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           THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA




                          Transcriber’s Note:

This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_.

Footnotes have been moved to follow the chapters in which they are
referenced.




          THE PRESENT STATE OF THE BRITISH INTEREST IN INDIA:

  WITH A PLAN FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN THAT
                                COUNTRY.

                                LONDON:
            Printed for J. ALMON, opposite Burlington House,
                             in Piccadilly.

                              MDCCLXXIII.

                        [Price Three Shillings.]




                               CONTENTS.


        I. The present State of the British Interest in       5
        India, &c.

        II. The Nature and Effects of the Company’s          17
        Government in Bengal

        III. The true Causes of Evil and Abuse in the        46
        Government of Bengal, and the Means to remedy them

        IV. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of    106
        political Government in India

        V. A Plan, for establishing a regular System of     156
        military Government, and of secure Defence, in
        India




                               Chapter I


No nation nor state ever acquired an accession of dominion so truly
valuable and beneficial, as are the acquisitions lately made by Britain
in India. But the particular situation of her circumstances at the time
when these acquisitions fell into her hands, enhanced the real and
intrinsic value of them to Britain. Oppressed by a grievous debt, the
annual interest of which, exceeding four millions and a half sterling,
was levied by taxes, which raised the price of each manufacture, her
commerce labouring under such disadvantages was daily sinking into
decay; whilst a considerable part of this annual interest being paid to
foreigners, created such a drain of specie, as the balance of her trade
could not supply; so that, in proportion as her expence increased, the
means of defraying it diminished; and she was every year approaching
towards a state of national poverty and bankruptcy.

In such circumstances did Britain acquire the sovereign dominion of
Bengal, and of other rich manufacturing and trading countries in India;
which, at the time they fell to her, were capable of not only defraying
every charge of their own government and defence, but over and above
that, of yielding annually to the sovereign a sum equal to 1,300,000 l.
sterling, as can be readily demonstrated. Nor do we include in this sum
the benefit which Britain had been accustomed to receive, in her
commercial capacity, by her trade with those countries: the sum here
specified would have arisen purely in consequence of dominion: and,
whether transmitted from those countries in merchandize or in money,
would at last have arrived at the public treasury in specie: and would
thus have served to alleviate the burden of those taxes, that are
pressing every branch of her domestic commerce to ruin. And, if Britain
had bestowed the smallest attention on the political government of those
countries, she might have continued to draw from them the abovementioned
tribute sum _in perpetuum_, without any danger of draining or
impoverishing them: nay it is certain, that under a just, equitable and
well ordered government, their commerce and agriculture might have been
extended to a degree, that would have enabled them to afford a still
larger annual tribute to the sovereign. The possession of this Indian
dominion is likewise so particularly secured from domestic and foreign
danger, by the extraordinary submissive disposition of the natives, the
singularly defensible situation of the country, and the naval
superiority of Britain, that, by a very trifling expence of men, and no
pecuniary charge, she might have maintained it against all enemies. So
that Britain might have derived from this dependent dominion resources
sufficient to relieve her from all her difficulties and distresses.

This is what Britain might have done: and this was not simply possible,
it was easy of execution. But if we enquire what Britain hath done, we
shall find that, instead of applying these resources by a proper care
and attention to the purpose, for which it would seem the all-wise
dispensation of Providence had at this critical conjuncture bestowed
them upon her, she hath indolently and desperately thrown them from her,
and left them to the will of blind chance. For surely it may with
propriety be said, that the government of Britain consigned all these
resources to the guidance of blind chance, or rather to certain
destruction, when it scrupulously withheld its own care, and implicitly
confided the sovereign charge of governing and defending this foreign
dominion to a Company of Merchants, so evidently unequal to such a
charge, that, instead of being surprized that these countries should now
at last be impoverished and ruined, we have reason to be astonished,
that they have supported, for such a length of time, the complicated
evils of tyranny and anarchy.

The consequences of committing this sovereign charge to the Company have
been long foreseen, and likewise foretold, by some who were acquainted
with the nature of their government: but the power and influence of
those who were sharing amongst them the plunder of those wretched
countries, blasted the credit of their representations: until at last,
the effects being felt at home, it hath become impossible to totally
suppress the truth. Nay even now, that these men are forced to partly
acknowledge the ruinous situation of this foreign dominion, yet have
they still the assurance to mislead the public judgment, by representing
the Company as the only party concerned in the consequence: though it is
certain, that this Indian concern, which hath been leased or farmed out
by Government to the Company, is of the very highest importance to the
public interest, as having been for many years the principal support of
national opulence and credit, as well as of commerce and revenue. For,
in the article of opulence, the private fortunes acquired in those
countries by the servants of the Company, ever since the time that their
power prevailed over the native government, that is ever since 1757,
hath created an annual influx of specie to Britain of about 700,000 l.
and the dedomagement paid to Government by the Company, since the
assumption of the dewanny in 1765, is a farther influx of 400,000 l. the
drawback on teas is reckoned about 200,000 l. and the Company hath
increased her dividend since the last mentioned period 200,000 l. though
only one half of this last sum may be reckoned to remain in the country,
the other half being paid to foreign proprietors. These four sums,
making together 1,400,000 l. have been yearly drawn from India in
consequence of dominion: and, whether sent from thence in merchandize,
in bills, or in specie, have produced so much money to Britain: and
notwithstanding the private fortunes have been acquired by means that
have exhausted these sources of wealth, that might otherwise have flowed
perpetually into Britain; and the dedomagement may be considered as a
base composition, received for alienating the sovereign rights of the
British crown and nation, and for furnishing a force to support the most
detestable tyranny of a few individuals over fifteen millions of men,
who are to all intents and purposes British subjects; yet did the
opportune importation of so much wealth, serve to support the credit of
the nation under the grievous accumulation of debt contracted in the
last war; and to prevent her feeling the drain of specie made by her
foreign creditors, which otherwise would by this time have completely
exhausted her. By her commerce with those countries, Britain hath
exported yearly 5 or 600,000 l. worth of her own manufactures and
merchandize, and for these she received the commodities of India; which
commodities, being re-exported, formed the most essential article of her
traffic with Africa, on which her West India colonies do entirely
depend; they are likewise the most valuable article of her trade with
America. And the duties levied by Government, on such part of these
Indian commodities as is expended at home, create a very considerable,
and by far the most equitable and convenient branch of revenue.

But the value and importance of this Indian concern will appear in a
still stronger light, if we shall look forward to the consequences that
must naturally and unavoidably ensue to the public interest from the
loss of it. The first and most immediate of these consequences will be
national bankruptcy; or, which is the same thing, a stop to the payment
of interest on the national debt; for a deprivation of that annual
influx of specie from India will quickly produce national poverty; and
an incapacity of paying in specie the interest of the foreign creditors.
But the loss of our Indian commerce will operate this effect still more
speedily; for, on the supposition that the nation shall be deprived of
this branch of commerce, it must necessarily follow, that Government
will lose that branch of revenue which arises from the home consumption
of Indian commodities; and it is plain, that Government cannot then
continue to pay the usual expence, without making good this deficiency
of revenue by additional taxes on land, and the necessaries of life: but
as this additional load, falling on our little remaining commerce, would
by one year’s experience be found insupportable, Government would be
forced to retrench its expence, in that only article that can be
dispensed with, the payment of interest on the national debt; and when
this happens, what advantage will the public creditor hold above the
India proprietor? The only difference will be, that the latter will have
felt his loss a little earlier than the former. But national bankruptcy,
though it may be the first, is not the only, nor even the greatest,
public damage, accruing from a deprivation of this Indian concern: loss
of future credit, of trade and navigation, and consequently of naval
power and defence, will soon follow; and, in this general calamity,
everyone individual of the community will come in for his share, in
proportion to his rank or situation.

Such are the consequences that must ensue to the public interest from a
deprivation of the benefit hitherto derived from this Indian concern:
and if the nation is to suffer so grievously by the loss of this object,
can she allow herself to be persuaded, that she hath no interest in its
preservation. Now this object stands in danger of being lost to the
nation by two different causes; the first being, the neglect or
incapacity of the Company to maintain and defend it from the assault of
enemies: and the other danger arises from the oppression and misconduct
of this Company’s political government; tending to despoil those
countries of their circulating specie, their arts, manufactures,
commerce, and inhabitants, which were the only means that enabled them
to afford this benefit to Britain. The first of these dangers is
scarcely dreamt of, and yet it is perhaps immediately imminent; at
present however we are treating of the danger to be apprehended from the
political cause.

How far the interest of this foreign dominion hath been injured by the
Company’s political misgovernment; or how near it may be reduced to a
state of utter inability to afford any farther benefit to Britain, is
but little known by the public. For though people have heard in the
gross, that affairs in those countries are rather in a bad situation,
yet do not they either understand or believe it to be so very bad as it
really is; or rather they do not comprehend how it should be so bad; as
not being acquainted with the full power of the cause that hath produced
the evil; and every one will form his notion of effects that he neither
feels nor sees, from his knowledge or opinion of the nature and power of
the causes that produced them. In the case before us, people have been
taught to consider the oppression and extortion of its government, (of
which certain instances are quoted) as the sole cause of evil to Bengal:
of consequence it is supposed that Bengal hath suffered no farther
damage from its government, than what may have been caused by some
private acts of extortion, exercised by the few persons vested with the
powers of governing: and, besides that the authenticity of these acts is
denied or disputed, and men who are to judge only from report are apt to
make allowance for the prejudice or passion of the accuser who brings a
charge against individuals; still if all these acts of oppression that
have been narrated should be fully credited; nay, if the hearer should
suppose still more than is represented, yet cannot he conceive or allow
himself to believe that such acts of extortion, exercised by a small
number of individuals, could suffice to reduce the lately rich
commercial kingdom of Bengal to such a deplorable state of misery,
poverty, and distress: the cause assigned will appear too trivial for
the effect; and of course the effect, at least the degree of it, will be
discredited.

But he who means to acquire a just notion of the present state of those
countries, and the extent of damage they have sustained from their
present Government, must fully inform himself of the true nature and
condition of that Government, and the manner of its operation on the
general interest of the people governed; he must learn, not only that
which it hath done, but likewise that which it hath not done; for the
interest of a community may suffer far more detriment from the
nonaction, than from the oppression, of its government. To the end,
therefore, that every one may be enabled to form a proper judgment on
these matters, we mean to present a general view of the nature, and
effects, of the Company’s Government in Bengal.




     THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE COMPANY’S GOVERNMENT IN BENGAL.


The English East India company is, under the title of Dewan, the real
and actual sovereign of Bengal, Behar, and Orixa: a dominion equal to
almost any one state in Europe, in respect of either extent and
fertility of country, or numbers of ingenious and industrious subjects;
and exceeding most of them in the internal materials of commerce, or
resources of wealth. The Company executes the government of this
dominion by a deputation, consisting of a Governor and Council; who
reside at Calcutta, the Company’s original presidency, or chief factory
in Bengal. And the Directors, who, as possessing the executive authority
of the Company, may be termed the supreme sovereigns of this Indian
dominion, have preserved to themselves the sole power of immediately
ordering, directing and controuling the government; for this deputed
government communicates its purposes, receives its orders, and accounts
for its conduct to none but the Directors.

But it is evident, that the distance of situation must render the
immediate controul of the Directors perfectly impotent, ineffectual, and
nugatory; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the government of
Bengal should defer the execution of any one purpose until it shall have
communicated with, and received the opinion of the Directors, which
cannot be effected in the space of a whole year; consequently the
directors cannot interfere in the direction, or ordering of this
government, farther than in some few cases of the most general or
invariable nature: but the execution of even these general orders
depends upon the will and discretion of the deputed government; seeing
the Directors cannot, at that distance, enforce it themselves: and the
same cause puts it out of their power to prevent or restrain abuse; so
that they hold neither positive nor negative authority in the immediate
execution of this government. And the condition or situation of these
directorial sovereigns at home, renders their retrospective controul
equally impotent and ineffectual; for they have no power in themselves
to inflict other punishment on their deputies, for the most audacious
disobedience, or for maladministration, than dismission from their
service; and this becomes no punishment, because the delinquents are
previously prepared for it, being ready to set out of their own accord
with a princely fortune for the mother country; where they set the
authority of the Directors at defiance; for there these sovereigns of
India are themselves subjects, and cannot call their quondam ministers
to account, except in an ordinary court of justice; and the difficulty
of obtaining evidence requisite to convict in these courts; the dread of
bringing to light, in the course of a legal process, some abstruse
mysteries of government; and the apprehension of danger arising to the
interest of the present direction from a powerful combination at the
next election, will ever deter the Directors from seriously prosecuting
a lawsuit against their deputies, even in cases of peculation from the
sovereign; but if it respects only the interest of the subject, they
will be more apt to palliate and defend the offence. We must therefore
perceive, that this deputed government acts perfectly independent of
either the immediate controul, or future awe of the sovereign: whilst
the sovereign is compelled to blindly support, with its whole power, the
authority of this government; and, without choice, to enforce all its
measures; seeing that to oppose the will of the deputy, is opposing the
authority of the sovereign.

And, as to the native subjects, the power of this deputed government
over them is perfectly absolute and complete. For the inhabitants of
those countries, being disposed by nature or climate to passive
obedience, and by long custom habituated to despotic authority, and
being farther impressed with a particular awe of Europeans, from a
notion of their natural superiority, implicitly submit to the will of
their present government, without once daring to either examine its
right, dispute its authority, or question its conduct. The subject
therefore holds not the smallest voice in the administration of
government; the jurisdiction, the police, the finances, the military
government and defence, are all incontroulably directed by the Company’s
deputation: and the entire interests of those countries, the lives and
property of the inhabitants, are subjected to its discretion, and depend
on its will.

So that this deputation of the Company executes the government of Bengal
with a power perfectly unlimited by any exterior controul; and if we
consider that it is at the same time foreign to the country governed,
mutable, and of very short duration, we shall find that it is equally
unrestrained by any internal check. It is therefore the most unlimited
government on earth; or rather it is the only government that can, with
propriety, be termed arbitrary and despotic.

For all other deputed governments are sufficiently restrained by the
authority of the sovereign; and we have no idea of despotism, except in
governments that are supreme or sovereign. But the idea of actual
despotism in a supreme government is merely imaginary; seeing that, in
one and all of these governments, the power of governing is conditional,
limited by rule, and subjected to controul both external and internal.
For it is evident, that, in all supreme governments, the power of
governing, and the means that support this power, must needs be derived
from the people governed; and therefore cannot exist in despight of
their consent; and though, in some of these governments, the condition,
upon which this power and these means are granted, is not specially
expressed, yet is it perfectly understood, and invariably enforced in
all of them; inasmuch as there are examples in each, of sovereigns who
have suffered the utmost punishment, for attempting to transgress the
limits of this condition; nay, there is scarce one instance where the
prince, thus transgressing, escaped the resentment of the people; and
examples of this nature are most frequent in these governments that are
falsely termed despotic. These examples must therefore convince all
sovereigns, that there is a power in the people, superior to, and
capable of controuling them; and the sense of this must ever prove an
effectual external controul on the conduct of a supreme government. But
self-interest, that _primum_ and _perpetuum mobile_ of human action,
which we may term an internal check, operates still more forcibly,
constantly, and immediately on the will of a supreme government; not
simply restraining it from doing or permitting injury, but impelling it
to promote the good of the people governed. For a government that is
sovereign, and perpetual (or _durante vita_ and hereditary) cannot
possibly separate its own private interest from that of the community
which it governs; being indeed itself a part of that community: and this
is so evident, that no prince ever attempted to advance a distinct
interest of his own, at the expence of the general weal, who was not a
fool, before he became a tyrant. But a wise sovereign considers his
people as the channel through which alone he can receive substantial
good or evil; and, acting upon this principle, he will, however absolute
and disposed by nature to tyranny, abstain from injuring the general
interest, because he is sensible that such injury will recoil upon
himself; and he will exert himself to promote the prosperity of his
people, as the only means of advancing his own power, grandeur, or
wealth. So that a sovereign prince, who understands his own real
interest, though otherwise void of virtue, will ever study to govern
well; nay, the private vices of such a prince do often operate public
good; a striking instance of which we meet with in our Henry the
Seventh; whose extreme and sordid avarice was the source of English
commerce and wealth; and his mean self-love, and jealousy of power,
established universal liberty.

But the nature of this Bengal government differs, in every circumstance,
from that of a supreme government; being deputed, foreign, mutable, and
temporary, it is no way interested in the lasting prosperity of the
community which it governs; on the contrary, this government holds an
interest which is not only distinct from, but diametrically opposite to
that of the subject. For these Governors return to Europe immediately on
the expiration of their office, which seldom dures above three years,
often less; therefore their sole aim is to amass all the wealth they
can, during the short term of their power, in order to transport it
along with their persons to their own country. But the wealth which a
government amasses, must needs be extorted from the people governed;
consequently self-interest leads this government to pillage and plunder
the subject: and we have seen that it is not restrained, by any external
controul, from advancing its own distinct interest at the expence of the
community which it governs, seeing it is perfectly exempted from all awe
of either the sovereign or the subject; and it cannot be restrained by
any internal check, because it holds no concern in the lasting welfare
of the people.

Such then is the ruling principle of this government: nor are the means
which it employs to promote its own interest less extraordinary than is
its power to enforce them. For this government, which arbitrarily
directs the jurisdiction and police, together with the imposition and
collection of taxes, doth at same time act in the capacity of a
merchant. And this commercial despotism, or despotic power lodged in the
hands of a few foreign merchants, hath, in its nature and consequences,
proved infinitely more destructive to the interest of that commercial
country, than all the operations of political tyranny have been: for
from it sprung these cruel monopolies, which struck at the very root of
manufacture, commerce, and even population.

To attempt describing the particular methods which this government hath
practised to promote its own interest at the expence of the people, in
its double capacity, of an absolute sovereign and a despotic merchant,
would be a tedious, invidious, and even an unprofitable undertaking; for
it is almost impossible to properly delineate the conduct of a tyranny
so various and irregular in its operations; and, to those who are
unacquainted with the modes, customs, and interests of the country in
question, the recital of a few particular instances would only serve to
mislead their judgment, and darken or diminish the truth. By attending
to the general description given of the nature views and interests of
this government, we shall form a more complete and just notion of its
conduct and deportment, than can be acquired from any disjointed account
of particulars. Let us suppose a few foreigners sent into a rich
commercial country, with absolute and unlimited power over the lives and
property of the inhabitants; actuated by no other principle than that of
acquiring riches, and stimulated thereto not only by avarice but
ambition, or the desire of excelling; unrestrained by any species of
present awe or future apprehension; but on the contrary, encouraged by
precedent to expect in their own country, titles, dignity, respect, and
consequence, each in proportion to the sum he imports; and whatever
methods we can suppose would be practised by such foreigners, to
accomplish their purpose, within a short limited term, we may suppose to
have been actually employed by this Bengal government. The enormous
amount of numerous fortunes, imported by the persons employed in this
government, together with the rapidity of acquisition, are circumstances
seen and known in this country; and these will thoroughly warrant our
supposing, that the acquirers have availed themselves to the utmost of
their powers, as well as their opportunities. However, we shall err
greatly in our estimate of the damage caused to those countries, by
their government’s prosecuting its own distinct interest, if we shall
confine the reckoning to only the loss of so much specie, as hath been
extorted and exported by these foreigners: for this, though in itself a
ruinous grievance, is merely trivial, when compared with the havoc and
waste committed on the manufacture, the commerce, agriculture, and
population, by the methods employed to acquire these sums. A herd of
hogs, broke into a well dressed vineyard, will gorge their voracious
maws; but that which they eat and devour doth not destroy the vineyard;
it is their manner of eating, their rutting up, their tearing down, and
trampling under foot.

