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  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  The original text used the long-form s; this has been replaced by
  the normal s in the etext.

  The original text printed ‘ct’ as a ligature, and is displayed
  simply as ‘ct’ character pair in the etext.

  Fractions are displayed as a./b., for example 3./4., similar to
  the format of the original text.

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  original text, for example ‘about 1800. is the number of ... ’.

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  to the number 1, and the five occurrences have been italicized in
  the etext. For example one hundred pounds is shown as 100_l._,
  instead of 100l.

  A superscript is denoted by ^{}, for example 1./5.^{th.}.

  All changes listed in the Errata at the back of the book have been
  applied to the etext.

  Some other minor changes to the text are noted at the end of the
  book.




  A
  TREATISE
  OF
  Taxes & Contributions.

  Shewing the Nature and Measures of

  { Crown-Lands.      }
  { Assessements.     }
  { Customs.          }
  { Poll-Moneys.      }
  { Lotteries.        }
  { Benevolence.      }
  { Penalties.        }
  { Monopolies.       }
  { Offices.          }
  { Tythes.           }
  { Raising of Coins. }
  { Harth-Money.      }
  { Excize, &c.       }

  With several intersperst Discourses and Digressions concerning

  { Warres.                     }
  { The Church.                 }
  { Universities.               }
  { Rents & Purchases.          }
  { Usury & Exchange.           }
  { Banks & Lombards.           }
  { Registries for Conveyances. }
  { Beggars.                    }
  { Ensurance.                  }
  { Exportation of { Money.     }
  {                { Wool.      }
  { Free-Ports.                 }
  { Coins.                      }
  { Housing.                    }
  { Liberty of Conscience, &c.  }

  _The same being frequently applied to the present
  State and Affairs of_
  IRELAND.


  _London_, Printed for _N. Brooke_, at the Angel in _Cornhill_. 1662.




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_The Preface._


Young and vain persons, though perhaps they marry not primarily
and onely on purpose to get Children, much less to get such as may
be fit for some one particular vocation; yet having Children, they
dispose of them as well as they can according to their respective
inclinations: Even so, although I wrote these sheets but to rid my
head of so many troublesome conceits, and not to apply them to the
use of any one particular People or Concernment; yet now they are
born, and that their Birth happened to be about the time of the
_Duke of Ormond’s_ going Lord Lieutenant into _Ireland_, I thought
they might be as proper for the consideration of that place, as of
any other, though perhaps of effect little enough in any.

_Ireland_ is a place which must have so great an Army kept up in
it, as may make the Irish desist from doing themselves or the
English harm by their future Rebellions. And this great Army
must occasion great and heavy Leavies upon a poor people and
wasted Countrey; it is therefore not amiss that _Ireland_ should
understand the nature and measure of Taxes and Contributions.

2. The Parishes of _Ireland_ do much want Regulation, by uniting
and dividing them; so as to make them fit Enclosures wherein to
plant the Gospel: wherefore what I have said as to the danger of
supernumerary Ministers, may also be seasonable there, when the new
Geograpy we expect of that Island shall have afforded means for the
Regulation abovementioned.

3. The great plenty of _Ireland_ will but undo it, unless a way be
found for advantageous Exportations, the which will depend upon the
due measure of Custom and Excize here treated on.

4. Since _Ireland_ is under-peopled in the whole, and since the
Government there can never be safe without chargeable Armies, until
the major part of the Inhabitants be English, whether by carrying
over these, or withdrawing the other; I think there can be no
better encouragement to draw English thither, then to let them
know, that the Kings Revenue being above 1./10. part of the whole
Wealth, Rent, and Proceed of the Nation; that the Publick Charge
in the next Age will be no more felt there then that of Tythes is
here; and that as the Kings Revenue encreases, so the causes of his
Expence will decrease proportionably, which is a double advantage.

6. The employing the Beggars in _England_ about mending the
High-wayes, and making Rivers Navigable will make the Wool and
Cattle of _Ireland_ vend the better.

7. The full understanding of the nature of Money, the effects of
the various _species_ of Coins, and of their uncertain values, as
also of raising or embasing them, is a learning most proper for
_Ireland_, which hath been lately much and often abused for the
want of it.

8. Since Lands are worth but six or seven years purchase, and yet
twenty years just cross the Channel, ’twere good the people of
_Ireland_ knew the reasons of it at a time when there is means of
help.

Lastly, if any man hath any Notions which probably may be good
for _Ireland_, he may with most advantage expose them to publick
examination now, when the Duke of _Ormond_ is Chief Governour: for,

1. His Grace knows that Countrey perfectly well, as well in times
and matters of Peace as War, and understands the Interests as well
of particular persons, as of all and every factions and parties
struggling with each other in that Kingdom; understanding withall
the state of _England_, and also of several Forreign Nations, with
reference to _Ireland_.

2. His Grace hath given fresh demonstration of his care of an
English Interest in _Ireland_, and of his wisdom in reconciling the
several cross concernments there so far as the same is possible.

3. His Graces Estate in Lands there is the greatest that ever was
in _Ireland_, and consequently he is out of the danger incident
to those _Proreges_, against whom _Cambden_ sayes, _Hibernia est
semper querula_; there being no reason for ones getting more Land,
who hath already the most of any.

4. Whereas some chief Governours who have gone into _Ireland_,
chiefly to repair or raise fortunes, have withdrawn themselves
again when their work hath been done, not abiding the clamors and
complaints of the people afterwards: But his Grace hath given
Hostages to that Nation for his good Government, and yet hath taken
away aforehand all fears of the contrary.

5. His Grace dares do whatever he understands to be fitting, even
to the doing of a single Subject Justice against a Confederate
multitude; being above the sinister interpretations of the jealous
and querulous; for his known Liberality and Magnificence shall ever
keep him free from the clamor of the people, and his through-tried
fidelity shall frustrate the force of any subdolous whisperings in
the Ears of His Majesty.

6. His good acceptance of all ingenious endeavours, shall make
the wise men of this Eastern _England_ be led by his Star into
_Ireland_, and there present him with their choicest advices, who
can most judiciously select and apply them.

Lastly, this great Person takes the great Settlement in hand, when
_Ireland_ is as a white paper, when there sits a Parliament most
affectionate to his Person, and capable of his Counsel, under a
King curious as well as careful of Reformation; and when there is
opportunity, to pass into Positive Laws whatsoever is right reason
and the Law of Nature.

Wherefore by applying those Notions unto _Ireland_, I think I have
harped upon the right string, and have struck whilest the Iron is
hot; by publishing them now, when, if ever at all, they be useful.
I would now advertise the world, that I do not think I can mend
it, and that I hold it best for every mans particular quiet, to
let it _vadere sicut vult_; I know well, that _res nolunt male
administrari_, and that (say I what I will or can) things will
have their course, nor will nature be couzened: Wherefore what I
have written (as I said before) was done but to ease and deliver
my self, my head having been impregnated with these things by the
daily talk I hear about advancing and regulating Trade, and by the
murmurs about Taxes, &c. Now whether what I have said be contemned
or cavilled at, I care not, being of the same minde about this, as
some thriving men are concerning the profuseness of their Children;
for as they take pleasure to get even what they believe will be
afterwards pissed against the wall, so do I to write, what I
suspect will signifie nothing: Wherefore the race being not to the
swift, &c. but time and chance happening to all men, I leave the
Judgement of the whole to the Candid, of whose correction I shall
never be impatient.




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The Index.


  _An Enumeration and description of the several Branches of
  the Publick Charge._                                        Page 1

  _The Maintenance of Governours ought to be in greater splendour
  then private Callings can reach to._                        Ibidem

  _The honour of being trusted, and the pleasure of being feared,
  is reward enough for some Offices._                           p. 2

  _The Pastorage of Souls ought to be a Publick Charge even upon a
  Civil Account._                                              Ibid.

  _The use of Schools and Universities, as they are a publick
  charge._                                                         3

  _The common and general Causes, which encrease and aggravate
  the burthen of paying Taxes._                                    4

  _The Causes that excite Forreign and Offensive Wars._        Ibid.

  _The Causes of Defensive and Civil Wars._                        5

  _A Cause of unnecessary Ecclesiastical Charge, is the not
  sizing of Parishes according to the Alterations which have been
  in Religion and Trade._                                          6

  _That five thousand Parishes are enough for_ England _and_
  Wales, _so as to give unto each but a thousand Parishioners,
  and so as that none need go two miles to Church._                7

  _Antiquated Offices and overgrown Fees a Cause of unnecessary
  Charge in the Government, and administration of Justice._        8

  _Registers for Conveyances of Lands and Depositories for
  moveable Pawns, as also Banks of Money will lessen the Charge
  of Law-suits and Writings._                                      9

  _How the number of such as relate to the Faculty of Medicine
  may be adjusted._                                               10

  _How the number of Students in the Universities intending to
  make Learning the way of their livelihood may be adjusted._  Ibid.

  _An Use propounded for the choice Parish-Children and Foundlings,
  to force on an useful Work, which hath hitherto been but
  perfunctorily pursued._                                      Ibid.

  _That the number of unnecessary Merchants and Retailers be
  retrenched._                                                    11

  _The careful Maintenance and Education of exposed Children,
  and concealing their names and Families, is a matter of great
  consequence._                                                Ibid.

  _A Proposal of several Employments, for Beggars and such as
  have now no Work._                                              12

  _Great Works of Labour though in themselves unnecessary, are
  nevertheless of advantage to the Publick._                      13

  _The mending of Highwayes, building Bridges and Causeys, and
  the making of Rivers Navigable in_ England, _would make English
  Horses an exportable Commodity, and help to vend the
  Commodities of_ Ireland.                                     Ibid.

  _The Causes of unquiet bearing of Taxes_, viz.                  14

  _First, That the Sovereign exacts too much._                    15

  _Secondly, That Assessments are unequally laid._             Ibid.

  _Thirdly, That the Moneys levied are vainly expended._       Ibid.

  _Fourthly, Or given to Favourites._                          Ibid.

  _Fifthly, Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the
  People._                                                        16

  _Sixthly, Obscurity about the right of imposing._            Ibid.

  _Seventhly, Fewness of People._                              Ibid.

  _Eighthly, Scarcity of Money, and confusion of Coins._          17

  _Ninthly, That scarce an hundredth part of the Riches of this
  Nation is Coined Bullion._                                   Ibid.

  _Tenthly, The non-acceptance of Some Commodities in_ specie
  _in discharge of Taxes._                                     Ibid.

  _The Consequences of a Tax too heavy if there be too much Money
  in a Nation, which may be; or if there be too little, and that
  either in a State well or ill governed._                17, 18, 19

  _The first way of providing for the Publick Charge, is the
  excinding or setting apart of a proportion of the Territory,
  in the nature of Crown-Lands._                                  20

  _The second is taking away the same proportion of the Rents of
  all Lands._                                                     21

  _The Nation is happy where either of the said two wayes is
  practised_ ab antiquo, _and upon original agreement, and not
  exacted as a sudden contingent Surcharge upon the People._      21

  _The Owners of settled Rents bear the burthen of a Land-Tax, or
  Assessment, others probably gaining thereby._                Ibid.

  _A Land-Tax upon free Estates resolves into an Excise upon
  Consumptions._                                                  22

  _Assessment upon Housing more uncertain then that of Land,
  Housing being of a double nature_, viz. _either an instrument
  of gain, or way of expence._                                 Ibid.

  _The heavy taxing of Housing no discouragement to new Buildings;
  nor is the discouragement of new Buildings any means to prevent
  the populousness of a City._                                 Ibid.

  _Prohibition to build upon new Foundations serves onely to fix
  the Ground-plot of a City._                                     23

  _The reason why the City of_ London _removes its Ground-plot
  Westward._                                                   Ibid.

  _That ’tis probable the King of_ Englands _Palace will in
  process of time be towards_ Chelsey.                         Ibid.

  _That the present Seat of_ London _will be the greatest
  Cohabitation of People ever whilst this Island is inhabited._   24

  _The nature and natural Measures of the Rent of Land, computed
  in Commodities of the growth of the said Land._              Ibid.

  _The Par between food or other proceed of Land, and Bullion or
  Coin._                                                          25

  _The Par between Gold and Silver._                           Ibid.

  _Gold and Silver are not natural Standards of the Values of
  the_ τἁ χρἠϛα.                                                  26

  _The prime Denominations of the_ τἁ χρἠϛα _are but two_, viz.
  _Land and Labour, as the Denominations of Money in_ England
  _are Pounds, Shillings, Pence._                              Ibid.

  _Of the Par between Land and Labour._      Ibid.

  _The reason of the number of years Purchase that Land is worth
  in several Countreys._                                          27

  _Why Land in_ Ireland _is worth fewer years Purchase then in_
  England.                                                    27, 28

  _The Description and_ Ratio formalis _of Usury._                29

  _The same of Exchange._                                      Ibid.

  _The Measures of both._                                     29, 30

  _Why Usury hath been limited more then Exchange._               30

  _A Parallel between the Changes of the Price of Money, and that
  of Land._                                                    Ibid.

  _How to compute and compare the Rents of Lands, in order to a
  just Land-Tax or Assessment._                                   31

  _The intrinsick value of Land is found by Surveys of the
  Quantity, Figure, and Scituation._                           Ibid.

  _And by the Survey of the Quality_, viz. _its aptitude to bear;
  first, precious Commodities; secondly, the best of the kinde;
  thirdly, most in quantity._                                  Ibid.

  _The extrinsick or accidental value depends upon the plenty of
  Money, luxurious or frugal living; the Opinions Civil, Natural,
  and Religious of the People._                                Ibid.

  _If is necessary to these Enquiries to know how to tell the
  Gold and Silver Coins of this present Age, and compare the same
  with that of former times._                                     32

  _How to compare not onely the Money of this present Age with
  that of the former, but the entire Riches of the present with
  the former People._                                          Ibid.

  _By the numbers of People, and the proportion of Money amongst
  them, the accidental values of Lands are to be computed._       33

  _How to proportion the Rates of a Commodity in one place, unto
  the Rates of the same in another place._                     Ibid.

  _That the Day-wages of Labourers and several other of the most
  vulgar Tradesmen ought to be ascertain’d, and well adapted to
  the changes of time._                                        Ibid.

  _That though the difficulty of computing the contingent values
  of Land be great, yet there be greater reasons for undergoing
  it._                                                            34

  _The nature of Credit, as the said word is commonly used among
  Tradesmen, and otherwise._                                   Ibid.

  _That the Sovereigns exact knowledge of the Subjects Estates
  would do them no harm._                                      Ibid.

  _A description of the Duty of Customs._                         35

  _A conjecture that Customs at first were a kinde of_ præmium
  _for ensurance against Pyrates._                             Ibid.

  _The measures of the said Duty upon exported Goods._            36

  _The inconvenience of too heavy Customs._                    Ibid.

  _What Commodities may be forced to pay Customs._                37

  _The measures of Customs upon imported Goods._               Ibid.

  _The inconveniences of raising money, by the way of
  Customs._                                                    Ibid.

  _A Proposal, that instead of Tunnage and Poundage upon shipped
  Goods, a Tunnage were paid out of the ships Fraight._           38

  _Or that the Customs were taken as an Ensurance_-præmium.    Ibid.

  _Of prohibited Commodities in general._                      Ibid.

  _Of prohibiting the exportation of Money and Bullion._          39

  _The said prohibition of Money serves as a sumptuary Law._   Ibid.

  _About the exportation of Wool._                             Ibid.

  _The lessening of our Sheep-trade, and encrease of Corn-tillage
  is an expedient in this case for many reasons._                 40

  _Other considerations tending to shew, that the too vehement
  prohibitions of Wool may be ineffectual, or to do more harm
  then good._                                                     41

  _Of prohibiting Importations._                               Ibid.

  _It were better to make and raise Commodities, though to burn
  them, then not to make them, or let the makers lose their
  Faculty, and be idle._                                       Ibid.

  _Of Free Ports, and in what cases they may do good or harm._    41

  _Of Poll-money, and the sorts of it._                        Ibid.

  _The faults of the late Poll-moneys._                           43

  _Of the most simple Poll-money, where all pay alike, its
  conveniencies and inconveniencies._                          Ibid.

  _Of Poll-money upon Titles, Offices, and Faculties._            44

  _Harth-money is of the same nature with simple Poll-money, but
  both are rather Accumulative Excizes._                          45

  _Grants for publick Lotteries are Taxes upon the people._    Ibid.

  _Why Lotteries ought not to be allowed but by good
  authority._                                                  Ibid.

  _Raising of Money by Benevolence is a real Tax._                46

  _Three cases where the way of a Benevolence may be made
  good._                                                       Ibid.

  _Several reasons against it._                               46, 47

  _The several species of Penalties._                             47

  _A doubt whether the Penalties set down in_ Moses _Law ought to
  be inflicted now._                                              47

  _The proper use and reason of every sort of Penalty._           48

  _Perpetual Imprisonment is a kinde of slow death._              49

  _In what case death, mutilation, imprisonment, disgrace, &c.
  ought to be commuted for pecuniary mulcts._                  Ibid.

  _The meaning of the double and multiple Restitutions mentioned
  in the Law of_ Moses.                                        Ibid.

  _Of the wayes for punishing or permitting Heterodox Believers
  in Religion._                                                   50

  _That the Sovereign may do either._                             51

  _That all Pseudodoxies whatsoever may be safely muzzled from
  doing harm by pecuniary mulcts._                            51, 52

  _That the Sovereign by punishing them with death, mutilations,
  or imprisonments, doth therein punish himself, and that too_
  re infecta, _very often._                                       51

  _That the Pastours ought in some measure to be punished for the
  errours and defections of their Flocks._                        52

  _The true use of the Clergy is rather to be patterns of
  Holiness, then to teach men variety of Opinions_ de rebus
  divinis.                                                        53

  _The substance of all that hath been said in this whole
  discourse about the Church._                                 Ibid.

  _The abuse of Penal Laws._                                      54

  _Of Monopolies._                                             Ibid.

  _The use and reason of instituting Monopolies._                 55

  _A Digression about new Inventions, and the relations incident
  to the Projectors of new practices._                         Ibid.

  _Offices instituted by the State, with Fees of their own
  appointment, are of a parallel nature to Monopolies._           56

  _Why the Fees of offices were great heretofore._             Ibid.

  _How offices are become as a saleable Commodity._               57

  _Why many superfluous Offices are not abolished._            Ibid.

  _A description of Tythes in several particulars._               58

  _The causes why Tythes encrease._                            Ibid.

  _The Rent of the Lands of_ England _is but a quarter of the
  Expence of the people._                                         59

  _The Tythes in_ England _are six times as much as they were
  four hundred yeas ago._                                      Ibid.

  _The clergy are far richer now then they were in ancient times,
  and yet have less work to do._                               Ibid.

  _The danger of too many Church men._                            60

  _How to adjust the number of Church-men and Students in
  Divinity._                                                   Ibid.

  _Tythes is now no Tax or burthen upon the people._              61

  _The way of Tythes is a good pattern for a Tax._             Ibid.

