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                  THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER




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                            COPYRIGHT, 1918
                                   BY
                          WARWICK & YORK, Inc.




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                   Educational Psychology Monographs

                 This volume, which is number 19 in the
                 series, was edited by J. Carleton Bell

                  THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PEDAGOGY OF ANGER

                                   By
                        ROY FRANKLIN RICHARDSON
              Professor of Education, University of Maine

                               BALTIMORE
                          WARWICK & YORK, INC.
                                  1918

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                                CONTENTS


     Preface                                                      3

     Introduction                                                 5

                              CHAPTER ONE
     Mental Situation Stimulating Anger                          11

                              CHAPTER TWO
     Behavior of Consciousness                                   31

                             CHAPTER THREE
     Disappearance of Anger                                      53

                              CHAPTER FOUR
     Conscious After-Effects                                     65

                              CHAPTER FIVE
     Educational Function                                        83

     Bibliography                                                99

     Index                                                      103

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                                PREFACE


The importance of the study of the emotions in relation to human conduct
is well understood. Just how consciousness behaves under the influence
of the fundamental human emotions like fear and anger, is one of vital
interest to the psychologist and educator. It has always been difficult
to study the structural side of our emotions because of an inability to
control voluntarily our emotions for purposes of introspection. The
structure of emotions is primarily important in so far as structure may
allow an interpretation of function. The study of the emotions has for
the most part been limited to theoretical discussions based on the
observations of normal and abnormal persons and on the casual
introspection of individual authors. This work is an attempt to study
systematically the emotion of anger in relation to the behavior of
consciousness, the ideas and feelings associated in the development of
anger, the reactive side of consciousness under the influence of anger,
individual differences in behavior, manner of the disappearance and
diminution of anger, devices used in the control and facilitation of the
emotion, and the conscious after-effects including the inter-relation of
anger and other feelings, emotions and attitudes which follow. The
education of the emotions was first voiced by Aristotle who indicated
that one of the aims of education should be to teach men to be angry
aright.

The author is under great obligations to President G. Stanley Hall, for
without his inspiration the investigation would never have been begun or
completed. A number of persons cooperated in the study both by criticism
and observation of emotional experiences. The study would not have been
possible without the kindly co-operation of the following: Professor and
Mrs. G. E. Freeland, Mr. A. E. Hamilton, Dr. G. E. Jones, Dr. George
Bivin, Dr. Frank E. Howard, Dr. W. T. Sangor, Dr. K. K. Robinson, Mr. D.
I. Pope, Mrs. R. F. Richardson, Dr. E. O. Finkenbinder, Dr. Raymond
Bellamy.

                                                                R. F. R.

  University of Maine

    June 20, 1917

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                              INTRODUCTION


Although the emotions are recognized as among the most important mental
phenomena, exerting a marked influence on other mental processes, they
have had comparatively little systematic investigation. We have our
casual descriptions of emotions in terms of feelings, sensations and
physiological effects. We have our theories, accounting for the
expression of the emotions, and our theories of the constituents of the
emotive consciousness. The functional side of emotions, emphasizing the
behavior of consciousness, has been for the most part neglected. In
looking over the literature on emotions, one is impressed by its
theoretical and opinionated trend. Much of it is based on casual
individual observations. Attention has for the most part been directed
to the most intense emotional experiences, neglecting the smaller
emotions, important as they are in the behavior of consciousness. Then
psychology has concerned itself with the exciting period of the emotion,
disregarding the consciousness preceding the emotion and that after the
emotion has disappeared. From the functional aspect of emotions, some of
the _questions_ which invite study are as follows: 1. the mental
situation, including the fore-period from which the emotion develops; 2.
the behavior of consciousness during the period the emotion exists; 3.
the manner of disappearance and diminution of the emotion; 4. the effect
in consciousness after the emotion has disappeared; 5. individual
differences in emotional life.

The statement of Wundt (21) and Külpe (14) concerning voluntary action,
that its mere period of duration is but a small part of its
psychological significance, may well be said of emotions. Wundt suggests
the close relation between the emotion and volitional action. A
volitional process that passes into an external act, he defines as an
emotion which closes with a “pantomimetic” movement. Ach (1), in his
experiments with the will, distinguishes in each experiment a fore, mid
and after period. In our emotional experiences, it is true to a marked
degree that we are predisposed and predetermined to a specific emotional
excitement by temporary or permanent dispositions and attitudes.

METHODS. The method in the present study has been to observe anger
introspectively as it appears in every-day life. Ten graduate students
of Clark University and two persons outside of the University
volunteered to observe their emotions for a period of at least three
months and report to the writer each day from the notes of their
introspections. These persons were asked to observe all instances of
anger and fear no matter how minute. Only anger will be used in the
present study. They were asked to observe the conscious fore-period
before the emotion begins, the development of the emotion, the
disappearance, the diminution and the consciousness after the emotion
has disappeared, which is recognized as having been influenced by the
emotion.

Historically, three methods have been used in studying the emotions.
Casual individual introspection is the earliest and is consequently the
basis for most of the literature. Bain (2) and Ribot (16) were among the
first to employ this method extensively. Observations of the behavior of
normal and abnormal persons have given some results. The questionnaire
method used by Dr. Hall (11) has shown the wide range of objective
reactions and objects of anger.

Both anger and fear are deep rooted psychic strata. Introspections
reveal motives of selfish, unsocial and unlawful character, springing
from a level lower than the social man. All observers have been quite
frank in giving the full introspections, even when their most private
and personal matters were concerned. Where illustrative material is used
it has been necessary to remove the personal element, as in many
instances, others besides the observer were concerned. This revision has
been the work of the writer. The essential psychological factor is
unchanged and the words of the observers are used as nearly as possible.
The twelve persons will be called by the first twelve letters of the
alphabet, and other persons named in the introspections will be called
X. Y. and Z. Ten of the observers were graduate men students of
psychology. Seven of these had had considerable experience in
introspection under controlled laboratory conditions. Most of the
illustrative data will be taken from the observations of A. B. C. D. E.
F. and G. who are the most experienced observers.

No apology is offered for this study because of the uncontrolled
conditions of introspection. Emotions are involuntary processes and
consequently do not lend themselves to voluntary control necessary for
laboratory technique. The emotion springs from an antecedent complex
combined with a present idea. The fact that anger does not develop from
a single experience but is a predetermined consciousness usually
cumulative in character, makes voluntary origin difficult. Even when the
individual is aware of the antecedent which tends to give rise to anger,
the voluntary combination with a present idea is unsuccessful. A further
difficulty in introspection is the tendency of the emotion to disappear
as a result of the act of introspection. It occurs frequently in the
data that a further development of the emotion is entirely cut off by
introspection. However, attention to the situation giving rise to anger
frequently reinstates the emotion, if the feeling background is intense
enough. It was necessary to instruct the observers to allow their
emotions to run their usual course and note the facts of behavior at
convenient times. The purpose of this study is to investigate the
behavior of consciousness in the development, expression and
disappearance of anger. The observers were asked to direct their
observation especially to the behavior side of consciousness. It is
believed, that regardless of the necessary uncontrolled conditions of
introspection, that a systematic observation of both mild and intense
experiences of anger by a number of observers over an extended period of
time will add to a better comprehension of the functional character of
this one of the fundamental emotions.




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                              CHAPTER ONE

                   MENTAL SITUATION STIMULATING ANGER


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Professor Titchener (19) states concerning emotions in general three
essential factors for their formation. First, a series of ideas shall be
interrupted by a vivid feeling; second, the feeling shall mirror a
situation or incident in the outside world; and third, the feeling shall
be enriched by organic sensations created by the course of bodily
adjustment to the situation. It has been well agreed from casual
introspection that the stimulus to an emotion is a total mental
situation or predicament. It is evidently necessary in the psychology of
the emotions that each emotion should be studied in connection with its
predetermining mental situation giving rise to it. Anger because of its
slowness to develop, lends itself more readily to a study of the
situation from which it arises, than some other emotions.

It is well known that there is little constancy in the outside
situation, associated with the emotion of anger. What one will take as
an insult, another will regard as a joke. With the same individual,
what will at one time excite anger, will at another be scarcely
noticed. We commonly say, referring to some incident, “There was
nothing for him to be angry about,” and the statement may be correct
if the outside situation is viewed as the stimulus to the emotion.
With the insane and hysterical, an observer is often baffled by the
apparently harmless idea that will excite anger. The fact is, the
situation stimulating anger is a psychic one. We fail in viewing our
emotional life in the same manner as we do in observing our sensations.
Whatever the outside conditions, it is the psychic situation as
only a partial reflection of outside conditions, that is of primary
importance. A few instances of the current views of the situation
exciting anger may be given. What may be called a genetic view is
illustrated in McDougall’s (15) statement, “The condition of its
(anger) excitement is rather any opposition to the free exercise of
any impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature
is impelled by any one of the other instincts.” Dewey (6) in his
conception of instincts has pointed out that we are not angry when we
are fighting successfully. Only when the pugnacious instinct is impeded
does emotion arise. An introspective view may be taken from Bain (2),
“When we have suffered harm at the hands of another, it leaves a sting
in the violation of the sanctity of our feelings. This pre-supposes a
sentiment of self regarding pride, the presence of which gives rise to
the best developed form of anger.” David Irons (12), who did some keen
work in the analysis of the emotions, does not qualify his statement
that anger appears only when we feel that we have been injured.

From the pathological side, Féré (7) and Magnan (11) have described slow
accumulation of anger in paranoiacs, which seems to re-enforce the
casual introspective view stated above. These insane persons first
believe they are persecuted. They suspect all about them. Even their
very best friends are trying to injure their business or reputation.
Gradually reactionary impulses begin and they themselves become the
persecutors and concern themselves with the business of revenge. They
find gratification in every sort of angry outburst,—insult, abuse,
threat, murderous attack, irony, witticism, etc.

The same view has been advanced by Steinmetz (18) in the observation of
the behavior of primitive people. He holds that revenge is essentially
rooted in the feeling of power and superiority. It arises upon the
experience of injury and its aim is to enhance self-feeling, which has
been lowered by the injury suffered.

The next few pages will be devoted to an examination of the mental
situations from which anger develops as found in the results of the
introspections. About six hundred introspections from the various
observers have been used for this study.

_Feelings of Irritation._ One of the characteristic mental situations
from which anger arises is that connected with feelings of irritation.
These feelings are described as unpleasant nervous tension with a
tendency to motor activity. Awareness of the feeling may be present
while attention is directed elsewhere. It may or may not be referred to
any particular incident. C.—“It is a sort of diffused unpleasant
consciousness that things in general are going wrong.”

Irritation in connection with pain or illness is a condition from which
anger may develop. From this a trivial incident may give rise to anger.
A note from E.’s records says, “I had a severe headache to-day and felt
irritable. When X. would try to sympathize with me, the irritation would
increase and I tended to be angry.” G, who has relatively few emotions
of anger, introspected upon ten cases of anger, arising from a
fore-period of irritation during a day’s illness. Subject I. states with
reference to pain, “While the pain was on I felt as though I wanted to
be angry at somebody or something, X. spoke to me and at once I was
angry.” Feelings of irritation may increase, gradually, accompanying the
increased intensity of pain. A. states, “Irritableness at the first
beginning of the pain increased to intense anger at the moment the pain
was most severe. There was a strong motor tension in the hands and face
muscles with the impulse to look about, vaguely aware that I was trying
to find something to refer the anger to.... A decrease of the pain was
accompanied by a decrease of the anger to a feeling of irritation
again.”

Feelings of irritation follow as a result of the thwarting of some
desire or mental attitude and are consequently predetermined by the
attitude of the moment. From this, anger develops for the most part, as
a result of a series of stimuli, which have a cumulative effect. Each
thwarting of the impulse intensifies the irritation until anger is
developed. One or two failures may stimulate unpleasant feelings, which
at the time are ignored; but with an increase of the number of stimuli,
there is an accumulative effect in which the awareness of the previous
failures becomes more intense than at the moment when they occurred. The
following from B.’s observations will illustrate, “I was writing a
letter to an important personage and was making special effort to write
it neatly. I made an error and felt unpleasantly irritated. Still
feeling quite unpleasant, I turned to look for my eraser and could not
find it. I looked in several places. Each failure was followed by a
sudden increase in intensity of unpleasant feelings.” Finally B. found
himself using defamatory language prolifically, giving expression to a
rather well developed case of anger. One is usually aware in anger of
this type, that the emotion is the cumulative effect of a number of
previous stimuli. It appears from the reports, that if the mental
predisposition is intense enough, one or two failures may suffice to
excite anger. In general the stronger the predisposition, the less
number of failures is required before anger is fully developed.

Another characteristic of the feeling of irritation is its indefinite
objective reference. It may not refer definitely to any object at first.
The tendency is usually present to refer it to some object or person,
regardless of the real cause of the feeling. E. states, “I felt I wanted
to get angry at somebody or something and I did not care much what.”
While it is common with all the persons studied, to be irritated and
burst out angrily at objects, the tendency to transfer the anger from
objects which may be the real objective cause to unoffending persons, is
a matter in which there is a wide individual difference. C. when
irritated by objects, finds a partial relief if he can lay the blame on
some person and take an imaginary vent against him. He states, “I have
been cross and grouchy all day; ‘felt out’ with everybody. Several times
the association of X. and Y. came up with a little rising anger and an
attitude that they were somehow to be blamed. I was aware that they were
not to be blamed, but at times I would find myself ignoring this and
taking pleasure in criticising them adversely.” This tendency to
personify the source of anger is illustrated in another incident from C.
He lost his umbrella. He looked for it in several places with an
increased feeling of irritation; following a line of other associations,
he imagined Z., a person whom he dislikes, walking off with it. He says,
“All this was mildly pleasant. I was scarcely aware how improbable it
was that Z. had taken it, till the act of introspecting on the emotion.
I really wanted to believe that he had taken it.” The personal objective
reference to somewhat suppressed feelings of irritation frequently
facilitates the sudden development of the emotion. The tendency to refer
the anger to some innocent person, ignoring for the moment the real
facts and forgetting one’s sense of justice for the time being, is a
matter in which there are marked individual differences in the subjects
studied.

It is a common characteristic of the initial stage of anger, that
although there is an awareness that the emotion is due to a series of
irritating stimuli, the entire situation exciting the anger is ignored
and the anger is referred to some person, frequently one recently
associated in time. Thus objectified, anger seems to find a more ready
expression. Anger is more successfully developed from a fore-period of
irritation if the present predicament is in any way associated with a
person or situation against which there is already an emotional
disposition of dislike. A feeling of pleasurable satisfaction is often
reported to follow the successful expression of anger after feelings of
irritation.

Anger with a fore-period of irritation is common with all the subjects
studied, but the manner in which the anger arises from these feelings is
a matter of wide individual difference. They all get angry at objects
when they act as hindrances. With B. and C., who live alone, this
tendency is more marked. With all the persons studied, anger with a
fore-period of irritation occurs more frequently against objects and
situations than against persons. When persons are involved in anger of
this type, they are usually those with whom there is close intimacy or
with servants and children.

The sentiment of justice may facilitate the development of anger arising
from feelings of irritation. Irritable feelings may more readily develop
into anger if a situation is associated in which fairness and justice
are violated, although the point of justice may be far removed from the
actual cause of the irritation. Under the influence of irritation, there
is frequently a little more sensitiveness to injustice if the idea of
unfairness can facilitate in the objective reference to the emotion. The
following instance will illustrate. A. was walking along the street at
night in an irritable state of mind in connection with a series of
incidents just past. In this state of mind he came to a place where a
new house was being built and the builders had left an accumulation of
dirt on the sidewalk. When it rained, the water would collect making the
walk bad. He had previously noted that they had made enough progress
with the building that it was unnecessary to leave the dirt on the walk.
“On this occasion,” he states, “I now become quite indignant, and
suddenly found myself in imagination telephoning the street commissioner
in an angry attitude and tone of voice, telling him about the dirt and
where the house was located, and ending with the sentence, ‘It is an
outrage to tax payers.’” But this did not fully satisfy his resentment.
He imagined himself the next day walking up to the overseer of the
construction gang and assuming a rather indignant air, telling him among
other things that the way he had left the walk was an outrage to the
public. On the other hand, the sense of justice may be ignored for the
time if it does not aid expression. In some extreme cases the subject
may assume a make-believe attitude and trump up reasons to suit his own
ends regardless of the facts. The tendency is strong to give some
justifiable expression to the present mental predicament. In such cases
reason serves the purpose of feeling. All other mental processes may
become subservient to the rising indignation till the point of anger is
reached, but with the expression of anger, the illusion of fairness
usually disappears. The behavior that seemed so commendable while angry
may excite shame or regret after the emotion has been vented.