Hitherto we have regarded this government in only one point of view: we
have seen it acting for itself; but we have not seen the part it acts
for the people, in its capacity of a sovereign ruler, administring the
government of a mighty state in all its different offices or
departments; and entrusted with the care of the whole and entire
interests of a numerous commercial nation. But, in the discharge of this
sovereign trust, we shall find the government of Bengal a mere _Vis
inertiæ_, void of the two efficient principles of action, ability or
power of acting, and will or inclination. For how can we expect to find
the ability, of governing well, in the men employed by the Company to
execute the government of those countries? to attain the knowledge of
any one science or mystery, demands an effort of the mind; but it is
impossible for the brightest natural genius to arrive at even a moderate
degree of skill in the art of governing, which, as it is the most
elevated, so is it the most difficult, abstruse, various and complicated
of all human sciences, without long and intense application, study, and
reflection; and, we may add, a series of practice; and all these
gradations to skill, in governing, are wanting to our Bengal governors.
Their scholastic education extends no farther than to qualify them for
merchants clerks; and, immediately on being taken from school, they are
dispatched to India; where the manner of life is consonant to the
climate, voluptuous to a degree of dissoluteness, vain, idle,
dissipated, and an enemy to study or reflection: the juvenile part of
their life being spent in this manner, they arrive at the charge of
government with minds perfectly uninformed, and so very averse to
application, that they commit and implicitly confide the charge of their
own private concerns to servants. If such men should possess the skill
or address of governing well, it must certainly be acquired
instantaneously and supernaturally; infused into them by miracle, like
the gift of speech into the ass of Balaam.

But the want of will or inclination is an obstacle to their governing
well, still more prevalent than is the want of ability. Labour, fatigue,
and difficulty are evils, to which the human mind is so naturally
averse, that, unless it is urged by some strong impulse of passion, such
as the fear of some superior evil, or the hope and desire of some mighty
good, it will decline and evade them: what stimulum then can be
sufficiently powerful to urge the habitually indolent minds of our
Bengal governors to encounter the difficulties, the labour, and fatigue
attending a due discharge of the duties of government; which, of all
human undertakings, is the most replete with these mental evils? Yet
this government, which demands a stronger stimulum than any other
government that ever yet existed, is in effect urged by no one motive or
consideration to discharge the duties of its office; for, as it holds no
interest in the lasting welfare of the people governed, neither its
hopes nor its fears are at all interested in the good or evil
consequences that may be caused by its own vigilance or neglect: being
altogether superior to the resentment of the subject, and independent of
the sovereign’s authority, it is not impelled, by the fear of immediate
danger, nor the apprehension of future punishment: and as to the
prospect of glory, applause, or respect, which push the generous and
ambitious mind to action, our governors aim to attain them, not by
governing well, but by acquiring and bringing home a mighty fortune to
their own country.

Men thus actuated, or rather unactuated, must, in the discharge of their
sovereign office, be perfectly torpid and listless; the machine of
political government stops in their hands, and stands stock still: their
minds being incapable of application, they withdraw themselves as much
as possible from attention, and leave the trouble of governing to
others, still less qualified than themselves; these inferior agents
being chosen, not for their abilities or virtue, but for their fitness
to serve the private purpose of the governors, otherwise by chance; but
they give themselves no trouble to inspect the conduct of these agents,
who in general are unprincipled miscreants; on the contrary, they
promiscuously approve and support every action; so that, wherever the
power of this government acts, it is only to oppress; and all beside is
left to chance. However, the power of governing, or rather of
oppressing, is not confined to the persons vested with the charge of
government: the numerous servants whom this Company disperses over the
face of the country, for the purpose of carrying on her trade, do each
of them, in his own district, assume the authority of a despot; and
communicates a like authority to all his servants and dependants, who,
it must be allowed, are far more unrelenting than their masters; and
thus tyranny is extended into every corner; oppression becomes general;
and the oppressed are excluded from the very prospect of redress; for,
on appeal to the superior, the plaintiff is ever remanded to the very
oppressor, who punishes him for having dared to complain. And thus
justice and protection are no where to be found; vice goes unpunished,
and innocence unsupported; therefore every man becomes a villain in his
own defence; and faith, confidence, truth, and honesty are banished the
land. In short, it may with strict propriety be said by these wretched
people, _Terras astræa reliquit_; and tyranny and anarchy have here set
up their throne.

And to this inaction or non-exertion of the powers of government we are
to impute the ruin of those countries, rather than to the avarice or
rapine of the persons deputed by the Company to execute that government.
For the power of governing being vested in only a few, the extortion of
these few might have been long supported by a rich commercial country,
provided they had exerted themselves to restrain and prevent all others
from plundering and oppressing. The avarice, profusion and bloody
tyranny of even Nero, and Domitian, was felt by only a few of their
subjects at Rome; every where else the empire flourished; because these
imperial monopolizers of vice would suffer none in power to be wicked
but themselves; they narrowly inspected the conduct of their governors
and officers, and severely punished their injustice or oppression. But
where the government doth not only plunder itself, but suffers every one
under it to plunder, that country must in time be completely ruined.

Now Bengal hath been subjected to a government of this nature for these
fifteen years past; for though we commonly date the commencement of the
Company’s sovereignty from the assumption of the Dewanny, (as it is
termed,) yet hath this Company (at least her deputies) possessed a
really absolute authority in those countries ever since the battle of
Plassey in 1757. That action rendered them masters of Bengal; and it was
equally within their power to assume the sovereign government at that
time, as afterwards in 1765; their own will was the only obstacle: but
notwithstanding they bestowed it on a native Nabob, yet did they retain
an absolute superiority over him, and he governed in a state of perfect
subordination to their authority; for he well knew and experienced, that
the duration of his office, and even of his existence, depended upon
their will; consequently this dependent native government could but
little restrain the conduct of the Company’s deputies, or protect the
subject from their rapacity; and when they, in 1765, set aside this
native government, they only removed a screen which they themselves had
set up, and till then preserved for their own purpose.

How far these countries may have advanced towards the period of final
ruin, under the fifteen or sixteen years domination of such a
government, we shall not pretend to determine, because the term _ruin_
is variously understood. This much is certain, that the unbounded
remittance of specie made, for some years, by the English Company, for
sundry purposes as sovereign; and for a much greater number of years,
and in much larger sums by the other European Companies, who received it
from the servants of the English Company for bills on Europe, at a very
low exchange, and employed it for every purpose in the other parts of
India and China, hath compleatly drained Bengal of its wealth, and
reduced it to a state of the most abject poverty. And the grievous
oppression and rapine exercised by the Company’s servants, and their
numerous dependants; together with the most cruel monopolies usurped by
them over every species of merchandize, and even the necessaries of
life, hath in a great measure suppressed commerce, and abolished trade.
Whilst the insatiable avarice and unrestrained extortion of those
employed in the collection of taxes and revenue having ruined the
farmer, the lands lay uncultivated and waste; insomuch that, not to
mention the immense decrease of revenue, that naturally most fertile of
all countries, Bengal, hath suffered a more severe famine than perhaps
was ever heard of; it being reckoned that a fifth part of the
inhabitants have died of want, and numbers have fled from starving and
oppression.

But it is not difficult to determine how near the interest of Britain in
those countries hath approached to ruin: for Britain is to consider them
as ruined to her purpose, so soon as they shall become incapable of
supporting a commerce beneficial to her; and at same time of yielding
her a consideration, in the nature of tribute, equivalent to the expence
of subjects which she sends out annually to maintain her dominion there.
And that they are nearly, if not totally, ruined to her, in both these
respects, we begin already to feel, in spite of all the art or influence
used to conceal the truth.

For, in the article of tribute, we find that, instead of receiving such
a surplus of revenue as sufficed, at the commencement of the Dewanny, to
not only pay for the specie part of the Company’s investment in Bengal
itself, but to purchase her cargoes, and defray all her charges in the
other parts of India, and in China, the government of Bengal was, two
years ago, reduced to the necessity of borrowing near a million sterling
on bills, which have been transmitted and accepted by the Company: in
like manner hath this government been obliged to borrow last year;
though the bills have been prevented, by an arbitrary stroke of deceit,
from appearing against them in Europe. These borrowed sums have all been
expended in Bengal itself: and if we allow that the whole hath been
employed to pay for the Company’s investment, (though by the by the
specie part of the Company’s investment cannot, at least it ought not,
if she exports the proper quantity of European commodities, exceed half
a million,) it must even then be admitted, that the revenue of Bengal
hath barely sufficed to defray the ordinary expence of government. And,
if so, from whence is the tribute of Bengal, (whether we term it
dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend) to arise? not from the
mighty cargoes imported; for they are purchased, not with surplus
revenue, but with borrowed money, which must be repaid either in India
or in Europe: and as to the profits on these cargoes, they will be more
than eat up by the charges of freight, and a long reckoning of India
interest at eight per cent. I am sensible, that this account is
strangely perplexed and embarrassed by intricate calculations of stock
in hand, annual importations, and future sales, &c. but when divested of
all these studied intricacies it will stand simply thus—As is the clear
surplus of revenue received in Bengal, so will be the amount of tribute
received in Britain; the former will ever exactly balance the latter.
But this surplus we find to have been, for the two past years, equal to
nothing; and the amount of tribute received in Britain must amount to
exactly as much; consequently the dedomagement, drawback, and increased
dividend for the two last years is still _in Nubibus_; where the
national part, consisting of the two first articles, is like to remain;
unless it shall be paid out of the Company’s capital stock, as the
encreased dividend hath been. But this revenue, which for the two years
past hath barely sufficed to defray the expence of government, hath not
been kept up even to that extent without the aid of violence: but
violence itself must yield to necessity, and cannot extort that which
doth not exist; moreover the Company had, in these two years, decreased
her military expence, by disbanding some thousand sipahis, and otherwise
diminishing the charge of her remaining force; and the attack made by
Shaw Allum in conjunction with the Mharrattors will, this year, compel
her to re-augment her military expence in every respect; whilst the
predatory incursions of these Mharrhattors will prevent the collection
of revenue; how then will she support the augmented charge of this year,
with a revenue decreased by a variety of causes so much below the degree
of last year? Another loan upon the strength of the capital is the only
resource; but possibly borrowing may, for several reasons, have become
impracticable by this time; and it is certain that troops will not, nay
cannot, serve without pay—Here is a blessed prospect indeed.

But, leaving this to the proof of time, we perceive that, at any rate,
we have lost the prospect of future tribute from Bengal, through the
channel of the Company; we have not so much as the promise of
dedomagement, drawback, or encreased dividend for this current year; and
if we can trust to our own reason, preferably to bankrupt promises, we
may give it up for good and all. Nay, there is mighty reason to
apprehend, that even the private fortunes will soon cease to exist; and
then Britain will cease to receive the sum of 1,400,000 l. sterling,
which for a number of years past hath been annually flowing in to her
from India, in consequence of dominion. And if she could barely support
her burden, when aided by this influx, how will she, when deprived of
it, answer the annual drain of specie made by her foreign creditors?

With respect to the present state of our commerce with those countries,
it is not enquired, and therefore not known, whether the Company exports
the stipulated sum of British commodities or not; and it is still less
known, whether the small quantity she hath exported of late is disposed
of; or whether it remains in her warehouses abroad, to swell up the
account of her stock; thus much however reason tells us, that the
inhabitants of Bengal, who cannot procure the necessaries of life,
millions having died of want, can but little afford to purchase foreign
fopperies or superfluities. Nevertheless we have seen large cargoes of
Indian manufactures imported this very year; but we are not to suppose,
that these cargoes are the produce of willing industry; they are
procured by force and compulsion; the artisan being held to work under
the discipline of task masters, who deprive him of his labour before it
is completed, at a price that will not afford him the means of living.
Of the many markets that for ages had taken off the manufactures of
Bengal, Europe is now the only one remaining; and this one market cannot
be supplied without the application of force. How long force might
supply the place of willing industry, we shall not pretend to determine;
but one year more will discover the united effects of want of artisans,
want of money, and Mharrattor incursions.

And thus have we demonstrated the nature and condition of this Bengal
government, together with the evils it hath caused to the country
governed, not from a recital of disputed facts, but from principles
universally understood and admitted. For every one, the least acquainted
with the Company’s affairs, must know and will allow that the views, the
interests, the powers and opportunities of her deputed government in
Bengal are exactly such as we have described them; and upon this one
undisputed _datum_ we have built our whole demonstration; the truth and
justness of which every man is capable of trying and proving, by the
touchstone of his own reason. For reason, without the aid of
circumstantial proof, can judge whether the line of conduct which we
have assigned to the government of Bengal, is fairly inferred and
deduced from its evident and allowed principle of action: and common
sense, unassisted by demonstration, will point out the effects that such
conduct must operate on the interest of the country governed; and, if we
farther advert to the length of time that this country hath been
subjected to such operation, we shall nearly guess at its present state
and condition.

And we doubt not, that what hath been said will enable every one, who
makes use of his own reason and reflection, to form a proper judgment
for himself on certain points of this East India business, which have
been most grossly misrepresented. For he will thereby discover, that the
object, for which the nation hath to apprehend at present, is not the
“_credit_ of the Company;” which, had she been restrained within her
natural sphere, and her conduct properly inspected by government, could
never have been injured; or, if it had, the breach could (in such case)
have little more affected the general weal, than the failure of any
large trading house; which, so long as the trade remained entire, would
have been immediately replaced by another; but he will perceive, that
the present bad state of the Company’s credit is only an effect, or
consequence, of the ruinous situation of affairs in India; and, of
course, that the object of national apprehension is the ruin or loss of
that mighty and important branch of national interest, which hath been
committed to the charge of the Company, in a manner so complete and
implicit, that the name, as well as the interest of the nation, nay the
very name of the object itself, hath been sunk and lost in that of the
Company: this Company, which is but the temporary farmer, having been,
to all intents and purposes, substituted in the stead of not only the
sovereign proprietor, but even of the farm itself. And it will farther
appear, that the danger which threatens this object is not to be averted
by blindly supporting the credit of the Company: but, on the contrary,
that the nation will, by affording this blind support, only furnish the
means of completing that ruin, which is already so far advanced. To
prevent this danger demands measures of a very different nature: and we
shall proceed to point out these measures; which, had they been applied
in time, would, we humbly conceive, have sufficed to prevent the ruin or
loss of this important concern: and which, if matters are not past
remedy, may yet serve to restore them.




 THE TRUE CAUSES OF EVIL AND ABUSE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, AND THE
                         MEANS TO REMEDY THEM.


It is a common saying that, the cause of an evil being known, the remedy
is readily discovered; and, upon the strength of this maxim, several,
who think they have hit upon some one cause of evil in the political
government of Bengal, have taken upon them to prescribe a remedy; which
is pronounced an universal panacea, a salve for every sore: but no
sooner have they produced their ware, than the eye hath discovered it to
be mere powder of post; or something equally unavailing.

Few of these prescriptions have at all attracted notice; the proposal
for protecting the liberty of the subject from the despotism of
government, by the institution of native juries, was indeed extremely
well calculated to please British speculation; and therefore, like the
device of hanging the bell about the cat’s neck, it was highly applauded
by those who never adverted to the difference betwixt Britain and
Bengal, in point of general constitution of government and disposition
of the natives. But, for practice, it must appear a mere chimera to such
as consider, on the one hand, that men, who are slaves to their
government and its officers in every other capacity, cannot possibly be
free in that of jurymen; and that juries, if they are not free and
impartial, avail nothing: and, on the other hand, that if the natives
should be actually endowed with the real cap of liberty in the jury
room, there is danger, nay, there is a certainty, that they would make
bold to wear it elsewhere; and then, adieu to the English dominion in
Bengal. In few words, the power of the English government, and the
freedom of native juries, are two things that cannot possibly exist
together in Bengal; the life of the one must unavoidably cause the death
of the other: and, however harsh this doctrine may sound in a freeborn
English ear, the force and truth of it will immediately strike the
politician.

Equally unavailing is that proposal for securing the liberty and
property of the subject, from the oppression and extortion of
government, by granting to the native a perpetual property in land;
without providing him the smallest security for the free possession of
its produce; which, so long as government stands on its present footing,
is liable to be wrested from him so soon as acquired.

But it would seem, that the reason why these political physicians have
been so unlucky in their prescriptions is, that they have proceeded upon
false principles; as having mistaken the nature of the malady. For they
have either assigned no one certain cause of evil; or else they have
traced it no farther than to the persons who have executed the
government of those countries, otherwise to the Directors: as if all the
evil had proceeded from some particular viciousness in their
disposition, as if they had been sinners above all men, or as if no men
would have done the wicked deed but they: whereas he who is the least
acquainted with human nature will allow, that few, if any men, would
have made any better use of their powers and opportunities; nay he will
add, that every other government on earth, would act the very part that
this Bengal government hath done, provided it held the same views and
interests, together with the same powers and opportunities. And, if so,
what can be more absurd, than the proposal to remedy the evils and
abuses of this government, by sending out Supervisors, with the same or
greater powers, and consequently possessing greater opportunities of
promoting their own views and interests; which are exactly the same as
these of the persons complained of; seeing that, as the same cause of
evil which existed in the Governors, would have existed in the
Supervisors, these similar causes must have operated similar effects.

Indeed we shall err widely, if we look for the original cause of evil in
these Governors: for, on inspecting the preceding description of this
Bengal government, we perceive, that their maladministration is itself
but an effect, or consequence, naturally flowing from the total want of
certain fundamental principles or powers; which, in every other
government, serve to restrain the party governing from doing or
permitting injury, and impel it to promote the good of the party
governed: and as the want of these restraining and impelling powers hath
unavoidably produced, the first tyranny, and the latter anarchy, it is
plain, that all the evils and abuses in the government of Bengal have
sprung from this deficiency. It farther appears, from the same
description, that the want of these restraining and impelling powers
arises from two different causes; the first being the particular
condition and constitution of the sovereign: and the second is there
termed the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and
the country governed; tho’ the sequel will evince this latter to be
rather a radical defect in the nature of that system, which the
Directors have adopted for the government of this distant dominion. That
these have been the two original causes of the tyranny and anarchy, and
consequently of all the evils and abuses in this Bengal government,
including these of the commercial despotism, is sufficiently evident. We
shall therefore proceed to point out the means of removing these causes,
as the only effectual method of remedying the evils. And as each of the
two causes hath contributed its proper share of the evil, and each
demands a distinct remedy, we shall consider them separately.

