Captain Bierer took part in the
successful expedition against Archangel. This same detachment under
Lieutenant Hicks bore their share in the pursuit of the retreating
Bolshevists to the interior, having some hard fighting. Under Colonel
G. W. Stewart, the 339th Infantry Regiment and 310th Engineers, about
5,600 men, having just completed their training at Aldershot, reached
Northern Russia September 4th, and they remained all winter. They were
immediately put in the front line, doing practically all the fighting
that was done, and during this time losing more men in action than all
the other Allies combined. The small detachment of Navy men privileged
to fight with their army brethren in Northern Russia, regard them as
among the noblest of all fighting forces.

The Asiatic Fleet, under command of Admiral Austin M. Knight,
coöperated with the Japanese and other Allied forces in the Far
East, and the flagship _Brooklyn_ or some other vessels were almost
constantly at Vladivostok, where Admiral Knight took a prominent part
in the conferences and operations to check enemy and hostile activities.

In June, 1918, Vladivostok and nearly all of Siberia fell into the
hands of the Bolsheviki. Assisted by German and Austrian prisoners
of war, they were resisting the advance of the Czecho-Slovaks who,
fighting their way for thousands of miles through Russia, were
endeavoring to reach the eastern coast, where Allied vessels might
take them home. Vladivostok was their destination, but they had hard
fighting before they could enter. On June 29 they took the city after
a three-hour battle with the Bolsheviki. There were 12,000 of the
Czecho-Slovaks, but only 2,500 of them were armed and equipped. The
city was still in an uproar, with desultory firing at various points.
In the afternoon Admiral Knight ordered ashore Marines and sailors to
guard the American consulate, and to act as part of a patrol force
composed of British, Japanese, Chinese and Czecho-Slovaks who patrolled
the city, preventing destruction and preserving order.

Marines from the _Brooklyn_ in July guarded the German and Austrian
prisoners of war on Russian Island, five miles from Vladivostok. Our
Navy had a radio station there. Men from our ships formed a part of
the force of British marines, Japanese and Chinese blue-jackets and
Czecho-Slovak soldiers organized to guard the Russian navy yard at
Vladivostok, and prevent disorder in the city.

The United States Asiatic Fleet performed a valuable function in the
Far East. Guarding American interests and coöperating with the Allied
forces, its vessels operated from the Philippines to the Russian coast.
They exerted, as always, decided influence in China, supporting the
Chinese Government in its stand with the Allies. Though the Japanese
had long before taken Kiao-Chau, the German stronghold, and the Teuton
strength was broken, constant efforts were required to prevent the
German propaganda and agitation from causing trouble. A sharp lookout
was maintained for German raiders. One, the famous _Seeadler_, sank two
American vessels in the Pacific. But after it was run down and disposed
of, no more raiders appeared.

Our vessels in the Pacific were of material assistance to the Army when
American troops were sent to Russia to protect the Siberian railway,
and again when they were being returned from Russia. Admiral William
L. Rodgers succeeded to the command of the Asiatic Fleet in the latter
part of 1918 and continued until late in 1919, when he was succeeded by
Admiral Gleaves. Some of our vessels were at Vladivostok practically
all the time. One of the first suggestions made by the British when
we entered the war was that we maintain our force in Asiatic waters,
and while the vessels were few in number, they performed excellent and
necessary service.

[Illustration: EAGLE BOATS AT ANCHOR IN THE ICE OF THE WHITE SEA

Insets: Rear Admiral James H. Glennon (left); Admiral Kolchak.]

[Illustration: THE HALF-WAY HOUSE

The harbor of Ponta Delgada, the naval base in the Azores. Inset: One
of the 7" guns at Ponta Delgada manned by U. S. Marines.]




CHAPTER XXV

THE HALF-WAY HOUSE

  AZORES VITAL IN NAVAL OPERATIONS--"ORION" CELEBRATED FOURTH OF JULY
  BY DRIVING OFF U-BOAT THAT WAS SHELLING PONTA DELGADA--HUNDREDS OF
  AMERICAN SHIPS STOPPED THERE ON THE WAY ACROSS--DUNN IN COMMAND OF
  BASE--MARINES MANNED GUNS, MAINTAINED AERIAL PATROL--SUBMARINES
  KEPT OFF SUBMARINES.


The Fourth of July, 1917, was ushered in by the booming of American
guns, not in the United States, but in the far-away Azores.

Bright and early, at 4:45 a. m. (not long after midnight in this
country), a German submarine began bombarding Ponta Delgada, the
principal city in the islands. The U-boat was one of the largest type,
with powerful guns, and she poured a rain of shells that crashed into
stores and residences, and exploded in the streets. People were panic
stricken. The antiquated forts were no defense. Their guns were not of
sufficient caliber to cope with the enemy. Knowing this, the Germans
thought they would have a picnic, without any risk or interruption,
shelling an undefended city and terrorizing its helpless inhabitants.

But relief came from an unexpected source. The United States naval
collier _Orion_ was in port, and three minutes after the enemy began
operations, her guns were in action. This was a surprise for the
submarine. When the shells began to fall around her, the Germans
could not imagine where they came from. The _Orion_ was at a dock
2,000 yards away on the other side of a point of land that juts out
into the harbor. She could not sail out immediately, as her stern had
been hoisted to make repairs. But she promptly turned her guns on
the intruder, and in a few moments the enemy found he was faced by a
formidable foe.

The _Orion's_ fire was too hot for the Germans. Its shells were falling
uncomfortably close; its gunners rapidly getting the range. Not many
minutes later the U-boat, baffled and disappointed, disappeared. The
submarine, it was discovered later, was the famous _Deutschland_, the
U-155.

Proclaiming that the American collier had saved the city, the whole
town joined in a spontaneous celebration. The captain of the _Orion_,
Lieutenant Commander J. H. Boesch, was cheered and fêted, as was his
whole crew. Officials tendered him their formal thanks, and he became
a hero in the Azores. All kinds of honors were paid him, and later he
was presented with a handsome gift, expressing the gratitude of the
Delgadans. They even named brands of cigars for him, with his picture
on the boxes--and I know no more conclusive evidence of popular favor
than that.

These islands--the "half-way point between America and Europe"--were
vitally important in our naval operations, and soon after war was
declared, we began negotiations with Portugal for permission to
establish an American naval base at that strategic point. U-boats of
large type were already operating in that region. Had the Germans
succeeded in establishing a base there or in utilizing the islands for
supplying or refueling submarines, they could have seriously menaced
our troop and cargo transportation, and trans-Atlantic lines of
communication.

The necessity of protecting this locality was emphasized in a dispatch
from our London headquarters on July 13, and letters of July 30, 1917,
in which we were informed that England had sent a mystery ship and two
submarines to the Azores, and the hope was expressed that the United
States would do the same. "The advisability," said the report, "of the
United States sending one of the older battleships with perhaps two or
three auxiliary craft to the Azores to prevent the use of these islands
as a base during the coming winter should be considered." The Germans
had, about that time, sent out the former _Deutschland_ to cruise in
the vicinity of the Azores.

Early in August, 1917, the _U. S. S. Panther_ and five coal-burning
destroyers arrived at Ponta Delgada "to operate against enemy vessels,
to assist torpedoed vessels and rescue survivors, and to deny the
island to enemy submarines which might try to use them as a base." In
September the _Wheeling_, with two destroyers, arrived, relieving the
_Panther_ and destroyers, which had been ordered to French waters. The
_Wheeling's_ captain was acting base commander.

On October 28, a division of U. S. submarines, the K-1, K-2, K-5 and
K-6, arrived, and later the E-1. These submarines and our destroyers
patrolled the waters around the Azores, and from the time operations
began there was practically no enemy submarine activity around the
islands, although the German Government had declared this a "barred
zone."

As a result of the Allied Naval Conference at London, in September,
1917, it was decided to establish a British naval intelligence center
in the Azores and to build a radio station eight miles west of Ponta
Delgada. Our Navy mounted a seven-inch gun on a high bluff for its
protection. This radio station was of great value, for prior to its
construction communication from the Azores was by cable to the United
States and thence to Europe. By arrangement, all British naval units
served under the general direction of the United States senior naval
officer.

As soon as the diplomatic negotiations with Portugal were completed, I
directed Admiral H. O. Dunn to proceed to Ponta Delgada and establish
a regular naval base. He embarked on the _Hancock_, with a complete
advance base outfit, and a detachment of Marine aviators with aircraft.
Guns were mounted at Ponta Delgada to defend the harbor, and nets and
other torpedo defenses were stretched across the entrance.

The First Marine Aeronautic Company, 12 officers and 133 men, operated
an anti-submarine patrol of ten R-6 and two N-9 seaplanes, and six
HS-2-L flying boats. Major Francis T. Evans was in command to July 18,
1918, when he was succeeded by Major David L. S. Brewster, who was in
command of these Marines until they were ordered home January 20, 1919.
Submarines and destroyers as well as aircraft, operated from Ponta
Delgada. The establishment of a hospital afforded treatment and comfort
not only to the personnel on duty there, but alike to men and officers
passing through, and to the people on the islands, who suffered greatly
during the influenza epidemic. Large warehouses, filled with stores,
furnished supplies to ships stopping at Ponta Delgada.

In addition to the value of this base to our own operations,
its potential value is seen from the fact that never after its
establishment did German submarines appear off the island. Several
operated in that region but were careful not to approach within reach
of our guns.

"The occupation of the Azores," said Admiral Dunn, "was of great
strategic value from the mere fact that had it been in possession of
the enemy, it would have formed an ideal base for submarines, and as
our convoy routes passed north and south of the islands an enemy base
would have been a very serious obstacle for the successful transport
across the ocean of troops and supplies."

All our submarine chasers, tugs and small craft sent to Europe stopped
at the Azores for fuel, provisions and repairs. Our repair ship and
station were found invaluable, particularly during the stormy winter
when many merchant vessels broke down in the vicinity. Tugs were sent
out to tow them in, repairs were promptly made, and they were sent
on their way. In several instances, merchant vessels were rescued at
distances of 400 to 500 miles from the islands. The relations between
the American naval officers and Portuguese authorities in the Azores
were most cordial, and this coöperation strengthened the ties between
the United States and Portugal.

If Portugal had not been in the war as an ally, it would have been a
tremendously difficult problem to have gotten across any of the yachts
and sub-chasers, and a large portion of our destroyers, because they
did not have the steaming radius to cover the more than 3,000 miles
of ocean between us and the coast of Europe. But for the base in the
Azores and Portugal's coöperation, we would have lacked a place to
re-fuel in mid-ocean. Before the Azores was open to us we were forced
to establish a mobile oil base at sea, moving the oilers secretly to
fuel our destroyers as they went across. Discovery of such an oil base
by the Germans would have been fatal to us, as sinking tankers and
oilers was a task at which their U-boats were most proficient.

On May 20, 1919, the people of Ponta Delgada again did honor to men of
the American Navy. On that day ships in the harbor were dressed, the
town decked in flags, and there was general rejoicing at the arrival
of the aviators on the first trans-Atlantic flight. A salute of
twenty-one guns was fired by the Portuguese battery, and the Governor
of the Azores and the Mayor of Ponta Delgada gave official welcome to
Commander J. H. Towers and the officers and crews of the "Nancys," as
those famous planes were called.

The Azores formed the central point in the flight from the United
States to Europe. It was the evening of May 16, 1919, when the three
giant planes swung out from Trepassy, Newfoundland, on the long "jump"
to the Azores, a distance of 1,380 miles. When the goal appeared to be
near, the worst foe of navigation appeared. A dense fog all but blinded
the pilots, endangering the success of the flight and putting the lives
of the flyers in peril. The NC-4 managed to ascend above the fog, and
15 hours and 13 minutes after leaving Newfoundland arrived at Horta,
the emergency stop in the Azores, and after a delay of three days, due
to bad weather, flew to Ponta Delgada. The NC-1 was forced to descend
to the water 45 miles from the island of Flores, and half an hour later
the NC-3 also descended not far from Fayal. Disabled by heavy seas, the
NC-1 sank. Nothing was heard from the NC-3 for more than two days. Many
people feared that she was lost, and there was general rejoicing when,
after fifty-three hours on the water, drifting and taxiing 209 miles,
she reached Ponta Delgada.

Early in the morning of May 26th, Commander Albert C. Read and his crew
departed on the NC-4 for the 891-miles flight for Lisbon, carrying
the good wishes of the people of the islands. Lisbon did honor to the
fliers, who had made a new world record. Bells rang, whistles blew, and
the guns of the shore batteries boomed as the thousands lined the water
front to welcome the aerial voyagers. Portuguese in Lisbon as well as
in the Azores took the deepest pride in the achievement of the great
adventure.




CHAPTER XXVI

TO VICTORY ON A SEA OF OIL

  ABILITY TO SECURE OIL AND TRANSPORT IT TO EUROPE WAS ESSENTIAL TO
  SUCCESS--OUR NAVY PATROLLED CARIBBEAN AND GULF COASTS--TRANSPORTED
  MATERIAL AND FURNISHED PERSONNEL TO LAY PIPE LINE ACROSS
  SCOTLAND--AMERICA FURNISHED EIGHTY PER CENT OF OIL FOR ALLIED
  FORCES.


"The Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil," was the epigrammatic
way in which Lord Curzon expressed the truth that oil was essential
for success in the World War. This was true particularly of the Navy's
part in the war, for most of the naval force and the Shipping Board's
ships were oil burners. That oil was necessary also for the army was
emphasized when General Foch warned that "interruption of the petroleum
supply would necessitate an entire change of campaign and if long
continued might result in the loss of the war."

Long before 1914, Great Britain had felt dependence upon Mexican
oil for its increasing oil-burning navy, and had made provision for
securing it through acquisition of Mexican oil fields. American
captains of industry had likewise large oil fields in Mexico. From the
minute war was declared in 1914, Allied dependence was upon Mexican
and American oil. Tampico and Port Arthur were strategic points in all
Allied plans of campaign on sea or land. If this supply of oil had been
interrupted, the war might have gone on much longer.

From the day the first German raider sank a British ship or a submarine
fired at an Allied vessel, the British and French were zealous to
protect the oil supplies in Mexico. They maintained patrol vessels in
that region and kept ceaseless vigil of sea routes to protect this
priceless agency of war. However great their need of ships on their
own coast, they knew that if the oil supply failed at Tampico they
would lose the only adequate available source of oil for all their
operations.

The question has sometimes been raised why the Navy Department did not
immediately upon the declaration of war send every patrol ship into
European waters. One answer is Oil.

Before the United States entered the war, sensing, as the authorities
did then, that oil might determine the outcome, a naval squadron, first
under Admiral Wilson and afterwards under Admiral Edwin A. Anderson,
was organized for patrol service in the Gulf and Caribbean as well as
in the North Atlantic. Why? Again the answer was Oil, with a big O.
The United States was importing millions of barrels of oil from Mexico
for its own ships and industries. It could not permit any danger of
cessation of this supply. Our dependence would be heightened when we
entered the war. Gasless Sundays and other methods of conservation were
practiced later in order that the Army and Navy in Europe might be well
supplied.

At one time the sinking of the tankers was serious enough to alarm the
Allied navies. The maintenance of fleets of Great Britain and America
in the North Sea was dependent upon oil supplies, and always the
U-boats were on the watch to torpedo oilers. They were so successful
and the number of tankers was so small, compared to the need, that the
American and British naval administrations decided to construct a pipe
line across Scotland as the best new way to lessen the danger of losing
tankers and to hasten the delivery of oil to the Allied fleet in the
North Sea.

  The Bureau of Navigation will enroll a force to lay the pipe line
  (Glasgow, Scotland) to consist of seven officers and one hundred
  men experienced in pipe line work. All material expense to be
  borne by British Government and personnel expense by United States
  Government.

That was the order I signed, April 5, 1918, in pursuance of which the
Navy undertook to furnish the personnel, and, coöperating with the
British, lay a pipe line across Scotland, thirty-six miles in length,
following the course of the Clyde and Forth Canal, extending from Old
Kilpatrick (St. Patrick's birth-place), to Grangemouth, Firth of Forth.
Directions were also given that pipe and other material should be
transported in American naval vessels. Priority orders were given by me
for the material in order to expedite shipment and construction, and
as soon as the necessary material was ready the naval force embarked
and carried out the work under Commander W. A. Barstow. The pipe line
was laid out by Mr. Forrest Towl, president of the Eureka Pipe Line
Company, New York, and the naval personnel was able to complete the
work in four months.

There were two intermediate pumping stations, and fuel oil could be
pumped in a cold state at the rate of 100 tons per hour. At the Old
Kilpatrick terminal sixteen large tanks were constructed, each with
a holding capacity of 8,000 tons. At the opposite end the oil was
pumped into large reservoirs, easily accessible to oil-burning ships at
Grangemouth and Forth ports.

The U-boats seemed, as I have stated, to have some uncanny way of
finding and sinking tankers carrying oil to Europe. When unable to
hit transports and cargo ships, their aim at tankers seemed unerring,
particularly when the ships were going around the north of Scotland
to carry oil to the fleet in the North Sea. And oil was more valuable
to the fleet than radium. In fact it was the prime essential. The
construction of the pipe line became a pressing war need for three
reasons:

1. To reduce the sinkings of tankers proceeding around the north of
Scotland or up the English channel.

2. To secure quicker trans-Atlantic voyages by eliminating the
necessity of the tankers going into the North Sea.

3. To increase the flexibility in the distribution of reserve stocks
between the west and east coasts, and vice versa.

Its completion secured a continuous and adequate supply of fuel oil
for the naval vessels operating in the area it served. The building of
this pipe line appealed to the Navy Department. As soon as the plans
were ready, the order, "Push it!", was sent to every bureau which could
assist in hastening construction and furnishing the officers and men.
The order was obeyed.

When the formal opening of the line was celebrated a telegram of thanks
was sent to American Naval Headquarters at London. Admiral Tothill,
the British Fourth Sea Lord, who turned on the steam that started the
pumps going, in his speech stated that this line, the longest in Great
Britain, had been completed in about six months time from placing of
order in the States, and that the U. S. Navy had in that time enrolled
a special unit to lay the pipe, and completed the work in a much
shorter time than had been expected.

In his report Commander Barstow said that "during the past year the
Allied governments' requirements amounted to 2,900,000,000 gallons,
of which large total the United States has furnished 80 per cent,
or about 2,320,000,000 gallons." The fact that eighty per cent. of
the oil required had to be transported across the Atlantic shows the
importance of the pipe line across Scotland which our Navy had a large
part in constructing, and equally proves the value of the patrol of the
Caribbean and Gulf Coast by our squadron in those waters.

In March, 1913, in answer to a letter from the Navy Department as to
whether the Navy would be justified in constructing all its ships as
oil burners, the Secretary of the Interior advised that the Geological
Survey's estimates of the available source of oil showed that it was
ample. The policy of "all oil-burners" was adopted by the Navy in 1913
and, when it was organized, the Shipping Board adopted the same policy.
It was found that four ships burning oil will do the work of five ships
burning coal. From the coal mine to the fireroom the use of oil saves
fifty men per ship. Oil is the super-fuel. It does effectively and
economically all that coal can do, and more. Its use makes possible the
highest service of the two hundred and seventy-five destroyers built or
contracted for during the war.

Foreseeing the larger use of oil for naval purposes, in the latter
part of 1912, President Taft withdrew certain lands in California from
public exploitation and set this land aside as Naval Reserves, No. 1
and No. 2. On April 30, 1915, President Wilson issued an order setting
aside Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 3, in Wyoming. The preservation
of these reserves intact for naval use is of such importance that
the Government has fought the many adverse claims and refused the
persistent applications of claimants and others to open wells on these
reserves. It will soon be recognized that the nation which controls the
oil supply of the world has an advantage in naval operations and in the
carrying of water-borne commerce which will give it supremacy. The Navy
Department appreciated this fact in 1913. After the war it recommended
that this Government take steps not only to keep a large reserve of
American oil stored in the ground but also to acquire wells in every
part of the world where oil is produced.

The contest for oil is a contest for supremacy of the sea traffic and
naval superiority. Naval need of oil and the need for a large merchant
marine, demand that the United States Government shall adopt a new
policy touching oil and other national resources. We have been so
wasteful of resources as to endanger national strength. It required the
World War to teach us the importance of large production of oil, and of
tankers and storage in all parts of the world.




CHAPTER XXVII

EDISON--AND 100,000 MORE

  FLOOD OF SUGGESTIONS AND INVENTIONS OFFERED, MOST OF THEM TO DOWN
  THE U-BOATS--"FIND THE SUBMARINE" WAS THE PROBLEM--BEST DETECTION
  DEVICES DEVELOPED IN AMERICA--NEW WEAPONS OF WAR--THE NAVAL
  CONSULTING BOARD AND ITS GREAT WORK--SOME AMUSING SUGGESTIONS.


One hundred thousand suggestions and inventions were offered the Navy
for winning the war. Four-fifths of them were designed to down the
submarine. They poured in upon the Department in floods, evidence that
American genius was mobilized along with man-power. Letters came in by
the thousand, plans and models by the hundred. All were examined, and
those that gave promise were tested.

The creation of the Naval Consulting Board, headed by Thomas A. Edison,
in 1915, made the Navy the natural center for war inventions. While
many did not prove practical and others were in process, a considerable
number of important inventions were completed and proved of the highest
value. A notable instance was the development of means for detecting
submarines. In this America led the world.

When these devices had been perfected and thoroughly tested out on this
side of the water, Captain R. H. Leigh was sent to England with a staff
of naval officers and civilian experts; and ten tons of apparatus, to
be tried out in British waters. Three trawlers, the _Andrew King_,
_Kunishi_, and _James Bentole_, were equipped at the Portsmouth dock
yard, and on December 30, 1917, accompanied by a speedy "P" boat, they
steamed out for "listening patrol" in the English channel. Mr. C. F.
Scott, one of the civilian engineers who accompanied Captain Leigh,
said:

  The day after New Year's we received a wireless from an airship
  that a submarine had been sighted. We steamed over, got our devices
  out, but couldn't hear a thing. Another message from the airship
  changed the "sub's" position, so we altered our course and obtained
  a clear indication from the listening devices. The Hun was moving
  slowly up the Channel, submerged.

  We gave the "P" boat a "fix" (cross bearing) on the spot where our
  indication showed the submarine to be. She ran over the place,
  dropping a "pattern" of depth charges, and soon we began to see
  tremendous amounts of oil rising to the surface. Evidently our
  first experience was to be successful. How successful we did not
  learn until afterward.

  A trawling device had been developed which indicated whether
  contact with a submarine had been made. After the oil came up, we
  got out our trawling device and ran over the area for about an hour
  and finally got an indication.