  _The way of paying Tythes in the City and Countrey is very
  disproportionable._                                             61

  _The inconveniences of contributing to the Publick Charge after
  the manner of Tythes._                                       Ibid.

  _A reason why the wayes of Taxing the people are often
  shifted._                                                       62

  _The State gains in several Countreys by being the common
  Cashier, Usurer, Ensurer, Monopolist, &c._                      63

  _The case of the Jews (every where subject to great Taxes)
  briefly stated._                                                64

  _The way of leavying an_ aliquot _part of mens Estates very
  dangerous._                                                  Ibid.

  _Alterations in the values of Coins is a Tax upon such as live
  by determined Rents, Pensions, Fees, &c._                       65

  _What is embasing of Moneys, and what is not._               Ibid.

  _Of Tin and Copper money, as well curiously as coursly
  wrought._                                                    Ibid.

  _Of the Tokens coined by retailing Shop-keepers._            Ibid.

  _What is Gold and Silver embased._                              66

  _The reasons for embasing of money._                         Ibid.

  _Reasons against the same._                                  Ibid.

  _What is properly raising of Money._                            67

  _The effect of raising both domestick and forreign Coins._   Ibid.

  _Raising of money changes the_ species _of moneys, but lessens
  the Bullion._                                                Ibid.

  _Why many wise States have raised their Moneys._                68

  _Raising of Forreign money to a double value, or abating the
  price of our Native commodities to half, is not all one, but
  the former is better._                                          69

  _The way of computing and comparing the prices of Commodities
  upon natural grounds._                                      69, 70

  _Men are really and actually rich according to what they spend
  and enjoy in their own persons._                                71

  _Excize being a Tax upon such riches, is a just way by which to
  defray the Publick Charge._                                  ibid.

  _That a proportion ought to be pitched between the Expence or
  Consumption of the whole Nation, and the Publick Charge
  thereof._                                                      ib.

  _Commodities ought not to be taxed until they be just ripe for
  Consumption._                                                   72

  _Commodities of equal value may be unequally excised with
  justice._                                                  ibidem.

  _Of accumulating the Excise of many things upon some one
  thing._                                                      ibid.

  _Whether Native Commodities exported ought to pay Excize._   ibid.

  _The explication of Accumulative Excise._                       73

  _Reason for accumulating the Excise of all things upon some one
  thing._                                                      ibid.

  _Why Beer ought not to be that one thing._                      74

  _Harth or Smoak-money is an Accumulative Excize, with the
  reasons for and against it._                                 ibid.

  _Reasons in behalf of the Excize._                              75

  _Of framing persons to be fit for great Trusts, as to be
  Cashiers, Store-keepers, Checques, &c._                      ibid.




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CHAP. I.

_Of the several sorts of Publick Charges._


The Publick Charges of a State, are, _That of its Defence_ by Land
and Sea, of its Peace at home and abroad, as also of its honourable
vindication from the injuries of other States; all which we may
call the Charge of the Militia, which commonly is in ordinary as
great as any other Branch of the whole; but extraordinary, (that
is, in time of War, or fear of War) is much the greatest.

2. Another branch of the Publick Charge is, the Maintenance of
the Governours, Chief and Subordinate; I mean, such not onely
as spend their whole time in the Execution of their respective
Offices, but also who have spent much in fitting themselves as well
with abilities to that end, as in begetting an opinion in their
Superiours of such their ability and trustworthiness.

3. Which Maintenance of the Governours is to be in such a degree
of plenty and splendour, as private Endeavours and Callings seldom
reach unto: To the end, that such Governours may have the natural
as well as the artificial Causes of Power to act with.

4. For if a great multitude of men should call one of their number
King, unless this instituted Prince, appear in greater visible
splendour then others, can reward those that obey and please
him, and do the contrary to others; his Institution signifies
little, even although he chance to have greater corporal or mental
faculties, then any other of the number.

5. There be Offices which are but πἀρεργα, as Sheriffs, Justices
of the Peace, Constables, Churchwardens, &c. which men may attend
without much prejudice to their ordinary wayes of livelihood, and
for which the honour of being trusted, and the pleasure of being
feared, hath been thought a competent Reward.

6. Unto this head, the Charge of the administring Justice may
be referred, as well between man and man, as between the whole
State or Commonalty and particular members of it; as well that of
righting and punishing past injuries and crimes, as of preventing
the same in time to come.

7. A third branch of the Publick Charge is, that of the _Pastorage
of mens Souls_, and the guidance of their Consciences; which,
one would think (because it respects another world, and but the
particular interest of each man there) should not be a publick
Charge in this: Nevertheless if we consider how easie it is to
elude the Laws of man, to commit unprovable crimes, to corrupt and
divert Testimonies, to wrest the sense and meaning of the Laws,
&c. there follows a necessity of contributing towards a publick
Charge, wherewith to have men instructed in the Laws of God, that
take notice of evil thoughts and designs, and much more of secret
deeds, and that punisheth eternally in another world, what man can
but slightly chastise in this.

8. Now those who labour in this publick Service, must also be
maintained in a proportionable splendour; and must withall have the
means to allure men with some kinde of reward, even in this life;
forasmuch, as many heretofore followed even Christ himself but for
the Loaves he gave them.

9. Another Branch is, the Charge of Schools and Universities,
especially for so much as they teach above _Reading, Writing,
and Arithmetick_; these being of particular use to every man, as
being helps and substitutes of Memory and Reason, Reckoning being
of the latter, as Writing and Reading are of the former, for
whether Divinity, &c. ought to be made a private Trade, is to me
a question.

10. ’Tis true, that Schools and Colledges are now for the most part
but the Donations of particular men, or places where particular
men spend their money and time upon their own private accounts;
but no doubt it were not amiss, if the end of them were to furnish
all imaginable helps unto the highest and fined Natural Wits,
towards the discovery of Nature in all its operations; in which
sense they ought to be a publick Charge: The which Wits should not
be selected for that work, according to the fond conceits of their
own Parents and Friends, (Crows that think their own Birds ever
fairest) but rather by the approbation of others more impartial;
such as they are, who pick from out of the Christians Children the
ablest Instruments and Support of the Turkish Government. Of which
Selections more hereafter.

11. Another Branch is, that of the _Maintenance of Orphans, found
and exposed Children_, which also are Orphans; as also of Impotents
of all sorts, and moreover such as want employment.

12. For the permitting of any to beg is a more chargeable way of
maintaining them whom the law of Nature will not suffer to starve,
where food may possibly be had: Besides, it is unjust to let any
starve, when we think it just to limit the wages of the poor, so
as they can lay up nothing against the time of their impotency and
want of work.

13. A last Branch may be, the Charge of High-wayes, Navigable
Rivers, Aquæducts, Bridges, Havens, and other things of universal
good and concernment.

14. Other Branches may be thought on, which let other men either
refer unto these, or adde over and above. For it suffices for my
purpose to have for the present set down these the chief and most
obvious of all the rest.




CHAP. II.

_Of the Causes which encrease and aggravate the several sorts of
Publick Charges._


Having thus spoken of the several sorts of Publick Charges, we
shall next consider the Causes which encrease them both in general
and in particular.

Among the general Causes is, First, the unwillingness of the
people to pay them; arising from an opinion, that by delay and
reluctancy they may wholly avoid them, with a suspition that what
is imposed is too much, or that what is collected is embezelled or
ill expended, or that it is unequally leavied and assessed. All
these resolving into an unnecessary Charge to collect them, and of
forcing their Prince to hardships towards the people.

2. Another Cause which aggravates Taxes is, the force of paying
them in money at a certain time, and not in commodities, at the
most convenient seasons.

3. Thirdly, Obscurities and doubts concerning the right of imposing.

4. Fourthly, Scarcity of Money, and Confusion of Coins.

5. Fifthly, Fewness of people, especially of Labourers and
Artificers.

6. Sixthly, Ignorance of the numbers, Wealth and Trade of the
people, causing a needless repetition of the charge and trouble of
new additional Levies, in order to amend mistakes.

7. As to particulars. The Causes of encreasing the Military Charge
are the same with those that encrease Wars, or fear of Wars, which
are Forreign or Civil.

8. An Offensive Forreign War is caused by many, and those very
various, secret, personal distastes coloured----with publick
pretences; of which we can say nothing, but that the common
encouragement unto them particularly here in _England_ is a
false opinion, that our Countrey is full peopled, or that if we
wanted more Territory, we could take it with less charge from our
neighbours, then purchase it from the _Americans_; and a mistake,
that the greatness and glory of a Prince lyeth rather in the extent
of his Territory, then in the number, art, and industry of his
people, well united and governed. And moreover, that it is more
glorious to take from others by fraud or rapine, then to gain ones
self out of the bowels of the Earth and Sea.

9. Now those States are free from Forreign Offensive Wars (arising
as abovesaid out of Personal and Private Causes) where the chief
Governours Revenue is but small, and not sufficient to carry on
such Wars, the which if they happen to be begun, and so far carryed
on, as to want general Contributions, then those who have the
power to impose them, do commonly enquire what private persons and
Ends occasioned the War, and so fall upon the Authors, rather then
contribute to the Effect; otherwise then to quench it.

10. Defensive Wars are caused from unpreparedness of the offended
State for War, as when defective Stores are served into the
Magazines by corrupt Officers at the rate of good; when Armies are
falsely Mustered; when Souldiers are either Tenants or Servants to
their Commanders, or else persons, who for their Crimes or Debts,
want protection from Justice; when the Officers are ignorant of
their business, and absent from their Commands; and withal afraid
to punish, because unwilling to pay. Wherefore to be alwayes in a
posture of War at home, is the cheapest way to keep off War from
abroad.

11. The causes of Civil Wars here in _Europe_ proceed very much
from Religion, _viz._ the punishing of Believers heterodox from the
Authorized way, in publike and open places, before great multitudes
of ignorant people, with loss of life, liberty, and limbs, rather
then by well proportioned tolerable pecuniary mulcts, such as every
conscientious Non-Conformist would gladly pay, and Hypocrites by
refusing, discover themselves to be such.

12. Civil Wars are likewise caused by peoples fansying, that
their own uneasie condition may be best remedied by an universal
confusion; although indeed upon the upshot of such disorders they
shall probably be in a worse, even although they survive and
succeed, but more probably perish in the contest.

13. Moreover, the peoples believing that Forms of Government shall
in a few years produce any considerable alteration as to the wealth
of the Subject that the Form which is most ancient and present
is not the best for the place; that any established family or
person is not better then any new pretender, or even then the best
Election that can be made; that Sovereignty is invisible, and that
it is not certainly annexed unto some certain person or persons.

14. Causes of Civil War are also, that the Wealth of the Nation
is in too few mens hands, and that no certain means are provided
to keep all men from a necessity either to beg, or steal, or be
Souldiers.

Moreover, the allowing Luxury in some, whilst others needlesly
starve.

The dispensing of benefits upon casual and uncertain Motives,
the giving vaste Emoluments to persons and parties of no certain
visible merit. These are the things which cause animosities among
the totter-headed multitude, who are the tinder that the sparks of
a few Designers may easily inflame.

15. One Cause of Publick Charge in matters of Religion, is the not
having changed the limits of Parishes and Cures with the Change of
Religion from Popery, and with the Changes in Plantation and Trade.
For now when the Ministers of the Gospel preach unto multitudes
assembled in one place, may not Parishes be bigger? that is, may
not Flocks be more numerous, then when every particular sheep was,
as heretofore, drest and shorn three or four times _per annum_
by Shrift. If there be in _England_ and _Wales_ but about five
millions of people, what needs more then 5000. Parishes? that is
1000. Sheep under every Shepheard. Whereas in the middling Parishes
of _London_ there are about 5000. souls in each. Upon which account
there needs be in _England_ and _Wales_ but a 1000. Parishes,
whereas there are near 10000.

16. Now the saving of half the Parishes, would (reckoning the
benefices one with another, but at 100_l._ _per Annum_ a piece) save
500000_l._ Besides, when the number of Parochial Parsons were halved,
then there would need but half the present number of Byshops, Deans
and Chapters, Colledges and Cathedralls, which perhaps would amount
to two or three hundred thousand pounds more: And yet the Church
of God would be more regularly served then now, and that without
prejudice to that sacred, ancient Order of Episcopacy, and the way
of their Maintenance by Tythes; and all this in a method of greater
Reformation and suitableness thereunto.

18. But suppose it be said, that in some wild Countreys, a thousand
people do not live in a less scope of ground then of eight miles
square. To which I answer, that there are few or no such places,
the largest Parishes I know, being not more capacious then of three
or four miles square, in which is no difficulty, for the people to
meet once a week at some central place within that scope.

19. Moreover I say, that a Curate of small Learning, if of good
life, and duly Ordained, may officiate in four Chappels of Ease
every Sunday; and the Preacher, who indeed should be a person of
Learning and Eloquence, may preach every other Sunday in every
of the said Chappels, by preaching in two of them one day, and
in the other two, the other day: And this with Catechizing, and
Extra-Lectures upon the Week-dayes, would perform as much as now is
performed, and as much as by the blessing of God is necessary to
salvation; for the yoak of Christ is easie, and his burthen light.

20. But to put an end to this doubt; I affirm, that if England and
Wales were cut out in parcels of three miles square, there would be
found few above four thousand such, of which to make Parishes.

21. Now if it be said, that the Alienation of these Tythes is
Sacriledge; I answer, that if the same be employed to defend the
Church of God against the Turke and Pope, and the Nations who
adhere to them, it is not at all; or less, then to give 3./4. of
the same to the Wives and Children of the Priests which were not in
being when those allowances were set forth?

21. If I had not an abhorrence from propounding the lessening of
the Church Means, I could say, that the retrenching part of each
remaining Parsons Tythes and Emoluments, and leaving them for part,
to the free Contributions of their Flocks, were a way to promote
the Gospel, and to give less offence to such as think that their
whole maintenance should be made in that manner.

22. I might also say, that forasmuch as there be more Males then
Females in _England_, (the said disproportion _pro tanto_ hindering
procreation) that it were good for the Ministers to return to
their Cælibat; or that none should be Ministers, whilst they were
married, it being easie among five millions of people to finde out
5000. that could and would live single, that is, one in a thousand:
And then our unmarried Parson might live as well with half, as now
with the whole of his Benefice.

23. Alwayes provided, that though the number of Parishes, and the
measure of Benefices were lessened, yet that the same ought to be
done without dammage to the present Incumbents.

24. As for lessening the Charge of Offices relating to the
Government and the Law, the same will consist in abolishing the
superfluous, supernumerary, and antiquated; and withall, in
retrenching the Fees of others, to what the labour, art, and trust
of their respective employments do require. For there be many
Offices wholly executed by Deputies for small wages, whereas the
Masters of them have ten times as much, although they know nothing
either of what is done, or ought to be done in the business.

25. Now such Surplusages as these should be either restored unto
the people who gave them unto the King, at a time when those Fees
made up but a just reward for the Officer; or else the King keeping
them still might take them for so much toward the Publick Charge,
but not give them away to stop the importunate suits of any
particular person, in whom and in all his dependants, such benefits
do but cause a laziness as to the true original gain of the Nation,
and themselves in particular, together with a total negligence and
ignorance of the publick good.

26. Many are the particulars that might be instanced of this
kinde; but my aim not being to prejudice any man in particular, I
descend no lower, wishing onely that there might be an universal
Reformation of what length of time hath warped awry, in which case
no particular men are to be troubled; for if all suffer, none
suffers, and all men would be no poorer then now they are if they
should lose half their Estates; nor would they be a whit the richer
if the same were doubled, the _Ratio formalis_ of Riches lying
rather in proportion then quantity.

27. To lessen the charge of Universities, unto which I adde the
Inns of Court, which is not much, were to lessen the number of the
Students in Divinity, Law and Medicine, by lessening the use of
those Professions.

Now having spoken already of Divinity, I come next to the Law, and
say; that if Registers were kept of all mens Estates in Lands, and
of all the Conveyances of, and Engagements upon them; and withal
if publick Loan-Banks, Lombards, or Banks of Credit upon deposited
money, Plate, Jewels, Cloth, Wooll, Silke, Leather, Linnen,
Mettals, and other durable Commodities, were erected, I cannot
apprehend how there could be above one tenth part of the Law-suits
and Writings, as now there are.

28. And moreover, if by accompt of the people, of their Land and
other wealth, the number of Lawyers and Scriveners were adjusted,
I cannot conceive how their should remain above one hundredth part
of what now are; forasmuch as I have heard some affirm, that there
be now ten times as many as are even now necessary; and that there
are now ten times as many Law-suits, as upon the abovementioned
Reformation, there would be. It follows therefore, that upon the
whole there would not need one in a hundred of the present number
of Retainers to the Law, and Offices of Justice; the occasions as
well of crimes as injuries being so much retrenched.

29. As for Physicians, it is not hard by the help of the
observations which have been lately made upon the Bills of
Mortality, to know how many are sick in _London_ by the number
of them that dye, and by the proportions of the City to finde
out the same of the Countrey; and by both, by the advice of the
learned Colledge of that Faculty to calculate how many Physicians
were requisite for the whole Nation, and consequently, how many
Students in that art to permit and encourage; and lastly, having
calculated these numbers, to adoptate a proportion of Chyrurgeons,
Apothecaries, and Nurses to them, and so by the whole to cut off
and extinguish that infinite swarm of vain pretenders unto, and
abusers of that God-like Faculty, which of all Secular Employments
our Saviour himself after he began to preach engaged himself upon.

30. Moreover, if it were agreed, what number of Divines,
Physicians, and Civilians (that is, of men bred in Universities)
were requisite to the publick service? As suppose 13000. in
the present way, and perhaps not above 6000. in that way of
Retrenchment which we propound; then supposing that but one in
forty dyes _per annum_, it follows that less then 350. might
suffice to be sent yearly out of the Universities: Where supposing
they stay five years one with another, it followeth also that
about 1800. is the number of Students fit to be allowed in the
Universities at a time; I mean, of such as intend to make Learning
their Trade and way of Livelihood.

31. I might intimate, that if 1800. Students were enough, and that
if there were 40000. Parish Children and Foundlings in _England_,
it were probable that one in twenty of them might be of excellent
wit and towardness.

Now since the Publick may dispose of these Children as they please,
and since there is Maintenance in both Universities for above 1800.
what if our Professors of Art were in this manner selected and
educated? But of this but _in transitu_.

32. Hereunto may be added, that by reason of Loan Banks
aforementioned, whereby the Credits and Estates of all Dealers may
be known, and all the mysterious dangers of money prevented, and
that by good Accompts of our growth, Manufacture, Consumption,
and Importation, it might be known how many Merchants were able
to mannage the Exchange of our superfluous Commodities with the
same of other Countreys: And also how many Retailers are needful
to make the subdistributions into every Village of this Nation,
and to receive back their superfluities. Upon these grounds I
presume a large proportion of these also might be retrenched, who
properly and originally earn nothing from the Publick, being onely
a kinde of Gamesters, that play with one another for the labours
of the poor; yielding of themselves no fruit at all, otherwise
then as veins and arteries, to distribute forth and back the blood
and nutritive juyces of the Body Politick, namely the product of
Husbandry and Manufacture.

