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                        THE THEORY AND PRACTICE

                                   OF

                        ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE




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                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

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                        MACMILLAN & CO., Limited

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                   THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.

                                TORONTO




                        THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
                                   OF
                        ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE


                                   BY
                   VICTOR ALVIN KETCHAM, B.A., LL.B.
            ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY


                                New York
                         THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
                                  1917

                         _All rights reserved_




                            COPYRIGHT, 1914,

                       BY THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

 Set up and electrotyped. Published May, 1914. Reprinted January, 1915;
                        July, 1916; March, 1917.


                             Norwood Press:
              Berwick & Smith Co., Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                                PREFACE


The object of this book is to furnish practical directions for the
preparation and presentation of oral and written arguments. Teachers of
Argumentation and Debate have come to realize that interest can best be
stimulated and practical results best secured by omitting the
theoretical forms of reasoning at first, and leading the student
directly to the actual work of building up an argument. The technical
name of a logical process has little to do with its practical
application. This fact is well illustrated by the constant use of
arguments in our conversation: moreover, the student who enters upon
this work is sufficiently advanced to appreciate the difference between
truth and error. For these reasons the book is divided into two parts,
the first of which deals with the Practice of Argumentation and Debate.
After the student has had some experience in constructing and presenting
arguments he is better fitted to make practical application of the
theoretical principles of argumentation which are presented in the
second part of this book under the head of the Theory of Argumentation
and Debate. Those teachers who prefer to follow the old order of
presentation can do so by taking up the Theory of Argumentation and
Debate after completing the chapter on Collecting Evidence and before
taking up the chapter on Constructing the Brief.

Since Argumentation and Debate has come to be a regular course of study
in almost every college and university and in many of our larger
preparatory and high schools, there has been a tendency among text-book
writers to multiply rules regarding every phase of the subject. By
consulting various works it will be found that no less than sixteen
different rules have been formulated for the construction of the brief
alone. One book contains as many as thirteen of these. To the average
student the result is confusion rather than enlightenment. One of the
objects of the author has been to remedy this condition of affairs by
attempting to state clear-cut rules, which, though covering all
contingencies, are limited to what is essential and practical. In regard
to illustrations and examples the same idea has been carried out.

The order in which the subjects are discussed is that dictated by actual
practice. The object has been to lead the student step by step, to point
out all the difficulties along the way, and to show by precept and
example how they may be overcome. After the essential definitions are
given and the importance of the subject upon which he is entering is set
forth, the student is shown where to find, and how to choose and
express, a proposition for argument. He is then directed how to analyze
that proposition for the purpose of finding out what he must do in order
to establish its truth or falsity. Next, he is informed of the sources
of evidence bearing upon the proposition, and how such evidence is to be
collected and used. Directions for constructing a brief out of this
evidence are then presented and the way in which the finished argument
is to be developed is set forth. The psychological development of an
argument is here for the first time given full consideration. Following
this the student is shown how to defend his own argument and overthrow
that of his opponent. Finally, instructions are given for delivering the
argument in the most effective manner. Even without the aid of an
instructor the student could follow the argumentative process through to
the end.

The exercises given are intended to be practical and to assure a
thorough working knowledge of the discussion. The material in the
appendix may be used at the discretion of the instructor. The prevalence
of references to the Lincoln-Douglas Debates is intentional and arises
from the fact that the circumstances under which these debates occurred,
the personalities of the participants, and the argumentative excellence
of the discussions make them especially useful to the student.

The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to all those who have
heretofore written upon this subject as well as to the students whom it
has been his pleasure to instruct. He wishes especially to acknowledge
the assistance of Professor Raymond M. Alden, who gave a careful reading
to the greater part of the manuscript and made many helpful suggestions.

                                                   VICTOR ALVIN KETCHAM.

  COLUMBUS, OHIO, _February 1, 1914_.




                                CONTENTS


                                _PART I_

                THE PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE


                                CHAPTER I

               DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF ARGUMENTATION

 Section                                                            Page

   I. Definitions                                                      3

  II. The Object of Argumentation                                      5

 III. Educational Importance of Argumentation                          6

  IV. Practical Importance of Argumentation                            7


                               CHAPTER II

                             THE PROPOSITION

   I. The Subject-Matter of the Proposition                            9

      1. The subject must be interesting                               9

      2. Subjects for first practice should be those of which the
           debater has a general knowledge                            11

      3. The subject must be debatable                                12

  II. The Wording of the Proposition                                  13

      1. The proposition should be so narrowed as to embody only
           one central idea                                           14

      2. The proposition should be stated in the affirmative          15

      3. The proposition should contain no ambiguous words            16

      4. The proposition should be worded as simply and as briefly
           as is consistent with the foregoing requirements           18


                               CHAPTER III

                        ANALYZING THE PROPOSITION

   I. The Importance of Analysis                                      21

  II. Essential Steps in Analysis                                     22

      1. A broad view of the subject                                  22

      2. The origin and history of the question                       23

      3. Definition of terms                                          24

      4. Narrowing the question                                       27

         (1) Excluding irrelevant matter                              27

         (2) Admitting matters not vital to the argument              28

      5. Contrasting the affirmative arguments with those of the
           negative                                                   29

 III. The Main Issues                                                 36


                               CHAPTER IV

                                EVIDENCE

   I. Sources of Evidence                                             39

      1. Personal knowledge                                           39

      2. Personal interviews                                          40

      3. Personal letters                                             41

      4. Current literature                                           42

      5. Standard literature                                          45

      6. Special documents                                            46

         (1) Reports and pamphlets issued by organizations            46

         (2) Reports and documents issued by the government           48

  II. Recording Evidence                                              51

      1. Use small cards or sheets of paper of uniform size           53

      2. Place only one fact or point on each card                    53

      3. Write only on one side of the card                           53

      4. Express the idea to be put on the card in the simplest and
           most direct terms                                          54

      5. Make each card complete in itself                            54

      6. In recording material for refutation put an exact
           statement of the argument to be refuted at the top of
           the card                                                   55

      7. State the main issue or subject to which the evidence
           relates at the top of the card                             55

      8. State the source from which the evidence is taken at the
           bottom of the card                                         56

 III. Selecting Evidence                                              58

      1. The evidence must come from the most reliable source to
           which it can be traced                                     58

      2. A person quoted as authority must be unprejudiced, in full
           possession of the facts, and capable of giving expert
           testimony on the point at issue                            60

      3. Evidence should be examined to determine whether there are
           attendant circumstances which will add to its weight       62

      4. The selection of evidence must be fair and reasonable        64

      5. The position and arguments of the opposition should be
           taken into consideration                                   65

      6. That evidence which will appeal most strongly to those to
           whom the argument is to be addressed should be selected    66

  IV. The Amount of Evidence Required                                 68


                                CHAPTER V

                         CONSTRUCTING THE BRIEF

   I. The Purpose of the Brief                                        72

  II. Method of Constructing the Brief                                73

 III. Rules for Constructing the Brief                                76

      1. A brief should be composed of three parts: Introduction,
           Proof, and Conclusion                                      76

      2. Each statement in a brief should be a single complete
           sentence                                                   77

      3. The relation which the different statements in a brief
           bear to each other should be indicated by symbols and
           indentations                                               77

      4. The introduction should contain the main issues together
           with a brief statement of the process of analysis by
           which they were found                                      79

      5. The main statements in the proof should correspond to the
           main issues set forth in the introduction, and should
           read as reasons for the truth of the proposition           84

      6. Every statement in the proof must read as a reason for the
           statement to which it is subordinate                       85

      7. Statements introducing refutation must state clearly the
           argument to be refuted                                     87

      8. The conclusion should be a summary of the main arguments
           just as they stand in the proof of the brief and should
           close with an affirmation or denial of the proposition
           in the exact words in which it is phrased                  89

      Specimen student brief                                          91


                               CHAPTER VI

                        CONSTRUCTING THE ARGUMENT

   I. Attention—Aroused by the Introduction                           95

      1. Kinds of attention                                           96

         A.  Natural attention                                        96

         B.  Assumed attention                                        97

      2. Methods of securing proper attention                         98

         A.  Immediate statement of purpose                           98

         B.  Illustrative story                                      100

         C.  Quotations                                              101

  II. Interest—Maintained by the Proof                               102

      1. Necessity                                                   103

      2. Methods of maintaining interest                             103

         A.  Appropriate treatment                                   103

             a.  Adaptation to speaker or writer                     103

             b.  Adaptation to audience or reader                    103

             c.  Adaptation to time or occasion                      106

         B.  Logical structure                                       106

         C.  Style                                                   107

             a.  Elements of style                                   108

                 (1) Vocabulary                                      108

                 (2) Sentences                                       109

                 (3) Paragraphs                                      110

             b.  Qualities of style                                  110

                 (1) Clearness                                       110

                 (2) Force                                           117

                 (3) Elegance                                        120

 III. Desire—Created by the Conclusion                               121

      1. Necessity                                                   121

      2. Interest                                                    122

         A.  Convenience                                             122

         B.  Pleasure                                                123

         C.  Profit                                                  123

      3. Jealousy, vanity, and hatred                                124

      4. Ambition                                                    124

      5. Generosity                                                  125

      6. Love of right and justice                                   125

      7. Love of country, home, and kindred                          125


                               CHAPTER VII

                                REBUTTAL

   I. Preparation for Rebuttal                                       129

      1. Sources of material for rebuttal                            129

         A.  Material acquired in constructing the argument          129

         B.  Books, papers, and documents                            131

         C.  Questions                                               133

      2. Arrangement of rebuttal material                            139

         A.  Classification of cards                                 140

         B.  Arranging books, papers, and documents                  142

         C.  The summary and closing plea                            143

  II. Presentation of Rebuttal                                       146

      1. Attention to argument of opponent                           146

      2. Selecting arguments to be refuted                           147

      3. Reading quotations                                          149

      4. Teamwork                                                    149

      5. Treatment of opponents                                      150

      6. The summary and closing plea                                152


                              CHAPTER VIII

                         DELIVERING THE ARGUMENT

   I. Methods of delivering the argument                             153

      1. Reading                                                     153

      2. Memorizing the argument verbatim                            154

      3. Memorizing the argument by ideas                            155

  II. Physical preparation for delivery                              158

      1. Position                                                    159

      2. Voice                                                       160

      3. Emphasis                                                    162

      4. Key, rate, and inflection                                   162

      5. Gesture                                                     164

      6. Transitions                                                 165

      7. Presenting charts                                           166

 III. Mental preparation for delivery                                167

      1. Directness                                                  167

      2. Earnestness                                                 169

      3. Confidence                                                  170


                                _PART II_

                 THE THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE


                                CHAPTER I

                           INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

   I. The Application of Processes of Reasoning to Argumentation     175

  II. Inductive Reasoning                                            176

 III. The Application of Inductive Reasoning to Inductive Argument   179

  IV. Requirements for an Effective Inductive Argument               182

      1. Perfect inductions                                          182

      2. Imperfect inductions                                        183

         A.  The number of specific instances supporting the
               conclusion must be sufficiently large to offset the
               probability of coincidence                            183

         B.  The class of persons, events, or things about which
               the induction is made must be reasonably homogeneous  185

         C.  The specific instances cited in support of the
               conclusion must be fair examples                      186

         D.  Careful investigation must disclose no exceptions       187

         E.  The conclusion must be reasonable                       188


                               CHAPTER II

                           DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

   I. Deductive Reasoning                                            190

  II. The Application of Deductive Reasoning to Deductive Argument   196

 III. The Enthymeme                                                  201


                               CHAPTER III

                      ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL RELATION

   I. Argument from Effect to Cause                                  208

      1. The alleged cause must be sufficient to produce the effect  210

      2. No other cause must have intervened between the alleged
           cause and the effect                                      211

      3. The alleged cause must not have been prevented from
           operating                                                 212

  II. Argument from Cause to Effect                                  213

      1. The observed cause must be sufficient to produce the
           alleged effect                                            215

      2. When past experience is invoked it must show that the
           alleged effect has always followed the observed cause     215

      3. No force must intervene to prevent the observed cause from
           operating to produce the alleged effect                   216

      4. The conclusion established should be verified by positive
           evidence whenever possible                                217

 III. Argument from Effect to Effect                                 218


                               CHAPTER IV

                          ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

   I. The two factors in the analogy must be alike in all
        particulars which affect the conclusion                      228

  II. The alleged facts upon which the analogy is based must be
        true                                                         231

 III. The conclusion established by the analogy should be verified
        by positive evidence whenever possible                       232


                                CHAPTER V

                                FALLACIES

   I. Fallacies of Induction                                         235

      1. The number of specific instances relied upon to support
           the conclusion should be determined                       235

      2. The class of persons, events, or things about which the
           induction is made should be scrutinized with a view to
           determining whether it is homogeneous                     236

      3. Whether or not the specific instances cited in support of
           the conclusion are fair examples should be determined     236

      4. A search should be made for exceptions to the rule stated
           by the induction                                          237

      5. The induction should be examined with a view to
           determining its reasonableness                            237

  II. Fallacies of Deduction                                         238

      1. Material fallacies                                          238

      2. Logical fallacies                                           239

         (1) The undistributed middle                                239

         (2) The illicit process                                     244

         (3) Irrelevancy of the premises, or ignoring the question   245

             A.  The appeal to passion, prejudice, or humor          246

             B.  The personal attack upon an opponent                246

             C.  The personal attack upon the person or persons
                   concerned in the controversy                      246

             D.  The appeal to custom and tradition                  247

             E.  Shifting ground                                     248

             F.  Refuting an argument which has not been advanced    248

             G.  Arguing on a related proposition                    248

         (4) Begging the question                                    249

             A.  Arguing in a circle                                 249

             B.  Directly assuming the point at issue                250

             C.  Indirectly assuming the point at issue              251

 III. Fallacies of Causal Relation                                   252

      1. Fallacies of the argument from effect to cause              252

         (1) Mistaking coincidence for cause                         253

         (2) Mistaking an effect for a cause                         254

         (3) Mistaking a subsequent cause for a real cause           254

         (4) Mistaking an insufficient cause for a sufficient cause  255

      2. Fallacies of the argument from cause to effect              255

      3. Fallacies of the argument from effect to effect             256

  IV. Fallacies of the Argument from Analogy                         256


                               CHAPTER VI

                               REFUTATION

   I. Revealing a Fallacy                                            261

  II. Reductio ad Absurdum                                           262

 III. The Dilemma                                                    263

  IV. Residues                                                       265

   V. Inconsistencies                                                267

  VI. Adopting an Opponent’s Evidence                                268




                                 PART I
                THE PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE




          THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE




                               CHAPTER I
               DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF ARGUMENTATION


I. Definitions.

Argumentation is the art of persuading others to think or act in a
definite way. It includes all writing and speaking which is persuasive
in form. The salesman persuading a prospective customer to buy goods,
the student inducing his fellow-student to contribute to the funds of
the athletic association, the business or professional man seeking to
enlarge his business and usefulness, and the great orator or writer
whose aim is to control the destiny of nations, all make use of the art
of argumentation to attain their various objects. These illustrations
serve but to indicate the wide field of thought and action which this
subject includes. Each instance in this broad field, which demands the
use of the art of argumentation, is subject to the same general laws
that govern the construction and presentation of formal arguments.
Formal arguments may be either written or oral, but by far the greater
benefit to the student of argumentation results from the delivery of
oral arguments, for it is in this form that he will be most frequently
railed upon to use his skill.

Debating is the oral presentation of arguments under such conditions
that each speaker may reply directly to the arguments of the opposing
speaker. The debate is opened by the first speaker for the affirmative.
He is then followed by the first speaker for the negative, each side
speaking alternately until each man has presented his main speech. After
all the main speeches have been delivered the negative opens the
rebuttal. The speakers in rebuttal alternate negative and affirmative.
This order gives the closing speech to the affirmative. Practice in this
kind of formal debate should go hand in hand with the study of the text
after the first five chapters have been mastered. The first arguments,
however, should be individual arguments written out for the purpose of
enabling the student to apply the rules regarding their form and
development.

A proposition in argumentation is the formal statement of a subject for
debate. It begins with the word “Resolved,”—followed by the statement of
the subject matter of the controversy, and worded in accordance with the
rules laid down in the next chapter. In formal debate it is always
expressed; as for example, “Resolved, that the Federal Government should
levy a progressive income tax.” In other forms of argumentation it may
be only implied, as in the case of the salesman selling goods, the
student soliciting subscriptions, the business man arguing for
consolidation, or the politician pleading for reform. Nevertheless, it
is always advisable for the speaker or writer to have clearly in mind a
definite proposition as a basis upon which to build his argument. The
proposition for the salesman might be, “Resolved, that James Fox ought
to buy a piano;” for the student solicitor, “Resolved, that George Clark
ought to give ten dollars to the athletic fund;” for the business man,
“Resolved, that all firms engaged in the manufacture of matches should
consolidate;” and for the politician, “Resolved, that the tariff
schedule on necessaries should be lowered.” This framing of a definite,
clear-cut proposition will prevent wandering from the subject and give
to the argument the qualities of clearness, unity, and relevancy.

Referring to the definition with which this chapter opened the student
should note that it defines argumentation as an art. While it is true
that argumentation must be directed in accordance with scientific
principles, and while it is also true that it has an intimate relation
with the science of logic, yet it is primarily an art in which skill,
tact, diplomacy, and the finer sensibilities must be utilized to their
fullest extent. In this respect argumentation is an art as truly as
music, sculpture, poetry, or painting. The successful debater must be a
master of this art if he hopes to convince and persuade real men to his
way of thinking and thus to direct their action.


II. The object of argumentation.

The object of argumentation is not only to induce others to accept our
opinions and beliefs in regard to any disputed matter, but to induce
them to act in accordance with our opinions and beliefs. The end of
argumentation is action. The form which this action is to take depends
upon the nature of the disputed matter. It may be only an action of the
mind resulting in a definite belief which will exert an influence in the
world for good or evil. It may be the desire of the one who argues to
persuade his hearers to advocate his opinions and beliefs and thus
spread his doctrines to many other individuals. It may be that some more
decided physical action is desired, such as the casting of a vote, or
the purchase of a certain article or commodity. It may be the taking up
of arms against a state, race, or nation, or the pursuit of a definite
line of conduct throughout the remainder of the life of the individual
addressed. These and many other phases of action may be the objects of
the debater.


III. Educational importance of argumentation.

From the standpoint of mental discipline no study offers more practical
training than does argumentation. It cultivates that command of feeling
and concentration of thought which keeps the mind healthily active. The
value of this kind of mental exercise cannot be overestimated.
Especially is it valuable when the arguments are presented in the form
of a debate, in which the speaker is assigned to defend a definite
position and must reply to attacks made on that position. Such work
brings forth the best powers of mind possessed by the student. It
cultivates quickness of thought, and the ability to meet men on their
own ground and conduct a successful encounter on the battlefield of
ideas.

Another faculty of mind which debating develops is tact in the selection
and presentation of material. Since the object of debate is action, it
is not enough that the speaker show his position to be the correct one.
He must do more than this; he must make the hearer desire to act in
accordance with that position. Otherwise the speaker will be in the same
position as the savage who induces his fellows to conform to his ideas
by the use of a club,—the moment the influence of the club is removed
the subject immediately reverts to his former habits of thought and
action. If you convince a man that he is wrong by the mere force of
argument, he may be unable to answer your argument but he will feel like
a man who has been whipped in a physical encounter—though technically
defeated he still holds to his former opinions. There is much truth in
the old saying that, “He who is convinced against his will is of the
same opinion still.” Therefore, the debater must do more than merely
convince his hearer; he must persuade him. He must appeal to the reason,
it is true, but he must also appeal to the emotions in such a way as to
persuade his hearer to take some definite action in regard to the
subject of dispute. Thus there are two things which the debater must
attempt—conviction and persuasion. If he convinces his hearer without
persuading him, no action is likely to follow. If he persuades his
hearer by appealing to his emotions, the effect of his efforts will be
short lived. Therefore, the debater must train himself to persuade his
hearer to act in accordance with his wishes as well as to find reasons
for such action and give them.

Finally, debating cultivates the ability to use clear and forcible
language. Practice of this kind gives the student a wealth of expression
and a command of language which is not otherwise possible. The
obligation to reply directly to one’s opponents makes it necessary for
the student to have such command of his material that he can make it
apply directly to the arguments he has just heard.

The educational value of debating is greater than that of any other form
of oral or written composition because it cultivates: (1) The command of
feeling and concentration of thought which keep the mind healthily
active, (2) The ability to state a clear-cut proposition, and to analyze
it keenly by sifting the essential from the trivial, thus revealing the
real point at issue, (3) The ability to find reasons and give them, (4)
The power to state facts and conditions with that tact and diplomacy
which success demands, (5) The power to persuade as well as convince,
(6) The power of clear and forcible expression. Certainly any subject
which tends to develop these qualities ought to receive the most careful
attention of the student.


IV. Practical importance of argumentation.

From the practical standpoint no study offers better preparation for the
everyday affairs of life than does argumentation and debate. Success in
life is largely a matter of reducing every situation to a definite,
clear-cut proposition, analyzing that proposition or picking out the
main points at issue, and then directing one’s efforts to the solution
of the problem thus revealed. To be more concrete: One young man accepts
the first situation which is brought to his notice when he graduates,
and stays in a mediocre position for years; another young man thinks
carefully over the matter, picks out a place where he is most likely to
succeed, and secures rapid promotion. Instances might be multiplied
indefinitely to show the practical value of argumentative training. The
man who is an expert in the use of argument holds the master key to
success in all lines. It is an invaluable asset to every one who has to
deal with practical affairs. It matters not whether you are to address
one individual or a thousand—whether you wish to persuade to a certain
course of action, your employer, a committee, a board of directors, a
town council, the senate of the United States, or an auditorium full of
people, knowledge of the use and application of the rules of
argumentation, and good training in the art of debate is a most valuable
asset. The business world, the professional world, and the political
world eagerly welcome the man who can think and who can effectively
present his thoughts. In every business, in every profession, and in
every department of government the skilled debater becomes the leader of
men.




                               CHAPTER II
                            THE PROPOSITION


I. The subject-matter of the proposition.

Argumentation demands a definite concrete subject. This subject must be
one about which there is a dispute; as for example, the liquor question.
There is a great controversy as to what ought to be done in this matter.
Many people contend that Prohibition, or the absolute forbidding of the
making or selling of all intoxicating liquors, is the best method of
procedure. On the other hand many people contend that High License, or
the regulating of the sale of such liquor, is the best method of
procedure. This is a proper subject for a written argument or an oral
debate, because the writer or speaker may take either Prohibition or
High License and show why, and in what way, it would benefit the
community. If he defends Prohibition he must prove that it will benefit
the community more than High License. If he defends High License he must
prove that it will benefit the community more than Prohibition. This
example illustrates what is meant by a definite, concrete subject about
which there is a dispute.

In selecting a subject for debate the following requirements should be
carefully observed:


_1. The subject must be interesting._

The subject must be one in which both speaker and audience have a real
interest. If the argument is written the subject must be one in which
the readers are interested. With this object in view, the question
selected should be practical rather than theoretical. That is, it should
be a question the final determination of which will affect the welfare
of the individual, the community, or the nation. No longer can interest
be aroused in a discussion of whether the pen is mightier than the
sword, or whether fire is more destructive than water. Objectionable in
like manner are the following questions taken from a book on debating
published in 1869: “Who is the most useful to society: the farmer or the
mechanic?”, “From which do we derive the greatest amount of pleasure:
hope or memory?”, “Are lawyers a benefit or a curse to society?”, “Is
there more pleasure in the pursuit than in the possession of a desired
object?”, “Who most deserves the esteem of mankind: the poet, the
statesman, or the warrior?”, and “Whether there is more pleasure derived
from the eye or the ear?” These and all similar subjects should be
avoided chiefly because they lack interest, since no practical result
can follow their determination. As well might one try to interest a
modern audience in the discussions of the ancient schoolmen, who grew
eloquent over a dispute as to how many angels could dance on the point
of a needle, whether there could be two hills without an intervening
valley, and whether God could make a yardstick with only one end. If men
are to be interested the speaker or writer must get close to the
questions which affect their everyday life at home and at work. If he
does this and his ideas are worth defending he will always find willing
hearers and readers.

Among interesting subjects for debate, questions of a local character
hold an important place. The advisability of building a town hall, an
athletic field, or a new bridge is very often more productive of genuine
interest than some weighty problem of national politics. Such questions
come close to the tax-payers and residents of any community, and at the
same time appeal to their pride, prejudice, and ambition. If the student
will but look about him he will find an abundance of controverted local
matter which will furnish excellent subjects for oral or written
arguments.

After the student has exhausted local subjects he may turn his attention
to the broader controversies of state and nation. Here the questions of
taxation, tariff, commerce, and international affairs afford ample scope
for the full development of the debater’s powers. The list of subjects
in the appendix may be found helpful in making a proper selection, but
preference should always be given to questions in which the people at
large are showing an active interest at the time of the debate. What
this interest is may be determined by consulting the current numbers of
the most widely circulating magazines and newspapers, such as the
“Independent,” “Nation,” “Harper’s Weekly,” and the various city
newspapers.


_2. Subjects for first practice should be those of which the debater has
a general knowledge_:

Since the object of the first few debates is to make the student
familiar with rules and forms, the subjects chosen should be within the
range of his information and experience. For this purpose subjects of a
local character are best adapted. The student should have had some
actual practice in debating before he attempts to take up questions
which require extended investigation. Such propositions as those
relating to the tariff, taxation, municipal problems, and Federal
control of industrial and commercial activities should be reserved for
more mature efforts.

The following subjects are fair examples of desirable questions for
first practice: (1) Should students who attain a rank of ninety per
cent, or higher, in their daily work be excused from examinations?, (2)
Should gymnasium work be made compulsory?, (3) Should first year
students at —— be allowed to engage in intercollegiate athletics?, (4)
Should the class rushes at the beginning of the college year be
discontinued?, (5) Should the game of football be abolished?


_3. The subject must be debatable._

If the first two requirements in regard to the choosing of a subject are
observed it is not probable that the question will be undebatable.
However, since it is always advisable to keep as far as may be from
one-sided questions, it is well to give this requirement some
consideration.

In the first place, the question must not be obviously true or obviously
false. The clearest examples of subjects objectionable because obviously
true are found in geometry. It is plain that an intelligent debate
cannot be held on the proposition, “Resolved, that the sum of the three
angles of a triangle is always equal to two right angles.” Equally
useless from the standpoint of argumentation is it to dispute that “All
men are mortal,” that “Huxley was a great scientist,” or that “Health is
more desirable than sickness.” Nevertheless questions just as obvious as
these are sometimes debated because their real character is concealed
under cover of confused language. The following question is a good
example of this, “Resolved, that breach of trust in high office is
reprehensible.” A moment’s thought will convince the reader that such a
proposition is not debatable because obviously true. On the other hand
propositions which are obviously false are sometimes worded so as to
have an appearance of validity. Such is the following, “Resolved, that
the only way to benefit humanity is to destroy the trusts.” To prove
this proposition it is necessary to show that education, religion, and
commerce cannot be made to benefit humanity. The proposition is not
debatable because it is obviously false.

In the second place, the question must be one which is capable of
approximate proof. It is not debatable if it cannot be proved
approximately true or false. The debater must be able, by means of
reasoning based upon the facts of the case, to arrive at a conclusion
either for or against the proposition. To make this possible, there must
be a common standard of comparison. This common standard does not exist
in the proposition “Resolved, that the lawyer is of more use to society
than the doctor,” because their work is entirely unlike and both are
necessary to the well-being of modern society. On the other hand it does
exist in the proposition “Resolved, that Federal control of life
insurance companies is preferable to State control.” This question
hinges on the comparative efficiency of the two means of control,
namely,—Federal and State, both of which are governmental in character.
Therefore a common standard of comparison exists which enables the
debater to show why one or the other method should be adopted.

Thus far we have dealt with the subject-matter of the proposition and
have seen that it must meet the three foregoing requirements. We must
now turn our attention to the phrasing of this subject in such a way
that it will form a suitable proposition for debate.

       SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF A PROPOSITION

  1. The subject must be interesting.

  2. Subjects for first practice should be those of which the debater
     has a general knowledge.

  3. The subject must be debatable.


II. The wording of the proposition.

To those unfamiliar with the art of debate it often seems that when the
subject is chosen but a moment’s time is required to whip it into the
form of an acceptable proposition for a debate. This, however, is not
the case; the work is only half done. After an interesting, suitable,
and debatable subject has been chosen there still remains the important
task of expressing that subject in proper form.

The subject for debate should be stated in the form of a resolution. One
form of such resolution would be, “Resolved, that the Federal government
should levy a progressive income tax.” A mere statement of the subject
is not enough. One may write a description of “The Panama Canal,” or a
narrative on “The Adventures of a Civil Engineer in Panama,” or an
exposition on “The Cost of Building the Panama Canal,” but for an
argument one must take one side or the other of a resolution, as for
example, “Resolved, that the United States should fortify the Panama
Canal.” This resolution is usually termed the Proposition, and
corresponds to the motion, resolution, or bill presented in deliberative
assemblies such as state legislatures or the branches of Congress. The
proposition must contain one definite issue. In it there must be no
ambiguous words or phrases. Otherwise the debate is liable to degenerate
into a mere quibble over words or a dispute as to the meaning of the
proposition. Hence no issues will be squarely joined and after the
debate is over, neither the debaters, the judges, nor the audience will
feel satisfied or have reason to believe that any progress has been made
toward a right solution of the question.

The proposition for debate should be worded in accordance with the
following rules:


_1. The proposition should be so narrowed as to embody only one central
idea._

In the beginning there is always a tendency to make the proposition
cover too broad a field. This is rather a defect of wording than of
subject-matter. Let us take a proposition which is too broad, and narrow
it so that it will contain but a single idea. For this purpose we may
select the proposition, “Resolved, that freshmen should not be permitted
to take part in athletics.” As it stands, this proposition includes all
freshmen everywhere and prohibits them from taking part in athletics of
every kind. In other words the field which it covers is too broad. The
proposition treats of two things, freshmen and athletics. Let us first
make the provision in regard to freshmen definite, that is, narrow it
down to a field with definite limits. We can do this by making it apply
only to the freshmen of Columbia University or of any other specified
institution. Thus the collecting of material as well as the
determination of the issues involved becomes a much simpler matter. In
the second place let us make the provision in regard to athletics more
definite. As the proposition stands it excludes freshmen from all
athletics whatsoever, including inter-class and inter-society as well as
intercollegiate. Here again the field is too wide and some restriction
must be placed upon the subject-matter. Therefore we insert the word
“intercollegiate” before the word “athletics” in order that the field
for discussion may be narrowed down to a single, definite issue. With
these modifications the proposition now stands, “Resolved, that freshmen
at Columbia University should not be permitted to take part in
intercollegiate athletics,” which is an entirely satisfactory
proposition because it narrows the field of discussion to one definite,
central idea.

Though this difficulty will doubtless present itself in a variety of
forms, the principles stated above as well as the illustration, if kept
in mind by the student, will enable him to keep clear of this fault.


_2. The proposition should be stated in the affirmative._

The first argument is always presented by the affirmative. Upon the
affirmative rests the burden of proof and if the affirmative proves
nothing the decision goes to the negative. “He who affirms must prove.”
The affirmative has the burden of proving the proposition to be true,
the negative that of proving it false. Therefore the proposition must be
worded in the affirmative. This insures that some progress will have
been made at the end of the first speech.

The burden of proof rests upon the party who has the risk of
non-persuasion. The risk of non-persuasion rests upon the party who
would fail if no evidence were introduced. We have seen that the
affirmative would fail if no evidence were introduced, because he who
alleges must prove. Therefore the risk of non-persuasion rests on the
affirmative. To be more concrete, if you are attempting to prove to a
friend that he ought to do (or ought not to do) a certain thing, you
take the risk of not persuading him to do the thing that you ask, i. e.
the risk of non-persuasion is on you. Likewise the salesman who
approaches a customer with the purpose of selling him a bill of goods
incurs this same risk of non-persuasion, because he may not be able to
induce the customer to buy. Since, as in the above cases, the
affirmative must be given a chance to prove something before the
negative can reply, the proposition should always be worded in the
affirmative.


_3. The proposition should contain no ambiguous words._

After the proposition has been narrowed down to a single idea and has
then been stated in the affirmative, it should be carefully scrutinized
in order to determine whether it contains any ambiguous words. Ambiguous
words have a meaning so broad that they may be taken in more than one
sense. Such a word is “Anarchist.” This word may refer to a lawless
individual bent on assassination, or to a peaceable individual who has
merely the beliefs of an anarchist with no intention of putting them
into practice. Almost all general terms such as “Anarchist,” “Monroe
Doctrine,” “Civilization,” “Policy,” and “Trusts,” should be avoided
because they tend to make the proposition ambiguous. When such terms are
used they should be almost invariably accompanied by explanatory words.
The words selected for use in the proposition should have but one
meaning and should be so plain that there can be no reasonable dispute
as to their significance. If this rule is not complied with the
discussion will become a foolish quibble over the meaning of the
proposition rather than an intelligent debate upon the merits of the
question.

In the question, “Resolved, that trusts should be suppressed by law,”
there are three ambiguous words, (1) trusts, (2) suppressed, and (3)
law. While these words may not be ambiguous in ordinary speaking or
writing, they are not sufficiently definite to be used in a proposition.
The word “Trust” has several meanings and several shades of meaning.
Among these is the meaning which has recently been given to it,
indicating a combination of firms engaged in some special line of
business, as for example, “The Sugar Trust”, “The Oil Trust”, “The Steel
Trust”, etc. Even this one meaning has different variations. The term
“trust” as used in this sense may refer to a mere combination of
manufacturers, to a monopoly, or to a monopoly in restraint of trade. In
order to make the meaning of the proposition clear we may strike out the
ambiguous term “trusts” and insert “monopolies in restraint of trade.”

The word “suppressed” in this connection may have two well defined
meanings. It may mean either destruction or regulation. If the intent is
that the question shall hinge on whether or not monopolies in restraint
of trade should be destroyed or wiped out altogether, the word
“dissolved” or “destroyed” should be used. If, on the other hand, it is
intended that the issue shall be whether such organizations be allowed
to exist in their present form, but subject to governmental regulation
which will suppress their evil effects on trade, the word “regulated”
should be used. For the purpose in hand let us choose the latter
meaning.

The term “law” is also somewhat ambiguous, because there is more than
one legal agency which could deal with such organizations. Therefore we
will make plain which agency is intended by modifying the word “law” by
the word “Federal.” This makes the proposition, as corrected, read,
“Resolved, that monopolies in restraint of trade should be regulated by
Federal law.” The proposition as thus worded is fairly free from
ambiguity and leaves little opportunity for quibbling over the meaning
of the words in which it is stated.

The proposition must be so worded as to have the same meaning for both
the affirmative and the negative, and this meaning must be absolutely
clear and unambiguous.


_4. The proposition should be worded as briefly and simply as is
consistent with the foregoing requirements._

After the proposition has been worded in accordance with the foregoing
rules it should be carefully scrutinized to determine whether or not
there is a simpler form in which it may be cast without sacrificing any
of its excellencies. The simpler the wording of the proposition the
easier will be the work of determining the main issues and the
subsequent work of preparing the argument.

In dealing with broad general problems such as questions of finance,
commerce, and taxation, it sometimes happens that some issue is brought
in which is aside from the real merits of the controversy and yet so
vitally connected with it as to be logically inseparable. Either side
may present such material, with disastrous results if their opponents
have dealt solely with the real merits of the controversy. An instance
of this difficulty appeared in the debates of one of the Inter-State
leagues. For three or four successive years the questions chosen for the
annual debates were of the character indicated above. In many of the
debates one or the other side of the controversy would bring up the
constitutionality of the proposed measures. The charge would be made
that the proposition could not be decided in the affirmative because the
proposed measure was contrary to the constitution of the United States.
In almost every case this question vitally affected the final adoption
of the resolution, although it could well be excluded from a discussion
on the merits of the problem. The question was especially exasperating,
inasmuch as the judges for the debates were almost always selected from
the bench of the Supreme Court of the states composing the league and
from the Federal Courts. It was finally determined by the official board
of the league to append the phrase “Constitutionality conceded,” to all
propositions in which there was any likelihood that the question of
constitutionality could be made an issue. Thus in one instance the
proposition adopted was, “Resolved, that the Federal Government should
levy a progressive inheritance tax. Constitutionality conceded.”

This did not in any way interfere with the simple wording of the
proposition, and it did effectually prevent the debate from hinging on
an issue which would have prevented a full discussion of the merits of
the question. This method of excluding undesirable matter is preferable
to an attempt to include any restriction in the body of the proposition.
The latter method is quite likely to lead to difficulties, in the form
of ambiguities and their attendant evils, almost impossible to foresee
when the proposition is framed.

In conclusion, the debater must not forget that time spent in selecting
a proper subject and wording it in accordance with the foregoing rules
is time well spent. It will make the great task which lies before him
much easier, and it will enable him to arrive at definite conclusions.


          SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR WORDING THE PROPOSITION

  1. The proposition should be so narrowed as to embody only one central
     idea.

  2. The proposition should be stated in the affirmative.

  3. The proposition should contain no ambiguous words.

  4. The proposition should be worded as briefly and simply as is
     consistent with the foregoing rules.


          EXERCISES IN SELECTING AND PHRASING THE PROPOSITION

1. Write out three propositions in accordance with the rules stated in
this chapter. The subject-matter of these propositions should be purely
local in character as suggested in the first and second sections.

2. Phrase, in proper form, one proposition on each of the following
subjects.

  A. Sunday baseball.

  B. Interstate commerce.

  C. Labor unions.

  D. United States Senators.

  E. Prohibition.

  F. Reciprocity.

3. Apply the appropriate rules to each of the following propositions and
point out where each is defective.

Resolved, that—

  A. We derive more pleasure from hope than from memory.

  B. Wit and humor are the same.

  C. Education ought to be compulsory.

  D. The law is a better profession than medicine.

  E. The Federal Government should levy a tax on large incomes and limit
     the amount of wealth which one man may possess.

  F. It is expedient for the United States to build a larger navy.




                              CHAPTER III
                       ANALYZING THE PROPOSITION


I. The importance of analysis.

The subject for argument has been determined and it has been reduced to
a satisfactory proposition. The next step is to analyze this
proposition. It is well to consider first the importance of this
analysis in order that its true value may be appreciated, and this
preliminary step be not passed over hurriedly. Upon the success of the
analysis depends in large measure the success of the argument. This is
true because the analysis shows just what must be proved in order to
sustain or overthrow the proposition. If the work has been done
carefully the student will have confidence in the solidity of his
argument. He cannot feel secure if he suspects that his analysis is
defective.

The question of analysis is not only of supreme importance in relation
to a particular proposition for discussion, but it is also of the
greatest importance in all the practical affairs of life. No mental
quality is so necessary as the analytical habit of mind. Practically all
the men whom history calls great have possessed in a large degree the
habit of analyzing everything. Lincoln was in the habit of applying this
analytical process not only to great affairs of state but to anything
and everything which came beneath his notice. He analyzed the actions of
his fellow men, the workings of a machine, the nature of moral
principles, and the significance of political movements. He was
continually penetrating to the point of things, visible and invisible,
and laying it bare.

Everything which comes up for personal action should be analyzed and the
vital point at issue determined. Nothing should be done blindly or in a
spirit of trusting to luck or chance. Instead of voting as the majority
seem to be voting in a class meeting, analyze the issue and vote
according to the light revealed by that analysis. Instead of entering
some business or profession blindly and in the hope that something will
turn up, analyze the situation and determine rationally what ought to be
done. For the right determination of these practical affairs no better
preparation can be made than the careful analysis of propositions for
debate.


II. Essential steps in analysis.


_1. A broad view of the subject._

In the first place the student must know something about the
subject-matter of the proposition. If the question is of a local
character and one with which he is familiar, the work of analysis may be
begun at once. The proposition can be scrutinized, its exact meaning
determined, and the proof for its establishment or overthrow decided
upon. If the question be one with which the student is not familiar, his
first duty is to become acquainted in a general way with the
subject-matter. He should carefully examine the proposition to see just
what subject-matter is included and then consult someone familiar with
its substance, or read some material which appears to treat the subject
in a general way. Here confusion is likely to result if an attempt is
made to substitute reading for thinking. The mind of the investigator
should be kept open, free, and independent. He should not allow the
opinions of men, either oral or written, to cause him to depart from the
precise wording of the proposition. His present object is to determine
its limits, meaning and significance.

When a general knowledge of the subject has been acquired, sufficient to
enable the student to reason about the question, he should next consider
the origin and history of the question.


_2. The origin and history of the question._

The meaning of a question must be determined in the light of the
conditions which gave rise to its discussion. For this reason it is well
to find out just how this question came to be a subject of debate. For
example, the people of this country a few years ago were debating the
proposition, “Resolved, that the Federal Government should control all
life insurance companies operating within the United States.” To one
unacquainted with the facts of the case at that time the proposition
appears at first glance to lack point. Why should anyone want Federal
control of insurance companies? What difference does it make as to who
controls them or whether they are controlled at all? These questions are
answered directly when we come to study the origin of the proposition.
Until within a few months of the discussions no one had thought of
debating this proposition. The insurance companies had always been under
the control of the states in which they operated. Then suddenly it came
to light that these companies were grossly mismanaged. Dishonesty had
characterized the administration of their affairs. This served to cast
grave doubt on the efficiency of state control. Therefore the stronger
arm of the Federal government was suggested as a remedy for the evils
which the states had been unable to prevent. The real heart of the
controversy, which a study of the origin of the question revealed was
“Will the control of insurance companies by the Federal government be
more efficient than that exercised by the state governments?” Thus the
real point at issue was made clear through the origin of the question.

In the search for the main issues, the history of the question is often
important. However, the tendency of the inexperienced debater is to
dwell too long upon this part of the argument. Actual practice often
reveals the fact that such a history causes the audience or reader to
lose interest. This is especially true if its bearing on the argument is
not immediately shown.

The history of the question should, however, receive serious
consideration, and any facts which bear directly upon its solution
should be stated in brief and concise form. When the question has
undergone a change because of shifting conditions, its history becomes
especially important. Very often the original significance of a
controversy becomes entirely changed by subsequent happenings. In such a
case the history of the question should be resorted to for the purpose
of finding out the changes through which the original dispute has passed
and determining the exact issues involved at the present time.


_3. Definition of terms._

Before proceeding farther it is well to examine each word in the
proposition. Now that a general idea of the significance of the
proposition has been obtained, and the main point of the controversy
reached through the study of the origin and history of the question, the
task of defining terms may be undertaken in an intelligent manner.

Let it be understood at the outset that a dictionary definition is not
satisfactory. A dictionary gives every meaning which can be attached to
a given word and thus covers a broad, general field. But when a word is
used in a proposition for debate it is used in a special and restricted
sense. The meaning depends largely on the context of the proposition.
The origin and history of the question, the meaning which expert writers
on this particular subject have attached to the words, and the present
conditions must be considered in determining the precise meaning of the
terms.

The words of a proposition which need definition are very often so
grouped that the meaning of a phrase or combination of words taken as a
whole must be determined. Here it is plain that dictionary definitions,
even if satisfactory in other respects, would be entirely inadequate. In
the question in the last chapter, “Resolved, that monopolies in
restraint of trade should be regulated by Federal law,” we find a
necessity for the definition of both a term and a phrase. The term
“regulate” may not in this instance be given the broad meaning which a
dictionary definition attaches to it. We must first look at the context
of the proposition in order to find out to what field of authority we
should go for a proper definition.

The proposition specified regulation by Federal law; therefore we must
go to the law for our definition of the term which indicates the action
the law is to take. But even here we need not be satisfied with the
broad legal definition of the term “regulate.” The field included by the
question is obviously a commercial field. The agencies which would come
under this regulation are for the most part engaged in interstate
commerce. Therefore the power to regulate would be placed under that
clause of the United States constitution which expressly gives Congress
the power to regulate commerce. We may then rely upon the definition
which the courts have placed upon the term “regulate” when used in this
connection. By consulting _Black’s Constitutional Law_,[1] an eminent
authority on this subject, we find that the power to “regulate” has
never been held to include the power to destroy. This eliminates a
possible meaning. By consulting some of the decisions of the United
States courts in which this term has been defined, we are given to
understand that to “regulate” commerce implies that “an intention to
promote and facilitate it, and not to hamper or destroy it, is naturally
to be attributed to Congress.” (_Texas & P. R. Co._ v. _Interstate
Commerce Commission_, 162 U. S., 197; _Interstate Commerce Commission_
v. _Alabama Midland Ry. Co._, 74 Fed., 715). Therefore we are warranted
in concluding that to “regulate” in this proposition means such control
by the Federal law as will promote the best commercial interests of the
country at large.

Footnote 1:

  P. 194.

It is thus seen that both the definition of the term and the source from
which it is taken are determined by the context of the proposition. If
the context of the proposition shows that legal definitions are
required, legal authorities must be consulted. If the context of the
proposition shows that an economic definition is required, economic
authorities should be consulted. In whatever field of knowledge the
context of the proposition lies, the authoritative definitions generally
accepted in these branches of learning should be consulted.

In defining the phrase “monopolies in restraint of trade” the student
should consult the same class of authorities utilized in defining the
term “regulate.” The generally accepted definitions used by prominent
writers may be relied upon with safety, since they are usually taken
directly from authoritative reports and decisions.

One of the most important requisites of a definition is that it be
reasonable. It must appear, in the light of all the circumstances of the
case, to be the most obvious and natural definition which can possibly
be produced. In no case must it appear that the speaker or writer has
laboriously searched for a definition which will conform to his view of
the proposition. Equally fatal is a highly technical definition which
ignores its evident meaning. No trickery based upon a technicality
should be tolerated. The definition presented must be so reasonable that
everyone concerned (with the possible exception of one’s opponents) will
willingly admit its validity.


_4. Narrowing the question._

The next step in the analysis of the question is to narrow it down to
the points which must be proved. Now that the meaning of the question is
well understood this task ought not to be difficult. Nevertheless it
demands the most earnest efforts of the student. There are two steps in
this process, (a) Excluding irrelevant matter, (b) Admitting matters not
vital to the argument.


(_a_) _Excluding irrelevant matter._

The first task is to cut away all surplusage. The proposition as it now
stands, should be closely examined in order to determine just what must
be proved. Neither the affirmative nor the negative should undertake the
burden of proving more than is necessary. In the discussion of the
proposition “Resolved, that Prohibition is preferable to High License,”
it is not necessary for the affirmative to prove that temperance is a
virtue. The task before these debaters is to show only that prohibition
is preferable to high license as a method of dealing with the liquor
traffic. It is not necessary for the negative to attempt to prove that
temperance is not a virtue; their task is to show only that high license
is preferable to prohibition. It is true that temperance as an abstract
virtue is very closely related to the subject-matter of the proposition,
but it is not one of the real points at issue. When the question has
been narrowed down to the method of dealing with the liquor traffic,
each side may prove this point in the way which appears most effective.
Each may assert that its method of control is preferable because theory
and practice show it to be better for (a) social, (b) political, and (c)
economic reasons. Any other division of the subject which seems
effective may be adopted.

It is evident from the above illustration that certain matters which are
relevant to the general subject should be eliminated in order that the
audience may understand just what must be proved. Everything that is not
relevant to the proposition as stated should be excluded.


(_b_) _Admitting matters not vital to the argument._

Since the debater should not attempt to prove more than is necessary he
should admit, in the beginning, such matters as may be admitted without
detriment. Great care should be exercised at this point; nothing should
be admitted the full bearing and significance of which the debater does
not understand. Only matters which may be admitted with safety should be
included. Otherwise an opponent may seize upon the admitted matter and
turn it to his own advantage. Furthermore, the language used in making
an admission should be carefully guarded lest an opponent ingeniously
attach to it a meaning which was not intended.

With these cautions in mind it is well to continue the process of
narrowing the question by admitting matters not vital to the argument.
These admissions should be made in the beginning in order that they may
appear in their true light as free admissions. For example, in the last
question discussed both sides may safely admit that neither plan will
wholly eliminate intemperance. The object is to adopt the plan which
will minimize the effect of this evil. In the question, “Resolved, that
physical valuation of the property of a corporation is the best basis
for fixing taxation values,” the affirmative may safely admit that no
basis for fixing taxation values will work absolute justice to all
tax-payers. This places the affirmative speakers in position to make
plain to their hearers that the method advocated will come nearer to the
goal of absolute justice than any other plan. In advocating any reform
it is usually best to admit that it is not a cure-all for existent
evils, but that it will remedy such evils to a greater extent than any
other measure.

In conclusion, it is well to remember that these admissions and
exclusions should be made plain rather than elaborate. They should be
stated in the introduction of the argument with such brevity and
clearness that the audience will realize that it is being led directly
to the vital issues.


_5. Contrasting the affirmative arguments with those of the negative._

Thus far we have been concerned with finding out the vital point at
issue. It is here that the term question is most aptly applied to the
proposition for debate, because when this vital point is revealed it is
always found to appear in the form of a question. To be more specific,
we found that in analyzing the proposition, “Resolved, that the Federal
Government should control all life insurance companies operating within
the United States,” the vital point at issue as revealed by a study of
the origin of the question was “Will the control of insurance companies
by the Federal Government be more efficient than that exercised by the
State Governments?” This treatment reveals the main point at issue in
the form of a question. It shows that the issue is between State control
on one side as compared with Federal control on the other. The
affirmative must advocate Federal control and the negative must defend
State control. The burden of proof is on the affirmative, for it must
show that a change should be made in existing conditions. The risk of
non-persuasion is upon the affirmative, because, if the position
advocated cannot be maintained, existing conditions will continue.

It is well to remember that the burden of proof remains with the
affirmative throughout the debate. It is frequently said that the burden
of proof “shifts,” that is, that when the affirmative has produced
enough evidence to make out a _prima facie_ case, and has shown reason
why the plan ought to be adopted, then the burden of proof shifts to the
negative and it becomes the duty of the negative to show why the plan
should not be adopted. This is not the correct view of the situation,
for the affirmative is bound to prove the proposition in the face of all
opposition. Therefore the burden of proof never “shifts;” it is the duty
of producing evidence which “shifts.” When the affirmative shows reason
why the proposition should be maintained, it puts upon the negative the
duty of producing evidence to show that the affirmative reasoning is
unsound or that there are more weighty arguments in favor of the
negative. Thus it is that the duty of producing evidence shifts from one
side to the other, but the burden of proof remains on the same party
throughout the discussion.

The question upon which the debate hinges must be answered in one way by
one side and in just the opposite way by the opponents of that side. In
the question above referred to, “Will the control of insurance companies
by the Federal Government be more efficient than that exercised by the
State Governments?”, the affirmative must answer “Yes” and the negative
must answer “No.”

At this point the next task of the analyst begins. He must determine the
main reasons why the affirmative should answer “Yes” and the negative
should answer “No.” These main reasons when discovered and contrasted,
those on the affirmative with those on the negative, will reveal the
main issues of the proposition. When these are found the process of
analysis is completed.

In undertaking the task of contrasting the affirmative contentions with
those of the negative, the student must assume an absolutely unbiased
attitude toward the proposition. The importance of this impartial
viewpoint cannot be too strongly emphasized. To be able to view any
subject with a mind free from prejudice is a most valuable asset.

With this proper mental attitude toward the proposition the analyst must
take up both sides of the question and find the main arguments in
support of each. He should not be deluded into thinking that it is only
necessary to study one side of the question. A lawyer in preparing his
case always takes into consideration the position of his opponent. In
fact, so important is this task that many lawyers develop their
antagonist’s case before beginning work on their own, and it frequently
happens that more time is devoted to the arguments of the opposition
than to the case upon which the lawyer is engaged. This careful study of
an opponent’s arguments must always be included in the work of the
debater, not only in the analysis of the question but throughout the
entire argumentative process.

The way in which this part of the analytical process should be carried
out is best made plain by a concrete example. We will take the
proposition “Resolved, that immigration into the United States should be
further restricted by law.” The origin of the question is found in the
alarm shown by some people over the large number of undesirable
foreigners coming to our shores. The question is “Should any of the
immigrants now coming to our shores be prohibited from coming?” The
affirmative say “Yes,” and the negative, “No.” Now to take the impartial
viewpoint, why should there be any further restriction of immigration;
why should the affirmative say “Yes” and the negative “No”? One of the
chief affirmative arguments is that some of these immigrants are having
a bad effect upon our country. Some of them are anarchists; some are
members of criminal societies such as the Black Hand; some group by
themselves in certain portions of large cities and form what are known
as “Little Germanys”, “Little Spains”, “Little Italys”, etc.; some have
contagious diseases; some have a very low standard of living and thus
tend to drag down the standard of living of the American workman; some
are illiterate and do not make good citizens; some are easily made the
dupes of city bosses and ward “heelers” and thus exert a harmful
influence in our political affairs. These and various other reasons may
be brought to support the affirmative argument that immigration is
having a bad effect upon our country.

In considering the matter carefully we come to the conclusion that these
are the chief reasons why immigration should be further restricted. Now,
the unskilled debater would probably be content with framing these
reasons into an argument and would proceed with a feeling that his
position was impregnable. The skilled debater, however, does not feel
content until he has viewed the whole subject impartially. Why do we not
have more stringent immigration laws? It must be that the present laws
are thought to be satisfactory. Why are they satisfactory? It must be
because they now exclude the worst class of immigrants. Upon
investigation we find this to be true. Let us look at the problem from a
slightly different point of view. Why do we allow all of these
immigrants to come in? They must be necessary to our welfare. They are
necessary to develop the natural resources of our country; they add to
the national power of production, they possess a money value as
laborers; they ultimately become American citizens, and their children,
educated in our public schools, become the most ardent of young
Americans.

The above reflections from the standpoint of the negative lead us to ask
a few questions which must be answered before we can answer the main
question upon which the proposition hinges, namely: “Should any of the
immigrants now coming into the United States be prohibited from coming?”
These questions are, so far as we have been able to determine: “Are the
present immigration laws satisfactory?”, “Do we need all the immigrants
now coming to us?”, “Do the immigrants now coming to us have a bad
effect upon our country?” These questions if answered “Yes” will
establish the affirmative, and likewise if answered “No” will establish
the negative. We may therefore conclude that these three questions
contain the main issues of the proposition. The issues may be stated in
different forms, but, if resolved to their essential elements, they will
ultimately be found in these three questions.

The next step in contrasting the arguments is to write them down in such
form that corresponding arguments can be set over against each other.
For convenience we adopt the following form:

      Proposition:—Immigration should be further restricted by law.

       _Affirmative argument_                _Negative argument_

 Immigration should be further       Immigration should not be further
 restricted, because                 restricted, because

   I. It is a detriment to the         I. It is a benefit to the
      country, for                        country, for
      1. We now admit extreme             1. The worst elements are now
           socialists and                      excluded.
           anarchists.
      2. They form undesirable            2. They are soon assimilated.
           groups of foreigners in
           the congested parts of
           cities.
      3. They lower the standard of       3. They furnish examples of
           living of the American              thrift to American
           workman.                            workmen.
      4. Many of the immigrants now       4. They ultimately become good
           admitted do not make good           citizens.
           citizens.

  II. The present laws are not        II. The present laws are
      satisfactory, for                   satisfactory, for
      1. Black Hand societies show        1. No law would exclude all
           that undesirable persons            undesirable immigrants.
           are admitted.
      2. Diseased persons are             2. All persons having
           admitted.                           contagious diseases are
                                               excluded.
      3. Steamship lines help to          3. Custom house officials are
           evade the immigrant laws.           diligent in enforcing the
                                               laws.
      4. Paupers are admitted.            4. Paupers are not admitted.

 III. We do not need all the         III. We need all the immigrants now
      immigrants now coming to us,        coming to us, for
      for
      1. The great necessity for          1. We need them to develop our
           laborers to develop our             natural resources.
           natural resources has
           passed.

By contrasting the arguments thus tabulated we derive the following main
issues.

  I. Is immigration under existing conditions a detriment or a benefit
     to the country?

  (The answer depends upon the answers to these subordinate questions.)

      1. Is the undesirable element excluded?

      2. Have the immigrants assimilated readily?

      3. Do they exert a detrimental influence upon the standard of
         living of the American workman?

      4. Do they make good citizens?

  II. Are the present laws satisfactory?

      1. Are they the most effective in excluding undesirable immigrants
         that it is possible to enact?

      2. Do they exclude diseased persons?

      3. Do the present laws exclude paupers?

      4. Are the present laws enforced?

  III. Do we need all the immigrants now coming to us?

      1. Do we still need all the immigrants we can get to develop our
         natural resources?

This arrangement of the affirmative and negative arguments places the
whole matter, so far as it has been worked out, before the student in
tangible form. It also affords a basis for the formal statement of the
main issues. The plan of analysis thus set forth should now be examined
with a critical eye. Here arise some of the most difficult problems of
argumentation. In the first place, is the analysis presented an
exhaustive one? Does it include the entire field of argument? It
includes the proposed immigration laws and their probable effects. It
includes the present laws and their effects. From these two facts it is
evident that the analysis covers the entire field of the proposed change
in the immigration laws.

Before passing final judgment upon the thoroughness of the analysis,
there are at least two other plans which may be applied to the question
to see whether either of them will afford a better method of treatment
than the foregoing. The first of these plans includes the division of
the question into three parts; viz. (1) political, (2) social, and (3)
economic. An examination of the question just discussed will show that
all the material suggested in the formal analysis could be grouped under
one or the other of these heads. For example, the anarchists, Black Hand
societies, etc. would come under “political;” the question of
assimilation would come under “social;” while the effect upon the
American workman and the question of the development of our natural
resources would come under “economic.”

This division may be applied to many questions, but it is well suited to
only a limited number. In fact, some eminent authorities are of the
opinion that it is almost never to be recommended. It is not as well
adapted to the immigration question as the division already made, for
the reason that it would be necessary to include some of the
subject-matter under two separate heads. For example, the Little Spains,
Little Italys, etc., mentioned above, might require treatment under the
social and political divisions and even under the heading of economics.
This is objectionable, because it requires a duplication of the
statement of facts under each head, and also because it is not conducive
to the clean, clear-cut thinking which is the result of a sharp division
of the subject into parts which do not overlap.

The second plan of analysis, which forms a good working basis for many
propositions, is that of dividing the subject into three parts, namely,
(1) Necessity, (2) Practicability, and (3) Justice. This division of the
subject is often applicable to propositions which advocate the adoption
of some new plan of action, as, “Resolved, that the Federal Government
should levy a progressive inheritance tax,” or “Resolved, that cities of
the United States, having a population of over 5,000, should adopt the
commission form of government.”

These and similar questions may be analyzed by one of the two plans
stated above, but it is well to beware adopting one or the other of
these methods merely because it affords an easy way out of the task of
analyzing the proposition. That analysis of a question should be adopted
which reveals the main issues of the proposition in the clearest and
most direct manner.

                   SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL STEPS IN ANALYSIS

  1. A broad view of the subject.

  2. The origin and history of the question.

  3. Definition of terms.

  4. Narrowing the question.

      (1) Excluding irrelevant matter.

      (2) Admitting matters not vital to the argument.

  5. Contrasting the affirmative arguments with those of the negative.


III. The main issues.

The process of analysis with which we are dealing has revealed the main
issues of the proposition. It now becomes the duty of the debater to
arrange the issues in logical and climactic order. The most forcible
array of argument should come at the end. For example, in the question
just analyzed the logical as well as the climactic order of arrangement
for the main issues on the affirmative would be as follows:

  I. The present laws are not satisfactory.

  II. We do not need all the immigrants now coming to us.

  III. Immigration (under the present system) is a detriment to the
     country.

This analysis should be the result of a thorough study of both sides of
the whole proposition. If the task has been well done no change in the
essential elements of the analysis will become necessary. However, as
the investigation of the subject progresses, and the work of collecting
evidence leads the student into a more intimate acquaintance with the
proposition, it may be found advisable to make some alterations in the
analysis first written out. Such alterations should be made only after
careful deliberation, for it often happens that, in investigating a
subject at close range, one loses the broad general view which is
necessary to an intelligent analysis. It may even become necessary for a
beginner to change his entire plan after he has made a more thorough
investigation of the subject. In such an event the work originally spent
in analysis should not be regarded as lost, because it is absolutely
necessary that the student have some definite plan as a basis for his
investigation. If it does no more than show him that he is wrong, the
time spent on it cannot be said to be wasted. In any event, the student
should keep his mind open for the reception of ideas which will make his
analysis clearer, briefer, and more forcible.

                            EXERCISES IN ANALYSIS

  1. Write out a complete analysis of one of the local questions phrased
     for Exercise 1, Chapter II.

  2. Show the importance of the origin and history of the question in
     the analysis of each of the following propositions:

      (1) Three-fourths of a jury should be competent to render a
         verdict in all criminal cases.

      (2) Public libraries should be open on Sundays.

      (3) The growth of large fortunes should be checked by a graduated
         income tax.

      (4) United States senators should be elected by direct vote of the
         people.

      (5) National party lines should be discarded in municipal
         elections.

      (6) The membership of the national House of Representatives should
         be considerably reduced.

  3. Define the terms which need defining in the above propositions.
     From what source or sources should these definitions be taken?

  4. Write out a complete analysis of one of the questions given under
     Exercise 2.




                               CHAPTER IV
                                EVIDENCE


The analysis of the question has revealed the main issues. The next step
in the argumentative process is to prove the truth of these main issues
by producing evidence. Evidence consists of the material by which the
truth or falsity of a proposition is proved. It is an error to use the
terms “proof” and “evidence” as synonymous. Proof is the result or
effect of evidence; evidence is the material of proof. A thing is not
proved until sufficient evidence has been produced to establish it. The
most accurate logicians make this distinction and it is well to observe
it in the study of argumentation. A given fact is not proof of the truth
of a statement unless it alone is sufficient to establish such truth;
otherwise it is merely evidence tending to show that the statement is
true. This distinction should be kept clearly in mind, and no fact
should be offered as complete proof when it is only evidence tending to
support a given proposition.

The student is now confronted with the necessity of establishing his
proposition by presenting evidence in support of the main issues. The
first problem which naturally comes to him is: “Where shall I go to find
this evidence?” In answering this question the student should consult
carefully, one by one, each of the following:


I. Sources of evidence:


_1. Personal knowledge._

Before turning to outside sources the student should carefully examine
the contents of his own mind to determine just how much he really knows
about the subject. He should, however, distinguish between exact
knowledge and mere conjecture. His exact knowledge, gained from whatever
source, is perfectly valid from the standpoint of evidence providing it
can be proved. The line between exact knowledge and mere conjecture is
determined by the ability of the student to lay his hands upon
sufficient evidence to prove the thing that he believes to be true.


_2. Personal interviews._

If the question is a local one personal interviews are both practicable
and valuable. Interviews with persons who are connected in some way with
the subject of dispute, or who are in a position to have exact knowledge
of the subject-matter, or who are taking an active part in the local
discussion of the subject, are a most important source of evidence.
Interviews with such persons not only give the student facts, reasons,
and opinions, but they usually reveal other sources to which he can go
directly. For example, in a local debate on the question of whether the
city, or the street railway company should bear the expenses of building
a bridge which they used in common, the debaters obtained personal
interviews with all the city officials having anything to do with the
bridge, and with the officials of the street railway company. Prominent
citizens and business men of the city were also interviewed. These
interviews were productive of a large amount of material in the form of
facts, reasons, illustrations, opinions, and references to other sources
of material. In the discussion of any local question the debater will
usually find the parties concerned willing, and even eager to give him
“ammunition” for the debate.

In collecting evidence on questions which deal with the problems of
commerce, taxation, economics, politics, and education, the student will
usually find some men whose opinions are entitled to careful
consideration and with whom interviews may be arranged. Whether these
men are quoted as authority will, of course, depend upon their known
reputation in the branch of knowledge upon which their opinion is asked.
Even if the debater does not think it best to quote the person
interviewed, he may gain from him much valuable help. Arguments reasoned
out from the facts of a case depend for their worth upon the validity of
the reasoning process and not upon their source. Therefore the arguments
of any well-informed, intelligent person, if based upon facts and
logically sound, can be utilized. Moreover, such persons are often able
to give information regarding sources of evidence which may have escaped
notice. The college student would do well to consult the members of the
faculty whose work would make them familiar with the subject-matter of
the argument. The student should by no means pass lightly over this
source of material. In fact, such sources should be exhausted before a
more extended search for evidence is entered upon. Furthermore, a
discussion of the subject with these well-informed people will beget new
ideas and give a breadth of view regarding the subject which will be
helpful in subsequent investigation.