  We threw over a buoy to indicate the spot and anchored for the
  night, as it was getting dark. Next morning we trawled again and
  got another contact within a hundred yards of the buoy. We had
  destroyed a submarine in our first test, and the "sub" was given
  out by the Admiralty as a "probable." [That is, probably sunk.]

Many detection devices had been tried out and proved failures, but
the American apparatus was so successful that the British ordered
them for their own vessels. Thousands were manufactured, and our
sub-chasers sent abroad were equipped with them. In December, 1917, it
was estimated that at times two to five U-boats had passed through the
English Channel in a day. After July 1, 1918, when patrol ships were
equipped with the improved listening devices, only one enemy submarine
is known to have passed through the Channel. Blocking the entrances to
Zeebrugge and Ostend, the Dover patrol and the better mine defenses are
to be credited with the larger part of this. But considerable credit
is due to these "listeners," whose ability to locate under-water craft
greatly increased the hazards of U-boats, especially in narrow waters.

The listeners also proved decidedly effective in high waters, off the
French coast, in the Adriatic, the Mediterranean, and wherever they
were used. They compelled the U-boats to change their tactics, and
remain motionless for hours, fearing that the slightest movement of
their propellers would disclose their presence.

Our submarine force began listening tests off Pensacola, Fla., in
January, 1917, using privately-invented apparatus which gave such
promise that an experimental station was established at Nahant, Mass.,
the General Electric, Submarine Signal, and Western Electric companies
coöperating with the Navy Department and Naval Consulting Board.

The Consulting Board had created a special Experimental Committee
headed by Mr. Lawrence Addicks, and on March 3 held a "Submarine
Defense Conference" at New York, which was addressed by Admiral Sims,
then president of the Naval War College; Captain J. K. Robison, of the
Newport Torpedo Station, and Commander Yates Stirling, Jr., in charge
of our submarine base at New London, Conn.

Scientists and naval officers engaged in this work held a conference
in my office in the Navy Department on May 9, and two days later I
created a Special Board on Anti-submarine Devices, with Rear Admiral A.
W. Grant as chairman, and representatives of the electrical and signal
companies, and the National Research Council as advisory members.
Extensive experiments were carried on at our submarine station at New
London, as well as at Nahant.

Magnetic, electrical and other apparatus having proved impracticable,
attention was concentrated on listening devices. The British had
been experimenting with various inventions of this nature, but none
had proved very effective. The first successful listening device
produced in America was the "C" tube, an application of the binaural
principle--that is, hearing through both ears--which was developed by
Dr. William D. Coolidge. Next was the "K" tube, developed at Nahant,
an adaptation of the rotary compensator devised by Prof. Max Mason at
New London, with microphones, enabling the device to be towed several
hundred feet astern of the listening vessel. Subsequently the combined
work at Nahant and New London resulted in production of the "Y" tube,
"Delta," "O S," and "O K" tubes, all modified forms of the "K" tube,
for installation on vessels of different types.

Submarine chasers were equipped with these tubes, the first of which
was developed by August, 1917, and a thorough test was made with
American submarines, which were easily located. But much depended on
the acuteness of the operator, and a school to train "listeners" was
established at New London. Phonograph records of the sound made by
various craft were prepared, and used in the school for listeners, who
soon became experts in determining direction, distance, type of vessel
and speed at which it was moving.

"Find the submarine," was the problem when we entered the war, and this
was the purpose of the listening devices. Once located, the "sub" could
be destroyed or damaged by the depth-bomb. Before its advent there was
no way of reaching the U-boat, once it submerged. The story is told
that a British vessel chased down a "sub," which dived and remained
stationary right under its pursuer. Down below them in the clear water,
the Britishers could see the enemy plainly. "If we only had some sort
of bomb that we could shoot down into the water, we could blow that
Fritzie to Kingdom-come," an officer remarked. The general idea of
the depth-bomb had long been known, and was then given its practical
application.

The first ones, designed by an officer in the Admiralty, were crude
affairs, metal cylinders like ash-cans. They were, at first, not very
reliable, but by development they became the most effective weapons
used against under-water craft.

The United States Navy developed depth-bomb tactics vastly superior
to any before in use. Instead of half a dozen bombs, our destroyers
carried fifty. The old method of releasing from the stern was
superseded by the "Y" gun, which hurled the huge charges with greater
accuracy and less risk to the vessel firing. Instead of dropping one
or two, the depth-charge barrage was devised, bombs being fired in
"patterns" all around the vicinity of the submerged boat, as well as
over the spot where it was believed to be. That was one reason the
destroyers proved such a terror to the "subs," which, as a rule, on
sighting one of these swift warships ducked or ran away.

[Illustration: THE NAVAL CONSULTING BOARD AND THE NAVY DEPARTMENT CHIEFS

Front row, left to right: Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt,
Hiram Maxim, Thomas A. Edison, Secretary Daniels, Peter Cooper Hewitt,
William LeRoy Emmett, Arthur Becket Lamb.]

Gunfire, tellingly effective against submarines as long as they were
on the surface, was ineffective the moment they submerged, as the
ordinary sharp-nose shells were deflected and ricocheted as they struck
the water. Our ordnance experts had already devised a non-ricochet
shell, a "flat nose" projectile which could be fired with considerable
accuracy at a target under water. The first contract for this type of
projectile was placed June 19, 1917, and deliveries began the next
month. Rapidity in firing was increased by a twin-gun produced for
destroyers, two barrels on a single mount, both aimed at one time and
firing alternately.

[Illustration: SECRETARY DANIELS AND THOMAS A. EDISON

Inset, Secretary Daniels and Mr. Edison with Mr. William L. Saunders
and Professor Max Mason, inventor of a submarine detection device, at a
test experiment at New London.]

Thus we had bombs and projectiles and quick-firing guns which would
"get" the undersea enemy, once it was located.

The paravane, an English invention, proved of great value in protecting
ships from mines. Its "wings," spread out in the water, picked up
mines; and its wires bore them away from the ships, where they could be
exploded without danger to the vessel.

Mines played a big part in naval warfare. The Germans sowed the seas
with them, and if the Allied mine-sweepers had not been so energetic
and skillful, they might have been as destructive to shipping as the
U-boats were. Our Bureau of Ordnance led in mine development, and the
new mine, called "Mark VI," which it produced in 1917, was decidedly
superior to any of its predecessors, and was the type used by us in the
North Sea Barrage.

Better guns for aeroplanes was a vital need. Machine-guns were made
more effective; but for anti-submarine warfare there was needed
something of larger caliber, with sufficient power to penetrate the
hull plating of the U-boat. An aeroplane "cannon," the Davis non-recoil
gun, was produced.

A 37-millimeter automatic cannon was being developed, as well as a
three-inch gun for the larger type of dirigibles. Aerial bombs were
improved and enlarged until they reached a weight of 550 pounds,
with 190 pounds of explosive, the largest type being 15 inches in
diameter and over 62 inches in height. Various experiments were made in
launching torpedoes from planes, and torpedo planes were designed to
accompany the fleet.

Night firing, naval experts realized, could be made much more effective
by some method of illuminating the area around enemy ships without
disclosing the position of our own. This was solved by "star" shells.
Fired at long distances and exploding high in the air, these shells
light up a considerable area, bringing out in bold relief the vessels
beneath.

Range-finding and fire-control devices were improved, increasing
the efficiency of large and medium caliber guns. "Smoke boxes" were
manufactured by the thousand and placed aboard merchant as well as
naval vessels, so that in case of attack they could make smoke screens.

So many new devices were developed that it would take volumes to
tell of them all. Though thousands of the suggestions made were
impracticable, not a few were of decided value, and the result as a
whole was fresh proof of the never-failing inventiveness and genius of
Americans.

When the Navy Department, in 1915, was planning its large program of
construction, and seeking for new weapons and new strategy to combat
the submarine, I was convinced that it would be of great assistance if
civilian scientists and inventors could be induced to give the Navy the
benefit of their experience and ability. This resulted in the creation
of the Naval Consulting Board. On July 7, I wrote Mr. Edison inviting
him to become the head of the Board, saying:

  One of the imperative needs of the Navy, in my judgment, is
  machinery and facilities for utilizing the natural inventive genius
  of Americans to meet the new conditions of warfare as shown abroad,
  and it is my intention, if a practical way can be worked out, as I
  think it can be, to establish, at the earliest moment, a department
  of invention and development to which all ideas and suggestions,
  either from the service or from civilian inventors, can be referred
  for determination as to whether they contain practical suggestions
  for us to take up and perfect.

  We are confronted with a new and terrible engine of warfare in the
  submarine, to consider only one of the big things which I have in
  mind; and I feel sure that with the practical knowledge of the
  officers of the Navy, with a department composed of the keenest and
  most inventive minds that we can gather together, and with your own
  wonderful brain to aid us, the United States will be able, as in
  the past, to meet this new danger with new devices that will assure
  peace to our country by their effectiveness.

Upon Mr. Edison's acceptance--he was the first American chosen by
selective draft--each of twelve leading scientific societies was asked
to name two representatives to compose the membership of the Board.
Most of them were eminent in scientific research or the development of
useful apparatus. This was the first civilian organization of a war
character which was created. Because of the personnel of its members,
it aroused wide interest.

The Board was composed of Thomas A. Edison, president; William L.
Saunders, chairman; Benjamin B. Thayer, vice-chairman; Thomas Robins,
secretary; Lawrence Addicks, Bion J. Arnold, Dr. L. H. Baekeland,
D. W. Brunton, Howard E. Coffin, Alfred Craven, W. L. R. Emmett,
Peter Cooper Hewitt, A. M. Hunt, M. R. Hutchison, B. G. Lamme, Hudson
Maxim, Spencer Miller, J. W. Richards, A. L. Riker, M. B. Sellers,
Elmer A. Sperry, Frank J. Sprague, A. G. Webster, W. R. Whitney, and
R. S. Woodward. Admiral William Strother Smith was named as special
representative of the Navy Department. All bureau chiefs and other
naval experts worked in coöperation with the Board.

With its technical talent, the Board began at once a survey of the
industries of the country, having effected an organization in every
state, with five technical men in each as advisory members. These
field aids, giving their services free, went into industrial plants
throughout the country, listing all machinery and machine tools
suitable for war service, and the men competent to serve in shops. That
gridiron organization functioned perfectly. This information of the
manufacturing resources of the country for public service in case of
emergency was the first that had been collected. The Navy had taken a
census of the ships and the Army knew of munition plants, but it was
this survey of industrial material and services which later formed the
basis for the big production work of the two military departments and
the War Industries Board. This was real preparedness--and it was begun
in 1915. Before England went into the war, it had prepared no record
of skilled labor suitable for war work. The result was that many men
hastened to the front whose services were far more valuable in munition
plants. The inventory taken by the Naval Consulting Board, completed
in five months, enabled our country to avoid that mistake. It made it
comparatively easy, when war came, to retain skilled men where they
counted most, and enabled factories to swing from their regular line of
production to Army and Navy work.

The card indexes, prepared with thoroughness, showed the concerns
that were working on military orders for foreign governments. It was
ascertained that 35,000 concerns in the United States could manufacture
war material, and the names, location and facilities of these plants
were docketed. The Board pointed out, what afterwards became generally
recognized, that the manufacture of munitions was a parts-making
business. Parts made in Toledo, Ohio, must fit those made in Portland,
Oregon, or Augusta, Georgia, and all these parts must fit each other
to the hundredth part of an inch. Over 500 concerns manufactured
parts of the Mark VI mine. When the Council of National Defense was
established, it took over the data and organization, and requested the
Naval Consulting Board to act as the official Board of Inventions for
the country.

After the experiments at Nahant, which followed the March meeting, in
1917, in company with Mr. Edison, Mr. William L. Saunders and others
of the Consulting Board, I visited New London. We took a sea trip on a
submarine-chaser equipped with listening devices. It was a matter of
gratification to both civilians and naval men to witness personally
the success of submarine detection, and to feel that their faith and
experiments had been rewarded.

Ship protection was the subject of constant study, and various
methods--camouflage, armament, smoke-boxes, submarine and torpedo
detection, plans to prevent and withstand attack and increase
buoyancy--were studied by the Consulting Board. It was through that
board that the naval research and experimental laboratory, now under
way on the Potomac, below Washington, was established and the money
provided through Congressional appropriation.

Mr. Edison spent most of his time during the war--practically all of
it--either on board the _Sachem_, which had been fitted up for his
special use, or in his office in the Navy Department at Washington.
I was in intimate touch with him. It was a revelation to go into his
chart-room and talk to him about his study of the lanes of the sea; to
see his maps studded with pins pointing out where sinkings were most
frequent, and to obtain his advice as to the routing of ships to lessen
the probability of attack. An authority on many other subjects, he
learned much about troop transportation, the routing of merchant ships
and their quick turn-around, and avoiding U-boats by changing routes.

One of his most successful and yet least known of his experiments
was in the detection of torpedoes. The Wizard of Menlo Park was most
modest in his claims. To a lady, enthusiastic over what she called
his inspiration, Mr. Edison is reported to have said, "Madam, it is
not inspiration, but perspiration." In a letter to a sub-committee
of the Senate, when some one had attributed the success in detecting
submarines to Mr. Edison, he wrote:

  I never worked or pretended to work on the detection of submarines.
  All of my work in this general direction was confined to the
  detection of torpedoes and to the quick turning of cargo boats
  ninety degrees in order to save the boat from being torpedoed.

  I was successful in both. With my listening apparatus, and while
  my boat was in full speed, I could hear a torpedo the instant it
  was fired nearly two miles away, and with my turning device, a
  5,000-ton cargo boat, fully loaded going at full speed, was turned
  at right angles to her original course in an advance of 200 feet.

Along with the hundred thousand suggestions of how to win the war,
there were not wanting incidents out of the ordinary. One day as I was
discussing department business with a bureau chief the telephone rang,
and a clerk said "long distance" was calling. He did not catch the
name clearly, but thought it was Mr. Ford. I found in a moment that it
was not the famous Detroit automobile maker, for the man at the other
end of the line began talking a blue streak, starting out with the
declaration: "I've invented a thing that will wipe out the submarines;
I've got something that positively will end the war." He seemed quite
excited about it. I asked him what it was. He said he could not tell me
over the phone, or entrust the secret to mails or telegraph.

"Send it to our Inventions Board," I suggested.

"Not on your life," he replied. "They might steal it, and I'd never get
the credit for it. It's worth millions, millions!"

He would never show it to but three people, he said, the President, Mr.
Edison and myself, and all three must give the pledge of secrecy.

"There's not a moment to be lost, and I want to bring it to Washington
myself," he exclaimed. "But I must be careful. If the Germans knew I
had this, their spies would murder me."

"All right, bring it on," I remarked, hoping to end the conversation
before he had bankrupted himself with telephone charges.

"Send me $5,000 by telegraph this afternoon, and I'll start tomorrow,"
he demanded. Used as I was to queer propositions, this did rather
startle me. "No, no," I replied emphatically; "I cannot do that."

"Do you mean to say,"--he seemed to be surprised--"that you won't send
me a measly little $5,000 when the thing I have is worth millions, and
will end the war?"

"That's correct," I said, rather sharply, I fear. "We will not send
anybody a dollar of Government money until we know what it is for."

"Well, that's the smallest piece of business I ever heard of," he
snapped. "I thought you were some Secretary, and now I believe all the
mean things some newspapers have said about you."

One of my office aids figured out that this irate citizen had spent
about $20 in telephone tolls. We never heard from him again, and the
invention that would end the war was lost to the world.

The sturdy police that guarded the portals of the State, War and Navy
building stopped at the entrance a tall, lean man who was lugging a box
about as big as two suitcases. They ordered him to open it, and found
inside a concern that looked as if it might go off at any moment. He
wanted to see somebody in the Navy Department, and one of my aids went
down to investigate. The fellow did not look like a spy or plotter, and
the Navy man asked him what his contraption was.

"It's a porcupine boat," he said, "a boat that'll keep off them
torpedoes that the submarines are firin'."

It was a model of a boat, its wooden sides thickly studded with long
spikes.

"What's the idea?" he was asked.

"Well, you see, the torpedoes can't sink a ship unless they hit her,"
he explained; "and if you put these long spikes all along the side,
they can't get to her. The spikes will stop 'em; the torpedoes are
stuck before they hit the boat--there you are."

It was a great idea; certainly no one else had thought of it. But as
the spikes would have to be about forty or fifty feet long to hold off
the torpedoes, and each ship would have to have a thousand or two of
them, we could not very well adopt the invention.

A Southern inventor brought forth a plan that would have brought joy
to the Sunny South, if it could have been adopted. This was to sheathe
all ships with an armor of thick cotton batting. He evidently got his
inspiration from the battle of New Orleans, where doughty old Andrew
Jackson erected a barricade of cotton bales which the British shells
could not penetrate. So a century later this Jacksonian figured that
a ship swathed in cotton would be immune from shell or torpedoes. The
Germans could fire away, and do no more harm than if they were throwing
rocks at a mattress. But unfortunately the naval experts seemed to have
their doubts about the efficacy of cotton-batting armor, preferring to
stick to steel.

"Lick the enemy before he lands!" was the slogan of an earnest soul who
was designing a submarine that would carry from 200 to 400 torpedoes.
If necessary, in the midst of a foreign fleet, he told us, they could
"unload the whole 400 in from four to eight minutes, according to the
number of men on duty to let them loose."

He also had "some very good ideas for warships," one of which was to
turn our old battleships into floating forts with 16-inch disappearing
guns. Attached to each vessel would be a sloping steel shelving running
into the water, a great plough that would turn the other fellow's
shells and scoop up torpedoes as if they were watermelons. "You could
just sit up on deck," he said, "and laugh at a hundred of them sending
torpedoes."

An airship that would sail from here to Germany, blow up Berlin, and
keep right on around the world, manufacturing its own fuel as it went
along, was another suggestion.

One citizen had a remarkable mine-catcher which, he said, "misses none;
it sees and feels for you and catches all, if the sea is strewed with
mines." He offered to sell his model for only $250,000.

We were offered an automatic field-gun that, placed in Washington,
could be operated by electricity from Texas. One man could operate a
thousand of them, the inventor claimed. Placing these guns all along
the German lines in France, the operator, seated at his switch-board in
Paris, could play on the keys like a typewriter, spraying the Teuton
lines with deadly missiles from Ypres to Verdun.

Another scheme was to put guns on top of all the skyscrapers in New
York to ward off aerial attack; and to build a machine that would
gather all the electricity in the metropolis, and project it by
wireless far to sea, sinking hostile vessels as if they had been struck
by lightning.

Mobilizing the dogs of America, sending them to France and "sicking"
them on the Germans was a proposition that might not have appealed to
dog-lovers so much as to the ferocious fighting men who wanted to bite
the Germans and "eat 'em up."

Mechanical soldiers capable of marching, fighting and capturing
man soldiers were proposed. You would only have to fill them with
ammunition, wind them up and let them go.

The German fleet at Kiel could have been easily destroyed, if the
floating torpedo suggested had been a success. Its originator proposed
to launch them in channels when the tide was going in, let them float
into the German harbors and blow up everything afloat.

These absurdities gave a touch of humor to the arduous task of
developing new methods and inventions--a task well performed by the
naval experts, civilian scientists and inventors who so patriotically
devoted their time and talents to the winning of the war.




CHAPTER XXVIII

BUILDING A THOUSAND SHIPS

  SIX HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS FOR DESTROYERS--"WARD" LAUNCHED 17-1/2
  DAYS AFTER KEEL WAS LAID--"REID" COMPLETED IN 45 DAYS--GREAT
  DESTROYER PLANT BUILT AT SQUANTUM--PATRIOTS IN OVERALLS--WHY WERE
  NOT MORE DESTROYERS BUILT BEFORE THE WAR?--NEW NAVY WILL SURPASS
  ALL OTHERS--REDUCTION OF ARMAMENT.


"Destroyer _Ward_ launched seventeen and a half days after laying of
keel," was the message from Mare Island Navy Yard that announced a new
world's record in ship construction.

In pre-war days from twenty months to two years had been required to
build a destroyer. Now they were being completed in a fraction of
that time. All the yards were working at top speed, far excelling any
previous accomplishments, but Mare Island had set a new pace hard to
equal.

"Liberty Destroyer," the _Ward_ was designated, and the way in which
she was put through was like a continuous Liberty Loan rally. "This
destroyer is needed to sink Hun submarines; let all hands help sink
them," was one of the numerous placards posted around her. Each day's
progress was marked on the big canvas banner stretched above the bow.
In twenty-four hours she began to assume shape. In two weeks they were
putting the finishing touches to the hull, and the banner read:

[Illustration:

  +---------------------------------+
  |    LIBERTY DESTROYER No. 139    |
  |                                 |
  | Keel Laid May 15th   14   DAYS  |
  |  Will be Launched         OLD   |
  |      June 1st             TODAY |
  |                                 |
  |         SHE'S SOME BABY         |
  +---------------------------------+]

Three and a half days later, she was sent down the ways. As she slid
into the water, officers and workmen cheered as they had never cheered
before.

This was the quickest time in which a vessel had ever been launched.
But the record for completion--the _Ward_ was commissioned in 70
days--was later bettered at the great Victory Plant at Squantum, Mass.,
where the _Reid_ was finished and made ready for her trials in 45-1/2
working days.

Before war began we ordered scores of destroyers, and soon afterwards
contracted for all that American yards could build. But we wanted more.
The question was how to get them. The Navy Department, after conferring
with one of the leading shipbuilders, determined on a bold stroke.
All the contractors, those building engines and machinery as well as
hulls, were summoned to Washington, and met with the Chief Constructor
and Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy in my office. "One hundred and fifty
more destroyers must be built," they were told. That proposition was
a "stunner." They had already contracted to build every one for which
they had facilities. And here was a demand that more than as many again
be constructed. Some shipyards would have to be enlarged, some new ones
built. The same was the case with engine manufacturers, and producers
of forgings; for producing enough engines was quite as difficult as
building hulls. Where companies could not finance additions, we agreed
that the Government would build them, as well as the new factories
or yards. Even at that, it was a staggering proposition. But the
contractors were game and patriotic. They promised every coöperation
and with the Navy experts began working out the thousand details
involved.

Congress was asked to appropriate $350,000,000 more for destroyers, to
build new plants required, as well as for ship construction. When the
bill was passed, October 6, 1917, the plans were ready, contracts were
signed, and the enlarged program was under way. Ground was broken at
Squantum the next day, October 7. Thousands of laborers were at work,
dredging, draining, making roads, driving piles, erecting buildings,
transforming that marsh into a fit habitation and working-place for
10,000 men. Buildings sprang up like magic. One concrete, steel and
glass structure three stories high and 200 feet long was finished in
two weeks. When winter came on, the laborers had to use picks and
shovels to dig through the frozen clay to lay foundations, and all the
workmen were handicapped by the bitter cold. Concrete poured hot--and
thousands of tons were used--had to be protected by masses of hay and
sheets of canvas, with heated air circulating inside to keep it from
freezing. But the work never halted, and in spite of all handicaps, was
completed in record time.