_Negative Self-feeling._ A second characteristic mental situation from
which anger arises, is that connected with negative self-feeling; the
self-feeling has been lowered and anger follows. In the observation
of all the observers, it appears at times in the initial stage of
anger. Whatever outside situation occasions lowered self-feeling
may indirectly give rise to anger. And just as there are feelings
of irritation, which do not pass into anger, so there are negative
self-feelings which are not followed by anger. In the description
of this feeling, it appears in marked contrast to the anger that
follows. As to time, it may last but a moment before anger arises. In
other instances the feeling of humiliation may be rather prolonged or
repeated before anger arises. The feeling is described as unpleasant,
as a lack of motor tension, a feeling like shrinking up, an impulse
to get away, a confused inco-ordinated state of mind. A rather wide
vocabulary referring to self and the feeling side of experience is
used by the subjects to designate this feeling in colloquial language.
Examples of such phrases from the observations are as follows:—“I felt
sat on,” “Was humiliated,” “Felt inefficient,” “Felt imposed upon,”
“Felt stepped on,” “A feeling of self depreciation,” “Felt offended,”
“A feeling of subjection,” “Felt as if he thought I were no good,”
“Felt worried,” “Felt as if he were hitting at me,” “Felt that what
he said reflected on my ability,” “Disappointed in myself,” “Felt
ashamed,” “My feelings were wounded,” “Felt that that was insult
added to injury,” “Felt slighted,” “Feeling of abasement,” “I was
embarrassed,” “Felt as if I had been caught with the goods on.”

Unlike the feeling of irritation, negative self-feeling has a more
definite reference to the outside situation and for the most part refers
to persons. It will be noted that the origin of anger from the mental
situation of lowered self-feeling, and that from a condition of
irritable feelings, comes about by quite different processes. The latter
is reached by an increased complexity till the anger point is suddenly
attained. In the former case the anger comes about as a rather sudden
reaction from a state of consciousness that is in marked contrast to
anger. Notes from the reports will illustrate this characteristic. B.
had made some errors at a public meeting. X. in a speech jokingly called
attention to the errors. At first B. was confused and felt a little
worried and embarrassed. In a few moments he found himself mildly angry
at X. and was planning to retaliate. B. states that his anger did not
refer to the fact that he had made the error, but to X. who had
humiliated him by calling public attention to it. F. went to get a check
cashed and was refused. He states, “I felt belittled and became
indignant as I walked away.... With the appearance of the imagery of
another person getting his check cashed the day before, I became quite
angry.” He adds that he was not angry because of the failure to get the
check cashed, but because of the discrimination against himself. The
anger referred to the cashier. The idea that he was acting according to
rules and not personally responsible, appeared, but was ignored by a
recall of the imagery of the other person getting his check cashed.

Negative self-feeling appears rather suddenly without any definite
conscious fore-period of its own. It is a state of consciousness
predetermined by pleasurable feelings of self regard. In taking the
report of C.’s emotions one evening, there was found to be an unusual
number. He had been usually observing from one to four emotions each
day, with occasionally a day having no experiences of anger. On this
particular day he had observed and taken notes on twelve rather strongly
developed cases of anger. An inquiry into the cause showed nothing
except that he had felt extra well all day and had turned off more than
the usual amount of work. This was a disturbing situation in connection
with evidence that had previously been collected from G. and D. These
two persons have few emotions of anger and have gone over a week with no
experience of anger. On December 4th, D. took observations on four cases
of anger. On inquiry it was found that he had been ill and not slept the
night before. G. on the two days that he was ill introspected on ten
cases of anger. An examination of G.’s and D.’s reports indicate a
fore-period of irritable feelings or a lack of immediate conscious
fore-period. In none of these cases was there any indication of lowered
self-feeling in the fore-period of the emotion, while with each of the
introspections of C. on the day he felt extra well and reported on the
unusual number of twelve cases, there was a fore-period of negative
self-feeling. With A. on the days when he feels best, there is an
increase in the number of cases of anger with an initial lowered
self- feeling. Such evidences as we have, indicate that anger with a
fore-period of negative self-feeling occurs most readily when the
sentiment of self-regard is active,—on the days when the person is well
pleased with himself. It is true that the play of this sentiment only
appears in consciousness, when it has been interfered with or enhanced.
It makes up an essential mental predisposition in connection with the
situation stimulating anger. The following note from C.’s observations
will illustrate. C. met X. and spoke to him; X. paid no attention. C.
states, “For a moment I felt humiliated.... I said to myself, ‘He does
not know my importance.’” C. then became quite angry thinking cutting
remarks about X. and ending the emotion by finding an excuse for X.’s
not seeing him.

Any remark, suggestion, chance association, it may be, attitude
of another or incident, which in any way lowers the sentiment of
self-respect may stimulate anger. In this regard there is a wide
individual difference with the persons studied and with the same person
at different times. A trivial incident may lower the play of the
self-regarding sentiment and consequently give rise to anger, while
at other times a direct thrust at one’s honor may be ignored. The
personality of the offender, his social and intellectual standing, his
general demeanor and attitude, play an important part in the entire
emotional situation, but at times personality is ignored and a “chip is
carried on the shoulder” for the chance passer-by.

It appears in the results that the anger of the person who is not
in authority against the one who is, or the anger of the man lower
down against the one higher up, usually has a fore-period of negative
self-feeling. A mental disposition toward the one in power in addition
to the sentiment of self-regard, is a predetermining mental situation
in exciting lowered self-feeling and consequently anger. The most
intense instances of anger that C., D. and E. experienced were against
persons in power. D.—“I was aware they were in authority and were
taking advantage of it to run us out. I felt a little humiliated but
not angry as I left the room. It occurred to me they were rather small
in usurping the place.” A little later D. became quite angry and
carried on in imagination a rather extensive verbal combat with the
usurpers in which he came out victor. E. states in his observation,
“If X. had been an ordinary man, I would not have given the occasion a
second thought. But being very high up ... I was inclined to take less
off of him than those I consider as not knowing better.”

On the other hand a certain mental disposition toward the person lower
down in connection with the self-regarding sentiment may be a
precondition of anger. Too great familiarity from an inferior may
momentarily lower the self-regarding sentiment to his level and in
consequence excite anger; we do not resent a slap on the back by one
whom we admire or recognize as our superior, but we do from our
inferior. The same act from the one may heighten our self-respect while
from the other it is lowered. D. reports a case of anger when he was in
a crowd. A boy kept purposely stepping on his heels. He states, “I was
not hurt but he acted too familiar for a boy under the circumstances. I
took his attitude as a personal matter and felt a little humiliated.” A.
reporting a case of anger stimulated by a person whom he holds in low
esteem, says, “It was not what X. did so much, but it was his familiar
confidential attitude before others that embarrassed me.”

It appears frequently in the observations that it is not what is done or
said, so much as it is the attitude of the person, that is so offensive.
A too positive and aggressive action, a too great display of wisdom, a
too familiar or condescending demeanor, may be the essential element in
the stimulus to anger. The following phrases are noted by the different
subjects as being an important part of the situation stimulating anger
of the type now being treated. C.—“I resented his too dignified air more
than anything else.” G.—“What angered me most was his condescending
attitude as if he knew it all.” I.—“He acted too wise and I was aware he
was trying to lord it over us. That was the most offensive part.” H.—“He
sat and stared at me as if he thought I didn’t know what I was talking
about.” F.—“He took on a wise air implying that he had already passed
through the stage in which I now was.” E.—“It was not his statement so
much as it was his rather spiteful attitude that angered me.” A.—“It was
not what he said. It was his haughty air and little condescending laugh
in dismissing the matter that rang in my ears.”

While in the presence of a situation that lowers self-feeling, even
though persons may not be connected with the situation, it is a common
characteristic to refer the anger to some person. The bounds of justice
may be, for the moment, overstepped. The dim awareness with some, that
the person is not to be blamed, is ignored for the time, while the
tendency is strongest in consciousness to give expression to the
emotion. The individual differences here are quite marked. G. apparently
has developed a habit of referring his anger to a principle, ignoring
the personality. In many of his observations, persons were connected
with a situation, but were neglected in his attention to the principle
violated. A business man had told him an untruth causing him difficulty.
G. states, “I was not angry at the man. That was his way of doing
business.” In the course of his emotional experience, his anger became
rather intense, referring to the business ethics practiced. The degree
in which the sense of justice is ignored under the influence of anger of
this type is also a matter of wide individual difference.

In the observations collected, anger at one’s self appears quite
frequently. There have been no cases found, in which anger at one’s self
develops purely from a fore-period of irritation. The subject takes the
matter to himself and feels a little humiliated and degraded and may
react against his own personality in the same manner that he would
against another. Two observers, B. and G., quite frequently get angry at
themselves. A. reports that this sort of anger rarely occurs with him.
G. observes the following case. After he had been repeatedly humiliated
by his own failure, he says, “I felt as if I were so inefficient. I said
to myself, ‘If I had a man working for me and he should do work in that
manner I would discharge him.’” G. then continued to talk to himself
like another person in rather severe condemnatory language. B. was
reading a book. He could not understand the author’s demonstration. He
had made several trials at it. He states, “I felt as if I must be
stupid, somehow; there was a slight feeling of worry and dejection. The
idea of my stupidity was followed by anger at myself for being so
stupid. I clinched my fists and threw my arms in angry demonstration,
feeling as if I would like to pummel myself. I went over the
demonstration again with an attitude of carefulness and finally
concluded that it was the author who was hazy instead of myself. I
slammed the book down on the table and broke forth angrily, ‘You, X.,
are the one who is stupid, you don’t make it clear.’ This anger at the
author was rather pleasant in quality. I felt a sort of triumph over
him.”

Another situation quite common in the origin of anger with a
fore-period of lowered self-feeling, is its appearance at times with
greater intensity after the actual outside stimulus is passed. One
becomes more angry in recalling afterward what was said, than he was
at the time of the offense. This belated origin of anger appears
in the observations of all the subjects studied. It may be noted
that anger with a fore-period of irritation does not appear in this
retarded manner. In the recall of an incident in imagination, anger
may become quite intense; while it may be at the time of the incident,
there was no awareness of any tendency to anger. Mild anger at the
time of the initial stimulus may become intensified in its recall.
In such cases there was evidently some element lacking in the mental
situation stimulating anger. An offensive statement in the heat of an
irascible discussion may be ignored. A rather severe thrust may seem
proper, but when recalled in connection with another mental situation,
the emotional content may be entirely changed. X. in the course of
an argument with E. implied, “You never will know as much about the
subject under discussion as Y.” “At the time I noted his statement and
was aware that it was a thrust at myself, but I had no feeling about
the matter then. I considered that I was producing the better argument,
and his personal thrust I was aware was an admission on his part that
he knew I was. To-day I recalled his statement and felt degraded and
angry.” Then C. proceeded to plan a series of cutting remarks that he
would like to tell X. In some instances the presence of a too active
aggressive attitude at the time of the stimulus seems to predispose
against a too easy lowering of self-esteem, and consequently anger with
a fore-period of negative self-feeling does not appear. But let one
momentarily lose faith in his point of view or fail in words to express
it, and he becomes more sensitive to the thrusts of his opponent’s
argument.

Another factor partly accounts for the greater emotional intensity of
the recalled incident. The conventional control of emotions during
social contact may be relaxed during the memory recall. The same ethical
standard is not required for one’s private thinking as in actual contact
with others. In this respect there is rather wide individual difference
with the subjects studied. Though in general with persons of rather
intense emotions, there is a marked difference in the ethical standard
they practice, when the incident is present to consciousness, and the
standard used when the anger occurs from the imaged situation; with all
persons studied at times during their most intense anger emotions, the
imaginative reaction is far more crude and unethical, and consequently
the imaged anger may be more intense. A third factor may be involved
here. A personal thrust may be partly ignored at the time without
lowered dignity because it is given with a smile or a friendly attitude,
but when recalled later, the friendliness may be neglected and
consequently anger is more intense. A fourth condition that partly
accounts for more intense anger in the imaged situation, is that the
anger consciousness of this type is usually cumulative. With an entirely
novel experience, a certain amount of resistance must be broken down
before the emotion develops. The emotion seems to develop by a
cumulative process through a series of stimuli. One personal thrust in a
situation in which there is involved no previous emotional excitement,
may be ignored or the humiliation may be borne at the time with no anger
reactions; but when it is repeated one or more times under similar
circumstances, there is present a characteristic mental situation for
the development of anger. The repeated occurrence of the incident in the
imagination intensifies the feelings till anger becomes fully developed.
E.’s observations will illustrate. “During the argument with X., I was
in splendid humor, enjoying myself to the fullest and naturally supposed
everybody was.” Referring to a statement made by X. during the argument,
E. states, “The glow of the conflict had not entirely departed when I
began to see his statement in an entirely new light as reflecting on
myself, then I felt somewhat distressed and overcome to a slight degree,
by a feeling of abasement but no resentment against X. The next day at
ten o’clock I was recalling the events of the argument. There was still
a feeling of abasement but now it stirred me to anger. I found myself
going over it and thinking what I might have said, and what I would say
the next time.”

_Anger Without an Immediate Feeling Fore-period._ This study was begun
tentatively with the view held by Wundt (21) that each emotion of anger
has an immediate feeling fore-period. The study had not progressed far
till this view had to be abandoned. It early appeared in the
observations that anger may begin rather suddenly with no initial
feeling fore-period, which the observer is able to find. The subject
reports that he suddenly finds himself in the midst of an emotion of
anger before he is scarcely aware of it, and is giving verbal and motor
expressions usually accompanying such emotions. In many of the emotions
of this type there is evidence in the observations that the emotion
refers to a previous emotional experience. From the mental disposition
left over from the previous emotion, the emotion suddenly emerges
without passing through the cumulative process that is necessary with an
entirely novel emotional experience. In other words the way has
previously been broken so that it is not necessary to break down the
same amount of resistance. A. observes, “Sitting in my room, I imaged X.
At once I was angry, motor expression not marked at first. X. was imaged
in a rather positive and demonstrative attitude which he sometimes
takes. I found myself with quite a good deal of motor activity saying in
voco-motor fashion as if talking to X.——I was partly aware of three
former disagreements with X., the imagery of the circumstances of the
last one was most clearly defined. I imagined X. a little humbled by my
remark. The emotional experience from the first was pleasant. I felt a
little victorious in the imaginary act of dealing a telling thrust.”

With all persons studied, there is evidence of a previously developed
mental disposition against certain persons and against certain
principles which allows the anger point to be reached in a short cut
fashion. Anger is easily attained without the initial feeling either
of irritation or lowered self-feeling. Anger that rises from this
situation is usually pleasant in quality. The mental disposition which
is connected with this sudden origin of anger may be present during
the later recall of the emotion. It is also shown by the frequent
re-occurrence that the same situation may repeatedly give rise to
anger. B. has a rather strongly developed sentiment against ministers
who preach what they do not believe; G. against persons who do their
work carelessly, especially manufacturers who send out goods of
inferior quality. I. has a marked sentiment against acts of cruelty in
the treatment of animals. D. reacts rather vigorously against persons
who are disloyal to friendship. These sentiments go back to early
experiences in the life of the individuals.