_3. Personal letters._

After the student has gained some knowledge regarding the most eminent
authorities on the subject under discussion, he may feel at liberty to
address some of them with a personal letter. This letter should be brief
and to the point, stating just what is wanted. If questions are asked
they should be brief and plain. The use to which the reply is to be put
should be stated.

If the question is one with which national, state, or municipal
officials are concerned personal letters may be written to them. If this
is carefully done in accordance with the foregoing suggestions, a prompt
reply is almost always assured. An opinion expressed in a personal
letter from a national or state official, or any information given by
him, is usually looked upon with considerable respect.

Still another class of men to whom personal letters may be written with
profit consists of the well known officials of large sectional and
national associations such as the American Bar Association, the American
Federation of Labor, and the National Manufacturers Association. The
officials of these and other similar associations are usually well
pleased to be consulted upon the questions in which their opinions are
regarded with respect. Although the debater should not carry on a
correspondence campaign for material, yet he should not hesitate to
write for facts and opinions which are of vital importance.


_4. Current literature._

Current literature offers the most prolific field of information on
subjects of general interest. This source of material is always
available to the debater. His first efforts should be directed to
finding out what this field contains that bears directly on the subject.
With this object in view he should consult _The Reader’s Guide_,
_Poole’s Index_ and the _Annual Library Index_. Here he will find all
the important magazine articles that have been written on any subject.
The title of the article, the name of the writer, the magazine in which
it is found, together with the date, volume, and page, are given
exactly. This opens a great storehouse of information. In consulting
these guides to periodic literature the investigator should exercise his
ingenuity as well as his imagination in determining under what topics he
will find his material listed. In investigating the proposition
“Resolved, that Congress should immediately provide for an increase in
the navy,” the student must not be content with merely looking up the
articles found listed in the guide under the topic “Navy.” He should
also look under “Battleships”, “Warships”, “Dreadnoughts”,
“International Peace”, “Foreign Affairs”, etc. At the end of these lists
cross-references to related subjects will be found and these should also
be consulted.

The student should go over the list of articles carefully and make out a
bibliography[2] of magazine references. Titles of all articles which
appear to have a bearing on the subject should be taken down in full.
This process of going over the lists in search of pertinent articles
should be repeated from time to time throughout the investigation,
because as the student’s knowledge of the subject broadens he will get
more clearly in mind the exact nature of the information which he
requires. The bibliography will save much time in getting at the most
valuable material in current literature.

Footnote 2:

  A bibliography (as the term is here used) is a list of books and
  periodicals on any one subject with exact references to volumes, page,
  etc.

The student can now select from the great number of articles before him
those which appear to be most valuable. The most valuable articles are
those which (a) bear directly upon some main issue of the question and
(b) are written by recognized authorities on the subject. If the writer
of any particular article is unknown to the student he should consult
“_Who’s Who in America_.” Here are arranged in alphabetical order the
names of all the men in America who have attained distinction in any
line of endeavor. In connection with each name there is given a brief
biography which sets forth the positions that individual has held,
honors which have been bestowed upon him, important work in which he has
been engaged, and any other facts which might tend to give weight to his
utterances. Foreign authorities should be investigated by consulting the
encyclopedias, the Who’s Who volume (if available) of the particular
country to which the writer belongs, or by referring to other prominent
writers. Throughout the entire investigation “_Who’s Who in America_”
should be consulted as an authority on the standing of men to whose work
the debater wishes to refer. This method of using “_Who’s Who_” and the
bibliography brings the student directly to the best sources of material
which can be found in current literature.

As indicated above, the real criterion of the value of an article in a
magazine is the standing of the man who wrote it. However, certain
periodicals have come to be looked upon with such respect by students
and scholars that all articles appearing in them are given considerable
weight. This reputation which is sustained by certain publications
results from the care with which the editors have selected the material
put into the magazine. They have been careful to allow only capable
writers to contribute to their periodicals in the past, and, we may
assume (although this is sometimes a violent assumption) that this
careful supervision will continue in the future. Moreover, the
editorials of these magazines are looked upon as good authority. For the
convenience of the student the following list of magazines is suggested
as reliable sources of evidence.

  (1) _The North American Review._

  (2) _The Literary Digest._

  (3) _The Independent._

  (4) _World’s Work._

  (5) _Review of Reviews._

  (6) _The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
     Science._

  (7) _Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public
     Law._

The last two publications are somewhat different from the others
mentioned in the list, but they are included because they are important
and are usually available in libraries having the other publications
enumerated. This list is not intended as a complete and exhaustive list
but merely as a suggestion to the student in search of material. It is
not intended to depreciate the value of any publication not included in
the list. However, the student should beware of relying upon material
found in any magazine merely because the publication poses as a magazine
instead of as a newspaper or story book. Some of the popular magazines
which appear to be manufactured for the sole purpose of being sold, make
an attempt at sensationalism rather than truth. Such periodicals should
never be relied upon as authority.

Another source of evidence found in current literature is the technical
and professional magazine. Almost every trade and profession has one or
more reliable magazines. In the fields of medicine, law, banking,
contracting, engineering, etc., are many periodicals. Each offers
articles by reliable writers on almost all phases of the particular
branch of learning to which the magazine is devoted. Prominent among the
technical magazines that may be quoted as authority is the Engineering
News. This periodical offers much valuable material on all the important
engineering problems of the day.

Magazine articles, outside of the technical and professional magazine,
are usually written for the layman; hence the subjects are usually
presented in a manner easy to understand. This is especially important
to the student at the beginning of his investigation when his knowledge
of the subject is limited. Simplicity of treatment and accuracy of
statement combined with an almost boundless range of subject-matter make
current literature a most valuable source of evidence.


_5. Standard literature._

Under this head are included all the reliable encyclopedias, reference
works, text-books, and books on special subjects written by experts and
authorities. For brief, accurate, and authoritative articles of a
general character, the encyclopedias are most valuable. The best works
of this class are _Britannica_, _Chambers’_, _Nelson’s_, _Johnson’s_,
_Appleton’s_, _Appleton’s Annual Cyclopedia_, and _Bliss’ Encyclopedia
of Social Reform_. Text-books and special works by authorities on all
subjects are very numerous. For this source of material it is best to
consult the catalogue of a library. Here will be found under the
author’s name all of his works that are in the library. After the
student has found out by personal interviews, reading current
literature, etc., who are the most reliable writers on the subject in
hand, he should always consult this index of authors to determine
whether any of their books are available. The catalogue of the library
usually classifies the books also according to subject-matter. Therefore
by consulting this catalogue all the books on this particular subject
contained in the library may be made accessible. Here again, as in the
case of the index to periodic literature, the investigator must use his
ingenuity in determining under what heads he may find his most valuable
material.


_6. Special documents._


(1) _Reports and pamphlets issued by organizations._

In order to gain access to this sort of material it is usually necessary
to write to the headquarters of the organizations. In most cases their
reports and other printed matter may be had for the asking, although in
some cases a charge is made. The student, however, can usually obtain
sufficient material of this character without any cost to himself other
than the small outlay necessary for postage. In the larger schools and
colleges it is now becoming customary for the debating teams to have
letter heads printed. These state the name of the institution or of the
debating league to which the institution belongs, the names of the
members of the team, and the question for debate. While this procedure
is unnecessary for class debates or written arguments, or even for
society or college debates, it is at least desirable in the preparation
for an intercollegiate debate such as is held between members of large
debating leagues. By this use of letter heads in writing to the
officials of organizations, as well as to private individuals, a full
and more careful response is almost always secured. However, in most
cases a request for reports or other material, with a statement of the
use to which they are to be put, is all that is necessary to bring a
prompt reply. Almost all the important trades and professions have
national organizations which are ready to aid in the distribution of
knowledge in their several spheres. Among organizations of a
professional character may be mentioned the American Bar Association,
the American Chemical Society, and the National Education Association.
Among industrial organizations, the American Federation of Labor, and
the National Manufacturers Association are probably the most important.

Organizations having for their object the bringing about of certain
reforms in our social or political life are always willing to send
material for use in the discussion of questions in which they are
interested. Among these may be mentioned the International Reform
Bureau, the Anti-Saloon League, the Lake Mohonk Conference on
International Arbitration, the American Peace Society, and the New York
Reform Club. It is well worth while for the student who is investigating
any of the questions in which these associations are interested to write
them for material.

In special branches of learning there are various organizations which
publish both reports of their meetings and special reports on subjects
connected with their work. The American Historical Association, and the
American Economic Association belong to this class. Other organizations
of this character will be brought to the attention of the student before
he has advanced far in the study of any proposition.


(2) _Reports and documents issued by the government._

Government documents and reports, especially those issued by the Federal
government, are among the most valuable sources of evidence. The authors
or compilers of these reports are men whose official positions enable
them to obtain accurate information. Furthermore, these men have usually
passed a civil service, or other examination, and thus demonstrated
their ability to perform the tasks assigned; or on account of favorable
reputation have been elected or appointed to fill the positions for
which they are well qualified. Their action is taken purely as
governmental agents and, from the nature of their office and the
requirements of public opinion, that action and all information gathered
conform approximately to the facts. For these reasons governmental
reports and documents are looked upon as the highest authority on the
subjects with which they deal, and anyone who argues can offer no better
evidence than a basis of fact backed up by definite references to
official government documents.

One of the most useful documents of this class is the _United States
Census Report_. This report contains not only the _population
statistics_ but also other funds of information even more valuable to
the student. In it there are vital statistics, statistics on labor,
manufacturing, commerce, and a multitude of other subjects which the
student dealing with any economic or commercial proposition cannot
overlook. If accurate information is required regarding any phase of our
national growth or present activity the census report should be
consulted before any other source of evidence.

Another most important source of evidence is the _Report of the United
States Industrial Commission_. This report comprises nineteen volumes,
the last of which (Vol. 19) contains valuable material, together with
the recommendations of the commission, in regard to almost all the
leading industrial and economic questions which are now being discussed.
The report as a whole covers the entire industrial field in this country
and offers a reliable and exhaustive fund of information.

In the _Congressional Record_ can be found discussions, both affirmative
and negative, of all the public questions which have come before either
branch of Congress. This source of material is very suggestive but it is
not always trustworthy. It should not be quoted in itself as an
authority. The mere fact that one may refer to a certain volume and page
of the _Congressional Record_ on which a certain statement appears is no
proof of the truth of that statement. The material which it contains is
mainly the reports of speeches. The record is official and authoritative
so far as concerns what was said in those speeches. However, the value
of the thing said depends upon the man who said it. Therefore, the
debater should quote Representative Douglas, or Senator Burton as saying
so-and-so which is found in such a volume and on such a page of the
_Congressional Record_. With this caution in mind, viz., that it is the
man who is quoted and not the mere fact of its appearance in the
_Congressional Record_ that gives weight to a statement, the student
should utilize this source of evidence. The index of these records is
decidedly awkward for a beginner, but the material contained therein is
so important that some little time may well be spent in making the
acquaintance of the indexing system. The _Congressional Record_ is
indexed under three heads, (1) names, (2) subjects, and (3) bills by
their official numbers. A great mass of material will be found under
subjects, but after the student has accustomed himself to using the
index he can readily find the material which he desires to read. The
_Congressional Documents_ which contain reports from the executive
departments and the legislative committees are divided for each session
of Congress into six groups: (1) _Senate Executive Documents_, (2)
_Senate Miscellaneous_, (3) _Senate Reports_ (of committees), (4) _House
Executive Documents_, (5) _House Miscellaneous_, (6) _House Reports_ (of
committees). A _Document Index_ for each session of Congress will be
found in connection with these volumes.

Any school or library, or in fact any individual, may obtain valuable
lists of government publications by writing to the Library of Congress
or to the Superintendent of Documents. From time to time the Library of
Congress publishes special books and articles on such subjects as
Taxation of Inheritance, Tariffs of Foreign Nations, Capital and Labor,
and many other questions of national importance.

In addition to the publications of the national government, reports
issued by the various states and municipalities should be investigated.
For example, in discussing a question of taxation the amount of tax
derived by each state from a certain source may become important. If
this information cannot be found already compiled, it may be obtained by
writing to the secretary, treasurer, or auditor of each state and asking
for the report in which such information is published. If it be a source
of taxation used only in a part of the states, the student should
compile a list of the states in which it is used and write to the
officials in those states only.

In the discussion of municipal problems, such as municipal ownership of
public utilities, the commission form of city government, etc., it is
well to write to the cities in which these plans have been tried and get
such reports as will show the results.

A careful investigation of all the sources here set forth will yield
information sufficiently broad and varied for the argumentative
discussion of any subject. However, the student may well consult other
text-books on Argumentation and Debate for the purpose of getting
suggestions regarding the sources of material which will be useful to
him. Books of briefs for debates and reports of debates are published,
which give helpful suggestions regarding material or evidence on many of
the most important questions. As advancement is made in the practical
work of investigating subjects for argumentative treatment, facility in
utilizing the sources of evidence will be acquired. At first the time
spent in the investigation of some sources, especially standard
literature and government documents, may not appear to yield the
practical results which time well expended ought to yield. Here a word
of caution is necessary, for time spent in this manner should never be
regarded as wasted. It is not wasted, because the student is acquiring
the power to investigate subjects on his own responsibility, and the
ability to skim rapidly over large masses of material and select only
the things that are really useful. It is only after long periods of such
diligent work that the student can feel himself master of the resources
of great libraries, and an expert in the use of the sources of evidence.

                     SUMMARY OF THE SOURCES OF EVIDENCE

  1. Personal knowledge.

  2. Personal interviews.

  3. Personal letters.

  4. Current literature.

  5. Standard literature.

  6. Special documents.

      (1) Reports and pamphlets issued by organizations.

      (2) Reports and documents issued by the government.


II. Recording evidence.

After an acquaintance with the sources of evidence is gained the
necessity for some orderly method or system of taking notes becomes
apparent. This is the next important step in argumentation. The
investigator should not rely upon his memory. Notes should be taken on
every source of evidence discussed in the preceding section. An idea
rarely becomes our own until it has been expressed in our own words. As
ideas on the subject for discussion occur to the debater’s mind they
should be recorded in order that they may be at hand when required.
Opinions expressed and information acquired in personal interviews
should be recorded either during the interview or immediately after. It
is preferable to devote one’s attention exclusively to an interview, and
then record the results as soon as possible after its termination. Even
the ideas expressed in personal letters and extracts from them should be
written down by the student in order that he may have them in convenient
form for reference. The futility of reading without taking notes is
apparent at first thought. Notes should be taken at the time the reading
is done. All important matters of fact and all quotable matters should
be recorded during the reading. Even if a particular fact does not
appear to bear directly on the phase of the subject under discussion, it
should, nevertheless, be recorded. It may later prove to be valuable
evidence.

The notes taken should be full and complete. This requirement applies to
the substance of the material and not to its form. In most cases the
reader should be able to condense the contents of a page into a few
words. The point or points which the writer regarded as vital should be
grasped by the reader and put down in a brief note. Statistics found in
different places should be assembled and reduced to tabular form. The
student must not only read, but he must think as well. New ideas, new
combinations of circumstances, new relations made evident by grouping
facts should all be carefully investigated and noted. Reading should be
an intelligent process, not mere drudgery. The reader should assimilate,
not merely store up, the knowledge gained from books.

In the recording of evidence the following rules should be strictly
observed:


_1. Use small cards or sheets of paper of uniform size._

A note-book or large sheets of paper should never be used. To do so is
to invite confusion. With several points on one sheet of paper or in a
note-book and recorded in the order in which they were found in the
reading, the student is not left free to group the ideas or points to
form his argument; no classification is possible, and the notes taken
become mere masses of material. The best form in which to record
material is by the use of the ordinary filing cards which may be
obtained at almost any book store. These cards should be about three by
five inches in size and of fairly heavy stock. Ruled cards with a red
line at the top are the kind most frequently used. If these cards cannot
be obtained, small pieces of paper of this same convenient size should
be used.


_2. Place only one fact or point on each card._

Never put more than one fact or point on the same card. Even though the
facts to be recorded are intimately related in their present position,
the reader should use a separate card for each. When the investigator is
ready to use these facts the relation may be unimportant or may be
entirely changed by the manner in which he wishes to use them. One
statement may be used to support one argument, while another may be used
to support an entirely separate argument. Furthermore, when this
material is utilized in constructing the brief, the student must be left
free to arrange his material in the most logical manner. To put more
than one point on a card greatly hampers this work.


_3. Write on only one side of the card._

The handling of these cards becomes a very awkward process if writing is
placed on both sides. Otherwise the process is simplicity itself. To
depart from this rule in a single instance may involve the loss of an
important point of evidence. This point may remain forgotten on the back
of a card used frequently.


_4. Express the idea to be put on the card in the simplest and most
direct terms._

In the reading, an idea should be considered only in its relation to the
reader’s present purpose. When this view is taken the condensation of
lengthy articles into a few terse expressions becomes an easy matter.
Moreover, it trains the reader to grasp the point, and to express that
point in the simplest and most direct manner. This training enables the
reader to cover a much wider field than would otherwise be possible.


_5. Each card should be complete in itself._

By a strict application of Rule 4 the student ought soon to acquire such
facility in condensation that each card will be complete in itself. It
is very awkward to have one idea or point written on several cards. When
such an arrangement cannot be avoided the cards should, of course, be
lettered or numbered to indicate their proper order. These cards should
be placed by themselves in company with other like series and kept
separate from the single cards. Some manner of distinguishing such
series of cards should be devised. The first series which it is
necessary to make in order to record a complete point, or idea, or
argument may be marked A1, A2, A3, etc. The second series may be marked
B1, B2, B3, etc. While this method may be adopted in unusual cases, the
general rule should seldom be departed from. By diligent efforts at
intelligent condensation, almost every point, idea, fact, or argument
may be put upon a single card. The observance of this rule will insure a
good command of the material on the part of the investigator and will
reduce the evidence to convenient form.

The same rule should apply to the use of quotations. Seldom if ever
should a lengthy quotation be used. If some passages are especially
clear and forcible they should be quoted exactly and put in quotation
marks. Omissions should be indicated by the use of dots, thus: ...
Condensations by the student, included in the quotation, or any comments
or explanations, should be enclosed in brackets, [thus].


_6. Material for refutation should be preceded (at the top of the card)
by an exact statement of the argument to be refuted._

In some cases a single word or phrase may be sufficient to indicate the
argument to which the refutation is intended to apply, but in most cases
this argument should be indicated fully by means of a complete
statement. This condensing of the arguments of the opposition into
brief, intelligible statements will also be of great use when the
material is put into either the main argument or the rebuttal.


_7. The main issue or subject to which the evidence relates should be
stated at the top of the card._

The subject stated at the top of the card should represent exactly the
subject-matter on the card. If this subject-matter comes clearly under
one of the main issues which the analysis has revealed this main issue
may be stated at the top of the card as its subject. If, however, the
student is unable to determine exactly under what main issue the fact
recorded on the card will come, he should state a subject at the top of
the card which will indicate precisely the material found upon it. The
classification of the card can then be left to a later part of the
process. In investigating a subject in which the main issues have been
determined to be (1) Necessity, (2) Practicability, and (3) Justice, a
card which states one of the evils which the proposed plan is designed
to remedy should not be marked “Justice;” it should be marked
“Necessity,” because it is this particular evil and like evils which
make the adoption of the proposed measure necessary.

If the card relates to some special topic that the main issue is too
broad to identify, then that special topic and not the broad main issue
should be stated at the top of the card. For example, a card coming
under Necessity may still more appropriately be classed under Political
Influence, because that title more nearly indicates the evidence stated
on the card. Therefore the subject should be Political Influence. Later,
when the cards are being used in the construction of the brief, this
card may be placed with others under the title Political Influence and
then all the cards under this topic placed with those covering other
topics under the head of Necessity.


_8. The source from which the evidence is taken should be definitely
stated at the bottom of the card._

This should be done at the time the cards are written out. Otherwise the
reference when wanted, either cannot be found or can be found only with
great loss of time. The exact reference is important not only to show
definitely the source of authority from which the evidence is taken, but
also to enable the student to return to the same source for further
details in case they become necessary. In the case of a letter or a
personal interview the name of the authority consulted should be given
together with the date of the letter or the time and place of the
interview. A magazine article should be referred to by the name of the
magazine, with the volume and page. The name of the writer should also
be given unless the article is an editorial, in which case that fact
should be stated. A report or document in several volumes should be
quoted by volume and page. Books should be referred to by their author,
title, and page.

The following diagram shows the form in which evidence should be
recorded:

 ┌────────────────────────────┬───────────┬────────────────────────────┐
 │         _Subject_          │           │        _Authority_         │
 ├────────────────────────────┴───────────┴────────────────────────────┤
 │                                                                     │
 │                             _Evidence_                              │
 │                                                                     │
 │_Source of Evidence._                                                │
 │                                                                     │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

For example, a student in preparing for a class debate on the tariff
question handed in a number of cards on the necessity for protection, of
which the following is a sample:

 ┌──────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┐
 │            _Subject_:            │           _Authority_:           │
 │     _Protection not needed._     │        _Richard T. Ely._         │
 ├──────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┤
 │“Our quondam infant industries have for the most part, attained a    │
 │very vigorous maturity, and in some instances have become belligerent│
 │and prone to monopolistic bullying.”                                 │
 │                                                                     │
 │_Source_: Outlines of Economics, p. 312.                             │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

             SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR RECORDING EVIDENCE

  1. Use small cards or sheets of paper of a uniform size.

  2. Place only one fact or point on each card.

  3. Write only on one side of the card.

  4. Express the idea to be put on the card in the simplest and most
     direct terms.

  5. Each card should be complete in itself.

  6. Material for refutation should be preceded at the top of the card
     by an exact statement of the argument to be refuted.

  7. The main issues or subjects to which the evidence relates should be
     stated at the top of the card.

  8. The source from which the evidence is taken should be definitely
     stated at the bottom of the card.


III. Selecting evidence.

All the reliable evidence obtainable should be collected before the
selection of the exact evidence which is to go into the argument is
begun. If the student has confined his collecting to the sources of
evidence suggested in the first section of this chapter, the presumption
will be in favor of its reliability. This presumption may be
strengthened and in some instances turned into certainty by a selection
made in accordance with the rules which it is the object of this section
to present.

It is of the utmost importance that a large amount of evidence from
which to construct the brief and argument be available. It is only in
this way that the strongest evidence obtainable can be brought to the
support of the argument. All the evidence used must be relevant but not
all the evidence that is relevant need be used. The following rules
should be observed in the selection of evidence:


_1. The evidence must come from the most reliable source to which it can
be traced._

All the evidence collected must have back of it some reliable source, as
indicated in the discussion of Sources of Authority. The more
trustworthy this source the more valuable is the evidence and the
greater the weight given to it. Therefore “the evidence must come from
the most reliable source to which it can be traced.” Every fact offered
in evidence comes from some definite source. If this source cannot be
found the fact should be discarded as worthless. To illustrate, in the
investigation of a subject, a fellow-student may know some fact which is
a most important piece of evidence in your favor. He may tell you about
this fact, but you would not think of going into the debate and quoting
one of your fellow-students as authority. Therefore you will at once ask
the student from what source he obtained knowledge of the fact. He may
reply that he has seen it in a newspaper article. But since a newspaper
is usually of little value as an authority, you cannot rely upon its
statement. Therefore you inquire from what source the newspaper obtained
it. By consulting the newspaper it is found that the statement is made
in an editorial which comments upon an article found in the _North
American Review_. You must then consult the number of the _North
American Review_ to which reference is made. This is fairly reliable,
and anyone would feel justified in quoting it as the source of his
evidence, although he would not feel justified in quoting the statement
of a fellow-student or the statement of a newspaper.

If the statement is one which is an opinion of the editor of the _North
American Review_, or if for any other reason it cannot be traced back of
this source, _North American Review_, volume and page, should be quoted
as the source of the evidence. But suppose that the statement can be
traced to its original source. To be more concrete, let us assume that
the statement is to the effect that there is a surplus of over one
million dollars in the United States treasury. For such a statement the
_North American Review_ is not the most reliable source. In this case
the most reliable source is the _Report of the Treasurer of the United
States_, which can be found in almost any library. When this fact is
located the student should make an exact statement of the amount of the
surplus and refer to the _Report of the United States Treasurer_.

Thus the fact to be used is traced through the statement of a
fellow-student, through the editorial in the newspaper, through the
article in the _North American Review_, back to its original and
trustworthy source—the _Report of the Treasurer of the United States_.
In this manner every fact presented must be traced to its most
trustworthy source. In quoting the opinions of individuals the same
principle should be applied. The greater the learning, ability, and
reputation of the person quoted, the greater is the weight attached to
his opinions.

In almost every branch of human endeavor and in every field of knowledge
there are a few men who possess especial ability. By common consensus of
opinion these men are regarded as authorities and their statements of
fact or judgment are accepted as the most trustworthy. For example, the
statements of Ely, Seligman, and Seager in the field of economics, and
the statements of J. P. Morgan, and Andrew Carnegie in the field of
industry and finance, are regarded as good authority. In chemistry the
statements of Dr. Ira Remsen would be considered good, while in regard
to psychology one could do no better than to quote the opinions of Hugo
Münsterberg. Regarding the wireless telegraph, Marconi would be the most
reliable source, while in the field of aërial navigation the opinion of
the Wright brothers could be quoted as the most reliable. Instances of
reputable sources of evidence could be cited sufficient in number to
cover many pages, but the few here suggested will serve to illustrate
the class of authority to which all points of evidence should be traced.


_2. A person quoted as authority must be unprejudiced, in full
possession of the facts, and capable of giving expert testimony on the
point at issue._

In the preceding section reliable sources of evidence have been
indicated in a general way. It is, however, by no means possible in the
treatment of all subjects to cite authorities so universally accepted.
The opinions of persons who are not known to the general public may be
given weight by means of their official position, their special work or
investigation in any line, or by the favorable statements of recognized
authorities regarding them or their work. As previously suggested,
_Who’s Who in America_, is a storehouse of information regarding such
people.

An opinion or even a statement of fact is not likely to be looked upon
with favor unless it comes from an unprejudiced source. It is not so
much the question of actual prejudice existing in the mind of the person
quoted as it is the surrounding circumstances which would naturally tend
to cause prejudice. For example, the statement of John D. Rockefeller,
in regard to the beneficent effect of monopolies on trade and commerce,
might be perfectly sincere, but since John D. Rockefeller has a
financial interest in the maintaining of a monopoly, it would not be
advisable to quote his statements in their favor. Such statements are
not only easily refuted but they lack weight because they do not appear
to come from an unprejudiced source. In like manner the President of the
Brewers’ Association would not be accepted as authority on any matter
connected with the prohibition of the liquor traffic. From the very
circumstance of his position he is presumed to be prejudiced against
such prohibition. The person cited as authority should have no financial
interest in the subject on which he is quoted. He should be in a
position to be unprejudiced.

The person quoted as authority must be in full possession of all the
necessary facts. Very often this knowledge of facts may be presumed from
the position which the authority occupies. The Secretary of the Navy is
presumed to be in full possession of all the general facts concerning
his department. The captain of a battleship would be presumed to know
all the essential facts in regard to his ship. An engineer on the Panama
Canal would be presumed to be in a position to know, and actually to
know, facts connected with the duties of his position. The authority
quoted must be in full possession of the facts which he is quoted to
prove, or upon which his opinion is based.

Regarding the capability of an authority to give expert evidence much
has been said. It is well to remember, however, that the opinion of fact
or judgment must be in the field of the authority’s professional
knowledge. The most eminent chemist in the United States would not be
considered proper authority on an economic question; much less would the
most eminent economist be considered good authority on some problem in
chemistry. The President of the United States might be quoted as the
highest authority on the political situation, while his opinion on some
technical problem of engineering would fall before a counter opinion by
an eminent engineer. In quoting an authority to establish an important
point in evidence it is often advisable to show directly that he is
unprejudiced, in full possession of the facts, and capable of giving
expert testimony.


_3. Evidence should be examined to determine whether there are attendant
circumstances which will add to its weight._

It often happens that evidence which is good in itself is given still
greater weight by some special circumstances. The law recognizes and
gives much weight to “Declarations against Interest,” and such
declarations are as valuable in argumentation as in law. A declaration
against interest is a statement of fact or opinion made by a party
before the subject became a matter of controversy, which statement is
now against the interest of the person making it. To illustrate, let us
suppose that John D. Rockefeller had made a statement opposing the
formation of monopolies. At present he wishes to argue in favor of
monopolies. The statement which he previously made and which was an
expression against monopolies now becomes a “declaration against
interest.” Likewise any statement made in regard to a subject before the
party making it becomes interested therein financially may be used
against him when the matter becomes one of controversy and he wishes to
take a different position.

Of equal value is the opinion frankly expressed, by one whose personal
interests are opposed to the statement made. Such statements are
sometimes made by public spirited men in the interests of right and
justice. An illustration in point is that of the banker who admitted
that the postal savings bank would be a benefit to the people at large,
although he recognized the fact that it would injure the business of the
private banker, a class to which he himself belonged. Such statements
are of the utmost importance when they come from leading members of the
class against which they constitute admissions. Statements made by
persons who express their views in accordance with what appears to them
to be right and without the knowledge that they are talking against
their own interests may likewise be used as admissions. Such were the
statements of a citizen who favored the building of an elevated railroad
in his city. He believed that such a highway would relieve the congested
condition of the streets and thus benefit the public. When the route for
the proposed road was definitely located he found that it would result
in irreparable damage to his private business. Although he at once
changed his view on the subject, his previous admissions were used
against him with such effect that his new arguments had no weight in the
final determination of the matter.

It very often happens that a well known authority frequently used by the
opponents of a proposition has changed his opinions or expressed himself
more definitely in such a way as to favor the speaker’s contentions.
Advantage should always be taken of such a state of affairs. It is a
most strategic move to be able to quote an opponent’s authority against
him. One should be sure, however, that the authority quoted is such as
will be accepted. Otherwise it is better to attack the validity of this
authority.

The above suggestions and illustrations are offered purely by way of
inducing the student to keep a sharp lookout for points in his favor.
There are many ways in which the attendant circumstances may be used to
give greater weight to the evidence offered.


_4. The selection of evidence must be fair and reasonable._

An advocate of any cause, public or private, must have as a basis for
his argument a genuine regard for right and justice. Therefore he is
bound to exercise due care in making sure that the selection of evidence
is fair and reasonable. No one who argues can gain any permanent
advantage from the use of unfair methods. In using quotations from
authority be sure that the words used indicate exactly the position of
that authority. By skillful omissions a reputable authority may be made
to defend almost any position. In the use of statistics the temptation
to juggle is sometimes strong. Statistics, by skillful combinations and
omissions, can be made to prove an absolute lie. In discussing the
income from a kind of state tax which is utilized in all the most
important states in the Union, the student who selected the states of
Nevada, South Dakota, and Rhode Island to show that the income derived
from the tax was a substantial source of revenue, must have succeeded
only in proving to his audience that he had had great difficulty in
finding states in which the tax had proved to be a success. Had he been
able to produce statistics to show that Massachusetts, New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois and other large and populous states were
using his form of taxation with success, his chance of persuading his
hearers would have been incalculably increased.

Not only must evidence be fairly selected but it must be reasonable as
well. No statement which is contrary to the usual experience of the
individuals addressed should be made unless it is based upon
indisputable authority. Facts outside the pale of usual human experience
are always regarded with distrust. Abnormal conditions, such as the
existence of unusual misery or vice among certain classes, oppression,
glaring social, industrial, or political evils, must always be kept
within the bounds of possibility and based upon reliable authority. The
temptation is often strong to cite instances on account of their
sensational character and the probable striking effect upon the audience
or readers. Such material is sometimes very important, but if it even
approaches the border of impossibility it should be fortified by the
strongest evidence.

The value of certain evidence may be greatly increased if it can be
shown to be reasonable. If surrounding circumstances can be introduced
to show that the evidence is either cause or effect and therefore
something naturally to be expected under the conditions stated, it will
be accepted almost without question. All evidence should be carefully
considered from the two standpoints of fairness and reasonableness. To
offer unfair evidence is dishonorable. It is the method of the swindler
and the trickster. It is especially reprehensible in the student of
argumentation, whose first duty is to uphold the truth.


_5. The position and arguments of the opposition should be taken into
consideration._

Argument implies opposition. It may not be active opposition, it may be
only passive. Arguments advanced for the purpose of inducing a change
meet conservatism, prejudice, and the natural feeling of distrust with
which any change is contemplated. These obstacles to success must be met
squarely. It is by this means alone that they can be overcome. In the
analysis of the question the necessity of finding the main contentions
on both sides was made plain. We have now reached a point at which these
contentions become of great importance. The arguments of the opposition
must never be disregarded. Many important advantages besides the economy
of time and material, come from the selection of such evidence as will
uphold the constructive argument and at the same time overthrow the
opposition. The selection and rejection of evidence must be determined
from this standpoint.


_6. That evidence should be selected which will appeal most strongly to
those to whom the argument is to be addressed._

In presenting an argument the writer or speaker must not always rely
upon his own judgment as the criterion of the value of evidence. He must
take the standpoint of those who are to hear or read. This attitude
presupposes that the evidence offered is reliable. If a speaker or
writer knows that evidence presented is unreliable but will nevertheless
be accepted by his auditors or readers, he is perpetrating a fraud if he
offers it. That reliable evidence which is most likely to appeal to
those before whom it is to be placed should be selected. The arguer
should put himself in the position of the persons to be persuaded, and
ask himself the question, “What evidence would most strongly appeal to
me and induce me to believe and act in the manner desired if I were the
person to be persuaded?” The accuracy with which the advocate can
perform this feat often measures his success. It requires the highest
order of constructive imagination. He must view his position with all
the prejudices and preconceived ideas, as well as the personal
interests, of the persons to be persuaded. He must, for the time being,
lose his character as an advocate and assume that of the reader or
hearer.

In quoting opinions of authority this attitude of mind becomes most
important. If the argument is to be addressed to an individual, the
opinion or action should be cited of some person in whom that individual
reposes confidence. If you wish to persuade John Jones to follow a
certain course of action, and you are aware that his most intimate
friend and the one to whom he looks as a model of discretion and good
judgment is Smith, you can do no better than to quote the opinion of
Smith, if Smith has expressed himself as favoring your contentions or if
he has followed the course of action which you desire Jones to follow.

In addressing an organization of workmen it is effective to quote the
opinions of their high officials in whom they repose trust and
confidence. Likewise in addressing the members of any trade, profession,
business, religious faith, or political party, the opinions of persons
high in their particular field of endeavor may always be quoted. Sources
of authority with which the audience is likely to be in sympathy should
be especially emphasized.

In selecting evidence with which to prove the truth or falsity of a
proposition too much care cannot be exercised. The foregoing rules
should be adhered to strictly. They should assert themselves
automatically. It is not enough for the student to have these rules of
argumentation so well in mind that he can recite them in class and give
them when asked for in an examination; he should have them so well in
mind that they become a part of the argumentative process. If these
rules can be remembered only with difficulty they will not be used,
because it would involve too much trouble to stop and apply each rule to
every fact and opinion offered in evidence. After the rules are
thoroughly mastered, a half-hour’s practice in their application will
serve to fix the habit of judicious selection of evidence so well in
mind that the process will become automatic.

These suggestions in regard to the rules for selecting evidence apply
with equal aptness to all other rules in this book. The person who
wishes to become a master of argumentation must be able to command the
rules of the art.

                   SUMMARY OF RULES FOR SELECTING EVIDENCE

  1. The evidence must come from the most reliable source to which it
     can be traced.

  2. A person quoted as authority must be unprejudiced, in full
     possession of the facts, and capable of giving expert testimony on
     the point at issue.

  3. The evidence should be examined to determine whether there are any
     attendant circumstances which will add to its weight.

  4. The selection of evidence must be fair and reasonable.

  5. The position and arguments of the opposition should be taken into
     consideration.

  6. That evidence which will appeal most strongly to those to whom the
     argument is to be addressed should be selected.


IV. The amount of evidence required.

The investigator must not stop collecting evidence until he has amassed
a sufficient amount to prove his proposition. Naturally the question is
at once asked, “What is the amount of evidence required to prove a
proposition?” To answer this question in a satisfactory manner some
careful thought is required. Since we are regarding argumentation as a
practical art, and since when we consider it in this way we must
conclude that its end is action, we are forced to admit that the amount
of evidence is not sufficient unless it actually produces the result
aimed at,—namely, the action of the person or persons addressed in a
manner which conforms to the wishes of the arguer. It is therefore plain
that the amount of evidence required varies with individual cases. The
arguer must consider the importance of the question to those to whom the
argument is addressed, as well as their prejudices and personal
interests. He must consider these things in their relation to the
present situation and then determine the amount of evidence in
accordance with what his judgment tells him is required. If the argument
is to be passed upon by judges whose duty it is to reach a conclusion
but who are not personally interested in the result, the following rule
may be applied: _Sufficient evidence must be produced to satisfy an
unprejudiced mind beyond a reasonable doubt_.

In relying upon the above rule we must eliminate prejudice, personal
interest, and results terminating in active or prolonged action.
Therefore if prejudice or personal interest exists in any particular
case, the first duty is to remove this prejudice or nullify the personal
interest. If active or prolonged action is desired evidence sufficient
in amount to induce this action must be produced. With these two
limitations the rule stated above may be accepted as the measure of the
amount of evidence required. There are, of course, some facts which may
be presented without relying upon any special evidence or authority for
their truth. All facts which are matters of common knowledge come within
this class. Geographical facts, such as the fact that Boston, New York,
and Savannah are seaports; historical facts, such as the fact that
Alaska was purchased from Russia; political facts, such as the fact that
the Southern States are largely adherents of the Democratic Party; and
things which must have happened in the ordinary course of nature, such
as the presumed death of a person born two hundred years ago, all may be
stated without evidence to support them.

In determining the amount of evidence to be offered it is sometimes
necessary to consider the different sources from which it is derived.
Care should be taken not to place too great reliance upon one source.
For example, in a debate on the prohibition question one speaker quoted
statistics from a bulletin issued by the Anti-Saloon League, he relied
for proof of his facts upon a committee report of the Anti-Saloon
League, he offered the opinion of the President of the Anti-Saloon
League, and finally quoted from the argument of a lawyer who is employed
by the Anti-Saloon League. Aside from the charge of prejudice which
might be made against this evidence, it is readily seen that too much
reliance is placed in one authority. It might well be termed “an
Anti-Saloon League argument.” No person is willing to accept some other
person’s opinion or evidence in preference to his own, but if a number
of authorities have arrived at substantially the same conclusion, or can
offer evidence which points to the same conclusion, and there has been
no collusion between them, any reasonable person will give such
conclusions his most serious consideration. Furthermore, if the speaker
or writer indicates that his evidence comes from various sources, it
inspires confidence in his words, since the variety of the evidence
offered indicates that the investigation has been broad and thorough.

The process of collecting evidence set forth in this chapter may be used
in other fields besides that of argumentation. Every individual has
frequent occasion to collect evidence regarding certain subjects
connected with his business or occupation. Whatever the occasion for
investigation the method of collecting evidence herein presented can be
used to great advantage.

The student of argumentation is cautioned to follow explicitly the
directions contained in this chapter. All the available sources of
evidence should be consulted. The rules regarding the recording of
evidence should be adhered to strictly. The recorded evidence should be
carefully studied, with the view of determining its relative importance,
according to the rules laid down for the selection of evidence. The
student should feel satisfied in his own mind that he has secured an
amount of evidence sufficient to establish each main issue. Then after
these tasks are completed he can turn his attention to the next great
step in argumentation,—the Construction of the Brief.

                      EXERCISES IN COLLECTING EVIDENCE

  1. Make out a list of topics under which you would look for material
     on the following propositions:

      a. The United States should impose a tariff for revenue only.

      b. The United States should provide for an immediate increase in
         the navy.

      c. Intercollegiate football should be abolished.

      d. Children under fourteen years of age should be prohibited by
         law from working in factories.

      e. Marriage and divorce should be controlled by Federal law.

  2. What sources of evidence would you consult in regard to each of the
     above propositions? State one or more items (books, magazine
     articles, persons, or documents) under each source.

  3. Write out and hand in for inspection ten cards on one of the above
     propositions. These cards should show the application of all the
     rules given for recording evidence.

  4. Apply to these cards the rules to be observed in selecting
     evidence. Does any one of these cards or any combination of the
     cards show evidence sufficient in amount to prove any one
     contention?




                               CHAPTER V
                         CONSTRUCTING THE BRIEF


The construction of a brief is a most interesting task, for the bringing
of order out of chaos always gives a thrill of satisfaction to the
active thinker. It indicates the mastery of the human mind over material
facts and conditions. In this as in all other spheres of endeavor the
joy of victory possesses him who overcomes.

The work of constructing a brief is usually looked upon by the
uninitiated with considerable apprehension. It is regarded as a most
difficult task, and so it is. But the difficulty of the task is greatly
overshadowed by the pleasure which may be derived from it, providing the
preliminary work has been done thoroughly. Every step in the
argumentative process up to this point must have been taken with
diligence. If this work has been well done the student finds himself in
the possession of a large amount of evidence. The analysis of the
proposition and the collecting of the evidence have given the student a
broad outlook over the field to be covered by the brief. Now, to get the
most comprehensive view of this field, he must look at it from the
standpoint of the Purpose of the Brief.


I. The purpose of the brief.

The purpose of the brief is to furnish a solid framework for the
argument. It indicates definitely the path which the argument is to
follow. It maps out a continuous course of procedure ending at the
conclusion which it is the purpose of the argument to establish. To
develop one of the above figures of speech still further, we may regard
the brief as the framework of the vehicle which carries the argument
along the straight road which leads to persuasion.

The brief enables the writer or speaker to present his arguments in
logical order, to indicate the relation which the evidence bears to the
arguments, and to give unity and coherence to the finished product.
Without a well constructed brief an argument will inevitably be more or
less rambling and incoherent; with a well constructed brief each piece
of evidence can be utilized in the place where it will do the most good.
The facts of evidence can be arranged in climactic order and the proper
proportion given to the completed structure. By keeping these objects in
mind the work of building a brief out of the evidence collected may be
intelligently begun.


II. Method of constructing the brief.

The work of constructing the brief should be begun with all the
evidence, which has been collected and recorded on cards or slips of
paper, ready at hand. By this time the investigator has probably
determined whether he wishes to make any alteration in his original
analysis. If any alterations seem advisable they should be made before
proceeding.

The analysis of the question reveals the main issues. In order to make
the work of construction as simple as possible let us suppose that the
evidence has been collected on the affirmative of the following
proposition: “Resolved, that all cities in the United States having a
population of over 5000 should adopt the commission form of city
government.” The analysis of the question has shown that in order to
establish the truth of this proposition it is necessary to prove these
three main issues: (1) That the proposed plan is necessary, (2) That the
proposed plan is good in theory, and (3) That the proposed plan works
well in practice. Each of these three main issues should be written on a
separate piece of paper, an extra slip of paper should be marked
“Introduction,” and still another “Refutation.” These five slips of
paper should be spread out on a table and the work of classifying the
cards begun. All cards containing facts or opinions which show the
necessity for the plan should be placed on the paper marked “The
proposed plan is necessary,” those dealing with theory should be placed
on the paper marked “The proposed plan is good in theory,” and those
dealing with the practical side of the question should be placed on the
paper marked “The proposed plan works well in practice.” To be more
concrete, suppose we have one card which contains a statement from the
mayor of Galveston, Texas, in which he says that the commission form of
city government has worked successfully in that city; another card on
which are statistics showing that the practical operation of the
commission plan in Des Moines, Iowa, has resulted in reducing the
governmental expenses of that city; and still another card which shows
that Grand Rapids, Michigan, has successfully used the commission form
of city government for ten years. All of these cards would, of course,
be placed under the heading “The proposed plan works well in practice.”
Cards treating the origin, history, and other matters discussed in the
analysis of the question should be placed under “Introduction,” while
cards containing material for refutation should be placed under
“Refutation.”

Sometimes there will arise a question as to which of two heads most
properly includes the material on a particular card. In such a case the
student must use his best judgment. If the point is very important and
the doubt great, a duplicate card may be made out and one card placed
under each heading. Then when the brief is being written out a more
intelligent decision can be made. Such difficulties as this, however,
are infrequent, providing proper care has been taken in making the
analysis of the question. The main issues should be distinct from each
other and the line of demarcation between them should be clear cut. If
this requirement is complied with, the classification of the cards in
the manner above described is a comparatively simple matter.

Now that the cards have been divided, each pile can be more easily
studied than could the large original pile. A half-hour spent in
arranging and rearranging the cards and in reading them over in various
connections will yield more information regarding the way in which the
argument should be put together than a whole day spent in unaided
pondering.

The cards should be examined with the object in view of making a
subdivision of the material under each main issue. To illustrate, an
examination of the cards under the first main issue above discussed,
viz. “That the proposed plan of city government is necessary,” reveals
the fact that this main issue “necessity” may be discussed under three
heads: (1) Political necessity, (2) Social necessity, (3) Financial
necessity. Now we proceed to divide the pack of cards on necessity into
three parts, corresponding to the above division. This is done in the
same manner in which the original pack was divided into five packs. Each
of these smaller packs should then be carefully examined in order to
determine whether a further subdivision is advisable. The process should
be continued until all the recorded evidence is classified. Then each
pack of cards should be carefully labelled with the name of the
subdivision to which it belongs, and kept, with its fellows of the same
subdivision, under the division to which they belong, and all the
members of each division should be kept under the main issue to which
they belong. The student must in the same way make himself familiar
with, and classify, the cards under the headings of “Introduction” and
“Refutation.” Next comes the task of arranging these groups of cards in
their proper order. In making this arrangement two principles should be
kept constantly in mind. In the first place the order of arrangement
must be logical; in the second place the divisions should be arranged in
climactic order wherever possible. The strongest argument should be put
last unless there is an important logical objection to putting it in
that position. In arranging the order of the main issues above
discussed, “necessity” should be placed first, because the necessity for
a thing paves the way for its adoption. It is the logical beginning.
Theory should be placed second, and last of all the argument “practice,”
because nothing can constitute a stronger argument in favor of the
adoption of a plan than to show that it has already worked well in many
instances. This arrangement is not only the climactic order, but from
the psychological standpoint it makes the strongest impression. The
process of arranging groups in their logical order should be carried on
until the cards comprising the smallest group are placed in what appears
to be the order dictated by logical sequence and climactic effect.

After the evidence has been duly arranged in accordance with the method
just explained, the task of writing out the brief formally may be
commenced.


III. Rules for constructing a brief.


_1. A brief should be composed of three parts: Introduction, Proof, and
Conclusion._

The three parts of the brief, Introduction, Proof, and Conclusion,
should bear a well regulated proportion to each other. The tendency of
the beginner is to make the introduction too long: a two page
introduction to a three page brief is absurd. The proof should occupy by
far the greater part of the brief, the introduction should be as compact
as is consistent with its purpose, and the conclusion should be shorter
than the introduction.


_2. Each statement in a brief should be a single complete sentence._

The sentences of the brief must be grammatically correct. Each idea
should be carefully thought out and presented in a short, simple,
direct, and comprehensive sentence, for long and complicated sentences
lead to ambiguity. Moreover, the sentence must contain but one central
idea, which must be stated completely. Mere topics are not sufficient.
The word “Practicable” should not be made to represent the entire
statement that “The commission form of city government is practicable,”
but the complete statement should be written out.


_3. The relation which the different statements in a brief bear to each
other should be indicated by symbols and indentations._

Every statement in the brief must stand either directly or indirectly as
a reason for the truth of the proposition. If a statement stands as
direct proof of the proposition, this fact must be indicated; if as
indirect, this fact must also be indicated. The statements which stand
as direct proof should be marked with the same kind of symbols and
indented in the same way. This enables the reader to glance over the
brief and see the main issues standing out distinctly from the
subordinate statements.

The system of symbols used is immaterial, providing they serve the
purpose above indicated. For the sake of uniformity, however, it is
suggested that the student adhere to the following plan:

              This proposition is true, for
                    I................................, for
                      A.............................., for
                        1............................, for
                          a.........................., for
                            (1)......................, for
                              (a)...................., for
                                (x).................., for
                                (y).................., for
                      B.............................., for
                        1.. etc.
                    II..............................., for
                      A...........
                            etc.
                      B..........
                            etc.

The above symbols with their appropriate indentations are sufficient in
variety for almost any brief. To make this plan more concrete let us
suppose that the proposition is held to be true for two reasons. These
reasons then are the main issues, and are coördinate so far as
subject-matter is concerned; therefore they are placed with the symbols
I and II, which are next to the left hand margin of the paper. There are
two main reasons for I, and these are marked A and B, with a greater
indentation from the left hand margin than I. There is one reason for A
and it is marked 1 with a slightly greater indentation from the margin
than A. If there were two reasons the second one would be marked 2 with
the same indentation as 1. That is, the same arrangement applies
throughout the entire system that applies to I and II, and A and B.
There is one reason for 1 and it is marked a with a slightly greater
indentation; the reason for a is marked (1), and the reason for (1) is
marked (a). There are two facts which prove the truth of (a) and they
are marked (x) and (y). In this way the entire brief, whether long or
short, is worked out and the relation existing between all its parts
clearly shown.


_4. The introduction should contain the main issues, together with a
brief statement of the process of analysis by which they were found._

As previously stated, in making the analysis of a proposition an
unprejudiced standpoint must be taken. This is true because the object
is to find the statements which if proved will establish the truth of
the proposition. Since it is the object of the introduction to set forth
the main issues it must contain nothing but the process of analysis by
which these issues were derived. There must be no statements which
require proof and none which indicate a prejudice in favor of one side
or the other.

A long introduction must be avoided, because it is almost sure to
contain irrelevant matter. Furthermore, a reader or hearer is not going
to keep in mind all the history, conditions, definitions, and
limitations which a long introduction may properly include, unless they
are briefly expressed and lead straight to the heart of the controversy.
Again, a long introduction is tiresome. The writer once heard a
prominent United States Senator say, after acting as judge of a college
debate: “Boil down your introduction. The men who pass on what you have
to say, whether in business, politics, or education, want to know what
you believe and why you believe it. Get at the ‘because’ part of your
speech without delay.”

The process of analysis may have been long and laborious, but once the
main issues have been found it is easy to point out the way to them. In
the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, which are masterpieces of this kind of
work, the introductions are exceedingly short as compared with the
length of the speeches. No time is wasted in getting to the points at
issue. A carefully worked out analysis may be presented briefly for it
is seldom necessary to an understanding of the question to discuss its
origin, its history, the admitted matter and the contentions of both
sides. Seldom is it important to discuss more than two of these topics.
Those phases of analysis which afford the shortest route to the main
issues should be chosen. While some brief writers prefer to give the
whole process of analysis, this makes the brief unnecessarily long.
Suppose that you went into the forest for the purpose of finding a
certain tree. You began a systematic search in which you traveled back
and forth through the forest for three days. At last you found the tree.
It is but a half-hour’s walk from the edge of the forest. Would you take
those to whom you wish to show the tree over the path which you traveled
in the three days’ search, or would you lead them directly to it? The
answer is obvious. Why, then, should we weary the reader or hearer with
a long introduction in which all the steps taken in search of the main
issues are set forth, when we can state one or two of these steps and
arrive at the main issues without delay?

Lincoln, in his first inaugural address, shows the virtue of a brief
introduction. He might have dwelt long upon the origin of the question
which he feared would sever the Union; he might have given extensively
the history of slavery and the controversies resulting from it; he might
have compounded definitions based upon the highest authorities; and all
of this would have been relevant matter for the introduction of his
speech. Moreover, there is no doubt that all of these matters had been
considered by him in his analysis of the question. But when he wished to
lead his hearers to the main issues which his analysis revealed, he
chose the simplest and most direct route. After a brief introductory
sentence he employed the process of elimination to cut away all
extraneous matter by saying:

“I do not consider it necessary at present for me to discuss those
matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or
excitement.”

Then he at once took up the subjects of slavery and secession, to which
his elimination of extraneous material had narrowed the question.

The same brevity and directness characterizes Lincoln’s introduction to
his Cooper Institute speech. Here a statement of admitted matter forms
the means by which the point at issue is reached. This offers an
introduction which is impartial, since both sides indorsed it, and the
main issues arose out of the different interpretation which the
Lincoln-Republicans and the Douglas-Democrats placed upon it. The
crucial part of the introduction is as follows:

“In his speech last autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New
York ‘Times’ Senator Douglas said: ‘Our fathers, when they framed the
government under which we live, understood this question just as well,
and even better, than we do now.’ I fully indorse this, and I adopt it
as a text for this discourse. I so adopt it because it furnishes a
precise and an agreed starting-point for a discussion between
Republicans and that wing of the Democracy headed by Senator Douglas. It
simply leaves the inquiry: What was the understanding those fathers had
of the question mentioned?”

It is seen that these statements bring us directly to the point at issue
through the statement of admitted matter. The adoption of this admitted
matter makes necessary some definitions. Lincoln gives these with
clearness and exactness. “The frame of government under which we live,”
is the Constitution of the United States. “The fathers” that framed this
constitution were the thirty-nine men who signed the original
instrument. The “question” which these fathers understood, “just as
well, and even better, than we do now,” was: “Does the proper division
of local from Federal authority, or anything in the constitution, forbid
our Federal Government to control as to slavery in our Federal
Territories?” Then Lincoln continues: “Upon this, Senator Douglas holds
the affirmative, and the Republicans the negative. This affirmation and
denial form an issue; and this issue—this question—is precisely what the
text declares our fathers understood “better than we.” Let us now
inquire whether the “thirty-nine,” or any of them, ever acted upon this
question; and if they did, how they acted upon it—how they expressed
that better understanding.” Thus Lincoln brings his hearers to the proof
of his argument—to the point where it introduces evidence to show that
the great majority of these men answered the question by voting for the
prohibition of slavery.

Now let us write out a formal brief of this introduction and thus
determine just what matters it really includes.

                             NEGATIVE BRIEF

  PROPOSITION: Resolved, that the proper division of local from Federal
                  authority or the Constitution, forbids our Federal
                  Government to control as to slavery in our Federal
                  territories.

                                INTRODUCTION

  I. Statement of admitted matter.

      A. The framers of the Constitution understood this question better
         than we do.

  II. Definition of terms.

      A. “The frame of government under which we live” is the
         Constitution of the United States.

          1. The original Constitution.

          2. The amendments.

      B. “The fathers” were the thirty-nine men who signed the original
         document.

      C. The “question” which these fathers understood “just as well,
         and even better, than we do now,” is: “Does the proper division
         of local from Federal authority, or anything in the
         Constitution, forbid our Federal Government to control as to
         slavery in our Federal Territories?

  III. The question is, therefore, “Did the framers of the constitution
     understand that the Federal Government is prohibited from
     controlling slavery in the territories?”

            The affirmative answers           The negative answers No,
              Yes, for:                       for:
         1. their words and actions        1. their words and actions
              prove that the Federal            prove that the Federal
              Government is prohibited          Government is given
              from controlling slavery          power to control slavery
              in the territories.               in the territories.
         2. The first Congress framed      2. The first Congress which
              annulments which deny             contained sixteen of the
              this power.                       “thirty-nine” exercised
                                                this power.

  IV. The special issues resulting from this clash of opinion are:

      1. Did the words and actions of the framers of the Constitution
         show that the Federal Government is prohibited from controlling
         slavery in the territories?

      2. Did the First Congress, which contained a part of these framers
         and which understood their intentions, show that it believed
         the Federal Government to be prohibited from controlling
         slavery in the territories?

The foregoing introduction shows well the brevity and directness which
should characterize the first division of a brief. The subject-matter
indicates the impartial manner in which the subject is discussed
throughout the introduction. Nothing is stated which requires proof. The
speaker selects common ground upon which both parties to the controversy
have agreed to stand. From this position he leads his opponents by
logical steps to the arguments which he advances. When the student has
once found the main issues he should eliminate all useless steps in the
analysis and present with clearness and force the necessary parts of the
process which lead directly to the proof.


_5. The main statements in the proof should correspond to the main
issues set forth in the introduction, and should read as reasons for the
truth of the proposition._

The object of the introduction to the brief is to set forth the main
issues. In like manner the object of the proof is to set forth the
evidence which supports these main issues. Therefore the main issues
constitute the main headings of the second division of the brief.
Moreover, these main issues must all read directly as reasons for the
truth of the proposition. To illustrate this rule, let us consider the
following example.

                                  BRIEF

 PROPOSITION: Resolved, that the policy of protection should be abandoned
                          by the United States.

                               INTRODUCTION

  I.  }
      } (First part of introduction omitted)
  II. }

  III. The clash of opinion reveals the following issues:

      A. Is protection sound in theory?

      B. Is protection sound in practice?

                                  PROOF

  I. Protection is unsound in theory, for

      A. ...

      B. ..., etc.

  II. Protection is unsound in practice, for

      A. ...

      B. ..., etc.

The above example sets forth the form in which these main issues appear
in the proof of the brief. The validity of the reasoning which connects
the main issues with the proposition may be tested by putting the word
“because” or “for” after the proposition and reading it in connection
with each main issue; thus:

  A. The policy of protection should be abandoned by the United States
     because (or for) protection is unsound in theory.

  B. The policy of protection should be abandoned by the United States
     because (or for) protection is unsound in practice.

Each main issue should be tested in the manner suggested above. This
will show whether the proper logical relation exists between the main
issues and the proposition. A further test may be applied by inverting
the order of the main issues and the proposition and joining the two by
the word “therefore,” as follows: A. Protection is unsound in theory;
therefore the policy of protection should be abandoned by the United
States. B. Protection is unsound in practice; therefore the policy of
protection should be abandoned by the United States. But the words
“hence” or “therefore,” should never be used in a brief, because they
reverse the natural order and make the main statements subordinate.

After making sure that each main issue is stated so that it reads as a
reason for the truth of the proposition, the arguer must next amass the
evidence, which has been classified, in support of each of the main
issues.


_6. Every statement in the proof must read as a reason for the statement
to which it is subordinate._

In the same way in which the main issues must read as reasons for the
truth of the proposition, every statement in the proof, down to the
smallest subdivision, must read as a reason for the statement of the
next higher order. There must be no break in this firm logical
structure. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. If any break
or weakness shows in the chain of argument, reaching from the detailed
facts up to the proposition itself, the whole argument must be discarded
and a new one built in its place. To illustrate this rule clearly, let
us take a section from the proof of the following proposition:

Resolved, that all combinations of capital intended to monopolize
industries should be prohibited by the Federal Government.

                                INTRODUCTION

                                  (Omitted)

                                    PROOF

    I. Combinations of capital are unnecessary, for

        A. The concentration of capital is possible without them, for

            1. Many individuals and partnerships have enough capital to
                  produce commodities in the most economical units.

            2. Trades are sufficiently large to admit many great
                  competitors.

        B. Combinations of capital are not necessary to resist labor
              organizations, for

            1. Labor unions do not have a complete monopoly of labor,
                  for

                a. Strikes are often a failure, for

                    (1) (Here cite specific instances from your personal
                          knowledge in which strikes have failed.)

            2. Associations for the purpose of resisting labor unions
                  are possible without combinations of capital.

    II. Combinations of capital are a social evil, for

        A. They encourage gambling and speculation, for

            1. They practice “watering stock,” for

                a. (Cite a number of specific instances.)

            2. They inflate or depress the value of stocks at will.

        B. They concentrate wealth in the hands of a few men, for

            1. John D. Rockefeller gained his immense wealth from the
                  Standard Oil monopoly.

            2. (Cite several other specific examples like the above.)

        C. They discourage individual enterprise, for

            1. Independent producers are driven out of business.

            2. An individual cannot build up a business for himself.

    III. Combinations of capital are an economic evil, for

        A. They limit natural production.

        B. They destroy competition, for

            1. They absorb large producers.

            2. They crush small producers.

        C. They raise prices, for

            1. They gain control of the market for this purpose.

    IV. The prohibition of combinations of capital by the Federal
          Government is practicable, for

        A. The power is given to the Federal Government by the
              Constitution, for

            1. Congress is given power to regulate interstate commerce,
                  for

                a. Art. 1, Sec. 8 grants this power.

            2. The United States courts have jurisdiction over these
                  matters, for

                a. Art. 1, Sec. 8 confers this power upon them.

In the above section taken from a completed brief enough evidence is
introduced to show clearly the relation which must exist between each
statement. Numbers I, II, III, and IV indicate the main issues. Under I,
A and B read as reasons for the truth of I. Under A, 1 and 2 read as
reasons for the truth of A and so on throughout the brief. Each
statement is connected with the preceding statement, to which it is
subordinate, by means of the conjunction “for.” These statements must
make complete sense and show their logical relation when connected by
this conjunction: as in II. Combinations of capital are a social evil,
for

A. They encourage gambling and speculation.

The rule stated at the beginning of this section is one of the most
important guides to correct brief making and every part of the proof
should be thoroughly tested by reference to it.


_7. Statements introducing refutation must show clearly the argument to
he refuted._

Refutation may be introduced at any point in the brief where objections
arise in connection with the constructive argument. It should always be
placed in its logical position, which is under the argument to which the
objection is made. Only the strong objections which appear to be obvious
hindrances to logical progress should be considered. Any stubborn
objections which need to be cleared away before the argument can proceed
with safety should be introduced. The argument to be refuted should be
clearly stated, and the refutation should be set forth in the same way
and subject to the same rules as the other parts of the brief.

An example of the proper introduction of refutation in a constructive
argument is shown in the speech of Roscoe Conkling delivered at the
Republican Convention in Chicago in 1880, in which he nominated Ulysses
S. Grant for President of the United States. The chief objection to
Grant’s candidacy was that he had already served two terms as President.
The precedent, set by Washington, that no man should serve more than two
terms as President, had always been followed and had become one of the
well established political customs of the country. Here was certainly a
strong objection to the constructive argument of the speaker. Therefore
the refutation is introduced where the speaker attempts to show that
Grant’s character as a man and his great services to his country entitle
him to the presidency. In brief form a statement of the refutation would
be as follows:

A. _Refutation._ The argument that Grant should not be nominated because
he has already served two terms as President is unsound, for

  1. It is absurd to say that because we have tried Grant twice and
     found him faithful we ought not to trust him again.

Refutation should always be introduced in the manner which the above
illustration indicates. First the series of symbols under which it
should come should be determined; then the word Refutation should be
placed opposite that symbol, followed by the formal statement that “The
argument that ... is unsound, for.” For a further illustration of the
manner in which refutation ought to appear the student should consult
the completed brief at the end of this chapter.


_8. The conclusion should be a summary of the main arguments just as
they stand in the proof of the brief, and should close with an
affirmation or denial of the proposition in the exact words in which it
is phrased._

A conclusion must be forcible and to the point. It should review the
main issues and show at a glance their relation to the proposition. The
conclusion to the brief given at the end of this chapter is a good
example of the form in which a conclusion should be stated.

               SUMMARY OF THE RULES FOR CONSTRUCTING THE BRIEF

  1. A brief should be constructed in three parts: Introduction, Proof,
     and Conclusion.

  2. Each statement in a brief should be a single complete sentence.

  3. The relation which the different statements in a brief bear to each
     other should be indicated by symbols and indentations.

  4. The introduction should contain the main issues together with a
     brief statement of the process of analysis by which they were
     found.

  5. The main statements of the proof should correspond to the main
     issues set forth in the introduction and should read as reasons for
     the truth of the proposition.

  6. Every statement in the proof must read as a reason for the
     statement to which it is subordinate.

  7. Statements introducing refutation must show clearly the argument to
     be refuted.

  8. The conclusion should be a summary of the main arguments just as
     they stand in the proof of the brief, and should close with an
     affirmation or denial of the proposition in the exact words in
     which it is phrased.