33. Now if the numerous Offices and Fees relating to the
Government, Law, and Church, and if the number of Divines, Lawyers,
Physicians, Merchants, and Retailers were also lessened, all which
do receive great wages for little work done to the Publick, with
how much greater ease would common expences be defrayed? and with
how much more equality would the same be assessed?

34. We enumerated six Branches of the Publick Charge, and have
slightly spoken how four of them might be lessened; we come next
to the other two Branches, whereof we shall rather recommend the
augmentation.

The first of these two Branches I call, generally speaking, Care of
the Poor, consisting of Receptacles for the aged, blinde, lame, &c.
in health; Hospitals for noysome, chronical, curable and uncurable,
inward and outward Diseases. With others for acute and contagious.
Others for Orphans, sound and exposed Children; of which latter
sort none should be refused, let the number be never so great,
provided their names, families, and relations were well concealed:
The choice of which Children being made at their being about eight
or ten years old, might afford the King the fittest Instruments
for all kinde of his Affairs, and be as firmly obliged to be his
faithful servants as his own natural Children.

35. This is no new nor rare thing, onely the neglect of it in
these Countreys, is rather to be esteemed a rare and new project:
Nor is it unknown what excellent fruits there have been of this
Institution, of which we shall say much more, upon another occasion
hereafter.

36. When all helpless and impotent Persons were thus provided for,
and the lazy and thievish restrained and punished by the Minister
of Justice, it follows now, that we finde out certain constant
Employments for all other indigent people, who labouring according
to the Rules upon them, may require a sufficiency of food and
raiment. Their Children also, (if small and impotent) as aforesaid,
being provided for elsewhere.

37. But what shall these Employments be? I answer, such as were
reckoned as the sixth Branch of the Publick Expence, _viz._ making
all High-wayes so broad, firm, and eaven, as whereby the charge
and tedium of travelling and Carriages may be greatly lessened.
The cutting and scowring of Rivers into Navigable; the planting of
usefull Trees for timber, delight, and fruit in convenient places.

The making of Bridges and Cawseys.

The working in Mines, Quarries, and Colleries.

The Manufactures of Iron, &c.

38. I pitch upon all these particulars, first, as works wanting in
this Nation; secondly, as works of much labour, and little art; and
thirdly, as introductive of new Trades into _England_, to supply
that of Cloth, which we have almost totally lost.

In the next place it will be asked, who shall pay these men? I
answer, every body; for if there be 1000. men in a Territory, and
if 100. of these can raise necessary food and raiment for the whole
1000. If 200. more, make as much commodities, as other Nations
will give either their commodities or money for, and if 400. more
be employed in the ornaments, pleasure, and magnificence of the
whole; if there be 200. Governours, Divines, Lawyers, Physicians,
Merchants, and Retailers, making in all 900. the question is,
since there is food enough for this supernumerary 100. also, how
they should come by it? whether by begging, or by stealing; or
whether they shall suffer themselves to starve, finding no fruit
of their begging, or being taken in their stealing be put to death
another way? Or whether they shall be given away to another Nation
that will take them? I think ’tis plain, they ought neither to
be starved, nor hanged, nor given away; now if they beg, they
may pine for hunger to day, and be gorged and glutted to morrow,
which will occasion Diseases and evil habits, the same may be said
of stealing; moreover, perhaps they may get either by begging or
stealing more then will suffice them, which will for ever after
indispose them to labour, even upon the greatest occasion which may
suddenly and unexpectedly happen.

39. For all these Reasons, it will be certainly the safer way to
afford them the superfluity which would otherwise be lost and
wasted, or wantonly spent: Or in case there be no overplus, then
’tis fit to retrench a little from the delicacy of others feeding
in quantity or quality; few men spending less then double of what
might suffice them as to the bare necessities of nature.

40. Now as to the work of these supernumeraries, let it be without
expence of Foreign Commodities, and then ’tis no matter if it be
employed to build a useless Pyramid upon _Salisbury Plain_, bring
the Stones at _Stonehenge_ to _Tower-Hill_, or the like; for at
worst this would keep their mindes to discipline and obedience, and
their bodies to a patience of more profitable labours when need
shall require it.

41. In the next place, as an instance of the usefulness of what
hath been propounded, I ask what benefit will the mending of
High-wayes, the building of Bridges and Cawseys, with making of
Rivers navigable produce, besides the pleasure and beauty of them?
To which I also answer, as an instance of the premises, that the
same, together with the numerous millions of Cattle and Sheep
out of _Ireland_, shall produce a vaste superfluity of English
Horses, the which because they have the many excellent qualities of
beauty, strength, courage, swiftness, and patience concentrated in
them, beyond the Horses of other places, would be a very vendible
Commodity all over _Europe_; and such as depending upon the
intrinsick nature of the English Soyle could not be counterfeited,
nor taken away by others. Moreover, an Horse is such a Commodity as
will carry both himself and his Merchant to the Market, be the same
never so distant.




CHAP. III.

_How the Causes of the unquiet bearing of Taxes may be lessened._


We have slightly gone through all the six Branches of the Publick
Charge, and have (though imperfectly and in haste) shewn what would
encrease, and what would abate them.

We come next to take away some of the general Causes of the unquiet
bearing of Taxes, and yielding to Contributions, _viz._

2. 1. That the people think, the Sovereign askes more then he
needs. To which we answer, 1. That if the Sovereign were sure to
have what he wanted in due time, it were his own great dammage
to draw away the money out of his Subjects hands, who by trade
increase it, and to hoard it up in his own Coffers, where ’tis of
no use even to himself, but lyable to be begged or vainly expended.

3. 2. Let the Tax be never so great, if it be proportionable unto
all, then no man suffers the loss of any Riches by it. For men (as
we said but now) if the Estates of them all were either halfed or
doubled, would in both cases remain equally rich. For they would
each man have his former state, dignity, and degree; and moreover,
the Money leavied not going out of the Nation, the same also would
remain as rich in comparison of any other Nation; onely the Riches
of the Prince and People would differ for a little while, namely,
until the money leavied from some, were again refunded upon the
same, or other persons that paid it: In which case every man also
should have his chance and opportunity to be made the better or
worse by the new distribution; or if he lost by one, yet to gain by
another.

4. 3. Now that which angers men most, is to be taxed above their
Neighbours. To which I answer, that many times these surmizes
are mistakes, many times they are chances, which in the next Tax
may run more favourable; and if they be by design, yet it cannot
be imagined, that it was by design of the Sovereign, but of some
temporary Assessor, whose turn it may be to receive the _Talio_
upon the next occasion from the very man he has wronged.

5. 4. Men repine much, if they think the money leavyed will be
expended on Entertainments, magnificent Shews, triumphal Arches,
&c. To which I answer, that the same is a refunding the said moneys
to the Tradesmen who work upon those things; which Trades though
they seem vain and onely of ornament, yet they refund presently to
the most useful; namely, to Brewers, Bakers, Taylours, Shoemakers,
&c. Moreover, the Prince hath no more pleasure in these Shews and
Entertainments then 100000. others of his meanest Subjects have,
whom, for all their grumbling, we see to travel many miles to be
spectators of these mistaken and distasted vanities.

6. 5. The people often complain, that the King bestows the money
he raises from the people upon his Favourites: To which we
answer; that what is given to Favourites, may at the next step or
transmigration, come into our own hands, or theirs unto whom we
wish well, and think do deserve it.

7. Secondly, as this man is a Favourite to day, so another, or
our selves, may be hereafter; favour being of a very slippery and
moveable nature, and not such a thing as we need much to envy; for
the same way that----leads up an hill, leads also down the same.
Besides, there is nothing in the Lawes or Customes of _England_,
which excludes any the meanest mans Childe, from arriving to the
highest Offices in this Kingdom, much less debars him from the
Personall kindness of his Prince.

8. All these imaginations (whereunto the vulgar heads are subject)
do cause a backwardness to pay, and that necessitates the Prince
to severity. Now this lighting upon some poor, though stubborn,
stiff-necked Refuser, charged with Wife and Children, gives the
credulous great occasion to complain of Oppression, and breeds ill
blood as to all other matters; feeding the ill humours already in
being.

9. 6. Ignorance of the Number, Trade, and Wealth of the people, is
often the reason why the said people are needlesly troubled, viz.
with the double charge and vexation of two, or many Levies, when
one might have served: Examples whereof have been seen in late
Poll-moneys; in which (by reason of not knowing the state of the
people, _viz._ how many there were of each Taxable sort, and the
want of sensible markes whereby to rate men, and the confounding of
Estates with Titles and Offices) great mistakes were committed.

10. Besides, for not knowing the Wealth of the people, the Prince
knows not what they can bear; and for not knowing the Trade, he
can make no Judgment of the proper season when to demand his
Exhibitions.

11. 7. Obscurities and doubts, about the right of imposing, hath
been the cause of great and ugly Reluctancies in the people, and of
Involuntary Severities in the Prince; an eminent Example whereof
was the Ship-money, no small cause of twenty years calamity to the
whole Kingdom.

12. 8. Fewness of people, is real poverty; and a Nation wherein are
Eight Millions of people, are more then twice as rich as the same
scope of Land wherein are but Four; For the same Governours which
are the great charge, may serve near as well, for the greater, as
the lesser number.

13. Secondly, If the people be so few, as that they can live, _Ex
sponte Creatii_, or with little labour, such as is Grazing, &c.,
they become wholly without Art. No man that will not exercise his
hands, being able to endure the tortures of the mind, which much
thoughtfulness doth occasion.

14. 9. Scarcity of money, is another cause of the bad payment of
Taxes; for if we consider, that of all the wealth of this Nation,
_viz._ Lands, Housing, Shipping, Commodities, Furniture, Plate, and
Money, that scarce one part of an hundred is Coin; and that perhaps
there is scarce six millions of Pounds now in _England_, that is
but twenty shillings a head for every head in the Nation. We may
easily judge, how difficult it is for men of competent estates, to
pay a Summe of money on a sudden; which if they cannot compass,
Severities, and Charges ensue; and that with reason, though
unluckie enough, it being more tolerable to undoe one particular
Member, then to endanger the whole, notwithstanding indeed it be
more tolerable for one particular Member to be undone with the
whole, then alone.

15. 10. It seems somewhat hard, that all Taxes should be paid in
money, viz., (when the King hath occasion to Victual his Ships at
_Portsmouth_) that Fat Oxen, and Corn should not be received in
kind, but that Farmers must first carry their Corn perhaps ten
Miles to sell, and turn into money; which being paid to the King,
is again reconverted into Corn, fetcht many miles further.

16. Moreover, the Farmer for haste is forced to under-sell his
Corn, and the King for haste likewise, is forced to over-buy his
provisions. Whereas the paying in kinde, _Pro Hic & Nunc_, would
lessen a considerable grievance to the poor people.

17. The next confederation shall be of the consequences, and
effects of too great a Tax, not in respect of particular men, of
which we have spoken before, but to the whole people in general:
To which I say, that there is a certain measure, and proportion
of money requisite to drive the trade of a Nation, more or less
then which would prejudice the same. Just as there is a certain
proportion of Farthings necessary in a small retail Trade, to
change silver money, and to even such reckonings as cannot be
adjusted with the smallest silver pieces. For money, (made of Gold
and silver) is to the τἁ χρἠϛα (that is to the matter of our Food
and Covering) but as Farthings, and other local extrinsick money,
is to the Gold and Silver species.

18. Now as the proportion of the number of Farthings requisite in
comerse is to be taken from the number of people, the frequency of
their exchanges; as also, and principally from the value of the
smallest silver pieces of money; so in like maner, the proportion
of money requisite to our Trade, is to be likewise taken from the
frequency of commutations, and from the bigness of the payments,
that are by Law or Custome usually made otherwise. From whence
it follows, that where there are Registers of Lands, whereby the
just value of each mans interest in them, may be well known; and
where there are Depositories of the τἁ χρἠϛα, as of Metals, Cloth,
Linnen, Leather, and other Usefuls; and where there are Banks of
money also, there less money is necessary to drive the Trade.
For if all the greatest payments be made in Lands, and the other
perhaps down to ten pound, or twenty pound be made by credit in
Lombars or Money-Banks: It follows, that there needs onely money to
pay sums less then those aforementioned; just as fewer Farthings
are requisite for change, where there be plenty of silver two
Pences, then where the least silver piece is six Pence.

19. To apply all this, I say, that if there be too much money in a
Nation, it were good for the Commonalty, as well as the King, and
no harm even to particular men, if the King had in his Coffers,
all that is superfluous, no more then if men were permitted to pay
their Taxes in any thing they could best spare.

20. On the other side, if the largeness of a publick Exhibition
should leave less money then is necessary to drive the Nations
Trade, then the mischief thereof would be the doing of less work,
which is the same as lessening the people, or their Art and
Industry; for a hundred pound passing a hundred hands for Wages,
causes a 10000_l._ worth of Commodities to be produced, which hands
would have been idle and useless, had there not been this continual
motive to their employment.

21. Taxes if they be presently expended upon our own Domestick
Commodities, seem to me, to do little harm to the whole Body of
the people, onely they work a change in the Riches and Fortunes of
particular men; and particularly by transferring the same from the
Landed and Lazy, to the Crafty and Industrious. As for example, if
a Gentleman have let his Lands to Farm for a hundred pound _per
annum_, for several years or lives, and he be taxed twenty pound
_per annum_, to maintain a Navy; then the effect hereof will be,
that this Gentleman’s twenty pound _per annum_, will be distributed
amongst Seamen, Ship-Carpenters, and other Trades relating to
Naval matters; but if the Gentleman had his Land in his own hands,
then being taxed a Fifth part, he would raise his Rents near the
same proportion upon his under Tenants, or would sell his Cattle,
Corn, and Wooll a Fifth part dearer; the like also would all other
subdependents on him do; and thereby recover in some measure, what
he paid. Lastly, but if all the money levied were thrown into the
Sea, then the ultimate effect would onely be, that every man must
work a fifth part the harder, or retrench a fifth part of his
consumptions, _viz._ the former, if forreign Trade be improveable,
and the latter, if it be not.

22. This, I conceive, were the worst of Taxes in a well policyed
State; but in other States, where is not a certain prevention of
Beggary and Theevery, that is a sure livelihood for men wanting
imployment; there, I confess, an excessive Taxe, causes excessive
and insuperable want, even of natural necessities, and that on a
sudden, so as ignorant particular persons, cannot finde out what
way to subsist by; and this, by the law of Nature, must cause
sudden effects to relieve it self, that is, Rapines, Frauds; and
this again must bring Death, Mutilations, and Imprisonments,
according to the present Laws which are Mischiefs, and Punishments,
as well unto the State, as to the particular sufferers of them.




CHAP. IV.

  _Of the several wayes of Taxe, and first, of setting a part,
  a proportion of the whole Territory for Publick uses, in the
  nature of Crown Lands; and secondly, by way of Assessement, or
  Land-taxe._


But supposing, that the several causes of Publick Charge are
lessened as much as may be, and that the people be well satisfied,
and contented to pay their just shares of what is needfull for
their Government and Protection, as also for the Honour of their
Prince and Countrey: It follows now to propose the several wayes,
and expedients, how the same may be most easily, speedily, and
insensibly collected. The which I shall do, by exposing the
conveniencies and inconveniences of some of the principal wayes
of Levyings, used of later years within the several States of
_Europe_: unto which others of smaller and more rare use may be
referred.

2. Imagine then, a number of people, planted in a Territory, who
had upon Computation concluded, that two Millions of pounds _per
annum_, is necessary to the publick charges. Or rather, who going
more wisely to work, had computed a twenty fifth part of the
proceed of all their Lands and Labours, were to be the _Excisum_,
or the part to be cut out, and laid aside for publick uses. Which
proportions perhaps are fit enough to the affairs of _England_, but
of that hereafter.

3. Now the question is, how the one or the other shall be raised.
The first way we propose, is, to Excize the very Land it self in
kinde; that is, to cut out of the whole twenty five Millions, which
are said to be in _England_ and _Wales_, as much Land _in specie_,
as whereof the Rack-rent would be two Millions, _viz._ about four
Millions of Acres, which is about a sixth part of the whole;
making the said four Millions to be Crown Lands, and as the four
Counties intended to be reserved in _Ireland_ upon the forfeitures
were. Or else to excize a sixth part of the rent of the whole,
which is about the proportion, that the Adventurers and Souldiers
in _Ireland_ retribute to the King, as Quit Rents. Of which two
wayes, the latter is manifestly the better, the King having more
security, and more obligees, provided the trouble and charge of
this universal Collection, exceed not that of the other advantage
considerably.

4. This way in a new State would be good, being agreed upon, as it
was in _Ireland_, before men had even the possession of any Land
at all; wherefore whosoever buyes Land in _Ireland_ hereafter, is
no more concerned with the Quit Rents wherewith they are charged,
then if the Acres were so much the fewer; or then men are, who
buy Land, out of which they know Tythes are to be paid. And truly
that Countrey is happy, in which by Original Accord, such a Rent
is reserved, as whereby the Publick charge may be born, without
contingent, sudden, superadditions, in which lies the very _Ratio_
of the burthen of all Contributions and Exactions. For in such
cases, as was said before, it is not onely the Landlord payes, but
every man who eats but an Egg, or an Onion of the growth of his
Lands; or who useth the help of any Artisan, which feedeth on the
same.

5. But if the same were propounded in _England_, _viz._ if an
aliquot part of every Landlords Rent were excinded or retrenched,
then those whose Rents were settled, and determined for long times
to come, would chiefly bear the burthen of such an Imposition,
and others have a benefit thereby. For suppose _A._ and _B._
have each of them a parcel of Land, of equal goodness and value;
suppose also that _A._ hath let his parcel for twenty one years at
twenty pound _per annum_, but that _B._ is free; now there comes
out a Taxe of a fifth part; hereupon _B._ will not let under 25_l._
that his remainder may be twenty, whereas _A._ must be contented
with sixteen neat; nevertheless the Tenants of _A._ will sell the
proceed of their bargain at the same rate, that the Tenants of _B._
shall do. The effect of all this is; First, that the Kings fifth
part of _B._ his Farm, shall be greater then before. Secondly, that
the Farmer to _B._ shall gain more then before the Taxe. Thirdly,
that the Tenant or Farmer of _A._ shall gain as much as the King
and Tenant to _B._ both. Fourthly, the Tax doth ultimately light
upon the Landlord _A._ and the Consumptioners. From whence it
follows, that a Land-taxe resolves into an irregular Excize upon
consumptions, that those bear it most, who least complain. And
lastly, that some Landlords may gain, and onely such whose Rents
are predetermined shall loose; and that doubly, _viz._ one way
by the raising of their revenues, and the other by enhansing the
prices of provisions upon them.

6. Another way is an _Excisum_ out of the Rent of Houseing,
which is much more uncertain then that of Land. For an House is
of a double nature, _viz._ one, wherein it is a way and means of
expence; the other, as ’tis an Instrument and Tool of gain: for
a Shop in _London_ of less capacity and less charge in building
then a fair Dining-Room in the same House, unto which both do
belong, shall nevertheless be of the greater value; so also shall
a Dungeon, Sellar, then a pleasant Chamber; because the one is
expence, the other profit. Now the way of a Land-taxe rates
housing, as of the latter nature, but the Excize, as of the former.