There were eighteen acres of shipyards covered by one continuous roof;
the arrangements being so complete that raw material went in at one end
and destroyers slid out at the other. There were hundreds of buildings,
not a few of them covering one to three acres. There were enough ways
for ten destroyers, and a score could have been under construction at
the same time.

Six months after ground was broken I had the privilege of witnessing
there the laying of the keels of five destroyers in one day.

The building of Squantum was rivaled by the erection of the big plants
at Erie, Pa., to make forgings for destroyer shafts and turbines; the
plant at Buffalo and by other feats of construction that would be
difficult to excel. All were erected and in operation in half the time
they could have been completed under ordinary conditions.

Our construction program embraced practically a thousand vessels--275
destroyers, 447 submarine-chasers, 99 submarines, 100 eagle boats, 54
mine-sweepers, and a number of gunboats and ships of other types. All
these in addition to the capital ships and scout cruisers authorized
in the three-year program. Though some contracts were cancelled
after the armistice, all but 100 or so of these vessels were built,
nearly 500 completed before the end of hostilities. In addition 1,597
privately-owned vessels, ranging from small patrol craft to huge
transports, were converted by the Navy for war purposes.

Over 2,000 vessels were in naval service before hostilities ended--six
times as many as were on the Navy list when war was declared. How was
it possible, in a country where shipbuilding had declined until it was
"a craft and not a trade," to build and alter and repair all these
ships, and also to provide munitions and build great establishments
ashore on both sides of the sea?

It was made possible by the foresight of Admirals Griffin and Taylor
and their associates, who before the war had made designs for building
various types of ships and for converting the ex-German vessels and
privately-owned craft suitable for war service. I wish the whole
country could know the true value of the work of these able officers
and their naval and civilian assistants. But for their forehandedness
and ability, our Navy would not have been able to have rendered such
prompt and valuable service. Great credit is due, alike, to the
shipbuilders who carried their plans into effect, devoting their
talents and untiring efforts to further warship construction.

It was also because the 100,000 mechanics and workers in navy yards and
naval plants, and the many more in private plants, who, with patriotic
naval and civilian experts, worked as never before. Many of these
"patriots in overalls" sacrificed their desire to enlist when told
that they could do more to win the war by driving rivets, fashioning
guns or making munitions. Labor was whole-heartedly in the war, and
would not tolerate slackers in production or in service. In the heat of
summer and the cold of winter, they rushed construction and astonished
the world by the celerity with which American skill and industry
turned out ships, weapons and supplies. On every war board labor had
its representative--in the Cabinet as well--and its patriotism and
unity made for a united and efficient America. The Navy and other war
agencies found the militant spirit and wise counsel of Samuel Gompers
worth a regiment of fighting men.

The Navy did not wait for war to begin building ships. When the program
for 156 vessels was proposed in 1915, without awaiting congressional
action, work was begun on plans so that on the very day that the
bill became a law the plans and specifications were issued for 20
destroyers, 27 submarines, 4 dreadnaughts and 4 scout-cruisers.
Contracts were placed for their construction as soon as the bids were
received. "Such speed," said Admiral Taylor, "was without precedent in
the history of the Navy Department. It was the result of the persistent
insistence by the Secretary of the Navy that work should be pushed and
his loyal support in this respect by bureaus concerned. There was no
procrastination or dilatoriness in the largest undertaking ever entered
into by the United States Navy, and the most important from the point
of view of preparation for any eventuality. While the large vessels
of the program had to be suspended during the war, the destroyers were
pressed."

Completion of the destroyer program gives the United States Navy 267
destroyers of the latest pattern, in addition to those of older type,
which, in the emergency of war, rendered such good service. These
destroyers have an aggregate of 7,400,000 horse-power, and they cost
approximately $600,000,000, counting $40,000,000 spent for new plants
and building ways. This sum is greater than the cost of all the ships
of the Navy available for service when we entered the war. The record
of our destroyers overseas won the admiration of Allied navies, and
reflected credit upon Congress, the naval administration and the
country.

But, in view of the need of thousands to patrol the seas in 1917-18,
where we only had scores, it has been asked, "Why did not the Navy
Department build hundreds of destroyers in 1915 and 1916 and have them
ready in 1917?" Looking backward, all of us admit that was the thing
that should have been done. No naval experts, however, either in Europe
or America, recommended in pre-war days such a building program.

All European admiralties, as well as our own, regretted that they
had not built more destroyers against the day when they were so much
needed. In reply to an inquiry made by a United States senator, Admiral
Sims said:

  If we could have imagined that the Germans would do what they did
  do we could have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if
  we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money. Nobody had
  any experience with this kind of war at all, and nobody could be
  savage enough in his disposition to know what the Germans would do,
  and therefore to prepare for it; so that I would advise you to be a
  little gentle in criticisms of naval officers in general, because
  they were not prepared for this war, because we are a more or less
  civilized people.

After ruthless submarine warfare began, we contracted, as we have
shown, for 275 destroyers, many more than any nation had ever attempted
to build in anything like so short a time.

But destroyers were by no means the only anti-submarine craft we
built. Realizing the usefulness of small craft, the Navy Department,
in 1916, turned its attention to the utilization of motor yachts and
other small power-driven vessels. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt
conferred with owners and builders, and an inventory of such craft was
taken. He started a campaign to interest owners of yachts and motor
boats and induce them to design their boats so that they could readily
be converted to war uses. Naval architects and their clients were
encouraged to submit their designs to the Navy Department. To give
further impetus to the movement, two small boats were constructed as
models.

Early in 1917, before war was declared, the Department's construction
experts, under the leadership of Captain J. A. Furer, naval
constructor, in coöperation with Mr. A. Loring Swazey, who later
enrolled as lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve, submitted to
the General Board, in February, a design for those wonderful boats
which became known as submarine-chasers. They were to be 110 feet long,
with a speed of 14 knots and a cruising radius of 800 miles, armed
with 3-inch guns, Y-guns for firing depth-charges, machine-guns and
depth-bombs. The shortage of structural steel and of labor required for
steel construction, necessitated building them of wood.

On March 19, 1917, orders were issued for building sixty chasers at
the New York navy yard and four at the New Orleans yard. On March 21st
orders were placed with private firms for 41 boats. Ten days later
contracts were placed with private builders for 179 additional boats,
and orders given for 71 more to be constructed at the navy yards at
Norfolk, Charleston, Mare Island and Puget Sound, a total of 355, all
ordered before war was declared. Fifty of these were, after completion,
turned over to the French government. The French were so pleased with
them that they ordered fifty more. A total of 447 chasers were ordered,
and 441 were completed. Their service far surpassed expectations of
designers and builders. Originally constructed for use in rivers
and harbors and near home coasts, they crossed the ocean and became
a reliance not only for patrol work but for offensive against the
U-boats--chasing submarines.

In the three-year program, there was provision for 58 coast submarines,
of which appropriations were made for thirty. On March 4, 1917, 20
additional submarines were provided for, and their construction was
begun. The Portsmouth (N. H.) navy yard had been made a submarine
construction yard and the orders were divided between that yard and
private contractors. Forty were completed before the armistice. We
sent several submarines to the Azores and a number to British waters,
where they operated from Bantry Bay. They gave an excellent account of
themselves, one, the AL-2 being credited with causing the destruction
of the German UB-65.

Having ordered all the destroyers and sub-chasers that could be built,
other sources were sought to produce more anti-submarine craft. On
December 24, 1917, I received a letter from Mr. Henry Ford proposing
quantity production of fabricated boats, suggesting that at least 500
could be built, and saying: "We will undertake the construction of
these boats with all possible speed, and deliver them to the United
States Government without profit to us." I telegraphed him, suggesting
that he send his engineers and construction men to confer with our
designers. Captain Robert Stocker and his associates in the Design
Division completed the plans and specifications in a few days, and
they were submitted to Mr. Ford. On January 15 he made a definite
proposal to build 100 to 500 of these vessels. I consulted with the
General Board, and two days later telegraphed him to proceed with
construction of 100. Later twelve additional were ordered for the
Italian Government. They were to be of 500 tons displacement, 200 feet
long, speed 18 knots, with a cruising radius of 3,500 miles. They were
to be armed with two 4-inch 50 caliber guns, discharge projectors,
anti-aircraft and machine guns.

These "eagle boats," as they were named, were built specifically to
hunt submarines. For their construction Mr. Ford erected a special
plant on the River Rouge near Detroit. Though only a few were in
service before the armistice, sixty in all were built. The completion
of 23 in one month in 1919 indicated that Mr. Ford was not far wrong
in his original estimate that it was possible, when his plant got into
quantity production, to turn out 25 per month.

"Eagles" went from New York to Inverness, Scotland, over a 4,500-mile
course, and after they had steamed 11,500 miles officers confirmed
their seaworthiness and their fitness for the task for which they
were built. Several sailed to Arctic waters, through fields of
ice. They were used to maintain dispatch service between ports in
Northern Russia, in which duty Admiral McCully reported they were very
successful.

Orders for many mine-sweepers were placed early in 1917, their design
permitting their construction by certain companies without interfering
with the building of naval or merchant craft. Some were built at the
Puget Sound and Philadelphia navy yards. The new mine-sweepers proved
exceptionally seaworthy. Thirty-six were employed in sweeping the mines
in the North Sea. In addition to the vessels designed and built for
this purpose, we employed a fleet of privately-owned ships of all sorts
and sizes, which were fitted out and used first as patrol and then as
mine-sweepers.

While war was on, construction had to concentrate on destroyers and
other anti-submarine craft. However, we completed two battleships, the
_Mississippi_ and _New Mexico_, and practically finished the _Idaho_;
but work was suspended on capital ships that were not already far
advanced.

Hostilities ended, attention was turned to the completion of the
program authorized in 1916. Should we proceed with the dreadnaughts and
battle-cruisers on the pre-war plans; or modify the plans, but still
build two distinct types; or abandon the plans altogether and build
a single type to do the work of both battleship and battle-cruiser?
These were questions that addressed themselves to naval administration.
Officers were debating them. From London came the information that the
British Admiralty had built a capital ship, the _Hood_, a composite
of the dreadnaught and the cruiser, which was said to combine the
advantages of both.

After consultation with leading members of the Naval Affairs Committee,
and upon their advice, accompanied by Admirals Griffin, Taylor
and Earle, heads of the Bureaus of Engineering, Construction and
Ordnance, I went to Europe to learn, at first hand, what changes,
if any, war experience taught should be incorporated into the new
ships to be constructed. An examination of the _Hood_ by our expert
officers disclosed that this new ship had more speed than earlier
battle-cruisers, though less than that of our design; a heavier
battery, though of only about half the power of that of our projected
battleships; and had protection much greater than that of earlier
battle-cruisers.

[Illustration: FITTING OUT FOR DISTANT SERVICE

New destroyers built and equipped at a privately owned ship yard in
Camden, New Jersey.]

[Illustration: HANGING UP A RECORD

The launching of the destroyer _Ward_ at the Mare Island Navy Yard
17-1/2 days after her keel was laid established a new record.]

Upon our return from Europe all the information gathered was laid
before the General Board. Admirals Mayo and Rodman, who had recently
returned from Europe, where they had been interested in the question,
were invited to act with them. The General Board made a unanimous
recommendation that the twelve battleships should be "completed
as expeditiously as possible on present lines of development in
battleship construction." In view of the importance of protection
as indicated by experience at the Battle of Jutland, where thinly
protected battle-cruisers were unable to stand up under heavy fire,
the Board recommended that "the six battle-cruisers now authorized be
completed as expeditiously as possible, but with additional protection,
particularly to turrets, conning towers, magazines and communications,
at the expense of a small reduction in speed." The recommendations were
approved, and directions given to press their construction.

The new battleships under construction will be 660 feet long, with
displacement of 43,200 tons, with an extreme breadth of 105 feet and a
mean draft of 33 feet. Engines developing 60,000 horse-power will drive
them at a speed of 23 knots. Their twelve 16-inch guns will be mounted
in four turrets, which revolve so that all can be fired simultaneously
to either side of the vessel. In a single salvo these guns will throw
25,000 pounds of projectiles. In every way they outclass any ships of
the line ever built.

The six battle-cruisers will be larger than any warships heretofore
constructed. Each will have 43,500 tons displacement, practically the
same as the battleships, but will be longer by over 200 feet, their
length being 874 feet, and they will be ten knots faster, making
33-1/4 knots, 38 miles an hour. No less than 180,000 horse-power is
required to drive these immense vessels through the water. Their
engines will develop as much electric power as is required to supply a
good-sized city. The six battle-cruisers will have a total of 1,080,000
horse-power. Each will be armed with eight 16-inch guns, firing 16,800
pounds of projectiles. The weight of metal is not, however, nearly as
important in gunfire as is the range. The guns of our battle-cruisers
will easily outrange those of any ships now afloat. Both battleships
and battle-cruisers will be propelled by electric drive, the new method
which, first installed on the _New Mexico_, proved its superiority, and
was adopted for all our later major vessels.

With the completion of these eighteen capital ships, together with the
scout cruisers and other types under construction, the Navy of the
United States will be at least "equal to the most powerful maintained
by any other nation of the world." That was the goal in view when the
big three-year program proposed in 1915 was adopted by Congress in the
act of August 29, 1916, to which, when this program is completed, the
Navy will owe its supremacy.

It is a matter of gratification that the United States, which
brought forth the steamship, the ironclad monitor, the torpedo boat,
the aeroplane, the flying boat, has again taken the lead in naval
construction and will soon have the most powerful of all armadas.

This country should keep that position for all time until--and
unless--with a powerful navy and great national wealth, the United
States succeeds in securing an international agreement to reduce
armament. The very act making possible our supremacy on the seas,
declared it to be the "policy of the United States to adjust and
settle its international disputes through mediation and arbitration";
authorized the President to invite a conference of all the great
governments to formulate a plan of arbitration and "consider the
question of disarmament"; and declared that the ships authorized but
not already under contract were not to be built if international
reduction of armament could be secured.

That statement of policy in the naval appropriation act of 1916--"a
most unusual place," said the President in an address at Seattle--was
in line with the policy of the Government from the day of Wilson's
inauguration. It was the authorization for the international
agreement looking to a reduction of armament contained in the Treaty
of Versailles. The Bryan treaties, ratified by every European
country except Germany, which insured cooling time and opportunity
for discussion in a world forum, were a long step toward settling
international differences by reason rather than by resort to war. It
was about the time those treaties were proposed that Winston Churchill,
First Lord of the British Admiralty, suggested a "naval holiday." In
my first report in 1913, reiterated in every subsequent report, I
declared: "It is not a vacation we need, but a permanent policy to
guard against extravagant and needless expansion." I recommended then
that "the war and navy officials, and other representatives of all
nations, be invited to hold a conference to discuss whether they cannot
agree upon a plan for lessening the cost of preparation for war" and
added this observation:

  It is recognized that the desired end of competitive building,
  carried on under whip and spur, could not be effective without
  agreement between great nations. It ought not to be difficult to
  secure an agreement by which navies will be adequate without being
  overgrown and without imposing over-heavy taxes upon the industries
  of a nation.

Long before the match was struck by the assassination of the Archduke
Ferdinand, President Wilson, Ambassador Page and Colonel House were
taking steps which, if Germany had been willing and Great Britain and
France had sensed the coming conflict, might have averted the World
War. To that end in the early part of 1914, President Wilson sent
Colonel House abroad with letters to the Kaiser and the heads of the
British and French governments, with whom earnest conferences were
held. President Wilson and his associates in 1913-14, as this shows,
had the vision of world agreement for peace to secure which he and the
representatives of other free nations signed the treaty in Paris in
1919.

"The last thing Germany wants is war," said the Kaiser to Colonel
House, just three months before he precipitated the conflict. The
Kaiser was obsessed at that time, so Colonel House reported, with the
thought of what he called "the Yellow Peril." The Kaiser said: "The
white nations should join hands to oppose Japan and the other yellow
nations, or some day they will destroy us." That fear, or simulated
fear, and his statement that Germany could not hastily join a peace
pact so long as 175,000,000 Slavs threatened his empire, furnished the
excuse for brushing aside the suggested agreement to prevent war.

Did he fear that President Wilson's tentative move early in 1914 toward
a League of Nations for world peace would be successful? Was the Kaiser
convinced that he must strike in that year, or surrender his mad
ambition for world domination?

As these lines are written a conference of five nations, called by
President Harding, is in session at Washington, where the discussion
of reduction of naval armament was given first place in a proposal to
scrap all pre-dreadnaughts and also the incompleted great dreadnaughts,
and not to build or complete the battle-cruisers under construction.
The plan presented by the American representatives is to adopt the
ratio of capital ships for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan
at five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for
Japan. Such a program, if followed by scrapping all submarines and
placing them in the category of outlaws, would, with reduction of land
armament and regulation of aircraft, carry out the hopes of those
responsible for the naval program authorized in 1916.




CHAPTER XXIX

MAKING SAILORS OUT OF LANDSMEN

  HALF A MILLION RECRUITED AND TRAINED IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS--"ONE OF
  THE MOST STRIKING ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE WAR," SIR ERIC GEDDES
  DECLARED--NAVY'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PAVED THE WAY--EVERY OFFICER A
  TEACHER--NAVAL ACADEMY GREATLY ENLARGED--NO SHIP KEPT WAITING FOR
  OFFICERS OR MEN.


Half a million men and thirty thousand officers were enlisted and
trained by the United States Navy in eighteen months. No navy in the
world ever had as large a personnel, or ever attempted to raise and
train as large a sea-force in so brief a time. Sir Eric Geddes, First
Lord of the British Admiralty, said:

  The dauntless determination which the United States has displayed
  in creating a large, trained body of seamen out of landsmen is one
  of the most striking accomplishments of the war. Had it not been so
  effectively done, one would have thought it impossible.

When the Archbishop of York, Honorary Chaplain-in-Chief of the
British Navy, visited Great Lakes, Ill., he was amazed quite as much
by the spirit of the personnel as he was by the vast extent of the
establishment, the largest naval training station in the world. The
Archbishop reviewed the cadets in the administration drill hall, a
structure large enough for three entire regiments to maneuver. Thirty
thousand blue-jackets were assembled in the hall, with three full
regiments, nine thousand men, and a band of three hundred pieces in
light marching order. After the preliminary ceremony "to the colors,"
they passed in review before the Archbishop, playing and singing "Over
There." The thousands massed in the center of the hall, sang "Columbia,
the Gem of the Ocean." Profoundly moved, the Archbishop turned and said
to Captain W. A. Moffett, the commandant, "Captain, now I know that we
are going to win the war."

When, a few days later, he visited Washington, the Archbishop told me
that the outstanding thing he had seen in America was the Great Lakes
Training Station. "If I had not seen it," he said, "I could not have
believed it possible that such a training camp for seamen could be
conducted a thousand miles from the ocean."

Like expressions came from members of the various missions and naval
officers who came to the United States. That station, situated in
the heart of the country, far from the ocean, trained and sent into
the navy during the war over one hundred thousand men. It was the
vitalizing spirit of the Navy in the Middle West; a center of the
patriotic inspiration which swept like a prairie fire and brought
young men into the Navy more rapidly than we could house them. Two
thousand five hundred enlisted men were under training there when war
was declared and in that month 9,027 recruits were received. But Great
Lakes never was swamped. No matter what strain was put upon it, the
authorities were equal to any emergency.

Between April 6, 1917, and March 11, 1919, 125,000 men were received;
96,779 trained and sent to sea duty, and 17,356 graduated at its
special schools. The camp grew to 1,200 acres, with 775 buildings.
Nine great drill halls were built in which thousands could maneuver in
regimental formation. But bigger than the number of men enrolled or
the buildings erected or the great schools conducted was the spirit
of the place. From the inspiring leadership of Captain Moffett, who
was a genius at organization, to the youngest boy fitted out in naval
uniform, pride in the station and the naval service was so contagious
that it reached back into the homes from which the youths had come and
stirred the whole Middle West with enthusiasm for the Navy.

In the early days of the war, Captain Moffett, who had come to
Washington to discuss plans for enlarging the station, said to me: "Mr.
Secretary, I have here a requisition for $40,000 for instruments for
the Great Lakes band."

It had not been very long since $40,000 was the entire appropriation
for the station. The captain's request seemed to me like extravagance.

"Do you expect to win the war, as the Israelites did?" I asked, "by
surrounding Berlin and expecting the walls to fall as every man in your
band blows his trumpet?"

I demurred at first, but he pleaded for it with such eloquence that I
signed the requisition. This enabled John Philip Sousa, enrolled as a
lieutenant in the Reserve Force, to train fifteen hundred musicians,
the largest band in the world. Bands were not only sent to ships and
stations overseas, but toured the country, giving the greatest impetus
to the Liberty Loan campaigns. These bands were an inspiration to the
entire service. I found later that a British commission had reported
that only three things were more important than music. These were food,
clothing and shelter.

The three other great permanent training stations, Hampton Roads, Va.,
Newport, R. I., and San Francisco, were animated by the same spirit as
Great Lakes. Their officers and men vied with each other in efficient
training of recruits. The same was true of the temporary stations along
the coast which came into being to give quarters and instruction to
youths who enlisted so rapidly that provision had to be made for them
at every available point.

Approximately 500,000 men and 33,000 officers were in the Navy when
hostilities ended, and nearly nine-tenths of them had been trained
after war was declared. Naval administration did not wait until
hostilities began to increase its force. Recruiting was pressed in
the closing months of 1916, immediately after Congress authorized a
substantial increase, and 8,000 men were enlisted. In January 1917,
enlistments went up to 3,512, and there was a larger increase the
next month. In March, when the President signed the order raising the
Navy to emergency strength--87,000 regulars, plus 10,000 apprentice
seamen, and hospital attendants and others, a total of 97,000--we began
a vigorous campaign that covered the entire country. When war was
declared there were in the Navy 64,680 enlisted men and 4,376 officers,
commissioned and warrant. Some 12,000 reserves had been enrolled, the
10,000 Naval Militia were mustered into service and 590 officers and
3,478 men of the Coast Guard were placed under the Navy. This gave us a
total force of approximately 95,000.