The following brief written by a student taking his first course in
argumentation shows clearly the application of all the above rules. It
is not given as an example of a perfect brief on the proposition stated
but it furnishes proper suggestions to the person whose experience in
drawing briefs is not extensive. In studying this brief the student
should observe the relation between the statements under each main
topic, the method of building up the structure of the brief so that the
relation of the various parts to the proposition is clear, and the fact
that in each case every statement rests upon a sound foundation. The
citation of good authority and the reliable source from which it was
obtained are given wherever an authority is required. The brief may be
criticised on the ground that too much reliance is placed upon one
source of evidence. As suggested in the chapter on Evidence the exact
reference to authority should always be given in order that its value
may lend weight to the argument. Furthermore, the student is thus
enabled to refer again to his source of evidence for further information
in case it becomes necessary.

In conclusion, the student must not forget that these rules should be
thoroughly mastered and that a conscious application of them must be
made in the actual practice of brief-drawing. It is only by this means
that they can be made a part of the argumentative equipment. After the
brief is drawn it should be carefully examined and tested by the above
rules. If certain parts evince weakness, these should be strengthened by
rearrangement, or by supplying more and stronger evidence. The student
may be compelled to return again and again to his source of evidence in
order to find material of which he has need. If the steps preceding the
construction of the brief have been carefully attended to, he will find
himself so familiar with the subject-matter of the proposition that such
work will be undertaken with the delight and interest which the keen
investigator feels when he is close on the trail of matter which will
prove his conclusions.

                           AFFIRMATIVE BRIEF

    PROPOSITION: Resolved, that the Federal Government should levy a
                        progressive income tax.


                              INTRODUCTION

  I. Recently the question of an income tax has aroused great interest.

      A. An amendment to the constitution has been proposed recently
         which will provide for this tax.

      B. The proposed amendment has caused the matter to be considered
         carefully by the public.

      C. Many eminent men have given opinions regarding the advisability
         of adopting the proposed tax.

  II. The following definition is adopted,

      The progressive income tax is simply a tax levied upon the income
         of an individual, the rate of tax increasing as the amount of
         the income of the individual increases.

  III. The contentions of the affirmative and the negative are as
     follows:

 Those who advocate the adoption of Those who oppose the adoption of
 this income tax support the        this income tax support the
 following contentions:             following contentions:

      A. The income tax is               A. The income tax is not
        necessary.                         necessary.

      B. The income tax is               B. The income tax is
        practicable.                       impracticable.

      C. The income tax is just.         C. The income tax is unjust.

  IV. Through this clash of opinions we reach the following issues:

      A. Is the income tax necessary?

      B. Is the income tax practicable?

      C. Is the income tax just?

                                    PROOF

  I. The progressive income tax is necessary, for

      A. It is necessary in meeting national exigencies, for

          1. In case of war the customs duties would cease or be
             impaired and the government would be without another source
             from which to draw revenue were not the income tax
             available. (Norris Brown, U. S. Senator from Neb. in
             _Outlook_, 94: 217.)

          2. Governor Hughes of New York believes this power (that of
             levying the income tax) should be held by the Federal
             Government so as to equip it with the means of meeting
             national exigencies. (_Outlook_, 94: 110.)

          3. Refutation. The argument that the income tax is not
             necessary on the grounds that other taxes can be made to
             cover all necessities is unsound, for

              a. In case of war with a great commercial nation when the
                 country would be in the greatest need of revenues, the
                 collection of imposts would cease or be materially
                 diminished. (Justice Harlan of the U. S. Supreme Court
                 in his dissenting opinion in the Pollock Case.
                 _Outlook_, 94:217.)

  II. The progressive income tax is practicable, for

      A. Experience shows it to be practicable, for

          1. During the great Civil War millions of dollars were
             collected from this source when the government was in need.
             (Norris Brown in _Outlook_, 94:216.)

          2. It has proved practicable in England and Italy. “Income
             taxation gains in economy and productiveness and wins
             increasing approbation as the years go by.” (Professor Ely,
             Professor of Economics in the University of Wisconsin, in
             _Outlines of Economics_, p. 635.)

  III. The progressive income tax is just, for

      A. The tax bears upon the individual according to his ability to
         pay, for

          1. It tends to relieve the poor from taxation and place it
             upon the rich who are able to bear it. (Philip S. Post in
             _Outlook_, 85:504.)

      B. It makes each individual bear his share of taxation, for

          1. Income is as good, and perhaps better than any other single
             measure of ability to pay and the tax is in accordance with
             this idea. (Professor Ely in _Outlines of Economics_, p.
             635.)

          2. The income tax reaches certain members of the professional
             class who under existing laws largely escape taxation
             through lack of tangible property. (Philip S. Post in
             _Outlook_, 85:594.)

                               CONCLUSION

I. Since the income tax is necessary in meeting national exigencies
where other revenues fail;

II. Since experience shows that the income tax is practicable;

III. Since the progressive income tax is just because it bears upon the
individual according to his ability to pay;

Therefore, the Federal Government should levy a progressive income tax.

                  EXERCISES IN CONSTRUCTING THE BRIEF

1. Let each student select some subject in which he is interested and
follow the argumentative process up to and including, the construction
of the brief.

2. Write out a full and complete brief of one of the arguments given in
the appendix.

3. After the briefs have been written out the instructor should have the
students exchange, and give them an opportunity in class to point out
the defects in each other’s work.

4. Without regard to order or form, let the instructor dictate all the
statements in a short brief, and let the student reconstruct a correct
brief out of these statements.




                               CHAPTER VI
                       CONSTRUCTING THE ARGUMENT


The last step has left us with the completed brief,—sound, logical, and
comprehensive. In some cases the task ends here, the brief being
constructed for its own sake and left to stand as a cold, formal,
logical framework upholding the truth of the proposition. In this form
it may be laid by for those who are to pass upon its validity, or the
advisability of adopting or rejecting the proposition which it supports;
or the author may explain its structure in an extemporaneous speech.
More often, however, the brief is but the framework of the argument
which is to be built upon it, giving the whole structure grace and
strength.

In this final process great care must be taken to make sure that the
naked framework is entirely covered. No rough edges or angular corners
should be left protruding from the finished product. The whole structure
must be made attractive, and impressive, just as the steel framework of
a great building is enveloped in solid walls of stone and marble made
elegant by the sculptor’s art.

The distinction between conviction and persuasion, which was pointed out
in a previous chapter, again enters into the argumentative process. For
purposes of discussion we may assume that the brief itself produces
conviction because it shows clearly that the proposition is right. But
the naked brief is as cold and formal as a proposition in geometry.
Hence it is the task of the written or spoken argument, based upon that
brief, to arouse the emotions so that it may move the will and thus end
in persuasion. Now, if every individual were a perfectly rational being
the brief would be all that would be necessary to arouse to action,
because by itself it shows what is right and what ought to be done. But
real men in everyday life are not perfectly rational beings. Their
reasoning processes are influenced by environment, education,
prejudices, and acquired habits of thought. The emotions of men, too,
play a large part in shaping their conduct. Therefore, a process must be
instituted in their minds which reaches persuasion through their
combined thoughts and feelings.

From the psychological standpoint we may divide this process into three
stages, I., Attention; II., Interest; and III., Desire. From the
argumentative standpoint we may divide the process into three parts
corresponding to the three parts of the brief, viz., I., Introduction;
II., Proof; and III., Conclusion. Now it will be seen that the
psychological process bears a logical relation to the argumentative
process, and that this relation is one of cause and effect. The end of
all argument is action. If the argument is successful it creates in
their order the mental and emotional conditions of attention, interest,
and desire. That is, the introduction, proof, and conclusion of the
argument result in the attention, interest, and desire of the individual
mind. These processes begin at the same point, since the introduction
secures the attention of the reader or hearer; they proceed along the
argumentative road together, since the proof must maintain the active
interest of the reader or hearer; and they end at the same point,
because the conclusion, if successful, leaves the mind with a desire for
action. Briefly stated, the introduction arouses the attention; the
proof maintains the interest; and the conclusion creates the desire.


=I. Attention—aroused by the introduction.=

The first duty of a written argument is to get itself read; the first
duty of an oral argument is to get itself heard; therefore the argument
must attract the attention of the reader or listener in the beginning or
introduction and must hold his attention throughout the proof. If
attention is not secured at the beginning of the argument it is seldom
secured at all, for the reader will throw the uninteresting argument
aside in disgust, while the listener will allow his thoughts to wander
to other subjects. Thus it is evident that the necessity for arousing
the attention by means of the introduction is very great.

In order that we may clearly apprehend the relation which should exist
between the introduction and attention let us consider, 1. The kinds of
attention, and 2. The methods of securing proper attention by means of
the introduction.


_1. Kinds of attention._


_A. Natural attention._

Natural attention requires no effort of the will to bring the mind to
bear upon the subject in hand. The human mind, when not engaged on some
definite object, attends in an effortless way to practically every
marked change in the circumstances with which it is surrounded. To
things that meet our approval we give our attention willingly, but if we
are displeased or bored by any happening we give our attention
unwillingly. Therefore the object of the introduction is to please in
order that attention may be given willingly.

When a speaker walks out on a platform and faces the audience he at once
attracts the spontaneous attention of practically everybody in that
audience. This much is easy. The problem that now confronts the speaker
is to begin his speech by saying something which will turn this
spontaneous attention into fixed attention. By fixed attention is meant
such attention as willingly follows the train of thought which the
speaker has to present. If the introduction is properly prepared this
fixed attention will be the result, but if the introduction is not
properly prepared the natural attention of the audience quickly
degenerates into what we may term Assumed Attention.


_B. Assumed attention._

This kind of attention is not given willingly, but is assumed by the
audience merely because it happens that the speaker has placed himself
on the platform and there is nothing left for the audience to do but to
listen to him. Now this assumed attention on the part of the listeners
may pass through several degrees of intensity, depending upon the kind
of audience and the degree of the lack of skill with which the speaker
proceeds. At first the speaker is treated to the ordinary manner of any
audience not especially interested in what is being said. This attitude
quickly degenerates into indifference, a point at which the audience
does not care what the speaker says or whether he says anything. Such a
condition as this often continues throughout an entire speech, and the
sooner the speaker realizes that fact and brings his argument to an end
the better. The next stage of assumed attention is that of abstraction.
At this stage the speaker does not even receive the indifferent
attention of the listeners. The mind of each individual before him
wanders off to some subject in which he is interested personally and the
speaker might just as well be talking to empty seats. Usually this is
the least desirable stage of assumed attention. Under some conditions,
however, it is possible to reach a still less desirable stage, which we
may call, for the purpose of making an exhaustive division of this
subject, incivility. At this stage the individuals of the audience
manifest their displeasure by talking among themselves, and making
uncomplimentary remarks about the speaker.

The above discussion will serve to make clear the kind of attention the
speaker must attempt to create by means of his introduction. We shall
now consider some of the methods by which the proper kind of attention
may be secured.


_2. Methods of securing proper attention._


_A. Immediate statement of purpose._

One of the most effective methods of securing the natural attention of
the audience is by an immediate statement of the purpose of the
discourse. It will be remembered that in the preparation of the brief
the student was cautioned against the evils of a long introduction. He
will also recall that the introduction was to contain only the main
issues and the essential steps in the analysis by which they were
reached. This same brevity should characterize the introduction to the
argument. The audience is naturally interested in what the speaker
believes and the reasons for his arguing in favor of or against the
proposition. Therefore he may gain the fixed attention by stating at
once just what he purposes to do. An extreme form of this kind of
introduction would be as follows:

“There are two reasons why we maintain that the Federal Government
should levy a progressive inheritance tax; first, because the national
government needs it as a source of revenue; and second, because it will
remedy the evils resulting from ‘swollen’ fortunes.

“The Federal Government needs this tax as a source of revenue because,
etc.”

This introduction is an immediate statement of the purpose of the
argument and will secure the attention of either reader or hearer.

In addressing an audience there are some cases in which just such an
introduction should be used; for example, when previous speakers have
dwelt upon the analysis of the question, or have given full
dissertations on the origin or history of the subject, or lengthy
definitions of terms and explanations of processes of reasoning. Again,
such an introduction may be used when the time limit is very short or
where the audience is presumed to be thoroughly familiar with the
subject under discussion. Lincoln uses this method in introducing his
discussion on the necessity of a settlement of the slavery struggle, as
the following introduction to his Springfield speech will show:

“If we could first know where we are, and whither we are tending, we
could better judge what to do and how to do it. We are now far in the
fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and
confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation. Under the
operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but
has constantly been augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a
crisis shall have been reached and passed. ‘A house divided against
itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot endure
permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be
dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it will
cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.
Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it,
and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is
in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it
forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well
as new, North as well as South.”

In this introduction it is seen that Lincoln comes at once to the point:
“I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half
free.” He makes his introduction complete by repeating this idea so that
no one can fail to understand the point he is making. The two sentences
which precede his statement and the three sentences which follow it
state the same idea in different forms. In an introduction the speaker
must not only make his position so plain that it can be understood, but
he must make it so plain that it cannot be misunderstood. This is what
Lincoln does in the introduction to his Springfield speech and it is
what must be done in every effective speech of this character.

The introduction quoted above touches lightly upon the origin and
history of the question with the simple statement: “We are now far into
the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and
confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the
operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but
has been constantly augmented.” More extended statements of the history
here alluded to are given further on in the argument at such places as
they are needed. Here in the Introduction merely the significant results
of origin and history are stated in the briefest possible form. This
method of stating the introduction well illustrates the application of
the general principle that extensive treatment of facts of origin and
history should not be allowed to interfere with the immediate statement
of the purpose of the argument.


_B. Illustrative story._

Sometimes the fixed attention of the audience or reader may be gained by
the use of an illustrative story. No speaker or writer should attempt to
use this method of introduction unless he is absolutely confident of his
ability to carry it through successfully. A story must conform to the
following rules before it can, with safety, be adopted for the purpose
of an introduction:

  (1) The story must be interesting.

  (2) The story must be well told.

  (3) The story must be obviously connected with the point which the
     arguer wishes to bring out.

If the story be of the comic variety, and is to be told orally, the
speaker must make sure that the audience will laugh with him and not at
him. Nothing is more fatal to natural attention than a story which
“falls flat.” Regarding the aptness of the story as illustrating the
point which the speaker wishes to make, it need only be suggested that
the connection must be obvious. If any explanation is required after the
story is told it usually serves to kill attention rather than to create
it. The connection must be so obvious that the speaker is able to lead
his auditors skillfully from the story directly to the point at issue.


_C. Quotations._

A third method of introducing an argument is by the giving of a familiar
quotation, or a quotation of the opposing speaker or someone concerned
in the controversy. Such a quotation must be very plainly connected with
the subject, and its bearing on the point which the speaker wishes to
make must be evident. In this respect the requirements of an
introductory story and an introductory quotation are identical. An
example of an introduction in which a quotation is used is that of the
speech of Roscoe Conkling in which he urges the nomination of Ulysses S.
Grant for President. This introduction begins as follows:

                  “When asked what state he hails from
                  Our sole reply shall be
                  He comes from Appomattox,
                  And its famous apple-tree.”

Likewise a speech advocating the adoption of free silver in our monetary
system began with

             “There is a tide in the affairs of men,
             Which taken at the flood leads on to fortune.”

In some cases the quotation may be used merely to secure the immediate
attention of the audience. In such a case it must bear directly on the
circumstances of the occasion, as when the third speaker in a college
contest took advantage of the two preceding speakers, who had both
forgotten their speeches and had been compelled to retire from the
platform, by beginning his speech with the quotation,

                   “Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet
                   Lest we forget, lest we forget.”

The effort was a decided success, if success were to be judged by the
amusement of the audience, but it only prolonged the time required to
get the attention of the audience fixed on the serious subject which the
speaker wished to present. Such a quotation may attract attention, and
if that is all that is required, well and good; but the usual
requirement is to attract attention in such a way that it will be fixed
on the subject in hand. Therefore the temptation to attempt comedy
should be carefully guarded against, and quotations should be used which
will procure more substantial results.

Of the three methods for securing proper attention herein given the
first is by far the most important and the most useful. The second and
third methods should be attempted only when the circumstances are most
favorable as measured by the principles stated in this discussion. The
student must keep constantly in mind the object to be gained by the
introduction, namely,—the natural fixed attention of the audience.


=II. Interest—maintained by the proof.=


_1. Necessity._

The necessity of maintaining the attention of the reader or hearer
throughout the proof is obvious. No permanent results can follow an
argument which is not fully comprehended. Even though the closing
paragraphs arouse the emotions, and a strong persuasive appeal is made
in the conclusion, they only result in persuasion, and we have learned
that in an effective argument conviction and persuasion must exist
together.


_2. Methods of maintaining interest._


_A. Appropriate treatment._

The task of maintaining the interest of auditors or readers is made much
easier if the writer will pause in his preparation and consider the
appropriateness of his treatment of the subject. In order to make this
treatment appropriate three factors must be considered: (1) The speaker
or writer, (2) The audience or reader, (3) The time or occasion. The
argument in order to be effective must be especially adapted to all of
these factors.


_a. Adaptation to speaker or writer._

The writer of an argument, whether the argument is to be written out for
the purpose of being read or whether it is to be delivered in the form
of a speech, must take into consideration his own power and ability.
With these clearly in mind he must present his subject in a way which
seems natural and spontaneous. Never should an attempt be made to
imitate the manner of any particular speaker or writer. Such attempts
always appear unnatural, strained, and artificial, as in truth they are.
The keynote of adapting a speech to the speaker is sincerity. Sincerity
begets naturalness. To be sincere and know that he is in the right leads
the speaker to treat his subject in a manner which will show forth the
best qualities of his character.

The argument should manifest the utmost fairness. It should be clear
that the speaker or writer desires truth and justice to prevail. When
stating an opponent’s position for purposes of refutation the speaker or
writer should be sure that his statements are fair and reasonable and
will bear the inspection of unprejudiced judges. If genuine sincerity
and absolute fairness are put into an argument they will go far toward
adapting it to the personality of the author.


_b. Adaptation to audience or reader._

As a basis for this sort of adaptation a real sympathy with those to
whom the argument is to be addressed is essential. In fact the arguer
must be able to take their view of the subject. He must realize that an
argument which is to be presented to a working-man must be, in a way,
different from one which is to be presented to a banker. To be sure, the
essence of the argument may be the same, but when the task of developing
the brief into a finished product is undertaken, these different
standpoints must be considered.

Not only must this adaptation be considered from the standpoint of those
engaged in different occupations in life, but the predominating
political, social, religious, and scholastic temperament must also be
considered. Especially is this true if the beliefs of the audience or
readers differ from those of the speaker or writer. Usually the speaker
realizes the importance of the latter situation but very often does not
know just how to meet it. Here again sympathy is the keynote. Nothing
should be said which will give offense. The speaker must prepare
carefully each step in his argument so as to lead the audience with him.
In the beginning a common basis must be found, then the true attitude of
the arguer may be made apparent as he proceeds.

An instance of this gradual leading on of the audience is found in
“Julius Caesar,” where Mark Antony addresses the citizens after the
murder of Caesar. The statements of “a plain blunt man” attach a much
different significance to the “honorable men” at the close of the
argument from that which was given in its beginning. Had Antony reversed
the order of his speech he would have been deliberately killed instead
of being hailed as a leader. He adapted his argument to his audience. He
led them along step by step until in the end they arrived at the
inference which he wished to establish and then with a fiery conclusion
he aroused in them the desire for action. Not once did he lose their
interest, because his treatment of the subject-matter took into account
their personal, financial, social, and political welfare. This classical
example illustrates well the maintaining of interest by that method of
appropriate treatment which adapts the argument to the audience.

An example of a speaker addressing an audience of an entirely different
class from that to which he himself belongs is that of Booker T.
Washington on the occasion of the opening of the Atlanta Exposition. Mr.
Washington had great difficulty in determining how he should take up his
subject. But he was wise enough to apply the principle of sympathy with
his audience, and the result was an address which stands as a monument
to his wisdom. He, himself, says that: “No two audiences are exactly
alike. It is my aim to reach and talk to the heart of each individual
audience, taking it into my confidence much as I would a person. When I
am speaking to an audience I care little for how what I am saying is
going to sound in the newspapers, or to another audience, or to an
individual. At the time, the audience before me absorbs all my sympathy,
thought, and energy.” Again he says, referring to the occasion above
mentioned, “I was determined to say nothing that I did not feel from the
bottom of my heart to be true and right.”

Lincoln had some very strong misgivings about the reception of his
Cooper Institute speech. It is said that he felt “miseries of
embarrassment from his sense of the unaccustomed conditions, the
critical and refined audience, his own ungainliness, and his ill-fitting
and wrinkled clothes.” But after he began to speak his embarrassment
disappeared. It was merged into sympathy with his audience, the people
of New York City, for whom he had especially prepared the address. How
well he succeeded in his adaptation we all know, and Nicolay and Hay say
in their account:

“Yet, such was the apt choice of words, the easy precision of sentences,
the simple strength of propositions, the fairness of every point he
assumed, and the force of every conclusion he drew that his listeners
followed him with the interest and delight a child feels in its easy
mastery of a plain sum in arithmetic.”

Every speech must be so adapted to the audience that it will maintain
just this kind of interest from the beginning to the close.


_c. Adaptation to time or occasion._

The final requirement of appropriate treatment is that the argument be
suited to the time or occasion. Every kind of occasion has an
individuality born of its environment. The political argument of a
candidate for office will have a somewhat different setting from the
same argument delivered in the halls of congress. A brief for an
argument might well serve for both occasions, but when that argument is
written out the time or occasion of its presentation must be considered.
The arguer can almost always foresee the circumstances of the particular
occasion or time of presentation and thus adapt his argument to them.
Formal college or intercollegiate debates before competent judges and
with a definite limit as to the length of the speech would demand that
the brief be developed in the most terse and direct manner possible;
whereas the same argument to be delivered before a Political Science
Club, with no judges and no time limit, might be developed much more
fully and adapted to the occasion in a widely different manner. In
conclusion, we must not forget that an argument intended to be read must
be adapted to the writer, the reader and the time; whereas, an argument
written for oral delivery must be adapted to the speaker, the audience,
and the occasion.


_B. Logical structure._

The very fact that a discourse is to take the form of an argument causes
those to whom it is addressed to look for logical structure and clear
reasoning. This expectation must not be ignored. The argument must not
only _be_ logical, but it must _appear_ logical. This logical structure
can be clearly set forth when the argument is written out, by means of
frequent statements of the divisions of the argument and their relation
to each other, summaries, and transition sentences and paragraphs. The
arguer should first tell what he has to prove, then show all along that
he is proving it, and finally call attention to the fact that he has
proved it. If this is well done the logical structure of the argument is
made obvious.

The argument must also show logical progress. We have already seen the
necessity of making the introduction as brief as is consistent with the
other requirements. This requirement regarding brevity must be observed
throughout the development of the brief. Every statement must be
developed to such an extent as to bring out clearly the central thought,
but when this has been done the writer must pass at once to the next
point, thus showing that some real progress is being made. An argument
which moves slowly tires the reader or hearer. Therefore the temptation
to elaborate a point in the brief upon which the writer has a large
amount of information should be carefully guarded against. Each argument
must be stated clearly, with supporting evidence to the point, and the
proof furnished by the evidence plainly shown. This logical progress
will aid greatly in maintaining interest in the proof of the argument.


_C. Style._

Style is the manner of selecting and arranging words, sentences, and
paragraphs in such a way that they will produce an intended effect upon
the reader or hearer. From this definition it will be seen at once that
style is a very important factor in argumentation. The argument is
constructed with the express purpose of producing an intended effect
upon the reader or hearer, and style is a necessary aid. The outward
appearance of things enhances their usefulness. Manufacturers are on the
constant lookout for designs which are really artistic and pleasing to
the eye. It is even claimed that the appearance of food affects its
digestion. Certainly, therefore, an argument ought to possess such style
that it will appear in the most favorable light.

Style, however, must not be considered an external thing. It is not a
trick by which an argument may be decorated for parade. Style is the
thought and the man behind that thought. It is the thought presented in
all its native force and completeness; it is the man with all his
earnestness and sincerity put into his words. No writer or speaker can
obtain good style by imitating that of another person. It must be the
natural expression of his own personality.


_a. Elements of style._


(1). _Vocabulary._

The selection of the words in which the argument is expressed is highly
important. The manuscript should be repeatedly revised with the object
of securing a clear and forcible diction. A general term should not be
used where a concrete term can be employed. All unusual words should be
eliminated and replaced with words which are familiar.

Connotation may enter into the diction of an argument as well as into
other forms of prose. There is a fitness possessed by certain words to
express certain shades of meaning which must be utilized by the arguer.
This regard for the connotative significance of words should guide in
their selection throughout the argument.

Significant expressions and combinations of words should also be brought
in for the purpose of heightening the effect of the argument. These
combinations may be such as are used for political campaign watchwords.
Greater force may be given to them by repetition, as in the case of the
sturdy Roman orator who always closed his speech with the words
“Carthage must be destroyed.” Alliteration may also be employed with
good effect, as in the case of the college debater who, when opposing a
further increase in our navy, designated a battleship as “A devilish
device designed to murder men.” Such suggestions bring ideas to the mind
with so much vividness that the impression which they make is not easily
effaced.


(2). _Sentences._

In framing the sentences of an argument the writer must consider whether
it is designed for oral delivery or merely for the purpose of being
read. If the latter, the rules of ordinary composition furnish a
sufficient guide, but, if the former purpose is to be considered special
attention must be given to sentence-structure. The writer should test
each sentence as it is written by actually reading it aloud or by
building a mental concept of the way in which it will sound when stated
orally. The meaning must be plain, since if the hearer does not grasp it
as the sentence is spoken he cannot grasp it at all. To aid in this
clearness, long and involved sentence-structure should be avoided.
Short, terse sentences should predominate. Both balanced and periodic
sentences may be made to contribute to the oratorical quality which an
argument should possess, but they must not interfere with that brevity
which makes for clearness. The following extract from the argument of
Daniel Webster in the White murder trial well illustrates the clearness
which results from the use of terse sentences.

“The criminal law is not founded in a principle of vengeance. It does
not punish that it may inflict suffering. The humanity of the law feels
and regrets every pain it causes, every hour of restraint it imposes,
and more deeply still every life it forfeits. But it uses evil as a
means of preventing greater evil. It seeks to deter from crime by the
example of punishment. This is its true, and only true main object. It
restrains the liberty of the few offenders, that the many who do not
offend may enjoy their liberty. It takes the life of a murderer that
other murders may not be committed.”


(3). _Paragraphs._

A paragraph should be devoted to each subdivision of the argument. Each
paragraph must be a complete unit. Its length should vary with the
importance of the subdivision to which it is confined. The sentence in
the brief which it is designed to elaborate should stand as the key
sentence of the paragraph.


_b. Qualities of style._


(1). _Clearness._

The most important quality of style is clearness. Clearness is a
valuable aid to interest, for the human mind delights in lucidity. The
audience or reader will seldom take the trouble to figure out exactly
what idea is intended to be conveyed. Most audiences are lazy and must
be assisted to think. The way in which a conclusion is to be reached
must be pointed out to them. Hence the necessity of making plain an
argument which is to be delivered orally is especially great.

Error can easily be smuggled into an argument under cover of confused
language, but clearness shows forth the argument in such a light that
any mistake must be apparent. This satisfies the minds of those
addressed, because they can see and judge for themselves. Moreover,
there is a quality of elegance coming from perfect clearness which
carries conviction with it. If clearness is lacking, grave errors may be
lurking in the obscure phrasing of the discourse and the reader or
hearer cannot feel satisfied in his own mind. Therefore, for the sake of
the writer and for the sake of those to whom the argument is addressed,
clearness should be the predominating quality of style.

It is not amiss at this point to quote in full the famous description of
eloquence from Webster’s oration on Adams and Jefferson. It is not only
a description but it is a great example of the thing described. The
student will do well to ponder over it and try to realize the full
significance of every statement.

“Clearness, force, and earnestness are the qualities which produce
conviction. True eloquence, indeed, does not consist in speech. It
cannot be brought from far. Labor and learning may toil for it, but they
will toil in vain. Words and phrases may be marshalled in every way, but
they cannot compass it. It must exist in the man, in the subject, and in
the occasion. Affected passion, intense expression, and pomp of
declamation, all may aspire to it; they cannot reach it. It comes, if it
comes at all, like the outbreaking of a fountain from the earth, or the
bursting forth of volcanic fires, with spontaneous, original, native
force. The graces taught in the schools, the costly ornaments and
studied contrivances of speech, shock and disgust men, when their own
lives, and the fate of their wives, their children, and their country,
hang on the decision of the hour. Then words have lost their power,
rhetoric is vain, and all elaborate oratory contemptible. Even genius
itself then feels rebuked and subdued, as in the presence of higher
qualities. Then patriotism is eloquent; then self-devotion is eloquent.
The clear conception outrunning the deductions of logic, the high
purpose, the firm resolve, the dauntless spirit, speaking on the tongue,
beaming from the eye, informing every feature, and urging the whole man
onward, right onward to his object,—this, this is eloquence; or rather
it is something greater and higher than all eloquence,—it is action,
noble, sublime, godlike action.”

Simplicity of expression is an important aid to clearness. No speaker
should strive for effect alone. The simplest words and the simplest
sentences should be chosen. Fine writing or high sounding language
should be avoided. The writer should make use of that directness which
characterizes his conversation when he is in earnest.

Concreteness is a most important aid to clearness, for general
statements make little impression upon the average mind. To secure the
best effect concrete particulars must be used to amplify and illustrate
all general statements. This not only makes the meaning of the speaker
more clear but it also gives a force and vigor to the idea presented. In
fact, some writers have named concreteness as the most important aid to
force. In Alden’s _Art of Debate_ a speaker during the time of the
Chicago strike is quoted as having moved his hearers to enthusiasm by
declaring: “If necessary, every regiment in the United States army must
be called out, that the letter dropped by the girl Jennie, at some
country post-office back in Maine, may go on its way to her lover in San
Francisco, without a finger being raised to stop its passage.” This is
concreteness as distinguished from generality. How much less clear and
less forcible would be the general abstract statement that “If
necessary, the whole force of the United States army will be called into
action for the purpose of preventing interference with the mails.”

Instead of making the general statement “There has been a constant
improvement in the methods devised by man for killing his fellow men in
war,” the idea would be more concrete if expressed in the following
terms: “Ever since Shamgar slew the opposing army of the Philistines
with an oxgoad man has been improving the instruments of war until
to-day we have the modern dreadnought weighing thousands of tons and
costing millions of dollars.” Or, the idea can be presented in a still
more concrete manner by stating the following facts: “Ever since David,
the shepherd boy, picked a pebble from the brook; placed it in his
sling; threw it and killed Goliath, man has been improving the method of
throwing things at his fellow men, in order to kill them, until to-day
we have the thirteen inch gun, which throws a projectile weighing one
thousand pounds a distance of thirteen miles.” These concrete instances
when elaborated become illustrations or illustrative instances. In fact,
the last statement given above might be dignified with the name
illustration. Lincoln in his Cooper Institute speech aptly illustrated
the attitude of the South toward secession when he said: “But you will
not abide the election of a Republican President! In that supposed event
you say you will destroy the Union! and then, you say, the crime of
having destroyed it will be upon us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a
pistol to my ear and mutters through his teeth ‘Stand and deliver or I
shall kill you, and then you will be a murderer.’” Again Lincoln uses a
most clear and forcible illustration in his Springfield speech when he
presents the following argument from analogy:

“We cannot absolutely know that all these adaptations are the result of
preconcert. But when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions
of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places and
by different workmen,—Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and James, for
instance,—and when we see these timbers joined together, and see they
exactly make the frame of a house or a mill, all the tenons and mortices
exactly fitting, and all the lengths and proportions of the different
pieces exactly adapted to their respective places, and not a piece too
many or too few,—not omitting even scaffolding,—or, if a single piece be
lacking, we see the place in the frame exactly fitted and prepared yet
to bring the piece in—in such a case, we find it impossible not to
believe that Stephen and Franklin and Roger and James all understood one
another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft
drawn up before the first blow was struck.”

Such concrete illustrations as are contained in the above quotation
should abound in every argument. The homelier the illustration, the more
pronounced the effect. It requires no especial insight into human nature
to see that such incidents as those quoted above will hold the interest
of the audience or reader much more effectively than cold, formal,
generalized statements. Therefore, the student should make use of
concreteness, and, in fact of all rhetorical devices, for the purpose of
making his argument clear and interesting. Even narratives of some
extended length may be introduced when they are especially pertinent to
the point at issue.

Clearness is aided by making plain in the argument that unity which
exists in the brief. All matter which does not tend to explain or prove
the main proposition should be excluded. It is dangerous for the arguer
to enter into lengthy explanations, for they may be but digressions from
the main argument. It is of course assumed that the brief possesses
unity. The temptation to include matter merely because of its interest
is always strong, but the student must apply the test of immediate
relevancy and be guided by it. The final acceptance of the argument by
the reader or hearer is aided or hindered by his impression of the unity
or solidity of its construction. The brief should be strictly followed
in order that unity may be apparent.

Coherence is also an important aid to clearness. The coherence which
exists in the brief must be expressed in the argument. The connective
“for,” which is used in the brief to show the relation subordinate
statements bear to the main statements, must be expanded in rhetorical
style so as to bring out plainly the force of the relation which it
expresses. In the effort to secure coherence the arguer should not
hesitate to repeat the main issues or even to show how they stand as
proof of the proposition. Every fact of evidence must be made to stand
out distinctly as proof for some statement in the argument. Otherwise
the evidence will be mere dead weight, loading down instead of
supporting the contentions of the arguer.

Connective words, such as “for,” “because,” “hence,” “therefore” should
abound throughout the proof for the purpose of showing precisely what
relation exists between a fact and a statement, or a statement and a
main issue, or a main issue and the proposition. Every fact of evidence
must be clearly connected with the statement which it proves; every
statement supported by evidence must be connected directly with the main
issue which it proves; and every main issue must be connected directly
with the proposition which it proves. This must be done not by
inference, but by an expressed connection. The connection may appear so
obvious that it seems foolish to put it in words, but experience shows
that the connective must be expressed or it will not be comprehended. If
the connections are not expressed the argument will appear incoherent.
Therefore, transitional sentences must be used frequently. When two or
more facts of evidence are offered in support of one statement the words
“First”, “Second”, and “Third”, or “Moreover”, “Again”, “Furthermore”
should be used. At the end of the enumeration what all these facts tend
to show regarding the proposition should be stated.

Coherence is not obtained by chance. To obtain it requires the greatest
care in the original writing out of the argument. A careful process of
revision must then be instituted to make sure that no fact of evidence
is left standing without its appropriate relation to the proposition
being clearly stated. Any break in coherence may mean the loss of part
or all of the evidence offered in support of a main issue.

One of the classical examples of argument noteworthy for its coherence,
and the one most often recommended for study in connection with the
subject of coherence, is Burke’s _Speech on Conciliation_. In that part
of the argument which treats of the American love of freedom, the skill
displayed in making transition from part to part, and the general effect
of coherence which results from this treatment are most conspicuous.

The following extracts taken from a portion of the argument will
illustrate Burke’s method of making his discourse coherent. The dots
indicate omissions.[3]

Footnote 3:

  After reading the selections here given the student will do well to
  make a study of the speech itself and scrutinize closely the substance
  of the parts which these statements serve to connect as well as the
  manner of connection. The first sentence may be taken as the main
  issue which Burke intends to offer evidence to prove; then come the
  sentences which mark the connection of the most important facts of
  evidence offered in support of the issue; and finally the summary
  which again calls attention to the connection existing between these
  pieces of evidence and the proposition contained in the first
  statement.

“In the character of the Americans, a love of freedom is the
predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole ... this
(results) from a great variety of powerful causes.... First, the people
of the colonies are descendants of Englishmen.... Their governments are
popular in a high degree.... If anything were wanting to this necessary
operation of the form of government, religion would have given it
complete effect.... The people are Protestants; and of the kind which is
most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion.... (The
Church of England tends to offset this influence in the Southern
colonies). There is, however, a circumstance attending these colonies,
which in my opinion, fully counterbalances this difference.... It is,
that in Virginia they have a vast multitude of slaves. Where this is the
case in any part of the world, those who are free are by far the more
proud and jealous of their freedom.... Permit me, Sir, to add another
circumstance in our colonies, which contributes no mean part towards the
growth and effect of this untractable spirit. I mean their education. In
no country perhaps in the world is the law so general a study.... The
last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less
powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the
natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean lie
between you and them.... Then, Sir, from these six capital sources: of
descent; of form of government; of religion in the northern provinces;
of manners in the southern; of education; of the remoteness of the
situation from the first mover of government; from all these causes a
fierce spirit of liberty has grown up....”

These transition sentences seem to imply a strong coherent argument,
and, when taken in connection with the context, they form an almost
perfect example of argumentative coherence.

Usually the first sentence of a paragraph developing a new argument is
the transition sentence. Sometimes a more extended transition becomes
necessary, in which case more than one sentence, or even an entire
paragraph, may be devoted to the transition from one part to another.
All of the methods suggested above may be properly employed in giving
the argument coherence.

In this discussion of clearness many things have been considered which
must be taken into account when reading the discussions of Force and
Elegance. No division of style can be absolute nor can a complete
exposition of its qualities be attempted without much repetition. The
student must therefore treat this division of subject-matter as helpful
only in emphasizing the qualities which his argumentative writing and
speaking should possess.


(2). _Force._

We speak of a “forcible argument” with respect because it indicates
something substantial. Force must pervade any writing or speaking which
aims to arouse to action. The material must be presented in an
impressive manner. By so doing we create a keener interest and bring to
the minds of our readers or hearers a more vivid realization of the
significance of our argument. Therefore after all the devices heretofore
considered have been employed to make the argument interesting, the
finished product should be considered with a view to determining whether
it is the most forcible piece of work that can be produced. Perhaps some
slight change in the way in which these devices have been employed will
give a better effect. If so, the modification should be carefully
attended to in order that the argument may possess in its highest degree
the quality of force.

The force of an argument depends in large measure upon the proper use of
emphasis. Emphasis is the means by which attention is called to the
importance or special significance of any portion of the argument. One
of the ways in which any part of the subject-matter may be emphasized is
by expanding or dwelling upon that part. This must always be done with
due consideration for the other parts of the argument. Hence it happens
that proportion is used as a means to secure emphasis. The writer must
determine the really vital parts of his argument and aim to give
emphasis to them alone, because every point cannot be emphasized. An
attempt to emphasize everything results in no emphasis whatever.
Everything must not be on the same dead level, because if it is the
audience or reader will soon lose interest. We sometimes speak of the
important points as the “high places” in the argument. These “high
places” must exist, because it is impossible for the reader or hearer to
remember all the details of a lengthy argument. He will, however,
remember the important points, providing they have been properly
emphasized.

We now turn to the methods by which the best use can be made of the
space devoted to the emphasizing of any particular point. The use of
metaphors, similes, and epigrams is an effective mode of emphasis. An
apt metaphor or simile will remain in the minds of readers or hearers
long after the trend of the argument is forgotten.

Another method frequently employed for the purpose of securing emphasis
is that of the rhetorical question. Since such a question implies an
answer favorable to the party asking it, it must appear plainly that the
answer is bound to be as he desires. In the Lincoln-Douglas debates both
speakers made frequent use of this method, and Webster, in emphasizing
the necessity of finding the murderer of Captain John White asks,
“Should not all the peaceable and well disposed naturally feel
concerned, and naturally exert themselves to bring to punishment the
authors of the secret assassination? Was it a thing to be slept upon or
forgotten? Did you, gentlemen, sleep quite as quietly in your beds after
this murder as you did before? Was it not a case for rewards, for
meetings, for committees, for the united efforts of all the good, to
find out a band of murderous conspirators, of midnight ruffians, and to
bring them to the bar of justice and law?”

The use of repetition for the purpose of emphasis is most important. In
employing this method care should be taken not to overdo it, as such a
process is always fatal to interest. The central idea should be
repeated, but the phrasing should be skillfully varied so as to prevent
the repetition from becoming monotonous. Furthermore, the point of view
should be changed. This not only serves to change the manner in which
the idea is presented but will help to hold the interest. Perhaps one
point of view will appeal more strongly to some people than to others.
Hence by changing the point of view the greatest number of people are
influenced. It must be kept in mind, however, that it is not the point
of view of the writer which changes but merely the point of view from
which he presents the part of the argument to be emphasized.


(3). _Elegance._

As has already been suggested, the appearance of an argument has a great
deal to do with the manner in which it is received. By appearance is
meant the way in which it appears to the mind of the person addressed.
If it appears to be a stiff, formal, arrogant piece of work it may only
excite intellectual curiosity instead of arousing interest and creating
desire. The argument must appeal with freshness and vivacity to the
person addressed. It is no small task to form an elegant forensic from a
solid, rigid brief.

From the student’s study of ease, grace, elegance, and rhythm as found
in books of rhetoric, he will have obtained a fair idea of the quality
of elegance and can make an intelligent effort to secure it in his own
work. But the most effective way in which to acquire a sense of elegance
is by the study of those masterpieces of argument which possess this
quality to a high degree. Rules cannot be formulated nor practicable
principles laid down for obtaining this quality. Just as the musician
acquires a sense of what is proper and what is not proper in his art,
so, must the writer of an argument acquire a sense of what is proper and
what is not proper by a study of the works of those who have been
masters in the art of argumentation. The simple elegance of Lincoln’s
style, the impressive elegance of the style of Webster, and the fiery
elegance of which Patrick Henry was master, must be studied earnestly by
the student. The orations of Webster, the speeches of Burke, and the
arguments of Lincoln should be read over and over again. Favorite
passages should be committed to memory and all the speeches should be
read for the purpose of being enjoyed. This will impart a wealth of
expression and an elegance of style which can be obtained in no other
way.

In considering the subject of “Interest—Maintained by the Proof” let the
student remember that all the methods herein suggested stand ready to
aid him in his supreme desire to be heard if he will but master them and
make them his servants.


III. Desire—created by the conclusion.

Attention has been previously called to the fact that the practical
application of introduction, proof, and conclusion to the creating of
attention, interest, and desire is approximate rather than absolute. The
main part of the argument which is contained in the proof carries
forward the work of persuasion. It creates a desire to understand the
whole truth about the proposition discussed. When we say that the desire
is created by the conclusion we mean that all the good effect produced
by the proof is summed up and presented in such a forcible manner that
it awakens the desire for action.

The proof has maintained the interest of those to whom the argument is
addressed. It has established a firm basis in rational desire. The
object of the conclusion is to arouse emotions sufficient to move the
will. In order that it may do this it should be in the form of an appeal
for the adoption or defeat of the resolution. To understand the way in
which this plea or appeal should be made it is necessary to understand
the forces which influence the individual to act. These forces are known
as the qualities of want. The desire to act results from one or more of
the following seven causes.


_1. Necessity._

If the proof which has been presented for or against the proposition
shows that the proposed measure is necessary the conclusion should make
necessity the basis of the plea. Necessity is a strong basis for an
argument. If a thing is a necessity, all reasonable persons will agree
that it should be adopted, providing there is no predominating
circumstance which makes its adoption inadvisable. Lincoln urged upon
his hearers the necessity of settling the slavery question, Patrick
Henry urged the necessity of resistance to the tyranny of England, and
Daniel Webster urged the necessity of holding the Union inviolate. By
showing that a thing is necessary, that disaster will follow inaction,
orators have aroused the energies of men in order that great reforms
might prevail. The speaker who can show that the cause of action which
he advocates is necessary to the state, to the community, or to the
individual has made a strong plea for its adoption.


_2. Interest._

By an appeal to interest we do not mean anything unworthy of either
speaker or hearer. Legitimate self-interest is perhaps the strongest
motive which incites men to action. This trait of the human character
should not be lost sight of by the student of argumentation. In one way
or another almost every proposition may be made to appeal to the
self-interest of the individual. For the purpose of being systematic we
may consider this self-interest under the three heads, Convenience,
Pleasure, and Profit.


_A. Convenience._

If it can be shown that the adoption of a definite course of action will
be for the convenience of the individual a strong point in its favor has
been established. If emphasis can be placed upon the fact that it will
be for the convenience of the community as a whole the argument will be
still stronger, for some people love to flatter themselves that they are
considering the interests of their fellow men as well as of themselves,
and many people are honest in this impulse. Moreover, this public spirit
is an actual factor in determining the actions of men. Such an argument
is especially valuable in discussing local questions. In advocating the
building of a new bridge, the granting of concessions to a proposed
railroad or street car line the appeal to the convenience of the people
of the community is very strong. By the application of a little
ingenuity in connecting the points of the argument with the everyday
life of the people to whom it is addressed, the effectiveness of the
conclusion may be greatly increased.


_B. Pleasure._

The average person is inclined to accept that which is pleasing to him
and reject that which is displeasing. In the construction of the proof
we have been trying to keep interest alive by presenting our subject in
an interesting manner. In the conclusion we must sum up this matter in
such a way as to conform to the pleasure of those addressed. The
building of a new theatre, a town hall, or a park may be made to appeal
to many interests of the community, but after all is said the fact
remains that the main justification for such buildings rests upon the
pleasure which they give to individual members of the community. As in
the case of convenience, this element of pleasure may be utilized with
practical results in the closing plea.


_C. Profit._

The strongest appeal to self-interest can be made by showing that the
action advocated will result in profit to the individual. By showing
that a proposed plan of taxation will result in lowering the yearly
amount of tax which John Jones will have to pay, you will probably
secure the vote of John Jones in favor of your proposition. By showing
that the purchase of a potato digger will increase the amount of money
which a farmer can make raising potatoes, you have gone far toward
convincing that farmer that he should buy a potato digger. By showing
that consolidation will yield greater profit to the business man you
have done much to persuade him to join the combination. By showing that
the lowering of the tariff schedule will reduce the cost of living you
may induce many persons to advocate a lower tariff. In every argument
self-interest plays an important part. The conclusion should therefore
leave firmly fixed in the mind of the reader or hearer the fact that the
action advocated will be for his best interests.


_3. Jealousy, vanity, and hatred._

An appeal to the baser passions of mankind is not to be commended.
Nevertheless, we are here treating of real arguments in a real world.
Since the end of argumentation is action, and since jealousy, vanity,
and hatred are motives which stir men to action, we must consider them.
Personal motives may furnish subsidiary inducements to action. The
jealousy which one business man feels toward his competitor may induce
him to adopt new methods of doing business in order that he may outdo
his rival. The vanity which a manufacturer feels in the superiority of
his goods may be the determining factor in the adoption of improved
machinery. The hatred which the honest citizen entertains for boss rule
may be the determining factor in deciding the way he will vote. The
ingenuity of the student must be employed in trying to fathom the unseen
causes which guide the activities of his fellows.


_4. Ambition._

The ambition of an individual to excel in his business, trade, or
profession; the ambition of a community to have the best social and
educational advantages; and the ambition of a nation to outreach the
world in trade and commerce, may all form the substantial basis for
action. By appealing to this praiseworthy ambition the emotional element
is added to the element of intellectual conviction.


_5. Generosity._

Every human being is moved at times by generous impulses which may arise
from a variety of causes. The arguer should study these causes and
attempt to stimulate the impulses. Dignify the position of those to whom
the appeal is made by showing them that they can well afford to be
generous.


_6. Love of right and justice._

The arguer should never fail to leave his hearers with the conviction
that he champions a just cause. This appeal can always be made, because
under no circumstances should anyone champion a cause which is unjust.
In this age people as a whole are willing to do the right thing, despite
the actions of particular individuals or groups of individuals to the
contrary. Abstract justice in its application to the particular
proposition should form the basis of the final plea.


_7. Love of country, home, and kindred._

The hearts of men have always been stirred by the appeal to patriotism.
Action in its most intense form will follow the right appeal to love of
country. The protection of home and kindred has from the dawn of history
been the prime motive in all great world movements. Other causes may
appear on the surface, but underlying these, in one form or another is
this primal cause. Wars are waged and nations built up or overthrown
because of the use or abuse of this power. Therefore the speaker must
make a broad application of his particular argument in the closing
paragraph.

With these fundamental suggestions in mind regarding the attitude which
the conclusion should take, we will now turn to the form in which it is
to be presented.

The conclusion must conform to the brief by summing up the main
arguments and putting them clearly before the audience. This summary is
necessary in order to make the proof clear and forcible. It should
contain the main issues, and, whenever practicable, the subordinate
reasons supporting them, in order that the chief points in the proof of
the proposition may be recalled by the audience.

An example of the simple summary which is often quoted as a model, is
the conclusion of the argument made by Daniel Webster in the case of
_Ogden_ v. _Saunders_:—

“To recapitulate what has been said, we maintain, first, that the
Constitution, by its grants to Congress and its prohibitions to the
states, has sought to establish one uniform standard of value, or medium
of payment. Second, that, by like means, it has endeavored to provide
for one uniform mode of discharging debts, when they are to be
discharged without payment. Third, that these objects are connected, and
that the first loses much of its importance, if the last, also, be not
accomplished. Fourth, that, reading the grant to Congress and the
prohibition on the states together, the inference is strong that the
Constitution intended to confer an exclusive power to pass bankrupt laws
on Congress. Fifth, that the prohibition in the tenth section reaches to
all contracts, existing or in the future, in the same way that the other
prohibition, in the same section, extends to all debts, existing or in
the future. Sixthly, that, upon any other construction, one great
political object of the Constitution will fail of its accomplishment.”

Again in the argument on the Presidential Protest he summarizes with
effect and concludes:—

“—We have not sought this controversy; it has met us and been forced
upon us. In my judgment, the law has been disregarded, and the
Constitution transgressed; the fortress of liberty has been assaulted,
and circumstances have placed the Senate in the breach; and, although we
may perish in it, I know we shall not fly from it. But I am fearless of
consequences. We shall hold on, Sir, and hold out, till the people
themselves come to its defense. We shall raise the alarm, and maintain
the post, till they whose right it is shall decide whether the Senate be
a faction, wantonly resisting lawful power, or whether it be opposing,
with firmness and patriotism, violations of liberty, and inroads upon
the Constitution.”

In concluding this chapter on constructing the argument, let us again
revert to the fact that the conclusion must be presented in such a way
as to create a desire for action. The conclusion must “clinch” the
argument. The time has come for the reader or hearer to act, or
determine upon action. All the labor spent upon the introduction in
arousing and fixing the attention, and all the labor spent upon the
proof in maintaining the interest and building a firm basis for
persuasion in rational conviction, is now lost unless the conclusion
rises supreme above these and presents a culmination forcible and
commanding. The conclusion should reap the harvest of persuasion sown
throughout the argument. The emotions must be aroused as they have not
been aroused in the presentation of the proof; they must be stimulated
to the highest pitch. The conclusion must command the best powers of the
speaker or writer. It must unite the audience, the subject, and the
personality of him who presents the argument into one mighty current of
thought and emotion which leads onward to action.




                              CHAPTER VII
                                REBUTTAL


Rebuttal consists of defending the constructive argument and weakening
or destroying opposing arguments. Rebuttal is both defense and attack.
Refutation is attack alone. In formal debate rebuttal refers to the
final speech made by each debater after he has presented his
constructive argument and his opponents have had a chance to reply. The
main speech in a formal debate is usually of ten minutes’ duration while
the rebuttal speech is of five minutes’ duration. Furthermore, after the
first affirmative speaker has opened the debate it is customary for each
succeeding speaker to introduce his main argument with a short rebuttal
speech of one or two minutes, or he may introduce rebuttal at any point
in his main speech.

The rebuttal speech must introduce no new argument, but is limited to a
discussion of the validity of the arguments already presented. After the
salesman has presented his goods and the reasons why the prospective
customer should buy, he must answer the questions regarding those
reasons and the objections which are made to them. Furthermore, he must
overthrow any reasons for not buying which may be advanced by the
customer. In arguing with a single individual regarding the advisability
of any course of action the arguer must defend his own position as well
as overthrow that of his opponent. In organizations and deliberative
bodies the speaker who proposes any plan or measure must be prepared to
answer any objections which may be made to it; and must also be prepared
to weaken or destroy the arguments which may be advanced in support of
other plans or measures which conflict with his own. It is thus seen
that a knowledge of the preparation and presentation of rebuttal is
almost indispensable to the student who would make practical application
of the theory and practice of argumentation. Since our work is to take
the form of debating, we shall consider the subject largely from this
standpoint. Nevertheless, the student should constantly keep in mind the
broader application of the principles which are used in formal debating.


I. Preparation for rebuttal.

Rebuttal should never be considered lightly from the standpoint of
preparation. The speaker who relies on the “spur” of the moment is quite
sure to find that when the moment arrives it has no “spur.” The rebuttal
should be prepared as carefully as the constructive argument. It demands
exact and far-reaching knowledge. Furthermore, it demands absolute
command of that knowledge in order that it may be used effectively. In
this preparation the student should consider the sources from which he
may derive the appropriate material, and the proper arrangement of that
material after it has been collected.


_1. Sources of material for rebuttal._


_A. Material acquired in constructing the argument._

The investigation which preceded and accompanied the construction of the
brief and argument should have yielded a wide knowledge of the subject.
Much of the material gathered could not be used because of limitations
of time or space, because of its not being adapted to use in the
argument as it was to be presented, or because of the abundance of
better material. The student will therefore have in his possession a
large number of facts which were not used. These should be carefully
reviewed in order that the “stock in trade” of rebuttal material may be
invoiced. The student should then revert to his original analysis and
examine his opponents’ position with a critical eye. He should measure
carefully the strength of that position and compare it with his own. All
the sources which were consulted in the beginning should again be made
to yield information. This can now be done with ease, because the
preparation of the constructive argument has given the student a firm
grasp upon the subject-matter.

Every possible point of attack which the constructive argument presents
must be fortified by full and complete rebuttal material. The debater
should begin at his argument as a starting point and work back along the
line of evidence supporting each general assertion. Since it was
impracticable to put into the argument all the evidence supporting any
one contention, the student must now have this evidence at hand in order
to support his argument at the point where the attack can be made. It is
almost impossible to construct an argument which cannot be attacked in a
plausible manner, but it is entirely possible to construct an argument
which can be defended successfully.

After the constructive argument has been fortified, the main contentions
of the opposition, which the analysis of the question has revealed, must
receive careful attention. Every possible line of attack which the
opposition may advance should be considered. The student cannot hope to
determine beforehand the form in which these arguments will be
presented. Nevertheless, if his analysis of the proposition has been
made in a thorough manner, and if his preparation has been thorough, he
cannot fail to have grasped the underlying arguments of his opponents’
position. These should now be refuted with the best material which the
debater can find. He must be as diligent in ferreting out evidence which
will overthrow his opponents’ position as he was in searching for
evidence with which to support his own. No available source of evidence
should be neglected. Every weak point in the opposing argument should be
exposed and “ammunition” with which to attack these weak places should
be collected. This material should be tabulated on cards in the same
form that was used in tabulating material for the constructive argument.
The following specimens of rebuttal cards, prepared by students for an
inter-class debate, may prove suggestive.

 ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │_Injustice._                                           _D. A. Wells._│
 ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
 │“Taxation in aid of private enterprises is to load the tables of the │
 │few with bounty, that the many may partake of the crumbs that fall   │
 │therefrom.”                                                          │
 │                                                                     │
 │_The Theory and Practice of Taxation_, p. 292.                       │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

 ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │_Test of Ability._                                  _Philip S. Post._│
 ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
 │“By successive stages more equitable standards of taxation have been │
 │reached, until now there is a general acceptance of the maxim that   │
 │income is the best test by which to measure a man’s ability.”        │
 │                                                                     │
 │_Outlook_, Vol. 85, p. 503 (1907).                                   │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

 ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
 │_Equality of Sacrifice._                                 _R. T. Ely._│
 ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
 │“An income tax honestly assessed and honestly collected answers the  │
 │canon of Equality of Sacrifice.”                                     │
 │                                                                     │
 │_Taxation in American States_, p. 89.                                │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘


_B. Books, papers, and documents._

It often happens that the question has been debated previously. In such
cases books, papers, and documents may be found which contain
“ready-made” rebuttal arguments. The debater should never rely on these
alone. The preparation suggested in the last section is an absolute
prerequisite to successful work in rebuttal. However, these ready-made
arguments should be searched out carefully and made to form a part of
the material for rebuttal. Such evidence is of course subject to the
same requirement regarding its worth and validity as the sources of
material consulted in constructing the main argument.

The student should now go over his cards carefully and consider the
various books, papers, or documents from which his information was
derived. Any of these books, papers, or documents which stand as
authority for vital facts, or for facts about which there is likely to
be a dispute, should be taken out and placed with the other material
which is to be used in rebuttal. Especially should this be done in cases
where the debater feels that he has authority which is probably better
than that which his opponents will be able to quote. For example, a
government document makes a very effective showing when it is quoted as
contradicting the statement of some unknown magazine writer. In like
manner statistics from the _United States Census Reports_ will prevail
over statistics found in an address delivered by some partisan leader.
Since such conflicts of authority are likely to arise it is important
that the debater have at hand the original sources of the information
which forms the basis of his argument or rebuttal. Moreover, a
recognized authority sometimes changes his opinion. In this case the
debater should be careful to provide himself with the book, paper, or
document which contains his latest views on the subject discussed. These
become especially valuable when the opposition relies upon the old views
of the authority quoted. In this, as in all other cases of authority,
the usual tests of sufficiency apply.


_C. Questions._

The skillful asking of questions is a most important matter in debating.
These are often asked in the main argument, but it is in the rebuttal
that the answers are usually threshed out. If the questions are not
asked originally in the rebuttal they should at least be reverted to
during this part of the debate. No debater can consider himself
thoroughly prepared who has not framed some effective questions and who
is not ready to answer questions which may be asked by his opponents.
The interrogatories which are intended to be discussed in the rebuttal
are not rhetorical questions, but questions calling for definite
answers.

There are two well defined uses to which these questions may be put.
First, they may be used to compel an opponent to take a definite
position on some issue which he appears to be attempting to evade.
Second, they may be used to force an opponent into a dilemma, in which
position he will be at a disadvantage without regard to the answer which
he gives. Very often an opponent is more skillful in evading the real
point at issue than he is in debating it. In such cases a question or
series of questions may be necessary in order to compel him to discuss
the subject of dispute. Sometimes an opponent intentionally evades the
real point at issue because he knows his position is weak and seeks to
cover up the real defect under a plausible show of language. In both of
these situations the use of direct questions is effective. The wording
of these questions should receive the same careful consideration which
is bestowed upon the wording of a proposition. The questions must be
clear and unambiguous and must call for definite and direct answers. No
opportunity for evasion should be allowed. Furthermore, these questions
must be worded forcibly and emphasized in such a way that an opponent
will not dare to leave them unanswered.

On the other hand, if an opponent propounds certain questions to which
answers are demanded, the debater must either answer these questions
satisfactorily or show good reason why they should remain unanswered. In
the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, which began August, 1858, questions
were frequently asked by both parties. In the first debate, which was
held at Ottawa, Illinois, Douglas asked Lincoln seven distinct
questions. In the second debate which was held at Freeport, Lincoln
restated these questions and answered them briefly and to the point in
the following manner:

“In the course of that opening argument Judge Douglas proposed to me
seven distinct interrogatories. In my speech of an hour and a half, I
attended to some other parts of his speech, and incidentally, as I
thought, answered one of the interrogatories then. I then distinctly
intimated to him that I would answer the rest of his interrogatories on
condition only that he would agree to answer as many for me. He made no
intimation at the time of the proposition, nor did he in his reply
allude at all to that suggestion of mine. I do him no injustice in
saying that he occupied at least half of his reply in dealing with me as
though I had _refused_ to answer his interrogatories. I now propose that
I will answer any of the interrogatories, upon condition that he will
answer questions from me not exceeding the same number. I give him an
opportunity to respond. The Judge remains silent. I now say that I will
answer his interrogatories, whether he answers mine or not; and that
after I have done so I shall propound mine to him.

“I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party
at Bloomington, in May, 1856, bound as a party man by the platforms of
the party, then and since. If in any interrogatories which I shall
answer I go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will
be perceived that no one is responsible but myself.

“Having said this much, I will take up the Judge’s interrogatories as I
find them printed in the Chicago _Times_, and answer them _seriatim_. In
order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the
interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one
of these interrogatories is in these words:

_Question 1_—‘I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did
in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave
law?’

_Answer_—I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional
repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

_Question 2_—‘I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day,
as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more Slave States into
the Union even if the people want them?’

_Answer_—I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission
of any more Slave States into the Union.

_Question 3_—‘I want to know whether he stands pledged against the
admission of a new State into the Union with such a Constitution as the
people of that state may see fit to make?’

_Answer_—I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State
into the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may
see fit to make.

_Question 4_—‘I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the
abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?’

_Answer_—I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in
the District of Columbia.

_Question 5_—‘I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the
prohibition of the slave trade between the different states?’

_Answer_—I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave trade
between the different states.

_Question 6_—‘I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit
slavery in all the Territories of the United States, north as well as
south of the Missouri Compromise line?’

_Answer_—I am impliedly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the
_right_ and _duty_ of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United
States Territories.

_Question 7_—‘I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the
acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited
therein?’

_Answer_-I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory;
and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition,
according as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate
the slavery question among ourselves.

“Now, my friends, it will be perceived upon an examination of these
questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not
_pledged_ to this, that, or the other. The _Judge_ has not framed his
interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered
in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly,
that I am not _pledged_ at all upon any of the points to which I have
answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his
interrogatory. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these
questions, and state what I really think of them.”

In the above example of the use of questions and answers it will be
noted that Lincoln emphasizes his fairness by offering to answer his
opponent’s questions provided that opponent will do the same with
questions which he propounds. When Judge Douglas does not accept this
proposition, Lincoln follows up his just course of conduct by declaring
that he will answer his opponent’s questions whether that opponent will
answer his or not. He then makes an introductory statement in which he
limits the responsibility of his answers strictly to himself. He next
takes up each question and answers it briefly and directly. He concludes
these answers with a paragraph in which he shows that he has answered
the questions strictly in accordance with the form in which they were
asked. Then he again shows his fairness and even liberality toward his
opponent by taking up the more important questions and giving a full and
complete discussion of each one. After this fair and comprehensive
treatment Lincoln proceeds to propound his questions to Judge Douglas in
the following manner.

“I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories so far as I
have framed them. I will bring forward a new installment when I get them
ready. I will bring them forward now only reaching to number four.

The first one is:—

_Question 1_—If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely
unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State constitution, and
ask admission into the Union under it, before they have the requisite
number of inhabitants according to the English bill,—some ninety-three
thousand,—will you vote to admit them?

_Question 2_—Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful
way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude
slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State constitution?

_Question 3_—If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of
acquiescing in, adopting, and following such a decision as a rule of
political action?

_Question 4_—Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in
disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery
question?”

The foregoing examples of questions and answers will give an idea of the
way in which they may be used in a formal debate. The third
interrogatory propounded by Lincoln illustrates well the type of
question which is designed to force an opponent into a dilemma. This
inquiry is an example of the great analytical ability of Lincoln, as the
following circumstances will show.

The Dred Scott decision by the United States Supreme Court had held that
Congress did not have the power to exclude slavery from any of the
territories. Lincoln regarded this decision as wrong and said so.
Douglas denounced Lincoln for his attitude in the matter and declared
that it was unpatriotic, disloyal, and revolutionary for any man to
criticize a decision of the United States Supreme Court. On the other
hand Lincoln denounced Douglas on the ground that he, acting in
conjunction with other Democrats, was engaged in a conspiracy to
nationalize slavery. In support of this charge he offered reasonable
evidence, and showed that the conspirators’ efforts would be complete
providing they could get a decision of the Supreme Court which would
declare that a state could not exclude slavery from its borders. Lincoln
charged Douglas with active attempts to secure this decision. It was
under these circumstances that Lincoln asked the third question,
viz.:—“If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the
States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of
acquiescing in, adopting, and following such decision as a rule of
political action?”