With regard to the condition and constitution of the Company, we have
already mentioned the several circumstances that disqualify her for the
office of a supreme sovereign; here therefore we shall only
recapitulate, or collect them into one point of view. The first defect
is, her impotence, or want of power to promote good government in her
dominion: and this proceeds from her being, with respect to her deputed
government, a meer fellow subject, totally void of supreme legislative
and judicial powers; and consequently incapable of inforcing obedience;
or of punishing disobedience: and this want of authority and power in
the sovereign, we have shown to be a principal cause of despotism in the
deputed government. A second defect in the constitution of the Company
is her want of inclination, or rather of interest, to discharge the duty
of a good sovereign; and this arises from the fluctuating and hourly
mutable state of the proprietary, the temporary and short duration of
her corporate existence, the still shorter tenor of this sovereignty,
and the annual rotation of her executive government; for, in consequence
of these several circumstances in her situation, her views are narrow,
contracted, and rapacious; the sole aim of all her measures being to
make the most of the present moment. The third defect is the mercantile
capacity of this sovereign Company; and from this defect alone flow
evils sufficient to ruin the interest of the country subjected to her
government: for, in consequence of her mercantile capacity, her deputed
government acts as a merchant; and, in consequence of her sovereign
capacity, all her mercantile servants assume the authority of
sovereigns.

These are the principal defects in the being and constitution of this
sovereign Company; and it is evident, that such defects in the
sovereign, must have contributed largely towards the existence of abuse,
in the deputed government. But these defects might have been, in a great
measure, remedied, and their consequences prevented, by a simple act of
parliament, past by the national government, at the time it thought
proper to commit the charge of this important branch of national
interest, to the care of the Company. This act might have been entitled,
“An act for better enabling the East India Company to administer the
political government, and to protect, maintain and defend certain states
and countries in India, which have become subjected to the dominion of
Britain, and which, for sundry weighty considerations, it hath been
judged proper to commit to her charge.” And it might have been conceived
in the following, or such like terms.

“Whereas it appears, that the want of a proper legislative authority
over the ministers and servants, employed by the Company to execute the
sovereign government of these subjected dominions, must be productive of
many abuses, detrimental as well to the interest of the Company, as to
the honour and interest of the British nation. Be it enacted by &c.
that, from the time of passing this act, the Company shall possess the
power of legislation, or making laws, for the government of this foreign
dominion: and the laws thus enacted by the Company, shall be equally
binding on all her ministers, servants, and subjects, in that dominion,
as are the acts of parliament on the subjects of Britain. And being
farther sensible of the many inconveniences, that must arise from the
Company’s incapacity of punishing the offences committed by her
ministers, and servants abroad, otherwise than by applying to courts of
justice that are foreign to her government; where she cannot convict,
through the difficulty of obtaining the evidence required by the forms
of these courts; and where she is deterred from prosecuting, by the fear
of divulging the secrets of her government; insomuch that, rather than
apply to these courts, she must submit to the most audacious acts of
disobedience, and maladministration; and considering that such
incapacity in the Company must discourage all good government, and
produce tyranny and anarchy in this dominion; be it enacted, that the
Company shall have authority to erect courts of justice, and appoint
judges; with the like powers, as are vested in his majesty’s judges, and
courts of judicature, for trying and judging all suits and causes, or
offences committed within the limits of this Indian dominion; and for
punishing the same, either capitally, or by fine, imprisonment, and
banishment, though to Europe only. And whereas it is probable, that some
of the ministers or servants of the Company may, by various methods,
elude the justice of her courts abroad, and escape to Europe; in order
therefore to prevent such dangerous illusion of justice, it is enacted,
that the Company’s court of directors shall, on due information being
made to them, have power at all times to call before them such escaping
delinquents, and to try and punish them, for the offences they may have
committed within the limits of this Indian dominion, in like manner as
they could have been tried or punished by the Company’s courts abroad.
And because the liberty of appealing from the Company’s courts of
justice, to the judgment of any other courts, must be productive of the
same inconveniences to the Company, as a trial of the same cause in the
first instance would have been, and must therefore deter the Company
from ever availing herself of the judicial powers granted by this act;
it is enacted, that delinquents shall have no liberty of appealing from
the Company’s courts abroad, excepting to the Court of Directors at
home, or to a general court of Proprietors; whose judgment in all such
cases shall be final. And as the Court of Directors have, and may be,
discouraged, from prosecuting or punishing the crimes of their rich
servants, by the fear of danger to their own private interest, from a
combination of the friends and abettors of such rich delinquents at a
future annual election, be it enacted, that the 24 Directors, being such
at the time of passing this act, shall continue in office, _durante
vita_.

“And whereas it appears, that the liberty of daily selling,
transferring, and alienating the shares in the Company’s stock, of which
this sovereign dominion forms a part, tends to infuse into the
proprietors a spirit of rapacity, that may be productive of much damage
to the several interests concerned; and hath many other very pernicious
consequences; whilst it reflects disgrace on the dignity of all other
sovereigns; be it enacted, that no proprietor in this Company’s stock,
of which the sovereignty forms a part, shall have power to send his
share in the said sovereignty to market, like as it were a hog or
bullock, and to sell, transfer, and alienate the same; but that the
several proprietors of this stock and sovereignty, being such at the
time of passing this act, shall remain and continue proprietors, without
the power of alienation, except in the cases that shall be hereafter
specified.

“And whereas it hath been represented that the Company’s holding this
sovereignty by lease, and for a short term, may not only alienate her
care and prevent her from studying and promoting the lasting welfare of
the country, but may induce her to pillage, plunder and waste it; be it
enacted, that the Company shall hold the sovereignty of this dominion,
_quamdiu se bene gesserit_; to the end, that she may consider and treat
it, not as the property of another, but as her own inheritance.

“And whereas the Company exercises traffic in this dominion; and, in
consequence thereof, her ministers do likewise traffic; and whereas the
exercise of traffic is evidently repugnant to a due discharge of the
duties of government, as being unavoidably productive of destructive
monopolies and oppression; all which it is impossible to prevent, so
long as the Company herself shall continue a merchant; be it enacted,
that this Company’s commercial charter shall be dissolved; and she, and
her ministers, shall be restrained from trading or trafficking, directly
or indirectly, within the limits of this Indian dominion, under certain
penalties to be mentioned in a new charter, which shall be granted to
this Company, constituting her the United Company of English East India
Sovereigns.”

These powers, grants, limitations, and restrictions, would have
qualified the Company, so far as the nature of things could admit, for
administring the political government; but, in her military capacity, as
the sovereign protector, maintainer and defender of this Indian
dominion, she hath been still less qualified, and would therefore have
required still more extraordinary powers. These however we shall not
specify, as apprehending, that what hath been already demanded will
shock. The grant of supreme legislative and judicial powers to subjects,
over their fellow subjects, must seem an absurd communication of that
which is incommunicable: the prohibition of selling and transferring the
shares of stock, would be termed a tyrannical restraint on private
property: the perpetual grant of this sovereignty to the Company, must
be deemed an unjust alienation of the Crown’s and Nation’s rights: and
the dissolution of the Company’s commercial charter, would alter her
very being and nature. In short, if we regard the proposed act simply,
it will appear a collection of absurd inconsistencies, and ridiculous
nonsense: but if we consider it conjunctly with the cause or purpose for
which it is required, then every absurdity vanishes from the act, and
centers in the cause that renders it necessary. For we appeal to common
sense, whether every circumstance, specified in this proposed act, is
not indispensably necessary, to qualify the Company for the sovereign
office of administring the political government of this Indian dominion:
and, if that necessity is admitted, then doth the act become a rational
and necessary consequence, of government’s having previously committed
that sovereign charge to the Company. Nay, we must take the liberty to
add, that government, by committing such a charge to the Company, and at
same time totally neglecting to capacitate her for supporting it, is in
a great measure accessory to all the ruinous consequences that have
ensued from her incapacity.

I am sensible it will be urged, that we proceed upon false premises; for
that government never considered these countries as subjected to the
dominion of Britain; that it never granted the sovereignty of them to
the Company; nor supposed her to be the sovereign; but that it only
acquiesced in her holding the Dewanny, on condition of her paying a part
of the revenues to the nation; and, of consequence, that government
never considered the inhabitants of those countries as subjects to the
government of Britain. But this is a most flimsy evasion, like that of
shutting our eyes to the sun, that we may deny it is day: government
granted to the Company a right or permission to hold the Dewanny; which
is explained to be, the power of collecting and appropriating the
revenues of Bengal; and, in consideration of this grant, government
demanded and received a share of these revenues; government therefore,
in its legislative capacity, admits a knowledge, that the Company did
possess the power of collecting, and also of applying the revenues of
Bengal, _ad libitum_; and, amongst other purposes, to that of defraying
the charges of the military, as well as the civil, government: and
government well knows, that the power which defrays the charges of the
military and civil government, must hold the absolute direction of both:
and what constitutes sovereign power, but the absolute direction of the
military and civil government, together with the disposal of the
revenues? But, exclusive of the Dewanny contract, the Company hath
applied, in every other characteristic of a sovereign, to government, in
its legislative capacity: she hath brought a bill into parliament, for
the grant of certain military powers and indulgences, for the better
enabling her to defend, what she there modestly, though vaguely, terms
her territorial acquisitions, (but which, by referring to the Dewanny
contract, is explained to include Bengal): and she hath applied for
certain juridical powers and grants, for the better administration of
the jurisdiction, not in her commercial factories, but over the whole
country of Bengal: therefore government hath been informed, in its
legislative capacity, by the Company herself, that she administred the
military and civil government, and appropriated the revenues of Bengal;
consequently that she was, in every sense and respect, the actual
sovereign of that country.

Now government could not be ignorant that the Company is a subject to
the national government of Britain; and that, as such, she could have
neither right, power, nor force to subject this dominion, or afterwards
to hold it in subjection, saving what she derived from the national
government; consequently government, as it understood that these
countries were subjected to the Company, must have known that they were
subjected to the dominion of Britain. And as government did permit the
Company to retain this dominion; and furnished her with a military
force, knowing it to be for the purpose of maintaining dominion, it is
plain, that the Company hath held this dominion, no otherwise than by
the grant and support of government.

But if the Company be the sovereign of Bengal, the inhabitants must,
_per_ force, be her subjects; and if the Company holds this sovereignty
as a subject to the government of Britain, by virtue of the grant or
permission of that government, and by means of a force furnished by the
same government, in what relation can this government regard the
inhabitants of Bengal? In that of subjects surely; tho’ the degree hath,
by the deed of government, been somewhat implicated; like that of a
child begot by the father upon his own daughter. And subjects they have
been to the government of Britain, in every sense and meaning; they have
yielded obedience to those subjects of this government whom it appointed
to rule over them; and they have yielded the fruits, as well as the
duties of obedience.

But the government of Britain, which hath thus by force subjected the
inhabitants of Bengal to its dominion; which hath, for a series of
years, held them in subjection; and hath, all along, exacted from them
the tribute of subjection; hath withheld from them the protection due to
subjects. For it hath scrupulously withdrawn itself from all regard or
attention to their government; and hath left it implicitly to the
guidance of a few merchants; whom it knew to be perfectly unqualified
for administring any sort of government: in consequence of which these
wretched people have, for many years, been ruled, without law, justice,
or government. Unhappy subjects, who are forced to obey a sovereign that
refuses them protection, and leaves them exposed to all the horrors of
tyranny and anarchy.

It will nevertheless be still insisted that government could not,
without committing a number of irregularities and absurdities, endow the
Company in the manner specified; as also that the Company, when thus
endowed, would still have been altogether unequal to the charge of
regularly administring a sovereign government. But surely government, if
it would not or could not capacitate the Company to regularly govern
those countries, ought not to have furnished her the means of
oppressing, ravaging, pillaging, and ruining them; to the disgrace of
humanity, and the indelible reproach of the British name. Government
would have acted a part far more consistent with the rules of honour and
humanity, if, instead of furnishing to the Company this military power,
it had restrained her from availing herself of the advantage, gained by
force and chance, over that mild, unwarlike, but industrious people; and
obliged her to leave them to their own government.

But then the situation of affairs in those countries, where the nation
and Company held such a valuable commercial interest, rendered it highly
improper and dangerous to leave the native government to itself:
moreover the nation and Company could not, in such case, have acquired
the mighty wealth and other benefits that have been derived from the
conquest, or assumed dominion, of those countries. Oh wealth, basely
acquired, and foolishly applied! Was there then no medium, no middle
channel, thro’ which government might have steered the Nation and
Company to this same wealth and benefits, clear of all these
irregularities, incongruities, inhumanities, and reproaches? Yes surely;
and one so obvious and conspicuous, that it is impossible to conceive
how government could be so industrious as to shun or miss it. Had the
national government taken upon itself the charge of superintending the
government of those countries, as reason and the nature of things
directed, then would it have furnished them a sovereign, naturally free
from all the defects of the Company, and completely endued with all the
qualifications of power, ability, and inclination from interest, to
protect and regularly govern them.

For it is plain, that the national government, possessing supreme
legislative, and judicial power, must have been capable of enforcing
obedience to the laws which it might have enacted for the good
government of those countries; and of punishing disobedience, not only
in the natives, but in the ministers whom it would have employed to
execute that government; as these must have been its own subjects. And,
on the other hand, the nation being an immutable body, and holding this
sovereignty in her own right, and by perpetual tenor; her government
must have been actuated, by the strong motive of self interest, to exert
itself in promoting the real and lasting welfare of those countries. And
as to the commercial despotism, it could never have existed under the
national government.

It therefore follows, that the national government, being perfectly free
from all the defects of the Company, would, by the simple, natural, and
rational act of assuming the administration of government in those
countries, have prevented or reformed all the several abuses or evils
that have sprung from the defective constitution of the Company, as
sovereign. But besides the mighty reform of abuses, that must have been
immediately caused by thus changing the person of the sovereign; there
is another advantage, which, though it cannot be said to spring directly
from that change, yet would it have ensued as a natural consequence of
the national government’s taking upon itself this sovereign charge; and
that is, the creation or institution of a new interest in that country;
a sort of middle state, betwixt the native subjects and their foreign
government.

The middle state here meant is the East India Company, (or which is the
same, her servants in Bengal;) which, being now reduced to the condition
of a subject, tho’ still retaining all her commercial privileges and
interests in that country, would have formed an intermediate link in the
political chain, serving to connect the natives with their government,
and government with the natives. For, in every one circumstance that
respected the liberty of the subject, this middle state must have held
precisely the same interest as the natives; and, in consequence, the
same inclination to oppose all oppression of government: and, in every
thing that respected the real interest, the power, or honour of the
sovereign, the community of _Natale Solum_ must have led it to support
the measures of government. Therefore, this middle state, holding a
great weight in that dependent dominion, (not indeed from its numbers,
but from the powerful support and influence of the Company, which would
have been still very respectable in the sovereign country,) must have
carried a mighty poise into the scale of liberty, in opposition to the
despotism of government; whilst, at same time, it would have created no
danger to the power of the sovereign. And a middle state of this nature
must have been of inexpressible utility; facilitating, in many respects,
the establishment of a regular political œconomy

in the government of these countries. For, in such case, the sovereign
could, with propriety, efficacy, and safety, have conferred every
reasonable privilege on the whole body of subjects in this foreign
dominion: seeing that the exertion of these privileges might have been
artfully confined to this middle state: and, as on the one hand, this
finesse would not have, in any shape, withheld the benefit of these
privileges from the natives; but, on the contrary, would have rendered
them more effectually useful to the whole body of subjects, than if they
had been committed either entirely or in common to the natives; because
the Company’s servants would, from interest, have had the same
inclination as the natives, to exert these privileges for the common
good; and they would have had infinitely greater power, from their
superior activity, intrepidity, and firmness, as also from their
superior opportunities of obtaining redress elsewhere against any
infringement made by government: so, on the other hand, the authority of
the sovereign could have incurred no risk from these privileges in the
hands of Europeans; whereas there is great danger in attempting to
confer on the natives a power to controul even the despotism of
government. With this middle state the power of juries would have been
effectual to the subject, and harmless to the sovereign: however, we
shall have occasion to be more particular on this head in the sequel.

But if the national government could, by taking this sovereign charge
upon itself, have prevented or reformed these many evils and abuses that
have arisen from the defects of the Company; and could have likewise
created other such advantages, facilitating the establishment of a
regular government in those countries; what reason can be assigned for
government’s declining this charge, and devolving it on the Company?
Government could not surely suppose that this important concern would be
managed to greater national advantage by the Company, than by itself:
seeing that common sense might have foreseen, what experience hath since
proved, that, under the management of the Company, the interest of
Britain in those countries would, in the space of a very few years, be
completely annihilated; that the countries themselves would either be
completely ruined, or otherwise lost to enemies; and that the wealth,
which was extorted from them by rapine and general havoc, being imported
into Britain in the hands of a few indiscreet individuals, would create
a torrent of profusion, extravagance, luxury, and prodigality, that
would sweep all before it into the gulf of bankruptcy, perdition, and
despair. Whereas, under the regular administration of national
government, those countries might have been still preserved in a
flourishing condition; and, in consequence, still capable of yielding to
Britain a tribute little inferior to the surplus revenue which the
Company received in the first year of the Dewanny: which tribute,
arriving immediately at the public treasury of Britain, and being there
applied to the diminution of taxes, and consequent reduction of the
price of necessaries and labour, would have proved a gentle universal
shower, reviving our decayed and drooping manufactures and commerce.

But neither could government be induced to confer this sovereignty on
the Company, by any motive of regard to the true interest of the
proprietors: seeing it was palpably evident that this charge, being so
unmeasurably superior to her powers of supporting it, must unavoidably
crush her to ruin, and, along with her, the countries subjected to her
rule; and, it is to be feared, even that community of which she forms a
part. Whereas, if the national government had taken into its own hands,
and carefully administered the government of those countries, whilst it
continued the Company in possession of her commercial privileges, she
would have continued to divide, in the first place, the six per cent.
which her commerce, (unaided by revenue) afforded; even when burdened
with the necessary expence of a small military force maintained for the
guard of that commerce in those foreign countries, and which must have
been equal to four per cent. on her capital: but this commercial
military expence being rendered in a great measure unnecessary, by the
immediate protection of national government, the saving thereof would
have added two per cent. to her dividend: and the equivalent, which
government would have paid for her fortresses, munition, &c. being added
to her capital stock, would have encreased her dividend nearly one per
cent. more; whilst her stock itself would, at this day, have been
really, and intrinsically worth 220 l. instead of ........ its present
real and intrinsic value.