7. We might adde hereunto, that housing is sometimes
disproportionally taxed to discourage Building, especially upon
new Foundations, thereby to prevent the growth of a City; suppose
_London_, such excessive and overgrown Cities being dangerous to
Monarchy, though the more secure when the Supremacy is in Citizens
of such places themselves, as in _Venice_.

8. But we say, that such checking of new Buildings signifies
nothing to this purpose; for as much as Buildings do not encrease,
until the People already have increased: but the remedy of the
abovementioned dangers is to be sought in the causes of the
encrease of People, the which if they can be nipt, the other work
will necessarily be done.

But what then is the true effect of forbidding to build upon new
foundations? I answer to keep and fasten the City to its old seat
and ground-plot, the which encouragement for new Buildings will
remove, as it comes to pass almost in all great Cities, though
insensibly, and not under many years progression.

9. The reason whereof is, because men are unwilling to build new
houses at the charge of pulling down their old, where both the old
house it self, and the ground it stands upon do make a much dearer
ground-plot for a new house, and yet far less free and convenient;
wherefore men build upon new free foundations, and cobble up old
houses, until they become fundamentally irreparable, at which time
they become either the dwelling of the Rascality, or in process of
time return to waste and Gardens again, examples whereof are many
even about _London_.

Now if great Cities are naturally apt to remove their Seats, I ask
which way? I say, in the case of _London_, it must be Westward,
because the Windes blowing near 3./4. of the year from the West,
the dwellings of the West end are so much the more free from the
fumes, steams, and stinks of the whole Easterly Pyle; which where
Seacoal is burnt is a great matter. Now if it follow from hence,
that the Pallaces of the greatest men will remove Westward, it will
also naturally follow, that the dwellings of others who depend upon
them will creep after them. This we see in _London_, where the
Noblemens ancient houses are now become Halls for Companies, or
turned Into Tenements, and All the Pallaces are Gotten Westward;
Insomuch, As I Do Not Doubt but That Five Hundred Years Hence,
The Kings Pallace will be near _Chelsey_, and the Old Building Of
_Whitehall_ converted to uses more answerable to their quality. For
to build a new Royal Pallace upon the same ground will be too great
a confinement, in respect of Gardens and other magnificencies,
and withall a disaccommodation in the time of the work; but it
rather seems to me, that the next Palace will be built from the
whole present contignation of houses at such a distance as the old
Pallace of _Westminster_ was from the City of _London_, when the
Archers began to bend their bowes just without _Ludgate_, and when
all the space between the _Thames_, _Fleet-street_, and _Holborn_
was as _Finsbury-Fields_ are now.

10. This digression I confess to be both impertinent to the
business of Taxes, and in it self almost needless; for why should
we trouble our selves what shall be five hundred years hence, not
knowing what a day may bring forth; and since ’tis not unlikely,
but that before that time we may be all transplanted from hence
into _America_, these Countreys being overrun with Turks, and made
waste, as the Seats of the famous Eastern Empires at this day are.

11. Onely I think ’tis certain, that while ever there are people
in _England_, the greatest cohabitation of them will be about the
place which is now _London_, the _Thames_ being the most commodious
River of this Island, and the seat of _London_ the most commodious
part of the _Thames_; so much doth the means of facilitating
Carriage greaten a City, which may put us in minde of employing our
idle hands about mending the High-wayes, making Bridges, Cawseys,
and Rivers navigable: Which considerations brings me back round
into my way of Taxes, from whence I digrest.

12. But before we talk too much of Rents in order to Taxes, we
should endeavour to explain the mysterious nature of them, with
reference as well to Money, the rent of which we call usury; as to
that of Lands and Houses, aforementioned.

13. Suppose a man could with his own hands plant a certain scope of
Land with Corn, that is, could Digg, or Plough, Harrow, Weed, Reap,
Carry home, Thresh, and Winnow so much as the Husbandry of this
Land requires; and had withal Seed wherewith to sowe the same. I
say, that when this man hath subducted his seed out of the proceed
of his Harvest, and also, what himself hath both eaten and given to
others in exchange for Clothes, and other Natural necessaries; that
the remainder of Corn, is the natural and true Rent of the Land for
that year; and the _medium_ of seven years, or rather of so many
years as makes up the Cycle, within which Dearths and Plenties
make their revolution, doth give the ordinary Rent of the Land in
Corn.

14. But a further, though collaterall question may be, how much
English money this Corn or Rent is worth? I answer, so much as
the money, which another single man can save, within the same
time, over and above his expence, if he imployed himself wholly
to produce and make it; _viz._ Let another man go travel into a
Countrey where is Silver, there Dig it, Refine it, bring it to the
same place where the other man planted his Corn; Coyne it, &c. the
same person, all the while of his working for Silver, gathering
also food for his necessary livelihood, and procuring himself
covering, &c. I say, the Silver of the one, must be esteemed of
equal value with the Corn of the other; the one being perhaps
twenty Ounces, and the other twenty Bushels. From whence it
follows, that the price of a Bushel of this Corn to be an Ounce of
Silver.

15. And forasmuch as possibly there may be more Art and Hazzard
in working about the Silver, then about the Corn, yet all comes
to the same pass; for let a hundred men work ten years upon Corn,
and the same number of men, the same time, upon Silver; I say,
that the neat proceed of the Silver is the price of the whole neat
proceed of the Corn, and like parts of the one, the price of like
parts of the other. Although not so many of those who wrought in
Silver, learned the Art of refining and coining, or out-lived the
dangers and diseases of working in the Mines. And this also is the
way of pitching the true proportion, between the values of Gold and
Silver, which many times is set but by popular errour, sometimes
more, sometimes less, diffused in the world; which errour (by the
way) is the cause of our having been pestred with too much Gold
heretofore, and wanting it now.

16. This, I say, to be the foundation of equallizing and ballancing
of values; yet in the superstructures and practices hereupon, I
confess there is much variety, and intricacy; of which hereafter.

17. The world measures things by Gold and Silver, but principally
the latter; for there may not be two measures, and consequently
the better of many must be the onely of all; that is, by fine
silver of a certain weight; but now if it be hard to measure the
weight and fineness of silver, as by the different reports of the
ablest Saymasters I have known it to be; and if silver granted to
be of the same fineness and weight, rise and fall in its price,
and be more worth at one place then another, not onely for being
farther from the Mines, but for other accidents, and may be more
worth at present, then a moneth or other small time hence; and if
it differ in its proportion unto the several things valued by it,
in several ages upon the increase and diminution thereof, we shall
endeavour to examine some other natural Standards and Measures,
without derogating from the excellent use of these.

18. Our Silver and Gold we call by severall names, as in _England_
by pounds, shillings, and pence, all which may be called and
understood by either of the three. But that which I would say upon
this matter is, that all things ought to be valued by two natural
Denominations, which is Land and Labour; that is, we ought to
say, a Ship or garment is worth such a measure of Land, with such
another measure of Labour; forasmuch as both Ships and Garments
were the creatures of Lands and mens Labours thereupon: This being
true, we should be glad to finde out a natural Par between Land and
Labour, so as we might express the value by either of them alone
as well or better then by both, and reduce one into the other as
easily and certainly as we reduce pence into pounds. Wherefore we
would be glad to finde the natural values of the Fee simple of
Land, though but no better then we have done that of the _usus
fructus_ abovementioned, which we attempt as followeth.

19. Having found the Rent or value of the _usus fructus per annum_,
the question is, how many years purchase (as we usually say) is
the Fee simple naturally worth? If we say an infinite number, then
an Acre of Land would be equal in value to a thousand Acres of the
same Land; which is absurd, an infinity of unities being equal to
an infinity of thousands. Wherefore we must pitch upon some limited
number, and that I apprehend to be the number of years, which I
conceive one man of fifty years old, another of twenty eight, and
another of seven years old, all being alive together may be thought
to live; that is to say, of a Grandfather, Father, and Childe;
few men having reason to take care of more remote Posterity: for
if a man be a great Grandfather, he himself is so much the nearer
his end, so as there are but three in a continual line of descent
usually co-existing together; and as some are Grandfathers at forty
years, yet as many are not till above sixty, and _sic de cæteris_.

20. Wherefore I pitch the number of years purchase, that any
Land is naturally worth, to be the ordinary extent of three such
persons their lives. Now in _England_ we esteem three lives equal
to one and twenty years, and consequently the value of Land, to be
about the same number of years purchase. Possibly if they thought
themselves mistaken in the one, (as the observator on the Bills of
Mortality thinks they are) they would alter in the other, unless
the confederation of the force of popular errour and dependance of
things already concatenated, did hinder them.

21. This I esteem to be the number of years purchase where Titles
are good, and where there is a moral certainty of enjoying the
purchase. But in other Countreys Lands are worth nearer thirty
years purchase, by reason of the better Titles, more people, and
perhaps truer opinion of the value and duration of three lives.

22. And in some places, Lands are worth yet more years purchase
by reason of some special honour, pleasures, priviledge or
jurisdiction annexed unto them.

23. On the other hand, Lands are worth fewer years purchase (as in
_Ireland_) for the following reasons, which I have here set down,
as unto the like whereof the cause of the like cheapness in any
other place may be imputed.

First, In _Ireland_ by reason of the frequent Rebellions, (in
which if you are conquered, all is lost; or if you conquer, yet
you are subject to swarms of thieves and robbers) and the envy
which precedent missions of English have against the subsequent,
perpetuity it self is but forty years long, as within which time
some ugly disturbance hath hitherto happened almost ever since the
first coming of the English thither.

24. 2. The Claims upon Claims which each hath to the others
Estates, and the facility of making good any pretence whatsoever
by the favour of some one or other of the many Governours and
Ministers which within forty years shall be in power there; as also
by the frequency of false testimonies, and abuse of solemn Oaths.

25. 3. The paucity of Inhabitants, there being not above the
1./5.^{th.} part so many as the Territory would maintain, and of
those but a small part do work at all, and yet a smaller work so
much as in other Countreys.

26. 4. That a great part of the Estates both real and personal
in _Ireland_ are owned by Absentees, and such as draw over the
profits raised out of _Ireland_ refunding nothing; so as _Ireland_
exporting more then it imports doth yet grow poorer to a paradox.

27. 5. The difficulty of executing justice, so many of those in
power being themselves protected by Offices, and protecting others.
Moreover, the number of criminous and indebted persons being
great, they favour their like in Juries, Offices, and wheresoever
they can: Besides the Countrey is seldom rich enough to give
due encouragement to profound Judges and Lawyers, which makes
judgements very casual; ignorant men being more apt to be bold and
arbitrary, then such as understand the dangers of it. But all this
a little care in due season might remedy, so as to bring _Ireland_
in a few years to the same level of values with other places; but
of this also elsewhere more at large, for in the next place we
shall come to Usury.




CHAP. V.

_Of Usury._


What reason there is for taking or giving Interest or Usury for any
thing which we may certainly have again whensoever we call for it,
I see not; nor why Usury should be scrupled, where money or other
necessaries valued by it, is lent to be paid at such a time and
place as the Borrower chuseth, so as the Lender cannot have his
money paid him back where and when himself pleaseth, I also see
not. Wherefore when a man giveth out his money upon condition that
he may not demand it back until a certain time to come, whatsoever
his own necessities shall be in the mean time, he certainly may
take a compensation for this inconvenience which he admits against
himself: And this allowance is that we commonly call Usury.

2. And when one man furnisheth another with money at some distant
place, and engages under great Penalties to pay him there, and at
a certain day besides; the consideration for this, is that we call
Exchange or local Usury.

As for example, if a man wanting money at _Carlisle_ in the
heat of the late Civil Wars, when the way was full of Souldiers
and Robbers, and the passage by Sea very long, troublesome, and
dangerous, and seldom passed; why might not another take much more
then an 100_l._ at _London_ for warranting the like summe to be paid
at _Carlisle_ on a certain day?

3. Now the Questions arising hence are; what are the natural
Standards of Usury and Exchange? As for Usury, the least that
can be, is the Rent of so much Land as the money lent will
buy, where the security is undoubted; but where the security
is casual, then a kinde of ensurance must be enterwoven with
the simple natural Interest, which may advance the Usury very
conscionably unto any height below the Principal it self. Now if
things are so in _England_, that really there is no such security
as abovementioned, but that all are more or less hazardous,
troublesome, or chargeable to make, I see no reason for endeavoring
to limit Usury upon time, any more then that upon place, which
the practice of the world doth not, unless it be that those who
make such Laws were rather Borrowers then Lenders: But of the
vanity and fruitlessness of making Civil Positive Laws against the
Laws of Nature, I have spoken elsewhere, and instanced in several
particulars.

4. As for the natural measures of Exchange, I say, that in times
of Peace, the greatest Exchange can be but the labour of carrying
the money _in specie_, but where are hazards and emergent uses for
money more in one place then another, &c. or opinions of these true
or false, the Exchange will be governed by them.

5. Parallel unto this, is something which we omitted concerning
the price of Land; for as great need of money heightens Exchange,
so doth great need of Corn raise the price of that likewise, and
consequently of the Rent of the Land that bears Corn, and lastly
of the Land it self; as for example, if the Corn which feedeth
_London_, or an Army, be brought forty miles thither, then the Corn
growing within a mile of _London_, or the quarters of such Army,
shall have added unto its natural price, so much as the charge of
bringing it thirty nine miles doth amount unto: And unto perishable
Commodities as fresh fish, fruits, &c. the ensurance upon the
hazard of corrupting, &c. shall be added also; and finally unto
him that eats these things there (suppose in Taverns) shall be
added the charge of all the circumstancial apparatus of House-rent,
Furniture, Attendance, and the Cooks skill as well as his labour to
accompany the same.

6. Hence it comes to pass, that Lands intrinsically alike near
populous places, such as where the perimeter of the Area that feeds
them is great, will not onely yield more Rent for these Reasons,
but also more years purchase then in remote places, by reason of
the pleasure and honour extraordinary of having Lands there; for

  ----_Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci._

7. Having finished our digression upon the measures of the Rents
and Values of Lands and Moneys, we now return to our second way of
leavying Publick Charges, which was the taking of a proportion of
the Rent, (commonly called Assessment) it follows next to speak
of the way of computing the said Rents, otherwise then according
to the bargains which a few men make one with another, through
ignorance, haste, false suggestion, or else in their passion or
drink: Although I acknowledge, that the medium or common result of
all the bargains made within three years (or other such Cycle of
time, as within which all contingencies of Land revolve) may be
very sufficient to this purpose, being but the summe synthetically
computed by casual opinions, as I would endeavour to cast up
analytically by a distinct particularizing of the Causes.

8. 1. Therefore I propound a Survey of the Figures, Quantities, and
Scituations of all the Lands both according to the civil bounds of
Parishes, Farms, &c. and the natural distinctions thereof by the
Sea, Rivers, ridges of Rocks, or Mountains, &c.

9. 2. I propound that the quality of each denomination were
described by the Commodities it had usually born, in some Land,
some sort of Timber, Grain, pulse or root growing more happily then
in others: Also by the encrease of things sown or planted, which
it hath yielded _communibus annis_; and withall, the comparative
goodness of the said Commodities not unto the common Standard
money, but to one another. As for example; if there be ten acres
of Land, I would have it judged whether they be better for Hay or
Corn; if for Hay, whether the said ten Acres will bear more or
less of Hay then ten other Acres; and whether an hundred weight
of the said Hay will feed or fatten more or less, then the same
weight of other Hay, and not as yet comparing it to money, in which
the value of the said Hay will be more or less, according to the
plenty of money, which hath changed strangely since the discovery
of the _West Indies_, and according to the multitudes of people
living near this Land, together with the luxurious or frugal
living of them; and besides all, according to the Civil, Natural,
and Religious Opinions of the said people: As for example, Eggs in
the fore-part of Lent (because their goodness and delicacy decayes
before Lent be done) being worth little in some Popish Countreys;
nor Swines flesh among the Jews, nor Hedgehogs, Frogs, Snails,
Mushrooms, &c. to those that fear to eat them, as poisonous or
unwholesome; nor Currans and Spanish Wines, if they were all to be
destroyed as the great thieves of this Nation, by an Edict of the
State.

10. This former I call a Survey or Inquisition into the intrinsick
Values of Land, this latter of extrinsick or accidentall follows.
We said, that the change of the store of money would change the
rates of commodities according to our reckoning in names and words,
(pounds, shillings, and pence being nothing else) as for example:

If a man can bring to _London_ an ounce of Silver out of the Earth
in _Peru_, in the same time that he can produce a bushel of Corn,
then one is the natural price of the other; now if by reason of new
and more easie Mines a man can get two ounces of Silver as easily
as formerly he did one, then Corn will be as cheap at ten shillings
the bushel, as it was before at five shillings _cæteris paribus_.

11. It behoves us therefore to have a way, whereby to tell the
money of our Countrey (which I think I have, and that in a short
time, and without cost, and (which is more) without looking into
particular mens pockets; of which hereafter.) Now if we know what
Gold and Silver we had in _England_ two hundred years ago, and
could tell it again now; and though we also knew the difference of
our denominations then, when thirty seven shillings were made out
the same quantity of Silver as sixty two are now; also that of the
alloy, labour in Coinage, remedies for weight and fineness, and
duties to the King; nay, if we also knew the Labourers wages then
and now, yet all this would not shew the difference of the Riches
of our Nation even in money alone.

12. Wherefore we must adde to the premises, the knowledge of the
difference of the numbers of the people, and conclude, that if
all the money in the Nation were equally divided amongst all the
people both then and now, that that time wherein each Devisee had
wherewith to hire most labourers, was the richer. So that we want
the knowledge of the People and Bullion which is now in this Land,
and which was heretofore; all which I think may be found out even
for the time past, but more probably for the time present and to
come.

13. But to proceed; suppose we had them, then we would pitch the
accidental values upon our Lands about _London_; as thus, _viz._ We
would first at hazzard compute the materials for food and covering,
which the Shires of _Essex_, _Kent_, _Surrey_, _Middlesex_ and
_Hertford_, next circumjacent to _London_, did _communibus annis_
produce; and would withal compute the Consumptioners of them living
in the said five Shires and _London_. The which if I found to be
more then were the Consumptioners living upon the like scope of
other Land, or rather upon as much other Land as bore the like
quantity of Provisions. Then I say, that Provisions must be dearer
in the said five Shires then in the other; and within the said
Shires cheaper or dearer as the way to _London_ was more or less
long, or rather more or less chargeable.

14. For if the said five Shires did already produce as much
Commodity, as by all endeavour was possible; then what is wanting
must be brought from a far, and that which is near, advanced in
price accordingly; or if the said Shires by greater labour then now
is used, (as by digging instead of Ploughing, setting instead of
sowing, picking of choice seed instead of taking it promiscuously,
steeping it instead of using it wholly unprepared, and manuring the
ground with salt instead of rotten straw, &c. could be fertilized)
then will the Rent be as much more advanced, as the excess of
encrease exceeds that of the labour.