B. in talking with X. directed the conversation to ministers who preach
what they really do not believe. He took Dr. Y. as an example. He had
previously seen Dr. Y. drinking beer with the boys and had resented his
behavior. He began to vituperate to X. against Y., giving instances and
telling his opinion rather vigorously about such men who have a double
personality. “Before I was scarcely aware of it, I was in the midst of
motor and verbal expressions of righteous indignation. I enjoyed it all
very much. I always take delight in making myself angry with ministers
of this sort.” B. has reported other instances of his anger against
ministers of this type. A case from I. will illustrate further. “I had
the same recurring anger for three weeks. A delivery boy who passes
about the same time each day goes by whipping and abusing his horse.
Anger arises each time the incident occurs. The sight made me pleasantly
indignant. I have the image of an old German, living near my home as a
child, who treated his horse so cruelly. The idea of telephoning to the
police occurs to me, but the boy goes on and the idea is abandoned.”




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                              CHAPTER TWO

                       BEHAVIOR OF CONSCIOUSNESS


------------------------------------------------------------------------


Wundt (21) has pointed out that there are two types of reaction to
an emotion, what he calls outer and inner volitional acts. The first
refers to the external bodily expression of an emotion and the latter
to the mental behavior. In the study of the emotions, attention has
for the most part been directed to the former. Darwin’s study of the
emotions in man and animals, early called attention to the finer
physical expressions of each emotion, explaining them as instinctive
habits which were formerly useful. Darwin’s study partly paved the way
for the James-Lange theory, which maintains that what we experience as
an emotion is but the sensation of the instinctive physical expression.

The aim of this chapter is to study the mental behavior during the
conscious period the anger exists. It is recognized that the motor and
physical expressions is primary and fundamental. For that reason it has
served so adequately in the objective study of the emotion. What we
shall attempt to study is the mental behavior of persons under the
influence of anger. Ethics tells us how we ought to act when angry, but
psychology has neglected to find out how in reality consciousness does
behave when the emotional excitement is on. David Iron’s (12) statement
is still apropos. He writes, “The neglect of the reactive side of human
consciousness is nowhere more conspicuous than in the case of the
emotions.”

The anger consciousness is characterized by heightened mental activity.
A multiple number of images, attitudes, fluctuations of the emotional
and feeling content appear in rapid succession till the emotion
disappears. This statement is true for even the more tenuous instances
of anger. In fact some of the milder experiences have the most marked
changeableness of conscious content. Objectively there may be little
activity, while simultaneously on the mental side, there is a wealth of
processes which must be considered in the psychology of the emotions.

After making a rather minute collection of the different kinds of mental
reaction to anger, as shown by the introspections, it is observed that
they fall into three rather clear types of conscious behavior. The first
type is in the general direction of the emotive tendency and is the one
that most impulsively follows on the stimulus of the emotion. It
expresses pugnacity in some form. This type of reaction expresses a
tendency similar to the basal instinct of the emotion of anger, such as
thinking cutting remarks, imagining the offender’s humiliation, hostile
witticism, joking and sarcasm. This type of a reaction will be called
_attributive reaction_. A second type is contrary to pugnacity; the
instinctive impulse is reversed. A friendly attitude may be assumed
toward the offender, an adequate excuse it found for his offense, an
over polite attitude may be taken. This type of behavior will be called
the _contrary reaction_. A third type is one that is entirely of a
conscious attitudinal character. The subject becomes indifferent to the
whole situation exciting the emotion. The offense may suddenly be
apathetically ignored and the subject behaves unconcerned and assumes an
“I don’t care,” or a “What-is-the-use” attitude. This will be called
_indifferent reaction_. These three types of behavior are characteristic
of the reactive consciousness to anger. The emotion may contain one, or
it may contain all three of these types before it finally ends. Going
over the results of the observations of all the subjects, about fourteen
hundred sixty eight reactions are counted in the six hundred cases of
anger studied. Seventy one percent of such reactions are classified as
attributive reaction, eighteen percent are the contrary type, and eleven
percent are the indifferent.

The initial reaction to anger is always of the attributive type.
Whatever other reactions may follow in the course of the entire anger
period, the attributive reaction in some form is characteristic of the
early stage of the emotion. The contrary and indifferent types are
secondary in point of time and occur after the initial hostile
tendencies have been restrained. If an emotion of anger is made up
entirely of the attributive type, which frequently occurs, and continues
for any length of time, it is always noted that some of the reactions
are more crude and unsocial and others are refined, disguised it may be,
covered up, and when the emotion is most intense whether it be in the
initial stage or elsewhere, the unsocial attributive tendencies are
usually found at those places.


                          ATTRIBUTIVE REACTION

The anger consciousness in its development, especially in its initial
stage is characterized by restraint. The subject is aware of hostile
unlawful impulses that must be controlled. Its initial stage is usually
reported as unpleasant. The second characteristic of the anger
consciousness is reaction of some sort. What takes place on the mental
side, is along the line of least resistance for the moment. Mental life
is rather versatile in providing subjective reaction to anger. Motor and
visual imagery play an important role involving lessened resistance. A
third characteristic of the anger consciousness is what the Germans call
“Verschiebung.” The emotive tendency is inhibited. A substitution
follows for the tendencies restrained. It may be purely subjective or
only partly subjective. But the subject in the observation of his anger
is fully aware that he would behave in some more drastic fashion if the
restraint were off.

_Substitution of Visual and Motor Imagery._ With the subjects studied
there occurred no real pugnacious attack in which blows were struck
except with those persons who have the correction of children; there are
also but few real quarrels reported. But the versatility of
consciousness in substituting and providing merely mental reaction for
other hostile tendencies that the subject really wished fulfilled is
quite striking. Visual and motor imagery may take the place of
tendencies which are inhibited and allow a successful expression. An
observation from A. will illustrate. “I found myself saying cutting
remarks as if speaking directly to X., and I planned a course of
behavior toward him that I considered would humiliate him. I finally
ended by imagining myself kicking him down the street, telling him I
wanted no more to do with him. The imagery of this act was pleasant. I
felt victorious. X. was imagined as penitent.” The imagery of the
pugnacious attack in some form is a quite common characteristic of the
mental reaction to anger. It occurs after a period of restraint when
there seems nothing else to be done; imagination and fancy appear at
such a crisis and assume the role of a surrogate for hostile tendencies,
which the subject has controlled. The awareness of the direct end of the
initial tendency of the anger may be present in consciousness or the aim
may be indefinite. Subject I. observes, “I felt as if I wanted to say
something or do something at once that would get even with X. The thing
to do was vague, but the impulse to do something in a hostile manner was
strong.” The aim of behavior may be rather definitely formed in the
early stage of the anger consciousness as soon as the irascible feelings
are definitely referred to some object. An illustration from A.
follows:—“The impulse to take X. (a child) and shake him, was strong on
the first stimulus of the emotion; suppressing this I spoke crossly to
him, at the same time there appeared motor imagery of my holding him
with both hands and shaking him.” Another instance from the same
subject: “I had an impulse to punish X., restraint was immediately
followed by a motor and visual imagery of the act of punishment.”
Subject C. observes, “The first impulse was to kick X., the restraint
was accompanied by motor images of kicking him, followed by the image of
his being hurt in the face.” E. states, “I felt as if I would like to
shake him and imagined myself doing it.” G. developed a case of anger
from a series of irritating stimuli. Describing his anger, he says, “I
felt like I wanted to bite or hit something.” B. reports a case when he
had been humiliated by some boys along the street. The tendency to anger
at the time was controlled, but as he passed on, the emotion arose with
greater intensity. “I imagined myself beating one of the boys, I gave
him several good punches; he had no show at all. I came out victor and
was enjoying it all.” One of the many sorts of mental reactions that H.
reports to a case of anger that extended over three quarters of an hour,
is, “I imagined myself charging at him and his looking frightened at my
behavior.”

_Substitution of Irascible Play._ The imagined fight and victory take
the place of tendencies which would have a more objective expression.
Another sort of substitution of the initially restrained emotional
reaction, is first to lessen the restraint by inhibition and react in
some less crude manner in a slightly disguised form, which gives a
feeling of satisfaction in inner victory and at the same time lacks the
objective hostility. A. felt humiliated because of X.’s remark in the
presence of others. “Resenting his familiarity, I went out of my way to
pass him; I grabbed his arm and gave it a tremendous grip, at the same
time I smiled playfully. I really aimed to hurt him and was fully aware
that I wished to hurt him worse than I did. What I did was merely a
substitution, but now that the act was over, I felt fully satisfied and
pleased with what I had done.” The playful attack is a rather common
sort of reaction to resentment with observers A., C. and D. D. observes,
“I was angry at X. and was trying to control myself; suddenly I grabbed
him and punched him several times in the ribs, at the same time I
smiled. I did not want him or the others to know I was angry. I enjoyed
pummelling him, as I felt I had demonstrated to him that I could handle
him.” In such observations the subject’s awareness that what he does in
a playful fashion is but a substitution of what he would like to do in
another manner, is significant. This sort of awareness seems to be
ignored in the every-day experience of our emotional life. Attention is
directed to the reaction; we involuntarily seek a place of lessened
resistance, but the act of introspection allows the subject to be more
clearly aware of the inhibited reaction and the substituted expression
which follows.

_Substitution of Imaginary Invective and Cutting Remarks._ The vocal
expression of anger is one of primary significance. Swearing, grumbling,
invective, quarrelling, interjectional obloquy, etc., are very common
signs of anger. The results would very strongly suggest that anger
rarely, if ever, occurs without its vocal expression in some manner, if
not by direct vocalization either by inner speech or voco-motor imagery.
Introspection of slight emotions or anger lasting momentarily, show as
their most marked sensation, one of tightening of the throat muscles.
Defamatory language or mild swearing is common with all the subjects
studied while in the privacy of their own rooms when the restraint is
off. The expression of the vocal cords is one of the most successful
vents. B. was instructed to abandon himself to vigorous invective and
interjectional obloquy when the emotion first began and note the result.
He followed these instructions on three occasions when the emotion from
the beginning was unpleasant, developing from a fore-period of
irritation. With this sort of voluntary vigorous vocal expression, the
anger soon passed into rather pleasurable excitement.

The reaction to anger in its initial stage may be a vocal tendency to
express one’s anger, referring the emotion directly to some person or to
an object. When the restraint is on, either from motives of decency or
the absence of the offender, the thinking of cutting remarks may be
substituted for the actual verbal attack. The subject is aware that what
he says to himself he would like to say to the offender. Methods of
procedure are elaborately planned for a future verbal attack, just what
he expects to say and wants to say, how he will say it, the inflection
of the voice, the emphasis of words and dramatic attitude. He may
imagine the effect of the attack on his opponent, the latter may talk
back. The imagined verbal combat is usually a one-sided affair and ends
in victory for the subject. Drastic remarks and the most cutting
sarcasms are planned at times by the subjects studied. However there are
wide individual differences which cannot be referred entirely to the
difference in intensity of the emotional life. Habit apparently plays an
important role. D. felt that he had been imposed upon by X. and Y. After
the humiliating incident had passed, D. suddenly found himself in the
midst of an anger reaction. “I found myself having a verbal combat with
them. I imagined I was telling X., ‘I should think it costs but little
to act like a gentleman, but I presume this is an illustration of your
piggishness.’ Then I imagined Y. beginning to talk. Just what he was
saying was not clear, but I was aware that he was helping X. I
interrupted by telling him, ‘I understand you are from —— and of course
I can’t expect anything better of you.’ They began to talk back several
times, but I got the better of them and felt pleased about it.”

The cutting remarks are at times crude and abusive. The subject may
swear at the offender. Persons who do not swear in actual life
frequently do in imagination. In such imaginative verbal attacks the
offender’s bad qualities are displayed before him, at other times the
same subject may resort to imagery, sarcasm, witticism or joking of a
hostile nature. The motivation seems to be to imagine remarks that would
humiliate the offender. The visual imagery of the astonished humble
opponent is usual in these imaginary attacks. Crude and abusive remarks
may at times seem entirely appropriate; at others, sarcasm and irascible
joking seem more adequate. Sarcasm usually develops rather slowly with a
period of restraint preceding it, unless it is ready made for the
occasion. When the fitting sarcastic remark is found, it is usually
accompanied by pleasantness in some degree. F. observes, “I could get no
imaginative remark that would suit me at first, but after the emotion
appeared several times in succession I suddenly discovered one and found
myself saying it over and over again. It rather pleased me, I practiced
it to get the right inflection and emphasis that I desired.”

The imaginative cutting remark may be in the second person as if
addressed directly to the offender, especially when the emotion is
intense. It may be in the third person about the offender, his
unfavorable qualities are recalled with no plan or intention of
repeating his remarks to him. The contemplation of his unworthiness is
accompanied by an agreeable feeling. B. became righteously indignant at
X. because of an incident of ungentlemanly conduct toward a friend. He
observes, “A moment later (that is after the first instance of anger) I
imagined myself in my alcove in the Library, and imagined some other
person, I did not know, who came in and said to me, ‘What do you think
of X?’ I replied with a good deal of pleasurable indignation, ‘I think
he is a damned ass.’ Three-quarters of an hour later as I was walking
along the street, the emotion arose again, and I imagined some one
asking the same question, I replied the same as before with a like
feeling of pleasure. I really wanted some one to ask me what I thought
of X.” The subject may be aware that what he says to and about the
opponent is a little unfair, but at the time that the emotion is
progressing, he ignores it and wants to believe ill of the offender.

The results of this study abundantly show that a make-believe attitude
plays an important role in the anger consciousness, in both the
development of the anger and the reactive consciousness. It is believed
momentarily, when the anger is most intense, that the offender is really
a bad man. Pausing for introspection in the midst of such emotional
reaction, it is frequently reported, “I knew very well I would say
nothing of the sort and that X. was not so bad as I believed him.” While
the emotion is most intense, ill reports about the offender which were
previously ignored are now believed and assumed as true, and
satisfaction is derived by degrading the best qualities of the offender,
by believing stories of ill repute, by suspecting or imagining evil of
him. The degree in which this tendency is present, depends partly on the
intensity of the emotion, and evidently in part on the individual habits
of reaction to anger. The chronic irascible gossiper is evidently a
characteristic type of person who has specialized in this mode of
reaction to anger.

_Substitutions by Witticism and Irony._ Witticism, sarcasm, irony,
teasing and joking make up a large class of vocal and imaginal reactions
which may take the place of the initially restrained emotional tendency.
The crude remarks, transformed into wit or fitting sarcasm, overcome the
consciousness restraint that was initially present in the emotion and
lessen resistance. It is accompanied by a pleasant feeling and may be
keenly delightful. A thrust in a half serious tone accompanied by a
smile, the jest and hostile joke follow a state of mind characterized by
restraint. In the observations of the subjects studied there is evidence
supporting Freud’s (8) theory of wit. What he calls “tendency wit”; that
is, wit with a definite aim has two divisions, the hostile joke and the
obscene joke. The first is a reaction to irascible anger and the latter
to the sexual emotions. The introspection of the reactive stage of anger
consciousness shows the Freudian mechanism for “tendency wit.” The
following case will illustrate a crude kind of wit. H. whose husband had
stayed out late at night became angry following a period of worry.
Fluctuating intensities of anger and periods of worry lasted over an
hour. After a number of reactions such as planning verbal attacks;
recalling his thoughtless behavior at other times; crying, assuming an
attitude of self-pity; devising some means of making him sorry; at times
trying to assume the attitude that it was no use to be angry; taking
observations of the emotion at a number of places, motivated by a wish
that her husband would see the results and feel sorry; imagining herself
going to him and talking rather abusively. Finally she found a remark
that gave the keenest pleasure of all. “I imagined myself saying, ‘Petty
dear, you have been out pretty late tonight.’” This was a condensed
veiled statement expressing about all she would like to say. “Petty” is
a character portrayed in a current illustrated newspaper as being mean
to his wife and flaring up angrily at every little incident. The
character of “Petty” was fully understood by her husband. The crude
hostile reaction was followed by a rather condensed acute remark; it was
reported as pleasant, “because it seemed so fitting.”