It would be insulting the understanding of ministry, to suppose that it
had been restrained from assuming this sovereign charge, by any delicacy
of regard to the ideal right of the Company; derived from either
conquests, as subjects; or from the sham grant of a man, who had not
power to dispose of a single bega of land, nay, not of a cocoa-nut-tree
in that country; and consequently whose grant of the sovereignty of
Bengal could contribute nothing more to investiture or possession, than
his grant of the crown of Britain could. Though if we should (for the
sake of argument) suppose, that ministry had really admitted some such
right, we must still esteem its acquiescence in that right a most absurd
and wildly mistaken indulgence; seeing it evidently tended to the ruin
of the party whom it meant to favour.

There hath been, however, one weighty argument against government’s
assuming this Indian charge, which is, the danger arising to national
liberty from government’s, (or, in other words, the crown or ministry’s)
acquiring such an accession of influence, as must arise from the
possession of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to this
Indian charge: whereas liberty is completely secured from such danger,
whilst the Company possesses it. And the certainty of this double maxim,
viz. the danger from government’s possessing this charge, and the
security whilst it is in the hands of the Company, is as generally
established as almost any one human principle: for, being violently
enforced by those whose personal views lead them to oppose
administration, and at same time not simply allowed, but even inculcated
by ministry itself, it hath been readily credited by those who, their
personal interest not being so deeply concerned, were less curious to
investigate the truth.

It may be deemed presumptuous in an individual, to question the
orthodoxy of a maxim so powerfully enforced by one party, readily
allowed by the other, and almost universally credited: tho’ the
extraordinary circumstance, of two violent rival parties concurring so
exactly on a point, where their personal interest seems to be so
materially and so oppositely engaged, would lead a bystander to suppose,
that either one of the two parties must be mistaken; or otherwise, that
one or both must misrepresent: at any rate, that uncommon instance of
candour, in ministry’s preaching up a doctrine so repugnant to that
which it pretends to be its own personal interest, would induce such
bystander to suspect its sincerity. However, as a right understanding of
this point may considerably import the public, at this critical
juncture, I shall venture disclosing my sentiments, at the risk of
censure for prolixity, as well as impertinence.

With regard to the first part of the maxim, I conceive that the danger
to liberty, from government’s holding this charge in its own hands, is
supposed to arise from the influence which the minister would acquire,
over the two subject branches of legislature, (those bulwarks of
liberty) by means of the many emoluments, places, posts, &c. annexed to
the possession of that charge. But before we admit that the ministers
holding this charge would be creative of that dangerous influence, we
ought to be satisfied that he doth not already possess it, by other
means; for, if he doth already possess such influence by other means, it
is plain that the Indian charge cannot confer it; nor will it avail to
shut one door, whilst there are others open to admit him. And that the
minister hath long been in full and plenary possession of such
influence, we have ever heard asserted by these very men who so loudly
enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by means of this Indian charge:
nay, we have much better authority than their contradictory assertions,
(even that of fact and daily experience,) for believing that the
minister hath and doth possess posts and places, and that, on any
emergency, he hath in his power other means equally effectual, towards
creating and holding such influence, in a degree as plenary and complete
as his own heart can desire. And, if the minister doth already possess
such influence by other means, it is plain, that the Indian charge
cannot confer it; nor will it avail to shut one door, whilst there are
others open to admit him. And that the minister hath been long in full
and plenary possession of such influence, we have ever heard asserted by
those very men, who so loudly enforce the danger of his acquiring it, by
means of this Indian charge: nay, we have much better authority than
their contradictory assertions, (even that of fact and daily
experience,) for believing that the minister hath and doth possess posts
and places, and that on any emergency he hath in his power other means
equally effectual, towards creating and holding such influence, in a
degree as plenary and complete as his own heart can desire. And, if the
minister doth already possess an influence so fully sufficient, it must
be allowed that, in so much as respects parliamentary influence, this
Indian charge would be a thing superfluous and useless to him; like meat
to a man that hath already filled his belly; the absence of it can
withhold nothing that he wants, and the acquisition cannot confer more
than he already possesses. I may venture to add, that we certainly hold
our liberty by some latent security, more powerful than that of
parliament itself, which neither the minister’s influence over
parliament, nor posts and places, will ever induce him to attack, or
enable him to subdue; for that, otherwise, we should have been divested
of our privileges and liberty long ago. And, upon considering these
several circumstances, I conclude, that if this Indian charge was in the
hands of government to-morrow, it would neither enable, nor induce the
minister, to attempt a jot more against our liberty, than he hath done,
can do, and will do, without it. However, by way of reinforcing my
argument, I shall add that, if the plan which I mean to propose should
be carried into execution, it would leave but few of these emoluments,
&c. to the immediate disposal of the minister; and, possibly, this
declaration may but little recommend it to his favour.

But still, if we were to admit a real danger to liberty from the
minister’s possessing these emoluments, &c. it remains to be proved that
liberty hath been, is, and will be secured from such danger, by the
Company’s holding that Indian charge. And, when the nature of this
security comes to be examined, I apprehend it will be found more
difficult to prove this latter part of the maxim, than the former. For
it is notorious that, ever until the late distraction in the Company’s
affairs, the arbitrary application of these emoluments, posts, &c. was
vested in the Directors; and indeed the entire powers and interests of
the Company; insomuch that the Directors might, with propriety, be
termed the Company. So that the whole security of national liberty, and,
of course, the sole obstruction to the minister’s dangerous views,
depended on the integrity and independent spirit of 24 Directors; of
whom, again, one or two generally leads all the rest. Consequently, to
come at the fingering of these dangerous emoluments, &c. the minister
had only to subvert the integrity, or subdue the independance, of these
Directors. And, to effect this, a minister possessed more than one
infallible recipe. By artfully joining the mighty influence which he
held in the Company’s stock thro’ his numerous dependants, to one or
other of two parties contending violently for the direction, he could
reduce both to a perfect dependance on himself: by the same means he
could hold them in subjection: but still more, by the awe of wresting
from them the sweet management of this Indian sovereignty, which they
were sensible he could do by a word. And thus he could work upon their
fears. But inclination would naturally and powerfully lead the Directors
to throw themselves into the arms of a minister; not so much for his
immediate assistance; tho’ even that might be of great use, for
rendering matters easy with the proprietors, as well as parliament and
the nation; but because, on these terms, they secured, in him, an
omnipotent supporter and all powerful advocate, against the day of
distress, which they well knew must come, and that soon: whereas,
otherwise, they must lay their account with finding him a severe judge,
and bitter prosecutor.

By these several operations on the hopes and fears of the Directors, it
was extremely easy for a minister to render them as pliant as a glove;
as obedient as a spaniel, to fetch and carry at bidding. And the
Directors being once reduced to this state of dependance, it is evident,
that the minister must possess a full and arbitrary power over all the
emoluments, posts, places, &c. appertaining to this Indian charge. But
the disposal of the present emoluments, &c. was a trivial matter,
compared with other advantages, which this Indian business, whilst in
the hands of the Company, presented to an artful and enterprising
minister. For, under the plausible and indeed undeniable pretext of
qualifying the Company for administring this sovereign charge, he might
have drawn from the legislature certain military as well as political
powers; which, being gradually augmented as occasion offered, might have
at last established a sort of power, in this government, distinct from
and independent of the legislature: the exertion of which power, being
confided to the Directors, would in fact have rested with the minister.
Here indeed was a real danger to liberty; provided it had been possible
to hold up this Indian business, in the hands of the Company, for any
length of time; for, notwithstanding I consider national liberty as
inexpugnable to the open assaults of a minister, yet, from such a secret
convenient and commanding post as this mentioned, he might have made
frequent sly and successful incursions on the confines of liberty; which
would have greatly straitened her quarters, and wasted her strength.

On the other hand, if that Indian charge had been vested in the national
government, liberty must have been perfectly secured from this last
mentioned danger; for, in such case, there could have been no pretext
for demanding these extraordinary distinct powers; and, consequently, no
opportunity of establishing that truly dangerous _imperium in imperio_.
And even in the application of the ordinary powers, emoluments, &c. a
minister must have been subjected to many troublesome checks, and
restraints. His Majesty, who can have no views distinct from the general
interest of his people, must have held a principal voice in every
measure; as likewise must some others his counsellors. Parliament too
must have proved an inconvenient restraint on a minister; particularly
in the article of estimates and accounts of revenue, which must have
been submitted to its inspection; and notwithstanding the certainty of
carrying points by a majority of voices, yet, as there will ever be some
refractory members, these might have carried tales to the public; which,
provided this charge had been in the hands of national government, would
have judged itself interested in the affair; and would therefore have
taken the liberty to criticise his measures, or censure his misconduct.
Whereas, this business being secured, as private property, in the hands
of the Company, king, parliament, and nation were all excluded from
participation: the proprietors alone had a right to examine measures or
accounts; and, the majority of them upon all questions being mercenary
retainers to ministry and the direction, they must have ever been a mere
_servile pecus_. So that the business might have been snugly confined to
three or four ministerial associates, with their faithful dependants in
Leadenhall Street; whilst the minister needed never appear in the
affair; free from care, charge, or trouble; and irresponsible for either
measures, or consequences; he might enjoy all the sweets, without the
least alloy of bitter.

Sure I am if I had been minister, and minded to make a job of this
Indian business, I would certainly have exerted myself most sedulously
to preserve it in the hands of the Company. And, to divert the nation
from ever turning her eye towards it, I would have strenuously
inculcated the rights of the Company, national faith, the impossibility
of conducting this business otherwise than through the Company; and,
above all things, I would, by my emissaries, have alarmed the public,
with fears of danger to their liberty, should this business ever come
into the hands of government; whilst, by the same canal, I would have
trumpeted forth my own candour, disinterestedness as a minister,
indifference to power, and delicate regard to national liberty and
private property, in thus disclaiming an object so replete with
ministerial advantages, which was within my power. And thus would I have
continued the game, until it was up: and then I would have directed the
enquiries, which decency and regard to appearances extorted from me, in
such a manner as to suppress, instead of investigating: though, at same
time, I would have boldly expressed my indignation at the Company’s
misconduct; and loudly denounced vengeance against the individuals that
had shared in the plunder; not a soul that was guilty should escape.
And, to wind up the whole affair dextrously, I would have tasked my own
powers, and those of my myrmidons, to represent all these Indian
acquisitions as a transitory, casual, and accidental piece of business;
which was altogether out of our tract; and which, if the nation had ever
engaged in maintaining them, would have ruined and exhausted her: and so
the nation was to thank me, for withholding her from ruin.

In this manner, I say, would I, who am a reptile, have acted, had I been
minister, and minded to make a job of this business: but I am far from
intimating or insinuating that our ministers, who are men of high birth
and strict honour, could be capable of admitting even a thought of
taking such base advantages. All that I have said is only meant to show,
that a minister, if he had the inclination, possessed an infinitely
fairer opportunity, of converting this business to sinister purposes,
whilst it was in the hands of the Company; than he possibly could have
had, from the same business, under the conduct of national government.
And, from thence, I would infer that, had this business been in the
hands of government, our liberty, nay and our property too, would have
been secured from many dangers, to which they have been exposed, whilst
this business hath been in the hands of the Company.

I cannot then conceive what other objections could be started against
government’s taking upon itself the charge of this Indian dominion:
unless it be the old trite arguments of timid sluggish indolence, want
of enterprize, &c. That, the distance of situation rendering it
impossible for Britain to properly maintain and govern this dominion, it
would become an object of no true value or importance, but rather a
heavy load exhausting her strength. But it is now more than time for the
nation to recal her faith from men whom she hath sufficient ground to
suspect of deceit; and, rousing her senses, to take the liberty of
trying these matters by the standard of her own reason; which we shall
endeavour to aid by the following hints.

To properly demonstrate the true value and importance of this Indian
dominion to Britain, would demand a volume; we have, in the first part,
presented a slight sketch of it; here therefore we shall offer only one
or two remarks respecting its importance to our finances; and though we
do not offer these remarks as the result of exact calculation, yet will
they serve to throw a light on this subject. Ever since the last war
Britain hath paid annually to foreign creditors, in interest, about
1,500,000 l. and this is paid, not in paper, but all in hard money; or,
otherwise, in what is equivalent, the stoppage of so much hard money as
is reckoned to come into Britain by the balance of her trade. On the
other hand, the net specie balance of trade with all the world,
(exclusive of that part which strictly and properly may be termed the
produce of Indian dominion,) after deducting the imperceptible and
enormous drain of specie made by smuggling, doth not at this day perhaps
amount to 800,000 l. The difference then betwixt her numerical specie
disbursement and receipt in balance of trade, must needs have been made
good from some other fund than the circulating stock of specie,
otherwise circulation must in that number of years have totally ceased.
And this fund we need not mention to have been the dominion in India.
Ever since 1757, the private fortunes acquired there in consequence of
dominion or conquest, having been remitted either in bills on foreign
Indian companies, or in diamonds, have created an annual influx of
specie, (or what is equivalent,) to the amount of at least 700,000 l.[1]
The Company too received since that period, and previous to the Dewanny,
though by virtue of dominion or conquest, sundry large sums of money;
which she invested in merchandize; and, thereby, saved to Britain so
much specie as she would, otherwise, have transmitted for the purchase
of such merchandize; and it doth not require demonstration to prove,
that all such saving is, in every respect, the same as the influx of an
equal sum. And ever from 1765, till some time in 1770, the Company paid
for all her cargoes, not only in India but in China, with the surplus
revenue of Bengal: and of course this surplus revenue hath, for that
space, saved, (which is the same as gained) annually to Britain, the
whole sums which the Company used to transmit for the purchase of her
cargoes in India and China; and which, on an average, may be reckoned
500,000 l. _per annum_: but these cargoes were, from 1765, encreased to
an enormous degree; and if we add only 200,000 l. for such encrease, we
shall find that the surplus revenue of Bengal hath, by the return of
trade, created an annual influx to Britain of at least 700,000 l. in
specie: and this, added to the private fortunes, makes 1,400,000 l.
received yearly by Britain, from Indian dominion.

But, for these two years past, the ruinous situation of those countries,
and the consequent deficiency of revenue, hath obliged the Company to
either transmit money from Europe, or otherwise to borrow money abroad,
on bill or bond, for the purchase of all her cargoes in India as well as
China: and the Company, by thus borrowing, for the purchase of cargoes,
and even the expence of her government, hath absorbed the private
fortunes, which, till then, had been transmitted to Britain, by bills on
foreign companies. We must therefore perceive, without descending to
tedious investigation, that the ruined state of those countries, having
cut off surplus revenue, hath, for these two years past, diminished the
annual influx to Britain from Indian dominion, at least one half, or
700,000 l. And this diminution of influx, whilst our drain continues the
same, we already begin to feel in our circulation: though this felt
effect is not yet traced up to its cause. Of what mighty importance then
must this Indian dominion have been, to the circulation of Britain: when
this circulation feels severely, from only two years partial deprivation
of the benefit formerly derived from that dominion? And what effect must
a total deprivation of that benefit operate, in a few years, on this
circulation; whilst, we are continuing to pay to our foreign creditors
about 1,500,000 l. _per annum_ in numerical specie; exclusive of other
less noted drains, which, it is most probable mount it up much higher?
And yet it is evident, that Britain must, unavoidably, be deprived of
this whole benefit, so soon as she shall lose her dominion in India;
whether that loss shall be caused by enemies, or by the ruin of the
countries subjected. Nay, by losing the dominion of Bengal singly, she
must not only incur a deprivation of almost the whole dominion benefit;
but she must likewise lose by far the most valuable part of that
commerce, which was carried on by the Company with those countries,
previous to dominion. For the commerce with Bengal, alone, is of much
greater value, than that with all the rest of India: and, as to the
trade with China, it is the most pernicious and losing trade to the
nation; however convenient it may be to government.

And if we shall then advert to the benefit and support which the
finances of Britain have received from this Indian dominion, for so many
years past, though under the most preposterous management; but, still
more, if we shall advert to the nature and degree of benefit that, under
proper management, might have been derived _in perpetuum_ from this
Indian dominion, in not only the article of finance, but in other
weighty respects: and, if we shall, yet farther, look forward to the
dismal consequences that must unavoidably ensue to Britain in these
several respects, from a deprivation of this Indian dominion and its
benefits; can we tamely surrender our reason to the _ipse dixit_ of men
who are hardy enough to tell us, that Indian dominion is of no value nor
utility to Britain.

Nor do these men less abuse our understanding, by holding forth the
difficulty of maintaining and defending this dominion: seeing that, of
all nations in the world, Britain is, by a variety of circumstances, the
best qualified to maintain and defend maritime or commercial dominion in
India. For, as she exceeds all the world in naval force, she is, through
that circumstance alone, the most capable of defending such dominion,
against the assault of European enemies: and had Britain availed herself
of evident advantages, had she established her naval and land defence
upon the plan that shall be explained, British dominion in India might,
at this day, have been secured from even the attempt of European rivals:
they might have admired and envied, but they would not have dared to
attack. And these European rivals are the only dangerous enemies to
British dominion in India: for as to the neighbouring native powers,
they would, from fear as well as inclination, have been amicable to
Britain; provided her government in those countries had acted with
common honesty, and common decorum, or prudence; and not as common
robbers. And, as to the unhappy native subjects themselves, their
loyalty hath been sufficiently proved, by so many years patient
submission to the most intolerable of all possible governments. Wherein
then consists the difficulty of maintaining and defending British
dominion in India?

And with regard to the so much talked of expence or drain of native
strength, we may surely, with good reason, say that this objection
militated much stronger against maintaining that dominion under the
Company, than under national government: tho’ the nature and extent of
even that drain under the Company, is most grossly misrepresented. For I
am well informed that the Company’s annual recruit, since the time she
completed her dominion force, hath never exceeded 1200 men; and I am
afraid it hath in general fallen short of 1000; notwithstanding she
laboured under many disadvantages, from which national government would
be exempted: such as being obliged to put up with very indifferent and
unhealthy recruits, for want of better; too little attention paid to the
manner of transporting them; and still less to their health and manner
of living in the country: whilst her governors expended numbers of them
on unnecessary predatory wars. And even this recruit we are not to
reckon a drain of real strength from Britain: seeing that, the Company’s
recruits have been mostly fellows of the most desperate circumstances,
who had no means of subsisting at home; and who therefore would, if the
Company had not taken them off, have been taken off by the gallows, or
otherwise would have emigrated to America or some other country, in
search of bread; and would thus have been equally lost to Britain. So
that, upon rationally considering this matter, we shall find that, for
the maintenance of dominion in India, the Company hath not drained this
country, of 100 men annually, that could, in any sense, be termed
useful, or a real strength to it. But, setting aside the precedent of
the Company, it is certain that, to maintain and defend the mighty
dominion of Bengal, demands an European force very little superior in
number to the garrison of that barren fortress Gibraltar: and to
maintain and defend the whole territorial possessions, together with the
commerce of Britain in India, requires a force very little exceeding the
aforesaid garrison with that of its filler fortress in Minorca. And the
annual recruit, necessary to keep up this force, after allowing largely
for climate, and every other circumstance, would, on a complete plan of
defence, not exceed 900 or at most 1000 men: and, of this recruit, at
least 200, would be wanted annually to maintain commerce, if there was
no dominion. Nay, if this is judged too great a drain for Britain, one
fourth part of that number may be reduced, by recruiting that proportion
of foreign protestants: such being easily procured; and, in such a low
proportion, they can in no respect be dangerous. And can Britain, regard
6 or 700 men annually as too great a drain, for the maintenance of that
important dominion and commerce, which is as one of the capital limbs of
her body; and at same time bestow a nearly equal share of her strength
on maintaining these two barren, and I had almost said useless,
fortresses; the pecuniary charge of which she pays out of her proper
finance, never to return; whilst Indian dominion defrays its own charge.