15. Now the price of labour must be certain, (as we see it made by
the Statutes which limit the day wages of several workmen); the
non-observance of which Laws, and the not adapting them to the
change of times, is by the way very dangerous, and confusive to
all endeavours of bettering the Trade of the Nation.

16. Moreover, the touchstone to try whether it be better to use
those improvements or not, is to examine whether the labour
of fetching these things even from the places where they grow
wilde, or with less Culture, be not less then that of the said
improvements.

17. Against all this will be objected, that these computations are
very hard if not impossible to make; to which I answer onely this,
that they are so, especially if none will trouble their hands or
heads to make them, or give authority for so doing: But withall,
I say, that until this be done, Trade will be too conjectural a
work for any man to employ his thoughts about; for it will be the
same wisdom in order to win with fair Dice, to spend much time in
considering how to hold them, how much to shake them, and how hard
to throw them, and on what angles they should hit the side of the
Tables, as to consider how to advance the Trade of this Nation;
where at present particular men get from their neighbours (not
from the earth and sea) rather by hit then wit, and by the false
opinions of others, rather then their own judgements; Credit every
where, but chiefly in _London_, being become a meer conceit, that
a man is responsible or not, without any certain knowledge of his
Wealth or true Estate. Whereas I think the nature of credit should
be limited onely to an opinion of a mans faculties to get by his
art and industry. The way of knowing his Estate being to be made
certain, and the way of making him pay what he owes to the utmost
of his ability, being to be expected from the good execution of our
Laws.

18. I should here enlarge upon a Paradox, to prove that if every
mans Estate could be alwayes read in his forehead, our Trade would
much be advanced thereby, although the poorer ambitious man be
commonly the more industrious. But of this elsewhere.

19. The next objection against this so exact computation of the
Rents and worth of Lands, &c. is, that the Sovereign would know too
exactly every mans Estate; to which I answer, that if the Charge
of the Nation be brought as low as it may be, (which depends much
upon the people in Parliament to do) and if the people be willing
and ready to pay, and if care be taken, that although they have not
ready money, the credit of their Lands and Goods shall be as good;
and lastly, that it would be a great discommodity to the Prince to
take more then he needs, as was proved before; where is the evil
of this so exact knowledge? And as for the proportion of every
Contributor, why should any man hope or accept to ease himself by
his craft and interest in a confusion? or why should he not fear,
though he may be advantaged this time, to suffer in the next.




CHAP. VI.

_Of Customs and Free Ports._


Custom is a Contribution or Excisum out of Goods sent out or
imported into the Princes Dominions: In these Countreys of a
twentieth part not according to the Prices currant among Merchants
of each respective Commodity, but according to other standing Rates
set by the State, though advised for the most part by concerned
Persons.

2. I cannot well imagine what should be the natural Reasons, why
a Prince should be paid this duty inward and outward both; there
seems indeed to be some, why he should be paid for indulging the
Exportation of some such things as other Countreys do really want.

3. Wherefore I think, that Customs at the first were a _præmium_
allowed the Prince for protecting the Carriage of Goods both inward
and outward from the Pyrats; and this I should verily believe, if
the Prince were bound to make good losses of that kinde. And I
thought that the proportion of five pound _per cent._ was pitched
upon computation, that the Merchants before the said undertaking
and composition, had usually lost more by Pyracy: And finally, that
the Customs had been an ensurance upon losses by enemies, as the
ensurance now usual, is of the casualties of sea, winde, weather
and Vessel, or altogether; or like the ensurance in some Countreys
of Houses from Fires for a certain small part of their yearly Rent.
But be it what it will, it is anciently established by Law, and
ought to be paid until it shall be abolished. Onely I take leave as
an idle Philosopher to discourse upon the Nature and Measures of it.

4. The Measures of Customs outwards may be such, as after
reasonable profit to the Exporter will leave such of our own
Commodities as are necessary to Forreigners somewhat cheaper unto
them then they can be had from elsewhere.

As for example, Tin is a Native Commodity, which governs the Market
abroad, that is, there is none so good and so easie to be had and
exported.

Now suppose Tin might be made in _Cornwall_ for four pence the
pound, and that the same would yield twelve pence at the nearest
part in _France_, I say, that this extraordinary profit ought to
be esteemed as a Mine Royal, or _Tresor Trové_, and the Sovereign
ought to have his share in it: Which he will have, by imposing
so great a duty upon Tin Exported, as on one side may leave a
subsistence to the Workmen, (and no more) with a competent profit
to the owners of the ground; and on the other side, may leave the
price abroad less then that for which Tin may be had from any other
place.

5. The same Imposition might also be made on the Tin spent at home,
unless it be as impossible so to do, as for the King of _France_ to
impose the Gabel upon Salt in the very places where it is made.

6. But it is observed, that such high duties make men endeavour
not to enter any such Goods at all, or pay for them, provided the
charge of smuckling and bribing, with the hazzard of being seized
do not _communibus vicibus_ exceed the Duty.

7. Wherefore the Measures of this Nature are, that it be more
easie, safe, and profitable for men to keep the Law, then to break
it, unless it be in such cases, where the Magistrate can with
certainty execute the Law. As for example, it would be hard to save
the Duties upon Horses shipped at a small Port, without adjacent
Creeks, and that but some certain two hours every Tide, forasmuch
as Horses cannot be disguised, put up in bags or cask, nor shipped
without noise and the help of many hands.

8. The Measures of Customs upon imported Commodities are; 1. That
all things ready and ripe for Consumption may be made somewhat
dearer then the same things grown or made at home; if the same be
feasible _cæteris paribus_.

2. That all Superfluities tending to Luxury and sin, might be
loaded with so much Impost, as to serve instead of a sumptuary Law
to restrain the use of them. But here also care is to be had that
it be not better to smuckle then to pay.

9. On the contrary, all things not fully wrought and Manufactured,
as raw Hides, Wool, Beaver, Raw-silk, Cotton; as also all Tools and
Materials for Manufacture, as also Dying-stuff, &c. ought to be
gently dealt with.

10. If to leavy the payment of these Duties could be most exactly
performed, Princes might strangely practice one upon another;
wherefore since they cannot, the people pay no more then they
cannot with greater safety upon the whole matter save, nor observe
any more of these Laws, then they cannot elude.

11. The Inconveniences of the way of Customs, are, _viz._

1. That Duties are laid upon things not yet ripe for use,
upon Commodities in _fieri_, and but in the way of their full
improvements, which seems the same ill-husbandry, as to make fuel
of young Saplings, instead of Dotards and Pollards.

2. The great number of Officers requisite to Collect the said
Duties, especially in a Countrey where the Harbours are many, and
the Tides convenient for shipping of Goods at any time.

3. The great facility of smuckling by Briberies, Collusions,
hiding and disguising of Commodities, &c. and all this
notwithstanding Oaths and Penalties, and withall by the several
wayes of mitigating and taking off the said Penalties even after
discovery.

4. The Customs or Duties upon the few Commodities of the growth
of _England_ exchanged with Foreigners, make too small a part of
the whole Expence of the people of this Kingdom, which (perhaps
is not less then fifty millions of pounds _per annum_) out of
which to bear the common Charges thereof, so as some other way
of Leavy must be practised together with it; whereas by some one
way, if the best, the whole work may be absolved: wherefore ’tis
an inconvenience in the way of Customs, that it necessitates other
wayes then it self.

12. Now as a small attempt of a Remedy or Expedient herein, I offer
rather, that instead of the Customs upon Goods shipped, every Ship
that goes in or out, may pay a Tonnage, the same being collectible
by a very few hands, as a matter visible to all the world; and
that the said Duty be but such a part of the Fraight, as the like
whereof being excinded out of the whole Consumption, would defray
all the Publique Charge; which part perhaps is 4. _per Cent._ or
thereabouts, _viz._ two millions _per annum_ out of fifty.

13. The other is, that the Customs be reduced into the nature of an
Ensurance-_præmium_, and that the same be augmented and fitted, as
whereby the King may afford to ensure the goods as well against the
Sea as Enemies; by which means the whole Nation would be concerned
in all such losses, and then the Merchant for his own sake would
more willingly enter and pay for whatsoever he would have ensured.

14. But it will be here objected, that although the duty of Customs
be abrogated, yet that there must be almost the same number of
Officers maintained as now to prevent the bringing in and carrying
out of prohibited Commodities. Wherefore we shall here state the
nature of such Prohibitions by two or three grand instances.

15. To prohibit the Exportation of Money, in that it is a thing
almost impracticable, it is almost nugatory and vain; And the
danger of it resolves either into a kinde of Ensurance answerable
to the danger of being seized, or unto a Surcharge of a Composition
by bribing the Searchers. As for example, If but one in fifty
Exportations are seized, or if twenty shillings be usually taken
for conniving at fifty pounds, then the Commodities bought with
this Money must be sold two at least _per cent._ the dearer to
the Consumptioner. Now if the Trade will not bear this Surcharge,
then Money will not be exported with discretion. Now the use of
this Prohibition, supposing it practicable, is to serve as a
sumptuary Law, and to binde the Nation in general not to spend
more then they get; for if we could export no Commodity of our
own growth or manufacture then by prohibiting the going out of
Money, it is also _ipso facto_ commanded that nothing forreign
should be brought in. Again supposing, that ordinarily we export
enough to furnish us with all Forreign Commodities, but upon some
extraordinary decay of our Land or hands, we are able to export but
half as much as would procure our ordinary proportion of Forreign
Goods, then the Prohibition of Money performs indeed the part of
a sumptuary Law, in hindring us to bring in any more then half as
much Forreign Commodities as we formerly used, onely it leaves it
to the discretion of the Merchant, to chose which he will neglect
or forbear to bring in, and which not; whereas in sumptuary Laws
the State taketh this care upon themselves. As for example, If we
wanted Exportation to ballance our Importations by forty thousand
pounds, and suppose for examples sake, that the Importation of
forty thousand pounds worth of Coffee-Berries, or the like of
Spanish Wine must be retrenched; in this case, the said Prohibition
of Money will do one, or some of the one, and some of the other as
the Merchant himself pleases: But the sumptuary Law determines,
whether we shall encourage and keep fair with the Nation that sends
us Wine rather then that which sends us Coffee, and whether the
Expence of Wine or Coffee be most prejudicial to our people, &c.

16. The benefits alledged for the free Exportation of Money is
meerly this, _viz._ That if a Ship carrying out of _England_ forty
thousand pounds worth of Cloth, might also carry with it forty
thousand pounds in Money, then could the Merchant stand the stiffer
upon his terms, and in fine would buy cheaper, and sell dearer;
but by the way, the Merchant buyes this power with the Interest
and advantage of the Money he carries, which if it amount to five
pound _per Cent._ then he had better sold his Goods at four pound
_per Cent._ under rate, then to have fortified himself with Money
as aforesaid. But of this more may be said, we hasten to the great
point of Wool.

17. The Hollanders having gotten away our Manufacture of Cloth, by
becoming able to work with more art, to labour and fare harder, to
take less fraight, Duties and Ensurance, hath so madded us here
in _England_, that we have been apt to think of such exorbitantly
fierce wayes of prohibiting Wool and Earth to be exported, as
perhaps would do us twice as much harm as the losse of our said
Trade. Wherefore to return to our Wits and Trade again, before we
can tell what to do in this case, we must consider;

1. That we are often forced to buy Corn from abroad, and as often
complain that we are pestered with abundance of idle hands at home,
and withall that we cannot vend the Woollen Manufactures even which
our few working hands do produce. In this case were it not better
to lessen our sheep-trade, and convert our hands to more Tillage?
Because 1. Flesh becomming dearer, there would be encouragement
for Fish, which will never be till then. 2. Our Money would not
run so fast away for Corn. 3. We should have no such Gluts of Wool
upon our hands. 4. Our idle hands would be employed in Tillage and
Fishing, one man by the way of grazing, tilling as it were many
thousand Acres of Land by himself and his Dog.

2. Suppose we wanted no Corn, nor had any idle hands, and yet
that we abounded with more Wool then we can work up; in this case
certainly Wool might be exported, because ’tis supposed, that the
hands which work are already employed upon a better Trade.

3. Suppose the Hollander outdo us by more art, were it not better
to draw over a number of their choice Workmen, or send our most
ingenious men thither to learn; which if they succeed; it is most
manifest, that this were the more natural way, then to keep that
infinite clutter about resisting of Nature, stopping up the windes
and seas, &c.

4. If we can make Victual much cheaper here then in _Holland_, take
away burdensome, frivolous, and antiquated Impositions and Offices.

I conceive even this were better then to perswade Water to rise of
it self above its natural Spring.

5. We must consider in general, that as wiser Physicians tamper not
excessively with their Patients, rather observing and complying
with the motions of nature, then contradicting it with vehement
Administrations of their own; so in Politicks and Oconomicks the
same must be used; for

  _Naturam expellas furcâ licet usque recurrit._

18. Nevertheless, if the Hollanders advantages in making Cloth be
but small and few in comparison of ours, that is, if they have but
a little the better of us, then I conceive that Prohibitions to
export Wool may sufficiently turn the scales. But whether this be
so or not, I leave to others, being my self neither Merchant nor
Statesman.

19. As for Prohibition of Importations, I say that it needs not be,
until they much exceed our Exportations. For if we should think it
hard to give good necessary Cloth for debauching Wines, yet if we
cannot dispose of our Cloth to others, ’twere better to give it
for Wine or worse, then to cease making it; nay, better to burn a
thousand mens labours for a time, then to let those thousand men by
non-employment lose their faculty of labouring. In brief, what may
be further said hereupon, resolves into the Doctrine and _Ingenium_
of making sumptuary Laws, and judicious use of them _pro hic &
nunc_.

20. Unto this Discourse of Customs appertains that of Free Ports,
which (in a Nation that onely trades for it self, _viz._ vents its
own superfluities, and imports onely Necessaries for it self) are
of no use, but rather harm; for suppose Wines be brought into a
Free Port, be there housed and privately sold, but the Cask filled
up with stained water, and put on ship-board again to be staved as
soon as the ship is out at sea: In this case, the Duties of those
Wines are defrauded, as it also may be many other wayes.

21. Now if it be said, that although we should trade but for our
selves, yet that our Ports (being more commodious then those of
other Nations) would be the more frequented; for being free, and
consequently the more enriched, by the expence of Sea-men and
Passengers, hire of Labourers, and Ware-houses, &c. even without
any Custom at all upon the Goods. Nevertheless ’tis reason that a
small duty should be paid upon the ship as aforesaid for such use
of our Ports, and that _eo nomine_; not expecting all our Benefit
from the said hire of Cellaridge, Porters, and Carmen, which also
might be had over and above for their proper reasons.

22. But if we could attain to be the Merchants between other
Nations, there is then no reason for exacting Duties (as was said
before) upon things _in fieri_, and which are but in the way of
their improvement: And as for the fraud that may be committed, as
in the case of Wines abovementioned, I affirm that our Excize upon
the Consumption, would overcome and elude them.




CHAP. VII.

_Of Poll-money._


Poll-money is a Tax upon the Persons of men, either upon all simply
and indifferently, or else according to some known Title or mark
of distinction upon each; and that either of bare honour, or else
of some Office sought or imposed, or of some Faculty and Calling
without respect to Riches or Poverty, Incomes or Expence, Gain or
Loss accrewing by the said Title, Office, or Faculty.

2. The Poll-moneys which have been leavied of late have been
wonderfully confused; as taxing some rich single persons at the
lowest rate; some Knights, though wanting necessaries, at twenty
pounds, encouraging some vain fellows to pay as Esquires, on
purpose to have themselves written Esquires in the Receipts; making
some pay ten pounds as Doctours of Physick or Law, who get nothing
by the Faculty, nor minde the practice; making some poor Tradesmen
forced to be of the Liveries of their Companies to pay beyond their
strength; and lastly, some to pay according to their Estates, the
same to be valued by those that know them not; thereby also giving
opportunity to some Bankrupts to make the world credit them as men
of such Estates, at which the Assessors did rate them by Collusion.

3. So as by this Confusion, Arbitraries, Irregularities, and
hotch-pot of Qualifications, no estimate could be made of the
fitness of this Plaister to the Sore, nor no Checque or way to
examine whether the respective Receipts were duly accompted for, &c.

4. Wherefore wholly rejecting the said complicated way of Tax, I
shall speak of Poll-money more distinctly, and first of the simple
Poll-money upon every head of all mankinde alike; the Parish paying
for those that receive alms, Parents for their Children under age,
and Masters for their Apprentices, and others who receive no wages.

5. The evil of this way is, that it is very unequal; men of unequal
abilities, all paying alike, and those who have greatest charges
of Children paying most; that is, that by how much the poorer they
are, by so much the harder are they taxed.

6. The Conveniencies are; first, that it may be suddenly collected,
and with small charge: Secondly, that the number of the people
being alwayes known, it may be sufficiently computed what the same
will amount unto. Thirdly, It seems to be a spur unto all men, to
set their Children to some profitable employment upon their very
first capacity, out of the proceed whereof, to pay each childe his
own Poll-money.

7. The next Poll-money is upon every head, but distinguished by
Titles of meer Honour, without any kinde of Office or Faculty; as,
Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, Barons, Baronets, Knights, and
Esquires, _viz._ the eldest Sons of Knights _in perpetuum_, and
Gentlemen if they write themselves so. This way is much more equal
then the other; forasmuch as those who are Titled, are for the most
part rich proportionably; or if they were not, yet men so dignified
shall command a preheminence and place, even although they do not
or cannot buy it of the vulgar by their Expence: my meaning hereby
is, that a Title may possibly save a man as much as his Poll-money,
may exceed the Plebeian Level by reason of such title.

8. Moreover, good and multiform Accompts being kept of the People,
this Tax may be also easily speedily and inexpensively collected;
and also being capable of being computed aforehand, may be fitted
and seized according to the needs of the Prince.

9. As for Offices, they are indeed Dignities for the most part, but
paid for by the trouble of administring them; as for example, to be
an Alderman suppose of _London_, is indeed an honour, yet many pay
five hundred pounds to be excused from receiving it.

Nevertheless it may not be improper to tax Offices sought; or such
as are accepted although they might be refused: And on the other
side no _Titulado_ should be forced to pay Poll-money according to
his Title, if he be contented to lay it down, and never resume it
more.

10. The Titles of Faculties and Callings ought to be no
Qualification in a Poll-money, because they do not necessarily
nor probably inferr ability to pay, but carry with them vaste
inequalities. But therefore if a man by his Licence to practise
get much, it may be presumed he will spend accordingly; in which
net the way of Excize will certainly take him, as it will all the
Officers aforementioned.

11. Harth-money seems to be a Poll-money, but is not, being rather
a way of Accumulative Excize; of which hereafter.




CHAP. VIII.

_Of Lotteries._


Men that accept Titles may foresee, that they may be taxed by them
as aforesaid, (although it be unlikely (one House of Parliament
being all Tituladoes, and the greatest part of the other being such
also) that any such way of Leavy should pass) and therefore they do
as it were _à priori_ consent unto the Tax in their own Individuals.