Within little more than a month after war was declared there were
100,000 regulars, and by June 1st the total force had grown to 170,000.
By January 1, 1918, there were 300,000 officers and men on the rolls,
including reserves and the Coast Guard. By August we had passed the
half-million mark, and when the armistice was signed there was a naval
personnel of approximately 533,000. The actual figures of the Bureau
of Navigation for November 11, 1918, were 531,198, and for December
1, 532,931. But practically all those shown in the latter report had
been enlisted before hostilities had ended. Figures of various branches
varied slightly before and after the armistice, but there were in the
naval service at its maximum:

               Officers    Men
  Regulars      10,590   218,251
  Reserves      21,618   278,659
  Coast Guard      688     6,101
                ------   -------
  Total         32,896   503,011

It is interesting to compare the above enlistment for the World War
with those who served in the Navy in previous wars:

  War of 1812           20,000
  Mexican War            7,500
  Civil War            121,000
  Spanish-American      23,000

The Navy was called upon to perform many new tasks--to man troop-ships
and cargo transports, to furnish guards for merchant ships, to maintain
forces ashore, in Europe as well as this country, and to render
other services that no navy had previously contemplated. All this
required personnel in large numbers. But no matter what the service or
requirement, when the call came the Navy was ready with officers and
men, regulars or reserves.

During the entire war "we never had a delay of a vessel on account
of not having the officers and men," said the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation. "The personnel were actually ready at seaports to put on
vessels before the vessels were ready."

Few of the recruits had any previous sea experience. Most of them were
from the interior, many had never seen the ocean. But the enthusiasm
and energy of teachers and pupils would have surprised Dana, who in
his "Two Years Before the Mast," said: "There is not so helpless and
pitiable an object in the world as a landsman beginning a sailor's
life." They knew they were woefully ignorant of the sea, but they had
a stimulus Dana's landsmen lacked--the eager desire to fit themselves
to fight. That sharpened their capacity so that in a few weeks they
learned more than, without such incentive, they could have mastered in
a twelve-month.

At training stations naval terms were used for everything. The barracks
building was the "ship"; the floor was the "deck"; offenders were tried
at the "mast"; requests for leave were to "go ashore," and returning
the men "reported aboard." Meals were "chow" and there was slang for
every article of food--stews being known as "slumgullion," salt as
"sand," coffee as "Java," and bread was called "punk." Recruits soon
picked up the lingo of the sea, and found their "sea legs."

Every feature of life at sea was simulated as closely as possible in
the stations, and when sent into service, the men felt at home aboard
ships. It was no new experience for them to sleep in hammocks. They had
slept in them while under training. "Hit the deck, boys," was always
the morning order in station as it is on shipboard. Before they had so
much as seen a man-of-war or transport, their motto was, "for the good
of the ship."

"Do your bit," never found favor in the Navy; we had a better term. As
the commanding officer of one station passed a squad at drill, he heard
ringing out the words: "Don't just do your bit. The men on this station
do their best."

Serious as was the work, recruits, with the spirit of eternal youth,
enlivened it by fun, humor and pranks. This was always in evidence.
No hardship could dispel it. A story is told of a young Texan, just
enlisted and being inspected at Great Lakes. All the recruits were
ordered to fall in line and strip for inspection. Sans shoes, sans
shirts, sans pants, in fact sans everything in the way of clothing,
the boy marched past the doctor. The Texan, with utter lack of the
awe which a gold-striped surgeon is supposed to inspire, had secured
a paper stencil, used to mark clothing, and using black paint had
lettered his bare stomach with the words, "Good morning, doctor."

The grave surgeon saw the joke was on him, and led the hearty laughter
at this original greeting. Another recruit from a Western state,
hearing of the various detentions and occasional surgical operations
supposed to precede acceptance, hung over the place where he supposed
his appendix was located this placard: "I have had my appendix
removed." He probably thinks to this day that this saved him from an
operation.

"I never knew what patriotism meant before I learned it by service in
the Navy."

That remark was addressed to me by an upstanding, clear-headed youth in
naval uniform as the mine-sweepers were welcomed back to New York after
they had finished the worst job assigned to the navy, that of sweeping
up the mines in the drab days after the armistice.

He was bronzed by the wind and the sun of the North Sea. His muscles
seemed made of steel. Exposure had given a vigor of body that made you
feel that he could do anything.

"Tomorrow," he went on, "I am going back to my job in civil life, but
I am a different man. Before the war I think I loved my country and
I suppose the flag meant something to me. But I felt no passion of
patriotism. It was a matter of course. But the Navy has taught me such
reverence for the flag that I have a thrill every time it is raised,
and somehow my country became something more than land and water and
houses. It seems something holy to me. And that's what my naval service
did for me," he added as he passed to his place at the banquet table.

Such inculcation of love of country was the best by-product of the war.

How was it that the regulars in the Navy were able to train so rapidly
the recruits that poured in after war was declared? How did they attain
the efficiency which led to the promotion of ten thousand of them to
warrant or commissioned officers?

The answer is that the Navy had been organized as an educational and
industrial, as well as a fighting, institution. Officers and men had
gone to school, they were subjected to frequent examinations, and
promotions were given from ascertained fitness rather than from the
outgrown policy of seniority. Post-graduate schools enabled officers to
qualify as experts. Vocational and grammar schools for enlisted men
had kindled ambition and given mental as well as physical and naval
training. The war, therefore, found the Navy not only fit to fight,
but its officers and men equipped to train quickly the half-million
young men who enlisted in 1917-18. The Navy had years before instituted
educational preparedness--professional, vocational, elementary--as a
part of its policy. And the test of war proved that no other form of
preparedness produced better results.

In 1913 I issued orders which established a school on every ship in the
Navy, the officers instructing the men in reading, spelling, writing
and arithmetic, geography, grammar and history, as well as in naval and
technical subjects. Nearly every enlisted man who availed himself fully
of this instruction afloat received promotion, and all of them became
more proficient.

The war proved that vessels manned by seamen having trained minds as
well as trained hands are superior to ships with uneducated crews.
Neither speed nor armor wins battles. It is intellect, education,
training, discipline, team-work, courage.

As a logical result of the schools afloat, Congress later authorized
the appointment of one hundred enlisted men annually as midshipmen at
the Naval Academy. In the first class after this law made it possible,
the honor graduate at Annapolis came from the enlisted personnel.
Others have since attained high standing in their class and in the
service. The day will come when all appointments to the Naval Academy
will be made from the ranks.

The educational system, adopted in the Navy in 1913, became part of
the army system of training before the American Expeditionary Force
returned from France, and Secretary Baker made such instruction an
integral part of the training for men enlisting in the Army.

With the advent of war the educational work of the Navy was greatly
enlarged and changed to meet war conditions. In addition to many
technical schools the fleet at Yorktown was utilized for intensive
training, and prepared over 45,000 officers and men for important and
varied duties afloat. The older type of battleships became virtual
training schools, devoting particular attention to gunnery, navigation
and engineering, qualifying men for various duties requiring
experience. When ordered to sea the men who had enjoyed this special
training gave full proof of the practical schooling through which they
had passed.

It required war to bring appreciation of the school as a necessary part
of military instruction. The Navy had started schools for sailors in
1914, but it was not until 1919 that the Army and Marine Corps felt
the necessity of such schools, which they then established, though in
1913 General Butler, in command of the Marines at Panama, was teaching
them Spanish. "It opened my eyes to what might be done," said Judge
Garrison, then Secretary of War, upon his return from an inspection
trip, "and I am going to advise Army officers to go down to Panama and
learn from General Butler how to teach men in the Army." Upon their
return from France General Lejeune and General Butler established
schools for the teaching of Marines at Quantico, a plan which is being
extended to all Marine bases and attracting a superior type of recruits.

In 1866 General Lew Wallace outlined a plan of education for soldiers,
approved by Charles Sumner, declaring that the "military system as
respects the rank and file is founded on egregious errors." The chief
error was that no system of giving the rank and file the same character
of instruction as imparted at West Point was at that time offered in
order that they might win commissions. He urged that the hours of
service of a private soldier be "so divided as to give him time for
study and meditation without interference with his routine of duty."
The "proverbial idleness of military life" which then prevailed was
due to lack of schools and proper instruction. By the addition of the
education and promotion policy suggested, General Wallace said, we
would "not only get better military service, but as an act of wisest
statesmanship you offer in a constitutional way the coveted opportunity
for education to every youth in the land."

The Navy, having given trial to the policy, found that all that General
Wallace claimed for it was true, and now that the Army and Marine Corps
have established like schools, educational advantages as a part of
military duty have become the accepted American policy.

The war emphasized the worth of education for military efficiency.
While excellent officers were obtained from every source possible,
the main dependence for all-around naval officers was upon the Naval
Academy graduates. In the test of war they more than justified what
was expected of them. In order to secure more officers with Annapolis
training, the course for midshipmen was reduced, during the war, to
three years and made more intensive, upon the recommendation of Rear
Admiral Edward W. Eberle, the able and resourceful superintendent of
the Naval Academy. He and his associates, anxious to get into the
active fighting, were doing more by the instruction of the increasing
number of midshipmen and the zeal with which they inspired all who came
under their influence.

Before the war, plans had been adopted and appropriations made for
greatly increasing the Naval Academy. A new Seamanship and Navigation
Building that cost $1,000,000 was constructed. Four million dollars was
expended in enlarging Bancroft Hall, which was more than doubled to
accommodate the increased number of midshipmen. In 1912 there were 768
midshipmen at Annapolis. Legislation adopted before the war increased
the number to 2,120 in 1917. The enlarged facilities will accommodate
2,400.

Two special courses were established at the Naval Academy in the spring
of 1917, one for line officers and the other for men of the supply
corps. A total of 1,622 were graduated as ensigns for line duty and 400
as supply officers. They went right into the fleet, and though they had
received only a few months' drill, they carried the Annapolis spirit
into the service--a spirit of valor and invincibility. The institution
at Annapolis, the pride of America and the admiration of all visitors
to our country, is easily the greatest naval school in the world.




CHAPTER XXX

THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND STRONG

  VAST OPERATIONS COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN CARRIED ON WITHOUT NAVAL
  RESERVES AND NATIONAL NAVAL VOLUNTEERS--MANNED HUNDREDS OF VESSELS
  PLYING TO FRANCE--SERVED ON TRANSPORTS, DESTROYERS, SUB-CHASERS
  AND EVERY KIND OF CRAFT--NAVAL AVIATION COMPOSED MAINLY OF
  RESERVISTS--THIRTY THOUSAND MADE OFFICERS.


"We are coming, Uncle Samuel, three hundred thousand strong!" That
was the spirit if not the song of the reservists who besieged the
recruiting stations and flocked into the Navy at the call of war.

They came from every walk of life--mechanics and millionaires, farm
boys and college students, clerks and merchants, yacht owners and
boatmen, fishermen and firemen. There was hardly a trade, profession
or calling that was not represented. Ninety-nine out of every hundred
were landsmen, knowing nothing of the sea. But they took to the naval
service like ducks to water, and the rapidity with which they learned,
and the efficiency with which they served, amazed the old sea-dogs.

Never again will men dare to ridicule the volunteer, the reservist,
the man who in a national crisis lays aside civilian duty to become a
soldier or sailor, to shoulder a gun or take his place in the turret.
The splendid body of young men from civil life who quickly adapted
themselves to military service astonished the old timers, who believed
that long service was absolutely necessary to make one efficient.

On every ship in the Navy were found young men who, without previous
training, had enrolled for the war, and in a short time were performing
well the duties of naval service. Moved by a zeal and patriotism which
quickened their ability to learn, the ambitious young men who responded
to the call in 1917-18 mastered military knowledge so rapidly as to
astonish naval officers, as well as the country. The most capable were
placed in command of small naval craft, and the commendation of older
officers was hearty and enthusiastic.

Before 1917, responsible naval officials knew that the chief need
when war came would be trained leaders. There was never any doubt
that patriotic young men would enroll by the thousands and tens of
thousands. But you cannot make a naval officer in a day. It is easier
to secure good officers on land than on sea. It was leadership, a
quality indefinable, that the Navy needed.

There was need for many more officers. After promoting many capable
regulars, we turned for officer material to the apt and alert young men
in colleges and schools, in shops, in professions and on the farms.
Most of them were given their intensive training on board ship, but
the Navy was able to give 1,700 a special course at the Naval Academy.
Securing that assignment by competition with all other reservists, they
came with the imprimatur of approval from ships or shore stations.
After the thorough course at Annapolis they went immediately to
service afloat, and from admirals and captains I received reports that
gave proof of their efficiency. Some did so well that they were keen
competitors, in the special duties they performed, with those who had
enjoyed a full four-year course at the Naval Academy.

Over 30,000 reservists were made commissioned or warrant officers,
nearly three times as many as the total, 10,590, in the regular Navy.
They served on vessels of every type, from submarine chasers to
battleships. On the transports the larger percentage of the officers
were reservists. The usual plan was to have the duties of the captain,
executive officer, chief engineer, gunnery officers, senior supply and
medical officers performed by regulars, the others being of the reserve
force. Out of a total of, say, thirty officers on board a transport,
twenty-four of them would be reservists. They were on duty on deck, in
the engine room, in the sick quarters, in the supply office, and in
practically every part of the ship.

The idea of some who thought in the early days of 1917 that family or
political influence would get them a commission was the subject of not
a little good natured ridicule in the service, which found expression
in verses like these:

    I never thought I'd be a gob--
      You see, dad owns a bank--
    I thought at least I'd get a job
      Above a captain's rank.

    But woe to me, alack, alas!
      They've put me in white duds;
    They don't quite comprehend my class--
      They've got me peeling spuds.

It was not easy work, this learning to be a seaman and studying to
be an officer. But it made men of those youngsters. The fact that
promotion depended on their own efforts, that there was a fair field
and no favor, inspired them to effort as nothing else could have done.

Men of all trades and professions were in the reserve. Millionaires
from New York and graduates of Princeton served alongside young fellows
who a year before had been plowing behind Missouri mules. An heir of
one of the country's largest fortunes was a seaman gunner, and his mate
in the same crew was a strapping youngster who had been working in a
factory.

An officer who went out for a run on a sub-chaser from Brest thought
there was something familiar about the grimy seaman who was testing the
forward gun. As the man turned the officer recognized him.

"Well, of all things!" exclaimed the officer. "You're the last man in
the world I'd ever expect to find here. The last time I saw you, you
were the ladies' favorite, engaged in photographing every debutante and
stage celebrity in New York. How did you get into the Navy?"

"Well, it is funny, even to myself," he laughed, and told his story.

He had made a picture of a well-known actress and her baby, and was on
his way back to the studio when he struck a recruiting party holding a
meeting in the street. Aroused by the enthusiasm, he felt he ought to
do his part. He enlisted on the spot, turned over his studio to others,
and in a month was shooting a gun on a sub-chaser instead of a camera.
He stayed on that boat until the last horn blew, and the boys were
ordered home. One of his mates at the gun was a former actor, another a
clerk in a store.

[Illustration:

                                                  © Great Lakes Recruit

                            THE LIVING FLAG

Ten thousand blue-jackets, at Great Lakes, the largest naval training
station in the world. Inset: Captain William A. Moffett, Commandant.]

[Illustration: PANORAMA OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY AT ANNAPOLIS

Inset: Rear Admiral Edward W. Eberle, Superintendent, who guided the
destinies of the Naval Academy during the trying days of the War.]

One day in New York four young fellows suddenly walked out of a
motion-picture studio and enlisted. Two of them were high salaried
photographers, but they said nothing about that and went in as seamen.
Several months afterwards a call was sent out for a few men experienced
in photo work. One of these four was found shoveling coal at Pelham. He
had been for three years the photographer for Sidney Drew, but he was
plugging along at coal passing, and doing a good job until found fitted
for other work.

"Captain, I'd like to get a transfer," was the request a young
reservist made of his commanding officer in 1918. The captain was
surprised. The youngster had rendered service in the armed guards and
was doing well on a cargo transport.

"What is the trouble with your present duty?" the Captain asked.

"Well, sir," he answered, "I've been going across on merchantmen. I
have been torpedoed three times, but I'd like to get on a destroyer or
a submarine-chaser, where I can see a little real action."

That was the spirit of the reservists. Willing to perform any duty,
they wanted to get into action, to be sent where the fighting was.

Naval aviation was made up largely of reservists, and the Naval Reserve
Flying Corps grew during the war into a force of more than 26,000, with
1,500 qualified pilots and 4,000 student officers in training. Not only
were hundreds of bright young men enrolled as prospective aviators, but
thousands of skilled mechanics were enlisted in the ground personnel.

Looking over the list of officers of the Cruiser and Transport Force,
I find that eight reservists were on Admiral Gleaves' staff, eighteen
on that of Admiral Jones. Of the 166 officers who served on the
_Leviathan_, the largest of all transports, 93 were reservists. On the
_George Washington_ there were 63 out of the total of one hundred.
Thirty-five served on the _President Lincoln_, 46 on the _President
Grant_, 69 on the _Mount Vernon_, 51 on the _Great Northern_, 43 on the
_Orizaba_, 28 on the _Pastores_, 33 on the _Pocahontas_, 24 on the
_Powhatan_, 30 on the _Princess Matoika_. Of this large force, there
was not a transport or cruiser which did not have a large proportion of
reservists in its officers and crew. In carrying the American Army to
France and bringing it home, the reservists did their full share of the
work.

They played an even larger part in the Naval Overseas Transportation
Service. Five thousand officers and thirty thousand men were required
to man this vast fleet of cargo ships carrying munitions and supplies
to France. Of the officers all but twelve were reservists, as were a
large majority of the enlisted men. Thousands more were in training to
furnish crews for the hundreds of vessels being built by the Shipping
Board which the Navy was preparing to man.

Of our 350 submarine chasers, which were on patrol duty in French and
English waters, in the Adriatic and all along the American coast, the
large majority were manned by reservists, who performed this hard and
often monotonous duty with a cheerfulness that was unfailing. These
sturdy little 110-foot boats stayed at sea in all kinds of weather, and
braved storms that even the largest vessels did not relish.

The record shows that the reservists could have done anything required
at any time anywhere. At the aviation assembly and repair base at
Pauillac, France, during an inspection by members of the Naval Affairs
Committee, one of the party, Congressman Peters, of Maine, remarked:

"My watch is broken and I have tried both in Paris and at Bordeaux to
get it repaired, but was told that it would take two weeks to do so."

Lieutenant Commander Briscoe, in command of the repair base, told the
Congressman that it could be fixed right there at the station.

"But," said Mr. Peters, "I have only an hour to spend here."

"All right," said Briscoe, "we can do it."

An instrument repair man was sent for. He took the watch, and fifteen
minutes later handed it back to the astonished Congressman, who found
it running and set at the correct hour.

"Well, well, I didn't think that you had such skilled mechanics in the
service."

"That's nothing," said Briscoe. "We can build a locomotive here--and
run it, too."

It was a fact. The mechanical personnel of the Flying Corps was
competent to manufacture, overhaul, repair and operate almost any
mechanical device made in America.

The United States had no naval-reserve legislation until Congress
authorized the creation of a reserve in 1915. It did have the nucleus
of a naval militia prior to the act of February 16, 1914, when Congress
coördinated these distinct and scattered branches into a cohesive real
naval militia organization, subject in time of war to the call of the
President. In pursuance of that act a division of Naval Militia was
organized in the department, and a board named by the Secretary of the
Navy to formulate standards of professional examinations for officers
and enlisted men, and also to strengthen the militia as an effective
arm of naval power. That board, which pioneered the organization so
well that it met the test of war with credit, was composed of Captains
W. A. Gill, Edward Capehart, and Harold Norton, and Commanders J. J.
Poyer and F. B. Bassett, of the Navy, and Commodore R. P. Forshew,
Captain C. D. Bradham, Captain E. A. Evers, Commander J. M. Mitcheson,
and Lieutenant J. T. McMillan, of the Naval Militia.

Cruises covering several weeks in the summer were organized for
training and were continued until 1917, when these short cruises merged
into war service. In encouraging and training these reserves we were
carrying out the wise counsel of Jefferson given in 1807: "I think it
will be necessary to erect our seafaring men into a naval militia and
subject them to tours of duty in whatever port they may be." The act
of August 29, 1916, provided that the militia in Federal service be
designated as "National Naval Volunteers." The force grew to twelve
thousand by 1917, and when war was declared this body of men, who had
enjoyed practical training, were at once available for duty. They were
given important assignments, ashore and afloat, in the fighting zone on
ships of all types, in administrative positions; and, as leaders and
instructors of newly enlisted reserves they rendered timely and useful
service. During the war the National Naval Volunteers and Reserves were
amalgamated along lines largely worked out by naval militia officers.

But for the naval reserve legislation of 1916, I do not see how we
could have promptly provided naval personnel for the war. It will
always be a monument to the wisdom of the then Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, Admiral Victor Blue, who was again called to that post
after serving as captain of the _Texas_ under Rodman in the North Sea
Fleet, that the legislation was made ready and prepared against the
day which we hoped would never come, but which did come, with all
suddenness, upon us.

It was the act of August 29, 1916, that created a Naval Reserve Force
of six classes--the Fleet Naval Reserve, of former officers, and
enlisted men who had completed as much as sixteen years' service in
the Navy; the Naval Reserve of men of seagoing experience; the Naval
Auxiliary Reserve, men employed on merchant vessels suitable for naval
auxiliaries; the Naval Coast Defense Reserve, in which civilians
without previous sea experience could be enrolled; the Volunteer Naval
Reserve, whose members obligated themselves to serve in the Navy in
any of the various classes without retainer pay or uniform gratuity in
time of peace; and the Naval Reserve Flying Corps, composed of officers
and student flyers and enlisted men qualified for aviation duties. At
the same time a Marine Corps Reserve of five classes was authorized,
corresponding to the Naval Reserve Force.

This was the basis upon which was built up the vast reserve force of
more than 300,000 which was enrolled, trained and put into service
during the war. Beginning with a few hundred the force grew rapidly
after the break with Germany. Upon the declaration of war the Naval
Militia were mustered in, and from 977 officers and 12,407 enlisted
militiamen and reserves in service April 6, 1917, the reserves grew in
six months to 77,000, in a year to 123,000, and eventually reached a
total of 355,447--30,358 officers and 305,089 men.

Except for a few thousand ex-service men and merchant seamen, this
immense force was made up of men who had had no seagoing experience,
men who had to learn the game from the beginning. And the rapidity
with which they were turned from landsmen into sailors reflected great
credit on instructors and apprentices.