The only remaining objection then to Indian dominion is, the difficulty
of properly governing it. But this difficulty doth not arise, like that
in America, from the indomitably obstinate spirit of the subjects; on
the contrary, it arises from their over passive or submissive
disposition, and incapacity of resisting the power of government: and
this, instead of being an objection, is the most valuable qualification
of a dependent dominion. To remove this difficulty demands no exterior
aids, no exertion of powers or force; it depends entirely on the will of
the sovereign; and a very little art, a very little care, with a little
honesty, would serve to completely remedy it; as we doubt not to evince.

In fine, Bengal, being one of the richest commercial countries is, to
Britain as a commercial nation, the noblest and most truly valuable
acquisition that providence could possibly bestow on her: by the mild
disposition of its inhabitants it is the most facilely governed and
maintained; and, by the nature of its situation, it is the most
defensible foreign dominion on this globe; particularly to Britain which
excels in naval force. And one may almost venture to say that
providence, by throwing Bengal into the arms of Britain, seems to have
intended that this, the richest commercial state in Asia, which, through
the effeminacy of its inhabitants, is incapable of maintaining its own
independance, should be subjected to Britain, as being the fittest,
through similarity of commercial disposition, interest, and modes, to
properly govern it; and, through her superiority in naval force, the
best qualified to defend and protect it from all enemies.

In what light then must posterity regard the policy of Britain, during
the third quarter of the eighteenth century: when it shall find her, in
the East, slighting and giving up that glorious field, which annually
yielded a golden crop, to be rutted up and trodden down by hogs and
viler beasts: whilst, in the West, she was tugging with all her might,
exerting her utmost study, care and attention, much strength, and more
money, on cultivating the sea sands; straining to subdue nature; and
forcing the horse to drink in spite of inclination? Will it not be said,
that she would have acted a far wiser part, if she had left nature and
time to slowly operate in America, the effects which they will
unavoidably produce, in spite of all her efforts; and had converted her
care and attention, to properly govern, and maintain, that noble, rich,
and grateful dependent dominion in India; which, upon such terms, would
have poured, into her publick treasury, resources, that would have
served to alleviate her burden of taxes; and, consequently, to reduce
the price of necessaries, of labour, and of manufactures; which, again,
would have preserved her commerce, not only with America, but with other
countries; and would at same time have preserved to her thousands of
industrious and useful subjects, who, through want of employment, were
forced to emigrate from her to America. And, by the same care and
attention to the government and revenue of that Indian dominion, she
would have prevented the inundation of eastern profusion and
extravagance; which chiefly contributed to convert this formerly
graniferous island, into a pasture for horses of parade and stately
pride; insomuch that, instead of supplying her neighbours as formerly,
with some hundred thousand pounds worth of grain annually, she could not
feed the greatly reduced number of her own inhabitants; nor furnish the
means of living to the industrious agricultor, and peasant; who, in
search of livelihood, fled from her to America; thereby debilitating her
own best source of strength, and prematurely accelerating the manhood of
those otherwise infant colonies.

Nevertheless there still remains a possibility of retrieving this error
in policy; or at least of preventing a farther encrease of the evils
that have arisen from it; provided that, in the first place, this Indian
dominion shall still be in our possession: and, in the second place,
that national government shall, by taking upon itself the charge of
administring the government thereof, remedy that first and radical cause
of evil and abuse which hath existed under the Company’s government: and
shall, at same time, with honest and sincere intention, spirit and
activity, apply a proper remedy to that which hath been assigned as the
second cause of evil, and the nature of which remedy shall be explained
in the sequel. For, upon such terms, there is no doubt that a regular
system of government may be established in that dependent dominion;
under which it may be restored to its pristine prosperity, nay, it may
be elevated to a state still more flourishing than it ever knew; and, in
consequence, to a capacity of yielding a still superior degree of
benefit to Britain; and in a manner widely different, and truely
salutary to her.

But I must again repeat, that it is vain to expect this reform of evils
from the management of the Company; loaded as she is with so many
natural defects, which it is out of the power of art to remedy,
otherwise than by conferring upon her the sovereign government of
Britain, along with that of this dependent dominion. For the execution
of these two sovereign governments is, by the nature of things,
inseparable: it being morally impossible, that any power can execute the
sovereign government of those Indian countries, as a dominion dependent
upon Britain, unless that power shall possess the sovereign execution of
government in Britain.

However, it would be still more vain to look for any good from that
extravagant fancy of joining the Company, with government, in this
sovereign charge. What quota of powers, proper to her and wanting to
government, can the Company contribute, to render her a necessary or
useful associate with government, in this sovereign charge? I doubt not
that the proposer’s intentions were good and honest: but his scheme
would be so far from promoting his or any one good purpose, that it
would produce the very opposite effects. For, instead of checking and
contrasting, it would serve, in the first place, to furnish, in the
Directors and their governors, a convenient cloke of excuse to ministry
and its governors, with the nation; whilst ministry and its governors
would serve the Directors and their governors a like good turn with the
proprietors: they would mutually vouch for and screen each other;
neither would be responsible, and neither would act; and thus, between
stools, &c. in the second place, commercial despotism which, by
separating the Company from the powers of government and the consequent
jealousy of privilege, must have been completely suppressed, would,
under this double-headed monster, flourish with redoubled vigour: the
national governors would, by their connection with the Company’s, become
merchants as well as tyrants; and the Company’s governors would, by
their power in the government, continue tyrants as well as merchants:
and thus the candle would burn at both ends. In the third place, the
Company which, by being excluded from the powers of government, would
have contributed so essentially in the nature of a middle state to the
establishment of a regular political system in those countries, must, by
being joined in the execution of government, entirely lose that virtue:
instead of supporting liberty, she would join in promoting tyranny; and
would still continue a ruinous pest to those countries. Indeed that
strange partnership of Nation and Co. in this sovereignty business, is a
cure infinitely worse than the disease.

In short, there is no alternative: if Britain means to preserve the
possession of that mighty benefit derived from dominion and commerce in
India; if she means to prevent the absolute ruin of the Company, and her
creditors; if she hath any regard to the loud cry of oppression sent
forth to her for a series of years, by her numerous wretched subjects in
those countries; and means to save them from final destruction, she must
furnish their government with a sovereign, or head, properly qualified
to administer it: for this is the foundation, as well as the crowning of
all good government; it is the center upon which the machine revolves,
from which every line issues, and in which every line terminates; it is
_sine qua non_, for without it no regular government can exist. And what
proper sovereign can Britain furnish to that dependent dominion, unless
it be her own sovereign government?

We have shown that the nation and her supreme government are perfectly
equal to the charge: to them there is not the smallest difficulty in
supporting it. Neither is there the smallest difficulty to her executive
government or ministry, provided it shall possess an ordinary share of
spirit, activity, or enterprize; and shall proceed with sincere and
upright intention. For, a regular form of government being once
established abroad, and a properly digested office or department formed
at home, the business would go on with great smoothness and facility to
ministry.

Nevertheless, as I have assumed the liberty of prescribing in this
important and almost desperate case, I am sorry, that a sincere regard
to the welfare of the patient should compel me to add, (by way of
concluding on this head,) that, unless ministry shall act upon a
principle, and with a spirit, extremely different from that which it
hath hitherto discovered in this business, it would be much more
adviseable to continue the charge in the hands of the Company: for it
can be but ruined under her. However, in strong hopes of a melioration
in these respects, which depends altogether on the will of government, I
shall proceed to disclose that plan, which, in the hands of a properly
qualified sovereign, would, I doubt not, serve to establish a regular
system of government in India.

Footnote 1:

  As it is impossible to exactly ascertain the annual amount of this
  private remittance made through various channels, it will no doubt be
  alledged, that we have exaggerated this article; and yet we have
  certain ground to affirm, that it is greatly underrated. Sure I am, if
  we can suppose that the amount of such remittance made from 1757 to
  1770 hath been in any degree equal to that of the two following years,
  (which is ascertained,) and we have no reason to suppose that there
  hath been any considerable difference, the sum assigned by us will be
  greatly under mark. For no sooner did the English Company, in 1770,
  open her treasury, to receive money for remittance to Britain, than
  there was poured in at her three capital settlements above 1,400,000
  l. for which bills were granted, presented, and accepted by the
  Company, and nearly two thirds of this sum was borrowed in Bengal. And
  in 1771 she hath borrowed in Bengal alone, under the promise of
  remittance, a sum perhaps exceeding the whole loan of the former year;
  though the bills have been postponed by her agents in Bengal, on
  account of the Company’s inability to answer them. Such was the
  remittance of British private fortunes for these two years, through
  the channel of the English Company alone: and we have good reason to
  suppose, that there may have been some made through other channels.
  And these enormous sums, borrowed by the Company, as sovereign, for
  the expence of Bengal, in these two years, will serve to show the
  mighty alteration of affairs in that country since 1765.




  A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT IN
                                 INDIA.


We have before observed, that the second cause why these restraining and
impelling powers, which alone can prevent tyranny and anarchy, have been
altogether wanting in the Company’s system of government, appears to be
the distance of situation, betwixt the sovereign residence and the
country governed. And we shall here add that, if national government
should adopt the same system, this distance would operate, under it,
effects the same in nature as these under the Company; and nothing but
the difference in other circumstances, betwixt the national government
and Company, could prevent these effects from being likewise equal in
degree. For it is evident that, if the executive government of the
nation should, as the Directors have done, preserve to itself the charge
and power of immediately superintending and controuling the execution of
government in that Indian dominion, the distance of situation would
create to that government an equal impossibility of advising and
directing measures, of enforcing the execution or observance of orders,
and of preventing or restraining abuse: consequently, in the immediate
execution of all measures, the national governors would possess the same
unlimited power, as the Company’s governors have done. And the only
advantage to that Indian government, from national governments assuming
from the Company the charge of administering it, would arise from the
following circumstances. First, the superior retrospective or _ex post
facto_ authority of national government, enabling it to judge and punish
the maladministration, or disobedience of its ministers. Second, The
superior inclination or disposition of national government (arising from
its perpetual interest in the property) to exert itself in promoting
proper measures. Third, The suppression of commercial despotism. And
fourth, The existence of the Company as a middle state betwixt the
natives and their foreign government. All which innovations, arising
from national government’s taking upon itself the administration of this
Indian government, though they are indispensably necessary and highly
conducive to the establishment of a regular political system, yet do we
perceive that they, singly and unsupported, cannot suffice to create
that due proportion of restraint on the power, or of impulse on the will
of the deputed executive government, which is absolutely necessary to
the perfect suppression of tyranny, anarchy, and abuse. Nor is it
possible to complete this restraint and impulse, to that sufficing
degree, unless by a proper exertion of the sovereign’s own supreme
influence.

But we find that, upon the Company’s system, the distance of situation
renders the influence of the sovereign altogether impotent to this
effect: and if we should take it for granted that her system hath been
just or complete, then must we conclude, that this sovereign impotence
is a consequence naturally and unavoidably arising from the distance;
and, therefore, above the remedy of art. But, if we consult our own
reason, we shall perceive that the Company’s impotence, in that
particular respect, proceeded from a radical defect or error in her
system; which might have been remedied by art. For, it is evident, that
the distance of situation was in every circumstance similarly and
equally obstructive to the Company’s immediately or personally executing
the government of that Indian dominion, as it was to her immediately
restraining or enforcing the manner of execution: and yet we find that
the Directors could discover a remedy for the first of these
obstructions, by the succedaneum of appointing a deputed executive
government. And, as the second sprung from the same cause, and was
exactly similar in its nature, common sense must surely have instructed
her, that it was to be removed by a similar remedy; it being certain
that, if the Directors had thought proper to institute in India a
deputation properly qualified to controul their executive deputation,
the measures of those Indian governments might have been enforced or
retrained by the sovereign rending in Europe, as effectually as they
have been executed by the same sovereign: that is to say, as
effectually, as the defective constitution of the Company, (which
equally disqualified her for controuling as for executing,) could admit.

But it could not be ignorance, or want of common sense, that prevented
the Directors from instituting a controuling deputation of this nature:
seeing they had before them the precedent of these other European
nations, who hold any possessions in India: all of whom have provided
something of this kind: for instance, the Dutch government at Batavia.
Sound policy quickly pointed out to the Dutch, the absurdity of
committing the charge of their dispersed concerns in India, to a
multiplicity of distinct heads, all acting under no other constraint, or
restraint, than that of the Company’s Directors residing in Europe.
Therefore, so soon as the Dutch Company began to extend her possessions
in India, she instituted one supreme government at Batavia, with full
powers, and authority, to direct and controul the executive government
of all her other settlements. And this government acts in India as an
intermediate power, betwixt the Company residing in Europe, and her
various possessions in that distant country; and as the perpetual
residentiary supervisor of all her interests there. The Directors
communicate all their purposes immediately to it; and it disperses
orders and instructions to all the subordinate governments; which again
transmit to it a regular account of their situation, wants, or
transactions. All governors, chiefs, &c. are immediately responsible to
it: all appointments to, and removals from, office in the subordinates,
are made immediately by it: and all complaints or appeals, against the
misconduct or injustice of these governors, are immediately addressed to
it. In fine, it may be termed the center of the Dutch government in
India. And though this government can in no shape be termed the complete
model of a deputation, fit to controul or enforce the execution of
sovereign government, in various territorial dominions; yet, to this
institution, defective as it is, the Dutch owe it, that the government
of their numerous subordinate possessions in India hath been conducted,
for about two hundred years, clear of any enormous abuse.

But if the Dutch and other European nations, which hold little other
concern in India than a few settlements established there for the
purpose of commerce, found it necessary, for the regular management of
these commercial concerns, to institute a sort of intermediate supreme
power, as a local check on the rest of their settlements: how much more
incumbent was it on the English Company, to constitute an immediate
directing and controuling power, over the conduct of her deputies, who
were entrusted with the charge of executing the sovereign government, of
sundry mighty states; a charge of such superior intricacy, weight,
importance, and delicacy; and so very liable to be abused.

What may have been the motive of the Directors for thus wilfully
omitting an institution so evidently useful and necessary, I shall not
pretend to determine. Possibly they might apprehend that if, upon their
acquiring this mighty sovereign dominion, they should alter that which
had been all along their commercial system, such alteration might induce
the nation to enquire into the cause of it, and so discover the nature
of their dominion, which they have ever carefully hid from the public.
Though, it is more probable, they might perceive, that the institution
of such an intermediate power would greatly interfere with their own
personal influence, power, and emoluments; seeing it must have possessed
the immediate disposal of places and posts, as well as a considerable
share in the direction of affairs: and, in order to prevent this, they
preserved to themselves the power, of immediately superintending, and
directing, the execution of government in those Indian dominions.

But whatever the motive of the Directors may have been, it is certain,
that the want of a deputed controuling power in India, hath been a
radical and grievous defect in their system: which hath produced a
number of those evils that have been falsely ascribed to the distance of
situation. And though we are far from alledging, that it was possible
for the Company to establish in those countries a government in any
degree regular, seeing that the numerous natural defects in her
constitution, unavoidably producing many destructive abuses, must have
ever proved an insuperable obstacle to that; yet do we affirm that, the
institution of a duly qualified intermediate controuling power, would
have totally prevented some, and would have greatly diminished most, of
these enormous abuses which, upon the system of the Directors, have
served to ruin those countries.

Now we have seen that the national government would, by taking upon
itself the charge of administring that Indian government, remedy or
suppress all the abuses that have sprung from the defective constitution
of the Company, (besides creating other circumstances of high utility,
that could not exist under the Company’s government.) And as the
distance of situation, preventing the sovereign from immediately
exerting his supreme influence over the deputed executive government, is
the only remaining cause of evil or abuse; it is plain that, if it is
possible to construct in India, a deputed power, upon such principles,
as that it shall effectually and completely supply the place of the
sovereign, in immediately directing, enforcing, and controuling the
measures of the deputed executive government, then must the only
obstruction to the establishment of a regular political system, be
remedied and removed. Consequently the grand _desideratum_, the only
thing that is wanting, to enable the national government of Britain to
regularly administer the government of those Indian dominions, is the
institution of a deputed controuling power in India, properly qualified
to fulfil the purposes that have been here specified.

And that it is possible, to constitute an intermediate power in India,
that shall effectually and faithfully direct, enforce, and controul the
measures of the deputed executive government in those Indian dominions,
I doubt not to evince: though, at same time, I am fully sensible of the
many real difficulties, arising from nature and circumstance, to
obstruct it; as likewise of the many artificial difficulties proceeding
from the endeavours of those who have an interest to obstruct such a
measure; and who have influence to enforce their objections, however
futile, on the understanding of others.

But before we proceed to describe the plan upon which we mean to
construct this controuling deputation, it will be necessary to explain
the extent of its charge, or number of the government’s composing that
dominion which it is meant to controul. For tho’, in our description of
the Company’s government in India, we confined our account to that of
Bengal alone, as being the most important and best known part of her
dominion; yet doth the Company possess, besides Bengal, certain other
territorial governments, of no small value and importance, in respect of
either revenue or commerce. All which governments being formed upon the
same system as that of Bengal, do not less demand reform, supervision,
and controul.

For, in the first place, the government of Madrass possesses a very
considerable and valuable territorial dominion, avowedly in the name and
right of the Company. This same government doth likewise, in every thing
beside the name, possess the absolute sovereignty of that rich
commercial province of Arcot, or the Carnatic, in which it is situated:
for, notwithstanding it tolerates a nominal Nabob, whose name it uses in
most acts of government; and who, consequently, for the Company’s
convenience, possesses the shadow of sovereignty; yet, as the government
of Madrass holds the charge of defending the country, and maintains the
military force requisite thereto, it is the actual sovereign: seeing
that, in all Indian or Asiatic governments, he who holds the sword must
be the absolute lord and master. And, notwithstanding all the Company’s
parade of appearances, this Nabob of Arcot is, in respect of sovereign
power, as much a pageant as he of Bengal: a mere screen or blind, placed
before the Company’s sovereignty.