2. Now in the way of Lottery men do also tax themselves in the
general, though out of hopes of Advantage in particular: A Lottery
therefore is properly a Tax upon unfortunate self-conceited fools;
men that have good opinion of their own luckiness, or that have
believed some Fortune-teller or Astrologer, who had promised them
great success about the time and place of the Lottery, lying
Southwest perhaps from the place where the destiny was read.

3. Now because the world abounds with this kinde of fools, it is
not fit that every man that will, may cheat every man that would be
cheated; but it is rather ordained, that the Sovereign should have
the Guardianship of these fools, or that some Favourite should beg
the Sovereigns right of taking advantage of such mens folly, even
as in the case of Lunaticks and Idiots.

4. Wherefore a Lottery is not tollerated without authority,
assigning the proportion in which the people shall pay for their
errours, and taking care that they be not so much and so often
couzened, as they themselves would be.

5. This way of Lottery is used but for small Leavies, and rather
upon privato-publick accompts, (then for maintaining Armies or
Equipping Fleets,) such as are Aque-Ducts, Bridges, and perhaps
Highwayes, &c. Wherefore we shall say no more of it upon this
occasion.




CHAP. IX.

_Of Benevolence._


The raising of Money by Benevolence, seems to be no force upon
any man, nor to take from any man but what himself knows he can
spare, nevertheless there is more in it; for to be but brow-beaten
by a Prince or Grandee, proves often as heavy as to be distrained
upon for an Assessment or Subsidy; and the danger of being
misrepresented by linsy Pick-thanks and Informers as disaffected to
the Cause for which the Leavy is made, is more frequent then the
payment of any summe in a due proportion with all other men (which
I have said is no impoverishment) can possibly be hurtful.

The benefits of this way are these, _viz._ That forasmuch as it
sometimes falls out (as in the late Differences with the Scots,
_annis_ 1638. and 1639. when the Church Dignitaries were most
concerned) that the cause of the Expence concerns some men more
then others, that then an Imposition should not pass upon all for
the sakes of a part: Sometimes it happens, that one sort of men
have received greater and fresher favours then another; as upon
the late Restoration of his Majesty _Anno_ 1660. those who needed
an Act of Indempnity did: And sometimes it is visible, that some
men have had better times of gain and advantages then others,
as the Clergy most eminently have had since his Majesties said
Restoration. In all these Cases, the proposal of a Benevolence may
be offered, although in no cases it be without its inconveniencies;
the which are principally these.

1. The abovementioned Brow-beating and distaste given, if a man
have not contributed as largely as envious observers think he
should have done.

2. A Benevolence in many cases may divide a whole Nation into
parties, or at least make the strength of Parties too well known to
such as need not know it: and withall it may (on the contrary and
upon design) disguize the same, and elude the measures which the
Governours thought to have taken by such an exploratory artifice.

3. Some men may have particular reasons to contribute large, _viz._
complacency with, and hopes of being repaired by the favour of some
Grandee, who favours the business, and the very same may make to
the prejudice of others.

4. Men of sinking Estates, (who nevertheless love to live high, and
appear splendid, and such who make themselves friends, (by their
hospitality paid for, in effect by others) enough to be protected,
even from Justice) do often upon this occasion of Benevolence set
extravagant Examples unto others, who have laboured hardly for what
they have; those not caring what they pay, because it encreaseth
their credit, to borrow the more, so as at length the whole burthen
of such Bankrupts Benevolence, lights upon the frugal Patriots, by
whom the Publique Weal subsists.




CHAP. X.

_Of Penalties._


The usual Penalties are Death, Mutilations, Imprisonment, Publick
disgrace, Corporal transient pains, and great Tortures, besides
Pecuniary Mulcts. On which last we shall most insist, speaking of
the others but in order to examine whether they may not be commuted
for these.

2. There be some certain Crimes, for which the Law of God appoints
death; and these must be punished with it, unless we say that those
were but the Civil Laws of the Jewish Commonwealth, although given
by God himself; of which opinion certainly most modern States
are, in as much as they punish not Adulteries, &c. with death, as
among the Jewes, and yet punish small Thefts with Death instead of
multiple reparation.

3. Upon this supposition we shall venture to offer; whether the
reason of simple Death be not to punish incorrigible Committers of
great faults?

4. Of publick Death with Torments, to affright men from Treasons,
which cause the deaths and miseries of many thousand innocent and
useful people?

5. Of Death secretly executed, to punish secret and unknown Crimes,
such as Publick Executions would teach to the World? Or else to
suffocate betimes some dangerous Novelties in Religion, which the
patient suffering of the worst man would much spread and encourage.

6. Mutilations suppose of Ears, Nose, &c. are used for perpetual
disgrace, as standing in the Pillory is for temporary and
transient; which and such other punishments have (by the way) made
some corrigible offenders, to become desperate and incurable.

7. Mutilations of parts as of Fingers, are proper to disable such
as have abused their dextrous use of them, by Pocket-picking,
Counterfeiting of Seals and Writings, &c. Mutilations of other
parts, may serve to punish and prevent Adulteries, Rapes, Incests,
&c. And the smaller Corporal pains, serve to punish those, who can
pay no pecuniary mulcts.

8. Imprisonment seems rather to be the punishments of suspected
then guilty persons, and such as by their carriage give the
Magistrate occasion to think, either they have done some smaller
particular Crime, as Thefts, &c. or that they would commit greater,
as Treasons and Seditions. But where Imprisonment is not a securing
men untill their Trialls, but a sentence after Triall, it seems
to me proper onely to seclude such men from conversation, whose
Discourses are bewitching, and Practices infectious, and in whom
neverthelesse remains some hopes of their future Amendments, or
usefulnesse for some service not yet appearing.

9. As for perpetual Imprisonment by sentence, it seems but the same
with death it self, to be executed by nature it self, quickened
with such Diseases, as close living, sadness, solitude, and
reflections upon a past and better condition, doth commonly beget:
Nor do men sentenced hereunto live longer, though they be longer in
dying.

10. Here we are to remember in consequence of our opinion, [That
Labour is the Father and active principle of Wealth, as Lands are
the Mother] that the State by killing, mutilating, or imprisoning
their members, do withall punish themselves; wherefore such
punishments ought (as much as possible) to be avoided and commuted
for pecuniary mulcts, which will encrease labour and publick wealth.

11. Upon which account, why should not a man of Estate, found
guilty of man-slaughter, rather pay a certain proportion of his
whole Estate, then be burnt in the hand?

12. Why should not insolvent Thieves be rather punished with
slavery then death? so as being slaves they may be forced to as
much labour, and as cheap fare, as nature will endure, and thereby
become as two men added to the Commonwealth, and not as one taken
away from it; for if _England_ be under-peopled, (suppose by half)
I say that next to the bringing in of as many more as now are, is
the making these that are, to do double the work which now they do;
that is, to make some slaves; but of this elsewhere.

13. And why should not the solvent Thieves and Cheats be rather
punished with multiple Restitutions then Death, Pillory, Whipping?
&c. But it will be asked, with how manifold Restitutions should
picking a pocket (for example) be punished? I say, ’twere good in
order to the solution hereof, to enquire of some candid Artists
in that Trade, how often they are taken one time with another
practising in this work? If but once in ten times, then to restore
even but seven-fold, would be a fair profit; and to restore but
ten-fold, were but an even lay; wherefore to restore twenty-fold,
that is, double to the hazard, is rather the true _ratio_ and
measure of punishment by double reparation.

14. And surely the restoring two, three, four, and seven-fold
mentioned in _Moses_ Law must be thus understood, or else a man
might make thieving a very fair and lawful profession.

15. The next question is, in such multiple Restitutions how many
parts should be given to the sufferer. To which I answer, never
above one, and scarce that, to oblige him to more care, and
self-preservation, with three parts to discoverers, and the rest to
publick uses.

16. Thirdly, In the case of Fornications, most of the punishments
not made by pecuniary mulcts and commuted, are but shame, and
that too but towards some few persons, which shame for ever after
obdurates the Offender, what ever it work upon such whose fames
are yet intire: Of all which men take little consideration,
standing upon the brink of such precipices as makes them giddy; and
when they are in danger of such faults as are rather madnesses,
distempers, and alienations of the minde and reason, as also
insurrections of the passions, then deliberate acts of the
understanding.

17. Moreover, according to that Axiom of _In quo quis peccat, in
eodem puniatur_; if the _Ratio formalis_ of the sin of _Concubitus
Vagi_, be the hindering of procreation, let those who by their
miscarriages of this kinde are guilty thereof, repair unto the
State the misse of another pair of hands with the double labour of
their own, or which is all one, by a pecuniary mulct; and this is
the practice of some wise States in punishing what they will never
be able to prevent: Nor doth the Gospel specifie any punishment in
this world, onely declaring they shall not be received into the
joyes of the next.

18. I could instance in more particulars, but if what I have
already said be reasonable, this little is enough; if not, then all
the rest would be too little also: wherefore I shall adde but one
instance more, as most suitable to our present times and occasions,
which is the way of punishing Heterodox Professors of Religion.

19. That the Magistrate may punish false Believers, if he believe
he shall offend God in forbearing it, is true; for the same
reasons that men give for Liberty of Conscience, and universal
tolleration; and on the other side, that he may permit false
Worships, seems clearly at least by the practice of all States,
who allow Ambassadours their freedom (be their Worship never so
abominable) even when they come to negociate but upon temporal and
small matters.

20. Wherefore, since the Magistrate may allow or connive at such
Worships as himself thinks fit, and yet may also punish; and since
by Death, Mutilations, and imprisonments of the Subjects, the
State not onely punisheth it self, but spreadeth the Pseudodoxies;
it follows, that pecuniary Mulcts are the fittest wayes of
checking the wantonness of men in this particular: forasmuch as
that course favours of no bitterness at all, but rather argues a
desire to indulge, provided such indulgence may consist with the
indempnity of the State; for no Heterodox believer will desire to
be tollerated longer then he keeps the Publick Peace; the which if
he means to do, he cannot take it ill of the Magistrate, to keep
him steddy unto that his duty, nor grudge to contribute towards so
much charge for that purpose as himself occasions.

21. Moreover, as there seems a reason for indulging some
conscientious misbelievers, so there is as much for being severe
towards Hypocrites, especially such as abuse holy Religion to cloak
and vizzard worldly ends: Now what more easie and yet effectual
way is there to discern between these two, then well proportioned
pecuniary mulcts? for who desiring to serve God without fear, and
labouring ten hours _per diem_ at his Calling, would not labour one
hour more for such a freedom? even as religious men spend an hour
_per diem_ more then the looser sort do at their Devotions; or who
wearing Cloth of one and twenty shillings the yard, would not be
contented with that of twenty shillings, for the same advantage of
his liberty in Worship? Those that kick at this, being unwilling
either to do or suffer for God, for whose sake they pretend so much.

22. It may be here objected, that although some bad Religions might
be tollerated, yet that all may not, _viz._ such as consist not
with the Civil Peace. To which I answer,

First; that there is no Schisme or Separation be it never so small,
consistent with that unity and peace as could be wisht; nor none so
perfectly conscientious, but may also be civilly most pernicious:
For that _Venner_ and his Complices acted upon internal motives,
the most free exposing of themselves to death may evince; and yet
their holding the King to be an Usurper upon the Throne and Right
of Jesus Christ was a Civil mischief neither to be pardoned or
parallel’d.

23. And yet on the other hand there is no Pseudodoxy so great, but
may be muzzled from doing much harm in the State, without either
Death, Imprisonment, or Mutilation: To make short, no opinion
can be more dangerous, then to disbelieve the immortality of the
Soul, as rendring man a beast, and without conscience, or fear of
committing any evil, if he can but elude the penalties of humane
Laws made against it, and letting men loose to all evil thoughts
and designs whereof man can take no notice: Now I say, that even
this Misbeliever may be adæquately punished if he be kept as a
beast, be proprietor of nothing, as making no conscience how he
gets; be never admitted in Evidence or Testimony, as under no
Obligation to speak truth; be excluded all Honours and Offices,
as caring onely for himself, not the protecting of others; and be
withall kept to extream bodily labour, the profit whereof to the
State is the pecuniary Mulct we speak of, though the greatest.

24. As for opinions less horrible then this, the Mulct may be
fitted to each of them respectively, according to the measure of
danger which the Magistrate apprehends from their allowance, and
the charge necessary to prevent it.

25. And now we are speaking of the wayes how to prevent and
correct Heterodoxies in Religion, which we have hitherto done
by designing punishments for the erring sheep, I think it not
amiss to adde, That in all these cases the Shepherds themselves
should not wholly scape free: For if in this Nation there be such
abundance of Free-Schools, and of liberall Maintenance provided in
our Universities and elsewhere for instructing more then enough in
all such learning as is fit to defend the established Religion,
together with superabundant Libraries for that purpose. Moreover,
if the Church-preferments be so numerous and ample both for Wealth,
Honour, and Power, as scarce any where more; it seems strange that
when by the laziness, formality, ignorance, and loose lives of our
Pastours, the sheep have gone astray, grown scabbed, or have been
devoured by Wolves and Foxes, that the Remedy of all this should
be onely sought by frighting those that have strayed from ever
returning again, and by tearing off as well the skins as the wool
of those that are scabbed; whereas Almighty God will rather require
the blood even of them that have been devoured, from the shepheards
themselves.

26. Wherefore if the Minister should lose part of the Tythes of
those whom he suffers to defect from the Church, (the defector not
saving, but the State wholly gaining them) and the defector paying
some pecuniary Mulct for his Schisme, and withall himself defraying
the charge of his new particular Church and Pastorage, me thinks
the burthen would be thus more equally born.

27. Besides, the judicious world do not believe our Clergy can
deserve the vaste preferments they have, onely because they preach,
give a better accompt of Opinions concerning Religion then others,
or can express their conceptions in the words of the Fathers, or
the Scriptures, &c. Whereas certainly the great honour we give
them, is for being patterns of holiness, for shewing by their own
self-denials, mortifications, and austerities, that ’tis possible
for us to imitate them in the precepts of God; for if it were but
for their bare Pulpit-discourses, some men might think there is
ten thousand times as much already printed as can be necessary,
and as good as any that ever hereafter may be expected. And it is
much suspected, that the Discipline of the Cloisters hath kept up
the Roman Religion, which the Luxury of the Cardinals and Prelates
might have destroyed.

28. The substance therefore of all we have said in this discourse
concerning the Church is, that it would make much for its peace,
if the Nursery of Ministers be not too big, that Austerities in
the Priests lives would reconcile them to the people; and that it
is not unreasonable, that when the whole Church suffers by the
defection of her Members, that the Pastours of it by bearing a
small part should be made sensible of the loss; the manner and
measures of all which I leave unto those unto whom it belongs.

29. Concerning Penalties and Penal Laws I shall adde but this, that
the abuse of them is, when they are made not to keep men from sin,
but to draw them into punishment; and when the Executers of them
keep them hid until a fault be done, and then shew them terrible to
the poor immalicious offender: Just like Centinels, who never shew
men the advertisements against pissing near their Guards, till they
have catcht them by the coats for the forfeiture they claim.




CHAP. XI.

_Of Monopolies and Offices._


Monopoly (as the word signifies) is the sole selling power, which
whosoever hath can vend the commodity whereupon he hath this power,
either qualified as himself pleases, or at what price he pleaseth,
or both, within the limits of his Commission.

2. The great example of a Monopoly is the King of _France_ his
Gabel upon Salt, whereby he sells that for sixty which costs him
but one; now Salt being a thing of universal use to all degrees
of men, and scarce more to the poor then the rich, it seems to be
of the same effect with the simplest Poll-money abovementioned,
in case all men spent equally of it, or if men be forced to take
it whether they spend it or not, as in some places they are. But
if men spend or eat Salt unequally, as they commonly do, nor are
bound to take or pay for more then they spend, then it is no other
then an accumulative Excize, especially if the salt be all of one
uniform goodness, otherwise it is a distinct species of Leavy,
_viz._ a Monopoly.

3. The use or pretence of instituting a Monopoly is,

First, Right of Invention; forasmuch as the Laws do reward
Inventions, by granting them a Monopoly of them for a certain time;
(as here in _England_ for fourteen years) for thereby the Inventor
is rewarded more or less according to the acceptance which his
Invention findes amongst men.

Where note by the way, that few new Inventions were ever rewarded
by a Monopoly; for although the Inventor often-times drunk with
the opinion of his own merit, thinks all the world will invade
and incroach upon him, yet I have observed, that the generality
of men will scarce be hired to make use of new practices, which
themselves have not thoroughly tried, and which length of time
hath not vindicated from latent inconveniences; so as when a new
Invention is first propounded, in the beginning every man objects,
and the poor Inventor runs the Gantloop of all petulent wits; every
man finding his several flaw, no man approving it, unless mended
according to his own advice: Now not one of an hundred out-lives
this torture, and those that do, are at length so changed by the
various contrivances of others, that not any one man can pretend to
the Invention of the whole, nor well agree about their respective
shares in the parts. And moreover, this commonly is so long a
doing, that the poor Inventor is either dead, or disabled by the
debts contracted to pursue his design; and withall railed upon as a
Projector, or worse, by those who joyned their money in partnership
with his wit; so as the said Inventor and his pretences are wholly
lost and vanisht.

Secondly, a Monopoly may be of real use for a time, _viz._ at the
first introducing of a new Manufacture, wherein is much nicety
to make it well, and which the generality of men cannot judge of
as to the performance. As for example; suppose there were some
most approved Medicament which one certain man could make most
exactly well, although several others could also make the same
less perfectly: in this case this same chief Artist may be allowed
a Monopoly for a time, _viz._ until others have had experience
enough under him, how to make the Medicament as well as himself.
First, because the world may not have the Medicament variously
made, when as they can neither discern the difference by their
senses, nor judge of the effects thereof _à posteriori_, by their
reasons. Secondly, because others may be fully instructed by him
that can best do it; and thirdly, because he may have a reward for
such his communications: But forasmuch as by Monopolies of this
kinde, great Leavies are seldom made, they are scarce pertinent to
our design.

Offices instituted by the State with Fees of their own appointment,
are of parallel nature to Monopolies; the one relating to actions
and employments as the other to things, and have the same to be
said for and against them as Monopolies have.

As a Kingdom encreaseth and flourisheth, so doth variety of things,
of actions, and even of words encrease also; for we see that the
language of the most flourishing Empires was ever the most copious
and elegant, and that of mountainous Cantons the contrary: Now as
the actions of this Kingdom encreased, so did the Offices (that is,
the power and faculty of solely executing and performing the said
actions) encrease likewise; and on the contrary, as the business of
Offices encreased, so did the difficulty and danger of discharging
them amiss decrease proportionably: from whence ’tis come to pass,
that the Offices which at their first erecting were not performed
but by the ablest, most inventive, and versatile Instruments, (such
as could wrestle with all emergent difficulties, and collect Rules
and Axioms out of the Series of their own Observations, (with
reference to the various casualties of their employments) whereby
to direct Posterity) are now performed by the most ordinary,
formal, pack-horse Deputies and Sub-Deputies.