There is no page of the war more illustrative of what the colleges
did, in addition to the college spirit of lofty patriotism which sent
educated youths into the service by the thousands,

    "Who took the khaki and the gun
    Instead of cap and gown,"

than preparing students for all branches of the service. The college
campus became a national training ground. Institutions of learning were
converted into naval schools where young men were given instruction
in branches fitting for service in the Navy. Harvard became a radio
school; Massachusetts "Tech" taught aviators, Princeton specialized
in cost accounting, Yale's units were commanded by a retired admiral,
Stevens Institute had its engineering school. Scores of other colleges
and universities in all parts of the country extended their facilities
in whatever way was most needed. There was not a rating in the Navy,
from the new duty in connection with listening devices to the oldest
calling of cook, without special schools. Intensive courses sent men
afloat with the best instruction possible in the brief period allotted.

College men did everything from peeling spuds to commanding ships.
Trained minds, plus work and courage in the test of war, forever
answered in the affirmative the question whether college education is
worth what it costs. The college man mastered navigation more rapidly
because he had mastered mathematics. His ability to learn readily
paid his country a large dividend upon its investment in educational
institutions.

Though colleges and universities were giving instruction and nearly
all our ships and stations engaged in training reserves as well as
regulars, the typical reserve camp was at Pelham Bay. We needed a
training station near New York. We had to have a good waterside
location with plenty of space, well drained and wholesome, and we found
it in the park at Pelham, which the municipal authorities generously
tendered for temporary use. Ten miles from the heart of the city, with
water on two sides, Pelham Bay was an ideal location, and there we
built a station capable of providing for 25,000 men. It was efficiently
commanded by Captain W. B. Franklin, a former officer in the regular
Navy, and a fine type of the reservist of mature years.

I made it a habit during the war, whenever my duties called me to New
York, to run over to Pelham. Being myself in the reserve class, called
from civilian life to service with the naval forces for a period, the
chance to touch elbow to elbow with these men was always embraced, and
after every visit I returned to Washington with new inspiration and
new zeal. Many young reservists trained there won promotion--I say
won, because commissions were not handed out. They were awarded by
demonstration of fitness. The course was so thorough that the reserves
called Pelham the "Reserve Naval Academy."

Eighteen reservists were commended for acts of personal bravery, 110
for courageous and heroic action. Four Medals of Honor were awarded
reservists; eleven received Distinguished Service Medals; the Navy
Cross was awarded to 265 officers and 50 enlisted men, and special
letters of commendation for exceptional performance of duty were sent
to 171 officers and 20 men of the Naval Reserve Force.

This is the record that glorified all the reservists, not alone those
marked for special distinction but the thousands who were of the same
stuff and spirit. They fought well. They died well. They have left
in deeds and words a record that will be an inspiration to unborn
generations. As illustrating their spirit I recall a legacy left by a
valorous young aviator for whom I named a destroyer.

Kenneth MacLeish, of Glencoe, Ill., was enrolled in the Reserve Flying
Corps in March, 1917. In October he went to France and became a member
of the bombing group, taking part in many air raids over the enemy's
lines. While on a raid his squadron was attacked by a dozen enemy
airplanes. Fighting desperately, to enable his fellows to escape,
MacLeish's plane was shot down and he was killed. His daring, his
fortitude, his Christian spirit were a trinity which make him immortal.
Writing to his parents, just before he was killed, MacLeish penned this
classic that will live in the annals of the Naval Reserves:

  In the first place, if I find it necessary to make the supreme
  sacrifice, always remember this; I am firmly convinced that the
  ideals which I am going to fight for are right, and splendid
  ideals, that I am happy to be able to give so much for them. I
  could not have any self-respect, I could not consider myself a
  man, if I saw these ideals defeated when it lies in my power to
  defend them. * * * So you see, I have no fears, I have no regrets.
  I have only to thank God for such a wonderful opportunity to serve
  Him and the world. * * * And the life that I lay down will be my
  preparation for the grander, finer life that I take up.

  I shall live! * * * you must not grieve; I shall be supremely happy
  * * * so must you--not that I have "gone west," but that I have
  bought such a wonderful life at such a small price, and paid for it
  so gladly.




CHAPTER XXXI

WOMEN IN THE NAVY

  MORE THAN ELEVEN THOUSAND REGULARLY ENLISTED--THEY CONSTITUTE THE
  ONLY WOMEN ENTITLED TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN LEGION--NO LACK
  OF WOMAN'S NURSING--GIRLS WORKED IN TORPEDO FACTORY AND MUNITION
  PLANTS--THE INSPIRING LEADERSHIP OF MRS. ANNA HOWARD SHAW, HEAD OF
  WOMAN'S COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.


The Navy was long regarded as an institution for men only. It was the
only place where there was no opening for women. To be sure no sailor
would have felt comfortable going to sea in a ship which had not been
sponsored by a woman's breaking the bottle as it slid into the waters
at the launching. A ship, feminine in all our language, demanded a
woman's benediction as the assurance of favoring winds and prosperous
voyages. But men alone wore the naval uniform prior to 1917.

It is true that before that time it had been found that the naval
establishment could not get along without women, and they had been
admitted to hospitals and dispensaries ashore, where they were found
indispensable.

In March, 1917, after the break with Germany, the Navy stood in
great need of clerical assistants in Washington and at all the shore
stations. There was no appropriation to pay civilians for the work
that was immediately necessary. Every bureau and naval establishment
appealed for clerks and stenographers. How could they be secured at
once? The Civil Service Commission could not furnish a tithe of the
number required, even if there had been the money to pay them.

"Is there any law that says a yeoman must be a man?" I asked my legal
advisers. The answer was that there was not, but that only men had
heretofore been enlisted. The law did not say "male."

[Illustration: YEOMEN (F) IN LIBERTY LOAN PARADE, NEW YORK CITY

The Yeomen (F) were regular yeomen, and they did yeomen service. Inset:
Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, chairman of the Woman's Council, Council of
National Defense, under whose direction the women of the United States
were mobilized for war work.]

[Illustration: U. S. S. CYCLOPS, THE COLLIER WHICH DISAPPEARED WITHOUT
LEAVING A TRACE]

"Then enroll women in the Naval Reserve as yeomen," I said, "and we
will have the best clerical assistance the country can provide."

It was done, and they were given the designation Yeomen (F)--not
"Yeomanettes," but regular yeomen, the F indicating female. They were
truly yeomen and did yeoman service. In the Marine Corps they were
equally efficient, and were known as "Marinettes" or Lady Marines.

"I do not wish to enroll as a Naval Reservist," said an independent
young woman to the enrolling officer at the Washington Navy Yard,
"until I know what ship I am to serve on."

It was explained to her that women yeomen were not to go to sea.

"But I want to go on the _Nevada_," she said, in tones of
disappointment.

These women yeomen, enlisting as reservists, served as translators,
stenographers, clerks, typists, on recruiting duty, and with hospital
units in France. Too much could not be said of their efficiency,
loyalty and patriotism.

Eleven thousand Yeomen (F), 1,713 nurses, and 269 Marinettes were
enrolled. They were, I am informed, the only women serving during the
war who were on the same footing as men with all allowances and pay
and clothing outfits, and the only women eligible to membership in the
American Legion. Those who made up the four companies in Washington
became proficient in military drill. They made a handsome appearance
when, upon the return of the Rainbow Division, they were the guard
of honor to the President, having previously taken part, with other
military units, in the welcome to President Wilson when he returned
from Paris. They made a notable showing as they formed in double lines
of spotless white uniforms as the presidential party passed through the
Union Station at Washington to receive the enthusiastic welcome given
by the multitudes.

The uniforms of the Yeomen (F) and the Marines (F) were natty and
beautiful, were worn with pride, and are preserved by them as the
honorable token of service during the great war. They were both
becoming and suited to the duty assigned. As a designer of woman's
uniforms the Navy Department scored a distinct success, for these
uniforms were copied by women all over the country.

The last drill of these Yeomen (F) was held on July 31, 1919, upon
their demobilization. They had saved the day in war, and the Navy
regretted the legislation which compelled the disbanding. I do not
know how the great increase of work could have been carried on without
them. I voiced the thanks of the Navy in expressing "gratitude and
appreciation of their splendid service and patriotic coöperation," as
they were mustered out. They are organized in posts in the American
Legion, and have carried into civil life the spirit of devotion to
country which they displayed in the days of the war.

I issued an order early in the war that women be given preference in
appointments to clerical positions in the Navy. This released men for
military duty. The war taught that the Navy was dependent upon woman's
deftness not only to prevent "lack of woman's nursing," but also in
multifarious duties, including assembling parts for torpedoes and other
war munitions. Upon a visit to the Newport Torpedo Station, I found
women in overalls at work, putting together parts of torpedoes made
there. They were so capable and showed such skill that scores were
enabled to do, and to do excellently, a character of work formerly
done exclusively by men. Not a few of them were school teachers, who,
feeling the compulsion for war-work, shared the feeling of the wealthy
woman in Washington, who, applying for a position in the gun factory at
Washington, said:

"I can knit at night. If I cannot fight, I wish something to do where I
can feel I am really in the war, helping to make guns or torpedoes or
other real instruments of war--a job that is hard, and where labor in
the heat and burden of the day taxes all my strength."

She was a sister in spirit of the many women who worked in munition
plants, fashioning rifles, dressed in overalls, faces begrimed, proud
that they were thus helping on with the war. If there had been need,
many more would have gone into the shops, glad to tax their strength
for the cause in which their very souls were enlisted.

Not only does the world owe a lasting debt of gratitude to women
who served, in shops, in the Navy Department, in factories making
naval aircraft, at navy bases, in work for the Army, but likewise the
larger number, who in their homes and communities and in welfare work
at home and abroad, dedicated their hands and spirit to the varied
war activities. Their most notable organized duties were in the Red
Cross and the Young Women's Christian Association. A story of the
benefactions of the Red Cross is chiefly the story of woman's work and
woman's ministrations. With the mothers of our fighting forces, they
constituted in truth the irresistible first line of defense and offense
which would have held to the last against all odds. They furnished the
basis of what, for lack of a better name, we called morale--the will to
win--without which ships and guns and fighting machinery never yet won
a battle. A Woman's Advisory Committee on Naval Auxiliaries to the Red
Cross War Council rendered patriotic and useful service.

The Government early found the necessity for the organization and
direction of women in war work, and the Council of National Defense
set up a Woman's Council, headed by that great woman of statesmanship
and vision, the late Dr. Anna Howard Shaw. The women who composed this
Council, in addition to Dr. Shaw, were Mrs. Philip N. Moore, Mrs.
Josiah E. Cowles, Miss Maude Wetmore, Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, Mrs.
Antoinette Funk, Mrs. Stanley McCormick, Mrs. Joseph R. Lamar, Miss
Ida M. Tarbell, Miss Agnes Nestor, Mrs. Ira Couch Wood, secretary.
Under the direction of this Woman's Council the women of America were
mobilized for war work in all parts of America. Women were found,
wholly enlisted, with their counsel and labors and sacrifice, wherever
men planned or fought or died. Some gave their lives, many gave their
health, all gave complete consecration.




CHAPTER XXXII

COAST GUARD WON DISTINCTION

  ESCORTING CONVOYS BETWEEN GIBRALTAR AND ENGLAND, CUTTERS MADE
  NOTABLE RECORD--"TAMPA" SUNK, WITH ALL HER GALLANT OFFICERS AND
  MEN--"SENECA" SAVED SURVIVORS OF "COWSLIP" AND "QUEEN"--COAST AND
  GEODETIC SURVEY AND LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE DID FINE WORK.


The Coast Guard automatically came under control of the Navy when
war was declared. Its vessels, its trained officers and men proved
a valuable addition to our forces, and rendered notable service in
various areas and in many lines of activity, at home and abroad.

They formed a very important part of our forces at Gibraltar,
which included six Coast Guard cutters, the _Seneca_, _Yamacraw_,
_Algonquin_, _Ossipee_, _Manning_ and _Tampa_, constantly engaged in
escorting convoys.

The splendid service they performed was commended in Admiral Niblack's
letter of September 5, 1918, to Captain Charles Satterlee, commanding
officer of the _Tampa_, in which, after detailing her record, under
way more than 3,500 miles each month since October 1, 1917, "never
disabled, ready whenever called on," he said:

  This excellent record is an evidence of a high state of efficiency,
  an excellent ship spirit, and organization capable of keeping
  the vessel in service with the minimum of shore assistance. The
  squadron commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the
  commanding officer, officers and crew on the record which they have
  made.

Three weeks after notable service had evoked this commendation, every
officer and man of the _Tampa_ met sudden and mysterious death. The
night of September 26, 1918, the _Tampa_, having escorted a convoy from
Gibraltar, was proceeding toward Milford Haven, Wales. At 8:45 p. m.,
a loud explosion was heard by vessels of the convoy, but the night
was so dark that the _Tampa_ disappeared before her companions could
see what had happened. American destroyers and British patrol craft
searched the vicinity.

Nothing was found except a small amount of wreckage and the bodies
of two men in naval uniforms. It is believed that the _Tampa_ was
torpedoed by a submarine. The German U-53 claimed to have sunk a United
States vessel of her description. "Listening-in" stations on shore
reported that they detected the presence of a submarine near the spot
where the _Tampa_ was destroyed. But no one knows how she met her fate.
Every soul on board the vessel perished, 115 in all, of whom 111 were
Coast Guard personnel. The officers lost were Captain Satterlee, First
Lieutenants Archibald H. Scally and John T. Carr, Second Lieutenants
Roy A. Bothwell, James M. Earp and John F. McGourty, and Third
Lieutenant James A. Frost, Jr.

It must, indeed, be a matter of solemn pride to the Coast Guard to
know that the _Tampa_, lost with all her gallant officers and men, was
distinguished by such service and sacrifice that it will always be
remembered in the naval annals of our country. It was my pleasure to
name one of the modern destroyers of the Navy for Captain Satterlee,
and on April 16, 1921, a new cruising vessel of the Coast Guard was
launched at Oakland, California, named the _Tampa_.

Few instances that occurred during the war are more indicative of
devotion to duty than the gallant attempt of the _Seneca_ to salvage
the steamer _Wellington_, torpedoed September 16, 1918. Though damaged,
its officers thought that the vessel would probably float, but the crew
refused to remain on board.

Lieutenant F. W. Brown (U. S. Coast Guard), the _Seneca's_ navigating
officer, asked permission to take a volunteer crew and endeavor to
work the _Wellington_ into port. Nearly all the _Seneca's_ complement
volunteered for this duty. Lieutenant Brown made a hasty selection
from the many volunteers, taking Acting Machinist William L. Boyce and
eighteen men. En route to the torpedoed vessel, lookouts and gun's
crew were detailed. Upon boarding the ship, ammunition was broken
out, the gun's crew was assigned, and lookouts posted. It was highly
probable that the submarine would make another attack. Soon a second
boat, containing the master, first and second officers and eleven
of the _Wellington's_ crew came on board. The _Seneca_ had to leave
at once to protect the remainder of the convoy, and could only send
out radio calls for assistance. There followed an heroic and all but
successful effort on the part of Lieutenant Brown and his men to save
the steamship.

Within half an hour, the _Wellington_ was started at slow speed,
heading for Brest. Men took turns in passing coal and firing, coming
out on deck when relieved and taking a gun-watch. One of the men from
the _Seneca_ was a cook, Russell Elam, who disappeared into the galley,
and in a short time announced that dinner was served for all hands.
When he appeared on the bridge with Lieutenant Brown's dinner, he was
clad in an immaculate white serving jacket and had omitted no detail of
service. And this on a torpedoed steamer in imminent danger of sinking!
Cook Elam met a heroic death with others of this gallant party.

During the afternoon all went well, but at sundown the wind increased,
seas crashed over the bow, and all on board were in danger. The ship
listed sharply, rolling so that the davit heads threatened to force
the lifeboat under. Those aboard were ordered to get into the boat,
and hold on to the _Wellington_ by use of a long rope, a sea painter.
Seven of the _Wellington's_ crew got into the boat with one _Seneca_
man detailed to unhook it, the other Coast Guardsmen standing by to
lower it. The radio operator, M. S. Mason, remained at his instruments
to keep in touch with the destroyer _Warrington_, which was proceeding
to their assistance, and three men kept the pumps going. Just after
the boat was lowered, someone cut the painter, and the boat drifted
away. The _Seneca's_ party and some of the collier's men were left on
board with nothing to rely upon except a small raft which they had
constructed.

At 11:35 p. m., the _Wellington's_ position was sent to the
_Warrington_ (Lieutenant Commander Van der Veer). To aid the destroyer
in her search, rockets were sent up at fifteen-minute intervals, and at
2:30 a. m., answering rockets were seen. The men in the lifeboat were
gotten aboard the _Warrington_, but the boat was crushed. Lieutenant
Brown found some long, heavy planks; from these three rafts were
improvised, which were lowered and lines let down so the men could
reach them in the darkness. The lights of the destroyer were now
in sight. The _Wellington_ listed rapidly. With a hand flashlight,
Lieutenant Brown signaled that he had to abandon ship immediately,
and asked the destroyer to work in close and pick up his men. As the
collier settled by the head, at the same time turning over, Brown
crawled out over the railing and flashed his last appeal, "My men are
in the water."

At that moment the boilers exploded, the vessel seemed to rise up, and
as she lurched into her final plunge, Brown sprang into the water. This
was at 4 a. m., in pitch darkness, a raging gale and tempestuous seas.

After swimming awhile, casting about for something to cling to, and
finding nothing, Brown heard a cry for help. Swimming towards the man,
he saw that he was clinging to a plank, and told him to hold on and
keep his mouth closed, so as not to take in water. Finding two calcium
lights burning, he extinguished them so no one should be misled into
thinking they marked a raft. As he approached the destroyer, Brown
called out repeatedly: "I had eighteen men." His sole thought was that
the men committed to his charge should be saved.

Running close to the _Wellington_, the _Warrington_ floated down
three life-rafts and all available buoys, well lighted. It was still
very dark, but from a few hundred yards to leeward the men on the
_Warrington_ watched the black hull turn turtle, slowly settle in the
water, and then disappear. When dawn broke, they began to see men in
the water, some on rafts and buoys, some on floating wreckage. Eight
men were finally picked up, one of whom died on board. One of the first
rescued proved to be Lieutenant Brown. A heaving line was flung to him
and he grabbed it, but said he did not remember having been hauled
on board. Apparently he lost consciousness, and his identity was not
discovered until he awoke.

Three of the _Warrington's_ crew had jumped into the heavy sea, with
lines made fast to their waists, in attempting to save life. Seaman
James C. Osborne, of the Coast Guard, supporting a shipmate, Coxswain
Peterson, swam through the heavy seas and placed Peterson, who was only
half conscious, on a raft. Several times both were washed off, but each
time Osborne went to his shipmate's assistance and replaced him on
the raft. Finally Osborne semaphored, "I am all right, but he is gone
unless you come right away." The _Warrington_ rescued them both.

Lieutenant Brown and eight men of the _Seneca_ were saved, Machinist
Boyce and ten Coast Guardsmen were lost, besides five belonging to
the _Wellington's_ crew. But for the heavy gale and rough sea that
developed, Brown and his volunteers would probably have won out and
saved ship and cargo. They upheld to the fullest the high traditions of
the Navy and Coast Guard.

Another example of readiness to assume responsibility and act as the
necessities of the occasion require, is that of Captain William J.
Wheeler (U. S. Coast Guard), commanding the _Seneca_, which rescued
the survivors from the British patrol sloop, _Cowslip_. After dark
on April 2, 1918, the danger zone escort from Gibraltar, including
the _Cowslip_, joined the convoy which the _Seneca_ had escorted
from England. A loud explosion was heard and the _Cowslip_ displayed
distress signals. The _Seneca_ immediately headed for her, although
the sloop flashed the signal, "Stay away! Submarine in sight, port
quarter." Circling the _Cowslip_ in search of the submarine, the
_Seneca_ and the destroyer _Dale_, which had also come up, began to
search for the enemy. The established doctrine then was that, when a
vessel was torpedoed, other vessels in the vicinity should not risk
their own destruction by endeavoring to go to her relief and that
rescue of survivors should be considered as a secondary duty. But
American officers could not witness a disabled and sinking ship without
making every effort to save her people.

Three times the _Seneca_ approached, stopping to lower her own boats
and take off survivors from the British sloop. One enlisted man and all
the wardroom officers of the _Cowslip_, except the officer-of-the-deck,
had been killed by the explosion. The _Seneca_ rescued all the
survivors, including the commanding officer, another commissioned
officer, and 79 enlisted men. For this courageous and meritorious act,
Captain Wheeler was commended by Admiral Niblack, Admiral Sims, and the
British admiral commanding at Gibraltar.

[Illustration: LOST WITH EVERY MAN ON BOARD

The Coast Guard Cutter Tampa was lost on the night of September 26,
1918, sunk, probably by a submarine, before any of her companions
in the convoy could see what had happened. Inset: Captain Charles
Satterlee, commanding the Tampa.]

[Illustration: THEY SAVED SURVIVORS OF TORPEDOED VESSELS

At the risk of their own destruction, the crew of the Coast Guard
Cutter Seneca repeatedly rescued survivors of torpedoed vessels,
although it was an established rule that when a vessel was torpedoed
other vessels in the vicinity should not go to her aid because of the
almost certain destruction which would await the rescuers. Inset:
Captain William J. Wheeler, commanding the Seneca.]

On June 29, 1918, the _Seneca_ was acting as ocean escort to a
convoy, when at 6:45 a. m., the British steamer _Queen_ was torpedoed
and sank in five minutes. As in the case of the _Cowslip_, Captain
Wheeler boldly approached the _Queen_. Dropping depth charges and
firing his guns to keep the submarine down, he picked up the survivors.

[Illustration: GALLANT OFFICERS OF THE COAST GUARD

Left to right: Commodore E. P. Bertholf, commandant of the Coast Guard
from 1911 to July, 1919; Lieutenant F. W. Brown, navigating officer of
the Seneca, who volunteered to work the torpedoed Wellington to port;
Boatswain John A. Midgett, of Coast Guard Station No. 179, who led the
rescue of survivors of the torpedoed Mirlo under extraordinary danger
from fire.]

It was work like this, calling for daring and quick decision, that
distinguished the vessels of the Coast Guard, which, operating in the
Navy, performed such signal service for the Allies and the commerce of
the world.

On this side of the Atlantic, the main contribution by the Coast
Guard was as part of the patrol service under Admiral Anderson in the
Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, protecting the oil supply that went
in large volume from Texas and Mexico to British and other Allied naval
ships and for the necessary uses by the Allied armies in France.

In the great disaster that followed the blowing up of a munition ship
at Halifax, the U. S. Coast Guard cutter _Morrill_, in command of
Lieutenant H. G. Hemmingway, and its crew gave first aid to the injured
in that stricken city. Coast Guard men supervised, without accident
or loss of life, the landing of 345,602 tons of high explosives in
New York and the loading on 1,698 vessels. The total value of the
explosives on these ships was more than five hundred million dollars.