Bombay is likewise embarked in dominion, since it seized on the rich
commercial city of Surat, with its district, &c. Though sound policy
must direct Britain to reprobate all territorial dominion on that side
of the peninsula; as causing a dangerous division and weakening of her
force and defence.

But the same policy will instruct Britain to regard dominion on the east
side of that peninsula in an opposite light; because, on that side lay
all the truly valuable dominions which she already possesses.

To fully explain what is the true interest of Britain, respecting
territorial dominion in India, would be, here, foreign and tedious; and,
to slightly touch on that subject, might afford ground for censure and
criticism: we shall only observe, in the general, that Britain ought to
value only such dominion in India as is maritime: because, in the first
place, these are ever trading and manufacturing countries; and, as such,
are highly useful to her proper commerce; they are likewise capacitated,
by their own active foreign trade, to richly reimburse her for her
expence of native strength in defending them, as well as for her trouble
in governing them: and, in the second place, being accessible to her
naval force, they are easily maintained and defended by her. Therefore,
so much of this maritime dominion as she can maintain and defend,
without creating any additional expence of native strength; and, upon a
footing so connected with that truly valuable dominion which she already
possesses, as not to cause any dangerous division of that original
strength, so much of this maritime dominion in India may be truly useful
and advantageous to her; on any other terms it may be detrimental.

Such is the present state of British dominion in India: and such is the
interest of Britain, with respect to future augmentation of dominion in
that country. And we have undertaken to plan the construction of an
intermediate power or deputation, which, under the national government
of Britain, shall effectually and faithfully superintend, enforce, and
controul the measures of these several governments that, at present are,
or in future may be, subjected to Britain: and which deputation shall of
course, in the first place, enable the national government of Britain to
establish a regular system of political government over this whole
present or future dominion: and, in the second place, shall constitute a
complete system of military government, and secure defence, for all the
several branches of this dominion. At present we are on the subject of
political government.

The properties requisite to qualify this intermediate power, or
deputation, for effectually superintending, enforcing, and controuling
the political government of dominion in India, are, first, virtue and
integrity, to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its
office: and, second, power or ability, to effectually fulfil the purpose
of its institution. The latter is more easily conferred; but the former
is rendered difficult, by sundry obstructions, arising from the nature
or disposition of the persons who must necessarily be employed to
compose this deputation. For it is needless to observe, that this
controuling power cannot be lodged in the subjects native of the
dependent dominion; the nature of the government, as well as the nature
of their disposition, rendering that impracticable; (as hath been
shewn): otherwise this difficulty might be more easily surmounted. But,
the Indian subjects being set aside, there remains no choice; this
controuling deputation must, _per_ force, be composed of British born
subjects: whilst the several governments, which it is meant to controul,
are at same time executed by British born subjects. And, from this
circumstance, it follows, that the personal interest of the party
controuling must naturally be the very same, with that of the party
controuled: and, of course, the views of both must likewise be the same.

This similarity or sameness of personal interest and views it is that
creates the difficulty of conferring virtue, integrity, honour, and
fidelity, on the controuling deputation. For it is morally certain, that
the similarity of interest and views will, naturally and invariably,
draw the party controuling, to concur and join, instead of controuling
or opposing, the measures of the party executing, (seeing such measures
tend to promote that which is their common interest) provided that this
party controuling shall possess the power, and opportunity of so joining
interest, with the party executing. And it is no less certain, that this
controuling deputation must, unavoidably, possess the opportunity of
thus joining interests, unless it can, by some means, be prevented and
restrained from joining and uniting the action of its own proper powers,
with the action of these powers that are proper to the executive office.
Whereas, if it shall be found possible to divide and separate the action
of these two different powers, the one from the other, in a manner so
distinct, that each shall act, in the sphere assigned to it, with
freedom and liberty; and neither shall have the opportunity of
transgressing the limits prescribed, to its own proper department, by
the sovereign; then, and in such case, it is not only possible, but
certain, that this controuling deputation may, and will be, prevented
from joining interests, with the executive deputation; and,
consequently, from promoting the very measures which it was meant to
restrain. And, from thence I conclude, that the only possible and
certain means of conferring, on this controuling deputation, virtue and
integrity to faithfully and honestly discharge the duties of its office,
is to cut it off from all opportunity of joining the powers of its
office, with those of the executive; or of assuming any share in the
executive government: in other words, it must be restrained from
interfering, either directly or indirectly, personally or by proxy, in
the immediate execution of measures, in any one of these governments
which it is meant to controul.

But it is evident that, if this controuling deputation shall exist or
reside within any one of those dominions whose government it is meant to
controul, it will be morally impossible to prevent it from joining its
powers, and, consequently, its interests, views, and measures, with the
deputed executive power of that government where it resides. For, by
virtue of its authority, which from the nature of its office must needs
be supreme over the executive deputation, it will usurp at least a part
if not the whole power of execution: or otherwise it will, by consent,
join and unite its powers with those of the executive, in order to
promote their mutual interest, by measures diametrically repugnant to
the purpose of its institution. Nor is it possible, in this case, by any
art, device or separation into parts, to prevent this usurpation or
union: let the controuling power be termed judges, supervisors, officers
of the revenue, or what else; and let the office of controuling be
divided, into as many parts as can be conceived; still, the difference
of term, will not alter the nature of the men employed; nor will the
division of parts separate their interest. All the various persons,
composing this office, will still be Europeans; the same as these who
compose the executive office; and so, all the persons in both offices
will be foreign to the country governed, acting by an authority which is
deputed mutable and temporary; consequently they will all hold the same
view; which is, to amass all the money they can during the short term of
their office, in order to transport it to their own country: and as all
of them would, by virtue of their residing within the same government,
possess the same powers, and the same opportunities of exerting them,
they would all be irresistably attracted, by the omnipotent sympathy of
self-interest, to join their several powers, in promoting that which is
the common view of one and all of them. In fine, if these controuling
and executive deputations, which thus, from the community of the _natale
solum_, hold one and the same interest, shall both reside together in
one and the same government, and thereby possess the same opportunities,
it will be equally impossible to prevent these two deputations, however
artfully separated into parts, from joining and uniting their different
powers, &c. as it is to preserve separate the guttæ of quicksilver;
which, however gently and carefully they are dropt upon the same
confined and smooth surface, will meet, join, and conglobate into one
united mass. But if the controuling deputation shall be thus permitted
to join its powers with these of the executive, and consequently forfeit
its virtue and integrity, with respect to that one territorial
government where it resides, it thereby becomes disqualified and unfit
to controul the measures of any one other government: for the judge who
is himself corrupt, is but little qualified to judge or punish
corruption in others. I therefore conclude that, in order to preserve
the virtue and integrity of this controuling deputation, it is
indispensably necessary that it should not reside within the limits of
any one of these territorial governments; these being the governments
which it is meant to controul.

On the other hand, it is equally certain, that this controuling
deputation cannot execute in person, or assume any personal share in the
execution of measures, in any one of those governments where it doth not
actually reside; it being impossible that it can act personally where it
is not personally present. It therefore follows that, by situating or
placing this controuling deputation at a sufficiently proper distance
from all these several territorial governments, it may be prevented from
assuming a personal share in the immediate execution of measures in any
one of them. And being thus, by the situation of its residence, cut off
from all opportunity of acting personally, it may likewise be precluded
from acting secondarily, or usurping by proxy any influence, in the
immediate execution of these governments, if it shall, after the manner
of the Dutch government at Batavia, be strictly prohibited from
exercising its supervising authority any where without the limits of its
own fixed residence; and from delegating or deputing its powers to any
person or persons, its own members or others, who shall reside, or may
be beyond these prescribed bounds. For though the system of the Dutch
government at Batavia is, in many respects, far too rude and unpolished;
yet is it, in this particular, most nicely circumscribed: that
government being restrained, in the most precise manner, from delegating
and transferring its authority; or from deputing any power to examine
into cases, of even the most dubious nature, within the subordinates:
but to obviate any inconvenience, that might otherwise arise from such
restraint, it hath a power to call before it, from the subordinates, all
persons or records necessary to information. For the Dutch were well
aware, that the supreme government, if it should be permitted to carry
its supervising authority on any pretext into the subordinates, would
gain an occasion of interfering in the execution of those measures which
it was intended to controul.

We must then perceive, that this controuling deputation being seated at
a properly sufficient distance from all these territorial governments,
and the exercise of its powers being expressly confined to that
particular seat of residence, it will, by such means, be effectually
restrained from interfering, in any shape, either directly or
indirectly, in the execution of any one of those governments which it is
intended to controul. And we must farther perceive that, by virtue of
such effectual restraint, that clear separation of office, which alone
can prevent the junction or union of the powers, interests, and views of
this controuling deputation with those of the executive, will be
completely accomplished. Seeing that, the action of the controuling
power being strictly confined within the limits of its own proper
sphere, the executive power must remain at full liberty to act
distinctly and freely in the office assigned to it by the sovereign.

The principal source of corruption, and grand stumbling block of virtue,
being thus removed, the integrity of this controuling deputation may be
established on a firm and solid basis, by skilfully dividing the parts
which go to compose it: and, in particular, by clearly separating the
political and judicial powers: which, if they shall be judiciously
divided into two distinct departments, mutually independent and
uninfluenced, will, each of them, act as an effectual check, and
powerful impulse, on the other: so as to prevent either from abusing its
authority, or neglecting its duty. Whereas, if the political power
should, at same time, possess the power of judging, trying and
determining, or should even possess any influence over the judicature,
there is danger that it might, on some occasions, sacrifice its duty to
its interest. And this is the very capital error of the Dutch system at
Batavia, inasmuch as that government, possessing the judicial power,
hath thereby the opportunity of perverting justice, sometimes to the
prejudice of its constituent, and often to the detriment of its
subordinates.

Nor would we be here understood to signify, by judicial power, a simple
court of judicature, established for the purpose of deciding litigated
cases of property; the judicial power here meant, must extend to every
thing that respects a due execution of the jurisdiction and police, in
the subordinate governments. Therefore its authority must not be
passive, and confined to such matter as shall come before it by
complaint; but it must be active, assuming cognizance of all public
nuisance, trespass, or delinquency, that may be brought before it by
information. For, here, juries may exist with great propriety and
efficacy, seeing that the Company will, on account of her commerce, keep
a number of servants at this supreme settlement; there will likewise be,
no doubt, many free merchants (as they are termed): and, consequently,
there will never be wanting a choice of persons unconnected with, and
uninfluenced by the political government; and therefore fit to form a
grand inquest; as well as petit or special juries, to decide in either
criminal cases, or disputes of property. And this judicial power must
farther be endued with all proper and necessary officers; particularly
an attorney general: it must likewise be divided into distinct courts;
resembling, as nearly as circumstances will admit, or occasion requires,
the courts of justice in the sovereign country.

Nevertheless, we do not presume to dictate or prescribe the exact or
complete form of this judicial power: we would only hint at the main
purposes of its institution; a due consideration of which will readily
suggest the particular form, to those whose province it may be to
construct it. We shall only observe that, in order to confer a due
weight on the judicial power, it is not sufficient that it should be
independent, in its corporate capacity; the judges and officers
composing it must, in their personal capacity, be placed as far as
possible beyond the influence of the political power. The salaries
annexed to their offices must be such as will afford dignity, as well as
independance: whilst, on the other hand, they shall be debarred, under
the severest penalties, from holding, either directly or indirectly, any
place, post, emolument, or employment, of any nature, distinct from that
of its own proper department. Moreover, the political power should hold
no voice in conferring the degrees of this department: that should be
vested in the judicial power itself, with reference to the confirmation
of the sovereign.

This judicial power may be termed the supreme Court of Judicature, for
the whole British dominion in India: to which all the subjects, under
the several governments, whether natives or Europeans, may readily
appeal, against the oppression of their governors, or the perversion of
justice: and, on which they may securely depend for redress; provided it
shall be placed above the influence of the political power. This supreme
court of judicature would likewise be of inexpressible utility, as a
check on the power, and an impulse on the will, of the political branch.

We may add, that a judicious subdivision of the political power, into
different departments, might contribute considerably to its virtue.

These are the outlines of that measure, by which we propose to preserve
this controuling deputation free from corruption: and we doubt not but,
upon this plan, when meliorated and improved by the superior
understanding of others, a controuling power may be constructed, which
shall be completely qualified, in point of virtue and integrity, to
faithfully and honourably superintend, enforce, and controul the
execution of political government in those Indian dominions. And this
is, by far, the most difficult, delicate, and important part of the
undertaking.

For, as to the power and ability, requisite to qualify this deputation
for effectually fulfilling the purpose of its institution, that is
readily bestowed. The degree of power is altogether in the disposal of
the sovereign. And, its efficacy or ability depends, principally, upon
the choice of such a situation for the seat of its residence, as shall
enable it to keep up, at all seasons, a ready and speedy correspondence
with the several subordinate governments,

With regard to the choice of situation proper for the residence of this
controuling power; (which is indeed a point of high importance,) we
shall readily conceive, from adverting to its nature and the purposes of
its institution, that this residence ought to be some convenient sea
port; situated at a considerable distance from the limits of all these
territorial governments; but, at same time, so centrically near to each,
that the communication, to and from it, shall, in either monsoon, be not
only practicable, but certain and speedy. I shall reserve the farther
explanation of this intended seat of residence, till I come to treat of
the military system; because there are some properties, particularly
requisite to a proper centre of military defence: and it is proposed
that the same power, and consequently the same residence, that
superintends the political government, should likewise direct the
military government and defence, of this dominion.

But this supreme controuling power being thus centrically situated, with
respect to the several subordinates, as that it shall at all times hold
a ready and speedy correspondence with each, will be thereby enabled to
effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the execution of
political government in that whole dominion. For, in the first place,
the ready and speedy communication with all the subordinates, affording
to the supreme power an opportunity of obtaining, from each, the most
early intelligence of every transaction, incident, or occurrence; as
likewise of immediately transmitting the orders and instructions, that
may be suitable to the occasion; will cut off from the several governors
of the territorial dominions all pretext for acting discretionally. And,
in consequence, that despotic and arbitrary power, which hath subsisted
under the Company’s system, will be completely suppressed. And, from
adverting to this circumstance, we shall perceive the importance of a
proper choice of situation, for this supreme center of government.

In the second place, this ready correspondence with all the subordinate
governments, enabling the supreme power to acquire a minute and complete
knowledge of every circumstance, respecting the state and nature of the
general police, in this whole dominion, will qualify it for originally
planning, and for afterwards improving, all such designs and measures as
can contribute to the institution of regularity and good order. It will
likewise attain an intimate knowledge of the whole manoeuvre of finance,
respecting the mode of collecting as well as appropriating the revenue
and taxes: and it will be thereby enabled to project judicious forms,
with different offices, as mutual checks upon each other, in that
branch: which will serve to remedy that incredible extortion, rapine,
and peculation: which, by ruining the farmer of the lands, hath almost
totally suppressed agriculture, and greatly depopulated those miserable
countries; whilst it hath grievously defrauded the sovereign of his
right. And all these planned modes, being approved and confirmed by the
sovereign, would be continued in vigorous and perpetual action, by the
vicinity of the supreme political power: and all these several measures,
being enacted into laws, the strict observance of them would be
effectually enforced by the same vicinity. And thus, that supreme power
will, not only establish, but perpetually conserve a just regularity in
police, and an exact oeconomy in finance.

In the third place, the supreme judicial power will, by its
neighbourhood to these dependent dominions, acquire a just knowledge of
the modes, customs, and dispositions of the inhabitants; and, by that,
it will be enabled to devise the best forms or offices, together with
skilful rules for administring the jurisdiction, in a manner truly
effectual, and at same time consonant and agreeable to the humour of the
subject. It will likewise be capable of afterwards improving and adding
to these forms and rules, as future occasion may require, or better
information may suggest. All which forms or offices may, by the
approbation of the sovereign, be established into standing courts; and
the rules enacted into laws. And a punctual observance of all these laws
enacted, either for the regular administration of justice, or
conservance of the police, will be completely enforced, by the awe of
this supreme tribunal: the communication with which, from all parts of
that dependent dominion, being easy and speedy, will afford a ready
access and opportunity to all the subjects, of presenting their
complaints, against any oppression of their government, or denial, or
perversion of justice: whilst the same ready communication will render
the trial of all litigated cases, speedy and easy. A mighty innovation
this, from the former mode of justice in those dominions; when it was
impossible for even Europeans to obtain redress, in our distant precise
European courts, against the most glaring oppression of government: and
the natives were excluded from even that distant and deceitful prospect
of remedy.

And in order that the course of justice may be rendered thoroughly
complete, it may be enacted, after the manner of the Dutch, that no
person, who hath held any office of power or trust within the
subordinates, shall depart immediately from thence for Europe; but shall
be obliged to repair to the supreme residence; there to remain for three
months; to the end that any person or persons who may, by any means,
have been restrained, during the existence of his office, from
preferring their complaint against him, on the score of either public or
private trespass, may there have the free opportunity of prosecuting
him.

The supreme political power shall immediately appoint to all offices, as
well political as military, within the subordinate governments; with
reference held to the future approbation, and confirmation, of the
sovereign: and it shall preserve regular minutes of all such
appointments, orders, and other transactions made in its supreme
capacity; which minutes, together with regular and properly vouched
accounts of the collection, as well as the appropriation of the revenue,
shall be punctually transmitted, by every occasion, to the sovereign.
The judicial power shall likewise keep an exact register of all trials,
causes, and proceedings; more particularly those of the grand inquest
and assizes: this latter to be signed by all the judges and officers of
the court, and attested by the foremen, with a majority of the juries:
two copies of which shall be regularly transmitted to Britain; one to
the sovereign; and the other to the Company; which, as holding a
material interest and share in these law proceedings, hath a claim to
such participation of knowledge. All which minutes, accounts, and
proceedings, being communicated to the sovereign, will enable him to act
as an ultimate check on the political government, the finance, and the
jurisdiction of that Indian dominion.