If Douglas answered this question in the affirmative it would put him in
the position of substantiating Lincoln’s charge of conspiracy. This
would be very embarrassing for Douglas and give Lincoln a decided
advantage. On the other hand, Douglas’s position would be just as
embarrassing and his opponent would reap as great an advantage, if he
answered in the negative, for then he would be opposing a decision of
the Supreme Court,—the very thing for which he had so bitterly denounced
Lincoln. The question was so worded that an affirmative or a negative
answer would be equally disastrous.

By a judicious use of such questions the debater may direct the
discussion along the narrow channel which it should take, and bring out
in a forcible way any defects in his opponents’ position. No debater
should consider himself thoroughly prepared for rebuttal until he has
worked out carefully a list of questions framed in accordance with the
principles here suggested.

Another form of attack which properly belongs under this heading is that
of demanding a definite plan. If the speaker is upholding the negative
in a debate on the question of the inheritance tax, he should demand
that the next affirmative speaker show a definite plan of taxation. If
the opponent refuses to present a definite plan he may be charged with
impracticability, vagueness, and a fear that no plan which he might
present could be defended safely. On the other hand if he presents a
definite plan it may be easy to point out glaring defects in its
construction. In either case the demanding of a definite plan may be
made to work to the advantage of the debater. If a definite plan is
demanded it is usually best to reply that the discussion is on
principles not plans. In this way attention may be called to the
underlying principles of the controversy and it can be shown that, after
the difficulties which they present have been solved, a discussion of a
definite plan will be in order and its construction will then be a
simple matter. This method of procedure, both as regards the demanding
of a definite plan and the answering of that demand, affords ample scope
for the argumentative mind to display its breadth of perception and its
keenness in analysis.


_2. Arrangement of rebuttal material._

After a satisfactory amount of rebuttal material has been collected the
debater must arrange this material in such a way that any particular
part of it will be readily accessible. Since the amount of evidence must
necessarily be so large, that all of it cannot be kept in mind at one
time, some easy method of classification is necessary which will include
everything that may be of use when the rebuttal is to be presented. The
importance of this systematic classification becomes apparent when the
debater stops to reflect that he has enough rebuttal material for a one
or two hour speech, while the actual time which is allowed for its
presentation in a formal debate is usually five or six minutes. Even if
there is no time limit the debater must not weary the audience by long
delays while he searches for material. The debater must know exactly
where each piece of evidence may be found. It is not sufficient that he
have a vague recollection that somewhere in his notes is an
authoritative fact which will refute the argument his opponent has just
advanced. He must know just where to find that fact. If his opponent has
misquoted statistics from the Report of the United States Industrial
Commission it is not sufficient for him to know that somewhere within
the nineteen volumes of that report is a small table of statistics which
will prove his opponent to be wrong. He must be able to turn to the
exact volume and page. He may be confident that an authority, which he
has quoted as favoring his position, is really on his side of the case;
but if he cannot give an exact reference to the place where such
authority is to be found, his opponent may dispute the assertion with
impunity. These and many similar situations which are bound to arise in
actual debating make it plain that the task of arranging material is a
very important part of the preparation for rebuttal.


_A. Classification of cards._

The rebuttal cards should all be classified under a sufficient number of
headings to cover the entire field of the evidence collected. The exact
number of headings will, of course, vary with different questions. There
must be, however, a sufficient number of divisions to separate the cards
into groups small enough to be handled easily. On the other hand the
number of divisions must not be so great as to become confusing in
themselves. In actual practice from four to eight divisions are
sufficient for practical purposes. In a debate on the proposition,
“Resolved, that the United States should make no discrimination between
the immigrants from China and those from other countries,” the rebuttal
cards were divided into the following groups; (1) Economic influence,
(2) Social influence, (3) Political influence.

If the number of cards in any one group is too large to be handled
easily, that group may be divided under two or more sub-heads. For
example, in the division above made the topic “Social influences” was
found to include a much larger number of cards than either of the other
subdivisions; hence it was divided into two sub-heads, (a) assimilation,
(b) morality and crime. This careful division of the material will make
the debater so familiar with all his rebuttal evidence that he can
without hesitation lay his hands upon just what is wanted. The work of
locating particular points of evidence must be done with dispatch. Time
is valuable, for the debater will soon be called upon to answer the
argument that is being presented. Moreover, if he spends too much time
looking over his cards and if the process requires all his attention, he
may lose some very important statement which is being made by his
opponent.

In a formal debating contest it is sometimes advisable to have the
alternate take charge of the entire mass of rebuttal material. In this
case the cards should be typewritten so that each member of the team can
read any card as well as any other member of the team can read it. The
alternate sits at the table with the team and has all the rebuttal cards
in a filing box before him. Then as each argument is brought up he
quickly finds the most effective rebuttal material on that point and
hands it over to the speaker who is to answer that argument. This system
of working allows the regular members of the team to give all their
attention to what their opponents are saying. The alternate performs the
mechanical work of finding the particular evidence required. With a team
whose members have worked out the question together in a thorough
manner, this method is very effective.


_B. Arranging books, papers, and documents._

Following the suggestions regarding sources of material, the debater
will have before him a number of books, papers, and documents. When the
time comes to use these sources of material the debater cannot delay the
discussion by hunting through them in an aimless fashion in search of
the precise information which he needs. He must be able to pick out the
volume and turn to the exact page without hesitation and at a moment’s
notice. This requisite demands the same systematized classification that
was employed in the arranging of rebuttal cards. One method of making
this classification is to have a card index of the material. The general
topic to be refuted should be placed at the top of the card. Below this
should be an exact reference to the book, paper, or document in which
the material for refutation is found. Then when an opponent puts forth
his argument it is only necessary to look it up in the card index and
turn to the reference. The places in the books, papers, and documents,
to which reference is made in the card index, should be marked with long
slips of paper extending beyond the tops of the books and having on the
protruding parts the numbers of the pages which they mark. Furthermore,
the particular portions of the page which are applicable should be
marked with marginal lines. Great care should be taken to mark only
those passages which are exactly to the point; otherwise too much time
will be wasted in referring to matters which may be relevant but are of
no value as proof.

This system of indexing material contained in books, papers, and
documents will be found to be almost indispensable when the time for use
arrives. The debater must practice this system until he can manipulate
it with ease and rapidity. In the case of team work, the alternate may
have charge of this index, which can be made a part of the large card
classification. He can then provide each rebuttal speaker with the
proper material as the occasion for its use arrives. Of course, in the
case of a single speaker, where only a very few volumes are to be used
in the rebuttal the system of card indexing can be dispensed with, but
the system of marking the exact references by means of slips of paper
and marginal lines should always be employed.

In the beginning the working of this system, as that of any system, will
seem awkward and unwieldy; but the debater must practice using it under
all argumentative conditions. In this way he will gain in the ease and
rapidity with which he can manipulate its parts. When this is
accomplished he will have a most effective aid to the kind of rebuttal
work which secures results. The student must not fail to make his
preparation in this respect thorough. Every detail must be mastered;
every rebuttal card must be so well in mind that a mere glance will be
sufficient to reveal its contents. The reading of rebuttal cards takes
all the life out of a rebuttal argument. This part of the argument more
than any other must be delivered with native force and enthusiasm.
Effective presentation in rebuttal follows only from the most thorough
preparation.


_C. The summary and closing plea._

After the preparation above outlined has been completed one task yet
remains. The debater must have an effective conclusion for his rebuttal
speech. He must not rely upon a chance inspiration of the moment.
Experience proves that for all but professional speakers, and oftentimes
even for them, it is best to have a committed summary or closing plea.
In the case of a debating team the work of closing the argument should
be left to the last speaker in rebuttal. This summary should be the
strongest statement that it is possible to produce. All the main
arguments that have been presented should be summarized. The position of
both sides of the controversy should be set forth in clear and vigorous
language. If questions have been asked, or demands have been made of the
opposition, a direct and forcible reference to the effect of these
questions or demands should be made. Then, summoning all the powers of
eloquent utterance of which he has command, the speaker should make a
closing plea for the adoption or defeat of the proposition.

Examples of effective closing pleas are too numerous to need extended
discussion. In debating the proposition “Resolved, that the Federal
Government should levy a progressive inheritance tax. Granted, that such
a tax would be held constitutional,” the last speaker for the
affirmative delivered the following summary:

“We have asked our opponents, how will the enforcement of present laws
reach the evils of congested wealth? What are the benefits derived from
the perpetuation of such fortunes? Where will you place the power of
control, at Wall Street or at Washington? Have the gentlemen answered
these questions to your satisfaction?

“We have accepted the burden that devolved upon the affirmative and we
have met that burden by showing that the Federal government needs this
revenue because of its rapidly increasing functions; that it is
practicable because it has twice been in actual operation; and that as a
Federal tax it possesses the qualities of certainty, elasticity, and
regularity.

“We have clearly shown that as a regulative measure it is necessary for
the reasons, that the perpetuation of swollen fortunes is productive of
industrial inequalities which are un-American and of evils which it is
beyond the power of ordinary legislation to control. We have
demonstrated its practicability by proposing a definite plan which will
remedy the evil, first, by actually taking a part of these enormous
accumulations, and second, by compelling their greater distribution.
Finally we set forth the beneficial effects of such a measure upon
public opinion—resulting in the greater responsibility of wealth and in
removing the incentive to corruption.

“In short, while the gentlemen of the opposition are standing as the
champions of swollen fortunes, magnates, and a governing aristocracy
founded upon wealth and corruption with the center of power at Wall
Street, we stand for the suppression of corruption, the resurrection of
individual opportunity, and government by the great mass of the common
people with the center of power at Washington. The negative would foster
an aristocracy; we would perpetuate democracy.

“We plead, therefore, that in passing upon this resolution, you consider
the welfare of the whole nation, that you consider this measure as
legislation complementary to the regulative laws already enacted; that
you consider the opinions of eminent statesmen, and the conservative
will of the people—in short, that you adopt this resolution.”

The conclusion for the final rebuttal speech should be prepared with the
same care that is exercised in the preparation of the conclusion for the
main argument. It differs from the latter in that it takes more into
account the arguments of the opposition. It is the last chance the
debater has to plead for his cause, and he must make the most of his
opportunity.


II. Presentation of rebuttal.

In the presentation of rebuttal all the principles which are laid down
in the next chapter should be observed. They are of equal importance and
apply with equal force to both the main argument and the rebuttal
speeches. However, the conditions under which the two speeches are
delivered are very different and it is therefore necessary that we give
special attention to the presentation of rebuttal. The difficulty of the
task which now confronts us is even greater than that which we must
consider in connection with the delivery of the main argument. The
qualities of mind which success demands are of a higher order, and the
mental exercise involved is of greater value. The ability to grasp the
essential features of a situation as it presents itself, the ability to
analyze keenly and determine definitely and without hesitation upon a
plain course of action, and finally the power of presenting clearly and
forcibly the conclusions which have been reached, are all comprised in
the art of debate.


_1. Attention to argument of opponent._

The first essential of rebuttal work is a keen interest in, and
attention to, the opposing argument. It is impossible to rebut an
argument which has not been heard or one which was not understood. If
the preparation for rebuttal has been thorough and has conformed to the
plan laid down in the first part of this chapter, the student will be so
familiar with the possible lines of discussion that he will have no
difficulty in grasping his opponents’ arguments. The debater should
experience a keen interest in the way in which the opposing speakers
will present their arguments. He must not let his mind wander from the
subject for a single instant. All his mental power must be concentrated
on the business in hand. He must not be confused by any unusual method
of presentation. If his preparation has been thorough no essentially new
argument will be brought forth, although arguments with which he is
familiar are quite likely to be presented in a form with which he is
unfamiliar. He must grasp quickly the significance of such arguments and
reduce them to terms in which they are clear to his own mind. Then he
must correlate his own rebuttal material with what he has heard. He must
see the relation which each part bears to the whole and be able to weigh
the relative values of the contentions. The keynote of effective
rebuttal is keen attention to the opposing argument.


_2. Selecting the arguments to be refuted._

No attempt should be made to refute everything which the opposing
speaker presents. In breaking a chain it is just as effective to break
one link as it is to break every link. The successful debater must
analyze keenly and sift the essential from the trivial. If his opponent
is a skilled debater he will have certain definite main issues and
definite evidence and reasoning. The task of refutation is thus made
easy. The main issues are refuted directly by showing that he has not
analyzed the question rightly, or by showing mistakes in evidence or in
processes of reasoning. If his opponent is not skilled in debate his
argument must be reduced to certain definite parts and then refuted in
like manner. Very often the rebuttal cards will contain the exact
arguments presented by an opponent, but more often it becomes necessary
for the speaker to select the vital parts of the opposing contentions
and write them down briefly. He should be sure that he states the exact
position of his opponent. Otherwise he is thrown open to the charge of
willful misrepresentation, or carelessness, or lack of ability in
grasping what has been said. Only that which is vital should be selected
and it should be written down either in clear-cut phrases, or in the
exact words of the opponent. The latter plan is often most effective
because it offers the least chance for a dispute as to what the argument
really is. On the other hand where the position of an opponent is
unmistakable, although somewhat ambiguously expressed, a decided
advantage is gained by stating his position in a better way than it has
previously been stated. In any event an argument is not selected for
refutation until it has been set off from all subsidiary material by
brief, clear phrasing.

Where several means of proving a proposition have been presented, but
only one of them could in reality stand as proof, that is the one to
discuss in rebuttal. The debater should be constantly on the lookout for
arguments or evidence which may be combined under one heading. By a
judicious combination of related arguments the destructive work of
rebuttal may be made to cover a wider field. Furthermore, much can be
done to widen the field by means of ingeniously arranging the order of
rebuttal arguments in such a way that certain arguments may be met by
referring them to contentions which have already been answered. In any
event the debater should arrange his arguments in their most effective
order.

When rebuttal is given in introducing the main argument, it is well to
begin by answering the last argument presented by the last speaker for
the opposition. This action on the part of the debater shows quickness
and ability and is sure to make a favorable impression on the hearers.
This may be followed by a refutation of one or two points which have
been especially emphasized by the preceding speaker, after which the
debater should swing naturally and easily into his main constructive
argument. Furthermore, as will be suggested in connection with the
chapter on delivery, the main speech should be so adapted to the
contentions of the opposition that the whole constructive argument is
used to tear down the case of the opposition as well as to be
constructive of one’s own case.


_3. Reading quotations._

The reading of exact quotations from authority usually plays a very
important part in a debate. Especially is this true in cases where a
dispute arises as to what a particular authority says on the point at
issue. For example, if the controversy hinges on the exact wording of a
decision of the Supreme Court, the speaker who produces that decision
and reads from it in the proper manner has gained a decided advantage.
The production of the large leather bound book, in itself, aids the
effect which it is the speaker’s intention to produce. It is something
tangible, something which the audience can see; it is the visual symbol
of superior authority.

Following out the preparation for this reading which has already been
suggested, the student should turn without hesitation to the passage to
be read. He must be so familiar with the wording that he can follow it
with but an occasional glance at the printed page. He must still look
directly at the audience and refer to the book only for the purpose of
guiding his reading. He should read slowly and deliberately, emphasizing
those parts which bear directly on the point at issue. If a statement
contradicts flatly the contentions of the opposition it is well to read
it over again in order to emphasize it more forcibly.


_4. Team work._

In a formal contest the individual debater must work with his team. It
is just as important that the members of a debating team work together
as it is that the members of a football team work together. In formal
debating contests one team is pitted against another team. It is not a
struggle between the individuals composing the teams but a struggle
between the teams themselves. Therefore each must sacrifice his own
inclinations for the good of the team. When there is a necessity for
rebutting an argument which has been advanced by the opposition, the
next speaker must rebut such argument. This must be done notwithstanding
the fact that the rebuttal for that argument is a pet piece of property
belonging to another member of the team who will speak later in the
program. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.


_5. Treatment of opponents._

The object of debate is to reveal the truth. One who speaks in public on
any question is under obligation to inculcate right principles into the
minds of his hearers. Vanity, subterfuge, resentment, and malice have no
place in debate. Only the truth should prevail; and nothing but the
truth will prevail in the end. Therefore the attitude of the debater
toward his work must be one of sincerity and respect. His whole
personality should indicate this state of mind. The use of invective,
ridicule, or satire towards one’s opponents is clearly out of keeping
with this spirit, and nothing of such a nature should be allowed to
intrude itself into the discussion.

The day has passed when “bullyragging” the opposition passed for
argument and won the respect of an audience. The simple fact remains
that an opponent’s argument, not his personality, is to be refuted. The
moment invective, ridicule, or satire enter, they drive out that spirit
of calm inquiry after truth which should be the controlling spirit of
every controversy. Although the hearers as a whole seem to acquiesce in
a vindictive spirit, laugh at sarcastic comments, and appear interested
in a belligerent attitude, the moment the excitement has subsided a
reaction sets in and their respect for the speaker who has amused and
entertained them in this way is dead. If an opponent has used these
unkind weapons against you, the most effective reply that you can make
is to ignore them and begin at once a continuation of the discussion in
a plain, orderly manner.

It is both discourteous and unnecessary to accuse an opponent of
dishonesty, or misrepresentation. If he has really indulged in these
unfair means the evidence advanced in rebuttal will reveal that fact.
When any difference arises it is best to assume that the opponent is
honestly mistaken. A favorite method of Lincoln’s was to show that his
opponent’s conclusion appeared to be right on the first consideration,
but that a more extended investigation revealed the fact that it was
unsound. Sometimes he even took great care to explain that he had
himself formerly held the opinions which his opponents were attempting
to defend, and then by skillful use of evidence he would show why he had
changed his own opinion. In this way, without giving offense to his
opponents or to his audience, he was able in many cases to win them to
his cause without their looking upon him as an active agency in
producing the change.

A debater must deal honestly with his opponents. It is dishonest and
immoral to present evidence in such a way that it will appear to show as
true that which the debater knows to be untrue. No concealment or
suppression of fact designed to mislead the opposition should be
tolerated. Sometimes vital issues are ignored or an attempt is made to
conceal them under a display of confusing language. Such methods are
reprehensible. Nothing but absolute fairness in the treatment of
opponents will gain any permanent advantage, for even from the selfish
standpoint honesty and fairness are best. A speaker cannot impress his
audience with his fair-mindedness unless he is treating his opponents in
a fair manner. An appearance of fairness always gains a respectful
hearing for a cause. A man must be a man before he can be anything else.
That fine sense of personal courtesy which characterizes the gentleman,
and the earnest desire for truth which denotes the scholar, are
fundamental requisites for him who would persuade.


_6. The summary and closing plea._

After the debater has answered what he conceives to be the essential
arguments of the opposition, he should present his final summary. Where
a time limit is fixed beyond which he may not speak, he must allow
himself ample time to deliver this closing plea entire. The necessity of
stopping before the end is reached destroys the sense of completeness
which this conclusion is designed to give the argument. The form of this
summary has been discussed in a previous section. All aids to a
persuasive delivery discussed in the chapter on delivering the argument
must be employed to give force and conviction to this last appeal. The
end of the discussion has been reached, and the debater, if his
preparation has been in accordance with the principles which we have
considered, has put forth his best efforts. All the weeks or months of
preparation must now be crystalized into one final effort, and the
speaker must realize his own responsibility. He should feel sure that
his cause will triumph, and the fire and vigor of his delivery must
manifest this fact to the audience. He should remember that he is
fighting for principles of right which are eternal. Even the defeat of
the moment, if it come to him, should in no wise make him afraid.
Victory should not elate, nor defeat depress, the spirit of truth which
ever should be the sure foundation of those whose high calling it is to
persuade men to act in accordance with that which is right.




                              CHAPTER VIII
                        DELIVERING THE ARGUMENT


The statement is frequently made by those well versed in the art of
public speaking that a poor speech well delivered is much better than a
good speech poorly delivered. Again the statement is sometimes made that
in judging the efficiency of an oral argument, twenty-five per cent is
counted on the substance while seventy-five per cent is counted on the
delivery. Be that as it may, the delivery of an argument is certainly a
most important factor in determining its effect upon the hearer. Under
the head of delivery we might include the whole field of public speaking
and oratory, but since we are treating only of argument we must confine
our attention to those phases of public speaking which may be applied in
a practical way to the oral delivery of argumentative discourse.


I. Methods of delivering the argument.


_1. Reading._

To read an argument is certainly the most ineffective way to present it.
After all the work of constructing the argument is accomplished, it is
certainly poor policy to intrust its delivery to the lazy method of
reading it from the manuscript. Such a method presents all the
disadvantages of speaking with none of the advantages of reading. If the
argument is read, the reader can inform himself fully of its contents,
because he can read it slowly or rapidly as he chooses. Passages which
he does not thoroughly understand may be re-read. Moreover, he may go
back over the argument and review its main points as well as scrutinize
all the evidence offered to support them. But if the argument is read
from a manuscript, the listener must receive it at the rate of delivery
which is chosen by the reader. He cannot, as a general rule, ask that
the passages which are not clear to him, be re-read, and at the end he
is not permitted to go back and ponder over parts which appear to him to
be of doubtful validity, nor can he very well question the evidence
presented. Furthermore, the reader, being tied down to his manuscript,
cannot give the force or expression to the argument which would be
possible were he speaking directly to the persons addressed. He cannot
see by the look of understanding or perplexity on their faces, just what
parts of his argument are clear and what parts are not clear to them.
Again, the sympathy which should exist between speaker and audience is
almost entirely shut out. A manuscript stands like the Chinese wall
between the speaker and his audience.

The defects of this method of delivering an argument are pointed out
because there is a decided tendency on the part of college men, and a
few men of some reputation, to adopt this manner of presentation, which
is certainly the easiest way but which is generally as ineffective as it
is easy. Whenever it is important that real results be obtained, whether
in the class room, in a formal debate, or in real life, this method
should be avoided.


_2. Memorizing the argument verbatim._

The delivery of a speech memorized verbatim is certainly to be preferred
to reading, because it at least affords the speaker the opportunity of
stating his case directly to his audience, and permits the use of all
the arts of declamation; but since the speech is set in definite form it
precludes the modification necessary to adapt the argument to the
contentions advanced by the opposition. In college debating this form of
delivery is especially objectionable because from it the student derives
little practical benefit. As has already been pointed out, the great
value of debating lies in its training for the practical affairs of life
by teaching the student to frame his argument on the spur of the moment,
adapt it to the conditions of the particular situation which he is
facing, and present it in an effective manner. All of these advantages
are lost if the argument is committed to memory verbatim.


_3. Memorizing the argument by ideas._

By this method the written argument which has been prepared is made the
basis of the delivery. It furnishes a substantial foundation for the
speech. The argument has gone through the process of construction
according to the directions heretofore given. It is, therefore, an
efficient instrument of persuasion and the greatest results may be most
surely obtained by the method of memorizing the argument by ideas. The
three steps in this process of memorizing are as follows:

First, the argument should be read over slowly several times in order
that the speaker may get an accurate view of the production as a whole.
In most cases the student will have this much accomplished by the time
he has written out the argument in final form.

Second, the central idea of each paragraph should be memorized. As a
general rule, the paragraphs will conform to the topics of the brief.
That is, each topic in the brief, with the possible exception of the
lowest sub-topic, will be developed by means of a separate paragraph.
The central idea will, of course, be the thought expressed by the
statement in the brief which the paragraph is designed to develop.
However, this idea should be committed in the form in which it appears
in the finished argument, and not in the form in which it appears in the
brief. In this way each idea will be grasped in its relation to the rest
of the argument as well as in its relation to the manner in which it has
been elaborated in the paragraph. Each idea presented should then be
committed in its proper order so that the speaker can go through the
entire argument and state the idea expressed in each paragraph.

Third, the idea contained in each sentence of the paragraph should be
committed to memory. If the student has honestly constructed his
argument each statement in it means all and more than he expressed when
he wrote it out, therefore the committing of the idea contained in each
sentence should not be difficult. Furthermore, the idea should be
grasped in its completeness without reference to the words in which it
is expressed in the manuscript. In most cases it is well to remember the
key-word of each sentence, which expresses the central thought.
Sometimes more than one word is necessary for this purpose, but in any
event, only those words which embody the heart of the thought, should be
committed. All subsidiary words, or words explaining, expanding,
limiting, or showing transitions or relations should not be committed,
but should be left for spontaneous utterance at the moment of delivery.

This method of memorizing gives naturalness, directness, and spontaneity
to the delivery. It trains the speaker to keep his mind firmly fixed on
the subject in hand and it eliminates the danger of that monotony which
is the result of verbatim memorizing. Perhaps the most important
advantage of this method of delivery is the fact that it allows the
speaker to adapt his argument to the contentions of his opponent. Since
he has made himself thoroughly familiar with the material of his
argument but has not tied himself to any set form of words, his
expression is flexible. If the argument is to be delivered in a debate,
the speaker should practice delivering it so as to meet the various
contentions which may be advanced by the opposition. Then when the time
comes for the final presentation, he will be prepared to so word his
speech as to make it directly applicable to what has just been said on
the other side. Practice of this kind is needed in everyday life without
regard to the occupation in which the student may chance to engage.

There are other methods of delivery, but we need not give them extended
consideration. The argument might be delivered extempore from the brief.
This method however, is likely to be ineffective, since the speaker does
not express himself with definiteness and precision. Furthermore, he is
likely to occupy a great deal of time in presenting points which, if
carefully framed in forcible sentences, could be stated directly and
briefly. Again, the tendency to ramble is great when the purely
extempore method is used.

The speaker should first write out his argument even though he expects
to follow what he has written only in a general way. The very fact of
his having written out the argument will tend to make more definite his
own ideas of what he wishes to say. It blazes the trail or wears a sort
of path through the mind of the writer from which he is not likely to
deviate far when the final delivery is made. The method of
extemporaneous delivery, however, is not well adapted to the
presentation of a formal constructive argument, because it is too loose
and lacks the conciseness characterizing the method of committing by
ideas. After long periods of practice the student may be able to use the
purely extemporaneous method with good effect, but while he is a student
he should keep to the well-beaten path.

Still another method of delivery is to write out an introduction, a
conclusion, and certain important passages, and leave the rest to
extemporaneous delivery. This method may be used with considerable
success providing the time limit is not a consideration, and providing,
furthermore, that the speaker is an expert in making the transitions
from the committed to the uncommitted parts of his speech. With the
inexperienced speaker, this method usually results in a rapid, fiery
delivery of the committed parts and a hesitating, stammering, and
woefully ineffective delivery of the uncommitted portions. This attracts
the attention of the audience to the way in which the speech has been
prepared and takes the attention away from the subject of the debate.

From every standpoint the method of committing by ideas is by far the
best for both the experienced and the inexperienced speaker. It gives
him a command of his argument which inspires confidence. There is not
the haunting fear that the speech may be forgotten, a fear which
terrorizes the heart of all speakers who commit word for word.

If the debater chooses he may have a full outline of his argument
written out on cards and take these with him when he goes to face the
audience. No attempt need be made to hide these notes, for they are a
legitimate safeguard against emergencies. They should be carried boldly
and laid on a table near the speaker so that he can refer to them
readily if occasion demands. He should never take cards or notes from
his pocket. Such an action always gives the audience the impression that
the speaker is trying to do something which is beyond his powers. The
notes should be referred to deliberately and only when it is absolutely
necessary. To refer too often to notes indicates a lack of thorough
preparation and makes an unfavorable impression. The notes should be
ready for use, but they should seldom be used. In fact, the best
speakers usually leave their notes untouched.


II. Physical preparation for delivery.

Much harm results from the advice so frequently given to the debater
which counsels him to be natural. If accepted in its proper significance
this advice is sound and accords well with common sense. Too often,
however, it is taken as a license to disregard all rules of physical
training for public speaking, and to give no thought to physical
appearance and action while on the platform. On the contrary these
things are highly important. In a sense, physical preparation is
composed of trifles; such as, matters of position, gesture, and so
forth. But it is these things that make for perfection, and we are told
with truth that perfection is no trifle. The person who tells the
inexperienced debater to be natural has failed to distinguish between
natural and _habitual_. James Fox may have acquired a bad habit of
standing, when before an audience, with all his weight on one foot. We
are then erroneously told that that is his natural way of standing
because he always stands that way. On the contrary, that is his habitual
way of standing, for no normal individual naturally stands with all his
weight thrown upon one foot. Such bad habits must be overcome and good
habits formed and strengthened. Then, and then only, may we safely
instruct the debater to be natural.


_1. Position._

The position of the debater on the platform should indicate ease and
dignity of bearing. It should give him an appearance of stability and
should make easy and natural the use of gestures. The speaker should not
stand rigidly throughout his delivery in the same position which he
first took. He should move easily about the platform, and all movements
should be made deliberately, not abruptly. The position should not be
changed too often but when a change is desired the speaker should not
turn away from his audience or move sideways along the platform; he
should move back and up again in a V-shaped course.

The object of these suggestions is to enable the speaker to acquire ease
and naturalness of bearing, for nothing should be done in a stiff,
formal manner. Every position and movement should be so natural and
spontaneous that the attention of the audience will not be diverted to
the personal eccentricities of the speaker but will follow
uninterruptedly the progress of his argument.


_2. Voice._

There is no set way of addressing the audience. Good form and manners
vary with the locality. Neither is there a set method of delivering an
argument. Individual peculiarities vary so widely and the style of
delivery adapted to the personality of the debater is so difficult to
attain that we can only point out the most common faults and explain
general rules regarding delivery. The best training in actual practice
is debating under the direction of a competent instructor.

The voice of the speaker should be clear and strong. We cannot give here
any complete treatment of the methods of vocal training which make the
voice clear and strong, but, where opportunity affords, the student of
debate should have a thorough training in the art of public speaking.
Singing, under proper instruction, will also improve the volume and
quality of the voice as well as give the speaker greater voice control.
A few practical suggestions regarding the use of the voice may be given
some attention at this point.

It has been said that breath is the stuff of which the voice is made.
Attention must therefore be given to proper breathing. The entire lung
capacity should be used. The breath should be directed through the vocal
chords so as to produce a pure tone. The speaker should remember to keep
the throat muscles relaxed and the tongue, jaws, and lips out of the
way. These organs of speech are to be used to mould into clear-cut words
the stream of sound issuing from the vocal chords. Their function is not
to suppress sound but to modify it.

Words should be formed as near the lips as it is possible to make them.
The speaker must not fear to open his mouth and articulate distinctly.
Most words should be formed just back of the front teeth. So formed, the
sound is thrown out with force and resonance, for the hard palate or
roof of the mouth is a natural sounding board. If the speaker forms his
words far back in his mouth they issue only in incoherent mutterings.
Since an argument must be heard to be believed, the most thorough
preparation up to this point may be entirely offset by a poor delivery.
The enunciation of the speaker should be so clear and distinct that the
attention of those addressed will be fixed upon what he is saying, not
upon the way in which he is saying it.

Every word should be pronounced distinctly. Vagueness in delivery is
just as harmful as vagueness in language or substance. If one word in a
sentence is pronounced so ineffectively that it is not understood, it
may be impossible for the person hearing that sentence to grasp its
meaning. In any event it requires the listener to make the mental effort
of figuring out what the sentence means, and this mental effort tires
the hearer, prevents him from giving his undivided attention to the
substance of the argument, and ultimately results in his losing all
interest in the discussion. It is therefore plain that clear enunciation
is a matter of fundamental importance.

A clear, resonant voice is in itself a valuable asset for the debater.
It inspires respect and denotes self-reliance. However, loudness should
not be confused with distinctness, for mere loudness often accentuates,
rather than remedies poor articulation. The world at large is more ready
to believe a person who has a clear-cut, distinct way of speaking than
it is to believe one who utters his words in a slovenly manner. It is
often true that slovenly habits of speech indicate slovenly habits of
thinking and even slovenly morals. The habit of using the voice
effectively, however, is not one which can be put on and taken off at
will. The voice must be used correctly in everyday conversation as well
as in formal debating.


_3. Emphasis._

The debater must make plain the important parts of his argument by means
of emphasis. In speaking, as in writing, it is useless to try to
emphasize everything. Only those parts which have been emphasized in
writing out the argument should be emphasized in delivering it. An
attempt to emphasize everything results in no emphasis at all. The
speaker should therefore study his argument carefully and pick out the
parts which are indispensable to his position. The audience will not
perform this task of picking out the most important passages; the
speaker must do it himself. In the delivery these parts should be
emphasized by means of gestures, by speaking them more slowly and
deliberately, or by any other legitimate method.


_4. Key, rate, and inflection._

The debater should speak in his average key. By key we mean the pitch of
the voice in speaking. By average key is meant that key to which the
voice of the particular individual is especially adapted. Average key
should not be confused with habitual key. One may easily acquire the
habit of speaking either above or below the average key. The tendency of
the inexperienced orator is usually to speak in a key which is too high.
This defect is tiresome to both audience and speaker and should be
overcome at any cost, for the debater should speak in a key which is
easy and natural. This enables him to derive the benefit of full
inflection both upward and downward, and bestows confidence and ease.

A common fault of the inexperienced speaker is a too rapid rate of
delivery. In the beginning of the speech it is especially important that
every word be spoken slowly and distinctly. At no part of the speech
should the rate be so rapid as to prevent the audience from grasping the
full significance of what is being said. The average rate of delivery
has been computed to be one hundred and twenty-five words per minute,
allowing for pauses and transitions; but the rate should vary according
to the speaker, the subject, and the audience. First of all the rate
should be adapted to the thought and to the emotion. Simple ideas can be
presented rapidly, while complex ideas must be presented slowly. In all
cases the audience should be given ample time to grasp the ideas
presented. With this caution in mind the speaker may dwell upon the
important thoughts and emotions and pass lightly and quickly over the
unimportant. Thought and emotion must be fully appreciated by the
speaker at the time of delivery, and this appreciation should be
indicated in part by the rate of speaking. In general it may be said
that the emotions of awe, grandeur, reverence, sorrow, etc., should be
voiced with a slow movement, while emotions of joy, anger, indignation,
enthusiasm, etc., should be voiced with a rapid movement. However the
student should be careful to avoid either a jerky or a drawling
delivery. These faults are due usually to a failure to dwell upon the
vowel sounds. No set rule can be established, but all of these things
should be considered by the speaker when he is preparing to deliver his
argument.

Inflection should be used to give variety to the argument, to bring out
the special significance of important passages, and to show the bearing
which the evidence has upon the general principles. The amateur speaker
usually varies his inflection according to the punctuation. This is not
a safe rule to follow. The falling inflection indicates that the thought
is complete, but not that the end of the sentence has been reached. In
argumentative speaking the falling inflection is most frequently used
because it indicates positive assertion. It denotes confidence in what
is being said. On the other hand, the rising inflection denotes doubt,
indecision, negation, or appeal. It is often necessary to express all of
these attitudes in delivering an argument; but the falling inflection,
which denotes a positive statement, should predominate.


_5. Gesture._

The memorizing of gestures is as ineffective as is the memorizing of
words. Both tend to make the delivery mechanical and hence should be
carefully avoided. The student should never pick out certain emphatic
parts in his discourse and seek to emphasize them by means of gestures
which he has studied out and practiced. In fact gesturing is not a
necessity in the delivering of an argument. It is certain that poor
gesturing is worse than none at all. Gestures add to the effectiveness
of an argument only when they are simple and natural. As a general rule
they are natural only when they are made spontaneously. Here, again,
practice before a competent instructor, or at least before a sensible
critic, is indispensable. Every gesture that is made must appear as a
natural effort to be understood and believed.

The student should learn to use gestures, not in connection with any
particular argument but in connection with the expression of his own
thought and feeling. Here, again, the instruction to be natural may
prove misleading. The speaker may be naturally awkward, or at least his
gesturing may be awkward, and thus produce only a desire to laugh on the
part of the audience. This natural awkwardness must be overcome and
replaced by a natural gracefulness. The gestures used in argumentation
need not be elaborate, in fact simple gestures are more effective. The
gesture should seem to be a part of the thought or emotion, and training
should be resorted to only for the purpose of securing naturalness,
gracefulness, and ease. In gesturing, only that which is natural in the
right way, that which enforces the thought instead of diverting
attention from it, is effective.


_6. Transitions._

The transition from one part of the speech to another should be clearly
indicated. In constructing the argument these transition points were
made plain by means of transition sentences showing the division between
the introduction and the proof, the main issues of the proof and each
subordinate issue, and the proof and conclusion. When the argument is to
be delivered, however, the delivery should make these transition points
stand out like white mile posts. In this way two advantages are gained.
First, the structure of the argument is vividly impressed upon the mind
of the hearer. Second, these transitions break the monotony of the
speech and keep alive the interest of the audience. In beginning each
new main issue, and often in beginning the presentation of an important
piece of evidence, the speaker should drop to the conversational tone.
He should talk directly to his audience as though it were an individual.
Then he should gradually increase the force of his delivery until he is
speaking in his strongest persuasive manner. This method gives variety
to the argument, and thus prevents it from growing monotonous.
Furthermore, it insures a better appreciation of the argument as a
whole.

Other devices which may be used in connection with the above method for
marking transitions are, (1) varying the inflections, (2) changing the
rate of delivery, (3) using appropriate gestures, (4) changing the mode
of emphasis, (5) making use of pauses, and (6) changing position on the
platform. All of these devices must be used with skill and ease. Nothing
should appear abrupt and fantastic, but each part of the speech should
be made to blend gracefully with the whole argument.


_7. Presenting charts._

In presenting a series of statistics the necessity for large charts,
which may be hung up at the back of the platform and explained by the
speaker, is almost absolute. No audience can keep in mind a mass of
statistics. The oral presentation of figures makes little real
impression upon the minds of the hearers and serves to confuse rather
than to enlighten. Therefore these figures must be presented so that the
audience can see them. Statistics should be carefully tabulated in
accordance with the following form:

 ┌─────────────────────────────────┬─────────────────┬─────────────────┐
 │                                 │   Real Estate   │Personal Property│
 ├─────────────────────────────────┼─────────────────┼─────────────────┤
 │United States                    │      77:13      │      22:87      │
 │New England States               │      71:50      │      28:50      │
 │Middle States                    │      86:60      │      13:40      │
 │Southern States                  │      70:77      │      29:23      │
 │Western States                   │      74:09      │      25:91      │
 │Territories                      │      46:81      │      53:19      │
 ├─────────────────────────────────┴─────────────────┴─────────────────┤
 │Source: United States Census Report—1880—Vol. VII—pp. 17.            │
 └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

The chart and the letters and figures upon it should be large enough to
be seen clearly by all auditors.

To set forth tables of statistics is not the only use to which these
charts may be put. They may be used to illustrate territorial conditions
by means of maps, to show comparisons by means of lines, squares, or
circles, and for as many other purposes as the ingenuity of the speaker
can invent. In formal debating contests a set of carefully prepared
charts usually gives a distinct advantage to their possessors. They
stand for something definite, something which the judges and audience
may see with their own eyes. These charts may be hung up and left open,
but it is often better to have a thin sheet of paper pinned over them.
When a chart is to be used either the speaker or one of his colleagues
may remove the sheet of paper. It should then be left open to the gaze
of the audience throughout the entire discussion. If several charts are
used and all of them cannot be left exposed to view, the most important
one should be placed in the favored position.

In explaining a chart the speaker should make use of his most
conversational delivery. He should take a light pointer in the hand
nearest the chart and direct the attention of his hearers to the figures
as he states them. In doing this the speaker should always face the
audience and talk to them instead of to the chart. He should be so
familiar with the material on the chart that he needs only to glance at
it for the purpose of directing attention to each new figure as he
starts to explain its significance. A carefully prepared chart, clearly
explained in accordance with the foregoing directions, is a valuable aid
to interest and clearness in the delivery of any argument.


III. Mental preparation for delivery.

In the last section we concerned ourselves with matters relating to the
form of delivery; with things primarily physical. We now turn to the
substance of delivery and consider things primarily mental. The attitude
of mind which the speaker maintains toward his subject and his auditors
is a powerful factor in persuasion.


_1. Directness._

Clear, intense thinking should always accompany the delivery of an
argument. The mental attitude of the speaker must be one of alert,
business-like attention. With the attention of the speaker riveted upon
the object of his argument, the audience will be compelled to follow him
straight to the conclusion. The simple directness of the speaker who
keeps his mind firmly fixed on his subject is irresistible.

No ostentation or striving after effect should be allowed to hold a
place in the speaker’s thoughts, for the day of bombastic oratory is
passed. This is a practical age; the world demands results, and results
demand directness. Simplicity of thought begets simplicity of
expression, and the orator with but a single idea underlying his
argument has this irresistible power.

In delivering the argument the debater must forget himself, so far as
his preparation and personality are concerned, and think only of what he
is saying. The simple conversational style in which two persons discuss
a subject of vital interest to them is usually direct. This directness
comes from the vital interest of the speakers and their desire to make
their ideas plain. The same conversational directness should exist in
debating. Very often the speaker can obtain greater directness by
picking out two or three people in various parts of the audience and
talking to them. In a formal debating contest the debater sometimes
picks out the judges and talks to them. The use of this method does not
ignore the rest of the audience, because the debater is speaking to the
audience as a whole, and it does give force and directness to the
delivery.

The greatest orators of modern times have been noted for their
simplicity and natural directness. In fact, this was clearly the
predominating characteristic of the style of Abraham Lincoln and Wendell
Phillips; and even Webster, highly endowed as he was with natural
attributes which made his style grand rather than simple, was above all
else noted for his directness.


_2. Earnestness._

Earnestness is the basis of persuasion. The man who is in earnest about
anything is bound to accomplish something. By this earnestness we do not
mean that which is assumed for the occasion, but that earnestness which
comes from deep convictions. Without the quality of earnestness the
debater becomes a mere speaker of words. For any particular occasion,
the speaker should prepare himself by forming in his own mind strong
convictions regarding his subject. In formal debating a speaker is
sometimes compelled to argue against his convictions. In such a case the
best he can do is to present his position. As a general rule the
questions discussed in class and debating contests are so evenly
balanced and so broad in their application that to arrive at a just
conclusion requires more investigation than the ordinary debater can
well undertake. The debater should, therefore, be content to fulfil his
function as a defender of the truth. He should make his investigation
thorough before championing any cause in real life. Having found the
proper cause for the exercise of his skill he must first convince
himself of its worth; then only can he present his case with the
earnestness of conviction.

In general the mental preparation of the speaker who strives for
earnestness must begin far back in his career. Sincerity is not
something which can be brought out for parade on special occasions. The
orator who wishes to impress his fellow men with his sincerity must in
all his thoughts and actions be sincere himself. If this fundamental
preparation in common integrity does not exist within the speaker, that
fact will be recognized by his audience. His words will carry neither
weight nor conviction because the hearer must inevitably declare with
Emerson “What you are speaks so loud, I cannot hear what you say.”

The earnestness of the speaker must be the result of high principles,
lofty character, and a firm and sincere conviction of the worth of his
cause. He must have a deep sympathy with his cause and with his
auditors. He must possess a wide knowledge of human nature which will
enable him to appeal to the emotions of his hearers in a sympathetic
manner. He must take their point of view and feel as he would have them
feel in regard to his subject. Then all the force of his being will
awake to fortify and render invincible his argument. In this way it will
become a conquering instrument of persuasion. The arts of the orator
must be employed to lead men, not to drive them. The speaker must take
the attitude that he is merely one of his audience who has found out
something worth while and who earnestly desires to share his discovery
with his neighbors. Anything approaching a patronizing air, or an “I am
holier (or wiser) than thou attitude,” is fatal to sympathy and
earnestness. He should follow the simple direct method of taking his
hearers into his confidence and talking to them as though he feels that
they are as wise and good as himself. He should watch the expressions of
sympathy or hostility on their faces and lead them quietly along the
road of earnestness, the end of which is persuasion.


_3. Confidence._

The speaker’s confidence in himself and in his cause should be absolute.
The time for hesitation and self-questioning has passed when the speaker
stands before his audience. Then he should feel himself master of the
situation. He must take the attitude of mind which befits an expert or a
professional. By this we do not mean an ostentatious show of knowledge
or insolent superiority. The directions contained in the last section
should be a sufficient guarantee against such an attitude. But the
speaker must honestly think that he is engaged in an important and
commendable undertaking and that he has the ability to carry it through
successfully. In order to do this he must assume an attitude of unbiased
fairness and honesty. His manner should indicate that he feels himself
responsible for the truth. He must never appear to be concealing
anything from his hearers, nor should he appear to be taking advantage
of his opponents or depriving them of any credit to which they are
justly entitled. Never should he misquote an opponent or put an
unfavorable interpretation upon what that opponent has said. An audience
loves fair play and the knowledge that he is making a fair fight, with
everything above board, gives confidence to the speaker.

A speaker should always exercise self-control. At no time should he put
all his force into the language which he uses. He should always maintain
a reserve force which will give a background of power to his delivery.
Never should he allow his temper to be ruffled by anything that may
happen during the discussion; to indulge in an outburst of temper is
positively belittling. Washington’s advice to young men was “Conquer the
territory under your own hat.” This is an apt expression for the debater
to keep constantly in mind. The complete self-reliance which puts the
speaker at his ease is acquired only by practice. In fact, many great
speakers have gone through life facing a period of nervousness just
before appearing before their audiences. This trait, however, is not
necessarily an evil. The speaker should always appreciate the importance
of the occasion and his own responsibility. If he does this to the
extent of having his emotions aroused it often makes his delivery more
direct, earnest, and confident. The point to be remembered is that he
must have that confidence which convinces his hearers that his argument
is the result of clean, clear-cut thinking, and persuades them to act in
accordance with the truth which that argument reveals.

The power of a speaker does not exist in the development of any one
trait. He must study methods of delivery, and must not weary of
painstaking physical and mental preparation. Back of all of this must be
the man himself, entrenched in mental and moral strength. No defect is
too trifling to be overcome by constant vigilance, no improvement so
unimportant as not to merit the most arduous striving. The student who
is ambitious to acquire the art of persuasion should practice constantly
and neglect no opportunity to appear before an audience. For every
principle gleaned from these pages the debater must provide himself with
ninety-nine opportunities for practice. It is only by actual practice
that anyone can hope to travel far along the road which leads to the
goal of perfection.




                                PART II
                 THE THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION AND DEBATE




                               CHAPTER I
                           INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT


All persons of average intelligence and education are able to
distinguish an obviously sound argument from an obviously false
argument. No knowledge of argumentation or logic is necessary to enable
such persons to perceive the truth of one or the falsity of the other.
However, the line which separates the true from the false, or the sound
from the unsound, is not always clearly marked. In fact most arguments
involve a consideration of so many factors that their truth or falsity
is very difficult to determine. It is for this reason that we must study
the various theoretical forms in which an argument may be presented.


I. The application of processes of reasoning to argumentation.

Logic deals with the formal process of reasoning. It tests the validity
of a reasoning process by applying certain principles which will reveal
its strength or weakness. It is not essential to know the science of
logic in order to reason or to argue well. Many of our most profound
thinkers have possessed only a superficial knowledge of that subject. A
knowledge of the forms of reasoning which logic considers, or of the
names applied to them, is by no means indispensable to an intelligent
argument or debate. Nevertheless, an exact knowledge of logical
processes of reasoning as applied to the construction of arguments is
absolutely indispensable to him who would become master of the Art of
Argumentation and Debate.

There are two uses to which the debater must put these correct processes
of reasoning. In the first place, he must use them to test the validity
of his own arguments. In the second place, he must use them to test the
validity of his opponents’ arguments. Both of these uses will suggest to
the mind of the student the importance of the application of processes
of reasoning to argumentation.

An argument is seldom presented in such a form that it is possible to
apply logical reasoning processes to it as it stands. Usually some parts
are omitted and others are expanded or modified for the purpose of
greater effect in persuasion. The student must therefore grasp the
essential parts of his argument before he can arrange them in the formal
manner which logic demands. This very exercise of cutting up a
discussion into parts for the purpose of determining whether it is
rightly constructed is a mental exercise of unusual value. Furthermore,
it reveals any weak places in the argument and shows where it must be
made strong if it is to be effective. In like manner the debater is able
to apply the same processes to the arguments of his opponents to show
their weaknesses and enable him to direct his efforts toward these
vulnerable points.


II. Inductive reasoning.

Inductive reasoning is the process by which we arrive at a general
conclusion through the observation of concrete particulars. I have read
_Treasure Island_ and I found it interesting. Moreover, I have read
_Kidnapped_, _David Balfour_, _Prince Otto_, and _St. Ives_, all of
which were interesting to me. All of these books were written by Robert
Louis Stevenson, and after I had read them I arrived at the general
conclusion that all books written by Robert Louis Stevenson were
interesting. I made use of this conclusion by searching in the library
for other books by this same author, for I felt sure that if I could
find another of his books it would be interesting. However, we are not
now concerned with the uses to be made of this process of reasoning, but
rather with its exact form. The process by which I arrived at the
conclusion that all of Stevenson’s works are interesting is a fair
example of inductive reasoning. I had five specific instances all
pointing to the same conclusion. I had observed five of Stevenson’s
books and I reached a conclusion regarding all of them. The conclusion
included those which I had not read as well as those which I had read.
This process conforms to our definition that inductive reasoning is the
process by which we arrive at a general conclusion through the
observation of concrete particulars.

In this way we arrive at many conclusions upon which we rely in our
daily life. We go to a certain place at ten minutes past the hour for
the purpose of boarding a street car which will take us to the city. We
do this because for many months we have been accustomed to go to this
same place at this particular time and there we have always found a
street car which took us to the city. Each one of the instances in which
we have done this is a concrete particular tending to support the
general conclusion that if we go to a certain place at a certain time we
shall find a car which will take us to the city.

A further investigation of this process of inductive reasoning reveals
the fact that it may be divided into two sharply defined classes, (1)
perfect inductions, and (2) imperfect inductions. A perfect induction is
one in which all the particular instances upon which a conclusion is
based can be examined directly. For example, if I am aware that each one
of the twenty men who are taking this course in Argumentation expect to
be civil engineers I may safely state the general conclusion that “All
the men who are taking this course in Argumentation expect to be civil
engineers.” This is a perfect induction, because I have included in the
conclusion only those men who are taking this course; there are only
twenty men and investigation has shown that each of them expects to be a
civil engineer. Therefore, it is plain that there can be no opportunity
for error. Every particular instance relied upon can be accounted for
and no instance outside of these is brought within the conclusion. The
induction is therefore perfect.

An imperfect induction is one in which the conclusion extends beyond the
concrete specific instances upon which it is based. The examples already
given regarding Stevenson’s novels and the street car are imperfect
inductions. I have not read all of Stevenson’s novels and I may yet find
one that is not interesting to me. Regarding the induction about the
street car, it is sufficient to note that if the car were late or failed
to appear at all, the conclusion would be of no value in that specific
instance. Likewise I may state the general inductive conclusion that all
roses are fragrant. I base this conclusion upon a great number of
specific instances. The rose that I plucked yesterday was fragrant;
those which I observed in the conservatory last month were fragrant; the
roses which bloom in my door-yard each summer are fragrant; all the
roses that I have known since I was old enough to notice such matters
have been fragrant. Upon this great number of specific instances I base
my inductive conclusion. It will be observed, however, that my
conclusion is not confined to the roses which I have seen but that it
extends beyond and includes all roses of every kind everywhere. It is
therefore an imperfect induction. As it stands it would be impossible to
make this induction a perfect one, because it would be an impossible
task to examine every rose in the world. The only way in which the
induction can be made perfect is to restrict the conclusion to cover
only the specific instances upon which it is based. The conclusion would
then be, “All the roses to which I have ever given attention were
fragrant.”

But it may not suit our purpose thus to restrict the conclusion. We may
wish to make use of it in its broad general significance. Every day we
are compelled to act upon imperfect inductions, as in the case of the
street car. In such cases we must resort to certain rules or tests
whereby we can determine the probability of the truth of the imperfect
induction. We shall consider these rules or tests after we have
discussed the application of inductive reasoning to inductive argument.


III. The application of inductive reasoning to inductive argument.

We have seen the nature of the process of induction and have observed
the distinction between the perfect and the imperfect. Let us now
consider the application of the inductive process to arguments. The
occurrence of this process in all argumentative discourse is frequent. A
simple illustration of its application is furnished in connection with
the proposition “Resolved, that the Federal Government should levy an
income tax.” The affirmative in the course of its investigation finds
that this tax has proved practicable in Switzerland, Germany, France,
and England. Further investigation discloses the fact that these are the
only countries in which this particular form of taxation has been
adopted. From these particular instances, namely,—Switzerland, Germany,
France, and England, the general inductive conclusion may be drawn that
“The income tax has proved practicable in all the countries in which it
has been adopted.” This is a perfect inductive conclusion.

In presenting this induction in an argument, the conclusion should be
stated first. Then each of the countries in which the income tax has
been adopted should be discussed and evidence introduced to show that it
has proved practicable in every case. Finally, evidence should be
brought forth to show that the countries named are the only ones in
which the tax has been adopted. The conclusion should be stated in the
form of a summary, which leaves the argument complete. It is a perfect
inductive argument. While the reasoning process cannot be assailed, the
facts upon which the induction is based may be disproved. Those
advancing the argument must therefore be sure that the facts alleged are
supported by sufficient evidence, while those seeking to overthrow the
argument should be diligent in their search for evidence showing the
weakness or impracticability of the tax in one or all of the countries
cited.

From the above illustration it is plain that the validity of the
reasoning of a perfect induction is easily determined. The mind at once
determines whether or not the specific instances presented warrant the
conclusion reached. The question of the validity of a perfect inductive
argument is largely a question of fact. With the imperfect induction,
however, the situation is somewhat different, for we have seen that the
conclusion extends beyond the actual facts upon which it is based. From
an examination of several observed specific instances a conclusion is
drawn which covers instances unobserved. By it we pass from the known to
the unknown. This process is sometimes called the inductive hazard. The
application of this form of reasoning to argument is illustrated by the
imperfect induction which is made by Lincoln in his Cooper Institute
Address. Here he draws a conclusion as to what all the framers of the
original Constitution thought about the slavery problem, by producing
evidence to show what a part of them thought about it. After introducing
specific evidence to show what each of twenty-three of these men
thought, he says:

“Here then we have twenty-three of our thirty-nine fathers ‘who framed
the government under which we live’, who have, upon their official
responsibility and their corporeal oaths, acted upon the very question
which the text affirms ‘they understood just as well, and even better,
than we do now’; and twenty-one of them—a clear majority of the whole
thirty-nine—so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross political
impropriety and willful perjury, if, in their understanding, any proper
division between local and Federal authority, or anything in the
Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the
Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories.
Thus the twenty-one acted; and as actions speak louder than words, so
actions under such responsibility speak still louder....

“The remaining sixteen of the ‘thirty-nine’, so far as I have
discovered, have left no trace of their understanding upon the direct
question of Federal control in the Federal Territories. But there is
much reason to believe that their understanding upon that question would
not have appeared different from that of their twenty-three compeers,
had it been manifested at all....

“The sum of the whole is that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the
original Constitution, twenty-one—a clear majority of the
whole—certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal
authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal
Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories; while
all the rest had probably the same understanding. Such, unquestionably,
was the understanding of our fathers who framed the original
Constitution; and the text affirms that they understood the question
‘better than we.’”

The true test of an imperfect induction is not its sufficiency for the
person who uses it, but its sufficiency for those to whom it is
addressed. The argument is designed to produce a definite effect and in
order to do this it must fulfil certain conditions. Even when these
conditions are fulfilled the effect of the argument is problematical.
Nevertheless, in order to approach its maximum efficiency an inductive
argument must meet the requirements explained in the following section.


IV. Requirements for an effective inductive argument.


_1. Perfect inductions._

In a perfect induction in which we have seen that the conclusion
includes only the specific instances that have actually been examined,
the only requirement is that the facts upon which it is based be true.
The student must observe the rules regarding the sufficiency of
evidence. He must be sure that he has introduced evidence which shows
conclusively that each specific instance cited in support of the
conclusion is true as a matter of fact. If he allows conjecture to enter
into any one of them he cannot claim for his argument the solidity which
characterizes the perfect induction. If in arguing for the necessity of
additional sources of revenue for the United States government, he has
stated the perfect inductive conclusion that “The expenditures of the
United States government for the last three years have greatly exceeded
its receipts,” he must substantiate his induction by exact reference to
the reports of the Treasurer of the United States for the last three
years. An investigation of these references must reveal the fact that
each of these years has shown a large deficit. The greatest temptation
against which the student will have to guard is that of careless
generalization. He may know that a conclusion includes four specific
instances. He may be certain that three of them support the conclusion,
but he is not quite sure about the fourth. Nevertheless he conjectures
regarding its validity and heedlessly proceeds to his conclusion. This
is a bad habit to cultivate, because it results in loose, inaccurate
thinking. A perfect induction should never be stated in an argument
until each specific instance upon which it is based, and which it
includes, has been determined to be an unquestioned fact.


_2. Imperfect inductions._

The requirements for an imperfect induction are somewhat involved and
demand the exercise of sound judgment in their application. An imperfect
induction can never be relied upon with the same confidence that may be
reposed in a perfect induction. This truth is apparent from the nature
of the imperfect induction. In order to measure up to a high standard of
effectiveness an imperfect induction must comply with the following
requirements.


_A. The number of specific instances supporting the conclusion must be
sufficiently large to offset the probability of coincidence._

The problem of determining the number of specific instances which will
justify us in relying upon an imperfect induction is most difficult. As
we shall presently see, this number varies greatly with different
classes of persons, events, and things about which we wish to reach
conclusions. But before we consider this difficulty we must be sure that
we have enough instances at hand to eliminate the element of chance. At
least from the argumentative standpoint this is the most practical
method of procedure. Suppose the student in his preparation for an
argument finds that during the last year there has been a decrease in
the value of manufactured articles produced in the state of Texas, that
a similar decrease is shown in the state of New York, and that
statistics relating to the state of Delaware show the same result. These
facts could not be used to support the conclusion that the value of
manufactured products of all the states of the Union has decreased
during the last year, because it may be only a coincidence that their
value has decreased in the states named. In all the other states of the
Union there may have been an increase. The conclusion stated should
belong to a perfect induction and could only stand upon proof of the
fact that the value of the products manufactured in each and every one
of the states showed a decrease. Moreover, it would not be safe to state
the conclusion that the value of manufactured products in general shows
a falling off in value during the past year and to cite the three
instances named in support of that contention. In fact, the probability
of coincidence is too great to enable us to arrive at any inductive
conclusion other than that the manufactured products of Texas, New York,
and Delaware for the past year show a decrease in value.

The student must be constantly on guard against this loose method of
inductive reasoning. It is most prolific in indefinite and loosely
stated conclusions seeking to masquerade under an appearance of
validity. He should always examine his own conclusions as well as those
of his opponent for the purpose of finding out whether the instances
used to support them are merely the result of chance or coincidence. Let
us suppose that the decrease observed in the three states named above
has suggested the probability of the truth of one of the conclusions.
The investigator should at once pick out a few of the most prominent
manufacturing states and find statistics showing manufacturing values in
them. For example, he might consult Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin. If the same decrease is found to have
existed in these states the truth of the inductive conclusion becomes
much more probable and at the same time the probability of coincidence
becomes correspondingly less. The student, however, should continue his
investigations and examine the statistics regarding all the
manufacturing states of the Union. He should then frame his conclusion
in such a way that it will stand supported by the evidence of all the
specific instances.


_B. The class of persons, events, or things about which the induction is
made must be reasonably homogeneous._

After we have seen three or four elephants we feel pretty safe in saying
that all elephants have trunks. After we have seen three or four red
schoolhouses we do not feel safe in saying that all schoolhouses are
red. The first class of objects is homogeneous, the second is not.
Therefore we may safely generalize regarding the appearance and
characteristics of all elephants from the three or four specimens which
have come beneath our notice. As a class they possess in a marked degree
common traits of character and appearance. No one member of the species
is radically different from any other member. With schoolhouses,
however, the situation is quite different. All schoolhouses in a given
community may be built alike and the first three or four seen by an
individual might be painted red; but since the class of schoolhouses is
not homogeneous, he cannot therefore correctly arrive at the imperfect
inductive conclusion that all schoolhouses are red. This illustration
should indicate to the student who would employ imperfect induction that
it is necessary to be careful in drawing a broad conclusion covering a
class of persons, events, or things whose members he does not know to be
reasonably homogeneous with respect to the point about which he wishes
to argue.

To advance a step further in the consideration of this requirement, we
must remember that it applies only to the homogeneity of the particular
characteristic of the class regarding which a conclusion is desired. For
example, if it is desired to arrive at some conclusion regarding the
color of all schoolhouses, the inductive process could not well be
applied because the class is by no means homogeneous in regard to this
particular characteristic. However, if it is desired to arrive at a
conclusion regarding the use to which all schoolhouses are put the
imperfect induction may safely be used because the class is reasonably
homogeneous in this characteristic.


_C. The specific instances cited in support of the conclusion must be
fair examples._

In an imperfect inductive argument the instances upon which the
conclusion is based must be fairly representative of the class of
persons, events, or things which it includes. A debater in an
interscholastic contest took three examples of cities having the
commission plan of city government as a basis for his argument in
support of the proposition that all American cities should adopt the
commission form of city government. He began by showing that the three
cities,—Galveston, Des Moines, and Grand Rapids, were fair examples of
American cities. He showed that they did not represent the exceedingly
large cities nor the exceedingly small cities but that they possessed
the chief characteristics of both. He produced evidence to prove that
they were directly representative of nine-tenths of the cities in
America and that the principles of government which would work well in
these three cities, taken as examples, would work equally well in any
American city. He then showed that the commission plan of city
government had worked well in the three examples which he had proved to
be fairly representative of all American cities.

The greatest temptation to error is that of selecting examples or
incidents which are most favorable to the debater’s contentions. Such
action is a flagrant violation of the great principle which should
govern all argumentative discourse—the principle that truth should stand
supreme over all contentions. It is not only dishonest to select unfair
examples, but it is disloyal to those who uphold the debater in his
efforts to persuade. Never should an example be presented which
possesses characteristics unusual to the class which it purports to
represent. An earnest effort should always be made to obtain the fairest
examples possible.


_D. Careful investigation must disclose no exceptions._

A person should seldom rely upon his own uncontradicted experience to
support an inductive conclusion. The small child concludes that all
children have fathers and mothers because it has a father and mother.
The tropical savage concludes that all parts of the earth are warm
because the part in which he lives is warm. Similarly we find reasonable
persons adopting like generalizations based upon their own
uncontradicted experience. The business man denounces all public
officials as dishonest because he has found that two or three are
dishonest. The farmer denounces all lawyers as dishonest because one
lawyer has treated him dishonestly. In each of these cases it is evident
that a little careful investigation would disclose enough exceptions to
overthrow the conclusion.

The debater should examine his own inductions as well as those of his
opponent for the purpose of discovering possible exceptions. The man who
declared that all trades-union men are anarchists would have found the
exceptions to his rule so overwhelming as to make his conclusion appear
ridiculous. The difficulty is that the abnormal and exceptional
instances which we know loom so large in our minds that they become
prejudices and crowd out calm reason. The few union men who have
destroyed life and property should not be made the specific instances
supporting an induction regarding the whole class of trades-union men.
The few college men who drink, swear, and carouse should not be made the
specific instances supporting an induction regarding the whole class of
college men. Every induction should be examined carefully for the
purpose of discovering exceptions.


_E. The conclusion must be reasonable._

After all the foregoing requirements have been met there still remains
one essential. The conclusion must be reasonable. This is the ultimate
test of validity. We have become so familiar with the usual course of
nature that we instinctively question that which appears to run contrary
thereto. Nothing occurs without an adequate cause. Upon this principle
we base our judgment regarding all matters which transcend our own
experience. Most of us have passed the superstitious days when the
breaking of a looking glass was regarded as a sure sign that someone in
the family would die before the end of the year. Even the time-honored
Friday and number thirteen with their attendant superstitious disasters
no longer have a large following. Scientific investigation and the
present age of commercialism have crowded out superstition and put
common sense in its place. The average mind is highly reasonable and
requires some causal connection between the breaking of a looking glass
and the death of a person. It would refuse to believe that one caused
the other, or that one was the sign of the other, even though there
might be a hundred instances to warrant the induction and not one to
contradict it. The final requirement for an imperfect inductive argument
is that it be reasonable.

         SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR AN IMPERFECT INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

  1. The number of specific instances supporting the conclusion must be
     sufficiently large to offset the probability of coincidence.