And whereas at first such large Fees were allowed as (considering
even the paucity of them which might then be received) should
compensate the Art, Trust, and Industry of the Administratour; yet
the said large Fees are still continued, although the skill and
trust be lessened, and the number of the said Fees so extreamly
multiplyed: so as now the profits of such Offices (being become
cleer, and the work so easie as any man is capable of it, even
those that never saw it,) are bought and sold for Years or Lives,
as any other Annuity may be; and withal, the splendor arising from
the easie gaines of those places in Courts of Justice, is called
the Flourishing of the Law, which certainly flourisheth best, when
the Professors and Ministers of it have least to do. And moreover,
when the burthen and uselesness of such an Office is taken notice
of, ’tis nevertheless spared as a Subjects Freehold in favour of
him that bought it.

Of these Offices are many in this Nation, and such as might be a
Revenue to the King, either by their Annual profits, or the Sale of
them for many years together. And these are the Offices that are
properly Saleable, _viz._ where the Fees are large, as appointed
when the number of them was few, and also numerous, as multiplying
upon the increase of business, and where the business is onely the
labour of the meanest men: length of time having made all the work
so easie, and found out security against all the frauds, breaches
of trust, and male-administrations, whereunto the infancies of
those places were obnoxious.

These Offices are therefore Taxes upon such as can or will not
avoid the passing through them, and are born as men endure and
run themselves into the mischiefs of Duelling, the which are very
great, which side soever prevails; for certainly men do not alwayes
go to Law to obtain right, or prevent wrong, which judicious
neighbours might perform as well as a Jury of no abler men; and men
might tell the Judge himself the merits of their Cause, as well
as now they instruct their Councel. This therefore of Offices is
a voluntary Tax upon contentious men, as Excize upon Drink is, to
good Fellows to love it.




CHAP. XII.

_Of Tythes._


The Word Tythes being the same with Tenths, signifie of it self
no more then the proportion of the Excisum, or part retrenched,
as if Customs upon imported and exported Commodities should be
called by the name of Twentieths, as it is sometimes called Tunnage
and Poundage; wherefore it remains to say, that Tythes in this
place, do together with the said proportion, consignifie the use
of it, _viz._ the maintenance of the Clergy, as also the matter
or substance out of which this Maintenance is cut, _viz._ the
immediate fruit of the Land and Waters, or the proceed of mens
Labour, Art, and Stock laid out upon them. It signifies also the
manner of paying it, _viz._ in _specie_, and not (but upon special
and voluntary causes) in money.

2. We said the matter of Tythes, was the immediate Fruits of the
Earth, _viz._ of Grain as soon as ’tis ready to be removed from
the ground that bare it; and not of Bread which is Corn thresht,
winnowed, ground, tempered with liquor and baked.

3. ’Tis also the second choice out of the young of multiparous
Cattle taken in _specie_, so soon as the said Younglings can
subsist without their Dams, or else a Composition in Money for the
Uniparous.

4. ’Tis Wool, so soon as it is shorn; ’tis Fowl and Fish, where
Fowling and Fishing is rather a Trade then a meer Recreation, &
_sic de cæteris_.

5. Moreover, in great Cities Tythes are a kinde of composition in
Money for the labour and profit of the Artisans who work upon the
materials which have paid Tythes before.

6. Tythes therefore encrease within any Territory, as the labour
of that Countrey increases; and labour doth or ought to increase
as the people do; now within four hundred years the people of
_England_ are about quadrupled, as doubling every two hundred
years, and the proportion of the Rent of all the Lands in _England_
is about the fourth part of the Expence of the people in it, so as
the other three parts is labour and stock.

7. Wherefore the Tythes now should be twelve times as good as they
were four hundred years ago; which the rates of Benefices in the
Kings books do pretty well shew, by comparing of times; something
of this should be abated because the proportion between the proceed
of Lands and Labour do vary as the hands of Labourers vary:
Wherefore we shall rather say, that the Tythes are but six times as
good now as four hundred years ago, that is, that the Tythes now
would pay six times as many Labourers, or feed six times as many
mouthes, as the Tythes four hundred years ago would have done.

8. Now if there were not onely as many Parishes then as now, more
Priests in every Parish, and also more Religious Men who were
also Priests, and the Religion of those times being more operose,
and fuller of work then now, by reason of Confessions, Holydayes,
Offices, &c. more in those dayes then now, (the great work in
these dayes being a compendious teaching above a thousand at once
without much particular Confession and Catechising, or trouble
about the Dead), it seems clear, that the Clergy now is far richer
then heretofore; and that to be a Clergy-man then was a kinde
of a Mortification, whereas now (praised be God) ’tis matter of
splendour and magnificence; unless any will say, that there were
golden Priests when the Chalices were wood, and but wooden Priests
when the Chalices were gold; or that Religion best flourisheth when
the Priests are most mortified, as was before said of the Law,
which best flourisheth when Lawyers have least to do.

9. But what ever the increase of the Churches Goods are, I grudge
it them not; onely wish, that they would take a course to enjoy
it with safety and peace to themselves; whereof one is, not to
breed more Churchmen then the Benefices as they now stand shared
out, will receive; that is to say, if there be places but for
about twelve thousand in _England_ and _Wales_, it will not be
safe to breed up 24000. Ministers, upon a view or conceipt that
the Church means otherwise distributed might suffice them all;
for then the twelve thousand which are unprovided for, will seek
wayes how to get themselves a livelihood; which they cannot do more
easily then by perswading the people, that the twelve thousand
Incumbents do poison or starve their souls, and misguide them in
their way to Heaven: Which needy men upon a strong temptation will
do effectually; we having observed, that Lecturers being such a
sort of Supernumeraries, have preached more times in a week, more
hours in the day, and with greater vehemence every time then the
Incumbents could afford to do; for _Graculus esuriens in Cælum,
jusseris, ibit._ Now this vehemence, this pains, this zeal, and
this living upon particular donations, makes the people think, that
those who act them are withall more Orthodox, nay better assisted
from God then the others. Now let any man judge, whether men
reputed to be inspired will not get help to lift themselves into
Church-livings, &c. But these things are too plain from the latest
experiences.

10. Now you will ask, how shall that be done, or how may we know
how to adjust our Nursery to our Orchard? To which I answer,
that if there be twelve thousand Church-livings in _England_,
Dignitaries included, then that about four hundred being sent forth
_per ann._ into the Vineyard, may keep it well served, without
luxuriency; for according to the Mortality-Bill-observation, about
that number will dye yearly out of twelve thousand Adult-persons,
such as Ministers are as to age, and ought to be as well as to
speculative knowledge, as practical experience, both of themselves
and others.

11. But I have digressed, my main scope being to explain the
nature of the Tax of Tythes; nevertheless since the end of such
explanation is but to perswade men to bear quietly so much Tax as
is necessary, and not to kick against the pricks; and since the end
of that again, and the end of all else we are to do, is but to
preserve the publick Peace, I think I have not been impertinent in
inserting this little Advertisement, making so much for the Peace
of our _Jerusalem_.

12. But to return to Tythes as a Tax or Levy, I say that in
_England_ it is none, whatsoever it might be or seem to be in
the first Age of its Institution; nor will the Kings Quit-rents
in _Ireland_ as they are properly none now, seem any in the next
Age, when every man will proportion his Expence to the remainder
of his own Rent after the King is paid his; for ’tis surprize and
the suddenness of the Charge, which a Tax supervenient to a mans
other expences and issues makes, that renders it a burthen, and
that intolerable to such as will not understand it, making men
even to take up Arms to withstand it; that is, leap out of the
Frying-pan upon earth into the fire even of hell, which is War and
the consequences thereof.

13. Now Tythes being no Tax, I speak of it but as the _modus_ or
pattern of a Tax, affirming it to be next to one, the most equal
and indifferent which can be appointed in order to defray the
publick Charge of the whole Nation as well as that of the Church;
for hereby is collected a proportion of all the Corn, Cattle, Fish,
Fowl, Fruit, Wool, Honey, Wax, Oyl, Hemp, and Flax of the Nation,
as a result of the Lands, Art, Labour, and Stock which produced
them; onely it is scarce regular in respect of Housing, Cloth,
Drinks, Leather, Feathers, and the several Manufactures of them;
insomuch, as if the difference of Tythes which the Countrey payes
in proportion to the City, were now _de novo_ to be established, I
do not see what in likelihood would sooner cause a grand sedition
about it.

14. The payment of an _aliquot_ part to the King out of the
same things as now pay Tythes, _in specie_, would have an
inconvenience, because the Kings Rents would be like the Dividend
in Colledges, _viz._ higher or lower according to the prices of
those Commodities, unless the said inequality in Colledges happen
by reason of the fewness of particulars, according to the market
rates whereof, their Rents are paid in money; whereas the whole
of all the particulars might well enough ballance each other, a
dear or plentiful year being but an appellation _secundum quid_,
_viz._ with reference as to Corn onely, as the chief food of the
multitude; whereas ’tis likely, that the same causes which makes
Corn scarce may make other things in plenty of no less use to the
King; as repairing in one thing what he wants in another.

15. Another inconvenience would be that which was observed in
_Ireland_, when the Ministery were paid by Sallary, and the Tythes
in kinde paid to the State; who because they could not actually
receive them _in specie_, let them at farm to the most bidder;
in the Transaction whereof was much juggling, combination, and
collusion, which perhaps might have been remedied, had not that
course been used but as a sudden temporary shift, without intention
of continuing it.

16. The third inconvenience is, that abovementioned, _viz._ the
necessity of another way of Tax, to take in the Manufactures of
those Commodities which pay the Tax of Tythes; whereas possibly
there is a way of Tax equal in its own nature, and which needs
not to be pieced up by any other; so as the Officers about that
may have a full employment, and none others wanted, whose wide
intervals of leasure shall make them seem Drones, as they are also
the Caterpillers of any State.




CHAP. XIII.

_Of several smaller wayes of levying Money._


When the people are weary of any one sort of Tax, presently
some Projector propounds another, and gets himself audience, by
affirming he can propound a way how all the publick charge may be
born without the way that is. As for example, if a Land-tax be the
present distasted way, and the people weary of it, then he offers
to do the business without such a Land-tax, and propound either
a Poll-money, Excize, or the institution of some new Office or
Monopoly, and hereby draws some or other to hearken to him; which
is readily enough done by those who are not in the places of profit
relating to the way of Levies in use, but hope to make themselves
Offices in the new Institution.

2. I shall enumerate a few of the smaller wayes which I have
observed in several places of _Europe_, _viz._

First, in some places the State is common Cashier for all or most
moneys, as where Banks are, thereby gaining the interest of as much
money as is deposited in their hands.

Secondly, Sometimes the State is the common Usurer, as where
Loan Banks, and _montes pietatis_ are in use, and might be more
copiously and effectually where Registers of Lands are kept.

Thirdly, Sometimes the State is or may be Common Ensurer, either
upon the danger onely of Enemies at sea, according to the supposed
primitive end of our Customs in _England_, or else of the
casualties of the Enemy, Weather, Sea, and Vessel taken together.

Fourthly, Sometimes the State hath the whole sale and benefit of
certain Commodities, as of Amber in the Duke of _Brandenburghs_
Countrey, Tobacco formerly in _Ireland_, Salt in _France_, &c.

Fifthly, Sometimes the State is common Beggar, as ’tis almost in
_Holland_, where particular Charity seems only to serve for the
relief of concealed wants, and to save these wanting from the shame
of discovering their poverty, and not so much to relieve any wants
that are declared, and already publickly known.

Sixthly, In some places the State is the sole Guardian of Minors,
Lunaticks, and Idiots.

Seventhly, In some other Countreys the State sets up and maintains
Play-houses, and publick Entertainments, giving Sallaries to the
Actors, but receiving the bulk of the profit to themselves.

Eighthly, In some places, Houses are ensured from fire by the State
at a small Rent _per annum_ upon each.

Ninthly, In some places Tolls are taken upon passage over Bridges,
Causeys, and Ferries built and maintained at the Publick Charge.

Tenthly, In some places men that dye are obliged to leave a certain
pittance to the publick, the same is practised in other places upon
Marriages, and may be in others upon Births.

Eleventhly, In some places strangers especially Jews, are
particularly taxed; which may be good in over-peopled Countreys,
though bad in the contrary case.

3. As for Jews, they may well bear somewhat extraordinary, because
they seldom eat and drink with Christians, hold it no disparagement
to live frugally, and even sordidly among themselves, by which way
alone they become able to under-sell any other Traders, to elude
the Excize, which bears but according to mens Expences; as also
other Duties, by dealing so much in Bills of Exchange, Jewels, and
Money, and by practising of several frauds with more impunity then
others; for by their being at home every where, and yet no where
they become responsible almost for nothing.

4. Twelfthly, There have been in our times, wayes of levying
an _aliquot_ part of mens Estates, as a Fifth, and Twentieth,
_viz._ of their Estates real and personal, yea of their Offices,
Faculties, and imaginary Estates also, in and about which way
may be so much fraud, collusion, oppression, and trouble, some
purposely getting themselves taxed to gain more trust: Others
bribing to be taxed low, and it being impossible to check or
examine, or trace these Collections by the print of any footsteps
they leave, (such as the Harths of Chimneys are) that I have not
patience to speak more against it; daring rather conclude without
more ado, in the words of our Comick to be naught, yea exceeding
naught, very abominable, and not good.




CHAP. XIV.

_Of raising, depressing, or embasing of Money._


Sometimes it hath happened, that States (I know not by what raw
advice) have raised or embased their money, hoping thereby, as it
were, to multiply it, and make it pass for more then it did before;
that is, to purchase more commodity or labour with it: All which
indeed and in truth, amounts to no more then a Tax, upon such
People unto whom the State is indebted, or a defalkation of what
is due; as also the like burthen upon all that live upon Pensions,
established Rents, Annuities, Fees, Gratuities, &c.

2. To explain this fully, one might lanch out into the deep Ocean
of all the Mysteries concerning Money, which is done for other ends
elsewhere; nevertheless I shall do it the best I can, by expounding
the reasons _pro & contrà_ for embasing and raising of Money: and
first of embasing.

3. Copper or Tin Money made _ad valorem_ in its matter, is no
embasing; the same being onely cumbersom and baser then silver
money, onely because less convenient and portable.

And Copper money _ad valorem_ in workmanship and matter both
together; (such as on which the Effigies and Scutcheon are so
curiously graven and impressed, as the moneys seem rather Medalls)
is not embasing, unless the numbers of such pieces be excessive,
(the measures whereof I shall not set down, until I shall hereafter
propound the fittest Sections of the abstracted pound into which
I would have money coyned, and determine how many pieces of each
Section should be in an hundred pound) for in case of such excess,
the workmanship being of no other use but to look upon, becomes
base by its being too common.

4. Nor are such Tokens base as are coyned for Exchange in retailing
by particular men, (if such men be responsible and able to take
them back, and give Silver for them.)

5. But that Gold I count to be embased, which hath more allay
either of Copper or Silver in it, then serves to correct its too
great natural softness and flexibility, whereby it wears too
fast in Money: And that Silver I reckon also embased, wherein is
commixed more Copper then will sufficiently toughen it, and save it
from cracking under the Hammer, Press, or Mill that must coin it,
or the like.

6. Base Money is therefore such as Dutch Shillings, Stivers, French
Soulz, Irish Bon-galls, &c. and for the most part consisting of
great pieces, though of small value. To answer the first reason or
pretence of making them, which is, that the said Pieces might be
more bulky, handleable, and the silver in them less apt to be lost
or worn away.

7. The other reason (besides that of allay which we must allow in
the Measures abovementioned) is to save it from being melted down
by Goldsmiths and Bullioners, or exported by strangers; neither of
which can happen but to their loss: for suppose a Stiver of two
pence, had a penny of pure silver, if the Bullioner melts it for
the sake of the silver onely, in the separation he shall lose the
Copper and charge of refining the Silver; nor will strangers export
it into places where the local value of the Piece perisheth, the
intrinsick leaving him to loss.

7. Now the reasons against this kinde of Money are, first the
greater danger of falsification, because the colour, sound, and
weight by which men (without the test) guess at the goodness of
the material of Money is too much confounded, for the vulgar (whom
it concerns) to make use of them for their marks and guides in the
business.

8. Secondly, In case small pieces of this Money, _viz._ pieces of
two pence should happen to be raised or depressed twelve, fifteen,
or sixteen _per cent._ then there will be a certain loss by reason
of the fractions, which the vulgar cannot reckon: As for example,
if such Money were depressed but ten, eleven, or twelve _per cent._
then the two pence piece would be worth but three half pence, which
is twenty five _per cent._ and so of other proportions.

9. Thirdly, In case the Inconvenience of this Money should be so
great as to necessitate a new Coinage of it, then will happen all
the losses we mentioned before in melting it down by Bullioners.

10. Fourthly, If the two pence piece contained but 1./5.^{th.}
part of the Silver usually in a shilling, then Dealers would have
fifteen pence paid in this money for the same Commodity, for which
they would take a shilling in Standard Silver.

11. Raising of Money is either the cutting the pound _Troy_ of
Standard Silver into more pieces then formerly, as into above
sixty, whereas heretofore the same was made but into twenty, and
yet both sorts called shillings, or else calling the money already
made by higher names: The reasons or pretences given for such
raising are these, _viz._ That the raising of Money will bring it
in, and the material thereof more plentifully; for trial whereof
suppose one shilling were proclaimed to be worth two, what other
effect could this have, then the raising of all Commodities unto
a double price? Now if it were proclaimed, That Labourers Wages,
&c. should not rise at all upon this raising of Money, then would
this Act be as onely a Tax upon the said Labourers, as forcing
them to lose half their wages, which would not be onely unjust but
impossible, unless they could live with the said half, (which is
not to be supposed) for then the Law that appoints such Wages were
ill made, which should allow the Labourer but just wherewithall to
live; for if you allow double, then he works but half so much as
he could have done, and otherwise would; which is a loss to the
Publick of the fruit of so much labour.

12. But suppose the _Quart d’ Ecus_ of _France_ commonly esteemed
worth eighteen pence were raised to three shillings, then ’tis
true, that all the Moneys of _England_ would be indeed _Quart d’
Ecus_ pieces; but as true, that all the English Money would be
carried away, and that our _Quart d’ Ecus_ would contain but half
so much Bullion as our own money did; so that raising of Money may
indeed change the _species_, but with so much loss as the Forreign
Pieces were raised unto, above their intrinsick value.

13. But for remedy of this, suppose we raised the _Quart d’ Ecus_
double, and prohibited the Exportation of our own money in Exchange
thereof. I answer, that such a Prohibition is nugatory, and
impossible to be executed; and if it were not, yet the raising of
the said _species_ would but make us sell the Commodities bought
with raised _Quart d’ Ecus_, in effect but at half the usual rate,
which unto them that want such commodities will as well yield the
full; so that abating our prices, will as well allure strangers to
buy extraordinary proportions of our Commodities, as raising their
money will do: But neither that, nor abating the price will make
strangers use more of our Commodities then they want; for although
the first year they should carry away an unuseful and superfluous
proportion, yet afterwards they would take so much the less.