Such is the form of this intermediate power, through which I propose to
convey, into the execution of government in those distant Indian
dominions, that plenary exertion of the sovereign’s restraining and
compelling power, which, alone, can suffice to prevent tyranny and
anarchy. And notwithstanding the materials are, through hurry and want
of time, rude, unpolished and coarsely arranged, yet do I flatter
myself, that candour will allow them to be solidly good, proper, and
fully sufficing to construct, at least, the groundplot, or basis, of a
regular political system. Sure I am, the high propriety, nay the
indispensable necessity of such a measure, must immediately strike every
person who employs his own judgment, however slightly, to consider,
first, the nature, interests, and views of the executive government in
those Indian dominions; as being foreign, deputed, mutable, and
temporary. Second the timid, passive, and slavishly submissive
disposition of the native subjects. And third, the distance of
situation, betwixt the sovereign residence, and the scene of government;
which, rendering the immediate restraint and constraint of the sovereign
perfectly impotent, confers on this foreign executive deputation an
unlimited and arbitrary power, of promoting its own personal views and
interest, by measures, which tend to the intolerable oppression of the
wretched inhabitants, and the utter ruin of those subjected countries;
as well as to the mighty detriment of Britain’s dearest interest, and
the blackest reproach to her reputation. Nor can all this be remedied or
prevented, but by such a measure as is here proposed.

And now we shall take a slight glance at the operation of this measure,
on the jurisdiction, and police, of the subordinate dominions. And
though, for the sake of perspicuity, we confine the view to Bengal
alone, as being the most eminent part, yet will the effects be equally
felt through the whole.

As to the fundamental establishments of Governors, Councils, &c. these
are sufficiently obvious; as likewise are the proper chambers of
revenue: and these, with the minutiæ appointments of inferior offices,
will be more properly provided and improved, by the better judgment,
true information, and future experience of the supreme controuling
power. Here we mean to offer only one or two hints on the mode of
jurisdiction and police.

And first, with regard to the courts of justice, I should propose that
the mayor’s court at Culcutta should still subsist, as a court of equity
for the whole country: and a most equitable court it is, if properly
regulated: for the truth of which assertion, I appeal to all those who
knew it previous to that alteration of the Company’s charter of justice,
which rendered it dependent on, and subservient to, the Governor and
Council: never was justice more exactly or more expeditiously
administered, than it was by this court, previous to that alteration. In
order therefore to restore it to its primitive utility, it ought to be
restored to its original state. Let the judges or aldermen, who at
present compose it, continue such: being servants to the Company, or
free merchants, they must be unconnected with, and uninfluenced by the
national government. And, in the case of death, or removal, the vacuum
to be supplied by the court itself, from amongst the Company’s servants,
or free merchants only: and if any alderman shall, subsequent to
entering on his office, accept of any post or place under government,
let that be an express disqualification and vacation of his office;
which is to be immediately made good, by the choice of another person,
properly qualified. The newly elected aldermen to be presented, for
acceptance, to the supreme court of judicature only. And the officers of
this court to be chosen by itself.

But as it would be impossible for the mayor’s court to dispatch all the
business that might be brought before it, there ought likewise to be a
court of law; consisting of a chief justice, with three judges; to be
appointed by the sovereign. And this court should guide itself, by such
laws as may be enacted for the jurisdiction of those countries;
otherwise by equity.

Appeals from this court of law, as well as that of equity, to be made
immediately to the supreme court of judicature; and from thence to his
Majesty in council.

If it is thought proper, there might be another mayor’s court, of the
same nature, established at Cossimbuzar, in the neighbourhood of the old
capital, Maxadavad.

And as to the forms, for the more universal distribution of justice to
the natives, these will be adjusted by the supreme supervising power; as
before mentioned. We shall only observe, that their courts of Zemindary
and Cutchery are, as they stand at present, a grievous nuisance.

But the noblest institution for protecting the liberty and property of
the subject, from the extortion and oppression of their foreign
government, and of its inferior train of native harpies, who are
infinitely more rapacious than the Europeans, would be that of juries,
properly constructed. Let the grand inquest of the country be held at
Culcutta, four times in the year: and let the juries, both grand and
petit, be expresly composed of Company’s servants, or free merchants,
Europeans, and none others: the judges of law, or at least two of them,
to sit on the assizes: the sheriff to be chosen annually, from amongst
the Company’s servants.

The powers of this grand inquest, if adapted to the situation of things,
must be enlarged beyond these of our juries in Britain; where there are
judicial and political aids, that must be wanting in those countries:
for instance, the enquiry must not be confined to place, but must extend
every where through the country: it must likewise have authority to
bring before it all manner of nuisance or trespass committed against the
liberty or property of the subject, natives as well as Europeans. And
the judges should have no power to reject or postpone the bills, found
by the grand jury: but should bring them on to decision, in turn, as
presented. Moreover, as the extent of enquiry may render it impossible
for the more distant defendant to appear with his evidences, during the
sitting of that assize to which the bill hath been presented against
him; let summons be issued, upon the bill’s being presented, for such
distant defendant to appear at next assizes; or let some other method be
found, either by means of the grand jury’s meeting a sufficient time
before the commencement of trials, or by some extraordinary power vested
in the judges or sheriff to produce such distant defendant with his
evidences in due time. And as this same extent of enquiry may, on the
other hand, produce inconvenience to the subject, by affording occasion
to litigious persons of distressing others, by bringing them from a
great distance to these assizes, on frivolous or ill grounded
complaints, it may be ordered that, where the cause shall appear to the
court truly litigious, the plaintiff shall be bound over to stand suit
at law, for damages to the defendant: and, one or two examples, of this
nature, will prove a barr to frivolous litigation.

And least the judges should, by any means, be influenced to act that
part which the Company’s governor and council commonly act, when they
absurdly preside at these assizes, as his Majesty’s judges in their own
cause; namely, to dismiss the Court, so soon as the grand jury shall
find a bill that may be disagreeable to them; it may be ordered that
neither the judges, nor any officer of the Court, shall have power to
adjourn the assizes, until all the trials shall be decided; or,
otherwise, by the consent of a majority in both juries.

The principal check however upon the conduct of these assizes, would be
that of obliging the Court to keep exact registers, of all trials, and
proceedings; signed and attested, as before mentioned. And if any part
of either jury shall except to the authenticity of such register, which
shall be publickly exposed in the Court, then, such dissenting part
shall have a right to protest, and assign its reasons. Three copies of
which register, with protest, (if any,) shall be dispatched, by the
earliest occasion, after each assize. One copy to the supreme Court of
Judicature, which will, thereby, have the earliest notice of any abuse;
and, with the concurrence of the supreme political power, shall have the
opportunity of immediately correcting it. A second copy shall be
transmitted to the sovereign; who will act as an ulterior check on the
supreme controuling power. And a third copy to the Company for the
reasons before specified.

But, as this single inquest at Calcutta cannot possibly carry justice to
the extremes of that extensive country, circulating assizes may be held,
at least once, or if possible twice a year, at Muxadavad as the center,
and at Patnah as the northern extreme; two judges to go this northern
circuit: and the other two judges to go on an eastern circuit, at Dacca.
And, as there may not be a sufficient number of Company’s servants,
properly qualified, to form complete juries at these northern and
eastern assizes: I would propose that, to make up any such deficiency,
natives should be mixed with the Europeans. Which mixture, if it shall
be artfully tempered, in the following manner, would produce all the
efficacy of entirely European juries; and, at same time, none of the bad
effects, that might be apprehended, from an attempt to confer freedom
and impartiality on juries entirely native.

Let, at least, one half of both the grand and petit juries be Europeans;
and the remaining part natives: and if it should happen, that there
cannot be collected, at the assize factory, and from the neighbouring
inferior factories, so many Company’s servants as shall make up half the
usual number of jurymen; then, let the whole number be diminished, to
the sufficing half of Europeans. Let the unanimity of verdict, in such
mixt juries, be dispensed with; and let the majority of voices, in
either jury, find the bill or verdict; as is the custom in Scotland. And
let an additional provision be made to the oath of the juryman,
purporting that he shall not, on any account, disclose the opinion given
by any individual, in the jury room.

By this artful mixture, and these precautions, the native jurymen would
be liberated from that slavish dread, of future revenge from their own
countrymen employed under government; seeing it would be impossible, for
these native officers of government, to discover the particular opinion
of each individual; which, if the juries were entirely native, they
would infallibly do, to the utter ruin of the poor native jurymen. So
that the native Jurymen, acting thus with freedom, under the cloke and
protection of the Europeans, would answer all the effectual purposes of
Europeans. Whilst, being sensible that they owed their freedom and
impartiality, together with all the other benefits arising from juries,
to their connection with the Europeans; this freedom conferred on them
in the jury room, would not in the least diminish their awe and
deference to government. The proceedings at these circuit assizes to be
registered and transmitted in like manner as at Calcutta.

These juries would prove the Magna Charta, the palladium, and true
security of Indian liberty and property, against the despotism and
extortion of their foreign government. And it evidently appears that the
virtue of these juries, (as being, at one and the same time, truly
effectual to the subject, and perfectly safe to the sovereign,) entirely
depends upon the circumstance, of completely excluding the Company and
her servants, from the smallest participation in the executive powers of
government. But the efficacy of these juries, and of other inferior
institutions made through the supreme controuling power, being once felt
and known, would speedily induce the natives to purchase perpetual
property in lands: seeing they would perceive themselves thoroughly
secured in the produce of those lands. And this, being divulged abroad,
would draw the inhabitants of the neighbouring countries to the standard
of Britain; together with their wealth, and industry. By which means the
British dominion in India, which, at present is, through oppression and
consequent famine, in a great measure deserted and depopulated, would
again be completely peopled and cultivated: arts, manufactures, and
commerce would soon be restored to their former state; nay, they would
be extended to a degree far superior: and these countries would, of
course, be enabled to richly repay Britain for the blessings conferred
by her, of perfect security in liberty and property; blessings, never
before known in India.

And all this may be effected by means of that intermediate supreme
controuling power: which would, not only create, but preserve, the full
and vigorous efficacy of all these institutions, in the subordinate
dominions. Whereas, if it was even possible, (though indeed it is
morally impossible,) to institute, by any temporary means, all these
powers, forms, rules, and regulations in those dominions, yet is it
evidently certain that, so soon as these temporary means were withdrawn,
the virtue and efficacy of all these institutions would immediately
vanish, and be suppressed by the power of the executive government;
which, from the nature of things, must unavoidably be, either despotic
over the native subjects, or cannot exist at all.

But this same controuling power, as it would, on the one hand, by its
fixed residence in the immediate neighbourhood, perpetually preserve the
action and motion of all these institutions, like to a power ever
present to wind up the springs of the machine; and, so, would check all
the bad effects of that naturally necessary despotism in executive
government: so would it, on the other hand, effectually support the
power and authority of that executive government; and prevent its being
encroached on, by an over exertion of the privileges conferred on the
subject. For, on this side too, there is a danger; which will be readily
comprehended, by those who consider the nature of government; and, at
same time, the disposition of human nature. But all danger, of
preponderating either scale, would be prevented, by the vicinity of the
controuling power: which, holding the balance in its hands, and nicely
diminishing from one, or adding to the other scale, would ever preserve
a just equilibrium, betwixt the liberty of the subject, and the power of
government.

Nor would the institution of new regulations be the only means, in the
hands of the controuling power, of preventing the dangerous over
exertion of privilege: it would likewise possess the instantaneous power
of seizing, or otherwise of ordering to its own residence, all such
persons as should prove over troublesome, or dangerous to the due
authority of executive government. For, though it would be extremely
absurd to trust a power of this nature, immediately in the hands of
executive government; which would, infallibly, employ it to its own
worst purposes: yet might such power be safely trusted to this
controuling government; which could not have the same motives to abuse
it.

Nevertheless, we do not mean that this, and all these other powers,
should be unlimitedly confided to this controuling deputation: we still
preserve a check over it, in the national government. And a most
effectual check too; by means of the beforementioned copies of
registers, immediately transmitted to Britain, from the subordinates; as
likewise by its own minutes, accounts, and registers.

So that here would be a regular gradation of effectual political checks.
The privilege of juries, and other institutions in the subordinate
dominions, being preserved in vigorous action, by the influence of the
intermediate controuling power, would prove an effectual check on the
despotism or extortion of executive government; and would thus
completely secure the liberty and property of the subject. And the same
influence of the controuling power would sufficiently check the
luxuriancy of privilege; and support the power of government; thus
preserving an exact poise betwixt both. Whilst the sovereign, at a
distance, could deliberately and effectually watch the hand that trimmed
the scales.

And thus the institution of this intermediate controuling and impelling
power, would completely remove every obstruction arising from the
distance of situation: it would serve as an intermediate link of the
political chain: or, as a bridge of communication, joining this
dependent Indian dominion to the sovereign country. But, all obstruction
arising from the distance of situation being thus removed, what
difficulty can the national government of Britain find, in administring
the political government of that Indian dominion? Upon this plan, that
task appears to me more facil, less pregnant with difficulty, charge, or
care, than it is to govern any one, the most pretty, of our foreign
Colonies: nay it appears equally easy, as it is to govern the
neighbouring Isle of Man: seeing that the opposition of the subjects, to
the authority of government in this Indian dominion, though they be so
infinitely more numerous, is not greater than is the opposition of the
few subjects in Man. The only difficulty, that could exist to national
government, was that of duly tempering, or abating, the power of the
deputed executive government: and it appears, that this may be
completely effected by means of this intermediate controuling power;
which, in the hands of the sovereign, would act upon the government of
this Indian dominion as the pegs or keys upon the strings of a musical
instrument; of which one being gently strained, and another properly
relaxed, would create, and perpetually preserve, a perfect: harmony, or
concord, in this political system.




A PLAN, FOR ESTABLISHING A REGULAR SYSTEM OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND OF
                       SECURE DEFENCE, IN INDIA.


The Company’s system of military government and defence in India is, at
least, equally defective, faulty, and absurd; and, therefore, doth
equally demand reformation, as doth her political system. For the same
cause that renders the power of the Company’s several deputed governors
perfectly arbitrary and discretional, in civil matters; namely, the
Directors having preserved to themselves the charge of immediately
directing and superintending those governments; confers, upon these
deputed governors, a like arbitrary and discretional power, in military
matters. And surely it is impossible to conceive any thing more
ridiculously extravagant, than is this military system of the Company;
which affords to each governor of four different capital settlements,
the absolute, independent, and discretional power, of applying the
military force of his own government; and likewise of directing the
measures of defence: whilst each, of these four governors, holds a
particular interest of his own, which is, not only distinct from, but
opposite to that of all the others.

Can it be supposed that four men, thus opposite in their personal views
and interests, and thus independent of each other, should heartily
concur in general measures; or should cordially unite in a system of
common defence? Common sense informs us that they will not; and
experience convinces us that they do not. For it hath been known that
one, of these settlements, hath furnished arms and ammunition; and hath
otherwise befriended a power, at open war with one of the others. And,
in the case of any one of these settlements being attacked, the others
are extremely backward in supporting it; because each, of the four
governors, giving the preference to his own particular charge, in which
his own personal interest is more immediately concerned, considers all
communication of his force, to any of the other settlements, as a
diminution of his own security, and even of his importance. So that,
upon such terms, the union betwixt these four distinct, and mutually
independent, governments, can scarcely be termed federal.

Moreover, each of these four governors possesses, within the limits of
his own government, the discretionary power of making war and peace.
And, so, hath the opportunity, whenever it shall suit the purpose of his
own personal interest, to pick a quarrel, and engage his government in
war, with some one of the neighbouring native states. Nor is this an
imaginary evil; or a simple supposition of what may possibly happen; it
is a real case; an abuse that hath actually existed. For we can produce
several instances where these governors, more particularly on the coast
of Cormondel, have commenced, and industriously protracted, wars with
the neighbouring states, expressly for the purpose of plunder and
peculation.

And, from this discretionary power of peace and war lodged in the hands
of these several governors, and the consequent abuse thereof, flow the
following evils to the sovereign. First, the governor, thus warring,
exhausts and consumes the treasure of his constituent; to the end that
he and his associates, may gain occasion to pocket a part. Second, by
these offensive wars, he wastes and destroys that force, which was
intended by the sovereign for defence: and, thereby, exposes his own
charge, naked and defenceless, to the attack of other enemies. And
third, by these wanton unnecessary and unjust wars, he provokes the
hatred and jealousy of all the neighbouring states; and, thus, converts
into enemies, those native powers, who would, otherwise, be amicable and
friendly to the sovereign.

To correct these, and many other abuses of a like nature, which flow
from this absurd military system of the Company, it is evidently and
indispensably necessary, that there should be instituted, one supreme
head of military government. Which, being vested with the supreme power
of making peace and war in India, shall restrain these several
territorial governors, from engaging in unnecessary wars with their
neighbours. And which, possessing the supreme direction of the common
force, shall, in the case of particular or general danger, apply that
force to the most proper and necessary purposes.

Now it is naturally proper, that the same intermediate supreme power,
which superintends the political government, should likewise supremely
superintend the military government, and defence, of those Indian
dominions. And, for this latter purpose, the choice of a proper
situation, for the residence of that supreme power, becomes likewise a
point of most essential consequence. For it is evident, on the one hand,
that this military superintending power ought not to exist in any one of
these territorial governments; nay it ought not to reside in the
immediate neighbourhood of any one rich native state; because, in either
of these two situations, it is liable to be tempted, by views of avarice
or ambition, to apply the general force, to its own personal purposes;
and, if so, the cure would be worse than the disease: and, on the other
hand, it is no less evident, (from the reasons assigned on the similar
head in the political system) that this supreme military power ought to
be situated so centrically near, to all the several territorial
governments, as that it may, at all times and seasons, be capable of
keeping up a ready and speedy correspondence with each.

The distant and unconnected situation, of these four capital
governments, is likewise a mighty obstruction to a secure system of
defence. For, the wind, blowing in those seas for six months from one
quarter of the compass, and for the other six months from the opposite
quarter, doth, alternately, cut off in a great measure all naval
communication betwixt these four governments. For instance, during the
violence of the south west monsoon, that is, from the middle of April
till the middle of July, it is almost impracticable for ships to pass
from Bengal to Madrass: and, during the three more moderate months of
that monsoon, this passage is difficult and tedious. And during the
north east monsoon, the passage is much the same from Madrass to Bengal.
But the communication betwixt Bombay, and these two settlements, is
still more obstructed. For Bombay, being situated in lat. 19 deg. north,
on the west side of the peninsula of India, it is almost impossible,
from the latter end of November till the middle of February, for ships
from Bombay, bound for the Bay of Bengal, to round the island of
Ceyloan: and, for the other three months of the north east monsoon, they
are obliged, in order to weather Ceyloan, to stand over to the eastward
almost as far as Atchen head, and back again to the island; a run of
about 20 degrees. From the end of April till August, it is almost
impracticable for ships from the Bay and bound for Bombay, to round
Ceyloan; and in the other three months of the south west monsoon, that
passage is difficult and tedious. And, even in the fair passage, the run
betwixt Bengal and Bombay is seldom made in less than a month. Moreover,
during the force of the south west monsoon on the west side of the
peninsula, that is, from the middle of May till the middle of August, it
is extremely dangerous for ships to attempt running in for Bombay: the
weather being then so extremely thick, that sometimes a solar
observation cannot be obtained for several days together: and if a ship
should, in such circumstances, run in for the land, which in such
weather is not distinguishable at three leagues distance, and should
miss the opening of the harbour, which is but small, it is more than
probable that she would not be able to clear the shore, with the wind
blowing fiercely right on, and rolling before it a heavy sea. As to
Bencolen, circumstances are nearly the same with it, as betwixt Bengal
and Madrass.