  2. The class of persons, events, or things about which the induction
     is made must be reasonably homogeneous.

  3. The specific instances cited in support of the conclusion must be
     fair examples.

  4. Careful investigation must disclose no exceptions.

  5. The conclusion must be reasonable.


                                  EXERCISES

  1. Are the following inductions perfect or imperfect?

      (1) All men are mortal.

      (2) All Irving’s books are interesting (or uninteresting).

      (3) All the presidents of the United States who have been
         assassinated were Republicans.

      (4) “Pythagoras was misunderstood, and Socrates, and Jesus, and
         Luther, and Copernicus, and Galileo, and Newton, and every pure
         and wise spirit that ever took flesh. To be great is to be
         misunderstood.”

                                                Emerson, _Self-Reliance_

      (5) Money is the root of all evil.

  2. Give in full the specific instances upon which each of the
     foregoing inductions is based.

  3. Apply the requirements for validity to each of the inductions in
     exercise one, and state the result.

  4. Write an inductive argument of four hundred words.




                               CHAPTER II
                           DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT


Deductive argument consists of the application of deductive processes of
reasoning to argumentative discourse. This process of applying logical
principles is somewhat more complicated than that involved in induction.
In some respects it is more important that the student thoroughly master
deduction than it is that he master induction. Fallacies are more easily
concealed in the deductive process than in the inductive process.
Nevertheless, when the fallacy is once detected it can be set forth
clearly by anyone who understands this form of reasoning. Neither the
inductive nor the deductive form of reasoning is often found alone. Most
arguments contain both of these processes and in some cases they are
very closely interwoven. This fact necessitates a thorough study of both
processes. From this standpoint a knowledge of one form is as important
as a knowledge of the other. In order that we may thoroughly understand
the application of the deductive process to argument we must first
consider separately that process of reasoning.


I. Deductive reasoning.

By deductive reasoning we arrive at a conclusion regarding a particular
person, event, or thing by reason of our knowledge regarding the whole
class to which the particular person, event, or thing belongs. In this
sense it is the opposite of induction. We conclude that a particular
book is interesting because we know that all the books written by the
author of this book are interesting. We may say that deductive reasoning
begins where inductive reasoning leaves off. For example, we found that
we could arrive at the imperfect inductive conclusion that all of
Stevenson’s books are interesting because each one of a number of his
books which we had read was interesting. Since (1) the number of
specific instances cited were sufficient to offset the probability of
coincidence, (2) the class was fairly homogeneous, (3) the examples were
fair, (4) we found upon investigation that there were no exceptions, and
(5) from the character of the author and other circumstances the
conclusion seemed reasonable, we concluded that our induction was sound.
Now, taking this conclusion as true we may apply it to any one of
Stevenson’s works not yet examined and thus determine that that work is
interesting. It must be kept in mind, however, that a deduction based
upon an imperfect induction is no stronger than that imperfect
induction. The imperfect induction gains no strength by reason of its
having a valid deduction based upon it. Nevertheless, unsound arguments
are often given a superficial appearance of validity by this means.

We may more clearly indicate the relation of the inductive and the
deductive process by arranging the material of the foregoing
illustration in the following manner.


  _A. Inductive process._

      1. Specific instances.

          (1) _Treasure Island_, written by Stevenson is interesting.

          (2) _Kidnapped_, written by Stevenson is interesting.

          (3) _David Balfour_, written by Stevenson is interesting.

          (4) _Prince Otto_, written by Stevenson is interesting.

          (5) _St. Ives_, written by Stevenson is interesting.

      2. Conclusion: All books written by Stevenson are interesting.


  _B. Deductive process._

      1. Major Premise: All books written by Stevenson are interesting.

      2. Minor Premise: _The Silverado Squatters_ was written by
         Stevenson.

      3. Conclusion: Therefore _The Silverado Squatters_ is interesting.

It will be observed that the inductive conclusion forms the first
statement, the basis, or what is called in logic, the major premise of
the deductive process. By induction we build several specific instances
into a conclusion, and from that conclusion we reason down again to one
particular instance. This illustration should serve to make plain to the
student the relation between induction and deduction and the reason why
the two processes are so often combined in an argument.

In logic the deductive form presented above is called a syllogism. It
consists of three statements called Major Premise, Minor Premise, and
Conclusion. This syllogism occurs in different forms, but we are
concerned with only the typical form above presented, because it is to
this form that we intend to reduce our own arguments and the arguments
of our opponents in order that we may test their validity.

Each statement in a syllogism is composed of two parts, called terms.
The names of these terms as well as their proper location in the
syllogism are indicated by the following form:

                        Middle term.     │        Major term.
                    —————————————————————│———————————————————————————
  1. Major Premise:    All college men   │should study argumentation.

                         Minor term.     │       Middle term.
                    —————————————————————│———————————————————————————
  2. Minor Premise:      Paul Morton     │     is a college man.

                         Minor term.     │        Major term.
                    —————————————————————│———————————————————————————
  3. Conclusion:    Therefore Paul Morton│should study argumentation.

The student will observe that each statement in the syllogism is
composed of two terms and that each term appears twice in the entire
syllogism, but only once in any one statement. The major term represents
the largest element in the syllogism namely,—the class of persons who
should study argumentation. The minor term represents the smallest
element in the syllogism namely,—Paul Morton, the particular person
about whom a conclusion is reached. The middle term serves as an
intermediary or connecting link which binds the minor term to the major
term. It does not appear in the conclusion but is cast away after it has
served its purpose in assigning the minor term,—Paul Morton, to the
major term,—those who should study argumentation.

In the typical form of the syllogism with which we are concerned the
major premise should always be in the universal affirmative-form. By
universal affirmative is meant that the assertion is made with regard to
the class as a whole as: “All men are mortal,” “All laws should be
obeyed,” “All students should pay their bills,” etc. No part of the
class of persons, events, or things about which an assertion is made
should be left outside the statement as would be the case if the
statements read—“Some laws should be obeyed,” “Some students should pay
their bills.”

From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the deductive
syllogism, in order to be valid, must be constructed in accordance with
certain well defined rules. In books of logic the student will find
these rules discussed at some length and their application set forth in
detail. For our purpose it is only necessary to refer to them and keep
them clearly in mind in connection with the discussion here given. The
rules of the syllogism with which we are concerned are as follows:

1. A syllogism must contain three terms, Major term, Minor term, and
Middle term.

2. A syllogism must consist of three complete statements, Major Premise,
Minor Premise, and Conclusion.

3. The middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises. A
term is distributed when it is universal in its application or taken in
its whole length of meaning.

4. A term cannot be distributed in the conclusion unless it is
distributed in the premises.

5. No conclusion can be drawn from two negative premises.

6. A negative conclusion always follows one negative premise and a
negative conclusion cannot be obtained unless one of the premises is
negative.

For the purpose of making more plain the relation between the terms and
the statements in a syllogism let us consider the old method of
graphical representation by means of circles.

  I. All college men should study argumentation.

  II. Paul Morton is a college man.

  III. Paul Morton should study argumentation.

From the diagrams on the following page it is seen that in the major
premise the middle term must be wholly included within the major term.
The entire class of college men must be included within the class of
those who should study argumentation. Not one single college man must be
left outside the class. In the minor premise the minor term must be
clearly and unmistakably included within the middle term. Paul Morton
must be a college man. He must not be a banker or a janitor. In the
conclusion the minor term must be included within the major term. This
position inevitably results from the two preceding situations. If the
middle term, college men, is wholly included within the major term,
those who should study argumentation, and if the minor term, Paul
Morton, is wholly included within the middle term, college men, then it
cannot be otherwise than that the minor term is included within the
major term. In other words, Paul Morton is definitely assigned to the
class of those who should study argumentation.

[Illustration:

  I MAJOR PREMISE

  (Major Term)
  Men who should study argumentation

  (Middle Term)
  College men
]

[Illustration:

  II MINOR PREMISE

  (Middle Term)
  College men

  (Minor Term)
  Paul Morton
]

[Illustration:

  III CONCLUSION

  (Major Term)
  Men who should study argumentation

  (Minor Term)
  Paul Morton
]

We may represent the whole syllogism in the following manner:

[Illustration:

  (Major Term)
  Men who should study argumentation

  (Middle Term)
  College men

  (Minor Term)
  Paul Morton
]

The student should be sure that he has mastered each step in the
construction of a valid syllogism of the typical form before he passes
on to the following section of this chapter.


II. The application of deductive reasoning to deductive argument.

From our examination of the deductive process of reasoning we cannot but
realize its importance when applied to the construction of an argument.
One cannot advance far into any argumentative discourse without
encountering deduction in some form. A student in a class debate
defended the following proposition with the inductive arguments given
below: “Resolved that tariff should be imposed for revenue only.” In his
introduction the student declared that the protective tariff should be
removed. In support of his contention he offered five substantial
reasons which he claimed included the vital points at issue. These
reasons were as follows:

  A. High duties encourage the formation of trusts.

  B. The high cost of living results from protection.

  C. Protection is unjust to the American people.

  D. Protection breeds corruption.

  E. The usefulness of the protective tariff has long ceased.

Each of the above reasons for the removal of the protective tariff is a
deductive argument. The complete deductive process is seen when we state
each argument in syllogistic form.

                                      A

  1. All things which encourage the formation of trusts should be
     abolished.

  2. The protective tariff encourages the formation of trusts.

  3. Therefore the protective tariff should be abolished.

                                      B

  1. All things which are the cause of the high cost of living should be
     abolished.

  2. The protective tariff is a cause of the high cost of living.

  3. Therefore the protective tariff should be abolished.

                                      C

  1. All things which are unjust to the American people should be
     abolished.

  2. The protective tariff is unjust to the American people.

  3. Therefore the protective tariff should be abolished.

                                      D

  1. All things which breed corruption should be abolished.

  2. The protective tariff breeds corruption.

  3. Therefore the protective tariff should be abolished.

                                      E

  1. All governmental policies the usefulness of which has long since
     ceased should be abolished.

  2. The protective tariff is a governmental policy the usefulness of
     which has long since ceased.

  3. Therefore the protective tariff should be abolished.

Each of the above syllogisms stands as an argument for the abolition of
the protective tariff; or, to take the standpoint of the proposition
each supports the contention that the tariff should be imposed for
revenue only. All of the five reasons lead to a single conclusion. We
may represent this relation by the following diagram:

[Illustration]

                   A       B      C        D        E
                   ↓       ↓      ↓        ↓        ↓
              CONCLUSION: The protective tariff should be
                              abolished.

This use of deductions is very simple, but in dealing with a combination
of induction and deduction the process may become very complicated. For
example, the major premise of the first syllogism above stated has back
of it another logical process of reasoning. Why should all things which
encourage the formation of trusts be abolished? What proof can we show
to establish the conclusion (in A, the major premise) that the formation
of trusts should be discouraged rather than encouraged? It must be
established in a logical manner. We may establish it by induction by
showing that each one of a large number of trusts has had injurious
effects. After we have introduced positive evidence establishing a
perfect or an imperfect induction we have laid a sufficiently strong
foundation for the deductive syllogism.

On the other hand, we may establish the major premise of the above
syllogism by means of deduction. To do this we might find evidence which
would prove that trusts increase the cost of producing commodities and
decrease their quality. In this case it would be necessary to introduce
evidence only along the line which would show that this evil was
characteristic of all trusts. This would be an induction, because the
general principle used as a major premise would be based upon specific
instances. Beginning with this induction we would build up the following
syllogism, the conclusion of which supports the major premise of the
foregoing syllogism.

1. All forms of business organization which increase the cost of
producing commodities and decrease their quality are an industrial evil.

2. The trust is a form of business organization which increases the cost
of production and decreases the quality of commodities.

3. Therefore the trust is an industrial evil.

Then to continue our deductive reasoning we would construct the
following syllogism based upon the foregoing:

1. All industrial evils should be discouraged.

2. The formation of trusts is an industrial evil.

3. Therefore the formation of trusts should be discouraged.

The exact phraseology has not been kept throughout the above line of
reasoning, because seldom in any practical work do we find the exact
words repeated except for emphasis. However, it requires the exercise of
only ordinary ingenuity to follow precisely the entire reasoning
processes involved in the foregoing argument.

An excellent example of the use of the deductive syllogism for the
purpose of showing that an opponent’s deductive argument is unsound is
the following extract from Lincoln’s reply to Douglas in the Fifth Joint
Debate at Galesburg:

  “In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe it is, of the
  Constitution of the United States we find the following language,
  ‘This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be
  made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties made, or which shall
  be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the
  supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be
  bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any state to
  the contrary notwithstanding.

  “The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence
  which I will now read, ‘Now as we have already said in an earlier
  part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property
  in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
  Constitution.’ I repeat it, ‘_The right of property in a slave is
  distinctly expressed and affirmed in the Constitution_.’ What is it
  to be ‘affirmed in the Constitution? Made firm in the
  Constitution,—so made that it cannot be separated from the
  Constitution without breaking the Constitution; durable as the
  Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now remembering the
  provision of the Constitution which I have read; affirming that that
  instrument is the supreme law of the land; that the Judges of every
  state shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any state to
  the contrary, notwithstanding; that the right of property in a slave
  is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot
  be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the instrument;
  part of the instrument; what follows as a short and even syllogistic
  argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the
  consideration of men capable of arguing whether as I state it, in
  syllogistic form, the argument has any faults in it? (1) Nothing in
  the constitution or laws of any state can destroy a right distinctly
  and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States. (2)
  The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly
  affirmed in the Constitution of the United States. (3) Therefore
  nothing in the Constitution or laws of any state can destroy the
  right of property in a slave.

  “I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument;
  assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have
  capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a
  fault in it as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; but
  the fault in fact is a fault of the premises. I believe that the
  right of property in a slave is not expressly and distinctly
  affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is. I
  believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision
  may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right
  of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed. I say,
  therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact.”

To give examples of all the forms in which deduction may be applied to
argument is impossible. The foregoing examples are merely suggestive.
They serve to make plain the practical use which can be made of this
logical process. The student must master the underlying principles
herein suggested and apply them to his own work.


III. The enthymeme.

An enthymeme is an incomplete syllogism. It is a syllogism in which only
one or two of the statements are expressed. An example of an enthymeme
is the following proposition, “The protective tariff should be abolished
because it encourages the formation of trusts.” This is the form in
which we most commonly encounter deductive reasoning. Seldom is the
complete syllogism expressed. It therefore becomes our task to construct
from this enthymeme a complete syllogism. Our first duty, then, is to
find out what parts of the syllogism are contained in the enthymeme and
then strive to supply the missing parts. Usually the major premise is
omitted. This requires that it be supplied from a consideration of the
minor premise and the conclusion. In almost all cases the conclusion is
expressed. If it is not expressed it is clearly implied. This supplies
the minor term (the thing about which something is said) and the major
term (the thing that is said about it). From these two terms it is
usually easy to find a middle term which will serve as a connecting
link. The process of building syllogisms upon enthymemes is
comparatively simple if the student will always find the conclusion and
then divide it into the two terms of which it is composed.

In order to illustrate the application of the principles above
expressed, let us reduce an enthymeme to the syllogistic form. We shall
take for our example the enthymeme, “The railroads of the United States
should be under Federal control because they are a natural monopoly.”
The parts of a syllogism which are expressed in this statement must be
found and of these the conclusion should be first determined. In this
case the conclusion is “The railroads of the United States should be
under Federal control.” “Railroads of the United States,” is the minor
term, and “should be under Federal control” is the major term. Now, to
represent what we have thus far discovered we apply the order of
statements and terms which were employed in the discussion of Deductive
Reasoning. The result is as follows:

  I. Major Premise:
                                    │           Major term
  ──────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
                                    │should be under Federal control.

  II. Minor Premise:
              Minor term            │
  ──────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
  The railroads of the United States│

  III. Conclusion:

              Minor term            │           Major term
  ──────────────────────────────────┼────────────────────────────────
  The railroads of the United States│should be under Federal control.

We thus have the entire syllogism completed with the exception of the
middle term. Our next task is to find this middle term. It _must
include_ the minor term and it _must be included in_ the major term. A
reference to the diagrams given in connection with the discussion of
Deductive Reasoning will make this plain. With this requirement in mind
we consider the enthymeme and find that the reason assigned for placing
railroads under Federal control is that they are a natural monopoly.
This gives us the middle term as it appears in the minor premise. We
then take this middle term and cast it into the universal affirmative
form, “All natural monopolies.” We now have the enthymeme with which we
started out, reduced to the following syllogistic form:

Major Premise: All natural monopolies should be under Federal control.

Minor Premise: The railroads of the United States are a natural
monopoly.

Conclusion: Therefore the railroads of the United States should be under
Federal control.

This places clearly before us the deductive argument contained in the
enthymeme. The syllogism is complete. The statements and terms are in
their proper order and form, and the conclusion follows logically and
inevitably from the premises. The form of the syllogism as it stands is
therefore sound. If the two premises are true as a matter of fact, the
conclusion must be true. Having determined these matters we now
scrutinize each of the premises to see whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish its truth. In the first place is it true that all
natural monopolies should be under Federal control? What is a natural
monopoly and why should it be under Federal control? All the sources of
evidence must be searched for facts and statements of authority to
substantiate this assertion. On this point opinions differ and the
student must strive to find out the truth for himself. The other
question which he must answer is, “Are the railroads of the United
States a natural monopoly?” Here again the student must resort to the
sources of evidence and by their aid answer the question in the
affirmative or in the negative. If he can introduce enough evidence to
prove that all natural monopolies in the United States should be under
Federal control, and that the railroads are a natural monopoly, then he
has completed a sound deductive argument in favor of the Federal control
of railroads. This example ought to make clear the method of reducing an
enthymeme to the syllogistic form and the use to which this form may
then be put.

Before leaving this subject a word of caution is necessary. Do not be
confused by the form in which the enthymeme appears. Be sure that you
have the real conclusion before you begin the construction of the rest
of the syllogism. If you have failed to grasp what the enthymeme really
says you are liable to get a wrong conclusion, and if you get a wrong
conclusion the whole syllogism will be wrong. High sounding oratorical
phrases and sentences are often confusing. Plainness is sometimes
avoided by the speaker for the express purpose of concealing a fault in
his argument. Even truth expressed in an unusual form is often
misleading when we seek to reduce it to logical terms.

Some difficulty is usually experienced in reducing the beatitudes to the
typical syllogistic form. For example, in reducing the enthymeme
“Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,” the
inexperienced student usually says that the conclusion is, “The blessed
shall see God.” A syllogism built upon this conclusion would appear as
follows:

  1. All those who are pure in heart shall see God.

  2. The blessed are pure in heart.

  3. Therefore the blessed shall see God.

This is a valid syllogism so far as the form is concerned; but it is of
no use in throwing light upon the truth or falsity of the enthymeme,
because the conclusion with which we started was not the true
conclusion. This fault is fatal to the success of the argument, because
after the syllogism is completed the student usually devotes his entire
attention to proving the truth or falsity of the two premises and seldom
gives any further attention to the conclusion.

Another erroneous statement of the conclusion expressed in the above
enthymeme is often given. It is “All those who are blessed shall see
God.” With this conclusion as a starting point we may construct the
following syllogism:

  1. All those who are blessed shall see God.

  2. The pure in heart are blessed.

  3. Therefore the pure in heart shall see God.

Again we have an invalid syllogism, because the conclusion from which we
built it is not the true conclusion expressed in the enthymeme. Likewise
there are many pitfalls for him who seeks to find the true meaning of
any statement worded in a manner different from that in which we are
accustomed to speak. The very difficulty, however, suggests the remedy.
The student should always reduce the complicated statement to plain,
ordinary, everyday English before attempting to find the conclusion.
Reducing the enthymeme under consideration in this manner we have this
simple statement, “The pure in heart are blessed because they shall see
God.” When we have put the statement in this form the real conclusion is
readily seen. It is “The pure in heart are blessed.” The remainder of
the enthymeme is a statement of the reason why the pure in heart are
blessed. With this as a basis we easily construct a valid syllogism.

  1. All those who shall see God are blessed.

  2. The pure in heart shall see God.

  3. Therefore the pure in heart are blessed.

In closing this discussion it may be remarked that actual practice in
the use of the deductive process as well as its application to argument
is the only way in which real practical benefit may be derived from the
knowledge here gained. This knowledge should not be reserved for use in
the class room but should be used all the time and everywhere.

                       EXERCISES IN DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENT

  I. Construct valid syllogisms showing the reasoning involved in each
     of the following enthymemes:

      1. Since large corporations are gaining control of all industries
         a Federal incorporation law should be enacted.

      2. As swollen fortunes are an evil, a progressive inheritance tax
         should be enacted.

      3. Commercial reciprocity between the United States and Canada
         would be for the best interest of the United States because it
         would reduce the high cost of living.

      4. Because compulsory insurance has been successful in Germany, it
         should be adopted in the United States.

      5. On account of the growth of the divorce evil in the United
         States, there should be a Federal law regulating marriage and
         divorce.

      6. There should be a state censorship of the stage because many
         immoral productions are being brought before the public.

      7. “Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth.”

  II. Diagram, by means of circles, the syllogisms constructed under
     exercise I.

  III. State three instances in which you have recently employed
     deductive argument.

  IV. Write a deductive argument of not less than three hundred words.




                              CHAPTER III
                     ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL RELATION


Arguments from causal relation are divided into three classes, I.
Arguments from Effect to Cause, II. Arguments from Cause to Effect, and
III. Arguments from Effect to Effect. All arguments from causal relation
may be classed under one or the other of these divisions. These
arguments are based upon a fact which human experience has demonstrated
to be true—the fact that everything that occurs has back of it some
adequate cause. In ancient times this belief in the laws of universal
causation did not exist. Hence every occurrence of any importance was
attributed to the commands of one of the numerous heathen gods. Instead
of attributing the defeat of a general to poor management it was
customary to say, “The gods decreed that this general should be defeated
in war.”

We still have remnants of this belief. These remnants consist of popular
superstitions, such as the supposition that Friday is an unlucky day,
that the number thirteen is unlucky, that the breaking of a looking
glass portends bad luck, or that the sight of a black cat in the path is
sure to be followed by some disaster. Modern science has abolished most
of these superstitions by pointing out the fact upon which all causal
relation arguments are based, viz.—that everything that happens has back
of it a reasonable cause—or in other words, if a thing is true there
must be some sufficient reason for it. So well has this fact been
established that, with the exception of the less enlightened members of
society, the belief in the laws of causation is universal. Upon this
sound basis must every argument find its ultimate justification. Even
inductions and deductions may be traced to their source where the law of
cause and effect will finally determine their validity. It is therefore
of the utmost importance that we give careful consideration to this
class of arguments. As in the case of imperfect induction, we are
reasoning from the known to the unknown; from things of which we are
conscious to things that are beyond the realm of our perception. We
shall consider the form of these arguments and the conditions with which
they must comply in order to be valid.


I. Argument from effect to cause.

The argument from effect to cause is one which relies upon an observed
effect to prove the operation of an unobserved cause. Upon arising in
the morning I observe that the ground which was bare the evening before
is now white with snow. Therefore I reason that snow must have fallen
during the night, although no snow is now falling and I have not seen
any snow in the actual process of falling. The snow-covered ground is
the effect which I observe and the unobserved fall of snow during the
night is the only possible cause for this effect. If a friend who has
not yet seen the snow disputes my assertion that there was a snowfall
during the night by saying that it is too warm to snow, I may
effectively establish my argument and refute his own by calling him to
the window and pointing to the snow. I should point to the effect as
establishing the existence of the cause. This would be conclusive
evidence of the truth of my statement.

The argument from effect to cause is based upon things observed after
the disputed fact. This process is called _a posteriori_ reasoning which
means reasoning _from that which comes after_. This is the process of
reasoning employed by the detective in tracing a criminal. The detective
by means of skillful observations taken after a crime is committed
reasons back to the person who is guilty. The fact that the criminal has
usually made an attempt to avoid leaving any traces that may be used as
a basis of _a posteriori_ reasoning makes this process a most
interesting one and accounts for much of the popularity of detective
stories.

This use of reasoning from effect to cause was first popularized by the
detective stories of Edgar Allan Poe and appears to have reached its
climax in the _Adventures of Sherlock Holmes_, the creation of Sir A.
Conan Doyle. Sherlock Holmes possesses remarkable powers of observation.
He notices that a young lady who calls to see him has finger tips that
are slightly spatulate. From this effect he reasons back to the cause
and determines that it is the result of much use of the piano. From this
and other observations he reasons that the young lady is a musician. He
observes that a farmer has a certain kind of mud on his boots and
reasons that the man has just come from a particular town near London
where such mud is to be found. The certain kind of mud on the farmer’s
boots is the effect; the recent presence of the farmer in that
particular town near London is the cause. Observing the effect Holmes
reasons back to the cause, or in other words, he constructs an argument
from effect to cause.

The application of this process of reasoning to the practice of
argumentation and debate is easily seen. The politician who says that
the high cost of living is due to the growth of monopolies employs an
argument from effect (_i. e._, the high cost of living) to cause (_i.
e._, the growth of monopolies). The minister who declares that the
prevalence of drunkenness is due to the licensed saloon expounds an
argument from effect (_i. e._, the prevalence of drunkenness) to cause
(_i. e._, the licensed saloon). The student who asserts that his class
dues are excessive because the business of the class is poorly managed
uses an argument from effect (_i. e._, excessive class dues) to cause
(_i. e._, poor management).

In order to be sound an argument from effect to cause must conform to
the following requirements:


_1. The alleged cause must be sufficient to produce the effect._

When the existence of a definite cause is alleged to have produced an
observed effect, the burden of proving the sufficiency of that cause
rests upon him who asserts its operation. No fault of reasoning is more
common than that of regarding an insufficient cause as sufficient. If a
man is successful we attribute his success to one quality, such as
perseverance; whereas his success may be due to a combination of
qualities. There may be a hundred other men who possess more
perseverance and yet fail. When a financial panic occurs we attribute it
to the rule of a certain political party; whereas the action of that
party may have been the smallest of the factors causing the panic.
Perseverance may be a quality contributing to success, but perseverance
alone is not sufficient to secure success. The action of a political
party may aid in producing a panic, but seldom are conditions such that
its action alone is sufficient to produce a panic. The question of what
is sufficient cause demands the exercise of sound judgment. A fall of
three feet would hardly be regarded as a sufficient cause for the death
of a man; a fall of one hundred feet would be regarded as sufficient
cause for his death. Between these two extremes the individual judgment
considering other circumstances connected with such an event, must
determine the adequacy of the cause to produce the result in any given
case. It is therefore plain that the debater who points to a result as
produced by a definite cause must show the adequacy of that cause.


_2. No other cause must have intervened between the alleged cause and
the effect._

A clear field must be shown for the operation of the alleged cause. This
can be done by proving that no other cause could have produced the
observed effect. Other causes which might possibly have produced the
effect must be shown to have been inoperative or inadequate. For
example, a student fails in his studies. He is called before the
delinquent board of the faculty and explains his failure by arguing that
he has had poor health. He alleges poor health as the cause of the
observed effect—the failure in his studies. A member of the board,
however, is skeptical regarding the validity of the argument and asks
him if it is not true that each week he attends the theatre at least
once and sometimes as often as four times. The student is forced to
admit that such is the case. Further inquiry reveals the fact that he
has been attending a dancing school one night each week; that he belongs
to a club which meets every Tuesday and Friday night; and that he is
known to spend much of his time in a public billiard room. These facts
show an independent cause (_i. e._, general dissipation) which has
intervened between the alleged cause (_i. e._, poor health) and the
effect (_i. e._, failure in his studies). The student has therefore
failed to prove his argument that poor health, which is a legitimate
cause, is responsible for his failure. The evidence shows that general
dissipation, which is not a legitimate cause, has intervened between the
alleged cause and the effect.

If the student had been able to show that he had been diligent in his
efforts, had attended to business in a reasonable manner, and that his
previous record had been satisfactory he would have established his
argument that ill health was the cause of his failure. In every argument
from effect to cause the adequacy of the alleged cause must first be
shown and then evidence must be produced establishing the fact that no
cause, other than the one alleged, produced the effect.


_3. The alleged cause must not have been prevented from operating._

As stated in the preceding section the alleged cause must have a clear
field for action. Not only must no other cause have intervened to
produce the effect attributed to the alleged cause, but no forces must
have intervened to prevent the alleged cause from operating. Any
circumstance which appears to have prevented the operation of the
alleged cause should be examined carefully. One morning a man was found
dead near the railroad. As there were some bruises on his body, the
cause of his death was attributed to his being struck by a local freight
which passed that point at midnight. No other train passed over this
road at night and the man had been killed sometime within six or eight
hours of the time when he was found. The case seemed clear. The result
(death) was apparently due to the alleged cause (a freight train).
Investigation, however, revealed the fact that the freight train had not
run that night on account of a wreck on a branch line. Therefore an
outside force,—viz., the wreck, had prevented the alleged cause from
operating. Hence it could not be the true cause. The inquiry into the
alleged cause ultimately resulted in the revealing of the true
cause—willful murder.

In arguing from effect to cause the adequacy of the alleged cause must
be proved, the fact that no other cause intervened between the alleged
cause and the observed effect must be clearly demonstrated, and the
circumstances of the case must show that the alleged cause was not
prevented from operating. With these requirements fulfilled such an
argument may be regarded as sound. It will be seen that the application
of these rules requires sound judgment and practical common sense. The
argument will be effective in persuading others only when every
requirement is met in a plain, straightforward manner.


II. Argument from cause to effect.

The argument from cause to effect is one which relies upon an observed
cause to prove or foretell the existence of an unobserved effect. For
example, I observe that the temperature is very low; the thermometer
registers below zero and the exposed parts of my body tingle with cold
when I am out of doors. This is a cause of several effects. One of them
is that the pond near my home will be frozen over. I observe the cause
(_i. e._, the low temperature) and at once state the effect (_i. e._,
the ice on the pond). The process by which I reached this conclusion is
called _a priori_ reasoning. The conclusion is based upon circumstances
observed before the disputed fact. Likewise, I observe that it is now
beginning to rain and that appearances indicate a heavy downpour. I at
once come to the conclusion that the path across the meadow will be
muddy when I pass over it in half an hour from now.

This case differs from the preceding one only in the fact that in the
first case the effect existed when the cause was observed, whereas in
the latter case the effect did not exist when the cause was observed. In
both cases the observed cause is the basis for determining the
unobserved effect. In this way we may reason from the past to the
present, from the remote past to the less remote past, from the present
to the future, from the near future to the more remote future, or from
the past to the future.

The student will doubtless have observed that the argument from cause to
effect as well as that from effect to cause is a special form of
deduction. The syllogistic form may be applied to either of these
processes of reasoning for the purpose of testing their strength.
Applying the syllogistic form to the _a priori_ reasoning involved in
one of the preceding illustrations we have:

  A. Low temperature is always followed by the forming of ice.

  B. This is low temperature.

  C. Therefore it is followed by the forming of ice.

Applying the syllogistic form to the _a posteriori_ reasoning involved
in one of the examples given under the discussion of that process we
have:

  A. All times when the ground is covered with snow are times when there
     has been a snowfall.

  B. This is a time when the ground is covered with snow.

  C. Therefore this is a time when there has been a snowfall.

For the purpose of extreme simplicity we may represent these two
processes by the following formula:

  I. _A posteriori_ reasoning.

      1. A is _preceded_ by B

      2. This is A

      3. Therefore it is preceded by B.

  II. _A priori_ reasoning.

      1. A is _followed_ by B

      2. This is A

      3. Therefore it is followed by B.

The advocates of a high protective tariff argue that if the tariff is
removed financial disaster will overwhelm the country. They support this
contention by showing that the large manufacturing industries are now
able to sell their products at a reasonable price; import duties prevent
foreign manufacturers from shipping their goods into this country and
selling them much cheaper than our manufacturers can make them. But if
the tariff is removed foreign made goods will drive out American made
goods, as the foreign goods can be sold much cheaper. Therefore
factories and mills must cease operations because there will be no
demand for their products. Workmen will be thrown out of employment and
capital will be idle. Starvation will overtake the working man and
financial ruin will overtake the business man. This is a typical example
of an argument from cause to effect. The operation of the cause (the
removal of the protective tariff) will produce the alleged effect
(industrial disaster). This argument appears to be valid, but an equally
plausible argument may be constructed against protection. We must,
therefore, look at the foundations of each argument for the purpose of
determining its validity. As in the case of argument from effect to
cause we must exercise sound judgment in applying certain requirements
to each particular argument. An argument from cause to effect must
conform to the following requirements:


_1. The observed cause must be sufficient to produce the alleged
effect._

This requirement implies absolute sufficiency of cause, not probable
sufficiency. Habitual inattention to business or professional duties is
a sure cause for failure. Habitual drunkenness is a sure cause for ill
health. Being run over by a locomotive is a sure cause of death. There
may be some exceptions to the above general rules, but the certainty of
the effect following the cause is so great that for all practical
purposes we may rely absolutely upon the sequence.


_2. When past experience is invoked it must show that the alleged effect
has always followed the observed cause._

An observed cause may possibly have an alleged effect even though there
is not one chance in a thousand that it will have this effect. No valid
argument can be constructed upon such a chance. In pure science this
rule is absolute. A combination of the same chemicals under the same
conditions always produces the same effect. The bringing of a magnet
near a piece of steel always results in the same effect so far as the
force which one exerts upon the other is concerned. When we depart from
the realm of exact science the working out of the rule becomes less
certain. Nevertheless, if human experience has sanctioned the adoption
of the rule we may rely upon it even though there are exceptions. A rise
in the tax rate is always followed by more revenue to the government. A
scarcity in the supply of iron is always followed by a rise in the
price. A drouth in the wheat belt is always followed by an increase in
the price of flour. There may be exceptions to these examples, but the
exceptions are so few and the number of instances supporting the rule is
so great that we feel safe in relying upon it. It is this kind of
certainty, rather than the absolute certainty of science, which
argumentation demands.


_3. No force must intervene to prevent the observed cause from operating
to produce the alleged effect._

A drouth in the wheat belt naturally causes an advance in the price of
flour. Past experience has proved this to be the case, and, furthermore,
the cause is adequate to produce the alleged effect. Nevertheless, a
lowering of the duty on wheat might permit wheat from foreign countries
to be imported in such quantities that there would be no rise in the
price of flour. The lowering of the duty on wheat would be another force
intervening to prevent the observed cause (the drouth in the wheat belt)
from producing the alleged effect (the rise in the price of flour).
Therefore we must always examine the circumstances of each case to
determine whether there are any forces at work which will prevent the
observed cause from producing the alleged effect.


_4. The conclusion established should be verified by positive evidence
wherever possible._

After all the other tests have been satisfied the argument from cause to
effect may be established or overthrown by the production of positive
evidence. A disappears and B is accused of his murder. A perfect case is
made out and B is convicted and sentenced to death. Then A suddenly
appears. The innocence of B is effectively established. Cases of this
kind are not unknown to the criminal law, though unfortunately the
missing man is usually discovered after his supposed murderer has been
put to death. This illustration suggests that too much care cannot be
exercised in substantiating an argument from cause to effect.

The argument from cause to effect is most frequently employed in
criminal trials. In such cases the motive for committing the crime is
regarded as the cause and the crime as the effect. The argument is
usually begun by proving the existence of strong motives such as an
abnormal desire to acquire more money or property, to work revenge on
bitter enemies, or to avert financial or domestic disaster. With these
strong motives shown it is easy to connect them with the crime. This is
the method of argument from cause to effect which is used by Daniel
Webster in the White murder trial. He showed clearly that the Knapps
believed that they could obtain the fortune of White by destroying his
last will and murdering him. He argued that this was the cause which
produced the effect of murder. The following extract from Webster’s
speech before the jury will show the application made of the argument
from cause to effect.

“When we look back, then, to the state of things immediately on the
discovery of the murder, we see that suspicion would naturally turn at
once, not to the heirs at law, but to those principally benefited by the
will. They, and they alone, would be supposed to have a direct object
for wishing Mr. White’s life terminated. And, strange as it may seem, we
find counsel now insisting, that, if no apology, it is yet mitigation of
the atrocity of the Knapps’ conduct in attempting to charge this foul
murder on Mr. White, the nephew and principal devisee, that public
suspicion was already so directed. As if assassination of character were
excusable in proportion as circumstances may render it easy. Their
endeavors, when they knew they were suspected themselves, to fix the
charge on others, by foul means and by falsehood, are fair and strong
proof of their own guilt.

“The counsel say that they might safely admit that Richard
Crowninshield, Jr., was the perpetrator of this murder.

“But how could they safely admit that? If that were admitted everything
else would follow. For why should Richard Crowninshield, Jr., kill Mr.
White? He was not his heir; nor was he his devisee; nor his enemy. What
could be his motive? If Richard Crowninshield, Jr., killed Mr. White he
did it at some one’s procurement who himself had a motive. And who
having any motive, is shown to have had any intercourse with Richard
Crowninshield, Jr., but Joseph Knapp and this principally through the
agency of the prisoner at the bar? It is the infirmity, the distressing
difficulty of the prisoner’s case, that his counsel cannot and dare not
admit what they yet cannot disprove, and what all must believe. He who
believes, on this evidence, that Richard Crowninshield, Jr., was the
immediate murderer cannot doubt that both the Knapps were conspirators
in that murder.”


=III. Argument from effect to effect.=

An argument from effect to effect is one in which an argument from
effect to cause is combined with an argument from cause to effect. To
illustrate this kind of argument we may explain a simple example
frequently used in this connection. A boy announces that there is
skating this morning because the thermometer registers below zero. Now
the thermometer registering below zero is not the cause of the skating.
Both the registering of the thermometer and the skating are the effects
of a common cause, viz.—low temperature. The boy has observed one of the
effects and at once concludes that the other effect must exist. His is
an argument from effect to effect, or to be more exact, an argument from
one effect of a cause to another effect of the same cause. The whole
process of reasoning involved as well as the relation between the two
parts of an argument from effect to effect may be represented by the
following tabulation:


_A. Argument from effect to cause._

1. All times when the thermometer registers below zero are times when
the temperature is far below freezing.

2. This is a time when the thermometer registers below zero.

3. Therefore this is a time when the temperature is far below freezing.


_B. Argument from cause to effect._

1. All times when the temperature is far below freezing are times when
skating ice is formed.

2. This is a time when the temperature is far below freezing.

3. Therefore this is a time when skating ice is formed.

The above analysis of the reasoning involved in an argument from effect
to effect will suggest the method of procedure to be employed in testing
its validity. The first step consists of dividing the argument into the
two essential processes employed, viz.—argument from effect to cause,
and argument from cause to effect. The second step consists of applying
the rules already considered in connection with each of these processes
to the parts revealed by the first step. In this way the validity of any
argument from effect to effect may be determined.

       SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ARGUMENTS FROM CAUSAL RELATION

  I. Arguments from Effect to Cause.

      1. The alleged cause must be sufficient to produce the effect.

      2. No other cause must have intervened between the alleged cause
         and the effect.

      3. The alleged cause must not have been prevented from operating.

  II. Argument from Cause to Effect.

      1. The observed cause must be sufficient to produce the alleged
         effect.

      2. When past experience is invoked it must show that the alleged
         effect has always followed the observed cause.

      3. No other force must intervene to prevent the observed cause
         from operating to produce the alleged effect.

      4. The conclusion established should be verified by positive
         evidence wherever possible.

  III. Argument from Effect to Effect.

      1. The argument must be resolved into its two parts, the argument
         from effect to cause, and the argument from cause to effect,
         and the rules under I and II applied.

                 EXERCISES IN ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL RELATION

  I. State the kind of argument involved in each of the following
     passages.

      1. If a Socialist president is elected, financial disaster is sure
         to overtake our country.

      2. This has been the coldest winter ever known in the United
         States. The rapid destruction of our forests is directly
         responsible for this undesirable change of climate and we are
         to reap still further evils from this same cause.

      3. Since we have conclusive proof that the savages of the island
         have murdered this missionary, we can no longer be in doubt as
         to what became of his companions.

      4. “Every word uttered by a speaker costs him some physical loss;
         and in the strictest sense, he burns that others may have
         light—so much eloquence, so much of his body resolved into
         carbonic acid, water and urea.”—Huxley.

      5. “The Constitution of the United States is so concise and so
         general in its terms, that even had America been as slowly
         moving a country as China, many questions must have arisen on
         the interpretation of the fundamental law which would have
         modified its aspect. But America has been the most swiftly
         expanding of all countries. Hence the questions that have
         presented themselves have often related to matters which the
         framers of the Constitution could not have contemplated. Wiser
         than Justinian before them or Napoleon after them, they foresaw
         that their work would need to be elucidated by a judicial
         commentary. But they were far from conjecturing the enormous
         strain to which some of their expressions would be subjected in
         the effort to apply them to new facts.”—Bryce.

      6. “The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is
         hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral
         but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three
         thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No
         contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in
         weakening government. Seas roll and months pass, between the
         order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation
         of a single point is enough to defeat a whole system.”—Burke.

      7. “Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies,
         which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of
         this untractable spirit. I mean their education. In no country
         perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The
         profession itself is numerous and powerful; and in most
         provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies
         sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read (and most
         do read), endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I
         have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of
         his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many
         books as those on the law exported to the plantations. The
         colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for
         their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of
         Blackstone’s _Commentaries_ in America as in England. General
         Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter
         on your table. He states that all the people in his government
         are lawyers, or smatterers in the law; and that in Boston they
         have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many
         parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. The smartness
         of debate will say that this knowledge ought to teach them more
         clearly the rights of legislature, their obligation to
         obedience, and the penalties of rebellion. All this is mighty
         well. But my honorable and learned friend on the floor, who
         condescends to mark what I say for animadversion, will disdain
         that ground. He has heard, as well as I, that when great honors
         and great emoluments do not win over this knowledge to the
         service of the State, it is a formidable adversary to
         Government. If the spirit be not tamed and broken by these
         happy methods, it is stubborn and litigious. _Abeunt studia in
         mores._ This study renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous,
         prompt in attack, ready in defence, full of resources. In other
         countries, the people, more simple, and of a less mercurial
         cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual
         grievance; here they anticipate the evil, and judge of the
         pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They
         augur misgovernment at a distance; and snuff the approach of
         tyranny in every tainted breeze.”—Burke.

  II. Attach definite circumstances to each of the foregoing arguments
     and then apply the requirements for validity to each one. State the
     results.

  III. Point out the kind of reasoning which may be employed in reaching
     each of the following conclusions.

      1. The record of our debating teams as compared with that of our
         opponents shows that we shall win this debate.

      2. Harold Small has been put on probation.

      3. Under these conditions an inheritance tax should be levied.

      4. International arbitration will ultimately take the place of war
         as a method of settling disputes between nations.

  IV. Analyze completely the reasoning processes employed in Exercise
     III. Where they may be reduced to syllogistic form, determine the
     validity of the resulting syllogisms.

  V. Write an argument from causal relation in support of any
     proposition which you wish to discuss. Employ each of the three
     classes of argument from causal relation.




                               CHAPTER IV
                         ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY


Analogy is such a resemblance between some of the known characteristics
of two different things as will lead to the conclusion that they are
alike in other characteristics. For example, an egg and a seed are two
different things but they have many characteristics in common. From the
characteristics in which we know that an egg is like a seed we reason
that they must be alike in other characteristics which we know one to
possess but which we do not know the other to possess. We know that heat
is required to develop an egg and by analogy we may conclude that heat
is required to develop a seed. In this, as in other forms of reasoning,
we proceed from the known to the unknown. The basis of inference is the
general resemblance which one thing bears to another thing. Experience
has led us to expect that when we find two different things alike in
many points we shall find them alike in many other points regarding
which no actual investigation has been made.

The argument applies the principle above suggested to the subject-matter
of the discussion. The standard illustration of this form of argument
usually quoted in books of logic and argumentation is found in Reid’s
_Intellectual Powers_. It is as follows:—

“We may observe a very great similitude between this earth which we
inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and
Mercury. They all revolve around the sun, as the earth does, although at
different distances and at different periods. They borrow all their
light from the sun, as the earth does. Several of them are known to
revolve on their axis like the earth, and by that means have like
succession of day and night. Some of them have moons that serve to give
them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are
all in their motions subject to the same law of gravitation as the earth
is. From all this similitude it is not unreasonable to think that these
planets may, like our earth, be the habitation of various orders of
living creatures. There is some probability in this conclusion from
analogy.”

Another frequently quoted illustration of the argument from analogy is
the reply of Abraham Lincoln to those who urged him to carry on the war
more vigorously.

“Gentlemen, I want you to suppose a case for a moment. Suppose that all
the property you were worth was in gold, and you had put it in the hands
of Blondin, the famous rope-walker, to carry across the Niagara Falls on
a tight rope. Would you shake the rope while he was passing over it, or
keep shouting to him, ‘Blondin, stoop a little more! Go a little
faster!’ No, I am sure you would not. You would hold your breath as well
as your tongue, and keep your hands off until he was safely over. Now
the government is in the same situation. It is carrying an immense
weight across a stormy ocean. Untold treasures are in its hands. It is
doing the best it can. Don’t badger it! Just keep still and it will get
you safely over.”

The argument from analogy is most effective when a comparison is made to
something that is plain, ordinary, and commonplace. In this way abstract
arguments may be made simple and concrete. No debater of modern times
has shown more discrimination in the use of material which would make an
analogy strong and convincing than has Lincoln. The strength of the
argument is greatly increased if it is apparent that the analogy is
perfect so far as the point at issue is concerned. In the following
quotation no exercise of the imagination is necessary to bring the two
factors of the analogy together. The argument is presented by David
Dudley Field in favor of the training of homeless children by the state.

“The question of safety is more vital still. Every one of these boys may
be a voter in ten or twenty years hence. His vote will then be as potent
as yours or mine. In countries where the sovereign is a prince it has
ever been thought prudent to bestow especial care upon the training of
an heir to the throne.—Here the people are sovereign, and the little
boy, now wandering about the streets, neglected or led astray, is in one
sense joint heir to the throne. Every dictate of prudence points to his
being fitted to fulfill the duties of his station.”

The foregoing examples with the accompanying explanations will serve to
make plain the meaning of argument from analogy and to suggest the
innumerable circumstances under which it may be used. Seldom is a
situation encountered in which an apt analogy cannot be employed. The
homelier the comparison, the more vivid and lasting will be the
impression conveyed, provided, of course, that the analogy is apt and
appropriate.

The search for an appropriate analogy is best begun by gaining a clear
conception of the universal principle upon which the proposition is
based. The student must be able to see the broadest application of the
reason which he offers in support of any particular contention. Having
grasped this fundamental principle it is easy to see its application in
other things of a more tangible form and which are more familiar to the
average mind. For example, Lincoln saw that it would not do to pursue
the Civil War too vigorously. He realized that the government was in a
very perilous position, that every step must be taken with care and
deliberation and that the least disturbance from those whose interests
were at stake might mean failure and the loss of everything. This was
the principle underlying the situation which he was facing. Now, he must
make this situation plain and its gravity clear to those who were
demanding that he hasten the progress of the war. Therefore he began
looking for the application of this principle in something which was
more familiar and more real and tangible. The newspapers had been full
of the wonderful feats of Blondin, the rope-walker. In this circumstance
Lincoln saw an opportunity to give a tangible exhibition of the
application of the principle under which he was acting.

The argument from analogy which he constructed is a model of
completeness. He compared abstract things which could not be seen and
appreciated with tangible things which could be seen and appreciated. He
compared the Government to Blondin. Blondin, walking on a rope across
Niagara Falls, was in a very dangerous position where it was necessary
that he move slowly and cautiously because the least misstep would dash
him to destruction. The situation of the government was analogous. It
was engaged in a very dangerous undertaking, a great civil war. It had
to move slowly and cautiously because the least misstep would mean
destruction. In order to make the analogy more complete Lincoln supposed
the case of Blondin performing this feat carrying with him all the
worldly possessions of the men who were urging that the war be pushed
more vigorously. The government was carrying out the dearest desire of
the people, the patriotic desire to save the grandest of all nations. If
the government failed it would mean the blighting of their dearest hopes
and to many it would mean financial ruin. Therefore the analogy was
complete in that particular. Now these men were here in Washington doing
the same thing to the government that they would be doing if, under the
above circumstances, they shook the rope or scolded Blondin while he was
walking across Niagara Falls. The forcibleness of the analogy and the
vividness of the impression which it conveyed was an argument powerful
enough to silence those who were demanding more aggressive action on the
part of the government.

An argument from analogy is never conclusive proof of the truth or
falsity of a proposition. At best it creates only a high degree of
probability. Its greatest use is to give force and vividness to an
argument already established by other means. Nevertheless, its probative
value is great provided it is properly constructed. The chance for
error, however, is a constant source of danger to him who relies upon
analogy, for the very facts upon which it is based may constitute the
reason for its falsity. A large oil refining company was recently
organized. People were induced to buy stock in the new enterprise by
means of argument from analogy. It was argued that this company was
similar to the Standard Oil Company. Now it is well known that the
Standard Oil Company pays large dividends. The argument was advanced by
the promoters of the new organization that since it was similar to the
Standard Oil Company and since the latter corporation pays large
dividends, therefore the new corporation would pay large dividends. The
analogy, of course, proved untrustworthy. The companies, though similar
in many ways, were entirely different in one essential particular
effecting the conclusion: the old company had entirely monopolized the
field of activity, while the new company had no territory in which to
work. Thus a false analogy led to the loss of many thousands of dollars.

Instances of unsound arguments from analogy might be multiplied
indefinitely. It is therefore evident that certain requirements exist
which must be strictly complied with if the argument from analogy is to
prove effective. The requirements necessary for a valid argument from
analogy are as follows:


I. The two factors in the analogy must be alike in all particulars which
affect the conclusion.

The two factors in the analogy are the thing about which the analogy is
made and the thing to which it is compared. For example, in the argument
from analogy which we have quoted from Lincoln, the first factor is the
position of the government during the Civil War and the second factor is
the rope-walker. The former is the thing about which the argument is
made; the latter is the thing to which the first factor is compared.
These two parts exist in every argument from analogy and the first
requirement is that they agree in everything which affects the
conclusion. The conclusion Lincoln wished to establish was that the
government must not be disturbed in its action because it was in a
dangerous position. A rope-walker crossing Niagara Falls must not be
disturbed because he is in a dangerous position. These are the facts
which affect the conclusion in each case. The two factors are alike in
this particular.

From the above example it will be seen that the two factors must agree
in the essential particulars. What is essential depends upon the nature
of the conclusion to be reached. In particulars affecting things other
than the conclusion to be established, it matters not whether they agree
or disagree. In comparing an illegal private monopoly to a highwayman
the particular method of robbing the victim is immaterial. The fact that
the two methods are not exactly alike does not weaken the force of the
analogy.

Burke made use of the argument from analogy in defending the policy of
conciliation which he favored. After urging that the colonies be granted
representation in Parliament, he declared that so far as government was
concerned there were four similar cases,—Ireland, Wales, Chester, and
Durham. He urged that the acts of Parliament with regard to these
territories be applied to America. He then proceeded to show that the
analogy was sound by pointing out that the two factors agreed in all
particulars which affected the conclusion. He said,

“Are not the people of America as much Englishmen as the Welsh? The
preamble of the Act of Henry the Eighth says the Welsh speak a language
no way resembling that of his Majesty’s English subjects. Are the
Americans not as numerous? If we may trust the learned and accurate
Judge Barrington’s account of North Wales, and take that as a standard
to measure the rest there is no comparison. The people cannot amount to
above 200,000, not a tenth part of the number in the colonies. Is
America in rebellion? Wales was hardly ever free from it. Have you
attempted to govern America by penal statutes? You made fifteen for
Wales. But your legislative authority is perfect with regard to America.
Was it less perfect in Wales, Chester, and Durham? But America is
virtually represented. What! does the electric force of virtual
representation more easily pass over the Atlantic than pervade Wales,
which lies in your neighborhood—or than Chester and Durham, surrounded
by an abundance of representation that is actual and palpable? But, Sir,
your ancestors thought this sort of virtual representation, however
complete, to be totally insufficient for the freedom of inhabitants of
territories that are so near and comparatively so inconsiderable. How
then can I think it sufficient for those which are infinitely greater
and infinitely more remote?”

It will be observed that there is a slight difference in the analogy
here employed and the one of which Lincoln made use. In the latter the
factors are entirely unlike, in the former they are similar. In all
analogies similar to that employed by Burke the points of similarity in
the two factors must be clearly shown to bear directly upon the
conclusion, whereas if any points of difference exist they must be shown
to have no vital bearing on the question at issue.

A failure to observe this application of the rule was made by a student
who argued that because an income tax had worked well in other countries
it would work well in the United States. His opponent pointed out the
unsoundness of the analogy by showing that the income tax proposed for
the United States was a progressive tax, whereas the income tax in the
foreign countries cited was not a progressive tax. He further revealed
the falsity of the analogy by showing that the proposed income tax for
the United States was to be levied by the national or Federal
government, whereas the income tax in the foreign countries cited was
levied by the states or smaller governmental units of those countries.
The analogy was shown to be false in that the two factors did not agree
in all particulars affecting the conclusion because (1) in one factor
the tax was progressive while in the other it was not, and (2) in one
factor the tax was levied by the national government and in the other it
was not.

The argument from analogy can be made stronger if it is shown that what
is true of the analogous case is much more likely to be true and to be
true in a greater degree, of the case in dispute. The example of analogy
quoted from Burke shows this phase of the process. Some writers call
this process an intensification of the argument from analogy. In logic
it is _a fortiori_ reasoning. The Scriptures abound in this kind of
argument, such as “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of
them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. Fear ye not
therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows.” Another passage
illustrating the intensification of the argument from analogy is,
“Consider the ravens; for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have
storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them; how much more are ye better
than the fowls?”

In a debate on the proposition, “Resolved, that courses of instruction
in the care and training of children should form a part of the
curriculum of every college and university,” a speaker for the
affirmative developed an analogy based upon the similarity between such
a course and the practical courses in the College of Agriculture on the
raising of live stock. He then gave force to his analogy by suggesting
that if it were worth while to give college courses dealing with the
raising of colts, calves, and pigs, it certainly would be much more
worth while to give courses dealing with the raising of children.


=II. The alleged facts upon which the analogy is based must be true.=

The facts alleged to be true in regard to each of the factors in the
analogy must be true as a matter of fact. A deviation from the truth in
either factor will invalidate the conclusion. In arguing in favor of the
municipal ownership and operation of the street railway system in an
eastern city a debater declared that the proposed plan would be
successful because it had been tried in Chicago with great success. He
then spent much time in showing that so far as street railway ownership
was concerned conditions in the two cities were exactly alike. This
argument from analogy, however, was promptly overthrown by the next
speaker, who introduced evidence which proved that the city of Chicago
did not own its street railway system. The analogy was unsound because
one of the alleged facts upon which it was based was not true.

The above example illustrates one of the chief sources of error in the
use of this class of argument. The student must be constantly on his
guard when inspecting his own work and that of his opponent. The
argument from analogy demands extensive and accurate knowledge of both
the factors involved and the result is almost always in favor of him
whose knowledge of the subject-matter is the most comprehensive. The
temptation to color the facts in order to fit the analogy is sometimes
great and to refrain from deceiving one’s self as well as one’s hearers
requires a high degree of intellectual honesty. In no other form of
argument is the demand for absolute impartiality more imperative. An
analogy which extends beyond the sound foundation of real facts is a
constant source of danger both for him who proposes it and for him who
receives it. All the alleged facts upon which this kind of argument is
based must be true.


III. The conclusion established by analogy should be verified by
positive evidence whenever possible.

The suggestion has already been made that no matter how perfect an
analogy may be, it can never amount to absolute proof. At its best
analogy creates only a high degree of probability. In order to
strengthen the conclusion a diligent search should be made for other
lines of reasoning which will fortify it. One of the most important uses
to which analogy may be put is to suggest possible conclusions which may
be substantiated by other processes of reasoning, as induction,
deduction, or causal relation. If two or more lines of reasoning can be
made to support the same conclusion the probability of its truth is
greatly strengthened; hence its argumentative value is increased. Where
all available processes of reasoning may be made to establish one
conclusion the probability of its truth is so strengthened that it
amounts to moral certainty, but no cumulation of probabilities can ever
amount to absolute certainty.

The fact that analogy must be substantiated by other processes of
reasoning should not lead the student to underestimate its importance.
The examples and explanations which have been given should lead him to
appreciate fully the fact that analogy has two well defined uses aside
from its value as proof of the truth or falsity of a conclusion. In the
first place it is a most important agency in suggesting conclusions
which may be verified or discredited by other processes of reasoning. In
the second place it affords a most valuable method of stating a case so
plainly that even the most ignorant may understand. A striking analogy
makes a most vivid impression on the mind and is retained long after
more formal processes of reasoning are forgotten.

          SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

  I. The two factors in the analogy must be alike in all particulars
     which affect the conclusion.

  II. The alleged facts upon which the analogy is based must be true.

  III. The conclusion established by analogy should whenever possible be
     verified by positive evidence.

                            EXERCISES IN ANALOGY

  I. Apply the requirements for validity to each of the arguments from
     analogy quoted in this last chapter.

  II. Suggest arguments from analogy in support of each of the following
     conclusions:

      1. College students should be allowed to select their own courses
         of study.

      2. A course in public speaking is a necessity for those who expect
         to teach.

      3. The greatest moral strength is fostered among many temptations.

      4. An inheritance tax is an exceedingly just method of taxation.

      5. All colleges should be coëducational.

      6. Military drill should be compulsory for all college freshmen.

      7. The use of clear and correct English is a prerequisite to
         success in any profession.

  III. Write an argument from analogy in support of one of the
     propositions given in the appendix.




                               CHAPTER V
                               FALLACIES


A fallacy is an error in the argumentative process. It may arise from a
mistake in the process of reasoning or from a mistake regarding the
facts upon which the reasoning is based. The task of detecting and
eliminating fallacies in his own argument and of detecting and exposing
fallacies in the argument of his opponent is one of the most important
phases of a debater’s work.

Self-evident fallacies are few. A fallacy is almost always concealed
under cover of language which makes it appear in the guise of valid
reasoning. It is usually embedded in an otherwise sound argumentative
structure. To detect and to separate it from that which is entirely
trustworthy is one of the severest tests of argumentative skill. Just as
in a mathematical computation one wrong figure will invalidate the
accuracy of the result though all the other figures be correct, so will
one false statement in an argument produce the same disastrous effect. A
fallacy may occupy but a very small part of the argument and yet be
fatal to the solidity of the entire structure. It may consist of only
one sentence in several pages of printed matter. It may be but a single
statement which makes an unwarranted transition or assumption.
Nevertheless it is as fatal to the argument as though it comprised a
greater part of the entire discussion.

While an opponent may cover up a fallacy with the deliberate intention
to deceive, yet the existence of most fallacies is not suspected by
those who use them. Therefore the use of fallacious arguments is seldom
evidence of dishonesty but is almost always the result of careless
reasoning or inability to detect and remedy such errors. To classify
fallacies into groups for the purpose of discussion is a most difficult
undertaking. Any division that can be made will not prove all inclusive
and all exclusive in practical application. Hard and fast divisions are
sure to overlap, and a particular fallacy may be treated under one
division or another according to the standpoint of the student and the
combination of circumstances under which it exists. For the purpose of
this discussion we shall divide fallacies according to the kind of
argument in which they occur and according to the form in which they are
usually found. This method of division will best serve our practical
object, which is the detecting and eliminating of fallacies.


=I. Fallacies of Induction.=

In a perfect induction a fallacy may be detected by scrutinizing the
conclusion to make sure that it includes only the specific instances
upon which it is based, and then examining each of these specific
instances to see that it is true as a matter of fact. If the conclusion
includes more than the facts warrant or if the alleged facts are false
the perfect induction is fallacious.

In searching for fallacies in an imperfect induction the rules which
have already been pointed out as governing the construction of such an
inductive argument should be applied. In order to make a systematic
search for fallacies in arguments involving this kind of reasoning, the
following steps should be taken.


_1. The number of specific instances relied upon to support the
inductive conclusion should be determined._

It is comparatively easy to determine the number of incidents claimed to
support the conclusion, provided they are all stated in the argument. In
such a case the searcher for fallacies merely counts these incidents and
passes on to the next step in his investigation. Seldom, however, is the
task so easy. In most arguments the writer or speaker extends his
conclusion far beyond the actual facts offered in its support. Often the
speaker states that “hundreds of other cases,” or “incidents too
numerous to mention,” or “thousands of similar cases,” etc., can be
produced to show the validity of the induction. The debater should never
be overawed by such sweeping statements or allow them to cause him to
cease his search for fallacies. He must be insistent in his demand that
the number of incidents upon which the conclusion is based be exactly
stated or at least that the number be shown as large enough to offset
the probability of coincidence. _The fallacy of the induction can then
be shown to exist by pointing out that the number of incidents in
support of the induction is not sufficiently great to warrant its
acceptance._


_2. The class of persons, events, or things about which the induction is
made should be scrutinized with a view to determining whether it is
homogeneous._

The discussion of this requirement for a valid imperfect induction which
has been previously given will make plain the nature of the
investigation under it. A fallacy may be exposed in such an argument by
showing that _the class of persons, events, or things about which the
induction is made is not homogeneous in respect to the particular about
which the conclusion is stated._


_3. Whether or not the specific instances cited in support of the
conclusion are fair examples should be determined._

It is usually easier to detect unfair examples in an opponent’s argument
than in one of the debater’s own construction. The person who uses an
induction is almost always prejudiced in favor of the instances which
support it, but to the unprejudiced mind the fairness of a given example
is not hard to determine. It is therefore important that the
investigator assume an unprejudiced attitude towards the examples
offered as representative of the class about which the induction is
made. _The existence of a fallacy in an argument based upon an imperfect
induction may be repealed by showing that the specific instances cited
in support of the conclusion are not fair examples._


_4. A search should be made for exceptions to the rule stated by the
induction._

One of the most effective ways to overthrow a generalization is to
present exceptions. Even the existence of one exception will greatly
weaken the effect of a conclusion, while several exceptions, clearly
established, will entirely destroy it. To prove the existence of more
exceptions to the rule than there are instances supporting it is to
prove it entirely fallacious. The search for exceptions should be made
by the same means employed in finding instances to support the
induction. _The fallacy of an induction may be shown by proving the
existence of exceptions to the rule which it states._


_5. The induction should be examined with a view to determining its
reasonableness._

An induction which appears on its face to be contrary to usual
experience is not an effective instrument of persuasion. By showing that
it is contrary to natural law or that no process of reasoning other than
induction can be made to uphold it, the student may weaken its force. If
clear proof of its validity can be established in this way it is not
necessary that other methods of showing a fallacy be introduced. _The
fallacy of an induction may be established by clear proof of its
unreasonableness._


=II. Fallacies of deduction.=

A thorough study of the chapter on Deductive Argument has revealed the
fact that such an argument in order to be valid must be constructed
according to certain definite principles. The knowledge of these
principles thus acquired should enable the student to detect fallacies
in this form of argument. Nevertheless, some of the fallacies to which
deduction is liable are so important and so easily concealed that a
separate treatment of them is necessary. Fallacies of deduction may be
divided into two classes, 1. Material fallacies, and 2. Logical
fallacies.