C. in a discussion with X. became angry and gives the following
observation, “I noted I was getting angry and wanted to say something
hostile, but instead I turned away suddenly and laughed, saying in a
joking, half-serious manner, ‘Oh you old bottle head, you don’t know
anything.’ Although I laughed, I really meant it. That gave complete
satisfaction. He laughed too.” Let us illustrate further. A., with four
others, was walking along the street, coming from a clinic at the
hospital, where a case of flight of ideas had just been observed. X.,
one of the party, was talking in a manner that seemed to A. a little
superfluous. He resented his attitude, and turning he said to X. in a
joking manner, “What did you say? The malady must be catching,”
(referring to the case observed). X. retorted, “I never have any fixed
ideas.” A. replied, “No, they do fly away pretty fast.” A. observed, “I
felt pleased and victorious with my remark, my resentment was entirely
gone and I entered into conversation with X. in a friendly manner.”

Witticism is one of the more refined modes of substitution for the
more directly hostile attack. Sarcasm is cruder. Its mechanism depends
for the most part upon the inflection and tone of voice in speaking.
The words themselves in sarcasm are innocent enough, but the mode of
expression and the meaning involved are the sources of hostility. The
following statement represent sarcastic remarks. A.—“I think I will
come around to your Club,” emphasis on the word “your.” A.—again, “You
surely must be right,” emphasis on “surely.” J.—“You are not the boss,
then?”—emphasis on “not,” with a little sneer and an accompanying
laugh. Sarcasm is a rather cheap and easy reaction to anger. It is
consequently more easily attained than wit. The period of conscious
restraint preceding sarcasm is usually less, unless the witticism
is already made for the occasion. Its feeling effect is also not so
pleasant as of wit. At times sarcasm may be combined with rather
crude wit, but wit of a more refined type will exclude sarcasm. The
following is a combination of this kind. C., having become angry at X.
for his “bragging attitude,” says, “I was conscious of the tendency
to say something hostile, but could think of nothing appropriate. In
the course of his remarks X. finally said, ‘I never read anything for
an experiment as I fear it might bias my results.’ I suddenly found
a remark that seemed entirely fitting at the time and at once the
restraint was off. I said a little sarcastically, ‘No, you never
want to read anything, it might hurt your intellect.’ As soon as the
statement was made I saw I had gone too far and felt a little cheap.
I at once noted that he did not take my remark seriously, and felt
relieved. My former resentment had entirely disappeared.”

_Substitution by Disguise._ There are many devices less refined than wit
which are commonly resorted to in slightly disguising the hostile
attack. The offender may be attacked indirectly and impersonally. The
following case will illustrate. F. became angry at a merchant because,
when he went to pay for an article, the price was marked more than he
had previously agreed to pay. Feeling resentful, he said, “I suppose the
bill is all right, the clerk said it would be less, but people in this
town don’t know what they are talking about anyway.” F. observes, “What
I really meant was that you don’t know what you are talking about.” To
avoid making the direct attack, the indefinite pronoun is substituted at
times for the definite. The use of “some one” or “somebody” instead of
“you,” in talking to the offender blunts the remark. The device is
rather cheap affording little pleasure and has but a short fore-period
of restraint. It is carried to an extreme when the subject pretends he
does not know the perpetrator of the offense and in fact may assume it
is some one else, so that he may speak his mind directly to the
offender. I. observes, “I was angry, and talked to her about the affair
as if I did not know that she did it. I wouldn’t have had her to know
that I knew for anything. I told her what I thought of a person who had
acted in that way and noted that she looked cheap. That pleased me.”
Some gossip and vituperate against their enemies and derive a moiety of
ill-gotten pleasure if a sympathetic hearer is found. One subject
states, “I went to tell X., hoping he would be angry too, and felt just
a little disappointed when he was not.” Hints and insinuations often
become devices to avoid a too hostile direct attack.

_Imaginary Exaltation of Self._ Another rather important reaction of
the attributive type is an idealistic one. Imagination and ideational
processes are active. Lowered self-feeling has been accomplished in
the subject usually by a number of repeated offenses by some one that
the subject really respects. The offender is frequently not imagined
as degraded, but he is left as he is, and the subject proceeds to
imagine,—it may be to fancy or day-dreams that he is the offender’s
superior. As the reaction to moments of humiliation, he may later plan
to surpass him. An attitude of make-believe may be momentarily assumed
that he is already the offender’s superior. Fantastic schemes of a
successful career may appear in which he imagines some distant future,
in which he has gained renown and the offender is glad to recall that
he knew him in other days. Sometimes he is imagined as seeking his
friendship or advice, or favor, and is refused with dignity. At the
next moment he may be graciously bestowing favors upon the offender.
Such imaginative processes are observed to afford pleasure to the
subject at the time and may lead to a new level of self-confidence
which has important influences on later behavior. Usually idealistic
reactions of this character appear in consciousness after more directly
hostile reactions have failed to satisfy the subject. A few cases
will illustrate. A., recalling an incident of the day before which
humiliated him, became angry. At first he began saying in voco-motor
fashion as if talking directly to X., “You are a conceited fellow. You
are hard to get along with. I will beat you. You are too nervous to get
very far.” “I imagined myself treating him in a superior, dignified
manner.” A. then laid plans how he would work, stick to one thing, make
himself a recognized authority, and how he would have little to do
with X. He imagined X. coming to him for favors when he had attained
the success he had planned, and himself taking a rather indifferent
attitude toward his requests. A. observes that his entire reverie
was pleasant, although the anger was unpleasant in the beginning. C.
reports a case of anger at X. who had taken a rather critical attitude
toward a problem which he was studying. He observes, “At first there
was a slight humiliated feeling. This was displaced by resentment. I
imagined myself standing before X. and giving him two good retorts
which I considered would have their ill effects on him. At this point
the theme changed, ‘I will leave you alone and have nothing to do with
you,’ I felt as if this behavior would somehow punish him, and that
pleased me a little.” But as a third and final reaction C. observes
the following. “I planned to do my work so well that X. would feel
sorry for what he had said, I imagined X. complimenting me after it
was finished.” The early stage of the emotion above was reported as
unpleasant, the final ending in which C. imagines X. complimenting him
on his success was a point of marked pleasure. Subject E. who had felt
humiliated by X. whom he considered had underestimated him, observed as
a final reaction, “I will show him in the next ten years, I am young
and can work, and he will see.” Then followed a number of plans for
the future. One subject reacts for a moment at times to resentment by
day dreams in which he imagines himself a man of wealth and deals out
favors to all except his enemy. He even uses his wealth and influence
against him. The feeling is rather pleasant in tone till the moment
he comes back to a sense of reality. The transition decreases the
pleasantness rather suddenly.

_Attitudinal Reactions._ Attitudinal reactions of a hostile nature are
an important part of the anger consciousness. What may be called
“resolutional attitudes” frequently occur as one of the final mental
reactions in the diminution of the emotion. The resolutional attitude to
do something in the future at a more convenient time when the effects
will be greater, becomes a convenient substitute for conscious
tendencies that require present restraint. The subject definitely
settles on a course of action which cannot be carried out at once. The
feeling tone of such conscious attitudes is pleasant. It is not unusual
to have a settled resolution and come to a definite conclusion in the
initial reactive stage of the emotion. Unless the attitude is ready made
for the occasion, it appears as one of the final resorts. A
characteristic of “nowness” belongs to anger. An attitude that portends
to future behavior is secondary, appearing after the possibilities of
present reactions are exhausted. Much of the initial restraint in
inhibitions is preparatory to the attainment of a settled conclusion; in
some cases initial reaction behaves in a trial and error fashion. The
results of a number of hostile impulses are imagined and are followed to
their end until finally one is selected that seems most fitting. The
conclusion reached may be temporary. Although it may be abandoned on the
reappearance of the emotion, there is a temporary satisfaction in having
attained a conclusive attitude even momentarily. The following case from
C. will illustrate. C. became angry on being told of X.’s behavior. He
first recalled a number of previous similar instances; second, he
transferred the anger momentarily to another person who told him of the
offense; third, he imagined himself cutting off all business relations
with X. and as a fourth reaction he observes, “I took on a pugnacious
attitude and concluded to fight it out according to the rules of the
game, and planned what I would do and say to make him come my way.” The
attitude of waiting for further developments, biding one’s time, being
cautious, is a frequent substitute for rising tendencies demanding
present action. Subject E. observes, “I finally came to the conclusion
not to lie in wait for the opportunity to get back at the offender, but
to be on guard against a future attack, but even after the conclusion
was formed it was not at once carried out though it pleased me. I still
found myself planning what I would say if the thing should be repeated.”
A. angry at X. and Y., finally came to the following hostile conclusive
attitude, “They had better be doing nothing like that, I will watch
them, and when I get a chance they will hear from me. I will be cautious
and sure first, with which final conclusion my anger disappeared.”


                         THE CONTRARY REACTION

The second general type of reaction to anger is what we have called
contrary reaction. The subject suddenly reacts contrary to the emotive
tendency of the emotion. He behaves contrary to what he actually wishes
at the time. Religion and morals have idealized this type of behavior in
its extreme form. “Turn the other cheek,” “Love your enemy,” “Do good to
those that hate you,” are exhortations of more than one religion. As
compared with the type described above, relatively a small percent of
the mental reactions under the influence of anger, as shown by the
observations of all the subjects studied, are classed as the contrary
reactive type, eighteen percent as compared with seventy one percent.

The contrary reaction is not so rich in versatile behavior as the one
just described, in fact it is limited to a few set reactions. The
subject suddenly reacts to a state of mind contrary to anger. It may
take strong effort to make the change and the attitude is not heartily
entered into at first and does not usually occur when the emotion is
most intense, but after it is partly diminished, consequently it is
usually delayed till a later stage of the emotion. If it appears in the
initial stage it precludes a complete development of the emotion.
Subject G. has apparently acquired the habit of championing, in the
initial stage of the emotion, the offender’s point of view and
forestalling the development of anger against persons. His anger is
attained most fully against objects and situations. He considers this
due to his training in early childhood. E. has developed a partial habit
of assuming an attitude of forgiveness toward the offender. C. and A.
when in a quandary and unable to find other adequate means of
expression, suddenly revert to the contrary reaction. It becomes a
habitual device toward close and intimate friends or toward persons with
whom it is necessary to get along. After the anger has gone so far, the
subject suddenly assumes a friendly attitude as if there were no
emotion.

There are various conditions under which this sort of mental reaction
to anger occurs. It is a frequent device in a social situation when
there is rising anger and it becomes necessary to adopt a sudden and
quick control. It is forced upon the subject to meet a sudden crisis.
He may at once assume an over-friendly or over-polite behavior, when
in reality he would like to behave in a hostile manner. A little
over-solicitude for the offender may be conspicuously displayed. A few
cases will illustrate. B. was met on the stairs by his landlady, who
requested him not to write on his machine after ten o’clock, also to
put on his slippers on coming home late before ascending the stairs.
He observes, “Before she had finished I felt uncomfortable and was
vaguely aware of the inconvenience that these limitations would cause
me. I recalled that she had said that I could use the typewriter all
I wished when I took the room; I found myself becoming angry, but at
once I took the attitude of excusing her. I noted that she looked tired
while she was talking, and thought perhaps I had kept her awake. I then
said with an extra pleasant tone, ‘That is all right, I am very glad
you speak of it, I wish you had told me before.’ The pleasantness was
assumed, I did not feel pleasant as I spoke, I was still mildly angry.
Five minutes later I recalled what she had said and began to get angry
again, but at once imaged her tired appearance and excused her as
before.” A.’s observation illustrates further. A. was humiliated and
angry at X.’s statement. “I wanted to say something cutting, several
hostile remarks appeared which were inhibited one after the other. I
felt extremely confused and unpleasant but I suddenly began to agree
with X. I told him in an over-polite manner he was quite right and that
I was glad he had mentioned it. In reality I did not agree with him nor
was I glad.” A. states that on leaving the presence of X. the emotion
reappeared many times in the course of the next half day and in no
case did he find any excuse for X.’s behavior but blamed him severely.
When the contrary reaction is resorted to as a device to gain quick
control, it is reported as unpleasant. The emotion reappears again and
is usually followed by unpleasant feelings, but when it is not forced
upon the subject and is entered into spontaneously with zest, as a
means of finding some sort of satisfaction for the emotional restraint,
it is accompanied by pleasant feelings. Subject A. sometimes takes
keen delight in assuming a dignified attitude toward an offender and
treating him rather friendly as if he were far above getting angry. He
states, “I always feel I am victor, that I am master of the situation,
and it is pleasing when I do this.” It may be said that whenever the
attributive reaction is satisfactory, the contrary reaction is not
resorted to. The latter type occurs for the most part when the subject
is mentally obstructed and there seems nothing else to be done but to
ally himself heartily with the opponent for the moment until the storm
of his mental stress is passed. Subject J. in a situation, when it
would be rude to display his anger, observes, “Each time I found myself
becoming angry at X.’s remarks, I would take a negative attitude toward
the rising impulse and laugh quite good naturedly at his statement. The
laugh was not forced, I entered into it heartily.” Subject C. finds
himself at times suddenly laughing at the most commonplace remarks
when mildly angry at an offence. It is a common device of subject B.
to burst out laughing at his behavior when mildly angry, as if he
were merely a spectator of his emotion and not a partaker of it. “I
recalled the offensive behavior of X. which had happened two hours
before. I found myself in an emotion of slight anger, followed by an
explosive, ‘Damn that X.’ There was present much motor tension in
arms and face muscles, then noting my angry demonstrations I laughed
outright at myself and felt pleased.” The anger disappeared entirely
with the act. It is frequently reported that a sudden pause in the
midst of unpleasant anger to introspect, is pleasant when attention is
directed to the behavior, but when attention passes to the situation
exciting the emotion, anger tends to be reinstated again. Observations
like the following are reported: “Pausing to observe my emotion, my
whole behavior seemed so ludicrous that I had to laugh.” The subject
may suddenly assume his opponent’s point of view, find a number of
probable excuses for his behavior and at times actually imagine himself
as champion for his enemy against himself. He does this heartily at
times when there is no outside compulsion and derives a feeling of
pleasure in the act. The contrary reaction may be hostilely resorted to
in some instances. The subject is aware that his aim is to humiliate
his opponent by making him ashamed and sorry; but it is usually
reported that, after he has assumed the over-friendly attitude with its
hostile intent, there is a self-satisfaction in the sudden breaking up
of the unpleasant conscious restraint. Subject D. observes, “I knew I
was doing the favor to make him feel ashamed; watching him, I saw he
was not ashamed in the least but I continued my friendliness and felt
pleased in doing it. There was no regret when I saw that he did not
take the matter as I had at first wished.” In the contrary reaction, a
joke or witticism may be employed, but it has an entirely different aim
from the joke discussed in attributive reaction. It lacks hostility.
Its aim is friendliness, the theme is contrary to the situation giving
rise to anger and serves to distract the attention from the emotion.


                        THE INDIFFERENT REACTION

The third class of mental reactions to anger is what has been called the
indifferent type. It is attitudinal in character. The subject assumes
for the time an indifferent attitude toward the situation and person
exciting the emotion. Eleven percent of the reactions of all the
subjects studied may be classified under this type. It occurs as one of
the last resorts when there is nothing else to be done. If it appears in
the initial stage of anger, the emotion does not fully develop. It is
not reported as actually pleasant but rather passively relieving for the
time. Subject B. had received a piece of adverse information in a
letter. He observes, “At first, I was angry and at once threw the letter
down on the table in an attitude of not caring anything about it. I felt
that nothing could be done. I had really wanted the information badly. I
threw up my hands and moved my body suddenly with a ‘don’t care’
feeling.” B. reports that he recalled the situation several times later,
but the anger did not appear again. The same subject recalling the
offensive behavior of X. and Y. became angry, and observes, “I found
myself saying aloud, ‘Oh confound them, I don’t care anything about
them,’ and at once started to attend to something else. My saying I did
not care, made me feel as if I did not care; in fact now I really did
not care.” The sudden assuming of an apathetic attitude toward the
developing anger is a frequent device of subject B. A. after a rather
prolonged emotional reaction in which he imagined cutting remarks and
planned how he would retaliate, suddenly changed his attitude, saying,
“What is the use anyway, it is just X., I don’t care anything about him,
I will let him go his way.” C. when angry at times reenforces an assumed
attitude of indifference by saying to himself, “Here, you must not be
bothered about such things, be a good sport and play the game.” One at
times assumes an attitude of accepting the situation as it is, and
dropping the matter.