Now it is evident, that this obstructed naval communication, betwixt the
four chief governments must, in many respects, greatly weaken the common
defence: and must greatly augment, to the sovereign, the charge, in both
men and money, of maintaining and defending those dominions and
possessions. Seeing it must necessitate him to keep up, in each of those
governments, a force sufficient to defend it against the whole united
strength of an offensive enemy, without trusting to any aid from the
others: because, otherwise, he runs the risk of losing them all singly,
to a force that can overpower but one of them.

But all the danger, inconveniences, and extraordinary expence, arising
from this obstructed naval communication, may be obviated and removed,
by establishing one supreme center of military defence; so situated,
with respect to the several parts of those truly valuable territorial
dominions, as that the communication betwixt it and them shall, in
either monsoon, be not only practicable but speedy and easy. For it is
evident that, in such a situation, this supreme center of defence could,
at all times, receive speedy notice of any impending danger, or actual
attack; and that, upon such notice, it could immediately transport its
own garrison, by sea; as well as collect aid from the other settlements.
So that the garrison of this supreme center of defence would act as an
army of observation; ever ready to pour in, at any quarter, on the back
of an aggressive enemy. And, of course, such a center of defence must
connect, and unite, the strength of all the several parts of British
dominion in India.

Now it appears that, the situation of residence, becomes a circumstance,
highly essential to the efficacy of each purpose, proposed from this
supreme intermediate power. And it farther appears that one, and the
same, situation is required, for all these several purposes: seeing
that, from a convenient naval port, situated at a proper distance from
the limits of all the territorial governments; and, at the same time, so
centrically near to each, that the communication with all the several
parts of dominion will be speedy and easy; this supreme power would, in
the first place, completely and effectually, faithfully and honourably
superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of political government,
as well as the conduct of military government: and, in the second place,
it would unite and connect the general strength of those dominions, and
completely secure the defence of the whole.

But, of the several settlements possessed by the Company in India,
Bengal and Madrass are evidently disqualified for this seat of
residence; not only because the communication betwixt them and the other
settlements is, at certain seasons, altogether cut off; but because they
are, themselves, territorial governments; and therein, the very object
to be controuled. Bencolen is, in every respect, out of the question.
And, there then remains only Bombay; which is so far possessed of the
properties requisite to this residence, in that it is, at present, not
greatly embarked in territorial dominion; and is, likewise, a sea port.
But in respect of communication, with the truly valuable possessions of
Britain in India, Bombay is altogether unfit to be either the residence
of the supreme controuling power, or yet the center of defence; as must
appear from the preceding description; which was more particularly
enlarged, for the express purpose of evincing this. Far from being a
proper center of defence, all the force that is lodged at Bombay becomes
detached, and completely lost to the defence of Britain’s truly valuable
possessions; at least on any sudden emergency. Indeed Bombay is, in
every thing, respecting either dominion or commerce, a dead load, and
useless settlement; saving it be for the sole purpose of a naval port,
or a place for refitting our squadrons.

But the choice of Bombay for a naval port, is the most dangerous and
fatal error, in the whole absurd system of the Company’s defence: seeing
that, by this absurd choice, Britain loses the use of her naval force;
which is her capital strength of defence, against the attack of France,
her only dangerous enemy in India—As will appear—It is impossible that
ships, the best fitted from Europe, can subsist, in those seas, for two
years, without a thorough repair: and more particularly in time of war;
when action hath happened, and is again expected. And this thorough
repair they cannot obtain but in a naval port, properly filled with
docks, or careening platforms. Bombay is the only naval port, thus
fitted by Britain, in India; consequently the squadron of Britain must
retire, at least every second year, to Bombay, for repair. But the
British squadron being once retired to Bombay, (as is common, in
October,) which is situated in lat. 19 degrees north, on the west side
of the peninsula; it is as effectually excluded, for five months, from
the bay of Bengal, and more particularly from Bengal itself, as if it
was still in Europe. And, during these five months, the enemy may either
scour that Bay with single cruizers, or she may transport, and, without
opposition, land a force in Bengal; and these said five months are the
very fittest in the whole year for land operations. This must be
thoroughly understood by all those who are acquainted with the
navigation of those seas: and could be here readily demonstrated; was it
not that, by publickly pointing out our own weakness, we should point
out to the enemy her strength. It is most certain that, if France
understands her own advantage, (and it is to be apprehended she is but
too well acquainted with it): she may either waste and consume the
British squadron, through preventing its repair; or otherwise she may
effect every purpose, against Bengal, nay against Madrass, with as great
security, as if there was no British squadron in India: ever so long as
Britain shall continue her only naval port at Bombay. Nor is there any
alternative. For as to that ridiculous notion, of carrying a squadron of
large ships up the river of Bengal to repair, no commander in his senses
would, in the time of war, when he expected to be equally matched by the
enemy, so soon as the season arrived, incur the risk of losing some of
his ships, in the passage up and down that incredibly dangerous river;
and still less would he subject himself to the certainty of losing half
his hands, by that putrid unhealthy air at Culpee, or Ingelee. Neither
would he be mad enough, in the while of a hot war, to use that dangerous
expedient, of half repairing at Trincamalay; where he is liable to be
surprized by an enemy, in the act of repairing. In fine, so long as
Bombay continues to be our only naval port, our commanders must, of
necessity, either waste and lose their squadron; or else they must
retire to Bombay, at the least, once in two years; and, thereby leave
the seas, with all our valuable possessions in the Bay of Bengal, freely
exposed to the attack of an enemy, for five months.

It therefore follows that, if Britain means to avail herself of her
naval force, which is the principal defence of her dominion and commerce
in India, she must establish a proper naval port, on the east side of
the peninsula; because, on that side lay all her truly valuable
possessions, and commerce. And that port, which I mean to propose, is in
every respect completely qualified for this purpose: though I cannot, in
this publication, specify the place; lest the enemy should anticipate,
and take the advantage of our shameful neglect.

I am sensible it will be immediately exclaimed that we have already too
many possessions in India; and that this is no time to increase our
settlements there; and thereby to increase the drain of our native
strength, as well as the expence of treasure.

But, to this, I answer, that this new establishment would not encrease
the number of our capital settlements in India: on the contrary, it
would diminish it, from four to three: for it would suppress, in the
first place, Bombay; which is in every respect a truly useless
settlement; and would therefore be exchanged for this new settlement;
which would serve to connect the whole strength of this dominion; as
well as to promote a variety of other very important purposes. In the
second place, Bencolen would be reduced to the degree of a subordinate,
immediately under the direction of the resident at this new settlement;
and completely secure under its protection.

As to the drain of native strength, this establishment would, instead of
adding, considerably decrease it: for the garrison, together with the
artillery, &c. of Bombay, would be transported thither; as likewise
would the better part of the garrison at Bencolen: and these two
garrisons, being placed there, would form an army of observation, for
all our valuable possessions, as hath been described; consequently the
territorial governments would not demand that degree of force, which is
requisite at present, when each stands on its own bottom.

And with regard to the expence of treasure, I shall only observe that,
it is most unaccountably absurd in Britain to send out to India, a
squadron of 17 ships of the line, besides frigates, (as she did in last
war,) for the protection of her dominion and commerce in that country;
which squadrons become evidently unprofitable to that purpose, through
the circumstance of wanting a properly situated naval port; when less
than a single year’s charge, of such squadron, would suffice to
completely fit up a naval port, so situated as that, from thence, her
naval force would completely effect its intended purpose. For I affirm,
that the port which I propose would be completely fitted up, in every
respect, as a naval port, for less expence than one year’s charge of
such squadron; seeing that I do not propose docks, but platforms for
careening, as at Batavia; and these are prepared, in infinitely less
time, and at much less charge than docks; whilst they are far more
convenient and expeditious for repairing large ships, than these docks
at Bombay. And, as to the fortification immediately requisite, it would
be but little expensive, and would demand but little time to rear it:
because it would be perfectly accessible to the ships; and so, whilst it
protected them, would be protected by them.

Moreover no part of the treasure, expended on originally fitting this
naval port, would come immediately out of Britain’s proper treasury; for
the whole would be defrayed by the dependent dominion in India. And this
new establishment would, in a very little time, not only support its own
charge, but would richly reimburse Britain for her original cost. Seeing
it would, in the first place, as a colony or settlement, yield her
immediate treasure, together with sundry commodities peculiar to itself;
and, in a little time, it would, under proper conduct, produce rich
manufactures. In the second place, it would, as an Emporium, (for which
purpose it is perfectly adapted by its situation,) greatly improve the
commerce of Britain in India: and as a centrical magazine or warehouse,
for the commodities of China as well as India, it would reduce the term
of the Company’s voyages to one year; and, thereby, reducing the expence
of her carriage nearly one third, it would enable her to sell cheaper;
and consequently advance her commerce in Europe. Likewise the Company’s
ships rendezvousing and departing from this port for Europe, under
proper convoy, this would secure her trade from that imminent danger to
which it is exposed, from her ships rendezvousing singly, at that button
of an island, St. Helena: a circumstance that may, in the very first
year of a French war, completely ruin this Company; as that enemy is now
perfectly acquainted with her route. Now Bombay is perfectly useless to
all these, and indeed to every other purpose; as can be readily
demonstrated: and the whole benefit derived from it, as a colony or
settlement, in the year, doth not suffice to defray one month’s expence.

But this new establishment, being once fitted up as a naval port, from
whence the squadrons of Britain can, in either monsoon, command all her
valuable possessions; this same establishment would, at same time,
completely suit for the residence of that supreme intermediately
superintending power. For this port is situated, at such a distance from
all the territorial governments, as would suffice to effectually prevent
the controuling power, from interfering in the immediate execution of
government. And, having said that it is perfectly well situated for a
naval port, it follows that the communication, betwixt it and all the
parts of the British dominion in India, must be speedy and easy, in
either monsoon: and consequently that, from this residence, this supreme
power can effectually superintend, enforce, and controul the measures of
political, as well as of military, government, in this whole dominion.
And, being the center of naval defence, it must be the only proper
center of land defence: seeing the squadron will be ever at hand, to
transport its land force, to any part of this dominion, that may be in
danger.

And thus have I accomplished that which I proposed: having planned the
design of an intermediate power which, in such a situation as hath been
described, would establish a completely regular system of government,
civil as well as military, in the whole present or future dominion of
Britain in India: nay which would, in the hands of national government,
render the task of governing this Indian dominion, as facil and easy, as
it is to govern the small Isle of Man. And, the seat of its residence
being at same time the center of naval and land defence, it would
completely connect the, otherwise, divided strength of the several
governments: and would establish the general defence, upon a footing so
secure, that no enemy, either European or native, would dare to attack
British dominion in India. It likewise appears that the drain of native
strength, requisite to maintain this whole dominion, would but little
exceed that which Britain expends on maintaining the two barren
fortresses, of Gibraltar and St. Philips’s. Whilst no part of the
pecuniary charge, of either establishing or afterwards supporting this
system of government, nor yet of the land and even naval defence, would
come out of the treasury of Britain; but would all be defrayed by the
dependent dominion.

I have farther demonstrated the moral impossibility of governing and
maintaining this Indian dominion, by means of the Company; upon any
other terms, than these, of constituting her sovereign at home as well
as abroad; and of conferring, upon her Directors, the sovereign
execution of government in Britain, as well as in that dependent
dominion.

And I have endeavoured to rouze and awake the nation, to some sense of,
and regard to, the interest she holds in this Indian dominion; by a
slight descriptive sketch of the nature, and degree, of benefit received
by her from it, for some years past. And, as the sensation received from
fact and experience makes ever a stronger impression on the mind, than
that which is conveyed by speculative argument, I shall here again apply
to the experience of the public, on this topic; which cannot be too much
inculcated, nor presented in too many different points of view; at this
truly critical juncture, when nothing less than the most speedy
application, of the most vigorous measures, can prevent the total loss,
of this most important object to Britain; either through the final ruin
of the countries themselves; or, otherwise, by the assault of enemies.

Britain feels a general failure of credit, not only in the East India
Company, but in individuals: and this failure of credit she can ascribe
to no other cause, than to some extraordinary defect of numerical
circulation, or a deficiency of numerical specie, sufficient to support
the wonted credit of paper. How happens this want of numerical specie to
be so severely felt, all of a sudden; or from whence should such defect
arise? Assuredly from a decrease of her wonted influx of numerical
specie; whilst her drain of that specie continues to be at least the
same as formerly. But what channel or source, of Britain’s influx, hath
been dried up so suddenly, as to create this surprizing failure of
numerical circulation? We have shown it to originate in Indian dominion;
which being, through misgovernment, reduced to a ruinous state, the
consequent wonderful decrease of revenue, hath obliged the Company, to
absorb and dry up that channel of Indian private fortunes; which, till
within these two years, used to convey into Britain, by foreign
Company’s bills, &c. at least 700,000 l. _per annum_, in numerical
specie, or what is equivalent. And as Britain hath, during the two years
that this channel was dried up, been continuing that drain, which she
could barely support, when aided by that private fortune influx, it is
plain that, within these two years, she must have diminished the
standing stock of her numerical circulation, at least, 1,400,000 l. And
one year, more of only an equally decreased degree of influx, will
diminish her circulating stock 2,100,000 l. and so on. But a total
deprivation of the influx received, for some years past, from Indian
dominion, will, annually, double the diminution of circulating stock.

And, from this view, the nation may draw the following just inferences:
first, the mighty value and importance, of this Indian dominion, to
Britain; in point of financial aid; as well as in other weighty
respects. Second, the mighty alteration of circumstances, in these
Indian countries, since the time they became subjected to the dominion
of the Company; as also, the present ruinous state of that dominion. And
from these two inferences she may deduce, that conclusion which hath
been just mentioned, that nothing less than the most speedy application
of the most vigorous and effectual measures, can possibly save those
countries from final ruin; and Britain from consequent bankruptcy,
poverty, loss of credit, of commerce, navigation, naval power, &c.

I have, in this hasty production, sketched out the nature of the
necessary measures; but the application of these measures depends
entirely upon the nation’s exerting her own attention. I am far from
meaning to work upon the passions, I apply only to the reason and
understanding of men; for had not respect to decorum, and to the dignity
of government, restrained me, I might, on this subject, have thrown out
many things, that must have excited discontent and indignation.
Nevertheless the importance and urgency of the case obliges me to add,
(and, without this, all I have said can avail nothing,) that unless the
nation shall exert herself most vigorously in this her own dearest
concern, she must not look for any such effectual measures, as will
suffice to prevent these disasters.

For the nation must consider, that her present administration consists
of the very men who transacted, and (by their truly reverberating eccho)
confirmed, to the Company, the second[2] grant of the Dewanny: knowing
that this Dewanny was nothing other than the sovereignty of a mighty
dominion, dependent upon the Crown, and Nation, of Britain: and,
consequently that, by subjecting the numerous inhabitants of those
countries to the dominion of a few merchants, incapable of administring
any sort of government, they were consigning over to tyranny and
anarchy, intolerable oppression and ruin, many millions of men, who
were, to all intents and purposes, subjects of Britain. And they are the
men who, during the four years that elapsed since that grant, have
furnished the force to support this tyranny and anarchy: and, in spite
of——enacting a farce, wherein the Directors were compelled to perform
the same part in Europe, that the native Nabobs have exhibited in India.
It cannot, therefore, be expected that they will, willingly, change
their plan of conduct: seeing that, besides their former motives, they
have the additional one of obstinacy; or shame of standing
self-condemned, for past mismanagement, should they now alter their
measures. It is rather to be supposed that they will continue the cloke
of the Company; together with the Directorial farce: and that, to
support the broken credit of the Company, (broken by collusive
management,) they will, through eccho, grant her a power, to force her
paper upon the public, for its money. As also that, under the pretext of
honouring the nation with some share in the charge of this sovereignty,
(under the Company, but no share in the profits,) they will gradually
thrust her shoulders under that whole load, which, as the Company must
manage it, will soon become intolerable. And, by the aid of these fresh
reinforcements, they will juggle it and bungle it, and bungle it and
juggle it on, for one, or possibly two, years longer: and then Nation
and Company will both tumble together, into the pit of bankruptcy,
perdition, and despair.

But shall the nation, with eyes open, suffer the pilot to crowd
stemlings on the rocks, which have already grazed the ship’s bottom? No,
we must about ship, and call another hand to the helm. Matters, it is to
be hoped, are not yet past remedy; the channel is obvious; if the nation
will but put to her hand. His Majesty can have no real interest but what
is common with that of his people: and, however the views of the Crown
may, in some cases, differ a little from these of the people; in this
particular case they must both exactly concur. He will, here, hearken to
the voice of his people: and a little popular heat will force into
administration something of that patriotic ambition, fire, spirit, and
enterprize, which alone can save this nation from dreadful impending
misfortunes.

But if the nation, sunk in the bed of slavish sloth, inebriated with the
transforming Circean cap, enervated and emasculated by the lewd embraces
of sensual pleasure, shall slight and disregard her own dearest
concerns: like the prodigal debauchee, who chides from him the faithful
friend that attempts recalling him to sober reflection; and implicitly
confides in the management of a steward, who hath already wasted the
better part of his fair patrimony: then let the nation, some two or
three years hence, recollect, that she was advised of her danger, by a
hasty production, issued about the middle of January, 1773: though not
thought of, until that most disinterested of all possible ministers had,
by way of remedying all evils, dispatched _his Secret Committee_ to the
India House: there to inspect the Company’s private œconomy: a thing,
with which neither law, justice, government, nor nation hath any thing
to do; and which, unless in cases of bankruptcy, is sacred to the
meanest individual. As if, from the Company’s books of accounts, it was
possible to discover the cause of abuse in the government of those
Indian dominions: or, as if schemes of saving to the Company, one
shilling _per_ ton, freight of her cargoes: or, three pence _per_ pound,
in warehouse room, would retrieve the, almost ruined, Interest of
Britain in India.

Footnote 2:

  We must make a wide difference betwixt the first and second grants of
  this Dewanny, (as it is termed.) The first grant was made for only two
  years, at a time when the then ministry were in a great measure
  unacquainted with the nature of the thing which they granted: having
  been deceived by base art: nor did this ministry, in the course of
  their administration, exert any manner of ministerial influence over
  the Directors. But far different were the lights, as well as the
  conduct of that ministry which, on the expiration of the first two
  years, renewed that grant for the long term of five years.

FINIS.




Transcriber’s Notes:

Missing or obscured punctuation was corrected.

Typographical errors were silently corrected.

Spelling and hyphenation were made consistent when a predominant form
was found in this book; otherwise it was not changed.