_1. Material Fallacies._

We have already learned that the deductive argument is seldom found in
the form of a syllogism but is mostly encountered in the form of an
enthymeme, which must be reduced to the syllogistic form. The method of
reduction has been explained in the chapter on Deductive Argument and
exercises in the use of that method have been given. It is therefore
assumed that the student is so familiar with this process that he can
readily reduce any argument to the syllogistic form. In the search for
fallacies we may begin at this point. After the argument has been
reduced to syllogistic form our first task is to examine the major and
minor premises for the purpose of discovering any material error, or
error of fact. In constructing our own argument we have been cautioned
to see to it that both of these statements in the syllogism are true.
Now we are examining our own arguments or our opponents’ arguments for
the very purpose of finding out whether they contain any error. A
sophomore urges John Pitt to come out for the class football team by
saying that all sophomores ought to be candidates for places on the
team. Reduced to the syllogistic form the argument would stand as
follows:

1. All sophomores ought to be candidates for the class football team.

2. John Pitt is a sophomore.

3. Therefore John Pitt ought to be a candidate for the class football
team.

Upon examining the major premise we find that it is not true as a matter
of fact, because it is obvious that one who is not physically capable of
taking part in such a game ought not to do so even though he is a
sophomore. The deduction is therefore fallacious. But suppose the major
premise to be sound, the next step in the search for fallacies would be
to examine the minor premise and find out whether it is true as a matter
of fact. An examination of this premise may disclose the fact that John
Pitt is a junior. The deduction is therefore fallacious, because the
minor premise is not true as a matter of fact. _A fallacy in a deductive
argument may be exposed by showing that either the major premise or the
minor premise is not true as a matter of fact._


_2. Logical fallacies._

We now come to the class of fallacies which inhere in deductive
reasoning independent of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts
contained in the premises. These are called logical fallacies. They
consist of many forms of error in reasoning, but we shall concern
ourselves only with those most likely to be encountered. These are four
in number, (1) The undistributed middle, (2) The illicit process, (3)
Irrelevancy of premises, or ignoring the question, and (4) Begging the
question.


(1). _The undistributed middle._

One of the most common errors of deductive argument is called the
fallacy of the undistributed middle. It consists of a defect in the
major premise. This defect is the failure of the major term to include
the middle term. The following syllogism is a typical illustration of
this error:

  1. Some college men are successful in business.

  2. Henry Winslow is a college man.

  3. Therefore Henry Winslow is successful in business.

The student will observe that the major term, “men who are successful in
business,” does not include the middle term, “college men,” but only
includes a part of that class of men. This is true because the middle
term reads “Some college men.” Therefore it is evident that there are
some college men who are not successful in business as well as some who
are. To represent this defect graphically the device of circles employed
in discussing the construction of valid deductions may again be used.
The result is as follows:

[Illustration]

It is thus made plain that some college men are within the class of
those who are successful in business, while some college men are not
within that class. Now, all that we know about Henry Winslow is that he
is a college man. Therefore we cannot tell whether he belongs to that
part of the class of college men who are successful in business, or to
that part of the class of college men which is not included in the class
of men who are successful in business. We may represent the complete
fallacy as follows:

[Illustration]

[Illustration]

In order to eliminate the logical fallacy contained in the foregoing
syllogism it would be necessary to include the middle term in the major
term of the major premise. The relation of the terms of the major
premise would then be represented by the diagram above.

The completed syllogism would then read as follows:

  1. All college men are successful in business.

  2. Henry Winslow is a college man.

  3. Therefore Henry Winslow is successful in business.

The student must not delude himself with the false impression that he
has remedied the defect and that the syllogism may therefore be used as
the basis of a sound argument. On the contrary he must now treat the
result of his efforts as a new syllogism and begin the search for
fallacies all over again. The first step in this process, as we have
already seen, is to inquire into the truth of the facts contained in the
premises. Let us first examine the major premise. Is it true that all
college men are successful in business? A little investigation and
reflection will prove that it is not. Therefore the argument is still as
fallacious as it was in the beginning. We have merely changed the
logical fallacy into a material fallacy. The result of our investigation
has been to disclose the fallacy of an enthymeme which reads, “Henry
Winslow is successful in business because he is a college man.”

Another form in which the fallacy of the undistributed middle appears in
a manner less easy to detect is shown by the following syllogism:

  1. All orators are men of great ability.

  2. Herbert Lang is a man of great ability.

  3. Therefore Herbert Lang is an orator.

Each of the premises in the above syllogism may be perfectly true as a
matter of fact, but it is obvious that there is something wrong with the
syllogism as a whole. The nature of the defect is not apparent until we
begin to apply the rules for constructing a valid syllogism. This
reveals the fact that instead of the major term including the middle
term, the middle includes the major. If we diagram the major premise by
the system of circles previously employed the following result is
obtained:

[Illustration]

If the conclusion to be established had been that Herbert Lang is a man
of great ability and the minor premise had stated that Herbert Lang was
an orator then the major premise as outlined above would have been
perfectly valid. But the conclusion that Herbert Lang is an orator does
not follow from the fact that he is a man of great ability and that all
orators are men of great ability. The only fact that we can draw from
these statements is that some men of great ability are orators. Because
we say that all orators are men of great ability we cannot be sure of
the converse, that is, that all men of great ability are orators. Only
some of them are orators, others may be ministers, doctors, lawyers, or
business men. Therefore all that we can conclude is that, “Some men of
great ability are orators.” It is now plain that when we construct the
completed syllogism from this major premise, the same defect will exist
which was revealed in the preceding illustration.

  1. Some men of great ability are orators.

  2. Herbert Lang is a man of great ability.

  3. Therefore Herbert Lang is an orator.

By examining the facts expressed in the invalid syllogism we have found
that the fallacy consists of an undistributed middle term. This fallacy
becomes obvious in some propositions in which the conclusion shows the
absurdity of the reasoning process. If we could maintain that Herbert
Lang is an orator because he is a man of great ability and all orators
are men of great ability, we could argue with equal reason that he is a
ground hog because he is an animal and all ground hogs are animals.


(2). _The illicit process._

The illicit process of either the major or minor term in the syllogism
consists of one of these terms appearing in the conclusion in a form
essentially different from that in which it appeared in the major or
minor premises. In this fallacy the major term which is in the
affirmative form in the major premise becomes negative in the
conclusion. The following fallacious syllogism illustrates this error:

  1. All football men are strong.

  2. Amos Buck is not a football man.

  3. Therefore Amos Buck is not strong.

The fallacy is evident; the class of football men does not include all
the strong men. There are some men who are not football men that are
strong. The fact that Amos Buck is not included in the class of football
men does not prove that he is not included in the larger class of strong
men. To be more concrete let us again make use of the diagrams.

From the diagram on page 245 it is seen that the fact that all football
men are strong and that Amos Buck is not a football man, does not prove
anything regarding his strength. He may be within the class of strong
men or he may be outside. Hence the syllogism is fallacious. Usually the
fallacy is not so apparent as in the above illustration but by reducing
the statements to syllogistic form in the manner indicated above the
error becomes apparent.

The minor term in a syllogism sometimes appears in the minor premise as
undistributed or particular and then appears in the conclusion as
distributed or universal. This is another form of the illicit process.
The same result follows when the minor term becomes either larger or
smaller or in any way different in the conclusion from what it was in
the minor premise. For example, a business man says, “I will not send my
son to college because some college men are ‘sports’ and I detest
‘sports’.” This error in reasoning results from the failure to phrase
each term in the same form throughout the syllogism. A scrutiny of the
terms of the syllogism will therefore reveal the presence of this
fallacy.

[Illustration]


(3). _Irrelevancy of the premises, or ignoring the question._

This fallacy consists in ignoring the conclusion to be established and
arguing toward some other conclusion. In logic it is called _ignoratio
elenchi_. It is a very important fallacy, because no error is more
common than that of wandering from the real point at issue and
discussing some related but irrelevant matter. The error may arise from
a deliberate attempt on the part of the speaker to deceive his hearers
by taking their attention from the real point at issue, from a failure
to analyze the question properly, or from inability to reason correctly.

In discussing this fallacy the first step is to analyze the argument in
its relation to the point to be proved. It should be reduced to the
syllogistic form, and the irrelevancy between the premises and the
conclusion should be made plain. After the premises are found it becomes
an easy task to determine whether they establish the right conclusion or
some other conclusion.

There are certain ways in which the question may be ignored that are so
common that they demand special attention. Of these the most important
are the following:


_A. The appeal to passion, prejudice, or humor._

Very often the speaker, instead of refuting the arguments of his
opponent, will attempt to cast ridicule upon them and thus by humorous
treatment divert attention from the real point at issue. Very often the
appeal is made to the passion or prejudice of the persons addressed
instead of to their reason.


_B. The personal attack upon an opponent._

A favorite method of the old time lawyer was to “bullyrag” his opponent
in a law suit and thus merge the case at issue into a personal conflict
with the opposing counsel. While this practice has long ago disappeared
from the court room it is very often encountered in other places. A
speaker who has a weak case will sometimes attack the personal character
of his opponent and thus seek to change the issue from a debate on the
proposition to a wrangle over the personal virtues of the participants.


_C. The personal attack upon the person or persons concerned in the
controversy._

We argue beside the point when we infer from the moral character,
position, or conduct of an individual, the truth or falsity of a
particular proposition. If the question is whether or not John Jones
killed John Smith, we make no progress by showing that John Jones
cheated John Doe out of his farm. If we are told that a certain person
advocates prohibition it is no refutation of his arguments to call
attention to the fact that he is a drunkard. The _validity_ of a
drunkard’s arguments in favor of prohibition are not affected by his
conduct, although their influence upon other persons would doubtless be
greatly affected by it. We always argue beside the point when we attempt
to defend or condemn a principle by praising or condemning the person
who advocates it. Neither can we establish the guilt or innocence of an
accused person by praising or condemning traits of his character which
have nothing to do with the charges against him.


_D. The appeal to customs and tradition._

The popular appeal to “let well enough alone,” “what has been should
be,” and other conservative arguments of this class entirely ignore the
question at issue. If the world had followed these precepts we should be
no farther advanced to-day than at the beginning of time. To follow them
now would mean that all progress must cease. A hundred years ago no
argument could have convinced the average individual that man would be
able to travel a mile a minute or that one man could hear another talk
at a distance of one thousand miles, or that a machine could be made
which would talk. Twenty years ago few people could have been convinced
that one could see through solid matter or that a man could fly, or that
a wireless telegraph was a possibility. Nevertheless all of these
seemingly impossible things have come to pass. Similar things are
constantly happening in the less material world of education, politics,
and religion. Therefore small weight attaches to the argument which
relies solely upon an appeal to custom and tradition.


_E. Shifting ground._

This fallacy usually arises from using a word in a double capacity. For
instance, “Every American citizen should be democratic in his conduct;
therefore he should vote the Democratic ticket,” is an example of this
fallacy. Here the term democratic is used in more than one sense. It is
first used to indicate an attitude of kindly sympathy towards one’s
fellow men; then it is used to designate a political party. Likewise we
might argue in an equally fallacious manner that because this country is
a republic, every man should vote the Republican ticket. The cause of
this fallacy is usually a failure on the part of the arguer to define
exactly his own position and to state the meaning of vital words used in
the proposition. An unscrupulous debater will take advantage of this
fallacy as soon as he is cornered by shifting to a different meaning of
the words employed. Whenever a debater begins to prove one proposition
and ends by upholding another proposition he has shifted ground. This
fallacy is usually so concealed in a maze of words that its detection is
difficult.


_F. Refuting an argument which has not been advanced._

This form of ignoring the question may arise from a deliberate attempt
to misrepresent the opposition or from an honest mistake as to just what
argument has been advanced. In either case it ignores the question at
issue and is a useless expenditure of time and effort. Sometimes a
debater cannot refute the arguments advanced by his opponents and he
therefore seeks to occupy his time by arguing against contentions which
he thought would be advanced but which in reality have not been
mentioned. It is far better not to argue at all than to ignore the real
points at issue in this manner.


_G. Arguing on a related proposition._

This is a very common way of ignoring the question. For example, in
support of prohibition, a debater often proves that temperance is a
benefit to the community. The real question is whether prohibition is
advisable as a means of dealing with the liquor traffic. The question as
to whether temperance benefits the community is only related. Therefore
to argue in support of the related question is to ignore the real one.
In a debate on the proposition “Resolved, that the compulsory
arbitration of strikes is practicable in the United States” the
affirmative devoted its efforts to proving that the system would be of
great advantage to the country and that it had worked well in New
Zealand. The question, whether compulsory arbitration is practicable in
the United States, was entirely ignored by its advocates arguing in
support of two related propositions which might be stated as follows:
“Resolved, that the compulsory arbitration of strikes would be of great
advantage to the United States,” and “Resolved, that compulsory
arbitration of strikes has worked well in New Zealand.” The real
question at issue was entirely ignored.


(4). _Begging the question._

To beg the question is to assume its truth or falsity without proof.
This does not mean a direct assumption of truth or falsity but an
indirect assumption reached in a circuitous manner by an appearance of
logical reasoning. In logic this error is called _petitio principi_. It
may appear in many different forms but the following are the most
frequently encountered:


_A. Arguing in a circle._

This error involves more than one syllogism. It begins by assuming the
truth of a premise, next upon this premise a conclusion is built and
then finally this very conclusion is used in an attempt to prove the
premise with which the syllogism was begun. For example, a student is
urged to take the course in corporation law in the Harvard Law School
because it is the best in the country. When the student inquires why it
is the best in the country he is told that it is the best because it is
given in the Harvard Law School. In other words no reason is given but
the statement stripped of its semblance of reasoning is merely that the
Harvard Law School is the best because it is the best.

An excellent example showing the refutation of a circular argument is
found in Percival and Jelliffe’s _Specimens of Exposition and Argument_.
It is taken from the argument of Felix Adler against the evils of child
labor in the United States.

“There is one other argument so un-American and so inhuman that I am
almost ashamed to quote it, and yet it has been used, and I fear is
secretly in the minds of some who would not openly stand for it. A
manufacturer standing near the furnace of a glasshouse and pointing to a
procession of young Slav boys who were carrying the glass on trays,
remarked ‘Look at their faces, and you will see that it is idle to take
them from the glasshouse in order to give them an education; they are
what they are, and will always remain what they are.’ He meant that
there are some human beings—and these Slavs of the number—who are
mentally irredeemable, so fast asleep intellectually that they cannot be
awakened; designed by nature, therefore, to be hewers of wood and
drawers of water. This cruel and wicked thing was said of Slavs; it is
the same thing which has been said from time immemorial by the slave
owners of their slaves. First they degrade human beings by denying them
opportunity to develop their better nature; no schools, no teaching, no
freedom, no outlook; and then, as if in mockery, they point to the
degraded condition of their victims as a reason why they should never be
allowed to escape from it.”


_B. Directly assuming the point at issue._

In directly assuming the truth of the point at issue much language is
employed which tends to conceal the lack of real proof. Stripped of
their wealth of expression such so-called arguments appear as bare
unsupported assertions. The following is a good example of this fallacy:
“Up to the time when the crime was committed, the character of the
prisoner was above reproach, for his conduct was always characterized by
honest respect for law and order.”

Often a single word may directly assume the truth or falsity of the
proposition under discussion. In opposing the proposition “Resolved,
that the boycott is a proper policy for organized labor,” the first
speaker began by saying, “It is our purpose to prove that the _wicked
and pernicious_ system of boycotting is not a proper policy for
organized labor.” This statement begged the whole proposition by
assuming at the outset that boycotting is _wicked and pernicious_. A
subsequent speaker committed the same fallacy by saying, “We contend
that there are ways by which organized labor can accomplish its purpose
that are—unlike the boycott—legitimate and proper.” In some cases such
question-begging words as those employed above are used in defining the
terms of the proposition. This manner of defining terms begs the
question as effectively and directly as any of the other fallacious
practices discussed under this heading.


_C. Indirectly assuming the point at issue._

One of the most common ways of begging the question is to assume the
truth of a broad general proposition which includes the one under
discussion. This does not directly assume the truth of the proposition,
but does it indirectly. For instance, a student declared that “Our
football team will win the championship, because the captain of the team
says we cannot lose it.” This begs the point at issue, namely—whether
our team will win the championship, by assuming the truth of a broader
proposition, namely—that whatever the captain of the team says is true.

The same result follows the assumption of particular truths which the
proposition involves. In supporting the proposition, “Resolved, that the
state should prescribe uniform text-books for the public schools” a
student attempted to prove that public instruction should be uniform
throughout the state. He thus assumed that uniform text-books would
secure uniform public instruction throughout the state. This was a
particular proposition involved in the main proposition, and it was the
duty of the debater to show that uniform text-books would bring about
uniform public instruction.


III. Fallacies of causal relation.

We have already considered the importance of causal relation in
argumentation. A relation clearly established between a cause and an
effect affords a substantial basis for valid reasoning. The failure to
establish such relation results in error. Of course the causal relation
may exist although undiscovered. Nevertheless, the failure to show such
relation should always be considered as a warning to look out for
fallacies.


_1. Fallacies of the argument from effect to cause._

The argument from effect to cause may be shown to contain a fallacy by
proving any one of the following contentions:

1. That the alleged cause was not sufficient to produce the effect.

2. That an independent cause intervened between the alleged cause and
the effect.

3. That the alleged cause was prevented from operating.

In arguing from a known effect to an unknown cause certain fallacies
occur with such frequency that we must give them special attention. Of
these common errors the following are the most important:


(1). _Mistaking coincidence for cause._

Most superstitions are due to this fallacy of mistaking coincidence for
cause. A black cat crosses our path as we are starting out on a journey.
If some misfortune overtakes us before our return our minds immediately
revert to the old superstition that if a black cat crosses our path we
must turn back and make a fresh start if we wish to ward off disaster.
The black cat is regarded by the superstitious as the cause of the
disaster. Obviously there is no causal relation between the appearance
of the black cat and the occurrence of the disaster. It is merely a
coincidence. If we regard it in any other light we are mistaking
coincidence for cause.

Political campaign oratory abounds in this kind of fallacy. One
political party comes into power and a period of industrial prosperity
follows. The party leaders point to their administration as the cause of
the prosperity. On the other hand if a period of depression follows the
election, the opponents of the successful party point to it as the cause
of the disaster. Seldom in such cases is any real causal relation
established. It is more often merely coincidence.

No fallacy is more inexcusable than that which asserts a mere prior
occurrence as a cause. Because it rained last Sunday and to-day I lose
my pocketbook is no reason why I should maintain that last Sunday’s rain
was the cause of my loss. Yet many arguments are advanced based upon a
lack of causal relation as evident as that of the above coincidence. In
an inter-class debate one of the speakers maintained that the large
number of Chinese in a certain city was the cause of the greater amount
of crime which existed in that city as compared with other cities of the
same size. No causal relation was established, but the mere fact of the
presence of the Chinese was set forth as proof that the Chinese were
responsible for the crime. One of the critics of the debate pointed out
that it was just as reasonable to suppose that the unusually cold
weather of the winter just passed was caused by the large number of
Congregationalists in the state.

Even when two events are repeatedly associated so far as time is
concerned we should not regard the repetition as proof of the causal
relation but only as an indication that a causal relation probably
exists. We should not arrive at any definite conclusion until the
existence of the causal relation has been finally established.


(2). _Mistaking an effect for a cause._

The fallacy of mistaking an effect for a cause consists in pointing to
one effect as the cause of another effect when in reality both effects
are the result of one cause. For example, a recent writer attributes the
anarchistic tendency of the masses of Russia to the arrogance of the
soldiery in that country. This reasoning is criticised on the ground
that both the anarchistic tendencies of the masses and the arrogance of
the soldiery are effects of the same cause, viz.—the despotic government
of Russia.


(3). _Mistaking a subsequent cause for a real cause._

This fallacy arises when an effect is observed and in the search for the
cause we accept something which in reality happened after the effect was
observed. A striking example of this fallacy occurred in a recent
municipal election. The increased cost of city government was charged to
the present mayor. His opponents pointed to him as the cause of this
increase in the city’s expenses. The mayor’s friends revealed the
fallacy by showing that the expense had really been incurred under the
former mayor. The acts of the present mayor could not have been the
cause of the increased expense because that expense had been incurred
before he went into office. Therefore those who made the unjust charge
had committed the fallacy of mistaking a subsequent cause for the real
cause.


(4). _Mistaking an insufficient cause for a sufficient cause._

This fallacy differs from those previously discussed in that there
exists some causal relation between the effect and the alleged cause.
The error consists of a failure to recognize the insufficiency of the
cause to produce the effect without the help of some other cause.

In a discussion of the proposition, “Resolved, that department stores
have proved a benefit to municipal communities,” one speaker argued that
such stores were the cause of the low price at which small necessities
such as hardware and dry-goods novelties could be purchased by the
consumer. The next speaker exposed the fallacy of this argument by
admitting that department stores had been a factor in lowering the cost
of such commodities, but that this could not have been done except for
the assistance of another and more powerful cause, viz.,—the invention
of machinery by which such articles could be manufactured in enormous
quantities.


_2. Fallacies of the argument from cause to effect._

Fallacies of the argument from cause to effect may be exposed by showing

1. That the observed cause is insufficient to produce the alleged
effect.

2. That past experience shows that the alleged effect does not always
follow the observed cause.

3. That an independent force has intervened to prevent the observed
cause from operating.

4. That the conclusion established by the argument is overthrown by
positive evidence.

It must be kept in mind that the argument from cause to effect is
subject to errors similar to those discussed in connection with
fallacies of the argument from effect to cause. In his desire to predict
the course of future events man is led to ignore the complex nature of
human affairs. A certain individual believes that if he puts all his
money into a business and then gives all his attention to its management
that that is a sufficient cause for success. Nevertheless, so much
depends upon the nature of the man and of the business that it is
extremely difficult to foretell the effect. The principle underlying
this situation is common to practically every argument from cause to
effect. Unless the fallacy is obvious it requires a broad and
penetrating intellect to fathom it.


_3. Fallacies of the argument from effect to effect._

The fallacies of the argument from effect to effect are discovered by
resolving it into the argument from effect to cause and from cause to
effect, of which it is composed, and examining the validity of each of
these processes.


IV. Fallacies of the argument from analogy.

The chapter on Argument from Analogy treated of the requirements for
validity to which such an argument must conform. We may expose the
fallacy of an argument from analogy by showing—

1. That the two factors in the analogy are not alike in all the
particulars affecting the conclusion.

2. That the alleged facts upon which the analogy is based are not true.

3. That the conclusion established by analogy is disproved by positive
evidence.

No test of an analogy is absolute. Its very nature makes it more
susceptible to fallacy than are the other forms of argument. At its best
it creates only a high degree of probability. As already stated, its
chief use is to give clearness and force to persuasive writing and
speaking. In the search for fallacies, here as well as elsewhere, the
best guarantee of success is an unprejudiced mind equipped with a
thorough working knowledge of all the argumentative processes of
reasoning and of the numerous fallacies to which they are subject.

                            EXERCISES IN FALLACY

  I. Point out clearly the kind of fallacies, if any, involved in the
     following arguments.

      1. The only people excluded from the privilege of voting are
         children, idiots, foreigners, convicts, and women. How much
         longer will the civilized nations of the earth permit their
         women to be classed with the incompetent and the criminal
         classes of society?

      2. Political parties are a necessity to free institutions. The
         United States is the oldest democracy on earth and in it
         political parties have always ruled.

      3. The election of a Republican president in 1896 was followed by
         a period of prosperity unrivalled in our history. Who can doubt
         that had a Democratic president been elected it would have
         worked the beginning of a sure decline of our industrial
         supremacy?

      4. The rapid increase in wages for the past twenty years shows the
         superior advantage gained by the organization of the working
         men.

      5. Is not the Spanish-American war proof of the fact that the
         government can meet its expenditures in time of great national
         emergencies without resorting to the income tax?

      6. England, France, and Germany are the great powers of Europe.
         Both England and Germany have signified their willingness to
         sign this treaty. We are therefore certain that the great
         powers of Europe will become parties to this treaty provided we
         give them the opportunity.

      7. Soon after the great flood the city of Galveston was grappling
         with serious municipal problems. By adopting the commission
         form of city government all these difficulties were solved.
         Therefore all American cities, oppressed by governmental
         difficulties, may secure prompt relief by adopting this plan of
         municipal administration.

      8. (1) Some Italians are good musicians.

          (2) This man is an Italian.

          (3) Therefore this man is a good musician.

      9. (1) All college students are interested in athletics.

          (2) Ira Simpson is not a college student.

          (3) Therefore Ira Simpson is not interested in athletics.

      10. My opponent must remember that the finger of suspicion has
         pointed to him as the one who willfully misrepresented that
         great mine disaster. Does he dare to assert that he is now
         telling the truth?

      11. The capitalistic class has always oppressed the working man.
         It has ground into the dust the man who toils for his living.
         It has enjoyed its ill-gotten wealth by living in luxury while
         the laboring man has earned his bread by the sweat of his brow.
         Now, my fellow workmen, shall we cast our vote for one of the
         most vicious members of this class?

      12. Never in its history has the town of Grogan stooped to borrow
         money for public improvements. No one will dare maintain that
         this time honored custom, founded upon reason and common sense,
         should now be broken.

      13. Brown County is overwhelmingly Republican in politics; it is
         therefore quite probable that your cousin who lives in that
         county is a Republican.

      14. The very foundation of this great republic is the idea of
         democracy. Why, then, should not every right minded citizen
         recognize his duty to support the Democratic party in the
         coming election?

      15. This climate is very healthful, for if it were not healthful
         the people who live here would not be free from disease.

      16. There must be a substantial reason back of the opinion that
         the tariff should be lowered, for the prevalence of this
         opinion throughout the country shows that it has a sound
         foundation.

      17. The inhuman method of killing murderers by electrocution
         should be abolished.

      18. It is evident that the recommendations of the Simplified
         Spelling Board should be adopted because one of the members of
         that board is the most eminent authority on the English
         Language in this country.

      19. The price of wheat is bound to increase rapidly within the
         next few months because the recent flood of the Arkansas River
         has destroyed many hundred acres of this crop.

      20. James was quite sure that something disagreeable would occur
         because only last night he saw the new moon over his left
         shoulder.

      21. Since this tax has worked well in England there can be no
         doubt of its practicability if it is adopted in the United
         States.

  II. Each student should write out and bring to the class at least one
     fallacy which he has found in the conversation of his
     fellow-students.

  III. Whenever possible use diagrams to show the fallacies in the
     specimens under I.




                               CHAPTER VI
                               REFUTATION


In discussing the Practice of Argumentation and Debate we have
considered the importance of refutation in both the main argument and in
rebuttal. We have seen that refutation must be introduced into the main
arguments whenever the prominence of opposing arguments makes it
necessary. We have seen that rebuttal consists largely of refutation. In
fact, rebuttal and refutation are used by some writers as synonymous
terms. However, in the chapter on rebuttal a distinction was made by
which that term was used to indicate the practical work of defending an
argument and attacking an opponent. In this chapter on Refutation we
shall consider the theory of the various methods employed in attacking
an opponent’s argument.

Refutation is entirely destructive as distinguished from constructive
argument. While the work of rebuttal includes both a defense of one’s
own argument and an attack upon that of an opponent, refutation consists
of weakening or destroying the arguments of the opposition. From the
destructive nature of refutation it is plain that it must be adapted to
the argument against which it is directed. This involves keen powers of
analysis and adaptation, an exact knowledge of the theory and practice
of argumentation, and a thorough insight into both sides of the
proposition under discussion. The first essential in refutation is that
the writer or speaker make perfectly plain the exact argument that he is
refuting. He must then show just how the refutation which he is making
bears upon that argument. Finally he must show plainly that his
refutation has weakened or destroyed the argument against which it was
directed. These three steps in refutation must be indicated plainly.

In refutation it is proper to establish a contrary proposition or to
refer to the fact that such a contrary proposition has been established.
The actual destructive work may be accomplished in any legitimate
manner. Of the methods employed in refutation the following are the most
important.


I. Revealing a fallacy.

The chapter on fallacies has pointed out the argumentative defects of
reasoning most frequently encountered. The student must not assume that
these errors will always occur in the exact form in which they have been
treated in any text-book. They are sure to appear in many and varied
guises. To identify and expose them requires the keenest qualities of
mind. Each student should pride himself on his ability to detect a
fallacy quickly and should look back with humiliation upon any
occurrence when he has allowed a fallacious argument to pass by
unchallenged.

Familiarity with the valid forms of logical reasoning and with the
errors to which they are subject are prerequisites to success. It is not
sufficient that the student have a vague feeling that there is something
wrong with an argument; he must be able to locate the defect exactly and
to point it out to others in such a way that they will see it. Vagueness
and ambiguity are the very substance of fallacies. Sometimes the student
must use his knowledge of constructive logic to build up a parallel
argument in the way it ought to stand and show more plainly by means of
contrast the defects of the unsound argument. In such cases it often
happens that the evidence points in an opposite direction from that
which is needed to support a valid argument. All of these devices should
be utilized in making plain the existence of fallacies.


II. Reductio ad absurdum.

This method of refutation adopts for the time being the argument of an
opponent and then by carrying out that argument to its logical
conclusion shows that it is absurd. For example, Beecher answered those
who favored the South, during the late Civil War, because they were “the
weaker party,” by reducing their argument to an absurdity. He said,

“Nothing could be more generous than your doctrine that you stand for
the ‘weaker’ party in a controversy, when that weak party stands for its
own legitimate rights against imperious pride and power. But who ever
sympathized with a weak thief, because three constables had got hold of
him? And yet the one thief in three policemen’s hands is the weaker
party. I suppose you would sympathize with him.”

The following quotation from Laycock and Scales’ _Argumentation and
Debate_ still further illustrates this method of refutation.

“This method is effective because of its simplicity and directness. It
also has in it an element of ridicule that is persuasive against an
opponent. William Ellery Channing, in a reply to Henry Clay on the
slavery question, used this method as follows:—

“‘But this property, we are told, is not to be questioned on account of
its long duration. “Two hundred years have sanctioned and _sanctified_
negro slaves as property.” Nothing but respect for the speaker could
repress criticism on this unhappy phraseology. We will trust it escaped
him without thought. But to confine ourselves to the argument from
duration; how obvious the reply! Is injustice changed into justice by
the practice of ages? Is my victim made a righteous prey because I have
bowed him to the earth till he cannot rise? For more than two hundred
years heretics were burned, and not by mobs, not by lynch law, but by
the decrees of councils, at the instigation of theologians, and with the
sanction of the laws and religions of nations; and was this a reason for
keeping up the fires, that they had burned two hundred years? In the
eastern world, successive despots, not for two hundred years, but for
twice two thousand, have claimed the right of life and death over
millions, and with no law but their own will, have beheaded, bowstrung,
starved, tortured unhappy men without number who have incurred their
wrath; and does the lapse of so many centuries sanctify murder and
ferocious power?’

“Again:—‘But the great argument remains. It is said that this property
must not be questioned, because it is established by law. “That is
property which the law declares to be property.” Thus human law is made
supreme, decisive, in a question of morals. Thus the idea of an eternal,
immutable justice is set at naught. Thus the great rule of human life is
made to be the ordinance of interested men. But there is a higher
tribunal, a throne of equal justice, immovable by the conspiracy of all
human legislatures. “That is property which the law declares to be
property.” Then the laws have only to declare you, or me, or Mr. Clay,
to be property, and we become chattels and are bound to bear the yoke!
Does not even man’s moral nature repel this doctrine too intuitively to
leave time or need for argument?’”


III. The dilemma.

The dilemma is one of the most conclusive forms of refutation. It
consists in forcing upon an opponent a choice between two possible
solutions to the question under discussion, and then showing that both
conclusions are unsound. These two conclusions are called the “horns of
the dilemma.” It matters not which of the “horns” an opponent selects;
the result is disastrous. For example, Lincoln used the dilemma against
those who charged that the Republicans stirred up insurrection among the
slaves and pointed to John Brown and his men as a specific example
showing the truth of that charge. Lincoln said, “John Brown was no
Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his
Harper’s Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty in that
matter, you know it or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are
inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact. If you do
not know it, you are inexcusable for asserting it, and especially for
persisting in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the
proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does
not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.” In effect Lincoln
said, “You know it or you do not know it. If you know it you are
inexcusable. If you do not know it you are inexcusable. Whichever horn
of the dilemma you accept, your conduct is inexcusable.”

In order to be conclusive a dilemma must meet two requirements. First,
there must be only two possibilities in the case; the alternative must
include these exactly. Second, both members of the alternative, or
“horns” of the dilemma must be untenable. To ignore or fail to comply
with either of these requirements is fatal to this method of refutation.
Lincoln, in the following quotation, shows that Douglas has violated the
first of these requirements. He refuses to accept either of the horns of
the dilemma which Douglas has sought to force upon him, by pointing out
a third possibility. On this third possibility, overlooked by Douglas,
he can stand with safety. He says:—

“Judge Douglas finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of
Independence includes all men, black as well as white, and forthwith he
boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue
gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they went to
vote, to eat and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that
they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against this counterfeit
logic which concludes that because I do not want a black woman for a
slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for
either. I can just leave her alone.”


IV. Residues.

The method of residues consists in stating all the possible conclusions
regarding the controverted subject and then destroying all of these
except one which is then regarded as the true conclusion. For example,
there are three possibilities, A, B, and C. A and B are false. Therefore
the presumption is that C is true. It will be seen that this process is
destructive and hence belongs with refutation. This method of refutation
must be used with great care. It is absolutely essential that every
possibility be included in the process. If one possibility is overlooked
the refutation is worthless. This is true because no one can tell
whether the known possibility is the true one or whether the possibility
which has been omitted is the true one. In such a case no conclusion is
reached. Even when it is apparent that the entire field has been
covered, and that every possibility has been stated the residuary part
should be supported by direct positive proof. This will offset the
suspicion, which is otherwise ever present in the minds of those who are
listening to or reading the argument, that perhaps one possibility has
been overlooked.

Foster in his _Argumentation and Debate_ quotes two excellent examples
of this method of refutation. The first of these is taken from Burke’s
_Speech on Conciliation_. After showing that a fierce spirit of liberty
has developed in the American colonies Burke asks what is to be done
with that spirit. Answering his own question he says:—

“‘As far as I am capable of discerning there are but three ways of
proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your
colonies, and disturbs your government. _These are—to change that
spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the cause; to prosecute it as
criminal; or to cope with it as necessary._ I would not be guilty of an
imperfect enumeration; I can think of but these three. Another has
indeed been started,—that of giving up the colonies; but it met so
slight a reception that I do not think myself obliged to dwell a great
while upon it. It is nothing but a little sally of anger, like the
frowardness of peevish children, who when they cannot get all they would
have, are resolved to take nothing.’

“Burke then proceeds to show that the first and second of these plans
are impracticable, and concludes with the following characteristic,
logical summary:—

“‘If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty
be for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable; if the ideas
of criminal process be inapplicable—or if applicable, are in the highest
degree inexpedient—what way yet remains? No way is open but the third
and last—to comply with the American spirit as necessary; or, if you
please, to submit to it as a necessary evil.’

“Huxley, in his first lecture on Evolution, presented three hypotheses
regarding the origin of the universe:—

“‘So far as I know, there are only three hypotheses which ever have been
entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting the past
history of Nature. I will, in the first place, state the hypotheses, and
then I will consider what evidence bearing upon them is in our
possession, and by what light of criticism that evidence is to be
interpreted.

“‘Upon the first hypothesis, the assumption is that phenomena of Nature
similar to those exhibited by the present world have always existed; in
other words, that the universe has existed from all eternity in what may
be broadly termed its present condition.

“‘The second hypothesis is, that the present state of things has had
only a limited duration; and that at some period in the past, a
condition of the world, essentially similar to that which we now know,
came into existence, without any precedent condition from which it could
have naturally proceeded. The assumption that successive states of
Nature have arisen, each without any relation of natural causation to an
antecedent state, is a mere modification of this second hypothesis.

“‘The third hypothesis also assumes that the present state of things has
had but a limited duration; but it supposes that this state has been
evolved by a natural process from an antecedent state, and that from
another, and so on; and on this hypothesis, the attempt to assign any
limit to the series of past changes is usually given up.’

“Huxley thus destroyed the first two hypotheses and left the third—since
called the Theory of Evolution—standing alone. Following this indirect,
destructive method of proof, Huxley offered direct, constructive proof
of the probable soundness of the Theory of Evolution. Such positive
proof should always be offered in corroboration of negative proof, for
the method of residues is, at best, only an indirect argument. The
chances of overlooking a possibility, or of failing completely to
destroy those dealt with, are so great that the result of the indirect
method should be reinforced by direct argument.”


V. Inconsistencies.

When a witness testifies in a court of law he injures his own
credibility as soon as one part of his story contradicts another part.
His entire account of the events about which he has been called to give
testimony must be consistent. Any inconsistency may prove fatal to the
acceptance of his testimony. In like manner any inconsistency in an
argument may prove fatal to its acceptance. The exposure of such
inconsistencies in an opponent’s argument is one of the most important
methods of refutation. In most cases the difficulty of the task is
greatly increased by the form in which such inconsistencies usually
occur. Seldom are they apparent. In most cases the error is revealed
only after the argument has been carefully analyzed and the inconsistent
parts stripped of their covering of confusing language.

The following quotation taken from the argument of Lincoln in one of the
Lincoln-Douglas debates shows the application of this method. Douglas
had maintained that slavery could be lawfully excluded from a territory
in spite of the Dred Scott decision. In refuting this argument by
exposing the inconsistency which it contained, Lincoln said:—

“The Dred Scott Decision expressly gives every citizen of the United
States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories.
Now, there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was right,
and saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive
slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter,
was cleared away from it,—all the chaff was fanned out of it,—it was a
bare absurdity: no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven away
from a place where it has a lawful right to be. Clear it of all the
verbiage, and that is the naked truth for his proposition—that a thing
may be lawfully driven from the place where it has a lawful right to
stay.”


VI. Adopting an opponent’s evidence.

This method of refutation consists in taking evidence which an opponent
has introduced in favor of his own argument and showing that in reality
it supports the opposite contention. This method of refutation is so
effective that it should never be neglected when an opportunity to use
it is presented. The opportunity may arise from the failure of an
opponent to grasp the full bearing of the evidence which he offers, or
it may arise from an unexpected turn in the discussion. Evidence may be
introduced in the beginning of a discussion to support a particular
contention by which it favors the writer or speaker who introduces it.
Later this same evidence may be interpreted as supporting a contention
entirely adverse to the writer or speaker who introduced it. An
excellent example of this method of refutation is found in Bouton’s
_Lincoln and Douglas Debates_ in Lincoln’s Cooper Institute Speech,
where he turns the warning of Washington against those who had been
quoting it against him.

“Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against
sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than
eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of
the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the
prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory, which act embodied
the policy of the Government upon that subject up to and at the very
moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he
wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure,
expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time
have a confederacy of free states.

“Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since risen upon
this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or
in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast
the blame of that sectionalism upon us who sustain his policy, or upon
you who repudiate it? We respect the warning of Washington, and we
commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right
application of it.”

We have now considered the important methods of refutation. Their
successful use depends upon the conscientious effort of the student.
Just as a boy cannot hope to learn to swim by sitting on the bank of a
stream and reading a book containing directions on how to swim, so can
no student hope to become successful in refutation by a study of the
methods explained and illustrated in this chapter. He must master the
theory of refutation, but it does not become an effective instrument in
his hands until he has applied it in actual practice. Moreover, just as
the boy can better profit by the instructions regarding swimming after
he has actually tried to swim, so can the debater better profit by the
theory of refutation after he has engaged in some real debates.

                           EXERCISES IN REFUTATION

  I. Point out the different methods of refutation employed in the
     arguments in Appendix A; Appendix B; Appendix C.

  II. Refute the following statements and name the method of refutation
     employed in each case.

      1. High school courses should be wholly prescribed. No electives
         should be offered.

      2. So far as political rights are concerned all citizens should
         have equal privileges. Therefore women should have the right to
         vote.

      3. The term of office of the President of the United States should
         be extended to eight years because we should not run the risk
         of losing the services of an efficient president at the end of
         four years.

      4. Our government should annex Cuba because we must gain
         possession of all territory adjacent to, or not separated by
         foreign possessions from, the United States.

      5. There is no ground for anticipating an immediate war with Japan
         since she has been compelled to come to our terms in the recent
         disputes.

  III. What methods of refutation are employed by Burke in his Speech on
     Conciliation? By Webster in his Reply to Hayne?

  IV. In the next class debate point out and name all the methods of
     refutation employed by your opponents and yourself.




                               APPENDICES


 APPENDIX A: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON                     273
 APPENDIX B: BRIEF OF THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON            317
 APPENDIX C: LINCOLN’S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH                       324
 APPENDIX D: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL DEBATING LEAGUE
   UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY                    342
 APPENDIX E: DEBATING AGREEMENT FOR A LEAGUE COMPOSED OF FIVE
   INSTITUTIONS                                                      346
 APPENDIX F: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR A TRIANGULAR DEBATING
   LEAGUE                                                            352
 APPENDIX G: PROPOSITIONS                                            355




                               APPENDIX A
                  THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON

                           [OCTOBER 15, 1858]


                        SENATOR DOUGLAS’S SPEECH

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is now nearly four months since the canvass
between Mr. Lincoln and myself commenced. On the 16th of June the
Republican Convention assembled at Springfield and nominated Mr. Lincoln
as their candidate for the United States Senate, and he, on that
occasion, delivered a speech in which he laid down what he understood to
be the Republican creed and the platform on which he proposed to stand
during the contest. The principal points in that speech of Mr. Lincoln’s
were: First, that this government could not endure permanently divided
into Free and Slave States, as our fathers made it; that they must all
become free or all become slave; all become one thing, or all become the
other,—otherwise this Union could not continue to exist. I give you his
opinions almost in the identical language he used. His second
proposition was a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States
because of the Dred Scott decision, urging as an especial reason for his
opposition to that decision that it deprived the negroes of the rights
and benefits of that clause in the Constitution of the United States
which guarantees to the citizens of each State all the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the several States. On the
10th of July I returned home, and delivered a speech to the people of
Chicago, in which I announced it to be my purpose to appeal to the
people of Illinois to sustain the course I had pursued in Congress. In
that speech I joined issue with Mr. Lincoln on the points which he had
presented. Thus there was an issue clear and distinct made up between us
on these two propositions laid down in the speech of Mr. Lincoln at
Springfield, and controverted by me in my reply to him at Chicago. On
the next day, the 11th of July, Mr. Lincoln replied to me at Chicago,
explaining at some length and reaffirming the positions which he had
taken in his Springfield speech. In that Chicago speech he even went
further than he had before, and uttered sentiments in regard to the
negro being on an equality with the white man. He adopted in support of
this position the argument which Lovejoy and Codding and other Abolition
lecturers had made familiar in the northern and central portions of the
State; to wit, that the Declaration of Independence having declared all
men free and equal, by divine law, also that negro equality was an
inalienable right, of which they could not be deprived. He insisted, in
that speech, that the Declaration of Independence included the negro in
the clause asserting that all men were created equal, and went so far as
to say that if one man was allowed to take the position that it did not
include the negro, others might take the position that it did not
include other men. He said that all these distinctions between this man
and that man, this race and the other race, must be discarded, and we
must all stand by the Declaration of Independence, declaring that all
men were created equal.

The issue thus being made up between Mr. Lincoln and myself on three
points, we went before the people of the State. During the following
seven weeks, between the Chicago speeches and our first meeting at
Ottawa, he and I addressed large assemblages of the people in many of
the central counties. In my speeches I confined myself closely to those
three positions which he had taken, controverting his proposition that
this Union could not exist as our fathers made it, divided into Free and
Slave States, controverting his proposition of a crusade against the
Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision, and controverting his
proposition that the Declaration of Independence included and meant the
negroes as well as the white men, when it declared all men to be created
equal. I supposed at that time that these propositions constituted a
distinct issue between us, and that the opposite positions we had taken
upon them we would be willing to be held to in every part of the State.
I never intended to waver one hair’s breadth from that issue either in
the north or the south or wherever I should address the people of
Illinois. I hold that when the time arrives that I cannot proclaim my
political creed in the same terms, not only in the northern, but in the
southern part of Illinois, not only in the Northern, but the Southern
States, and wherever the American flag waves over American soil, that
then there must be something wrong in that creed; so long as we live
under a common Constitution, so long as we live in a confederacy of
sovereign and equal States, joined together as one for certain purposes,
that any political creed is radically wrong which cannot be proclaimed
in every State and every section of that Union, alike. I took up Mr.
Lincoln’s three propositions in my several speeches, analyzed them, and
pointed out what I believed to be the radical errors contained in them.
First, in regard to his doctrine that this government was in violation
of the law of God, which says that a house divided against itself cannot
stand, I repudiated it as a slander upon the immortal framers of our
Constitution. I then said, I have often repeated, and now again assert,
that in my opinion our government can endure forever, divided into Free
and Slave States as our fathers made it,—each State having the right to
prohibit, abolish, or sustain slavery, just as it pleases. This
government was made upon the great basis of the sovereignty of the
States, the right of each State to regulate its own domestic
institutions to suit itself; and that right was conferred with the
understanding and expectation that inasmuch as each locality had
separate interests, each locality must have different and distinct local
and domestic institutions, corresponding to its wants and interests. Our
fathers knew when they made the government that the laws and
institutions which were well adapted to the Green Mountains of Vermont
were unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina. They knew then,
as well as we know now, that the laws and institutions which would be
well adapted to the beautiful prairies of Illinois would not be suited
to the mining regions of California. They knew that in a Republic as
broad as this, having such a variety of soil, climate, and interest,
there must necessarily be a corresponding variety of local laws,—the
policy and institutions of each State adapted to its condition and
wants. For this reason this Union was established on the right of each
State to do as it pleased on the question of slavery, and every other
question; and the various States were not allowed to complain of, much
less interfere with, the policy of their neighbors.

Suppose the doctrine advocated by Mr. Lincoln and the Abolitionists of
this day had prevailed when the Constitution was made, what would have
been the result? Imagine for a moment that Mr. Lincoln had been a member
of the Convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, and
that when its members were about to sign that wonderful document, he had
arisen in that Convention as he did at Springfield this summer, and,
addressing himself to the President, had said, “A house divided against
itself cannot stand; this government, divided into Free and Slave States
cannot endure, they must all be free or all be slave; they must all be
one thing, or all the other,—otherwise, it is a violation of the law of
God, and cannot continue to exist;”—suppose Mr. Lincoln had convinced
that body of sages that that doctrine was sound, what would have been
the result? Remember that the Union was then composed of thirteen
States, twelve of which were slaveholding, and one free. Do you think
that the one Free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding
States, and thus have secured the abolition of slavery? On the other
hand, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one
free State, and thus have fastened slavery, by a constitutional
provision, on every foot of the American Republic forever? You see that
if this Abolition doctrine of Mr. Lincoln had prevailed when the
government was made, it would have established slavery as a permanent
institution in all the States, whether they wanted it or not; and the
question for us to determine in Illinois now, as one of the Free States,
is whether or not we are willing, having become the majority section, to
enforce a doctrine on the minority which we would have resisted with our
heart’s blood had it been attempted on us when we were in a minority.
How has the South lost her power as the majority section in this Union,
and how have the Free States gained it, except under the operation of
that principle which declares the right of the people of each State and
each Territory to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their
own way? It was under that principle that slavery was abolished in New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania; it was under that principle that one-half of the
slaveholding States became free; it was under that principle that the
number of Free States increased until, from being one out of twelve
States, we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union,
with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and
the power, consequently, to elect a President by Northern votes, without
the aid of a Southern State. Having obtained this power under the
operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the
principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will
wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you
force them to abolish slavery everywhere?

After having pressed these arguments home on Mr. Lincoln for seven
weeks, publishing a number of my speeches, we met at Ottawa in joint
discussion, and he then began to crawfish a little, and let himself
down. I there propounded certain questions to him. Amongst others, I
asked him whether he would vote for the admission of any more Slave
States, in the event the people wanted them. He would not answer. I then
told him that if he did not answer the question there, I would renew it
at Freeport, and would then trot him down into Egypt, and again put it
to him. Well, at Freeport, knowing that the next joint discussion took
place in Egypt, and being in dread of it, he did answer my question in
regard to no more Slave States in a mode which he hoped would be
satisfactory to me, and accomplish the object he had in view. I will
show you what his answer was. After saying that he was not pledged to
the Republican doctrine of “no more Slave States,” he declared:

“I state to you freely, frankly, that I should be exceedingly sorry to
ever be put in the position of having to pass upon that question. I
should be exceedingly glad to know that there never would be another
Slave State admitted into this Union.”

Here permit me to remark, that I do not think the people will ever force
him into a position against his will. He went on to say:

“But I must add, in regard to this, that if slavery shall be kept out of
the Territory during the Territorial existence of any one given
Territory, and then the people should, having a fair chance and a clear
field, when they come to adopt a constitution, if they should do the
extraordinary thing of adopting a slave constitution uninfluenced by the
actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if
we own the country, but we must admit it into the Union.”

That answer Mr. Lincoln supposed would satisfy the old line Whigs,
composed of Kentuckians and Virginians, down in the southern part of the
State. Now, what does it amount to? I desired to know whether he would
vote to allow Kansas to come into the Union with slavery or not, as her
people desired. He would not answer, but in a roundabout way said that
if slavery should be kept out of a Territory during the whole of its
Territorial existence, and then the people, when they adopted a State
Constitution, asked admission as a Slave State, he supposed he would
have to let the State come in. The case I put to him was an entirely
different one. I desired to know whether he would vote to admit a State
if Congress had not prohibited slavery in it during its Territorial
existence, as Congress never pretended to do under Clay’s Compromise
measures of 1850. He would not answer, and I have not yet been able to
get an answer from him. I have asked him whether he would vote to admit
Nebraska, if her people asked to come in as a State with a constitution
recognizing slavery, and he refused to answer. I have put the question
to him with reference to New Mexico, and he has not uttered a word in
answer. I have enumerated the Territories, one after another, putting
the same question to him with reference to each, and he has not said,
and will not say, whether, if elected to Congress, he will vote to admit
any Territory now in existence with such a constitution as her people
may adopt. He invents a case which does not exist, and cannot exist
under this government, and answers it; but he will not answer the
question I put to him in connection with any of the Territories now in
existence. The contract we entered into with Texas when she entered the
Union obliges us to allow four States to be formed out of the old State,
and admitted with or without slavery, as the respective inhabitants of
each may determine. I have asked Mr. Lincoln three times in our joint
discussions whether he would vote to redeem that pledge, and he has
never yet answered. He is as silent as the grave on the subject. He
would rather answer as to a state of the case which will never arise
than commit himself by telling what he would do in a case which would
come up for his action soon after his election to Congress. Why can he
not say whether he is willing to allow the people of each State to have
slavery or not as they please, and to come into the Union, when they
have the requisite population, as a Slave or a Free State as they
decide? I have no trouble in answering the question. I have said
everywhere, and now repeat it to you, that if the people of Kansas want
a Slave State they have a right, under the Constitution of the United
States, to form such a State, and I will let them come into the Union
with slavery or without, as they determine. If the people of any other
Territory desire slavery, let them have it. If they do not want it, let
them prohibit it. It is their business, not mine. It is none of our
business in Illinois whether Kansas is a Free State or a Slave State. It
is none of your business in Missouri whether Kansas shall adopt slavery
or reject it. It is the business of her people, and none of yours. The
people of Kansas have as much right to decide that question for
themselves as you have in Missouri to decide it for yourselves, or we in
Illinois to decide it for ourselves.

And here I may repeat what I have said in every speech I have made in
Illinois, that I fought the Lecompton Constitution to its death, not
because of the slavery clause in it, but because it was not the act and
deed of the people of Kansas. I said then in Congress, and I say now,
that if the people of Kansas want a Slave State, they have a right to
have it. If they wanted the Lecompton Constitution, they had a right to
have it. I was opposed to that constitution because I did not believe
that it was the act and deed of the people, but, on the contrary, the
act of a small, pitiful minority acting in the name of the majority.
When at last it was determined to send that constitution back to the
people, and, accordingly, in August last, the question of admission
under it was submitted to a popular vote, the citizens rejected it by
nearly ten to one, thus showing conclusively that I was right when I
said that the Lecompton Constitution was not the act and deed of the
people of Kansas, and did not embody their will.

I hold that there is no power on earth, under our system of government,
which has the right to force a constitution upon an unwilling people.
Suppose that there had been a majority of ten to one in favor of slavery
in Kansas, and suppose there had been an Abolition President and an
Abolition Administration, and by some means the Abolitionists succeeded
in forcing an Abolition Constitution upon those slaveholding people,
would the people of the South have submitted to that act for an instant?
Well, if you of the South would not have submitted to it a day, how can
you, as fair, honorable, and honest men, insist on putting a slave
constitution on a people who desire a Free State? Your safety and ours
depend upon both of us acting in good faith, and living up to that great
principle which asserts the right of every people to form and regulate
their domestic institutions to suit themselves, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States.

Most of the men who denounced my course on the Lecompton question
objected to it, not because I was not right, but because they thought it
expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the party together, to
do wrong. I never knew the Democratic party to violate any one of its
principles, out of policy or expediency, that it did not pay the debt
with sorrow. There is no safety or success for our party unless we
always do right, and trust the consequences to God and the people. I
chose not to depart from principle for the sake of expediency on the
Lecompton question, and I never intend to do it on that or any other
question.

But I am told that I would have been all right if I had only voted for
the English bill after the Lecompton was killed. You know a general
pardon was granted to all political offenders on the Lecompton question,
provided they would only vote for the English bill. I did not accept the
benefits of that pardon for the reason that I had been right in the
course I had pursued, and hence did not require any forgiveness. Let us
see how the result has been worked out. English brought in his bill
referring the Lecompton Constitution back to the people, with the
provision that if it was rejected, Kansas should be kept out of the
Union until she had the full ratio of population required for member of
Congress,—thus in effect declaring that if the people of Kansas would
only consent to come into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution,
and have a Slave State when they did not want it, they should be
admitted with a population of 35,000; but that if they were so obstinate
as to insist upon having just such a constitution as they thought best,
and to desire admission as a free State, then they should be kept out
until they had 93,420 inhabitants. I then said, and I now repeat to you,
that whenever Kansas has people enough for a Slave State she has people
enough for a Free State. I was, and am willing to adopt the rule that no
State shall ever come into the Union until she has the full ratio of
population for a member of Congress, provided that rule is made uniform.
I made that proposition in the Senate last winter, but a majority of the
Senators would not agree to it; and I then said to them, If you will not
adopt the general rule, I will not consent to make an exception of
Kansas.

I hold that it is a violation of the fundamental principles of this
government to throw the weight of Federal power into the scale, either
in favor of the Free or the Slave States. Equality among all the States
of this Union is a fundamental principle in our political system. We
have no more right to throw the weight of the Federal Government into
the scale in favor of the slaveholding than the Free States, and last of
all should our friends in the South consent for a moment that Congress
should withhold its powers either way when they know that there is a
majority against them in both Houses of Congress.

Fellow-citizens, how have the supporters of the English bill stood up to
their pledges not to admit Kansas until she obtained a population of
93,420 in the event she rejected the Lecompton Constitution? How? The
newspapers inform us that English himself, whilst conducting his canvass
for re-election, and in order to secure it, pledged himself to his
constituents that if returned he would disregard his own bill and vote
to admit Kansas into the Union with such population as she might have
when she made application. We are informed that every Democratic
candidate for Congress in all the States where elections have recently
been held was pledged against the English bill, with perhaps one or two
exceptions. Now, if I had only done as these anti-Lecompton men who
voted for the English bill in Congress, pledging themselves to refuse to
admit Kansas if she refused to become a Slave State until she had a
population of 93,420 and then returned to their people, forfeited their
pledge, and made a new pledge to admit Kansas at any time she applied,
without regard to population, I would have had no trouble. You saw the
whole power and patronage of the Federal Government wielded in Indiana,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania to re-elect anti-Lecompton men to Congress who
voted against Lecompton, then voted for the English bill, and then
denounced the English bill, and pledged themselves to their people to
disregard it. My sin consists in not having given a pledge, and then in
not having afterward forfeited it. For that reason, in this State, every
postmaster, every route agent, every collector of the ports, and every
Federal officeholder forfeits his head the moment he expresses a
preference for the Democratic candidates against Lincoln and his
Abolition associates. A Democratic Administration which we helped to
bring into power deems it consistent with its fidelity to principle and
its regard to duty to wield its power in this State in behalf of the
Republican Abolition candidates in every county and every Congressional
District against the Democratic party. All I have to say in reference to
the matter is, that if that Administration have not regard enough for
principle, if they are not sufficiently attached to the creed of the
Democratic party, to bury forever their personal hostilities in order to
succeed in carrying out our glorious principles, I have. I have no
personal difficulty with Mr. Buchanan or his Cabinet. He chose to make
certain recommendations to Congress, as he had a right to do, on the
Lecompton question. I could not vote in favor of them. I had as much
right to judge for myself how I should vote as he had how he should
recommend. He undertook to say to me, “If you do not vote as I tell you,
I will take off the heads of your friends.” I replied to him, “You did
not elect me. I represent Illinois, and I am accountable to Illinois, as
my constituency, and to God; but not to the President or to any other
power on earth.”

And now this warfare is made on me because I would not surrender my
convictions of duty, because I would not abandon my constituency, and
receive the orders of the executive authorities as to how I should vote
in the Senate of the United States. I hold that an attempt to control
the Senate on the part of the Executive is subversive of the principles
of our Constitution. The Executive department is independent of the
Senate, and the Senate is independent of the President. In matters of
legislation the President has a veto on the action of the Senate, and in
appointments and treaties the Senate has a veto on the President. He has
no more right to tell me how I shall vote on his appointments than I
have to tell him whether he shall veto or approve a bill that the Senate
has passed. Whenever you recognize the right of the Executive to say to
a Senator, “Do this, or I will take off the heads of your friends,” you
convert this government from a republic into a despotism. Whenever you
recognize the right of a President to say to a member of Congress, “Vote
as I tell you, or I will bring a power to bear against you at home which
will crush you,” you destroy the independence of the representative and
convert him into a tool of Executive power. I resisted this invasion of
the constitutional rights of a Senator, and I intend to resist it as
long as I have a voice to speak or a vote to give. Yet Mr. Buchanan
cannot provoke me to abandon one iota of Democratic principles out of
revenge or hostility to his course. I stand by the platform of the
Democratic party, and by its organization, and support its nominees. If
there are any who choose to bolt, the fact only shows that they are not
as good Democrats as I am.

My friends, there never was a time when it was as important for the
Democratic party, for all national men, to rally and stand together, as
it is to-day. We find all sectional men giving up past differences and
continuing the one question of slavery; and when we find sectional men
thus uniting we should unite to resist them and their treasonable
designs. Such was the case in 1850, when Clay left the quiet and peace
of his home, and again entered upon public life to quell agitation and
restore peace to a distracted Union. Then we Democrats, with Cass at our
head, welcomed Henry Clay, whom the whole nation regarded as having been
preserved by God for the times. He became our leader in that great
fight, and we rallied around him the same as the Whigs rallied around
old Hickory in 1832 to put down nullification. Thus you see that whilst
Whigs and Democrats fought fearlessly in old times about banks, the
tariff, distribution, the specie circular, and the sub-treasury, all
united as a band of brothers when the peace, harmony, or integrity of
the Union was imperiled. It was so in 1850, when Abolitionism had even
so far divided this country, North and South, as to endanger the peace
of the Union; Whigs and Democrats united in establishing the Compromise
Measures of that year, and restoring tranquillity and good feeling.

These measures passed on the joint action of the two parties. They
rested on the great principle that the people of each State and each
Territory should be left perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions to suit themselves. You Whigs and we Democrats
justified them in that principle. In 1854, when it became necessary to
organize the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, I brought forward the
bill on the same principle. In the Kansas-Nebraska bill you find it
declared to be the true intent and meaning of the Act not to legislate
slavery into any State or Territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to
leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their own way. I stand on that same platform in
1858 that I did in 1850, 1854, and 1856. The Washington “Union,”
pretending to be the organ of the Administration, in the number of the
5th of this month, devotes three columns and a half to establish these
propositions; first, that Douglas, in his Freeport speech, held the same
doctrine that he did in his Nebraska bill in 1854; second, that in 1854
Douglas justified the Nebraska bill upon the ground that it was based
upon the same principle as Clay’s Compromise Measures of 1850. The
“Union” thus proved that Douglas was the same in 1858 that he was in
1856, 1854, and 1850, and consequently argued that he was never a
Democrat. Is it not funny that I was never a Democrat? There is no
pretence that I have changed a hair’s breadth. The “Union” proves by my
speeches that I explained the Compromise Measures of 1850 just as I do
now, and that I explained the Kansas and Nebraska bill in 1854 just as I
did in my Freeport speech, and yet says that I am not a Democrat, and
cannot be trusted, because I have not changed during the whole of that
time. It has occurred to me that in 1854 the author of the Kansas and
Nebraska bill was considered a pretty good Democrat. It has occurred to
me that in 1856, when I was exerting every nerve and every energy for
James Buchanan, standing on the same platform then that I do now, that I
was a pretty good Democrat. They now tell me that I am not a Democrat,
because I assert that the people of a Territory, as well as those of a
State, have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery can or
cannot exist in such Territory. Let me read what James Buchanan said on
that point when he accepted the Democratic nomination for the Presidency
in 1856. In his letter of acceptance, he used the following language:

“The recent legislation of Congress respecting domestic slavery, derived
as it has been from the original and pure fountain of legitimate
political power, the will of the majority, promises ere long to allay
the dangerous excitement. This legislation is founded upon principles as
ancient as free government itself, and, in accordance with them, has
simply declared that the people of a Territory, like those of a State,
shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist
within their limits.”

Dr. Hope will there find my answer to the question he propounded to me
before I commenced speaking. Of course, no man will consider it an
answer who is outside of the Democratic organization, bolts Democratic
nominations, and indirectly aids to put Abolitionists into power over
Democrats. But whether Dr. Hope considers it an answer or not, every
fair-minded man will see that James Buchanan has answered the question,
and has asserted that the people of a Territory, like those of a State,
shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist
within their limits. I answer specifically if you want a further answer,
and say that while under the decision of the Supreme Court, as recorded
in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, slaves are property like all
other property, and can be carried into any Territory of the United
States the same as any other description of property, yet when you get
them there they are subject to the local law of the Territory just like
all other property. You will find in a recent speech delivered by that
able and eloquent statesman, Hon. Jefferson Davis, at Bangor, Maine,
that he took the same view of this subject that I did in my Freeport
speech. He there said:

“If the inhabitants of any Territory should refuse to enact such laws
and police regulations as would give security to their property or to
his, it would be rendered more or less valueless in proportion to the
difficulties of holding it without such protection. In the case of
property in the labor of man, or what is usually called slave property,
the insecurity would be so great that the owner could not ordinarily
retain it. Therefore, though the right would remain, the remedy being
withheld, it would follow that the owner would be practically debarred,
by the circumstances of the case, from taking slave property into a
Territory where the sense of the inhabitants was opposed to its
introduction. So much for the oft-repeated fallacy of forcing slavery
upon any community.”

You will also find that the distinguished Speaker of the present House
of Representatives, Hon. Jas. L. Orr, construed the Kansas and Nebraska
bill in this same way in 1856, and also that great intellect of the
South, Alex. H. Stephens, put the same construction upon it in Congress
that I did in my Freeport speech. The whole South are rallying to the
support of the doctrine that if the people of a Territory want slavery,
they have a right to have it, and if they do not want it, that no power
on earth can force it upon them. I hold that there is no principle on
earth more sacred to all the friends of freedom than that which says
that no institution, no law, no constitution, should be forced on an
unwilling people contrary to their wishes; and I assert that the Kansas
and Nebraska bill contains that principle. It is the great principle
contained in that bill. It is the principle on which James Buchanan was
made President. Without that principle, he never would have been made
President of the United States. I will never violate or abandon that
doctrine, if I have to stand alone. I have resisted the blandishments
and threats of power on the one side, and seduction on the other, and
have stood immovably for that principle, fighting for it when assailed
by Northern mobs, or threatened by Southern hostility. I have defended
it against the North and the South, and I will defend it against whoever
assails it, and I will follow it wherever its logical conclusions lead
me. I say to you that there is but one hope, one safety for this
country, and that is to stand immovably by that principle which declares
the right of each State and each Territory to decide these questions for
themselves. This government was founded on that principle, and must be
administered in the same sense in which it was founded.