------------------------------------------------------------------------


                             CHAPTER THREE

                         DISAPPEARANCE OF ANGER


------------------------------------------------------------------------


The anger consciousness is one of variability and change. The emotion
may disappear rather suddenly with the appearance of a new emotion or it
may disappear gradually. There are usually fluctuating nodes of
increasing and diminishing intensity accompanying the changing direction
of attention, ideational behavior, and motor and mental activity in
general. Attention again to the situation exciting anger tends to
increase its intensity, if the situation from which it arises remains
unchanged.

Any behavior, whether mental or motor, which changes the total mental
situation from which anger originates, tends to modify the emotion
itself. This total mental situation cannot remain unchanged long. The
affective processes which have been aroused usually serve to redirect
attention again and again to the situation exciting anger. The aim of
angry behavior may be said to be three fold, referring to the total
mental situation from which the three main types of anger arise; (1) to
enhance self-feeling which has been lowered; (2) to get rid of the
opposing obstacle to the continuity of associative processes; (3) to
recover from one’s wounded sense of justice.

The total feeling situation becomes modified in the course of the
disappearance or diminution of the emotion. Anger which springs from a
fore-period of irritable feelings disappears by a different set of ideas
than from anger arising from a fore-period of negative self-feeling.

Pleasantness is an important condition in the diminution of anger.
There are but few instances that show no pleasantness in some degree
somewhere in the reactive stage of the emotion. The pleasantness ranges
from momentary mild relief to active delight. Periods of restraint
during anger are periods of unpleasantness. Periods of lessened
restraint are accompanied by relief or pleasantness. Two periods in
the development of anger are most unpleasant. (1) The entire cumulative
development of anger is unpleasant. It is a frequent observation in the
immediate fore-period, “I wanted to get angry at somebody or something,
I felt I would feel better if I did.” (2) Often during the active stage
of anger, there are found one or more periods of unpleasant inhibition
and restraint. This is often a stage of experiment in imagination,
foreseeing unpleasant results of too drastic behavior, inhibiting,
choosing and selecting in the effort to discover some reaction which
may successfully meet the emotional crisis of the moment. There
are cases of anger with all the persons studied, which do not get
beyond this inhibitive unpleasant stage. Anger may be almost entirely
unpleasant or mostly pleasant. Some persons have a greater mental
versatility than others in finding a successful expression to anger,
consequently they have relatively a greater proportion of pleasantness.
Under the influence of fatigue, the ability for successful expression
is lessened and there is a correspondingly increased tendency to
emotive excitation and decreased emotional control.

When a fully successful reaction is not found, anger dies hard. It may
become necessary to attend to something else voluntarily for self
protection. Anger disappearing unsuccessfully tends to recur again and
again, it may be. Its reappearance frequently allows the unpleasant
initial stage to be shortened or dropped entirely leaving a mildly
pleasant experience.

Anger disappears suddenly and pleasantly if the subject can gain the
subjective end of the emotion. Subject J. observes in the case of an
anger arising from a feeling of irritation, “At this moment (the moment
of successful expression) I felt pleased, my anger now disappeared
leaving a pleasant after-effect.” A case from A. will illustrate
further. A. got on the wrong street car. The conductor refused to allow
him to get off at his corner of the street. He observes he was angry,
not because he was hindered from getting off, but because of the
insulting attitude and remark of the conductor, who said in a hostile
manner, “Why did you not pay attention to what I said, this car does not
stop, you will have to go on.” A. then became angry and demanded in
rather severe language to have the car stopped. At this point the
conductor changed his attitude and stopped with no further words. A.
observes, “As I stepped off I had a distinct feeling of pleasantness. I
felt I had been victorious. I was no longer angry. Sensations were still
present in chest, arm and leg muscles but these were now pleasant. Upon
recalling the incident, I had not the least resentment against the
conductor. On the whole, I now felt glad the incident had occurred.”

Pleasantness may appear on the observation of the offender’s failure or
humiliation. C. becoming angry at X., who was manipulating some
laboratory apparatus, observes, “I let him proceed rather hoping he
would spoil his results. When I noted he was failing and observed his
discomposure, I felt pleased. That satisfied my anger against him at
once.”

The imaginal humiliation and trouble coming to the offender, also
increases the feeling of pleasantness and diminishes for the moment the
anger. The imaginative verbal or physical attacks usually allow a
subject to come out victor. What D. observes is typical. “I imagined he
was stunned by my attack, and the result pleased me; that satisfied my
anger.”

If the offender acts friendly and accommodating, that affords a relief
to the offended person and is a condition for the rapid disappearance of
anger. F. observes, “He behaved so friendly that I thanked him and felt
relieved. My anger was now almost gone.” C. became angry at X. for what
he had interpreted as a hostile attitude. Five minutes later X. sat down
by him. C. observes, “He acted sociable and I felt relieved, my anger
was entirely gone, in fact I now felt quite friendly toward him.” It is
also commonly reported that when the offender becomes submissive, it
affords a relief to the subject and usually kills the emotion. C.
observes, “After he had submitted, my anger had disappeared and I now
felt a little repentant at what I had done.” The same subject sometimes
observes that he imagines the absent offender at whom he is angry,
smiling and acting friendly in the usual way, and the imagined friendly
attitude is a relief to the emotion.

Anger which develops from a fore-period of negative self-feeling,
disappears when the subject is able to acquire a positive feeling
attitude toward the offender. It may be accomplished subjectively. The
subject tends to lower his opinion of his opponent, he enjoys an idle
gossip, it may be, at his expense, recalls ill reports he had previously
heard but ignored, and in fact may employ a number of devices of
imagination and make-believe. He at times tends to magnify the
offender’s unworthiness, and may come to the conclusion that he is
scarcely worth troubling about. Mental behavior of this sort is commonly
reported to enhance self-feeling. On the other hand the subject may
accomplish the same end by magnifying his own personal feelings directly
by dwelling on his own good qualities and worth in comparison with that
of the offender. Such comparisons are almost always to the disadvantage
of the opponent. Subject C., in a controversy with X., became angry and
walked away when the emotion was still intense. “I now began to recall
how insignificant he is and how important I am. He is narrow, pedantic
and incapable of seeing a large point of view. I am not so narrow. All
was slightly pleasant and was accompanied by a decreased intensity of my
emotion. I now met X. and joked with him; my anger was entirely gone.”
The feeling of superiority kills anger of the type which arises from a
fore-period of humiliation. It has already been indicated that when a
positive feeling is maintained in receiving an injury, anger does not
arise. The would-be offender if he is regarded as unworthy or
unaccountable for his act, does not usually excite anger. The same
person, however, may stimulate anger by a process of increased irritable
feelings. Subject A. beginning to get angry at X., (a person he holds in
low esteem) observes the following association. “Oh, it is just X., no
use in my getting angry at a fellow like that, he is not responsible
anyway, and I would be foolish to be bothered by him. I had started to
ridicule him but now my emotion was gone.”

A contemplated victory gives pleasure and diminishes anger even before
the victory is attained. The emotion disappears on assuming a positive
determined mental attitude, it may pass off in vehement resolution as to
further behavior. In fact, one may begin and finish his fight through
the medium of ideas and have no enthusiasm left for the actual
encounter.

With a third condition for the disappearance of anger, pleasantness is
present but usually in the form of mild relief. Positive self-feeling is
not so clearly marked in consciousness. The subject looks at the
offender’s point of view, finds excuses for his behavior, elevates his
opinion it may be of him. A new idea is added to the mental situation
exciting anger which entirely alters the feeling content, and
consequently anger disappears. Subject I. observes, “When I finally
concluded that X. meant well, my anger was almost gone.” G. resentful at
X. because he did not speak to him states, “I recalled suddenly that he
is cross-eyed and probably did not see me. I said to myself, ‘He is a
good fellow and is friendly toward me all right.’ My emotion was now
gone.” B. mildly angry at X. and Y. for intruding upon him, observes the
following soliloquy. “No, they have more right here than I have. This
room is for people to converse in rather than for one man to occupy
alone. My anger was now decreased but not entirely gone.” Even a
tentative excuse for the offender’s behavior allays anger temporarily.
The emotion may last for several days, appearing at intervals, and with
a sudden introduction of a new idea providing an adequate excuse for the
offence, the condition exciting the emotion will be completely changed.

Anger diminishes and disappears more frequently in the change of
attention than by any other one condition. A pause in the midst of anger
to attend to one’s mental behavior affords a diminution of the affective
process. It is often reported as amusing when a subject suddenly ceases
attending to the situation exciting the emotion and observes his mental
behavior; laughter at this point is often reported. Close attention to
the act of managing the irritating or humiliating incident, allows a
rather gradual diminution of anger. Anger does not arise when the
subject is rigidly attending to the damage done, but only when he begins
to feel the damage as humiliating, irritating or as contrary to justice.
One subject hums or sings when angry. A joke or witticism will break the
crust of conscious tension allowing the attention to be distracted
elsewhere.

The subject may suddenly assume an apathetic attitude toward the whole
incident and kill the emotion at least temporarily. The mental situation
from which anger arises, is one contrary to indifference, in fact, the
lack of indifference is one of the essential characteristics of the
fore-condition of anger, and consequently when this attitude is present,
anger is cut off.

A resolution or a settled judgment has a relieving effect. Whenever the
subject comes to a definite conclusion whether it refers to the
emotional situation or a contemplated mode of behavior toward the
offender, there is reported a sudden drop in the intensity of the
emotion, even though the attitude is but a tentative and temporary one.
The reason for this is evidently that such a mental attitude is contrary
to the immediate mental situation from which anger arises. Anger springs
from the fact that there is lacking a definite mental attitude as to
what should be done during the reactive stage of the emotion. One of the
most efficient controls is to have a well planned reaction to meet the
emotional crisis before it appears; when the injury occurs, if there is
a preparedness as to what should be done, even though the response is
but a subjective one purely attitudinal in its nature, anger fails to
develop to its intense stage.


                        SUCCESSFUL DISAPPEARANCE

The success with which the emotion of anger disappears is a matter of
wide individual difference with the persons studied. With some the
reporting of the emotion from the introspection notes tended to
reinstate the emotion. One subject was frequently disturbed by the
reappearance of the emotion during the report. In one instance he
refused to report to the writer for three days afterward. He reports he
could not recall the situation without the reappearance of the anger in
its unpleasant form. Other persons could rarely reinstate an emotion in
any unpleasant form over night. At times the anger was reinstated in its
pleasant aspect. Sometimes a feeling of exaltation was displayed. The
subject showed he enjoyed recalling the emotion. Imagined and carefully
devised schemes of retaliation were often rehearsed with pleasure. Again
the observation would be a feeling of indifference, as something past
and finished. Often the statement was given, “The whole thing seems
ludicrous and amusing to me now.”

It is rather pleasing to recall the situation exciting anger when the
original emotion is short-circuited, as it were, allowing a pleasurable,
gossipy vituperation against the offender without the initially
unpleasant stage of anger. In fact the subject may re-experience a
little of the unpleasant humiliation through imaginative stimulus, if
the pleasantly reactive stage is successful enough to compensate. If the
subject is aware he has a sympathetic hearer, it is far easier to pass
over the initially unpleasant stage of the reinstated anger and enjoy a
hostile, gossipy reaction. The writer in the course of the study became
so intimately acquainted with the private emotional life of the subjects
studied and had been a sympathetic listener of the emotional experiences
so long, that after the period of observation had ended, he would find
himself the recipient of emotional confidences which the subjects took
pleasure in relating to him. Says one on reporting, “I really was not
interested so much in the scientific side of this emotion as I was to
tell you of my resentment, and as I look over it now, I am really aware
that I assumed a scientific interest as a means of gaining full sympathy
and giving me full freedom to speak everything in mind.” Another subject
says, “I went to tell X. for I believed he would get angry too and I
hoped that he would.” The same situation does not usually allow anger to
continue to reappear in its unpleasant form, for repeated appearance
tends to eliminate the active unpleasant stage.

An emotion of anger which has been unsuccessfully expressed may continue
to reappear in consciousness again and again. Crowded out, it will
suddenly return at times by chance associations. It may become so
insistent that it is an unpleasant distraction from business affairs and
the subject must find some sort of reaction to satisfy it. F. observes,
“I could not do my work. Just as I would get started, the idea would
reappear suddenly and I would find myself angry, tending to think
cutting remarks and planning what I should do. Each time I tried to
escape from it, it would come back again. Finally I determined
deliberately to get rid of it. I recalled all the good qualities of X.,
what favors he had bestowed upon me and in fact felt quite friendly
toward him. Before I had finished, the anger had disappeared and did not
return. Later, as I recalled the situation incidentally, I felt
indifferent toward it.” Such deliberate behavior is unusual. The
reaction to an emotion is mostly involuntary. In many instances, when
emotion is prolonged, it is much like a trial and error process, one
reaction after another is tried out in imagination until a rather
successful one is found. This reappearance of an emotion when it has
been repressed gives opportunity for a new trial and mode of attack.

There are two general conditions under which anger disappears most
successfully. First, if the mental situation from which anger arises is
changed directly by the addition of a new idea that gives an entirely
new meaning content to the incident so that it will no longer be
humiliating or irritating, as when the subject can thoroughly come to
believe that the motives of the opponent’s offense were not hostile but
friendly, anger disappears rather successfully with no unpleasant after
effects; the anger is cut off directly at its source. To illustrate,
C.’s anger at X. which had been a source of unpleasant disturbance for
two days, completely disappeared when he was finally informed that what
X. did was not meant as personal. The subject at times finds himself
trying to assume a little of the attitude of make-believe. He really
wants to believe the offender meant well. A second successful condition
for the removal of anger is when the subject reacts so that he feels he
has fully mastered his opponent. He has given full restitution for the
offense and feels a pleasureable satisfaction in the results. Feeling is
an essential factor, whatever the method employed. If a feeling of
complete victorious satisfaction is accomplished in connection with the
disappearance of anger it is usually successful. The circumstances are
rare in which the direct verbal or physical attack would be fully
satisfactory. A substitution in the form of hostile wit, teasing, irony,
or it may be a favor bestowed with a hostile intent, may accomplish the
same result as far as feelings are concerned and completely satisfy the
anger. The imagined victory, or a make-believe one, may serve the same
purpose.

The most unsuccessful condition for the disappearance of anger is one
commonly used in emergencies—that of changing the attention and avoiding
the offensive idea. Intense anger usually returns when diminished in
this manner. The attitude of indifference and over-politeness usually
serves only as a temporary device of removal for the purpose of
expeditious control. Mere repression is not always most successful.




------------------------------------------------------------------------


                              CHAPTER FOUR

                        CONSCIOUS AFTER-EFFECTS


------------------------------------------------------------------------


Anger has an important influence upon mental life and behavior long
after the emotion itself has disappeared. The functional effect of anger
may be disclosed in a period after the emotion proper has disappeared.
Other emotions may immediately follow anger, such as pity, regret,
sorrow, joy, shame, remorse, love and fear. Feelings and tendencies are
left over which the subject is fully aware are directly related to the
previous emotion. For purposes of study, the period after the emotion
will be divided into two parts; first, that immediately after the
emotion has disappeared, and second, the more or less remote period of
indefinite time. The reaction while the emotion is present, and the way
in which the emotion disappears, are conditions which determine to a
large extent what will consciously appear after the emotion has passed
away. With the aim of finding out what mental factors follow in the wake
of anger, the subjects were instructed to keep account of any sort of
consciousness of which they were aware as referring either directly or
indirectly to the previous emotion observed.