When the tug _Perth Amboy_ and four barges were shelled by a German
submarine on July 21, 1918, within sight of Coast Guard station No.
40, at East Orleans, Mass., Keeper Robert F. Pierce, with his crew,
launched their surfboat, and while the shelling was continuing,
proceeded out to assist the tug and her tow and aided in safely landing
the crew and treating the wounded.

A very gallant action was that of the keeper and crew of Coast Guard
Station No. 179 at Chicamacomico, North Carolina, in rescuing life
under extraordinary circumstances following the destruction of the
steamship _Mirlo_, on August 16, 1918. At 4:30 p. m. the lookout
reported seeing a great mass of water shoot into the air. It seemed
to cover the after portion of a steamer that was about seven miles
away. At the same time a quantity of smoke rose from the steamer. Fire
was seen, and heavy explosions were heard. The Coast Guard boat went
to the rescue. Five miles off shore they met one of the ship's boats
with the captain and six men in it, who informed them that the ship
was a British tank steamer and that she had been torpedoed. Keeper
John A. Midgett directed the captain where to go. The Coast Guard boat
was headed for the burning mass of wreckage and oil. On arrival the
sea was found to be covered with burning oil and blazing gas for a
hundred yards, with two masses of flames about a hundred yards apart.
In between these, when the smoke would clear away a little, a lifeboat
could be seen, bottom up, with six men clinging to it. Heavy seas
washed over the boat.

The Coast Guardsmen made their way through that inferno of smoke,
thrashing wreckage and blazing oil. They evaded the perils of floating
debris, fire, and wave. Lifting the six men on board, all that survived
of the sixteen who had been in that lifeboat, the Coast Guard rescuers
sought the safety of clear water. Thirty-six men of the _Mirlo_ were
rescued.

The first United States vessel to pass the German fortifications
at Heligoland and through the Kiel Canal after the signing of the
armistice was the _Aphrodite_, commanded by a Coast Guard officer,
Captain F. C. Billard. While passing through the North Sea, the
_Aphrodite_ struck a German mine, but escaped destruction and was able
to proceed to Germany.

The danger to American shipping by a submarine base on our coast,
not to speak of the violation of neutrality which such action would
involve, necessitated a patrol of the coast to make sure that there was
no such base and to prevent U-boat operations. These requirements were
admirably met by the coöperation of the Coast Guard. There were on the
Atlantic and Gulf coasts 199 stations.

On April 6, 1917, one message, "Plan One. Acknowledge," incorporated
the Coast Guard as an integral part of the Navy during the war. That
service had 138 line officers, 70 engineer officers, 13 district
superintendents, and 2 constructors, a total of 233 commissioned
and 257 warrant officers, and 3,478 men--a valuable addition to the
naval forces. The professional ability of the Coast Guard officers
is evidenced by the fact that twenty-four commanded combatant ships
operating in European waters, five vessels of the patrol force in the
Caribbean Sea, and twenty-three combatant craft attached to naval
districts. Five Coast Guard officers commanded training camps, six
performed aviation duty, two being in command of air stations, one of
these in France. The Navy Department, naturally enough, assigned to the
command of combatant ships only officers whose experience and ability
warranted such detail and only those officers in whom the Department
had implicit confidence.

Commodore E. P. Bertholf, then commandant, and Commodore W. E.
Reynolds, later commandant of the Coast Guard, and other officers were
assigned important administrative duties. Ashore and afloat, officers
and men discharged their duties with such efficiency that at the close
of the war I strongly recommended to the President and Congress that
the Coast Guard be continued permanently as a part of the Navy.

Not only was the Coast Guard an integral part of the Navy during the
war, but the Lighthouse Service added 1,284 men to the naval personnel
and fifty vessels to the naval force. These vessels did a large part of
the work on the defensive entrance areas, laid mines, and were employed
as patrols. The light vessels and lighthouses served as lookouts and
reporting stations. The Diamond Shoal Light vessel, off Cape Hatteras,
was sunk by a German submarine, but not until after it had given
warning and saved a number of vessels. The larger light-house tenders
were almost continuously in the danger-zone and were employed to buoy
the wrecks of torpedoed vessels.

The transfer of forty-one commissioned officers of the Coast and
Geodetic Survey gave the Navy additional officers who, from their
previous training and experience, immediately assumed important duties.
In addition to commanding patrol boats and auxiliaries and other
service afloat, their scientific attainments made them particularly
useful. For example, one officer, by his experience in developing the
wire-drag method of searching for hidden rocks and dangers, was well
fitted for research work on the anti-submarine problem. His services
were so valuable that he was ordered to London to coöperate with the
British Admiralty in further study of anti-submarine devices. Officers
of this service at the Naval Observatory, among other contributions,
designed a new type of submarine compass binnacle and new type of
aircraft compass. One of the ships of the Coast and Geodetic Survey,
the _Surveyor_, did excellent service at Gibraltar and shared with the
_Wheeling_ and the _Venita_ the credit for a successful attack on a
submarine.




CHAPTER XXXIII

WINNING THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE WAR

  THE WAR AGAINST DISEASE FOUGHT AND WON BY MEDICAL
  DEPARTMENT--GENERAL ORDER NO. 99--SAFETY ZONES
  ESTABLISHED--HOSPITALS OVERSEAS--SKY PILOT LEADERSHIP--COÖPERATION
  OF VOLUNTEER WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS--NAVAL OFFENDERS HELPED TO FIND
  THEMSELVES.


The death rate in the Navy by disease in 1917-18 was the lowest in the
history of wars. Sickness, until the influenza epidemic, was less than
in peace time. The loss of days by immoral disease decreased below the
rate prevailing before the war. Preventive medicine, and war against
disease and vice gave a record to the Navy Medical Corps which is a
tribute alike to them and to the profession to which they belong.

No branch of the military service was more forehanded and no officer
saw more clearly the possible needs that war would entail or made
ampler provision for them than the Surgeon General of the Navy, Admiral
William C. Braisted, who in recognition of his distinguished service
was given the privilege of retirement by a special act of Congress. He
was later elected president of the American Medical Association.

"The first battle of the war, that against disease, was won by the
Medical Department of the Navy," reported the House Naval Affairs
Committee.

When I was pressing for large appropriations for the Medical Department
of the Navy, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee asked
me:

"Mr. Secretary, do you really think there is proof of the absolute need
for the whole of the large amount asked for by the Surgeon General?"

"I do not," was my reply.

"Then why are you here urging the appropriation of so large a sum?" he
asked.

"For the same reason," I replied, "that will cause you to appropriate
it."

He looked at me with some astonishment and I added:

  I have not the information that justifies so large an expenditure;
  nobody has. The Surgeon General, who is a wise and economical
  administrator, has estimated that under certain contingencies this
  money will be required. I cannot see into the future. If there are
  no unforeseen casualties and no epidemics, we will neither need nor
  spend the money. But if the possible in war happens, and some great
  disaster or far-reaching epidemic befalls us, what could I say to
  the fathers and mothers of the Republic if I had disapproved the
  recommendation of the Surgeon General, and what would they say of
  you and the Congress if you refused to vote the appropriation? The
  sum may seem too large to you or to me. It is, if past experience
  can be depended upon. But in war, in matters of battles and wounds
  and death and possible epidemics, our duty is to make large
  provision in the hope that it may not all be needed.

The Chairman, zealous to win the war and to give every aid, led the
fight for the large appropriation.

The administration at Washington, charged with the conduct of the war,
early realized that health was the foundation of military efficiency,
that health was dependent upon clean living, and that protection of men
in uniform from drink and disease was the prime duty owed to them, to
their parents, and to the world dependent, in the last analysis, upon
their fitness to fight. Ignorance, intemperance and indifference were
the first foes to be faced in 1917.

The war broke precedents. The first broken was to override the ancient
theory that Government has nothing to do with the private life of a
fighter and no duty to protect him from immoral surroundings. Our
Government recognized that "the single man in khaki ain't no plaster
saint." As the youths poured into the training camps, harpies set up
their joints hard by. For the first time in history the Government said
to them: "Thou shalt not." It drove them and their establishments from
the vicinity of stations and camps.

Authority was given by Congress for the Chief Executive to establish
zone systems for protection of camps. President Wilson established
zones wherever sailors, soldiers, or marines were undergoing training.
Appeals were made to state and local authorities for assistance.
Writing early in 1917 to the Governor of Rhode Island, where military
efficiency was jeopardized by failure to enforce laws, I said:

  There lies upon us morally, to a degree far outreaching any
  technical responsibility, the duty of leaving nothing undone to
  protect these young men from that contamination of their bodies
  which will not only impair their military efficiency but * * *
  return them to their homes a source of danger to their families and
  the community at large.

Seeking his hearty coöperation, I reminded this executive that these
dangers were bad enough in ordinary times, but were multiplied manifold
in times of war when great bodies of men are necessarily gathered
together away from the restraints of home and under the stress of
emotions and reaction which tend to dislodge the standards of normal
life.

A Commission on Training Camp Activities, headed by Mr. Raymond
Fosdick, led in the welfare work, extending from the home to the
trenches and turrets. The other members were:

  John J. Eagan, Vice Chairman, Clifford W. Barnes, Lieutenant
  Richard E. Byrd, U. S. N., Walter Camp, Selah Chamberlain, Lee F.
  Hanmer, Joseph Lee, Lieutenant Commander Claude B. Mayo, U. S. N.,
  E. T. Meredith, Barton Myers, Charles P. Neill, Mrs. Helen Ring
  Robinson, Mrs. Finley J. Shepard, Mrs. Daisy McLaurin Stevens, Mrs.
  Edward T. Stotesbury, John S. Tichenor, Dean C. Mathews, Secretary,
  Marion M. Jackson, Field Secretary.

The multitude of religious and social agencies, anxious to serve, made
it necessary for the Government to give its imprimatur to certain
organized forces whose benefactions justified such recognition. I refer
to the Red Cross, Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's
Christian Association, Knights of Columbus, Young Hebrew Association,
Salvation Army and American Library Association. They coöperated
cordially with Army and Navy authorities.

The inspiration and leadership of the religious and welfare work of
the Navy came from its corps of chaplains. There had been no addition
to the number of the corps for forty years before 1914. The increase
gave a "sky pilot" for every great ship and every important station.
Additions in the regular and reserve corps when war came enabled the
Navy to supply religious direction by consecrated men of every creed.
They went with the Marines into Belleau Wood, with Rodman's fleet in
the North Sea, guided the new recruits on sea and shore--faithful,
devoted spiritual leaders in days when men unafraid looked death in the
face. These soldiers of the cross were comrades in battle, shipmates in
storm, and comforters in death.

In 1914 an order was issued known as "General Order 99" prohibiting the
introduction of intoxicants as a beverage on any ship or station in the
Navy. That temperance order was in these words:

                      _General Order No. 99_

                                               Navy Department
                                       Washington, D. C., June 1, 1914.

  On July 1, 1914, article 827, Naval Instructions, will be annulled,
  and in its stead the following will be substituted:

  "The use or introduction for drinking purposes of alcoholic liquors
  on board any naval vessel, or within any navy yard or station,
  is strictly prohibited, and commanding officers will be held
  responsible for the enforcement of this order."

                                             JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
                                                 Secretary of the Navy.

This was recommended by the Surgeon General of the Navy. If not
universally popular when it was promulgated, when war came it was
recognized that it had contributed to the fitness of the naval
personnel. The zone system of excluding drink and houses of ill fame
from training places, laws prohibiting the sale of liquor to any man
in uniform, war-time prohibition, and finally the ratifying of the
national prohibition amendment to the Constitution evidenced the
progressive steps taken for protection of men in uniform.

With the coming of war, plans made long before were put into effect.
Permanent hospitals were enlarged and temporary hospitals built to make
ready for the large expansion in personnel. The bed capacity within
eight months was increased from 3,850 to 15,689, and before the end
of the war to over 19,000. Four hospitals were established in Great
Britain. One was at Strathpeffer, Scotland, in easy communication
with the Grand Fleet and the bases established by the North Sea
mining groups. It was magnificently located and splendidly equipped,
and proved of great service to the British Navy as well as our own.
Another at Leith was near one of the North Sea bases, and a third was
established at Queenstown, the chief base of our destroyers operating
with the British. Early in the war two base hospital units were sent to
Brest. Dispensaries and hospitals were established in the Mediterranean
at Corfu, in Italy, France, Gibraltar and the Azores. Three hospital
ships were in service commanded by medical officers, who, as President
Roosevelt wisely said, should always be in command of hospital ships.

When the armistice was signed the Navy was ready to bring back from
France 30,000 sick and wounded men per month. Wherever men of the Navy
and Marine Corps were on duty in Europe, naval medical officers were
with them with all equipment needed. The personnel of the Medical Corps
increased from 353 doctors to 3,093; from 34 to 485 dentists; woman
nurses from 160 to 1,713; members of the Hospital Corps from 1,585 to
16,564. Into the Medical Reserve came many of the ablest men in the
profession. To the regulars and the reserves, the woman nurses and the
hospital corps, went out the gratitude of the men wounded and ill to
whom they administered unselfishly. Private John C. Geiger, a Marine,
who lost his right foot as a result of a wound in Belleau Wood, voiced
the feeling of all fighting men when he said:

  But I want to give credit to those hospital corps men of the Navy,
  who worked with the Marines. Those fellows deserve a gold medal qr
  the highest award they can receive. Why, before we could reach our
  objective, they were right out on the field picking up and tagging
  the wounded. They didn't mind the danger and did their duty without
  protection of any kind. They were unarmed and could not shoot a
  German if they did run across one.

With the arrangements by which the Navy was to man the transports, a
new and unexpected duty, it became necessary for the Medical Corps
to expand its personnel and undertake a service that called for
discretion and judgment as well as medical skill. Never in the history
of troop movements have troops been so well taken care of, their
health protected in every possible manner, the sanitary precautions
provided, and such attention and elaborate provision made for the care
of the sick and wounded. The larger transports were indeed combined
transports and hospital ships.

This transport work was taken over and performed entirely by the
Medical Department of the Navy without extra appropriation and without
expense to the Army. Every contingency was met. The provisions were
ample for the care of sick troops in transit, and there were returned
on naval transports, 151,649 Army sick, wounded and insane; 4,385 Navy;
and 3,625 Marines from the expeditionary forces in France.

The Navy always put the man before the gun. If a member of the Navy did
wrong, we sought to save him. Two thousand men, punished for offenses
committed, were restored during the war, and most of them made good.
This was possible by the restoration of morale through the Mutual
Welfare League organized in naval prisons. It was an experiment that
contravened all former military methods, and was inaugurated by Thomas
Mott Osborne. Desiring to substitute modern penology for the methods
in vogue, I requested Mr. Osborne to become head of the naval prison,
and he was commissioned as lieutenant commander in the Reserves. In the
League he gave a large measure of self government to prisoners. He used
discipline as a means of helping young men to find themselves, and its
success was most encouraging. Too much honor cannot be given him.

"Treat men as pawns and nine-pins," said Emerson, "and you shall suffer
as well as they. If you leave out their heart you shall lose your
own." It was that spirit, as well as the disuse of bread and water and
solitary confinement and other ancient punishments, which made naval
discipline the pattern for dealing with military offenders.

There was no "hard boiled" discipline tolerated in the Navy.
Courts-martial were reviewed in a spirit of meting out justice, with
consideration and discrimination, as well as mercy. Admiral George R.
Clark, Judge Advocate General during most of the war, set new standards
of military court procedure and lessened the rigors of punishment.




CHAPTER XXXIV

FIGHTING THE PROFITEERS

  MANY MILLIONS SAVED BY REFUSING TO PAY EXORBITANT PRICES--"NAVY
  ORDER" PREVENTED EXTORTION--OVER THREE BILLION DOLLARS EXPENDED
  WITH NEVER A HINT OF GRAFT OR EXTRAVAGANCE--COMPETITION ADHERED TO
  IN WAR--FEEDING AND CLOTHING 500,000 MEN A BIG TASK, ACCOMPLISHED
  WITH SIGNAL SUCCESS--SAVING IN HUGE SHORE CONSTRUCTION.


The Navy spent over three billion dollars for war purpose without a
suggestion of extravagance or graft. To be exact, Congress appropriated
$3,692,354,324.71. Of the amount $334,360,000 were returned to the
Treasury, in February, 1919, and additional sums later by the sale of
excess supplies and vessels that were no longer needed.

The rule of the Department, "A dollar's worth of Navy for every dollar
spent," was adhered to in war as well as in peace. Early in 1917 steel
was contracted for at 2.90 for Navy ships when the price was soaring
in the market. Coal and oil and copper were purchased at reasonable
prices or commandeered. Manufacturers of torpedoes and smokeless powder
and other makers of munitions were held to reasonable profits. Where
munition or supply dealers wished more than a fair profit, a "Navy
Order" was placed.

The history of the "Navy Order" should be told, for it was the weapon
that saved the Navy from profiteering. Competition prevailed through
the war in all purchases except where the supply was inadequate for war
necessities. In some cases the exigency of war demanded commandeering
orders. Such orders were sometimes required because excessive prices
were quoted, but often because the only private concerns which could
manufacture the article needed were under contract for all their
output. If they furnished the government of their own will, they were
liable to the parties who had contracted for their product. In such
instances, a commandeering order was necessary both to obtain a war
necessity and to protect the manufacturers.

In the naval appropriation act a provision was early inserted, drawn by
Chairman Padgett, giving the power, when agreement could not be reached
as to the price for something essential, to commandeer it--whether
ships or land or munitions or supplies--and pay 75 per cent of the
appraisement, leaving to the owner the right to contest in the courts
the reasonableness of the compensation so fixed. That provision later
became applicable to all war agencies of Government. It was not often
invoked. The knowledge that the power was there and the declaration by
the Secretary of the Navy that he would invoke it when any excessive
price was demanded, and its use in some notable instances, made
profiteering on the Navy not easy, and it was seldom undertaken.

"Certain coal operators are demanding excessive prices for coal," said
an officer of the Supply Department when coal was necessary to bring
back soldiers and munitions from Europe and carry on naval operations.

"Place a Navy Order" was the direction, and the Navy secured its coal
from mines that produced Navy coal at prices that were not excessive.

At another time some oil operators, while selling oil to foreign ships,
were refusing to deliver any oil to our ships on a naval order.

"What shall we do?" asked the officer in charge.

"Order the Marines to seize the oil," was the direction.

The Marines had the reputation for carrying out orders. It was not
necessary for them to take the oil by force, but they were ready to do
it if the oil had not been furnished otherwise.

These two cases were exceptional and they occurred after the armistice.
As a rule, manufacturers and business men and bankers, as well as
farmers and mechanics, showed from the moment war began that they, like
our soldiers and sailors, had forgotten all selfish interests, all
class interests of every kind. While the fighting men in the field gave
the world a new conception of democracy, men of affairs were given the
opportunity which, with few exceptions, they embraced, of showing to
the world that the American's idea of his money, like his idea of his
life, was something which was to be freely and ungrudgingly given for
his ideals and his country whenever his country called.

One of the early supplies that had to be husbanded was coal. At a
conference of coal operators held in Washington in the spring of 1917,
an agreement was made for Navy coal at reasonable prices, all operators
to furnish their fair proportion to meet the needs.

In 1916 a board of officers in the Navy Department was named which was
an important step in preparedness. Its duties were to get together at
frequent intervals, to compare notes, to place on record probable needs
and then to find out definitely where the necessary supplies could be
obtained, in what quantities and how soon. Its work was most helpful
in securing active coöperation all along the line and also in pointing
the path--in a very modest way--toward the successful accomplishment of
the task which was soon to be faced by the War Industries Board. This
commodity-section plan, according to which the War Industries Board
effected its own first successful internal organization, originated for
naval uses in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and, while the War
Industries Board rendered most useful and invaluable service to the
Navy, such help as was received related solely to priorities and to
items of supplies and services of which there was a shortage. So long
as supply exceeded or equalled demand and the usual orderly processes
of business could consequently function, the Navy's long-established
methods of procedure stood the test of war unchanged and unscathed.

The Navy, as did all other war agencies, leaned upon the War
Industries Board which, by priority orders, saw that war material
was furnished where most needed. Admiral Frank F. Fletcher was the
Navy's representative on the Board. He showed the same ability in that
important position which he had demonstrated when commander-in-chief of
the Atlantic Fleet.

The War Industries Board, which rendered invaluable service, was
made up of men who won national approval by their masterful handling
of the big tasks committed to them. Its membership was: Bernard M.
Baruch, chairman; Andrew Legge, vice-chairman; Robert S. Brookings,
Hugh Frayne, Rear Admiral F. F. Fletcher, Brigadier General Hugh S.
Johnson, Judge Edwin B. Parker, George N. Peek, J. L. Replogle,
L. L. Summers; H. P. Ingels, secretary; Albert C. Ritchie, general
counsel; Herbert Bayard Swope, associate member of the board, assistant
to chairman. Admiral C. J. Peoples was the Navy representative on
priorities.

All supplies for the Navy, except such as were regulated by priority
orders, were obtained throughout the war by formal contracts entered
into after the widest possible public competition in the open market,
the only restriction being that--as required by Section 3722 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States--no person was allowed to bid
unless he was a manufacturer or regular dealer.

Throughout the war, all formalities attendant upon the opening of
bids were strictly adhered to. The proposals were opened every
day--sometimes far into the night--and read out publicly, each bidder
having ample opportunity to know his competitors' offers and also to
be sure that his own were not overlooked. Even in the few cases where
military secrecy was obligatory, there was still genuine competition.
The eight bidders, for instance, on the mines for the North Sea Barrage
were invited to meet each other and the purchasing officials in a
locked and guarded room, even these confidential bids being strictly
competitive.

The idea in all business dealings by the Navy was that every single
transaction--indeed every part of every transaction--must not only be
right but look right.

It is scarcely to be wondered at that by following this rule and also
by giving prompt inspections and making immediate payments, the Navy
throughout the war maintained most cordial relations with a business
public which well knew that every contract was awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder whose goods were up to the standard required by
specifications and fit for the use for which they were intended. It
was largely for this reason that the purchasing machinery was able to
expand so enormously without confusion or delay. In one day during
the war the purchases amounted to over $30,000,000, as compared with
$19,000,000 during the heaviest pre-war year.