14. If this be true, as in substance it is, why then have so many
wise States in several ancient, as well as modern times frequently
practised this Artifice, as a means to draw in money into their
respective Dominions?

I answer, that something is to be attributed to the stupidity
and ignorance of the people, who cannot of a sudden understand
this matter: for I finde many men wise enough, who though they be
well informed that raising of money signifies little, yet cannot
suddenly digest it. As for example, an unengaged person who had
money in his purse in _England_, and should hear that a shilling
was made fourteen pence in _Ireland_, would more readily run
thither to buy Land then before; not suddenly apprehending, that
for the same Land which he might have bought before for six years
Purchase, he shall now pay seven. Nor will Sellers in _Ireland_
of a sudden apprehend cause to raise their Land proportionally,
but will at least be contented to compound the business, _viz._ to
sell at six and an half; and if the difference be a more ragged
fraction, men under a long time will not apprehend it, nor ever be
able exactly to govern their practice according to it.

15. Secondly, Although I apprehend little real difference between
raising Forreign Money to double, and abating half in the price of
our own Commodities, yet to sell them on a tacite condition to be
paid in Forreign present Money, shall increase our money; forasmuch
as between raising the money, and abasing the price, is the same
difference as between selling for money and in barter, which latter
is the dearer; or between selling for present money, and for time;
barter resolving into the nature of uncertain time.

16. I say, suppose English Cloth were sold at six shillings a Yard,
and French Canvas at eighteen pence the Ell, the question is,
whether it were all one in order to increase Money in _England_ to
raise the French Money double, or to abate half of the price of
our Cloth? I think the former better, because that former way or
proposition carries with it a condition of having Forreign Money
in _specie_, and not Canvas in barter, between which two wayes
the world generally agrees there is a difference. Wherefore if we
can afford to abate half our price, but will not do it but for
our neighbours money, then we gain so much as the said difference
between Money and Barter amounts unto, by such raising of our
Neighbours Money.

17. But the fundamental solution of this Question depends
upon a real and not an imaginary way of computing the prices
of Commodities; in order to which real way I premise these
suppositions: First then, suppose there be in a Territory a
thousand people, let these people be supposed sufficient to Till
this whole Territory as to the Husbandry of Corn, which we will
suppose to contain all necessaries for life, as in the Lords Prayer
we suppose the word Bread doth; and let the production of a Bushel
of this Corn be supposed of equal labour to that of producing an
ounce of Silver. Suppose again that a tenth part of this Land, and
tenth of the people, viz. an hundred of them, can produce Corn
enough for the whole; suppose that the Rent of Land (found out as
abovementioned) be a fourth part of the whole product, (about which
proportion it really is, as we may perceive by paying a fourth
Sheaf instead of Rent in some places) suppose also that whereas but
an hundred are necessary for this Husbandry, yet that two hundred
have taken up the Trade; and suppose that where a Bushel of Corn
would suffice, yet men out of delicacy will use two, making use of
the Flower onely of both. Now the Inferences from hence are;

First, That the goodness or badness, or the value of Land depends
upon the greater or lesser share of the product given for it in
proportion to the simple labour bestowed to raise the said Product.

Secondly, That the proportions between Corn and Silver signifie
onely an artificial value, not a natural; because the comparison
is between a thing naturally useful, and a thing in it self
unnecessary, which (by the way) is part of the reason why there are
not so great changes and leaps in the prices of Silver as of other
Commodities.

Thirdly, That natural dearness and cheapness depends upon the
few or more hands requisite to necessaries of Nature: As Corn is
cheaper where one man produces Corn for ten, then where he can
do the like but for six; and withall, according as the Climate
disposes men to a necessity of spending more or less. But Political
Cheapness depends upon the paucity of Supernumerary Interlopers
into any Trade over and above all that are necessary, _viz._ Corn
will be twice as dear where are two hundred Husbandmen to do the
same work which an hundred could perform: the proportion thereof
being compounded with the proportion of superfluous Expence,
(_viz._ if to the cause of dearness abovementioned be added to the
double Expence to what is necessary) then the natural price will
appear quadrupled; and this quadruple Price is the true Political
Price computed upon naturall grounds.

And this again proportioned to the common artificiall Standard
Silver gives what was sought; that is, the true Price Currant.

18. But forasmuch as almost all Commodities have their Substitutes
or Succedanea, and that almost all uses may be answered several
wayes; and for that novelty, surprize, example of Superiours, and
opinion of unexaminable effects do adde or take away from the price
of things, we must adde these contingent Causes to the permanent
Causes abovementioned, in the judicious foresight and computation
whereof lies the excellency of a Merchant.

Now to apply this Digression, I say, that to encrease Money, it
is as well necessary to know how to abate as raise, the price of
Commodities, and that of Money, which was the scope of the said
Digression.

19. To conclude this whole Chapter, we say, that raising or
embasing of Moneys is a very pittiful and unequal way of Taxing the
people; and ’tis a sign that the State sinketh, which catcheth hold
on such Weeds as are accompanied with the dishonour of impressing a
Princes Effigies to justifie Adulterate Commodities, and the breach
of Publick Faith, such as is the calling a thing what it really is
not.




CHAP. XV.

_Of Excize._


It is generally allowed by all, that men should contribute to the
Publick Charge but according to the share and interest they have in
the Publick Peace; that is, according to their Estates or Riches:
now there are two sorts of Riches, one actual, and the other
potential. A man is actually and truly rich according to what he
eateth, drinketh, weareth, or any other way really and actually
enjoyeth; others are but potentially or imaginatively rich, who
though they have power overmuch, make little use of it; these being
rather Stewards and Exchangers for the other sort, then owners for
themselves.

2. Concluding therefore that every man ought to contribute
according to what he taketh to himself, and actually enjoyeth. The
first thing to be done is, to compute what the Total of the Expence
of this Nation is by particular men upon themselves, and then what
part thereof is necessary for the Publick; both which (no not the
former) are so difficult as most men imagine.

3. In the next place we must conceive, that the very perfect Idea
of making a Leavy upon Consumptions, is to rate every particular
Necessary, just when it is ripe for Consumption; that is to say,
not to rate Corn until it be Bread, nor Wool until it be Cloth,
or rather until it be a very Garment; so as the value of Wool,
Cloathing, and Tayloring, even to the Thread and Needles might be
comprehended; But this being perhaps too laborious to be performed,
we ought to enumerate a Catalogue of Commodities both native and
artificial, such whereof accompts may be most easily taken, and can
bear the Office marks either on themselves, or on what contains
them; being withall such, as are to be as near Consumption as
possible: And then we are to compute what further labour or charge
is to be bestowed on each of them, before consumption, that so
an allowance be given accordingly. As for example, suppose there
be an hundred pounds worth of Stript Stuff for Hangings, and an
hundred pounds worth of Cloth or Stuff for the best mens Cloathes;
I conceive, that the Cloth should bear a greater Excize then the
said stript stuff, the one wanting nothing but tacking up, to be
at its wayes end; and the other Tayloring, Thread, Silk, Needles,
Thimbles, Buttons, and several other particulars: The Excise of
all which must be accumulated upon the Excize of the Cloth, unless
they be so great (as perhaps Buttons, Lace, or Ribbons may be) to
be taxed apart, and inserted into the Catalogue abovementioned.

4. Now the things to be accumulated upon Cloth are, as near as
possible, to be such particulars as are used onely to Cloth, or
very rarely to any other particular, as the several sorts of
peculiar trimmings; so on Corn should be accumulated the charge
of grinding, bolting, yeast, &c. for the baking of it into Bread,
unless, as was said before, any of these particulars can be better
rated apart.

5. A Question ariseth hence, whether any Native Commodities
exported ought to pay the Excize, or that what is imported in lieu
of it should pay none? I answer no, because they are not spent here
_in specie_; but I conceive that the Goods returned from abroad for
them and spent here should pay, if the exported have not already,
for so shall what we spend pay once, but not oftner. Now if Bullion
be returned, then if it be coyned into Money it ought not to pay,
because Money will beget other commodities which shall pay; but if
the said Bullion be wrought into Plate and Utensils, or disgrost
into Wire or Lace, or beaten into Fueilles, then it also ought to
pay, because it is consumed and absolutely spent, as in Lace and
Gilding is too notorious; and this is the reason why I think the
Leavy we commonly call Customs to be unseasonable and preposterous,
the same being a payment before consumption.

6. We have several times spoken of Accumulative Excize, by which we
mean Taxing many things together as one: As for example, suppose
the many Drugs used in Treacle or Mithridate were used onely in
those Compositions, in such case by taxing any one of them, the
whole number will be taxed as certainly as that one, because
they all bear a certain proportion one to another: In Cloth, the
Workmanship and Tools as well as the Wool may be well enough taxed,
&c.

7. But some have strained this Accumulation so, as they would have
all things together taxed upon some one single particular, such as
they think to be nearest the Common Standard of all Expence, the
principal ends of their proposition being these, _viz._

First, To disguise the name of Excize, as odious to them, that do
neither know the payment of Taxes to be as indispensable as eating,
and as have not considered the natural justice of this way of
Excizing or proportionating.

Secondly, To avoid the trouble and charge of Collecting.

Thirdly, To bring the business _ad firmum_, and to a certainty of
all which we shall speak hereafter, when we examine the several
reasons for and against the way of Excize, proceeding now to the
several _species_ of Accumulative Excizes propounded in the world.

8. Some propound Beer to be the only Excizable Commodity, supposing
that in the proportion that men drink, they make all other
Expences; which certainly will not hold, especially if Strong Beer
pay quintuple unto, (as now) or any more Excize then the small:
For poor Carpenters, Smiths, Feltmakers, &c. drinking twice as
much Strong Beer as Gentlemen do of Small, must consequently pay
ten times as much Excize. Moreover, upon the Artizans Beer is
accumulated, onely a little Bread and Cheese, leathern Clothes,
Neck-Beef, and Inwards twice a week, stale Fish, old Pease without
Butter, &c. Whereas on the other, beside Drink, is accumulated as
many more things as Nature and Art can produce; besides this way
of Excizing, though it be never so well administred, is neither
so equal nor so easie, nor so examinable as the simple Poll-money
before spoken of, which is also but an Accumulative Excize.

9. What hath been propounded for Beer may be of Salt, Fuel,
Bread, &c. and the Propositions would all labour under the
same Inconveniences; for some spend more, some less of these
Commodities; and sometimes Families (each whereof are propounded
to be farmed, without descending to individual heads) are more
numerous at sometimes then at others, according as their Estates or
other Interests shall wax or wane.

10. Of all the Accumulative Excizes, that of Harth-money or
Smoak-money seems the best; and that onely because the easiest,
and clearest, and fittest to ground a certain Revenue upon; it
being easie to tell the number of Harths, which remove not as
Heads or Polls do: Moreover, ’tis more easie to pay a small Tax,
then to alter or abrogate Harths, even though they are useless
and supernumerary; nor is it possible to cover them, because most
of the neighbours know them; nor in new Building will any man who
gives forty shillings for making a Chimney be without it for two.

11. Here is to be noted, that a Harth-money must be but small, or
else ’twill be intolerable; it being more easie for a Gentleman of
a thousand pound _per annum_ to pay for an hundred Chimneys (few of
their Mansion-Houses having more) then for Labourers to pay for
two. Moreover, if the Land-Lord onely pay this Tax, then is it not
an Accumulative Excize for all, but a particular Excize upon but
one onely Commodity, namely Housing.

12. Now the Reasons for Excize are these, _viz._

First, The Natural Justice that every man should pay according to
what he actually enjoyeth; upon which account this Tax is scarce
forced upon any, and is very light to those, who please to be
content with natural Necessaries.

Secondly, This Tax if it be not farmed, but regularly collected,
engages to thrift, the onely way to enrich a Nation, as by the
Dutch and Jews, and by all other men, who have come to vaste
Estates by Trade, doth appear.

Thirdly, No man payes double or twice for the same thing, forasmuch
as nothing can be spent but once; whereas it is frequently seen,
that otherwise men pay both by the Rent of their Lands, by their
Smoaks, by their Titles, and by Customs, (which all men do, though
Merchants chiefly talk of it) they also pay by Benevolence and by
Tythes; whereas in this way of Excize no man need pay but one way,
nor but once, properly speaking.

Fifthly, By this way an excellent account may be taken of the
Wealth, Growth, Trade, and strength of the Nation at all times.
All which Reasons do make not for particular compoundings with
Families, nor for letting the whole to farm, but for collecting it
by special Officers, who having a full employment, will not be a
fourth of the charge of our present many multiform Levies; for to
put extraordinary trouble and hazzard upon the Countrey Officers,
is a sorer Taxing of them, then to make them pay a small Reward
unto practised Persons to be their Substitutes. All which are the
common Objections against Excize.

13. I should here adde the manner of Collecting it, but I refer
this to the practice of _Holland_; and I might also offer how men
may be framed to be fit for this and other Publick Trusts, as to be
Cashiers, Store-keepers, Collectors, &c. but I refer this Enquiry
unto a more ample and fit occasion.




[Illustration: (decorative header)]




Errata.


  Pag.  line.
  1      14    between [_who_ and _spent_] interline [_have_]
  5      13    after [_want_] read [_general_] instead of [_more_]
  6      19    before [_starve_] interline [_needlesly_]
  6      29    before [_cause_] read [_one_] instead of [_the_]
  6      30    read [_is_] instead of [_are_]
  8      7     read [_them_] for [_him_]
  8      8     read [_their_] for [_his_]
  17     19    read [_viz._] for [_that is_]
  18     3     read [τἁ χρἠϛα] instead of [τἁ χρἠσα]
  20     17    read [_Excisum_] not [_Excisium_]
  21     7     read [_obligees_] not [_obliges_]
  22     12    read [_enhansing_] not [_exhausting_]
  22     23    between [_way_ and _Land-Tax_] interline [_of a_]
  22     25    deleatur [_sometimes_]
  24     25    between [_Rents_ and _we_] interline [_in order to Taxes_]
  28     24    between [_seldom_ and _enough_] interline [_rich_]
  28     28    deleatur [_with_]
  30     11    after [_hazards_] interline [_and_]
         14    read [_omitted_]
         27    read [_apparatus_] instead of [_appurtenances_]
  32     10    after [_the_] interline [_former_]
         11    after [_Land_] read [_this latter_] instead [_of the_]
  33     26    deleatur [_by_]
         31    between [_&c._ and _then_] interline [_could be
                   fertilized_]
  34     36    read [_worth_] not [_work_]
  36     16    after [_market_] interline [_abroad_]
  37     12    read [_paribus_] not [_talibus_]
  39     6     read [_conniving_] not [_coyning_]
  39     32    deleatur [_as much harm_]
        ibid.  between [_of_ and _one_] interline [_the_]
       penult. after [_Coffee_] inter [_and_]
  40     2     read [_meerly_] for [_merrily_]
        ult.   before [_certainly_] interline [_case_]
  41     13    dele [_out_]
         24    read [_so or not_] instead of [_use_]
  47     26    read [_on_] for [_of_]
  51     3     read [_their_] for [_the_]
         15    after [_Heterodox_] interline [_Believer_]
         29    read [_wearing_] for [_weaving_]
  53     14    read [_defect_] for [_dissent_]
  54     36    between [_then_ and _is_] interline [_it_]
  56    ult.   after [_yet the_] interline [_said_]
  57     3     read [_offices_] for [_officers_]
  60     2     read [_shared_] for [_shred_]
  61     15    read [_consequences_] for [_calamities_]
         32    read [_an_] for [_no_]
  62     1     after [_plentiful_] interline [_year_]
  65     21    read [_medalls_] instead of [_a medall_]
  66     10    between [_consisting_ and _great_] interline [_of_]
  67     29    read [_d’ Ecus_] instead of [_d’ Esens_]
  68     36    read [_abating_] for [_abasing_]
  69     11    after [_former_] interline [_better_]
  70     12    read [_prices_] for [_proceed_]
  71     5     read [_as_] for [_the_]
  75     25    read [_families_] for [_faculties_.]


_FINIS._




  TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

  All changes listed above in the Errata have been applied to the
  etext.
    --the change listed for page 18 line 3, changing “τἁ χρἠσα”
      to “τἁ χρἠϛα”, has also been applied to the three other
      occurrences in the text.
    --the change listed for page 20 line 17, changing “Excisium”
      to “Excisum”, has also been applied to the three other
      occurrences in the text.
    --the change listed for page 67 line 29, changing “d’ Esens”
      to “d’ Escu” has been modified to change to “d’ Ecus”. This
      change has also been applied to the four other occurrences
      in the text. (Quart d’ Ecu was a French coin of this period.)
    --the preposition “than” in modern English is consistently
      written as “then” in the original text, and has not been
      changed.

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  Except for those changes noted below, all spellings in the text,
  and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.

  Preface: ‘acceptance ofall’ replaced by ‘acceptance of all’.
  Pg 2: ‘Schools and Universitities,’ replaced by ‘Schools and
         Universities,’.
  Pg 4: ‘that enrease Wars,’ replaced by ‘that encrease Wars,’.
  Pg 5: ‘Armies are fasly’ replaced by ‘Armies are falsely’.
  Pg 14: ‘have slighty gone’ replaced by ‘have slightly gone’.
  Pg 15: ‘mangnificent Shews’ replaced by ‘magnificent Shews’.
  Pg 18: ‘superflous, no more’ replaced by ‘superfluous, no more’.
  Pg 19: ‘Impisonments, according to’ replaced by ‘Imprisonments,
          according to’.
  Pg 26: ‘infinity of unites’ replaced by ‘infinity of unities’.
  Pg 37: ‘the said Duies,’ replaced by ‘the said Duties,’.
  Pg 40: ‘Intrest and     of the’ replaced by ‘Interest and
          advantage of the’.
  Pg 41: ‘resisting of   ture’ replaced by ‘resisting of Nature’.
  Pg 41: ‘Merchant nor Statseman’ replaced by ‘Merchant nor
          Statesman’.
  Pg 43: ‘all mankiude alike;’ replaced by ‘all mankinde alike;’.
  Pg 45: ‘not, bebeing rather’ replaced by ‘not, being rather’.
  Pg 50: ‘parts to discoveers’ replaced by ‘parts to discoverers’.
  Pg 51: ‘such a freedon’ replaced by ‘such a freedom’.
  Pg 55: ‘have not throughly’ replaced by ‘have not thoroughly’.
  Pg 57: ‘are thererore Taxes’ replaced by ‘are therefore Taxes’.
  Pg 58: ‘for the Uniparons’ replaced by ‘for the Uniparous’.
  Pg 65: ‘it hath hapned,’ replaced by ‘it hath happened,’.
  Pg 68: ‘sell them on on a’ replaced by ‘sell them on a’.
  Pg 71: ‘but acccording to’ replaced by ‘but according’ to.
  Pg 75: ‘Seondly, This Tax’ replaced by ‘Secondly, This Tax’.
  Errata: the changes noted for page 32 lines 10 and 11 do not make
          sense; a “conjectured emendation”, as given in some
          other reprints of this book, has been used instead;
          namely, ‘after [_this_] interline [_former_]’ and
          ‘after [_Land,_] read [_the latter_] instead of [_that_]’.