But the Abolition party really thinks that under the Declaration of
Independence the negro is equal to the white man, and that negro
equality is an inalienable right conferred by the Almighty, and hence
that all human laws in violation of it are null and void. With such men
it is no use for me to argue. I hold that the signers of the Declaration
of Independence had no reference to negroes at all when they declared
all men to be created equal. They did not mean negro, nor the savage
Indians, nor the Feejee Islanders, nor any other barbarous race. They
were speaking of white men. They alluded to men of European birth and
European descent,—to white men, and to none others,—when they declared
that doctrine. I hold that this government was established on the white
basis. It was established by white men for the benefit of white men and
their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men, and
none others. But it does not follow by any means, that merely because
the negro is not a citizen, and merely because he is not our equal,
that, therefore, he should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow
that we ought to extend to the negro race, and to all other dependent
races, all the rights, all the privileges, and all the immunities which
they can exercise consistently with the safety of society. Humanity
requires that we should give them all these privileges; Christianity
commands that we should extend those privileges to them. The question
then arises, What are those privileges, and what is the nature and
extent of them? My answer is, that that is a question which each State
must answer for itself. We in Illinois have decided it for ourselves. We
tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and finding that it was not
profitable, we abolished it for that reason, and became a Free State. We
adopted in its stead the policy that a negro in this State shall not be
a slave and shall not be a citizen. We have a right to adopt that
policy. For my part, I think it is a wise and sound policy for us. You
in Missouri must judge for yourselves whether it is a wise policy for
you. If you choose to follow our example, very good; if you reject it,
still well,—it is your business, not ours. So with Kentucky. Let
Kentucky adopt a policy to suit herself. If we do not like it, we will
keep away from it; and if she does not like ours, let her stay at home,
mind her own business, and let us alone. If the people of all the States
will act on that great principle, and each State mind its own business,
attend to its own affairs, take care of its own negroes, and not meddle
with its neighbors, then there will be peace between the North and
South, the East and the West, throughout the whole Union.

Why can we not thus have peace? Why should we thus allow a sectional
party to agitate this country, to array the North against the South, and
convert us into enemies instead of friends, merely that a few ambitious
men may ride into power on a sectional hobby? How long is it since these
ambitious Northern men wished for a sectional organization? Did any one
of them dream of a sectional party as long as the North was the weaker
section and the South the stronger? Then all were opposed to sectional
parties; but the moment the North obtained the majority in the House and
Senate by the admission of California, and could elect a President
without the aid of Southern votes, that moment ambitious Northern men
formed a scheme to excite the North against the South, and make the
people be governed in their votes by geographical lines, thinking that
the North, being the stronger section, would outvote the South, and
consequently they, the leaders, would ride into office on a sectional
hobby. I am told that my hour is out. It was very short.


                          MR. LINCOLN’S REPLY

Ladies and Gentlemen: I have been somewhat, in my own mind, complimented
by a large portion of Judge Douglas’s speech,—I mean that portion which
he devotes to the controversy between himself and the present
Administration. This is the seventh time Judge Douglas and myself have
met in these joint discussions, and he has been gradually improving in
regard to his war with the Administration. At Quincy, day before
yesterday, he was a little more severe upon the Administration than I
had heard him upon any occasion, and I took pains to compliment him for
it. I then told him to “Give it to them with all the power he had”; and
as some of them were present, I told them I would be very much obliged
if they would _give it to him_ in about the same way. I take it he has
now vastly improved upon the attack he made then upon the
Administration. I flatter myself he has really taken my advice on this
subject. All I can say now is to recommend to him and to them what I
then commended,—to prosecute the war against one another in the most
vigorous manner. I say to them again: “Go it, husband!—Go it, bear!”

There is one other thing I will mention before I leave this branch of
the discussion,—although I do not consider it much of my business,
anyway. I refer to that part of the Judge’s remarks where he undertakes
to involve Mr. Buchanan in an inconsistency. He reads something from Mr.
Buchanan, from which he undertakes to involve him in an inconsistency;
and he gets something of a cheer for having done so. I would only remind
the Judge that while he is very valiantly fighting for the Nebraska bill
and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, it has been but a little
while since he was the _valiant advocate_ of the Missouri Compromise. I
want to know if Buchanan has not as much right to be inconsistent as
Douglas has? Has Douglas the _exclusive right_, in this country, of
being _on all sides of all questions?_ Is nobody allowed that high
privilege but himself? Is he to have an entire _monopoly_ on that
subject?

So far as Judge Douglas addressed his speech to me, or so far as it was
about me, it is my business to pay some attention to it. I have heard
the Judge state two or three times what he has stated to-day,—that in a
speech which I made at Springfield, Illinois, I had in a very especial
manner complained that the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had
decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States. I
have omitted by some accident heretofore to analyze this statement, and
it is required of me to notice it now. In point of fact it is _untrue_.
I never have complained _especially_ of the Dred Scott decision because
it held that a negro could not be a citizen, and the Judge is always
wrong when he says I ever did so complain of it. I have the speech here,
and I will thank him or any of his friends to show where I said that a
negro should be a citizen, and complained especially of the Dred Scott
decision because it declared he could not be one. I have done no such
thing; and Judge Douglas, so persistently insisting that I have done so,
has strongly impressed me with the belief of a predetermination on his
part to misrepresent me. He could not get his foundation for insisting
that I was in favor of this negro equality anywhere else as well as he
could by assuming that untrue proposition. Let me tell this audience
what is true in regard to that matter; and the means by which they may
correct me if I do not tell them truly is by a recurrence to the speech
itself. I spoke of the Dred Scott decision in my Springfield speech, and
I was then endeavoring to prove that the Dred Scott decision was a
portion of a system or scheme to make slavery national in this country.
I pointed out what things had been decided by the court. I mentioned as
a fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen; that
they had done so, as I supposed, to deprive the negro, under all
circumstances, of the remotest possibility of ever becoming a citizen
and claiming the rights of a citizen of the United States under a
certain clause of the Constitution. I stated that, without making any
complaint of it at all. I then went on and stated the other points
decided in the case; namely, that the bringing of a negro into the State
of Illinois and holding him in slavery for two years here was a matter
in regard to which they would not decide whether it would make him free
or not; that they decided the further point that taking him into a
United States Territory where slavery was prohibited by Act of Congress
did not make him free, because that Act of Congress, as they held, was
unconstitutional. I mentioned these three things as making up the points
decided in that case. I mentioned them in a lump, taken in connection
with the introduction of the Nebraska bill, and the amendment of Chase,
offered at the time, declaratory of the right of the people of the
Territories to _exclude slavery_, which was voted down by the friends of
the bill. I mentioned all these things together, as evidence tending to
prove a combination and conspiracy to make the institution of slavery
national. In that connection and in that way I mentioned the decision on
the point that a negro could not be a citizen, and in no other
connection.

Out of this Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication of my
purpose to introduce a perfect social and political equality between the
white and black races. His assertion that I made an “especial objection”
(that is his exact language) to the decision on this account, is untrue
in point of fact.

Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has been alluded
to, I desire to place myself, in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly
right before this people as may be. I am quite aware what the Judge’s
object is here by all these allusions. He knows that we are before an
audience having strong sympathies southward, by relationship, place of
birth, and so on. He desires to place me in an extremely Abolition
attitude. He read upon a former occasion, and alludes, without reading,
to-day to a portion of a speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his
quotations from that speech, as he has made them upon former occasions,
the extracts were taken in such a way as, I suppose, brings them within
the definition of what is called _garbling_,—taking portions of a speech
which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense of the
speaker as expressed at the time. I propose, therefore, out of that same
speech, to show how one portion of it which he skipped over (taking an
extract before and an extract after) will give a different idea, and the
true idea I intended to convey. It will take me some little time to read
it, but I believe I will occupy the time that way.

You have heard him frequently allude to my controversy with him in
regard to the Declaration of Independence. I confess that I have had a
struggle with Judge Douglas on that matter, and I will try briefly to
place myself right in regard to it on this occasion. I said—and it is
between the extracts Judge Douglas has taken from this speech, and put
in his published speeches:

“It may be argued that there are certain conditions that make
necessities and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity
is imposed upon a man he must submit to it. I think that was the
condition in which we found ourselves when we established this
government. We had slaves among us, we could not get our Constitution
unless we permitted them to remain in slavery, we could not secure the
good we did secure if we grasped for more; and having by necessity
submitted to that much, it does not destroy the principle that is the
charter of our liberties. Let the charter remain as our standard.”

Now, I have upon all occasions declared as strongly as Judge Douglas
against the disposition to interfere with the existing institution of
slavery. You hear me read it from the same speech from which he takes
garbled extracts for the purpose of proving upon me a disposition to
interfere with the institution of slavery, and establish a perfect
social and political equality between negroes and white people.

Allow me while upon this subject briefly to present one other extract
from a speech of mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in
discussing this very same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his
ground that negroes were not included in the Declaration of
Independence:

“I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include
_all_ men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal _in all
respects_. They did not mean to say all men were equal in color, size,
intellect, moral development, or social capacity. They defined with
tolerable distinctness in what they did consider all men created
equal,—equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This they said, and this they
meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth that all were
then actually enjoying that equality, or yet that they were about to
confer it immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer
such a boon. They meant simply to declare the _right_, so that the
_enforcement_ of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.

“They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be
familiar to all,—constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even,
though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby
constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the
happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, everywhere.”

There again are the sentiments I have expressed in regard to the
Declaration of Independence upon a former occasion,—sentiments which
have been put in print and read wherever anybody cared to know what so
humble an individual as myself chose to say in regard to it.

At Galesburgh, the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas, that
three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew or
believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of
Independence did not include negroes in the term “all men.” I reassert
it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends may search
the whole records of the country, and it will be a matter of great
astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being
three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term
“all men” in the Declaration did not include the negro. Do not let me be
misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who,
finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring
about the ascendency and perpetuation of slavery, _denied the truth of
it_. I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school
denied the truth of the Declaration. I know that it ran along in the
mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that
shameful, though rather forcible, declaration of Pettit of Indiana, upon
the floor of the United States Senate, that the Declaration of
Independence was in that respect “a self-evident lie,” rather than a
self-evident truth. But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this
hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three
years ago there never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in
the sneaking way of pretending to believe it, and then asserting it did
not include the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was
Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our
friend Stephen A. Douglas. And now it has become the catchword of the
entire party. I would like to call upon his friends everywhere to
consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a
way so entirely different from their former belief; to ask whether they
are not being borne along by an irresistible current,—whither, they know
not.

In answer to my proposition at Galesburgh last week, I see that some man
in Chicago, has got up a letter, addressed to the Chicago “Times,” to
show, as he professes, that somebody _had_ said so before; and he signs
himself “An Old Line Whig,” if I remember correctly. In the first place,
I would say he _was not_ an old line Whig. I am somewhat acquainted with
old line Whigs from the origin to the end of that party; I became pretty
well acquainted with them, and I know they always had some sense,
whatever else you could ascribe to them. I know there never was one who
had not more sense than to try to show by the evidence he produces that
some man had, prior to the time I named, said that negroes were not
included in the term “all men” in the Declaration of Independence. What
is the evidence he produces? I will bring forward _his_ evidence, and
let you see what _he_ offers by way of showing that somebody more than
three years ago had said negroes were not included in the Declaration.
He brings forward part of a speech from Henry Clay,—_the_ part of _the_
speech of Henry Clay which I used to bring forward to prove precisely
the contrary. I guess we are surrounded to some extent to-day by the old
friends of Mr. Clay, and they will be glad to hear anything from that
authority. While he was in Indiana a man presented a petition to
liberate his negroes, and he (Mr. Clay) made a speech in answer to it,
which I suppose he carefully wrote out himself and caused to be
published. I have before me an extract from that speech which
constitutes the evidence this pretended “Old Line Whig” at Chicago
brought forward to show that Mr. Clay didn’t suppose the negro was
included in the Declaration of Independence. Hear what Mr. Clay said:

“And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana to liberate
the slaves under my care in Kentucky? It is a general declaration in the
act announcing to the world the independence of the thirteen American
colonies, that all men are created equal. Now, as an abstract principle,
_there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration_; and it is
desirable, _in the original construction of society and in organized
societies_, to keep it in view as a great fundamental principle. But,
then, I apprehend that in no society that ever did exist, or ever shall
be formed, was or can the equality asserted among the members of the
human race be practically enforced and carried out. There are portions,
large portions,—women, minors, insane, culprits, transient
sojourners,—that will always probably remain subject to the government
of another portion of the community.

“That declaration, whatever may be the extent of its import, was made by
the delegations of the thirteen States. In most of them slavery existed,
and had long existed, and was established by law. It was introduced and
forced upon the colonies by the paramount law of England. Do you believe
that in making that declaration the States that concurred in it intended
that it should be tortured into a virtual emancipation of all the slaves
within their respective limits? Would Virginia and other Southern States
have ever united in a declaration which was to be interpreted into an
abolition of slavery among them? Did any one of the thirteen colonies
entertain such a design or expectation? To impute such a secret and
unavowed purpose, would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest
band of patriots that ever assembled in council,—a fraud upon the
Confederacy of the Revolution; a fraud upon the union of those States
whose Constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of slavery, but
permitted the importation of slaves from Africa until the year 1808.”

This is the entire quotation brought forward to prove that somebody
previous to three years ago had said the negro was not included in the
term “all men” in the Declaration. How does it do so? In what way has it
a tendency to prove that? Mr. Clay says _it is true as an abstract
principle_ that all men are created equal, but that we cannot
practically apply it in all cases. He illustrates this by bringing
forward the cases of females, minors, and insane persons, with whom it
cannot be enforced; but he says it is true as an abstract principle in
the organization of society as well as in organized society and it
should be kept in view as a fundamental principle. Let me read a few
words more before I add some comments of my own. Mr. Clay says, a little
further on:

“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of
slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have
derived it from the parental government and from our ancestors. But here
they are, and the question is, How can they be best dealt with? If a
state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of
society, _no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to
incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements_.”

Now, here in this same book, in this same speech, in this same extract,
brought forward to prove that Mr. Clay held that the negro was not
included in the Declaration of Independence, is no such statement on his
part, but the declaration _that it is a great fundamental truth_ which
should be constantly kept in view in the organization of society and in
societies already organized. But if I say a word about it; if I attempt,
as Mr. Clay said all good men ought to do, to keep it in view; if, in
this “organized society,” I ask to have the public eye turned upon it;
if I ask, in relation to the organization of new Territories, that the
public eye should be turned upon it,—forthwith I am vilified as you hear
me to-day. What have I done that I have not the license of Henry Clay’s
illustrious example here in doing? Have I done aught that I have not his
authority for, while maintaining that in organizing new Territories and
societies, this fundamental principle should be regarded, and in
organized society holding it up to the public view and recognizing what
_he_ recognized as the great principle of free government?

And when this new principle—this new proposition that no human being
ever thought of three years ago—is brought forward, _I combat it_ as
having an evil tendency, if not an evil design. I combat it as having a
tendency to dehumanize the negro, to take away from him the right of
ever striving to be a man. I combat it as being one of the thousand
things constantly done in these days to prepare the public mind to make
property, and nothing but property, of the _negro in all the States of
this Union_.

But there is a point that I wish, before leaving this part of the
discussion, to ask attention to. I have read and I repeat the words of
Henry Clay:

“I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of
slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have
derived it from the parental government and from our ancestors. I wish
every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors.
But there they are; the question is, How can they best be dealt with? If
a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of
society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be to
incorporate the institution of slavery among its elements.”

The principle upon which I have insisted in this canvass is in relation
to laying the foundations of new societies. I have never sought to apply
these principles to the old States for the purpose of abolishing slavery
in those States. It is nothing but a miserable perversion of what I
_have_ said, to assume that I have declared Missouri, or any other Slave
State, shall emancipate her slaves; I have proposed no such thing. But
when Mr. Clay says that in laying the foundations of societies in our
Territories where it does not exist, he would be opposed to the
introduction of slavery as an element, I insist that we have _his
warrant_—his license—for insisting upon the exclusion of that element
which he declared in such strong and emphatic language _was most hateful
to him_.

Judge Douglas has again referred to a Springfield speech in which I said
“a house divided against itself cannot stand.” The Judge has so often
made the entire quotation from that speech that I can make it from
memory. I used this language:

“We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with
the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery
agitation. Under the operation of this policy, that agitation has not
only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not
cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. ‘A house
divided against itself cannot stand.’ I believe this government cannot
endure permanently, half slave and half free. I do not expect the house
to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all
one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest
the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest
in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its
advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all
the States,—old as well as new, North as well as South.”

That extract and the sentiments expressed in it have been extremely
offensive to Judge Douglas. He has warred upon them as Satan wars upon
the Bible. His perversions upon it are endless. Here now are my views
upon it in brief.

I said we were now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated
with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the
slavery agitation. Is it not so? When that Nebraska bill was brought
forward four years ago last January, was it not for the “avowed object”
of putting an end to the slavery agitation? We were to have no more
agitation in Congress; it was all to be banished to the Territories. By
the way, I will remark here that, as Judge Douglas is very fond of
complimenting Mr. Crittenden in these days, Mr. Crittenden has said
there was a falsehood in that whole business, for there was _no slavery
agitation at that time to allay_. We were for a little while _quiet_ on
the troublesome thing, and that very allaying plaster of Judge Douglas
stirred it up again. But was it not understood or intimated with the
“confident promise” of putting an end to the slavery agitation? Surely
it was. In every speech you heard Judge Douglas make, until he got into
this “imbroglio,” as they call it, with the Administration about the
Lecompton Constitution, every speech on that Nebraska bill was full of
his felicitations that we were _just at the end_ of the slavery
agitation. The last tip of the last joint of the old serpent’s tail was
just drawing out of view. But has it proved so? I have asserted that
under that policy that agitation “has not only not ceased, but has
constantly augmented.” When was there ever a greater agitation in
Congress than last winter? When was it as great in the country as
to-day?

There was a collateral object in the introduction of that Nebraska
policy, which was to clothe the people of the Territories with a
superior degree of self-government, beyond what they had ever had
before. The first object and the main one of conferring upon the people
a higher degree of “self-government” is a question of fact to be
determined by you in answer to a single question. Have you ever heard or
known of a people anywhere on earth who had as little to do as, in the
first instance of its use, the people of Kansas had with this same right
of “self-government”? In its main policy and in its collateral object,
_it has been nothing but a living, creeping lie from the time of its
introduction till to-day_.

_I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a
crisis should have been reached and passed._ I have stated in what way I
thought it would be reached and passed. I have said that it might go one
way or the other. We might, by arresting the further spread of it, and
placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the
public mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of
ultimate extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed
forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as
well as new, North as well as South. I have said, and I repeat, my wish
is that the further spread of it may be arrested, and that it may be
placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the
course of ultimate extinction. I have expressed that as my wish. I
entertain the opinion, upon evidence sufficient to my mind, that the
fathers of this government placed that institution where the public mind
did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.
Let me ask why they made provision that the source of slavery—the
African slave-trade—should be cut off at the end of twenty years? Why
did they make provision that in all the new territory we owned at that
time slavery should be forever inhibited? Why stop its spread in one
direction, and cut off its source in another, if they did not look to
its being placed in the course of its ultimate extinction?

Again: the institution of slavery is only mentioned in the Constitution
of the United States two or three times, and in neither of these cases
does the word “slavery” or “negro race” occur; but covert language is
used each time, and for a purpose full of significance. What is the
language in regard to the prohibition of the African slave-trade? It
runs in about this way: “The migration or importation of such persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred
and eight.”

The next allusion in the Constitution to the question of slavery and the
black race is on the subject of the basis of representation, and there
the language used is:

“Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole
number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of
years, and excluding Indians not taxed,—three-fifths of all other
persons.”

It says “persons,” not slaves, not negroes; but this “three-fifths” can
be applied to no other class among us than the negroes.

Lastly, in the provision for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it is
said: “No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or
regulation therein be discharged from such service or labor, but shall
be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may
be due.” There again there is no mention of the word “negro” or of
slavery. In all three of these places, being the only allusions to
slavery in the instrument, covert language is used. Language is used not
suggesting that slavery existed or that the black race were among us.
And I understand the contemporaneous history of those times to be that
covert language was used with a purpose, and that purpose was that in
our Constitution, which it was hoped and is still hoped will endure
forever,—when it should be read by intelligent and patriotic men, after
the institution of slavery had passed from amongst us,—there should be
nothing on the face of the great charter of liberty suggesting that such
a thing as negro slavery had ever existed among us. This is part of the
evidence that the fathers of the government expected and intended the
institution of slavery to come to an end. They expected and intended
that it should be in the course of ultimate extinction. And when I say
that I desire to see the further spread of it arrested, I only say I
desire to see that done which the fathers have first done. When I say I
desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief
that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, I only say I desire to
see it placed where they placed it. It is not true that our fathers, as
Judge Douglas assumes, made this government part slave and part free.
Understand the sense in which he puts it. He assumes that slavery is a
rightful thing within itself,—was introduced by the framers of the
Constitution. The exact truth is, that they found the institution
existing among us, and they left it as they found it. But in making the
government they left this institution with many clear marks of
disapprobation upon it. They found slavery among them, and they left it
among them because of the difficulty—the absolute impossibility—of its
immediate removal. And when Judge Douglas asks me why we cannot let it
remain part slave and part free, as the fathers of the government made
it, he asks a question based upon an assumption which is itself a
falsehood; and I turn upon him and ask him the question, when the policy
that the fathers of the government had adopted in relation to this
element among us was the best policy in the world, the only wise policy,
the only policy that we can ever safely continue upon, that will ever
give us peace, unless this dangerous element masters us all and becomes
a national institution,—_I turn upon him and ask him why he could not
leave it alone_. I turn and ask him why he was driven to the necessity
of introducing a _new policy_ in regard to it. He has himself said he
introduced a new policy. He said so in his speech on the 22d of March of
the present year, 1858. I ask him why he could not let it remain where
our fathers placed it. I ask, too, of Judge Douglas and his friends why
we shall not again place this institution upon the basis on which the
fathers left it. I ask you, when he infers that I am in favor of setting
the Free and Slave States at war, when the institution was placed in
that attitude by those who made the Constitution, _did they make any
war?_ If we had no war out of it when thus placed, wherein is the ground
of belief that we shall have war out of it if we return to that policy?
Have we had any peace upon this matter springing from any other basis? I
maintain that we have not. I have proposed nothing more than a return to
the policy of the fathers.

I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough
for me that I do not intend anything evil in the result, but it is
incumbent on me to show that it has not a _tendency_ to that result. I
have met Judge Douglas in that point of view. I have not only made the
declaration that I do not _mean_ to produce a conflict between the
States, but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have
shown to the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a
most peaceful tendency. The quotation that I happened to make in that
Springfield speech, that “a house divided against itself cannot stand,”
and which has proved so offensive to the Judge, was part and parcel of
the same thing. He tries to show that variety in the domestic
institutions of the different States is necessary and indispensable. I
do not dispute it. I have no controversy with Judge Douglas about that.
I shall very readily agree with him that it would be foolish for us to
insist upon having a cranberry law here in Illinois, where we have no
cranberries, because they have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they
have cranberries. I should insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in
us to deny to Virginia the right to enact oyster laws, where they have
oysters, because we want no such laws here. I understand, I hope, quite
as well as Judge Douglas or anybody else, that the variety in the soil
and climate and face of the country, and consequent variety in the
industrial pursuits and productions of a country, require systems of law
conforming to this variety in the natural features of the country. I
understand quite as well as Judge Douglas that if we here raise a barrel
of flour more than we want, and the Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar
more than they want, it is of mutual advantage to exchange. That
produces commerce, brings us together, and makes us better friends. We
like one another the more for it. And I understand as well as Judge
Douglas, or anybody else, that these mutual accommodations are the
cements which bind together the different parts of this Union; that
instead of being a thing to “divide the house,”—figuratively expressing
the Union,—they tend to sustain it; they are the props of the house,
tending always to hold it up.

But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel
between these things and this institution of slavery? I do not see that
there is any parallel at all between them. Consider it. When have we had
any difficulty or quarrel amongst ourselves about the cranberry laws of
Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine-lumber laws of
Maine, or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour?
When have we had any quarrels over these things? When have we had
perfect peace in regard to this thing which I say is an element of
discord in this Union? We have sometimes had peace, but when was it? It
was when the institution of slavery remained quiet where it was. We have
had difficulty and turmoil whenever it has made a struggle to spread
itself where it was not. I ask, then, if experience does not speak in
thunder-tones, telling us that the policy which has given peace to the
country heretofore, being returned to, gives the greatest promise of
peace again. You may say, and Judge Douglas has intimated the same
thing, that all this difficulty in regard to the institution of slavery
is the mere agitation of office-seekers and ambitious Northern
politicians. He thinks we want to get “his place,” I suppose. I agree
that there are office-seekers amongst us. The Bible says somewhere that
we are desperately selfish. I think we would have discovered that fact
without the Bible. I do not claim that I am any less so than the average
of men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than Judge Douglas.

But is it true that all the difficulty and agitation we have in regard
to this institution of slavery springs from office-seeking, from the
mere ambition of politicians? Is that the truth? How many times have we
had danger from this question? Go back to the day of the Missouri
Compromise. Go back to the Nullification question, at the bottom of
which lay this same slavery question. Go back to the time of the
Annexation of Texas. Go back to the troubles that led to the Compromise
of 1850. You will find that every time, with the single exception of the
Nullification question, they sprung from an endeavor to spread this
institution. There never was a party in the history of this country, and
there probably never will be, of sufficient strength to disturb the
general peace of the country. Parties themselves may be divided and
quarrel on minor questions, yet it extends not beyond the parties
themselves. But does _not_ this question make a disturbance outside of
political circles? Does it not enter into the churches and rend them
asunder? What divided the great Methodist Church into two parts, North
and South? What has raised this constant disturbance in every
Presbyterian General Assembly that meets? What disturbed the Unitarian
Church in this very city two years ago? What has jarred and shaken the
great American Tract Society recently, not yet splitting it, but sure to
divide it in the end? Is it not this same mighty, deep-seated power that
somehow operates on the minds of men, exciting and stirring them up in
every avenue of society,—in politics, in religion, in literature, in
morals, in all the manifold relations of life? Is this the work of
politicians? Is that irresistible power, which for fifty years has
shaken the government and agitated the people, to be stilled and subdued
by pretending that it is an exceedingly simple thing, and we ought not
to talk about it? If you will get everybody else to stop talking about
it, I assure you I will quit before they have half done so. But where is
the philosophy or statesmanship which assumes that you can quiet that
disturbing element in our society which has disturbed us for more than
half a century, which has been the only serious danger that has
threatened our institutions,—I say, where is the philosophy or the
statesmanship based on the assumption that we are to quit talking about
it, and that the public mind is all at once to cease being agitated by
it? Yet this is the policy here in the North that Douglas is
advocating,—that we are to care nothing about it! I ask you if it is not
a false philosophy. Is it not a false statesmanship that undertakes to
build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the
_very thing that everybody does care the most about?_—a thing which all
experience has shown we care a very great deal about?

The Judge alludes very often in the course of his remarks to the
exclusive right which the States have to decide the whole thing for
themselves. I agree with him very readily that the different States have
that right. He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am
contending against the right of the States to do as they please about
it. Our controversy with him is in regard to the new Territories. We
agree that when the States come in as States they have the right and the
power to do as they please. We have no power as citizens of the Free
States, or in our Federal capacity as members of the Federal Union
through the General Government, to disturb slavery in the States where
it exists. We profess constantly that we have no more inclination than
belief in the power of the government to disturb it; yet we are driven
constantly to defend ourselves from the assumption that we are warring
upon the rights of the _States_. What I insist upon is, that the new
Territories shall be kept free from it while in the Territorial
condition. Judge Douglas assumes that we have no interest in them,—that
we have no right whatever to interfere. I think we have some interest. I
think that as white men we have. Do we not wish for an outlet for our
surplus population, if I may so express myself? Do we not feel an
interest in getting to that outlet with such institutions as we would
like to have prevail there? If _you_ go to the Territory opposed to
slavery, and another man comes upon the same ground with his slave, upon
the assumption that the things are equal, it turns out that he has the
equal right all his way, and you have no part of it your way. If he goes
in and makes it a Slave Territory, and by consequence a Slave State, is
it not time that those who desire to have it a Free State were on equal
ground? Let me suggest it in a different way. How many Democrats are
there about here [“A thousand”] who have left Slave States and come into
the Free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution of slavery?
[Another voice: “A thousand and one.”] I reckon there are a thousand and
one. I will ask you, if the policy you are now advocating had prevailed
when this country was in a Territorial condition, where would you have
gone to get rid of it? Where would you have found your Free State or
Territory to go to? And when hereafter, for any cause, the people in
this place shall desire to find new homes, if they wish to be rid of the
institution, where will they find the place to go to?

Now, irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether
there is a right or wrong in enslaving a negro, I am still in favor of
our new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a
home,—may find some spot where they can better their condition; where
they can settle upon new soil and better their condition in life. I am
in favor of this, not merely (I must say it here as I have elsewhere)
for our own people who are born amongst us, but as an outlet for _free
white people everywhere_, the world over,—in which Hans, and Baptiste,
and Patrick, and all other men from all the world, may find new homes
and better their conditions in life.

I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well state again, what
I understand to be the real issue in this controversy between Judge
Douglas and myself. On the point of my wanting to make war between the
Free and the Slave States, there has been no issue between us. So, too,
when he assumes that I am in favor of introducing a perfect social and
political equality between the white and black races. These are false
issues, upon which Judge Douglas has tried to force the controversy.
There is no foundation in truth for the charge that I maintain either of
these propositions. The real issue in this controversy—the one pressing
upon every mind—is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks
upon the institution of slavery _as a wrong_, and of another class that
_does not_ look upon it as a wrong. The sentiment that contemplates the
institution of slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of
the Republican party. It is the sentiment around which all their
actions, all their arguments, circle, from which all their propositions
radiate. They look upon it as a being a moral, social, and political
wrong; and while they contemplate it as such, they nevertheless have due
regard for its actual existence among us, and the difficulties of
getting rid of it in any satisfactory way and to all the constitutional
obligations thrown about it. Yet, having a due regard for these, they
desire a policy in regard to it that looks to its not creating any more
danger. They insist that it should, as far as may be, _be treated_ as a
wrong; and one of the methods of treating it as a wrong is to _make
provision that it shall grow no larger_. They also desire a policy that
looks to a peaceful end of slavery at some time, as being wrong. These
are the views they entertain in regard to it as I understand them; and
all their sentiments, all their arguments and propositions, are brought
within this range. I have said, and I repeat it here, that if there be a
man amongst us who does not think that the institution of slavery is
wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is misplaced,
and ought not to be with us. And if there be a man amongst us who is so
impatient of it as a wrong as to disregard its actual presence amongst
us and the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a satisfactory
way, and to disregard the constitutional obligations thrown about it,
that man is misplaced if he is on our platform. We disclaim sympathy
with him in practical action. He is not placed properly with us.

On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let
me say a word. Has anything ever threatened the existence of this Union
save and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we
hold most dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever
threatened our liberty and prosperity, save and except this institution
of slavery? If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition
of things by enlarging slavery,—by spreading it out and making it
bigger? You may have a wen or cancer upon your person, and not be able
to cut it out, lest you bleed to death; but surely it is no way to cure
it, to engraft it and spread it over your whole body. That is no proper
way of treating what you regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of
dealing with it as a wrong,—restricting the spread of it, and not
allowing it to go into new countries where it has not already existed.
That is the peaceful way, the old-fashioned way, the way in which the
fathers themselves set us the example.

On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as
_not_ being wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of this day. I do
not mean to say that every man who stands within that range positively
asserts that it is right. That class will include all who positively
assert that it is right, and all who, like Judge Douglas, treat it as
indifferent, and do not say it is either right or wrong. These two
classes of men fall within the general class of those who do not look
upon it as a wrong. And if there be among you anybody who supposes that
he, as a Democrat, can consider himself “as much opposed to slavery as
anybody,” I would like to reason with him. You never treat it as a
wrong. What other thing that you consider as a wrong do you deal with as
you deal with that? Perhaps you _say_ it is wrong, _but your leader
never does, and you quarrel with anybody who says it is wrong_. Although
you pretend to say so yourself, you can find no fit place to deal with
it as a wrong. You must not say anything about it in the Free States,
_because it is not here_. You must not say anything about it in the
Slave States, _because it is there_. You must not say anything about it
in the pulpit, because that is religion, and has nothing to do with it.
You must not say anything about it in politics, _because that will
disturb the security of “my place.”_ There is no place to talk about it
as being a wrong, although you say yourself it is a wrong. But, finally,
you will screw yourself up to the belief that if the people of the Slave
States should adopt a system of gradual emancipation on the slavery
question, you would be in favor of it. You would be in favor of it. You
say that is getting it in the right place, and you would be glad to see
it succeed. But you are deceiving yourself. You all know that Frank
Blair and Gratz Brown, down there in St. Louis, undertook to introduce
that system in Missouri. They fought as valiantly as they could for the
system of gradual emancipation which you pretend you would be glad to
see succeed. Now, I will bring you to the test. After a hard fight they
were beaten, and when the news came over here, you threw up your hats
and _hurrahed for Democracy_. More than that, take all the argument made
in favor of the system you have proposed, and it carefully excludes the
idea that there is anything wrong in the institution of slavery. The
arguments to sustain that policy carefully excluded it. Even here to-day
you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me because I uttered a wish that it
might some time come to an end. Although Henry Clay could say he wished
every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors, I
am denounced by those pretending to respect Henry Clay for uttering a
wish that it might some time, in some peaceful way, come to an end. The
Democratic policy in regard to that institution will not tolerate the
merest breath, the slightest hint, of the least degree of wrong about
it. Try it by some of Judge Douglas’s arguments. He says he “don’t care
whether it is voted up or voted down” in the Territories. I do not care
myself, in dealing with that expression, whether it is intended to be
expressive of his individual sentiments on the subject, or only of the
national policy he desires to have established. It is alike valuable for
my purpose. Any man can say that who does not see anything wrong in
slavery; but no man can logically say it who does see a wrong in it,
because no man can logically say he don’t care whether a wrong is voted
up or voted down. He may say he don’t care whether an indifferent thing
is voted up or down, but he must logically have a choice between a right
thing and a wrong thing. He contends that whatever community wants
slaves has a right to have them. So they have, if it is not a wrong. But
if it is a wrong, he cannot say people have a right to do wrong. He says
that upon the score of equality, slaves should be allowed to go in a new
Territory, like other property. This is strictly logical if there is no
difference between it and other property. If it and other property are
equal, his argument is entirely logical. But if you insist that one is
wrong and the other right, there is no use to institute a comparison
between right and wrong. You may turn over everything in the Democratic
policy from beginning to end, whether in the shape it takes on the
statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the
shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short
maxim-like arguments,—it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that
there is anything wrong in it.

That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this
country, when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be
silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right
and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have
stood face to face from the beginning of time, and will ever continue to
struggle. The one is the common right of humanity, and the other the
divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it
develops itself. It is the same spirit that says: “You work and toil and
earn bread, and I’ll eat it.” No matter in what shape it comes, whether
from the mouth of a king who seeks to bestride the people of his own
nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one race of men as
an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical
principle. I was glad to express my gratitude at Quincy, and I
re-express it here, to Judge Douglas,—_that he looks to no end of the
institution of slavery_. That will help the people to see where the
struggle really is. It will hereafter place with us all men who really
do wish the wrong may have an end. And whenever we can get rid of the
fog which obscures the real question, when we can get Judge Douglas and
his friends to avow a policy looking to its perpetuation,—we can get out
from among that class of men and bring them to the side of those who
treat it as a wrong. Then there will soon be an end of it, and that end
will be its “ultimate extinction.” Whenever the issue can be distinctly
made, and all extraneous matter thrown out so that men can fairly see
the real difference between the parties, this controversy will soon be
settled, and it will be done peaceably, too. There will be no war, no
violence. It will be placed again where the wisest and best men of the
world placed it. Brooks, of South Carolina, once declared that when this
Constitution was framed its framers did not look to the institution
existing until his day. When he said this, I think he stated a fact that
is fully borne out by the history of the times. But he also said they
were better and wiser men than the men of these days; yet the men of
these days had experience which they had not, and by the invention of
the cotton-gin it became a necessity in this country that slavery should
be perpetual. I now say that, willingly or unwillingly, purposely or
without purpose, Judge Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in
changing the position of the institution of slavery which the fathers of
the government expected to come to an end ere this,—_and putting it upon
Brooks’s cotton-gin basis_; placing it where he openly confesses he has
no desire there shall ever be an end of it.

I understand I have ten minutes yet. I will employ it in saying
something about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the
Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still
somehow exclude slavery. The first thing I ask attention to is the fact
that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether
they could or not, _was a question for the Supreme Court_. But after the
court had made the decision he virtually says it is _not_ a question for
the Supreme Court, but for the people. And how is it he tells us they
can exclude it? He says it needs “police regulation,” and that admits of
“unfriendly legislation.” Although it is a right established by the
Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of
the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the Territorial
Legislature will give friendly legislation, and, more especially, if
they adopt unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him.
Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to
consider the real constitutional obligation. Let me take the gentleman
who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that he is a
member of the Territorial Legislature. The first thing he will do will
be to swear that he will support the Constitution of the United States.
His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs
Territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that constitutional
right. Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the
enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of
the United States which he has sworn to support? Can he withhold it
without violating his oath? And, more especially, can he pass unfriendly
legislation to violate his oath? Why, this is a _monstrous_ sort of talk
about the Constitution of the United States! _There has never been as
outlandish or lawless a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man
on earth._ I do not believe it is a constitutional right to hold slaves
in a Territory of the United States. I believe the decision was
improperly made and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious
against those who go for reversing a decision. But he is for legislating
it out of all force while the law itself stands. I repeat that there has
never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a
respectable man.

I suppose most of us (I know it of myself) believe that people of the
Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave law,—that
is a right fixed in the Constitution. But it cannot be made available to
them without Congressional legislation. In the Judge’s language, it is a
“barren right,” which needs legislation before it can become efficient
and valuable to the persons to whom it is guaranteed. And as the right
is constitutional, I agree that the legislation shall be granted to
it,—and that not that we like the institution of slavery. We profess to
have no taste for running and catching niggers,—at least, I profess no
taste for that job at all. Why then do I yield support to a Fugitive
Slave law? Because I do not understand that the Constitution, which
guarantees that right, can be supported without it. And if I believed
that the right to hold a slave in a Territory was equally fixed in the
Constitution with the right to reclaim fugitives, I should be bound to
give it the legislation necessary to support it. I say that no man can
deny his obligation to give the necessary legislation to support slavery
in a Territory, who believes it is a constitutional right to have it
there. No man can, who does not give the Abolitionists an argument to
deny the obligation enjoined by the Constitution to enact a Fugitive
State law. Try it now. It is the strongest Abolition argument ever made.
I say if that Dred Scott decision is correct, then the right to hold
slaves in a Territory is equally a constitutional right with the right
of a slaveholder to have his runaway returned. No one can show the
distinction between them. The one is express, so that we cannot deny it.
The other is construed to be in the Constitution, so that he who
believes the decision to be correct believes in the right. And the man
who argues that by unfriendly legislation, in spite of that
constitutional right, slavery may be driven from the Territories, cannot
avoid furnishing an argument by which Abolitionists may deny the
obligation to return fugitives, and claim the power to pass laws
unfriendly to the right of the slaveholder to reclaim his fugitive. I do
not know how such an argument may strike a popular assembly like this,
but I defy anybody to go before a body of men whose minds are educated
to estimating evidence and reasoning, and show that there is an iota of
difference between the constitutional right to reclaim a fugitive, and
the constitutional right to hold a slave, in a Territory, provided this
Dred Scott decision is correct. I defy any man to make an argument that
will justify unfriendly legislation to deprive a slaveholder of his
right to hold a slave in a Territory, that will not equally, in all its
length, breadth, and thickness, furnish an argument for nullifying the
Fugitive Slave law. Why, there is not such an Abolitionist in the nation
as Douglas, after all.


                        MR. DOUGLAS’S REJOINDER

Mr. Lincoln has concluded his remarks by saying that there is not such
an Abolitionist as I am in all America. If he could make the
Abolitionists of Illinois believe that, he would not have much show for
the Senate. Let him make the Abolitionists believe the truth of that
statement, and his political back is broken.

His first criticism upon me is the expression of his hope that the war
of the Administration will be prosecuted against me and the Democratic
party of this State with vigor. He wants that war prosecuted with vigor;
I have no doubt of it. His hopes of success and the hopes of his party
depend solely upon it. They have no chance of destroying the Democracy
of this State except by the aid of Federal patronage. He has all the
Federal officeholders here as his allies, running separate tickets
against the Democracy to divide the party, although the leaders all
intend to vote directly the Abolition ticket, and only leave the
greenhorns to vote this separate ticket who refuse to go into the
Abolition camp. There is something really refreshing in the thought that
Mr. Lincoln is in favor of prosecuting one war vigorously. It is the
first war that I ever knew him to be in favor of prosecuting. It is the
first war that I ever knew him to believe to be just or constitutional.
When the Mexican war was being waged, and the American army was
surrounded by the enemy in Mexico, he thought that war was
unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust. He thought it was not
commenced on the right _spot_.

When I made an incidental allusion of that kind in the joint discussion
over at Charleston some weeks ago, Lincoln, in replying, said that I,
Douglas, had charged him with voting against supplies for the Mexican
war, and then he reared up, full length, and swore that he never voted
against the supplies; that it was a slander; and caught hold of Ficklin,
who sat on the stand, and said, “Here, Ficklin, tell the people that it
is a lie.” Well, Ficklin, who had served in Congress with him, stood up
and told them all that he recollected about it. It was that when George
Ashmun, of Massachusetts, brought forward a resolution declaring the war
unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust, that Lincoln had voted for
it. “Yes,” said Lincoln, “I did.” Thus he confessed that he voted that
the war was wrong, that our country was in the wrong, and consequently
that the Mexicans were in the right; but charged that I had slandered
him by saying that he voted against the supplies. I never charged him
with voting against the supplies in my life, because I knew that he was
not in Congress when they were voted. The war was commenced on the 13th
day of May, 1846, and on that day we appropriated in Congress ten
millions of dollars and fifty thousand men to prosecute it. During the
same session we voted more men and more money, and at the next session
we voted more men and more money, so that by the time Mr. Lincoln
entered Congress we had enough men and enough money to carry on the war,
and had no occasion to vote for any more. When he got into the House,
being opposed to the war, and not being able to stop the supplies,
because they had all gone forward, all he could do was to follow the
lead of Corwin of Ohio, and prove that the war was not begun on the
right spot, and that it was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and wrong.
Remember, too, that this he did after the war had been begun. It is one
thing to be opposed to the declaration of a war, another and very
different thing to take sides with the enemy against your own country
after the war has been commenced. Our army was in Mexico at the time,
many battles had been fought; our citizens, who were defending the honor
of their country’s flag, were surrounded by the daggers, the guns, and
the poison of the enemy. Then it was that Corwin made his speech in
which he declared that the American soldiers ought to be welcomed by the
Mexicans with bloody hands and hospitable graves; then it was that
Ashmun and Lincoln voted in the House of Representatives that the war
was unconstitutional and unjust; and Ashmun’s resolution, Corwin’s
speech, and Lincoln’s vote were sent to Mexico and read at the head of
the Mexican army, to prove to them that there was a Mexican party in the
Congress of the United States who were doing all in their power to aid
them. That a man who takes sides with the common enemy against his own
country in time of war should rejoice in a war being made on me now, is
very natural. And, in my opinion, no other kind of a man would rejoice
in it.

Mr. Lincoln has told you a great deal to-day about his being an old line
Clay Whig. Bear in mind that there are a great many old Clay Whigs down
in this region. It is more agreeable, therefore, for him to talk about
the old Clay Whig party than it is for him to talk Abolitionism. We did
not hear much about the old Clay Whig party up in the Abolition
districts. How much of an old line Henry Clay Whig was he? Have you read
General Singleton’s speech at Jacksonville? You know that General
Singleton was for twenty-five years the confidential friend of Henry
Clay in Illinois, and he testified that in 1847, when the Constitutional
Convention of this State was in session, the Whig members were invited
to a Whig caucus at the house of Mr. Lincoln’s brother-in-law, where Mr.
Lincoln proposed to throw Henry Clay overboard and take up General
Taylor in his place, giving as his reason that, if the Whigs did not
take up General Taylor, the Democrats would. Singleton testifies that
Lincoln in that speech urged as another reason for throwing Henry Clay
overboard, that the Whigs had fought long enough for principle, and
ought to begin to fight for success. Singleton also testified that
Lincoln’s speech did not have the effect of cutting Clay’s throat, and
that he (Singleton) and others withdrew from the caucus in indignation.
He further states that when they got to Philadelphia to attend the
National Convention of the Whig party, that Lincoln was there, the
bitter and deadly enemy of Clay, and that he tried to keep him
(Singleton) out of the Convention because he insisted on voting for
Clay, and Lincoln was determined to have Taylor. Singleton says that
Lincoln rejoiced with very great joy when he found the mangled remains
of the murdered Whig statesman lying cold before him. Now, Mr. Lincoln
tells you that he is an old line Clay Whig! General Singleton testifies
to the facts I have narrated, in a public speech which has been printed
and circulated broadcast over the State for weeks, yet not a lisp have
we heard from Mr. Lincoln on the subject, except that he is an old Clay
Whig.

What part of Henry Clay’s policy did Lincoln ever advocate. He was in
Congress in 1848–9, when the Wilmot Proviso warfare disturbed the peace
and harmony of the country, until it shook the foundation of the
Republic from its centre to its circumference. It was that agitation
that brought Clay forth from his retirement at Ashland again to occupy
his seat in the Senate of the United States, to see if he could not, by
his great wisdom and experience, and the renown of his name, do
something to restore peace and quiet to a disturbed country. Who got up
that sectional strife that Clay had to be called upon to quell? I have
heard Lincoln boast that he voted forty-two times for the Wilmot
Proviso, and that he would have voted as many times more if he could.
Lincoln is the man, in connection with Seward, Chase, Giddings, and
other Abolitionists, who got up that strife that I helped Clay to put
down. Henry Clay came back to the Senate in 1849, and saw that he must
do something to restore peace to the country. The Union Whigs and the
Union Democrats welcomed him, the moment he arrived, as the man for the
occasion. We believed that he, of all men on earth, had been preserved
by Divine Providence to guide us out of our difficulties, and we
Democrats rallied under Clay then, as you Whigs in Nullification time
rallied under the banner of old Jackson, forgetting party when the
country was in danger, in order that we might have a country first, and
parties afterward.

And this reminds me that Mr. Lincoln told you that the slavery question
was the only thing that ever disturbed the peace and harmony of the
Union. Did not Nullification once raise its head and disturb the peace
of this Union in 1832? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? Did
not disunion raise its monster head during the last war with Great
Britain? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? The peace of this
country has been disturbed three times, once during the war with Great
Britain, once on the tariff question, and once on the slavery question.
His argument therefore that slavery is the only question that has ever
created dissension in the Union falls to the ground. It is true that
agitators are enabled now to use this slavery question for the purpose
of sectional strife. He admits that in regard to all things else, the
principle that I advocate, making each State and Territory free to
decide for itself, ought to prevail. He instances the cranberry laws and
the oyster laws, and he might have gone through the whole list with the
same effect. I say that all these laws are local and domestic, and that
local and domestic concerns should be left to each State and each
Territory to manage for itself. If agitators would acquiesce in that
principle, there never would be any danger to the peace and harmony of
the Union.

Mr. Lincoln tries to avoid the main issue by attacking the truth of my
proposition, that our fathers made this government divided into Free and
Slave States, recognizing the right of each to decide all its local
questions for itself. Did they not thus make it? It is true that they
did not establish slavery in any of the States, or abolish it in any of
them; but finding thirteen States, twelve of which were slave and one
free, they agreed to form a government uniting them together as they
stood, divided into Free and Slave States, and to guarantee forever to
each State the right to do as it pleased on the slavery question. Having
thus made the government, and conferred this right upon each State
forever, I assert that this government can exist as they made it,
divided into Free and Slave States, if any one State chooses to retain
slavery. He says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be
abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be
allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it
is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is
its own business,—not mine. I care more for the great principle of
self-government, the right of the people to rule, than I do for all the
negroes in Christendom. I would not endanger the perpetuity of this
Union, I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white
men, for all the negroes that ever existed. Hence, I say, let us
maintain this government on the principles that our fathers made it on,
recognizing the right of each State to keep slavery as long as its
people determine, or to abolish it when they please. But Mr. Lincoln
says that when our fathers made this government they did not look
forward to the state of things now existing, and therefore he thinks the
doctrine was wrong; and he quotes Brooks, of South Carolina, to prove
that our fathers then thought that probably slavery would be abolished
by each State acting for itself before this time. Suppose they did;
suppose they did not foresee what has occurred,—does that change the
principles of our government? They did not probably foresee the
telegraph that transmits intelligence by lightning, nor did they foresee
the railroads that now form the bonds of union between the different
States, or the thousand mechanical inventions that have elevated
mankind. But do these things change the principles of the government?
Our fathers, I say, made this government on the principle of the right
of each State to do as it pleases in its own domestic affairs, subject
to the Constitution, and allowed the people of each to apply to every
new change of circumstances such remedy as they may see fit to improve
their condition. This right they have for all time to come.

Mr. Lincoln went on to tell you that he does not at all desire to
interfere with slavery in the States where it exists, nor does his
party. I expected him to say that down here. Let me ask him, then, how
he expects to put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction
everywhere, if he does not intend to interfere with it in the States
where it exists? He says that he will prohibit it in all Territories,
and the inference is, then, that unless they make Free States out of
them he will keep them out of the Union; for, mark you, he did not say
whether or not he would vote to admit Kansas with slavery or not, as her
people might apply (he forgot that, as usual, etc.); he did not say
whether or not he was in favor of bringing the Territories now in
existence into the Union on the principle of Clay’s Compromise Measures
on the slavery question. I told you that he would not. His idea is that
he will prohibit slavery in all the Territories, and thus force them all
to become Free States, surrounding the Slave States with a cordon of
Free States, and hemming them in, keeping the slaves confined to their
present limits whilst they go on multiplying, until the soil on which
they live will no longer feed them, and he will thus be able to put
slavery in a course of ultimate extinction by starvation. He will
extinguish slavery in the Southern States as the French general
exterminated the Algerines when he smoked them out. He is going to
extinguish slavery by surrounding the Slave States, hemming in the
slaves, and starving them out of existence, as you smoke a fox out of
his hole. He intends to do that in the name of humanity and
Christianity, in order that we may get rid of the terrible crime and sin
entailed upon our fathers of holding slaves. Mr. Lincoln makes out that
line of policy, and appeals to the moral sense of justice and to the
Christian feeling of the community to sustain him. He says that any man
who holds to the contrary doctrine is in the position of the king who
claimed to govern by divine right. Let us examine for a moment and see
what principle it was that overthrew the divine right of George the
Third to govern us. Did not these Colonies rebel because the British
Parliament had no right to pass laws concerning our property and
domestic and private institutions without our consent? We demanded that
the British Government should not pass such laws unless they gave us
representation in the body passing them; and this the British Government
insisting on doing, we went to war, on the principle that the Home
Government should not control and govern distant colonies without giving
them a representation. Now, Mr. Lincoln proposes to govern the
Territories without giving them a representation, and calls on Congress
to pass laws controlling their property and domestic concerns without
their consent and against their will. Thus, he asserts for his party the
identical principle asserted by George III. and the Tories of the
Revolution.

I ask you to look into these things and then tell me whether the
Democracy or the Abolitionists are right. I hold that the people of a
Territory, like those of a State (I use the language of Mr. Buchanan in
his Letter of Acceptance), have the right to decide for themselves
whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. The point
upon which Chief Justice Taney expresses his opinion is simply this,
that slaves, being property, stand on an equal footing with other
property, and consequently that the owner has the same right to carry
that property into a Territory that he has any other, subject to the
same conditions. Suppose that one of your merchants was to take fifty or
one hundred thousand dollars’ worth of liquors to Kansas. He has a right
to go there, under that decision; but when he gets there he finds the
Maine liquor law in force, and what can he do with his property after he
gets it there? He cannot sell it, he cannot use it; it is subject to the
local law, and that law is against him, and the best thing he can do
with it is to bring it back into Missouri or Illinois and sell it. If
you take negroes to Kansas, as Colonel Jefferson Davis said in his
Bangor speech, from which I have quoted to-day, you must take them there
subject to the local law. If the people want the institution of slavery,
they will protect and encourage it; but if they do not want it they will
withhold that protection, and the absence of local legislation
protecting slavery excludes it as completely as a positive prohibition.
You slaveholders of Missouri might as well understand what you know
practically, that you cannot carry slavery where the people do not want
it. All you have a right to ask is that the people shall do as they
please: if they want slavery, let them have it; if they do not want it,
allow them to refuse to encourage it.

My friends, if, as I have said before, we will only live up to this
great fundamental principle, there will be peace between the North and
the South. Mr. Lincoln admits that, under the Constitution, on all
domestic questions, except slavery, we ought not to interfere with the
people of each State. What right have we to interfere with the people of
each State? What right have we to interfere with slavery any more than
we have to interfere with any other question? He says that this slavery
question is now the bone of contention. Why? Simply because agitators
have combined in all the Free States to make war upon it. Suppose the
agitators in the States should combine in one half of the Union to make
war upon the railroad system of the other half? They would thus be
driven to the same sectional strife. Suppose one section makes war upon
any other particular institution of the opposite section, and the same
strife is produced. The only remedy and safety is that we shall stand by
the Constitution as our fathers made it, obey the laws as they are
passed, while they stand the proper test, and sustain the decisions of
the Supreme Court and the constituted authorities.




                               APPENDIX B
                  THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON

       (Prepared as an exercise in briefing by a class in written
                             argumentation)


                       _Senator Douglas’s Speech_

Proposition: Vote for Douglas and the Democratic Party


                             _Introduction_

Douglas states that there are three points at issue between Lincoln and
himself:

  1. Whether the Union can exist half slave and half free.

  2. Whether the Supreme Court was in error in the Dred Scott Decision.

  3. Whether the Declaration of Independence included the negroes.


                                _Proof_

Proposition: (Repeated) Vote for Douglas and the Democratic Party,
because

  A. The Republican creed is wrong for the reason that it cannot be
     advocated everywhere, for

      I. Any creed is radically wrong that cannot be proclaimed alike in
         every state in the Union.

  B. Refutation: The argument that this government cannot exist half
     slave and half free is unsound, for

      I. Each state decides upon its own institutions, for

          a. Each state is sovereign.

      II. If the makers of the Constitution had believed Lincoln’s
         doctrine, they would have made a provision establishing
         slavery, for

          a. At that time twelve out of thirteen states were slave
             holding states.

      III. It would be unjust for the Northern states to attack slavery
         in the slave states, for

          a. When the free states were in the minority the slave states
             did not interfere with them.

          b. It would violate the sovereignty of the states which is
             guaranteed them in the Constitution.

  C. Lincoln is undecided about the admission of more slave states, for

      I. He would not answer at Ottawa.

      II. At Freeport he said he would be very sorry to be put in a
         position to decide that question.

      III. He has not answered my question directly, for

          a. His answer depended upon whether slavery had been kept out
             during the state’s whole territorial existence, etc.

      IV. He has not said, and will not say, whether, if elected to
         Congress, he will vote to admit any territory now in existence
         with such a Constitution as her people may provide.

      V. He will not say whether he will redeem our pledge with Texas.

  D. Douglas takes a clear and just stand on these questions, for

      I. He plainly states that he will let the people of any territory
         come into the Union slave or free as they decide.

  E. Douglas has stood by the principles he advocated, for

      I. He opposed the Lecompton Constitution because it did not
         represent the will of the people, for

          a. When it was submitted to the people of Kansas last August
             it was rejected by a vote of ten to one.

      II. He refused to support the English bill, for

          a. He was right and honest in his opposition to the Lecompton
             Constitution.

          b. He believed that whenever Kansas had enough people for a
             slave state she had enough people for a free state but the
             English bill was directly opposed to this principle, for

              1. The bill provided that if Kansas came in as a slave
                 state it would be admitted with a population of 35,000,
                 but if it desired admission as a free state it must
                 have 93,420 inhabitants.

      III. He opposes the attempt on the part of the Executive to
         control the Senate, for

          a. It will lead to despotism.

      IV. He stands on the same platform now that he stood on in 1850,
         1854, and 1856, for

          a. Even the Washington Union admits this.

  F. The principle of letting the people of each state decide for
     themselves about slavery is the right principle, for

      I. It is the principle advocated by our leading statesmen and
         patriots, for

          a. James Buchanan advocates it, for

              1. He said so in his letter of acceptance after he
                 received the Democratic nomination for the Presidency
                 in 1856.

          b. Chief Justice Taney does not deny this principle.

          c. The Honorable Jefferson Davis took the same view in his
             speech at Bangor, Maine.

          d. The Speaker of the House, Mr. Orr, holds the same view.

          e. Alex. H. Stephens puts the same construction upon it that
             Douglas does.

      II. The people believe it is right, for

          a. The people made James Buchanan president on this same
             principle.

      III. It is the principle that can bring peace to the Union, for

          a. If the people of all the states will act on this great
             principle, and each state mind its own business, take care
             of its own negroes, and not meddle with its neighbors,
             there will be no cause for dissension.

                                _Conclusion_

  A. A plea for peace by adopting the principles presented in the proof.

  B. A denunciation of those who seek to turn this public controversy to
     their own personal advantage.

                          MR. LINCOLN’S REPLY

    Proposition: Vote for Lincoln and the Republican party.

                               _Introduction_

  A. Lincoln advises Judge Douglas to continue the war upon the other
     wing of his party.

  B. Douglas should not make too much of Buchanan’s inconsistency
     because he is inconsistent himself, for he once championed the
     Missouri Compromise but now he opposes it.

                                _Proof_

Proposition: (Repeated) Vote for Lincoln and the Republican party,
because

  A. Refutation: The statement that I have complained that the Supreme
     Court in the Dred Scott case had decided that a negro could never
     be a citizen of the United States is untrue, for

      I. No such idea can be found in my speech.

      II. The truth is that I mentioned the Dred Scott Decision only as
         part of a conspiracy to make slavery national.

  B. Douglas misrepresents my position on the Declaration of
     Independence, for

      I. He has garbled my Chicago speech, for

          a. He omitted between two quotations four sentences necessary
             to my meaning.

      II. Douglas has taken no notice of an extract from my Springfield
         speech in which my views are clearly expressed.

      III. My position is the same as that of Henry Clay, for

          a. Clay declared the Declaration as an abstract principle is
             true and the new proposition of the Dred Scott Decision is
             intended to make the negro nothing but property in all the
             states.

          b. Refutation: The statement that Henry Clay held that the
             negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence
             is untrue, for

              1. He never expressed this belief.

              2. The speech referred to in the Chicago Times as showing
                 that this was Mr. Clay’s view shows precisely the
                 opposite view, for

                  (a) He says that it is true as an abstract principle
                     that all men are created equal, but that we cannot
                     practically apply it in all cases.

  C. Lincoln still says that the proposition that “A house divided
     against itself cannot stand” is true, for

      I. The agitation over slavery will not cease, for

          a. Douglas’ Kansas-Nebraska bill has stirred up the whole
             discussion again, for

              1. Although the Kansas-Nebraska bill was declared to be
                 the end it has stirred up strife in the last Congress
                 and throughout the entire country.

          b. In its pretense to confer local self-government the
             Kansas-Nebraska bill proved to be a lie.

      II. The framers of the Constitution hoped to put slavery in a
         course of extinction, for

          a. They provided that the slave trade should cease after
             twenty years.

          b. The Constitution does not contain the words “slavery” or
             “negro race,” for

              1. Its framers thought slavery a temporary thing.

              2. Fugitive slaves are not mentioned.

              3. The representation clause avoids using these words.

      III. Refutation: The statement that the framers of the
         Constitution introduced slavery is not true, for

          a. They found it but marked it with their disapproval.

      IV. Lincoln wishes to return to the policy of the framers of the
         Constitution, for

          a. Refutation: The charge that the Constitution has stirred up
             this agitation over slavery is false, for

              1. The agitation has been stirred up by Judge Douglas and
                 his friends.

          b. Other local laws have not caused strife, for

              1. The cranberry laws of Indiana caused no strife.

              2. The oyster laws of Virginia have not caused strife.

          c. The slave traffic has caused trouble whenever it has
             attempted to extend itself, for

              1. The Missouri Compromise and the Annexation of Texas
                 prove this.

              2. Slavery has divided political parties and churches.

  D. The real issue between Lincoln and Douglas is not as to states, it
     is whether Congress shall exclude slavery from the territories
     while in a territorial condition, for

      I. I agree with Douglas that the states have a right to determine
         for themselves about slavery.

      II. I differ from Douglas as to the right of the people to take
         slaves into the territories of the United States, for

          a. We must preserve the territories for free white people the
             world over.

  E. Fundamentally this controversy means that the Republicans believe
     slavery to be wrong and the Democrats believe it to be right, for

      I. The Republicans insist that slavery shall grow no larger.

      II. The Democrats never treat slavery as wrong, for

          a. When the proposition to abolish slavery in Missouri failed
             the Democrats rejoiced.

          b. Douglas, unlike Clay, does not care whether slavery is
             voted up or down.

          c. Douglas looks to no end of the institution of slavery.

          d. Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in placing
             slavery upon “Brooks’ cotton-gin basis” where he openly
             confesses he has no desire to see it ended.

  F. Judge Douglas’ position on the Dred Scott Decision is a doctrine of
     lawlessness, for

      I. Before the Dred Scott decision Douglas said constantly, that
         whether or not the people of the territories could exclude
         slavery was a question for the Supreme Court to decide. Now he
         says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the
         people.

      II. Douglas’s doctrine of local police regulation is contrary to
         the Constitution, for

          a. The territories cannot withhold the legislation which a man
             needs for the enjoyment of a right fixed in his favor by
             the Constitution.

      III. If such a right as Judge Douglas holds to be a right really
         exists then the fugitive slave law can be made of no effect by
         the same kind of action.

                        MR. DOUGLAS’S REJOINDER

Proposition: Vote for Douglas and the Democratic party, because

  A. Mr. Lincoln’s tendency is toward abolitionism.

  B. Lincoln’s course in Congress with reference to the Mexican War was
     unpatriotic, for

      I. He voted that it was unnecessary, unconstitutional, and unjust,
         after it had been begun.

  C. Refutation: Lincoln’s claim to be an old line Clay Whig is false,
     for

      I. In a caucus in 1847 Lincoln wanted to throw Henry Clay
         overboard and take up General Taylor in his place.

      II. Lincoln was the bitter enemy of Clay in the National
         Convention at Philadelphia.

      III. Singleton says that Lincoln rejoiced greatly at Clay’s
         defeat.

      IV. Lincoln never supported any of Clay’s policies, for

          a. Lincoln voted forty-two times for the Wilmot Proviso,
             whereas Clay opposed it.

  D. Refutation: Lincoln’s statement that the slavery question is the
     only thing that ever threatened the Union is false, for

      I. Nullification threatened the Union in 1832.

      II. In 1813 the Hartford Convention threatened the Union.

  E. The fathers made this government divided into free and slave
     states, recognizing the right of each to decide all its local
     questions for itself, for

      I. They did not abolish or establish slavery in any of the states.

      II. Refutation: The statement that conditions have changed does
         not affect the question, for

          a. Changed conditions do not change the principles of the
             government.

  F. Lincoln advocates the identical principle asserted by George III
     and the Tories of the Revolution, for

      I. He wants Congress to pass laws controlling the property and
         domestic concerns of the people in the territories, without
         their consent and against their will.

  G. Douglas’s principle of local option on the slavery question is
     sufficient to preserve peace, for

      I. It preserves peace on all other local questions.

                              _Conclusion_

The only remedy and safety is that we stand by the Constitution as our
fathers made it, obey the laws as they are passed, while they stand the
proper test, and sustain the decisions of the Supreme Court and the
constituted authorities.