Looking back at it now, the mere suggestion of waiving competition--and
thereby striking at the very foundation of the system--brings a smile
of incredulity. But it was no joke at the time. Scarcely had war been
declared when requests came from a number of quarters for authority
"to cut red tape" by doing away with competition, the argument being
advanced that deliveries could thereby be expedited and important
work accelerated. The idea was not easy to suppress, because its
many advocates really believed they were right and insisted upon
convincing superior authority. The answer was that competition was
bound to speed things up rather than retard them and that, in any
event, the responsible officials in Washington had given the matter due
consideration and decided definitely and finally that competition must
continue uninterruptedly, as to everything except where the demand so
largely exceeded the supply as to compel priority orders.

The record of the commissary branch--and this applies to the hundreds
of thousands of soldiers transported overseas and back as well as
the half-million men within the Navy itself--was one of unqualified
success from first to last and one of which the service has good reason
to be proud. Never were men in uniform so well fed or was so much
attention paid to a balanced and abundant ration. "Only the best (with
no substitute said to be 'equally as good'), is good enough for our
fighting men," was the motto of Rear Admiral Samuel McGowan, Chief of
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and his capable assistants, who
took the greatest pride in seeing that men in the service never even
knew, except by reading in the papers, that Government restriction was
put upon the quantity and kind of food for civilians.

With respect to the forwarding of supplies of every description to
the forces abroad, an intra-bureau order issued by Admiral McGowan in
July, 1917, directed that every wish of the senior naval officer in
European waters should be complied with on the same day that it became
known--indeed that the discretion vested in the Chief of the Bureau of
Supplies was already exercised when the needs of European forces were
made known.

When the armistice was signed and demobilization followed, there was
on hand a quantity of supplies in excess of prospective needs. The
same supply officers, who had so capably provided for the Navy's wants
during hostilities, promptly inaugurated a selling campaign; and, on
the first $70,000,000 worth of surplus thus disposed of, the Government
realized a net profit of more than three millions.

Throughout the entire ordeal--preparation, operation,
demobilization--the Navy's business organization functioned in all
its various branches with full one hundred per cent effectiveness.
So much so, in fact, that an investigating sub-committee from the
House Committee on Naval Affairs officially reported to Congress that
the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts "has won and well deserves a
nation-wide reputation for business efficiency."

In appreciation of the service rendered by Admiral McGowan, Congress
passed an act authorizing his retirement earlier than the usual time
prescribed. This recognition was limited in its terms, applicable only
to the Paymaster General, the Surgeon General and the Chief Naval
Constructor. And no special distinction was ever more deserved.

Sound business principles were adhered to when it became necessary to
give navy orders and provide funds for enlargement or construction of
plants. Reference has been made to the methods of securing munitions of
all characters. When it was necessary to take over an optical plant,
for example, expert ordnance officers carried on its operation without
injury to the rights of its owners, and expert accountants kept all
transactions in accordance with the most approved business practice.

Most of the great construction was done under contract, as for example
the giant armor plate and projectile plant at Charleston, W. Va., and
the big dry-docks at Philadelphia and at Norfolk.

[Illustration: A GENERAL VIEW OF BANTRY BAY

At Berehaven, in Bantry Bay, the Americans maintained a large submarine
base.]

[Illustration: A CLOSE-UP VIEW OF AMERICAN "SUBS" AT BEREHAVEN]

When the demand for new and larger training stations and other shore
establishments, which ran into hundreds of millions of dollars, made
it impossible to secure fixed price contracts, the supervision of the
work was so efficient in the few cost-plus contracts that the cost
was less than if undertaken under contract at a fixed price. This was
notably true of the two mammoth office buildings occupied by the Navy
Department and certain divisions of the War Department. The story of
these two buildings--the largest office structures in the world--is
interesting. The need for more space by the two war departments of
the Government was recognized, even after temporary modern structures
had been completed. Congress was asked for relief, and plans were
presented. The Navy urged upon the Chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee the construction of fire-proof concrete buildings instead
of the flimsy wooden fire-traps built in the hurry of the outbreak of
the war. The suggestion met with favor, and the Navy was authorized
to proceed with the construction of both buildings, the one for the
Army as well as the one for the Navy. Under the direction of Captain
A. L. Parsons, U. S. N., these structures were completed within five
months at a price lower than the sums estimated by most contractors.
They stand today as the best arranged office buildings in Washington, a
monument to naval business methods and construction efficiency and to
the wisdom of Congress.

[Illustration: RODMAN AND BEATTY

Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman, who commanded the American battle squadron in
the North Sea, and Admiral, the Earl Beatty, commander-in-chief of the
British Grand Fleet.]

The vast shore construction program, involving more than $300,000,000,
was carried out with the greatest energy and efficiency by the Bureau
of Yards and Docks, under the direction, first, of Admiral F. R. Harris
and, later, of Admiral Charles W. Parks. The civil engineers, permanent
and reserve, who directed shore construction in this country and in
Europe, more than measured up to war demands.

The Board of Compensation, of which Admiral Washington Capps was
made chairman, rendered service beyond computation in protecting the
government in all "Navy order" contracts. Millions of dollars were
saved by the thoroughness and efficiency with which this important
board performed its manifold and difficult duties.

The only criticism of the Navy voiced during the war was that it was
too insistent upon holding on to peace-time competition and economies.
One officer complained that I "held up an order for torpedoes." He was
correct. It was held up long enough to secure a conference with the
makers. By a few days' delay on one order, $5,000,000 was saved, and
we always had an abundant supply. In one order for shells $200,000
was saved. Such instances could be multiplied many times. Insistence
upon competition, where possible, and strict inspection in other
cases, enabled the Navy to close the war with the assurance that naval
expenditures were as free from extravagance as they were untainted by
graft or favoritism.




CHAPTER XXXV

"SIRS, ALL IS WELL WITH THE FLEET"

  TWO THOUSAND VESSELS IN SERVICE--200,000 MEN OVERSEAS OR
  TRANSPORTING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES ACROSS ATLANTIC--373 SHIPS, 81,000
  OFFICERS AND MEN IN EUROPEAN FORCES--VISITS OF ROOSEVELT, BENSON,
  MAYO AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE--PERSHING'S TRIBUTE.


With more than two thousand vessels in service and 533,000 officers
and men, the largest personnel ever possessed by any Navy, our naval
operations in the World War literally belted the globe. Operating with
the Allies from the Arctic to the Adriatic, from Corfu to the Azores,
we manned and operated the vast fleet of American transports carrying
troops, munitions and supplies across the Atlantic, and furnished
man-of-war escort to protect them.

Patrolling our own coasts and the Western Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea, our vessels also kept watch in South American
waters and guarded the approaches to the Panama Canal. Our ships in
South American waters, commanded by Admiral W. B. Caperton, coöperated
with the naval forces of our sister republics and gave insurance
against possible raiders and submarines. Ships under Caperton, the
squadron under Anderson in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and
Mayo's ships further north maintained the patrol throughout the war on
this side of the Atlantic.

Guarding against raiders and German activities in the Pacific, our
operations extended from our west coast to Hawaii, Guam and the
Philippines, and our vessels in the Orient coöperated with the
Japanese and other Allied naval forces from Manila to Vladivostok.
The destroyers sent from Cavite, which voyaged twelve thousand
miles through the Straits, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean, met at Gibraltar the forces from the other side of the
world.

Eight hundred and thirty-four vessels and two hundred thousand men
of the United States Navy were either serving in European waters
or engaged in transporting troops and supplies to Europe, before
hostilities ended. This was more than twice as many ships and nearly
three times as many officers and men as were in naval service before
the war.

Four hundred vessels were assigned to the Naval Forces Operating in
European Waters, 373 being present at the time of the armistice--70
destroyers, 5 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 120 submarine chasers,
27 yachts, 12 submarines, 13 mine sweepers, 10 mine planters, 8
battleships, 3 cruisers, 16 tugs, 4 cross-channel transports, 55
vessels carrying coal for the army, 18 tenders and repair ships, and 7
vessels of miscellaneous types. In addition three Russian destroyers
were manned by United States naval personnel. Eighty-one thousand
officers and men of the Navy were in service in Europe. Thirty thousand
Marines were sent overseas for service with the Army and 1,600 for
naval duty ashore.

But that by no means covers all the service performed for the Allies
and our own forces in Europe. The entire Cruiser and Transport Force,
with its 83 vessels, 3,000 officers and 41,000 men; and the Naval
Overseas Transportation Service, with 378 vessels in operation, manned
by 4,692 officers and 29,175 men, were in trans-Atlantic service,
carrying troops and supplies. Practically all the 384 merchant ships
which had naval armed guards and navy guns were carrying food,
materials and other articles to allied armies and peoples. Thirty
thousand of the naval personnel were, at one time or another, engaged
in this service. Thus, a total of 834 vessels and more than 200,000
officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps were engaged either in
European service or in trans-Atlantic service to and from Europe.

Our forces in Europe operated in forty-seven different localities,
extending from the Arctic Ocean all the way around to the Adriatic Sea.
The extent of our operations is seen from this list of the principal
naval bases, and the United States naval vessels on duty at each of
them on November 11, 1918:

  Queenstown (2 tenders, 24 destroyers, 30 chasers, 3 tugs)           59

  Berehaven (3 battleships, 1 tender, 7 submarines, 1 tug,
  1 oiler)                                                            13

  Brest (1 gunboat, 16 yachts, 3 tenders, 38 destroyers,
  9 tugs, 1 station ship, 4 steam barges, 4 barges,
  9 mine sweepers)                                                    85

  Cardiff (1 tender, 1 refrigerator hulk, 55 colliers)                57

  Gibraltar (2 cruisers, 4 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters,
  9 yachts, 1 tender, 6 destroyers, 18 chasers)                       45

  Genoa (2 tugs)                                                       2

  Azores (2 yachts, 1 tender, 1 oiler, 2 mine sweepers,
  5 submarines, 1 tug)                                                12

  Grand Fleet (5 battleships)                                          5

  Murmansk (1 cruiser, also 3 Russian destroyers)                      1

  Mine Force (1 tender, 10 mine layers, 2 mine sweepers)              13

  Southampton (4 transports)                                           4

  Plymouth (1 tender, 2 destroyers, 36 chasers)                       39

  Corfu (1 tender, 36 chasers)                                        37

  Liverpool (1 oiler)                                                  1

Naval aviation activities were almost as extensive as those of our
ships, extending from England, Ireland and Northern France to eastern
Italy. There were thirty aviation bases, the Northern Bombing Group
considered as one base:

  Ireland--Queenstown (2 stations, seaplane, and assembly and
  repair); Whiddy Island, Wexford, Lough Foyle, Berehaven.

  England--Killingholme, Eastleigh.

  France--Dunkirk, Northern Bombing Group; Treguier, L' Aber Vrach,
  Fromentine, St. Trojan, Arcachon, Pauillac, La Trinite, La Pallice,
  Moutchic, Paimboeuf, Rochefort, Gujan, Brest, Guipivas, Le Croisic,
  and Ile Tudy.

  Italy--Lake Bolseno, Porto Corsini, Pescara.

  Azores--Marine Corps aviators.

Two divisions of our submarines operated in European waters--seven at
Berehaven, Ireland, with the _Bushnell_ as tender, and five at the
Azores. Twenty-one sightings of enemy submarines and four torpedo
attacks were reported by the Berehaven division. The AL-2 (Lieutenant
P. F. Foster, commanding) had a remarkable encounter on July 10, 1918.
Shaken by a terrific explosion, evidently that of a torpedo, the
AL-2 discovered the periscope of a submarine apparently injured and
attempting to get to the surface. The only chance to get the U-boat
was to ram it submerged, and the AL-2 executed a crash dive, which
carried it down a hundred feet. It barely missed the German, who was
trying to slip under the American submarine. Swinging around, the AL-2
started again after the enemy, which was trying to rise. But it never
came to the surface. Radio calls from another U-boat were unanswered.
The lost submarine was the German U-B-65, known to be operating in
that vicinity. "Known sunk," was the verdict of the British Admiralty,
and for this the AL-2 was given the major part of the credit. Our
submarines did excellent and faithful service, and proved their
usefulness in that new and strange phase of undersea warfare where "sub
hunts sub."

Our vessels in European waters were employed in so many regions that
they did not operate together as one fleet, but constituted a "task
force" of the Atlantic Fleet. In British waters our ships usually
operated with British forces under the direction of British officers.
Elsewhere they remained under the direction of American officers,
always coöperating freely with Allied naval forces. At the United
States Naval Headquarters at London there was a force of 1,200. The
200 commissioned personnel included a number of the ablest officers
in the Navy, with Captain (later Rear Admiral) N. C. Twining as chief
of staff, and Captain W. R. Sexton as assistant chief of staff.
It embraced experts whose daily association with officers in the
Admiralty, under the leadership of Admiral Sims, brought about complete
understanding and perfect team-work. Those at the head of important
divisions were:

  Intelligence Department, Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted
  as aid; Convoy Operations, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-Submarine
  Section, Captain R. H. Leigh; Aviation, Captain H. I. Cone, and
  afterward, Lieutenant Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel, Commander
  H. R. Stark; Communications, Lieutenant Commander E. G. Blakeslee;
  Material, Captain E. C. Tobey; Repairs, Captain S. F. Smith, and
  afterward, Naval Constructor L. B. McBride; Ordnance, Commander
  G. L. Schuyler, and afterward Commander T. A. Thomson; Medical
  Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell, and afterward, Commander Edgar
  Thompson; Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; Scientific
  Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph. D.

This large establishment in Grosvenor Gardens had been built up from
the small beginning in 1917 when Admiral Sims, accompanied by his aid,
arrived just after war was declared. Entrusted first with the duty of
conferring with the British Admiralty and reporting the naval situation
with his recommendations, Admiral Sims was soon designated as commander
of our forces in European waters with the rank of vice admiral, and
before the armistice was promoted to admiral. Keeping in constant
touch with the British and other Admiralties, representing our Navy
upon the Allied Naval Council, the information he secured, with that
furnished us by Allied naval officers stationed in Washington, enabled
the Navy Department to keep pace with all naval activities, and his
recommendations were taken into consideration in important decisions
that were made. Serving with zeal and ability, he won the regard and
confidence of his associates of the allied navies, and received high
honors from European governments.

In addition to the daily exchange of messages between London
headquarters and Washington, information from special Government
missions, and the intimate intercourse of officers of all the Allied
navies, high ranking officials of our Navy from time to time went to
Europe for conferences and inspection of our forces and activities,
among them Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Admirals Benson, Mayo and
Gleaves. The Assistant Secretary, going over in the destroyer _Dyer_,
spent six weeks abroad in the summer of 1918. He had conferences with
the Allied naval authorities in London, Paris and Rome, and inspected
our bases and mine depots, and witnessed the work of laying the North
Sea barrage. Reporting that our personnel there had done well under
hazardous and difficult circumstances, he advised a like mine barrage
across the strait of Otranto.

Admiral Benson, going abroad in 1917, took part in the organization
of the Allied Naval Council, and urged a more vigorous offensive,
which we had favored from our entrance into the war. Months before,
Admiral Benson had prepared, and I had approved and sent to the British
Admiralty, "proposed measures to prevent German submarines from
operating against Allied commerce in the Atlantic," which pointed out
the following courses which were open to us:

  We may attempt to--

    (a) Reduce the Heligoland region and close exits for submarines.

    (b) Reduce the Zeebrugge region and close exits for submarines.

    (c) Enter the Baltic and close exits for submarines from the
    Baltic bases.

    (d) Prevent Danish and Dutch territory being used for submarine
    bases.

    (e) Construct and maintain mine barriers about the Heligoland
    area.

    (f) Construct and maintain a mine barrier in the Skagerrack or
    Kattegat.

    (g) Construct and maintain mine barriers in the Zeebrugge region.

    (h) Construct and maintain a mine barrier across the North Sea.

    (i) Close Dover straits to submarines by a mine barrier and
    surface patrol.

These matters were discussed by Benson with officers of the British
Admiralty, and the methods and the difficulties of carrying them out
were considered. Speaking, sometime after the war, of the offensive
plans he advocated, Benson said:

  I think that the bases of the German submarines should have been
  attacked, and I so urged when the war was in progress; and one of
  my conferences with the British Admiralty in London in 1917 was to
  urge more active operations against the bases of the submarines.
  But it was an operation that had to be not only a concerted action,
  but the principal part of it would have been necessary to be taken
  by the Allies, we simply to add our part to it; and all during the
  summer of 1917, I urged active operations of that kind and could
  never understand why we did not get definite plans from the other
  side as to how such operation should be carried out.

  While in London I agreed with Admiral Jellicoe on a plan, a very
  confidential plan, that was to be carried out later on, in which I
  not only volunteered to place our ships but insisted that our ships
  should be placed there.

During Benson's absence from Washington, Captain (later Admiral) W.
V. Pratt in both 1917 and 1918 acted as Chief of Operations. In the
discharge of that duty, as well as Assistant Chief of Operations,
succeeding Captain Volney Chase, who died in the summer of 1917,
Admiral Pratt demonstrated ability unsurpassed by any officer serving
in any important position during the World war. When Captain Pratt
later was ordered to sea, Admiral Josiah S. McKean, who had served with
marked ability as Chief of Material during the war, became Acting Chief
of Operations and added to his well-earned reputation.

Admiral Mayo, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of our ships in
European as well as home waters, made an official visit to Europe in
September, 1917, inspecting bases and forces, and conferring with naval
leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy. He was on duty again in
Europe in 1918. Attending the Allied Naval Conference in London, he
urged the construction of the North Sea Barrage, which was shortly
afterwards approved.

Visiting the famous Dover Patrol, he witnessed a bombardment of Ostend
by British monitors, and had the experience of being under enemy
fire. The flotilla leader _Broke_, in which he embarked with Sir John
Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and other British officers
of high rank, flew the flags of both Mayo and Jellicoe.

The monitors, armed with 15-inch naval guns, were accompanied on these
expeditions by spotting aircraft and destroyers. The party accompanied
the _Terror_. Soon after she began to fire, the German shore batteries
got the range. Firing with precision and accuracy, some of the German
shells fell within a short distance of the _Broke_. Admiral Reginald
Bacon gives this interesting account of the incident:

  On Tuesday, September 25th [1917], Sir John Jellicoe, Admiral Sir
  Henry Oliver, and Admiral Philpotts arrived at Dover and came
  with Admiral Mayo and his staff up the patrol line. It was a
  quaint experience for them. Half an hour after leaving Dunkirk in
  the _Broke_ we lost sight of the shore. After an hour's steaming
  we sighted the _Terror_ and destroyers in the open sea, and the
  motor-launches just starting their smoke-screen. Nothing else was
  in sight except a small monitor five miles away right out at sea,
  burning her searchlight for an aiming mark. Really our visitors
  must have thought we were humbugging when the _Terror_ opened fire
  and fired single rounds at fixed intervals.

  A few seconds afterwards while steaming about in the _Broke_--we
  had altered course three points--a splash came from a Tirpitz shell
  about 300 yards off. It fell very near the spot where we would have
  been if we had kept on our original course. I apologized to the
  American Chief of the Staff for not having kept on and brought the
  shell nearer. His reply was quaintly American in humor:

  "Don't mention it, Admiral; by the time we get to New York that
  shell will have been close alongside right enough!"

  The result of the _Terror's_ shooting was most successful, as
  all the rebuilding in the dockyard done by the Germans was again
  demolished. On October 19th, the _Terror_ was torpedoed, and had
  to be docked. On the following day the _Soult_ fired at Ostend and
  destroyed a high explosive magazine. One German craft was sunk, and
  two more damaged.

Upon his return, Admiral Mayo made detailed reports covering the
entire naval situation, with important recommendations as to plans
and measures. When war began it was expected that the time would come
when the entire Atlantic Fleet would be sent abroad, and Admiral Mayo
would command all our forces in the looked-for great naval battle with
the German fleet. Our vessels in Europe were, therefore, considered our
advance forces, a "task force" assigned to special duties until the
whole fleet should be united for action. But the character of the war
called for wide dispersion of its units, and it was not until after
hostilities ended that they were reunited under the commander-in-chief,
who was in command when the dreadnaughts sailed from Brest in December,
1918.

No navies in all history ever worked together in such close coöperation
as did ours with the British, French and Italians. The cordial
relations between the civilian populations, as well as the naval
personnel, will be a lasting tie. I wish it were possible to put
on record the sentiments expressed, the appreciation felt by all
Americans in the Navy for the gracious courtesies and friendly offices
shown to our men serving a common cause far from their homes. The one
regrettable incident at Cork, where an unruly element attacked some of
our sailors, was recognized as an exception. It was confined to the few
engaged in the trouble, the people of that city and country having no
relation to it and not affected by it in their feeling of friendship
for our sailors and our country. It left no resentment towards
the great Irish people, who received us with open arms and showed
hospitality and cordiality towards our forces domiciled in that country.

One of the services which the people of Lille, France, will long
remember is the voluntary act of men of the Navy in turning carpenters
for the time, and building with their own hands scores of houses for
the homeless people. That act, together with the generous gift by
American sailors of their own rations to needy peoples, illustrates the
spirit that actuated our men. At one place, so moved were they by the
lack of food for women and children, the sailors denied themselves to
such an extent that the captain was forced to issue an order limiting
their generosity to prevent a shortage of food for the sustenance of
the crew.

Cardiff does not bulk large on the war maps. Mention of it recalls no
such adventure as at Zeebrugge, no such achievement as laying the
mine-barrage in the North Sea, or sinking of submarines at Durazzo
or on the high seas. But it spelled coal for our forces, and meant
hard work and called for efficient management. The limited number of
colliers, the time for making voyages to American coal fields, and the
hazard from U-boats suggested obtaining coal from Wales for the needs
of the army in France. The Army requested the Navy to release colliers
for that service, and at first to operate twenty "lake" and other
chartered boats and undertake the carrying of coal from Great Britain
to supplement the steady flow from America. Admiral Philip Andrews,
with headquarters at Cardiff, directed this work, which required a
naval personnel of 4,101, operated 65 ships, and delivered 30,000 to
45,000 tons of coal each month.

There is no glamour about the work of repairing ships. Even in peace
times it is a hard overalls job, but our nine European bases with
eleven repair ships and tenders, kept our ships in condition. If I were
a poet I would immortalize the skilled men, working in the dark, often
flat on their backs, to keep our ships fit and to repair the ravages of
U-boat attacks. Not counting the 500 ships going and coming from the
United States to Europe, often calling for first aid, we had nearly 400
ships on duty in European waters. Though taxed by their own needs, the
facilities of our Allies were freely at our disposal, but the fact that
it was possible to make our forces so nearly self-sustaining is a high
tribute to the officers and men charged with that duty. Allied navies
expressed admiration for the ability of a ship's force to do much of
their own repairing, and marvelled at the efficiency of the repair
ships--the _Melville_, _Dixie_, _Panther_, _Prometheus_, _Bridgeport_,
_Black Hawk_.