Pity is frequently associated with anger. Mild anger may merge into pity
at the point where attention changes from the situation exciting anger
to the effects of angry behavior on the offender. Pity often follows the
imaginal humiliation of the person committing the offense. It follows
more readily when the emotion is against children, servants, dependents
or persons with whom there is close intimacy. A kind of self-pity is
sometimes associated with anger. With one subject, a mildly pleasant
self-pity would frequently follow anger at an injury. At times there is
found a curious mixture of anger and self-pity. H. observes, “At times I
would be angry, then at other times I would find myself taking a
peculiar pleasure in rehearsing my injuries and feeling rather pitiful
for one who had been mistreated like myself.” An observation from C.
will illustrate the suddenness of the transition from mild anger to
pity. Angry at a clerk for a slight offense, he observes, “As I turned
away I said to myself, ‘I wish that fellow would lose his place,’ but at
once I felt a little pity for him and said, ‘No, that would be too bad,
he has a hard time putting up with all these people.’” Subject A., angry
at a child observes, “I found myself tending to punish him, I saw his
face, it looked innocent and trusting, that restrained me, I now
thought, ‘Poor little fellow, he does not know any better,’ and I felt a
pity for him to think that such a person as myself had the correcting of
him.”

Shame may follow in the wake of anger. It arises rather suddenly in the
disappearing stage of the emotion when attention is directed to the
results of the angry behavior just finished. Both shame and pity,
following anger, are usually a condition of immunity against the
reappearance of the same emotion. After shame appears, a reaction
usually follows in the effort to compensate in some fashion. Subject C.
observes, “Becoming aware of my act and how it appeared, I now felt
ashamed and humiliated at what I had said. In a few minutes I brought it
about to offer him a favor and felt pleased when it was accepted. I had
really been trying to convince him that I was not angry, and now felt
that I was doing it.” Subject C. observes, “I noted that they saw I was
angry and at once I felt ashamed. I now began to laugh the matter off as
if trying to show I was not.” At times during mild anger when the
emotion is displayed too impulsively and the bounds of caution have been
overstepped, exposing one’s self to a too easy attack from an opponent,
an uncomfortable feeling of chagrin appears. The anger may be displayed
in too crude a fashion, consequently an advantage is given to the
opponent which was not intended. Anxiety that the opponent may take the
hostile thrust too seriously or fear of the consequence, may suddenly
displace anger. Instead of an offending person, the same person now
suddenly becomes one exciting anxiety or fear.

A fourth affective condition of the immediate after-period of anger is
an active pleasantness. Anger disappears and joy takes its place. The
condition, originally exciting anger, is no longer able to reproduce
the emotion as the subject has become the victor and the offense
is recompensed. The goal of anger from its impulsive and feeling
side is to be found in the pleasurable victorious affection in the
after-period of the emotion. Any anger possesses possibilities of
pleasantness in its after-stage. If an objective victory cannot be
had, a subjective one plays the part of a surrogate. The processes
of imagination, make-believe and disguise, as previously discussed,
become devices directly referring to the aim of pleasurable feelings in
the after-period of anger. The motivation is to avoid the unpleasant
emotions and feelings in the wake of anger and acquire the feeling
of victory. The tendency to humor and jocular behavior after anger
is sometimes observed. The subject tends to recall his feelings of
success and relive them, self-confidence and positive self-feelings are
increased.

The feeling of friendliness toward the offender may follow anger which
has been successfully expressed. Spinoza was right when he said, “An act
of offense may indirectly give origin to love.” It is frequently
observed in the after-period of anger, “I felt more friendly toward him
after my emotion had disappeared.” In fact an unusual friendliness with
a desire to bestow favors was often observed. We like a man better after
we have been angry at him in a successful manner. The emotional attitude
is entirely changed toward an opponent who has been overcome, if he
allows the victory. It is the unreasoning person who never becomes aware
of his defeat, against whom hate follows anger.

Feelings of unpleasant irritation usually follow anger when social or
other conditions prevent adequate expression. These feelings seem to be
the medium by which the situation exciting anger is repeatedly recalled.
The emotion which appears from the imagined situation usually does not
leave such intense unpleasant feelings, as the subject tends to attain
in his deliberate moments, to some degree, an inner victory over his
opponent, or to find an adequate excuse for his behavior. Either of
these reactions may be successful enough to exclude irritable feelings
in the after-period. Irritation after controlled anger is the medium for
the so-called transfer of the emotion from an offending to an
unoffending object, which is so often observed. In the after-period of
irritation, it is a rather common observation of the subjects, “I was
looking for something or somebody at whom I could get angry.” “I felt I
wanted to hurt somebody.” In fact irritation in the after-period becomes
an essentially affective element in a situation from which may arise a
new anger of a different type. The first anger may have arisen from a
fore-period of humiliation, while the latter is from that of irritation.

There is evidence that the affective state in the after-period of anger
has a compensating relation to the emotion that has just passed, not
unlike the compensation role played between the anger proper and the
feeling fore-stage from which it arises. The reactive stage of anger
tends to over-compensate for the unpleasant feelings of irritation and
humiliation in the fore-period of anger by either increasing the
pleasantness or diminishing unpleasantness. If the reaction is
incomplete and has not adequately met the emotional crisis of the
moment, irritation may follow with a tendency to continue further the
emotion, or if the reaction has gone too far, it is paid for by the
appearance in the after-stage of other emotions of social origin, such
as fear, shame, pity, etc. The feeling of relief occurs after the
expression has nearly restored consciousness to about the same affective
level as before the beginning of the emotion; but with active pleasure,
a higher affective level has been attained and the subject feels he was
glad to have been angry. There is a heightened effect in the affective
state following anger; a sort of over-compensation, which is a little
out of proportion to the behavior apart from the anger itself. If the
after-period is one of pleasantness, the feeling is increased far more
because of what the subject has done during the emotion, for it is
evident if the same mental processes and behavior occur without anger,
the pleasantness is less. Joy is a good example of the intensification
of the emotion in the after-period of anger which is out of proportion
to the idea stimulating it. The relation between the fore-period, the
anger proper, and the after-period is so intimate in anger that the
writer has had it repeatedly impressed upon him in making the present
study, that to solve some of the important problems of our emotional
life, this relation must be taken into account. The entire gamut of the
emotional consciousness for each emotion must be studied from the
initial feeling stage to the termination of the conscious content after
the emotion has disappeared. The emotions do not appear as separate
effective entities, but have an intimate relation which is important in
the study of their psychology.

Mild anger may leave the subject in a state of curiosity. A feeling of
doubt as to the motivation of the offender may appear, and curiosity
follows with an awareness of a tendency for anger to reappear if the
occasion should arise. After the emotion has passed, the subject is
aware of tendencies or attitudes, referring directly to the mental
behavior, which were present during the emotion. An attitude of
indifference toward the offender and offending situation follows what
has been called the indifferent type of reaction. The emotion of anger
may leave the subject in a state of confidence toward himself, positive
self-feelings have been reached as a result of the entire experience. On
the other hand, slightly reduced self-feelings may follow if the
reaction to anger has been unsuccessful. It may leave the subject in
either a heightened or a lowered opinion of the offender. A previously
friendly interest in the person committing the offense may be increased
or otherwise. A feeling of amusement at one’s behavior when recalling it
after the emotion has disappeared, is often reported. The subject stands
off, as it were, and views his own response to anger as if he were a
spectator rather than a partaker of his emotion. What the subject did
when angry seems so incongruous with his mental state after the emotion
has disappeared, that it strikes him as ludicrous. Laughter and
amusement frequently appear in the recall of the emotional situation.

An attitude of caution often follows. After a period of stressed
inhibition, in which the evil consequences of a too impulsive behavior
have been pre-perceived, there is assumed an attitude of control and at
the same time a readiness to respond to a suitable stimulus. Anger may
leave in its place an attitude of greater determination to make one’s
point, or if the emotion has been entirely satisfactory, the subject
takes the attitude that the score has been settled. An attitude of
belief or conviction as to a future course of action toward a like
offense may follow in the period after anger, which is a direct result
of the conclusion reached when the emotion was present. Mild anger may
have changed the feeling tone but little, but leaves the subject primed
and ready to respond more quickly to another offense. The result of
anger may be purely a practical attitude as to what should be done in
such cases with little marked feeling accompanying it. The subject is
left not in a fighting attitude, but in one of preparedness to prevent
the offense recurring. It is usually necessary in the after-period to
reconstruct or modify the revengeful plans or conclusions which were
formed when the emotion was intense. What seemed so justifiable during
the emotion proper, after it has disappeared becomes strikingly
inopportune. If the emotion has disappeared unsuccessfully and resentful
feelings still linger, the subject wishes to execute the plans
previously formed; but in the act of doing it, he usually finds
difficulties of which he was not aware when the emotion was intense. An
instance from A. will illustrate. He had been intensely angry at X. and
had planned to tell him his opinion of his conduct. By the time he had
opportunity to speak, the emotion had subsided. He observes, “I had at
this point a severe struggle with myself. I wanted to tell him what I
had planned; I felt I was inconsistent if I did not. On the other hand I
was slightly apprehensive, not of X., but of making myself ludicrous. I
recognized what I had not before, that I was not fully justified, and
partially excused him for what he had done. But the tendency to do what
I had planned still persisted, and I felt I would give anything if I
could do it.” He reports further that although the emotion was now fear,
at this point “the tendency to execute the plan, formed during the
anger, persisted for about fifteen minutes of intense struggle with
myself before it disappeared.” Tendencies in the after-period of the
emotion, which refer to conclusions or resolutions reached during its
active stage, at times, when they appear are passed over lightly and
even with amusement.

The effects of anger may extend far beyond the period immediately after
the emotion has disappeared. The more remote after-period, after the
immediate effects have passed off or been modified, have important
results in our mental life. The momentum, acquired during anger by
determined emotional outburst, may be a reenforcement to volitional
action and may allow old habits to be more quickly broken down and new
ones formed. If an error has been repeatedly made with increased
irritation, till the subject has been thoroughly aroused to anger at
himself, the tendency to repeat the error is usually successfully
forestalled by an attitude of caution and determination following the
emotion. The possible failure may be prevented by mild anger at the
imagined humiliating result, which increases volitional action to a
point insuring success, and a new momentum is acquired which may have
far reaching influences. Slight habitual mistakes, like errors in
typewriting or speaking, repeated forgetting of details, and social
blunders, are reported as cured by anger.

Mild prolonged anger which has not had a fully satisfactory expression
may leave in its wake a fighting attitude which if transferred into work
enables the subject to acquire new levels of activity. A record from C.
will illustrate. He observes, “I would not allow myself to be dejected,
but have planned to fight and dig into it like everything. These
emotions are the greatest stimuli I have. I get angry, then I want to
get down to work for all I am worth.” On the other hand, anger which has
been successfully expressed may be followed by a feeling of satisfaction
in the result and an attitude of success, which gives momentum for
increased volitional action in the future.

There is usually a residuum from intense anger which may appear long
after the anger has consciously disappeared. The recall of the situation
which had previously excited anger may have little or no feeling; merely
indifference is present. Sometimes feelings of resentment and dislike
are observed, while at other times, there is amusement. It frequently
happens that while the situation which has previously excited the
emotion may be accompanied by indifference upon its being recalled
either voluntarily or involuntarily, there follows an emotion of dislike
and hate. The incident itself may be almost forgotten, or not recalled
at all, but the result of anger is to be observed in tendencies and
emotional dispositions left in the wake of the emotion. An over-critical
attitude, with something of a gossipy tendency and hostile suspicion in
which the bounds of justice are partly ignored, may long continue to
reappear after the emotion itself has passed away and the situation has
been forgotten. It is rather probable that a single strong outburst of
anger does not leave the hostile emotional disposition in its wake. It
is usually the mild anger, preceded by much feeling of humiliation and
anger which tends to recur again and again till it has settled to a
hostile disposition toward the offender. It is reported in some
instances to refer to the offender’s way of talking, laughing, manner of
walking, his mode of dressing; in fact any chance idea of the offender’s
behavior may be sufficient to allow a feeling of dislike and disgust to
appear.

It may be said that anger which disappears in an unsatisfactory manner
leaves an emotional disposition which possesses potentialities of both
pleasant and unpleasant feelings. Some persons seem to derive much
satisfaction in picking the sores of their unhealed resentments; little
acts of revenge and retaliation are suddenly hit upon; even hate may
have its pleasures. Small acts of revenge and retaliation are observed
with an affective state which cannot be called anger, but the subject is
aware that it refers to the anger which is passed. One subject became
severely angry at his grocer and went to trade with another merchant
near by. He states that on several occasions just after the anger, when
buying at another place he felt pleased at the other man’s having lost
his trade. Once he observes, “I believe I bought several things I did
not need, I felt I was retaliating and enjoyed it.” The emotional
disposition following anger may be a source of rather intense enjoyment.
Laughter and mirth are observed with the appearance of an idea that has
humiliated the offender. In such cases the laughter is purely
spontaneous with no recall of anger. Subject J. broke out laughing when
told that X. was on unfavorable terms with Y. His laughter, he observes,
referred to a resentment a few days before against X. In fact laughter
frequently springs rather suddenly from the mental disposition which has
followed from anger. Such cases afford another instance of the close
intimacy of our emotions with each other. The residuum of potential
feelings from an emotion of anger appears in the form of less active
pleasantness.

There is a relation between the immediate after-period of anger and the
more remote one that is important. If anger is immediately followed by
such emotions as pity, shame, regret or fear, any positive tendency left
over in the remote after-period from the emotion itself is apparently
lacking. There is, however, a negative effect. The subject is immune to
re-experience the same emotion from the same emotional situation again,
but anger which has disappeared with unpleasant feelings may tend to
recur in a rather prolonged after-period and may finally settle into an
emotional disposition and mental attitude which play an important role
in behavior and later feelings. It seems to be true, that when anger
disappears consciously in such a manner that the subject is aware that
his wishes have not been satisfied and the disappearance is followed by
unpleasant feelings, the immediate after-period is rather barren as
compared with the out-cropping which appears in a more remote period
after the emotion. In anger, when sudden control is required, the
subject is forced to attend to something else or react contrary to the
emotional tendency to save himself a later humiliation. The immediate
after-period is usually one of unpleasantness and tension. Under such
circumstances, the tendency to recur again and again is characteristic
and if, in some later recurrence or expression through the imaginative
process, it does not end satisfactorily, it may settle down to an
emotional disposition and mental attitude.

Anger that arises from a fore-period of irritation in which the subject
suddenly bursts out with emotion may have an immediate after-period
of irritation, but it leaves little in the remote after-period; the
subject is aware that the emotion is finished. Anger which ends with
active pleasantness of victory leaves an attitude of confidence and
success toward the situation which has excited the emotion. There
is little tendency for the emotion, disappearing in this fashion,
to reappear except in its pleasant stage. With a consciousness of
complete victory in the immediate after-period, there is established
an attitude of positive self-feeling and confidence toward the
situation exciting the emotion so that a practical immunity against the
reappearance of anger in its unpleasant stage is reached as a negative
result of the emotion. There are wide individual differences in the
ability of the subjects studied to allow anger to disappear, leaving
a pleasant after-period. C. reports but few instances in which his
anger disappeared with a fully satisfactory result. He consequently
has a wealth of emotional dispositions and mental attitudes following
anger. On the other hand F. and E., whose anger emotions are less
intense, are early able either to attain an inner victory or to react
contrary to the emotion and leave an after-period of immunity against
its reappearance from the same mental situation. Hence the tendencies
and dispositions left over in the after-period of their anger are less.
E.’s dislikes are short lived. It is probable that some subjects have
acquired the habit of shortening their emotions of anger, short-cutting
the unpleasant period of restraint and early acquiring the after-period
of relief, humor or it may be indifference, before the emotion has
developed far.