                               APPENDIX C
                 LINCOLN’S ADDRESS AT COOPER INSTITUTE

                          [FEBRUARY 27, 1860]


MR. PRESIDENT AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF NEW YORK: The facts with which I
shall deal this evening are mainly old and familiar; nor is there
anything new in the general use I shall make of them. If there shall be
any novelty, it will be in the mode of presenting the facts, and the
inferences and observations following that presentation. In his speech
last Autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New York “Times,”
Senator Douglas said:

“Our fathers, when they framed the government under which we live,
understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now.”

I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse. I so
adopt it because it furnishes a precise and an agreed starting-point for
a discussion between Republicans and that wing of the Democracy headed
by Senator Douglas. It simply leaves the inquiry: What was the
understanding those fathers had of the question mentioned?

What is the frame of government under which we live? The answer must be,
“The Constitution of the United States.” That Constitution consists of
the original, framed in 1787, and under which the present government
first went into operation, and twelve subsequently framed amendments,
the first ten of which were framed in 1789.

Who were our fathers that framed the Constitution? I suppose the
“thirty-nine” who signed the original instrument may be fairly called
our fathers who framed that part of the present government. It is almost
exactly true to say they framed it, and it is altogether true to say
they fairly represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at
that time. Their names, being familiar to nearly all, and accessible to
quite all, need not now be repeated.

I take these “thirty-nine,” for the present, as being “our fathers who
framed the government under which we live.” What is the question which,
according to the text, those fathers understood “just as well, and even
better, than we do now”?

It is this: Does the proper division of local from Federal authority, or
anything in the Constitution, _forbid_ our Federal Government to control
as to slavery in our Federal Territories?

Upon this, Senator Douglas holds the affirmative, and Republicans the
negative. This affirmation and denial form an issue; and this issue—this
question—is precisely what the text declares our fathers understood
“better than we”. Let us now inquire whether the “thirty-nine,” or any
of them, ever acted upon this question; and if they did, how they acted
upon it—_how they expressed that better understanding_. In 1784, three
years before the Constitution, the United States then owning the
Northwestern Territory, and no other, the Congress of the Confederation
had before them the question of prohibiting slavery in that Territory,
and four of the “thirty-nine” who afterward framed the Constitution were
in that Congress, and voted on that question. Of these, Roger Sherman,
Thomas Mifflin, and Hugh Williamson voted for the prohibition, thus
showing that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from
Federal authority, nor anything else, properly forbade the Federal
Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory. The other of
the four, James McHenry, voted against the prohibition, showing that for
some cause he thought it improper to vote for it.

In 1787, still before the Constitution, but while the convention was in
session framing it, and while the Northwestern Territory still was the
only Territory owned by the United States, the same question of
prohibiting slavery in the Territory again came before the Congress of
the Confederation; and two more of the “thirty-nine” who afterward
signed the Constitution were in that Congress, and voted on the
question. They were William Blount and William Few; and they both voted
for the prohibition—thus showing that in their understanding no line
dividing local from Federal authority, nor anything else, properly
forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal
territory. This time the prohibition became a law, being part of what is
now well known as the Ordinance of ’87.

The question of Federal control of slavery in the Territories seems not
to have been directly before the convention which framed the original
Constitution; and hence it is not recorded that the “thirty-nine,” or
any of them, while engaged on that instrument, expressed any opinion on
that precise question.

In 1789, by the first Congress which sat under the Constitution, an act
was passed to enforce the ordinance of ’87, including the prohibition of
slavery in the Northwestern Territory. The bill for this act was
reported by one of the “thirty-nine”—Thomas Fitzsimmons, then a member
of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania. It went through all
its stages without a word of opposition, and finally passed both
branches without ayes and nays, which is equivalent to a unanimous
passage. In this Congress there were sixteen of the thirty-nine fathers
who framed the original Constitution. They were John Langdon, Nicholas
Gilman, Wm. S. Johnson, Roger Sherman, Robert Morris, Thos. Fitzsimmons,
William Few, Abraham Baldwin, Rufus King, William Patterson, George
Clymer, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler, Daniel Carroll, and
James Madison.

This shows that, in their understanding, no line dividing local from
Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, properly forbade
Congress to prohibit slavery in the Federal territory; else both their
fidelity to correct principle, and their oath to support the
Constitution, would have constrained them to oppose the prohibition.

Again, George Washington, another of the “thirty-nine,” was then
President of the United States, and as such approved and signed the
bill, thus completing its validity as a law, and thus showing that, in
his understanding, no line dividing local from Federal authority, nor
anything in the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control
as to slavery in Federal territory.

No great while after the adoption of the original Constitution, North
Carolina ceded to the Federal Government the country now constituting
the State of Tennessee; and a few years later Georgia ceded that which
now constitutes the States of Mississippi and Alabama. In both deeds of
cession it was made a condition by the ceding States that the Federal
government should not prohibit slavery in the ceded country. Besides
this, slavery was then actually in the ceded country. Under these
circumstances, Congress, on taking charge of these countries, did not
absolutely prohibit slavery within them. But they did interfere with
it—take control of it—even there, to a certain extent. In 1798 Congress
organized the Territory of Mississippi. In the act of organization they
prohibited the bringing of slaves into the Territory from any place
without the United States, by fine, and giving freedom to slaves so
brought. This act passed both branches of Congress without yeas and
nays. In that Congress were three of the “thirty-nine” who framed the
original Constitution. They were John Langdon, George Read, and Abraham
Baldwin. They all probably voted for it. Certainly they would have
placed their opposition to it upon record if, in their understanding,
any line dividing local from Federal authority, or anything in the
Constitution, properly forbade the Federal Government to control as to
slavery in Federal Territory.

In 1803 the Federal Government purchased the Louisiana country. Our
former territorial acquisitions came from certain of our own States; but
this Louisiana country was acquired from a foreign nation. In 1804
Congress gave a territorial organization to that part of it which now
constitutes the State of Louisiana. New Orleans, lying within that part,
was an old and comparatively large city. There were other considerable
towns and settlements and slavery was extensively and thoroughly
intermingled with the people. Congress did not, in the Territorial Act,
prohibit slavery; but they did interfere with it—take control of it—in a
more marked and extensive way than they did in the case of Mississippi.
The substance of the provision therein made in relation to slaves was:

1st. That no slave should be imported into the Territory from foreign
parts.

2d. That no slave should be carried into it who had been imported into
the United States since the first day of May, 1798.

3d. That no slave should be carried into it, except by the owner, and
for his own use as a settler; the penalty in all cases being a fine upon
the violator of the law, and freedom to the slave.

This act also was passed without ayes or nays. In the Congress which
passed it there were two of the “thirty-nine.” They were Abraham Baldwin
and Jonathan Dayton. As stated in the case of Mississippi, it is
probable they both voted for it. They would not have allowed it to pass
without recording their opposition to it if, in their understanding, it
violated either the line properly dividing local from Federal authority,
or any provision of the Constitution.

In 1819–20 came and passed the Missouri question. Many votes were taken,
by yeas and nays, in both branches of Congress, upon the various phases
of the general question. Two of the “thirty-nine”—Rufus King and Charles
Pinckney—were members of that Congress. Mr. King steadily voted for
slavery prohibition and against all compromises, while Mr. Pinckney as
steadily voted against slavery prohibition and against all compromises.
By this, Mr. King showed that, in his understanding, no line dividing
local from Federal authority, nor anything in the Constitution, was
violated by Congress prohibiting slavery in Federal territory; while Mr.
Pinckney, by his votes, showed that, in his understanding, there was
some sufficient reason for opposing such prohibition in that case.

The cases I have mentioned are the only acts of the “thirty-nine,” or of
any of them upon the direct issue, which I have been able to discover.

To enumerate the persons who thus acted as being four in 1784, two in
1787, seventeen in 1789, three in 1798, two in 1804, and two in 1819–20,
there would be thirty of them. But this would be counting John Langdon,
Roger Sherman, William Few, Rufus King, and George Read each twice, and
Abraham Baldwin three times. The true number of those of the
“thirty-nine” whom I have shown to have acted upon the question which,
by the text, they understood better than we, is twenty-three, leaving
sixteen not shown to have acted upon it in any way.

Here, then, we have twenty-three out of our thirty-nine fathers “who
framed the government under which we live,” who have, upon their
official responsibility and their corporal oaths, acted upon the very
question which the text affirms they “understood just as well, and even
better, than we do now”; and twenty-one of them—a clear majority of the
whole “thirty-nine”—so acting upon it as to make them guilty of gross
political impropriety and wilful perjury if, in their understanding, any
proper division between local and Federal authority, or anything in the
Constitution they had made themselves, and sworn to support, forbade the
Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal Territories.
Thus the twenty-one acted; and, as actions speak louder than words, so
actions under such responsibility speak still louder.

Two of the twenty-three voted against Congressional prohibition of
slavery in the Federal Territories, in the instances in which they acted
upon the question. But for what reasons they so voted is not known. They
may have done so because they thought a proper division of local from
Federal authority, or some provision or principle of the Constitution,
stood in the way; or they may, without any such question, have voted
against the prohibition on what appeared to them to be sufficient
grounds of expediency. No one who has sworn to support the Constitution
can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an
unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it; but one may
and ought to vote against a measure which he deems constitutional if, at
the same time, he deems it inexpedient. It, therefore, would be unsafe
to set down even the two who voted against the prohibition as having
done so because, in their understanding, any proper division of local
from Federal authority, or anything in the Constitution, forbade the
Federal Government to control as to slavery in Federal territory.

The remaining sixteen of the “thirty-nine,” so far as I have discovered,
have left no record of their understanding upon the direct question of
Federal control of slavery in the Federal Territories. But there is much
reason to believe that their understanding upon that question would not
have appeared different from that of their twenty-three compeers, had it
been manifested at all.

For the purpose of adhering rigidly to the text, I have purposely
omitted whatever understanding may have been manifested by any person,
however distinguished, other than the thirty-nine fathers who framed the
original Constitution; and, for the same reason, I have also omitted
whatever understanding may have been manifested by any of the
“thirty-nine” even on any other phase of the general question of
slavery. If we should look into their acts and declarations on those
other phases, as the foreign slave-trade, and the morality and policy of
slavery generally, it would appear to us that on the direct question of
Federal control of slavery in Federal Territories, the sixteen, if they
had acted at all, would probably have acted just as the twenty-three
did. Among that sixteen were several of the most noted anti-slavery men
of those times—as Dr. Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur
Morris—while there was not one now known to have been otherwise, unless
it may be John Rutledge, of South Carolina.

The sum of the whole is that of our thirty-nine fathers who framed the
original Constitution, twenty-one—a clear majority of the
whole—certainly understood that no proper division of local from Federal
Authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal
Government to control slavery in the Federal Territories; while all the
rest had probably the same understanding. Such, unquestionably, was the
understanding of our fathers who framed the original Constitution; and
the text affirms that they understood the question “better than we.”

But, so far, I have been considering the understanding of the question
manifested by the framers of the original Constitution. In and by the
original instrument, a mode was provided for amending it; and, as I have
already stated, the present frame of “the government under which we
live” consists of that original, and twelve amendatory articles framed
and adopted since. Those who now insist that Federal control of slavery
in Federal Territories violates the Constitution, point us to the
provisions which they suppose it thus violates; and, as I understand,
they all fix upon provisions in these amendatory articles, and not in
the original instrument. The Supreme Court, in the Dred Scott case,
plant themselves upon the fifth amendment, which provides that no person
shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property without due process of
law”; while Senator Douglas and his peculiar adherents plant themselves
upon the tenth amendment, providing that “the powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution” “are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”

Now it so happens that these amendments were framed by the first
Congress which sat under the Constitution—the identical Congress which
passed the act, already mentioned, enforcing the prohibition of slavery
in the Northwestern Territory. Not only was it the same Congress, but
they were the identical, same individual men who, at the same session,
and at the same time within the session, had under consideration, and in
progress toward maturity, these constitutional amendments, and this act
prohibiting slavery in all the territory the nation then owned. The
constitutional amendments were introduced before, and passed after the
act enforcing the ordinance of ’87; so that, during the whole pendency
of the act to enforce the ordinance, the constitutional amendments were
also pending.

The seventy-six members of that Congress, including sixteen of the
framers of the original Constitution, as before stated, were
pre-eminently our fathers who framed that part of “the government under
which we live” which is now claimed as forbidding the Federal Government
to control slavery in the Federal Territories.

Is it not a little presumptuous in anyone at this day to affirm that the
two things which that Congress deliberately framed, and carried to
maturity at the same time, are absolutely inconsistent with each other?
And does not such affirmation become impudently absurd when coupled with
the other affirmation, from the same mouth, that those who did the two
things alleged to be inconsistent, understood whether they really were
inconsistent better than we—better than he who affirms that they are
inconsistent?

It is surely safe to assume that the thirty-nine framers of the original
Constitution, and the seventy-six members of the Congress which framed
the amendments thereto, taken together, do certainly include those who
may be fairly called “our fathers who framed the government under which
we live.” And so assuming, I defy any man to show that any one of them
ever, in his whole life, declared that, in his understanding, any proper
division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the
Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in
the Federal Territories. I go a step further. I defy anyone to show that
any living man in the world ever did, prior to the beginning of the
present century (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of the
last half of the present century), declare that, in his understanding,
any proper division of local from Federal authority, or any part of the
Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in
the Federal Territories. To those who now so declare I give not only
“our fathers who framed the government under which we live,” but with
them all other living men within the century in which it was framed,
among whom to search, and they shall not be able to find the evidence of
a single man agreeing with them.

Now, and here, let me guard a little against being misunderstood. I do
not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our
fathers did. To do so would be to discard all the lights of current
experience—to reject all progress, all improvement. What I do say is
that if we would supplant the opinions and policy of our fathers in any
case, we should do so upon evidence so conclusive, and argument so
clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed,
cannot stand; and most surely not in a case whereof we ourselves declare
they understood the question better than we.

If any man at this day sincerely believes that a proper division of
local from Federal authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbids
the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the Federal
Territories, he is right to say so, and to enforce his position by all
truthful evidence and fair argument which he can. But he has no right to
mislead others, who have less access to history, and less leisure to
study it, into the false belief that “our fathers who framed the
government under which we live” were of the same opinion—thus
substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair
argument. If any man at this day sincerely believes “our fathers who
framed the government under which we live” used and applied principles,
in other cases, which ought to have led them to understand that a proper
division of local from Federal authority, or some part of the
Constitution, forbids the Federal Government to control as to slavery in
the Federal Territories, he is right to say so. But he should, at the
same time, brave the responsibility of declaring that, in his opinion,
he understands their principles better than they did themselves; and
especially should he not shirk that responsibility by asserting that
they “understood the question just as well, and even better, than we do
now.”

But enough! Let all who believe that “our fathers who framed the
government under which we live understood this question just as well,
and even better, than we do now,” speak as they spoke, and act as they
acted upon it. This is all Republicans ask—all Republicans desire—in
relation to slavery. As those fathers marked it, so let it be again
marked, as an evil not to be extended, but to be tolerated and protected
only because of and so far as its actual presence amongst us makes that
toleration and protection a necessity. Let all the guaranties those
fathers gave it be not grudgingly, but fully and fairly maintained. For
this Republicans contend, and with this, so far as I know or believe,
they will be content.

And now, if they would listen—as I suppose they will not—I would address
a few words to the Southern people.

I would say to them: You consider yourselves a reasonable and a just
people; and I consider that in the general qualities of reason and
justice you are not inferior to any other people. Still, when you speak
of us Republicans, you do so only to denounce us as reptiles, or, at the
best, as no better than outlaws. You will grant a hearing to pirates or
murderers, but nothing like it to “Black Republicans.” In all your
contentions with one another, each of you deems an unconditional
condemnation of “Black Republicanism,” as the first thing to be attended
to. Indeed, such condemnation of us seems to be an indispensable
prerequisite—license, so to speak—among you to be admitted or permitted
to speak at all. Now can you or not be prevailed upon to pause and to
consider whether this is quite just to us, or even to yourselves? Bring
forward your charges and specifications, and then be patient long enough
to hear us deny or justify.

You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the
burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it?
Why, that our party has no existence in your section—gets no votes in
your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the
issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle,
begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be
sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you willing
to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that we have
ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very
year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that
your proof does not touch the issue. The fact that we get no votes in
your section is a fact of your making, and not of ours. And if there be
fault in that fact, that fault is primarily yours, and remains so until
you show that we repel you by some wrong principle or practice. If we do
repel you by any wrong principle or practice, the fault is ours; but
this brings you to where you ought to have started—to a discussion of
the right or wrong of our principle. If our principle, put in practice,
would wrong your section for the benefit of ours, or for any other
object, then our principle, and we with it, are sectional, and are
justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us, then, on the question of
whether our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section; and so
meet us as if it were possible that something may be said on your side.
Do you accept the challenge? No! Then you really believe that the
principle which “our fathers who framed the government under which we
live” thought so clearly right as to adopt it, and indorse it again and
again, upon their official oaths, is in fact so clearly wrong as to
demand your condemnation without a moment’s consideration.

Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional
parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight
years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the
United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the
prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory, which act embodied
the policy of the government upon that subject up to and at the very
moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he
wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure,
expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time
have a confederacy of free States.

Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon
this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or
in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast
the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon
you, who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington, and we
commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right
application of it.

But you say you are conservative—eminently conservative—while we are
revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is
conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new
and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the
point in controversy which was adopted by “our fathers who framed the
government under which we live”; while you with one accord reject, and
scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting
something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that
substitute shall be. You are divided on new propositions and plans, but
you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the
fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave-trade; some for
a Congressional slave code for the Territories; some for Congress
forbidding the Territories to prohibit slavery within their limits; some
for maintaining slavery in the Territories through the judiciary; some
for the “gur-reat pur-rinciple” that “if one man would enslave another,
no third man should object,” fantastically called “popular sovereignty,”
but never a man among you is in favor of Federal prohibition of slavery
in Federal Territories, according to the practice of “our fathers who
framed the government under which we live.” Not one of all your various
plans can show a precedent or an advocate in the century within which
our government originated. Consider, then, whether your claim of
conservatism for yourselves, and your charge of destructiveness against
us, are based on the most clear and stable foundations.

Again, you say we have made the slavery question more prominent than it
formerly was. We deny it. We admit that it is more prominent, but we
deny that we made it so. It was not we, but you, who discarded the old
policy of the fathers. We resisted, and still resist, your innovation;
and thence comes the greater prominence of the question. Would you have
that question reduced to its former proportions? Go back to that old
policy. What has been will be again, under the same conditions. If you
would have the peace of the old times, re-adopt the precepts and policy
of the old times.

You charge that we stir up insurrections among your slaves. We deny it;
and what is your proof? Harper’s Ferry! John Brown!! John Brown was no
Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his
Harper’s Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty in that
matter, you know it or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are
inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact. If you do
not know it, you are inexcusable for asserting it, and especially for
persisting in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the
proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does
not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.

Some of you admit that no Republican designedly aided or encouraged the
Harper’s Ferry affair, but still insist that our doctrines and
declarations necessarily lead to such results. We do not believe it. We
know we hold no doctrine, and make no declaration, which were not held
to and made by “our fathers who framed the government under which we
live.” You never dealt fairly by us in relation to this affair. When it
occurred, some important State elections were near at hand, and you were
in evident glee with the belief that, by charging the blame upon us, you
could get an advantage of us in those elections. The elections came, and
your expectations were not quite fulfilled. Every Republican man knew
that, as to himself at least, your charge was a slander, and he was not
much inclined by it to cast his vote in your favor. Republican doctrines
and declarations are accompanied with a continual protest against any
interference whatever with your slaves, or with you about your slaves.
Surely, this does not encourage them to revolt. True, we do, in common
with “our fathers who framed the government under which we live,”
declare our belief that slavery is wrong; but the slaves do not hear us
declare even this. For anything we say or do, the slaves would scarcely
know there is a Republican party. I believe they would not, in fact,
generally know it but for your misrepresentations of us in their
hearing. In your political contests among yourselves each faction
charges the other with sympathy with Black Republicanism; and then, to
give point to the charge, defines Black Republicanism to simply be
insurrection, blood, and thunder among the slaves.

Slave insurrections are no more common now than they were before the
Republican party was organized. What induced the Southampton
insurrection, twenty-eight years ago, in which at least three times as
many lives were lost as at Harper’s Ferry? You can scarcely stretch your
very elastic fancy to the conclusion that Southampton was “got up by
Black Republicanism.” In the present state of things in the United
States, I do not think a general, or even a very extensive, slave
insurrection is possible. The indispensable concert of action cannot be
attained. The slaves have no means of rapid communication; nor can
incendiary freemen, black or white, supply it. The explosive materials
are everywhere in parcels; but there neither are, nor can be supplied,
the indispensable connecting trains.

Much is said by Southern people about the affection of slaves for their
masters and mistresses; and a part of it, at least, is true. A plot for
an uprising could scarcely be devised and communicated to twenty
individuals before some one of them, to save the life of a favorite
master or mistress, would divulge it. This is the rule; and the slave
revolution in Hayti was not an exception to it, but a case occurring
under peculiar circumstances. The gunpowder plot of British history,
though not connected with slaves, was more in point. In that case, only
about twenty were admitted to the secret; and yet one of them, in his
anxiety to save a friend betrayed the plot to that friend, and, by
consequence, averted the calamity. Occasional poisonings from the
kitchen, and open or stealthy assassinations in the field, and local
revolts extending to a score or so, will continue to occur as the
natural results of slavery; but no general insurrection of slaves, as I
think, can happen in this country for a long time. Whoever much fears,
or much hopes, for such an event, will be alike disappointed.

In the language of Mr. Jefferson, uttered many years ago, “It is still
in our power to direct the process of emancipation and deportation
peaceably, and in such slow degrees, as that the evil will wear off
insensibly; and their places be, pari passu, filled up by free white
laborers. If, on the contrary, it is left to force itself on, human
nature must shudder at the prospect held up.”

Mr. Jefferson did not mean to say, nor do I, that the power of
emancipation is in the Federal Government. He spoke of Virginia; and, as
to the power of emancipation, I speak of the slaveholding States only.
The Federal Government, however, as we insist, has the power of
restraining the extension of the institution—the power to insure that a
slave insurrection shall never occur on any American soil which is now
free from slavery.

John Brown’s effort was peculiar. It was not a slave insurrection. It
was an attempt by white men to get up a revolt among slaves, in which
the slaves refused to participate. In fact, it was so absurd that the
slaves, with all their ignorance, saw plainly enough it could not
succeed. That affair, in its philosophy, corresponds with the many
attempts, related in history, at the assassination of kings and
emperors. An enthusiast broods over the oppression of a people till he
fancies himself commissioned by Heaven to liberate them. He ventures the
attempt which ends in little else than his own execution. Orsini’s
attempt on Louis Napoleon, and John Brown’s attempt at Harper’s Ferry,
were, in their philosophy, precisely the same. The eagerness to cast
blame on old England in the one case, and on New England in the other,
does not disprove the sameness of the two things.

And how much would it avail you, if you could by the use of John Brown,
Helper’s book, and the like, break up the Republican organization? Human
action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be
changed. There is a judgment and a feeling against slavery in this
nation, which cast at least a million and a half of votes. You cannot
destroy that judgment and feeling—that sentiment—by breaking up the
political organization which rallies around it. You can scarcely scatter
and disperse an army which has been formed into order in the face of
your heaviest fire; but if you could, how much would you gain by forcing
the sentiment which created it out of the peaceful channel of the
ballot-box into some other channel? What would that other channel
probably be? Would the number of John Browns be lessened or enlarged by
the operation?

But you will break up the Union rather than submit to a denial of your
constitutional rights.

That has a somewhat reckless sound; but it would be palliated, if not
fully justified, were we proposing, by the mere force of numbers, to
deprive you of some right plainly written down in the Constitution. But
we are proposing no such thing.

When you make these declarations you have a specific and well-understood
allusion to an assumed constitutional right of yours to take slaves into
the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as property. But no such
right is specially written in the Constitution. That instrument is
literally silent about any such right. We, on the contrary, deny that
such a right has any existence in the Constitution, even by implication.

Your purpose, then, plainly stated, is that you will destroy the
government, unless you be allowed to construe and force the Constitution
as you please, on all points in dispute between you and us. You will
rule or ruin in all events.

This, plainly stated, is your language. Perhaps you will say the Supreme
Court has decided the disputed constitutional question in your favor.
Not quite so. But waiving the lawyer’s distinction between dictum and
decision the court has decided the question for you in a sort of way.
The court has substantially said, it is your constitutional right to
take slaves into the Federal Territories, and to hold them there as
property. When I say the decision was made in a sort of way, I mean it
was made in a divided court, by a bare majority of the judges, and they
not quite agreeing with one another in the reasons for making it; that
it is so made as that its avowed supporters disagree with one another
about its meaning, and that it was mainly based upon a mistaken
statement of fact—the statement in the opinion that “the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution.”

An inspection of the Constitution will show that the right of property
in a slave is not “distinctly and expressly affirmed” in it. Bear in
mind, the judges do not pledge their judicial opinion that such right is
impliedly affirmed in the Constitution; but they pledge their veracity
that it is “distinctly and expressly” affirmed there—“distinctly,” that
is, not mingled with anything else—“expressly,” that is in words meaning
just that, without the aid of any inference, and susceptible of no other
meaning.

If they had only pledged their judicial opinion that such right is
affirmed in the instrument by implication, it would be open to others to
show that neither the word “slave” nor “slavery” is to be found in the
Constitution, nor the word “property” even, in any connection with
language alluding to the thing slave, or slavery; and that wherever in
that instrument the slave is alluded to, he is called a “person”; and
wherever his master’s legal right in relation to him is alluded to, it
is spoken of as “service or labor which may be due”—as a debt payable in
service or labor. Also it would be open to show, by contemporaneous
history, that this mode of alluding to slaves and slavery, instead of
speaking of them, was employed on purpose to exclude from the
Constitution the idea that there could be property in man.

To show all this is easy and certain.

When this obvious mistake of the judges shall be brought to their
notice, is it not reasonable to expect that they will withdraw the
mistaken statement, and reconsider the conclusion based upon it?

And then it is to be remembered that “our fathers who framed
the government under which we live”—the men who made the
Constitution—decided this same constitutional question in our favor long
ago; decided it without division among themselves when making the
decision; without division among themselves about the meaning of it
after it was made, and, so far as any evidence is left, without basing
it upon any mistaken statement of facts.

Under all these circumstances, do you really feel yourselves justified
to break up this government unless such a court decision as yours is
shall be at once submitted to as a conclusive and final rule of
political action? But you will not abide the election of a Republican
president! In that supposed event, you say, you will destroy the Union;
and then, you say, the great crime of having destroyed it will be upon
us! That is cool. A highwayman holds a pistol to my ear, and mutters
through his teeth, “Stand and deliver, or I shall kill you, and then you
will be a murderer!”

To be sure, what the robber demanded of me—my money—was my own; and I
had a clear right to keep it; but it was no more my own than my vote is
my own; and the threat of death to me, to extort my money, and the
threat of destruction to the Union, to extort my vote, can scarcely be
distinguished in principle.

A few words now to Republicans. It is exceedingly desirable that all
parts of this great Confederacy shall be at peace, and in harmony one
with another. Let us Republicans do our part to have it so. Even though
much provoked, let us do nothing through passion and ill temper. Even
though the Southern people will not so much as listen to us, let us
calmly consider their demands, and yield to them if, in our deliberate
view of our duty, we possibly can. Judging by all they say and do, and
by the subject and nature of their controversy with us, let us
determine, if we can, what will satisfy them.

Will they be satisfied if the Territories be unconditionally surrendered
to them? We know they will not. In all their present complaints against
us, the Territories are scarcely mentioned. Invasions and insurrections
are the rage now. Will it satisfy them if, in the future, we have
nothing to do with invasions and insurrections? We know it will not. We
so know, because we know we never had anything to do with invasions and
insurrections; and yet this total abstaining does not exempt us from the
charge and the denunciation.

The question recurs, What will satisfy them? Simply this: we must not
only let them alone, but we must somehow convince them that we do let
them alone. This, we know by experience, is no easy task. We have been
so trying to convince them from the very beginning of our organization,
but with no success. In all our platforms and speeches we have
constantly protested our purpose to let them alone; but this has had no
tendency to convince them. Alike unavailing to convince them is the fact
that they have never detected a man of us in any attempt to disturb
them.

These natural and apparently adequate means all failing, what will
convince them? This, and this only: cease to call slavery wrong, and
join them in calling it right. And this must be done thoroughly—done in
acts as well as in words. Silence will not be tolerated—we must place
ourselves avowedly with them. Senator Douglas’s new sedition law must be
enacted and enforced, suppressing all declarations that slavery is
wrong, whether made in politics, in presses, in pulpits, or in private.
We must arrest and return their fugitive slaves with greedy pleasure. We
must pull down our free State constitutions. The whole atmosphere must
be disinfected from all taint of opposition to slavery, before they will
cease to believe that all their troubles proceed from us.

I am quite aware they do not state their case precisely in this way.
Most of them would probably say to us, “Let us alone; do nothing to us,
and say what you please about slavery.” But we do let them alone—have
never disturbed them—so that, after all, it is what we say which
dissatisfies them. They will continue to accuse us of doing, until we
cease saying.

I am also aware they have not as yet in terms demanded the overthrow of
our free-State constitutions. Yet those constitutions declare the wrong
of slavery, with more solemn emphasis than do all other sayings against
it; and when all these other sayings shall have been silenced, the
overthrow of these constitutions will be demanded, and nothing be left
to resist the demand. It is nothing to the contrary that they do not
demand the whole of this just now. Demanding what they do, and for the
reason they do, they can voluntarily stop nowhere short of this
consummation. Holding, as they do, that slavery is morally right and
socially elevating, they cannot cease to demand a full national
recognition of it as a legal right and a social blessing.

Nor can we justifiably withhold this on any ground save our conviction
that slavery is wrong. If slavery is right, all words, acts, laws, and
constitutions against it are themselves wrong, and should be silenced
and swept away. If it is right, we cannot justly object to its
nationality—its universality; if it is wrong, they cannot justly insist
upon its extension—its enlargement. All they ask we could readily grant,
if we thought slavery right; all we ask they could as readily grant, if
they thought it wrong. Their thinking it right and our thinking it wrong
is the precise fact upon which depends the whole controversy. Thinking
it right, as they do, they are not to blame for desiring its full
recognition as being right; but thinking it wrong, as we do, can we
yield to them? Can we cast our votes with their view, and against our
own? In view of our moral, social, and political responsibilities, can
we do this?

Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where it
is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual
presence in the nation; but can we, while our votes will prevent it,
allow it to spread into the national Territories, and to overrun us here
in these free States? If our sense of duty forbids this, then let us
stand by our duty fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none
of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously
plied and belabored—contrivances such as groping for some middle ground
between the right and the wrong: vain as the search for a man who should
be neither a living man nor a dead man; such as a policy of “don’t care”
on a question about which all true men do care: such as Union appeals
beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divine
rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance;
such as invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what
Washington said and undo what Washington did.

Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations against
us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the government,
nor of dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right makes might,
and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand
it.




                               APPENDIX D
   MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL DEBATING LEAGUE UNDER THE
                  DIRECTION OF A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY


The Bangor High School, the Bar Harbor High School, the Bucksport East
Maine Conference Seminary, and the Foxcroft Academy, do hereby agree to
form an Interscholastic Debating League. The purpose of this League is
to hold debates subject to the following conditions:


                                   I

The executive committee of the League shall consist of the principal of
each of the above-named institutions and of the Debate Coach at the
University of Maine. This committee shall meet once a year at such time
and place as agreed upon by the schools and the University. It shall
have charge of all matters pertaining to the League, subject to the
provisions herein contained.


                                   II

The League shall hold two preliminary debates and one final debate each
year, according to the following plan:

The high schools and academies composing this League shall be divided
into two equal groups. Each group shall hold a preliminary debate as
herein provided. The two winning schools shall then meet in a final
debate to be held at the University of Maine. The executive committee
shall determine at its first meeting the time, place, and method of
rotation to be observed in holding contests for succeeding years.


                                  III

The questions for debate shall be selected in the following manner:

(1) For the preliminary contests. On or before October first, each
school at which a debate is to be held shall submit to the visiting
school a list of three propositions. The visiting school shall thereupon
select one of these propositions and choose the side which it wishes to
defend. On or before October fifteenth, notice of this selection must be
communicated to the school at which the debate is to be held.

(2) For the final contest. Immediately upon the announcement of a
decision in a preliminary contest, the principal of the winning school
shall mail notice of the result to the Debate Coach of the University of
Maine. The Debate Coach shall determine by lot the school which is to
propose the list of propositions to its opponent. Notice of this fact
shall immediately be sent to the school thus designated. This school
shall prepare immediately a list of three propositions and submit them
to its opponent. Within three days the opposing school shall mail to the
other school an announcement of the proposition which it has selected
from the list proposed and shall state the side of the proposition which
it wishes to defend.


                                   IV

The judges for both the preliminary and final contests shall be selected
in the following manner:

Four weeks before the contest, the school which has proposed the list of
propositions shall submit to its opponent, a list of twelve judges. The
opposing school shall select three persons from this list and return
their names to the other school. This school shall immediately attempt
to secure the persons so named to act as judges. If any or all of the
persons selected refuse the invitation to serve, the proposing school
shall ask the visiting school to select substitute judges from the list.
The school making the final selection of judges may require at any time,
a new list of names from the opposing school. No school shall propose as
judge any person who is financially or officially interested in, or a
graduate or former student of, such school.


                                   V

In the preliminary contests the visiting school shall bear all expenses
of its own team. The school at which the contest is held shall bear the
expenses of procuring judges and shall have charge of all local
arrangements.

In the final contest each participating school shall bear the expense of
its own team and one-half the expense of the judges.


                                   VI

Each school shall select for its team three representatives and an
alternate, but no one shall be chosen who is not a _bona fide_ student
of the institution which he represents.


                                  VII

Each debater shall be allowed two speeches, one of ten (10) minutes
duration, the other of five (5) minutes. The first series of speeches
shall be opened by the affirmative, and shall alternate between
affirmative and negative speeches. The second series shall be opened by
the negative, and shall alternate between negative and affirmative
speeches.


                                  VIII

In preparing for any contest, each school is entitled to three visits
from a student of Argumentation and Debate in the University of Maine.
This student Coach will give such assistance as is asked for in the
training of the debaters representing each school. No charge will be
made for this service, but each school must bear the expense of the
student sent to coach its team.


                                   IX

In each contest the judges shall be instructed to award the decision on
the merits of the argument as presented in the debate, and not upon the
merits of the question. It is understood that effectiveness of style and
manner of delivery are to be considered.


                                   X

This agreement may be amended at any time by the unanimous vote of the
executive committee.


                                   XI

At the close of the final contest, the President of the University of
Maine, or some one on his behalf, will present to the winning team the
University of Maine Interscholastic Debating Cup. The name of the
winning school and the year of the contest will be engraved upon the
cup. This cup will be kept in the possession of the winning school until
within one week of the next annual contest. At this time it shall be
returned to the University of Maine to be awarded to the school winning
the final contest for that year.


                                  XII

At the close of the final contest, the President of the University of
Maine, or some one on his behalf, will present to the debater whose work
is regarded by the judges as the most effective, a scholarship to the
value of $30.00 good for one year in the above-named institution.


                                  XIII

This agreement shall be in full force and operation when one of the two
copies herewith submitted to each of the four institutions composing the
League is signed by the principal of the institution and mailed to the
Head of the Department of English at the University of Maine.




                               APPENDIX E
     DEBATING AGREEMENT FOR A LEAGUE COMPOSED OF FIVE INSTITUTIONS


        CONSTITUTION OF THE CENTRAL DEBATING CIRCUIT OF AMERICA


                               ARTICLE I

OBJECT.—The object of this organization shall be to foster interest in
debate by holding an annual contest in December on the Friday evening
one week before the opening of the holiday recess.


                               ARTICLE II

DEBATING BOARDS.—Each university shall create a debating board a
majority of whose members shall be of the faculty. The members of this
board shall be chosen annually as each university may deem wise. The
debating board shall have general supervision of all debating matters of
the league affecting its university.


                              ARTICLE III

QUESTIONS.—On April first each university shall submit to each of the
others a question properly stated for debate. On April fifteenth each
university shall send the five questions to each of the others arranged
in the order of its choice. The question ranked highest by all the
universities shall be debated by all the teams. In the case of a tie the
selection from the tying questions shall be made by the President of
Yale University.


                               ARTICLE IV

TIME AND ORDER OF SPEAKING.—Each speaker shall have seventeen minutes;
twelve minutes for opening and five for rebuttal, but the order of
rebuttal speeches on either side may be changed at the wish of the
speakers on that side. The negative shall lead in the rebuttal. The
visiting team shall support the negative.


                               ARTICLE V

JUDGES.

                (_Contests for 1906–1907 and 1910–1911_)

 _Contesting states._   │_Place of contest._    │_Residence of Judge._

 Minnesota              │Iowa City              │Illinois
 Iowa                   │  „                    │Nebraska

 Nebraska               │Urbana                 │Iowa
 Illinois               │  „                    │Wisconsin

 Iowa                   │Madison                │Illinois
 Wisconsin              │  „                    │Minnesota

 Illinois               │Minneapolis            │Iowa
 Minnesota              │  „                    │Wisconsin

 Wisconsin              │Lincoln                │Iowa
 Nebraska               │  „                    │  „


                (_Contests for 1907–1908 and 1911–1912_)

 Illinois               │Iowa City              │Minnesota
 Iowa                   │  „                    │Nebraska

 Wisconsin              │Urbana                 │Iowa
 Illinois               │  „                    │  „

 Minnesota              │Madison                │Illinois
 Wisconsin              │  „                    │Iowa

 Nebraska               │Minneapolis            │Wisconsin
 Minnesota              │  „                    │  „

 Iowa                   │Lincoln                │Minnesota
 Nebraska               │  „                    │  „


                (_Contests for 1908–1909 and 1912–1913_)

 Wisconsin              │Iowa City              │Illinois
 Iowa                   │  „                    │Nebraska

 Minnesota              │Urbana                 │Wisconsin
 Illinois               │  „                    │Iowa

 Nebraska               │Madison                │Illinois
 Wisconsin              │  „                    │Minnesota

 Iowa                   │Minneapolis            │Wisconsin
 Minnesota              │  „                    │Nebraska

 Illinois               │Lincoln                │Iowa
 Nebraska               │  „                    │  „


                (_Contests for 1909–1910 and 1913–1914_)

 Nebraska               │Iowa City              │Minnesota
 Iowa                   │  „                    │Illinois

 Iowa                   │Urbana                 │Wisconsin
 Illinois               │  „                    │

 Illinois               │Madison                │Minnesota
 Wisconsin              │  „                    │

 Wisconsin              │Minneapolis            │Nebraska
 Minnesota              │  „                    │Iowa

 Minnesota              │Lincoln                │Iowa
 Nebraska               │  „                    │  „

On April first each university shall submit judges according to the
above schedule.

When a single state furnishes the judges for any contest it shall submit
a list of 24 names to each of the two competing universities. These
lists shall be duplicates.

When two states furnish the judges they shall each submit a list of 12
names.

When a state furnishes judges for two or more contests it shall make up
its several lists as impartially as possible with reference to the
distribution of able men.

Convenience and economy for the attending judges shall be a factor in
their nomination in so far as may be consistent with the choice of able
men.

Not later than the first of October preceding the contest the visiting
university shall send to the entertaining university a list of six
candidates for judges chosen from the proper rolls. Not later than the
same date the entertaining university shall send to its opponent a list
of twelve judges chosen from the proper rolls. Each university shall
arrange the opponent’s list of candidates in the order of its choice.

Each university shall have the right to challenge any or all of the
number of the candidates submitted by its opponent on presentation of
good and sufficient reason. The challenge list, together with
objections, shall be returned at once to the sender. The list shall be
completed and re-submitted not later than October twentieth.

It is further understood that any person recommended for judge who is a
relative, actual or prospective, of any contestant, or who is an alumnus
of either university, or who holds or has held, any official relation
with either university may be rejected.

The secretary of the entertaining university shall notify the judges by
a joint note, the form of which shall be as follows;

The state universities of (name) and (name) will hold a joint debate at
(place) on (date). The specific wording of the proposition for debate
is, “Resolved, that &c—

We shall consider ourselves especially favored if you can be with us at
(place) to hear and judge this contest. (Insert a sentence here stating
the names of the other judges who have been invited or who consented to
serve.)

We shall of course meet your entire expense. Trusting that we may have
an early and favorable reply, we remain,

                                             Respectfully yours,

                                               A. B., University of ————
                                               C. D., University of ————

The entertaining university shall sign the names of both secretaries to
the letter and shall enclose a stamped envelop addressed to each for the
reply.

Before the contest the judges shall be entertained at a hotel and every
semblance of an effort to influence them will be regarded as
dishonorable conduct.

The secretary will secure two judges from the list of the entertaining
university and one from the list of the opponent adhering strictly to
the order recommended by the respective universities. But if any name or
names should be found on both lists they shall be first invited to
serve.

The university submitting a list of names shall always report on the
qualifications of the judges in the following respects; I. Occupation.
II. Where educated. III. Politics. IV. Religion. V. Official relations
with any university of the league at any time.


                               ARTICLE VI

INSTRUCTIONS TO JUDGES.—Each judge shall be instructed to decide for
himself what constitutes effective debate, except that he shall consider
both thought and delivery. Without consultation he shall vote
affirmative or negative on the merits of the debate, _not on the merits
of the question_. He shall sign, seal and deliver his vote to the
presiding officer who shall open the votes and announce the decision.


                              ARTICLE VII

EXPENSES.—Each university shall pay all the expenses of its own
debaters. All other expenses of the contest shall be paid by the
entertaining university.


                              ARTICLE VIII

CONDUCT OF THE DEBATES.—In the contests of this league all communication
with the debaters, by prompting or otherwise, is forbidden; also the
introduction of both private correspondence and charts is debarred.


                               ARTICLE IX

AMENDMENTS.—This constitution may be amended by the authorized
representatives of the universities at any special meeting or by
correspondence providing twenty days notice be given of the changes
desired.


                               ARTICLE X

SCHEDULE.—The schedule for debates shall be as follows:

        _First Year_  Minnesota shall send a team to Iowa City
                      Nebraska   “    “   “   “  “   Urbana
                      Iowa       “    “   “   “  “   Madison
                      Illinois   “    “   “   “  “   Minneapolis
                      Wisconsin  “    “   “   “  “   Lincoln

        _Second Year_ Minnesota  “    “   “   “  “   Madison
                      Nebraska   “    “   “   “  “   Minneapolis
                      Iowa       “    “   “   “  “   Lincoln
                      Illinois   “    “   “   “  “   Iowa City
                      Wisconsin  “    “   “   “  “   Urbana

        _Third Year_  Minnesota  “    “   “   “  “   Urbana
                      Nebraska   “    “   “   “  “   Madison
                      Iowa       “    “   “   “  “   Minneapolis
                      Illinois   “    “   “   “  “   Lincoln
                      Wisconsin  “    “   “   “  “   Iowa City

        _Fourth Year_ Minnesota  “    “   “   “  “   Lincoln
                      Nebraska   “    “   “   “  “   Iowa City
                      Iowa       “    “   “   “  “   Urbana
                      Illinois   “    “   “   “  “   Madison
                      Wisconsin  “    “   “   “  “   Minneapolis




                               APPENDIX F
        MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR A TRIANGULAR DEBATING LEAGUE

 Debating Agreement between Indiana University, Ohio State University,
                     and the University of Illinois


(Adopted by the representatives of the three institutions at Columbus,
June 17, 1905)


ARTICLE 1.—This organization shall consist of the Indiana University,
Ohio State University, and the University of Illinois, and shall be
known as the State University Debating League.

ARTICLE 2.—Its affairs shall be conducted by an executive committee
consisting of one member of the Faculty of each institution, to be
selected by that institution.

(a) One of these shall act as President, one as Vice President, and one
as Secretary and Treasurer, each holding office for one year.

(b) The three offices shall be filled by the representatives of the
three institutions in rotation in the following order: 1905–1906
Presidency, Ohio State University, Vice Presidency, Indiana University,
Secretary and Treasurership, University of Illinois; 1906–1907
Presidency, Indiana University, Vice Presidency, University of Illinois,
Secretary and Treasurership, Ohio State University; 1907–1908
Presidency, University of Illinois, Vice Presidency, Ohio State
University, Secretary and Treasurership, Indiana University; and
thereafter in the same rotation.

ARTICLE 3.—The debates shall be held on the second Friday in March—one
at Bloomington, Indiana, one at Columbus, Ohio, and one at Urbana,
Illinois. In the year 1905–1906 the teams shall come together as
follows: University of Illinois and Indiana University at Bloomington;
Indiana University and Ohio State University at Columbus; Ohio State
University and University of Illinois at Urbana. In the year 1906–1907
Ohio State University and Indiana University at Bloomington; University
of Illinois and Ohio State University at Columbus; Indiana University
and University of Illinois at Urbana; and thereafter in the same
biennial rotation.

ARTICLE 4.—(a) A question shall be proposed by each institution not
later than the 5th of October preceding the debates.

(b) The Secretary shall at once send the three questions to the three
institutions, and they shall reply not later than the 25th of October,
each institution indicating its ranking of the three questions as first
choice, second choice, third choice.

(c) The Secretary shall report the result of this vote not later than
the 30th of October, and the question ranked highest in the vote shall
be debated by all teams. In case of a tie in the ranking the selection
from the three questions shall be made by the President of the
University of Minnesota.

(d) After the question has been chosen no modification shall be made in
its wording and no definition permitted.

ARTICLE 5.—The home team shall support the affirmative of the question
and the visiting team the negative.

ARTICLE 6.—Each speaker shall be allowed twelve minutes for a principal
speech and five minutes for a rebuttal speech. No time may be
transferred from one speaker to another, but the order of rebuttal
speeches on either side may be changed at the wish of the speakers on
that side. “The negative shall lead in rebuttal.”

ARTICLE 7.—(a) The visiting institution shall not later than the 15th of
January nominate a list of twenty names of persons living within two
hundred and fifty miles of the place of the debate, no one of whom shall
be or shall have been connected with any of the three institutions
concerned either as officer, teacher or student. The home institution
shall have the right of veto for cause to be explicitly stated to the
other institution within two weeks thereafter, and the visiting
institution shall submit other names equal in number to those vetoed.
The home institution shall choose three persons from this list to act as
judges.

(b) Each judge shall be provided with written instructions in the
following form:

                                                Date..................

  In rendering your decision, you are asked to consider the merits of
  the _debate_ and not the merits of the question. You are the sole
  judges of what constitutes effective debating, remembering that both
  thought and delivery are to be considered.

  In my opinion the ......... team has done the most effective
  debating.

                                          ...................... Judge

(c) At the close of the debate each judge shall be permitted to
withdraw, and within 15 minutes shall present to the chairman in a
sealed envelope his individual decision, reached without conference with
his colleagues.

ARTICLE 8.—Each institution shall pay the expenses of its debaters. All
other expenses of each debate shall be paid by the entertaining
institution.




                               APPENDIX G
                              PROPOSITIONS


                               POLITICAL


_A. Legislative._

  1. Any further centralization of power in the Federal Government of
     the United States should be condemned.

  2. United States senators should be elected by popular vote.

  3. The House of Representatives should elect its standing committees.

  4. The state of        should adopt the legislative referendum.

  5. An amendment of the Federal Constitution should be adopted
     convening the first session of Congress within a few months after
     the election and compelling the second session to adjourn several
     days before the following election.

  6. The number of representatives to Congress should be reduced.

  7. All members of the Senate and House of Representatives should be
     required to be present during the discussion of all proposed
     legislation, unless prevented by illness.

  8. The United States should adopt the Swiss referendum.

  9. The Constitution should be so amended as to make the passing of
     amendments easier.

  10. The United States Senate should adopt a closure rule.

  11. Lobbying in Congress and in the state legislatures should be
     prohibited by law.

  12. Direct legislation by means of the initiative and referendum is
     desirable for our states and their subdivisions.

  13. The initiative and referendum offer a desirable relief from the
     evils arising from the dominance of special interests in our states
     and their municipalities.


_B. Executive._

  14. The President of the United States should be elected for one term
     of seven years, and be ineligible for reëlection.

  15. The President of the United States should be elected by direct
     vote of the people.

  16. The President should be allowed to veto items in appropriation
     bills.

  17. The President of the United States is justified in calling out the
     militia to subdue local disturbances, without consent or request of
     state authorities.

  18. Counties in which a lynching occurs should be placed under martial
     law until they give evidence of capacity to exercise effective
     local government, not exceeding a term of one year.

  19. For the better protection of life, liberty, and property in rural
     districts a state constabulary is necessary.


_C. Judicial._

  20. The recall of state and local judges by popular vote is desirable.

  21. A two-thirds vote of the jury should constitute a verdict in
     criminal cases.

  22. A two-thirds vote of the jury should constitute a verdict in civil
     cases.

  23. Federal judges should be elected by popular vote.

  24. The jury system should be abolished.

  25. The courts should be forbidden by law to issue “blanket”
     injunctions in labor disputes.

  26. The detention of innocent witnesses, pending the trial of cases in
     court, without adequate compensation and without proof of its
     necessity should be prohibited by law.

  27. State judges should be appointed by the governor to hold office
     during life or good behavior.

  28. The law governing judicial process should be so amended as to
     provide for the more speedy conduct of criminal cases, and fewer
     opportunities for delay in the execution of the sentences imposed.

  29. It would be desirable to elect justices of the United States
     Supreme Court by popular vote.


_D. Franchise._

  30. The right of suffrage should be limited to persons who can read
     and write.

  31. There should be an educational test as a qualification for voting.

  32. The white citizens of the South are justified in using all
     peaceable means to secure political supremacy.

  33. Men and women should have equal suffrage.

  34. The admission to citizenship into the United States should be
     granted under stricter requirements as to a working knowledge of
     rights and duties of the privileges conferred.

  35. Admission of aliens to the privileges of citizenship should be
     granted on more restrictive conditions.

  36. The admission of native-born and foreign-born citizens to the
     privilege of voting should be granted only upon evidence of due
     qualifications both as to knowledge of the rights and obligations
     and also of respect for the institutions and ideals of our national
     life.


_E. Immigration._

  37. The immigration restrictions which now apply to the Chinese should
     be extended so as to apply to the Japanese.

  38. The United States should make no discrimination between the
     immigrants from China and those from other countries.

  39. Admission of further immigration to the United States, so long as
     the congestion of alien groups persist in our large cities, should
     be subject to Federal control of such arrivals for a definite
     period of years for purposes of better distribution with regard to
     the requirements of the different sections of the country.

  40. The immigration of all Japanese and Chinese laborers to the United
     States should be prohibited by law.


_F. Miscellaneous._

  41. Party lines should be disregarded in all elections.

  42. Public advocacy of violent means for the subversion of government
     should be suppressed by law in the United States.

  43. The United States should have exclusive jurisdiction over Behring
     Sea.

  44. The sharing of public funds for purposes which ignore the
     constitutional separation of church and state is a menace to our
     Federal, State, and Municipal institutions and should be abandoned
     wherever inaugurated and prevented wherever existing or proposed.

  45. The short ballot should be adopted in State and Municipal
     governments.

  46. The tendency of political platform making is to overburden the
     Federal government with proposals whose nature and accomplishment
     are better adapted to State, Municipal, and other local
     governmental agencies.

  47. Congress should provide for uniform Federal marriage and divorce
     laws. Constitutionality conceded.

  48. All cities in the United States of over 5,000 inhabitants should
     adopt the commission form of government.

  49. The “Galveston Plan” of city government by a board of directors
     insures increase of efficiency combined with a decrease of
     corruption in city affairs.

  50. There should be a large and immediate increase in the United
     States Navy.

  51. A political reformation in the United States looking to the
     formation of two new political parties is desirable.

  52. The states should adopt the recall for all state and local
     officers except members of the judiciary.

  53. A commission form of government is preferable to a mayor and
     council plan.


                                ECONOMIC


_A. Tariff._

  54. Commercial reciprocity with Canada would be for the best interest
     of the United States.

  55. The tariff on goods imported into the United States should be
     fixed by a bi-partisan commission.

  56. The United States should impose a tariff on imports from the
     Philippines. Constitutionality conceded.

  57. The protective tariff should be removed from trust-made products.

  58. Raw materials should be admitted to the United States free of
     duty.

  59. The tariff on raw materials is justified on the ground of the
     protection of American industry against foreign competition.

  60. Sugar should be admitted to the United States free of duty.

  61. Commercial reciprocity between the United States and South America
     would be for the best interests of the United States.

  62. The United States should adopt the policy of tariff for revenue
     only.

  63. Steel should be admitted to the United States free of duty.

  64. All goods, the price of which is controlled by a single capitalist
     or combination of capitalists, should be admitted to the United
     States free of duty.


_B. Taxation._

  65. The growth of large fortunes should be checked by means of
     national progressive income and inheritance taxes.

  66. The Federal government should levy a progressive inheritance tax.
     Granted, that such tax would be held constitutional.

  67. The Federal government should levy a progressive income tax.
     Constitutionality conceded.

  68. The single tax as advocated by Henry George, would be an
     improvement over our present system of taxation.

  69. The tax on the issue of state banks should be repealed.

  70. That a graduated income tax would be a desirable addition to the
     Federal system of taxation.

  71. A Federal graduated income tax with an exemption of all incomes
     below $5000 per annum would be a desirable modification of the
     system of Federal taxation.


_C. Corporations._

  72. Congress should pass laws prohibiting corporate contributions to
     political campaign funds.

  73. The regulating power of Congress should be extended over all
     corporations doing an interstate business. Constitutionality
     conceded.

  74. All corporations engaged in interstate commerce should be required
     to take out a Federal license.

  75. Physical valuation of the property of a corporation is the best
     basis for fixing the rate of taxation.

  76. Railroad pooling is economically advantageous to the public.

  77. The price of “trust-made” products should be regulated by law.

  78. The National Bureau of Corporations should have control of
     industrial and commercial corporations doing interstate business,
     similar to the control which the Interstate Commerce Commission has
     over railroads.

  79. All corporations engaged in interstate commerce should be required
     to take out Federal charters; it being conceded that such a
     requirement would be constitutional and that Federal license shall
     not be available as an alternative plan.

  80. The policy of regulating industrial corporations is preferable to
     the policy of dissolving them.


_D. Labor._

  81. The New Zealand system of compulsory arbitration should be adopted
     in the United States.

  82. A system of compulsory arbitration should be adopted in the United
     States.

  83. Employers and employees of all public service corporations such as
     railroads, street railways, etc., should be compelled to arbitrate
     labor disputes.

  84. Members of trades-unions are justified in refusing to work with
     non-union men.

  85. State boards of arbitration, with compulsory powers, should be
     established to settle all disputes between employers and employees.

  86. Employers are justified in refusing recognition to labor unions.

  87. The history of trades-unions for the past ten years shows a
     tendency detrimental to the industrial development of the United
     States.

  88. The boycott is a legitimate means of enforcing the demands of
     organized labor.

  89. The growth of labor unions is a menace to liberties of the working
     man.

  90. The closed “shop” is justifiable.

  91. Employers should be prohibited from setting up contributory
     negligence or negligence of a fellow servant as a bar to recovery
     of adequate compensation by an injured employee.

  92. The right to strike on the part of public employees should always
     be subject to referendum on the part of the community immediately
     concerned.

  93. It would be advisable to legalize the strike and the boycott.

  94. The movement of organized labor for the closed shop should receive
     the support of public opinion.

  95. The best interests of the laboring classes would be advanced by
     the development of a separate labor party.


_E. Public Ownership._

  96. The Federal government should buy and operate the telegraph
     systems.

  97. Municipalities in the United States of over 10,000 inhabitants
     should own and operate their systems for lighting and local
     transportation.

  98. The United States should own and operate the coal mines within its
     borders.

  99. The forests of the United States should be owned and operated by
     the Federal government.


_F. Miscellaneous._

  100. The powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission should be
     enlarged.

  101. The United States should subsidize our merchant marine.

  102. It is economically advantageous to the United States to own
     territory in the tropics.

  103. The amount of property transferable by inheritance should be
     limited by statute.

  104. The existing systems of commercial distribution between producers
     and consumers is chiefly responsible for the high cost of living.

  105. The national debt should be paid as rapidly as possible.

  106. Mail order stores are a benefit to the public.

  107. Prison-made products should be excluded from the open market.

  108. The labor of prisoners in the state penitentiary should be
     utilized in improving the highways of the state.

  109. The American coastwise traffic should pass through the Panama
     Canal toll free.

  110. Congress should be given the power by constitutional amendment to
     regulate manufactures and industry.

  111. The Federal government should establish a bank of the United
     States.

  112. The Aldrich plan of a National Reserve Association should be
     adopted by the Federal government.

  113. The Federal government should regulate and supervise all fire and
     life insurance companies doing an interstate business.

  114. The Federal government should grant financial aid to ships
     engaged in our foreign trade and owned by citizens of the United
     States.

  115. There should be some legislation providing for the guarantee of
     bank deposits.

  116. The Federal government should develop the waterway from the Great
     Lakes to the Gulf.

  117. A system of compulsory industrial insurance covering accident,
     sickness, and old age should be adopted in the United States.
     Constitutionality conceded.

  118. The inland waterways of the United States should be extensively
     improved by the Federal government.

  119. The United States should adopt a double monetary standard.


                                 SOCIAL


_A. The Liquor Problem._

  120. The elimination of private profits offers the best solution of
     the liquor problem.

  121. Prohibition of the liquor traffic is preferable to any system of
     license, wherever public opinion will sanction the passage and
     enforcement of such a law.

  122. The United States army should reëstablish the use of the canteen.

  123. The Carolina Dispensary System for controlling the use and sale
     of intoxicating liquors should be adopted in the state of       .

  124. State prohibition has failed wherever it has been adopted.

  125. Prohibition is more conducive to temperance than high license.


_B. International Peace._

  126. The United States should at once announce and carry out a policy
     of total disarmament.

  127. The present growth of armaments should be checked by mutual
     agreement between the nations.

  128. The United States should immediately provide for an increase in
     its navy.

  129. International peace is best promoted by extensive warlike
     preparations.


_C. Insurance and Pensions._

  130. The German system of compulsory insurance should be adopted in
     the United States.

  131. The Federal government should control all life insurance
     companies.

  132. A system of compulsory industrial insurance should be adopted in
     the United States.

  133. The United States government should grant uniform pensions to all
     citizens over sixty years of age.

  134. The Federal government should grant old-age pensions.


_D. The Church._

  135. All church property should be taxed.

  136. The modern church should maintain more rigid rules regarding the
     personal conduct of its members.

  137. A union of all Christian churches in the United States would
     further the cause of Christianity.


_E. Miscellaneous._

  138. Sunday baseball should be prohibited.

  139. Public libraries, museums, and art galleries should be open on
     Sunday.

  140. Lavish social entertainments should be condemned.

  141. In times of business depression the states and municipalities
     should furnish employment to the unemployed.

  142. Capital punishment should be abolished.

  143. All cities of over 25,000 population should establish free public
     employment bureaus.

  144. State institutions should be established providing for the care
     and training of homeless children.

  145. The growth of monopolies shows a tendency toward Socialism.

  146. Congress should enact laws providing for the censorship of the
     stage.

  147. Moving picture shows should be compelled to exhibit only such
     pictures as can be shown to have an educational or cultural value.

  148. The United States is moving toward Socialism.

  149. The tendency of the population of the United States to
     concentrate in the cities is detrimental to the best interest of
     the people.

  150. Children under sixteen years of age should be prohibited by
     Federal law from working in factories.

  151. A maximum eight hour working day for all occupations should be
     established by state law.

  152. Vivisection should be prohibited by law.

  153. Arctic and Antarctic expeditions should be looked upon with
     disfavor by the public.

  154. The United States government should grant permanent copyright.

  155. Automobiles should be prohibited from running more than fifteen
     miles an hour.

  156. Railroads should be required by Federal and state law to adopt
     all devices such as block signals, steel passenger coaches, etc.,
     which minimize the danger from wreck.

  157. Greater security should be given by law to wills and bequests.

  158. The negro is not fitted to exercise the right of suffrage.

  159. There should be a state censorship of the stage.

  160. Letter postage should be reduced to one cent.

  161. Male citizens should be compelled to serve two years in the
     United States army.

  162. Popular literature shows a decline in public morals.

  163. Social settlement organizations offer the best means of
     conducting charitable work.

  164. The plea of insanity shall not be available as a bar to
     punishment for crime.

  165. Newspapers should be prohibited from publishing matter which has
     a tendency to corrupt the public morals.


                              EDUCATIONAL


_A. Common School._

  166. The Bible should be taught in the public schools.

  167. Free text-books should be furnished to all pupils below the high
     school grade.

  168. The state should prescribe uniform text-books for the public
     schools.

  169. Public funds should not be appropriated to aid private or
     sectarian schools.

  170. No prizes should be offered in public schools.


_B. High School._

  171. Every high school should be compelled to maintain courses in
     manual training and domestic science.

  172. Secret societies should be prohibited in public high schools.

  173. High school courses should be revised so as to furnish more
     practical educational training.

  174. The high school course as at present given by almost all high
     schools is of no practical value to the pupil who does not go to
     college.

  175. Military drill should be compulsory in all public high schools of
     the United States.


_C. College._

  176. The honor system of examinations should be adopted by all
     American colleges.

  177. Freshmen at        should not be permitted to engage in
     intercollegiate athletics.

  178. All college courses should be completely elective.

  179. Athletics, as now conducted, are a detriment to American
     colleges.

  180. No college should be located near a large city.

  181. Denominational colleges should not receive financial aid from the
     state.

  182. For the average student the small college is preferable to the
     large college.

  183. Admission to American colleges should be by examination only.

  184. Intercollegiate football should be abolished.

  185. Segregation of sexes in American colleges and universities is
     preferable to coëducation.

  186. Students in college courses who attain the rank of ninety per
     cent or higher in daily work should be excused from examinations.

  187. Two years of college work should be required for admission to any
     course in law or medicine.

  188. Written term examinations should be abolished.

  189. The class rushes at the beginning of the college year should be
     prohibited.

  190. Chapel attendance at the University of        should be
     compulsory.

  191. Student government should be established at the University
     of       .

  192. The Oxford type of university should be adopted in the United
     States.

  193. For the average man a college education is an aid to business
     success.

  194. The colleges of the state of        should be combined into one
     centrally located university.


_D. Miscellaneous._

  195. A National University should be established at Washington.

  196. Novels should not be placed in circulation by public libraries
     until two years after publication.

  197. The number of subjects taught in high schools and colleges should
     be greatly reduced.

  198. The recommendations of the simplified spelling board should be
     adopted throughout the United States.

  199. Night trade schools should be established as a part of our system
     of public instruction.

  200. Industrial education will solve the negro race problem in the
     United States.


                Printed in the United States of America.

------------------------------------------------------------------------




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      space. The chapter on the Sentence goes into minute detail because
      the average student, at present, does not understand the structure
      of the sentence; the chapter on Narrative deals with constructive
      problems mainly, because it is in learning to construct a story
      that the Freshman can best make Narrative increase his powers of
      expression; the chapter on Description includes literary and
      esthetic problems, because one variety of Description can only
      thus be taught. An order of succession for these various topics
      has been chosen after experiment with many classes. Nevertheless,
      except that Exposition must come first, the instructor will find
      that the plan of this book permits any arrangement of subjects.

      Guided by the results of two years’ remarkably extensive use of
      the first edition, the authors revised and rewrote the entire
      book. In the new edition, therefore, the defects of the earlier
      work do not appear, while the general plan, which proved so
      successful, is, of course, retained. Hence the book is now unique
      in its effectiveness as a teaching text—one in which the actual
      difficulties of the student are clearly realized, only to be met
      with practical, definite and concrete means of overcoming them.


                                 PUBLISHED BY
                            THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
               Publishers      64–66 Fifth Avenue      New York

------------------------------------------------------------------------




                             TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES


       1. Silently corrected typographical errors and variations in
            spelling.
       2. Archaic, non-standard, and uncertain spellings retained as
            printed.
       3. Footnotes have been re-indexed using numbers.
       4. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
       5. Enclosed bold font in =equals=.