Our own Shipping Board voiced its thanks for naval assistance abroad
as well as at home. In fact, in all ship construction and repair work
as well as plans for operation and navigation undertaken by that
organization the Navy furnished constructors and other experts, and was
ready upon call with its entire facilities.

Little has been heard of the _Scorpion_, which was interned in Turkish
waters during the war. The crew of that ship, whose base had long
been at Constantinople, protected the American and British embassies,
one regular duty of the vessel being to act as despatch boat to our
Ambassador to Turkey. After America entered the war, some of them,
eager to get into the fray, made their escape over land and joined the
American forces in France.

From the outbreak of the European conflict the _Scorpion's_ men had a
"front seat at the show," and witnessed many interesting sights. From
the deck of their ship they saw the thrilling finish of the race of the
German cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, which made their sensational
escape from British pursuers and then interned in the harbor of
Constantinople. They saw the Teutonic crews of the erstwhile ships
of the Germany Navy, hastily doffing their German caps and donning
Moslem fezzes to camouflage their nationality, as the Turkish flag was
hoisted to the mastheads. They observed, from their point of vantage,
the gallant sweep of the harbor by a British submarine which bobbed
up in the Bosporus as the Turks were preparing to send reinforcements
to Gallipoli, torpedoed a Turkish vessel at its dock, and caused such
consternation that the Turks, at the quays ready to sail with 40,000
troops, did not dare venture out with their transports. One single
daring British submarine caused all the troops to be disembarked, and
the sea expedition to the Dardanelles was abandoned.

The "Scorpions," as they called themselves, brought one story home with
them which, if verified, is worthy of the best French epic. The Turks,
as the story was told in Constantinople, captured a French submarine,
the _Turquoise_. Not one of the captors who boarded the ship understood
how to operate its delicate mechanism. Therefore, the French engineers
were ordered to start the engines. Nothing loath, the orders were
obeyed. The sub dived, carrying with it Turkish captors and French
engineers, never to return. Whether or not that particular act can be
confirmed, the war produced many men of the navies with the spirit
which the incident illustrates.

The _Scorpion_ was truly a ship of mercy. First, under the direction of
Ambassador Morgenthau and afterwards of Ambassador Elkus, it carried
hundreds of refugees to places of safety, was the almoner of many in
distress and gave asylum to Americans, who were heartened in that
harbor, crowded with ships carrying the flags of many nations, to see
the glorious Stars and Stripes floating from the mainmast.

No story of the Navy's preparedness and efficiency would be complete
without recognition of the wisdom of the Council of National Defense,
authorized by Congress and appointed by the President in 1916. That
Council had large responsibility, and measured up to its great duties
before and during the war. The Council was thus constituted: Secretary
of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels,
Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of Agriculture
David F. Houston, Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, Secretary
of Labor William B. Wilson.

The Advisory Commission of the Council was composed of these men:
Daniel Willard, Howard E. Coffin, Julius Rosenwald, Bernard M. Baruch,
Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Samuel Gompers, Dr. Franklin Martin, Walter S.
Gifford, director, Grosvenor B. Clarkson, secretary.

Eight months before the Armistice, March 11, 1918, the House
Sub-Committee, composed of men of both parties--W. B. Oliver, chairman,
W. W. Venable, Adam B. Littlepage, James C. Wilson, Fred A. Britten,
John A. Peters and Frederick C. Hicks--which had made a thorough
investigation of the Navy and naval administration, unanimously
reported:

  First. All appropriations have been expended or obligated with
  judgment, caution and economy, when you consider that haste was
  necessary to bring results and abnormal conditions obtained in
  reference to all problems of production or operations.

  Second. The Navy, with limited personnel and material, was suddenly
  called to face many difficult and untried problems in sea warfare,
  and has met the situation with rare skill, ingenuity, and dispatch
  and a high degree of success.

  Third. The efficiency of the Navy's pre-war organization, the
  readiness and fitness of its men and ships for the difficult and
  arduous tasks imposed by war were early put to the acid test and
  thus far in no way have they been found wanting, and we feel that
  the past twelve months presents for the Navy a remarkable record
  of achievement, of steadily increasing power in both personnel and
  material, of rapidly expanding resources, and of well-matured plans
  for the future, whether the war be of long or short duration.

They could say at the close of hostilities, as they said then: "Sirs,
all is well with the fleet."

The immense scope and signal success of our operations in Europe
surprised even those familiar with the Navy, and the great work of the
war. Leading members of the House Committee on Naval Affairs--Chairman
Lemuel P. Padgett, Representative Thomas S. Butler, the present
Chairman, and Representatives Daniel J. Riordan, Walter L. Hensley,
John R. Connelly, William B. Oliver, William W. Venable, James C.
Wilson, William J. Browning, John R. Farr, John A. Peters, Frederick C.
Hicks and Sydney A. Mudd--in July and August, 1918, made an inspection
of our naval activities in Europe. Chairman Padgett, for the committee,
on his return, said:

  The magnitude of our naval operations overseas, on the water and in
  the air, reflects credit upon the American people, and commands the
  respect and admiration of our Allies. When the war is over and the
  full history of our naval operations abroad may be given in detail,
  it will be a source of pride and honor to the American people, and
  the fidelity, patriotism and devotion of our naval officers and
  enlisted men, embracing as a part of the Navy the Marine Corps
  officers and men, will form a bright part in the world's history. *
  * *

The record speaks for itself. "Hindsight is better than foresight," and
if it was to be done over again, the Navy, with its war experience,
might do it better. But when all is said as to errors and achievements,
this is the imperishable record:

_The Navy performed successfully every task with which it was
entrusted. In not one did it fail._

_If it made mistakes--(and some were made)--not one of them had any
serious or disastrous result._

_If there were delays--(and there were some unavoidable ones)--not one
of them had any material effect upon the trend or duration of the war._

_If all the criticisms, of whatever kind or character, that have been
made be lumped together, they would not tilt the scales one degree, if
balanced against the Navy's achievements._

After the war was all over and the men were returning home, with time
and opportunity to assess the value of the service rendered, General
John J. Pershing, in command of the American Expeditionary Forces,
wrote on April 21, 1919:

  We fully realize that had it not been for the Navy, who kept watch
  and guard night and day over our transport fleet, the American
  effort in France would never have been successful. The Navy's
  assistance was whole-hearted and arduous, and was always given in a
  most generous spirit of coöperation.




CHAPTER XXXVI

AFTER THE ARMISTICE

  NAVAL DIPLOMACY PREVENTED CLASH IN FORMER AUSTRIAN TERRITORY
  AND STABILIZED CONDITIONS IN DISTURBED AREAS--ANDREWS IN THE
  ADRIATIC--BRISTOL AT CONSTANTINOPLE--MC CULLY'S CONFIDENTIAL
  MISSION TO RUSSIA--MISSIONS OF ROOSEVELT AND BENSON--SHIPS AND MEN
  SERVED AS ALMONERS TO THE STARVING.


Men in the fighting line were full of solemn thanksgiving the day the
armistice was signed. At home we built bonfires and rejoiced. In Paris
the celebration was a jubilee. It meant home to the Americans, with
eyes turned toward our shores, coming back to firesides with the sense
of a hard duty finished with honor.

Much has been heard since November 11, 1918, of regret that war was not
continued until Berlin was captured. There was no such feeling on the
front line on that glad day in November. The Allies could have gone on
to Berlin, but the victory would have been no greater, only costlier
in lives. Those who think that the troops should have been ordered "On
to Berlin," instead of accepting the victory through the terms of the
armistice, ought to recall the statement by Marshal Foch. When the
terms had been drawn up, one of the American Peace Commissioners asked
General Foch whether he would rather the Germans would reject or accept
the armistice that had been drawn up. The commander of the Allied
armies answered:

  The only aim of war is to obtain results. If the Germans sign an
  armistice on the general lines we have just determined we shall
  have obtained the result we seek. Our aims being accomplished, no
  one has the right to shed another drop of blood.

But the armistice did not end naval operations in Europe. It changed
them and lessened the number of ships and men required. The terms
of the armistice were to be carried out. The Second Division of the
American Expeditionary Forces, commanded by General Lejeune, now head
of the Marine Corps, composed of men of the Army and the Marine Corps,
was sent to Germany as part of the Army of Occupation.

The starving had to be fed, and the Americans alone had the food and
the organization. Everywhere in Europe there was the reaction from long
strain. Having put our hands to the plow, we could not turn back until
stable conditions were restored. And there were problems more difficult
than those confronted in war.

When I reached Paris in March, 1919, the conditions in the Adriatic had
reached an acute state. Vice-Admiral Niblack, the senior Allied officer
charged with carrying out the armistice agreements on the Adriatic,
came to Paris, and outlined to me the imminence of such clashes as
later occurred at Trau, and such coups as that of D'Annunzio at Fiume,
unless the authority of the Allied Council was promptly invoked. He
had recently succeeded Rear Admiral W. H. G. Bullard on the Adriatic
Mission. Before leaving Spalato, where he maintained headquarters,
Admiral Niblack, in concert with other Allied commanders, had
established a shore patrol, because of the fear of an outbreak. By the
terms of the armistice, an Allied Naval Mission was created, and the
Americans were given oversight over a stretch of ex-Austrian territory
about three hundred miles long on the Dalmatian coast, embracing the
ancient towns of Trau and Spalato. Admiral Niblack urged that the
duties and rights of the Italians and Jugo-Slavs be set forth and their
observance enforced.

It was a tense time. I had just returned from Rome as the guest of
the Italian Navy, where American and Italian admirals exchanged views
upon future naval problems and the future type of naval craft. In both
nations there was the earnest desire to strengthen and cement the
American and Italian friendship, jeopardized by the situation on the
Dalmatian coast. I had scarcely finished my interview with Admiral
Niblack, who felt the need of prompt action to prevent trouble in the
Adriatic, when I received a visit from Count V. Macchi Cellere, the
Italian Ambassador to the United States. He had felt the approaching
disagreement between Wilson and Orlando and had hurried to Paris to
make an earnest effort to avert it. A charming gentleman, who loved
his country passionately, he had a sincere attachment for the United
States, where he was highly esteemed. He sensed that, if President
Wilson did not approve Italy's claims on the Adriatic, the people
of his country would feel deep disappointment. He foresaw that the
sincere admiration of the Italians for President Wilson, as shown on
his visit to Rome, would be turned into resentment. He was deeply moved
in his appeal in advocacy of the position of his country, which he
pressed with great earnestness. He believed in his soul that if the
aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs were approved and they obtained important
bases on the Adriatic, such settlement would prove disastrous to his
country. Knowing my regard for Italy and his countrymen, and assured
of my personal friendship, he felt free to speak without reserve. I
never saw him after the break at Paris, but I knew his disappointment
was poignant. When he died, not long afterwards, at Washington, I
had the honor to send his body home on an American dreadnaught with
distinguished escort, a token of American regard for Italy and its
diplomatic representative.

When, during the command of Rear Admiral Philip Andrews, who served two
years in charge of our naval forces in the Adriatic, as well as the
American member of the Allied Armistice Commission, the shore patrol
was removed, the duty of preserving order fell on the Serbs. Their
central authority was light and order was not always preserved. Though
there was no real authority for it, the American naval force was the
real factor in maintaining order. Admiral Andrews came to be recognized
by common consent as the controlling influence in that zone in the
early days when authority was feeble. That country being ex-Austrian
territory, some one did at times have to exercise authority. Our naval
representative was looked upon to do this, and exercised it principally
by moral force and fair dealing. His leadership was recognized, even
demanded, by the Allies and by the Jugo-Slav government at Belgrade.

[Illustration: FROM MANILA TO THE ADRIATIC

The Olympia, once Dewey's flagship at Manila, was flagship of Rear
Admiral Philip Andrews (inset) in the Adriatic.]

[Illustration: THE SCORPION, ONLY AMERICAN NAVAL VESSEL INTERNED DURING
THE WAR

Interned by the Turks, she was later used as station ship at
Constantinople by Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol (inset), High
Commissioner at Constantinople.]

He promoted trade between the Italians and Jugo-Slavs, the first
transaction being made on his flagship, the historic _Olympia_. That
opened the door to better understanding. He was in direct touch with
the governments at Rome and Belgrade and was in a very real sense the
friendly mediator. His duties were mainly diplomatic, and he exercised
the good offices of his country so impartially and fairly as to secure
and maintain peace and business dealings. This was made possible, of
course, through earnest friendly intervention, whose disinterested
nature was soon recognized, and the judgment, ability, poise and
courtesy of Admiral Andrews. In proof of his impartiality and the
appreciation of both nations, he was decorated both at Belgrade and
Rome.

It was only the wise and prompt action of Captain David F. Boyd, of
our Navy, that saved the situation when Trau was captured by soldiers
from the Italian Zone, September 23, 1920. They crossed the armistice
line without Italian authority and surprised and captured the small
Serbian guard. This imitation of D'Annunzio's _coup_ was short-lived.
Captain Boyd, after agreement with the Italian admiral, put the
offending Italian army captain and soldiers in an Italian motor boat,
and turned them over to an Italian naval officer. The situation was so
acute that Captain Boyd's service called for this high commendation
from Vice Admiral Knapp: "The whole affair was most creditably handled
and the very prompt action of Captain Boyd, in my opinion, undoubtedly
prevented a very serious incident which might have resulted in open
warfare between Italians and Serbians." Admiral Andrews thought that,
but for the action in securing the withdrawal of the Italians so
promptly, "the Serbs would have killed them all, and a small war would
have been started."

War between the other Allies and Italians was narrowly averted at
Fiume at the time of the D'Annunzio _coup_. The French and British
had troops ashore, and there were Allied ships in the harbor, Admiral
Andrews having with him on his flagship Major General C. P. Summerall,
U. S. A. The question was whether the Allied troops would drive out
the D'Annunzio forces or withdraw. They were disinclined to withdraw.
Admiral Andrews urged withdrawal on the ground that, as it was the
Italian regulars who had let D'Annunzio's troops into the city, it
was the duty of Italy to get them out and not the duty of the Allies
to make war in order to expel them. This course opened the way for
continued Allied friendship after the passing of the storm.

Though he had no control on land, the American Admiral was looked to by
the people for guidance. They not only respected him but he won their
regard as he won the approval of the Allies and the plaudits of his
countrymen. The children flocked about him. They had not seen sugar
or sweets for four or five years. As he traveled about the country
from Spalato, Admiral Andrews always took with him plenty of cakes of
chocolate for the children. They welcomed the chocolate and as his car
would go from place to place, the happy children would call out: "Here
comes the Chocolate Admiral," in terms of gratitude and affection.

"At that time," wrote a navy officer, "President Wilson was venerated
by the Jugo-Slavs. They were always appealing to him through Admiral
Andrews. He was to them an idol, able and willing to redress all
wrongs, and all powerful. The only way President Wilson was known to
the children was as the owner of a chocolate factory, whose chocolate
was dispensed by the Admiral as his agent."

The duties assigned the Navy in the Near East were largely diplomatic,
though naval vessels carried on, and still carry on, the work of mercy
begun by the Navy in 1914 when the _Tennessee_ carried persecuted Jews
and others from Turkey to places of safety. Our ships were employed
in these waters, whenever occasion made it possible, in carrying food
and clothing to suffering peoples. Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, in
command of the naval forces in Turkish waters during the early days of
transition, was appointed by the President of the United States, in
August, 1919, as High Commissioner at Constantinople. The unsettled
conditions and the fact that our country had recognized no government
in Turkey made the selection of a naval officer the best agency for
the protection of Americans and American interests, the hastening of
stability, and helpfulness to those in dire need.

As naval commander in these important waters, Admiral Bristol
maintained a system of communications, sometimes stationing vessels at
various points as radio traffic ships, and operated vessels on regular
schedules for relief work, for transporting army officers and members
of recognized philanthropic societies to ports where their duties
demanded their presence, or where stores were needed for the immediate
sustenance of the impoverished inhabitants. During the severe fighting
in southern Russia, he aided in evacuating Americans, non-combatants
and sick and wounded.

As High Commissioner, he performed the varied duties of an ambassador,
commercial representative and shipping expert at Constantinople, where
all roads meet and all nationalities struggle for trade and power. Like
other American naval officers on duty in Europe since the armistice,
he illustrated the best traditions of naval capacity by the wise
performance of the varied diplomatic duties entrusted to them. They did
this so well that Lord Palmerston's estimate of a British naval officer
was proved to be true of American officers. "When I have a hard job to
be done anywhere in the world, calling for a clear head and a steady
hand," said Palmerston. "I send a captain of the Navy."

Conditions in Russia were chaotic and deplorable. Rear Admiral
Newton A. McCully, who had first been naval attaché at Petrograd and
afterwards in command of Naval Forces in Northern Russian Waters,
was ordered to Southern Russia upon a confidential mission after the
armistice. This was done at the request of the State Department.
Admiral McCully speaks the Russian language like a native. He is
trusted and esteemed by Russians and he reciprocates their regard.
He was not accredited to any Russian government. His reports were
invaluable in keeping the American authorities and the Allies
acquainted with the rapidly changing conditions in that disturbed
region in a period when practically no other accurate information could
be obtained. In addition to that diplomatic duty, Admiral McCully
was instrumental in safeguarding the lives of Americans, and in
ameliorating the conditions of Russians and aiding in their evacuation.
Upon his return to America, he brought with him half a dozen Russian
children to whom he is giving a home and training--a beautiful evidence
of his friendship to the country and his distress at the plight of its
children.

The story of naval aid in north Russia, while not conspicuous, was a
blessing in chaotic days and afforded protection and assistance in
varied ways. The _Galveston_ and _Chester_ arrived in Archangel in
April, 1919, with Brigadier General W. P. Richardson and a detachment
of the 167th Railway Transportation troops to assist in the withdrawal
of American forces. The _Des Moines_, the _Yankton_, the _Sacramento_
and a number of eagle boats and sub-chasers came later, and in May
the _Des Moines_ managed to get through the ice at the cost of a
few hundred feet of copper sheathing. They did excellent service as
despatch boats, and brought provisions and comforts and doctors.

All American troops had been withdrawn from advanced positions, and
all the troops, except a very small detachment, were withdrawn from
Northern Russia in June. Then the withdrawal of naval ships began, the
last one, the _Des Moines_, leaving in August, taking out the last
of the Americans. Prior thereto, after our Ambassador, Hon. David R.
Francis, had, even in illness, exhausted every effort to serve Russia
and the world's peace, the _Olympia_ gave him passage to England
on his way home. This was only one of the many services of Dewey's
flagship in the war. Dewey and the _Olympia_ were the link between
the Spanish-American and the World War. Under Dewey's leadership the
plans for war with Germany were made before we entered the war. His old
flagship was the ship of service during the war, of diplomacy in Europe
after the war, particularly in the Adriatic, and was often the bearer
of food to starving peoples.

The duty of almoner by America after the armistice endeared our country
to all Europeans, particularly those in distress. The Navy not only
transported and distributed supplies but also took over the repair and
operation of the telegraph and telephone, the operation of wireless,
and made possible communication by trained radio men and other naval
personnel. "I do not see how we could have carried on the work without
the wonderful help of the Navy," said Mr. Herbert Hoover, who was
telling me in Paris in March, 1919, of the splendid service of navy men
in the countries devastated by war.

In December, 1920, Russian refugees began arriving at Cattaro in
the lower Adriatic. There was no one to give them immediate help but
the Americans. Admiral Andrews sent the _Olympia_ and wired to Paris
for doctors, money and nurses, and hurried them to the place by fast
destroyers. They fed and organized the first 8,000. There was no food
but ours. There were some soldiers, but most of the refugees were old
men and women and children. Many died coming from Constantinople.
Fortunately the American Red Cross was near, and it is safe to say that
but for the American Navy and the American Red Cross, there would have
been thousands of deaths from typhus alone and that disease would have
spread all over the Balkans and Central Europe.

In November, 1918, Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt went to
Europe to expedite settlements with Allied governments and speed up
the return of American ships and men. During the war we had agreements
with them not reduced to writing, and these called for adjustment.
Mr. Roosevelt was accompanied by Assistant Attorney General Thomas
J. Spellacy and Commander J. M. Hancock, of the Supply Corps. All
negotiations were satisfactorily completed, demobilization hastened,
and excess material sold or salvaged. The most important of these
transactions was perfecting the sale to the French Government of the
high power radio station built in France by our Navy and named for
Lafayette.

In October, 1918, Admiral Benson, making his second official visit to
Europe during the war, sailed for France to attend sessions of the
Allied Naval Conference and to take part in the arrangements leading
up to the armistice and the fixing of naval terms in that instrument.
He remained until the following summer as the naval adviser to the
American Peace Mission. With a competent staff, he was enabled to give
information and advice to the President and the Peace Mission. Upon his
arrival, Benson took his place as the American naval representative on
the Allied Naval Council. Admiral Sims, who had served on the Council
in the absence of Benson, having completed his duties at London,
returned to the United States in the spring of 1919. He was succeeded
by Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, who was later promoted to Vice
Admiral. Upon his retirement, Admiral H. McL. P. Huse succeeded to the
assignment, and in 1920 Vice Admiral Niblack became the commander of
American forces in European waters.

In Paris in 1919 I held informal conferences with Admirals
Benson, Knapp, Niblack, Griffin, Taylor, Earle and Long, and with
representatives of Allied nations touching problems affecting the
future naval programs of the nations. At that time the world believed
that with the adoption of the peace treaty, naval and military policies
would be radically changed. It was confidently expected that the
countries would unite to reduce the burdens of armament which the war
had shown menaced world peace.

Admiral A. S. Halstead, who had succeeded Admiral Wilson at Brest,
supervised the naval duty of returning the soldiers, continuing on duty
until embarkation had been completed. Other officers in all parts of
Europe remained in connection with the shipping and the other tasks
which the Navy was called upon to perform.

The last gigantic task had to do with the greatest American
contribution to the war--the sweeping up of the mines planted in the
North Sea as the effective barrier against the egress of submarines.
This was a hazardous undertaking, involving the loss of men and ships,
but fewer lives were lost than any had dared to hope. By November,
1919, the 89 ships assigned to that drab and dangerous duty, with their
officers and men, were in home waters.

Thus the task of the Navy in the World War came to an end. The officers
and men serving overseas had forged friendships with their comrades
of the mist which will always gladden their lives. As they raised the
"homeward bound" pennant, they were cheered by the consciousness of a
great task well ended and by the thanks of grateful peoples for all
they had done.

Coming in sight of the Statue of Liberty, its steady rays lighting
their course, they found awaiting them the welcome reserved only for
those who love liberty more than life.