_Classifications._ Anger might be classified according to a number of
schemes that would serve the purpose of emphasizing its characteristics.
From the standpoint of feeling, anger might be classed as pleasant or
unpleasant. Some emotions of anger are observed to be almost entirely
pleasant from their early beginning including their final ending. Other
cases have fluctuating pleasant and unpleasant stages. There are few
instances of anger that have no flash of pleasantness anywhere, in some
degree before the emotion is finally completed. The unsatisfactorily
expressed emotion is almost entirely unpleasant. Even anger of this kind
usually shows some flash of pleasantness or relief at the moment of the
angry outburst.

Secondly, anger might be classified as exciting or calm. The exciting
anger has greater tension during the period of the emotion proper. There
is usually less co-ordination and greater intensity of feeling which may
be either pleasant or unpleasant. The motor reactions are more prominent
than the mental reactions. On the other hand, calm anger usually has a
longer observable fore and after-period of the emotion. Mental processes
are intensified, the motor expression is correspondingly less.

Anger may be classified according to its function. The emotion may be
merely an end in itself. It relieves the tension of unpleasant feelings.
It is purgative in its effect in removing an unpleasant mental
situation. The underlying purpose of such anger is not to increase
volitional action, in fact, it may disturb co-ordination to any
purposive end. This type serves primarily to remove the tension of
unpleasant accumulations of feelings in some act of expression. If
successful in its purpose, it may have an indirect hygienic effect on
mental action. Further, anger may be of a kind which intensifies
volitional action, accomplishes work, and serves the end of survival. A
residuum in mental attitude and emotional disposition follows, which has
possibilities either of morbidity or a source of energy which is
sublimated into work.

Anger may be classified genetically on the basis of sentiments which are
violated in its origin. Anger which springs from a thwarting of desires
is primary in its origin. This is the usual type of anger of young
children and animals. Anger which has its source in the self-feelings,
such as the sentiments of honor and self respect and in social feelings,
of injustice, of fairness, are genetically later in their development.

_Types._ Three rather definite types appear. First is anger which rises
from a fore-period of irritable feelings. It develops by a cumulative
process of irascible feelings, through a series of stimuli till the
point of anger is suddenly reached. An idea is present at the point of
anger which serves as a vehicle of expression. It may be an idea not
directly associated with the situation exciting the emotion. In fact an
apparently irrelevant idea may break the crust of unpleasant feeling
tension and serve as an objective reference for the emotion. Anger of
this type is scattered. It is not necessary that the emotion be referred
to the actual thwarting idea, it frequently refers to inanimate objects
and often arises from the irritation accompanying pain. The active
period of this type of emotion is mostly voco-motor tension and reaction
of larger muscles. The immediate after-period may be a feeling of
relief, irascible irritation, or other emotions such as pity, shame,
regret and fear. Its increased volitional action may establish a mental
attitude of caution and determination against a future thwarting when it
is finished. A new emotion may arise however from the same background of
irritation. The after effects of an emotion of this type are shallow and
easily forgotten. It does not leave hate or dislike in its wake, there
is nothing left over for revengeful behavior.

A second type of anger is predetermined by another sort of mental
disposition. Self-feelings are its source. An idea excites negative
self-feeling and anger follows as a reaction with the purpose of
restoring positive feelings of self. It usually has a greater proportion
of pleasantness than the type described above. Its end is to attain
pleasantness in some form of positive self-feeling, and when that is
successfully reached the emotion disappears. Any idea from a subjective
or objective source which intensifies positive feelings of self, tends
to diminish emotion of this type. The thwarting of a desire, due to the
damage and inconvenience done, is insignificant as compared with the
thrust that one’s pride and self-respect have received. In the type
above, there is thwarting of desire; while in this type, there is
humiliation. In fact in the latter type, serious inconvenience may be
suffered in the effort to heal a wounded self respect. Anger of this
type is not so indefinite in its objective reference. It has direct
reference to an offender before the point of anger has been reached, and
another person or object cannot be substituted with any degree of
satisfaction. Anger of this type leaves an important residuum after the
emotion has disappeared in the form of other affective processes, in
tendencies, mental attitudes and dispositions, some of which have
possibilities of morbidity, others mere pleasantness or sublimation into
work.

A third type of anger is that which springs from social sentiments
involving justice and fairness. It has little unpleasant fore-period and
arises suddenly without the initial cumulative feeling development which
is usual with the other types described. The point of anger is more
readily reached; the emotion is nearer the surface as if it were ready
for a sudden rise. The origin of anger of this type is not unlike anger
which springs rather suddenly from an emotional disposition left over
from the second type described above. The expression of the emotion in
this type is less restrained, it is usually reported as pleasant
throughout. While anger of this type is sensitive to justice and
fairness, the two types above may grossly disregard these sentiments. In
its wake is often observed the tendency to reappear. The after-period
has not the possibilities of so intense pleasure as the second type
above, nor of morbidity, nor of a disposition capable of being
sublimated into work.

The three types above may occur in a rather pure form but frequently
they are mixed. When desire has been thwarted or pride has been wounded,
a sense of miscarried justice or fairness with reference to self,
intensifies the emotion. In addition to lowered self-feeling, the social
sentiment of justice and fairness may re-enforce the irascible feelings
or negative feelings of self. At times make-believe of offended fairness
is assumed to justify the angry behavior, and consequently increases the
intensity and allows pleasurable expression when the subject is vaguely
aware that the real cause is his own selfish pride which has been
wounded.




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                              CHAPTER FIVE

                          EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION


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From the present study, anger may be said to have a two fold functional
meaning. First it intensifies volitional action in a useful direction.
Second, viewed from the mental conditions under which it occurs, it may
be a superfluous affectivity and is largely an end in itself. These two
functions are not to be separated. In fact any single emotion of anger
in its different stages of reaction may be merely hedonic, it may serve
a directly useful purpose or it may be both. These two functional
aspects of anger are the basis for pedagogical conclusions.

_Sublimation._ Anger in a modified form has been the theme of the poet
and artist. With its running mate fear, it has played an important role
in religion. Primitive magic with its self assertive coercion of the
supernatural, is not unlike anger. The curse prayer of backward religion
is motivated by resentment. A deity with an irascible temper like that
of the ancient Hebrews suggests the role of righteous indignation in the
discipline of the soul. Plato[1] held that anger is at the foundation of
the organization of the State. Ribot (16) has suggested that it is at
the basis of justice. More recently Bergson writes, “No society can
reach civilization unless throughout its members, there exists the
nervous organization which supports the sentiment of anger and hostility
against criminals; and this physical organization is the foundation of
what we call our moral code.” President Hall (10), James (13), and Dewey
(5) have suggested that much of the best work of the world and the great
deeds of valor have been done by anger. Dr. Hall states, “A large part
of education is to teach men to be angry aright,—it should be one aim of
pedagogy to show how the powers of the soul should be utilized.—Man has
powers of resentment which should be hitched onto and allowed to do good
and profitable work. We should keep alive our emotions and allow them to
do our labor.” (From lecture notes.) It has been suggested by Wundt
(22), James (13) and Stanley (17) that the function of anger is to
increase volitional action. The latter author writes, “At some point in
the course of evolution, anger comes in as a stimulant to aggressive
willed action. Some favored individual first attained the power of
getting mad, in violently attacking his fellows and so attaining
sustenance likely in the struggle for food.” The same author further
writes, “We take it then that it was a most momentous day in the
progress of mind when anger was first achieved and some individuals
really got mad.”

Education has to do with the function of anger in human needs, in growth
and development and in mental hygiene. Ethics has at times advocated the
elimination of anger as if it were a noxious product. From a pedagogical
view, it should be cultivated and excited aright. The familiar moral
exhortations, “Let not the sun go down on your wrath,” “Love your
enemies and do good to those that hate you,” and others like them, are
in accord with some satisfactory individual reactions to anger from the
feeling side, which have been cited; but their universal application
would not always serve the purpose of ethics. In pedagogical practice,
they would fall short. A good healthy resentment is, at times, a good
thing and should be kept alive. The emotion, if it works, must not die
out too satisfactorily at the cost of real effort. There should be a
working residuum for the time when it is needed. An injury may be
forgiven too quickly and resentment given up too easily. A healthy
fighting attitude, increased caution and willed action turned into
productive work is often subverted for an immediate satisfactory ending
of the emotion. There are none of the subjects studied but observe this
wholesome effect of anger at times. Anger may disappear successfully and
satisfactorily on the side of the feelings. The subject may attain the
full sense of victory by a number of devices of make-believe,
substitution, disguise, etc. An inner victory may be a good thing. In
fact, all subjects would, at times, resort to imaginative processes
motivated by the feeling and impulsive side of the emotion. A subjective
satisfaction may in fact save the day, clear the mental atmosphere, so
to speak, and allow mental life to continue along its habitual lines. On
the other hand, a subjective victory may become too easy. On the verge
of defeat, victory is at times imagined which takes the place of real
volition. The fight may be carried too far through the medium of ideas
leaving little enthusiasm for actual effort. A too easy habit of
excusing the offender at times serves an unprofitable end. Anger should
not be cut off too near its beginning by finding excuses too readily for
the offender or offending situation. It should at least be allowed to
get a little above the initial feeling stage to keep the emotional life
alive or there is danger of lapsing into obliviousness to essential
rights; mental life becomes too prosaic and commonplace, on a plateau
with no capacity to acquire new levels.

A second point of which the writer is convinced, is that in order to
study the emotions, especially the deep seated primary emotions like
fear and anger, it is necessary to take into account the finer working
of the emotion in its feeling and impulsive stage of development and
disappearance. In fact, the milder tenuous emotions of anger are
markedly important from the educational side as well as psychologically.
The normal function of the emotion is better exemplified in the less
intense experiences. Anger, as it is usually thought of, is the emotion
in its excited uncontrolled stage. Anger, sublimated into keener
intellectual and willed action, is no less anger though its affective
side is less intense; its reactive side is working in better accord with
the evolutionary function of the emotion,—to intensify action in a
needed direction. In fact, affective processes of indignation,
resentment and irascible feelings which are not called anger in the
popular sense, from the scientific side should be considered a part of
the anger consciousness. They have the feeling fore-stage of humiliation
and an intellectual reaction; the residuum of the affective process has
every mark of that victorious satisfaction, which is typical of anger.

Such tenuous emotions are reported to have far reaching results in
mental behavior and personal development. One subject, resentful at an
implication against the value of his work, considers that it stimulated
him to increased determined action and intensified endeavor for several
months in order to show the offender he was wrong. A., resentful of X.’s
adverse suggestion, put in three days of severe intellectual labor to
prove his point. E. observes that a humiliation and mild resentment was
a keen stimulus to his ambition. His ambitious behavior, he considers
was accompanied by increased friendliness toward the offender. The
question was privately put to a number of persons as to the effects of
resentment on some of their ambitions in the past. Every person who was
asked, after a careful recall, was able to find one and some times
several instances of important results of anger of this kind. Some
persons from early childhood have habitually reacted to little
resentments to beat the offender in an ambitious way. One person with
defective eyes early became sensitive about it. Any implication against
his defect was always reacted to, he says, by saying to himself, “I will
show you I can do more with poor eyes than you can with good ones, and
you will be sorry some day.” M. 28—“Resentful because the parents of a
lady to whom I was paying attention did not approve of me, I determined
to make so much of myself that they would be sorry. It was one of the
main incentives to my entering on a career. With this aim I went to the
University; I worked hard with success. Many times during the year I
would recall the incident and would resolve again and again to show them
some day. For two years this idea was pretty constantly in my mind. In
the course of four years I now take keen satisfaction in recalling that
I have partly accomplished my purpose.” M. 25.—“Four years ago a friend
whom I admire much, told me that I would never make a scientist. I have
resented it ever since and have laid plans to show him, which I have
partly carried out. Every once in a while I recall his statement in
connection with my work. It spurs me on. I imagine myself sending him a
copy of my scientific problem on which I am working.” M. 34.—“In my
sophomore year in college, I failed to be elected president of our
literary society. I became resentful against the one who beat me in the
election. This person was ambitious in college contests. I now laid
plans to beat him. I went into an oratorical contest first with the sole
aim of surpassing him. I did not care about the others. I am certain
that I would never have gone into this contest and others if it had not
been for a deep set resentment developed against him. I recall yet how
in practicing and writing in contests during the two years of my college
work my aim principally was to surpass this person. We were good friends
all the time.”

Such tenuous resentments which persist for years, it may be, against
people with whom one is on friendly terms, and which are accompanied by
a rather sudden rise in the curve of personal growth, are evidently an
essential part of the anger consciousness. Smaller achievements of
individual worth are often reported to be the direct result of a healthy
sort of reaction from resentment. It is entirely probable that most
persons, especially those of irascible disposition, could point to
sudden spurts in their own personal development and achievement, which
were motivated by anger which never reached the stage of intense
excitability or from the residuum of exciting anger which disappeared
unsuccessfully. Freud (9) has taken the view that much of biography
should be rewritten to include the part that sexual motives, which have
been sublimated, play in personal ambitions. Evidently anger cannot be
neglected by one who seeks for motives of personal growth whether
biographer or educator.

A too soft pedagogy which would heal over too soon the injury to
self-feelings, has its disadvantages. Encouragement at times by
superficial means may cut off a good healthy angry reaction which may
be needed. In fact a little lowered self-feeling with an irascible
response is a good thing and it may be a signal for “hands off,” or a
little skillful and judicious suggestion. It is frequently observed by
the subjects studied that anger at self intensifies a lagging willed
action and breaks up interfering habits. A quotation from B. will
illustrate. “I turned the anger inward and vituperated against myself
for being such a lazy man. The emotion of the moment was relieved and
I feel now like getting down to work at the stuff and getting it out
of the way.” Some subjects work at their very best when mildly angry.
Attention and association processes are intensified to the point that
real difficulties disappear. Anger in the exciting stage and at a
situation too remote from the problem at hand, interferes with mental
work. Bryan and Harter (3) in their study of skill in telegraphy,
found that the skillful operator may work best when angry, but the
inexperienced worker is less efficient. Michael Angelo is said to
have worked at his best in a state of irascible temper. The mass of
mankind are sluggish and need a hearty resentment as a stimulant. If
the circumstances are too soft and easy, the best which is in a man may
be dormant; there is no tonic to a strong nature capable of bearing it
like anger.

Many a good intellect has lacked the good powers of resentment necessary
for the most efficient work. The boy who has not the capacity for anger
should be deliberately taught it by some means. Göthe, who was a rather
keen observer of human nature, said, “With most of us the requisite
intensity of passion is not forth-coming without an element of
resentment, and common sense and careful observation will I believe
confirm the opinion that few people who amount to anything are without a
good capacity for hostile feelings upon which they draw freely when they
need it.”

_Need of Expression._ The second condition for the expression of anger
is that in which reaction is an end in itself. It may be said that while
on the one hand from a genetic and utilitarian point of view the
function of anger is to do work, to aid in behavior, where increased
willed action is needed; on the other, the mere expressional side in
connection with feeling and impulse assumes an important role in every
emotion. In fact with intense and exciting anger, utility may be ignored
and actually thwarted, volitional action is exerted contrary to
objective needs.

There is much in the expression of anger in both the subjective and
objective reaction to the emotion whose impulsive aim is merely to
release unpleasant feeling tension, to clear the mental atmosphere, so
to speak. A brief resumé of the reactive consciousness to anger will
illustrate. First on the feeling side there occurs a mental situation
accompanied by a tendency to expression in order to remove or modify the
situation. Irritation may be relieved or turned into pleasantness by the
reaction. Lowered self-feeling may be restored with extra compensation
in pleasurable feelings of victory, if the reaction has been successful.
Second, the expression of anger involves restraint, the cruder unsocial
tendencies are controlled and others are substituted of a less
objectionable and offensive nature. By both objective and subjective
reactions, devices of disguise, transfer and modification of the
unsocial pugnacious tendencies may allow the restraint to be released
and the emotive tendency fully satisfied, in which a feeling of
pleasantness follows. Third, the reaction which has been fully
satisfactory from the feeling side, is followed by a partial or complete
immunity against the recurrence of the anger from the same mental
situation, as the successful reaction has removed the mental situation
from which the emotion arose.

Anger from the point of view stated above, touches upon the second
educational aim. So large a part of the reactive consciousness to anger
is motivated to find a successful surrogate for cruder and unsocial
tendencies which are objectional, that this side of anger expression is
educationally important. It is a desirable personal equipment to have
strong potentialities of anger. However there should be a mentality
which is versatile and active enough by training and habit to react
successfully to the emotion, in the first place to use such reservoirs
of energy for work, and second, to react satisfactorily from the
feeling-side, where the instinctive tendencies are restrained, and break
up morbid and unpleasant mental tension which may be an inference.

A good angry outburst at times may be a good thing, but most frequently
some sort of surrogate is more satisfactory. Habits of witticism,
refined joking, a little good-natured play and teasing within the limits
of propriety serves a worthy end for mental hygiene, and often leaves a
basis for good will and a friendship which would otherwise be in danger.
The habit of suddenly breaking up an angry tension by a good thrust of
wit or joke would be a good one to inculcate with the irascibly
inclined. Many persons suffer in feelings and lack of good friendship
because they have never learned to be good mental sparrers and to
relieve their emotions by socially appropriate reaction rather than by a
method of repression which is cheaper at the moment but more expensive
in the end. Their anger is too absorbing and serious. It lacks the
necessary flexibility, their emotions are too near the instinctive level
and when the instinctive tendencies are restrained they lack mental
habits of purging their feelings in a satisfactory way, consequently
suppression is resorted to as a self-defense.

_Anger and Instruction._ As Terman (20) has pointed out, the emotions
employed in the act of instruction need a systematic investigation. The
emotions brought into play in school control, as incentive to work,
emotional reactions which retard, and those which accelerate learning
and efficient work in classes, these are little known scientifically.

Anger, or, perhaps, better potentialities of anger in both teacher and
pupils, is impulsively used in the role of teaching. Skill in using this
emotion aright is part of the teacher’s stock in trade. Pugnacity in the
form of rivalry is a common device.

_Individual Differences._ First, there is the problem of individual
differences in the emotional life of students; and the teacher, too,
for that matter. With some, the dominant emotion is fear and anxiety.
The material of the present study shows a wide variation in the
type and character of emotional reactions of the subjects studied
in which anger is one of the most frequently occurring emotions.
This difference is illustrated by the following summary from three
subjects: With J., anger predominates over fear; he knows but little
of the latter emotion. Anger usually occurs from a fore-period of
lowered self-feeling, the feeling intensity of the fore-period is not
strong. The reactive stage of the anger does not reach a high degree
of excitement. With him, anger usually disappears into indifference
and unpleasantness, leaving tendencies of passive dislike. He observed
no cases of anger at injustice or unfairness except when the latter
sentiments referred to himself. His anger for the most part is an
unsuccessful experience and is unpleasant. He consequently tries to
avoid getting angry and has relatively few emotions. The after-period
of his anger tends to be a little morbid, lacking any strongly marked
disposition which is the source of tendencies to do more work. Subject
G. has anger as a dominant emotion over fear. He scarcely knows anger
which arises from a fore-period of humiliation except anger at himself
when he has been inefficient. He does not hold resentments against
persons but against situations and principles. Anger is usually
unpleasant except a mild after-period of relief. With him, anger is a
means of throwing off superfluous feelings of irritation and serves
but little the purpose of work, except to increase volitional action
for the moment. His anger often refers to himself. Anger at unfairness
tends to refer to the principle rather than to the person. The emotion
occurs more frequently when he is unwell. It is rather slow to appear,
by a gradual accumulation, till the point of anger is reached; the
emotion does not attain a high degree of excitement. With subject C.
the character and type of anger reaction is in marked contrast to the
two subjects mentioned above. He knows but little of fear except in
extreme situations. His anger nearly all springs from a fore-period
of humiliation and is often intense in its most active stage. For a
time during the most intense stage of the emotion, he almost loses
the sense of justice; but as the emotion begins to die down, he has
a habit of excusing the offender and looking at his side of the
question. His anger is frequently followed by pity, remorse, shame and
fear. The emotion is both pleasant and unpleasant. The disappearance
is usually unpleasant and leaves a wealth of affective tendencies
and mental attitudes which are later a source of both pleasant and
unpleasant feelings. Anger is one of the greatest stimuli he has to
do work. He will work for days preparing some subject in which he has
had opposition that excited his resentment in order to even up with
the offender, and takes extreme delight in making his point. His
tendency to anger is greater when feeling well pleased with himself.
The residuum of his emotion involves attitudes of determination and
idealization which plays an important role in his ambition in general.

The description above will suffice to show the problem in individual
differences in emotional life. With some subjects fear is the ruling
passion. Subjects A. and B. have almost an even proportion of fear and
anger during the period of observation. However these instances
represent adult persons. How far the habitual emotional reactions are
determined by training and instruction, is an important question. It is
highly probable that the character of training in childhood and early
adolescence plays a leading part. Subject C. above was an only child and
took considerable license, almost getting beyond the control of his
parents at an early age. J. reports that at early adolescence, anger was
much more frequent and intense than at present. He believes that an
early philosophical notion that intelligence should dominate the
emotions, had an influence in establishing his present emotional habits.
G. was early taught that it was sinful to get angry, an idea which he
accepted at the time. His anger rarely refers to persons but vents on
objects, principles and situations involved. He has relatively few
emotions of anger. He believes that his early religious training was of
importance in moulding the habitual reactions which he now assumes when
angry. Such material as we have makes it entirely probable that a large
part of the habitual mental reactions assumed in anger is the result of
training. It may be said further that when instruction involves affairs
of emotional life, individual difference become a still more pressing
problem than when intelligence is the criterion.

Other inferences of the role of anger in the act of instruction are
suggested from the present study. If the teacher himself does not
possess the ability of well defined resentment against an infringement
of fairness, advantage of this defect may be taken by the alert pupil
unless there is compensation for it in another direction as by the
principle of co-operation, by love or pride appealed to. Cooley however
puts the matter a little too strongly when he says, “No teacher can
maintain discipline unless his scholars feel that in some manner he will
resent a breach of it.” (Human Nature and the Social Order (4), Page
244.) The method of school control itself refers to some extent to the
individual emotional life of the teacher, as well as pupil.

When anger enters into the role of discipline, of the three types
already discussed, that which springs from the sentiment of justice is
most efficient in instruction. Anger which arises from irritable
feelings, from its nature becomes a dangerous emotion to be used in
discipline. Emotion of this type develops by a cumulative process till
the point of anger has been reached. It too readily ignores justice and
is easily transferred from the real offender and may finally break out
against an innocent party who may have unwittingly touched off the
feelings which have been accumulated by previous stimuli, consequently
anger of this type which is so frequently displayed in school rooms
usually defeats the ends of discipline. Anger with a fore-period of
lowered self-feeling because of the personal element entering into this
type of anger and the tendency to ignore justice can evidently be
resorted to but sparingly in school control unless it also involves the
sense of justice.

Another point the teacher has to take into account is that from his
position, if he is held in respect, the anger he excites in the student
will usually be preceded by humiliation and, if he has been unfair, it
will be intensified by the sense of offended fairness. Anger of this
type is the one most frequently followed by an emotional disposition
against the offender. It is the residuum of unsuccessfully expressed
anger of this type which becomes a disturbing element in school control
with the student who is irascibly inclined. The wise teacher who
understands the individual emotional life of the pupil and the nature of
the after-period of anger, will skillfully remove the morbid residuum
and ally the resentful pupil on his side. Dislike following anger, is
skillfully removed, will frequently increase the friendship of the
offender more than before the offense. This principle of compensation in
the after-period is thus to be utilized in discipline. It may be a good
plan deliberately to bring a moody pupil to the point of anger and let
him vent his wrath. Any punishment in discipline has the possibilities
of being dangerous to school control, especially with the student of
pugnacious disposition, if the justice of the punishment cannot be
recognized by the offending pupil. Evidently a mistake in control is not
to recognize the individual differences in emotional life and to attempt
to use the discipline of fear with an irascible boy who knows no fear.
Anger, disappearing unsuccessfully, may leave a morbid residuum which
completely disqualifies the student for efficient learning, consequently
when it exists, it is the business of the educator to remove the
morbidity, transform it into work or to have the pupil transferred; for
it may be as serious a hindrance to learning as adenoids or defective
sense organs.

There is every reason to believe that a large part of the mental
reactions to anger is individually acquired habits, consequently
successful and satisfactory reactions are a matter of training.
Potentialities of anger may actually be taught indirectly by building up
the sentiments and mental disposition from which anger arises. Whatever
will increase ideals and new desires, achievements in school which allow
a better opinion of self and build up the sentiment of self-regard, of
fairness and justice, are at work at the very root of anger
consciousness. The study of the mental situation from which anger arises
allows every reason to believe that when there is a lack of
potentialities to anger, it may be built up in this indirect manner. The
student who lacks good healthy resentment when the proper stimulus is at
hand evidently is weak in the sentiment of self-regard, desire to
achieve, or sense of fairness.

Whatever exercises will excite the pugnacious instinct, if done
satisfactorily may involve a training in emotional habits. Habits of
good fighting in work and play, the give and take in debate, class
discussion, the witty retort, boxing, the team games if carried on
aright, afford good exercise for the emotions. To acquire good habits of
behavior when under fire, to fight clean and to the finishing point, to
take defeat in a sportsman-like manner, are valuable acquisitions
educationally whether they are acquired in athletics or the rivalry of
intellectual work. On the other hand, athletics and mental contests may
be carried on under conditions of emotional reaction, which defeat the
aim of healthy emotional habits and consequently lack their better
educational significance.

-----

Footnote 1.

  The Republic




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                              BIBLIOGRAPHY


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   1. ACH, N. _Ueber die Willenstatigkeit und das Denken._ Eine
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   2. BAIN, ALEXANDER. _The emotion and the Will._ Third Edition.
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   3. BRYAN, W. D. AND HARTER N. _Studies in the Physiology and
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   4. COOLEY, C. H. _Human Nature and the Social Order._ C. Scribner’s
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   5. DEWEY, JOHN. _Psychology._ New York. American Book Company. 1890.

   6. DEWEY, JOHN. _The Theory of Emotions._ Psychological Review.
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   7. FÉRÉ, C. _L’antithèse dans l’expression des émotions._ Rev.
      Philos. 1896. XLII, 498-501.

   8. FREUD, S. _Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten._ Leipzig
      und Wien F. Deuticke. 1905. pp. 205.

   9. FREUD, S. _Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie._ Wien. Deuticke.
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  10. HALL, G. STANLEY. _Adolescence._ D. Appleton and Co. 1909.

  11. HALL, G. STANLEY. _A Study of Anger._ American Journal of
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  12. IRONS, DAVID. _Psychology of Ethics._ Edinburgh. Blackwood
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  13. JAMES, W. _Principles of Psychology._ Henry Holt and Co. 1896.

  14. KÜLPE, O. _Grundis der Psychologic._ Leipzig Engelmann. 1893.
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  17. STANLEY, H. M. _Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of
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  18. STEINMETZ, S. R. _Ethnologische Studien zur ersten Entwicklung der
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  19. TITCHENER, E. B. _Outlines of Psychology._ Macmillan. 1906.

  20. TERMAN, L. _The Teacher’s Health, A Study in the Hygiene of an
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  21. WUNDT, W. _Outlines of Psychology._ Translated by C. H. Judd.
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      Creighton and E. B. Titchener. Macmillan. 1896.




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                                 INDEX


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 Ach: On study of will, 6.

 Anger: On voluntary control of, 7;
   introspection of, 7, 12-13;
   function of, 8, 68;
   mental situation giving rise to, ch. I;
   fore-period of, ch. I;
   referring to persons, 15, 16, 26;
   referring to objects; 14, 16, 77, 93;
   referring to self, 22-23;
   delayed disappearance of, 23-25;
   without immediate fore-period, 25-27;
   behavior of consciousness during, ch. II, 53;
   vocal expression of, 36-38;
   attributive reaction to, 33-46;
   contrary reaction to, 46-50;
   indifferent reaction to, 50;
   disappearance of, ch. III, 60-62;
   conscious after-effects of, ch. IV, 74;
   classification of, 75, 77;
   types of, 77-79;
   education of, ch. V;
   at servants and children, 15;
   in relation to justice, 16, 22, 83;
   after period of, 74, ch. IV;
   control of, 53, 58, 59;
   in school control, 91-94.

 Aristotle: On education of emotions, 1.

 Attention: Change of in disappearance of anger, 58.

 Attitude: Reaction to anger, 44-46, 58, 70.

 Attributive Reaction: In expression of anger, 32.


 Bain: On introspective view of anger, 12.

 Behavior: Importance in study of emotions, 3, 7.

 Bergson: Concerning anger and society, 83.

 Bryan and Harter: Effects of anger during practice, 88.


 Dewey, John: On relation of instinct and emotions, 12;
   concerning the function of anger, 83.


 Emotion: Function of, 5, 85-88;
   introspection of, 1;
   importance of structure of, 1;
   method of study of, 6;
   factors in development of, 11;
   initial steps of, 15.


 Feelings: Irritable feelings in development of anger, 13, 14-15.
   _See pleasantness and unpleasantness._

 Féré: Concerning anger with paranoices, 12.

 Freud: On sex as a motive in conduct, 88;
   on theory of wit, 39-40.

 Function: Referring to anger, 8, 68, 72, ch. V


 Göthe: On function of resentment, 89.

 Gossip: And anger, 39, 42, 56, 59, 72.


 Hall: Concerning education of anger, 83;
   on education of emotions, 84.

 Habits: And expression of anger, 95.

 Hate: Development from anger, 72.


 Individual Differences: In emotional behavior, 59, 75, 91-94.

 Instruction: And anger, 91-93.

 Introspection: Difficulty of with emotions, 1.

 Imagination: A factor in control and expression of anger, 37, 62, 85;
   invective, 36-38.

 Imagery: Visual and motor in expression of anger, 33-35.

 Irony: A means of reaction to anger, 36-42.

 Irons, David: Appearance of anger, 12;
   behavior of consciousness during anger, 31.


 James, William: On function of anger, 33, 84.

 Joy: Following anger, 69, 73-74.

 Justice: Facilitates development of anger, 16;
   ignoring of when angry, 22, 83.


 Külpe: Concerning voluntary action and emotions, 12.


 Make-believe: In expression of anger, 39, 62.

 Magnan: Concerning anger in paranoices, 12.

 McDougall: On genetic view of origin of anger, 11.


 Pity: Following anger, 65, 66.

 Pedagogy: Danger of too soft, 88.

 Play: A means of expression of anger, 35-36.

 Pleasantness: A condition of disappearance of anger, 60, 53, 55, 57,
    59;
   in after-period of anger, 67, 73.


 Ribot: On anger and justice, 83.


 Sarcasm: In expression of anger, 38, 41.

 Self: Imaginary exaltation of, 43-44.

 Sentiment of Self Regard: Fore-period of anger, 20-21.

 Steinmetz: On danger with primitive people, 12.

 Shame: Following anger, 17, 66.

 Sublimation: In expression of anger, 83-92.

 Swearing: In expression of emotions, 37.


 Titchener: On factors in development of emotions, 11.


 Unpleasantness: During anger, 54, 60, 74.


 Witticism: In expression of anger, 39-42, 58.

 Wundt: Concerning voluntary action, 5, 84.




TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

   Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected.
   The table of contents has been changed to include Chapters
   Four and Five to match the book’s contents. Variations in
   hyphenation and accents have been standardised but all other
   spelling and punctuation remains unchanged.